Appendix — Bomhardt v. Maryland

eas ‘ neg Supreme Court, U.S.

47 Q AY FILED

FEB 16 1988

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

No.

IN THE

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

JOHN EMIL BOMHARDT,

Appellant

V.

STATE OF MARYLAND,

Appellee

On Appeal From the Court of Special

Appeals of the State of Maryland

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

APPENDIX

ANDREW J. GROSZER, JR., ESQUIRE

12209 Happy Hollow Road

Cockeysville, Maryland 21030

(301) 561-8047

Counsel of Record

NO,

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

JOHN EMIL BOMHARDT

Appellant

Vv.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Appellee

On Appeal From the Court of Special

Appeals of the State of Maryland

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

APPENDIX

ANDREW Js GROSZER, JR.,° ESQUIRE

12209 Happy Hollow Road

Cockeysville, Maryland 21030

(301) 561-8047

Counsel of Record

APPENDIX TO

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Constitutional Provisions

and Gtatetes.... oe: ew se 4s eS la

Maryland Statutes ...-+-e+¢-+s**s es 3a

Notice of Appeal, No. 1509. . . «+ «+ = 7a

Certificate of Service. . ..+ *« «+s 9a

Order, Court of Appeals, NO. 1509 . . 10a

Mandate, Court of Special

Appeals, No. 1509. . ». » + + © © * lla

Opinion, Court of Svecial

Appeals, No. 1509. . . «+ «© + + © » 13a

Remand Opinion, Judge Lerner. ..-s +» 27a

Order, Court of Appeals, NO. 1632s » _—

Mandate, Court of Special

Appeals, No. 1453. . »« «+ + + + + » 33a

Opinion, Court of Svecial

Appeals, "4, 8 CN ease ee

Commitment Record, No. 9216. iiss OO

la

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

United States Constitution

Ninth Amendment:

"The enumeration in the Constitu-

tion, of certain rights, shall not be

construed to deny or disparage others

retained by the people."

Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1:

"All persons born or naturalized in

the United States, and subject to the

jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of

the United States and of the State

wherein they reside, No State shall

make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities

of citizens of the United States; nor

Shall any State deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law; nor deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws."

Sixteenth Amendment:

"The Congress shall have power to

lay and collect taxes on incomes, from

whatever source derived, without re-

gard to any census or enumeration,"

United States Statutes

U.S.C. Title 26, Internal Revenue Code:

Section 61. Gross income defined.

"(a) General definition - Except

2a

as otherwise provided in this sub-

title, gross income means all in-

come from whatever source derived,

including (but not limited to) the

following items:

(1) Compensation for services,

including fees, commissions, and

Similar items;

(2) Gross income derived from

business;

(3) Gains derived from dealings in

property;

(4) Interest;

(5) Rents;

(6) Royalties;

(7) Dividends;

(8) Alimony and separate mainte-

nance payments;

(9) Annuities;

(10) Income from life insurance and

endowment contracts;

(11) Pensions;

(12) Income from discharge of

indebtedness;

(13) Distributive share of partner-

ship gross income;

(14) Income in respect of a dece-

3a

dent; and

(15) Income from an interest in an

estate or trust,"

Section 6012. Persons required to

make returns of income.

"(a) General Rule - Returns with re-

spect to income taxes under sub-

title A shall be made by the

following:

(1)(A) Every individual having for

the taxable year a gross income of

$1,000 (the exemption amount) or

more, except that a return shall

not be required of an individual

(other than an individual described

in subparagraph (C)) -

(iii) who is entitled to make a

joint return under section 6013 and

whose gross income, when combined

with the gross income of his

spouse, is, for the taxable year,

less than $5,400 (the sum of twice

the exemption amount plus the zero

bracket amount applicable to a

joint return), but only if such

individial and his spouse, at the

close of the taxable year, had the

same household as their home,"

Maryland Statutes

Article 8l, Revenue and Taxes:

4a

Section 288, Imposition of tax.

"(a) Tax on individuals - There

is hereby levied and imposed for

each calendar year beginning after

December 31, 1966, a tax on the

taxable net income, as defined in

Section 280 (a) of every resident

individual of this State and on the

taxable net income, taxable in this

State, of every individual not a

resident of this State.*

Section 294, Who shall file returns,

"(a) Individuals generally. -

(1) Every individual resident of

this State, and every individual

not a resident of this State,

receiving income derived from

sources within this State, other

than fiduciaries, who is required

to file a federal income tax return

under the provisions of Section

6012 (a) of the Internal Revenue

Code, as amended from time to time,

or whose federal income together

with any modification additions

contained in Section 280 (b) of

this subtitle exceed the limits

provided by said Section 6012 (a),

shall file with the Comptroller a

return in such form as the

Comptroller shall prescribe, ....*

Section 297, Copy of federal return

may be required,

"Whenever in the opinion of the

Comptroller it is necessary to

5a

examine the federal income tax

return or a copy thereof, of any

taxpayer in order properly to audit

the returns of such taxpayer, the

Comptroller shall have the right to

compel the taxpayer to produce for

inspection a copy of such return

and all statements and schedules in

support thereof.*

Section 304, Administration.

"(b) Records, statements and

returns, - Every taxp*yer liable to

any tax imposed by this subtitle

shall keep such records, render

such statements, file such returns,

and comply with such rules and

regulations as the Comptroller from

time to time may prescribe. When-

ever the Comptroller judges it

necessary he may reguire any tax-

payer by notice served upon him to

file a return, render such state-

ments, or keep such records as he

deems sufficient, to show whether

Or not such taxpayer is liable to

tax under this subtitle and the

extent of such liability.*

Section 310, Refunds.

*"(a) In general. - In the event

any person pays more tax than is

found to have been due, the

Comptroller shall refund the

overpayment in the manner herein

provided except that any refund in

an amount less than one ($1.00)

dollar shall not be made.

(6b) Form of claim; time of

filing. - Any claim for a refund

made under and pursuant hereto

shall be in such form, verified in

such manner, contain such

information, and be supported by

such documents as may be prescribed

by regulations of the Comptroller

and shall be filed within three

years from the date the return was

due to be filed,.*

Section 320, Failure to file a return

Or report required by this subtitle.

