Opposition Brief — National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler

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No. 92-780 | DEC 22 1992 =|

He CLERA

IN THE ———

Supreme Cet of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

JOSEPH SCHEIDLER, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF RESPONDENTS

RANDALL A. TERRY, PROJECT LIFE,

AND OPERATION RESCUE

WALTER M. WEBER VINCENT P. MCCARTHY

(Counsel of Record) 8 South Main Street

1000 Thomas Jefferson St., N.W. New Milford, CT 06776

Suite 520 (203) 355-0923

Washington, D.C. 20007 LAWRENCE M. GAVIN

(202) 337-2278 BELL, Boyp & LLOYD

Three First National Plaza

Suite 3000

70 West Madison Street

Chicago, IL 60602

(312) 372-1121

Attorneys for Respondents Randall A. Terry,

Project Life, and Operation Rescue

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Cu., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962

taken with a complete absence of any economic

purpose?

2. Whether anti-abortion “rescues” and protest activities

constitute “extortion” under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1951?

3. Whether the court of appeals correctly affirmed the

dismissal of petitioners’ antitrust claim? (See Brief

of Respondents John P. Ryan and Pro-Life Direct

Action League, Inc. in Opposition, and Brief in Oppo-

sition of Respondents Joseph Scheidler, et al., for

statement of the specific issues presented with respect

to petitioners’ antitrust claims. )

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT .....0 0... a

II.

IV.

PETITIONERS’ UNSOUND AND SURREAL

THEORY OF THE CASE DOES NOT MERIT

| ____EERS Ae SE Ee ae eee ee

THERE IS NO CONFLICT IN THE CIR-

THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY DETER-

MINED THAT THE RICO STATUTE RE-

QUIRES AT LEAST SOME ECONOMIC

alate clo iacatraasatieleincenasadadabahsiapsioinanen

AN ALTERNATIVE GROUND FULLY SUP-

PORTS THE JUDGMENT BELOW: THE

ACTS ALLEGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE

PREDICATE EXTORTION ...... ssdisainaocotanigesicenbs

A. No Allegation of “Obtaining”...

B. No Allegation of “Property” ........ ee a ae

C. No Allegation of “Consent”...

D. No Allegation of “Force, Violence, or Fear”.

I iivcebaseslakmiscacehtainncsinsoes SEE NOL Ie ec RE IE |

APPENDIX:

Selected excerpts of Ex. B to Plaintiffs’ Responses

to Terry’s First Interrogatories to All Plaintiffs

I Sonoda tient Aintthadeieetbhsansbeasledecéncaniiadsasion

Page

a an Nd

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492

AE SE See 11

McCormick v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1807

(fA ERR TD ee PPE a NRT OO 22

McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)... 19, 20

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886

III ailis ncicinssbbthet nebdap hal dcdiabianibacbchdaTaatancmnadtaplchhiccladseks 13, 21

National Organization for Women v. Scheidler,

765 F. Supp. 987 (N.D. Til. 1991) ......................... 5, 10

National Organization for Women v. Scheidler,

_ By Fs Fy. Ee Ae. — ; Ea eeeaenanes 5, 13, 14

Northeast Women’s Center, Inc. v. McMonagle,

868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.

I a i adenine 9, 10, 22

Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915

vy § & §. A, | Freer 21

United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 464 U.S. 917 (1983) —............. 8,9, 10, 12, 13

United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) ............ 23

United States v. Caldes, 457 F.2d 74 (9th Cir.

nA pe EARN se REE aoe ae 22, 23

United States v. Clark, 646 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir.

| ATARI SPSS IL 81 EO Cree PE PRIN See ee 9

United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371 (1978) _...... 22

United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir.

EPR a Pe Oe 18

United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937 (1986) ......002.00200222. 9

United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973) .... 22, 23

United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1023 (1985) _......0...... 8,9,10,12

United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988) .... 00. 9,10,11

United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415 (1956) .......... 18

United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).. 8,

passim

United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610

ERE ASIST cere Reels Lars eco nares een 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.)

(en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975)... 23

Statutes

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18 U.S.C. § 1341 -...00.. : 19

a I ie tstiscnsnntcndancinntemssnsdinernienaicimanediaeiladl 15, 21, 23

18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1) -2.0000. re 15

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Be I sccceitecescinsinvcecstnsiertatsesiacakouied 11, 12, 13, 14

18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) .... 1, 10, 13, 14

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28 U.S.C. § 455 (b) (1) —_ 7

Other Authorities

OR I i Fe CIID. ccneinciahwitnacecitntnmasonasemniaan 22

ee re rs Fe GA Erb oeciinndnittncnticiectcstaaion 3

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

SITTIN ssusastscshichsebicteneacsaichabnenbedabianatdgnleslbussaciabadieaaa tama aneaaes 11

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1992

No. 92-780

NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC., et al.,

- Petitioners,

JOSEPH SCHEIDLER, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF RESPONDENTS

RANDALL A. TERRY, PROJECT LIFE,

AND OPERATION RESCUE

INTRODUCTION

Petitioners initiated this action for declaratory and

injunctive relief and damages by invoking federal anti-

trust law (the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, and the

Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. $1), the Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act (18

U.S.C. §§1962(c) and (d)),’ and pendent state law.?

1 Petitioners initially sought relief under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) as

well. The courts below rejected this claim, and petitioners have not

sought review of those rulings in this Court.

2 Petitioners did not allege any pendent state law claims against

respondents Randall A. Terry, Project Life, or Operation Rescue.

The state law claims alleged against other respondents are “tortious

interference with prospective economic advantage” (Count V),

“tortious interference with existing business relationship” (Count

Petitioners are the National Organization for Women,

Inc., an advocacy organization opposed to any legal re-

strictions on human abortion, and two abortion businesses.

Respondents are various individuals and organizations

opposed to abortion, and a corporation that provides

pat'clogy testing services (Vital-Med Laboratories, Inc.).

Petitioners allege that some of the respondents have con-

spired to close down abortion businesses’ by un!awful

conduct that amounts to violations of federal antitrust

and racketeering laws.

Petitioners’ lawsuit rests at its core on several errone-

ous propositions:

—that pro-life “rescue” sit-ins and protest activities

constitute federal criminal extortion;

—that a series of such sit-ins amount to a violation

of the federal racketeering statute; and,

—that concerted anti-abortion efforts, because aimed

at closing abortion businesses, amount to a federal

antitrust violation.

After nearly five years of discovery and repeated

amendment of its complaint, petitioners remained un-

able to plead a valid cause of action under the governing

federal statutes. The court of appeals correctly affirmed

the judgment of the district court dismissing the peti-

tioners’ lawsuit. This Court should deny certiorari.

STATEMENT OF CASE

1. Statement of Facts

The district court dismissed the petitioners’ complaint.

The record on appeal, then, consists of all facts properly

pleaded in the complaint.*

VI), and (against respondent Vital-Med) “breach of duty of con-

fidentiality” (Count VII).

3 Petitioners’ recitation of the facts improperly includes numer-

ous allegations from the RICO Case Statement that are not present

—

Petitioner National Organization for Women, Inc.

(NOW) is an organization dedicated, inter alia, to pre-

serving access to abortion. Second Amended Complaint

(2d Am'd Cplt.) at 3-4, 95. Petitioners Delaware

Women’s Health Organization (DWHO) and Summit

Women’s Health Organization, Inc. (Summit) are com-

mercial abortion businesses. Jd. at 4-5, {| 6-8; see also

Pet. at 6 (describing abortion businesses as “commercial

establishments” ) .

