Jurisdictional Statement — Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States
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|) No, 9661 108 JAN 101997
gfFIGE OF THE CLERK
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Hnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1996
-
GRAFF PAY-PER-VIEW, INC..,
Appellant,
—Vi—
JANET RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL; THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA; THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE; AND THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION,
Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM A THREE-JUSTICE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
— ws —
_—~ —-
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
CHARLES S. SiMS
Counsel of Record
JOHN SIEGAL
Of Counsel: PROSKAUER ROSE GOETZ
& MENDELSOHN LLP
DANIEL BARSKY 1585 Broadway
Graff Pay-Per-View, Inc. New York, New York 10036
536 Broadway (212) 969-3000
New York, New York 10012
(212) 219-6204 Counsel for Appellant
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Does section 505 of the Communications Decency Act of
1996, which regulates "indecent" and “sexually explicit adult"
programming on selected cable television channels by requiring
most cable systems either to make economically unjustifiable
technological upgrades or to “not provide" adult pay-per-view
programming except during an 8-hour period beginning at 10:00
p.m., and which would substantially diminish the adult viewership
of such programming, violate the First Amendment?
2. By regulating "sexually explicit adult programming" and
"indecent" programming on a handful of targeted cable television
channels while leaving other cable channels and other
communications media entering the home free to transmit the same
or comparable programming, does section 505 violate the First and
Fifth Amendments?
3. Does section 505 violate the First Amendment because it
subjects protected speech to unconstitutionally vague regulations?
LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 29.1 STATEMENT
In addition to the parties listed on the cover, Playboy
Entertainmen: Group inc. ("Playboy") is nominally an appellee.
Playboy’s interests are aligned with those of Graff Pay-Per-View
Inc. ("Graff"), and Graff's suit challenging section 505 in the
District Court was consolidated with Playboy's for hearing and deci-
sion. Playboy has filed a jurisdictional statement, No. 96-1034.
Graff has no parent company and no subsidiaries that are not
wholly-owned. Effective December 2, 1996, Graff's corporate name
was changed to Spice Entertainment Companies, Inc.
ili
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I no i ak ae k's wb wk i
LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 29.1 STATEMENT ..... il
as oo ek se tab aawkve aa iV
EEE ee en ee eee ee l
I tes ek ere Se as ebb ew aes 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND
REGULATIONS INVOLVED ................. 2
I a er es at eae MS 2
THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE SUBSTANTIAL . 13
I. DAETC CONFIRMS THAT SECTION 505 VIOLATES THE
ET. i°.'. a l'n-s's carving d Wag hee eae 14
Il. THE DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT ACCORDED
IDENTICAL PROGRAMMING, DEPENDING ON THE
PROGRAMMER’S PREDOMINANT PROGRAMMING,
VIOLATES THE FIRST AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS .... 25
ee a ak i ews Cede om bes 30
APPENDIX
CE 7 Oe ten Pit auld 6 o's k < hoe wae Were la
ee ew ewe ea ean 2a
Opanion of the District Court ............2000.- 3a
Temporary restraining order issued by the
IE A a Re eae a a aaa aera 46a
Decision of the District Court granting the temporary
ee ee eee eae 48a
Order of the District Court staying enforcement of
section 505 pending appeal ............. 67a
Sections 504 and 505 of the Communications
CE so uaa ts kee s bv es to's Bee c03 68a
Interim Regulations Implementing
EE Fad eet tue ba CRRA Che eee 70a
iV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page(s)
Altmann v. Television Signal Corp., 849 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D.
Cel FID cc Seca cducuccaet yarns dette een 5
Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, Inc., 481 U.S. 221
1) [ee errr rs Terre aes eS 26
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
0 eer ere Per eee kT ee es 13
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) 14, 26
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)... ee ee eee ees 24-25
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)... - eee eee eee 14
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). -- +. eee eee eee 26
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 916 (1978). ccc crete eerverces 25
Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp.
1164 (D. Utah 1982) ... 2.2... ee ee eee ee eee 5
Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985) .......----- 5
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v.
FCC. 116 S. Ct. Z374 (1996) 2. cc cee eee: passim
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) .....---6 ee eee eee 10
Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
Poe gts & 2). 0.) re ree se 18, 24-26
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) .... 28
Vv
FCC vy. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) 11, 15-18, 24
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85 .. 28
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) ............ 25
Goldstein v. Manhattan Cable Television, Inc., No. 90 Civ.
4750, 1995 WL 562182 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1995) .... 5
Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987 (D. Utah
RIED Xe Se CAS Se ee ban Oe 5, 14
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) ............. 27
Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) . 24
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) ...........6-. 27, 28
Playboy Entertainment Group v. United States, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17000 (D. Del. Nov. 8, 1996) ............. l
Playboy Entertainment Group v. United States,
918 F. Supp. $13 (D. Del. 1996) 2. kw ew cee: ]
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, probable jurisdiction
noted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1996) ...... 14
Sable Commun. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC,
SOe Ele B08 CORO. iether EPR ee eee ae 14, 22
Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) ........... 26
Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) ....... 26
Turner Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. FCC,
SESS. GA Bee Case. cecal & ea hore Ree 14, 26
vi
Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc.,
rCORIE@ 0), SPerrererrrrr rr eres 24
Wilkinson v. Jones, 480 U.S. 926 (1987) ........-.4.. 5, 14
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:
738 Cosy, Aste. fT iicxceee es Cbaecet bese beers: 2
STATUTES AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS:
Section 504 of the Communications Decency Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 136 (1996) (to be codified at
47 USL. § GED) oc sccccteteedosicetertces passim
Section 505 of the Communications Decency Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 136 (1996) (to be codified at
47 U.S.C. § G41) occ ccc es eervewestsecun passim
Section § 551(a)(4) of the Communications Decency Act, Pub. L.
1064-304. 480 Beet, 848 i doe cb cess ts curb binvenees 26
y RUS Tomo): Reon ete Pe ee ee 2
47 UBC. § SAME) noc nine vn tdedecstupucetenas 5
In re Implementation of Section 505 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 11 FCC Red. 5386 (1996) ............ 2
Statistical Abstrast of the United States 1995, Dep’t of
Commerce, Bureau of Census (115 ed. Sept. 1995) ....... 17
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1996
GRAFF PAY-PER-VIEW INC.,
Appellant,
—v.—
JANET RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL; THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA; THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
AND THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM A THREE-JUDGE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
—=—[—=—==—=======——oo———>_—=__[{=_"_[{_—_=>—=—=—===—=—-2
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellant Graff Pay-Per-View Inc. ("Graff") respectfully submits
this jurisdictional statement to docket its appeal from the November
8, 1996 order of a three-judge district court denying Graff's motion
for a preliminary injunction to restrain the implementation and
enforcement of section 505 of the Communications Decency Act of
1996.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion and order of the three-judge court denying Graff's
motion for a preliminary injunction are published at 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17000 (D. Del. November 8, 1996), and reprinted in the
appendix infra (“JS App.”) at 2a and 3a.
The opinion granting a temporary restraining order is published
at 918 F. Supp. 813 and reprinted below at 48a. The TRO is
reprinted at 46a.
The subsequent order of December 5, 1996, granting plaintiffs’
motions to stay enforcement of § 505 pending appeal, is
unpublished and reprinted below at 67a.
JURISDICTION
The three-judge court denied Graff's motion for a preliminary
injunction on November 8, 1996, and Graff's notice of appeal was
filed on November 12, 1996. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 confers jurisdiction
on this Court over any appeal "from an order .. . denying, after
notice and hearing, an interlocutory . . . injunction in any civil
action . . . required by any Act of Congress to be heard and
determined by a district court of three judges." Section 561 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, required
this action to be heard "by a district court of 3 judges... .”
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress shall make no law .. .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press... . .”
Section 505 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 136 (1996), will be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 641 and is reproduced below at 68a.
The implementing regulations of the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”), Jn re Implementation of Section 505 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Red. 5386, are published
at 61 Fed. Reg. 9648 (March 11, 1996) and reproduced below at
70a.
STATEMENT
Section 505 of the Communications Decency Act (“§ 505” or
“the CDA”) is highly similar to § 10(b) of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (the "1992 Cable
Act"), which this Court closely scrutinized and struck down last
term in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium
v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996) ("DAETC”"). Because the CDA
interferes even more substantially than § 10(b) did with the ability
of adults to access speech they would otherwise obtain, the reasons
that led this Court in DAETC to closely scrutinize and strike down
§ 10(b) are determinative here as well.
OY ey SP ee So e+
3
Section 10(b) was presumptively invalid because of its "obvious
restrictive effects," which the Court identified as the likely reduction
of impulse viewership, its interference with the privacy interests of
viewers who choose to watch "indecent" programming, and the
adverse costs and burdens it imposes on cable operators. DAETC,
116 S. Ct. at 2391.
Also counting against § 10(b) were the special burdens and costs
it imposed on the cablecast of specified programming, which were
likely "to encourage [the] operator to ban programming that the
operator would otherwise permit to run... .” Jd.
After reviewing conceivable alternatives, the Court concluded that
§ 10(b) does not reveal
the caution and care that the standards underlying these
various verbal formulas impose upon laws that seek to
reconcile the critically important interest in protecting
free speech with very important, or even compelling,
interests that sometimes warrant restrictions.
DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2392.' The government had merely said —
but had not proved — that subscriber-initiated blocking or lockboxes
were an inadequate solution to the problem of children accessing
adult programming: "the reasons [offered by the government] do not
show need for a provision as restrictive as the one before us." 116
S. Ct. at 2393.
In striking down § 10(b)’s blocking provision, this Court made
plain that the required scrutiny is not a loose balancing of "sexually
explicit speech" against "protection of children" in which the latter
always wins, but rather a demanding insistence that less restrictive
means be employed in preference to more restrictive ones:
' The Court’s reference in DAETC to the Communications Decency Act
as a less-restrictive alternative to § 10(b) does not prejudge the merits of
plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge. This Court expressly noted in DAETC
that "we cannot, and do not, decide whether the new provisions are
themselves lawful (a matter not before us)." 116 S. Ct. at 2392.
4
No provision, we concede, short of an absolute ban,
can offer certain protection against assault by a deter-
mined child. We have not, however, generally allowed
this fact alone to justify reducing the adult popula-
tion... to... only what is fit for children’. . . . But,
leaving that problem aside, the Solicitor General’s list
of practical difficulties would seem to call, not for
"segregate and block" requirements, but rather for
informational requirements, for a simple coding system,
for ready availability of blocking equipment (perhaps
accessible by telephone), for imposing cost burdens
upon system operators (who may spread them through
subscription fees); or perhaps even for a system that re-
quires lockbox defaults to be set to block certain
channels (say, sex-dedicated-channels).
DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2392 (citations omitted).
Section 505 is subject to precisely those same criticisms, and the
three-judge court’s refusal to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of
§ 505 ignored this Court’s teachings.
1. Prior to 1992, Congress appeared to recognize that the First
Amendment prohibited for cable television the content regulation
that had been narrowly upheld as permissible for broadcast speech.
By abstaining from legislating content restrictions on cable
television, Congress acknowledged that the justifications for
restricting broadcast speech do not extend to the delivery of cable
television programming which can be more narrowly targeted and
controlled than universally available over-the-air broadcast signals.
Indeed, Congress affirmed this distinction by empowering
consumers to selectively block specific cable channels through the
use of lockboxes as provided for in the 1984 Cable Act. 47 U.S.C.
§ 544(d)(2). Until 1992, Congress did not attempt to prohibit or
.
5
otherwise regulate indecent speech on cable systems, and courts
repeatedly struck down local legislation enacted for that purpose.’
In DAETC, this Court invalidated Congress’s first attempt to
directly regulate cable "indecency." The only exception was one
provision, §10(a) of the 1992 Cable Act, that did not directly
regulate or necessarily affect any programming, but only gave back
to cable operators a portion of the editorial discretion that federal
law had previously taken from them and given to cable program-
mers.
2. Section 505 requires that "indecent" or "sexually explicit adult
programming" on any channel "primarily dedicated to sexually-
oriented programming” must be "fully scramble[d] or otherwise fully
block[ed]" so that one not a subscriber to such programming does
not receive it. JS App. 68a. Until or unless a cable system acquires
the technical means of fully scrambling or blocking the full audio
and video signal of such programming on such channels,
transmission is to be prohibited "during the hours of the day . . .
when a significant number of children are likely to view it," JS App.
68a, which the FCC has determined to be 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.
JS App. 70a.
Section 505 was adopted by the Senate and incorporated into the
conference committee bill that the President signed without any
legislative findings to support its restrictions. As the District Court
noted when it temporarily restrained enforcement of § 505 (JS App.
64a):
Prior to DAETC, courts had unanimously held that restrictions on
“indecent” cable programming violate the First Amendment. E..,
Wilkinson v. Jones, 480 U.S. 926 (1987) (mem.), aff’g 800 F.2d 989 (10th
Cir. 1986), aff’g 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985). See also Goldstein
v. Manhattan Cable Television, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 4750, 1995 WL 562182
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1995); Altmann v. Television Signal Corp., 849
F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir.
1985); Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164
(D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987
(D. Utah 1982).
6
[T]here is an absolute void of legislative findings that
Section 505 is necessary to protect minors from
exposure to sexually oriented material shown on adult
cable channels which their parents have chosen not to
subscribe to... .
Indeed, the Senate adopted § 505 without hearings or debate,
even though both the Heuse bill (H.R. 1555) and the Senate bill (S.
652) already contained provisions requiring that any cable channel
— without regard to content but certainly including those selected
for regulation by § 505 — be fully scrambled or blocked to a
consumer's home on request (§ 504) and that a ratings system and
blocking technology (the V-Chip) be implemented. In support of
§ 551 (the V-Chip requirement), Congress expressly found that:
Providing parents with timely information about the
nature of upcoming video programming and with the
technological tools that allow them easily to block
violent, sexual or other programming that they believe
harmful to their children is a nonintrusive and narrowly
tailored means of achieving that compelling
governmental interest.
CDA § 551(a)(9). Despite the carefully-crafted, less-restrictive
alternatives contained in the same legislation, as well as the pre-
existing lockbox requirement, all of which afford parents the ability
to control the sounds and images that enter their homes, Congress
nevertheless adopted and the President signed into law the far more
restrictive scramble or time-channel requirement of § 505 that
applies to all homes in America, whether children live there or not,
regardless of the viewing preferences of the adults in the household.
3. Graff and Playboy, cable programmers whose programming
was targeted by § 505, each brought suit to challenge this
substitution of governmental for parental control, and the actions
were consolidated. The District Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining implementation and enforcement of § 505 on March
7, 1996, holding inter alia that there exits "serious and substantial
questions as to whether the blocking and FCC time requirements
imposed on cable operations by § 505 . . . constitute the least
restrictive means of achieving the Government’s interest in
‘
:
:
regulating the accessibility of adult programming to minors." JS
App. 62a.
After expedited discovery, the District Court held a three day
hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. At the
hearing, the parties presented extensive expert testimony and other
evidence concerning the impact of § 505 and various available
methods of complying with its full scrambling or blocking require-
ment.
Graff and Playboy demonstrated that the conduits who transmit
their speech to the paying public, cable system operators ("MSOs"),
would seek to comply by using the "safe-harbor," under which they
would simply "not provide" plaintiffs’ programming for 16 hours a
day ("time-channeling") — not through expensive technological
upgrades. Plaintiffs further showed, without any contrary evidence,
* that time-channeling would likely reduce viewership in those
systems by 30%;°
* that an alternative means that the government had suggested
for MSOs to comply, "double scrambling with a positive
;
Based on "[a]verage buy curves for adult services," TCI, the nation’s
largest cable operator, estimated "that 30% of adult programming buys
would be lost by limiting coverage to 10 p.m.-6.a.m." Graff Trial Exhibit
5, a memorandum from a TCI executive to local system operators, dated
February 26, 1996 (the "TCI Memo”).