"The failure on the part of any

person or taxpayer to file a

return or report as required by the

provisions of this subtitle, or to

comply with any action taken by the

Comptroller pursuant to Section 304

hereof shall be deemed a violation

of the provisions of this subtitle

subject to penalty and interest as

prescribed in Section 318 hereof.

The wilful failure on the part of

any person or taxpayer to file a

return or a report as required by

the provisions of this subtitle or

to comply with any action taken by

the Comptroller pursuant to Section

304 hereof shall be a misdemeanor,

subject to a fine of not exceeding

five hundred dcllars ($500) or

imprisonment for not exceeding six

months, or both, in the discretion

of the Court.*

JOHN E, BOMHARDT

Appellant

Vv.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Appellee

In the Court of Special Appeals

of Maryland

October Term, 1987

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME

COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Notice is hereby given that John Emil

Bomhardt, the appellant above-named,

hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of

the United States from the opinions and

judgments of this Court in the above

captioned case, No. 1453, September Term,

1985 and No. 1509, September Term, 1986,

which together are now the final judgment

8a

affirming the conviction entered in the

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County,

Maryland.

A petition to the Court of Appeals of

Maryland for writ of certiorari to review

the opinion issued in No, 1509 on June

11, 1987 and the mandate issued on July

13, 1987 was denied on November 20, 1987.

That denial includes refusal of the

appellant's prayer to review the judgment

of No. 1453 which disposed of the federal

Questions,

An earlier petition to the Court of

Appeals of Maryland for writ of

certiorari to review the opinion issued

in No. 1453 on September 8, 1986 and the

mandate issued on October 8, 1986 was

denied on January 2, 1987.

This appeal is taken pursuant to

Section 1257(2) of Title 28 of the United

States Code,

atl

9a

ANDREW J. GROSZER, JR., ESq.

12209 Happy Hollow Road

Cockeysville, Maryland 21030

(301) 561-8047

Counsel for Appellant

Filed February < 1988

JOHN EMIL BOMHARDT

Appellant

V.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Appellee

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

October Term 1987

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the

10a

Foregoing Notice of Appeal to the United

States Supreme Court was mailed to J.

Joseph Curran, Attorney General, Seven

North Calvert Street, Baltimore, Maryland

21202 and to Daniel Anderson, Assistant

Attorney General, at the same address on

the 4th day of February, 1988.

Andrew J. Groszer, Jr., Esq.

Attorney for Appellant

Filed February 4, 1988.

JOHN EMIL BOMHARDT

Vv.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Petition Docket No, 316”

September Term, 1987

(No. 1509, September Term, 1986

lla

Court of Special Appeals)

ORDER

Upon consideration of the petition for

a writ of certiorari to the Court of

Special Appeals and the answer filed

thereto, in the above entitled case, it

is

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of

Maryland, that the petition be, and it is

hereby, denied as there has been no

showing that review by certiorai is

desirable and in the public interest.

Robert C. Murphy

Chief Judge

Date: November 20, 1987

MANDATE

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

No. 1509, September Term, 1986

12a

John Emil Bomhardt

Vv.

State of Maryland

JUDGEMENT: June 11, 1987: Opinion by |

Gilbert, C.J. Judgement affirmed, Costs

to be paid by appellant.

July 13, 1987: Mandate issued.

STATEMENT OF COSTS:

In Circuit Court: for Anne Arundel

County 9216

ROCORG: Cais Ha aS oe es .. -40.00

Steneeraphes . COSES 42 cana civ sees 49.50

In Court of Special Appeals:

Filing Record on Appeal.........50.00

Printing Brief for Appellant....96.00

Printing Brief for Appellee.....52.80

STATE OF MARYLAND, Sct:

I do hereby certify that the foregoing

is truly taken from the records and

proceedings of the said Court of Special

l3a

Appeals. In testimony whereof, I have

hereunto set my hand as Clerk and affixed

the seal of the Court of Special Appeals,

this Thirteenth day of July A.D. 1987.

Howard E, Friedman

Clerk of the Court of Special Appeals.

Costs shown on this mandate are to be

settled between counsel and NOT THROUGH

THIS OFFICE,

REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

ND. 1509

September Term, 1986

JOHN EMIL BOMHARDT

Vv.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Gilbert, C.J.

14a

Bloom

Karwacki,

JJ.

OPINION BY GILBERT, C.J.

Filed: June 1l, 1987

"If, as some assert, the law is the

light of the land, taxes are the bat-

teries that power the light.*"!

Probably since taxes were first

levied, few have enjoyed paying them,

Fewer yet have defied the right of the

sovereign to assess taxes, Still fewer

have been successful in their defiance of

the tax laws. This case represents one

of the latter majority.

As part of his continuing battle

against paying Maryland income taxes,

Jonn Emil Bomhardt avers that the

Attorney General was not empowered to

Sign a Criminal Information. Proceeding

15a

from that premise, Bomhardt reasons that

Since the Attorney General did not sign

the Criminal Information upon which

Bomhardt was tried the convictions are

invalid. Hence, he urges us to reverse

the judgments of the Circuit Court for

Anne Arundel County and concomitantly

direct his release from confinement. We

Shall do neither but rather affirm the

judgements, We explain.

Mr. Bomhardt's first appeal to this

court was the result of his being con-

victed of willfully failing to file State

income tax returns for the years 1981,

1982, and 1983. In his initial appeal he

posited six questions, including a

challenge to the authority of the

Attorney General to act as prosecutor,

We perceive no error in the trial pro-

ceedings with respect to five of the

issues raised by Bomhardt; but, in an

16a

unreported opinion, Bomhardt v. State,

No. 1453, September Term, 1985 (filed

September 8, 1986) (unreported), we or-

dered “a limited remand under rule 1071

to the trial court for the sole purpose

of ascertaining whether the Attorney

General possessed authority to maintain

this prosecution," The convictions

remained in effect pending those further

proceedings.

Pursuant to that limited remand, a

hearing was held before Judge Eugene M,

Lerner, At that hearing a March 9, 1984

letter from then-Governor Harry Hughes to

the rer ere General Stephen H.

