Jurisdictional Statement — Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States

Supreme Court brief1997

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|) No, 9661 108 JAN 101997

gfFIGE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

-

GRAFF PAY-PER-VIEW, INC..,

Appellant,

—Vi—

JANET RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL; THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA; THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE; AND THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION,

Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM A THREE-JUSTICE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

— ws —

_—~ —-

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

CHARLES S. SiMS

Counsel of Record

JOHN SIEGAL

Of Counsel: PROSKAUER ROSE GOETZ

& MENDELSOHN LLP

DANIEL BARSKY 1585 Broadway

Graff Pay-Per-View, Inc. New York, New York 10036

536 Broadway (212) 969-3000

New York, New York 10012

(212) 219-6204 Counsel for Appellant

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does section 505 of the Communications Decency Act of

1996, which regulates "indecent" and “sexually explicit adult"

programming on selected cable television channels by requiring

most cable systems either to make economically unjustifiable

technological upgrades or to “not provide" adult pay-per-view

programming except during an 8-hour period beginning at 10:00

p.m., and which would substantially diminish the adult viewership

of such programming, violate the First Amendment?

2. By regulating "sexually explicit adult programming" and

"indecent" programming on a handful of targeted cable television

channels while leaving other cable channels and other

communications media entering the home free to transmit the same

or comparable programming, does section 505 violate the First and

Fifth Amendments?

3. Does section 505 violate the First Amendment because it

subjects protected speech to unconstitutionally vague regulations?

LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 29.1 STATEMENT

In addition to the parties listed on the cover, Playboy

Entertainmen: Group inc. ("Playboy") is nominally an appellee.

Playboy’s interests are aligned with those of Graff Pay-Per-View

Inc. ("Graff"), and Graff's suit challenging section 505 in the

District Court was consolidated with Playboy's for hearing and deci-

sion. Playboy has filed a jurisdictional statement, No. 96-1034.

Graff has no parent company and no subsidiaries that are not

wholly-owned. Effective December 2, 1996, Graff's corporate name

was changed to Spice Entertainment Companies, Inc.

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I no i ak ae k's wb wk i

LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 29.1 STATEMENT ..... il

as oo ek se tab aawkve aa iV

EEE ee en ee eee ee l

I tes ek ere Se as ebb ew aes 2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND

REGULATIONS INVOLVED ................. 2

I a er es at eae MS 2

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE SUBSTANTIAL . 13

I. DAETC CONFIRMS THAT SECTION 505 VIOLATES THE

ET. i°.'. a l'n-s's carving d Wag hee eae 14

Il. THE DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT ACCORDED

IDENTICAL PROGRAMMING, DEPENDING ON THE

PROGRAMMER’S PREDOMINANT PROGRAMMING,

VIOLATES THE FIRST AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS .... 25

ee a ak i ews Cede om bes 30

APPENDIX

CE 7 Oe ten Pit auld 6 o's k < hoe wae Were la

ee ew ewe ea ean 2a

Opanion of the District Court ............2000.- 3a

Temporary restraining order issued by the

IE A a Re eae a a aaa aera 46a

Decision of the District Court granting the temporary

ee ee eee eae 48a

Order of the District Court staying enforcement of

section 505 pending appeal ............. 67a

Sections 504 and 505 of the Communications

CE so uaa ts kee s bv es to's Bee c03 68a

Interim Regulations Implementing

EE Fad eet tue ba CRRA Che eee 70a

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page(s)

Altmann v. Television Signal Corp., 849 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D.

Cel FID cc Seca cducuccaet yarns dette een 5

Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, Inc., 481 U.S. 221

1) [ee errr rs Terre aes eS 26

Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652

0 eer ere Per eee kT ee es 13

Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) 14, 26

Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)... ee ee eee ees 24-25

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)... - eee eee eee 14

Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). -- +. eee eee eee 26

Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,

439 U.S. 916 (1978). ccc crete eerverces 25

Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp.

1164 (D. Utah 1982) ... 2.2... ee ee eee ee eee 5

Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985) .......----- 5

Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v.

FCC. 116 S. Ct. Z374 (1996) 2. cc cee eee: passim

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) .....---6 ee eee eee 10

Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville,

Poe gts & 2). 0.) re ree se 18, 24-26

FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) .... 28

Vv

FCC vy. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) 11, 15-18, 24

First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85 .. 28

Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) ............ 25

Goldstein v. Manhattan Cable Television, Inc., No. 90 Civ.

4750, 1995 WL 562182 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1995) .... 5

Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987 (D. Utah

RIED Xe Se CAS Se ee ban Oe 5, 14

Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) ............. 27

Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) . 24

Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of

Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) ...........6-. 27, 28

Playboy Entertainment Group v. United States, 1996 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 17000 (D. Del. Nov. 8, 1996) ............. l

Playboy Entertainment Group v. United States,

918 F. Supp. $13 (D. Del. 1996) 2. kw ew cee: ]

Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, probable jurisdiction

noted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1996) ...... 14

Sable Commun. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC,

SOe Ele B08 CORO. iether EPR ee eee ae 14, 22

Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) ........... 26

Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) ....... 26

Turner Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. FCC,

SESS. GA Bee Case. cecal & ea hore Ree 14, 26

vi

Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc.,

rCORIE@ 0), SPerrererrrrr rr eres 24

Wilkinson v. Jones, 480 U.S. 926 (1987) ........-.4.. 5, 14

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

738 Cosy, Aste. fT iicxceee es Cbaecet bese beers: 2

STATUTES AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS:

Section 504 of the Communications Decency Act, Pub. L.

No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 136 (1996) (to be codified at

47 USL. § GED) oc sccccteteedosicetertces passim

Section 505 of the Communications Decency Act, Pub. L.

No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 136 (1996) (to be codified at

47 U.S.C. § G41) occ ccc es eervewestsecun passim

Section § 551(a)(4) of the Communications Decency Act, Pub. L.

1064-304. 480 Beet, 848 i doe cb cess ts curb binvenees 26

y RUS Tomo): Reon ete Pe ee ee 2

47 UBC. § SAME) noc nine vn tdedecstupucetenas 5

In re Implementation of Section 505 of the Telecommunications

Act of 1996, 11 FCC Red. 5386 (1996) ............ 2

Statistical Abstrast of the United States 1995, Dep’t of

Commerce, Bureau of Census (115 ed. Sept. 1995) ....... 17

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

GRAFF PAY-PER-VIEW INC.,

Appellant,

—v.—

JANET RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL; THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA; THE UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;

AND THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM A THREE-JUDGE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

—=—[—=—==—=======——oo———>_—=__[{=_"_[{_—_=>—=—=—===—=—-2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Appellant Graff Pay-Per-View Inc. ("Graff") respectfully submits

this jurisdictional statement to docket its appeal from the November

8, 1996 order of a three-judge district court denying Graff's motion

for a preliminary injunction to restrain the implementation and

enforcement of section 505 of the Communications Decency Act of

1996.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion and order of the three-judge court denying Graff's

motion for a preliminary injunction are published at 1996 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 17000 (D. Del. November 8, 1996), and reprinted in the

appendix infra (“JS App.”) at 2a and 3a.

The opinion granting a temporary restraining order is published

at 918 F. Supp. 813 and reprinted below at 48a. The TRO is

reprinted at 46a.

The subsequent order of December 5, 1996, granting plaintiffs’

motions to stay enforcement of § 505 pending appeal, is

unpublished and reprinted below at 67a.

JURISDICTION

The three-judge court denied Graff's motion for a preliminary

injunction on November 8, 1996, and Graff's notice of appeal was

filed on November 12, 1996. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 confers jurisdiction

on this Court over any appeal "from an order .. . denying, after

notice and hearing, an interlocutory . . . injunction in any civil

action . . . required by any Act of Congress to be heard and

determined by a district court of three judges." Section 561 of the

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, required

this action to be heard "by a district court of 3 judges... .”

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,

STATUTES, AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress shall make no law .. .

abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press... . .”

Section 505 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub.

L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 136 (1996), will be codified at 47 U.S.C.

§ 641 and is reproduced below at 68a.

The implementing regulations of the Federal Communications

Commission (“FCC”), Jn re Implementation of Section 505 of the

Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Red. 5386, are published

at 61 Fed. Reg. 9648 (March 11, 1996) and reproduced below at

70a.

STATEMENT

Section 505 of the Communications Decency Act (“§ 505” or

“the CDA”) is highly similar to § 10(b) of the Cable Television

Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (the "1992 Cable

Act"), which this Court closely scrutinized and struck down last

term in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium

v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996) ("DAETC”"). Because the CDA

interferes even more substantially than § 10(b) did with the ability

of adults to access speech they would otherwise obtain, the reasons

that led this Court in DAETC to closely scrutinize and strike down

§ 10(b) are determinative here as well.

OY ey SP ee So e+

3

Section 10(b) was presumptively invalid because of its "obvious

restrictive effects," which the Court identified as the likely reduction

of impulse viewership, its interference with the privacy interests of

viewers who choose to watch "indecent" programming, and the

adverse costs and burdens it imposes on cable operators. DAETC,

116 S. Ct. at 2391.

Also counting against § 10(b) were the special burdens and costs

it imposed on the cablecast of specified programming, which were

likely "to encourage [the] operator to ban programming that the

operator would otherwise permit to run... .” Jd.

After reviewing conceivable alternatives, the Court concluded that

§ 10(b) does not reveal

the caution and care that the standards underlying these

various verbal formulas impose upon laws that seek to

reconcile the critically important interest in protecting

free speech with very important, or even compelling,

interests that sometimes warrant restrictions.

DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2392.' The government had merely said —

but had not proved — that subscriber-initiated blocking or lockboxes

were an inadequate solution to the problem of children accessing

adult programming: "the reasons [offered by the government] do not

show need for a provision as restrictive as the one before us." 116

S. Ct. at 2393.

In striking down § 10(b)’s blocking provision, this Court made

plain that the required scrutiny is not a loose balancing of "sexually

explicit speech" against "protection of children" in which the latter

always wins, but rather a demanding insistence that less restrictive

means be employed in preference to more restrictive ones:

' The Court’s reference in DAETC to the Communications Decency Act

as a less-restrictive alternative to § 10(b) does not prejudge the merits of

plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge. This Court expressly noted in DAETC

that "we cannot, and do not, decide whether the new provisions are

themselves lawful (a matter not before us)." 116 S. Ct. at 2392.

4

No provision, we concede, short of an absolute ban,

can offer certain protection against assault by a deter-

mined child. We have not, however, generally allowed

this fact alone to justify reducing the adult popula-

tion... to... only what is fit for children’. . . . But,

leaving that problem aside, the Solicitor General’s list

of practical difficulties would seem to call, not for

"segregate and block" requirements, but rather for

informational requirements, for a simple coding system,

for ready availability of blocking equipment (perhaps

accessible by telephone), for imposing cost burdens

upon system operators (who may spread them through

subscription fees); or perhaps even for a system that re-

quires lockbox defaults to be set to block certain

channels (say, sex-dedicated-channels).

DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2392 (citations omitted).

Section 505 is subject to precisely those same criticisms, and the

three-judge court’s refusal to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of

§ 505 ignored this Court’s teachings.

1. Prior to 1992, Congress appeared to recognize that the First

Amendment prohibited for cable television the content regulation

that had been narrowly upheld as permissible for broadcast speech.

By abstaining from legislating content restrictions on cable

television, Congress acknowledged that the justifications for

restricting broadcast speech do not extend to the delivery of cable

television programming which can be more narrowly targeted and

controlled than universally available over-the-air broadcast signals.

Indeed, Congress affirmed this distinction by empowering

consumers to selectively block specific cable channels through the

use of lockboxes as provided for in the 1984 Cable Act. 47 U.S.C.

§ 544(d)(2). Until 1992, Congress did not attempt to prohibit or

.

5

otherwise regulate indecent speech on cable systems, and courts

repeatedly struck down local legislation enacted for that purpose.’

In DAETC, this Court invalidated Congress’s first attempt to

directly regulate cable "indecency." The only exception was one

provision, §10(a) of the 1992 Cable Act, that did not directly

regulate or necessarily affect any programming, but only gave back

to cable operators a portion of the editorial discretion that federal

law had previously taken from them and given to cable program-

mers.

2. Section 505 requires that "indecent" or "sexually explicit adult

programming" on any channel "primarily dedicated to sexually-

oriented programming” must be "fully scramble[d] or otherwise fully

block[ed]" so that one not a subscriber to such programming does

not receive it. JS App. 68a. Until or unless a cable system acquires

the technical means of fully scrambling or blocking the full audio

and video signal of such programming on such channels,

transmission is to be prohibited "during the hours of the day . . .

when a significant number of children are likely to view it," JS App.

68a, which the FCC has determined to be 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.

JS App. 70a.

Section 505 was adopted by the Senate and incorporated into the

conference committee bill that the President signed without any

legislative findings to support its restrictions. As the District Court

noted when it temporarily restrained enforcement of § 505 (JS App.

64a):

Prior to DAETC, courts had unanimously held that restrictions on

“indecent” cable programming violate the First Amendment. E..,

Wilkinson v. Jones, 480 U.S. 926 (1987) (mem.), aff’g 800 F.2d 989 (10th

Cir. 1986), aff’g 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985). See also Goldstein

v. Manhattan Cable Television, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 4750, 1995 WL 562182

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1995); Altmann v. Television Signal Corp., 849

F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir.

1985); Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164

(D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987

(D. Utah 1982).

6

[T]here is an absolute void of legislative findings that

Section 505 is necessary to protect minors from

exposure to sexually oriented material shown on adult

cable channels which their parents have chosen not to

subscribe to... .

Indeed, the Senate adopted § 505 without hearings or debate,

even though both the Heuse bill (H.R. 1555) and the Senate bill (S.

652) already contained provisions requiring that any cable channel

— without regard to content but certainly including those selected

for regulation by § 505 — be fully scrambled or blocked to a

consumer's home on request (§ 504) and that a ratings system and

blocking technology (the V-Chip) be implemented. In support of

§ 551 (the V-Chip requirement), Congress expressly found that:

Providing parents with timely information about the

nature of upcoming video programming and with the

technological tools that allow them easily to block

violent, sexual or other programming that they believe

harmful to their children is a nonintrusive and narrowly

tailored means of achieving that compelling

governmental interest.

CDA § 551(a)(9). Despite the carefully-crafted, less-restrictive

alternatives contained in the same legislation, as well as the pre-

existing lockbox requirement, all of which afford parents the ability

to control the sounds and images that enter their homes, Congress

nevertheless adopted and the President signed into law the far more

restrictive scramble or time-channel requirement of § 505 that

applies to all homes in America, whether children live there or not,

regardless of the viewing preferences of the adults in the household.

3. Graff and Playboy, cable programmers whose programming

was targeted by § 505, each brought suit to challenge this

substitution of governmental for parental control, and the actions

were consolidated. The District Court issued a temporary restraining

order enjoining implementation and enforcement of § 505 on March

7, 1996, holding inter alia that there exits "serious and substantial

questions as to whether the blocking and FCC time requirements

imposed on cable operations by § 505 . . . constitute the least

restrictive means of achieving the Government’s interest in

‘

:

:

regulating the accessibility of adult programming to minors." JS

App. 62a.

After expedited discovery, the District Court held a three day

hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. At the

hearing, the parties presented extensive expert testimony and other

evidence concerning the impact of § 505 and various available

methods of complying with its full scrambling or blocking require-

ment.

Graff and Playboy demonstrated that the conduits who transmit

their speech to the paying public, cable system operators ("MSOs"),

would seek to comply by using the "safe-harbor," under which they

would simply "not provide" plaintiffs’ programming for 16 hours a

day ("time-channeling") — not through expensive technological

upgrades. Plaintiffs further showed, without any contrary evidence,

* that time-channeling would likely reduce viewership in those

systems by 30%;°

* that an alternative means that the government had suggested

for MSOs to comply, "double scrambling with a positive

;

Based on "[a]verage buy curves for adult services," TCI, the nation’s

largest cable operator, estimated "that 30% of adult programming buys

would be lost by limiting coverage to 10 p.m.-6.a.m." Graff Trial Exhibit

5, a memorandum from a TCI executive to local system operators, dated

February 26, 1996 (the "TCI Memo”).

