Opposition Brief — Lastimosa v. Hughes Aircraft Co.

Supreme Court brief1988

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Text

No. 87-1263

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL,

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM. 1987

CATALINO LASTIMOSA,

Petitioner,

vs.

HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY

AND JACK CURTIS,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

“PETER H. BENZIAN

DEANNE P. GEORGE

KRISTINE P. NESTHUS

LATHAM & WATKINS

Suite 2100

701 “B” Street

San Diego, California 92101

(619) 236-1234

Attorneys for Respondents

*Counsel of Record

Lawyers Brief Service / Legal Publishers / (213) 383-4457 / (714) 720-1510

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Did the court below err in affirming the district

court’s judgment for respondents on the ground that

petitioner’s wrongful discharge claim under state law was

essentially a claim that he was discharged in violation of a

collective bargaining agreement, and thus was preempted

by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29

U.S.C. § 185, where petitioner claimed he was discharged in

violation of safety provisions contained in a collective

bargaining agreement?

2. Did the court below err in holding that the district

court need not imply an amendment of petitioner’s

complaint to allege an essential element of a claim under

federal law, where petitioner represented to the district

court that he made no such allegation and did not seek

leave to amend in the district court?

aad

RULE 28.1 LISTING

Parties to the proceedings below were: plaintiff-appellant

Catalino Lastimosa and defendants-appellees Hughes

Aircraft Company (““HAC’’) and John Curtis. The parent

company of HAC is GM Hughes Electronics Corporation,

a wholly-owned subsidiary of General Motors Corporation.

HAC’s subsidiaries (except wholly-owned subsidiaries) and

affiliates presently include ACCSO S. A.; Alliance

Development Corporation; Atlantic Satellites Ltd.;

ELEKLUFT Elektronik-und Luftfahrtgerate GmbH;

ELTRO GmbH; HBH Services Corporation; Japan

Communications Satellite Company, Inc.; Japan Satellite

Communications Network Corporation L-T Ranches, Inc.;

Nippon Avionics Co., Ltd.; and UKADGE Systems

Limited. HAC also has an interest in the following joint

venture partnerships: AMRAAM International Licensing

Company; Earth Observation Satellite Company; HBH

Company, a Joint Venture of Hughes Aircraft Company,

The Bendix Corporation and Holmes & Narver, Inc.; HKV,

a Joint Venture of International Electronics Systems, Inc.

and A/S Kongsberg Vaapenfrabrikk; Hughes Information

Systems, a Partnership of International Electronics

Systems, Inc. and Hughes Systems Management Interna-

tional; MET, a Joint Venture of Hughes Aircraft Company

and Texas Instruments Incorporated; Project 436 Joint

Ventures (two classified joint ventures); T.A.D. Communi-

cations Company, a Joint Venture of Hughes Aircraft

Company and the International Telephone and Telegraph

Corporation; T.A.D. Communications Company Interna-

tional, a Joint Venture of International Electronics Systems,

Inc.. AVCRON; and Western Alliance Air Defense.

—iii—

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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I DB MOD oo ciccscccsasecsssccvssscecocssssecnnaccanses vi

OPINION AND JUDGMENT BELOW ....................0...... 1

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:: Ee GPE BEE CARE. nc ccccnccccscccssesccsssnccscens 2

Sy ig AYR BS ee Ce) E | ® 3

B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND .................... 6

Il. REASONS REVIEW SHOULD BE

inal dusilnaseeaeusatanneneniivasicnace 11

A. LASTIMOSA’S CLAIM UNDER

STATE LAW IS PREEMPTED BY

SECTION 301 BECAUSE IT IS ESSEN-

TIALLY A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF

THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

sec cnanianionunionninaebodeuciies 11

1. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in This

Action Does Not Conflict With The

EPECISINS CE EER COUAEE. ...0.04..000.ccccsccccccccsce..s 11

peat Seem

Page

a. The Decision Does Not Conflict

MAE MIE a viccnicrniarsdnconessescrcssace 1]

b. The Decision in This Action is

Consistent With Allis-Chalmers ........ 14

c. State Law Supports the Decision

RE ROSS RE Sane Seen OE 16

d. The Other Authorities Cited by

Lastimosa Are Inapposite .................. 18

2. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in This

Action Does Not Conflict With Other

CE WN GE oii si ckekecbncccknidcecicns 20

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT

ERR IN REFUSING TO IMPLY AN

AMENDMENT OF - LASTIMOSA’S

| |g aa ARAN em ee ot AICS, a ee 24

26

| es GN Rancsteatinnsiscovnrasantnenenenebecommenseeaianien

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Page

APPENDIX A

29 U.S.C.§ 185

Section 301, Labor Management Relations

pO DEAL a SINO OLR AEA ios EBB LEN CI ET ARN LEAPED ETO RR OG A-1

29 US.C.§ 157

Section 7, National Labor Relations Act. ...... A-1

29US.C.§ 158

Section 8, National Labor Relations Act ....... A-2

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, ............................sc000 A-2

APPENDIX B

Excerpts from Deposition of Catalino Lastimosa. .......... B-1

=

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,

7G EE aes. Btw CODD \ cccorececcsscvssenssscessannedais 14, 15, 18

Bale v. General Telephone Co. of Calif...

795 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1985) ......cccc eee. 23

Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,

736 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984) oo... 8

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams,

482 U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (1987) ............ 11-14

Davis v. United States,

EET Goie DOS COPED cccivevisecacsiccssscccsievsvasscorueinsicinnns 20

De Soto v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc.,

BIT F.2G 1333 (SUR Car. 19ST) c.rccscccccccsccccssess 22-24

Friday v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,

188 Cal.App.3d 117,

SED CORR, TRBET.. GD CIDR) cccsscsresecscsssccccscesssccss 17, 22

Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc.,

726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. den.

