Reply Brief — Union Oil Co. v. Sierra Club
Supreme Court brief1988
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In the Supreme Court
OF THE
United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1987
UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA,
Petitioner,
VS.
SIERRA CLUB,
Respondent.
REPLY TO SIERRA CLUB RESPONSE TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
*Counsel of Record
CHARLOTTE URAM*
RONALD C. HAUSMANN
PATRICK J. CAFFERTY
JOHN F. BARG
LANDELS, RIPLEY & DIAMOND
450 Pacific Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94133
(415) 788-5000
Counsel for Petitioner
BOWNE OF SAN FRANCISCO, INC. +
190 NINTH ST. « S.F.. CA 94103 + (415) 864-2300
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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A. Sierra Club Focuses On The EPA-Created Upset
Defense Instead Of Addressing Union Oil’s Funda-
mental Statutory Issue Which Affects All Permittees
Under The Clean Water Act.................... 2
B. Sierra Club Offers No Reason Why A Permittee
May Not Introduce Evidence In Its Defense In A
Clean Water Act Enforcement Suit, Except To Say
It Would Complicate The Suit By Requiring The
District Court To Determine The Facts; This Reason
Does Not Overcome The Permittee’s Constituticnal
APPENDIX: April 15, 1983 Self-Monitoring Report
(cover letter and page 3) Def. Ex. D. .... A-1
ae ie
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page
Albert Hanson Lumber Company v. United States, 261 U.S.
_ F . rere weer ery rt rrr er rey 7
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984)... 4
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
ee RAE EA ORs 1) reer eee eee eee l
Marathon Oil Company v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977) .............. 2
United States v. Provident Trust Company, 291 U.S. 272
Ci Pre Pe Vee TS ee Te os Sree ero re ree 7
Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980) ................ 4
Federal Statutes
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. .......... passim
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319............. eta 4
Regulations
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40 Fed. Ran. 21946 (May 20, 1975) .... 2... cc ccc eee 3
No. 87-852
In the Supreme Court
OF THE
United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1987
UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA,
Petitioner.
VS.
SIERRA CLUB,
Respondent.
REPLY TO SIERRA CLUB RESPONSE TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Sierra Club, in its opposition to Union Oil’s petition for writ of
certiorari, does not meet the first issue presented in Union Oil’s
petition. Instead, Sierra Club rewrites the first issue and then
argues against the issue it presents. Sierra Club also misses the
mark on Union Oil’s second issue. Its arguments reinforce the
need for plenary review by this Court.’
'Union Oil recently filed a motion to defer consideration of its
petition for writ of certiorari pending reconsideration of federal court
jurisdiction over all or part of this case in light of Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4017
(1987). Because of the Court’s subsequent request for this repiy, Union
Oil has deferred filing its motion to dismiss in United States District
Court pending the outcome of Union Oil’s petition for writ of certiorari.
2
A. Sierra Club Focuses On The EPA-Created Upset Defense
Instead of Addressing Union Oil’s Fundamental Statutory
Issue Which Affects All Permittees Under The Clean Water
Act.
1. The issue Union Oil raises is simple: does the Clean Water
Act allow a permittee to be excused for exceeding its permit
limits where extreme or unusual acts of nature caused the
exceedance? Sierra Club chooses not to meet that issue, but
instead revises the issue to address the EPA-created defense,
found in 40 C.F.R. Section 122.41(n). Sierra Club fixes its
argument, including six of its seven reasons for denying the writ,
on the issue it substitutes for that raised by Union Oil. Union Oil,
however, does not raise the issue or application of the EPA-
created defense. Union Oil’s question is broader: it goes to the
scope of liability established by the Clean Water Act.’
2. The issue Union Oil raises is separate from and indepen-
dent of the EPA-created defense in 40 C.F.R. Section 122.41(n).
The EPA-created defense was established to address the operat-
ing failures that inevitably occur during normal conditions; the
defense Union Oil raises goes to exceedances due to abnormal
natural conditions.’ The EPA-created upset defense does not
2 Union Oil conducted the case below relying on the EPA-created
upset defense. It prevailed on that defense in the District Court and lost
before the Court of Appeals. Upon further consideration, Union Oil
realized that the issue in this case is more fundamental: the real issue is
whether the Clean Water Act holds a permittee liable for extreme or
unusual acts of nature. The EPA-created defense was not established to
respond to this issue. (See paragraph 2 of Part A of this reply.)
