Reply Brief — Union Oil Co. v. Sierra Club

Supreme Court brief1988

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In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA,

Petitioner,

VS.

SIERRA CLUB,

Respondent.

REPLY TO SIERRA CLUB RESPONSE TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

*Counsel of Record

CHARLOTTE URAM*

RONALD C. HAUSMANN

PATRICK J. CAFFERTY

JOHN F. BARG

LANDELS, RIPLEY & DIAMOND

450 Pacific Avenue

San Francisco, CA 94133

(415) 788-5000

Counsel for Petitioner

BOWNE OF SAN FRANCISCO, INC. +

190 NINTH ST. « S.F.. CA 94103 + (415) 864-2300

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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A. Sierra Club Focuses On The EPA-Created Upset

Defense Instead Of Addressing Union Oil’s Funda-

mental Statutory Issue Which Affects All Permittees

Under The Clean Water Act.................... 2

B. Sierra Club Offers No Reason Why A Permittee

May Not Introduce Evidence In Its Defense In A

Clean Water Act Enforcement Suit, Except To Say

It Would Complicate The Suit By Requiring The

District Court To Determine The Facts; This Reason

Does Not Overcome The Permittee’s Constituticnal

APPENDIX: April 15, 1983 Self-Monitoring Report

(cover letter and page 3) Def. Ex. D. .... A-1

ae ie

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Albert Hanson Lumber Company v. United States, 261 U.S.

_ F . rere weer ery rt rrr er rey 7

Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984)... 4

Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,

ee RAE EA ORs 1) reer eee eee eee l

Marathon Oil Company v. Environmental Protection

Agency, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977) .............. 2

United States v. Provident Trust Company, 291 U.S. 272

Ci Pre Pe Vee TS ee Te os Sree ero re ree 7

Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980) ................ 4

Federal Statutes

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. .......... passim

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319............. eta 4

Regulations

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40 Fed. Ran. 21946 (May 20, 1975) .... 2... cc ccc eee 3

No. 87-852

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA,

Petitioner.

VS.

SIERRA CLUB,

Respondent.

REPLY TO SIERRA CLUB RESPONSE TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Sierra Club, in its opposition to Union Oil’s petition for writ of

certiorari, does not meet the first issue presented in Union Oil’s

petition. Instead, Sierra Club rewrites the first issue and then

argues against the issue it presents. Sierra Club also misses the

mark on Union Oil’s second issue. Its arguments reinforce the

need for plenary review by this Court.’

'Union Oil recently filed a motion to defer consideration of its

petition for writ of certiorari pending reconsideration of federal court

jurisdiction over all or part of this case in light of Gwaltney of

Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4017

(1987). Because of the Court’s subsequent request for this repiy, Union

Oil has deferred filing its motion to dismiss in United States District

Court pending the outcome of Union Oil’s petition for writ of certiorari.

2

A. Sierra Club Focuses On The EPA-Created Upset Defense

Instead of Addressing Union Oil’s Fundamental Statutory

Issue Which Affects All Permittees Under The Clean Water

Act.

1. The issue Union Oil raises is simple: does the Clean Water

Act allow a permittee to be excused for exceeding its permit

limits where extreme or unusual acts of nature caused the

exceedance? Sierra Club chooses not to meet that issue, but

instead revises the issue to address the EPA-created defense,

found in 40 C.F.R. Section 122.41(n). Sierra Club fixes its

argument, including six of its seven reasons for denying the writ,

on the issue it substitutes for that raised by Union Oil. Union Oil,

however, does not raise the issue or application of the EPA-

created defense. Union Oil’s question is broader: it goes to the

scope of liability established by the Clean Water Act.’

2. The issue Union Oil raises is separate from and indepen-

dent of the EPA-created defense in 40 C.F.R. Section 122.41(n).

The EPA-created defense was established to address the operat-

ing failures that inevitably occur during normal conditions; the

defense Union Oil raises goes to exceedances due to abnormal

natural conditions.’ The EPA-created upset defense does not

2 Union Oil conducted the case below relying on the EPA-created

upset defense. It prevailed on that defense in the District Court and lost

before the Court of Appeals. Upon further consideration, Union Oil

realized that the issue in this case is more fundamental: the real issue is

whether the Clean Water Act holds a permittee liable for extreme or

unusual acts of nature. The EPA-created defense was not established to

respond to this issue. (See paragraph 2 of Part A of this reply.)