Sachs was admitted into evidence, The

letter read, in pertinent part:

"... I hereby authorize and direct

the Attorney General to act with the

Same powers as the State's Attorney

for Anne Arundel County in the

investigation and prosecution of

cases involving criminal violations

of the Maryland income tax laws

17a

which are brought to your attention

by the Comptroller's office for

proscution in Anne Arundel County.

~.e. YOU are authorized to use

any necessary subpeona powers to

present to the Grand Jury for Anne

Arundel County any evidnce or tes-

timony you consider appropriate to

carry out this authorization. You

are further authorized, in this

category of criminal actions, to act

with the same authority as the

State's Attorney for Anne Arundel

County to bring and prosecute

resulting criminal charges."

Judge Lerner ruled that the “guber-

natorial authorization (in the March 9

letter) cloaked the Attorney General with

the requisite authority under Article V,

Sect. 3 of the Constitution of Maryland

to investigate and prosecute (Mr.

Bomhardt)." Consquently, he ordered the

convictions to stand,

Article V, Sect. 3 of Maryland's Con-

Stitution provides, in pertinent part;

"(a) The Attorney General

shall:

18a

(2) Investigate, commence, and

prosecute or defend any civil or

criminal suit or action or category

of such suits or actions in any of

the Federal Courts or in any Court

of this State, or before adminis-

trative agencies and quasi legis-

lative bodies, on the part of the

State or in which the State may be

interested, which the General

Assembly by law or joint resolu-

tion, or the Governor, shall have

directed or shall directed to be

investigated, commenced and

prosecuted or defended,

(3) When required by the

General Assembly by law or joint

resolution, or by the Governor, aid

any State's Attorney or other

authorized prosecuting officer in

investigating, commencing, and

prosecuting any criminal suit or

action or category of such suits or

actions brought by the State in any

Court of this State,"

The Court of Appeals has explained that

Article V, Sect.3(a)(2) “vests the

Attorney General with ... prosecutorial

powers," In re Special Investigation No.

281, 299 Md. 181, 199, 473 A.2d 1, 10

(1984).

The Governor's letter authorized and

directed the Attorney General to “act

with the same powers as the State's

Attorney ... in the investigation and

prosecution of (the instant case and

authorized the Attorney General) to act

with the same authority as the State's

Attorney ... to bring and prosecute

a2

rr?

resulting criminal charges, Persuan

to Article V, Sect. 3, Similar authority

and power have been conferred by the

Governor on the Attorney General, see,

e.g., In Re; Special Investigation N

195, 295 Md. 276, 277, 454 A.2d 843

(1983); Wiener v. State, 290 Md. 425,

8, 430 A.2d 588, 591 (1981), and upheld

on appeal, In re Special Investigation

io. 281, 299 Md. 181, 199-200, 473 A.2d

1, 19 (1984), In Re: A Special

Investigation No. 277, 55 Md. App. 650,

655, 466 A.2d 48, 51 cert, denied, 297

Md. 417 (1983).

20a

As Chief Judge Murphy opined for this

court? in State v, Hunter, 10 Md. App.

300, 305, 270 A. 2d 343, 345 (1976),

modified on other grounds, 263 Md. 17,

278 A.2d 608 (1971), “Under the Consti-

tution and laws of Maryland, the State's

Attorney is a constitutional officer

elected by the people and entrusted by

them with the prosecution of persons

accused of crime." It is the duty of the

State's Attorney to “prosecute ..., On

the part of the State, all cases in which

the State may be interested....° Md. Ann,

Code Art. 10, Sect. 34. In performing

that duty, it is within the State's

Attorney's discretion “to determine the

mode or means ... to initiate the

Criminal charges." Wodoslawsky v. State,

36 MG. App. 654, 659, 374 A.2d 917, 920

cert. denied, 281 Md. 746 (1977), 434

U.S. 1068, 98 S. Ct. 1248, 55 L. Ed. 2d

2la

770 (1978).

The offense of willfully failing to

file a state income tax return is a mis-

demeanor, Md. Ann. Code Art. 8l, Sect.

320, and is within the district court's

exclusive original jurisdiction, Md. Cts,

& Jud. Proc. Code Ann. Sect. 4-301(b)(1).

The prosecution for that offense may be

commenced by either a criminal infor-

mation or a statement of charges. Md.

Rule 4-201(b)(1) and (2). Md. Rule

4-202(b) requires that a criminal infor-

mation must be “signed by the State's

Attorney of a county or by any other

person authorized by law to do so,"

The State's Attorney for Anne Arundel

County was fully empowered to sign and

file in the district court a criminal

information against Mr. Bomhardt alleging

willful failure to file 1981, 1982, and

1983 State income tax returns, In the

22a

matter sub judice, on or about April 10,

1985, the Attorney General filed in the

district court’ a criminal information

which had been signed by the Attorney

General>. Under Article V, Sect. 3,

together with the direction contained in

the Governor's letter, the Attorney

General was fully vested with the power

to "commence" and prosecute these

criminal charges,

Governor Hughes's letter to the

Attorney General extended authority to

investigate and prosecute “cases

involving criminal violations of the

Maryland income tax laws which are

brought to (the Attorney General's)

attention by the Comptroller's oktics for

prosecution in Anne Arundel County.” Mr.

Bomhardt argues that this exténeion

exceeds the “category of ... suits or

actions" contemplated by Article V, Sect.

23a

3, thus making the grant of authority

"overbroad in nature and ... unconsti-

tutional." We do not see it that way.

Past Gubernatorial grants of authority

to the Attorney General under Article V,

Sect. 3 of the Constitution have included

investigation and prosecution in the

following categories of actions: various

forms of criminality in Frederick County

including illegal drug activities and

State income tax violations, Winters v.

State, 301 Md. 214, 220, 482 A.2d 886,

889 (1984); Medicaid fraud, In Re;

Special Investigation No. 244, 296 Md,

80, 87-88, 459 A.2d 111ll, 1114-15 (1983);

misuse of state services and personnel by

the Anne Arundel County Public Defender,

Wiener v, State, 290 Md. 425, 428, 430

A.2d 588, 591 (1981); corruption of

public officials in connection with the

arrest, prosecution, and escape of an

ne, ,

24a

individual from the Baltimore County

jail, Green v. State, 25 Md. App. 679,

682, 337 A.2d 729, 731, cert. denied, 275

Mad. 749 (1975); Irvin v. State, 23 Md.