Respondents (aside from Vital-Med Laboratories, Inc.)

consist of individuals and organizations, 2d Am’d Cplt.

at 5-8, 17 9-15, 17-20, sharing a common goal of shutting

down all abortion businesses in the United States, id. at

10, { 26. These respondents are leaders and participants

in the “activist anti-abortion movement.” Jd. at 17, 7 52;

id. at 5 79 (respondent Scheidler is “the director of

defendant Pro-Life Action League, Inc.”) ; id. at 5, 7 10

(respondent Ryan was “the director of defendant Pro-Life

Direct Action League, Inc.’’) ; id. at 5, 111 (respondent

Terry is “the national organizer of Operation Rescue’).

Respondents have agreed to “drive . . . out of business”

every abortion business in the country. /d. at 10, { 26.

The methods these various respondents and other pro-

life individuals employ to shut down abortion businesses

include: distribution of a book “outlining methods in-

tended to be used to interfere with and stop” abortion

in the second amended complaint. In particular, petitioners recite a

veritable nationwide laundry list of offenses that apparently in-

cludes every unlawful anti-abortion act known to petitioners. Pet.

at 3n.1. Petitioners’ Second Amended Complaint (2d Am’d Cplt.),

by contrast, lists only certain very specific incidents as the basis”

for petitioners’ RICO claim. 2d Am’d Cplt. at 31-36, 17 98a-l. See

infra pp. 15-17 (chart categorizing alleged predicate acts).

A RICO Case Statement may explain or focus allegations in a

complaint; it cannot, however, substitute for an amended complaint

under Rule 15(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., or otherwise make up for

material deficiencies or omissions by adding to the factual allega-

tions.

businesses from operating, id. at 10, 28 (Scheidler) ;

training and encouraging other persons to use these tech-

niques to close abortion businesses, e.g., id. at 11, {1 29

(Scheidler), 33 (Ryan), 35 (Terry); organizing or par-

ticipating in blockades and trespassing at abortion busi-

nesses, ¢.g., id. at 20-21, 759-63 (various respondents

and thousands of other unnamed participants) ; stealing

fetal remains from respondent Vital-Med Laboratories,

Inc., and then arranging “highly-publicized” funeral

services and burials for these remains, id. at 22-25,

1 64-74 (Scheidler, Scholberg, Murphy, Migliorino, Woj-

nar, PLAL and other non-defendant participants) ; *

damaging or destroying abortion business property (sur-

gical supplies), id. at 14, 42 (non-defendant Joan

Andrews) ; picketing, id. at 15-16, 1] 48-50 (Scheidler

and Ryan); and pressuring a landlord not to lease space

to petitioner Summit, id. at 26, 1] 77-78 (Migliorino).

Petitioners allege that one of the purposes of respond-

ents’ activities is to create a “threatening and intimidat-

ing atmosphere” at abortion businesses. E.g., id. at 13,

1] 39; id. at 19, J] 56.

Petitioners further allege that respondents receive in-

come in the form of “contributions . . . in support” of

their acts designed to shut down abortion businesses, 7d.

at 37, 7100, and that certain individual respondents

receive salaries and benefits for their pro-life work, id.

4 Respondent Scheidler announced publicly in 1988 that the re-

mains were “individually packaged and labelled . . . with the names

of the mothers, doctors, dates and places” of the abortions. Jd. at

24, 70. While this fact in itself “presented an obvious threat,”

i.e., possibility, that the mothers’ names could be made public, id.

at 25, 1 75, petitioners have not alleged that any of the respondents

have revealed or “threatened” to reveal this information. There-

fore petitioners’ legal assertion that respondents “threatened to

disclose confidential information about previous patients,” id. at 35,

36, 917 98(j), 98(1) (Count II) (alleged predicate acts), finds no

support in petitioners’ factual allegations.

Petitioners have not alleged that respondents have re-

ceived any income other than donations from their pro-

life supporters (and salaries and benefits derived from

these donations). Petitioners have not alleged that re-

spondents have demanded, requested, or even suggested

that petitioners or any other abortion businesses, staff,

or clientele turn over money or other property either to

respondents or to any other persons or organizations.

Furthermore, petitioners have not alleged that any of the

respondents have any financial or economic incentive for

shutting down abortion businesses. Nor have petitioners

alleged that respondents have any motivation for their

actions other than a genuine, deeply held desire to stop

the killing of unborn children by abortion.

2. Course of Preceedings

Petitioners filed their original complaint on October 17,

1986. Petitioners subsequently filed, with leave of court,

an amended complaint (on February 2, 1989) and a

second amended complaint (on September 22, 1989). On

March 18, 1991, petitioners submitted a RICO Case

Statement in response to an order of the district court.

On May 28, 1991, the district court granted the motion

of respondents Joseph Scheidler and others to dismiss the

second amended complaint. National Organization for

Women v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937 (N.D. Ill. 1991).

The district court held that petitioners failed to state a

claim, under the federal antitrust and racketeering laws,

upon which relief could be granted. The district court

accordingly declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over

the remaining state claims, and dismissed the case in its

entirety.

The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of peti-

tioners’ lawsuit. NOW v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612 (7th

Cir. 1992), and subsequently denied rehearing and rehear-

ing en banc, Pet. App. G-1.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

This brief focuses on the RICO claims at issue on

appeal. Respondents Randall A. Terry, Project Life, and

Operation Rescue adopt the arguments of respondents

John P. Ryan and Pro-Life Direct Action League, Inc.,

and of Joseph Scheidler, et al., with respect to petitioners’

antitrust claims. Petitioners have not alleged any pendent

state claims against respondents Terry, Project Life, or

Operation Rescue.

There are four main reasons for this Court to deny

review of petitioners’ RICO claims:

1. This case, because of petitioners’ overblown and

ultimately paranoid theory of litigation, does not

present a suitable vehicle for the resolution of the

question petitioners have posed.

2. There is no conflict in the circuits.

3. Review is unnecessary for the simple reason that

the court below correctly resolved the question

petitioners have posed.

4. Finally, resolution of the question petitioners

have posed is not necessary to the disposition of

this case, as a ready alternative ground exists

for rejecting petitioners’ RICO claims.

I. PETITIONERS’ UNSOUND AND SURREAL THE-

ORY OF THE CASE DOES NOT MERIT REVIEW.

To state that the theory of petitioners’ case borders on

the absurd is to understate the situation. In essence,

petitioners argue that the entire activist pro-life move-

ment represents one huge, illegal conspiracy stretching

across the country. See Pet. at 3, n.1; 2d Am’d Cplt. at

11 26-27, 49, 60-63.

Respondent Terry served interrogatories on petitioners

seeking, inter alia, the names of persons having knowl-

edge of the facts of the alleged antitrust and racketeering

conspiracies. In response, petitioners submitted a 68-page

single-spaced list of names of “Persons Who May Have

Knowledge of the Facts About Which the Interrogatories

Inquire or Which Are Contained in Plaintiff’s [sic]

Answers Thereto,” Ex. B to Plaintiffs’ Responses to

Terry’s First Interrogatories to All Plaintiffs (July 16,

1990). (Excerpts of this document are included in the

appendix to this brief.) Scattered among the hundreds and

hundreds of names were the following:

Blackmun, Harry

Kennedy, Hon. Anthony

Marshall, Hon. Thurgood

O’Connor, Justice Sandra Day

Powell, Hon. Lewis

Rehnquist, Hon. William

Scalia, Justice Antonin

Stevens, Hon. John Paul

White, Justice Byron

See Appendix. Presumably petitioners’ assertions, if taken

seriously, would require recusal of those Justices listed

above who are currently Members of the Court. See 28

U.S.C. § 455(b) (1) (requiring disqualification of any

justice who has “personal knowledge of disputed evidenti-

ary facts concerning the proceeding”).