Therefore, regardless of the presence or absence of the EPA-created
defense in this permit, the issue is whether the Clean Water Act excuses
permit exceedances due to extreme or unusual acts of nature. Although
that issue was not directly addressed below, it may be considered for the
reasons stated in paragraphs 3 through 6 of this Part.
7 EPA established the upset provisions of 40 C.F.R. Section
122.41(n) at the direction of the Court in Marathon Oil Company v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977). The
Court there reviewed EPA’s “best practicable technology” regulations,
which set standards based on the best performance achievable in normal
3
reach the unusual natural conditions; it does not identify or set
requirements pertinent to the consequences of hurricanes, torna-
does, severe storms, droughts, earthquakes and other unusual
natural events. Instead, it focuses on routine matters in daily
operation, like preventive maintenance, operational error, and
careless operation. 40 C.F.R. Section 122.41 (n), reprinted at Pet.
App. F.* Thus, the EPA-created defense is limited in scope and
does not reach the situation here. Moreover, it is not the exclusive
defense available under the Clean Water Act.°
3. Union Oil raises this issue in response to the decision of the
Court of Appeals below. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit interprets the Clean Water Act to prohibit
permit exceedances due to an unusual natural event, if the
unusual natural event is likely to occur over the life of the piant.
operations. Data reflecting poor performance due to unusual natural
events, such as hurricanes or tornadoes, were generally discarded from
consideration in setting best practicable technology standards. See e.g.,
40 Fed. Reg. 21946. col. 3 (May 20, 1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 21942, col. |
(May 20, 1975). Even so, EPA’s technological data showed that the
standard it had set in the best practicable technology regulation at issue
could not be achieved, even with the most exemplary performance under
normal operating conditions, more than 97-99% of the time. Because
EPA nevertheless required compliance 100% of the time, the Court
found EPA exceeded its authority for establishing best practicable
technology regulations under the Clean Water Act by requiring more
than was achievable. EPA remedied this flaw in its regulation by
establishing an upset provision for the best practicable technology
regulations. EPA structured the upset provision as an affirmative defense
to alleged permit violations.
*“Pet. App.” refers to the appendix to Union Oil’s petition for writ of
certiorari. “Response” refers to Sierra Club’s response in opposition to
Union Oil’s petition for writ of certiorari. In all other respects, this reply
employs the same usages as the petition.
°To the extent that the EPA-created upset defense does apply to
these kinds of rainfall events, the Court should grant certiorari, reverse
the Court of Appeals’ holding that the upset defense was unavailable to
Union Oil, and find that the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the District
Court’s findings of fact on whether Union Oil met the upset defense,
constituted plain error.
4
Pet. App. at A-16 and A-17. Although the Court of Appeals’
conclusion was submerged in a discussion of the EPA-created
upset defense, this Court may nevertheless consider the resulting
issue Union Oil raises because it is important, it is a legal issue,
and the facts necessary to resolve this issue are not in dispute. See
e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-699
(1984); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 259 n.5 (1980).
Furthermore, the issue fairly reflects the central circumstances in
this case; extraordinary rainfall, consisting of two six-month
winter seasons in a row, each constituting a hundred-year rainfall
event, resulted in approximately fifty permit exceedances. These
central circumstances fairly raise the question whether the Clean
Water Act allows a permittee to be excused for exceeding its
permit limits where extreme or unusual acts of nature caused the
exceedance.
4. The issue is important because it may affect every permit
under the Clean Water Act. According to the Court of Appeals’
decision, permittees should design their pollution control systems
to function normally despite extreme or unusual acts of nature, if
those unusual events are likely to occur over the life of the
facility. Most facilities operate in areas occasionally subject to
extreme or unusual acts of nature which are likely to occur over
the life of the facility. The east and gulf coasts suffer from
hurricanes, the midwest from tornadoes, and the west coast is
prone to earthquakes. All areas may experience exceptionally
severe storms. If permittees do not design their facilities to
accommodate the stresses of extreme or unusual natural condi-
tions, they may be subject to enforcement action, civil or crimi-
nal.° 33 U.S.C. Section 1319. In such enforcement suits,
permittees could not successfully defend on grounds that extreme
or unusual acts of nature had caused the permit exceedances
because, in the Court of Appeals’ view, the problem would not be
the extreme events, but the inadequacy of the facility to meet the
extreme events. The potential liability for exceedances due to
° The Clean Water Act provides criminal penalties, including impris-
onment of responsible corporate officers, for willful or negligent violation
of permit terms. 33 U.S.C. Section 1319(c).