App. 457, 459, 328 A.2d 329, 331 (1974),

aff'd, 276 Md. 168, 344 A.2d 418 (1975);

overpayment in state and county funds to

school bus contractors in Charles County,

Maloney v. State, 17 Md. App. 609,

614-15, 304 A.2d 260, 263-64, cert,

denied, 269 Md. 761, 762, 767 (1973).

Mr. Bomhardt's attack on the Gover-

nor's direction to the Attorney General

as being overly broad fails. The direc-

tive was supported by the clear language

of the Maryland Constitution and by case

law.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED,

COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT

FOOTNOTES

1 attributed to Jim Oigan. See

25a

Republic Ins. Co. v. Bd. of County

Comm'rs, 68 Md. App. 428, 429 n.1, 51l

A.2d 1136 (1986).

2 For a background of the relationship

between the offices of State's Attorney

and Attorney General, see Murphy v.

Yates, 276 Md. 475, 348 A.2d 837 (1975);

State v. Hunter, 10 Md. App. 300, 305-07

n.5, 270 A.2d 343, 345-46 (1970),

modified on other grounds, 263 Md. 17,

278 A.2d 608 (1971). ee

3 The Honorable Robert C. Murphy was

appointed in 1967 as the first Chief

Judge of the Court of Special Appeals. He

served in that position until August ll,

1972, when he was appointed Chief Judge

of the Court of Appeals, a ‘post he

currently holds,

4 Upon Mr. Bomhardt's demand for a

jury trial, the cases were removed to the

circuit court and the offenses were tried

on the charging documents filed in the

district court. Md, rule 4-201(c)(3).

> On the first day of trial, Mr.

Bomhardt cited the three year statute of

limitations for commencement of prose-

cution for willful failure to-file a

State income tax return, Md. Ann. Code

art 81, sect.-321, and moved to dismiss

count one which alleged his willful

failure to file a 1981 return. The limi-

tations period for that offense began

April 15, 1982. The charging document in

the record at that time was a statement

of charges issued by a judicial officer

On May 2, 1985, The State explained that

a criminal information was filed in April

| ’

26a

prior to the end of the statutory period,

When service was attempted soon there-

after, Mr. Bomhardt refused to accept the

summons, and a new statement of charges

that led to Mr. Bomhardt's arrest was

issued in May.

During the trial, the State introduced

a copy of a statement of charges against

Mr. Bomhardt which had been issued by a

judicial officer of the district court on-

April 10, 1985. Accompanying that state-

ment of charges were three undated

writings entitled "COUNT 1 ... COUNT 2

.. (and) COUNT 3," respectively. The

writings elaborated on the charges,

Judge Lerner ruled that a criminal infor-

mation had been "properly filed," and he

denied the motion to dismiss count one,

We note the erratic and confusing

manner in which the charging documents

were processed in this case and suggust

that the better practice is to proceed

. with either an information or a statement

of charges as Md, Rule 4-201 provides and

to label clearly a criminal information

when that document is used. While these

Suggestions relate to form rather than

substance, see Brown v. State, 285 Md.

105, 108-09, 400 A.2d 1133, 1135-36

(1979), consistency and clarity of form

in charging documents both simplify and

increase the effectiveness of litigation

as well as remove unnecessary distraction

from substantive issues,

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR

27a

ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY

CRIMINAL NO, 9216

STATE OF MARYLAND

Ve

JOHN EMIL BOMHARDT

Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The within matter was tried by this Court

with a jury on October 9 and 10, 1985.

At the-conclusion of the case, the

Defendant was found guilty of three

counts of wilfull failure to file income

tax returns for the years 1981, 1982, and

1983. The Defendant subsequently

appealed, and pursuant to an unreported

Opinion issued by the Court of Special

Appeals on September 8, 1986, the convic-

tion of the Defendant was affirmed con-

tingent upon this Court determining

eel

28a

whether the Attorney General possessed

the requisite authority pursuant to

Article V, Sect. 3 of the Maryland Con-

stitution to investigate and prosecute

the Defendant.

Pursuant to the mandate of the Court

of Special Appeals, a hearing was held in

this Court on October 27, 1986, at which

time the Court heard argument on behalf

of the State and the Defendant. In

addition, the parties stipulated into

evidence a letter dated March 9, 1984,

from Governor Harry Hughes to Attorney

General Stephen H. Sachs in which the

Governor authorized and directed “the

Attorney General to act with the same

power as the State's Attorney for Anne

Arundel County in the investigation and

prosecution of cases involving criminal

Violations of the Maryland income tax

laws." State's Exhibit 1. In addition,

29a

it was stipulated by counsel for the

Defendant that the prosecutor in this

case, Daniel R. Anderson, was an

Assistant Attorney General at all times

pertinent hereto,

Although the Defendant argues that

this grant of authority by the Governor

to the Attorney General was overbroad in

nature and therefore unconstitutional,

this conclusion is not supported by the

Clear language of the Maryland Constitu-

tion or by caselaw. Article V, Sect.

3(a) of the Constitution of Maryland

clearly permits the Governor to authorize

the Attorney General to prosecute any

category of cases as directed by the

Governor. In particular, this section of

the Constitution provides that the Attor-

ney General may:

(2) Investigate, commence and

prosecute or defend any civil or

Criminal suit or action or category

=

30a

€ such suits or actions in any of

the federal courts or in any court

of this state, or before adminis-

trative agencies and quasi legis-

lative bodies, on the part of the

State or in which the State may be

interested, which the General

Assembly by law or joint resolu-

tion, or the Governor, shall have

directed or shall direct to be

investigated, commenced and prose-

cuted or defended,

(3) When required by the General

Assembly by law or joint resolu-

tion, or by the Governor, aid any

State's Attorney or other author-

ized prosecuting attorney in inves-

tigating, commencing, and prose-

cuting any criminal suit or action

or category of such suits or

actions brought by the State in any

court of this state.