8
trap,"* would reduce viewership by even more, likely in the
50% range in affected systems;° and
* that few if any MSOs would choose to comply by that route
because the costs of doing so are not warranted by
foreseeable revenues, particularly in view of the sharply
reduced viewership caused by elimination of the opportunity
for "impulse” viewing which is a prime characteristic of adult
pay-per-view programming.°
Responding to the government’s simplistic suggestion that viewers
who would otherwise obtain pay-per-view programming before 10
p.m. could continue to do so by using their VCRs, plaintiffs
demonstrated that the technical requirements for purchasing pay-per-
* The District Court described "[djouble scrambling with positive trap'
technology” a* follows (JS App. 22a):
To achieve double scrambling, RF or baseband scrambling is
combined with a jamming signal at the headend. The headend
jamming completely blocks video and audio so that no signal
bleed occurs in the homes of non-subscribers. In order for a
subscriber to view programming that has been double
scrambled, the subscriber needs both a positive trap and an
addressable converter. The positive trap filters out the
interference from the jamming signal, and the addressable
converter descrambles the RF or baseband scrambling. The
addressable converter can be used to start up and end periods of
premium service and also to permit pay-per-view reception.
> Several TCI systems that had installed double scrambling technology
experienced, on average, a 50% reduction in buy rates of adult
programming. See TCI memo cited at note 3 supra; see also JS App. 23a.
* Based on uncontroverted evidence that currently non-compliant cable
systems would opt to implement time-channeling as the only means of
compliance that ensures no risk of violation and that does not require
substantial capital costs, the District Court found that:
The MSOs that have taken a position on the method by
which they would comply with § 505 have all announced
that they would adopt time channeling.
JS App. 24a.
9
view programming generally render that impossible (e.g., because
the order must be placed contemporaneously from a telephone in the
home where the program is to be delivered, and a viewer who
working a night shift or asleep cannot make such a call).
The government offered no evidence whatsoever to contradict
plaintiffs’ proof (a) that MSOs would in fact choose to comply by
means of time-channeling, not double scrambling with a positive
trap, and (b) that both means of compliance would drastically curtail
viewership — by 30% and 50%, respectively. (Moreover, those
estimates are highly conservative, since they ignore the probability
that MSOs will substitute non-adult programming on channels
presently occupied by Graff.)’ Instead, the government’s case
depended almost entirely on evidence of the technological feasibility
of "double scrambling with a positive trap," regardless of its
economic impracticality. While the two technical experts presented
by the government contended that MSOs could, as a technical
matter, use double scrambling with a positive trap to comply with
the CDA, neither purported to have any knowledge or expertise
concerning whether MSOs would select double scrambling with a
positive trap in preference to time channeling, given its far higher
direct costs and much more adverse impact on viewership, or any
information about viewership impacts.
The District Court found that although double scrambling with a
positive trap was the "most workable alternative" from a technical
point of view, it entailed significant implementation costs ($7 for
parts and approximately $35 for labor per household plus $750 to
’ Undisputed evidence showed a substantial likelihood that many MSOs,
faced with "dead" channels for 16 hours each day, the resulting loss of
30% of present revenues, and cable programmers vying for channel
capacity, would likely cancel their agreements with plaintiffs (or not renew
them) and program other programming instead. For the same reasons,
time-channeling will reduce the number of systems entering into carriage
contracts with plaintiffs for the first time, since the content-based limitation
of carriage to 8 hours a day (most after midnight) severely impairs the
attractiveness to MSOs of plaintiffs’ programs as compared to those of
other programmers.
10
$1,000 for each system headend, JS App. 22a), “interferes with the
spontaneous nature of . . . the impulse purchasing" that drives the
pay-per-view business, JS App. 22a, and “raises privacy concerns"
because requesting a positive trap, which would be required in order
to access Graff's programming, will result in "[t]he ~ew subscriber
[being] identified as a consumer of sexually explicit material." Jd.
Since the record was undisputed that the MSOs which had
announced how they would comply would do so by time-channeling
(JS App. 24a), the court properly considered § 505’s consti-
tutionality on the understanding that MSOs not presently in com-
pliance would time-channel plaintiffs’ programming. Graff
estimated, based on MSO analyses and its own experience, that
time-channeling would reduce Graff's viewership and resulting
revenues in affected systems by approximately 30 percent."
4. Despite its evident agreement that time-channeling would
cause some reduction in viewership, and the lack of any evidence
disputing the assessment of MSOs that the reduction would be
roughly 30%, the District Court nevertheless denied the motions for
a preliminary injunction on November 8, 1996 in a decision by
Judge Roth. It did so by holding that lost viewership pendente lite
is not irreparable harm unless plaintiffs are also likely to succeed on
the merits, and by deeming plaintiffs’ lost revenues irrelevant to the
irreparable injury assessment, even though they would be
* Although the District Court was "skeptical" that Graff would lose fully
30% of its viewership nationally upon implementation, noting that some
MSOs are already in compliance (JS App. 22a n.19), whether Graff's
overall revenues (and viewership) would be reduced by that amount is
irrelevant for present purposes. The relevant inquiry is whether § 505 will
prevent willing viewers in particular systems from obtaining programming
that they would otherwise obtain, not the overall viewership reduction
nationally. Any “loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Filrod vy.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74 (1976). A law permitting sale of The New
York Times in Manhattan only from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. surely would be
held to cause irreparable harm and to violate the First Amendment.
OS ae en ll a Biot
1]
unrecoverable if the CDA were eventually struck down. JS App. 25a
& n.20.
On the merits, the District Court believed it could hold time-
channeling constitutional in this context because of FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), regardless of the differences in
transmission mode — and, therefore, blocking possibilities —
between the over-the-air radio broadcast presented in Pacifica and
the cable delivery at issue here. JS App. 38a-40a.’
The government offered no evidence that the less restrictive
alternatives to § 505 already contained in federal law are infeasible,
yet the cour: below so held without any evidentiary support. For
instance, the District Court "viewed" the parental contro] measures
enacted in § 504 (blocking-on-request) and § 551 (the V-chip and
ratings system) "as an adjunct of lesser efficacy because its exercise
requires knowledge and the taking of affirmative steps," JS App.
40a, n.28, without any evidence of their actual inefficacy, .ithout
any trial period in which these newly enacted safeguards can be
tried and without any consideration of the ways that this Court listed
in DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2392, for enhancing the efficacy of
information and blocking types of parental control mechanisms.
Rather, the District Court simply assumed, contrary to the
legislative intent behind § 504, § 551 and the 1992 Cable Act at
issue in DAETC, as well as the prescriptions of this Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence, that parental control is so ineffective that
governmental control is warranted. The District Court had no
evidence of inefficacy, and did not appear to consider (as this Court
had in DAETC) that, if parental control mechanisms are in fact of
"lesser efficacy," then the least-intrusive and most effective means
of raising their efficacy is to publicize their availability and
desirability.
° The FCC made the same assumption, concluding that judicial approval
of time-channeling in the broadcast context was a satisfactory basis for
upholding time-channeling cable programming regardless of the different
blocking mechanisms available to households seeking to employ them.
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Red. 5386, 5387
(1996).
12
The District Court’s view that voluntary parental blocking
approaches are necessarily ineffective rested on its assumption that
for § 504 to achieve the appropriate level of "efficacy," ail
households in presently non-compliant systems that do not subscribe
to adult channels would have to be equipped with lockboxes or
converters capable of fully blocking the targeted channels. JS App.
39a. There was no basis for that assumption in the statute, the
evidentiary record or logic. The government presented no evidence
suggesting any necessity for blocking or time-channelling
programming in every home in the nation regardless of whether
children reside there, or whether adults in a given residence feel the
need for government-compelled insulation from "signal bleed" —
with all the expense and viewership reduction that blocking or time-
channelling in every home would entail.
Similarly, in holding that
in view of the fact that children watch television in the
homes of their friends as well as in their own homes,
we do not find Congress to have been unreasonable in
wishing to extend protection from signal bleed beyond
a child’s own home,
the District Court ignored that the homes of minor children and their
friends comprise less than a majority of American households. JS
App. 40a.
5. Graff promptly filed a notice of appeal and simultaneously
moved for an injunction against implementation of § 505 pending
this Court’s disposition of its appeal. On December 5, 1996, the
District Court enjoined enforcement of § 505 until final disposition
in this Court. JS App. 67a.
THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE SUBSTANTIAL
Section 505 is a content-based and speaker-based regulation of
speech subject to the "strictest" First Amendment review or, at a
minimum, to a still "strict" review requiring that it be no more
13
extensive than necessary.'® In denying a preliminary injunction
against the implementation of § 505, and holding that plaintiffs’
First Amendment challenge was unlikely to succeed, the three-judge
court emptied strict scrutiny of any real content. The decision
effectively reversed the burdens the First Amendment imposes on
the government to justify content-based regulation of speech, and ig-
nored congressional findings that "[p]roviding parents with timely
information ... and with the technological tools that allow them
easily to block violent, sexual, or other programming that they
believe harmful to their children is a nonintrusive and narrowly
tailored means" of advancing the government’s interest. CDA
§ 551(aX(9).
In contrast to the low hurdle that the District Court found strict
scrutiny posed, this Court has not upheld on strict scrutiny a single
statute challenged as violative of free speech in three decades, with
the exception of two decisions emphasizing the unique concern for
avoiding corruption of the political process.'' This Court’s recent
decisions concerning the regulation of cable television, and
especially its opinion in DAETC striking down 6-3 a highly similar
statutory provision requiring cable operators to block "indecent"
cable programming absent an express request for that programming,
on the ground that there was no proof that less restrictive means
were not available, are irreconcilable with the decision below.
I.
DAETC CONFIRMS THAT SECTION 505
VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A statute that imposes content-based restrictions on protected
speech, as § 505 does, is unconstitutional unless the government
proves that it is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling
governmental interest. Sable Commun. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492
0 DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2391.
'' Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1989);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
14
U.S. 115, 126 (1989). In addition, "the government may not
‘reduce the adult population . . . to reading only what is fit for
children’... [t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox for
television set] simply cannot be limited to that which would be
suitable for a sandbox." Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 73-74 (1983) (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,
383 (1957)).
The undisputed record below establishes that a sizeable number
of cable systems around the nation presently lack the technical
capability to meet § 505’s "blocking or scrambling to full
unintelligibility" standard reliably. The record further showed
without contrary evidence that the technological means for
complying are either presently unavailable or, to the extent
available, so grossly uneconomic that most MSOs are highly
unlikely to use them in the near future, given the alternative means
available of escaping liability (namely, time-channeling or simply
See also Turner Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459
(1994) (where every member of the Court agreed that content-based
regulations of cable television are subject to "the most exacting scrutiny");
Wilkinson v. Jones, 480 U.S. 926 (1987) (mem.), aff’g 800 F.2d 989 (10th
Cir. 1986), aff'g 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985).
Justice Breyer and three other members of the Court found it
unnecessary to decide in DAETC whether the "strictest" First Amendment
standard, or a "somewhat less 'strict'" standard, applied to the statute
under review. Although § 505 would similarly fail either standard, the
strictest test should apply because Sable, Turner, and Wilkinson so held
and five members of the Court in DAETC agreed that strict scrutiny pro-
perly applied. See 116 S. Ct. at 2404-2419 (Kennedy and Ginsburg, J.J.),
and 116 S. Ct. at 2419-2432 (Thomas and Scalia, J.J., and Rehnquist,
C.J.). Presumably, any remaining doubt on that issue will be resolved by
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, No. 96-51 1, probable jurisdiction
noted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1996).
Given the enormous range of speech that local, state, and federal
employees and entities could term "indecent," and the vague,
offensiveness-based definition that provision has been afforded, subjecting
such decisions only to intermediate scrutiny is inconsistent with the
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.
——
15
replacing adult pay-per-view with programming not covered by
§ 505). JS App. 24a. Indeed, every MSO that announced its
compliance plans said it would comply by time-channeling. Jd.
The District Court therefore correctly treated the issue as whether,
in systems not presently in compliance, a governmental prohibition
on cablecast of "sexually explicit adult programming" or "other
indecent programming" except during a narrow 8-hour period late
at night when most viewers are asleep passes strict scrutiny. JS App.
38a.
The court erred, however, both in its approach to answering that
question and in the answer it reached, each of which is contrary to
the teachings of DAETC and its predecessors.
1. Despite a verbal commitment to strict scrutiny, the District
Court’s holding resulted not from the analysis required by DAETC
but from a simplistic analogy to Pacifica:
Because the Supreme Court endorsed a time-channeling
solution in very similar circumstances in Pacifica
Foundation, we believe that time-channeling also
survives constitutional scrutiny here.'*
JS App. 38a.
If strict scrutiny means anything, it necessarily requires close
attention in the less restrictive means analysis to facts and context.
Those were ignored when the court accepted the government’s
argument that "[for] purposes of indecency regulation, the cable
medium cannot be distinguished from broadcasting," and treated
time-channeling as a matter of simply analogizing to Pacifica
3 See also JS App. 40a ("Congress enacted, as one of the regulatory
options, time channeling, which the Supreme Court had in Pacifica
Foundation held to be a constitutionally acceptable way of protecting
children from a pervasive, sexually explicit medium. Therefore, even if
§ 505(a) does not pass constitutional analysis, § 505(b) does.").
16
regardless of the differences between broadcast and cable technol-
ogy.'*
Pacifica did not adopt any less-than-strict standard for indecent
speech generally, or indecent speech accessible on a television set;
to the contrary, Justice Powell’s concurrence made plain the lack of
any majority for so doing (438 U.S. at 761-62), as did both Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in DAETC (116 S.Ct. at 2415-16) and
Justice Breyer’s plurality (116 S.Ct. at 2391). Pacifica expressly
rested on the premise that "of all forms of communication . . .
broadcasting [ ] has received the most limited First Amendment
protection." 438 U.S. at 748. The Court expressly noted that its
decision was based on the "context" of the broadcast medium, and
that a different result might have been reached if non-broadcast
("closed-circuit") transmission had been involved. 438 U.S. at 750.
Moreover, the nature of radio transmission left the FCC with no
less restrictive alternatives insofar as Pacifica’s broadcast of the
Carlin monologue was concerned. Pacifica could not have, and did
not, address the alternatives afforded by the far more extensive
capabilities of cable technology, which render § 505 far from the
least restrictive alternative and far more extensive than necessary.
The Pacifica Court surely did not decide that it is "necessary," in
order to protect children from access to audio bleed, to censor adult
pay-per-view programming from every cabled household in every
non-compliant system in the nation for the sixteen hours daily when
most persons are awake, even though
° roughly two-thirds of the nation’s households are
comprised only of adults and lack any minor children,"®
and
° specific cable channels, unlike broadcast channels, can be
easily excluded from individual households on a
'* Defendants’ Post-Hearing Mem. at 15 n.6 (July 12, 1996); see also n.9
supra.
'S Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995, Dep’t of Commerce,
Bureau of Census (115 ed. Sept. 1995).
17
household-by-household (or even television-by-television)
basis.
If roughly two-thirds of the nation’s households house no minor
children, how can it be "necessary" to turn off adult pay-per-view
for sixteen hours daily in each of those homes when concerned par-
ents can eliminate access to signal bleed by a simple request for
blocking (which under § 504 must be accomplished 2 he cable
operator’s expense), and when the government’s own witnesses
confirmed that blocking on request worked even before enactment
of § 504?° The court below did not make those findings of
necessity and narrow tailoring; indeed, it failed even to make the
inquiry, concluding instead that, based on Pacifica, § 505 was not
"unreasonable" and was “an acceptable governmental response" as
a matter of settled law. JS App. 40a-4la.
