Jurisdictional Statement — Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission

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upreme Court, U.S.

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86 4915 f EILED

MAY 27 1987

In the Supreme Coi7t.::..""" |

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

BOHEMIAN CLUuB,

Appellant,

VS.

FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING COMMISSION,

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; DEPARTMENT OF FAIR

EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING;

and MARK GUERRA, as Director,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the

Court of Appeal of the State of C.lifornia

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

WILLIAM I. EDLUND

MICHAEL H. SALINSKY

COUNSEL OF RECORD

KEVIN M. FONG

225 Bush Street

Mailing Address

P.O. Box 7880

PILLSBURY, MADISON & San Francisco, CA 94120

SUTRO Telephone: (415) 983-1462

225 Bush Street Counsel for Appellant

Mailing Address

P.O. Box 7880

San Francisco, CA 94120

Of Counsel

BOWNE OF SAN FRANCISCO. INC. + 190 NINTH ST. + S.F.. CA 94103 » (415) 864-2300

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does § 701(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

enacted by Congress to protect the freedom of association of

members of bona fide private clubs, preempt inconsistent state

laws prescribing the employment practices of such private clubs?

2. Does the freedom of association guaranteed by the First

Amendment protect from governmental intrusion the selection by

private club members of employees involved in the members’

private, social, associational activities?

3. Is a state court constitutionally required to make an inde-

pendent review of the administrative record in determining

whether a statute violates the freedom of association of private

club members?*

* The parties are named in the title of this jurisdictional statement.

Appellant Bohemian Club is a private, non-commercial, social associa-

tion of men only, with approximately 2,000 members.

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Conetiees BUURONINE o.6 ok i kde ee es ee i

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Constitutional provisions and statutes involved ........... 2

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po RCTS Tee re eee 6

The questions are substantial ...... 2... cc cc ccccscssenss 7

The application of state employment discrimination laws to

regulate the employment practices of bona fide private

membership clubs is inconsistent with, and preempted by,

§ 701(b) of Title VII, in which Congress intended to

protect the freedom of association of private club members 9

II

This case also presents an important constitutional question:

whether the freedom of association protects from govern-

mental intrusion the selection by club members of

employees involved in the members’ private, social, associ-

stiomel acta ..... ..0.000404s40ude nee eeeees 13

Ill

A state court is constitutiona!ly required to make an indepen-

dent review of the administrative record in determining

whether a statute violates the freedom of association of

grivake GhOD GROGNDOND o.oo. once pansccnsuaneaeeaween 19

Consiesion . og os. cnc ccckackunnwpeeee ee 20

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717....... 20

Adcock v. Board of Education, 10 Cal.3d 60 ........... 19

eee VW. Meeryeeee, 37S UB. ZOB 2... ccc cccccccccccsss 14

Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 55

U.S. Law Week 4606, CS i ntwe 5 snk hv O 8, 14, 15

Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment and Housing

Commission, 187 Cal.App.3d 1.................. 2, passim

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 ........ aon neues per 17

California Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 107

I, ce EE ss pa dessa esse sesee 12

EEOC v. St. Joseph Hospital East Inc., 19 FEP Cases 1439 9, 10

ROU Ws PUI, UE PS AO cc ccc ccc swccecccccen 14

Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc., 428 F.Supp.

EN Cs Seva ewukseudn sad en de k0da'ssddnes 8, 10, 12

Florida Avocado Geveen * Pam, eo Ue. 132 ......5. 13

Grann v. City of Madison, 738 F.2d 786............... 13

Guesby v. Kennedy, 580 F.Supp. 1280 ................ 11

Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332.......5.......000000- 9

Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 ............. 18

Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club, 535 F.Supp. 313 .... 11

Kemerer v. Davis, 520 F.Supp. 256 ...........0.c0000. 8, 11

Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d

ES LIE SE 19

Local 246, Util. Wkrs. U. v. Southern California Edison

bac kebseccececcesecccvens 13

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 ........... 13,14

ek A 14, 17

NAACP vy. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886...... 19

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609... 13, 14, 15, 19

I I ER BOD coc ow ccccscucacasccsccess 17

a 13

ee

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 ............

Thomas Pub. Ce. v. Division of Human Rights, 456

Pe BUI 6c Sd ccc nencnneasepresaasssesandenss 13

Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 3

Constitution

United States Constitution

PE I A ccvedencccesabiadccassecsens i, passim

Statutes

California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cali-

fornia Government Code § 12900, et seq. ......... 1, passim

Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ............ 8, 11

Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title I, 42 US.C. § 2000a, of ang. ................. 10

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 20000, et seq. ............. i, passim

Section 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) ......... i, passim

Section 708, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7................. 3,12

Title XI

Section 1104, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 ............. 3, 10, 12

Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 501(c), 26 U.S.C.

DDL iee ih ius bake eek b bond gs 6ecaecnndaspeduas 3, 10

United States Code

Be IE SEPTEEE ccc cc pctecocccaaandacnaes 2

Title 28, Section 2103 ............. ee eee eee eee eee 2

Other Authorities

Bernard, The Sex Game: Communication Between the

CH, SOURED. Soi cere det neneadesenscaas 6

Congressional Record, Volume 110 (June 13, 1964) 13697 10

No.

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM, ‘1986

BOHEMIAN CLUB,

Appellant,

VS.

FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING COMMISSION,

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; DEPARTMENT OF FAIR

EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING;

and MARK GUERRA, as Director,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the

Court of Appeal of the State of California

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Appellant Bohemian Club appeals from a final judgment of the

Court of Appeal of the State of California. The California Fair

Employment and Housing Act, as applied by the California Fair

Employment and Housing Commission to the Club, prohibits the

Club from employing only men in jobs integrally involved with

the private, social, all-male associational activities that are the

purpose of the Club’s existence. The Court of Appeal held that

the Act, as so applied, is constitutional and does not violate the

freedom of association protected by the First Amendment. The

Court of Appeal also held that the Act, as so applied, is not

preempted by § 701(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, in which Congress intended to protect the freedom of

association of private club members.

2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeal of the State of California,

First Appellate District, Division One ((1986) 187 Cal.App.3d

1), is printed in Appendix A. The order of the Supreme Court of

the State of California denying review of the Court of Appeal’s

decision is printed in Appendix B.

The following other opinions were rendered in the case: The

opinion of the Superior Court of the State of California, County

of Sonoma, is printed in Appendix C; the opinion of appellee

California Fair Employment and Housing Commission is printed

in Appendix D.

JURISDICTION

The opinion of the Court of Appeal of the State of California

was filed and entered on November 20, 1986 (Appx. A), and the

order of the Supreme Court of the State of California was filed

and entered on February 26, 1987 (Appx. B). A notice of appeal

to this Court was timely filed in the Court of Appeal on May 19,

1987 (Appx. E).

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 1257(2) of Title 28 of

the United States Code. Appellant raised the claims in the

proceedings below that the California Fair Housing and Employ-

ment Act “as applied to the Club, is preempted by conflicting and

superseding provisions of Federal law and violates the members’

Federal and state constitutional rights to privacy and free associa-

tion” (Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal, p. 467).

In the alternative, appellant respectfully submits that this

statement should be regarded and granted as a petition for writ of

certiorari pursuant to § 2103 of Title 28 of the United States

Code.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

INVOLVED

First Amendment, United States Constitution:

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the

3

freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people

peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a

redress of grievances.”

Section 701(b), Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.

§$ 2000e(b) ):

“The term ‘employer’ * * * does not include * * * (2) a bona

fide private membership club (other than a labor organization)

which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of Title 26

sess”

Section 708, Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-7):

“Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or

relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment

provided by any present or future law of any State or political

subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to

require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful

employment practice under this subchapter.”

Section 1104, Title XI, Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.

§ 2000h-4):

“Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed

as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field

in which any such title operates to the exclusion of State laws on

the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be

construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such

provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or

any provision thereof.”

Pertinent provisions of the California Fair Employment and

Housing Act, California Government Code § 12900, et seq., are

printed in Appendix F.

' The First Amendment is applicable to the States through the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (e.g., Va. Pharmacy Bd.

v. Va. Consumer Council (1976) 425 U.S. 748, 749, n.1).

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Bohemian Club is the epitome of a bona fide private club.

As the California Court of Appeal stated,

“The Bohemian Club is a distinguished private nonprofit

association whose membership is limited to men professing

devotion to the arts. It has a long and honorable history since

its inception more than a century ago and it occupied an

important place in the history of literature in early-day San

Francisco. Its approximately 2,000 members are chosen by a

highly selective process. Potential members are interviewed

extensively and must be devoted to the arts, or willing to

participate in artistic activities” (Appx. A, p. 3).

And

“(T]he consequent relationship among members is undoubt-

edly ‘intimate’ in associational terms” (Appx. A, p. 10).

Although carefully selected for their dedication to the arts, -

Club members are men of diverse backgrounds’, races and

religions.? Membership cannot be purchased, and selection is not

based upon business success, wealth, or status (Appx. C, p. 32).

The Club is strictly noncommercial; it prohibits all commercial or

business activities (Appx. D, p. 45). “It is mot a ‘business’

commercial luncheon club” (Appx. C, p. 32; emphasis added).

? The membership includes the famous and the unknown. Past mem-

bers include John Muir and Jack London (Admin.Record, p. 368);

recent members include Herman Wouk, Seiji Ozawa, former Governor

Edmund G. Brown, and William F. Buckley, Jr. (Admin.Record,

pp. 168, 460). The Club is aot “just a club for very wealthy men”

(Admin.Record, p. 363), and the membership includes musicians,

writers, actors, artists, teachers, doctors, and men from a wide variety of

other professions and occupations (Admin.Record, pp. 167-169,-290).

3 The Club does not discriminate in employment (Appx. D, p. 49) or

membership based on “race, religious creed, color, national origin,

ancestry, physical handicap, marital status, citizenship, or sexual orien-

tation” (Appx. C, pp. 27, 45).

5

The Club’s purposes are and always have been male fellowship

and participation in the arts in a men-only environment (Appx. C,

p. 33). Participation in artistic activities is an obligation of

membership; all members participate in Club activities (Appx. C,

p. 33). All possible measures are taken to insure complete privacy

of Club members (Appx. D, p. 47).

Important Club activities take place at the Grove, a rustic,

completely private camping area, during two all-male summer

retreats when members, approved guests, and employees live at

the Grove (Appx. C, p. 33). Members participate in artistic,

musical, and dramatic performances, both serious and for en-

tertainment, on “virtually a 24-hour-a-day basis throughout the

Grove” (Appx. C, p. 33; Appx. D, p. 47). The retreats include

concerts, theatrical productions, and oratorical presentations; in-

formal musical entertainment, singing, and dancing is performed

extermporaneously throughout the day and night in outdoor thea-

tres and along the walks and paths (Appx. C, p. 33; Appx. D, pp.

47-48).° Many of these activities take place during meal times

and are an integral part of the camaraderie in which employees

are involved throughout the Grove (Appx. C, p. 33).

To protect the members’ associational and privacy interests, the

Club employs only men at the Grove (Appx. C, p. 37).° Employ-

ees are necessarily involved with and integral to the all-male

* Guests may be invited to the Midsummer Encampment only upon

written application by a member and approval by the Club board of

directors of the proposed guest’s merits and qualifications (Ad-

min.Record, pp. 733-734).

> All conversations and events at the Grove are “off-the-record”

(Admin.Record, p. 185); “it is both explicit and implicit that the whole

operation is entirely private” (Admin.Record, p. 437).

° The Club employs women at its City Club in all positions which do

not require intrusion into the all-male atmosphere of camaraderie that

distinguishes Club activities (Appx. C, p. 37). In accordance with the

policy, the Club regularly employs women in its print shop, in account-

ing and administrative positions in its business office, in maintenance

positions, and as food servers in the private rooms for members’ parties

(Appx. A, p. 3; Appx. C, p. 37).

6

society at the Grove (Appx. C, p. 36). Employees are present

during all of the 24-hour-a-day performances and festivities

(Appx. C, p. 36). Employees work before, during, and after meal

times in the open dining area, where dramatic and musical events

take place (Appx. C, p. 35). Other informal gatherings and

performances occur throughout the Grove while employees work

and serve refreshments, necessarily involving them in the com-

pany of members (Appx. C, p. 35).

Women are not permitted at the Grove during the men-only

retreats (Appx. C, p. 37). The intrusion of women would funda-

mentally change the nature and purpose of the Club—its collegi-

ality, camaraderie, and fellowship (Appx. C, p. 37). The presence

of women at the Grove would fundamentally alter and inhibit the

participation by members and would bring about a completely

different social and emotional environment from that which is at

the heart of the Club’s purpose (Appx. C, pp. 37-38).’ Some

changes in the environment would be subtle, and others would be

dramatic, but the presence of women would significantly alter the

activities, attitudes, and experiences for which the Club was

formed and exists (Appx. C, p. 38).

Proceedings below

Appellee California Department of Fair Employment and

Housing accused the Club of discriminatory hiring, in violation of

the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Appx. A,

p. 1). In response, the Club asserted, among other things, that

7 Dr. Bernard, a sociologist specializing in family and community

organizations, makes the same point in her book, The Sex Game:

Communication Between the Sexes (Atheneum, 1972) p. 47 (quoted at

Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal, pp. 524-525). For example, the trial court

found that “Club members and guests would be inhibited in taking

women’s roles and performing generally in theatricals, musicals, serious

drama, skits and other artistic productions if women were present;

members now comfortably portray female as well as male roles because

they are within the private social atmosphere reflecting the Club’s spirit

and traditional objectives; attendance and member participation in such

associational activities would decrease if women were present”

(Appx. C, p. 38).

7

gender is a bona fide occupational qualification for jobs at the

Grove and other jobs that involve the collegial gatherings that are

at the core of the Club’s purpose and existence and, in any event,

the Act (as applied to the Club) is preempted by conflicting and

superseding federal laws and violates the members’ constitutional

rights of privacy and free association (see Appx. A, p. 1).

The administrative law judge who heard the case credited the

testimony of the Club witnesses and determined that the Club’s

employment practices were bona fide, that the Club had not

engaged in illegal employment discrimination, and that gender

was a bona fide occupational qualification (Admin.Record, pp.

1304-1334). The Fair Employment and Housing Commission,

without hearing or seeing any witnesses or taking any evidence,

rejected the administrative law judge’s decision, and ordered the

Club to institute an affirmative action program to employ women

throughout the Club (Appx. A, p. 2).

The California Superior Court issued a writ of mandate com-

manding the Commission to set aside its decision and to dismiss

the accusation against the Club (Appx. C). Because the Com-

mission’s decision substantially affected the Club members’ con-

stitutional freedom of association (Appx. C, p. 26), the Superior

Court made findings pursuant to its independent judgment

(Appx. C, pp. 30-39).

The California Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and

directed the Superior Court to reinstate the Commission’s find-

ings (Appx. A). On February 26, 1987, the California Supreme

Court denied a petition for review (Appx. B).

THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL

This case presents the important unresolved question whether a

state may regulate the employment practices of bona fide private,

non-commercial, membership clubs in a manner that is inconsis-

tent with the purpose of federal law, and accordingly preempted

by federal law. Section 701(b) of Title VII exempts “bona fide

private membership clubs” from the coverage of Title VII; the

legislative history demonstrates that § 701(b) was designed to

protect the freedom of association of bona fide private member-

8

ship clubs. Contrary to the congressional intent to protect private

clubs from regulation by employment discrimination laws, the

ruling below holds that Title VII is “neutral” on private club

employment practices (Appx. A, pp. 14, 17). But Title VII is not

“neutral”: Congress has expressed in § 701(b) its purpose of

preserving a “small non-commercial enclave for the unfettered

exercise of the freedom of association” (see Fesel v. Masonic

Home of Delaware, Inc. (D.Del. 1977) 428 F.Supp. 573, 577).

The ruling below not only conflicts with congressional intent,

but also creates a serious conflict with the decision in Kemerer v.

Davis (E.D.Mich. 1981) 520 F.Supp. 256 that application of the

Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, to the employment

practices of a bona fide private membership club would be in

“irreconcilable conflict” with § 701(b). If a federal law such as

§ 1981 would be inconsistent with Title VII when applied to

private membership clubs, a fortiori a state law that purports to

regulate bona fide private membership clubs is no less inconsis-

tent with the congressional purpose to preserve the associational

rights of club members. Any law, whether state or federal, which

purports to regulate employment by private clubs is inconsistent

with the purpose of § 701(b) and may not stand.

— — —

The decision is of crucial importance to bona fide private, non-

commercial, associational groups throughout the country. There

are hundreds of such clubs, all totally unlike the Rotary Clubs and

United States Jaycees considered by this Court in prior decisions

(see Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte (U.S.

May 4, 1987) 55 U.S. Law Week 4606, 4609, n. 6, ___ US.

____). The ruling below gives states carte blanche to destroy

members’ freedom of association by intruding into the selection of

employees who will necessarily become involved in bona fide

private associational activities. The court below has created a

dangerous precedent by approving the state’s attempt to force a

bona fide private social association of men to employ women,

even though the presence of women at the Club’s retreats would

destroy the very purpose and reason for existence of the associa-

tion—pursuit of the-arts in an all-male environment.

This is not a case where the state is regulating a business club

or an organization with chapters across the nation. Rather, the

all

9

state is attempting to regulate the long-standing private social

activities of an entirely non-commercial group, thus interfering

with relationships among members that are “undoubtedly ‘inti-

mate’ in associational terms” (Appx. A, p. 10). If the ruling

below is left unreviewed, the state may not only require an all-

male group to hire women to participate in its previously all-male

retreats, but also require a women’s club to hire men to join in

previously all-female activities, or require an all-black sorority to

hire whites to work and live in a private dormitory intended to

provide a supportive all-black environment for black students.

Many private groups formed for associational purposes will cease

to exist because their purposes can no longer be achieved. States

will have the power to regulate out of existence those totally non-

commercial social clubs that Congress intended to preserve as “a

refuge for private associational values” (EEOC v. St. Joseph

Hospital East Inc. (W.D.Tenn. 1979) 19 FEP Cases 1439, 1440).

Such a blatantly overreaching use of state employment discrimi-

nation laws is without precedent. A summary dismissal or affirm-

ance by this Court would convert the ruling below into a

precedent binding upon all other courts (Hicks v. Miranda

(1975) 422 U.S. 332, 344-345).

Clearly, the issues presented are of crucial importance to the

administration of employment discrimination laws, the freedom of

association of members of all varieties of private clubs and,

indeed, to the pluralistic nature of our society.

THE APPLICATION OF STATE EMPLOYMENT DIS-

CRIMINATION LAWS TO REGULATE THE EMPLOY-

MENT PRACTICES OF BONA FIDE PRIVATE

MEMBERSHIP CLUBS IS INCONSISTENT WITH, AND

PREEMPTED BY, §701(b) OF TITLE VII, IN WHICH

CONGRESS INTENDED TO PROTECT THE FREEDOM

OF ASSOCIATION OF PRIVATE CLUB MEMBERS.

The issue—whether a state, contrary to the purposes of Title

VII, may require a bona fide private membership club to hire

employees whose presence would undermine the purpose of the

10

club—is-of crucial importance to private clubs and associations

throughout the country.

All state laws “inconsistent with any of the purposes of [the

Civil Rights Act of 1964], or any provision thereof” are pre-

empted (Title XI, § 1104, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4; emphasis ad-

ded). Here, the application of California’s employment law to

private clubs is inconsistent with the purpose of § 701(b) of Title

VII. Section 701(b) defines an “employer” to exclude “a bona

fide private membership club (other than a labor organization)

which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of [the

Internal Revenue Code of 1954]” (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) )—the

Club is such a tax-exempt private membership club (Appx. C,

p. 27). Thus, Congress exempted non-commercial private mem-

bership clubs from Title VII’s coverage. The purpose of § 701 (b)

was to protect the freedom of association of private membership

clubs; Title VII’s sponsor, Senator Humphrey, emphasized that

the private club exemption was designed to protect “the genuine

privacy of private clubs or other establishments whose member-

ship is genuinely selective on some reasonable basis” (110

Cong.Rec. (June 13, 1964) 13697; emphasis added).

The courts have confirmed the congressional objective: “The

legislative history of Title VII rather clearly indicates that Con-

gress drafted § 701(b) to preserve social and fraternal organiza-

tions of self-controlled membership as a refuge for private

associational values” (EEOC v. St. Joseph Hospital East Inc.

(W.D.Tenn. 1979) 19 FEP Cases 1439, 1440). The Title VII

exemption and the parallel Title II (public accommodations)

exemption for private clubs have similar purposes:

“In Title II, Congress sought to preserve a small non-

commercial enclave for the unfettered exercise of the free-

dom of association * * *. By including a similar exemption in

Title VII, Congress made it possible, in this limited setting,

for those who wish to restrict the universe of their personal

associates to also determine with whom they would associate

in their employer-employee relationships” (Fesel v. Masonic

Home of Delaware, Inc. (D.Del. 1977) 428 F.Supp. 573,

577).

Peon.

1]

Given the clear congressional intent to protect the freedom of

association of private club members, it necessarily follows that

laws which impose employment practices on private membership

clubs are “inconsistent” with the purpose of § 701(b). One court

has expressly recognized that government regulation of private

club employment is in conflict with the private club exemption in

§ 701(b). Kemerer v. Davis (E.D.Mich. 1981) 520 F.Supp. 256

holds that application of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981, to the employment practices of a bona fide private

membership club would be in “irreconcilable conflict” with

§ 701(b) (520 F.Supp. 258):

“If applied literally, [§] 1981 would reach within private

establishments protected by the 1964 Act, the two statutes,

thus, are in conflict” (520 F.Supp. 258).

The court therefore held:

“[P]rivate membership clubs are impliedly exempted from

the provisions of [§] 1981 by virtue of the explicit, conflict-

ing and therefore superseding exemption of Title VII * * *”

(520 F.Supp. 260).

The California Court of Appeal is wrong in asserting that

Kemerer merely discusses the reconciliation of two federal stat-

utes (Appx. A, p. 14). As the above-quoted language from

Kemerer demonstrates, laws that would reach into the employ-

ment practices of private membership clubs are inconsistent with

§ 701(b) (see Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club (W.D.N.C.

1982) 535 F.Supp. 313; but see Guesby v. Kennedy (D.Kan.

1984) 580 F.Supp. 1280). The inevitable conclusion from the

Kemerer reasoning is that any law, whether state or federal, that

purports to regulate employment by bona fide private clubs is

inconsistent with the purpose of § 701(b) and may not stand.

Contrary to the suggestion of the ruling below, Shaw v. Delta

Air Lines, Inc. (1983) 463 U.S. 85 does not hold that Title VII

never preempts state employment discrimination laws because

Title VII is “neutral” in those areas not covered by its terms

(Appx. A, pp. 14, 17). Title VII is not “neutral” on the subject of

employment practices of private membership clubs. Congress has

expressed in § 701(b) its purpose of preserving a “small non-

12 -

commercial enciave for the unfettered exercise of the freedom of

association” (see Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc.

(D.Del. 1977) 428 F.Supp. 573, 577).

The crux of the ruling below is the erroneous rationalization

that “Title VII’s overriding objective of eliminating employment

discrimination,” results in preemption only of “[l]aws which

hinder the protection of civil rights” (Appx. A, p. 16). The ruling

below totally ignores the critical language of § 1104 of Title XI of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964—that all state laws “inconsistent

with any of the purposes of * * * any provision” of the Civil

Rights Act are preempted (42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4; emphasis

added). The issue thus presented is not whether state regulation

of private club employment hinders “civil rights,” but whether

such regulation is inconsistent with any of the purposes of any

provision—in this case, § 701(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act.

The reliance of the ruling below upon the “savings clause” of

§ 708 of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7) highlights the need for

review by this Court. California Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v.

Guerra (1987) 107 S.Ct. 683, ____ U.S. —___-_ leaves open the

question whether Title VII’s preemptive scope is governed only by

§ 708, or by the express preemption provision in § 1104 of Title

XI, in conjunction with § 708. Part III-A of Just'ce Marshall’s

opinion in California Federal, joined by Justices Brennan, Black-

mun, and O’Connor (107 S.Ct. 689-691), necessarily suggests

that sections 1104 and 708 must be considered together in

determining Title VII’s preemptive effect. Justice Scalia’s con-

curring opinion concludes that § 708 is the only provision gov-

erning Title VII preemption (107 S.Ct. 697), and Justice

Stevens’ concurring opinion notes, but does not reach, the issue

(107 S.Ct. 696, n.1}. The dissenting opinion of Justice White,

joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell, cites both

sections 708 and 1104 (107 S.Ct. 698, 702, n. 12), but also does

not expressly address this issue. Thus, the proper interpretation of

the provisions governing Title VII’s preemptive scope is in-a state

of confusion.

No doubt the error of the ruling below stemmed from the

novelty of this important issue and the lack of guidelines as to

13

Title VII’s preemptive scope. The need for this Court’s resolution

of this issue is thus clear.

II

THIS CASE ALSO PRESENTS AN IMPORTANT CONSTI-

TUTIONAL QUESTION: WHETHER THE FREEDOM

OF ASSOCIATION PROTECTS FROM GOVERNMEN-

TAL INTRUSION THE SELECTION BY CLUB MEM-

BERS OF EMPLOYEES INVOLVED IN THE

MEMBERS’ PRIVATE, SOCIAL, ASSOCIATIONAL

ACTIVITIES.

The ruling below, endorsing the intrusion by the state into the

hiring practices of a private club, violates important freedom of

association rights.

It is beyond dispute that the essence of the Club is its all-male

functions; the central purposes of the Club have always been the

enjoyment of male fellowship and the appreciation of the arts in

an all-male atmosphere (Appx. C, p. 33). The freedom of

association under the First Amendment guarantees the right to

conduct private, social activities without governmental intrusion.

This Court has always recognized “the right of the individual to

pick his own associates so as to express his preferences and

dislikes, and to fashion his private life by joining such clubs and

* None of the lower court cases cited in the ruling below (Appx. A,

pp. 15-16) involved situations where Congress had affirmatively ex-

pressed its intent to leave an area free from government regulation (see

Grann v. City of Madison (7 Cir. 1984) 738 F.2d 786, certiorari denied

(1984) 469 U.S. 918; Thomas Pub. Co. v. Division of Human Rights

(S.D.N.Y. 1978) 456 F.Supp. 1104; Local 246, Util. Wkrs. U. v.

Southern California Edison Co. (C.D.Cal. 1970) 320 F.Supp. 1262).

The ruling below also cites several inapposite decisions of this Court that

do not involve employment (Appx. A, p. 16; Savage v. Jones (1912) 225

U.S. 501; Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul (1963) 373 U.S. 132; Moose

Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis (1972) 467 U.S. 163) or do not involve a truly

private club protected by the freedom of association (Appx. A, p. 16;

Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609).

14

groups as he chooses” (Evans v. Newton (1966) 382 U.S. 296,

298).”

“The associational rights which our system honors permit all

white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed.

* * * Government may not tell a man or woman who his or

her associates must be. The individual can be as selective as

he desires” (Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis (1972) 407 US.

163, 179-180, Douglas, J., dissenting; cited with approval in

Beard of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte (U.S.

May 4, 1987) 55 U.S.Law Week 4606, 4609, n. 6, ____ US.

nmaniie

This constitutional protection applies without regard to the

popularity or social utility of a club’s ideas, beliefs, or objectives

(N.A.A.C.P. v. Button(1963) 371 U.S. 415, 444-445). The courts

must carefully scrutinize a state’s attempt to regulate private

clubs because of the threat that the state may single out clubs that

endorse unpopular ideas or philosophies. The trial court expressly

found that the Fair Employment and Housing Commission had

acted arbitrarily and capriciously, in an intentional attack on the

Club and the beliefs of the members:

“The Commission has * * * engaged in arbitrary and

capricious conduct by its prejudgment and bias against the

Club, * * * and its announced motivation and bias against

clubs which discriminate by having only men as members”

(Appx. C, p. 39).

This Court has never delineated the scope of the freedom of

association of truly private associations. The Court has approved

regulation of the United States Jaycees, a nationwide organization

whose local chapters are “large and basically unselective groups”

(Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609, 621), and

of Rotary Clubs, which “rather than carrying on their activities in

an atmosphere of privacy, seek to keep their ‘windows and doors

°“Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the

constitutional right of every person to close his home or club to any

person * * *” (Bell v. Maryland (1964) 378 U.S. 226, 313, Goldberg,

Warren & Douglas, JJ., concurring).

15

open to the world’ ” (Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club

of Duarte (U.S. May 4, 1987) 55 U.S.Law Week 4606, 4609,

__ U.S. ___). The United States Jaycees and Rotary Clubs,

howevc ~. stand in sharp contrast to the Bohemian Club, a non-

commercial private club that has “extremely selective” member-

ship policies (Appx. A, p. 10) and “takes all measures necessary

to insure privacy for members” (Appx. D, p. 47).

The freedom of association protects personal relationships

“distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high

degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the

affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the

relationship” (Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S.

609, 620). The key factors include “size, purpose, policies, selec-

tivity, congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular

case may be pertinent” to a particular association (468 U.S. 620).

Under these criteria, the Club is a paradigm of the truly private,

non-commercial, social association protected by the freedom of

association:

Size. The Club’s by-laws strictly limit membership to

1,100 regular members and approximately 900 non-resident,

associate, and other members (Admin.Record, pp. 713-719).

The wait for admission is as long as thirteen years in some

categories (Admin.Record, p. 680).

Purpose. The Club activities are considered as “retreats

from the outside world, and the Grove has been seen as a

natural, rustic setting in which to enjoy male fellowship and

celebrate the arts” (Appx. D, p. 48).

Policies. The Club’s “rules and traditions prohibit mem-

bers and guests from engaging in commercial, trade or

business activities while at the Club or its functions” (Appx.

D, p. 45). The Club by-laws and rules strictly restrict all

disclosure of Club activities to the public (Admin.Record,

pp. 235-238, 737, 741). “At the Grove, access roads leading

into the living and camping area are fenced, the entry roads

have locked gates, and signs are posted along the perimeter

to identify the area as private property. Fourteen security

guards patrol the Grove at all times during the summer

16

events to prevent uninvited persons from entering”

(Appx. D, p. 47).'°

Selectivity. “[{M]embership in the Club is open only to

men connected professionally with or devoted to the arts.

*** Memberships are not based upon business achieve-

ments, and memberships cannot be purchased or sold. * * *

The Club’s membership standards and rules are strictly

enforced” (Appx. D, p. 44). Even a guest at the Grove must

be approved by the board of directors based on his merits and

qualifications (Admin.Record, pp. 733-734).