MEE UE. TORR CED) cercessscscsnnnassorcssccaccssecsessec . 21-23

Internat’! Brotherhood of Electrical

Workers v. Hechler,

107 S.Ct. ZIGT CUGBTZ) ....cccrcccccccsrsccccscccrscessesesceses 1S

Page

Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB,

GID FAG 122 CGE Cae. FSG) wvccccccressccccsccccsscnccccns 8

Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,

823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987), ceri.

granted, 108 S.Ct. 226 (1987) ....ccccccceccseeeeeeeeeees 19

NLRB vy. City Disposal Systems, Inc.,

BS CIS, Ba Ce cceciscnvnaniecdcsccinsciesenctsnssocssscescscsces 8

Oglesby v. RCA Corp.,

roe Beer By Ee Ae). penne 22

Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co.,

740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984) .............. 19, 22, 23

Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co.,

826 F.2d 857 (9h Cir. 1987) .......... 11, 20-22, 24

San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,

i> SR Gb 2 i, RRR Ce ee ererrenverere 8, 18

Schroeder v. Trans World Airlines,

pi ee” Bes oO, ORS | renee 23

United Air Lines, Inc. v. Occupational Safety

and Health Appeals Board,

32 Cal.3d 762, 187 Cal. Rptr. 387,

G58 Be ST CEG cccscsksccsccssccinnnicticisesntenssnsns 18, 19

Vaca v. Sipes,

SOG UTS. O91 COGGT): cccreiincrssnscciccicssscsscosccssssnens 18, 25

_

— viii

Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc.,

830 F.2d 993 (9h Cir. 1987)

Statutes

Federal

29 U.S.C. § 185(a), Section 301 of the

Labor Management Relations Act

29 U.S.C. § 157, Section 7 of the

National Labor Relations Act

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), Section 8 of the

National Labor Relations Act

State

California Labor Code

§§ 6300, ef seq.

§ 6400

§ 6310

Rules

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1‘S(a)

United States Supreme Court Rule 17

Page

No. 87-1263

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1987

CATALINO LASTIMOSA,

Petitioner,

VS.

HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY

AND JACK CURTIS,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Respondents Hughes Aircraft Company (“HAC”) and

Jack Curtis (collectively the “respondents”’) respectfully

request that this Court deny the petition of Catalino

Lastimosa (“‘Lastimosa”’) for a writ of certiorari, seeking

review of the decision and opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit filed in this

proceeding on October 30, 1987.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT BELOW

The original opinion (an unpublished memorandum

decision) and judgment of the Court of Appeals, the order

amending such opinion and denying petitioner’s Petition for

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc (the

“Petition for Rehearing’’), and the findings of fact and

conclusions of law of the United States District Court for

oe, oe

the Central District of California are reproduced in the

Appendix to Lastimosa’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari (the

‘*Petition’’), and are therefore not reproduced herein.

STATUTES AND RULES INVOLVED

Pertinent portions of the California Occupational Health

and Safety Act, California Labor Code §§ 6300, et seq. are

reproduced in the Appendix to the Petition and are

therefore not reproduced herein. The pertinent portions of

Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29

U.S.C. § 185(a), Sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor

Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 158, and Rule 15 (a) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are set forth in

Appendix A hereto.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE!

As the question before this Court is whether this action

raises any issues which merit the Court’s review,

respondents will not attempt to state here all of the facts

relevant to this action. However, the foilowing factual

statement is necessary to consider the issue now before the

Court.

| The facts set forth herein are supported by documentary evidence,

deposition testimony, and declarations presented to the district court in

connection with respondents’ motion for summary judgment in this

action. Lastimosa presented no evidence in the district court which

contradicted that presented by respondents.

bd tens

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Lastimosa was employed by HAC from June 1978 until

June 1984. At all relevant-times, HAC was engaged in the

business of, among other things, manufacturing delicate

electronic circuits used in products such as travelling wave

tubes. At the time of his discharge, Lastimosa worked as a

furnace operator in what is known in the electronics

industry as a Class 100,000 clean room. The air in a Class

100,000 clean rocm is specially filtered to be roughly 10

times cleaner than the outside air. HAC maintained the

furnace room in this manner because the furnaces were used

to braze electronic circuits, which are particularly

susceptible to contamination from dust and other particu-

lates. In addition to filtering the air, HAC required furnace

room employees to wear special clothing and prohibited

smoking in the room. Access to the room was gained

through an air lock, and daily “‘wet downs” and cleanings

of the furnace room were also performed. One wall of the

furnace room included several large glass windows, and

HAC customers occasionally passed by these windows on

tours of the facility or on business visits. HAC marketed its

products in part by indicating the ciean conditions under

which these delicate electronic circuits were processed,

including the clean room status of its furnace room

operation.

Lastimosa claims in his Petition that the external surfaces

of the furnaces were ‘‘wrapped in asbestos.” The evidence

before the courts below showed that actually, some of the

surfaces of five of eleven furnaces in the furnace room were

wrapped in a “sleeve” composed of transite, which is a

hard, cement-like compound, partially composed of

asbestos. The transite served as a heat shield. Furnace

operators did not come in contact with the transite while

operating the furnaces, no moving parts were made of this

“iain

asbestos material, and the transite was never used as a

working surface. Lastimosa also asserts that in June 1984,

HAC “began replacing the asbestos on the furnace with-new

asbestos, thereby increasing the risk of asbestos exposure.”

This statement presumably refers to the fact that at one

time, certain furnaces used asbestos gaskets, which were

replaced on occasion. HAC presented undisputed evidence

that the use of asbestos gaskets in the furnaces was

discontinued at least 18 months prior to Lastimosa’s

termination, and that in any event, the furnaces were always

removed from the furnace room when the gaskets were

replaced.

Throughout his employment at HAC, Lastimosa was a

member of a labor organization, the Electronic and Space

Technicians, Local 1553 of the AFL-CIO (the ‘“Union”’),

which was the exclusive collective bargaining representative

of Lastimosa and certain other HAC employees. At all

times relevant to the issues herein, there was a written

collective bargaining agreement in effect between HAC and

the Union (the “CBA’”’), which governed Lastimosa’s wages,

hours and working conditions.

Article XXI of the CBA dealt with safety in the

workplace. HAC agreed in this Article to conduct safety

inspections, provide safety devices, and take other specific

steps to maintain “high standards of safety.” One of HAC’s

specific obligations under this Article was:

[T]o provide modern and appropriate safety

devices and protective equipment to safeguard

and protect its employees; and, the use of such

safety devices and protective equipment, when

furnished, shall be mandatory.