The Justices whom petitioners identify as potential

factual witnesses in this case enjoy diverse and illustrious

company: also included on petitioners’ list were various

ministers (including “Kennedy, D. James Ph.D.”), Roman

Catholic bishops and cardinals, elected officials (including

“Bond, Gov. Kit,” “Bradley, Mayor Tom,” “Dole, Sen.

Bob,” “Edwards, Rep. Don,” “Helms, Sen. Jesse,” “Ken-

nedy, Tec,” “O’Neill, Tip,” and “Packwood, Sen. Bob”),

judges, attorneys (including “Benshoof, Janet,” “Bopp,

Jame [sic],” and “Susman, Frank”), writers (including

“Chapman, Stephen,” and “Will, George F.”), abortion-

ists, and a huge miscellany of other individuals, from

“Terry, Randy,” to “Abzug, Bella,’ and from “Robertson,

The Rev. Pat” to “Tribe, Laurence.” In petitioners’ dis-

torted, paranoid version of reality, the gigantic alleged

conspiracy which petitioners face is apparently so huge as

to be virtually common knowledge.

These outlandish delusions cannot be taken seriously.

Nor do these fantasies merit the time of this Court.

The judges sitting on the courts below have unanimously

voted to reject petitioners’ federal claims. There is no

reason for this Court to resurrect this legal monstrosity.

II. THERE IS NO CONFLICT IN THE CIRCUITS.

Petitioners portray the Seventh Circuit’s decision in this

case as creating a conflict with the Third Circuit, and an

“inconsistency” with the Second and Eighth Circuits, over

the question whether RICO applies when the defendants’

activities involve neither economic crimes nor economic

goals. A closer look at the authorities upon which peti-

tioners rely, however, reveals that this “conflict” is non-

existent.

The circuits that have actually addressed the relevant

issue—the Second and Eighth—are in harmony with the

Seventh Circuit. First, in United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d

51 (2d Cir. 1983), the Second Circuit held that RICO does

not apply unless the defendants have at least some finan-

cial motivation—i.e., the defendants either engage in

economic crimes (e.g., larceny) or pursue economic goals

(i.e., seek revenue from their racketeering), id. at 58-65.

Subsequent cases in the Second Circuit clarified that an

economic goal need not be the sole or even predominant

motive of the racketeering activity, United States v.

Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 58, 55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464

U.S. 840, 917 (1983), and that classic economic crimes

like robbery fall within the RICO statute regardless of

the defendants’ ultimate noneconomic “revolutionary” pur-

pose, United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 853 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032 (1985). But both

9 -

Bagaric and Ferguson applied the RICO statute as con-

strued in Jvic; neither decision purported to read the

economic purpose element out of the RICO statute.

The Eighth Circuit, meanwhile, has explicity concurred

in the /vic court’s interpretation of RICO. United States

v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,

488 U.S. 974 (1988) (“For purposes of RICO, an enter-

prise must be directed toward an economic goal”) (citing

Ivic and an earlier Eighth Circuit opinion).°

Petitioners’ failure even to mention either Flynn or

[vic in their petition to this Court is indefensible.

Petitioners’ supposed conflict, then, reduces to the iso-

lated Third Circuit ruling in Northeast Women’s Center,

Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,

493 U.S. 901 (1989). But McMonagle merely held that

under the Hobbs Act (prohibiting extortion) a defend-

5 Petitioners cite two pre-Flynn decisions which are irrelevant to

the issue of economic purpose. In United States v. Ciark, 646 F.2d

1259 (8th Cir. 1981), the court held that RICO applies to govern-

mental bodies and added, in passing, that a RICO enterprise need

not be “units of economic organization”—i.e., “organizations or

structures which exist for the purpose of maintaining operations

directed toward an economic goal.” Id. at 1265 n.11 (second empha-

sis added; internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But

this is no more than to say that the raison d’etre of an enterprise

need not be to make money—a proposition wholly consistent with

Ivie and Bagaric. The RICO statute requires only some economic

purpose, as the Eighth Circuit subsequently reaffirmed in Flynn.

Petitioners’ other Eighth Circuit case, United States v. Ellison,

793 F.2d 942 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937 (1986), simply °

held that predicate acts of arson “were related to the affairs of the

enterprise” (a white supremacist group) even though those acts

provided “no direct financial benefit” to the enterprise. 793 F.2d

at 950. The issue in Ellison was not the existence of at least some

mercenary motive: the court had already observed that the supre-

macist group was involved in theft “intended to produce operating

funds,” id. at 945. The issue in Ellison, then, was only the “re-

latedness” of the predicate acts to the RICO enterprise, an issue

inapposite to the case at bar,

ant need not receive a financial benefit from the alleged

extortionate conduct (petitioners themselves des-ribed the

holding of McMonagle in these terms in the court below,

see Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Brief at 37-38) and that the

property rights extorted may be intangible. 868 F.2d at

1349-50. As the district court correctly recognized in the

case at bar, 7¢~ F. Supp. at 942-43, McMonagle simply

did not address the question of an economic requirement

for the “enterprise” element of RICO. Indeed, McMonagle

did not even cite, much less discuss, the Second Circuit

cases of Ivic, Bagaric, and Ferguson, or the Eighth Cir-

cuit’s Flynn.

In sum, the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits are

all in agreement that the RICO statute requires some

economic purpose. The Third Circuit has not yet ad-

dressed this specific issue. The alleged conflict petitioner

has identified does not exist.

Ill. THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY DETERMINED

THAT THE RICO STATUTE REQUIRES AT LEAST

SOME ECONOMIC PURPOSE.

The RICO statute in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) forbids “any

person employed by or associated with any enterprise en-

gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate com-

merce, to conduct or participate . .. in the conduct of

such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeer-

ing activity .. .” (emphasis added). The court of ap-

peals correctly rejected petitioners’ claim under § 1962(c)

for failure to allege facts showing any “enterprise”

within the meaning of RICO: petitioners have alleged

no economic purpose or profit-seeking activity whatsoever

on the part of respondents.

RICO does not define the term “enterprise” explicitly.

Instead, the statute merely provides that “ ‘enterprise’

includes any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-

tion, or other legal entity, and any union or group of

individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”

18 U.S.C. §1961(4) (emphasis added). By using the

term “includes” instead of “means,” Congress clearly in-

dicated that not every individual, partnership, and so

forth qualifies per se as an enterprise. Indeed, the enter-

prise concept itself would be superfluous if every person,

legal entity, or association in fact automatically qualified

as an enterprise.

Other provisions of RICO make it clear that the term

“enterprise” must mean an undertaking in which one can

“invest” by acquiring an “interest” in or funding the

“establishment or operation” of the enterprise. See 18

U.S.C. §1962(a), (b). The plain implication of the

text, then, is that an “enterprise” under RICO must,

at a minimum, be engaged in or directed toward some

economic undertaking.®

The Second Circuit thoroughly analyzed this question

in United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 58-65 (2d Cir.