Congeniality. The Club has a “warmth of fellowship

unmatched in social club history” (Admin.Record, p. 658).

“There is a suspension of disbelief at the Grove; a certain

kind of magic; a certain kind of special illusion which is

created there. This is part and parcel of the setting and the

camaraderie and the psychological intimacy that the Grove

allows” (Admin.Record, p. 365).

Thus, the Club’s private social activities place it far into the

protected end of the spectrum of personal associational relation-

ships. The courts below and the Commission acknowledge that

the Club’s “common purpose is to enjoy the arts in an atmosphere

of male camaraderie” and that “relationship among members is

undoubtedly ‘intimate’ in associational terms,” necessarily receiv-

ing constitutional protection (Appx. A, p. 10). The ruling below

also acknowledges the credibility of the testimony that the pres-

ence of women would intrude upon the “intimate” associational

activities of Club members (Appx. A, p. 19, n. 12).""

'° The Club by-laws provide that “none of the facilities shall at any

time or in any manner be made available to the general public or to any

outside group or organization” (Admin.Record, pp. 735, 738).

'! Club member William F. Buckley, Jr., testified that the presence of

women at the Grove “would make so critical a difference as far as I can

see that I would certainly forfeit my sense of allegiance to it” (Ad-

min.Record, p. 441). Former Governor Edmund G. Brown, who “disa-

gree[d] with almost everything [Mr. Buckley] says,” agreed with Mr.

Buckley’s testimony about the Club and its associational values (Ad-

min.Record, p. 464). Governor Brown testified that the ‘presence of

ee

17

The ruling below holds, however, that the members’ freedom of

association is not violated, as “the Club members’ relationship

with employees cannot reasonably be termed ‘intimate’” (Appx.

A, p. 11; emphasis added). This misses the point: It is the

“intimate” relationship among members that is threatened by the

state regulation of the Club’s employment practices. The state’s

intrusion into those protected activities (by requiring female

employees pervasively throughout the Club’s encampment)

would destroy this “intimate” relationship among members. The

reasoning of the ruling below proves too much: Under that

reasoning, the state could, for example, require the Club to admit

state officials to monitor all Club activities, under the theory that

the Club members’ relationship with the state monitors would not

be “intimate.”

The ruling below suggests, in the alternative, that any infringe-

ment of freedom of association “would be justified by the state’s

compelling interest in eradicating employment discrimination”

(Appx. A, p. 11). However, government regulations limiting

fundamental rights “must be narrowly drawn to express only the

legitimate state interests at stake” (Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 U.S.

113, 155; see Buckley v. Valeo (1976) 424 US. 1, 44-45;

NAA.C.P. v. Button (1963) 371 U.S. 415, 433, 438). The ruling

below concedes that the application of the Fair Employment and

Housing Act to the Club is “ambiguous” and “is not clear”

(Appx. A, p. 4). The state has failed to draw with narrow

specificity a statute covering the Club and its selection of employ-

ees involved with the Club’s associational activities (see

NA.A.C.P. v. Button (1963) 371 U.S. 415, 433, 438)."?

women employees “would change the spirit of the organization” and

would “destroy the Bohemian feeling” (Admin.Record, pp. 466, 468).

'2 Moreover, as discussed above (supra, p. 14), the state’s motivation

in applying the Act to the Club was not to eradicate employment

discrimination. The trial court found that the state’s “action before filing

its accusation and in prosecuting the Club before the Commission

reflects arbitrary and capricious conduct designed to unfairly and preju-

dicially bring enforcement proceedings against the Club because of its

membership” (Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal, p. 1034). The state singled

out the Club as “a juicy target” simply because state officials viewed the

18

This Court should determine the important and novel question

whether the freedom of association protects from governmental

intrusion the selection by a private club of employees involved in

the Club’s private, social, associational activities.

Club members as “very, very rich and very, very famous” (Ad-

min.Record, p. 1489). That is certainly not a “compelling interest.”

The ruling below relies upon Hishon v. King & Spaulding (1984) 467

U.S. 69 as its sole authority for “the proposition that the impact, if any,

of forced hiring of female employees on Club members’ associational

rights could be justified by the state’s compelling interest in eliminating

employment discrimination” (Appx. A, p. 12). But Hishon holds no

such thing:

“(I]n Hishon v. King and Spaulding, supra,* * * we readily

rejected a large commercial law firm’s claim to First Amendment

protection for alleged gender-based discriminatory partnership de-

cisions for associates of the firm. We found no need to inquire into

any connection between gender as a condition of partnership and

the speech of the law firm, and we undertook no weighing of

‘compelling’ state interests against the speech interests of the law

firm. As a commercial enterprise, the law firm could claim no First

Amendment immunity from employment discrimination laws, and

that result would not have been altered by a showing that the firm

engaged even in a substantial amount of activity entitled to First

Amendment protection” (Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984)

468 U.S. 609, 637, O’Connor, J., concurring; emphasis added).

In Hishon, the defendant law firm, a commercial business, had simply

“not shown how its ability to fulfill such a function [working as

commercial lawyers] would be inhibited by a requirement that it

consider petitioner for partnership on her merits” (467 U.S. 78). Here,

the Club’s function would be destroyed if—as required by the Commis-

sion—the Club is compelled to hire women throughout the Club

regardless of its activities.

19

Il

A STATE COURT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED

TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE

ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD IN DETERMINING

WHETHER A STATUTE VIOLATES THE FREEDOM OF

ASSOCIATION OF PRIVATE CLUB MEMBERS.

In resolving First Amendment issues, the courts must make an

independent examination of the whole record (NAACP v. Clai-

borne Hardware Co. (1982) 458 U.S. 886, 915-916, n. 5).

Because of its erroneous view that, “as a matter of law,” the

freedom of association does not protect against governmental

intrusion into the selection of private club employees, the Court of

Appeal refused to make an independent examination of the record

(Appx. A, p. 7 & n. 3).

Moreover, the Court of Appeal erroneously rejected the trial

court’s independent review of the record, on the erroneous theory

that, as a matter of law, the associational rights affected by the

Fair Employment and Housing Commission decision “do not rise

to the level of fundamentally vested interests” (Appx. A, p. 7).

Clearly, the freedom of association is “protect[ed] as a funda-

mental element of personal liberty” (Roberts v. United States

Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609, 618; see Adcock v. Board of

Education (1975) 10 Cal.3d 60, 66). If the Court of Appeal

intended to say that Club members’ freedom of association was

not “affected” by the application of the Fair Employment and

Housing Act, the Court of Appeal is wrong. The trial court found

—and the evidence is overpowering—that the Club members’

associational activities would be drastically affected by the pres-

ence of female employees at private gatherings (Appx. C, p. 38).

Independent review is especially important in this case, where

the evidence is contained in the administrative record before the

Fair Housing and Employment Commission, rather than in a trial

record before a jury or trial judge.

““When the executive or the administrative process abridges

constitutional rights, it is subject to closer scrutiny than

otherwise, and ultimately it is the court rather than agency

that must balance the competing interests’” (Lebron v.

20

Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. (D.C. Cir. 1984) 749

F.2d 893, 897, n. 7; quoting A Quaker Action Group v.

Morton (D.C. Cir. 1975) 516 F.2d 717, 723).

The Court of Appeal’s total rejection of any independent

examination of the record by the courts is without precedent. In

considering the merits of the First Amendment issues in this case

this Court should make independent examination of the whole

record or, at the very least, remand the case to the Court of

Appeal for such a review.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should note probable

jurisdiction of this appeal or, in the alternative, regard and grant

this jurisdictional statement as a petition for writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM I. EDLUND

MICHAEL H. SALINSKY

COUNSEL OF RECORD

KEVIN M. FONG

Counsel for Appellant

PILLSBURY, MADISON & SUTRO

Of Counsel

(Appendices follow)

x

Appendix A

Certified for Publication

In the Court of Appeal of the State of California

First Appellate District

Division One

A024988

Super.Ct.No.

119026

Bohemian Club,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

Vv.

Fair Employment and Housing Commission,

State of California,

Defendant and Appellant,

Department of Fair Employment

and Housing et al.,

Intervenors and Appellants.

[Filed Nov. 20, 1986]

NEWSOM, J.—The Department of Fair Employment and Hous-

ing (hereafter Department) filed an accusation against the Bohe-

mian Club (hereafter Club) for alleged violations of the Fair

Employment and Housing Act (hereafter FEHA). The accusa-

tion alleged that the Club, as an employer covered by the FEHA,

had—in violation of the act—pursued a discriminatory hiring

policy which systematically excluded women from all temporary

and permanent jobs at its Monte Rio camp and most of such

positions at its San Francisco location.

The Club denied that it is a covered employer, and, in the

alternative, asserted that male gender is a bona fide occupational

qualification. It also asserted that the FEHA is preempted by

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e) (Title

VII), which does not include private clubs in its definition of

employers subject to its antidiscrimination provisions.

A-2

The procedural background may be summarized as follows. An

administrative law judge heard the case and ruled that male

gender is a bona fide occupational qualification at the Club. The

Fair Employment and Housing Commission (hereafter Commis-

sion) rejected the judge’s findings and conclusions and issued its

own findings and decision ordering the Club to institute an

affirmative action program to employ women in both San Fran-

cisco and Monte Rio.

Pursuant to section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the

Club filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the superior court.

The petition did not name the Department and its director as

real parties in interest; they, however, opposed the petition and

filed their own petition in intervention to set aside the Commis-

sion’s ruling purporting to deny classwide backpay. While the

Commission agreed that the backpay ruling should be set aside,

the trial court, in granting the Club’s petition, denied the petition

in intervention as moot.

On December | and 3, a hearing was held, after which the trial

court issued a tentative ruling granting the Club’s petition. In the

aftermath of attendant publicity, the Commission learned for the

first time that the trial judge had participated in the Club’s

activities, and the Commission’s request that he disqualify him-

self was denied.

The Club’s petition was granted. The trial court held that:

(1) Title VII preempts the FEHA; and (2) even if the FEHA is

not preempted, male gender is a bona fide occupational qualifica-

tion. The court did not merely order the Commission to set aside

its decision, but also dismissed the underlying accusation against

the Club. While the Club was awarded costs, its cost bill was

subsequently taxed insofar as it claimed attorney’s fees.

Both the Commission and the Department appealed.’ The

Club also appealed from the order denying it attorney’s fees.

' We will hereafter refer to the Commission and Department together

as appellants. :

A-3

A review of the pertinent factual context reveals the following.

The Pohemian Club is a distinguished private nonprofit associa-

tion whose membership is limited to men professing devotion to

the arts. It has a long and honorable history since its inception

more than a century ago and it occupied an important place in the

history of literature in early-day San Francisco. Its approximately

2,000 members are chosen by a highly selective process. Potential

members are interviewed extensively and must be devoted to the

arts, or willing to participate in artistic activities.

The Club’s activities take place at two different locations: the

City Club in San Francisco and the Grove, a 2,500 acre camping

area near Monte Rio, California. Members attend concerts,

theatrical and musical productions, oratorical presentations, lake-

side talks and other functions.

The Club permanently employs 90 men in managerial, clerical,

craft, food preparation and service, cleaning and personal service

positions at its San Francisco location. Women are employed in

positions which do not require their presence at Club functions. In

accordance with this policy, women work in accounting and

administrative positions and at the print shop. Women also clean

rooms and may be hired as food servers for members’ private

parties. At the Grove, a permanent work force of about 10

employees is maintained. These permanent staff members super-

vise a temporary work force of 250 men hired during the annual

retreats at the Grove.

The Club’s general manager testified that employees are prima-

rily hired through union referrals and from the area around the

Grove. When the union cannot provide an employee, the Club

goes to the state employment department and sometimes even

hires “off the street.” Don Hiemforth, a member of the local Food

Servers’ Union, who has frequently worked at the Club, testified

that, to his knowledge, referrals from the union have never been

refused.

One waiter frequently employed at the Club testified concern-

ing the Club’s policy against fraternization between employees

and members and guests. Waiters, for example, are not permitted

to remain in the dining room at the City Club during the

A-4

Thursday night club functions staged after dinner has been

served. Such employees are strictly instructed to maintain rela-

tions with members at a minimal, exclusively business level.

Similar rules at the Grove prohibit fraternization between

employees and members. The Club’s general manager conceded

that Grove employees are prohibited from fraternizing with mem-

bers, and testified as well that employees are not permitted use of

the swimming facilities.

The first legal question to be addressed in the present appeal is

whether the Bohemian Club, as a private nonprofit corporation, is

subject to the antidiscrimination provisions of the Fair Employ-

ment and Housing Act. (Gov. Code, § 12920 et seq.)

The Fair Employment and Housing Act is a comprehensive

scheme for the realization of the state’s public policy “to protect

and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek,

obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or abridge-

ment on account of race, religious creed, color, national origin,

ancestry, physical handicap, medical condition, marital status,

sex, or age.” (Gov. Code, § 12920.)

Under Government Code section 12926, subdivision (c), the

term employer “does not include a religious association or corpo-

ration not organized for private profit.” The Club accordingly

contends that, as a nonprofit corporation, it is exempted from the

antidiscrimination provisions of the FEHA. Appellants assert

however, that the word “religious” modifies both “association”

and “corporation not organized for private profit.” (Gov. Code

§ 12926, subd. (c).) Thus, under appellants’ interpretation the

exemption would only apply to the Club if it were a religious

nonprofit corporation. The language at issue is ambiguous; it is

not clear whether “religious” only modifies “association” or

whether it also refers to a nonprofit corporation. This ambiguity is

resolved, however, by a review of the pertinent legislative history.

(Sand v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 567, 570 [194

Cal.Rpir. 480, 668 P.2d 787].}

When Government Code section 12926, subdivision (c) was

originally enacted, the term employer did not “include a social

club, fraternal, charitable, educational or religious association or

Bie.»

A-5

corporation not organized for private profit.” (Lab. Code, § 1413,

subd. (d).) Under the amended version, however, the Legislature

deleted social clubs, as well as fraternal, charitable, and educa-

tional organizations from the statutory exemption. “Where the

amendment of a statute consists of the deletion of an express

provision, the presumption is that a substantial change in the law

was intended.” (Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Industrial Acc. Com.

(1963) 59 Cal.2d 842, 844 [31 Cal.Rptr. 477, 382 P.2d 597]

citing Clements v. T. R. Bechtel Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 227, 231

[273 P.2d 5]; see also Longshore v. County of Ventura (1979) 25

Cal.3d 14, 26 [157 Cal.Rptr. 706, 598 P.2d 866]; Ladd v. Board

of Trustees (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 984, 990 [100 Cal.Rptr. 571 ].)

By specifically deleting “social clubs” from the statutory ex-

emption, it appears that the legislature no longer wished to afford

such entities an exemption from the nondiscrimination policies of

the FEHA. Moreover, the deletion of charitable organizations,

which are by nature nonprofit, clearly indicates that the term

religious was intended to modify both “association” and “corpora-

tion not organized for private profit.” Had the legislature simply

intended, as respondent suggests, to exempt all nonprofit corpora-

tions, it seems unlikely that it would have deleted charitable

organizations from the exemption provision. In any event, we

conclude that the adjective “religious” must be read as modifying

both “association” and “corporation not organized for private

profit.” And, upon this reading of the statute, we conclude that

only religious associations or nonprofit corporations are exempt

from the antidiscrimination provisions of FEHA, and that appel-

lants do not fall within this exempt category.’