8

trap,"* would reduce viewership by even more, likely in the

50% range in affected systems;° and

* that few if any MSOs would choose to comply by that route

because the costs of doing so are not warranted by

foreseeable revenues, particularly in view of the sharply

reduced viewership caused by elimination of the opportunity

for "impulse” viewing which is a prime characteristic of adult

pay-per-view programming.°

Responding to the government’s simplistic suggestion that viewers

who would otherwise obtain pay-per-view programming before 10

p.m. could continue to do so by using their VCRs, plaintiffs

demonstrated that the technical requirements for purchasing pay-per-

* The District Court described "[djouble scrambling with positive trap'

technology” a* follows (JS App. 22a):

To achieve double scrambling, RF or baseband scrambling is

combined with a jamming signal at the headend. The headend

jamming completely blocks video and audio so that no signal

bleed occurs in the homes of non-subscribers. In order for a

subscriber to view programming that has been double

scrambled, the subscriber needs both a positive trap and an

addressable converter. The positive trap filters out the

interference from the jamming signal, and the addressable

converter descrambles the RF or baseband scrambling. The

addressable converter can be used to start up and end periods of

premium service and also to permit pay-per-view reception.

> Several TCI systems that had installed double scrambling technology

experienced, on average, a 50% reduction in buy rates of adult

programming. See TCI memo cited at note 3 supra; see also JS App. 23a.

* Based on uncontroverted evidence that currently non-compliant cable

systems would opt to implement time-channeling as the only means of

compliance that ensures no risk of violation and that does not require

substantial capital costs, the District Court found that:

The MSOs that have taken a position on the method by

which they would comply with § 505 have all announced

that they would adopt time channeling.

JS App. 24a.

9

view programming generally render that impossible (e.g., because

the order must be placed contemporaneously from a telephone in the

home where the program is to be delivered, and a viewer who

working a night shift or asleep cannot make such a call).

The government offered no evidence whatsoever to contradict

plaintiffs’ proof (a) that MSOs would in fact choose to comply by

means of time-channeling, not double scrambling with a positive

trap, and (b) that both means of compliance would drastically curtail

viewership — by 30% and 50%, respectively. (Moreover, those

estimates are highly conservative, since they ignore the probability

that MSOs will substitute non-adult programming on channels

presently occupied by Graff.)’ Instead, the government’s case

depended almost entirely on evidence of the technological feasibility

of "double scrambling with a positive trap," regardless of its

economic impracticality. While the two technical experts presented

by the government contended that MSOs could, as a technical

matter, use double scrambling with a positive trap to comply with

the CDA, neither purported to have any knowledge or expertise

concerning whether MSOs would select double scrambling with a

positive trap in preference to time channeling, given its far higher

direct costs and much more adverse impact on viewership, or any

information about viewership impacts.

The District Court found that although double scrambling with a

positive trap was the "most workable alternative" from a technical

point of view, it entailed significant implementation costs ($7 for

parts and approximately $35 for labor per household plus $750 to

’ Undisputed evidence showed a substantial likelihood that many MSOs,

faced with "dead" channels for 16 hours each day, the resulting loss of

30% of present revenues, and cable programmers vying for channel

capacity, would likely cancel their agreements with plaintiffs (or not renew

them) and program other programming instead. For the same reasons,

time-channeling will reduce the number of systems entering into carriage

contracts with plaintiffs for the first time, since the content-based limitation

of carriage to 8 hours a day (most after midnight) severely impairs the

attractiveness to MSOs of plaintiffs’ programs as compared to those of

other programmers.

10

$1,000 for each system headend, JS App. 22a), “interferes with the

spontaneous nature of . . . the impulse purchasing" that drives the

pay-per-view business, JS App. 22a, and “raises privacy concerns"

because requesting a positive trap, which would be required in order

to access Graff's programming, will result in "[t]he ~ew subscriber

[being] identified as a consumer of sexually explicit material." Jd.

Since the record was undisputed that the MSOs which had

announced how they would comply would do so by time-channeling

(JS App. 24a), the court properly considered § 505’s consti-

tutionality on the understanding that MSOs not presently in com-

pliance would time-channel plaintiffs’ programming. Graff

estimated, based on MSO analyses and its own experience, that

time-channeling would reduce Graff's viewership and resulting

revenues in affected systems by approximately 30 percent."

4. Despite its evident agreement that time-channeling would

cause some reduction in viewership, and the lack of any evidence

disputing the assessment of MSOs that the reduction would be

roughly 30%, the District Court nevertheless denied the motions for

a preliminary injunction on November 8, 1996 in a decision by

Judge Roth. It did so by holding that lost viewership pendente lite

is not irreparable harm unless plaintiffs are also likely to succeed on

the merits, and by deeming plaintiffs’ lost revenues irrelevant to the

irreparable injury assessment, even though they would be

* Although the District Court was "skeptical" that Graff would lose fully

30% of its viewership nationally upon implementation, noting that some

MSOs are already in compliance (JS App. 22a n.19), whether Graff's

overall revenues (and viewership) would be reduced by that amount is

irrelevant for present purposes. The relevant inquiry is whether § 505 will

prevent willing viewers in particular systems from obtaining programming

that they would otherwise obtain, not the overall viewership reduction

nationally. Any “loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal

periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Filrod vy.

Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74 (1976). A law permitting sale of The New

York Times in Manhattan only from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. surely would be

held to cause irreparable harm and to violate the First Amendment.

OS ae en ll a Biot

1]

unrecoverable if the CDA were eventually struck down. JS App. 25a

& n.20.

On the merits, the District Court believed it could hold time-

channeling constitutional in this context because of FCC v. Pacifica

Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), regardless of the differences in

transmission mode — and, therefore, blocking possibilities —

between the over-the-air radio broadcast presented in Pacifica and

the cable delivery at issue here. JS App. 38a-40a.’

The government offered no evidence that the less restrictive

alternatives to § 505 already contained in federal law are infeasible,

yet the cour: below so held without any evidentiary support. For

instance, the District Court "viewed" the parental contro] measures

enacted in § 504 (blocking-on-request) and § 551 (the V-chip and

ratings system) "as an adjunct of lesser efficacy because its exercise

requires knowledge and the taking of affirmative steps," JS App.

40a, n.28, without any evidence of their actual inefficacy, .ithout

any trial period in which these newly enacted safeguards can be

tried and without any consideration of the ways that this Court listed

in DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2392, for enhancing the efficacy of

information and blocking types of parental control mechanisms.

Rather, the District Court simply assumed, contrary to the

legislative intent behind § 504, § 551 and the 1992 Cable Act at

issue in DAETC, as well as the prescriptions of this Court’s First

Amendment jurisprudence, that parental control is so ineffective that

governmental control is warranted. The District Court had no

evidence of inefficacy, and did not appear to consider (as this Court

had in DAETC) that, if parental control mechanisms are in fact of

"lesser efficacy," then the least-intrusive and most effective means

of raising their efficacy is to publicize their availability and

desirability.

° The FCC made the same assumption, concluding that judicial approval

of time-channeling in the broadcast context was a satisfactory basis for

upholding time-channeling cable programming regardless of the different

blocking mechanisms available to households seeking to employ them.

Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Red. 5386, 5387

(1996).

12

The District Court’s view that voluntary parental blocking

approaches are necessarily ineffective rested on its assumption that

for § 504 to achieve the appropriate level of "efficacy," ail

households in presently non-compliant systems that do not subscribe

to adult channels would have to be equipped with lockboxes or

converters capable of fully blocking the targeted channels. JS App.

39a. There was no basis for that assumption in the statute, the

evidentiary record or logic. The government presented no evidence

suggesting any necessity for blocking or time-channelling

programming in every home in the nation regardless of whether

children reside there, or whether adults in a given residence feel the

need for government-compelled insulation from "signal bleed" —

with all the expense and viewership reduction that blocking or time-

channelling in every home would entail.

Similarly, in holding that

in view of the fact that children watch television in the

homes of their friends as well as in their own homes,

we do not find Congress to have been unreasonable in

wishing to extend protection from signal bleed beyond

a child’s own home,

the District Court ignored that the homes of minor children and their

friends comprise less than a majority of American households. JS

App. 40a.

5. Graff promptly filed a notice of appeal and simultaneously

moved for an injunction against implementation of § 505 pending

this Court’s disposition of its appeal. On December 5, 1996, the

District Court enjoined enforcement of § 505 until final disposition

in this Court. JS App. 67a.

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE SUBSTANTIAL

Section 505 is a content-based and speaker-based regulation of

speech subject to the "strictest" First Amendment review or, at a

minimum, to a still "strict" review requiring that it be no more

13

extensive than necessary.'® In denying a preliminary injunction

against the implementation of § 505, and holding that plaintiffs’

First Amendment challenge was unlikely to succeed, the three-judge

court emptied strict scrutiny of any real content. The decision

effectively reversed the burdens the First Amendment imposes on

the government to justify content-based regulation of speech, and ig-

nored congressional findings that "[p]roviding parents with timely

information ... and with the technological tools that allow them

easily to block violent, sexual, or other programming that they

believe harmful to their children is a nonintrusive and narrowly

tailored means" of advancing the government’s interest. CDA

§ 551(aX(9).

In contrast to the low hurdle that the District Court found strict

scrutiny posed, this Court has not upheld on strict scrutiny a single

statute challenged as violative of free speech in three decades, with

the exception of two decisions emphasizing the unique concern for

avoiding corruption of the political process.'' This Court’s recent

decisions concerning the regulation of cable television, and

especially its opinion in DAETC striking down 6-3 a highly similar

statutory provision requiring cable operators to block "indecent"

cable programming absent an express request for that programming,

on the ground that there was no proof that less restrictive means

were not available, are irreconcilable with the decision below.

I.

DAETC CONFIRMS THAT SECTION 505

VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT

A statute that imposes content-based restrictions on protected

speech, as § 505 does, is unconstitutional unless the government

proves that it is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling

governmental interest. Sable Commun. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492

0 DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2391.

'' Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1989);

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

14

U.S. 115, 126 (1989). In addition, "the government may not

‘reduce the adult population . . . to reading only what is fit for

children’... [t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox for

television set] simply cannot be limited to that which would be

suitable for a sandbox." Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463

U.S. 60, 73-74 (1983) (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,

383 (1957)).

The undisputed record below establishes that a sizeable number

of cable systems around the nation presently lack the technical

capability to meet § 505’s "blocking or scrambling to full

unintelligibility" standard reliably. The record further showed

without contrary evidence that the technological means for

complying are either presently unavailable or, to the extent

available, so grossly uneconomic that most MSOs are highly

unlikely to use them in the near future, given the alternative means

available of escaping liability (namely, time-channeling or simply

See also Turner Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459

(1994) (where every member of the Court agreed that content-based

regulations of cable television are subject to "the most exacting scrutiny");

Wilkinson v. Jones, 480 U.S. 926 (1987) (mem.), aff’g 800 F.2d 989 (10th

Cir. 1986), aff'g 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985).

Justice Breyer and three other members of the Court found it

unnecessary to decide in DAETC whether the "strictest" First Amendment

standard, or a "somewhat less 'strict'" standard, applied to the statute

under review. Although § 505 would similarly fail either standard, the

strictest test should apply because Sable, Turner, and Wilkinson so held

and five members of the Court in DAETC agreed that strict scrutiny pro-

perly applied. See 116 S. Ct. at 2404-2419 (Kennedy and Ginsburg, J.J.),

and 116 S. Ct. at 2419-2432 (Thomas and Scalia, J.J., and Rehnquist,

C.J.). Presumably, any remaining doubt on that issue will be resolved by

Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, No. 96-51 1, probable jurisdiction

noted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1996).

Given the enormous range of speech that local, state, and federal

employees and entities could term "indecent," and the vague,

offensiveness-based definition that provision has been afforded, subjecting

such decisions only to intermediate scrutiny is inconsistent with the

freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.

——

15

replacing adult pay-per-view with programming not covered by

§ 505). JS App. 24a. Indeed, every MSO that announced its

compliance plans said it would comply by time-channeling. Jd.

The District Court therefore correctly treated the issue as whether,

in systems not presently in compliance, a governmental prohibition

on cablecast of "sexually explicit adult programming" or "other

indecent programming" except during a narrow 8-hour period late

at night when most viewers are asleep passes strict scrutiny. JS App.

38a.

The court erred, however, both in its approach to answering that

question and in the answer it reached, each of which is contrary to

the teachings of DAETC and its predecessors.

1. Despite a verbal commitment to strict scrutiny, the District

Court’s holding resulted not from the analysis required by DAETC

but from a simplistic analogy to Pacifica:

Because the Supreme Court endorsed a time-channeling

solution in very similar circumstances in Pacifica

Foundation, we believe that time-channeling also

survives constitutional scrutiny here.'*

JS App. 38a.

If strict scrutiny means anything, it necessarily requires close

attention in the less restrictive means analysis to facts and context.

Those were ignored when the court accepted the government’s

argument that "[for] purposes of indecency regulation, the cable

medium cannot be distinguished from broadcasting," and treated

time-channeling as a matter of simply analogizing to Pacifica

3 See also JS App. 40a ("Congress enacted, as one of the regulatory

options, time channeling, which the Supreme Court had in Pacifica

Foundation held to be a constitutionally acceptable way of protecting

children from a pervasive, sexually explicit medium. Therefore, even if

§ 505(a) does not pass constitutional analysis, § 505(b) does.").

16

regardless of the differences between broadcast and cable technol-

ogy.'*

Pacifica did not adopt any less-than-strict standard for indecent

speech generally, or indecent speech accessible on a television set;

to the contrary, Justice Powell’s concurrence made plain the lack of

any majority for so doing (438 U.S. at 761-62), as did both Justice

Kennedy’s concurrence in DAETC (116 S.Ct. at 2415-16) and

Justice Breyer’s plurality (116 S.Ct. at 2391). Pacifica expressly

rested on the premise that "of all forms of communication . . .

broadcasting [ ] has received the most limited First Amendment

protection." 438 U.S. at 748. The Court expressly noted that its

decision was based on the "context" of the broadcast medium, and

that a different result might have been reached if non-broadcast

("closed-circuit") transmission had been involved. 438 U.S. at 750.

Moreover, the nature of radio transmission left the FCC with no

less restrictive alternatives insofar as Pacifica’s broadcast of the

Carlin monologue was concerned. Pacifica could not have, and did

not, address the alternatives afforded by the far more extensive

capabilities of cable technology, which render § 505 far from the

least restrictive alternative and far more extensive than necessary.

The Pacifica Court surely did not decide that it is "necessary," in

order to protect children from access to audio bleed, to censor adult

pay-per-view programming from every cabled household in every

non-compliant system in the nation for the sixteen hours daily when

most persons are awake, even though

° roughly two-thirds of the nation’s households are

comprised only of adults and lack any minor children,"®

and

° specific cable channels, unlike broadcast channels, can be

easily excluded from individual households on a

'* Defendants’ Post-Hearing Mem. at 15 n.6 (July 12, 1996); see also n.9

supra.

'S Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995, Dep’t of Commerce,

Bureau of Census (115 ed. Sept. 1995).

17

household-by-household (or even television-by-television)

basis.

If roughly two-thirds of the nation’s households house no minor

children, how can it be "necessary" to turn off adult pay-per-view

for sixteen hours daily in each of those homes when concerned par-

ents can eliminate access to signal bleed by a simple request for

blocking (which under § 504 must be accomplished 2 he cable

operator’s expense), and when the government’s own witnesses

confirmed that blocking on request worked even before enactment

of § 504?° The court below did not make those findings of

necessity and narrow tailoring; indeed, it failed even to make the

inquiry, concluding instead that, based on Pacifica, § 505 was not

"unreasonable" and was “an acceptable governmental response" as

a matter of settled law. JS App. 40a-4la.