1983), and concluded that RICO does not apply unless

the defendants have at least some financial motivation.’

*In analyzing the term “enterprise,” this Court “must start with

the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the

ordinary meaning of the words used.” H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell

Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238 (1989) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). An “enterprise,” according to Webster's

Third New International Dictionary (1981), can in the abstract

be any plan, design, or undertaking. Jd. at 757. The first defini-

tion given for a concrete enterprise, however, is as follows: “a

unit of economic organization or activity (as a factory, a farm,

a mine); esp: a business organization: FIRM, COMPANY.” 7d.

(definition 1(c)). This economic connotation also appears in such

uses as “Acme Enterprises” or the term “enterpriser,” i.e., an

“entrepreneur,” defined as “the organizer of an economic venture;

esp: one who organizes, owns, manages, and assumes the risks of

a business... .” Jd. at 757 (definition of “enterpriser’”’), 759 (first

definition of “entrepreneur’’).

™The Eighth Circuit has also recognized that a RICO enterprise

requires at least some economic purpose. United States v. Flynn,

852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.) (“For purposes of RICO, an

enterprise must be directed toward an economic goal”), cert. denied,

488 U.S. 974 (1988).

This economic motive need not be the sole, or even pre-

dominant motive, United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d

42, 53, 55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 917 (1983) ;

there need not even be a “significant economic purpose”

for RICO to apply, United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d

848, 853 (2d Cir.) (emphasis in original), cert. denied,

474 U.S. 1023 (1985). But when neither the enterprise

nor the predicate acts reveal “any financial purpose,”

RICO does not apply. Jvic, 700 F.2d at 65 (emphasis

added).

The /vic court gave several reasons for this conclusion.

First, as discussed above, the text of §§ 1962(a) and

(b) shows that “the term ‘enterprise’ quite clearly refers

to the sort of entity in which funds can be invested and a

property interest of some sort acquired, and hence the

sort of entity which one joins to make money.” 700 F.2d

at 60. Thus, an “enterprise” “is evidently an organized

profit-seeking venture.” * Second, the title of the statute,

“Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,” serves

as an “aid in showing what was in the mind of the legis-

lature,” United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.)

610, 631 (1818). The terms “corrupt” and “racketeer”

ordinarily would exclude “members of an organization

striving for [a political or social goal] even by the most

abhorrent means but without any desire for personal

gain.” Ivic, 700 F.2d at 61. The Jvic court likewise

found support for its conclusion in the Congressional

findings prefacing RICO, id. at 61-62, and the legislative

history of RICO, id. at 62-64. Finally, the Jvic court

observed that the RICO Guidelines of the Justice Depart-

ment explicitly bar any indictment charging an “associa-

tion in fact” as an enterprise “ ‘unless the association in

8 The concept of “profit-seeking venture” is by no means limited

to for-profit corporations. A non-profit corporation may charge

for its services and pay a return to its investors. Governmental

bodies may engage in bribery schemes. And even an unincorporated

entity—a gang or robbers, for example—-may seek a profit and

provide a return to its “investors”,

fact has an ascertainable structure which exists for the

purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an eco-

nomic goal ...,’” id. at 64 (emphasis in Jvc) (quoting

Guideline VI).

This statutory requirement of at least some financial

purpose is not a judicially created obstacle to the proper

functioning of RICO. Rather, as the Seventh Circuit

recognized in this case, “this interpretation of § 1962(c)

is dictated by the terms of the statute,” 968 F.2d at 629,

specifically the “enterprise” concept. The economic pur-

pose element does no more than recognize a fundamental

difference between those enterprises which engage in

racketeering and corruption, even as a sidelight, ¢.g.,

United States v. Bagaric (extorting payments from mod-

erate Croatians as a means of furthering predominant

nationalist political goals) from those movements which

address exclusively political or social goals and, while

breaking some laws, commit no “economic” crimes, cf.

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)

(civil rights activism included violent incidents).

RICO prescribes no murky inquiry into “how much”

economic motivation a defendant has. Rather, the eco-

nomic purpose element posits a straightforward, bright-

line test: Is there any mercenary purpose? The crucial

distinction is between “some” and “none”—between some-

thing and nothing—and that is all the difference in the

world.

The Seventh Circuit, after thoroughly analyzing the

decisions of other courts of appeals on the question, cor-

cluded that “the use of the term enterprise in §§ 1962 (a)

and (b) conveys a restriction to economic entities,” 968

F.2d at 629; therefore, an identical “interpretation of

[the word ‘enterprise’ in] § 1962(c) is dictated by the

terms of the statute.” Id.

The court of appeals then applied the economic motive

requirement to the facts of the case at bar and correctly

concluded that petitioners’ complaint failed to satisfy this

statutory requisite. Jd. at 630.

In the instant case, petitioners have alleged no eco-

nomic purpose whatsoever on the part of respondents.

At most, petitioners point to the facts that respondent

organizations receive third-party donations to support

their work and that some of the individual respondents

receive salaries or in-kind benefits (e.g., use of a car)

from these organizations. 2d Am’d Cplt. at 37, { 100.

As the Seventh Circuit held, “it is not reasonable to infer

that the purpose of the [petitioners’ alleged conduct] is

to raise funds” simply because that conduct “results in-

cidentally in donations to support it,” id.

The fact that an organization is donor-sponsored, or

that it pays its employees or agents, simply has no con-

nection at all to the legality of its activities or its lia-

bility under RICO. The court of appeals therefore cor-

rectly held that petitioners failed to satisfy the economic

purpose requirement of RICO.

IV. AN ALTERNATIVE GROUND FULLY SUPPORTS |

THE JUDGMENT BELOW: THE ACTS ALLEGED

DO NOT CONSTITUTE PREDICATE EXTORTION.

The Seventh Circuit rejected petitioners’ RICO claim

under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) for failure to allege facts

sufficient to satisfy the economic purpose requirement of

RICO. Petitioners urge this Court to construe RICO not

to require any economic purpose whatsoever. Pet. at 12.

But even if this Court were to do so, this would not help

petitioners. The petitioners’ complaint fails to state a

RICO claim for an additional, wholly independent reason :

a complete absence of the necessary “predicate acts.”

Thus, review of the “economic purpose” issue would be

an advisory exercise.

Each subsection of the RICO statute requires proof

of a “pattern of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962

(a), (b), (ce). RICO specifies that a “pattern” of racket-

eering activity “requires at least two acts of racketeering

activity,” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The necessary predicate

acts of racketeering activity must in turn come within

RICO’s definition of “racketeering activity,” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1961(1), which lists the offenses that qualify as predi-

cate acts. Thus, a RICO plaintiff must allege at least two

“predicate acts” that fall within the RICO definition of

“racketeering activity.” Petitioners have failed to do so.

Petitioners rely exclusively upon allegations of “extor-

tion” under the federal Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. See

2d Am’d Cplt. at 31-36, 1 97-98; RICO Case Statement at

5. Hobbs Act violations do indeed constitute predicate acts

under RICO. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). The conduct peti-

tioners alleged, however, does not make out even a single

violation of the Hobbs Act, much less the minimum RICO

requirement of two such acts.