? The Club relies on Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985)

40 Cal.3d 72 [219 Cal.Rptr. 150, 707 P.2d 212] for the proposition that

nonprofit corporations are not considered employers under the FEHA.

In Isbister, the Boys’ Club argued that the FEHA coniained an express

exemption for “‘association[s] or corporation[s] not organized for

private profit” and that “by excluding ‘nonprofit’ groups from the

housing and employment laws, the Legislature demonstrated its intent

that the phrase ‘business establishments,’ as used in the Unruh Act,

should have a strictly commercial meaning.” (/d., at p. 83.)

A-6

Appellants assert that the trial court was limited to determining

whether substantial evidence supported the Commission’s find-

ings, and that it erred in using the independent judgment standard

of review.

Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes

judicial review of administrative decisions. When it is claimed

that the administrative findings are not supported by the evidence,

“the statute contemplates that the court will apply either the

independent judgment test or the substantial evidence test... .”

(Kerrigan v. Fair Employment Practice Com. (1979) 91

Cal.App.3d 43, 48 [154 Cal.Rptr. 29].) “[I]f the order or

decision of the agency substantially affects a fundamental vested

right, the court, in determining under section 1094.5 of the Code

of Civil Procedure whether there has been an abuse of discretion

because the findings are not supported by the evidence, must

exercise its independent judgment on the evidence and find an

abuse of discretion if the findings are not supported by the weight

of the evidence. If, on the other hand, the order or decision does

not substantially affect a fundamental vested right, the trial

court’s inquiry will be limited to a determination of whether or not

the findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the

whole record.” (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Re-

tirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 44-45 [112 Cal.Rptr. 805,

520 P.2d 29].) “Whether an administrative decision substantially

affects a fundamental, vested right so as to require independent

judgment review must be decided on a case-by-case basis.”

The court rejected this contention and cited the FEHA’s express

provision that “ ‘nothing contained in this part shall be construed, in any

manner or way, to limit or restrict the application of Section 51 of the

Civil Code [i.e., the Unruh Act].’” (/d., at p. 84.) Thus, the court did

not interpret the FEHA’s exemption provision. And significantly, the

exemption provision was only quoted in part; the word “religious,” which

precedes, and thus modifies, “association and corporation not organized

for private profit,” was omitted. It is thus clear that our high court did

not address the question here at issue—namely, whether the legislative

history of the FEHA indicates an intent to exempt a private social club,

which also happens to be a nonprofit corporation, from the Act’s

antidiscrimination provisions.

A-7

(Kerrigan v. Fair Employment Practice Com., supra, 91

Cal.App.3d at p. 49.)

The Club contends that “it is the constitutional right of every

person to close his... club to any person... .” (Bell v. Maryland

(1964) 378 U.S. 226, 313 [12 L.Ed.2d 822, 848, 84 S.Ct. 1814]),

and that accordingly, the forced hiring of women would violate

the Club members’ right of freedom of association, a fundamental

right triggering the independent judgment test.

In Adcock v. Board of Education (1973) 10 Cal.3d 60 [109

Cal.Rptr. 676, 513 P.2d 900], our high court stated that it is

“essential to adopt a special rule or standard to review administra-

tive decisions when constitutional rights are assertedly limited.

[ Citations. ]” (/d., at pp. 65-66; see also Kerrigan v. Fair Employ-

ment Practice Com., supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 52; Franklin v.

Leland Stanford Junior University (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 322,

330-331 [218 Cal.Rptr. 228].) Because the protected constitu-

tional right of free speech was manifestly implicated in Adcock,

the court concluded that the independent judgment test was the

proper standard of review. (10 Cal.3d at p. 69.)

For reasons we will discuss at length later in this opinion, we

find in the present record that such associational or privacy

interests of members as are implicated do not rise to the level of

fundamental vested interests for which an independent judicial

evaluation and judgment are traditionally required. We conclude,

on the contrary, that the conventional substantial evidence test

was the proper standard for the trial court’s review of the

administrative record.3-4

3 We will add, however, that our conclusions on the substantive issues

presented in this appeal do not depend upon which standard of review

should have been employed by the trial court. As will be apparent, given

the state of the evidence we are able to resolve such issues as a matter of

law and without regard to whether the trial court was obliged to limit its

review by the substantial evidence rule or free to exercise its indepen-

dent judgment.

4 As was said in Guesby v. Kennedy (D.Kan. 1984) 580 F.Supp. 1280,

“We believe that in the context of an employment relationship, the

A-8

Among the Club’s principal substantive contentions is that the

forced hiring of women violates members’ constitutional right of

association; therefore, it is argued the FEHA’s inclusion of private

clubs in its antidiscrimination provisions is unconstitutional. In so

arguing, the Club relies on the following language from Gilmore

v. City of Montgomery (1974) 417 U.S. 556 [41 L.Ed.2d 304, 94

S.Ct. 2416]: “ “The associational rights which our system honors

permit all white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be

formed. ... Government may not tell a man or woman who his or

her associates must be. The individual can be as selective as he

desires.’” (Jd., at p. 575 [41 L.Ed.2d at p. 320]; quoting Moose

Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis (1972) 407 U.S. 163, 179-180 [32 L.Ed.2d

627, 641, 92 S.Ct. 1965] (dis. opn. of Douglas, J.) The Club also

directs us to the following language of our Supreme Court:

“[p]rejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable... [al-

though] it is the constitutional right of every person to close his

home or club to any person...” (Bell v. Maryland, supra, 378

U.S. 226, 313 [12 L.Ed.2d 882, 848] (conc. opn. of Goldberg,

J.).)

Quite apart from the fact that Gilmore and related

cases—unlike the case at bench—involve the relationship of

member to member and not member to employee, these sweeping

statements have been significantly modified by subsequent deci-

sions of our high court. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees

(1984) 468 U.S. 609 [82 L.Ed.2d 462, 104 S.Ct. 3244], in

upholding the application of a Minnesota human rights statute

compelling the Jaycees to accept women as full voting members,

the court flatly rejected the Jaycees’ claim that the inclusion of

women would violate their right to freedom of association, observ-

ing that the Constitution protected only “intimate” and “expres-

sive” associational rights. The first aspect of associational freedom

protects “the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly

personal relationships....” (Jd. at p. 618 [82 L.Ed.2d at

p. 471].) An individual’s choice “to enter into and maintain

certain intimate human relationships must be secured against

undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relation-

scope of the right of association is much more limited than in the

context of membership in an organization.” (/d., at p. 1284.)

A-9

ships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our

constitutional scheme.” (/d., at pp. 617-618 [82 L.Ed.2d at p.

471].) The second aspect of associational freedom encompasses

an individual’s “right to associate for the purpose of engaging in

those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, as-

sembly, petition for the redress of grievences [sic], and the

exercise of religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of

association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving

other individual liberties.” (Jd., at p. 618 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 471].)

Because the Jaycees did not have selective membership stan-

dards, the only criteria being age and sex, the court found that no

“intimate” associational rights would be infringed by the inclusion

of women as full voting members. (/d., at p. 621 [82 L.Ed.2d at

p. 473].) The Roberts court also rejected the Jaycees’ claim that

their right of “expressive” association would be violated by the

inclusion of women. While recognizing that the Jaycees dominant

purpose had been to further the social and political views of young

men, the court refused to entertain what it termed “stereotypical”

assumptions that the presence of women members would thwart

or stultify these “expressive” activities necessary to implementing

that purpose. (Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S.

at p. 628 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 479].)

It bears repetition that we are of course confronted here with

the impact of women employees upon the Club, and nothing in

the discussion which now follows bears upon the wholly separate

issue of women as members. And, in assessing this impact, our

first inquiry is whether hiring females would unduly interfere with

the Club’s “intimate” associational rights under Roberts.’ Also, in

determining the intimacy of a relationship, and the corresponding

entitlement to protection from state intrusion, pertinent factors we

should consider include: “size, purpose, policies, selectivity, con-

* Our high court held that “even if enforcement of the Act cause[d]

some incidental abridgement of the Jaycees’ protected speech, that

effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the State’s legitimate

purposes.” (Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 628

[82 L.Ed.2d at p. 478].)

A-10

geniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case may

be pertinent.” (/d., at p. 620 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 473].)

As we have said, the Club’s membership consists of approxi-

mately 2,000 men whose common purpose is to enjoy the arts in

an atmosphere of male camaraderie. But while the Club’s mem-

bership policy is extremely selective, and the consequent relation-

ship among members is undoubtedly “intimate” in associational

terms, the same cannot be said for the associational rights of

members vis 4 vis employees. As the Club’s manager testified,

little is known concerning employees at hiring. Such testimony

was corroborated by a member of the local food servers union who

declared that, to his knowledge, the Club had never refused

anybody referred by the union. In short, the record amply demon-

strates that the Club’s hiring procedure is not selective.

We are obliged to carefully consider as well whether the Club’s

purposes of promoting male fellowship and appreciation of the

arts would be undermined by hiring female employees in selective

capacities. In this respect, it seems highly relevant that, according

to the Club’s manager, employees are prohibited from fraterniz-

ing with the members. It is difficult to understand how, for

example, the presence of women cooks or food servers would

inhibit realization of the Club’s purposes in view of this non-

fraternization rule. Indeed, the existence of that rule renders

implausible any assertion that the Club’ s “intimate” associational

rights would be infringed by hiring female employees. Nothing in

the present record demonstrates that the members have so

“highly personal a relationship” with employees as to warrant

protection from state intrusion.

The Club nevertheless contends that the mere presence of

women on a regular basis “would change the spirit of the

organization” and would “destroy the Bohemian feeling.” The

eminent author and editor, William F. Buckley, Jr.—himself a

Bohemian—testified that the presence of women employees at

the Grove “would make so critical a difference as far as I can see

A-11

that I would certainly forfeit my sense of allegiance to it.” Such

feelings,—however sensitive and genuine,—are not afforded con-

stitutional protection, however, for—we repeat—the right to free-

dom of association only protects “highly personal” relationships

(Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 618 [82

L.Ed.2d at p. 471]),’ and the Club members’ relationship with

employees cannot reasonably be termed “intimate” within the

letter or spirit of the high court’s careful exegesis of that term.

The Club makes a corollary contention that hiring women

employees would violate its privacy rights, citing White v. Davis

(1975) 13 Cal.3d 757 [120 Cal.Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222], for the

proposition that “‘[t]he right of privacy... [encompasses the]

freedom to associate with the people we choose.’” (Jd., at

p. 774); as we have already said, however, Roberts v. United

States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. 609, establishes the rule that the

constitutional right of association protects only “intimate” rela-

tionships, while here members’ relationships with employees are

neither “highly personal” nor “intimate.”

Even were we to assume arguendo that the members’ associa-

tional rights would somehow be constricted by the Club’s forced

hiring of women, we think such infringement would be justified by

the state’s compelling interest in eradicating employment dis-

crimination. Again we are guided by high authority. In Hishon v.

King & Spalding (1984) 467 U.S. 69 [81 L.Ed.2d 59, 104 S.Ct.

2229], plaintiff asserted that she had been unlawfully denied

partnership status in a law firm on the basis of sex. The Supreme

Court found that plaintiff had stated a cognizable claim under

Title VII and rejected the law firm’s claim of infringement of its

associational rights, stating: “ ‘[I]nvidious private discrimination

may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of associa-

° It may be observed that, as the record here shows, during World

War II the Club employed women without apparent damage to its

tradition.

’ We need not address the question of whether the Club’s “expres-

sive” right of association would be infringed because the thrust of the

Club’s argument is that the presence of women would destroy the

initimate all-male atmosphere.

A-12

tion protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been

accorded affirmative constitutional protections.’” (/d., at p. 78

[81 L.Ed.2d at pp. 68-69].) In a concurring opinion, Justice

Powell noted that laws barring discrimination may well infringe

first amendment rights: “The court’s opinion properly reminds us

that ‘invidious private discrimination . . . has never been accorded

affirmative constitutional protections.’ . . . This is not to say, how-

ever, that enforcement of laws that ban discrimination will always

be without cost to other values, including constitutional rights.

Such laws may impede the exercise of personal judgment in

choosing one’s associates or colleagues.” (/d., at p. 80, fn. 4 [81

L.Ed.2d at p. 70].) We read Hishon as authority for the proposi-

tion that the impact, if any, of forced hiring of female employees

on Club members’ associational rights could be justified by the

state’s compelling interest in eliminating employment

discrimination.

The Club also asserts that the Fair Employment and Housing

Act’s inclusion of private clubs within its antidiscrimination

provisions is inconsistent with, and thus superseded by, Title VII,

which in section 701, subdivision (b) specifically exempts private

clubs from its antidiscrimination strictures.’

In deciding whether a federal law preempts a state statute,

“[o]ur task is ‘to determine whether, under the circumstances of

this particular case, [the State’s] law stands as an obstacle to the

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives

of Congress.’ ” (Jones v. Rath Packing Co. (1977) 430 U.S. 519,

526 [51 L.Ed.2d 604, 614, 97 S.Ct. 1305].) The United States

Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “[c]ongress enacted

Title VII to assure equality of employment opportunities without

distinction with respect to race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin.” (Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp. (1982) 456

U.S. 461, 468 [72 L.Ed.2d 262, 272, 102 S.Ct. 1883], citing

* Section 701, subdivision (b) of Title VII provides that the term

“employer” does not include “a bona fide private membership club

(other than a labor organization) which is exempt from taxation under

section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954....” (42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e(b).)

A-13

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974) 415 U.S. 36, 44 [39

L.Ed.2d 147, 155, 94 S.Ct. 1011] and McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 800 [36 L.Ed.2d 668, 676-677, 93

S.Ct. 1817].) With these principles in mind, we examine the

question of whether the FEHA is preempted by Title VII.

As the Club observes, the private club exemption in Title VII

was, in the words of Senator Humphrey, designed to protect “the

genuine privacy of private clubs or other establishments whose

membership is genuinely seiective on some reasonable basis.”

(110 Cong.Rec. (June 13, 1964) 13697.)° Accordingly, the Club

argues, under section 1104 of Title XI, a preemption provision of

the Civil Rights Act, the FEHA’s inclusion of private clubs is

fatally inconsistent with Title VII and cannot stand. Section 1104

provides: “[N]othing contained in any title of this Act shall be

construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to

occupy the field in which any such title operates to the exclusion

of State laws on the same subject matter, not shall any provision

of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law

unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of

this Act, or any provision thereof.” (42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4.)

(Italics added. )

The Club also cites Kemerer v. Davis (E.D. Mich. 1981) 520

F.Supp. 256, for the proposition that application of antidis-

crimination legislation to private clubs is inconsistent with Title

VII. In Kemerer, the court held that the application of the Civil

Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981) to the employment

practices of a private club would conflict with section 701,

subdivision (b) of Title VII. The court stated: “If applied

literally, 1981 would reach within private establishments pro-

*See also EEOC v. St. Joseph Hospital East Inc. (W.D. Tenn. 1979)

19 F.E.P. 1439, 1440 (“The legislative history of Title VII rather clearly

indicates that Congress drafted § 701(b) to preserve social and fraternal

organizations of self-controlled membership as a refuge for private

associational values.”); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc.

(D.Del. 1977) 428 F.Supp. 573, 577 (“In Title II, Congress sought to

preserve a small non-commerical enclave for the unfettered exercise of

the freedom of association... .”)