Article XXI also stated that:

An employee, or the employee’s Department

Steward who believes that a job assignment is

—

unsafe, shall report such conditions to the

immediate Supervisor who will institute an

investigation immediately.

Article II of the CBA provided that employees could be

discharged ‘for cause,” and that HAC had the right to

establish work procedures and methods. The CBA also

provided a final and binding grievance and arbitration

procedure for settling disputes between an employee and

HAC, including disputes over an employee’s rights under

the CBA. Lastimosa had received a copy of the CBA and

had utilized its grievance procedure on many occasions.

In 1984, Lastimosa complained to HAC about what he

thought was a safety hazard in his workplace: he claimed

that there were asbestos particles in the furnace room air.

At Lastimosa’s request, HAC provided him with protective

paper dust masks to wear pending an investigation of his

complaint. Lastimosa also made an anonymous complaint

to the State of California’s Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (‘‘Cal-OSHA”), which conducted a surprise

inspection of HAC’s facility for the purpose of determining

whether there was any asbestos exposure danger. The

inspection conducted by Cal-OSHA resu!ted in no citation

or violations to HAC, and showed no safety hazard or

asbestos detected in Lastimosa’s workplace. In fact, Cal-

OSHA determined that levels of asbestos in the furnace

room were lower than what Lastimosa encountered in the

air outside the buiiding, and so advised Lastimosa.

The results of the 1984 Cal-OSHA inspection were

consistent with a prior inspection by the same agency, and

earlier testing conducted by HAC. In 1983, Cal-OSHA had

made a surprise inspection of the same furnace room in

response to an anonymous complaint, and had found no

violation of safety regulations. Moreover, HAC conducted

air sampling tests in the furnace room in 1980 and 1982. A

certified, independent laboratory reported to HAC on both

—

occasions that no asbestos within detectable limits was

found in the air samples collected.

Following Cal-OSHA’s 1984 inspection, Lastimosa was

advised about the results of the inspection and told that he

would no longer be permitted to wear a dust mask. HAC

took the position that there was no asbestos hazard, as borne

out by the inspections and testings; that Lastimosa had not

presented any medical documentation to indicate he was

suffering from asbestos exposure or that he was unable to

work in the furnace room; and that continued wearing of a

dust mask was detrimental to HAC’s ability to ensure the

integrity of its clean room to customers. Lastimosa then

filed a written grievance under the CBA, stating that he

should be allowed to wear a dust mask. In its response,

HAC stood by its position that Lastimosa would not be

allowed to wear a dust mask.

Subsequently, Lastimosa began wearing a dust mask

again. When Lastimosa refused to remove the mask after

being reminded of the Cal-OSHA test results, he was

suspended pending further notice. He then received a

telegram from HAC in which he was given one last chance

to report to work without a dust mask, or submit medical

documentation of the need to wear one; he was also advised

that if he failed to do so he would be discharged. Lastimosa

then met with supervision and Union representatives. At

this meeting, Lastimosa maintained that he would not work

without a dust mask and did not submit any medical

documentation. HAC therefore discharged Lastimosa at the

conclusion of the meeting.

B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Lastimosa challenged his discharge through the CBA’s

grievance process and by filing unfair labor practice charges

against HAC and the Union with the National Labor

pas, ea

Relations Board (““NLRB”). In both forums, he claimed

that he was discharged for wearing the dust mask, and that

his discharge violated Article XXI of the CBA, which

stated that the use of safety devices, when provided by

HAC, was “mandatory.” The Union’s Executive Commit-

tee reviewed his grievance and concluded that it lacked

sufficient merit to place it into formal arbitration. The

NLRB dismissed Lastimosa’s charges and denied his

subsequent appeal for lack of sufficient evidence to

establish that he was discharged for any reason other than

failure to comply with instructions.

Lastimosa then filed this action in the California Superior

Court for the County of Los Angeles, alleging a single

cause of action for “wrongful discharge.”” The Complaint

referred to “company rules” which Lastimosa claimed were

violated by HAC and which, he alleged, entitled him to use

the dust masks; Lastimosa testified in his deposition that the

“rules” referred to Article XXI of the CBA. Lastimosa

further testified that he was discharged in violation of the

CBA for wearing a safety mask whose use was, according to

his interpretation of Article XXI, mandatory. Lastimosa

disclaimed in his deposition the argument that he was

discharged in retaliation for filing a complaint with Cal-

OSHA and indeed, his complaint to the agency was made

anonymously. The following quotes dramatically illustrate

the inconsistency between Lastimosa’s argument and the

undisputed facts (emphasis has been added). Additional

deposition excerpts showing the nature of Lastimosa’s

claim are set forth in Appendix B hereto.

Q. ... Have you told me all the information you have

upon which you're basing your claim that you were

fired from Hughes for reporting them to Cal-OSHA

about asbestos?

A. I never claimed I was fired for reporting it to Cal-

OSHA. I — I was fired for wearing a safety mask.

Q. Did you call [the Carpenters’ Union] to complain

about asbestos at Hughes?

A. No. I called to complain that I was terminated for

wearing a safety mask because of the asbestos

exposure.

HAC removed the Complaint to federal district court on

the ground that Lastimosa’s alleged state law claim was

preempted by federal labor law. HAC then moved for

summary judgment on the grounds that federal labor law

preempied Lastimosa’s alleged state law claim, or

alternatively, because Lastimosa’s claim was preempted by

the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”) and

within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. 29 U.S.C.

§§ 157, 158(a)(1).?

2 This second ground, based on the NLRA, was not addressed by

either the district court or the Ninth Circuit in their decisions, and

Lastimosa has not raised the issue in his Petition. Respondents contend

that NLRA preemption provides a separate, independent ground for the

decision of the Ninth Circuit. Lastimosa’s allegations amount to

protected activity under Section 7 of the NLRA, because he was

invoking a right arising under the CBA. Further, Lastimosa alleged in

his NLRB proceedings that HAC and his Union committed unfair labor

practices under Section 8 of the NLRA. Controversies under Sections 7

and 8 are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, and state

claims based on the same activity are preempted. San Diego Building

Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959)(states must defer to

the exclusive competence of the NLRB); NLRB vy. City Disposal

Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984)(employee acting alone may engage in

protected activity). See also Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d

122 (6th Cir. 1980) (employee claiming layoff in retaliation for filing

safety complaints with Michigan Occupational Safety and Health

Administration held to be engaged in protected activity under Section 7);

Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 736 F.2d 1348 (Mh Cir. 1984)

(employee’s wrongful discharge claim properly removed and dismissed

based on NLRA preemption where plaintiff claimed retaliation for

voicing complaints about employer practices).