The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, prohibits interference

with commerce by “extortion,” § 195lia), and defines

extortion as “the obtaining of property from another, with

his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threat-

ened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official

right.” § 1951(b) (2). Petitioners’ complaint of predicate

extortion under the Hobbs Act fails in four respects: 1)

no allegation of “obtaining”; 2) no allegation of “prop-

erty”; 3) no allegation of “consent”; and 4) no allegation

of actual or threatened “force, violence, or fear.”

The complaint specifies fifteen supposed predicate acts

of extortion. See 2d Am’d Cplt. at 31-36, 98. The follow-

ing chart lists the factual allegatio.s corresponding to

each alleged predicate act, and provides a brief description

of the act in question. (Paragraphs refer to the Second

Amended Complaint.)

Allegation Corresponding Description of act

of predicate factual

act allegation Status Substance

1. {98a {38 Attempt, rescue

conspiracy, blockade ®

commission

*A “rescue blockade” is a sit-in designed to prevent access to an

abortion business. See 2d Am'd Cpit. at 12-13, { 38; id. at 15, % 47.

Allegation Corresponding Description of act

of predicate factual

act allegation Status Substance

2. 98b 40 Conspiracy rescue

blockades

3. 98c 41 Conspiracy “unlawful,

concerted

action”

4. 98d 42 Attempt, “stormed the

commission clinic” and

injured two

persons

5. 98e 42 Commission “stormed the

clinic,”

“ransacked a

medical

procedures

room,” and

destroyed

surgical

supplies

6. 98f 47 Attempt, rescue blockade

conspiracy,

commission

7. 98g 44 Attempt threat of

should

administrator

of abortion

business not

quit job

8. 98h 53 Attempt, rescue blockade

conspiracy,

commission

9. 98i(1) 59, 63 Attempt, rescue

conspiracy, blockades

commission

10. 98i(2) 60 Attempt, rescue

conspiracy, block ades

commission ‘

11. 98i(3) 61 Attempt, rescue

conspiracy, blockades,

commission trespass, and

assaults upon

police officers

Allegation

of predicate

act

Corresponding

factual

allegation

Description of act

Status

Substance

12. 98i(4)

13. 98j

14. 98k

15. 981

64-76

69-76

64-76

Attempt,

conspiracy,

commission

Attempt,

conspiracy,

commission

Attempt,

conspiracy

Attempt,

conspiracy

rescue

blockades

theft and

concealment of

fetal remains;

publicizing

and conducting

funerals and

burials

of stolen

fetuses 1

disclosure of

identity of

abortionists

responsible for

fetal remains;

conducting and

publicizing

fetal funerals

theft,

concealment,

and transport

of fetal

remains;

threat to

disclose

identity of

abortionists ;

publicizing and

conducting

funeral

Masses and

burials for

stolen

fetuses 12

None of these alleged acts constitute federal criminal

extortion.

10 See supra note 4.

11 See supra note 4.

A. No Allegation of “Obtaining.”

A defendant may “obtain” property for purposes of the

Hobbs Act in several ways. Most obviously, the extorter

may personally receive a direct payment from the victim.

E.g., United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir.

1973) (policeman extorting cash from merchant), cert.

denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974). The extorter may also

“obtain” property for another person; no direct personal

benefit to the extorter is necessary. United States v.

Green, 350 U.S. 415 (1956) (extorting “wages” for em-

ployees performing unwanted, superfluous, or fictitious

services).

In the case at bar, however, petitioners have alleged

neither alternative. Petitioners have not alleged that

respondents themselves either received or sought any

benefit from any of the alleged victims of extortion. (The

only “benefits” petitioners allege are donations and sala-

ries which come, not from the alleged victims, but from

independent sources.) Nor have petitioners alleged any

attempt to coerce the transfer of any property to third

parties.’* Therefore respondents cannot, in any reasonable

sense of the word, be guilty of “obtaining” any property.

B. No Allegation of “Property.”

Petitioners identify the following supposed “property”

extorted from the alleged victims: from employees, “jobs”;

from doctors, the “economic right to practice medicine”

at facilities that provide abortions; from patients, the

“right to obtain services” at facilities that provide abor-

tions; and from prospective patients, the “constitutional

12 Petitioners have alleged that certain “co-conspirators” them-

selves caused damage to the property of some abortion businesses.

But vandalism alone—even intentional vandalism—is not extortion.

Nor have petitioners themselves ventured so far as to allege that

the property so damaged constitutes the property allegedly “ob-

tained” by respondents. See 2d Am’d Cplt. at 31, 797 (describing

“property” allegedly extorted).

oP thie Rn ak ar ne ta

right to decide whether and where to obtain medical

services free from fear of violence or threatened or actual

force.” 2d Am’d Cplt. at 31, 197; RICO Case Statement

at 5. These abstract “rights” of uncertain legal status do

not constitute “property” for purposes of the Hobbs Act.

Any unlawful conduct, whether a tort, a breach of con-

tract, or even a parking violation, will interfere to some

degree with another person’s “right” to do as he pleases.

But if such “rights” constitute “property” under the

Hobbs Act, then there are simply no limits whatsoever to

the kind of injury necesary to rise to the level of federal

criminal extortion.

This Court rejected a similar attempt to expand the

concept of “property” beyond all meaning in the context

of the federal mail fraud statute. See McNally v. United

States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). The mail fraud statute, 18

U.S.C. § 1341, prohibits use of the mails for “obtaining

money or property” by fraud. 483 U.S. at 352 n.1. In

McNally, the government charged the defendant with

defrauding Kentucky citizens “of their right to have

the Commonwealth’s business and its affairs conducted

honestly, impartially, free from corruption, bias, dis-

honesty, deceit, official misconduct, and fraud... .” Id.

at 354 n.4 (trial court’s instruction to iury). This Court

recognized an obvious difference between “property rights”

and “the intangible right of the citizenry to good govern-

ment.” Jd. at 356. Indeed, this distinction was so clear

that the Court considered that the only “arguable” way

of saving the prosecution would be to construe the mail

fraud statute so as to dispense entirely with “the money-

or-property requirement” for certain kinds of fraudulent

schemes. Jd. at 358. Relying upon the rule of lenity, the

Court rejected a construction that would render the prop-

erty requirement meaningless: “The Court has often

stated that when there are two rational readings of a

criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to

choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear

and definite language.” Jd. at 359-60 (citations omitted).

The Court refused to construe the mail fraud statute “in a

manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and

involves the Federal Government in setting standards of

disclosure and good government for local and state offi-

cials,” and instead read the statute as “limited in scope

to the protection of property rights.” Jd. at 360.

Acceptance of petitioners’ strained characterization of

abstract “rights” as property would likewise leave the

boundaries of the Hobbs Act highly ambiguous and would

put the federal government in the business of enforcing

order in domestic social movements. Did the civil rights

activists of the 1960’s extort owners of diners of their

“property right” to serve only the customers they chose?

Employees of their “property right” to hold jobs in all-

white establishments? White bus passengers of their

“property right” to sit in the front of the bus? Such

convoluted abstractions simply do not satisfy the “prop-

erty requirement of the Hobbs Act.

C. No Allegation of “Consent.”

The core of extortion is the inducement of voluntary—

but coerced—action on the part of the victim. The Hobbs

Act embodies this concept with its element of “consent”

from the victim. Petitioners, however, have alleged no

such extraction of consent.