A-14

tected by the 1964 Act; the two statutes, thus, are in conflict.”

(/d., at p. 258.) The court concluded that private clubs were

impliedly exempted from the provisions of 1981 by virtue of the

conflicting and therefore superseding exemption set forth in Title

VII. (/d., at p. 260.) (See also Hudson v. Charlotte Country

Club, Inc. (W.D.N.C. 1982) 535 F.Supp. 313, 317.)"°

Kemerer involved two federal statutes, however. In Kemerer v.

Chemical Construction Corp. (1981) 456 U.S. 461 [72 L.Ed.2d

262, 102 S.Ct. 1883], the court discussed the relationship be-

tween two federal statutes and observed that “whenever possible,

statutes should be read consistently.” (/d., at p. 468 [72 L.Ed.2d

at p. 271].) This was accomplished in Kemerer by finding the

earlier federal statute preempted by the later, thereby effectively

incorporating a subsequently enacted exemption into the 1866

Civil Rights Act. (See also Hunter v. Erickson (1969) 393 U.S.

385, 388 [21 L.Ed.2d 616, 620, 89 S.Ct. 557].) The question

presented here, however, is whether states have the power to

enact broader antidiscrimination legislation than that provided by

Title VII.

In arguing that the states retain such power, appellants rely on

section 708, the “savings” clause of title VII, which provides as

follows: “[n]othing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt

or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punish-

ment provided by any present or future law of any State of

political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which

purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be

an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.”

In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1983) 463 U.S. 85 [77

L.Ed.2d 490, 103 S.Ct. 2890], our nation’s high court said of

section 708: “... Title VII does not itself prevent States from

extending their nondiscrimination laws to areas not covered by

Title VII, see § 708, 78 Stat 262, 42 USC § 2000e-7 ... . Quite

simply, Title VII is neutral on the subject of all employment

practices it does not prohibit.” (Jd. at p. 103 [72 L.Ed.2d at

'° For a contrary view, see Guesby v. Kennedy, supra, 580 F.Supp.

1280, 1286, where the court held that Title VII’s private club exemption

does not apply to § 1981 actions.

ee Sen sa atl «

A-15

p. 505].) Thus, states may extend “their nondiscrimination laws

to areas not covered by Title VII ....” (Jbid.) In Government

Code section 12926, subdivision (c), California’s Act extends its

nondiscrimination policies to private clubs, an area not covered by

Title VII, a result section 708, as interpreted in Shaw, permits.

A number of cases have interpreted section 708 as preserving

state laws which further Title VII's objective of eliminating

employment discrimination. In Grann v. City of Madison (7th

Cir. 1984) 738 F.2d 786, for example, the court held that section

708 was designed to save state laws which are “consistent with the

goals of Title VII while invalidating those that hindered protec-

tion of civil rights.” (Id., at p. 792.) The court also noted that

section 1104, the preemption provision upon which the Club

relies, “should not be construed to undermine state efforts [in

eliminating employment discrimination.]” (Jd., at p. 791.)

We find further support for appellants’ position in Thomas Pub.

Co. v. Division of Human rights (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 456 F.Supp.

1104, rejecting the argument that Title VII preempted New

York’s Human Rights Law and holding that “even if the Human

Rights Law and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act were inconsis-

tent with respect to pregnancy disabililty benefits, this inconsis-

tency would not be of a nature requiring supersedure or

preemption of the state law by federal law.” (/d., at p. 1108.) The

court concluded that the Human Rights Law in no way interfered

with Title VII's purpose of eliminating employment discrimina-

tion and hence was not subject to preemption. (/bid.) And in

Local 246, Util. Wkrs. U. v. Southern California Edison Co.

(C.D.Ca. 1970) 320 F.Supp. 1262, 1264, it was held that the

purpose of section 1104, the preemption provision, and section

708, the “savings” clause, “is to insure preservation of state laws

which parallel the Federal Act in prohibiting employment dis-

crimination, such as California’s recently amended Fair Employ-

ment Practices Act.”

We similarly find that, even though the FEHA’s inclusion of

private clubs may be facially inconsistent with Title VII, the

inconsistency is not “of a nature requiring supersedure or preemp-

tion of the state law by federal law.” (Thomas Pub. Co. v.

Division of Human Rights, supra, 456 F.Supp. at p. 1108.) The

A-16

inclusion of private clubs in no way hinders Title VII’s overriding

objective of eliminating employment discrimination. Contrary to

the Club’s simplistic interpretation of section 1104, the term

“inconsistent” must be interpreted by focusing primarily upon

whether a law furthers Title VII’s goal of eliminating employment

discrimination. Laws which hinder the protection of civil rights

are inconsistent with Title VII’s purpose, and thus subject to

preemption. (Grann v. City of Madison, supra, 738 F.2d at p.

792.)

In our view, the fact that Congress has acted to limit the scope

of federal regulation does not necessarily indicate an intent to

preempt a state’s exercise of its police power. As our high court

has stated: “[T]he intent to supersede the exercise by the state of

its police power as to matters not covered by the Federal legisla-

tion is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has

seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited

field.” (Savage v. Jones (1912) 225 U.S. 501, 533 [56 L.Ed.

1182, 1195, 32 S.Ct. 715]; see also Florida Avocado Growers v.

Paul (1963) 373 U.S. 132, 146 [10 L.Ed.2d 248, 259, 83 S.Ct.

1210].) In the area of discrimination, the police power of states to

regulate private discrimination has often been sustained despite

lack of federal coverage of such discrimination, either by congres-

sional choice or constitutional limitation. In Moose Lodge No. 107

v. Irvis, supra, 407 U.S. 163, for example, the court held that the

equal protection clause could not be invoked to prohibit the

discriminatory actions by a private club which held a state liquor

license. In contrast, in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra,

468 U.S. 609, the state's right to regulate discrimination in a

private club’s membership selection was upheld.

Appellants contend, and we agree, that limited federal regula-

tion of discrimination does not necessarily indicate a congres-

sional intent to preempt state laws with broader

antidiscrimination provisions. We subscribe to the view that

congressional reluctance to extend coverage of this antidis-

crimination law to private clubs acting as employers is not a

purpose of the statute. And as one commentator in the field has

succinctly said, “... congressional concern... [over] congres-

sional refusal to extend a federal statute to include particular

A-17

entities is hardly a prohibition of the states doing so.” (Garcia,

Title VII Does Not Preempt State Regulation of Private Club

Employment Practices (1983) 34 Hastings L.J. 1107, 1130.)

We follow the authority of the United States Supreme Court:

“Quite simply, Title VII is neutral on the subject of all employ-

ment practices it does not prohibit.” Shaw v. Delta Airlines,

supra, 463 U.S. at p. 103 [77 L.Ed.2d at p. 505]. Because states

can extend antidiscrimination laws to areas not covered by Title

VII, we conclude that the FEHA is not preempted by Title VII."

(Ibid.)

Another of the Club’s key contentions is that male gender is a

bona fide occupational qualification for Club employees which

justifies its exclusion of female employees.

The Fair Employment and Housing Act provides that a dis-

criminatory employment practice is not unlawful if it is based

upon a “bona fide occupational qualification” (hereafter BFOQ).

(Gov. Code, § 12940.) At the same time, however, the availabil-

ity of a BFOQ defense is “an extremely narrow exception to the

general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.”

(Dothard v. Rawlinson (1977) 433 U.S. 321, 334 [53 L.Ed.2d

786, 800, 97 S.Ct. 2720]; see also County of Alameda v. Fair

Employment & Housing Com. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 499, 506

[200 Cal.Rptr. 381]; Long v. State Personnel Bd. (1974) 41

Cal.App.3d 1000, 1016 [116 Cal.Rptr. 562].) Hence, “the princi-

ple of nondiscrimination requires . . . that in order to rely on the

bona fide occupational qualification exception an employer has

the burden of proving that he had reasonable cause to believe,

that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all

women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the

duties of the job involved.” (Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone &

Telegraph Company (Sth Cir. 1969) 408 F.2d 228, 235; see also

'! The Club further contends that the state may not exercise its police

power to regulate private discrimination when such regulations are

inconsistent with the purpose of federal law. This contention, however, is

subsumed within the general question of whether Title VII preempts the

Fair Employment and Housing Act and accordingly, need not be

separately addressed.

A-18

Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. (Sth Cir. 1976) 531 F.2d 224,

228 fn. 10.) Even if an employer can demonstrate that certain

jobs require members of one sex, the employer must also “bear

the burden of proving that because of the nature of the operation

of the business they could not rearrange job responsibilities . . .”

in order to reduce the BFOQ necessity. (Hardin v. Stynchcomb

(11th Cir. 1982) 691 F.2d 1364, 1370-1371; see also Gunther v.

Iowa State Men's Reform. (8th Cir. 1980) 612 F.2d 1079, 1086,

cert. den. (1980) 446 U.S. 966 [64 L.Ed2d 825, 100 S.Ct.

2942].)

The Fair Employment and Housing Commission has inter-

preted the BFOQ defense in a manner incorporating all of the

federal requirements necessary for its establishment. Under the

Commission’s regulations: “Where an employer or other covered

entity has a practice which on its face excludes an entire group of

individuals on a basis enumerated in the Act (e.g., all women or

all individuals with lower back defects), the employer or other

covered entity must prove that the practice is justified because all

or substantially all of the excluded individuals are unable to safely

and efficiently perform the job in question and because the

essence of the business operation would otherwise be under-

mined.” (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 2, § 7286.7, subd. (a).)

“(a) Among situations which will not justify the application of

the BFOQ defense are the following:

“(3) Customer preference for employees of one sex;

“(4) The necessity for providing separate facilities for one sex;

or

“(5) The fact that members of one sex have traditionally been

hired to perform the particular type of job.

“(b) Personal privacy considerations may justify a BFOQ only

where:

“(1) The job requires an employee to observe other individuals

in a state of nudity or to conduct body searches, and

A-19

“(2) It would be offensive to prevailing social standards to

have an individual of the opposite sex present, and

“(3) It is detrimental to the mental or physical welfare of

individuals being observed or searched to have an individual of

the opposite sex present.

“(c) Employers or other covered entities shall assign job

duties and make other reasonable accommodation so as to mini-

mize the number of jobs for which sex is a BFOQ.” (Cal. Admin.

Code, tit. 2, § 7290.8).

The standards of the Commission are thus seen to be in

harmony with federal law regarding the availability of a BFOQ

defense. And, as the Commission correctly observes, its interpre-

tation of the act it enforces is entitled to great respect. Gay Law

Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458,

491 [15u Cal.Rptr. 14, 595 P.2d 592]; Dermegerdich vy. Rank

(1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 848, 851 [199 Cal.Rptr. 30].

The Club argues that the presence of women employees would

undermine the essence of its business operation, and that accord-

ingly, male gender is a valid BFOQ under the FEHA. The Club

cites the following testimony in support of its contention that the

presence of women would destroy the essence or character of its

operations. In the words of former Governor Edmund G. Brown:

“*( W Jhat really is important is the spirit of camaraderie, the male

camaraderie where men get together and they are free of the

element of the battle of the sexes or the competition or distraction

of having the other sex present. It is a single-sex gathering, and

that is a very special thing.” Yet another member commented: “It

is a social experience, the kind that this particular club seeks to

provide you, that requires a total affinity of gender. People do

behave differently where there are women... It’s an argument

tha’ when there are women waitresses, the situation alters. And it

would certainly alter in the dining circle or in the auditorium or

anywhere else in that camp.”’? Other testimony, however, indi-

cated that the Club had never received complaints about one of

'2 We intend no denigration of the sincerity or accuracy of such

sentiments. They are, however, to be measured against the counter-

A-20

the Club’s longstanding female employees, Ms. Lily Lum, who

works as a food server during lunch at the City Club. Two cases

cited by appellants, Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (5th

Cir. 1971) 442 F.2d 385, cert. den. (1971) 404 U.S. 950 [30

L.Ed.2d 267, 92 S.Ct. 275], and Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co.(9th

Cir. 1981) 653 F.2d 1273, refute the Club’s legal contention that

customer preference can form the basis of a BFOQ defense.

In Diaz, an employer attempted to justify its exclusion of male

flight attendants by claiming that female flight attendants pro-

vided a more pleasant environment. Despite evidence produced

by the airlines that passengers overwhelmingly preferred female

flight attendants, the court rejected the BFOQ defense, explain-

ing: “We do not feel this alone justifies discriminating against all

males. . .. Before sex discrimination can be practiced, it must not

only be shown that it is impracticable to find the men that possess

the abilities that most women possess, but that the abilities are

necessary to the business, not merely tangential.” (442 F.2d 385,

388-389.) Thus, because the essence of the airline’s business was

the safe transport of passengers, and the pleasant atmosphere

created by female flight attendants was merely tangential thereto,

the court concluded that female gender was not a BFOQ (Jd., at

p. 389.)

In Fernandez, the court again rejected a BFOQ defense, in the

face of evidence which showed that South American customers

might refuse to deal with women. The court found “no factual

basis for linking sex with job performance.” (653 F.2d 1273,

1276; italics added.) Customer preference was considered irrele-

vant because a woman could perform the job as readily as a man.

Both Fernandez and Diaz stand for the proposition that BFOQ

defenses cannot be established on the basis of stereotypical

gender-based assumptions. ~

In the case at bench, the evidence overwhelmingly establishes

that club members prefer male employees. The preference is

presumably based upon assumptions concerning the inhibiting

effect women employees might have upon men. These are,

vailing constitutional rights of persons to be free from invidious discrimi-

nation in hiring.

A-21

however, mere stereotypical assumptions, lacking in any factual

basis. Moreover, because of the nonfraternization policy and lack

of selectivity in hiring employees, such male tellowship as might

exist between club members and employees is clearly in a legal

sense tangential. (Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., supra,

442 F.2d at pp. 388-389.)

The trial court erred in disregarding the principles laid down in

Fernandez and Diaz as inapposite for the reason that, in its view,

those cases dealt with commercial enterprises. That the Club is a

private club does not exempt it from high legal authority which

unequivocally declares that employment decisions cannot be

predicated upon “stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.”

(Dothard v. Rawlinson, supra, 433 U.S. at p. 333 [53 L.Ed.2d at

p. 800]; see also City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v.

Manhart (1978) 435 U.S. 702, 707 [55 L.Ed.2d 657, 664-665, 98

S.Ct. 1370], on remand 577 F.2d 98; Rosenfeld v. Southern

Pacific Company (9th Cir. 1971) 444 F.2d 1219, 1224-1225;

Thorne v. City of El Segundo (9th Cir. 1983) 726 F.2d 459, 468,

cert. den. 469 U.S. 979 [83 L.Ed.2d 315, 105 S.Ct. 380].) As an

employer subject to the provisions of the FEHA, the Club must

abide by the same rules which govern all California employers.

As we have already said, while the relationship among club

members is certainly not commercial, that between employees

and members can be described as almost exclusively commercial

in nature. Employees are hired “sight-unseen” through union

referrals. As earlier noted, the Club’s own manager testified that

very little is known about employees when they are hired. Most

positions do not require written applications. The parties, in fact,

stipulated that applications, when required, ask for only minimal

personal information, and the only selection criteria in the hiring

process are gender and the appearance of ability to de the job. At

Monte Rio, employees are hired as seasonal laborers. The rela-

tionship between members and employees can fairly be described

as transitory and business-like, rather than intimate.