Given the technological susceptibility of cable television (unlike
broadcast television or radio) to household-by-household (and indeed
television-by-television) blocking, DAETC and this Court’s prior
First Amendment jurisprudence required the government not merely
to cite Pacifica, but to shoulder the burden of proving that time-
channelling was the least restrictive means available, or no more
restrictive than necessary. To prevail, the government had to show
that the congressional goal of aiding parental supervision and pro-
'6 Of the four witnesses with anecdotal evidence presented by the
government, Beth Mahlo confirmed that her cable system provided a
lockbox the same day she requested it, without charge; Anthony Snesko
confirmed that his cable company makes lockboxes available, and notifies
subscribers by post card that this option can block programming deemed
offensive; Frank Allen, Jr. confirmed that his cable company installed a
blocking device after he complained; and Ann Harris testified that her
cable operator would have immediately blocked the unwanted material
from her television (as it in fact did the next day) but that she asked to
delay installation of the blocking device so that she could make the
videotape that the government introduced into evidence. See Mahlo Decl.
€ 7 and Mahlo Dep. Tr. 16-17; Snesko Dep. Tr. 51-52; Allen Dep. Tr.
19; and Harris Dep. Tr. 22-23. There was no evidence that any parent
who sought blocking on request was not able to obtain it promptly and
effectively even before enactment of § 504, which now mandates it.
18
tecting children could not likely be effectively served by giving
cable subscribers the tools to block any unwanted channel and the
information to enable them to use those tools.
Proper consideration of plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge
requires holding § 505 invalid for the same reasons that this Court
in DAETC invalidated § 10 of the 1992 Cable Act: in both cases,
arming parents with tools to eliminate unwanted signals, as now
required by § 504 of the CDA, perhaps with an added informational
requirement, is a substantially less restrictive alternative than the
heavy-handed, viewership-reducing blocking requirements also
mandated by Congress. Cf. Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975).
The record here leaves unanswered the same questions asked by
the plurality in DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2392:
* Why, if customer-initiated blocking "adequately protect{s]
children from “patently offensive" material broadcast on
ordinary channels . . would [it] not offer adequate protection
from similar material" on adult premium channels?
* Why would informational requirements and the ready availa-
bility of customer-initiated blocking equipment (perhaps
accessible by telephone) not offer adequate protection?
* If costly technological fixes are mandated, why should
legislation requiring them be drafted to produce the
imposition of such costs on adult programming services only
(thereby deterring cable systems from carrying them), rather
than on all programming services carrying programming that
could cause the same kind of harm (thereby severely reducing
the harmful First Amendment impact)?"’
* Why wouldn’t amending the lockbox provision to require
"lockbox defaults to be set to block certain channels" (say,
sex-dedicated channels) be a less restrictive alternative?
” See Point Il infra.
19
Because the government had no answers to those questions, the
record precluded any conclusion that the restrictions at hand "are a
narrowly, or reasonably, tailored effort to protect children." Rather,
§ 505 is overly restrictive, "sacrificing" important First Amendment
interests for too "speculative a gain." DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2394.
Indeed, Congress virtually concluded as much when it found that
Providing parents with timely information about the nature
of upcoming video programming and with the
technological tools that allow them easily to block violent,
sexual, or other programming that they believe harmful to
their children is a nonintrusive and narrowly tailored
means of achieving that compelling governmental interest.
CDA § 551(a)(9).
Notably, a combination of programming information and
blocking-on-request (now compelled by § 504) is likely to be even
more effective than it was in the context of leased access pro-
gramming — where that combination was nonetheless so presump-
tively effective that, in the absence of contrary proof, the
government was found to have failed to meet its burden of
justification. The reason is that a cable subscriber who chooses to
eliminate the nsk of signal bleed from adult pay-per-view knows (or
can be easily and reliably informed by such means as billing inserts
or a notice on the scrolling channel guide) precisely where and
when adult pay-per-view programming will appear. Parents may,
therefore, easily choose to permanently obtain the blocking that
§ 504 offers.
By contrast, as Justice Thomas observed in DAETC, indecent
programming on leased access channels was so intermittent,
infrequent and random that the practicality of customer-initiated
blocking or lockboxes was far less certain:
Rather than being able to simply block out certain channels
at certain times, a subscriber armed with only a lockbox
must carefully monitor all leased-access programming and
constantly reprogram the lockbox to keep out undesired
programming . . . /T/his distinguishing cha. acteristic of
leased access channels makes lockboxes and reverse-
20
blocking [in the context of leased access programming]
largely ineffective.
DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2429 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
Ironically, time-channelling would produce the very lack of
consistency that concerned Justice Thomas. Once MSOs substitute
non-adult programming during daily 16-hour period when adult
programming will now be prohibited, parents will no longer be able
to block a full channel confident that they are blocking only
unwanted speech (as they now are). To the contrary, blocking the
time-channeled adult-pay-per-view channel would deprive that
family of the newly substituted non-adult programming added
during the day and evening (to 10:00 p.m.) in order to replace lost
revenue from adult pay-per-view. Parents seeking to keep newly-
added daytime non-adult programming but to eliminate any possi-
bility of receiving the adult programming would be faced with the
Hobson’s choice of either (a) obtaining a lockbox and turning it on
and off in the morning and at night, or (b) requesting blocking
under § 504, thereby forfeiting access to non-adult programming as
the price of blocking adult programming.
2. Because blocking on request is undeniably /ess restrictive than
time channeling — allowing all adults who choose to obtain affected
programming to do so at the times when they seek to purchase and
see it (and when cable operators, free of government restriction,
choose to program it) — the only proper basis for finding no
likelihood that plaintiffs’ challenge would succeed would have been
a finding that blocking-on-request was so likely to be ineffective
that it was not a cognizable "alternative." The Court implicitly so
found only by improperly shifting the burden of proof to plaintiffs:
We have no evidence in the present record that local
cable operators or producers of sexually explicit
programming are advertising the free availability of the
§ 504 lockbox or other blocking devices upon demand.
Likewise, there is no evidence that parents are
otherwise aware of the § 504 means of achieving
complete blocking of undesired channels. Upon this
21
record, the government has demonstrated an
expectation that § 504 will not be a viable alternative.
JS App. 40a. (Emphasis added. )'*
But that reasoning would have led to a different result in DAETC,
where with the same evidence “missing” this Court nonetheless
struck down § 10(b). Speakers challenging laws that literally violate
the central command of the First Amendment need not prove that
conceivable less restrictive means are presently working; under strict
scrutiny, it is the government’s burden to prove that the means
chosen are both necessary and the least restrictive means that could
have been chosen to advance compelling governmental interests.
DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2394; Sable, 492 U.S. at 128-29.
Thus, the District Court’s "we have no evidence" complaints were
off the mark. Under First Amendment jurisprudence, it was not
plaintiffs’ burden (only weeks after § 504 had been enacted!) to
'* See also JS App. 20a, where, after recounting various means by which
cable subscribers can be alerted through public relations
efforts that blocking devices will be made available to them,
free of charge, upon request . . . [such as] inserts in
program guides and bills, informative screens shown on
“barker channels’, advertisements run on other channels, and
special mailings,
the court held those means legally irrelevant because it had not “received
evidence that MSOs are advising cable customers of the availability of the
free channel blocks under § 504" or that "customers are responding to
such notices, if given." JS App. 21a. This turns strict scrutiny on its head
and retroactively penalize plaintiffs for not presenting evidence case law
gave them no reason to present. It also blindly assumes that enactment of
the free blocking-on-request requirement of § 504, which became law at
the same time as § 505, would have no effect on the likelihood that parents
would block adult pay-per-view channels from their homes.
Moreover, even if adults are not obtaining blocking on request (and
there was no evidentiary basis for that conclusion), that would not
necessarily show that § 504 is not an effective less restrictive alternative.
An alternative, equally plausible interpretation would be that there is no
widespread problem of minors accessing “audio bleed." The government
made no empirical showing whatever of the extent of any problem.
22
show that blocking-on-request was already working so successfully
that § 505 was unnecessary; it was the government’s burden, having
set out on the road of content-based restrictions of protected speech,
to prove that such remedies (which had already been stamped with
Congress's imprimatur) cannot work.'®
Faulting plaintiffs for not presenting evidence "that local cable
operators or producers of sexually explicit programming are
advertising the free availability of the § 504 lockboxes" was
similarly an improper shift of the government’s burden.’ If § 504
does not prove to be effective without more, then the least
restrictive means will be to make it so (e.g., by requiring that sub-
scribers be notified routinely about its availability), not to censor
popular, constitutionally-protected programming that Graff seeks to
communicate, MSOs choose to disseminate, and adult viewers
regularly pay to obtain. See DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2393 (calling on
Congress to eschew blocking "for informational requirements, for a
'° For that matter, it was not for plaintiffs to prove the prevalence of
audio bleed or the intermittent and random bleeding of video signals,
another evidentiary lacuna that the district court held against plaintiffs. JS
App. i7a. It was the government’s burden to show a compelling need to
abridge First Amendment rights.
As against the unilluminating finding that "40 million cable subscribers
have the potential for a *bieed’ problem," JS App. 17a (emphasis added),
is the absence from the record of a single article in any academic journal,
newspaper, magazine, or other printed work reporting that teens or
children are sitting around and accessing "signal bleed,” much less being
harmed by doing so. Few phenomena in American society have ever gone
so unremarked, unstudied, and unnoticed as audio- or video-bleed from
adult pay-per-view programming — a fact particularly striking in view of
the enormous media and academic attention on the availability to nearly all
sentient children of far more explicit sources of "indecency," including on
the Internet (as the record in Reno v. ACLU makes plain).
* The District Court’s criticism was also factually incorrect. Plaintiffs
offered testimony and documentary evidence establishing that cable
operators can and do routinely advise their customers of the availability of
parental control devices and the nature of adult programming that may lead
parents to obtain and employ them.
j
;
i
;
i
i
;
i
POTS DS eo BL te
23
simple coding system, for readily available blocking equipment
(perhaps accessible by telephone), [and] for imposing cost burdens
upon system operators (who may spread them through subscription
fees).")
3. Notwithstanding its nod to strict scrutiny, the District Court’s
decision, to the extent that it was not based solely on Pacifica, was
the product of simple balancing: since § 505
leaves the speaker and the listener with an opportunity
to maintain sufficient adult communication, while re-
specting the privacy interests of those who might be
offended or inappropriately exposed{,] [w]e believe the
law thus strikes a permissible balance of constitutional
interests.
JS App. 39a; see also id. at 40a-4l1a. Under this Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence, however, § 505 is subject to far more
demanding scrutiny than review for "overall reasonableness" or
"permissible balance."
This Court has repeatedly rejected unstructured balancing as
being inconsistent with the First Amendment and insufficiently
protective of vital First Amendment freedoms. The District Court’s
"balancing" analysis would justify barring books like Ulysses from
libraries or general interest bookstores,”' barring films with nudity
from drive-in movie theaters,” barring "indecent" cable
programming from basic tier cable channels absent written
request,” barring protestors from demonstrating near foreign
embassies,“ and barring anti-abortion protestors from
*! But see Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383
(1988).
2 But see Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
> But see DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2390-94 (plurality opinion) and 2407-16
(Kennedy and Ginsburg, J.J., concurring).
** But see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
24
demonstrating in proximity to "those who might be offended or
inappropriately exposed."”*
To the extent that the District Court in fact accorded § 505 lesser
review than was applied in DAETC because of its perception that
§ 505 was directed not at “the speech itself, i.e., sexually explicit
adult programming," but rather at "signal bleed, a secondary effect
of the transmission of that speech," JS App. 31a, that was clear error
as well. Section 505 was directed squarely at the communicative
impact of the targeted speech, as its text, structure, and meager
legislative history all confirm. That Congress sought to protect
persons at whom the speech is not directed and who might, notwith-
standing the programmers’ hopes and best efforts that they not do
so, access the audio signal or, intermittently receive a hard-to-
decipher frozen video image, is no warrant for applying any lesser
level of scrutiny, when it is precisely the alleged harm from hearing
the speech that underlies the regulatory scheme. See, e.g., Erzoznik,
422 U.S. at 209-10 (strict scrutiny despite governmental concern for
passers by); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. at 320-21 (1988) (strict
scrutiny notwithstanding governmental concern with fact of demon-
stration as distinguished from content); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d
1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (permitting Nazi
Party march notwithstanding likelihood that speech would be heard
by Jewish residents of Skokie).
THE DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT ACCORDED
IDENTICAL PROGRAMMING, DEPENDING ON
THE PROGRAMMER’S PREDOMINANT PROGRAMMING,
VIOLATES THE FIRST AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS
Legislation that treats speech differently depending on the
speaker’s identity is presumptively unconstitutional. Where, as here,
legislation on a subject of legitimate governmental concern targets
only a subset of potentially responsible speakers, the legislated
25 Compare JS App. 39a with Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512
U.S. 753 (1994).
25
solution is substantially underinclusive and thus unconstitutional.
The government has the burden of proving that such measures "will
in fact alleviate the[] harms [they are meant to prevent] in a direct
and material way." Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2470. See also DAETC,
116 S. Ct. at 2416 ("Partial service of a compelling interest is not
narrow tailoring.") (Kennedy and Ginsburg, J.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541-42
(1989) (“a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest ‘of the
highest order,’ and thus as justifying a restriction upon truthful
speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital
interest unprohibited”) (citation intentionally omitted); and Bolger,
463 U.S. at 73 (restriction that "provides only the most limited
incremental support for the interest asserted" cannot pass muster
even under commercial speech standards).”°
Section 505 distinguishes between speakers of similar speech; its
attempt to protect minors is peculiarly and suspiciously
underinclusive in terms of the interest of protecting minors from
harmful speech.
Plaintiffs were expressly targeted by name (141 Cong. Rec.
$8167). Section 505’s sponsors crafted and Congress enacted
legislation that exempts from its restrictions (i) all "sexually explicit
adult programming or other programming that is indecent" carried
on any cable television channel that is not "primarily dedicated to
sexually-oriented programming," and (11) all other programming, re-
gardless of how harmful to minors it might be, even though
% See also Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. at 215 (laws
distinguishing among speakers cannot be justified by the one-step-at-a-time
rationale that justifies such distinctions in mere economic regulation);
Simon & Schuster, Inc. , 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring); Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1979);
Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, Inc., 481 U.S. 221, 230
(1987); and Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 n.9 (1980).
26
Congress expressly found that certain violent programming was
harmful to minors.”’
The favored speakers outside § 505’s purview are left free to
carry identical or comparable programming regardless of (i) the size
of their audience, (ii) the proportion of the audience comprised of
minors, (iii) the absolute number of minors who regularly access
such favored channels, having been encouraged to do so through
advertising and marketing efforts, or (iv) the time of day. And they
are free to do so even though, on those favored (unregulated)
channels, minors can view and hear the full signal, and not just the
audio signal.
Plaintiffs submitted extensive proof that unregulated,
"mainstream" cable channels advertised for families and fully
available to minors carry programming indistinguishable (in terms
of the regulatory interest) from plaintiffs’ programming. By way of
example, plaintiffs offered an episode of HBO’s "Real Sex" series,
showing a sexually-explicit dominatnix performance (whose cable-
cast would be forbidden by Graff and Playboy guidelines, given its
sado-masochistic sexual content), which was carried in Denver at
9:00 on Friday night — prime time for children’s television viewing,
and a time parents are particularly likely to be away from home or
not supervising their children’s viewing.
Given § 505’s speaker-based distinctions and its substantial
underinclusiveness in terms of the stated regulatory interest, the
government was required to prove the necessity both for the time-
channelling effectively imposed by § 505, and for restricting that
remedy to speakers whose networks are “primarily dedicated to
sexually-oriented programming," but do not carry the violent
*” CDA § 551(a)(4) (findings underlying V-chip mandate), 110 Stat. 140.