MD. CONSTITUTION, Art. V, Sect. 3(a)

(emphasis added). These provisions of the

Constitution are bolstered by caselaw

which upholds the Governor's right to

authorize the Attorney General to inves-

tigate and prosecute a category of cases,

See In Re Special Investigation No, 244,

296 Md. 80 (1983). This Court rejects

the argument made by the De endant that

3la

the grant of authority contained within

the letter of March 9, 1984 from Governor

Hughes to Attorney General Sachs is

overbroad,

This Court therefore finds that the

gubernatorial authorization contained

within Governor Hughes’ letter of March

9, 1984 to Attorney General Sachs

provided to the Attorney General the

requisite authority under Article V,

Sect. 3 of the Constitution of Maryland

to investigate and prosecute the Defen-

dant in this case, As an Assistant

Attorney General, Daniel R. Anderson was

authorized to act in this case with the

Same powers as the State's Attorney for

Anne Arundel County in the investigation

and prosecution of the Defendant.

WHEREFORE, in light of this Court's

findings and those of the Court of

Special Appeals in its unpublished

32a »

Opinion dated September 8, 1986, it is

hereby ORDERED that the judgments of

convictions originally entered herein on

November 26, 1985, hereby stand,

Judge Eugene M, Lerner

Circuit Court for

Anne Arundel County

Filed: October 29, 1986

JOHN EMIL BOMHARDT

Vv.

STATE OF MARYLAND

In the Court of Appeals

of Maryland

Petition Docket No. 418

September Term, 1986

(No. 1453 September Term, 1985

Court of Special Appeals)

ORDER

33a

Upon consideration of the petition for

a writ of certiorari to the Court of

Special Appeals and the answer filed

thereto, in the above entitled case, it

is

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of

Maryland, that the petition be, and it is

hereby, denied as there has been no

showing that review by certiorari is

desirable and in the public interest.

Date: January 2, 1987

MANDATE

Court of Special Appeals

of Maryland

Jonn Emil Bomhardt

34a

Vv.

State of Maryland

September 8, 1986: Per Curiam filed.

Case remanded without affirmance or

reversal to the Circuit Court for Anne

Arundel County for the purpose of

conducting a hearing on the authority of

the Attorney General to prosecute these

charges. The judgments on conviction

remain in effect pending further

proceedings. Costs to be paid five-

sixths by appellant and one sixth by Anne

Arundel County.

October 8, 1986: Mandate issued,

STATEMENT OF COSTS:

In Circuit Court: for Anne Arundel

County

IND No. 9216

ROCOLG. ccccccsccdcocscccscc$40.00

Stenographer's Costs.....$600.00

In Court of Special Appeals:

35a

Filing Record on Appeal...$50.00

Printing Brief for Appellant....

errr 96006066066600000069b bee SU

Reply Brieb.cccsccccccccce’

Portion of Record Extract -

RFT ey TT TT TTTTTTy.

Printing Brief for Cross -

Appellee. >’ * ee ee *e © feeee#e hetero ane

Printing Brief of npenepene © :

WYTTTTYTTY TYVTTTTY $163. 20

Printing Brief for Cross -

Appellant “ee eeeeeeee *e eevee ose ow

STATE OF MARYLAND, Sct:

I do hereby certify that the foregoing

is truly taken from the records and

oroceedings of the said Court of Special

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto

lerk and affixed the seal

ourt of Special Appeals, this

Eighth day of October A.D. 1986.

LEE En

36a

Howard E, iedman

Clerk of the Court of Special

Appeals of Maryland

Costs shown on this Mandate are to be

settled between counsel and NOT THROUGH

THIS OFFICE,

UNREPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No, 1453

September Term, 1985

JOHN EMIL BOMHARDT

Vv.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Bishop

Bloom

Bell, Rosalyn B.,

JJ.

37a

PER CURIAM

Filed: September 8, 1986

John E, Bomhardt was convicted by a

jury in the Circuit Court for Anne

Arundel County of three counts of State

income tax evasion, The court sentenced

him to six month consecutive terms of

imprisonment on each count and imposed a

fine of $1500. Mr. Bomhardt appeals to

this Court raising six questions for our

resolution;

"I. Does a trial judge lack

jurisdiction to sentence a defendant

to imprisonment for willful failure to

file income tax returns when the

Information supplying the charge of

willfullness (sic), initiated by the

Attorney General with undisclosed

authority, is not entered until after

the defense rests?

"II. Has a defendant in an income tax

case been denied an impartial jury

where an Internal Revenue agent

remains on a jury throughout voir

dire?

"III. Is the duty of a married

38a _

technician to file Maryland income tax

forms, because he recieved wages for

labor, stated in Article 8l of the

Annotated Code of Maryland with

sufficient clairity and certainty to

impose criminal sanctions?

"IV. Has the Comptroller for the

State of Maryland arbitrarily and

capriciously prescribed income tax

forms for filing returns that

discriminate against the equal

opportunity of Maryland residents

receiving wages for labor to freely

and voluntarily assert the

consideration given in the contract

for labor?

"V. Does a jury have sufficient

evidence to find the elements of

willfullness (sic) to support a guilty

verdict where the State's exhibits

show a defendant considered his

conduct to be in conformity with the

law?

"VI. Is atrial court's instructions

on willfullness (sic) which holds the

defendant to a standard of

reasonableness erroneous?"

We find merit to only one of appellants

challenges and affirm subject to a

limited remand,

JURISDICTION

- INFORMATION -

39a

a. Jurisdiction

The record reflects that the

Application for Statement of Charges,

filed on April 10, 1985, contains the

phrase “wilful failure to file taxes."

When service of process was first

attempted on May l, 1985, appellant

refused to accept the suamons and

Information; therefore, a warrant was

obtained for hi arrest, A second

be

7)

Statement of charges was filed on May 2,

1985, which omitted the term "wilful",

and merely charged him with “failure to

file" taxes, Appellant was arrested

Sased on this second statement of

charges. Admittedly, a proper

M4

|

formation was filed before the case was

completed, After the defense rested, the

State filed a statement of charges with

the court which did contain the word

40a

Appellant asserts the court lacked

jurisdiction to sentence him because the

Information supplying the charge of

"wilful failure to file" income tax

returns was not filed until after the

defense rested, We hold that the trial

judge did have jurisdiction and appellant

waived his right to raise this defect.

"(The) primary purpose of a charging

document is to fulfill the constitutional

requirement contained in Article 21 of

the Maryland Declaration of Rights that

each person charged with a crime must be

informed of the accusation against him."