Given the technological susceptibility of cable television (unlike

broadcast television or radio) to household-by-household (and indeed

television-by-television) blocking, DAETC and this Court’s prior

First Amendment jurisprudence required the government not merely

to cite Pacifica, but to shoulder the burden of proving that time-

channelling was the least restrictive means available, or no more

restrictive than necessary. To prevail, the government had to show

that the congressional goal of aiding parental supervision and pro-

'6 Of the four witnesses with anecdotal evidence presented by the

government, Beth Mahlo confirmed that her cable system provided a

lockbox the same day she requested it, without charge; Anthony Snesko

confirmed that his cable company makes lockboxes available, and notifies

subscribers by post card that this option can block programming deemed

offensive; Frank Allen, Jr. confirmed that his cable company installed a

blocking device after he complained; and Ann Harris testified that her

cable operator would have immediately blocked the unwanted material

from her television (as it in fact did the next day) but that she asked to

delay installation of the blocking device so that she could make the

videotape that the government introduced into evidence. See Mahlo Decl.

€ 7 and Mahlo Dep. Tr. 16-17; Snesko Dep. Tr. 51-52; Allen Dep. Tr.

19; and Harris Dep. Tr. 22-23. There was no evidence that any parent

who sought blocking on request was not able to obtain it promptly and

effectively even before enactment of § 504, which now mandates it.

18

tecting children could not likely be effectively served by giving

cable subscribers the tools to block any unwanted channel and the

information to enable them to use those tools.

Proper consideration of plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge

requires holding § 505 invalid for the same reasons that this Court

in DAETC invalidated § 10 of the 1992 Cable Act: in both cases,

arming parents with tools to eliminate unwanted signals, as now

required by § 504 of the CDA, perhaps with an added informational

requirement, is a substantially less restrictive alternative than the

heavy-handed, viewership-reducing blocking requirements also

mandated by Congress. Cf. Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422

U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975).

The record here leaves unanswered the same questions asked by

the plurality in DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2392:

* Why, if customer-initiated blocking "adequately protect{s]

children from “patently offensive" material broadcast on

ordinary channels . . would [it] not offer adequate protection

from similar material" on adult premium channels?

* Why would informational requirements and the ready availa-

bility of customer-initiated blocking equipment (perhaps

accessible by telephone) not offer adequate protection?

* If costly technological fixes are mandated, why should

legislation requiring them be drafted to produce the

imposition of such costs on adult programming services only

(thereby deterring cable systems from carrying them), rather

than on all programming services carrying programming that

could cause the same kind of harm (thereby severely reducing

the harmful First Amendment impact)?"’

* Why wouldn’t amending the lockbox provision to require

"lockbox defaults to be set to block certain channels" (say,

sex-dedicated channels) be a less restrictive alternative?

” See Point Il infra.

19

Because the government had no answers to those questions, the

record precluded any conclusion that the restrictions at hand "are a

narrowly, or reasonably, tailored effort to protect children." Rather,

§ 505 is overly restrictive, "sacrificing" important First Amendment

interests for too "speculative a gain." DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2394.

Indeed, Congress virtually concluded as much when it found that

Providing parents with timely information about the nature

of upcoming video programming and with the

technological tools that allow them easily to block violent,

sexual, or other programming that they believe harmful to

their children is a nonintrusive and narrowly tailored

means of achieving that compelling governmental interest.

CDA § 551(a)(9).

Notably, a combination of programming information and

blocking-on-request (now compelled by § 504) is likely to be even

more effective than it was in the context of leased access pro-

gramming — where that combination was nonetheless so presump-

tively effective that, in the absence of contrary proof, the

government was found to have failed to meet its burden of

justification. The reason is that a cable subscriber who chooses to

eliminate the nsk of signal bleed from adult pay-per-view knows (or

can be easily and reliably informed by such means as billing inserts

or a notice on the scrolling channel guide) precisely where and

when adult pay-per-view programming will appear. Parents may,

therefore, easily choose to permanently obtain the blocking that

§ 504 offers.

By contrast, as Justice Thomas observed in DAETC, indecent

programming on leased access channels was so intermittent,

infrequent and random that the practicality of customer-initiated

blocking or lockboxes was far less certain:

Rather than being able to simply block out certain channels

at certain times, a subscriber armed with only a lockbox

must carefully monitor all leased-access programming and

constantly reprogram the lockbox to keep out undesired

programming . . . /T/his distinguishing cha. acteristic of

leased access channels makes lockboxes and reverse-

20

blocking [in the context of leased access programming]

largely ineffective.

DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2429 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis

added).

Ironically, time-channelling would produce the very lack of

consistency that concerned Justice Thomas. Once MSOs substitute

non-adult programming during daily 16-hour period when adult

programming will now be prohibited, parents will no longer be able

to block a full channel confident that they are blocking only

unwanted speech (as they now are). To the contrary, blocking the

time-channeled adult-pay-per-view channel would deprive that

family of the newly substituted non-adult programming added

during the day and evening (to 10:00 p.m.) in order to replace lost

revenue from adult pay-per-view. Parents seeking to keep newly-

added daytime non-adult programming but to eliminate any possi-

bility of receiving the adult programming would be faced with the

Hobson’s choice of either (a) obtaining a lockbox and turning it on

and off in the morning and at night, or (b) requesting blocking

under § 504, thereby forfeiting access to non-adult programming as

the price of blocking adult programming.

2. Because blocking on request is undeniably /ess restrictive than

time channeling — allowing all adults who choose to obtain affected

programming to do so at the times when they seek to purchase and

see it (and when cable operators, free of government restriction,

choose to program it) — the only proper basis for finding no

likelihood that plaintiffs’ challenge would succeed would have been

a finding that blocking-on-request was so likely to be ineffective

that it was not a cognizable "alternative." The Court implicitly so

found only by improperly shifting the burden of proof to plaintiffs:

We have no evidence in the present record that local

cable operators or producers of sexually explicit

programming are advertising the free availability of the

§ 504 lockbox or other blocking devices upon demand.

Likewise, there is no evidence that parents are

otherwise aware of the § 504 means of achieving

complete blocking of undesired channels. Upon this

21

record, the government has demonstrated an

expectation that § 504 will not be a viable alternative.

JS App. 40a. (Emphasis added. )'*

But that reasoning would have led to a different result in DAETC,

where with the same evidence “missing” this Court nonetheless

struck down § 10(b). Speakers challenging laws that literally violate

the central command of the First Amendment need not prove that

conceivable less restrictive means are presently working; under strict

scrutiny, it is the government’s burden to prove that the means

chosen are both necessary and the least restrictive means that could

have been chosen to advance compelling governmental interests.

DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2394; Sable, 492 U.S. at 128-29.

Thus, the District Court’s "we have no evidence" complaints were

off the mark. Under First Amendment jurisprudence, it was not

plaintiffs’ burden (only weeks after § 504 had been enacted!) to

'* See also JS App. 20a, where, after recounting various means by which

cable subscribers can be alerted through public relations

efforts that blocking devices will be made available to them,

free of charge, upon request . . . [such as] inserts in

program guides and bills, informative screens shown on

“barker channels’, advertisements run on other channels, and

special mailings,

the court held those means legally irrelevant because it had not “received

evidence that MSOs are advising cable customers of the availability of the

free channel blocks under § 504" or that "customers are responding to

such notices, if given." JS App. 21a. This turns strict scrutiny on its head

and retroactively penalize plaintiffs for not presenting evidence case law

gave them no reason to present. It also blindly assumes that enactment of

the free blocking-on-request requirement of § 504, which became law at

the same time as § 505, would have no effect on the likelihood that parents

would block adult pay-per-view channels from their homes.

Moreover, even if adults are not obtaining blocking on request (and

there was no evidentiary basis for that conclusion), that would not

necessarily show that § 504 is not an effective less restrictive alternative.

An alternative, equally plausible interpretation would be that there is no

widespread problem of minors accessing “audio bleed." The government

made no empirical showing whatever of the extent of any problem.

22

show that blocking-on-request was already working so successfully

that § 505 was unnecessary; it was the government’s burden, having

set out on the road of content-based restrictions of protected speech,

to prove that such remedies (which had already been stamped with

Congress's imprimatur) cannot work.'®

Faulting plaintiffs for not presenting evidence "that local cable

operators or producers of sexually explicit programming are

advertising the free availability of the § 504 lockboxes" was

similarly an improper shift of the government’s burden.’ If § 504

does not prove to be effective without more, then the least

restrictive means will be to make it so (e.g., by requiring that sub-

scribers be notified routinely about its availability), not to censor

popular, constitutionally-protected programming that Graff seeks to

communicate, MSOs choose to disseminate, and adult viewers

regularly pay to obtain. See DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2393 (calling on

Congress to eschew blocking "for informational requirements, for a

'° For that matter, it was not for plaintiffs to prove the prevalence of

audio bleed or the intermittent and random bleeding of video signals,

another evidentiary lacuna that the district court held against plaintiffs. JS

App. i7a. It was the government’s burden to show a compelling need to

abridge First Amendment rights.

As against the unilluminating finding that "40 million cable subscribers

have the potential for a *bieed’ problem," JS App. 17a (emphasis added),

is the absence from the record of a single article in any academic journal,

newspaper, magazine, or other printed work reporting that teens or

children are sitting around and accessing "signal bleed,” much less being

harmed by doing so. Few phenomena in American society have ever gone

so unremarked, unstudied, and unnoticed as audio- or video-bleed from

adult pay-per-view programming — a fact particularly striking in view of

the enormous media and academic attention on the availability to nearly all

sentient children of far more explicit sources of "indecency," including on

the Internet (as the record in Reno v. ACLU makes plain).

* The District Court’s criticism was also factually incorrect. Plaintiffs

offered testimony and documentary evidence establishing that cable

operators can and do routinely advise their customers of the availability of

parental control devices and the nature of adult programming that may lead

parents to obtain and employ them.

j

;

i

;

i

i

;

i

POTS DS eo BL te

23

simple coding system, for readily available blocking equipment

(perhaps accessible by telephone), [and] for imposing cost burdens

upon system operators (who may spread them through subscription

fees).")

3. Notwithstanding its nod to strict scrutiny, the District Court’s

decision, to the extent that it was not based solely on Pacifica, was

the product of simple balancing: since § 505

leaves the speaker and the listener with an opportunity

to maintain sufficient adult communication, while re-

specting the privacy interests of those who might be

offended or inappropriately exposed{,] [w]e believe the

law thus strikes a permissible balance of constitutional

interests.

JS App. 39a; see also id. at 40a-4l1a. Under this Court’s First

Amendment jurisprudence, however, § 505 is subject to far more

demanding scrutiny than review for "overall reasonableness" or

"permissible balance."

This Court has repeatedly rejected unstructured balancing as

being inconsistent with the First Amendment and insufficiently

protective of vital First Amendment freedoms. The District Court’s

"balancing" analysis would justify barring books like Ulysses from

libraries or general interest bookstores,”' barring films with nudity

from drive-in movie theaters,” barring "indecent" cable

programming from basic tier cable channels absent written

request,” barring protestors from demonstrating near foreign

embassies,“ and barring anti-abortion protestors from

*! But see Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383

(1988).

2 But see Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).

> But see DAETC, 116 S. Ct. at 2390-94 (plurality opinion) and 2407-16

(Kennedy and Ginsburg, J.J., concurring).

** But see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).

24

demonstrating in proximity to "those who might be offended or

inappropriately exposed."”*

To the extent that the District Court in fact accorded § 505 lesser

review than was applied in DAETC because of its perception that

§ 505 was directed not at “the speech itself, i.e., sexually explicit

adult programming," but rather at "signal bleed, a secondary effect

of the transmission of that speech," JS App. 31a, that was clear error

as well. Section 505 was directed squarely at the communicative

impact of the targeted speech, as its text, structure, and meager

legislative history all confirm. That Congress sought to protect

persons at whom the speech is not directed and who might, notwith-

standing the programmers’ hopes and best efforts that they not do

so, access the audio signal or, intermittently receive a hard-to-

decipher frozen video image, is no warrant for applying any lesser

level of scrutiny, when it is precisely the alleged harm from hearing

the speech that underlies the regulatory scheme. See, e.g., Erzoznik,

422 U.S. at 209-10 (strict scrutiny despite governmental concern for

passers by); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. at 320-21 (1988) (strict

scrutiny notwithstanding governmental concern with fact of demon-

stration as distinguished from content); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d

1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (permitting Nazi

Party march notwithstanding likelihood that speech would be heard

by Jewish residents of Skokie).

THE DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT ACCORDED

IDENTICAL PROGRAMMING, DEPENDING ON

THE PROGRAMMER’S PREDOMINANT PROGRAMMING,

VIOLATES THE FIRST AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS

Legislation that treats speech differently depending on the

speaker’s identity is presumptively unconstitutional. Where, as here,

legislation on a subject of legitimate governmental concern targets

only a subset of potentially responsible speakers, the legislated

25 Compare JS App. 39a with Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512

U.S. 753 (1994).

25

solution is substantially underinclusive and thus unconstitutional.

The government has the burden of proving that such measures "will

in fact alleviate the[] harms [they are meant to prevent] in a direct

and material way." Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2470. See also DAETC,

116 S. Ct. at 2416 ("Partial service of a compelling interest is not

narrow tailoring.") (Kennedy and Ginsburg, J.J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541-42

(1989) (“a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest ‘of the

highest order,’ and thus as justifying a restriction upon truthful

speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital

interest unprohibited”) (citation intentionally omitted); and Bolger,

463 U.S. at 73 (restriction that "provides only the most limited

incremental support for the interest asserted" cannot pass muster

even under commercial speech standards).”°

Section 505 distinguishes between speakers of similar speech; its

attempt to protect minors is peculiarly and suspiciously

underinclusive in terms of the interest of protecting minors from

harmful speech.

Plaintiffs were expressly targeted by name (141 Cong. Rec.

$8167). Section 505’s sponsors crafted and Congress enacted

legislation that exempts from its restrictions (i) all "sexually explicit

adult programming or other programming that is indecent" carried

on any cable television channel that is not "primarily dedicated to

sexually-oriented programming," and (11) all other programming, re-

gardless of how harmful to minors it might be, even though

% See also Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. at 215 (laws

distinguishing among speakers cannot be justified by the one-step-at-a-time

rationale that justifies such distinctions in mere economic regulation);

Simon & Schuster, Inc. , 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (Blackmun, J., concur-

ring); Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1979);

Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, Inc., 481 U.S. 221, 230

(1987); and Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 n.9 (1980).

26

Congress expressly found that certain violent programming was

harmful to minors.”’

The favored speakers outside § 505’s purview are left free to

carry identical or comparable programming regardless of (i) the size

of their audience, (ii) the proportion of the audience comprised of

minors, (iii) the absolute number of minors who regularly access

such favored channels, having been encouraged to do so through

advertising and marketing efforts, or (iv) the time of day. And they

are free to do so even though, on those favored (unregulated)

channels, minors can view and hear the full signal, and not just the

audio signal.

Plaintiffs submitted extensive proof that unregulated,

"mainstream" cable channels advertised for families and fully

available to minors carry programming indistinguishable (in terms

of the regulatory interest) from plaintiffs’ programming. By way of

example, plaintiffs offered an episode of HBO’s "Real Sex" series,

showing a sexually-explicit dominatnix performance (whose cable-

cast would be forbidden by Graff and Playboy guidelines, given its

sado-masochistic sexual content), which was carried in Denver at

9:00 on Friday night — prime time for children’s television viewing,

and a time parents are particularly likely to be away from home or

not supervising their children’s viewing.

Given § 505’s speaker-based distinctions and its substantial

underinclusiveness in terms of the stated regulatory interest, the

government was required to prove the necessity both for the time-

channelling effectively imposed by § 505, and for restricting that

remedy to speakers whose networks are “primarily dedicated to

sexually-oriented programming," but do not carry the violent

*” CDA § 551(a)(4) (findings underlying V-chip mandate), 110 Stat. 140.

Defendants’ meagre production of materials collected by the legislative or

executive branches concerning the exposure to minors to programming

considered questionable (which was available to but in fact not considered

by Congress) concerned mostly programming that is not subject to § 505.