Defendants’ meagre production of materials collected by the legislative or
executive branches concerning the exposure to minors to programming
considered questionable (which was available to but in fact not considered
by Congress) concerned mostly programming that is not subject to § 505.
Much of this programming that remains unregulated is carried on channels
that often — if not ordinarily — carry family-oriented programming, such
as HBO, Cinemax/ Showtime and MTV.
27
programming that Congress indicated was harmful to minors as well.
E.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439
(1991).
No rationale for these content- and speaker-based distinctions ap-
peared in the scant legislative history. Indeed, the justifications
advanced by the Senate sponsors of § 505 apply equally with
respect to much of the sexually-oriented programming carried on
cable channels such as HBO or hit movie-pay-per-view channels as
well as programming carried on leased and public access cable
channels around the nation.”
The District Court began its analysis by mischaracterizing the
claim, referring to a “Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection"
challenge, JS App. 41a, that plaintiffs never made. It proceeded to
ignore the central cases on which plaintiffs relied.”
Rather than searching for a compelling necessity for enacting
such a speaker-based, underinclusive approach to "indecency" and
sexually explicit speech on cable television, the court satisfied itself
with noting "a significant difference between plaintiffs’ networks
and the non-adult premium networks," as all of plaintiffs’
programming is "adult" whereas only some programming on other
networks is "adult." JS App. 41a-42a. In doing so, it ignored every
bit of plaintiffs’ voluminous comparable programming evidence ex-
8 Such material includes popular R-rated movies such as Disclosure, Jade
and 9 1/2 Weeks, excerpts of which Graff submitted to the district court
as videotaped exhibits.
29 In addition to the cases cited above at 26, the District Court ignored
such cases Graff relied on as First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. at 784-85 (1978) ("[T]he legislature is constitutionally disqualified
from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the
speakers who may address a public issue"); FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 384 (1984) (among the "purest examples of a
‘law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . [is a] regulation that denies
one group of persons the right to address a selected audience"); and
Minneapolis Star Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
at 592-93.
28
cept the "Real Sex" episode described above, and attempted to
minimize that by observing that this program was "one sixteenth" of
the number of adult programs shown on plaintiffs’ channels that
day. JS App. 42a.
Given the asserted governmental interest, however, the relevant
measure is not the number of programs or the proportion of a full
day that such programming comprises, but rather minors’ viewing
of such programming. The "problem" addressed by § 505 is the
potential for youth access to "sexually explicit adult programming,"
"indecent programming" and other programming perceived to be
"harmful to children," not "signal bleed." Congress did not find,
there was no basis on which it could have found, and the govern-
ment never attempted to prove, that children access more
"indecency" through signal bleed on channels subject to § 505 than
they obtain through audio and video exposure to other channels
(including the leased access channels at issue in DAETC, or other
channels such as HBO, MTV, and Cinemax/Showtime). To the
contrary, as shown by the CDA’s blocking-on-request and V-chip
provisions (§§ 504 and 551) and the 1992 Cable Act provisions at
issue in DAETC, Congress knew full well that minors can access
"indecent" and "sexually explicit adult" programming, in full, on
many cable channels.
Common-sense suggests — and the government made no effort to
disprove — that minors are far more likely to obtain "indecent"
speech while watching or surfing a popular premium channel like
HBO (the single most popular premium cable service, on which
Real Sex is cablecast weekly), as compared te an out-of-the-way
pay-per-view channel that is partially scrambled and therefore un-
pleasant to watch. Given the size and demographics of the audience
for HBO, Showtime, and other premium cable channels, there is
every reason to expect that far more minors see "Real Sex" in its
entirety and other "indecent" or "sexually explicit" (or violent) cable
programming on such channels than have ever been exposed to
signal bleed.
Because the government offered no evidence, and Congress
considered none, that would permit the Court to find any necessity
for limiting the blocking and scrambling of programming thought
29
harmful to minors to easy-to-score-political-points-on speakers
(Playboy and Graff), the District Court should have concluded that
Graff is likely to prevail on its claim that § 505 is so underinclusive
and so likely to be ineffective as to violate the First Amendment and
the equal protection principle of the Fifth Amendment.”
CONCLUSION
Probable jurisdiction should be noted and the case set for plenary
review.
Respectfully submitted,
CHARLES S. SIMS
Counsel of Record
JOHN SIEGAL
Proskauer Rose Goetz
& Mendelsohn LLP
1585 Broadway
New York, N.Y. 10036
(212) 969-3000
Counsel for Appellant
Of Counsel:
DANIEL BARSKY
Graff Pay-Per-View, Inc.
536 Broadway
New York NY 10012
(212) 219-6204
New York, New York
January 9, 1997
* With respect to the third question presented, concerning § 505’s
vagueness (see p. i supra), Graff relies on the argument made in Playboy's
Jurisdictional Statement, at 25-29.
APPENDIX
la
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
Civil Action Nos. 96-94 & 96-107-]JF
Consolidated Actions
PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.
AND GRAFF-PAY-PER-VIEW INC.,
PLAINTIFFS
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JANET RENO,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, ano THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
DEFENDANTS.
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Notice is hereby given that Graff Pay-Per-View, Inc.,
plaintiff in the above captioned action, appeals to the United
States Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and section
561(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
104, §561(b), 110 Stat. 143, from an order denying Graff Pay-
Per-View, Inc.’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, entered
by this Court on November 8, 1996.
YOUNG, CONAWAY, STARGATT & TAYLOR
/s/ William D. Johnston
William D. Johnston (#2123)
John W. Shaw (#3367)
11th Floor, Rodney Square North
P.O. Box 391
Wilmington, Delaware 19899-0391
Attorneys for Plaintiff Graff Pay-Per-View
Dated: November 12, 1996
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
Civil Action Nos. 96-94 & 96-107-]]F
Consolidated
PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.
AND GRAFF-PAY-PER-VIEW INC.,
PLAINTIFFS
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JANET RENO,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, ano THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
DEFENDANTS.
ORDER
This 8th day of November, 1996, for the reasons
stated in the Opinion filed today, it is ORDERED that the
plaintiffs’ petitions for a preliminary injunction are denied.
/s/ Jane R. Roth
United States Circuit Judge
3a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
Civil Action Nos. 96-94 & 96-107-JJF
PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.
AND GRAFF-PAY-PER-VIEW INC.,
PLAINTIFFS
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JANET RENO,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, anp THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
DEFENDANTS.
November 8, 1996, Decided
November 8, 1996, FILED
DISPOSITION: Plaintiffs’ petitions for preliminary injunction
denied.
A. Gilchrist Sparks, II], Esquire and Katharine R. Witherspoon,
Esquire, of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington,
Delaware
OF COUNSEL:
Burton Joseph, Esquire, of Barsy, Joseph & Lichtenstein,
Chicago, Illinois. Robert Corn-Revere, Esquire, Jean S. Moore,
Esquire, Ronald J. Wiltsie, Il, Esquire, of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P.,
Washington, D.C., Attorneys for Plaintiff, Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc.
William D. Johnston, Esquire and John W. Shaw, Esquire, of
Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, Delaware.
OF COUNSEL: Charles S. Sims, Esquire and John Siegal, Esquire
Of Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn LLP, New York, New
York. Daniel Barsky, Esquire, Graff Pay-Per-View Inc., New
|
4a
York, New York, Attorneys for Plaintiff, Graff Pay-Per-View,
Inc.
Gregory M. Sleet, Esquire, United States Attorney, Patricia
Hannigan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, John J. Polk, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, Wilmington, Delaware; Frank W. Hunger, Assistant
Attorney General, Dennis G. Linger, Esquire, Theodore C. Hirt,
Esquire, James J. Gilligan, Esquire, Joseph V. Jest, Esquire, and
Sarah L. Wilson, Esquire, of the United States Department of
Justice, Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch, Washington,
D.C.; OF COUNSEL: Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate General
Counsel, Susan Fox, Office of the General Counsel, Federal
Communications Commission, Attorneys for Defendants.
Robert J. Katzenstein, Esquire, of Smith, Katzenstein &
Furlow, Wilmington, Delaware. OF COUNSEL: Michael A.
Bamberger, Esquire and Margaret A. Jacobs, Esquire, of
Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, New York, New York,
Attorneys for Amici Curiae, American Booksellers Foundation
for Free Expression, Association of American Publishers,
Counsel for Periodical Distributors of The Americas, Feminists
for Free Expression, Freedom to Read Foundation, Interactive
Digital Software Association, International Periodical
Distributors Association, Motion Picture Association of
America, Inc., National Association of College Stores, Inc.,
National Association of Recording Merchandisers, Periodical
and Book Association of America, Inc., Publishers Marketing
Association, of America, Inc., and Video Software Dealers
Association.
Henry N. Herndon, Jr., Esquire and Eric D. Schwartz, Esquire,
of Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington, Delaware.
OF COUNSEL: Patrick D. Maines, Esquire, of The Media
Institute, Washington, D.C.; Robert M. O'Neill, Esquire and
Joshua Wheeler, Esquire, of The Thomas Jefferson Center for
Protection of Free Expression, Charlottesville, Virginia,
Attorneys for Amici Curiae, Thomas Jefferson Center for The
Protection of Free Expression and The Media Institute.
eS eS a ee ee
5a
Before: ROTH’, Circuit Judge, FARNAN?’ and SIMANDLE’,
District Judges
OPINION BY: Jane R. Roth
OPINION Wilmington, Delaware November 8, 1996
ROTH, Circuit Judge: The plaintiffs in this action, Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc. ("Playboy") and Graff Pay-Per-View
("Graff"), challenge the constitutionality of section 505 of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("the CDA" or "the Act”),
which is Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-104, 110 Sat. 56. Congress enacted section 505 in an
effort to eliminate signal bleed, i.e., the partial reception of
sexually explicit adult cable television programming in the
homes of nonsubscribers to that programming.
Most cable television systems in the United States offer one
or more optional premium channels dedicated to sexually
oriented programming. However, of the 62 million households
that subscribe to cable television, only about 3 million will
purchase or subscribe to adult programming during the course
of a year. Cable system operators attempt to block non-sub-
scribers from receiving this programming by various scramb-
ling techniques which we will explain in greater detail in our
Findings of Fact. Signal bleed occurs when the scrambling
process is not fully successful.
The stated purpose of section 505 is to protect children
from signal bleed. Section 505(a) requires a cable television
operator to completely scramble or block the video and audio
1 Judge Jane R. Roth, United States Circuit Court Judge for
the Third Circuit.
Judge Joseph J. Farnan, United States District Court Judge
for the District of Delaware.
bo
3 Judge Jerome B. Simandle, United States District Court
Judge for the District of New Jersey.
Ne
6a
portions of any cable channel that is primarily dedicated to
sexually explicit programming. If a cable operator is unable to
comply in full with section 505(a), then section 505(b) requires
“time channeling", i.e., that sexually explicit adult programming
be transmitted only during those hours when children are not
likely to view it. The Federal Communications Commission has
determined these “safe harbor" hours to be from 10:00 p.m. to
6:00 a.m. The principal issue facing us is whether government
regulation of signal bleed from sexually explicit programming
offends the free speech and equal protection rights of adult-
programming networks and of their subscriber audience. Our
analysis is narrowed by the fact that plaintiffs do not contend
that signal bleed itself is protected speech. Moreover, plaintiffs
concede that their programming is essentially 100% sexually
oriented, in contrast to other entertainment channels that
display only occasional or sporadic sexually explicit scenes or
programs. Nevertheless, because the regulatory scheme of
section 505 impacts on the transmission of adult programming,
which is entitled to First Amendment protection, we will
examine whether section 505 is a content-based restriction of
4 We recognize at the outset that the programming on
plaintiffs’ sexually dedicated channels is indecent, meaning
vulgar or offensively explicit sexual material not generally
available for viewing by children, but that it is not obscene.
Indecent speech is subject to constitutional protection
because it is established that "sexual expression which is
indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amend-
ment." Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S.
115, 126, 106 L. Ed. 2d 93, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989); Fabulous
Associates, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 896
F.2d 780, 783 (3d Cir. 1990); Action for Children’s Television
v. F.C.C., 313 U.S. App. D.C. 94, 58 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996); accord,
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), at 851
(Sloviter, J.), at 858 n3 (Buckwalter, J.), and at 865-6
(Dalzell, J.).
7a
speech, and, if so, whether it survives scrutiny by addressing
a compelling interest and by being narrowly tailored for that
end. We will also consider whether Congress has unconstitu-
tionally singled out networks that are exclusively dedicated to
sexually oriented programming, while not regulating signal
bleed from other premium networks that at times will transmit
sexually oriented programs or scenes. Finally, we will examine
plaintiffs’ claim that the language of section 505 is unconstit:-
tionally vague.
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
President Clinton signed the CDA into law on February 8,
1996. On February 26, Playboy filed this action in the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware, seeking a
declaratory judgment that § 505 violates the First Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. In addition, Playboy sought injunctive
relief that would prohibit enforcement of § 505 by the Govern-
ment.° Graff subsequently filed an action seeking identical re-
lief against the same defendants. On March 4, 1996, Judge
Farnan granted Graff's motion to consolidate these actions pur-
suant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a). That same day,
Chief Judge Dolores K. Sloviter of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit granted the parties’ request to
appoint a three-judge district court pursuant to § 561(a) of the
CDA. She named Judge Joseph P. Farnan of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Delaware, Judge Jerome B. Simandle
of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, and
5 The defendants in this action are the United States; the
United States Department of Justice; Attorney General of
the United States, Janet Reno; and the Federal Communi-
cations Commission ("the FCC"). To simplify matters, we
will refer to these defendants jointly as "the Government.”
8a
Judge Jane R. Roth of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.’
Because the CDA was to go into effect on March 9, 1996,
Playboy requested a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to
enjoin implementation and enforcement of § 505 of the Act.
On March 6, 1996, Judge Farnan heard oral argument on Play-
boy’s TRO motion.’ He granted Playboy’s motion on March
6 Section 561(a) of the CDA provides that a three judge
district court shall be convened to decide "any civil action
challenging the constitutionality, on its face, of this title or
any amendment made by this title . . . pursuant to the
provisions of section 2284 of title 28, United States Code."
Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 561(a), 110 Stat. 56, 142 (1996).
Section 2284 requires that at least one of the judges
appointed to serve on the three-judge panel be a circuit
judge.
7 Pursuant to § 505(b), section 505 was set to go into effect
on March 9, 1996, thirty days after it was signed into law
by the President. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 505(b), 110 Stat. 56,
136 (1996).
8 Section 2284(b)(3) delineates the preliminary matters that
may be decided by a single judge from those matters that
must be decided by three-judge district courts. That section
provides:
A single judge may .. . grant a temporary restrain-
ing order on a specific finding, based on evidence
submitted, that specified irreparable damage will
result if the order is not granted, which order,
unless previously revoked by the district judge,
shall remain in force only until the hearing and
determination by the district court of three judges
of an application for a preliminary injunction. A
single judge shall not . . . hear and determine any
(continued...)
—
9a
7, 1996, temporarily enjoining enforcement of § 505 until the
matter could be heard by the three judge panel appointed by
Chief Judge Sloviter. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United
States, 918 F. Supp. 813 (D. Del. 1996).
In preparation for our consideration of the plaintiffs’
Application for a Preliminary Injunction, the parties negotiated
a mutually acceptable discovery and briefing schedule. Much
of the factual and technical evidence was presented by
affidavits and briefs submitted prior to the preliminary
injunction hearing. We heard testimony on May 20 and May
21, 1996, and closing arguments were presented on May 22.
We concluded that we should delay our decision until after the
Supreme Court's decision in Alliance for Community Media v.