Williams v. State, 302 Md. 787, 790-91

(1985). The court in Williams, supra,

established a two-pronged test. First,

the charge must characterize the crime,

Second, it must describe the alleged

Criminal act in enough detail to inform

the accused of the specific conduct with

4la

which he is charged, Id. at 791.

"(I)n determining, for jurisdictional

purposed, whether an indictment

sufficiently charges and characterizes

a crime, (it is clear) that merely

because the charging document does not

allege, expressly or by implication,

every essential element of an offense

does not necessarily mean that no

cognizable crime within the court's

subject-matter jurisdiction has been

charged (W)hile the customary method

of identifying a particular crime

charged in an indictment has been to

aver its essential elements, that

method is not exclusive...."

State v. Chaney, 304 Md. 21, cert.

Genied, 106..8..-¢t. $24 (1905), .1t-i6 net

necessarily fatal if the words of the

indictment leave unspecified one or more

essential elements of the crime, Jones

v. State, 303 Md. 323, .337 (1985),

quoting State v, Coblentz, 167 Md. 523,

529 (1934). Furthermore, the particular

conduct necessary to establish an offense

need not be alleged as elements in the

charging document. Jones, supra at 337,

In the case sub judice, appellant

42a

received a copy of the statement of

charges which referred to the charge as

"failure to file" an income tax return,

This phrase adequately fulfills both

prongs of the Williams, supra, test in

that it characterizes and describes the

crime, Appellant knew he was being

charged with a criminal violation of Md,

Code Ann. Art. 81, Sect. 320 (1957, 1980

Repl. Vol., 1985 Cum. Supp.). He refers

to this section of the Code in his

Oleading entitled "Specific Objection to

States (sic) Response to Notice of

Special Continuing Appearance." Article

81, Sect. 320, supra, includes only one

criminal offense, the willful failure to

file tax returns...Therefore, it is

reasonable to conclude that appellant was

aware he was being charged with this

particular crime. Furthermore, he refers

to the charge, including the term

43a

"willfully,*” in his “Demand to Strike

Surplusages (sic) from Application for

Charging Document," which states;

"The (a)ccused appears specially and

not generally in the above captioned

action pursuant to Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure and appropriate

Maryland Rules demanding that certain

prejudicial allegations be stricken (sic)

from the charging document and probable

cause application to wit: 2. '... did

Willfully fail to file....'" (Emphasis

added, )

We hold that the purpose of the

charging document was served, Appellant

demonstrated he was aware of the

accusations against him,

b, Waiver of Defect

"(W)here no cognizable crime is

Charged, the court lacks fundamental

Subject matter jurisdiction to render a

judgment of Géacietion....* Williams,

Supra at 792, In the case sub judice,

the crime of willful failure to file tax

returns was cognizable because the

44a

charging document adequately

characterized the crime and informed

appellant of the conduct with which he

was charged, Id. at 791. Thus, the

court had jurisdiction over this matter.

A defect in the charging document

other than its failure to show

jurisdiction in the court or its failure

to charge an offense shall be raised by

motion in conformity with this Rule and

if not so raised is waived. Rule

4-252(a)(2). "A motion under darian (a)

of this Rule shall be filed within 30

days after the earlier of the appearance

of counsel or the first appearance of the

defendant before the court...." Rule

4-252(b). Appellant's initial appearance

before the court occurred on May 6, 1985.

In accordance with the Rule, appellant

had until June 5, 1985 to raise any

nonjurisdictional defects. He waived his

45a

right to challenge the defect in the

Statement of charges by waiting until the

morning of the trial to raise the

objection, Chaney, supra, Accordingly,

since the statement of charges in the

case sub judice was not jurisdictionally

Gefective and was not challenged ina

timely fashion, appellant's contention is

without merit.

~ Prosecutorial Authorization -

Appellant also alleges that, even if

the court was correct in applying both

charging documents, the prosecutor was

not authorized to litigate the case,

Appellant contends that "(p)rosecution

may be by the Attorney General when

authorized by implementation of certain

constitutional provisions.... The record

does not state that authorization was

given for this action (investigation or

prosecution),.”

46a

The state asserts that appellant has

waived this. keeue for our review,

Conceding that before trial appellant

sought removal of the Attorney General

and appointment of a "public prosecutor,”

the State suggests that appellant's

objection was based on his assertion that

the Attorney General manifested a

conflict of interest when it swore out

the probable cause application in support

of the statement of charges, The State

argues that at no time did appellant

specifically complain that the Attorney

General lacked the necessary

authorization needed to prosecute this

matter,

The authority of the sovereign to

govern and exercise control is

jurisdictional. 50 C.J.S. Jurisdiction

Sect, 320 (Supp. 1985). A question of

jurisdiction may be raised at any time,

47a

Cooper v. State, 44 Md. App. 59, 63

(1979). Appellant's objection is a

jurisdictional one and hence may now be

raised,

Article V, Section 3(a) of the

Constitution of Maryland sets out the

duties of the Attorney General,

including, inter alia:

"(2) Investigate, commence, and

prosecute or defend any civil or

Criminal suit or action or category of

Such suits or actions in any of the

Federal Courts or in any Court of this

State, or before administrative

agencies and quasi legislative bodies,

on the part of the State or in which

the State may be interested, which the

General Assembly by law or joint

resolution, or the Governor, shall

have directed or shall direct to be

investigated, commenced and prosecuted

. - = .

aa » + "-aa4¢

Or agerendced,

ot when reguired by the General

Assembly by law or joint resolution,

Or by the Governor, aid any State's

Attorney or other authorized

Orosecuting officer in investigating,

commencing, and prosecuting any

Criminal Suit or action or category of

such suits or actions brought by the

tate in any Court of this State."

48a

In State v. Hunter, 10 Md. App. 300,

305-06 n.5, (1970), this Court noted that

under Art. V, Sect, 9 of the Constitution

of Maryland the power to prosecute at ;

trial level formerly vested in the common

law office of Attorney General passed to

the State's Attorney. In State v.

Aquilla, 18 Md. App. 487, 493-94, cert.

denied, 269 Md. 755 (1973), we reaffirmed

that responsibility for prosecuting

criminal cases at the trial level

devolved upon the State's Attorney.