Much of this programming that remains unregulated is carried on channels

that often — if not ordinarily — carry family-oriented programming, such

as HBO, Cinemax/ Showtime and MTV.

27

programming that Congress indicated was harmful to minors as well.

E.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of

Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439

(1991).

No rationale for these content- and speaker-based distinctions ap-

peared in the scant legislative history. Indeed, the justifications

advanced by the Senate sponsors of § 505 apply equally with

respect to much of the sexually-oriented programming carried on

cable channels such as HBO or hit movie-pay-per-view channels as

well as programming carried on leased and public access cable

channels around the nation.”

The District Court began its analysis by mischaracterizing the

claim, referring to a “Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection"

challenge, JS App. 41a, that plaintiffs never made. It proceeded to

ignore the central cases on which plaintiffs relied.”

Rather than searching for a compelling necessity for enacting

such a speaker-based, underinclusive approach to "indecency" and

sexually explicit speech on cable television, the court satisfied itself

with noting "a significant difference between plaintiffs’ networks

and the non-adult premium networks," as all of plaintiffs’

programming is "adult" whereas only some programming on other

networks is "adult." JS App. 41a-42a. In doing so, it ignored every

bit of plaintiffs’ voluminous comparable programming evidence ex-

8 Such material includes popular R-rated movies such as Disclosure, Jade

and 9 1/2 Weeks, excerpts of which Graff submitted to the district court

as videotaped exhibits.

29 In addition to the cases cited above at 26, the District Court ignored

such cases Graff relied on as First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435

U.S. at 784-85 (1978) ("[T]he legislature is constitutionally disqualified

from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the

speakers who may address a public issue"); FCC v. League of Women

Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 384 (1984) (among the "purest examples of a

‘law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . [is a] regulation that denies

one group of persons the right to address a selected audience"); and

Minneapolis Star Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.

at 592-93.

28

cept the "Real Sex" episode described above, and attempted to

minimize that by observing that this program was "one sixteenth" of

the number of adult programs shown on plaintiffs’ channels that

day. JS App. 42a.

Given the asserted governmental interest, however, the relevant

measure is not the number of programs or the proportion of a full

day that such programming comprises, but rather minors’ viewing

of such programming. The "problem" addressed by § 505 is the

potential for youth access to "sexually explicit adult programming,"

"indecent programming" and other programming perceived to be

"harmful to children," not "signal bleed." Congress did not find,

there was no basis on which it could have found, and the govern-

ment never attempted to prove, that children access more

"indecency" through signal bleed on channels subject to § 505 than

they obtain through audio and video exposure to other channels

(including the leased access channels at issue in DAETC, or other

channels such as HBO, MTV, and Cinemax/Showtime). To the

contrary, as shown by the CDA’s blocking-on-request and V-chip

provisions (§§ 504 and 551) and the 1992 Cable Act provisions at

issue in DAETC, Congress knew full well that minors can access

"indecent" and "sexually explicit adult" programming, in full, on

many cable channels.

Common-sense suggests — and the government made no effort to

disprove — that minors are far more likely to obtain "indecent"

speech while watching or surfing a popular premium channel like

HBO (the single most popular premium cable service, on which

Real Sex is cablecast weekly), as compared te an out-of-the-way

pay-per-view channel that is partially scrambled and therefore un-

pleasant to watch. Given the size and demographics of the audience

for HBO, Showtime, and other premium cable channels, there is

every reason to expect that far more minors see "Real Sex" in its

entirety and other "indecent" or "sexually explicit" (or violent) cable

programming on such channels than have ever been exposed to

signal bleed.

Because the government offered no evidence, and Congress

considered none, that would permit the Court to find any necessity

for limiting the blocking and scrambling of programming thought

29

harmful to minors to easy-to-score-political-points-on speakers

(Playboy and Graff), the District Court should have concluded that

Graff is likely to prevail on its claim that § 505 is so underinclusive

and so likely to be ineffective as to violate the First Amendment and

the equal protection principle of the Fifth Amendment.”

CONCLUSION

Probable jurisdiction should be noted and the case set for plenary

review.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES S. SIMS

Counsel of Record

JOHN SIEGAL

Proskauer Rose Goetz

& Mendelsohn LLP

1585 Broadway

New York, N.Y. 10036

(212) 969-3000

Counsel for Appellant

Of Counsel:

DANIEL BARSKY

Graff Pay-Per-View, Inc.

536 Broadway

New York NY 10012

(212) 219-6204

New York, New York

January 9, 1997

* With respect to the third question presented, concerning § 505’s

vagueness (see p. i supra), Graff relies on the argument made in Playboy's

Jurisdictional Statement, at 25-29.

APPENDIX

la

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

Civil Action Nos. 96-94 & 96-107-]JF

Consolidated Actions

PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.

AND GRAFF-PAY-PER-VIEW INC.,

PLAINTIFFS

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JANET RENO,

ATTORNEY GENERAL, ano THE FEDERAL

COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

DEFENDANTS.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that Graff Pay-Per-View, Inc.,

plaintiff in the above captioned action, appeals to the United

States Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and section

561(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

104, §561(b), 110 Stat. 143, from an order denying Graff Pay-

Per-View, Inc.’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, entered

by this Court on November 8, 1996.

YOUNG, CONAWAY, STARGATT & TAYLOR

/s/ William D. Johnston

William D. Johnston (#2123)

John W. Shaw (#3367)

11th Floor, Rodney Square North

P.O. Box 391

Wilmington, Delaware 19899-0391

Attorneys for Plaintiff Graff Pay-Per-View

Dated: November 12, 1996

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

Civil Action Nos. 96-94 & 96-107-]]F

Consolidated

PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.

AND GRAFF-PAY-PER-VIEW INC.,

PLAINTIFFS

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JANET RENO,

ATTORNEY GENERAL, ano THE FEDERAL

COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

DEFENDANTS.

ORDER

This 8th day of November, 1996, for the reasons

stated in the Opinion filed today, it is ORDERED that the

plaintiffs’ petitions for a preliminary injunction are denied.

/s/ Jane R. Roth

United States Circuit Judge

3a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

Civil Action Nos. 96-94 & 96-107-JJF

PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.

AND GRAFF-PAY-PER-VIEW INC.,

PLAINTIFFS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JANET RENO,

ATTORNEY GENERAL, anp THE FEDERAL

COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

DEFENDANTS.

November 8, 1996, Decided

November 8, 1996, FILED

DISPOSITION: Plaintiffs’ petitions for preliminary injunction

denied.

A. Gilchrist Sparks, II], Esquire and Katharine R. Witherspoon,

Esquire, of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington,

Delaware

OF COUNSEL:

Burton Joseph, Esquire, of Barsy, Joseph & Lichtenstein,

Chicago, Illinois. Robert Corn-Revere, Esquire, Jean S. Moore,

Esquire, Ronald J. Wiltsie, Il, Esquire, of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P.,

Washington, D.C., Attorneys for Plaintiff, Playboy

Entertainment Group, Inc.

William D. Johnston, Esquire and John W. Shaw, Esquire, of

Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, Delaware.

OF COUNSEL: Charles S. Sims, Esquire and John Siegal, Esquire

Of Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn LLP, New York, New

York. Daniel Barsky, Esquire, Graff Pay-Per-View Inc., New

|

4a

York, New York, Attorneys for Plaintiff, Graff Pay-Per-View,

Inc.

Gregory M. Sleet, Esquire, United States Attorney, Patricia

Hannigan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, John J. Polk, Assistant U.S.

Attorney, Wilmington, Delaware; Frank W. Hunger, Assistant

Attorney General, Dennis G. Linger, Esquire, Theodore C. Hirt,

Esquire, James J. Gilligan, Esquire, Joseph V. Jest, Esquire, and

Sarah L. Wilson, Esquire, of the United States Department of

Justice, Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch, Washington,

D.C.; OF COUNSEL: Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate General

Counsel, Susan Fox, Office of the General Counsel, Federal

Communications Commission, Attorneys for Defendants.

Robert J. Katzenstein, Esquire, of Smith, Katzenstein &

Furlow, Wilmington, Delaware. OF COUNSEL: Michael A.

Bamberger, Esquire and Margaret A. Jacobs, Esquire, of

Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, New York, New York,

Attorneys for Amici Curiae, American Booksellers Foundation

for Free Expression, Association of American Publishers,

Counsel for Periodical Distributors of The Americas, Feminists

for Free Expression, Freedom to Read Foundation, Interactive

Digital Software Association, International Periodical

Distributors Association, Motion Picture Association of

America, Inc., National Association of College Stores, Inc.,

National Association of Recording Merchandisers, Periodical

and Book Association of America, Inc., Publishers Marketing

Association, of America, Inc., and Video Software Dealers

Association.

Henry N. Herndon, Jr., Esquire and Eric D. Schwartz, Esquire,

of Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington, Delaware.

OF COUNSEL: Patrick D. Maines, Esquire, of The Media

Institute, Washington, D.C.; Robert M. O'Neill, Esquire and

Joshua Wheeler, Esquire, of The Thomas Jefferson Center for

Protection of Free Expression, Charlottesville, Virginia,

Attorneys for Amici Curiae, Thomas Jefferson Center for The

Protection of Free Expression and The Media Institute.

eS eS a ee ee

5a

Before: ROTH’, Circuit Judge, FARNAN?’ and SIMANDLE’,

District Judges

OPINION BY: Jane R. Roth

OPINION Wilmington, Delaware November 8, 1996

ROTH, Circuit Judge: The plaintiffs in this action, Playboy

Entertainment Group, Inc. ("Playboy") and Graff Pay-Per-View

("Graff"), challenge the constitutionality of section 505 of the

Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("the CDA" or "the Act”),

which is Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.

L. No. 104-104, 110 Sat. 56. Congress enacted section 505 in an

effort to eliminate signal bleed, i.e., the partial reception of

sexually explicit adult cable television programming in the

homes of nonsubscribers to that programming.

Most cable television systems in the United States offer one

or more optional premium channels dedicated to sexually

oriented programming. However, of the 62 million households

that subscribe to cable television, only about 3 million will

purchase or subscribe to adult programming during the course

of a year. Cable system operators attempt to block non-sub-

scribers from receiving this programming by various scramb-

ling techniques which we will explain in greater detail in our

Findings of Fact. Signal bleed occurs when the scrambling

process is not fully successful.

The stated purpose of section 505 is to protect children

from signal bleed. Section 505(a) requires a cable television

operator to completely scramble or block the video and audio

1 Judge Jane R. Roth, United States Circuit Court Judge for

the Third Circuit.

Judge Joseph J. Farnan, United States District Court Judge

for the District of Delaware.

bo

3 Judge Jerome B. Simandle, United States District Court

Judge for the District of New Jersey.

Ne

6a

portions of any cable channel that is primarily dedicated to

sexually explicit programming. If a cable operator is unable to

comply in full with section 505(a), then section 505(b) requires

“time channeling", i.e., that sexually explicit adult programming

be transmitted only during those hours when children are not

likely to view it. The Federal Communications Commission has

determined these “safe harbor" hours to be from 10:00 p.m. to

6:00 a.m. The principal issue facing us is whether government

regulation of signal bleed from sexually explicit programming

offends the free speech and equal protection rights of adult-

programming networks and of their subscriber audience. Our

analysis is narrowed by the fact that plaintiffs do not contend

that signal bleed itself is protected speech. Moreover, plaintiffs

concede that their programming is essentially 100% sexually

oriented, in contrast to other entertainment channels that

display only occasional or sporadic sexually explicit scenes or

programs. Nevertheless, because the regulatory scheme of

section 505 impacts on the transmission of adult programming,

which is entitled to First Amendment protection, we will

examine whether section 505 is a content-based restriction of

4 We recognize at the outset that the programming on

plaintiffs’ sexually dedicated channels is indecent, meaning

vulgar or offensively explicit sexual material not generally

available for viewing by children, but that it is not obscene.

Indecent speech is subject to constitutional protection

because it is established that "sexual expression which is

indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amend-

ment." Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S.

115, 126, 106 L. Ed. 2d 93, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989); Fabulous

Associates, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 896

F.2d 780, 783 (3d Cir. 1990); Action for Children’s Television

v. F.C.C., 313 U.S. App. D.C. 94, 58 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir.

1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996); accord,

ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), at 851

(Sloviter, J.), at 858 n3 (Buckwalter, J.), and at 865-6

(Dalzell, J.).

7a

speech, and, if so, whether it survives scrutiny by addressing

a compelling interest and by being narrowly tailored for that

end. We will also consider whether Congress has unconstitu-

tionally singled out networks that are exclusively dedicated to

sexually oriented programming, while not regulating signal

bleed from other premium networks that at times will transmit

sexually oriented programs or scenes. Finally, we will examine

plaintiffs’ claim that the language of section 505 is unconstit:-

tionally vague.

I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

President Clinton signed the CDA into law on February 8,

1996. On February 26, Playboy filed this action in the United

States District Court for the District of Delaware, seeking a

declaratory judgment that § 505 violates the First Amendment

and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment of

the U.S. Constitution. In addition, Playboy sought injunctive

relief that would prohibit enforcement of § 505 by the Govern-

ment.° Graff subsequently filed an action seeking identical re-

lief against the same defendants. On March 4, 1996, Judge

Farnan granted Graff's motion to consolidate these actions pur-

suant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a). That same day,

Chief Judge Dolores K. Sloviter of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit granted the parties’ request to

appoint a three-judge district court pursuant to § 561(a) of the

CDA. She named Judge Joseph P. Farnan of the U.S. District

Court for the District of Delaware, Judge Jerome B. Simandle

of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, and

5 The defendants in this action are the United States; the

United States Department of Justice; Attorney General of

the United States, Janet Reno; and the Federal Communi-

cations Commission ("the FCC"). To simplify matters, we

will refer to these defendants jointly as "the Government.”

8a

Judge Jane R. Roth of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit.’

Because the CDA was to go into effect on March 9, 1996,

Playboy requested a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to

enjoin implementation and enforcement of § 505 of the Act.

On March 6, 1996, Judge Farnan heard oral argument on Play-

boy’s TRO motion.’ He granted Playboy’s motion on March

6 Section 561(a) of the CDA provides that a three judge

district court shall be convened to decide "any civil action

challenging the constitutionality, on its face, of this title or

any amendment made by this title . . . pursuant to the

provisions of section 2284 of title 28, United States Code."

Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 561(a), 110 Stat. 56, 142 (1996).

Section 2284 requires that at least one of the judges

appointed to serve on the three-judge panel be a circuit

judge.

7 Pursuant to § 505(b), section 505 was set to go into effect

on March 9, 1996, thirty days after it was signed into law

by the President. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 505(b), 110 Stat. 56,

136 (1996).

8 Section 2284(b)(3) delineates the preliminary matters that

may be decided by a single judge from those matters that

must be decided by three-judge district courts. That section

provides:

A single judge may .. . grant a temporary restrain-

ing order on a specific finding, based on evidence

submitted, that specified irreparable damage will

result if the order is not granted, which order,

unless previously revoked by the district judge,

shall remain in force only until the hearing and

determination by the district court of three judges

of an application for a preliminary injunction. A

single judge shall not . . . hear and determine any

(continued...)

—

9a

7, 1996, temporarily enjoining enforcement of § 505 until the

matter could be heard by the three judge panel appointed by

Chief Judge Sloviter. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United

States, 918 F. Supp. 813 (D. Del. 1996).

In preparation for our consideration of the plaintiffs’

Application for a Preliminary Injunction, the parties negotiated

a mutually acceptable discovery and briefing schedule. Much

of the factual and technical evidence was presented by

affidavits and briefs submitted prior to the preliminary

injunction hearing. We heard testimony on May 20 and May

21, 1996, and closing arguments were presented on May 22.

We concluded that we should delay our decision until after the

Supreme Court's decision in Alliance for Community Media v.