F.C.C., 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court
published its decision on June 28, 1996, sub nom., Denver Area
Education Telecommunications Consortium v. F.C.C., 135 L. Ed. 2d
888, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996). The varties then submitted supple-
mental memoranda, as we had instructed, on the impact and
applicability of the Supreme Court's decision.
I.
FINDINGS OF FACT
In order to understand fully the arguments made by the
parties in this case, it is necessary to understand the techno-
logical workings of cable signals and transmission. During the
preliminary injunction hearing, the court heard extensive and
complex testimony regarding cable technology and the
mechanisms available to comply with § 505. Pursuant to
8(...continued)
application for a preliminary or permanent injunc-
tion. . .. Any action of a single judge may be
reviewed by the full court at any time before final
judgment.
28 U.S.C. § 2284.
10a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), we make the following
findings of fact:
The Statute At Issue
1. Playboy and Graff challenge § 505 of the CDA, entitled
"Scrambling of Sexually Explicit Adult Video Service Program-
ming.” This section requires a multisystem operator ("“MSO")’
to scramble "sexually explicit adult programming or other
programming that is indecent" which is transmitted on a
channel "primarily dedicated to sexually oriented program-
ming.” Section 505 requires that any such adult channel or
network be fully scrambled. The purpose of this scrambling is
to eliminate signal bleed.” "Signal bleed" is the partial reception
of video images and/or audio sounds on a scrambled channel.
If an MSO does not or cannot comply with § 505’s blocking
requirement, the MSO is prohibited from transmitting the
adult programming during hours of the day when minors are
most likely to view it.”
9 Section 505 applies to "multichannel video programming
distributors." These distributors are more simply known as
"multisystem operators” or "MSOs" and we will refer to
them in this manner.
10 Section 505 provides:
(a) REQUIREMENT.--In providing sexually
explicit adult programming or other programming
that is indecent on any channel of its service
primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented program-
ming, a multichannel video programming distribu-
tor shall fully scramble or otherwise fully block the
video and audio portion of such channel so that
one not a subscriber to such channel or program-
ming does not receive it.
(b) IMPLEMENTATION.--Until a multichannel
video programming distributor complies with the
(continued...)
lla
2. M5Qs, such as Telecommunications, Inc. ("TCI") and
Time Warner Cable, provide cable subscribers with various
packages of cable channels for which subscribers pay a
monthly fee. Some subscribers receive a "basic" package or
"tier" of channels. A basic cable tier often includes local
broadcast networks (like ABC, CBS, and NBC), leased and
public access channels, as well as networks devoted entirely to
news, education, fine arts, music videos, sports, or shopping.
MSOs also provide "premium" tiers, which offer, in addition to
the basic tier channels, channels showing recently released
movies (like HBO, Cinemax, and Showtime) and channels ded-
icated solely to adult entertainment. MSOs charge a monthly
fee for a basic cable package and additional monthly fees for
premium cable channels.
3. Premium programming is also offered by MSOs on a
"pay-per-view" basis. A pay-per-view consumer places an order
with a cable operator, requesting access to a particular movie
or sporting event. A consumer may also purchase program-
ming on a premium channel for a specified period of time.
When a consumer places a pay-per-view order, the MSO at the
beginning of the requested program unscrambles the signal by
10(...continued)
requirement set forth in subsection (a), the distribu-
tor shall limit the access of children to the program-
ming referred to in that subsection by not provid-
ing such programming during the hours of the day
(as determined by the Commission) when a signifi-
cant number of children are likely to view it.
(c) DEFINITION.--As used in this section, the
term ‘scramble’ means to rearrange the content of
the signal of the programming so that the program-
ming cannot be viewed or heard in an understand-
able manner.
Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 505, 110 Stat. 56, 136 (1996) (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 641).
12a
remote accessing of a converter/descrambler box in the
subscriber’s home. The MSO rescrambles the signal at the
conclusion of the program. The fee charged for receiving a
program on a pay-per-view basis is always in addition to
monthly fees paid for a cable package.
4. Playboy and Graff provide MSOs with adult, sexually
oriented video programming. The MSOs then transmit the
plaintiffs’ programming to premium subscribers and pay-per-
view purchasers who request access to such programming.
Playboy owns two adult-programming networks: Playboy
Television and AdulTVision. Graff also owns two adult
networks: Adam & Eve and Spice. The programming on the
Playboy and Graff networks is virtually 100% sexually explicit
adult programming. In marketing its programming, Playboy
relies on both premium subscription and pay-per-view sales,
while Graff relies almost entirely on pay-per-view. On a yearly
basis, 3 million households subscribe to and/or receive
pay-per-view sexually explicit adult programming.
5. Other non-adult premium networks have obtained
licenses to exhibit particular Playboy films. In addition, non-
adult premium and basic cable channels will, among other pro-
grams, transmit sexually explicit programs or programs which
contain some sexually explicit scenes. We received evidence of
the frequency of sexually explicit programming on non-adult
channels. It was demonstrated for example that the number of
sexually explicit programs available on non-adult channels on
the evening of Friday, May 17, 1996, in Denver, Colorado, was
one sixteenth that shown on the plaintiffs’ adult channels.
Moreover, unlike the adult channels, the sexually explicit
programs on non-adult channels were mainly "R" rated movies
which contained some sexually explicit scenes but were not
continuously sexually explicit as was plaintiffs’ programming.
6. MSOs receive signals from many sources, such as
master antennas, satellites, and local television stations. The
signals are received at the system transmitter or "headend"
where they are amplified and retransmitted by coaxial cable.
Cable subscribers receive the channels directly by cable, if they
13a
own a cable-ready television, or by attaching the cable to a
converter box if they own a non-cable-ready television."
7. Because the cost of premium and pay-per-view pro-
gramming is in addition to the cost of basic programming,
MSOs seek to secure premium network signals for subscribers
only. To prevent a signal from reaching the home of a
non-subscriber, MSOs "scramble" the signal by blocking a
portion of it. Currently, most MSOs scramble premium chan-
nel signals using either "RF" or "baseband" technology.
11 A converter box sits on top of an older model television set
which can receive only a finite number of VHF or UHF
channels. The converter takes the cable signal and
converts it to a channel which can be received by the
subscriber's television set. When cable systems began to
offer programming, other than local broadcast stations, on
channels that television sets designed for broadcast
reception were not capable of receiving, MSOs began to
distribute these converter boxes to their subscribers.
Converter boxes are electronic channel selectors. They are
connected both to the subscriber’s TV set and to the
MSO’s cable line. When a subscriber chooses a cable
channel to view, the box "converts" the selected channel to
a frequency (typically broadcast television channel three or
four) that the subscriber’s TV set can receive and display.
In about 1980, TV set manufacturers began marketing
"cable-ready" TV sets, units equipped with tuners capable
of directly receiving cable programming transmitted on
non-broadcast (cable only) frequencies. If a subscriber has
a cable-ready TV set, and it is capable of tuning’ all the
channels offered by the cable system, the subscriber's line
can be connected directly to the TV set.
l4a
Generally, this scrambling affects only the video portion of the
transmission.”
8. When a consumer decides to subscribe to a premium
or pay-per-view channel, the MSO must descramble the chan-
nel for the new subscriber. This can be done either by in-
stalling a positive or negative trap in the coaxial cable leading
to the new subscriber's home or by providing the new sub-
scriber with an addressable converter. The trap or the address-
able converter descrambles the signal so that the integrity of
the image and/or the sound is restored in the set or sets
attached to the descrambled line. The MSO can remotely
“address” an addressable converter by sending out an electrical
impulse. Addressable converters make pay-per-view requests
possible by enabling an MSO by remote direction to descram-
ble and then rescramble the cable signals entering the sub-
scriber’s home.”
9. As mentioned above, one of the technologies used by
MSOs to secure premium channels is “positive trapping.” For
positive trapping, the MSO installs at its transmitter headend
an electronic box which jams the signal of the channel to be
secured. Non-subscribers to that channel will receive only
"snow" for video and a high-pitched beep for audio. Subscrib-
ers to the jammed channel receive a metal cylinder, the posi-
tive trap, which is attached to the cable-ready TV or to the set
top converter box in order to filter out the jamming signal.
12 Because RF affects only the picture portion of the televi-
sion transmission, no audio scrambling occurs. Some
baseband systems do include audio encryption so that no
intelligible audio will be presented to the non-subscribing
customers.
13 The previously described converter box and the address-
able converter/descrambler can be combined in one set top
box.
15a
10. A premium channel's signal can also be secured by
“negative trapping.” Using this technology, the signal will be
transmitted in the clear. A negative trap is installed at the
homes of non-subscribers, jamming the signal there.
11. An MSO’s choice between using positive or negative
trapping will depend on whether the majority of subscribers
to the overall cable service also wish to subscribe to a par-
ticular premium service. It is cost effective to use negative traps
only when a large majority of the customers of a cable system
subscribe to a particular premium channel.
12. The problem which § 505 was enacted to remedy is
known as "signal bleed." Audio or video "bleed" occurs when
a signal is not effectively scrambled by the MSO’s RF or
baseband equipment. Bleeding does not occur in TV sets with
converter boxes that have a feature known as channel map-
ping." Cable ready television sets, however, do not include
this mapping feature. When a consumer with a cable-ready TV
tunes to a scrambled premium channel to which the consumer
does not subscribe, the consumer receives the jammed signal
which under some circumstances includes a video picture or
portions of a picture because of a phenomenon called random
lockup. The non- subscribing consumer will also receive a clear
audio signal unless the MSO’s scrambling system is one which
scrambles the audio.” The severity of this signal bleeding
problem varies from time to time and from place to place. The
reason for these inconsistencies may be weather extremes,
faulty or old equipment, or human error in installing, oper-
ating, and/or maintaining systems. Moreover, according to
plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Walter Ciciora, the cable-ready TV’s that
14 When a consumer with a converter box attempts to tune
a scrambled channel, the converter box will not tune that
channel but will tune to another channel, providing either
a promotional message or a blue screen.
1S A subscriber will of course receive the descrambled video
and audio.
16a
pervade the market today have improved electronic circuitry
which will make a discernible picture out of a partly-scrambled
signal. This technology, developed over the past two decades,
permits the child of a cable subscriber to tune the cable-ready
TV to a premium or pay-per-view channel offered on the cable
system and to receive discernible images even though the
parent is a non-subscriber to that channel.
13. With this incidence of improved electronic technology
and/or partially scrambled signals, a non-subscriber may see
and hear portions of a channel or program to which he or she
does not subscribe. This result is of particular concern when
the programming is sexually explicit, intended for an adult-
only audience. Families, who do not subscribe to adult
entertainment channels, have found that sounds and images
from these channels are at least partially discernible. The
government presented anecdotal evidence of parents discov-
ering that their children have been exposed to sights and
sounds from sexually explicit programming only after the
exposure had occurred. This evidence included affidavits from
several parents testifying about the danger in their homes of
signal bleed from adult programming networks. Other parents
complained that, even though their own sets were attached to
lockboxes that fully blocked indecent programs, their children
were exposed to signal bleed from adult programming when
they visited friends. Anecdotal evidence of signal bleed was
also presented in letters which had been sent to various
members of Congress and were made part of the record before
this court. In addition, video tapes of sexually explicit signal
bleed were admitted into evidence. For instance, Defendant's
Exhibit No.4 was taped from the Playboy Channel in Orange,
California. Exhibit No. 4 shows partially scrambled images of
a nude woman caressing herself and then of two nude women
in the water and in a boat, caressing each other. Defendant's
Exhibit No. 5 is an audio tape of the Spice Channel, made by
a non-Spice subscriber from the audio bleed. It carries the
sounds of what appear to be repeated sexual encounters
accompanied by assorted orgiastic moans and groans.
17a
14. There are approximately 62 million households in the
United States which receive cable television. Of these, 20 to 25
million have converter boxes to receive basic and/or premium
cable service. These converter boxes will map out the scram-
bled channels and as a consequence these households will not
receive "signal bleed." The other 40 million cable subscribers
have the potential for a "bleed" problem. It is not clear how
many of these 40 million cable homes with the potential for
"signal bleed” will not in fact receive signal bleed either
because the local MSO employs effective baseband or digital
scrambling or because the household is already a subscriber to
the adult channels." No evidence was presented of any con-
sumer desire to receive “signal bleed.” Moreover, plaintiffs
make no claim that “signal bleed" itself is constitutionally
protected.
15. On June 12, 1995, after hearings and substantial debate
had been held regarding the legislation that was to become the
1996 Telecommunications Act, Senator Diane Feinstein of
California and Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi offered
Amendment 1269 which ultimately became Section 505 of the
Act. Their amendment proposed that MSOs, offering adult
programming, should be required to completely scramble the
audio and video signals to prevent partial reception of those
channels in the homes of nonsubscribers.
16. Senator Feinstein told members of the Senate that
"parents . . . come home after work only to find their children
sitting in front of the television watching or listening to the
adult’s-only channel, a channel that many parents did not
even know existed.” Cong. Rec. $8167; see Playboy Ex. 20. She
noted that guidelines which put the burden on the subscriber
to request complete scrambling of adult channels were inade-
16 If at the trial on the permanent injunction more specific
evidence of the number of households with the potential
for signal bleed were to be presented, we would be in a
better position to consider whether the standards for a
permanent injunction have been met.
18a
quate because often non-subscribers are unaware that indecent
audio and/or video signals can be received. Id. The object of
the amendment, she said, was to "“protect{] children by
prohibiting sexually explicit programming to those individuals
who have not specifically requested such programming.”
17. Senators Feinstein and Lott each spoke briefly about
their proposed amendment. 141 Cong. Rec. $8166-S8169.
Accompanying the transcript of their statements before the
Senate was a memorandum from the American Law Division
("ALD") of the Congressional Research Service. The memoran-
dum analyzed the Feinstein-Lott amendment in light of First
Amendment case law and concluded that some language con-
tained in the provision might be unconstitutional and over
broad. Id. at $8168. Except for the statements of Senators
Feinstein and Lott, there was no debate on the amendment
and no hearings were held on it. The amendment passed
easily in the Senate (91 votes in favor; none opposed) and
became § 505 of the bill that emerged from the conference
which ironed out the differences between the House and
Senate versions. On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed
the bill into law.
18. Section 505 does not eliminate adult programming.
Instead, it offers MSOs either the option of fully scrambling
the video and audio signals of adult programming or, if
complete scrambling is not possible or is not the choice of the
MSO, the option of transmitting adult programs only during
the "safe harbor" hours. Specifically, pursuant to § 505-(a),
MSOs are required to "fully block the video and audio portion
of [an adult entertainment] channel so that one not a sub-
scriber to such channel or programming does not receive it.”
If an operator cannot fully block its adult channels, it must
then, pursuant to § 505(b), discontinue programming “during
the hours of the day . . . when a significant number of
children are likely to view it." The FCC regulation imple-
menting this alternative would limit adult programming to the
eight hour period between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. We will
refer to the requirement found in subsection (a) as “complete
19a
scrambling,” and the alternative offered by subsection (b), as
"time channeling.”
The Technological and Economic Impacts of 505
19. There are MSOs that already meet the requirements of
§ 505. For example, Steven Saril, Senior Vice President of Sales
and Marketing for Graff, testified that roughly half of the
systems carrying Graff programming are in compliance with
§ 505.” For the MSOs that are not in compliance, several
technologies may become available in the future that would
allow an MSO to meet the requirements of § 505. Television
manufacturers may soon be required by law to insert the so-
called "v-chip," in all new televisions. Pub. L. No. 104-104,
§ 551, 110 Stat. at 139-41. The v-chip will allow parents to block
types of programming which they find inappropriate for their
children. The v-chip is currently being tested in Canadian
markets. It is not clear, however, how long it will be before
televisions with v-chips become widely available in the United
States.