Vandalism—even deliberate, serious property damage—

is not the same as extortion. Nor are mere torts—even

intentional torts—a form of extortion. This is because the

consent of the victim is irrelevant to vandalism and in-

tentional torts. The purpose of the vandal or tortfeasor

is not to obtain permission for anything, but simply to

inflict damage or injury.

In the case at bar, petitioners allege a conspiracy to

shut down abortion businesses by unlawful conduct. But

this is not extortion. Petitioners have not alleged that

respondents seek the consent of abortionists to blockade

their facilities or publicly to display the remains of

aborted babies.

Any unlawful activity exerts pressure on those who

wish to avoid the consequences of that activity. But

unless the Hobbs Act were construed to outlaw the uni-

verse of wrongful conduct, the deliberate seeking of some

consensual conduct by the victim must remain a critical

element of this statutory offense.

D. No Allegation of “Force, Violence, or Fear.”

Conduct typical of civil disobedience—sit-ins, pickets,

vehement rhetoric—does not constitute “force, violence,

or fear” under the Hobbs Act. Petitioners have alleged no

more than conduct of this sort; '* hence, there can be no

predicate extortion. Accord Town of West Hartford v.

Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 1990) (“‘it

would be difficult to construe the [anti-abortion rescuers’ ]

activities as described in the complaint, consisting of re-

sistance to police efforts to clear protestors from the

[abortion business] . . ., as the ‘wrongful use of actual or

threatened force, violence or fear’ within the meaning of

section 1951(b)”’).

In the case at bar, petitioners have sought to charac-

terize a quintessentially social, moral, and political battle

as “extortion.” This semantic legal endeavor is flawed not

only as a matter of statutory construction, but also as a

18 Arson and bombing would represent examples of force or vio-

lence; however, petitioners have alleged no such predicate acts.

Petitioners have alleged a solitary incident of apparent assault by

persons who are not defendants in this case. 2d Am’d Cplt. at 14,

"42. But petitioners have alleged no connection to respondents

that would support legal liability for this isolated incident. Liability

of one person for the acts of another “certainly .. . cannot” rest

upon a finding of an agency relationship “simply because both

shared certain goals.”” NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.

886, 925 n.69 (1982) (citation omitted).

fundamental matter of jurisprudence. As the sponsor of

the Hobbs Act noted, the words “robbery” and “extortion”

have been construed a thousand times by the courts.

Everybody knows what they mean.” 91 Cong. Rec. 11912

(1945) (quoted in United States v. Culbert, 485 U.S. 371,

378 (1978)). Petitioners’ artificial and unbounded con-

struction of the Hobbs Act, like the prosecutor’s attempted

expansive reading of that same Act in McCormick v.

United States, 111 S. Ct. 1807, 1816 (1991), is “an

unrealistic assessment of what Congress could have meant

by making it a crime to obtain property from another,

with his consent... .”

For forty years after the passage of the Hobbs Act of

1948, not a single reported decision suggested that the

pursuit of social, moral, or political goals through pres-

sure tactics—including lawbreaking in the form of tres-

pass, obstruction, mass picketing, and incidental scuffling

—constitutes federal criminal extortion. The isolated and

aberrant decision in Northeast Women’s Center, Ine. v.

McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (8d Cir.), cert. dented, 493

U.S. 901 (1989), cannot have singlehandedly revolution-

ized American jurisprudence.

Civil disobedience and social or political pressure tactics

are “as American as apple pie,” and characterizing ideo-

logical movements as extortionate simply because of the

use of these traditional methods would move this country

precisely in the direction of totalitarian oppression so

recently abandoned in the former Soviet Union. The

theory of petitioners’ complaint would make a racketeer

and an extortionist out of everyone from Mohandas

Gandhi, to Martin Luther King, Jr., to the leaders of the

Boston Tea Party. Petitioners’ construction of RICO and

the Hobbs Act would distort these statutes into weapons

for combatting anti-nuclear protestors, animal rights ac-

tivists, and opponents of apartheid. But as the Ninth

Circuit declared in United States v. Caldes, 457 F.2d 74

(9th Cir. 1972) (cited with approval in United States v.

haa eA

Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 409 (1973)), “it appears to us

that vandalism of the type committed by these [defend-

ants] would be more properly and suitably prosecuted in

the state courts and it is doubtful if Congress intended

by Section 1951 to elevate this type of conduct to the

level of the federal court.” 457 F.2d at 79 (citing United

States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) ).

Seventeen years ago Judge (now Justice) Stevens ob-

served for an en banc Seventh Circuit that the “extraordi-

nary growth of federal criminal litigation poses a serious

threat to the quality of federal justice; moreover, this

growth may not only reflect but contribute to the con-

tinuing transfer of power from the several states to the

national government.” United States v. Stasczuk, 517

F.2d 58, 55 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S.

837 (1975). Judge Stevens confirmed that ‘we have no

desire to accelerate this trend unnecessarily,” 517 F.2d at

55. This Court expressed the same caution in refusing to

apply the Hobbs Act to uniawful conduct incident to a

labor strike:

First, this being a criminal statute, it must be strictly

construed, and any ambiguity must be resolved in

favor of lenity.... Secondly, it would require statu-

tory language much more explicit than that before us

here to lead to the conclusion that Congress intended

to put the Federal Government in the business of

policing the orderly conduct of strikes. Neither the

language of the Hobbs Act nor its legislative history

can justify the conclusion that Congress intended to

work such an extraordinary change in federal labor

law or such an unprecedented incursion into the

criminal jurisdiction of the States.

United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. at 411 (citations omit-

ted). These same principles govern the case at bar.

Petitioners have failed to allege facts that would con-

stitute even a single predicate act of federal criminal

extortion. Whereas the RICO statute requires at least

two or more such predicate acts, petitioners’ complaint is

fatally deficient. It follows that there is simply no

occasion even to reach the “economic purpose” question

on which petitioners seek review.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny the

petition for writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

WALTER M. WEBER VINCENT P. MCCARTHY

(Counsel of Record) 8 South Main Street

1000 Thomas Jefferson St., N.W. New Milford, CT 06776

Suite 520 (203) 355-0923

Washington, D.C. 20007

LAWRENCE M. GAVIN

(202) 337-2273

BELL, BoyD & LLOYD

Three First National Plaza

Suite 3000

70 West Madison Street

Chicago, IL 60602

(312) 372-1121

Attorneys for Respondents Randall A. Terry,

Project Life, and Operation Rescue

December 23, 1992

APPENDIX

Selected Excerpts of Ex. B to Plaintiffs’ Responses

to Terry’s First Interrogatories to All Plaintiffs

(July 16, 1990)

. > >

[page 6]

Bierbaum, Hank

Billings, Dot and Lloyd Missouri

Binkley, Lawrence

Birckell, Hays Denver, CO

Bird, Robert

Birgen, John

Bisol, Lisa Marie [ ] Palm Bay Road, N.E.

Bittenbender, Capt. Carl

Bitz, Dennis

Bixby, Bonnie

Bjune, Russell

Black, David

Blackmun, Harry

Blackwell, Edwina

Blackwell, J. Kenneth

Blaine, Ellen

Blair, Rev. Beatrice

Blancato, Nancy

Blanton Elizabeth

Blasko, Mary

Blomgren, Danny

Bloom, David

Bloom, Howard

Blum, Joanne

Blumenthal, Hope

No. [ J

Paim Bay, FL

P. O. Box 150

[ ] N. 3rd St.

Fargo, ND 58107

Brooklyn, NY

Three Rivers, MI

Cincinnati, OH

NYC

[ ] Carmichael Pkwy.