F.C.C., 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court

published its decision on June 28, 1996, sub nom., Denver Area

Education Telecommunications Consortium v. F.C.C., 135 L. Ed. 2d

888, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996). The varties then submitted supple-

mental memoranda, as we had instructed, on the impact and

applicability of the Supreme Court's decision.

I.

FINDINGS OF FACT

In order to understand fully the arguments made by the

parties in this case, it is necessary to understand the techno-

logical workings of cable signals and transmission. During the

preliminary injunction hearing, the court heard extensive and

complex testimony regarding cable technology and the

mechanisms available to comply with § 505. Pursuant to

8(...continued)

application for a preliminary or permanent injunc-

tion. . .. Any action of a single judge may be

reviewed by the full court at any time before final

judgment.

28 U.S.C. § 2284.

10a

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), we make the following

findings of fact:

The Statute At Issue

1. Playboy and Graff challenge § 505 of the CDA, entitled

"Scrambling of Sexually Explicit Adult Video Service Program-

ming.” This section requires a multisystem operator ("“MSO")’

to scramble "sexually explicit adult programming or other

programming that is indecent" which is transmitted on a

channel "primarily dedicated to sexually oriented program-

ming.” Section 505 requires that any such adult channel or

network be fully scrambled. The purpose of this scrambling is

to eliminate signal bleed.” "Signal bleed" is the partial reception

of video images and/or audio sounds on a scrambled channel.

If an MSO does not or cannot comply with § 505’s blocking

requirement, the MSO is prohibited from transmitting the

adult programming during hours of the day when minors are

most likely to view it.”

9 Section 505 applies to "multichannel video programming

distributors." These distributors are more simply known as

"multisystem operators” or "MSOs" and we will refer to

them in this manner.

10 Section 505 provides:

(a) REQUIREMENT.--In providing sexually

explicit adult programming or other programming

that is indecent on any channel of its service

primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented program-

ming, a multichannel video programming distribu-

tor shall fully scramble or otherwise fully block the

video and audio portion of such channel so that

one not a subscriber to such channel or program-

ming does not receive it.

(b) IMPLEMENTATION.--Until a multichannel

video programming distributor complies with the

(continued...)

lla

2. M5Qs, such as Telecommunications, Inc. ("TCI") and

Time Warner Cable, provide cable subscribers with various

packages of cable channels for which subscribers pay a

monthly fee. Some subscribers receive a "basic" package or

"tier" of channels. A basic cable tier often includes local

broadcast networks (like ABC, CBS, and NBC), leased and

public access channels, as well as networks devoted entirely to

news, education, fine arts, music videos, sports, or shopping.

MSOs also provide "premium" tiers, which offer, in addition to

the basic tier channels, channels showing recently released

movies (like HBO, Cinemax, and Showtime) and channels ded-

icated solely to adult entertainment. MSOs charge a monthly

fee for a basic cable package and additional monthly fees for

premium cable channels.

3. Premium programming is also offered by MSOs on a

"pay-per-view" basis. A pay-per-view consumer places an order

with a cable operator, requesting access to a particular movie

or sporting event. A consumer may also purchase program-

ming on a premium channel for a specified period of time.

When a consumer places a pay-per-view order, the MSO at the

beginning of the requested program unscrambles the signal by

10(...continued)

requirement set forth in subsection (a), the distribu-

tor shall limit the access of children to the program-

ming referred to in that subsection by not provid-

ing such programming during the hours of the day

(as determined by the Commission) when a signifi-

cant number of children are likely to view it.

(c) DEFINITION.--As used in this section, the

term ‘scramble’ means to rearrange the content of

the signal of the programming so that the program-

ming cannot be viewed or heard in an understand-

able manner.

Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 505, 110 Stat. 56, 136 (1996) (to be

codified at 47 U.S.C. § 641).

12a

remote accessing of a converter/descrambler box in the

subscriber’s home. The MSO rescrambles the signal at the

conclusion of the program. The fee charged for receiving a

program on a pay-per-view basis is always in addition to

monthly fees paid for a cable package.

4. Playboy and Graff provide MSOs with adult, sexually

oriented video programming. The MSOs then transmit the

plaintiffs’ programming to premium subscribers and pay-per-

view purchasers who request access to such programming.

Playboy owns two adult-programming networks: Playboy

Television and AdulTVision. Graff also owns two adult

networks: Adam & Eve and Spice. The programming on the

Playboy and Graff networks is virtually 100% sexually explicit

adult programming. In marketing its programming, Playboy

relies on both premium subscription and pay-per-view sales,

while Graff relies almost entirely on pay-per-view. On a yearly

basis, 3 million households subscribe to and/or receive

pay-per-view sexually explicit adult programming.

5. Other non-adult premium networks have obtained

licenses to exhibit particular Playboy films. In addition, non-

adult premium and basic cable channels will, among other pro-

grams, transmit sexually explicit programs or programs which

contain some sexually explicit scenes. We received evidence of

the frequency of sexually explicit programming on non-adult

channels. It was demonstrated for example that the number of

sexually explicit programs available on non-adult channels on

the evening of Friday, May 17, 1996, in Denver, Colorado, was

one sixteenth that shown on the plaintiffs’ adult channels.

Moreover, unlike the adult channels, the sexually explicit

programs on non-adult channels were mainly "R" rated movies

which contained some sexually explicit scenes but were not

continuously sexually explicit as was plaintiffs’ programming.

6. MSOs receive signals from many sources, such as

master antennas, satellites, and local television stations. The

signals are received at the system transmitter or "headend"

where they are amplified and retransmitted by coaxial cable.

Cable subscribers receive the channels directly by cable, if they

13a

own a cable-ready television, or by attaching the cable to a

converter box if they own a non-cable-ready television."

7. Because the cost of premium and pay-per-view pro-

gramming is in addition to the cost of basic programming,

MSOs seek to secure premium network signals for subscribers

only. To prevent a signal from reaching the home of a

non-subscriber, MSOs "scramble" the signal by blocking a

portion of it. Currently, most MSOs scramble premium chan-

nel signals using either "RF" or "baseband" technology.

11 A converter box sits on top of an older model television set

which can receive only a finite number of VHF or UHF

channels. The converter takes the cable signal and

converts it to a channel which can be received by the

subscriber's television set. When cable systems began to

offer programming, other than local broadcast stations, on

channels that television sets designed for broadcast

reception were not capable of receiving, MSOs began to

distribute these converter boxes to their subscribers.

Converter boxes are electronic channel selectors. They are

connected both to the subscriber’s TV set and to the

MSO’s cable line. When a subscriber chooses a cable

channel to view, the box "converts" the selected channel to

a frequency (typically broadcast television channel three or

four) that the subscriber’s TV set can receive and display.

In about 1980, TV set manufacturers began marketing

"cable-ready" TV sets, units equipped with tuners capable

of directly receiving cable programming transmitted on

non-broadcast (cable only) frequencies. If a subscriber has

a cable-ready TV set, and it is capable of tuning’ all the

channels offered by the cable system, the subscriber's line

can be connected directly to the TV set.

l4a

Generally, this scrambling affects only the video portion of the

transmission.”

8. When a consumer decides to subscribe to a premium

or pay-per-view channel, the MSO must descramble the chan-

nel for the new subscriber. This can be done either by in-

stalling a positive or negative trap in the coaxial cable leading

to the new subscriber's home or by providing the new sub-

scriber with an addressable converter. The trap or the address-

able converter descrambles the signal so that the integrity of

the image and/or the sound is restored in the set or sets

attached to the descrambled line. The MSO can remotely

“address” an addressable converter by sending out an electrical

impulse. Addressable converters make pay-per-view requests

possible by enabling an MSO by remote direction to descram-

ble and then rescramble the cable signals entering the sub-

scriber’s home.”

9. As mentioned above, one of the technologies used by

MSOs to secure premium channels is “positive trapping.” For

positive trapping, the MSO installs at its transmitter headend

an electronic box which jams the signal of the channel to be

secured. Non-subscribers to that channel will receive only

"snow" for video and a high-pitched beep for audio. Subscrib-

ers to the jammed channel receive a metal cylinder, the posi-

tive trap, which is attached to the cable-ready TV or to the set

top converter box in order to filter out the jamming signal.

12 Because RF affects only the picture portion of the televi-

sion transmission, no audio scrambling occurs. Some

baseband systems do include audio encryption so that no

intelligible audio will be presented to the non-subscribing

customers.

13 The previously described converter box and the address-

able converter/descrambler can be combined in one set top

box.

15a

10. A premium channel's signal can also be secured by

“negative trapping.” Using this technology, the signal will be

transmitted in the clear. A negative trap is installed at the

homes of non-subscribers, jamming the signal there.

11. An MSO’s choice between using positive or negative

trapping will depend on whether the majority of subscribers

to the overall cable service also wish to subscribe to a par-

ticular premium service. It is cost effective to use negative traps

only when a large majority of the customers of a cable system

subscribe to a particular premium channel.

12. The problem which § 505 was enacted to remedy is

known as "signal bleed." Audio or video "bleed" occurs when

a signal is not effectively scrambled by the MSO’s RF or

baseband equipment. Bleeding does not occur in TV sets with

converter boxes that have a feature known as channel map-

ping." Cable ready television sets, however, do not include

this mapping feature. When a consumer with a cable-ready TV

tunes to a scrambled premium channel to which the consumer

does not subscribe, the consumer receives the jammed signal

which under some circumstances includes a video picture or

portions of a picture because of a phenomenon called random

lockup. The non- subscribing consumer will also receive a clear

audio signal unless the MSO’s scrambling system is one which

scrambles the audio.” The severity of this signal bleeding

problem varies from time to time and from place to place. The

reason for these inconsistencies may be weather extremes,

faulty or old equipment, or human error in installing, oper-

ating, and/or maintaining systems. Moreover, according to

plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Walter Ciciora, the cable-ready TV’s that

14 When a consumer with a converter box attempts to tune

a scrambled channel, the converter box will not tune that

channel but will tune to another channel, providing either

a promotional message or a blue screen.

1S A subscriber will of course receive the descrambled video

and audio.

16a

pervade the market today have improved electronic circuitry

which will make a discernible picture out of a partly-scrambled

signal. This technology, developed over the past two decades,

permits the child of a cable subscriber to tune the cable-ready

TV to a premium or pay-per-view channel offered on the cable

system and to receive discernible images even though the

parent is a non-subscriber to that channel.

13. With this incidence of improved electronic technology

and/or partially scrambled signals, a non-subscriber may see

and hear portions of a channel or program to which he or she

does not subscribe. This result is of particular concern when

the programming is sexually explicit, intended for an adult-

only audience. Families, who do not subscribe to adult

entertainment channels, have found that sounds and images

from these channels are at least partially discernible. The

government presented anecdotal evidence of parents discov-

ering that their children have been exposed to sights and

sounds from sexually explicit programming only after the

exposure had occurred. This evidence included affidavits from

several parents testifying about the danger in their homes of

signal bleed from adult programming networks. Other parents

complained that, even though their own sets were attached to

lockboxes that fully blocked indecent programs, their children

were exposed to signal bleed from adult programming when

they visited friends. Anecdotal evidence of signal bleed was

also presented in letters which had been sent to various

members of Congress and were made part of the record before

this court. In addition, video tapes of sexually explicit signal

bleed were admitted into evidence. For instance, Defendant's

Exhibit No.4 was taped from the Playboy Channel in Orange,

California. Exhibit No. 4 shows partially scrambled images of

a nude woman caressing herself and then of two nude women

in the water and in a boat, caressing each other. Defendant's

Exhibit No. 5 is an audio tape of the Spice Channel, made by

a non-Spice subscriber from the audio bleed. It carries the

sounds of what appear to be repeated sexual encounters

accompanied by assorted orgiastic moans and groans.

17a

14. There are approximately 62 million households in the

United States which receive cable television. Of these, 20 to 25

million have converter boxes to receive basic and/or premium

cable service. These converter boxes will map out the scram-

bled channels and as a consequence these households will not

receive "signal bleed." The other 40 million cable subscribers

have the potential for a "bleed" problem. It is not clear how

many of these 40 million cable homes with the potential for

"signal bleed” will not in fact receive signal bleed either

because the local MSO employs effective baseband or digital

scrambling or because the household is already a subscriber to

the adult channels." No evidence was presented of any con-

sumer desire to receive “signal bleed.” Moreover, plaintiffs

make no claim that “signal bleed" itself is constitutionally

protected.

15. On June 12, 1995, after hearings and substantial debate

had been held regarding the legislation that was to become the

1996 Telecommunications Act, Senator Diane Feinstein of

California and Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi offered

Amendment 1269 which ultimately became Section 505 of the

Act. Their amendment proposed that MSOs, offering adult

programming, should be required to completely scramble the

audio and video signals to prevent partial reception of those

channels in the homes of nonsubscribers.

16. Senator Feinstein told members of the Senate that

"parents . . . come home after work only to find their children

sitting in front of the television watching or listening to the

adult’s-only channel, a channel that many parents did not

even know existed.” Cong. Rec. $8167; see Playboy Ex. 20. She

noted that guidelines which put the burden on the subscriber

to request complete scrambling of adult channels were inade-

16 If at the trial on the permanent injunction more specific

evidence of the number of households with the potential

for signal bleed were to be presented, we would be in a

better position to consider whether the standards for a

permanent injunction have been met.

18a

quate because often non-subscribers are unaware that indecent

audio and/or video signals can be received. Id. The object of

the amendment, she said, was to "“protect{] children by

prohibiting sexually explicit programming to those individuals

who have not specifically requested such programming.”

17. Senators Feinstein and Lott each spoke briefly about

their proposed amendment. 141 Cong. Rec. $8166-S8169.

Accompanying the transcript of their statements before the

Senate was a memorandum from the American Law Division

("ALD") of the Congressional Research Service. The memoran-

dum analyzed the Feinstein-Lott amendment in light of First

Amendment case law and concluded that some language con-

tained in the provision might be unconstitutional and over

broad. Id. at $8168. Except for the statements of Senators

Feinstein and Lott, there was no debate on the amendment

and no hearings were held on it. The amendment passed

easily in the Senate (91 votes in favor; none opposed) and

became § 505 of the bill that emerged from the conference

which ironed out the differences between the House and

Senate versions. On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed

the bill into law.

18. Section 505 does not eliminate adult programming.

Instead, it offers MSOs either the option of fully scrambling

the video and audio signals of adult programming or, if

complete scrambling is not possible or is not the choice of the

MSO, the option of transmitting adult programs only during

the "safe harbor" hours. Specifically, pursuant to § 505-(a),

MSOs are required to "fully block the video and audio portion

of [an adult entertainment] channel so that one not a sub-

scriber to such channel or programming does not receive it.”

If an operator cannot fully block its adult channels, it must

then, pursuant to § 505(b), discontinue programming “during

the hours of the day . . . when a significant number of

children are likely to view it." The FCC regulation imple-

menting this alternative would limit adult programming to the

eight hour period between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. We will

refer to the requirement found in subsection (a) as “complete

19a

scrambling,” and the alternative offered by subsection (b), as

"time channeling.”

The Technological and Economic Impacts of 505

19. There are MSOs that already meet the requirements of

§ 505. For example, Steven Saril, Senior Vice President of Sales

and Marketing for Graff, testified that roughly half of the

systems carrying Graff programming are in compliance with

§ 505.” For the MSOs that are not in compliance, several

technologies may become available in the future that would

allow an MSO to meet the requirements of § 505. Television

manufacturers may soon be required by law to insert the so-

called "v-chip," in all new televisions. Pub. L. No. 104-104,

§ 551, 110 Stat. at 139-41. The v-chip will allow parents to block

types of programming which they find inappropriate for their

children. The v-chip is currently being tested in Canadian

markets. It is not clear, however, how long it will be before

televisions with v-chips become widely available in the United

States.

20. Digital cable technology is another future option that

will permit MSOs to completely scramble signals to nonsub-

scribers as § 505 requires. Approximately 2 million American

consumers presently receive digital television service. Digital

signals will prevent all audio and video bleeding, but digital

service will require conversion of the MSOs’ headend equip-

ment from analog to digital technology. As MSOs adopt digital

service, they will probably use it first for premium channels,

including adult programming.