=—

The district court granted summary judgment to

respondents, holding that “[dJeposition testimony makes

clear that plaintiff's claim in reality is essentially that he

was discharged in violation of the provisions of the CBA

pertaining to safety and discharge.” (Petition, Appendix A

at A-13.) Thus, Lastimosa’s claim was preempted by Section

301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (the

“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185. The court further held that

even if Lastimosa’s state law claim was recharacterized as a

claim for breach of the CBA under Section 301, it failed as a

matter of law because the grievance and arbitration

procedures set forth in the CBA were final and binding on

Lastimosa, absent any allegation that the Union had

breached its duty of fair representation in processing

Lastimosa’s grievance. (Petition, Appendix A at A-19 to A-

20.)

Lastimosa appealed the district court's decision to the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Lastimosa continued to

argue that his claim for wrongful discharge was not

preempted, and, for the first time, argued that if his state

claim was preempted the district court had improperly

denied him the opportunity to amend his Complaint to

plead that the Union had breached its duty of fair

representation.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district

court in a memorandum decision, concluding that the

action had been properly removed and subsequently

dismissed by the trial court. The Ninth Circuit held that the

district court properly applied the artful pleading doctrine

to determine that Lastimosa was asserting a claim grounded

in the safety provisions of the CBA, even though his claim

was framed as a state law tort and contract action. The

=" a

Ninth Circuit concluded that Lastimosa’s rights in his state

wrongful discharge action would “substantially depend on

analysis of the terms” of the CBA. (Petition, Appendix A at

A-3to A-4.)

The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that the state statutes

relied upon by Lastimosa were directed not at the general

public, but at employers and the employment relationship,

and that the CBA provided no less protection to Lastimosa

than did these state statutes. The Ninth Circuit finally

concluded that federal labor policies favoring uniform

interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and

exclusivity of union-employer procedures mandated that

Lastimosa not be allowed to pursue his state law claim.

(Petition, Appendix A at A-4 to A-6.)

As to Lastimosa’s proposed amendment to _ the

Complaint, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did

not err by failing to imply an amendment to include an

allegation of breach of the duty of fair representation,

because Lastimosa had asserted in the district court that he

was alleging no such breach. Furthermore, the Ninth

Circuit concluded that Lastimosa had not raised the issue in

the district court, and had not requested leave to amend his

Complaint from such court at any time. (Petition, Appendix

A at A-7.) Thereafter, Lastimosa filed his Petition for

Rehearing with the Minth Circuit, which was denied-

(Petition, Appendix A at A-9.)

—(

II

REASONS REVIEW SHOULD BE

DENIED

A. LASTIMOSA’S CLAIM UNDER STATE

LAW IS PREEMPTED BY SECTION 301

BECAUSE IT IS ESSENTIALLY A

CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE COL-

LECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

Lastimosa argues that certiorari should be granted in this

action because the Ninth Circuit “refused to consider” the

decision by this Court in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482

U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (1987), another Ninth Circuit

decision, Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co. 826 F.2d 857 (%h

Cir. 1987), and “other generally applicable principles of

Federal Pre-emption.” (Petition at i.) The Ninth Circuit not

only considered, but properly applied, principles set out in

this Court's decisions on Section 301 preemption, including

this Court's decision in Caterpillar. Furthermore, the

decision in this action is consistent with Paige and other

Ninth Circuit decisions. Therefore, Lastimosa’s Petition

does not present any question suitable for this Court's

review.

1. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in This

Action Does Not Conflict With The

Decisions of This Court

a. The Decision Does Not Conflict

With Caterpillar

Lastimosa claims that the Ninth Circuit “refused to

consider” Caterpillar. However, the Ninth Circuit's

=x =

decision in Caterpillar was fully discussed in the appellate

briefs of the parties to this action (before this Court

affirmed), and the Ninth Circuit cited this Court's decision

in Caterpillar in its decision in this action. Clearly the

Ninth Circuit did consider the principles set forth in

Caterpillar, and did not act in conflict with such principles.

In Caterpillar, the plaintiffs claimed that while they were

management employees, Caterpillar made certain promises

to them concerning the length of their employment. The

plaintiffs were later downgraded to hourly positions

covered by a collective bargaining agreement, and then laid

off from those positions. The plaintiffs filed an action in

California state court claiming breach of the individual

employment contracts. Caterpillar’s removal of the action

to federal court on the ground that any individual

employment contracts were merged into and superseded by

the collective bargaining agreement was upheld by the trial

court. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the

plaintiffs’ state-law claims were neither directly nor

indirectly grounded upon rights created by the collective

bargaining agreement, did not require interpretation or

application of that agreement, and therefore did not arise

under Section 301. This Court affirmed.

Generally, when federal preemption is raised as a defense

to allegations in a pleading, removal is not justified.

However, in Caterpillar, this Court recognized that claims

brought by a plaintiff under state law may in reality be

Section 301 claims which are completely preempted by

federal law. Under the “complete preemption™ doctrine,

such claims may only be considered as federal claims

arising under federal law, and are properly removable. 107

S.Ct. at 2430. That is, Section 301 governs claims founded

on rights created by collective bargaining agreements, as

well as claims “substantially dependent on analysis of a

==

collective bargaining agreement.” Jd. at 2431. As to such

claims, Section 301 has complete preemptive effect.

[W)hen “(the heart of the [state law) complaint [is]

a... Clause in the collective bargaining

agreement,” ... that complaint arises under

federal law:

“[T)he pre-emptive force of § 301 is so powerful

as to displace entirely any state cause of action

‘for violation of contracts between an employer

and a labor organization.” Any such suit is

purely a creature of federal law, notwithstand-

ing the fact that state law would provide a cause

of action im the absence of § 301."