Therefore, regardless of the presence or absence of the EPA-created

defense in this permit, the issue is whether the Clean Water Act excuses

permit exceedances due to extreme or unusual acts of nature. Although

that issue was not directly addressed below, it may be considered for the

reasons stated in paragraphs 3 through 6 of this Part.

7 EPA established the upset provisions of 40 C.F.R. Section

122.41(n) at the direction of the Court in Marathon Oil Company v.

Environmental Protection Agency, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977). The

Court there reviewed EPA’s “best practicable technology” regulations,

which set standards based on the best performance achievable in normal

3

reach the unusual natural conditions; it does not identify or set

requirements pertinent to the consequences of hurricanes, torna-

does, severe storms, droughts, earthquakes and other unusual

natural events. Instead, it focuses on routine matters in daily

operation, like preventive maintenance, operational error, and

careless operation. 40 C.F.R. Section 122.41 (n), reprinted at Pet.

App. F.* Thus, the EPA-created defense is limited in scope and

does not reach the situation here. Moreover, it is not the exclusive

defense available under the Clean Water Act.°

3. Union Oil raises this issue in response to the decision of the

Court of Appeals below. The United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit interprets the Clean Water Act to prohibit

permit exceedances due to an unusual natural event, if the

unusual natural event is likely to occur over the life of the piant.

operations. Data reflecting poor performance due to unusual natural

events, such as hurricanes or tornadoes, were generally discarded from

consideration in setting best practicable technology standards. See e.g.,

40 Fed. Reg. 21946. col. 3 (May 20, 1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 21942, col. |

(May 20, 1975). Even so, EPA’s technological data showed that the

standard it had set in the best practicable technology regulation at issue

could not be achieved, even with the most exemplary performance under

normal operating conditions, more than 97-99% of the time. Because

EPA nevertheless required compliance 100% of the time, the Court

found EPA exceeded its authority for establishing best practicable

technology regulations under the Clean Water Act by requiring more

than was achievable. EPA remedied this flaw in its regulation by

establishing an upset provision for the best practicable technology

regulations. EPA structured the upset provision as an affirmative defense

to alleged permit violations.

*“Pet. App.” refers to the appendix to Union Oil’s petition for writ of

certiorari. “Response” refers to Sierra Club’s response in opposition to

Union Oil’s petition for writ of certiorari. In all other respects, this reply

employs the same usages as the petition.

°To the extent that the EPA-created upset defense does apply to

these kinds of rainfall events, the Court should grant certiorari, reverse

the Court of Appeals’ holding that the upset defense was unavailable to

Union Oil, and find that the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the District

Court’s findings of fact on whether Union Oil met the upset defense,

constituted plain error.

4

Pet. App. at A-16 and A-17. Although the Court of Appeals’

conclusion was submerged in a discussion of the EPA-created

upset defense, this Court may nevertheless consider the resulting

issue Union Oil raises because it is important, it is a legal issue,

and the facts necessary to resolve this issue are not in dispute. See

e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-699

(1984); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 259 n.5 (1980).

Furthermore, the issue fairly reflects the central circumstances in

this case; extraordinary rainfall, consisting of two six-month

winter seasons in a row, each constituting a hundred-year rainfall

event, resulted in approximately fifty permit exceedances. These

central circumstances fairly raise the question whether the Clean

Water Act allows a permittee to be excused for exceeding its

permit limits where extreme or unusual acts of nature caused the

exceedance.

4. The issue is important because it may affect every permit

under the Clean Water Act. According to the Court of Appeals’

decision, permittees should design their pollution control systems

to function normally despite extreme or unusual acts of nature, if

those unusual events are likely to occur over the life of the

facility. Most facilities operate in areas occasionally subject to

extreme or unusual acts of nature which are likely to occur over

the life of the facility. The east and gulf coasts suffer from

hurricanes, the midwest from tornadoes, and the west coast is

prone to earthquakes. All areas may experience exceptionally

severe storms. If permittees do not design their facilities to

accommodate the stresses of extreme or unusual natural condi-

tions, they may be subject to enforcement action, civil or crimi-

nal.° 33 U.S.C. Section 1319. In such enforcement suits,

permittees could not successfully defend on grounds that extreme

or unusual acts of nature had caused the permit exceedances

because, in the Court of Appeals’ view, the problem would not be

the extreme events, but the inadequacy of the facility to meet the

extreme events. The potential liability for exceedances due to

° The Clean Water Act provides criminal penalties, including impris-

onment of responsible corporate officers, for willful or negligent violation

of permit terms. 33 U.S.C. Section 1319(c).