21. Because the currently used "RF" and “baseband”

technologies are not capable of fully scrambling both the audio

17 Saril also testified that the Spice network might go out of

business if the non-complying channels were required to

time channel. The Graff "standard agreement,” however,

requires an MSO to carry Spice only during the hours of

9 p.m. to 3 a.m. - hours that are very close to the safe

harbor time period.

Deiter iittala ie ill

aN i a nc

20a

and video signal at all times, many MSOs would be required,

if § 505(a) was enforced today, to resort to other and/or

additional scrambling techniques. If an MSO was not abie or

willing to initiate additional scrambling techniques, it would be

required to time channel adult programming.

22. One device which has been available for several years

and which succeeds in fully scrambling unwanted cable signals

is the lockbox. Since the early 1980s, MSOs have been required

by law to provide a lockbox to any customer upon request.

Section 544(d) of the 1984 Cable Act requires that cable oper-

ators either sell or lease a blocking device to any subscriber

who requests that a channel be completely blocked. See 47

U.S.C. § 544(d)(2)(A). However, few households have obtained

the lockboxes made available by this provision.

23. Section 504 of the CDA also requires MSOs to com-

pletely block upon request any programming that a cable cus-

tomer finds personally offensive. This blocking requirement is

not limited to the “sexually explicit adult video service pro-

gramming” which is the target of § 505. Pub. L. No. 104-104,

§ 504, 110 Stat. 56, 136 (1996). Moreover, under § 504, the MSO,

rather than the subscriber, is responsible for bearing the cost

of providing the blocking mechanism.” Despite this economic

burden, plaintiffs suggest that § 504 presents a constitutional,

"less restrictive alternative” because it would require an MSO

to provide complete blocking only upon request. Plaintiffs also

assert that cable subscribers can be alerted through public

relations efforts that blocking devices will be made available to

18 Section 504(a) provides:

(a) SUBSCRIBER REQUEST.--Upon request by

a cable service subscriber, a cable operator shall,

without charge, fully scramble or otherwise fully

block the audio and video programming of each

channel carrying such programming so that one

not a subscriber does not receive it.

Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 504, 110 Stat. 56, 136 (1996) (empha-

sis added).

ee Ee etn, En AN a a

2la

them, free of charge, upon request. Methods of disseminating

this information could include inserts in program guides and

bills, informative screens shown on “barker channels", adver-

tisements run on other channels, and special mailings. We

have not, however, received evidence that MSOs are advising

cable customers of the availability of the free channel blocks

under § 504. Nor is there evidence that customers are respond-

ing to such notices, if given. Thus, we cannot effectively assess

piaintiffs’ claim that § 504 is likely to become a viable remedy

for eliminating signal bleed. If the § 504 blocking option is not

being promoted, it cannot become a meaningful alternative to

the provisions of § 505. At the time of the permanent injunc-

tion hearing, further evidence of the actual and predicted

impact and efficacy of § 504 would be helpful to us.

24. MSOs that adopted the lockbox remedy, in order to

comply with § 505, would be required to provide all nonsub-

scribers with a lockbox programmed to block the audio and

video signals of adult entertainment networks. A mapping con-

verter with a lockbox feature allows parents to control when

adult programming will be received and when it will be

blocked. Most lockboxes currently available are capable of

blocking only signals entering the television set to which the

box is attached. In order to fully block access to sexually

oriented programming at all times, each cableconnected TV set

in the home would have to be connected to a lockbox. A single

converter/lockbox costs approximately $115. If MSOs that offer

adult programming were to distribute one converter/lockbox

to every nonsubscribing household currently without one, the

total cost would be prohibitive, probably in excess of one

million dollars.

25. In the alternative, MSOs could provide "negative traps"

to nonsubscribers. A “negative trap" is installed on the cable

wiring of non-subscribing households and scrambles a clear

signal. Subscribers to adult channels receive the clear signal

without the negative trap. Negative trapping costs between

$12 and $15 per household. It is an economically feasible

22a

solution only in areas, such as military bases, where a large

majority of cable subscribers want to receive the adult channel.

26. Double scrambling with “positive trap" technology

provides the most workable alternative for non-complying

MSOs. To achieve double scrambling, RF or baseband scramb-

ling is combined with a jamming signal at the headend. The

headend jamming completely blocks video and audio so that

no signal bleed occurs in the homes of non-subscribers. In

order for a subscriber to view programming that has been

double scrambled, the subscriber needs both a positive trap

and an addressable converter. The positive trap filters out the

interference from the jamming signal, and the addressable

converter descrambles the RF or baseband scrambling. The

addressable converter can be used to start up and end periods

of premium service and also to permit pay-per-view reception.

Positive trap technology would be economically advantageous

in areas where nonsubscribers outnumber subscribers. If the

positive trapping alternative were adopted by an MSO, positive

traps would be delivered to or installed at an households

subscribing to adult programming. The average cost of a

positive trap is $7. A positive trap is easily installed by the

subscriber or it can be installed by the MSO at a cost of

approximately $35. The cost of the additional equipment

necessary for jamming at the MSO’s headend is estimated to

be $750 to $1,000.

27. Positive trapping technology poses an additional

problem for pay-per-view purchases. Customers either have to

pick up a positive trap or order it in advance of viewing the

desired program. This interferes with the spontaneous nature

of what plaintiffs consider to be the impulse purchasing of

sexually explicit adult programming.

28. Professional installation of traps also raises privacy

concerns. A subscriber, who enjoys adult entertainment at

home, might be dissuaded from requesting a positive trap

upon realizing that the MSO will learn his or her identity. The

new subscriber will be identified as a consumer of sexually

explicit material - although with sexually explicit premium and

23a

pay-per-view programming, the subscriber will also be

identifiable through billing for the programming.

29. A few MSOs have already adopted “double scrambling"

to resolve community opposition to sexually explicit program-

ming and to the audio and/or video bleeding of signals from

such programming. Plaintiffs contend that in these double-

scrambling communities revenues from adult channels has

fallen by fifty per cent. Plaintiffs are of the opinion that a

significant factor causing this drop in revenue is the impulse

nature of the purchase or adult programming.

30. Finally, an MSO has the option of complying with

§ 505 by "time channeling" as provided in subsection (b). If an

MSO cannot or chooses not to completely scramble audio

and/or video signals as required by § 505(a), it must restrict

adult program to certain "safe harbor" hours. In preparation

for implementing § 505, the FCC established a regulation that

defines the safe harbor hours as the eight hour period be-

tween 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. In re Implementation of Section

505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CS Dkt. No. 96-40,

FCC 96-84, Order & Notice of Proposed Rulemaking amending

47 C.F.R. § 76 9 6 (released March 5, 1996; intended to become

effective March 9, 1996). If time channeling were adopted by

an MSO, adult cable programming would not be available in

the MSO’s service area except during the safe harbor hours.

Plaintiffs estimate that their revenues would fall approximately

thirty per cent if time channeling were adopted.”

19 We are skeptical of plaintiffs’ estimate of revenue loss. It

appears to be significantly overstated. Although Graff's

Vice President, Steven Saril, stated that 30 percent of those

who purchase his company’s programming do so outside

the safe harbor hours, many of these customers may not

be affected by time channeling because half of the cable

systems, carrying Graff channels, already comply with

§ 505(a). The customers of these MSOs will still be able to

view Graff's channels outside the safe harbor period.

(continued...)

2Aa

31. The MSOs that have taken a position on the method

by which they would comply with § 505 have all announced

that they would adopt time channeling.

Il.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. The Preliminary Injunction Standard

Playboy and Graff have asked this court to exercise

extraordinary judicial authority by striking down a law drafted

and adopted by a co-equal branch of government. The plain-

tiffs’ request raises one of the judiciary’s most “awesome

responsibilities calling for the utmost circumspection in its

exercise.” Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 13 L. Ed.

2d 12, 85 S. Ct. 1, 2 (1964). After thorough examination and

discussion, we conclude that, at this preliminary injunction

stage, we will not strike down § 505. As the case has presently

been developed before us, the plaintiffs have not met the re-

quirements for the issuing of a preliminary injunction. We will,

therefore, deny their petition for preliminary relief.

The standard used to determine whether plaintiffs are entit-

led to a preliminary injunction is well established. In order to

succeed, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they are likely to pre-

vail on the merits and that they will suffer irreparable harm if

they are not granted injunctive relief. We must also consider

19(...continued)

Moreover, Saril admitted on cross-examination that 21% of

the non-safe-harbor purchases occur at 9:00 or 9:30 p.m.,

and that a 10:00 p.m. starting time would cause no loss of

revenue. He further admitted that people may rearrange

their viewing schedule or use a VCR to tape adult pro-

gramming during the safe harbor hours, again preserving

Graff’s revenues. Finally, plaintiffs acknowledge some

remaining elasticity in the pricing of sexually explicit

programming. Graff would be able raise its rates a certain

extent without losing customers.

25a

whether the potential harm to the defendant that will result

from the issuing of a preliminary injunction outweighs the

harm that may fall upon the plaintiffs if such relief is denied,

and whether granting the requested injunctive relief is in the

public interest. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F.

Supp. 824, 851 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citing Campbell Soup Co. V.

ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1992) and Bradley v.

Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1175 (3d Cir. 1990)); see

also Clean Ocean Action v. York, 57 F.3d 328, 331 (3d Cir. 1995).

In a case such as this one, in which the alleged injury is a

threat to First Amendment interests, the finding of irreparable

injury is often tied to the likelihood of success on the merits.

American Civil Liberties Union, 929 F. Supp. at 851 (citing Elrod

v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347) (1976)). The loss of First Amendment

freedoms is unquestionably irreparable injury. Elrod, 427 U.S.

at 373 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713

(1971).

Conversely, however, if the only irreparable injury alleged

is the loss of first amendment freedoms, the likelihood that

plaintiffs will not succeed on the merits creates an equal like-

lihood that they will not suffer First Amendment injury.”

Constitutional injury cannot occur if there is not a constitu-

tional violation. We will, for this reason, turn our inquiry first

20 Plaintiffs also claim that they will suffer financial loss.

Financial loss is not, however, the type of irreparable

injury that warrants the granting of injunctive relief. See,

e.g., In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee Litigation, 689 F.2d

1137, 1145 (3d Cir. 1982). To the extent that plaintiffs may

suffer financial loss for which they will not be reimbursed,

that economic burden is an element which we considered

infra in the balancing of harms, particularly in our discus-

sion of the benefit to the public of time channeling (per

F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1073,

98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978)) and its availability under § 505 as an

alternative to complete scrambling.

ee en ee ee

26a

to the issue of the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the

merits.

Plaintiffs challenge § 505 on grounds that it (1) infringes

the free speech protections provided by the First Amendment

of the U.S. Constitution, (2) violates the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the U.S. Constitution,

and (3) contains unconstitutionally vague terminology. With

regard to all three of these claims, we conclude that Playboy

and Graff have failed to meet the preliminary injunction test.

They have not persuaded us that they are likely to prevail on

the merits if any of these three claims are ultimately litigated.

Moreover, they have not demonstrated that the public interest

is served by permitting signal bleed to invade nonsubscribers’

homes, particularly in view of our interest in protecting child-

ren from a pervasive medium which transmits sexually explicit

sounds and images and in view of the continuing availability

under § 505 of sexually explicit adult programming during the

safe harbor hours.”

B. First Amendment Jurisprudence

Playboy and Graff claim that § 505 burdens their rights

guaranteed under the First Amendment by inhibiting their

freedom of speech. The First Amendment provides: "Congress

shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S.

21 In our discussion, we do not separate out the elements to

consider with regard to the issuing of an injunction, ie.,

likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm,

balancing of harms, and public interest. First, in this

context of a claim of unconstitutional restriction of free

speech, the harm and public interest elements are impor-

tant factors in determining the likelihood of success on the

merits. These factors will therefore be discussed in con-

junction with the merits of the claims. Second, as we note

above, our irreparable harm analysis is subsumed by our

finding that plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the

merits.

27a

Const. amend. I. The Supreme Court has been exacting in its

protection of this First Amendment right. Moreover, as circum-

stances and technologies have changed, the Court has adapted

free speech protection to meet these changes.

We postponed our decision here until the Supreme Court

reached its decision in a case dealing with a similar field of

developing technology - that of leased and public access cable

channels. See Denver Area Educational Telecommunications

Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 135 L. Ed. 2d 888, 116 S. Ct. 2374

(1996) [hereinafter Denver Consortium]. In Denver Consortium,

the plaintiffs challenged three sections of the Cable Television

Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, which

placed restrictions upon indecent programming aired on leased

and public access cable channels.” Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106

22 The plaintiffs in Denver Consortium challenged sections

10(a), 10(b), and 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Act. These provi-

sions were to be applied to "leased access channels” and

"public, educational, or governmental channels" ("PEG

channels"). Section 10(a) “permit[s] a cable operator to

enforce prospectively a written and published policy of

prohibiting programming [on leased access channels] that

the operator reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual

or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive

manner as measured by contemporary community stan-

dards." 1992 Cable Act, § 10(a)(2). Section 10(b) requires

that, if cable operators choose not to ban sexually explicit

programming as permitted under § 10(a), when they

broadcast such programming on leased access channels,

they must completely segregate and block the signal

carrying the indecent programming. 1992 Cable Act,

§ 10(b). According to regulations promulgated pursuant to

§ 10(b), leased access programmers must inform cable

operators if their programming will be indecent, and cable

operators must then place that programming on a single

channel. 47 C.F.R. § 76.701(d) (1995). The signal of this

(continued...)

28a

Stat. 1460, 1486, §§ 10(a), 10(b), and 10 (c) (codified at 47 U.S.C.

§§ 532(h), 532(j), and note following § 531) ("the 1992 Cable

Act"). A majority of the Supreme Court agreed that § 10(b) of

the 1992 Cable Act was unconstitutional, but the Court was

unable to form a majority regarding the constitutionality of the

remainder of the Act.”

Justice Breyer wrote for the Court regarding § 10(b), but

thereafter he wrote for a plurality, which upheld § 10(a) and

struck down § 10(c). One of the seemingly unresolved aspects

of Denver Consortium is the standard of scrutiny we should ap-

22(...continued)

single channel must be completely blocked by the cable

operator, and unscrambled only upon the written request

of an adult subscriber. Id. at § 76.701(b). Upon receiving

a subscriber's request, the operator must provide access to

the blocked channel within thirty days and, if that sub-

scriber later asks that the channel be re-blocked, the

operator must accommodate the subscribers request, again

within 30 days. Id. at § 76.701(c).

Section 10(c) is similar to § 10(a) but applies only to PEG

channels. It instructs the F.C.C. to enact regulations that

would permit a cable operator "to prohibit the use, on [a

cable system], of any channel capacity of any public,

educational, or governmental access facility for any

programming which contains obscene material, sexually

explicit, conduct, or material soliciting or promoting

unlawful conduct.” 1992 Cable Act, § 10(c).

23 Unlike leased and public access channels, the Graff and

Playboy networks are commercial premium channels. The

segregation of adult programming and the scrambling of

adult channel signals, which concerned the Court in

Denver Consortium, is, in the context of adult channels, a

commercial decision which MSOs have made in order to

limit access to those viewers who pay to subscribe to the

adult channels.

29a

ply in our analysis here. The plurality suggested that it was

“unwise and unnecessary" to decide whether a lower standard

of scrutiny, such as that applied in F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation,

438 U.S. 726 (1978), should apply in the cable context. Denver

Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2385. It was unnecessary to specify a

specific standard because § 10(b) could not pass constitutional

muster either under strict scrutiny or under a less rigorous

standard. And, it was unwise to declare a "rigid single stan-

dard" for fear of dampening the rapid rate of development in

the field of communications technologies.