Id. at 2430 (citations omitted)? Applying these principles to

the facts in Caterpillar, this Court concluded that the

plaintiffs’ claims were not “completely preempted™ Section

301 claims, because the plaintiffs were claiming rights

under individual employment contracts, and not a collective

bargaining agreement. /d. at 2431.

The facts of the present action are quite different.

Lastimosa was, throughout his employment at HAC, a

bargaining unit employee, and does not rely on any

separate, individual contract as the source of his state law

claim. Moreover, Lastimosa’s wrongful discharge claim is

firmly based on HAC’s alleged breach of the CBA, and is

entirely dependent upon analysis of the safety and

discharge provisions thereof. Lastimosa consistently

* Lestimosa contends that under Caterpillar he is “master of his

complaint.” and may choose whether to bring his claim under state or

federal law. However, this Court in Caterpillar recognized that such a

chonce caists only when preemption ts ransed as a defense to a static law

claim which ts not completely preempted Lastumosa has invoked a nght

created by the CBA and asserted a claim which arises under federal law

He therefore cannot “choose™ to bring a state law claim instead

= =

maintained, on the job, in his deposition testimony, and in

his Union grievance and NLRB charges that he was

asserting a right under Article XX1 of the CBA to wear the

dust mask and that he was discharged in violation of

Articles XXI and II (the safety and discharge provisions) of

the CBA. Although Lastimosa now attempts to argue that

he is relying upon independent state rights, his own

testimony and conduct show otherwise.

Finally, Lastimosa focuses on this Court's statement in

Caterpillar that not every dispute concerning employment

or “tangentially involving™ the provisions of a collective

bargaining agreement is preempted by Section 301. (Petition

at 16.) This argument is without merit. Lastimosa’s claim

more than tangentially involves the CBA. It concerns

matters of workplace safety, matters over which HAC and

the Union specifically bargained during the collective

bargaining process, and over which the parties reached

agreement as set forth in the CBA. Moreover, the CBA's

safety and discharge provisions can reasonably be read to

prohibit retaliatory discharges of employees who make

safety complaints. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 US

202, . 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1913 (1985) (“The assumption that

the labor contract creates no implied rights is not one that

state law may make ... . There is no reason to assume that

the labor contract as interpreted by the arbitrator would not

provide such relief .”).

b. The Decision in This Action is

Consistent With Allis-Chalmers

Lastimosa further argues that the rights against

retahatory discharge afforded him under Cal-OSHA are

rights afforded every California employee which exist

independent of the CBA, and thus his state action asserting

such rights is not preempted. He also argues that his state

——————————————

=—"

claim is an action in tort and thus separate from the CBA

(Petition at 17.) Both arguments fail under this Court's

decision in Allis-Chalmers Corp, 105 S.Ct. at 1904, a

decision which Lastimosa fails to mention in his Petition. In

Allis-Chalmers, a union employee brought a state law tort

action against his employer for bad faith handling of an

insurance claim. The claim had been made pursuant to an

insurance plan contained in the collective bargaining

agreement between the plaintiff's union and the employer

The Court held that federal labor law preempts not only

state contract claims, but also state tort claims which “us

applied, would frustrate the federal labor-contract scheme

established in § 301." 105 S.Ct. at 1910. This Court held

that the plaintiff's tort claim was preempted by federal

labor law because the claim was “inextricably intertwined

with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.” 105

S.Ct. at 1912. See also, Internat’! Brotherhood of Electrical

Workers v. Hechler, 107 $.Ct. 2161 (1987) (state law tort

claim based on allegation that union failed to provide safe

workplace preempted by Section 301 because claim not

sufficiently independent of the collective bargaining

agreement)

The Court emphasized in Allis-Chalmers that preemption

was necessary to preserve “the central role of arbitration”

in the collective bargaining system, expressing concern that

plaintiffs could simply bypass arbitration by “re-labeling™ a

claim arising out of a labor contract as a tort claim. 105

S.Ct. at 1915

A rule that permitted an individual to sidestep

available grievance procedures would cause

arbitration to lose most of its effectiveness, .. . as

well as eviscerate a central tenet of federal labor-

contract law under § 301 that it is the arbitrator,

not the court, who has the responsibility ‘o

intefpret the labor contract in the first instance

105 S.Ct. at 1916 (citation omitted).

In the present action, Lastimosa’s state claim is

inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of

the CBA because it is derived from the CBA itself. The fact

that Lastimosa has chosen to label his claim a tort claim,

and has gone to considerable length to find some state

statute which purportedly protects him, ‘cannot alter this

state of affairs.

c. State Law Supports the Decision in

This Action

Lastimosa invokes state policies set forth in the California

Labor Code. Section 6400 of that Code provides that

‘{elvery employer shall furnish employment and a place of

employment which are safe and healthful for the employees

therein.” Labor Code § 6310 prohibits, inter alia, the

discharge of an employee because such employee has made

safety complaints. However, the language of Labor Code

Section 6310 evinces a specific intent on the part of the state

legislature not to prevent the operation of collective

bargaining processes in connection with retaliation claims

under the Labor Code. Section 6310 provides in pertinent

part as follows:

(b) ... Any employer who willfully refuses to

rehire, promote, or otherwise restore an employee

or former employee who has been determined to be

eligible for such rehiring or promotion by a

grievance procedure, arbitration, or hearing

authorized by law, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, the state specifically envisioned

that in the case of union employees, enforcement of the

policy set forth in Section 6310 would come through the

grievance and arbitration procedures contained in collective

bargaining agreements. To hold that Lastimosa can invoke

—

those procedures and then ignore their binding effect by

subsequently pursuing a state law wrongful discharge action

would not only undermine a method of enforcement

specifically recognized by the state statute in question, but

would pose a significant threat to the collective bargaining

process.