20. Digital cable technology is another future option that
will permit MSOs to completely scramble signals to nonsub-
scribers as § 505 requires. Approximately 2 million American
consumers presently receive digital television service. Digital
signals will prevent all audio and video bleeding, but digital
service will require conversion of the MSOs’ headend equip-
ment from analog to digital technology. As MSOs adopt digital
service, they will probably use it first for premium channels,
including adult programming.
21. Because the currently used "RF" and “baseband”
technologies are not capable of fully scrambling both the audio
17 Saril also testified that the Spice network might go out of
business if the non-complying channels were required to
time channel. The Graff "standard agreement,” however,
requires an MSO to carry Spice only during the hours of
9 p.m. to 3 a.m. - hours that are very close to the safe
harbor time period.
Deiter iittala ie ill
aN i a nc
20a
and video signal at all times, many MSOs would be required,
if § 505(a) was enforced today, to resort to other and/or
additional scrambling techniques. If an MSO was not abie or
willing to initiate additional scrambling techniques, it would be
required to time channel adult programming.
22. One device which has been available for several years
and which succeeds in fully scrambling unwanted cable signals
is the lockbox. Since the early 1980s, MSOs have been required
by law to provide a lockbox to any customer upon request.
Section 544(d) of the 1984 Cable Act requires that cable oper-
ators either sell or lease a blocking device to any subscriber
who requests that a channel be completely blocked. See 47
U.S.C. § 544(d)(2)(A). However, few households have obtained
the lockboxes made available by this provision.
23. Section 504 of the CDA also requires MSOs to com-
pletely block upon request any programming that a cable cus-
tomer finds personally offensive. This blocking requirement is
not limited to the “sexually explicit adult video service pro-
gramming” which is the target of § 505. Pub. L. No. 104-104,
§ 504, 110 Stat. 56, 136 (1996). Moreover, under § 504, the MSO,
rather than the subscriber, is responsible for bearing the cost
of providing the blocking mechanism.” Despite this economic
burden, plaintiffs suggest that § 504 presents a constitutional,
"less restrictive alternative” because it would require an MSO
to provide complete blocking only upon request. Plaintiffs also
assert that cable subscribers can be alerted through public
relations efforts that blocking devices will be made available to
18 Section 504(a) provides:
(a) SUBSCRIBER REQUEST.--Upon request by
a cable service subscriber, a cable operator shall,
without charge, fully scramble or otherwise fully
block the audio and video programming of each
channel carrying such programming so that one
not a subscriber does not receive it.
Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 504, 110 Stat. 56, 136 (1996) (empha-
sis added).
ee Ee etn, En AN a a
2la
them, free of charge, upon request. Methods of disseminating
this information could include inserts in program guides and
bills, informative screens shown on “barker channels", adver-
tisements run on other channels, and special mailings. We
have not, however, received evidence that MSOs are advising
cable customers of the availability of the free channel blocks
under § 504. Nor is there evidence that customers are respond-
ing to such notices, if given. Thus, we cannot effectively assess
piaintiffs’ claim that § 504 is likely to become a viable remedy
for eliminating signal bleed. If the § 504 blocking option is not
being promoted, it cannot become a meaningful alternative to
the provisions of § 505. At the time of the permanent injunc-
tion hearing, further evidence of the actual and predicted
impact and efficacy of § 504 would be helpful to us.
24. MSOs that adopted the lockbox remedy, in order to
comply with § 505, would be required to provide all nonsub-
scribers with a lockbox programmed to block the audio and
video signals of adult entertainment networks. A mapping con-
verter with a lockbox feature allows parents to control when
adult programming will be received and when it will be
blocked. Most lockboxes currently available are capable of
blocking only signals entering the television set to which the
box is attached. In order to fully block access to sexually
oriented programming at all times, each cableconnected TV set
in the home would have to be connected to a lockbox. A single
converter/lockbox costs approximately $115. If MSOs that offer
adult programming were to distribute one converter/lockbox
to every nonsubscribing household currently without one, the
total cost would be prohibitive, probably in excess of one
million dollars.
25. In the alternative, MSOs could provide "negative traps"
to nonsubscribers. A “negative trap" is installed on the cable
wiring of non-subscribing households and scrambles a clear
signal. Subscribers to adult channels receive the clear signal
without the negative trap. Negative trapping costs between
$12 and $15 per household. It is an economically feasible
22a
solution only in areas, such as military bases, where a large
majority of cable subscribers want to receive the adult channel.
26. Double scrambling with “positive trap" technology
provides the most workable alternative for non-complying
MSOs. To achieve double scrambling, RF or baseband scramb-
ling is combined with a jamming signal at the headend. The
headend jamming completely blocks video and audio so that
no signal bleed occurs in the homes of non-subscribers. In
order for a subscriber to view programming that has been
double scrambled, the subscriber needs both a positive trap
and an addressable converter. The positive trap filters out the
interference from the jamming signal, and the addressable
converter descrambles the RF or baseband scrambling. The
addressable converter can be used to start up and end periods
of premium service and also to permit pay-per-view reception.
Positive trap technology would be economically advantageous
in areas where nonsubscribers outnumber subscribers. If the
positive trapping alternative were adopted by an MSO, positive
traps would be delivered to or installed at an households
subscribing to adult programming. The average cost of a
positive trap is $7. A positive trap is easily installed by the
subscriber or it can be installed by the MSO at a cost of
approximately $35. The cost of the additional equipment
necessary for jamming at the MSO’s headend is estimated to
be $750 to $1,000.
27. Positive trapping technology poses an additional
problem for pay-per-view purchases. Customers either have to
pick up a positive trap or order it in advance of viewing the
desired program. This interferes with the spontaneous nature
of what plaintiffs consider to be the impulse purchasing of
sexually explicit adult programming.
28. Professional installation of traps also raises privacy
concerns. A subscriber, who enjoys adult entertainment at
home, might be dissuaded from requesting a positive trap
upon realizing that the MSO will learn his or her identity. The
new subscriber will be identified as a consumer of sexually
explicit material - although with sexually explicit premium and
23a
pay-per-view programming, the subscriber will also be
identifiable through billing for the programming.
29. A few MSOs have already adopted “double scrambling"
to resolve community opposition to sexually explicit program-
ming and to the audio and/or video bleeding of signals from
such programming. Plaintiffs contend that in these double-
scrambling communities revenues from adult channels has
fallen by fifty per cent. Plaintiffs are of the opinion that a
significant factor causing this drop in revenue is the impulse
nature of the purchase or adult programming.
30. Finally, an MSO has the option of complying with
§ 505 by "time channeling" as provided in subsection (b). If an
MSO cannot or chooses not to completely scramble audio
and/or video signals as required by § 505(a), it must restrict
adult program to certain "safe harbor" hours. In preparation
for implementing § 505, the FCC established a regulation that
defines the safe harbor hours as the eight hour period be-
tween 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. In re Implementation of Section
505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CS Dkt. No. 96-40,
FCC 96-84, Order & Notice of Proposed Rulemaking amending
47 C.F.R. § 76 9 6 (released March 5, 1996; intended to become
effective March 9, 1996). If time channeling were adopted by
an MSO, adult cable programming would not be available in
the MSO’s service area except during the safe harbor hours.
Plaintiffs estimate that their revenues would fall approximately
thirty per cent if time channeling were adopted.”
19 We are skeptical of plaintiffs’ estimate of revenue loss. It
appears to be significantly overstated. Although Graff's
Vice President, Steven Saril, stated that 30 percent of those
who purchase his company’s programming do so outside
the safe harbor hours, many of these customers may not
be affected by time channeling because half of the cable
systems, carrying Graff channels, already comply with
§ 505(a). The customers of these MSOs will still be able to
view Graff's channels outside the safe harbor period.
(continued...)
2Aa
31. The MSOs that have taken a position on the method
by which they would comply with § 505 have all announced
that they would adopt time channeling.
Il.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. The Preliminary Injunction Standard
Playboy and Graff have asked this court to exercise
extraordinary judicial authority by striking down a law drafted
and adopted by a co-equal branch of government. The plain-
tiffs’ request raises one of the judiciary’s most “awesome
responsibilities calling for the utmost circumspection in its
exercise.” Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 13 L. Ed.
2d 12, 85 S. Ct. 1, 2 (1964). After thorough examination and
discussion, we conclude that, at this preliminary injunction
stage, we will not strike down § 505. As the case has presently
been developed before us, the plaintiffs have not met the re-
quirements for the issuing of a preliminary injunction. We will,
therefore, deny their petition for preliminary relief.
The standard used to determine whether plaintiffs are entit-
led to a preliminary injunction is well established. In order to
succeed, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they are likely to pre-
vail on the merits and that they will suffer irreparable harm if
they are not granted injunctive relief. We must also consider
19(...continued)
Moreover, Saril admitted on cross-examination that 21% of
the non-safe-harbor purchases occur at 9:00 or 9:30 p.m.,
and that a 10:00 p.m. starting time would cause no loss of
revenue. He further admitted that people may rearrange
their viewing schedule or use a VCR to tape adult pro-
gramming during the safe harbor hours, again preserving
Graff’s revenues. Finally, plaintiffs acknowledge some
remaining elasticity in the pricing of sexually explicit
programming. Graff would be able raise its rates a certain
extent without losing customers.
25a
whether the potential harm to the defendant that will result
from the issuing of a preliminary injunction outweighs the
harm that may fall upon the plaintiffs if such relief is denied,
and whether granting the requested injunctive relief is in the
public interest. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. 824, 851 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citing Campbell Soup Co. V.
ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1992) and Bradley v.
Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1175 (3d Cir. 1990)); see
also Clean Ocean Action v. York, 57 F.3d 328, 331 (3d Cir. 1995).
In a case such as this one, in which the alleged injury is a
threat to First Amendment interests, the finding of irreparable
injury is often tied to the likelihood of success on the merits.
American Civil Liberties Union, 929 F. Supp. at 851 (citing Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347) (1976)). The loss of First Amendment
freedoms is unquestionably irreparable injury. Elrod, 427 U.S.
at 373 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971).
Conversely, however, if the only irreparable injury alleged
is the loss of first amendment freedoms, the likelihood that
plaintiffs will not succeed on the merits creates an equal like-
lihood that they will not suffer First Amendment injury.”
Constitutional injury cannot occur if there is not a constitu-
tional violation. We will, for this reason, turn our inquiry first
20 Plaintiffs also claim that they will suffer financial loss.
Financial loss is not, however, the type of irreparable
injury that warrants the granting of injunctive relief. See,
e.g., In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee Litigation, 689 F.2d
1137, 1145 (3d Cir. 1982). To the extent that plaintiffs may
suffer financial loss for which they will not be reimbursed,
that economic burden is an element which we considered
infra in the balancing of harms, particularly in our discus-
sion of the benefit to the public of time channeling (per
F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1073,
98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978)) and its availability under § 505 as an
alternative to complete scrambling.
ee en ee ee
26a
to the issue of the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the
merits.
Plaintiffs challenge § 505 on grounds that it (1) infringes
the free speech protections provided by the First Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution, (2) violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the U.S. Constitution,
and (3) contains unconstitutionally vague terminology. With
regard to all three of these claims, we conclude that Playboy
and Graff have failed to meet the preliminary injunction test.
They have not persuaded us that they are likely to prevail on
the merits if any of these three claims are ultimately litigated.
Moreover, they have not demonstrated that the public interest
is served by permitting signal bleed to invade nonsubscribers’
homes, particularly in view of our interest in protecting child-
ren from a pervasive medium which transmits sexually explicit
sounds and images and in view of the continuing availability
under § 505 of sexually explicit adult programming during the
safe harbor hours.”
B. First Amendment Jurisprudence
Playboy and Graff claim that § 505 burdens their rights
guaranteed under the First Amendment by inhibiting their
freedom of speech. The First Amendment provides: "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S.
21 In our discussion, we do not separate out the elements to
consider with regard to the issuing of an injunction, ie.,
likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm,
balancing of harms, and public interest. First, in this
context of a claim of unconstitutional restriction of free
speech, the harm and public interest elements are impor-
tant factors in determining the likelihood of success on the
merits. These factors will therefore be discussed in con-
junction with the merits of the claims. Second, as we note
above, our irreparable harm analysis is subsumed by our
finding that plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the
merits.
27a
Const. amend. I. The Supreme Court has been exacting in its
protection of this First Amendment right. Moreover, as circum-
stances and technologies have changed, the Court has adapted
free speech protection to meet these changes.
We postponed our decision here until the Supreme Court
reached its decision in a case dealing with a similar field of
developing technology - that of leased and public access cable
channels. See Denver Area Educational Telecommunications
Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 135 L. Ed. 2d 888, 116 S. Ct. 2374
(1996) [hereinafter Denver Consortium]. In Denver Consortium,
the plaintiffs challenged three sections of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, which
placed restrictions upon indecent programming aired on leased
and public access cable channels.” Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106
22 The plaintiffs in Denver Consortium challenged sections
10(a), 10(b), and 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Act. These provi-
sions were to be applied to "leased access channels” and
"public, educational, or governmental channels" ("PEG
channels"). Section 10(a) “permit[s] a cable operator to
enforce prospectively a written and published policy of
prohibiting programming [on leased access channels] that
the operator reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual
or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive
manner as measured by contemporary community stan-
dards." 1992 Cable Act, § 10(a)(2). Section 10(b) requires
that, if cable operators choose not to ban sexually explicit
programming as permitted under § 10(a), when they
broadcast such programming on leased access channels,
they must completely segregate and block the signal
carrying the indecent programming. 1992 Cable Act,
§ 10(b). According to regulations promulgated pursuant to
§ 10(b), leased access programmers must inform cable
operators if their programming will be indecent, and cable
operators must then place that programming on a single
channel. 47 C.F.R. § 76.701(d) (1995). The signal of this
(continued...)
28a
Stat. 1460, 1486, §§ 10(a), 10(b), and 10 (c) (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 532(h), 532(j), and note following § 531) ("the 1992 Cable
Act"). A majority of the Supreme Court agreed that § 10(b) of
the 1992 Cable Act was unconstitutional, but the Court was
unable to form a majority regarding the constitutionality of the
remainder of the Act.”
Justice Breyer wrote for the Court regarding § 10(b), but
thereafter he wrote for a plurality, which upheld § 10(a) and
struck down § 10(c). One of the seemingly unresolved aspects
of Denver Consortium is the standard of scrutiny we should ap-
22(...continued)
single channel must be completely blocked by the cable
operator, and unscrambled only upon the written request
of an adult subscriber. Id. at § 76.701(b). Upon receiving
a subscriber's request, the operator must provide access to
the blocked channel within thirty days and, if that sub-
scriber later asks that the channel be re-blocked, the
operator must accommodate the subscribers request, again
within 30 days. Id. at § 76.701(c).
Section 10(c) is similar to § 10(a) but applies only to PEG
channels. It instructs the F.C.C. to enact regulations that
would permit a cable operator "to prohibit the use, on [a
cable system], of any channel capacity of any public,
educational, or governmental access facility for any
programming which contains obscene material, sexually
explicit, conduct, or material soliciting or promoting
unlawful conduct.” 1992 Cable Act, § 10(c).
23 Unlike leased and public access channels, the Graff and
Playboy networks are commercial premium channels. The
segregation of adult programming and the scrambling of
adult channel signals, which concerned the Court in
Denver Consortium, is, in the context of adult channels, a
commercial decision which MSOs have made in order to
limit access to those viewers who pay to subscribe to the
adult channels.
29a
ply in our analysis here. The plurality suggested that it was
“unwise and unnecessary" to decide whether a lower standard
of scrutiny, such as that applied in F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation,
438 U.S. 726 (1978), should apply in the cable context. Denver
Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2385. It was unnecessary to specify a
specific standard because § 10(b) could not pass constitutional
muster either under strict scrutiny or under a less rigorous
standard. And, it was unwise to declare a "rigid single stan-
dard" for fear of dampening the rapid rate of development in
the field of communications technologies.