Specific authority under Art. V, Sect.

3(a)(3), Supra, is necessary for someone

other than the State's Attorney to

prosecute a criminal case,

In the case, Sub judice, the record is

barren of any evidence that the Governor

or General Assembly conferred on the

Attorney General the authorization to

investigate and prosecute State income

49a

tax violations, although the State

asserts in its brief that such authority

exists in a letter dated March 9, 1984

Signed by Governor Hughes, Since we are

restricted to the record, we order a

limited remand under Rule 1071 to the

trial court for the sole purpose of

ascertaining whether the Attorney General

possessed authority to maintain this

prosecution, If on remand the court

determines that the Attorney General

possessed the requisite authority, the

judgments of conviction entered are

affirmed pursuant to our holdings on the

remaining issues, If, however, on remand

the court determines that the Attorney

General lacked the authority to

PANEL JUROR

Appeliant claims the court erred in

. 50a

failing to exclude or isolate an Internal

Revenue Service agent on the voir dire

jury panel because "(t)his (juror)

remained a member of the jury panel for

an extensive period of time,..sat with

persons who ultimately constituted the

jury of twelve throughout the voir

dire...had ample opportunity to affect

the impartiality of the jury, and did in

fact make comments regarding ‘tax

protests,'"

The record reflects that juror number

24 was an I.R.S. agent, During voir

dire questioning, this juror was struck

for cause by appellant. The record

reflects that he answered affirmatively

the question whether he knew the

attorneys in the case and whether he had

previously served on a jury panel,1

lrhat is the full extent of the record

relating to this juror.

5la

The record is barren, however, of even

a hint of any prejudicial comments made

by this juror, It is equally barren of

any objections made by appellant to such

alleged comments. Failure of appellant

to object contemporaneously to any

improper remarks made by a prospective

juror or.to object prior to his

exoression that he was satisfied with the

jury as empaneled, waives appellant's

right to review of this issue, Rule

1085; see White v. State, 300 Md. 719,

729 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S, ’

105 S. Ct. 1779, rehearing denied, 476

U.S. e 405 S. Ct... 2351 (1965S).

In any event, there is no merit to

appellant's allegation. Unlike

Commonwealth v,. Harkins, 328 A.,2d 156

(Pa, 1974), cited by appellant, the

"prejudicial" remarks of juror 24 in the

case sub judice, were not set out on the

52a

record, nor stated obviously in the

presence of all prospective jurors. In

Harkins, supra, a prospective juror

announced aloud that he should not hear

the trial because “he (indicating the

defendant) stole my car." Id. at 157.

Moreover, appellant does not suggest

in what manner he was prejudiced by the

remarks or the extent of prejudice.

Instead, he merely asserts the remarks

were prejudicial. We hold the court did

not err in failing to exclude or isolate

from the jury panel a tax agent.

MARYLAND TAX LAW

Appellant contends that the Maryland

income tax laws violate due process, To

this end, he asserts his duty to file a

return under Md, Code Ann, Art. 81 Sect.

320 (1957, 1980 Repl. Vol., 1985 Cum,

Supp.) was not stated with sufficient

clarity and certainty because the law

53a

does not state that wages are equal to

income. We disagree,

Section 294 of Art. 8l, supra, creates

a duty on the part of each Maryland

resident to file a tax return form with

the comptroller. Md. Code Ann. Art. 81,

Sect. 294, supra. The Code also imposes

both civil and criminal sanctions for

failure to comply with Sect. 294, supra,

Mad. Code Ann. Art. 8l, Sect. 320, supra.

he comptroller is directed under Md,

Code Ann. Art. 81, Sect. 304(a), Supra,

to “apply as far as practicable the

administration and judicial inter-

pretation of the federal income tax law.”

Comptroller of the Treasury v. Chesapeake

Coro., 54 Md. App. 208, 214, cert.

denied, 296 Md. 653 (1983). Section 6012

person to file when his or her gross

income exceeds $5400. Gross income is

54a

defined in 26 U.S.C. Sect. 61 (1982) as

"the total of incomes," Although a

number of items or sources of income are

listed, none of these include wages in

exchange for labor. It is clear,

however, that wages for labor is implied

in the phrase "income from whatever

source derived,” as provided in 26 U.S.C.

Section 61, supra. We hold that

appellant's duty to file was stated with

sufficient specificity.

MARYLAND TAX FORMS

Appellant argues that the "comptroller

...nas arbitrarily and capriciously

prescribed income tax forms... (which)

discriminate against the equal oppor-

tunity of Maryland residents receiving

wages for labor to freely and voluntarily

assert the consideration given in the

contract for labor." He further contends

that "the structure of the federal...and

55a

Maryland...forms for individual income

tax returns discourages, and inhibits,

the voluntary entry of the information

necessary to sever income from wages for

labor."

The Maryland income tax law clearly

states a duty to file a tax return form,

Md. Code Ann. Art. 8l, Sect. 294, Supra,

These forms do provide a "space" or

"line" for income. They may, however, be

added to in any manner. Appellant could

easily have attached his request for an

exemption to the Form when he returned

it, rather than ignore his duty to file,

Further, if appellant claims he is exempt

from filing because his wages equaled his

labor, he must prove that such an

exemption exists, State Tax Commissioner

Vv. Baltimore Block and Tile Co., 180 Md,

620, 627 (1942). Appellant failed to

demonstrate that this exemption was

56a

authorized by law. Thus, appellant's

contention is without merit.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

The State presented evidence to

demonstrate that appellant's failure to

File tax returns for 1981-1983 was

willful. Appellant contends the evidence

shows a lack of willfulness on his part,

and claims a defense of subjective

mistake of law. Where two opposing

inferences may be drawn from the same

evidence, the jury is at liberty to

believe whichever inference it chooses,

Pinkney v. State, 12 Md. App. 598, 604,

cert. denied, 263 Md. 781 (1971).