5

extreme natural occurrences would thus fall on tens of thousands

of permittees.

5. The issue is legal: it raises the intended scope of a permit-

tee’s liability under the Clean Water Act. The inquiry is whether

Congress intended to impose absolute liability on permittees

under the Clean Water Act, making them responsible for the

consequences of extreme or unusual acts of nature. The inquiry

may extend to interpretation of the permit terms, and the regula-

tions on which those terms are based, to determine whether they

seek to impose liability on permittees for extreme or unusual acts

of nature. Even in this extension, the issue is one of legal

interpretation.

6. The facts necessary to resolve this issue are not in dispute.

The key fact is that there were exceptionally heavy and unusual

rains which resulted in permit exceedances. Sierra Club suggests

otherwise, Response at 4-5, but Sierra Club simply quarrels with

the record. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals

agreed on this key fact. The District Court found “the winters of

1981 to 1982 and 1982 to 1983 produced exceptionally heavy

rainfall, causing widespread flooding and property damage.” Pet.

App. at A-31. The Court of Appeals similarly characterized the

rains as “heavy rainfall”, “heavy rains”, and “unusual rains”. Pet.

App. at A-16 and A-17. The Court of Appeals did not reverse the

District Court on this factual finding; instead, it disagreed on

whether Union Oil was liable for the consequences of the heavy

and unusual rains.’ Only Sierra Club still tries to argue that there

were no unusual rains in the winters of 1931-82 and 1982-83; but

Sierra Club is both wrong and too late.* The factual finding of

’ The Court of Appeals’ disagreement with the District Court was

predicated on a differing interpretation of the legal responsibilities and

liabilities of permittees under the Clean Water Act. Had it been no more

than a differing factual conclusion, the Court of Appeals would have

committed plain error in reversing the District Court’s finding of fact on

causation.

* Sierra Club tries to minimize the severity of these rainstorms,

neglecting to mention that its own expert testified on cross-examination

that the winter season storms were hundred-year rainfall events:

6

exceptional or unusual rains is undisturbed; the question left for

the Court is the legal question of a permittee’s liability for the

consequences of extreme or unusual natural occurrences.

B. Sierra Club Offers No Reason Why A Permittee May Not

Introduce Evidence In Its Defense In A Clean Water Act

Enforcement Suit, Except To Say It Would Complicate The

Suit By Requiring The District Court To Determine The

Facts; This Reason Does Not Overcome The Permittee’s

Constitutional Rights.

1. The Court of Appeals held the Clean Water Act bars a

permittee from showing at trial that an exceedance reported in the

permittee’s self-monitoring report was an error. Pet. App. at A-20

and A-21. The Court so held even though the permittee reported

the error, together with the exceedance, in its self-monitoring

report. The Court of Appeals misinterpreted the law. The Clean

Water Act neither states nor implies that an exceedance in a

monthly monitoring report is conclusive evidence of a violation

and may not be explained, rebutted or in any way disproved at

trial. The Clean Water Act did not create such an irrebuttable

The Court: So what you are saying is that the rain for that six-

month period was a rain that occurred once every hundred years?

Question: Statistically that’s right, isn’t it, doctor?

Answer: Yes. [5 Tr. at 614 (Dr. Schroeder) }.

Sierra Club’s attempt to tie the exceedances only to unusually severe

daily storms, Response at 4-5, is also inappropriate because the stress of

a season of storms on bacteria in a bioplant is cumulative. The bacteria

do not have the capability to renew themselves every 24 hours. The fact

that the winter season constituted a hundred-year rainfall event is far

more significant for the operation of the bioplant than that the rain on

any particular day was or was not itself unusual. It is the combined effect

of the rain and cold that caused these problems. Although Sierra Club

goes so far as to suggest the drop in temperature associated with the

rains did not contribute to the violations, Response at 4, the witness to

whose testimony Sierra Club refers in fact testified most clearly: “it’s a

given the water is going to be colder going to the bioplant during a rain

storm. I am saying that it’s also a given that reduced temperatures slow

the rate of biological activity in a bioplant.” 4 Tr. 526 (Dr. Stone).

eh A A

;

presumption; if it did, it would violate due process. See Petition at

13-17.