Moreover, the California Court of Appeals has held that

where a collective bargaining agreement deals specifically

with safety issues, state wrongful discharge claims based on

state safety statutes are preempted. Friday v. Hughes

Aircraft Co., 188 Cal.App.3d 117, 225 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1986)

(appeal to California Supreme Court dismissed and this

opinion ordered published by Supreme Court). In Friday,

an employee brought a state claim for wrongful termination,

claiming that he was terminated for reporting violations of

the hazardous waste provisions of the California Health and

Safety Code to his employer. The plaintiff’s employment

was governed by a CBA which contained express safety

provisions substantially similar to those in the present

action, since the plaintiff was also employed by HAC and

represented by the same union as Lastimosa. The California

Court of Appeals held that plaintiff’s state action was

preempted by Section 301 despite the state’s interest

expressed in its Health and Safety statutes.

We find the facts reported in Friday’s declaration

imply nothing more than complaints about the

safety of his workplace, a subject expressly

covered by article XXI of the collective bargain-

ing agreement.

... allowing Friday’s wrongful termination action

to go forward would involve consideration of the

terms of the labor contract and directly interfere

with federal regulation of disputes arising out of

collective bargaining agreements.

188 Cal.App.3d at 124.

d. The Other Authorities Cited by

Lastimosa Are Inapposite

Lastimosa vaguely refers in his Petition to ‘well

established federal law concerning preemption” which the

Ninth Circuit failed to consider in this action, but does not

detail how the decision in the preseni action conflicts with

such federal law. The two cases he cites in support of this

argument — Vaca y. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), and United

Air Lines, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Healih Appeals

Board, 32 Cal.3d 762, 187 Cal. Rptr. 387, 654 P.2d 157

(1982) — do not support his Petition.

Lastimosa misstates the holding in Vaca. This Court

stated in Vaca that ‘this preemption doctrine, however, has

never been rigidly applied to cases where it could not fairly

be inferred that Congress intended exclusive jurisdiction to

lie with the NLRB,” not the federal courts as stated by

Lastimosa. 386 U.S. at 179 (emphasis added). The

preemption doctrine referred to was not Section 301

preemption, but preemption based on the _ exclusive

jurisdiction of the NLRB under San Diego Building Trades

Council vy. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). These two

doctrines involve different considerations and _ tests;

‘““Garmon and like cases have no application to § 301 suits.”

386 U.S. at 184. See also Allis-Chalmers, 105 S.Ct. at 1913

n.9 (the balancing test applied in Garmon preemption cases

is “irrelevant” to suits under Section 301, in which Congress

has mandated that federal law should govern).

The California Supreme Court decision in United

Airlines involved a jurisdictional conflict between Cal-

OSHA and the Federal Aviation Administration (the

—

‘“FAA”) over regulation of employee safety at an airport

ground maintenance facility. The California Supreme Court

rejected an argument by United that Cal-OSHA could not

regulate airport employee safety because of jurisdictional

limits set forth in the Federal Occupational Safety and

Health Act (‘“‘Fed-OSHA”’), reasoning that Fed-OSHA

specifically provides an exception to federal preemption

where a state has enacted a federally approved plan. The

decision in United Airlines does not address the question of

federal labor law preemption, nor does it address the

question of federal preemption where the relevant federal

statute (in the present case, Section 301) does not

specifically provide for limited state regulation.*

4 As a final note, respondents wish to refer to a Seventh Circuit case,

not addressed in the Petition, in which certiorari has been granted by

this Court. In Lingie v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031

(7th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 226 (1987), the Seventh Circuit

held that state law retaliatory discharge claims are preempted where the

plaintiff is subject to a collective bargaining agreement which regulates

discharge. The court reasoned, as the Ninth Circuit did in Olguin v.

Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984),

and other decisions, that these state claims require interpretation of the

collective bargaining agreements’ discharge provisions, that such

agreements provide protection equal to that of state statutes and policies

prohibiting retaliatory discharge, and that the interests of federal labor

policy require that such state claims be preempted. In the present action,

the undisputed facts available to the courts below are much more

compelling than in Lingle, and make clear that Lastimosa’s claim is not

a claim that he was discharged in retaliation for exercising rights under

a state statute. Instead, Lastimosa claims that he was discharged for

asserting a right under the CBA, a claim completely preempted by

Section 301.

— ex

2. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in This

Action Does Not Conflict With Other

Decisions of the Circuit

Lastimosa also seeks review by this Court based on the

assertion that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this action

conflicts with the decision of another Ninth Circuit panel in

Paige. Although conflict between the federal courts of

appeal is a consideration governing this Court’s review (see

Rule 17 of this Court), ordinarily an intracircuit conflict is

not a sufficient basis for granting a writ of certiorari. See

Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 340 (1974) (petition for

certiorari denied in earlier proceeding where party claimed

intra-circuit conflict). There is no reason in the present

action to depart from that usual practice. A party’s remedy

for such conflict is to seek hearing en banc by the court of

appeals, which court will presumably resolve any perceived

inconsistencies. Lastimosa filed such a petition, and the

Ninth Circuit in its responsive order declared that “no

judge of [the Ninth Circuit] has requested a vote to rehear

the matter en banc.” (Petition, Appendix A at A-10.)

In any event, the decision here does not conflict with the

Ninth Circuit’s decision in Paige, and is consistent with

other Ninth Circuit decisions on the issue of Section 301

preemption. In Paige, plaintiffs claimed that they were

fired because they refused to refuel generators on a

construction site in a way that they believed was

unnecessarily and illegally hazardous. The plaintiffs based

their action for wrongful discharge on Cal-OSHA

provisions providing for regulation of safety on the job.

Defendants removed the action to federal court. The district

court held that the plaintiffs’ wrongful discharge claims

were in fact claims under Section 301 and dismissed them.

The Ninth Circuit reversed.

a

The collective bargaining agreement in Paige did not

contain specific provisions governing worker safety, but

merely a statement requiring the employer to comply with

all state and federal health and safety laws, including

OSHA. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that the

employees’ claim was not “intertwined or substantially

dependent upon consideration of the terms of the labor

contract.” 826 F.2d at 863. The Ninth Circuit further

reasoned that because the employees were concerned about

the potential for a serious explosion at the jobsite, the

employer’s alleged conduct jeopardized the safety of others

on the site, and not just the plaintiffs’ safety. The

employees’ conduct thus implicated California’s interest in

protecting its citizens, rather than its interest in regulating

the employment relationship. Jd.