The Club also contends that its members’ privacy interests

establish a BFOQ, noting that many shower and bathroom

facilities are unenclosed and that members walk about the camp

in various states of undress. Claims of-a BFOQ based on privacy

A-22

interests have been upheld if the job actually requires the em-

ployee to carry out such intimate duties. (Fese/ v. Masonic Home

of Del. Inc. (D.Del. 1978) 447 F.Supp. 1346, affd. (3d Cir.

1979) 591 F.2d 1334.)

Club members’ privacy interests, however, need not be

threatened because enclosed shower and bathroom facilities are

available. If a member chooses not to use the enclosed facilities,

no legally enforceable right of privacy is impaired. Thus, in Forts

v. Ward (2d Cir. 1980) 621 F.2d 1210, 1217, the court ordered

shower screens and sleeping garments for prison inmates, refusing

to hold that the inmates’ privacy interests encompassed a prefer-

ence for sleeping nude, when such preference would eliminate

equal employment opportunities for male guards. Similarly, Club

members’ privacy interests do not encompass a legally protectible

right to use unenclosed bathroom or shower facilities.

In sum, Diaz and Fernandez establish that customer preference

cannot from the basis of a BFOQ defense. Finding the reasoning

of these authorities persuasive, and for all of the reasons we have

stated, we also conclude that male gender is not a BFOQ for Club

employees.

Two remaining issues require only brief discussion.

First is the Club’s contention that, in finding appellants’ con-

duct arbitrary and capricious, the trial court bound itself to award

the Club attorney fees under Government Code section 800, and

erred in refusing such fees. We disagree, first, because the word

“may” in section 800 indicates that the award is discretionary

(Fair v. Hernandez (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 868, 876 [172

Cal.Rptr. 379]) and second, because the court also—and we

think correctly—concluded that “the case involve[d] . . . novel

and complicated issues...” and that it was a “bona fide legal

dispute of great importance... .”

Finally, we are asked by appellants to permit correction of

errors contained in the petition on intervention. For the following

reasons we agree.

The instant case was initiated by the Director of the Depart-

ment of Fair Employment and Housing, who filed a complaint

~~ 6 be A ae eh

A-23

authorized by Government Code section 12960. The Director

then issued an accusation based on the complaint, which chal-

lenged the club’s practices of excluding female employees. The

complaint and accusation therein did not name any women as

parties or seek backpay on their behalf.

The Commission, while the case was pending before it, re-

ceived a class action notice, in a separate complaint filed against

the Club by one Carol Esses, a woman who had been denied

employment by the Club. Carol Esses’ complaint was mistakenly

included in the record of the instant case. When ruling on this

case, the Commission also ruled on the Esses complaint and

denied an award of backpay.

The portions of the Commission’s decision which denied

backpay to members of Carol Esses’ class action complaint were

challenged in the petition in intervention. The Commission agrees

that it had no authority to decide issues not raised in a pending

case and which concern persons who are not parties.

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Commission is

only empowered to hold a hearing and issue a decision when an

accusation, based upon a complaint, is pending before the agency.

(Gov. Code, §§ 11503 and 12967.) Since no accusation was ever

filed on the Esses complaint, the commission lacked authority to

decide the issues it raises. The case is accordingly remanded to

the Commission for rectification. (Department of Alcoholic Bev.

Control v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd. (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d

720, 727 [173 Cal.Rptr. 582]; Flaherty v. Board of Retirement

(1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 397, 406 [18 Cal.Rptr. 256].)

That part of the judgment denying the Club attorney’s fees is

affirmed. In all other respects the judgment is reversed with

directions to the trial court to reinstate the Commission’s findings.

The parties shall bear their own costs."

Racanelli, P. J., and Holmdahl, J., concurred.

'3 This judgment in no way precludes the Club from attempting to

demonstrate that male gender is a BFOQ for particular employment

positions.

A-24

APPENDIX B

Order Denying Review

After Judgment by the Court of Appeal

lst District, Division 1, No. AO24988 |

In the Supreme Court of the State of California

In Bank

Bohemian Club,

Appellant,

Vv.

Fair Employment and Housing Commission et al.,

Appellants.

[Filed Feb. 26, 1987]

Petition for review of appellant Bohemian Club DENIED.

LUCAS

Chief Justice

A-25

Appendix C

In the Superior Court of the

State of California,

in and for the County of Sonoma

No. 119026

Bohemian Club,

Petitioner,

vs.

Fair Employment and Housing Commission,

State of California,

Respondent.

Department of Fair Employment

and Housing and Joanne A. Lewis,

Director and Complainant,

Real Parties in Interest

and Intervenors.

STATEMENT OF DECISION

[Filed Sept. 12, 1983]

This matter came on for trial before the Court on December 1

and 3, 1982 on the petition of the Bohemian Club (“petitioner” or

“Club”), pursuant to section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Proce-

dure, for a writ of mandamus commanding the Fair Employment

and Housing Commission (“respondent” or “Commission”) to

set aside its decision and order dated October 14, 1981 in

Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Bohemian Club

(No. FEP 78-79, A5-1632S and N-15159) and to dismiss the

underlying accusation dated May 15, 1980 (as amended on July

30, 1980 and September 30, i989) (“accusation”) of real parties

in interest and intervenors Department of Fair Employment and

Housing (“Department”) and its Director, Joanne A. Lewis

(“Lewis”).

The Club moved for a stay of the Commission’s order, and

after briefing and the submission of declarations by the parties,

this Court, pursuant to stipulation of the Commission and the

Club, ordered that the Commission order be stayed pending the

A-26

entry of judgment. Thereafter, the Commission demurred to, and

moved to strike the Club’s Petition, which demurrer was over-

ruled and motion to strike denied by this Court’s ruling dated July

27, 1982. The Commission filed its Return to the Club’s Petition

on August 3, 1982.

Pursuant to stipulation by the Club and the Commission at

hearing before this Court on February 11, 1982, intervenors

Department and Lewis filed on March 2, 1982, their Petition in

Intervention dated February 2, 1982. The Commission filed on

March 4, 1982, its Return to the Petition in Intervention, and the

Club filed its Answer to the Petition on March 19, 1982.

Pursuant to an agreed schedule, the parties have submitted

written briefs, further declarations and supporting papers in sup-

port of their pleadings on the merits. The Court has reviewed the

pleadings, has read, considered and reviewed the Administrative

Record as well as all of the briefs, declarations and supporting

papers, and has heard the arguments presented by counsel for

each of the parties on December 1 and December 3, 1982. The

Court affirms the evidence rulings of Administrative Law Judge

Robert S. Kendall, and except as to the evidence excluded by

Judge Kendall, all of the evidence in the Administrative Record

and each of the declarations previously submitted by the parties in

this proceeding is admitted into evidence.

The Court has exercised its independent judgment on the

evidence. The Club has raised at every stage in the proceeding

before the Department and the Commission as well as before this

Court the Club members’ rights of freedom of association and

privacy as protected by the United States and California Consti-

tutions. The Commission’s order substantially affects the Club

members’ rights of freedom of association and rights of privacy,

and those rights are fundamental vested rights for purposes of

review under Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5. Similarly, the

Club’s rights with respect to its continued existence and its vital

and substantial stake with respect to possible monetary awards or

judgments against it also raise fundamental vested rights for

purposes of such review.

~ ee ee oe

A-27

The Court has carefully considered, reviewed and assessed all

of the evidence, including Administrative Law Judge Kendall’s

January 19, 1981 Proposed Decision and the findings and assess-

ment of evidence made by Judge Kendall. After making its own

independent judgment on all of that evidence, and for the reasons

set forth below, the decision of this Court is that a peremptory

writ of mandamus shall issue commanding the Commission to set

aside and vacate its decision and order, and to dismiss the

accusation against petitioner Bohemian Club. It is further the

decision of this Court that the Petition in Intervention of the

Department and Lewis be denied.

First, petitioner is, and always has been, a bona fide private

membership Club which is tax-exempt under section 501(c) of

the Internal Revenue Code and the laws of California. The Club

possesses all the attributes of a bona fide private membership club

and, throughout its history, the Club has exercised in good faith

those attributes as a distinctly private social association dedicated

to and supportive of male fellowship and appreciation of litera-

ture, music, drama, and the arts generally. Membership in the

Club is open only to men connected professionally with or

devoted to the arts, and the Club’s membership standards are

stricily and honestly enforced. All members are professionally

connected with, or devoted to, the arts, and participate in the

Club on that basis. The Club has no membership restrictions

concerning race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry,

physical handicap, marital status, citizenship, or sexual orienta-

tion. Membership cannot be purchased or sold, and the Club

receives no public funds. It is a self-governing orgainzation which

vests responsibility for its affairs, including admission to member-

ship, in its Board of Directors. The facilities at which the Club’s

membership activities take place, the San Francisco City Club

and the Bohemian Grove camping area near Monte Rio, Califor-

nia, are owned by the Club and are operated for the exclusive and

private use and enjoyment of members and their guests. The Club

and its members maintain that private social environment at the

City Club and the Grove. The Club is noncommercial, and has

resisted attempts to make it commercial or a business club. The

Club’s facilities are never rented out to the public or otherwise

made-available for public use. The common associational objec-

A-28

tives of the Club’s members—the enjoyment of male fellowship

and the appreciation and support of, and participation in, the

arts—are bona fide and the members’ activities are rigorously

directed to those objectives.

As such a tax-emempt, bona fide private membership club,

petitioner is exempt from coverage under Title VII of the Federal

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et

seq.). The Federal Civil Rights Act supersedes the provisions of

any state laws which are inconsistent with any of the purposes or

any of the provisions of the Federal Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4).

The clear congressional purpose in exempting bona fide private

membership clubs from Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act

was to protect the associational and privacy rights of the members

of bona fide private clubs. The provisions of the Act are mani-

festly intended to assure those rights to genuinely private non-

commercial, bona fide social associations. The Court holds that

respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction because respon-

dent’s construction of the Fair Employment and Housing Act

(“FEHA”) as applied to petitioner, a bona fide private member-

ship club whose members have always genuinely exercised their

rights of privacy and association directed toward their announced

common objectives, is inconsistent with, and superseded by Fed-

eral law. The Commission has not, therefore, proceeded in the

manner required by law and its order is not supported by its

findings.

Second, and in any event, even assuming that respondent

Commission has jurisdiction over petitioner, which the Commis-

sion has found to be an “employer” within the meaning of the

Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov.Code, § 12926(c)), the

Court determines that respondent abused its discretion in con-

cluding that the Club failed to establish that gender is a bona fide

occupational qualification under Government Code § 12940 for

those employment positions involved with, or which touch and

concern, petitioner’s all-male associational activities at the City

Club and Bohemian Grove. Respondent’s conclusions constitute

an abuse of discretion in that Commission Findings No. 24 (last

sentence), 25 (last sentence), 36 (last sentence), 37, 40 (last two

sentences), 41, 42, 43, 44 (the first sentence and the second

oe et te kt ome.

i ee

A-29

clause of the second sentence), 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51,

which findings of fact were made by the Commission to support

the conclusions of law reached by the Commission in its decision

and order, are neither supported by the weight of evidence nor by

any substantial evidence. The Court further determines that, to

the extent certain of respondent’s other findings are supported by

the evidence and are consistent with the facts found herein,

respondent has abused its discretion in that its own findings do not

support its decision or order.

Third, and in any event, based upon its independent judgment,

and the facts set forth herein, this Court finds that in the positions

where the Club has employed only men, those employees are

present during and integrally involved with the all-male associa-

tional activities. The employment of men in those positions at the

City Club and the Bohemian Grove is essential to preserve the

members’ rights of privacy, the integrity of the Club’s objectives,

its bona fide associational activities dedicated to and supportive of

the arts, and the all-male atmosphere which is indispensable to,

and the essence of those activities. The Commission’s contrary

conclusions are neither supported by the weight of the evidence or

any substantial evidence, nor by such of the Commissions’ own

findings as have support in the evidence.

The Court further determines that the Commission’s conclu-

sion that a una fide occupational qualification has not been

established erroneously relies upon regulations and judicial deci-

sions concerning commercial or business employers. The Com-

mission’s conclusion is not supported by the weight of the

evidence, or any substantial evidence, that the Club is or should

be treated as a commercial or business institution or association,

or that the Club members engage in commercial, trade or

business activities at the Club or its functions. The Commission’s

conclusions are not supported by its own findings. The Court finds

that the bona fide occupational qualification provision

(Gov.Code, § 12940) applies to the policy and practices of the

Club as a private noncommercial, bona fide social association in

employing men in those positions involved with the all-male

associational activities at the Club. The Commission has not

A-30

proceeded in the manner required by law in its contrary conclu-

sion in its order and decision.

For the foregoing reasons, and based upon the facts set forth

herein, the Court holds that male gender is a bona fide occupa-

tional qualification for all positions at petitioner's Bohemian

Grove and all those positions at respondent’s City Club which are

involved with and touch and concern the members’ traditional all-

male associational activities. On the basis of its independent

judgment, the Court concludes that this narrow limited bona fide

occupational qualification applies to petitioner’s employment pol-

icy and practices and they are not in violation of the FEHA.

Fourth, and in any event, the Court further determines that, to

the extent they are not inconsistent with the facts stated herein,

all of the findings of Administrative Law Judge Kendall are

supported by the weight of the evidence.

In accordance with long-established principles of decision mak-

ing, the Court declines to decide if the Constitutions of the

United States and California preclude any governmental intrusion

under the Fair Employment and Housing Act into respondent’s

employment decisions as a violation of the Club members’ rights

of freedom of association and privacy. Intervenors Department

and Lewis have also petitioned the Court to issue a peremptory

writ ordering the Commission to set aside its Findings of Fact 6, 8

and 9, and its decision and order insofar as the Commission

recognized the chilling effect of its decision upon the Club’s

constitutional freedoms of association and privacy, and deter-

mined that backpay shall not be awarded to a complainant and

other women similarly situated. The Court denies the intervenors’

petition because of its rulings on the petition of the Club and

because it has declined to decide if any intrusion by the State

under the Fair Employment and Housing Act violates the Club’s

and its members’ constitutional freedoms of association and

privacy.

In addition to the facts already stated, the Court finds as

follows:

1. Intervenor Department is an administrative agency of the

State of California empowered to issue accusations under the

A-31

FEHA, but not deriving its adjudicatory power from the Califor-

nia Constitution.

2. On May 18, 1979, Intervenor Joanne A. Lewis, in her

official capacity as Director of the Department, filed a complaint

with the Department alleging that the Club had violated the

FEHA within the preceding year by discriminating against wo-

men in filling positions of office clerk-typist at the Grove.

3. On February 25, 1980, the Director amended her com-

plaint to allege that the Club had pursued a practice and pattern

of discrimination against females in hiring, transfers, promotional

opportunities and recruitment at the San Francisco City Club and

the Bohemian Grove.

4. On May 15, 1980, the Department issued an Accusation

against the Club and on June 2, 1980, the Club served a Notice of

Defense and Objections to the Accusation.

5. The Department filed an Amended Accusation and a

Second Amended Accusation on July 30, 1980, and September

30, 1980, respectively.

6. Petitioner placed a job order for an office clerk-typist with

the California Employment Development Department on August

4, 1978. The Club specified that only male applicants were

acceptable for the position and requested that only men be

referred to it. Qualified women were available for referral at that

time. But for the prerequisite established by the Club these

persons would have been available to apply for the position.