2. Sierra Club responds by asserting that the monthly moni-

toring report is an admission, that a permittee may not+mpeach

its own admission, and, therefore, that a ban on evidence holds no

constitutional flaw. Sierra Club’s reasoning does not support its

conclusion, even if a monitoring report is viewed as an admission,

because a party may introduce evidence to clarify or respond to an

admission. E.g., Albert Hanson Lumber Company v. United

States, 261 U.S. 581,589 (1923). The ban is not against including

evidence, but against excluding evidence by establishing irrebut-

table presumptions in the absence of compelling reasons. £.g.,

United States v. Provident Trust Company, 291 U.S. 272, 281-282

(1934).

3. Sierra Club’s argument rests on erroneous facts. Sierra

Club implies Union Oil did not stand behind its reports and

sought to impeach them. To the contrary, Union Oil proved at

trial what its monitoring reports stated on their face for five of the

seven exceedances at issue: that the reported exceedances were

invalid because of sampling errors or calculation variabilities.’

The April 15, 1983 self-monitoring report, for example, noted two

exceptionally high results and stated:

“Both excesses were reported ...on the following day. On

each occasion, repeat samples a few hours later and the

following day yielded results well within limits. All other

measures and observations indicated our treatment plant was

operating well and that our effluent was on grade. These

settleable solids excesses were traced to sampling problems.

We have taken steps to resolve these problems.” [ Def. Ex.

D, reproduced in part in the appendix to this reply. ]

Union Oil thus did not impeach its reports; instead, Sierra Club

and the Court of Appeals deleted from consideration those parts

* The other two reports do not indicate an exceedance at all, but

instead report that meaningful sample results could not be obtained

because of laboratory problems.

8

of the self-monitoring reports which explained the exceedances

reported.

4. This issue is significant. The 65,000 permittees under the

Clean Water Act file a self-monitoring report each month, report-

ing numerous measurements and samples. These hundreds of

thousands of routine monthly monitoring reports, according to the

Court of Appeals decision, constitute conclusive evidence against

the permittee in court: those filing the reports are not to be

permitted an opportunity to explain the circumstances of any

errors in the testing or in the reporting. Denying a person his day

in court is a classic deprivation of due process. It should not be

implied as a requirement of the Clean Water Act, nor tolerated

here.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLOTTE URAM

RONALD C. HAUSMANN

PATRICK J. CAFFERTY

JOHN F. BARG

LANDELS, RIPLEY & DIAMOND

450 Pacific Avenue

San Francisco, CA 94133

(415) 788-5000

Counsel for Petitioner

February, 1988.

Appendix

[UNION LETTERHEAD }

April 15, 1983 WNS-102

Regional Water Quality Control Board

San Francisco Bay Region

1111 Jackson Street, Room 6040

Oakland, California 94607

Attention Mr. Fred H. Dierker

4 Gentlemen:

7 Attached is the March 1983 monthly report on the Self-

Monitoring Program for Union’s San Francisce Refinery.

The Refinery was in compliance with all limits with the

4 exception of two high settleable solids results for Station E-002,

] 8.8 ml/1-hr on March 1 and 1.3 ml/1-hr on March 28. The two

high daily values resulted in a monthly average of 1.14 ml/1-hr,

exceeding the monthly average limit.

Both excesses were reported to RWQCB on the following day.

On each occasion, repeat samples a few hours later and on the

following day yielded results well within limits. All other mea-

sures and observations indicated our treatment plant was operat-

ing well and that our effluent was on grade. These settleable solids

excesses were traced to sampling problems. We have taken steps

to resolve these problems.

The information contained herein is correct to the best of my

knowledge and belief.

Very truly yours,

/s/ W.N. Stark

Manager

DMGinosar/lo

Attachment

cc: Environmental Protection Agency

be: M. J. Dougherty/Dr. C. B. Scott

Messrs. G. O. Dyke/F. A. Swingle

Circulate: J. R. Dietzman

F. R. Bottomley

S. D. Smith

D. M. Ginosar ?

A. L. Felderman

D. W. DeBuse

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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