5
extreme natural occurrences would thus fall on tens of thousands
of permittees.
5. The issue is legal: it raises the intended scope of a permit-
tee’s liability under the Clean Water Act. The inquiry is whether
Congress intended to impose absolute liability on permittees
under the Clean Water Act, making them responsible for the
consequences of extreme or unusual acts of nature. The inquiry
may extend to interpretation of the permit terms, and the regula-
tions on which those terms are based, to determine whether they
seek to impose liability on permittees for extreme or unusual acts
of nature. Even in this extension, the issue is one of legal
interpretation.
6. The facts necessary to resolve this issue are not in dispute.
The key fact is that there were exceptionally heavy and unusual
rains which resulted in permit exceedances. Sierra Club suggests
otherwise, Response at 4-5, but Sierra Club simply quarrels with
the record. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
agreed on this key fact. The District Court found “the winters of
1981 to 1982 and 1982 to 1983 produced exceptionally heavy
rainfall, causing widespread flooding and property damage.” Pet.
App. at A-31. The Court of Appeals similarly characterized the
rains as “heavy rainfall”, “heavy rains”, and “unusual rains”. Pet.
App. at A-16 and A-17. The Court of Appeals did not reverse the
District Court on this factual finding; instead, it disagreed on
whether Union Oil was liable for the consequences of the heavy
and unusual rains.’ Only Sierra Club still tries to argue that there
were no unusual rains in the winters of 1931-82 and 1982-83; but
Sierra Club is both wrong and too late.* The factual finding of
’ The Court of Appeals’ disagreement with the District Court was
predicated on a differing interpretation of the legal responsibilities and
liabilities of permittees under the Clean Water Act. Had it been no more
than a differing factual conclusion, the Court of Appeals would have
committed plain error in reversing the District Court’s finding of fact on
causation.
* Sierra Club tries to minimize the severity of these rainstorms,
neglecting to mention that its own expert testified on cross-examination
that the winter season storms were hundred-year rainfall events:
6
exceptional or unusual rains is undisturbed; the question left for
the Court is the legal question of a permittee’s liability for the
consequences of extreme or unusual natural occurrences.
B. Sierra Club Offers No Reason Why A Permittee May Not
Introduce Evidence In Its Defense In A Clean Water Act
Enforcement Suit, Except To Say It Would Complicate The
Suit By Requiring The District Court To Determine The
Facts; This Reason Does Not Overcome The Permittee’s
Constitutional Rights.
1. The Court of Appeals held the Clean Water Act bars a
permittee from showing at trial that an exceedance reported in the
permittee’s self-monitoring report was an error. Pet. App. at A-20
and A-21. The Court so held even though the permittee reported
the error, together with the exceedance, in its self-monitoring
report. The Court of Appeals misinterpreted the law. The Clean
Water Act neither states nor implies that an exceedance in a
monthly monitoring report is conclusive evidence of a violation
and may not be explained, rebutted or in any way disproved at
trial. The Clean Water Act did not create such an irrebuttable
The Court: So what you are saying is that the rain for that six-
month period was a rain that occurred once every hundred years?
Question: Statistically that’s right, isn’t it, doctor?
Answer: Yes. [5 Tr. at 614 (Dr. Schroeder) }.
Sierra Club’s attempt to tie the exceedances only to unusually severe
daily storms, Response at 4-5, is also inappropriate because the stress of
a season of storms on bacteria in a bioplant is cumulative. The bacteria
do not have the capability to renew themselves every 24 hours. The fact
that the winter season constituted a hundred-year rainfall event is far
more significant for the operation of the bioplant than that the rain on
any particular day was or was not itself unusual. It is the combined effect
of the rain and cold that caused these problems. Although Sierra Club
goes so far as to suggest the drop in temperature associated with the
rains did not contribute to the violations, Response at 4, the witness to
whose testimony Sierra Club refers in fact testified most clearly: “it’s a
given the water is going to be colder going to the bioplant during a rain
storm. I am saying that it’s also a given that reduced temperatures slow
the rate of biological activity in a bioplant.” 4 Tr. 526 (Dr. Stone).
eh A A
;
presumption; if it did, it would violate due process. See Petition at
13-17.