The Court thus compared the facts in Paige to the facts

in Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th

Cir. 1984), cert. den. 471 U.S. 1099 (1985). In Garibaldi, a

truck driver subject to a collective bargaining agreement

alleged that he was discharged because he refused to deliver

a load of spoiled milk in violation of a state statute. As in

Paige, the Court of Appeals concluded that a state law

claim based on such conduct “‘pose{d] no significant threat

to the collective bargaining process,” and “‘further{ed] the

state’s interest in protecting the general public — an interest

which transcended] the employment relationship.” 726

F.2d at 1375.

The facts in Paige and Garibaldi are distinguishable. In

Paige and Garibaldi, the plaintiffs were not relying on

rights specifically set forth in the collective bargaining

agreement. In addition, the employers’ conduct in Paige

and Garibaldi threatened the general public, persons

beyond the employee, and transcended the employment

relationship between the companies and the plaintiffs. By

contrast, Lastimosa claims that he had a right under the

==

CBA to wear a dust mask, and that he was wrongfully fired

for insisting on this right. Contrary to the claims alleged in

Garibaldi and Paige, the claim alleged by plaintiff

encroaches upon the collective bargaining process because

workplace safety and employee termination are expressly

governed by the CBA, and Lastimosa specifically invoked

those provisions.°

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case is also consistent

with and supported by its other decisions, particularly

Olguin vy. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. 740 F.2d

1468 (9th Cir. 1984), and De Soto v. Yellow Freight

Systems, Inc, 811 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1987). In Olguin,

decided after Garibaldi, the plaintiff alleged that he was

unjustly discharged in retaliation for safety complaints, in

violation of federal policy set forth in mine safety statutes

and general state policy. Olguin’s allegations were very

similar to those in Lastimosa’s Complaint, except that

Lastimosa did not refer to any federal policy. The Ninth

Circuit held that the allegations in Olguin were insufficient

to invoke any state policy. The Court also remarked that

Olguin had already filed a complaint with the NLRB, just

as Lastimosa did in this case, and with the federal mine

safety agency. The Court held as follows: “... Olguin

complained to both the NLRB and the FMHSA. He cannot

now seek protection in state law, because he acted in behalf

of no state law or policy.” 740 F.2d at 1475 (emphasis

> See also Friday, 188 Cal.App.3d at 124 (state wrongful termination

claim preempted where plaintiff did not rely on a statute for the

protection of the general public, but instead ‘‘complained of what he

perceived to be unsafe internal practices in the handling of chemicals”);

Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1987)

(Garibaldi applies only when the state policy is “independent of the

employment relationship”); Oglesby v. RCA Corp., 752 F. 2d 272 (7th

Cir. 1985)(Section 301 preempted state claim of employee who alleged

wrongful discharge motivated by his safety complaints).

|

added). See also Bale v. General Telephone Co. of Calif,

795 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1985)(state tort claims of bargaining

unit employees preempted where employees had sought

intervention of their union in regard to their termination).

The Ninth Circuit further reasoned in Olguin that it was

“apparent that the true nature of Olguin’s wrongful

discharge complaint concerns the terms and conditions of

employment as they are set out in the collective bargaining

agreement,” so that his complaint was “‘in fact” a Section

301 suit. 740 F.2d at 1474-75. Finally, the Ninth Circuit

found that federal law preempted state law because “(t]he

[collective bargaining] agreement provides the same or

greater protection of job security that state tort law seeks to

provide for nonunionized employees.” 740 F.2d at 1474.

Cf., Schroeder v. Trans World Airlines, 702 F.2d 189, 191

(9th Cir. 1983)(state claims preempted by Railway Labor

Act where dispute concerned “topics discussed in the

collective bargaining agreement”’).

In De Soto, a truck driver was terminated when he

refused to drive a trailer which he mistakenly believed

lacked proper registration. The Ninth Circuit held that the

plaintiff's state claim for wrongful discharge was preempted

by Section 301. The Court declined to follow its holding in

Garibaldi, reasoning:

Unquestionably, DeSoto thought he was doing the

right thing in refusing to take the trailer out.

Unfortunately for him, he was mistaken. He was

not acting in defense of a public policy of the State

of California, but incorrectly asserting his own

interpretation of the law. It is just this kind of

dispute over what is the appropriate management

response to difficult behavior by an employee that

should be the subject of a grievance procedure. It

is not the kind of case that should become either a

federal case or a State tort action.

a

811 F.2d at 1336. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Paige, in

distinguishing DeSoto:

The fact that [the plaintiff in DeSoto] was

mistaken as to the law was central to the court’s

decision; no such mistaken belief is alleged here.

Furthermore, health and safety concerns were not

present in the case. Any potential health and

safety problems from driving a truck with an

unregistered trailer were negated by the fact that

the trailer did indeed have the proper permits.

826 F.2d at 863 n. 11.

In the present action, the undisputed facts show that

Lastimosa’s fear for his health was completely unfounded

and unsubstantiated. Testing by a private laboratory and

Cal-OSHA itself had indicated that there was no risk to

Lastimosa, and there was no evidence that Lastimosa had a

medical problem related to asbestos or dust exposure. Thus,

as in DeSoto, Lastimosa’s concerns were unfounded. In any

event, Lastimosa was not acting in defense of the Cal-

OSHA statutes, but as he specifically testified, he was

asserting his mistaken interpretation of the CBA.

Lastimosa’s insistence on wearing a dust mask, despite

evidence that it was unnecessary and in disregard of HAC’s

business interests, is the type of “difficult behavior by an

employee” which should be and was settled by way of the

CBA'’s grievance procedure.

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT

ERR IN REFUSING TO IMPLY AN

AMENDMENT OF LASTIMOQOSA’S

COMPLAINT

Lastimosa also seeks review of the decision of the Ninth

Circuit that the district court did not err by failing to imply

an amendment of the Complaint to include a claim of

= =

breach of the duty of fair representation by his Union, a

prerequisite to suit under Section 301. Lastimosa merely

argues that the Ninth Circuit erred; his argument does not

raise any important questions of law, nor does Lastimosa

point to any conflict between the Ninth Circuit’s decision

and the decision of any other court.