The other five members of the Court suggested that strict
scrutiny remained the applicable standard where a law re-
stricted speech on the basis of its content. Thus, these mem-
bers of the Court would have required that the law be "nar-
rowly tailored" to achieve a “compelling” government interest
in order to survive constitutional review. Justice Thomas,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia believed
that all three challenged provisions of the 1992 Cabie Act were
constitutional and that even § 10(b) would survive strict
scrutiny. See id. at 2422, 2428-29 & 2432 (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, would have held to the contrary that strict
scrutiny was fatal to the challenged provisions and all three
should be struck down. See id. at 2405-07, 2416-17, & 2419
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In the
aftermath of the Denver Consortium decision, it is clear only
that we should apply either strict scrutiny or something very
close to strict scrutiny when a content-based law, applicable in
the cable television context, is challenged on grounds that it
violates the First Amendment.”
24 We recognize that several Supreme Court pluralities have
suggested that sexually explicit material receives less
protection under the First Amendment than, for exampic
artistically, politically, or scientifically valued forms of
speech. For example, in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
(continued...)
30a
However, whatever the standard of scrutiny, as Justice
Breyer stated for the Court in Denver Consortium: "The essence
of that protection is that Congress may not regulate speech
except in cases of extraordinary need and with the exercise of
2A(...continued)
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 49 L. Ed. 2d 310, 96 S. Ct. 2440 (1976), a
plurality of the Court explained:
Even though we recognize the First Amendment
will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic
materials that have some arguably artistic value, it
is manifest that society’s interest in protecting this
type of expression is of a wholly different, and
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled
political debate that inspired Voltaire’s immortal
comment ["I disapprove of what you say, but I will
defend to the death your right to say it."). Whether
political oratory or philosophical discussion moves
us to applaud or to despise what is said, every
schoolchild can understand why our duty to
defend the right to speak remains the same. But
few of us would march our sons and daughters off
to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Speci-
fied Sexual Activities” exhibited in the theatres of
our choice. Even though the First Amendment
protects communication in this area from total
suppression, we hold that the State may legitimate-
ly use the content of these materials as the basis for
placing them in a different classification ... .
id. at 70-71. This plurality also noted that "even within the
area of protected speech, a difference in content may
require a different governmental response.” Id. at 66. The
plurality opinion in Pacifica Foundation similarly suggested
that a lower standard of scrutiny may be appropriately
applied in certain contexts when the content of the
regulated material is offensive, vulgar, or shocking. See
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 744-48.
3la
a degree of care that we have not elsewhere required." Id. at
2384.
The first step that the majority took in Denver Consortium
was to scrutinize the statute to assure that it properly ad-
dressed "an extremely important problem, without imposing,
in light of the relevant interests, an unnecessarily great
restriction on speech. Id. at 2385. The Court defined the
problem as the protection of children from exposure to patent-
ly offensive depictions of sex. Id. it was to address this same
that Congress enacted § 505.
Section 505 differs, however, from the statute at issue in
Denver Consortium and from most statutes that are directed at
speech or at the regulations of speech in that the target of
§ 505 is not the speech itself, ie., sexually explicit adult
programming. The target is signal bleed, a secondary effect of
the transmission of that speech. Moreover, § 505 is directed at
this secondary effect because signal bleed is intruding into the
homes of television viewers who have chosen not to receive
the underlying sexually explicit programming.
This focus of § 505 on a secondary effect of speech leads us
to our next inquiry, whether § 505 is "content-based" or
“content- neutral.” See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). As we have noted, in Denver Consortium
five justices agreed that a content- based strict scrutiny
standard should apply. We conclude here, but not without
considerable deliberation, that § 505 should be treated as a
content-based restriction on speech. Even though § 505 is
aimed at the content-neutral objective of preventing signal
bleed, the section applies only when signal bleed occurs during
the transmission of "sexually explicit adult programming or
other programming that is indecent.” It does not apply when
signal bleed occurs on other premium channel networks, like
HBO or the Disney Channel. Thus, Congress targeted signal
bleed based on its sexually explicit content, rendering § 505 a
"content-based" restriction. We will therefore apply content-
based analysis.
32a
We must, however, also consider content in context. We
cannot ignore the fact that the households that receive signal
bleed have not subscribed to the adult channel which trans-
mits the unwanted images and sounds. Nor can we ignore the
fact that cable television is a means of communication which
is pervasive and to which children are easily exposed. The
Supreme Court has recognized that cable television is as ac-
cessible to children as over-the-air broadcasting, if not more so.
See Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2386.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in its consideration of free-
dom of speech under the First Amendment has recognized the
need to protect children from sexually explicit material,
particularly in the context of a pervasive medium. See Denver
Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2386 ("The provision before us comes
accompanied with an extremely important justification, one
that this Court has often found compelling -- the need to
protect children from exposure to patently offensive sex-related
material."); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 US.
115, 126 (1989) ("We have recognized that there is a compelling
interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being
of minors. This interest extends to shielding minors from the
influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards.");
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) ("It is evident
beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in
‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a
minor’ is “compelling.” (citation omitted)); Fabulous Assocs. Inc.
v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 896 F.2d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 1990) ("There
is little question that the interest of the state in shielding its
youth from exposure to indecent materials is a compelling state
interest.”).
Nor are the courts alone in finding that chi. en should be
protected from exposure to sexually explicit materials. In 1986,
the Attc ney General’s Commission on Pornography issued a
final report that reached similar conclusions regarding the
effects of “non-violent and non-degrading,” sexually explicit
materials on children. The Commission explained:
er |
33a
Perhaps the most significant potential harm in
this category exists with respect to children. We
all agree that at least much, probably most, and
maybe even all material in this category, re-
gardless of whether it is harmful when used by
adults only, is harmful when it falls into the
hands of children .. .. We have no hesitancy
in concluding that learning about sexuality
from most of the material in this category is not
the best way for children to learn about the
subject. There are harms both to the children
themselves and to notions of family control
over a child’s introduction to sexuality if chil-
dren learn about sex from the kinds of sexually
explicit materials that constitute the bulk of this
category of materials.
We have little doubt that much of this material
does find its way into the hands of children,
and to the extent that it does we all agree that
it is harmful. We may disagree about the extent
to which people should, as adults, be tolerated
in engaging in sexual practices that differ from
the norm, but we agree about the question of
the desirability of exposing children to most of
this material, and on that our unanimous
agreement is that it is undesirable.
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s Commission on
Pornography, July 1986, at 343-44 (Def.’s Ex. 80).*
25 In considering harm to children, we have not relied on the
study conducted by Government's expert witness, Dr.
Diana M. Elliott, Ph.D. See Diana M. Elliott, Children’s
Exposure to Pornography: Prevalence and Impact (Def.’s
Ex. 79). We understand, as she testified, that it would be
unethical to expose children to pornography in order to
test their reactions to sexually explicit material, but, for a
(continued...)
3a
As a result, we conclude that § 505 clearly addresses a
recognized "compelling interest,” and it remains only for us to
determine whether the provision is carefully tailored to serve
that end. For the reasons that we now develop, and particular-
ly
on the basis of the Supreme Court's ruling in F.C-C. v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), we hold that Congress
has adopted, at least in respect to § 505(b), a carefully tailored,
and constitutional, solution.”
25(...continued)
26
number of reasons, we have concerns regarding the
reliability of her methods and conclusions. Her results
strike us as anecdotal and possibly misleading. Because
the parties stipulated prior to the preliminary injunction
hearing that all evidence submitted would be admissible,
we did not consider the admissibility of her study under
the rules established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceu-
ticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469
(1993) and In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717
(3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1253 (1995). Instead,
the reliability concerns that the court had regarding Dr.
Elliott’s research were considered only in weighing the
evidence. We ultimately decided that her research should
not be given weight in coming to our present decision. If
plaintiffs plan to seek a hearing in order to request a
permanent injunction before this panel, it would be helpful
if the parties would provide the court with additional
evidence demonstrating the effects of sexually explicit
materials on children.
The Supreme Court held in an earlier "secondary effects"
decision, regarding the exposure of the unwilling viewer
nudity, that a city ordinance was invalid which barred the
exhibition in drive-in theaters of motion pictures in which
human male or female bare buttocks, human female bare
breasts, or human bare pubic areas were shown if the
motion picture was visible from any public street or public
(continued...)
35a
In Denver Consortium, a plurality of the Supreme Court
acknowledged that case’s similarity to Pacifica Foundation,
noting that, like the broadcast system at issue in Pacifica
Foundation, "cable television systems . . . ‘have established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.”
Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2386 (quoting Pacifica Founda-
tion, 438 U.S. at 748). It was largely the pervasive nature of
broadcast media that motivated the Court in Pacifica Foundation
to uphold governmental restrictions placed on radio broadcasts
of indecent material.
We wholeheartedly agree with the plurality’s finding in
Denver Consortium that cable television is now “uniquely
pervasive." Id. The plurality also noted that "cable television
broadcasting . . . is as ‘accessible to children’ as over-the-air
broadcasting if not more so." Id. Justice Souter further ex-
plained:
While we have found cable television different
from broadcast with respect to the factors justi-
fying intrusive access requirements under the
| rule in Red Lion [Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395
U.S. 367 (1969)], see Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. F.C.C., (512 U.S. 622 (1994)] (finding that
26(...continued)
place. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 45 L.
Ed. 2d 125, 95 S. Ct. 2268 (1975). We find the present case
distinguishable from Erznoznik in that it is not an occasion-
al glimpse of a portion of nude anatomy which is visible in
the signal bleed from adult channels, but instead it is an
unbroken continuum of sexually explicit sounds and
images, delivered without invitation to one’s home rather
than to passers-by on a public highway. We believe it is
likely that if the Jacksonville ordinance at issue in Erznoznik
had been directed solely at the display of 100% sexually
explicit films which were visible from the public street and
from private homes, the ordinance would have been held
to be valid.
36a
Red Lion's spectrum scarcity rationale had no
application to cable), today’s plurality opinion
rightly observes that the characteristics of
broadcast radio that rendered indecency partic-
ularly threatening in Pacifica, that is, its intru-
sion into the house and accessibility to children,
are also present in the case of cable television.
Id. at 2401-02 (Souter, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
There is no question that a commanding majority of
households in this nation subscribe to cable programming. As
a result of imperfect signal scrambling, millions of children
then have potential access not only to indecent sounds, similar
to those raising concern in Pacifica Foundation, but also to sexu-
ally explicit visual images. In the homes of families who do not
subscribe to sex-dedicated networks, these images enter as an
offensive pollutant. They invade the household and "confront{]
the citizen . . . in the privacy of the home, where the individ-
ual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amend-
ment rights of an intruder." Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 748;
see also Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2386 (plurality opinion).
In Pacifica Foundation, the Supreme Court found it undis-
puted that George Carlin’s "Filthy Words" monologue was
"vulgar,” “offensive,” and "shocking." 438 U.S. at 747. The Court
noted that, in the right context, the speech deserved First
Amendment protections, providing adult listeners with a right
to find Carlin’s observances funny and provocative, instead of
vulgar and offensive. The Court therefore examined the con-
text of the monologue, broadcast at 2 o’clock in the afternoon.
It emphasized the ubiquitous nature of broadcast radio and
recognized that airing Carlin’s performance at the time "could
have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an instant." Id. at 749.
Similarly, when cable signal bleed occurs, children may be
exposed to the sights and sounds of sexually explicit films and
other adult programming. Such programming has the potential
to affect not only a child’s vocabulary, but also his or her
capacity for inappropriate conduct that is sexual in nature. We
believe that the danger of prematurely exposing children to
37a
video and audio transmissions of graphic adult sexual behavior
is even more troublesome than the exposure to offensive
language that was at issue in Pacifica Foundation.
Indeed, the parties do not dispute that the government has
a well-established compelling interest in protecting children
from unsupervised exposure to sexually explicit material.
We then turn to the solution which Congress crafted in
§ 505. Congress provided MSOs with two alternative methods
of compliance with the section: (1) complete scrambling, or (2)
time-channeling the programming into safe-harbor hours.
Playboy and Graff argue that very few MSOs will be finan-
cially able to comply with § 505 by distributing expensive
equipment that will fully scramble the signals of sex-dedicated
networks as required by subsection (a). Plaintiffs fear that
MSOs will drop adult programming entirely, rather than invest
in technologies which will be made obsolete by the v-chip or
that MSOs will transmit plaintiffs’ networks for an unprofita-
bly short eight-hour period. Not only do the plaintiffs foresee
lost profits, they present the possibility of bankruptcy caused
by implementation of § 505.
There is undoubtedly a substantial expense involved in
complying with subsection (a). However, while an economic
burden may warrant consideration when weighing the relative
harms imposed by a law, economics alone cannot dictate the
result where constitutional rights are at issue. See Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 78 (1976) (Powell
concurring); Mitchell v. Comm’n on Adult Entertainment Establish-
ments, 10 F.3d 123, 144 (3d Cir. 1993).” Moreover, § 505 does
not require that MSOs shoulder potentially fatal economic
burdens. If the economic hardship imposed by subsection (a)
27 While we are aware that Young and Mitchell are zoning
cases, we consider that their holdings on economic impact
are relevant in that, as is the statute at issue in this case,
the regulations there were directed at competing concerns
of public welfare rather than at the speech itself.
38a
is too severe, an MSO is free to choose to comply with § 505
by time-channeling in accordance with subsection (b).
By including the time-channeling compliance option in
§ 505, Congress provided MSOs with decision-making flexi-
bility and an economically less restrictive alternative. We thus
find that the economic burden placed on MSOs by subsection
(a) is not determinative of the result in light of the substantial-
ly less expensive option provided by time-channeling in sub-
section (b). It follows therefore that if the time-channeling
alternative provides a constitutional means of compliance with
§ 505, then § 505 is constitutional.
Time-channeling was explicitly approved by the Supreme
Court as a constitutional restriction on pervasive indecent
speech in Pacifica Foundation. There, the Supreme Court found
that one of the most troubling aspects of the Carlin broadcast
was the early afternoon hour at which it was aired. Shown at
that time, the broadcast was “like a pig in a parlor instead of
the barnyard.” Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 750 (quoting
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)).
The F.C.C. opiruon challenged by the Pacifica Foundation did
not intend to ban future indecent broadcasts entirely but
merely sought to channel them into a safe-harbor period
during which significant numbers of children would not be
listening. Id. at 732 (citing 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976)). The Supreme
Court held that time-channeling was an appropriate response
to the problem presented. It therefore approved the F.C.C.
attempt to prevent the airing of offensive programming on a
pervasive form of communicatic ; at a time of day when
children were likely to be listening.
Because the Supreme Court endorsed a time-channeling
solution in very similar circumstances in Pacifica Foundation, we
believe that time-channeling also survives constitutional
scrutiny here. It is important to our reasoning that § 505 does
not seek to ban sexually explicit programming, nor does it
prohibit consenting adults from viewing erotic material on
premium cable networks if they so desire. It is clearly estab-
lished that a complete ban on indecent speech will rarely (if
39a
ever) be tolerated. See Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2387
(plurality opinion) (suggesting that § 10(a) passed constitu-
tional muster in part because it gave a cable operator the
flexibility to choose not to ban indecent broadcasts, but rather
“to rearrange broadcast times, better to fit the desires of adult
audiences while lessening the risks of harm to children); id. at
2423 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Certainly, under our current jurisprudence, Congress could
not impose a total ban on the transmission of indecent pro-
gramming."); Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 127 (holding
total ban on indecent telephone communications to be uncon-
stitutional and distinguishing the time-channeling remedy
approved in Pacifica Foundation on grounds that it "did not
involve a total ban on broadcasting indecent material."); Young,
427 U.S. at 70 (finding that the First Amendment protects
communication in the area of sexually oriented materials from
total suppression). The time-channeling alternative in § 505
explicitly allows MSOs to continue transmitting sex-dedicated
networks. Section 505 thus leaves the speaker and the listener
with an opportunity to maintain sufficient adult communica-
tion, while respecting the privacy interests of those who might
be offended or inappropriately exposed. We believe the law
thus strikes a permissible balance of constitutional interests.