2. Sierra Club responds by asserting that the monthly moni-
toring report is an admission, that a permittee may not+mpeach
its own admission, and, therefore, that a ban on evidence holds no
constitutional flaw. Sierra Club’s reasoning does not support its
conclusion, even if a monitoring report is viewed as an admission,
because a party may introduce evidence to clarify or respond to an
admission. E.g., Albert Hanson Lumber Company v. United
States, 261 U.S. 581,589 (1923). The ban is not against including
evidence, but against excluding evidence by establishing irrebut-
table presumptions in the absence of compelling reasons. £.g.,
United States v. Provident Trust Company, 291 U.S. 272, 281-282
(1934).
3. Sierra Club’s argument rests on erroneous facts. Sierra
Club implies Union Oil did not stand behind its reports and
sought to impeach them. To the contrary, Union Oil proved at
trial what its monitoring reports stated on their face for five of the
seven exceedances at issue: that the reported exceedances were
invalid because of sampling errors or calculation variabilities.’
The April 15, 1983 self-monitoring report, for example, noted two
exceptionally high results and stated:
“Both excesses were reported ...on the following day. On
each occasion, repeat samples a few hours later and the
following day yielded results well within limits. All other
measures and observations indicated our treatment plant was
operating well and that our effluent was on grade. These
settleable solids excesses were traced to sampling problems.
We have taken steps to resolve these problems.” [ Def. Ex.
D, reproduced in part in the appendix to this reply. ]
Union Oil thus did not impeach its reports; instead, Sierra Club
and the Court of Appeals deleted from consideration those parts
* The other two reports do not indicate an exceedance at all, but
instead report that meaningful sample results could not be obtained
because of laboratory problems.
8
of the self-monitoring reports which explained the exceedances
reported.
4. This issue is significant. The 65,000 permittees under the
Clean Water Act file a self-monitoring report each month, report-
ing numerous measurements and samples. These hundreds of
thousands of routine monthly monitoring reports, according to the
Court of Appeals decision, constitute conclusive evidence against
the permittee in court: those filing the reports are not to be
permitted an opportunity to explain the circumstances of any
errors in the testing or in the reporting. Denying a person his day
in court is a classic deprivation of due process. It should not be
implied as a requirement of the Clean Water Act, nor tolerated
here.
Respectfully submitted,
CHARLOTTE URAM
RONALD C. HAUSMANN
PATRICK J. CAFFERTY
JOHN F. BARG
LANDELS, RIPLEY & DIAMOND
450 Pacific Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94133
(415) 788-5000
Counsel for Petitioner
February, 1988.
Appendix
[UNION LETTERHEAD }
April 15, 1983 WNS-102
Regional Water Quality Control Board
San Francisco Bay Region
1111 Jackson Street, Room 6040
Oakland, California 94607
Attention Mr. Fred H. Dierker
4 Gentlemen:
7 Attached is the March 1983 monthly report on the Self-
Monitoring Program for Union’s San Francisce Refinery.
The Refinery was in compliance with all limits with the
4 exception of two high settleable solids results for Station E-002,
] 8.8 ml/1-hr on March 1 and 1.3 ml/1-hr on March 28. The two
high daily values resulted in a monthly average of 1.14 ml/1-hr,
exceeding the monthly average limit.
Both excesses were reported to RWQCB on the following day.
On each occasion, repeat samples a few hours later and on the
following day yielded results well within limits. All other mea-
sures and observations indicated our treatment plant was operat-
ing well and that our effluent was on grade. These settleable solids
excesses were traced to sampling problems. We have taken steps
to resolve these problems.
The information contained herein is correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
Very truly yours,
/s/ W.N. Stark
Manager
DMGinosar/lo
Attachment
cc: Environmental Protection Agency
be: M. J. Dougherty/Dr. C. B. Scott
Messrs. G. O. Dyke/F. A. Swingle
Circulate: J. R. Dietzman
F. R. Bottomley
S. D. Smith
D. M. Ginosar ?
A. L. Felderman
D. W. DeBuse
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.