P.O. Box 17352

Montgomery, AL 36117

(205) 277-[ ]

Spokane, WA

[ ] Hadden Avenue

Akron, OH

Washington, D.C.

(212) 645-[ J

Bluni, Gail

Bobo, James Christian

Bodine, Mark

Bogan, Chris Fow

Bogojaviensky, MD

Bohl, Carolyn

Boltino, Fr. Dominic

Bond, Gov. Kit

Bond, Leslie

Bonder, J. Earle

Bonnel, William Edward

Bonner, Brian

Bonner, Lane

Bonning, Jim

Booker, Lorri Denise

Bopp, Jame

Bork, Helen

[page 32]

Kaufman, Laura

Kavanaugh, Carol

Kavanaugh, Louis, Jr.

Keaggy, Phil

Keating, John

Keck, Dallas W.

Keefe, Eileen

Kefauver, Julia

Kefauver, Walter

Kefauver, Wayne

Keichline, Rev. Bill

Keith, Greg

[ ] Gransborough Ct.

Fairfax, VA 22030

(703) 691-[ ]

Worcester, MA

Cleveland, OH

Missouri

[ ] N.E. 28rd Terrace

Pompano Beach, FL

P.O. Box 14263

Washington D.C. 20044

(202) 638-[ ]

Washington, D.C.

Louisville, KY

Indiana

Wisconsin

Chicago

(312) 922-[ ]

[ ] Ist Ave. N.

Fargo, ND 58102

Portland, OR

[ ] Calvert St. N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20016

(202) 332-[ ]

Indiannapolis, IN

Keller, Richard

Kelly, James

Kelly, John, MD

Kelly, Kathy

Kelly, Pete

Kemler, Elea

Kemme, Steve

Kemp, Kathy

Kempf, David and Candy

Kempf, Mary

Kendrigan, Mary

Kennedy, Anthony, Hon.

Kennedy, Gaytha

Kennedy, D. James Ph.D.

Kennedy, Jane

Kennedy, Joseph III

Kennedy, Makel

Kennedy, Mary

Kennedy, Ted

Keplik, Lewis MD

Kerr, Bonnie

Kildee, Rep. Dale

Kilman, Richard

Kimmy, Jimmye

King, Craig Lee

King, Lt. Greg

King, Henry V.

King, Lou

King, Patricia

Darby, PA

[ ] 14th St. N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20003

W: 783[ ]

H: (202) 829-[

Jefferson City, MO

Atlanta, GA

[ ] N. Federal Highway)

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33308

[ ] W. Colonia Dr.

Orlando, FL 32804

(305) 898-[ ]

[ ] Stratford

St. Louis, MO

Fargo, ND

Wilmington, DE

[ ] Wayland Rd. S.W.

Palm Bay, FL

462-[ ]

660-[

[page 40]

Malnich, Janet

Malone, Tyrone

Maloney, Betty

Mandel, Marjorie

Manees, Barbara

Manler, Paul

Manley, Paul

Mann, Judy

Mann, Mercedes

Mann, Nancy Jo

Mann, Terry

Mannies, Jo

Mansnerus, Laura

Mansour, Mary Agnes

Mantylia, Doris

Marchese, Rosemary

Marcus, Ruth

Marden, Janet

Marino, Archbishop Eugene

Marke, Fr. Paul

Markley, Fr. Edward

Markovich, Bob

Markum, Roland

Marquiss, Debra Jean

Marsh, Jon

Marshall, David Ray

Marshall, Robert G.

Marshall, Steve

Marshall, Hon. Thurgood

Martel, Espie

Martin, Barbara

Martin, Carols J. M. MD

South Bend, IN

[ ] Cathedral Ave. N.W.

Washington, D.C..20016

(202) 244-[ 7

Atlanta, GA

Washington, D.C.

# 144-147

Box 1107

Dr.aper Correctional Institute

Elmore, AL 36205

(204) 267-2221

[ ] Ridley Avenue

Norwood, PA

[ ] Gadsden Avenue, N.W.

Palm Bay, FL

Escambia County

Spokane, WA

Martin, Donald

Martin, Ed

Martin, Leon

Martin, Patte

Martin, Priscilla

Martinez, Lisa

[page 43]

Noble, Anne R.

Nolan, Chris

Nolan, Lucy

Nolen, John

Nolte, Bob

Noms, Jay

Noonan, John T.

Norad, Lorijo

Nordreemer, Jon

Norko, Judge Raymond R.

Norotny, Susan

Norris, Murray, Ph.D.

North, Gary, Ph.D.

Notes, Sarah

Novak, Judge Raymond

Nufer, Kathy Walsh

Nungester, Richard L.

Nunes, Flo

Nuzzio, Lt. Michael

O’Brien, Ann

O’Brien, Art

Ocala, FL

Pensacola

[ ] Herman Ave.

Orlando, FL 32803

H: { ] Park Lake Circle

Orlando, FL 32803

(305) 896-[ ]

W.[ ] N. Magnolia Ave.

Orlando, FL 32803

(305) 423-[ J

Oregon

Spokane, WA

Berkeley, CA

Michigan

Pensacola, FL

[ ] Columbia Rd. N.W.

#[ ]

Washington, D.C. 20009

(202) 462-[ ]

Spokane, WA

Cherry Hill, NJ

St. Louis, MO

New York

(516) 746-[ ]

O’Brien, Duran

O’Brien, Jack

O’Brien, John

O’Brien, Lee

O’Brien, Mike

O’Brien, Nancy

O’Brien, Pat

O’Connell, Colleen

O’Connor, Fr. John

O’Connor, Catherine

O’Connor, John Cardinal

O’Connor, Richard Joe

O’Connor, Rita

O’Connor, Justice Sandra Day

O’Dell, Raymond

O’Donnell, Bernard J.

O’Donnell, Eileen

O’Donnell, Mike

O’Donnell, Paul

O’Keefe, John Cavanaugh

O’Keefe, Lucy

O’Malley, Mary

O’Mally, John M.

[page 46]

Pickett, William

Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro

Pine, Rachael, Esq.

Pine, Rachel

Pinelli, Teresa

Pini, Sue

Piron, Gayle

Piron, Rachel

Philadelphia, PA

[ ] Raewyck Dr.

West Chester, PA

[ ] Pryor Street, S.W.

Atlanta, GA 30335

(404) 730-[ ]

Cincinnatti, OH

Philadelphia, PA

New York, NY

Illinois

[ }] Silent Wood La.

Reston, VA 22091

H: (703) 648-[ J

W: (703) 742-[ ]

Atlanta, GA

Minneapolis, MN

Washington, D.C.

Gaithersberg, MD

Spokane, WA

San Francisco

Pittman, Craig

Pittman, Karen Washington, D.C.

Pitts, William Kansas City, MO

Plata, Greg Philadelphia, PA

Pocock, Tom

Pollack, Amy, M.D.

Pollock, Betty {[ ] Claytonbrook, Apt. [ ]

St. Louis, MO 63011

Poole, Patrick [ ] Rose Court

Kalamazoo, MI

Poppema, Suzanne, M.D.

Postlethwait, Monte [ ] Newton St. N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20010

(202) 234-[ J

Potter, Gary

Potter, M.C.

Black Forest, Colorado

Powell, Dan

Power, Edward

Powell, Hon. Lewis

Power, Timothy [ ] Conway

St. Louis, MO

Prathes, Joe

Pratt, Jim [ ] 24th Ave.