The plaintiffs contend, nevertheless, that § 504 is a less
restrictive option which is available to provide protection from
signal bleed. They urge, therefore, that we declare § 505
invalid. However, the cost to MSOs of creating an adequate
shield from a widespread intrusion of signal bieed by supply-
ing converter/ lockboxes to households that don’t subscribe to
adult channels, would be close to the expense of providing
converter/lockboxes to non-subscribing households under
§ 505(a). The main difference is that under § 504 the household
has to request the box, while under § 505 the MSO must
40a
provide the box.¥ We have no evidence in the present record
that local cable operators or producers of sexually explicit
programming are advertising the free availability of the § 504
lockbox or other blocking devices upon demand. Likewise,
there is no evidence that parents are otherwise aware of the
§ 504 means of achieving complete blocking of undesired
channels. Upon this record, the government has demonstrated
an expectation that § 504 will not be a viable alternative.
Moreover, in view of the fact that children watch television
in the homes of their friends as well as in their own homes,
we do not find Congress to have been unreasonable in wish-
ing to extend protection from signal bleed beyond a child’s
own home.
Furthermore, Congress enacted, as one of the regulatory
options, time channeling, which the Supreme Court had in
Pacifica Foundation held to be an unconstitutionally acceptable
way of protecting children from a pervasive, sexually explicit
medium. Therefore, even if § 505(a) does not pass constitu-
tional analysis, § 505(b) does.
28 Plaintiffs also assert that Congress found, in § 551(a)(8) &
(9) of the Act, that there is a compelling governmental
interest in empowering parents to control the television
viewing by their children, such as by providing parents
with technological tools that allow them to easily block
violent, sexual or other programming that they believe
harmful to their children. Section 504 was one such
mechanism, and the development of v-chip technology will
be another. Congress recognized, as Senator Feinstein’s
remarks indicated, supra, that many parents are unaware
of the problem of sexually explicit signal bleed and its
accessibility to children of non-subscribers of sexually-dedi-
cated channels. The parental control option is viewed as
an adjunct of lesser efficacy because its exercise requires
knowledge and the taking of affirmative steps such as
requesting the blocking device from the MSO.
4la
Given the content of adult programming and the pervasive
nature of cable television, we find that § 505 is an acceptable
governmental response intended to prevent exposure of
minors to sexually explicit signal bleed. We therefore conclude
that plaintiffs have failed to show that they are likely to
succeed in their claim that the provision violates their First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech.”
C. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Jurisprudence
Likewise, plaintiffs have not persuaded us that they can
succeed on the merits of their claim that § 505 violates their
rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause. Playboy and
Graff argue that other premium channel networks carry
adult-oriented programming but that § 505 will not restrict the
speech of these networks. They claim, for example, that HBO
and Showtime present programming that is an equivalent to
the sexually oriented programming shown on the Playboy
networks and on Spice, and that this programming is shown
at hours outside of the safe-harbor period. They assert that
legislation directed at them, but not at these other premium
networks, denies them equal protection of the laws. See, e.g.,
News America Pub. Inc. v. F.C.C., 269 U.S. App. D.C. 182, 844
F.2d 800, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("The safeguards of a pluralistic
political system are often absent when the legislature zeroes in
on a small class of citizens.") (citing Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949)).,
There is, however, a significant difference between plain-
tiffs’ networks and the non-adult premium networks. The
plaintiffs admit that all of the programming shown on their
29 We are mindful that the Supreme Court in Denver Consor-
tium referred to the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
including specifically § 505, as "significantly less restrictive"
than § 10(b) of the 1992 Cable Act which they struck
down. See, e.g., 116 S. Ct. at 2392. However, since § 505
was not before the Court in Denver Consortium, this
reference is dictum.
SES ea ROS at aor an |
42a
networks -- in some cases, twenty-four hours per day -- is
“adult programming.” Transcript of Preliminary Injunction
Hearing 201-02 (D. Del. May 20, 1996) (testimony of Steven
Saril, Senior Vice President of Sales and Marketing for Graff);
see Deposition of Anthony J. Lynn, President of Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc. at 124-25 (Def.’s Ex. 72) (stating that
sexually explicit programming aired on AdulTVision “is at risk
of being defined as sexually explicit" under § 505); Plaintiff
Graff Pay-Per-View Inc.’s Answers to Defendants’ First Set of
Interrogs. at 6 (Def.’s Ex. 43) (responding that 100% of Graff's
progranuning contains material that is "sexually oriented"). On
the premium channels, however, sexually explicit shows consti-
tute only a fraction of the programming. For example, only
one sixteenth of the programming on the non-adult cable
channels on a Friday evening in Denver was sexually explicit.
Moreover, many of the shows constituting that one-sixteenth
were "R" rated movies with some sexually explicit scenes,
rather than being 100% sexually explicit. Thus, it cannot be
said that the non-adult channels, such as HBO and Showtime,
are "primarily dedicated" to sexually explicit programming.
Moreover, signal bleed from that one-sixteenth, if signal bleed
occurred, would not continuously present sexually explicit
scenes to the channel surfer.”
We find therefore that Congress was justified in initially
addressing the problem of sexually explicit signal bleed by
focusing on sex-dedicated networks. Section 505’s “differential
treatment” or plaintiffs’ networks is justified by their “special
characteristic’ of providing nothing but sexually explicit
programming intended for adult audiences. See Turner Broad-
casting, 114 S. Ct. at 2468. It is perfectly logical that Congress
would begin its attempt to prevent minors from gaining access
30 We note also that § 505 applies uniformly and without
discrimination to all networks that are "primarily dedicated
to sexually-oriented programming.” Pub. L. No. 104-104,
§ 505, 106 Stat. at *136 (1996) (emphasis added). The law
does not, for instance, favor Playboy over Graff.
43a
to programming intended solely for adults by focusing first on
the networks that specialize in adult-only programming.
"Congress need not deal with every problem at
once, and Congress "must have a degree of
leeway in tailoring means to ends." Denver
Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2393 (majority opinion)
(citing cf Semler v. Oregon Bd. Of Dental Examin-
ers, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935) and Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 102-03 (1973)); see also Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) ("Reform
may take one step at a time, addressing itself to
the phase of the problem which seems most
acute to the legislative mind."); United States v.
Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993)
(The Court does not "require that the Govern-
ment make progress on every front before it
can make progress on any front.”).
We find that the means chosen by Congress to protect
children and aid their parents was a permitted and measured
response to a national problem. The cause of the problem was
primarily traced to sex-dedicated networks and, understand-
ably, Congress began its efforts to address the problem by
focusing on those networks.” Congress thus made a logical
31 Furthermore, this is not a case involving governmental
discrimination against a Suspect class, nor is there any
evidence of arbitrary or invidious governmental conduct.
See, e.g., New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 US.
568, 592-93, 59 L. Ed. 2d 587, 99S. Ct. 1355 (1979). There-
fore, we apply rational basis review and ask whether the
alleged classification is “rationally related” to a "legitimate"
government interest. In our discussion of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, supra, we applied a much higher
standard of scrutiny and concluded that § 505 is constitu-
tional. We therefore hold that § 505 is not merely rational-
(continued...)
44a
distinction and tailored the law in an acceptable manner. As a
result, plaintiffs’ claim that § 505 will violate their right to
equal protection of the laws is likely to fail.
D. Vagueness Jurisprudence
After the Supreme Court's decision in Denver Consortium,
it is clear that plaintiffs’ vagueness claim will also fail on the
merits. Graff noted in its Memorandum of Law in support of
its Motion for a Preliminary Injunction that "the Supreme
Court has before it a similar vagueness challenge in the cable
indecency case,” citing Denver Consortium. At that time, argu-
ment had been heard by the Supreme Court in Denver
Consortium, but the decision was pending. When the Supreme
Court published its decision in that case, it flatly rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument that the provisions challenged were
unconstitutionally vague. Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at
2389-90. The Court concluded that similar terms had been
previously defined by courts and by the F.C.C. It also found
the language of the statute "similar to language previously
used by this Court for roughly similar purposes,” referring to
its decision in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), among
others. Id. at 2389. Thus, the use of accepted terms imbued the
statute with meaning.
In recent decisions, other members of the federal judiciary
have likewise found that the term “indecent” has, over time,
been sufficiently defined. See American Civil Liberties Union v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 865, 868 (Dalzell, J., concurring); Shea ex
rel. American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 935-36 (S.D.N.Y.,
1996). As pointed out recently by a three-judge panel in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, federal courts have approved the F.C.C.’s definition of
“indecency” and have rejected vagueness challenges to that
31(...continued)
ly related to a legitimate government interest, it is carefully
tailored to an interest that is widely regarded as compel-
ling.
45a
term in the context of broadcast media, commercial telephone
communications, and cable programming. See Shea, 930 F.
Supp. at 935-36. The court in Shea comprehensively reviewed
the precedent in this area, and we find their research and their
reasoning persuasive.
Therefore, we conclude that § 505 does not suffer from the
‘vice of vagueness." The plaintiffs clearly understood that the
law applied to them, and in the wake of this litigation, it is
clear that the F.C.C. would apply § 505 to MSOs that carry the
plaintiffs’ networks. Thus, the meaning and application of
§ 505 should be plain to MSOs as well. Playboy and Graff have
little-to-no chance of succeeding on the merits of a vagueness
claim.
VI. Conclusion
Plaintiffs have not satisfied the elements of the preliminary
injunction test. We will therefore remove the temporary
restraining order, which was previously granted by this court,
and we will deny plaintiffs request for preliminary injunctive
relief.
46a
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.,
GRAFF PAY-PER-VIEW INC.,
Plaintiffs, CONSOLIDATED ACTION
v. Civil Action No. 96-94/96-107 JJF
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, JANET RENO, Attorney
General, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION,
Defendants.
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
This 7th day of March, 1996 at 6:30 p.m., having
considered Plaintiff Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.’s
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order,
THE COURT FINDS that:
(1) Plaintiff has demonstrated it is likely to succeed
on the merits of its claim that Section 505 of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 violates the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution;
(2) Plaintiff has demonstrated it will suffer irrepara-
ble harm unless injunctive relief is granted;
(3) Defendants and others will suffer no harm from
the imposition of this Order; and
(4) the public interest supports this Order.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.’s Application is GRANT-
47a
ED. The United States of America, the United States De-
partment of Justice, Attorney General Janet Reno, the Feder-
al Communications Commission, and all their officers,
agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and anyone else
acting in concert with them are hereby enjoined from en-
forcing or implementing Section 505 of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 in any manner.
Unless previously ordered by this Court, this Order
shall remain in force only until the hearing and determina-
tion by the district court of three judges of Plaintiff's Motion
for Preliminary Injunction.
[S/ ae i
United States District Judge
48a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
Civil Action Nos. 96-94 & 96-107-]JF
Consolidated Action
PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.,
GRAFF PAY-PER-VIEW INC.,
PLAINTIFFS,
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JANET RENO,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION,
DEFENDANTS.
March 7, 1996, Decided
A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Katherine R. Witherspoon, of
MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL, Wilmington,
Delaware. Robert Corn-Revere, Jean S. Moore, Ronald J. Wiltsie,
Il, of HOGAN & HARTSON L.L.P., Washington, D.C. Burton
Joseph, of BARSY, JOSEPH & LICHTENSTEIN, Chicago,
Illinois. Attorneys for Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.
William D. Johnston, John W. Shaw, of YOUNG,
CONAWAY, STARGATT & TAYLOR, Wilmington,
Delaware. Charles S. Sims, John Siegal, of PROSKAUER ROSE
GOETZ & MENDELSOHN LLP, New York, New York.
Daniel Barsky, Jane Hatterer, New York, New York. Attorneys
for Graff Pay-Per-View Inc.
Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Gregory M.
Sleet, United States Attorney, Patricia C. Hannigan, Assistant
United States Attorney, of UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE, Wilmington, Delaware. Theodore C. Hirt, James J.
Gilligan, Sarah L. Wilson, of UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, Washington. D.C. Christopher J. Wright, Deputy
49a
General Counsel, Danie! M. Armstrong, Associate General
Counsel, of FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C. Attorneys for Defendants.
Joseph J. Farnan, Jr., District Judge
OPINION BY: Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.
OPINION: March 7, 1996
Wilmington, Delaware
Farnan, District Judge
[. INTRODUCTION
Presently before the Court is the Application for a
Temporary Restraining Order filed by Playboy Entertain-
ment Group, Inc. ("TRO") (D.I. 3). Pursuant to Rule 65 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Playboy seeks to
prevent Defendants the United States, the United States
Department of Justice, Attorney General Janet Reno, and the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") from imple-
menting or enforcing Section 505 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 (the “Act)’ pending a preliminary injunction
1 Subsequent to the filing of the instant action, Graff
Pay-Per-View, Inc. filed a similar action against Defendants.
See Graff Pay-Per-View v. Reno, CA. 96-107-JJF.
Simultaneously with the filing of its Complaint, Graff filed
an Unopposed Motion to Consolidate its action with the
instant action. The Court entered an Order granting
Graff's motion.
2 The Court will refer to the Defendants as _ the
“Government.”
at 47 US.C.A. § 641.
Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act will be codified
50a
hearing before a three-judgessaurt.* Playboy contends that
Section 505 of the Act violates the First Amendment and the
Equal Protection Guarantee of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States C unstitution. The Government opposes the
granting of a TRO on the grounds that Playboy has failed to
satisfy the TRO standards necessary to bar the enforcement
of an Act of Congress. (D.I. 21 at 3.) As provided in the Act,
Section 505 becomes effective on March 9, 1996, 30 days after
it was signed by the President.
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
Section 561 of the Act. This Opinion shall constitute the
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Il. BACKGROUND
A. Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
Section 505 provides in its entirety:
SCRAMBLING OF SEXUALLY EXPLICIT ADULT
VIDEO SERVICE PROGRAMMING.
(a) REQUIREMENT. In providing sexually explicit
adult programming or other programming that is
indecent on any channel of its service primarily
dedicated to sexually-oriented programming, a
multichannel video programming distributor shall
fully scramble or otherwise fully block the video and
audio portion of such channel so that one not a
subscriber to such channel or programming doe ; not
receive it.
(b) IMPLEMENTATION. Until a multichannel
video programming distributor complies with the
requirement set forth in subsection (a), the
distributor shall limit the access of children to the
4 Section 561 of the Act requires that facial challenges to the
Act's constitutionality must be heard by a district court of
three judges empaneled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284.
5la
programming referred to in that subsection by not
providing such programming during the hours of the
day (as determined by the Commission) when a
significant number of children are likely to view it.
(c) DEFINITION. As used in this section, the term
‘scramble’ means to rearrange the content of the
signal of the programming so that the programming
cannot be viewed or heard in an understandable
manner.
Section 505 requires a video programming distributor ("a
cable operator") to scramble "sexually explicit adult
programming or other programming that is indecent" which
is transmitted on a channel "primarily dedicated to sexually
oriented programming,” often referred to as an “adult
network." Section 505 requires that any such channel must
be fully scrambled regardless of whether scrambling has
been requested by the customer. If a cable operator does not
or cannot comply with this "blocking requirement," it is
prohibited from transmitting the adult channel program-
ming during hours of the day when minors are most likely
to view it. Section 505 provides that said hours shall be
determined by the FCC.’ Cable operators must be in full
compliance with the Section 505 blocking requirements by
March 9, 1996, or risk exposure to possible enforcement by
the Government and resulting penalties.
B. History of Section 505
The Telecommu
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