The other five members of the Court suggested that strict

scrutiny remained the applicable standard where a law re-

stricted speech on the basis of its content. Thus, these mem-

bers of the Court would have required that the law be "nar-

rowly tailored" to achieve a “compelling” government interest

in order to survive constitutional review. Justice Thomas,

joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia believed

that all three challenged provisions of the 1992 Cabie Act were

constitutional and that even § 10(b) would survive strict

scrutiny. See id. at 2422, 2428-29 & 2432 (Thomas, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy, joined by

Justice Ginsburg, would have held to the contrary that strict

scrutiny was fatal to the challenged provisions and all three

should be struck down. See id. at 2405-07, 2416-17, & 2419

(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In the

aftermath of the Denver Consortium decision, it is clear only

that we should apply either strict scrutiny or something very

close to strict scrutiny when a content-based law, applicable in

the cable television context, is challenged on grounds that it

violates the First Amendment.”

24 We recognize that several Supreme Court pluralities have

suggested that sexually explicit material receives less

protection under the First Amendment than, for exampic

artistically, politically, or scientifically valued forms of

speech. For example, in Young v. American Mini Theatres,

(continued...)

30a

However, whatever the standard of scrutiny, as Justice

Breyer stated for the Court in Denver Consortium: "The essence

of that protection is that Congress may not regulate speech

except in cases of extraordinary need and with the exercise of

2A(...continued)

Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 49 L. Ed. 2d 310, 96 S. Ct. 2440 (1976), a

plurality of the Court explained:

Even though we recognize the First Amendment

will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic

materials that have some arguably artistic value, it

is manifest that society’s interest in protecting this

type of expression is of a wholly different, and

lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled

political debate that inspired Voltaire’s immortal

comment ["I disapprove of what you say, but I will

defend to the death your right to say it."). Whether

political oratory or philosophical discussion moves

us to applaud or to despise what is said, every

schoolchild can understand why our duty to

defend the right to speak remains the same. But

few of us would march our sons and daughters off

to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Speci-

fied Sexual Activities” exhibited in the theatres of

our choice. Even though the First Amendment

protects communication in this area from total

suppression, we hold that the State may legitimate-

ly use the content of these materials as the basis for

placing them in a different classification ... .

id. at 70-71. This plurality also noted that "even within the

area of protected speech, a difference in content may

require a different governmental response.” Id. at 66. The

plurality opinion in Pacifica Foundation similarly suggested

that a lower standard of scrutiny may be appropriately

applied in certain contexts when the content of the

regulated material is offensive, vulgar, or shocking. See

Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 744-48.

3la

a degree of care that we have not elsewhere required." Id. at

2384.

The first step that the majority took in Denver Consortium

was to scrutinize the statute to assure that it properly ad-

dressed "an extremely important problem, without imposing,

in light of the relevant interests, an unnecessarily great

restriction on speech. Id. at 2385. The Court defined the

problem as the protection of children from exposure to patent-

ly offensive depictions of sex. Id. it was to address this same

that Congress enacted § 505.

Section 505 differs, however, from the statute at issue in

Denver Consortium and from most statutes that are directed at

speech or at the regulations of speech in that the target of

§ 505 is not the speech itself, ie., sexually explicit adult

programming. The target is signal bleed, a secondary effect of

the transmission of that speech. Moreover, § 505 is directed at

this secondary effect because signal bleed is intruding into the

homes of television viewers who have chosen not to receive

the underlying sexually explicit programming.

This focus of § 505 on a secondary effect of speech leads us

to our next inquiry, whether § 505 is "content-based" or

“content- neutral.” See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,

475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). As we have noted, in Denver Consortium

five justices agreed that a content- based strict scrutiny

standard should apply. We conclude here, but not without

considerable deliberation, that § 505 should be treated as a

content-based restriction on speech. Even though § 505 is

aimed at the content-neutral objective of preventing signal

bleed, the section applies only when signal bleed occurs during

the transmission of "sexually explicit adult programming or

other programming that is indecent.” It does not apply when

signal bleed occurs on other premium channel networks, like

HBO or the Disney Channel. Thus, Congress targeted signal

bleed based on its sexually explicit content, rendering § 505 a

"content-based" restriction. We will therefore apply content-

based analysis.

32a

We must, however, also consider content in context. We

cannot ignore the fact that the households that receive signal

bleed have not subscribed to the adult channel which trans-

mits the unwanted images and sounds. Nor can we ignore the

fact that cable television is a means of communication which

is pervasive and to which children are easily exposed. The

Supreme Court has recognized that cable television is as ac-

cessible to children as over-the-air broadcasting, if not more so.

See Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2386.

Moreover, the Supreme Court in its consideration of free-

dom of speech under the First Amendment has recognized the

need to protect children from sexually explicit material,

particularly in the context of a pervasive medium. See Denver

Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2386 ("The provision before us comes

accompanied with an extremely important justification, one

that this Court has often found compelling -- the need to

protect children from exposure to patently offensive sex-related

material."); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 US.

115, 126 (1989) ("We have recognized that there is a compelling

interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being

of minors. This interest extends to shielding minors from the

influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards.");

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) ("It is evident

beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in

‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a

minor’ is “compelling.” (citation omitted)); Fabulous Assocs. Inc.

v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 896 F.2d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 1990) ("There

is little question that the interest of the state in shielding its

youth from exposure to indecent materials is a compelling state

interest.”).

Nor are the courts alone in finding that chi. en should be

protected from exposure to sexually explicit materials. In 1986,

the Attc ney General’s Commission on Pornography issued a

final report that reached similar conclusions regarding the

effects of “non-violent and non-degrading,” sexually explicit

materials on children. The Commission explained:

er |

33a

Perhaps the most significant potential harm in

this category exists with respect to children. We

all agree that at least much, probably most, and

maybe even all material in this category, re-

gardless of whether it is harmful when used by

adults only, is harmful when it falls into the

hands of children .. .. We have no hesitancy

in concluding that learning about sexuality

from most of the material in this category is not

the best way for children to learn about the

subject. There are harms both to the children

themselves and to notions of family control

over a child’s introduction to sexuality if chil-

dren learn about sex from the kinds of sexually

explicit materials that constitute the bulk of this

category of materials.

We have little doubt that much of this material

does find its way into the hands of children,

and to the extent that it does we all agree that

it is harmful. We may disagree about the extent

to which people should, as adults, be tolerated

in engaging in sexual practices that differ from

the norm, but we agree about the question of

the desirability of exposing children to most of

this material, and on that our unanimous

agreement is that it is undesirable.

U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s Commission on

Pornography, July 1986, at 343-44 (Def.’s Ex. 80).*

25 In considering harm to children, we have not relied on the

study conducted by Government's expert witness, Dr.

Diana M. Elliott, Ph.D. See Diana M. Elliott, Children’s

Exposure to Pornography: Prevalence and Impact (Def.’s

Ex. 79). We understand, as she testified, that it would be

unethical to expose children to pornography in order to

test their reactions to sexually explicit material, but, for a

(continued...)

3a

As a result, we conclude that § 505 clearly addresses a

recognized "compelling interest,” and it remains only for us to

determine whether the provision is carefully tailored to serve

that end. For the reasons that we now develop, and particular-

ly

on the basis of the Supreme Court's ruling in F.C-C. v.

Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), we hold that Congress

has adopted, at least in respect to § 505(b), a carefully tailored,

and constitutional, solution.”

25(...continued)

26

number of reasons, we have concerns regarding the

reliability of her methods and conclusions. Her results

strike us as anecdotal and possibly misleading. Because

the parties stipulated prior to the preliminary injunction

hearing that all evidence submitted would be admissible,

we did not consider the admissibility of her study under

the rules established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceu-

ticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469

(1993) and In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717

(3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1253 (1995). Instead,

the reliability concerns that the court had regarding Dr.

Elliott’s research were considered only in weighing the

evidence. We ultimately decided that her research should

not be given weight in coming to our present decision. If

plaintiffs plan to seek a hearing in order to request a

permanent injunction before this panel, it would be helpful

if the parties would provide the court with additional

evidence demonstrating the effects of sexually explicit

materials on children.

The Supreme Court held in an earlier "secondary effects"

decision, regarding the exposure of the unwilling viewer

nudity, that a city ordinance was invalid which barred the

exhibition in drive-in theaters of motion pictures in which

human male or female bare buttocks, human female bare

breasts, or human bare pubic areas were shown if the

motion picture was visible from any public street or public

(continued...)

35a

In Denver Consortium, a plurality of the Supreme Court

acknowledged that case’s similarity to Pacifica Foundation,

noting that, like the broadcast system at issue in Pacifica

Foundation, "cable television systems . . . ‘have established a

uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.”

Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2386 (quoting Pacifica Founda-

tion, 438 U.S. at 748). It was largely the pervasive nature of

broadcast media that motivated the Court in Pacifica Foundation

to uphold governmental restrictions placed on radio broadcasts

of indecent material.

We wholeheartedly agree with the plurality’s finding in

Denver Consortium that cable television is now “uniquely

pervasive." Id. The plurality also noted that "cable television

broadcasting . . . is as ‘accessible to children’ as over-the-air

broadcasting if not more so." Id. Justice Souter further ex-

plained:

While we have found cable television different

from broadcast with respect to the factors justi-

fying intrusive access requirements under the

| rule in Red Lion [Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395

U.S. 367 (1969)], see Turner Broadcasting System,

Inc. v. F.C.C., (512 U.S. 622 (1994)] (finding that

26(...continued)

place. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 45 L.

Ed. 2d 125, 95 S. Ct. 2268 (1975). We find the present case

distinguishable from Erznoznik in that it is not an occasion-

al glimpse of a portion of nude anatomy which is visible in

the signal bleed from adult channels, but instead it is an

unbroken continuum of sexually explicit sounds and

images, delivered without invitation to one’s home rather

than to passers-by on a public highway. We believe it is

likely that if the Jacksonville ordinance at issue in Erznoznik

had been directed solely at the display of 100% sexually

explicit films which were visible from the public street and

from private homes, the ordinance would have been held

to be valid.

36a

Red Lion's spectrum scarcity rationale had no

application to cable), today’s plurality opinion

rightly observes that the characteristics of

broadcast radio that rendered indecency partic-

ularly threatening in Pacifica, that is, its intru-

sion into the house and accessibility to children,

are also present in the case of cable television.

Id. at 2401-02 (Souter, J., concurring) (citation omitted).

There is no question that a commanding majority of

households in this nation subscribe to cable programming. As

a result of imperfect signal scrambling, millions of children

then have potential access not only to indecent sounds, similar

to those raising concern in Pacifica Foundation, but also to sexu-

ally explicit visual images. In the homes of families who do not

subscribe to sex-dedicated networks, these images enter as an

offensive pollutant. They invade the household and "confront{]

the citizen . . . in the privacy of the home, where the individ-

ual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amend-

ment rights of an intruder." Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 748;

see also Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2386 (plurality opinion).

In Pacifica Foundation, the Supreme Court found it undis-

puted that George Carlin’s "Filthy Words" monologue was

"vulgar,” “offensive,” and "shocking." 438 U.S. at 747. The Court

noted that, in the right context, the speech deserved First

Amendment protections, providing adult listeners with a right

to find Carlin’s observances funny and provocative, instead of

vulgar and offensive. The Court therefore examined the con-

text of the monologue, broadcast at 2 o’clock in the afternoon.

It emphasized the ubiquitous nature of broadcast radio and

recognized that airing Carlin’s performance at the time "could

have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an instant." Id. at 749.

Similarly, when cable signal bleed occurs, children may be

exposed to the sights and sounds of sexually explicit films and

other adult programming. Such programming has the potential

to affect not only a child’s vocabulary, but also his or her

capacity for inappropriate conduct that is sexual in nature. We

believe that the danger of prematurely exposing children to

37a

video and audio transmissions of graphic adult sexual behavior

is even more troublesome than the exposure to offensive

language that was at issue in Pacifica Foundation.

Indeed, the parties do not dispute that the government has

a well-established compelling interest in protecting children

from unsupervised exposure to sexually explicit material.

We then turn to the solution which Congress crafted in

§ 505. Congress provided MSOs with two alternative methods

of compliance with the section: (1) complete scrambling, or (2)

time-channeling the programming into safe-harbor hours.

Playboy and Graff argue that very few MSOs will be finan-

cially able to comply with § 505 by distributing expensive

equipment that will fully scramble the signals of sex-dedicated

networks as required by subsection (a). Plaintiffs fear that

MSOs will drop adult programming entirely, rather than invest

in technologies which will be made obsolete by the v-chip or

that MSOs will transmit plaintiffs’ networks for an unprofita-

bly short eight-hour period. Not only do the plaintiffs foresee

lost profits, they present the possibility of bankruptcy caused

by implementation of § 505.

There is undoubtedly a substantial expense involved in

complying with subsection (a). However, while an economic

burden may warrant consideration when weighing the relative

harms imposed by a law, economics alone cannot dictate the

result where constitutional rights are at issue. See Young v.

American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 78 (1976) (Powell

concurring); Mitchell v. Comm’n on Adult Entertainment Establish-

ments, 10 F.3d 123, 144 (3d Cir. 1993).” Moreover, § 505 does

not require that MSOs shoulder potentially fatal economic

burdens. If the economic hardship imposed by subsection (a)

27 While we are aware that Young and Mitchell are zoning

cases, we consider that their holdings on economic impact

are relevant in that, as is the statute at issue in this case,

the regulations there were directed at competing concerns

of public welfare rather than at the speech itself.

38a

is too severe, an MSO is free to choose to comply with § 505

by time-channeling in accordance with subsection (b).

By including the time-channeling compliance option in

§ 505, Congress provided MSOs with decision-making flexi-

bility and an economically less restrictive alternative. We thus

find that the economic burden placed on MSOs by subsection

(a) is not determinative of the result in light of the substantial-

ly less expensive option provided by time-channeling in sub-

section (b). It follows therefore that if the time-channeling

alternative provides a constitutional means of compliance with

§ 505, then § 505 is constitutional.

Time-channeling was explicitly approved by the Supreme

Court as a constitutional restriction on pervasive indecent

speech in Pacifica Foundation. There, the Supreme Court found

that one of the most troubling aspects of the Carlin broadcast

was the early afternoon hour at which it was aired. Shown at

that time, the broadcast was “like a pig in a parlor instead of

the barnyard.” Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 750 (quoting

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)).

The F.C.C. opiruon challenged by the Pacifica Foundation did

not intend to ban future indecent broadcasts entirely but

merely sought to channel them into a safe-harbor period

during which significant numbers of children would not be

listening. Id. at 732 (citing 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976)). The Supreme

Court held that time-channeling was an appropriate response

to the problem presented. It therefore approved the F.C.C.

attempt to prevent the airing of offensive programming on a

pervasive form of communicatic ; at a time of day when

children were likely to be listening.

Because the Supreme Court endorsed a time-channeling

solution in very similar circumstances in Pacifica Foundation, we

believe that time-channeling also survives constitutional

scrutiny here. It is important to our reasoning that § 505 does

not seek to ban sexually explicit programming, nor does it

prohibit consenting adults from viewing erotic material on

premium cable networks if they so desire. It is clearly estab-

lished that a complete ban on indecent speech will rarely (if

39a

ever) be tolerated. See Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2387

(plurality opinion) (suggesting that § 10(a) passed constitu-

tional muster in part because it gave a cable operator the

flexibility to choose not to ban indecent broadcasts, but rather

“to rearrange broadcast times, better to fit the desires of adult

audiences while lessening the risks of harm to children); id. at

2423 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

("Certainly, under our current jurisprudence, Congress could

not impose a total ban on the transmission of indecent pro-

gramming."); Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 127 (holding

total ban on indecent telephone communications to be uncon-

stitutional and distinguishing the time-channeling remedy

approved in Pacifica Foundation on grounds that it "did not

involve a total ban on broadcasting indecent material."); Young,

427 U.S. at 70 (finding that the First Amendment protects

communication in the area of sexually oriented materials from

total suppression). The time-channeling alternative in § 505

explicitly allows MSOs to continue transmitting sex-dedicated

networks. Section 505 thus leaves the speaker and the listener

with an opportunity to maintain sufficient adult communica-

tion, while respecting the privacy interests of those who might

be offended or inappropriately exposed. We believe the law

thus strikes a permissible balance of constitutional interests.