San Francisco, CA

Preat, Earnest PA Attorney General

Strawberry Square

Harrisburg, PA

(717) 787-3391

Prendergrast, Alexia 895-[ ]

Presenzia, Judge Philadelphia, PA

Press, Jill Cherry Hill, NJ

Presser, Esther

Preston, Virginia

Price, Sgt. Bill Escambia County

Price, Capt. B.Q. Wichita

Price, Diana :

Prise, Darryl MD Dallas, TX

Pristin, Terry

Probert, Lois

Procter, Carlton

Provaznik, Hon. Richard

Pruitt, Rev. Dusty

Pugh, Tony

Puli, Margaret

[page 47]

Pursley, Fr. Dow

Pursley, Melissa

Pyne, Sandee

Pyrdum, Sgt. Carl S. Jr.

Quayle, R. Danforth

Quilte, Donna

Rader, Tammy

Radezky, Joy

Radford, Barbara

Ragland, Steven

Ragsdale, Katherine

Ragsdale, MD

Ragusa, Ann

Ramey, Catherine

Randall, Joseph MD

Randall, Lynne

Rasmussen, Jeri

Rathburn, Bruce

Ratner, Herb, MD

Rattner, Lisa

Ravenal, S. DuBose MD

Ray, Randall

Rea-Luthin, Marianne

Rebech, Daniel C.

Recker, James

Reckman, Barbara

Redfern, Charles

Reed, Francis A. MD

Reed, Marjorie

St. Louis County

Arkansas

(215) 867-[ ]

Atlanta, GA

Spokane, WA

(215) 867-[ ]

P. O. Box 187

Edinboro, PA 16412

(814) 739-[ ]

Rockford, IL

Mil, OR

[ ] Fourteenth St. N.W.

Atlanta, GA 30318

(909) 879-[ ]

[ ] North Mollison

El Cajon, CA

, Massachusetts

Reeder, Richard

Rehberg, Wes

Rehnquist, Hon. William

Reichman, John L.

Reilly, William M.

Reiswender, Chet

Rendal, Judge Joel

Reque, Paul

Respereny, Catherine

Ressler, William

Retter, Fr. Wendelyn

Revera, Marie

Reynolds, Ann

Reynolds, Audrey

Reynolds, Bonnie

Reynolds, Hon. John

Rhoden, Yalinda

[page 50]

Sand, Gayle

Sanders, James A.

Sanders, Petra V.

Sanders, Roger P.

Sanders, Scott

Sanders, Wayne

Sandstrom, Eric

Sanger, Margaret

Sanseverino, Gay

Sasscer, Roland Russell

Sassone, Robert Esq.

Spokane, WA

Pensacola, FL

[ ] 112th Street S.E.

Bellevue, WA 98004

(206) 296-[ J

Grand Chute, WI

Fargo, ND

[ ] Weaver

Kalamazoo, MI

Spokane, WA

Wisconsin

Akron

1] *

Iowa City, IA

[ ] Rose Court

Kalamazoo, MI

Prickett, Ward, Burt &

Sanders

1310 King Street

Wilmington, DE 19801

[ ] Seaton St. N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20009

(202) 234-[ J

Manchester

Gaithersburg, MD

[ ] Halstead Ave., N.W.

Palm Bay, FL

10a

Sassone, Susan M. Fountain Valley, CA

Satterfield, Led

Savage, Gerald

Savato, Al

Say, Rev. William

Saylor, Kevin

Saylor, Wanda

Scalia, Justice Antonin

Seanlan, Bishop John J. Honolulu, HI

Searf, Rev. Daniel Spokane WA

Schachtschober, Eric

Schaefer, Franky V [ ] Winchester, Suite[ ]

Los Gatos, CA 95030

Schaefer, Lt. John T. Cyprus, CA

Schaeffer, Francis

Schaeffer, Franky

Schaeffer, Pamela

Schaeffer, Rose

Schafer, Janet

Schanne, Michael Joseph [ ] Wyncote Road

Jenkintown, PA 19046

Schanuel, Loralie Lunn [ ] Tree Ridge lane, N.E.

Palm Bay, FL

Scharf, Laura

Schecht, Ellen

Schechtel, Martha Oregon

Scheidler, Ann Hf } N. Leroy Ave.

Chicago, IL 60646

Scheidler, Joseph [ ] N. Leroy Ave.

Chicago, IL 60646

[ ] North LeMai Ave

Chicago, IL 60601

[ ] N. Cicero Ave

Chicago, IL 60646

. * * *

[page 57]

Stevens, Elliot [ ] Front St.

Wilmington, DE

lla

Stevens, Janet 785-[ ]

Stevens, Hon. John Paul

Stevens, Patricia

Stevens, Mr. and Mrs. Stocky

Stevenson, Mary L. RD 4 Box 300

Middlebury, VT 05753

462-[ ]

Steward, Lt. John Cherry Hill, PA

Stewart, Anne

Stewart, Candace

Stewart, David South Bend, IN

Stewart, Iva Marie

Stewart, John

Stewart, Kathy

Stewart, Lisa 320-[ ]

Stewart, Maurice Chesterfield, MO

Stickles, Michael A. [ ] Club Trailm, No.[ ]

Melbourne, FL

Stickney, Allie

Still, Anne

Stillwell, Georgia

Atlanta, GA

Stingl, Jim

Stockton, Debbie

Arlington, VA

Stokes, Lon S.

Spokane, WA

Stokes, Rosemary [ ] S. Tripp Ave.

Chicago, IL

Stolley, Richard

Stone, Diane [ ] Shumate

St. Louis, MO

Stone, Rev. Jerry

Appleton, WI

Stone, Lisa

Stone, Rev. Norman

[ ] W. Prospect

Appleton, WI

Stoneking, Mark

Stons, Nancy J.

Stoos, John CA

12a

Storer, Dawn

Portland, OR

Stout, Rev. Donna

Morton

Stover, Dawn OR

Strader, Nancy

Stradling, Thomas D.

Stratford, Marie C.

[page 64]

Weaver, Helen

Webb, Robert

Webb, Ronald M.

Spokane, WA

Webber, Tom

Minneapolis, MI

(612) 698-[ ]

Webber, Walter

[ ] N. Wells St.

Milwaukee, WI 53233

Webster, Lee Ronald

[ ] Shoreview Circle

Indialantic, FL

Webster, William H. Washington, D.C.

Wein, Helen

Atlanta, GA

Wein, Louis Seattle, WA

Weiner, Bob

Weiner, Tim

Weinstein, Linda

Weir, Diane

Weiss, E.J.

Weiss, John

Welch, Jan [ ] 34th St. N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20008

Wells, David

Wells, Donna

Wells, Shirley

Spokane, WA

Welton, Rob

Wendt, Paula

Wernicke, Carl

West, Cindy

West, Joan

West, William W.

Westphal, Buzz

Westphal, Denise

Wheaton, Therese

Whelton, Robert

Whibbs, Vince

Whipple, Beverly

White, Justice Byron

White, Byron P.

White, Cheryl Dianne

White, Eric Thomas

18a

Minneapolis, MN

(612) 925-[ ]

Mahoning Valley, OH

Kansas City, MO

Penscola, FL

Seattle, WA

Portland, OR

[ ] Orleandor Ave

Satellite Beach, FL

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.