Lastimosa argues that “neither the Court of Appeal nor

the district court, gave any justifiable reason for not

allowing [Lastimosa] to proceed” on his Section 301 claim,

and that both courts thus abused their discretion under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) to deny amendments

to his Complaint. (Petition at 23-24.) Lastimosa’s assertions

are simply untrue. The district court properly held that

“[slince the CBA provides that the grievance and

arbitration procedures are his sole remedy for breach,

Lastimosa can only bring a § 301 suit against Hughes if he

also makes a claim that the union breached its duty of fair

representation with respect to the handling of his grievance.

Since no such claim has been made against the union, an

action cannot be maintained against Hughes.” (Petition,

Appendix A at A-19 to A-20.) Vaca, 386 US. at 184. The

district court never denied Lastimosa leave to amend

because he never sought such leave.

When Lastimosa argued on appeal that the district court

should have sua sponte “implied” the required allegation

into his Complaint, the Court of Appeals disagreed and

affirmed the district court, reasoning that Lastimosa had

not raised the issue below and that “‘in the district court he

asserted that ‘no breach of the duty of fair representation is

alleged.’ ” (Petition, Appendix A at A-7.) Thus, each court

explained its decision on this issue, and acted within its

discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1S(a).

=

Il!

CONCLUSION

Respondents respectfully submit that Lastimosa has

wholly failed to sustain his burden of establishing under

Rule 17 of this Court's rules that there are special and

important reasons why review should be granted. The

decision below is not in conflict with the decisions of this

Court or other decisions of the Ninth Circuit. Given the

clear evidence supporting the decision below, the Petition

poses no important question of federal law which should be

settled by this Court. For the foregoing reasons, respondents

respectfully request that Lastimosa’s petition for a writ of

certiorari be denied

DATED: February 26, 1988

Respectfully submitted,

“PETER H. BENZIAN

DEANNE P. GEORGE

KRISTINE P. NESTHUS

LATHAM & WATKINS

Attorneys for Respondents

“Counsel of Record

APPENDIX A

.

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— soe

29 U.S.C. § 185

(in pertinent part)

§ 185. Suits by and against labor organizations

Venue, amount, and citizenship

(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer

and a labor organization representing employees in an

industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or

between any such labor organizations, may be brought in

any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of

the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or

without -regard to the citizenship of the parties.

29 U.S.C. § 157

§ 157. Right of employees as to organization,

collective bargaining, etc.

Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to

form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain

collectively through representatives of their own choosing,

and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose

of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,

and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of

such activities except to the extent that such right may be

affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor

organization as a condition of employment as authorized in

section 158(a)(3) of this title.

a © oe

29 U.S.C. § 158

(in pertinent part)

§ 158. Unfair labor practices

(a) It shall be an unfair practice for an employer—

(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce

employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed

in section 157 of this title;

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15

(in pertinent part)

(a) Amendments. A party may amend the party’s

pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a

responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to

which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action

has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may

so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served.

Otherwise a party may amend the party’s pleading only by

leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party;

and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A

party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within

the time remaining for response to the original pleading or

within 10 days after service of the amended pleading,

whichever period may be longer, unless the court otherwise

orders.

APPENDIX B

eas

Fie,

= <=

Excerpts From Deposition of

Catalino Lastimosa

Lastimosa: Okay. During this time when I

showed my supervisor —

Respondents’

Attorney: The brochures?

Lastimosa: Yeah — the document that I made

copies of, I also showed him a union

contract, on page 63, paragraph B,

where it says, you know — I can’t

remember what it says, exactly, but I

brought that to his attention.

Lastimosa’s

Attorney: I'll paraphrase it, if I can recall it.

“If safety equipment is furnished, it

must be worn.”

Respondents’

Attorney: _ Is that what you're referring to?

Lastimosa: Yes.

Respondents’

Attorney: Q. Something to that effect?

A. Yes.

Q. And you showed it to [your

supervisor]?

A. Several times.

*~_ * *

Q. Now, even after you had the

meeting with your supervisor and

your union and you were told you

can’t wear this mask any more,

you insisted on wearing the mask;

is that right?

Q >

>

—

That’s correct, according to the

union contract.

And June 22nd, you were

suspended because you didn’t want

to work without the mask; is that

right?

. That’s correct.

And then Mr. Carillo, I gather,

suspended you that day because

you would not take off the mask;

is that right?

Yes.

And what did you and he Say at

that time?

I don’t understand.

I take it you had a conversation

with Mr. Carillo. And just relate

to me what you and he said at

that time, the day you were

suspended.

. He says, “I warned you about

wearing the safety mask.” And I

said, ““This is a hazardous area.

The union contract states that I

am allowed to wear it, if it was

given to me.”

*_ * *

. So what was said to you in this

meeting on June 28th?

. I can’t remember exactly what was

said.

=— 7 oe

Q. Can you remember, in general,

what was said?

A. Generally, they told me to go to

work in there, without the safety

mask. And I told them the safety

mask was given to me by the

safety officer, and according to the

union contract, it’s mandatory that

I wear it. And I’m wearing it for

my own protection. It’s not

affecting my job in any way.

*_ * *

Q. After that, you filed charges with

the NLRB against the company

and the union; is that right?

A. That’s correct.

And those were initially dismissed

by the NLRB for insufficient

evidence?

A. That’s correct.

©

2

And against the company, your

complaint was that you’d been

unfairly fired and the company

wasn’t complying with the union

contract about the safety thing?

A. Yes, because the union contract

states that I should be able to

wear the mask.

*- * &

Q. Let me just show this to you, and

we'll mark this Exhibit 17. Is that

a copy of the appeal you sent to

the NLRB?

liens

=

Lastimosa: Yes.

Respondents’

Attorney: Q. Now, you attached a page from

the union contract to this; right? Is

this what you were referring to

earlier? [Referring to Article XXI

of the CBA]

Yes.

Q>

And you were talking about

Section A, number Ib there?

A. Yes.

Q. And your appeal was also

dismissed by the NLRB; is that

right?

A. That's correct.

e

Now when you say, in there, you

were following union policy, you're

talking about this specific part of

the union contract that’s attached?

A. Yes. [Referring to Article XXI of

the CBA ]

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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