The plaintiffs contend, nevertheless, that § 504 is a less

restrictive option which is available to provide protection from

signal bleed. They urge, therefore, that we declare § 505

invalid. However, the cost to MSOs of creating an adequate

shield from a widespread intrusion of signal bieed by supply-

ing converter/ lockboxes to households that don’t subscribe to

adult channels, would be close to the expense of providing

converter/lockboxes to non-subscribing households under

§ 505(a). The main difference is that under § 504 the household

has to request the box, while under § 505 the MSO must

40a

provide the box.¥ We have no evidence in the present record

that local cable operators or producers of sexually explicit

programming are advertising the free availability of the § 504

lockbox or other blocking devices upon demand. Likewise,

there is no evidence that parents are otherwise aware of the

§ 504 means of achieving complete blocking of undesired

channels. Upon this record, the government has demonstrated

an expectation that § 504 will not be a viable alternative.

Moreover, in view of the fact that children watch television

in the homes of their friends as well as in their own homes,

we do not find Congress to have been unreasonable in wish-

ing to extend protection from signal bleed beyond a child’s

own home.

Furthermore, Congress enacted, as one of the regulatory

options, time channeling, which the Supreme Court had in

Pacifica Foundation held to be an unconstitutionally acceptable

way of protecting children from a pervasive, sexually explicit

medium. Therefore, even if § 505(a) does not pass constitu-

tional analysis, § 505(b) does.

28 Plaintiffs also assert that Congress found, in § 551(a)(8) &

(9) of the Act, that there is a compelling governmental

interest in empowering parents to control the television

viewing by their children, such as by providing parents

with technological tools that allow them to easily block

violent, sexual or other programming that they believe

harmful to their children. Section 504 was one such

mechanism, and the development of v-chip technology will

be another. Congress recognized, as Senator Feinstein’s

remarks indicated, supra, that many parents are unaware

of the problem of sexually explicit signal bleed and its

accessibility to children of non-subscribers of sexually-dedi-

cated channels. The parental control option is viewed as

an adjunct of lesser efficacy because its exercise requires

knowledge and the taking of affirmative steps such as

requesting the blocking device from the MSO.

4la

Given the content of adult programming and the pervasive

nature of cable television, we find that § 505 is an acceptable

governmental response intended to prevent exposure of

minors to sexually explicit signal bleed. We therefore conclude

that plaintiffs have failed to show that they are likely to

succeed in their claim that the provision violates their First

Amendment rights to freedom of speech.”

C. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Jurisprudence

Likewise, plaintiffs have not persuaded us that they can

succeed on the merits of their claim that § 505 violates their

rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause. Playboy and

Graff argue that other premium channel networks carry

adult-oriented programming but that § 505 will not restrict the

speech of these networks. They claim, for example, that HBO

and Showtime present programming that is an equivalent to

the sexually oriented programming shown on the Playboy

networks and on Spice, and that this programming is shown

at hours outside of the safe-harbor period. They assert that

legislation directed at them, but not at these other premium

networks, denies them equal protection of the laws. See, e.g.,

News America Pub. Inc. v. F.C.C., 269 U.S. App. D.C. 182, 844

F.2d 800, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("The safeguards of a pluralistic

political system are often absent when the legislature zeroes in

on a small class of citizens.") (citing Railway Express Agency v.

New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949)).,

There is, however, a significant difference between plain-

tiffs’ networks and the non-adult premium networks. The

plaintiffs admit that all of the programming shown on their

29 We are mindful that the Supreme Court in Denver Consor-

tium referred to the Telecommunications Act of 1996,

including specifically § 505, as "significantly less restrictive"

than § 10(b) of the 1992 Cable Act which they struck

down. See, e.g., 116 S. Ct. at 2392. However, since § 505

was not before the Court in Denver Consortium, this

reference is dictum.

SES ea ROS at aor an |

42a

networks -- in some cases, twenty-four hours per day -- is

“adult programming.” Transcript of Preliminary Injunction

Hearing 201-02 (D. Del. May 20, 1996) (testimony of Steven

Saril, Senior Vice President of Sales and Marketing for Graff);

see Deposition of Anthony J. Lynn, President of Playboy

Entertainment Group, Inc. at 124-25 (Def.’s Ex. 72) (stating that

sexually explicit programming aired on AdulTVision “is at risk

of being defined as sexually explicit" under § 505); Plaintiff

Graff Pay-Per-View Inc.’s Answers to Defendants’ First Set of

Interrogs. at 6 (Def.’s Ex. 43) (responding that 100% of Graff's

progranuning contains material that is "sexually oriented"). On

the premium channels, however, sexually explicit shows consti-

tute only a fraction of the programming. For example, only

one sixteenth of the programming on the non-adult cable

channels on a Friday evening in Denver was sexually explicit.

Moreover, many of the shows constituting that one-sixteenth

were "R" rated movies with some sexually explicit scenes,

rather than being 100% sexually explicit. Thus, it cannot be

said that the non-adult channels, such as HBO and Showtime,

are "primarily dedicated" to sexually explicit programming.

Moreover, signal bleed from that one-sixteenth, if signal bleed

occurred, would not continuously present sexually explicit

scenes to the channel surfer.”

We find therefore that Congress was justified in initially

addressing the problem of sexually explicit signal bleed by

focusing on sex-dedicated networks. Section 505’s “differential

treatment” or plaintiffs’ networks is justified by their “special

characteristic’ of providing nothing but sexually explicit

programming intended for adult audiences. See Turner Broad-

casting, 114 S. Ct. at 2468. It is perfectly logical that Congress

would begin its attempt to prevent minors from gaining access

30 We note also that § 505 applies uniformly and without

discrimination to all networks that are "primarily dedicated

to sexually-oriented programming.” Pub. L. No. 104-104,

§ 505, 106 Stat. at *136 (1996) (emphasis added). The law

does not, for instance, favor Playboy over Graff.

43a

to programming intended solely for adults by focusing first on

the networks that specialize in adult-only programming.

"Congress need not deal with every problem at

once, and Congress "must have a degree of

leeway in tailoring means to ends." Denver

Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2393 (majority opinion)

(citing cf Semler v. Oregon Bd. Of Dental Examin-

ers, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935) and Columbia Broad-

casting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412

U.S. 94, 102-03 (1973)); see also Williamson v. Lee

Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) ("Reform

may take one step at a time, addressing itself to

the phase of the problem which seems most

acute to the legislative mind."); United States v.

Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993)

(The Court does not "require that the Govern-

ment make progress on every front before it

can make progress on any front.”).

We find that the means chosen by Congress to protect

children and aid their parents was a permitted and measured

response to a national problem. The cause of the problem was

primarily traced to sex-dedicated networks and, understand-

ably, Congress began its efforts to address the problem by

focusing on those networks.” Congress thus made a logical

31 Furthermore, this is not a case involving governmental

discrimination against a Suspect class, nor is there any

evidence of arbitrary or invidious governmental conduct.

See, e.g., New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 US.

568, 592-93, 59 L. Ed. 2d 587, 99S. Ct. 1355 (1979). There-

fore, we apply rational basis review and ask whether the

alleged classification is “rationally related” to a "legitimate"

government interest. In our discussion of First Amend-

ment jurisprudence, supra, we applied a much higher

standard of scrutiny and concluded that § 505 is constitu-

tional. We therefore hold that § 505 is not merely rational-

(continued...)

44a

distinction and tailored the law in an acceptable manner. As a

result, plaintiffs’ claim that § 505 will violate their right to

equal protection of the laws is likely to fail.

D. Vagueness Jurisprudence

After the Supreme Court's decision in Denver Consortium,

it is clear that plaintiffs’ vagueness claim will also fail on the

merits. Graff noted in its Memorandum of Law in support of

its Motion for a Preliminary Injunction that "the Supreme

Court has before it a similar vagueness challenge in the cable

indecency case,” citing Denver Consortium. At that time, argu-

ment had been heard by the Supreme Court in Denver

Consortium, but the decision was pending. When the Supreme

Court published its decision in that case, it flatly rejected the

plaintiffs’ argument that the provisions challenged were

unconstitutionally vague. Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at

2389-90. The Court concluded that similar terms had been

previously defined by courts and by the F.C.C. It also found

the language of the statute "similar to language previously

used by this Court for roughly similar purposes,” referring to

its decision in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), among

others. Id. at 2389. Thus, the use of accepted terms imbued the

statute with meaning.

In recent decisions, other members of the federal judiciary

have likewise found that the term “indecent” has, over time,

been sufficiently defined. See American Civil Liberties Union v.

Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 865, 868 (Dalzell, J., concurring); Shea ex

rel. American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 935-36 (S.D.N.Y.,

1996). As pointed out recently by a three-judge panel in the

United States District Court for the Southern District of New

York, federal courts have approved the F.C.C.’s definition of

“indecency” and have rejected vagueness challenges to that

31(...continued)

ly related to a legitimate government interest, it is carefully

tailored to an interest that is widely regarded as compel-

ling.

45a

term in the context of broadcast media, commercial telephone

communications, and cable programming. See Shea, 930 F.

Supp. at 935-36. The court in Shea comprehensively reviewed

the precedent in this area, and we find their research and their

reasoning persuasive.

Therefore, we conclude that § 505 does not suffer from the

‘vice of vagueness." The plaintiffs clearly understood that the

law applied to them, and in the wake of this litigation, it is

clear that the F.C.C. would apply § 505 to MSOs that carry the

plaintiffs’ networks. Thus, the meaning and application of

§ 505 should be plain to MSOs as well. Playboy and Graff have

little-to-no chance of succeeding on the merits of a vagueness

claim.

VI. Conclusion

Plaintiffs have not satisfied the elements of the preliminary

injunction test. We will therefore remove the temporary

restraining order, which was previously granted by this court,

and we will deny plaintiffs request for preliminary injunctive

relief.

46a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.,

GRAFF PAY-PER-VIEW INC.,

Plaintiffs, CONSOLIDATED ACTION

v. Civil Action No. 96-94/96-107 JJF

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, JANET RENO, Attorney

General, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION,

Defendants.

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

This 7th day of March, 1996 at 6:30 p.m., having

considered Plaintiff Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.’s

Application for a Temporary Restraining Order,

THE COURT FINDS that:

(1) Plaintiff has demonstrated it is likely to succeed

on the merits of its claim that Section 505 of the Telecommu-

nications Act of 1996 violates the First Amendment of the

United States Constitution;

(2) Plaintiff has demonstrated it will suffer irrepara-

ble harm unless injunctive relief is granted;

(3) Defendants and others will suffer no harm from

the imposition of this Order; and

(4) the public interest supports this Order.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.’s Application is GRANT-

47a

ED. The United States of America, the United States De-

partment of Justice, Attorney General Janet Reno, the Feder-

al Communications Commission, and all their officers,

agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and anyone else

acting in concert with them are hereby enjoined from en-

forcing or implementing Section 505 of the Telecommunica-

tions Act of 1996 in any manner.

Unless previously ordered by this Court, this Order

shall remain in force only until the hearing and determina-

tion by the district court of three judges of Plaintiff's Motion

for Preliminary Injunction.

[S/ ae i

United States District Judge

48a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

Civil Action Nos. 96-94 & 96-107-]JF

Consolidated Action

PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.,

GRAFF PAY-PER-VIEW INC.,

PLAINTIFFS,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JANET RENO,

ATTORNEY GENERAL, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION,

DEFENDANTS.

March 7, 1996, Decided

A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Katherine R. Witherspoon, of

MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL, Wilmington,

Delaware. Robert Corn-Revere, Jean S. Moore, Ronald J. Wiltsie,

Il, of HOGAN & HARTSON L.L.P., Washington, D.C. Burton

Joseph, of BARSY, JOSEPH & LICHTENSTEIN, Chicago,

Illinois. Attorneys for Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.

William D. Johnston, John W. Shaw, of YOUNG,

CONAWAY, STARGATT & TAYLOR, Wilmington,

Delaware. Charles S. Sims, John Siegal, of PROSKAUER ROSE

GOETZ & MENDELSOHN LLP, New York, New York.

Daniel Barsky, Jane Hatterer, New York, New York. Attorneys

for Graff Pay-Per-View Inc.

Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Gregory M.

Sleet, United States Attorney, Patricia C. Hannigan, Assistant

United States Attorney, of UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S

OFFICE, Wilmington, Delaware. Theodore C. Hirt, James J.

Gilligan, Sarah L. Wilson, of UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE, Washington. D.C. Christopher J. Wright, Deputy

49a

General Counsel, Danie! M. Armstrong, Associate General

Counsel, of FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

Washington, D.C. Attorneys for Defendants.

Joseph J. Farnan, Jr., District Judge

OPINION BY: Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.

OPINION: March 7, 1996

Wilmington, Delaware

Farnan, District Judge

[. INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court is the Application for a

Temporary Restraining Order filed by Playboy Entertain-

ment Group, Inc. ("TRO") (D.I. 3). Pursuant to Rule 65 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Playboy seeks to

prevent Defendants the United States, the United States

Department of Justice, Attorney General Janet Reno, and the

Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") from imple-

menting or enforcing Section 505 of the Telecommunications

Act of 1996 (the “Act)’ pending a preliminary injunction

1 Subsequent to the filing of the instant action, Graff

Pay-Per-View, Inc. filed a similar action against Defendants.

See Graff Pay-Per-View v. Reno, CA. 96-107-JJF.

Simultaneously with the filing of its Complaint, Graff filed

an Unopposed Motion to Consolidate its action with the

instant action. The Court entered an Order granting

Graff's motion.

2 The Court will refer to the Defendants as _ the

“Government.”

at 47 US.C.A. § 641.

Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act will be codified

50a

hearing before a three-judgessaurt.* Playboy contends that

Section 505 of the Act violates the First Amendment and the

Equal Protection Guarantee of the Fifth Amendment of the

United States C unstitution. The Government opposes the

granting of a TRO on the grounds that Playboy has failed to

satisfy the TRO standards necessary to bar the enforcement

of an Act of Congress. (D.I. 21 at 3.) As provided in the Act,

Section 505 becomes effective on March 9, 1996, 30 days after

it was signed by the President.

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to

Section 561 of the Act. This Opinion shall constitute the

Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Il. BACKGROUND

A. Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996

Section 505 provides in its entirety:

SCRAMBLING OF SEXUALLY EXPLICIT ADULT

VIDEO SERVICE PROGRAMMING.

(a) REQUIREMENT. In providing sexually explicit

adult programming or other programming that is

indecent on any channel of its service primarily

dedicated to sexually-oriented programming, a

multichannel video programming distributor shall

fully scramble or otherwise fully block the video and

audio portion of such channel so that one not a

subscriber to such channel or programming doe ; not

receive it.

(b) IMPLEMENTATION. Until a multichannel

video programming distributor complies with the

requirement set forth in subsection (a), the

distributor shall limit the access of children to the

4 Section 561 of the Act requires that facial challenges to the

Act's constitutionality must be heard by a district court of

three judges empaneled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284.

5la

programming referred to in that subsection by not

providing such programming during the hours of the

day (as determined by the Commission) when a

significant number of children are likely to view it.

(c) DEFINITION. As used in this section, the term

‘scramble’ means to rearrange the content of the

signal of the programming so that the programming

cannot be viewed or heard in an understandable

manner.

Section 505 requires a video programming distributor ("a

cable operator") to scramble "sexually explicit adult

programming or other programming that is indecent" which

is transmitted on a channel "primarily dedicated to sexually

oriented programming,” often referred to as an “adult

network." Section 505 requires that any such channel must

be fully scrambled regardless of whether scrambling has

been requested by the customer. If a cable operator does not

or cannot comply with this "blocking requirement," it is

prohibited from transmitting the adult channel program-

ming during hours of the day when minors are most likely

to view it. Section 505 provides that said hours shall be

determined by the FCC.’ Cable operators must be in full

compliance with the Section 505 blocking requirements by

March 9, 1996, or risk exposure to possible enforcement by

the Government and resulting penalties.

B. History of Section 505

The Telecommu

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