7. The Club is a bona fide private social association of men

founded in San Francisco in 1872. The Club has always been

organized as a nonprofit corporation and presently is a nonprofit

mutual benefit corporation organized and acting under Part 3,

Division 2, Title 1, California Corporations Code.

8. The Club is a tax-exempt organization under the laws of

the State of California and the United States. The Club’s Consti-

tution and By-Laws provide that membership in the Club is open

only to men connected professionally with or devoted to the arts.

A-32

9. All of the Club’s membership standards and rules are

strictly enforced. All members must be connected professionally

with or devoted to the arts, and participate in the Club’s associa-

tional activities on that basis. The Club receives no public funds.

The Club has never been convicted of any crime or wrongdoing.

The Club has approximately 2,000 members.

10. Petitioner is a private, noncommercial social association.

It rigorously maintains its noncommercial status. It is not a

“business” commercial luncheon club. Memberships cannot be

purchased or sold, and are not based upon business or commercial

success, wealth or status.

11. Petitioner prevents commercial exploitation of Club activ-

ities and guards the privacy of its members. All of the Club

proceedings or happenings are maintained privately. Neither

members nor guests exploit the Club activities for commercial

purposes.

12. Petitioner is a self-governing private organization which

vests responsibility for its affairs in its Board of Directors elected

by the membership. All of the Club’s policies and the implement-

ing Committee actions are devoted to its associational objectives

of appreciation of literature, music, drama, and the arts generally.

13. The Board of Directors establishes petitioner’s employee

personnel policies, which are implemented by the Club’s general

manager and staff. Those policies are in accord with and directed

to the accomplishment of the Club’s associational objectives.

14. The Club members’ associational activities take place at

two locations: the City Club at 624 Taylor Street, San Francisco,

California, and the Grove, a large rustic camping area near Monte

Rio, California. Both the City Club and the Grove are owned and

privately maintained by petitioner.

15. The City Club is a five-story building which contains

sleeping accommodations for Club members’ use; several dining

rooms (Main Dining Room, Anza Room, Balboa Room, Cabrillo

Room, Bohemian Room, Board Room, Grove Room, Red Room

and Owl Room); several other meeting, association and activity

rooms (Music Room, Green Room, Domino Room, Main Card

ine Hae eh lame

A-33

Room and Main Lounge); a theatre (Jinks Theatre); a bar and

stage (Cartoon Rvom); a library; an archives; a barbershop; and

an art gallery.

16. The Grove comprises more than 2,500 acres and includes

a small well-defined living and camping area containing about 125

group living areas (“camps”), various buildings, shelters and

other associational activity areas, including a large open-air dining

area, various other eating areas, several bars, stages and theatres.

Each camp is a voluntary fraternal smaller group of members

living and associating together.

17. The purposes of the Club are the enjoyment of male

fellowship and the appreciation of, and participation in the arts.

Participation is an obligation of membership. There is extensive

participation in Club associational activities by all members.

18. Petitioner’s associational activities are based upon and

follow traditions over 100 years old. In general, the Club’s main

associational activities at the Grove are two all-male retreats (the

three-day Spring Jinks weekend in June and the seventeen-day

Midsummer Encampment in July), during which members and

guests live at the Grove and participate in artistic, musical and

theatrical activities. During the Spring Jinks ar.d the Midsummer

Encampment, Club associational activities proceed on virtually a

24-hour-a-day basis throughout the Grove. There are many

scheduled as well as informal activities: concerts, theatrical and

musical productions, oratorical presentations, Lakeside talks,

readings, art appreciation discussions, singing, and many other

similar activities. In addition to the major theatrical and musical

productions (which may take over two years in the process of

production), there is a regular artistic production every evening,

and the annual retreats are characterized by an extensive variety

of informal musical entertainment, singing and dancing per-

formed extemporaneously by members and their guests through-

out the day and night at individual camps, at various

entertainment areas, and along the walks, paths and all of the

nearby areas. Many of these informal activities take place during

mealtimes and are associated with camaraderie, refreshments and

conversation at the large common dining area, in the Grill

(a restaurant, bar and stage) and at the individual camps. Club

A-34

members and guests go from one camp to another to participate

in the ongoing associational activities.

19. Petitioner’s primary all-male associational activities at the

City Club take place in connection with artistic, musical, literary

and theatrical presentations. There are at least thirty-six weekly

Thursday evening theatrical and musical productions, weekly

musical entertainment on Tuesday evenings, concerts and talks,

readings by authors, poets and dramatists, classes in photography,

art and other subjects and many other formal and informal

artistic, theatrical and musical events.

20. To accommodate the Club activities at the Grove and at

the City Club, members rehearse, perform and associate together

in all areas in the Grove and at the City Club in the Cartoon

Room, the Jinks Theatre, the Main Dining room, various re-

hearsal rooms, the Art Gallery, and in other available rooms.

21. The activities restricted to members and their male guests

are the Spring Jinks and the Midsummer Encampment at the

Grove and all of the Club’s regular all-male associational activi-

ties taking place in the Main Dining Room, the Cartour Room.

the other activity rooms and the rehearsal rooms of the City Club.

22. Petitioner’s facilities at the Grove and the City Club are

private and for the exclusive use of members and their guests. The

Club takes all measures necessary to ensure privacy for members

and their guests. Nonmembers and uninvited persons are not

permitted and, if they enter, are not allowed to remain. Access

roads at the Grove leading into the living and camping area are

fenced, the entry roads have locked gates, signs are posted along

the perimeter to indentify the area as private property and

security guards patrol the Grove to prevent uninvited persons

from entering. Privacy and seclusion are emphasized to assure the

special environment of retreat and sanctuary.

23. During the Midsummer Encampment and Spring Jinks,

the Grove becomes the home of up to 2,500 Bohemians and their

male guests. These events are retreats by members and guests

away from the outside world in a natural, rustic setting to create

an ambience and intimacy where men join together to celebrate

the arts.

ee ee

A-35

24. Grove participants live together in approximately 125

camps, consisting of cabins, tents, tepees and open sleeping

porches; some are assembled for the retreats and taken down

afterwards. The camps are rustic and, in many camps, toilet and

shower facilities (some of which are completely open and un-

shielded, or only partially shielded from view) are separate from

the sleeping quarters. Some of the toilet facilities have stalls with

doors and some do not. Men urinate without the benefit of even

the existing rudimentary toilet facilities. Members and guests at

times walk about the Grove in various states of dress and undress:

from the sleeping quarters in one camp to the toilet and shower

facilities which may be removed some distance away; from the

camps to the swimming area; and from camp to camp.

25. Members and guests who attend the Grove eat in an

open-air, unenclosed dining area from which they view and

participate in dramatic, musical and other such events that take

place before, during and after the dining hours at the dining site

itself. Food service preparation and food service employees, all

male, work in and around the dining area and adjacent areas

before, during and after the hours when food is served. There are

informal and extemporaneous social activities throughout the rest

of the Grove, in the camps and other areas where male employees

work, serve drinks and refreshments, and assist in connection with

the associational activities.

26. At the City Club, petitioner employs approximately 90

individuals, both male and female, in managerial, clerical, craft,

food preparation and service, cleaning and personal service posi-

tions. This staff is supplemented, as necessary, by temporary

employees hired to work at Club functions.

27. At the Grove, petitioner maintains a small year-round

staff of around ten craft workers, office workers and laborers, all

male, who have substantial expertise and are knowledgeable and

experienced in various special fields such as plumbing, carpentry,

electrical work and fire protection. They are hired because of their

individual proficiencies and ability to work and to be available

during the retreats. These employees, as a condition of employ-

ment, must be available full-time to supervise and work with the

special, temporary work force during the retreats. The members

A-36

of this permanent staff supervise this temporary work force of

approximately 250 men who are employed solely during the

Spring Jinks and Midsummer Encampment. These employees eat

within the Grove and most of them live within the Grove when

they work there.

28. Grove employees are regularly required to enter individual

camps and adjacent areas as well as travel all the roads and paths

to and around the Grove’s common areas during day and night in

the performance of their duties, such as delivering baggage, mail,

messages and supplies from a central, in-camp commissary to the

individual camps and to the central Grove buildings; gathering

and delivering supplies for camps throughout the Grove; perform-

ing maintenance work involving repairs of plumbing, wiring and

Carpentry; moving furniture and pianos; and serving food and

drinks at the dining areas and in the camps.

29. During the Midsummer Encampment and Spring Jinks,

Club activities proceed continuously throughout the Grove. At

the City Club associational activities take place in the Main

Dining Room, the other activity rooms, the Cartoon Room and

the rehearsal rooms. These associational activities are generally

scheduled to coincide with or follow immediately before or after

meals and refreshments. Employees are present during all of the

activities at the Grove and most of the activities at the City Club,

working closely with members in connection with the activities: at

the Grove, performing various duties in the Grove common areas

and at the camps, coming and going between their own living

quarters at the campground and the entrance to the Grove, to _

other Grove areas and to individual camps; at the City Club,

performing various duties and coming and going from different

rooms; participating in the badinage and camaraderie during the

associational activities in the dining areas and the other common

areas at the Grove and City Club, and in the Grove camps; and

attending Club theatrical and artistic events, productions and

other associational activities when their work schedules permit. In

the course of performing their duties at the Grove and in various

rooms of the City Club when all-male associational activities take

place, employees are necessarily involved with, integral to and

present during those activities.

a Lene

A-37

30. For many years it has been, and is, the Club’s policy to

employ only males at the Grove and in all those positions at the

City Club which require the employee to work during and in

connection with the regular, all-male, associational activities in

the Main Dining Room, the other dining rooms, the activity

rooms, the Cartoon Room, the rehearsal rooms and theatre. That

policy is not contrived to evade any law; it is bona fide and has

been established and maintained to implement and protect the

Club members’ privacy and associational interests.

31. Petitioner employs women in positions which do not

require either presence at the Grove or involvement with or

participation in or presence during regular associational activities

at the City Club. In accordance with this policy, petitioner

regularly employs women at the City Club in its print shop, in

accounting and administrative positions in its business office, for

cleaning and care of the rooms for sleeping accommodations, as

assistant chef and as food servers in the private rooms for

members’ private parties but not in any of the common rooms

when associational activities are taking place. One woman, Lily

Lum, works for two hours serving breadstuffs during lunch in the

City Club Main Dining Room. She was hired to work during

World War II because of the nonavailability of male help. She

remained an employee to perform this two-hour duty because of

her loyalty and the high regard in which she is held by the

members. Miss Lum is not present during, nor is she integrally

involved in any of the Club’s all-male associational activities.

32. Women, whether guests of members or employees, are

not and have never been allowed to be present during the Club’s

all-male associational activities at the Grove or City Club.

33. The introduction of women employees at the Grove and

in positions at the City Club now held by men would drastically

and fundamentally change the nature and purpose of the Club

and would profoundly affect the male associational activities,

values, camaraderie and fellowship of the Club and its members.

If women were present during the all-male associational activities,

the behavior, involvement and participation by members with

respect to those activities would be altered, and a completely

—— —different social situation would be created with significantly

A-38

changed social dynamics. The presence of womer during these

activities would create a different kind of socia! association and

environment than that which the members have in good faith

determined for the Club.

34. The introduction of women employees at the Grove and

in positions at the City Club now held by men would result in

some changes which would be subtle and some changes which

would be dramatic in connection with the all-male associational

activities: the environment and ambience during mealtimes, Af-

terglows, Lakeside talks, camp entertainments and campfires at

the Grove and during such associational activities conducted both

at the Grove and the City Club, would be different if women were

present; Club members and guests would be inhibited in taking

women’s roles and performing generally in theatricals, musicals,

serious drama, skits and other artistic productions if women were

present; members now comfortably portray female as well as male

roles because they are within the private social atmosphere

reflecting the Club’s spirit and traditional objectives; attendance

and member participation in such associational activities would

decrease if women were present; and other changes would further

significantly alter the integrity of the Club’s objectives if women

were present at the Grove or during such activities at the City

Club.

35. The Grove is not physically arranged to accommodate

segregated living facilities ensuring privacy for women employees.

Because of the frequency and the pervasive nature of the all-male

associational activities at the Club, employees are present during,

integrally involved with, and, in some instances, participate in

those activities. The performance of duties and work assignments

of the male employees could not be rescheduled, altered, or

reorganized to avoid impact and effect upon the Club and

members’ associational activities and privacy as reflected in the

facts stated herein.

36. The introduction of women, whether as guests or employ-

ees, would significantly interfere with the privacy of the members

and would result in radical change of the nature and ambience of

the private associational activities at the Grove during the Spring

A-39

Jinks and Midsummer Encampment and at the City Club during

its regular, all-male associational activities.

37. The Commission, the Department and Lewis have op-

posed petitioner on various grounds which are not supported by

the evidence, including assertions that the Club is a “scoff law”

whose employment practices are pretexts, and based on claims

that are unbelievable, nonsensical, and reflect incredible specula-

tion. The Department’s and Lewis’ action befvre filing its accusa-

tion and in prosecuting the Club before the Commission reflects

arbitrary and capricious conduct designed to unfairly and prejudi-

cially bring enforcement proceedings against the Club because of .

its membership. The Commission has similarly engaged in arbi-

trary and capricious conduct by its prejudgment and bias against

the Club, its acquiescence and participation in the procedures and

actions of the Department and Lewis, and its announced motiva-

tion and bias against clubs which discriminate by having only men

as members.

In addition to the conclusions already stated, and based upon

the facts herein, the Court concludes that petitioner is entitled to

its attorneys’ fees because the accusation by intervenors, the

Department and Lewis, their prosecution of the Club, and the

Commission’s decision and order were inextricably related and

connected to the result of arbitrary and capricious action and

conduct by the Commission, the Department and Lewis in her

official capacity.

A-40

Therefore, it is ORDERED that a peremptory writ of manda-

mus shall issue commanding respondent Commission to set aside

its decision and order dated October 14, 1981, and to dismiss the

accusation as twice amended against petitioner. Petitioner shall

recover its costs according to cost bill. Petitioner may claim

reasonable attorneys’ fees in its cost bill, the propriety of which

may be addressed under appropriate motion to tax.

—

. —-

ee dint ae

Dated: Sept. 12, 1983.

/s/

Kenneth M. Eymann,

Judge of the Superior Court

A-41

Appendix D

Before the Fair Employment and Housing Commission

of the State of California

Case No. FEP78-79

A5-1632s

N-15159

In the Matter of the Accusation of the

Department of Fair Employment and Housing

vs

Bohemian Club,

Respondent.

Joanne A. Lewis, Director,

Complainant.

Decision

[Filed Oct. 14, 1981]

This matter was heard on an Accusation, Amended Accusa-

tion, and Second Amended Accusation before Robert S. Kendall,

Administrative Law Judge, State of California, Office of Admin-

istrative Hearings, on October 16, 17, and 21, 1980, at San

Francisco, California.

The Department of Fair Employment and Housing’ was repre-

sented by Robert Barnes, Staff Counsel.