The following evidence was presented

by the State. Appellant did file an

income tax return in 1978 but not

thereafter. In 1982, however, he

Submitted a withholding form to his

employer stating that he "did not owe any

BY A me et le lO Sa BOR AIAN ahd de Ned be ID Ry ahs eH as

57a

Maryland-income tax." Appellant sent a

letter to his employer requesting the

return of a signed affidavit "in order to

eliminate the possibility of an

accusation of having filed a fraudulent

withholding form," After receiving a

letter from the office of the comptroller

which informed appellant that he was not

exempt from withholding tax, and which

reported that his employer had been

instructed to begin withholding taxes

from his wages, appellant threatened to

institute legal action against his

employer. Appellant refused to file the

tax forms for years 1979 and 1983 that

were sent to him by a revenue specialist

with the office of the comptroller.

Interestingly, appellant demanded cash

from the tenants of his rental property

and preserved no record or receipt of

this income,

58a

"(W)illfulness may be established

through proof that the accused's failure

to file constituted a voluntary

intentional violation of a known legal

duty, not the result of accident or

mistake or other innocent cause,"

Johnson v. State, 294 Md. 515, 518-19

(1982). The reasonable inference could

be drawn from the filing of a 1978 tax

return form that appellant knew of the

duty to file income tax returns yearly.

His actions and correspondence with his

employer demonstrate he understood the

requirement of filing. Further, it was

not unreasonable to infer that appellant

demanded cash from his tenants to avoid

declaring the rental income on his

return, It was reasonable to conclude,

therefore, that he did not have a

"mistaken understanding of the law," as

he claims,

es ane

59a

Appellant points to State's Exhibit 4B

and 5 to suggest the State established

and proved a subjective mistake of law on

his part. State's Exhibit 4B was an

affidavit prepared and signed by

appellant in which he stated that he was

neither liable for any income tax nor

required to submit an employee

withholding exemption certificate.

Exhibit 5 was a letter sent by appellant

to his_employer, which stated that the

I.R.S. tax regulations did not apply in

his case, Also submitted as part of

Exhibit 5 was an MW-4 certificate with

the word “incorrect” written in capital

letters across its face,

Appellant confuses the possible

existence of a defense with evidence

sufficient to disprove willfulness. As

Stated, the jury was free to draw

reasonable inferences from the evidence

60a

presented, Pinkney, supra, and the

evidence was sufficient to prove the

element of willfulness beyond a

reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in |

Original); Tichnell v. State, 287 Md.

695, 717 (1980).

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Appellant argues that the trial

court's instructions on willfulness were

erroneous because they failed to inform

the jury of the subjective mistake of law

defense, and insufficient because they

incorrectly explained willfulness,

Appellant has failed to preserve these

issues for our review, Rule 4-325(e).

He did not object to the jury instruction

on willfulness, either in discussion at

the bench before the instruction was

given, or immediately after it was read

to the jury. On both occasions,

6la

appellant had the opportunity to object

and did not do so, He did, however,

object to other instructions at both

times,

In any event, we find no error in the

instructions, The Court of Appeals has

held that "attention should not be

focused on a particular portion (of the

challenged instructions) lifted out of

context, but rather its adequacy is

determined by viewing it as a whole,"

Poole v. State, 295 Md. 167, 186 (1983),

guoting State v. Foster, 263 Md. 388, 397

(1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 908

(1972).

In the case sub judice, the

instruction given by the court was as

follows:

"As I instructed you an element of the

crime with which the (d)efendant is

charged is wilfulness, As used in the

Criminal law wilfully characterizes an

act which is done knowingly and with

62a

deliberate intention for which there

is no reasonable excuse, The element

of deliberate intention reguires that

there be a full and conscious design

to violate the law. You are

instructed that the (d)efendant's

conduct is not wilful if he acted

through negligence, inadvertence

justifiable excuse Or mistake, or due

to S_ goo aith misunderstanding o

the requirement of the law. However,

mere disagreement with the law in and

of itself, does not constitute good

faith misunderstanding of the

requirements of the law, because it is

the duty of all] persons to obey the

law whether or not they agree with it.

Stated otherwise, while a good faith

misunderstanding of the law may negate

wilfulness, a good faith disagreement

with the law does not. Furthermore,

any misunderstanding must be in good

faith." (Emphasis added).

Appellant contends that the use of the

phrase "no reasonable excuse” to explain

willfulness negated the defense of

Subjective mistake of law. While the

trial judge did use this language in the

instruction, the language was explained,

The court provided examples of situations ,

where the defendant's conduct would not

be deemed willful, and followed this with

a |

63a

contrasting examples where willfulness

would be present, He defined “good faith

misunderstanding," and distinguished it

from mere disagreement with the law.

Finally the judge emphasized that any

misunderstanding must be in good faith.

Thus, in light of the trial judge's

Clarifications and explanations, when the

instruction is read in toto, it is

correct, Therefore, appellant's

contentions that the instruction was

erroneous and insufficient to prove

willfulness are without merit.

CASE REMANDED WITHOUT AFFIRMANCE OR

REVERSAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE

ARUNDEL COUNTY FOR THE PURPOSE OF

CONDUCTING A HEARING ON THE AUTHORITY OF

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO PROSECUTE THESE

CHARGES,

THE JUDGMENTS ON CONVICTION REMAIN IN

64a

EFFECT PENDING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

COSTS TO BE PAID FIVE-SIXTHS BY APPELLANT

AND ONE SIXTH BY ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY.

CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY

COMMITMENT RECORD

State of Maryland v. John Emil Bomhardt

Criminal Case No. 9216 DOB: 01/27/29

Docket; Folio:

Term: September 1985

Trial by Court

Judge: Hon. Eugene M. Lerner

Date of Verdict: 10/10/85

Date Sentence Imposed: 11/22/85

Court charge;

1. Failure to file income tax return

Plea: Not Guilty Verdict; Guilty

2. Failure to file income tax return

Plea; Not Guilty Verdict: Guilty

3, Failure to file income tax return

65a

Plea: Not Guilty Verdict: Guilty

Prisoner is committed to the

jurisdiction of the Superintendent of the

Anne Arundel County Detention Center

commencing on 11/22/85 for a period of:

Count Years Months Days

l 6 Concurrent

2 6 Consecutive

3 6 Consecutive

WT #2 CONS TO WT #1 & WT #3 CONS TO

WTS. #1&2

Truly taken from the docket proceedings

of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel

County, in testimony whereof, I hereunto

set my name and affix the Seal of the

said Court this 22nd day of November,

1985.

E, Aubrey Collison, Clerk

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County