' Pursuant to the Governor’s Reorganization Plan No. 1, effective

January 20, 1980, the Division of Fair Employment Practices and the

Fair Employment Practice Commission, within the Department of

Industrial Relations, were abolished and replaced by the Department of

Fair Employment and Housing and the Fair Employment and Housing

Commission within the State and Consumer Services Agency, which

entities succeeded to the functions of the former Division and Commis-

sion. As part of this reorganization, the California Fair Employment

Practice Act (former Lab. Code, § 1410 et seq.) and the Rumford Fair

Housing Act (former Health and Saf. Code, § 35710 et seq.) were,

effective January 1, 1981, included in the Fair Employment and Hous-

A-42

Respondent Bohemian Club was represented by William I.

Edlund, Joseph R. Tiffany, and Michael J. Boylan, Attorneys at

Law.

The Commission received Judge Kendall’s proposed decision

on January 19, 1981. The Department of Fair Employment and

Housing submitted a Petition for Opportunity for Further Argu-

ment on February 6, 1981, and Respondent timely filed an

Opposition to such Petition on March 24, 1981. Pursuant to

Government Code section 11517, subdivision (c), we issued a

Notice of Opportunity for Further Argument on April 27, 1981,

and the parties’ briefs were thereafter timely received.

In view of several issues raised by Respondent in its Response,

on July 2, 1981, the Commission issued a Resolution and Notice

of Opportunity to Petition for Further Evidence or Argument. On

July 17, 1981, Respondent timely filed a Response to said Notice

in which it declined to petition for such opportunity. The case

therefore stood submitted as of July 17, 1981.

After exhaustive consideration of the entire record in this case,

the Commission makes the following Findings of Fact and Deter-

mination of Issues.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Complainant Joanne A. Lewis, Director of the Department

of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”), made the allega-

tions in the Accusation, the first amendment thereto, and the

Second Amended Accusation in her official capacity and not

otherwise.

2. The DFEH is an administrative agency of the State of

California empowered to issue accusations under the Fair Em-

ployment and Housing Act (“Act”) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et

seq.). The DFEH has complied with all procedural requirements

of the Act.

ing Act and codified in the California Government Code at section

12900 et seq.

> ee

A-43

3. On May 18, 1979, the Director, acting in her official

capacity, filed with the DFEH a verified written complaint alleg-

ing that Respondent Bohemian Club (“Respondent” or “Club”)

had violated the Act within the preceding year by discriminating

against women in filling positions of office clerk-typist at the

Bohemian Grove (“Grove”) in Monte Rio, California.

4. On February 25, 1980, the Director amended her com-

plaint to allege that Respondent had pursued a practice and

pattern of discrimination against females in hiring, transfers,

promotional opportunities, and recruitment at both its City Club

in San Francisco and the Grove in Monte Rio.

5. On May 15, 1980, the DFEH issued an Accusation against

Respondent and on June 2, 1980, Respondent served a Notice of

Defense and Objections to the Accusation.

6. On June 4, 1980, Carol Linda Esses filed with the DFEH a

verified written complaint on behalf of herself and all others

similarly situated alleging that Respondent had engaged in unlaw-

ful practices under the Act.

7. The DFEH filed an Amended Accusation and a Second

Amended Accusation on July 30, 1980, and September 30, 1980,

respectively.

8. On May 12, 1981, the DFEH notified the Commission that

this litigation would proceed as a class action for all purposes.

9. The class of which Ms. Esses is a member is composed of

all females who between January 1, 1978, and the present were

members of Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 2

(“Union” or “Local 2”), and who were refused employment by

Respondent on account of their sex as employees at the Grove, as

permanent employees of Respondent’s City Club, as temporary

employees in the City Club’s Main Dining Room, or who would

have sought such employment but for Respondent’s reputation for

discrimination on account of sex.

10. Respondent Bohemian Club is an employer of five or

more persons within the meaning of Section 12926, subdivision

(c) of the California Government Code.

A-44

11. It was established that Respondent placed a job order for

an Office clerk-typist with the California Employment Develop-

ment Department on August 4, 1978. At that time, Respondent

specified that only male applicants were acceptable for the posi-

tion and requested that only men be referred to it.

12. Qualified women were available for referral at that time.

But for the prerequisite established by Respondent, these persons

would have been available to apply for the position.

13. Respondent is a bona fide private social association of

men founded in San Francisco in 1872. It has always been

organized as a non-profit corporation and presently is a non-profit

mutual benefit corporation organized and acting under Part 8,

Division 2, Title 1, California Corporations Code. The Club is a

tax-exempt organization under the laws of the State of California

and the United States and receives no public funds.

14. Respondent is a self-governing organization which vests

responsibility for the oversight of its affairs in an eleven-member

Board of Directors elected by the membership. The policies of the

Board of Directors are implemented by various committees,

including the Jinks Committee (supervision of Club entertain-

ment), the Art Committee (supervision of Club artistic exhibi-

tions and care of the Club’s are collection), the Library

Committee (care and supervision of the library), the Grove

Committee (care and supervision of the Grove), and the Mem-

bership Committee (selection of members).

15. Respondent’s Constitution and By-Laws provide that

membership in the Club is open only to men connected profes-

sionally with or devoted to the arts. The Club has approximately

2,000 members in various membership categories, including cate-

gories of membership for non-Bay Area residents and persons

professionally connected with the arts or sciences. Memberships

are not based upon business achievements, and memberships

cannot be purchased or sold. Potential members are individually

sponsored by present members, and unsolicited applications for

membership are not received. The Club’s membership standards

and rules are strictly enforced.

A-45

16. The purpose of the Club is participation in and apprecia-

tion of the arts and male fellowship. Participation is an obligation

of membership—every member is required to “Carry a Spear in

Bohemia”—and a participation subcommittee is responsible for

encouraging wide participation by members in Club activities.

The Club’s By-Laws provide that each member must accept “the

obligation to render to the Club, when called upon, such assis-

tance with the objects, purposes and customs of the Club as lies

within his abilities” and members are subject to disciplinary

action for failure to do so. Members are not shy or reluctant to

participate in the Club’s associational activities and are willing to

meet their membership obligations. Indeed, there is extensive

participation in associational activities by all members.

17. While Respondent restricts membership to males only, no

evidence was introduced at hearing to suggest that the Club has

membership restrictions concerning members’ (or their guests’)

race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical

handicap, medical condition, marital status, citizenship, or sexual

orientation.

18. Respondent is a non-commercial association, and its rules

and traditions prohibit members and guests from engaging in

commercial, trade or business activities while at the Club or its

functions. The Club prevents commercial expioitation of its

activities by prohibiting reporters, requests for autographs or

souvenirs, and the use of tape recorders; by restricting the use of

still and motion picture cameras; by forbidding the publication of

Club proceedings or happenings (including plays, songs, talks and

papers); and by prohibiting references by members or guests to

the Club activities for commercial purposes. The non-commercial

nature of the Club is reflected in its motto “Weaving spiders

come not here” and in its prohibition against “shop talk.”

19. Respondent’s members’ associational activities are carried

out at two locations: a City Club at 624 Taylor Street, San

Francisco, California, and a large camping area near Monte Rio,

California, known as the Grove. Both the City Club and the

Grove are owned by Respondent, are for the exclusive enjoyment

of members and their guests, and are never available for public

use.

A-46

20. The City Club is a five-story building which contains

sleeping accommodations for Club members’ use on either a

permanent or a short-term basis; several dining rooms (Main

Dining Room, Anza Room, Balboa Room, Cabrillo Room, Bohe-

mian Room, Board Room, Grove Room, Red Room and Owl

Room); several other meeting, association and activity rooms

(Music Room, Green Room, Domino Room, Main Card Room,

and Main Lounge); a theatre (Jinks Theatre); a bar and stage

(Cartoon Room); a library; an archives; a barbershop; and an art

gallery.

21. The Grove is over 2,500 acres and, within that area, there

is a small well-defined living and camping area comprising about

125 group living areas, various buildings, shelters, and other

associational activity areas, including a large open-air dining area,

various other eating areas, several bars, stages, and theatres.

22. Each group living area, called a camp, is a voluntary

fraternal group of members within the Club itself. Camps consist

of cabins, tents, teepees, and open sleeping porches; some are

assembled for the retreats and taken down afterwards. Each camp

has a small platform which is used as a performing area for camp

associational activities conducted for camp members and their

guests. Other Club members and guests at the Grove are habitu-

ally invited to a specific camp to participate in entertainment,

conversation, luncheon, etc.

23. In many camps the toilet and shower facilities are sepa-

rate from the sleeping quarters. Although members and their

guests are usually dressed in outdoor clothing, they will be in

various states of dress and undress when walking to and from the

removed facilities, and will occasionally forego using the facilities

in favor of urinating elsewhere. -

24. Some toilet and shower facilities are unshielded or only

partially shielded from view. These facilities could be modified to

insure privacy at de minimis cost to Respondent.

25. Bathroom facilities reserved for use by Grove employees

are in enclosed buildings and could be used by either sex. If

needed, walls could be built and existing employee housing could

A-47

be otherwise altered to accommodate female employees at de

minimis cost to Respondent.

26. Respondent takes all measures necessary to insure privacy

-for members and their guests at the Grove and the City Club.

Radios. phonographs, television sets and recording equipment are

prohibited at the Grove and photography is controlled. Nonmem-

bers and uninvited persons are not permitted and, if they enter,

are not allowed to remain. At the City Club, nonmembers must

have a visitor card or be accompanied by a member. At the

Grove, access roads leading into the living and camping area are

fenced, the entry roads have locked gates, and signs are posted

along the perimeter to identify the area as private property.

Fourteen security guards patrol the Grove at all times during the

summer events to prevent uninvited persons from entering. All

members and guests must be identified and check in upon arrival

at the main gate where all cars must be unloaded and parked

permanently under guard.

27. Respondent’s activities are based upon and follow tradi-

tions over 100 years old. Respondent’s associational activities at

the Grove are two retreats (the three-day Spring Jinks weekend

in June and the seventeen-day Midsummer Encampment in

July), during which members and their male guests live at the

Grove and participate in a wide variety of artistic, musical and

theatrical activities.

28. During-the Spring Jinks and the Midsummer Encamp-

ment, Club associational activities proceed on virtually a 24-hour-

a-day basis throughout the Grove. There are many scheduled

activities: concerts, theatrical and musical productions (in which

all parts, male and female, are played by Club members),

oratorical presentations, Lakeside talks (talks by members and

guests), hikes, and sporting activities.

29. At the Midsummer Encampment, three major produc-

- tions are presented, one on each of the three weekends. On the

first weekend, the Cremation of Care, an elaborate traditional

ceremony symbolizing the members’ retreat from the everyday

working commercial world, takes place at the Lake, centering on

the Owl Shrine, an outdoor stage activity area. On the second

A-48

weekend, the Club presents the Low Jinks, an original musical

comedy, at Field Circle, an outdoor stage. On the final weekend,

the Grove play, an original serious musical drama, is presented on

the Grove Stage, another outdoor amphitheatre. At the Spring

Jinks, two variety shows comprise the major scheduled theatrical

presentations.

30. In addition to these productions (which can take over two

years in the process of production), there is a regular artistic

production every evening, and the annual retreats are character-

ized by an extensive variety of informal musical entertainment,

including singing and dancing performed extemporaneously by

members and their guests throughout the day and night at

individual camps, at various entertainment areas, and along the

walks and paths of the Grove. Many of these informal activities

take place during mealtimes and are associated with camaraderie,

refreshments and conversation at the large common dining area,

in the Grill (a restaurant, bar, and stage), and at the individual

camps.

31. During the Midsummer Encampment and Spring Jinks,

the Grove becomes the home of up to 2,500 Bohemians and their

guests. Many non-Bay Area members are able to participate in

Club activities only during these events. Historically, members

and guests have considered these events retreats from the outside

world, and the Grove has been seen as a natural, rustic setting ir

which to enjoy male fellowship and celebrate the arts.

32. Respondent’s associational activities at the City Club take

place in connection with artistic, musical, literary and theatrical

presentations. The major activities at the City Club include at

least thirty-six weekly Thursday evening theatrical and musical

productions, weekly musical entertainment on Tuesday evenings,

concerts and talks, monthly evening readings by authors, poets

and dramatists, classes in photography, art and other subjects on

Wednesday evenings, and many other formal and informal artis-

tic, theatrical and musical events.

33. The Thursday night productions are scheduled for the

third Thursday in September through the first Thursday in May.

Rehearsals and performances take place in the Main Dining

ee

A-49

Room and are scheduled to immediately precede and follow

dinner, respectively. Employees are required to leave the Dining

Room prior to the performances. Rehearsals for the Grove plays

take place from May through July in the Main Dining Room and

in all available rooms as needed, and are likewise scheduled for

before and after the dinner hour.

34. The Board of Directors establishes Respondent’s em-

ployee personnel policies, which are implemented by Respon-

dent’s general manager and staff. No evidence was received,

wherefrom it can be found, that Respondent has either express or

tacit employee hiring policies based on a potential employee’s

race, religious creed, color, age, or sexual orientation. For many

years it has been, and is, Respondent’s policy to employ only

males in those positions which allegedly require the employee to

work during its regular, all-male, associational activities. Respon-

dent’s intentional discriminatory hiring policy systematically ex-

cludes females from all temporary and permanent jobs at the

Grove, nearly all permanent jobs in food service functions at the

City Club, and most temporary and other permanent jobs at the

City Club. As a result of limiting its job offerings, Respondent has

denied employment and promotional and transfer opportunities to

qualified females because of their sex.

35. Of 74 current permanent City Club employees, 11 are

women. The jobs presently performed by women include those of

maid (3 women clean the members’ sleeping/living area), tele-

phone operator (1), accounting clerk (2), caterer (1), cook (1),

secretary (1), manicurist (1), and busperson (Lily Lum, who

serves breadstuffs during lunch in the Main Dining Room). The

male staff (63) performs all other tasks. This permanent staff is

supplemented, as necessary, by temporary employees hired to

work at Club functions. Women are employed as foodservers in

the private rooms for members’ private parties (members may

have women as their guests in the various private dining rooms)

but not in the “associational” rooms. With the exception of Lily

Lum (and several women who, like Ms. Lum, were hired during

World War II but who, unlike Ms. Lum subsequently left the

Club’s employ), no woman has ever been hired as a permanent

foodserver.

A-50

36. At the Grove Respondent maintains a small year-round

staff of around ten craft workers, office workers, and laborers, all

male, who are knowledgeable and experienced in various special

fields such as plumbing, carpentry, electrical work, and fire

protection, and who are hired because of their individual

proficiencies. These employees, as a condition of employment,

must be available full time to supervise and work with special,

temporary work crews in the Grove during the retreats. Under the

direction of the Club Manager and Maitre d’ (who take up

residence in the Grove during the retreats) the members of this

permanent staff supervise the temporary work force of approxi-

mately 250 male-only laborers, guards, firefighters, parking at-

tendants, office helpers, and culinary employees who are

employed solely during the Spring Jinks and Midsummer En-

campment. These employees eat within the Grove and, although

not required to do so, nearly all of them live within the Grove

during their period of employment. Although the Club’s current

practice is to require the permanent City Club employees to work

at the Grove during its summer retreats, the Club failed to

establish that this practice is necessary for the Club to be able to

conduct these events.

37. Respondent fills its positions through accepting referrals

from Local 2 and the Employment Development Department,

hiring men “off the street,” and, in the case of the Grove,

recruiting men from the area. The evidence suggests that there

exists an understanding between Local 2 and the Club that the

former is to refer only males unless otherwise specified (for

mixed-gender private parties at the City Club). In those instances

when women have been referred without request, they have been

paid union wages (the Club prohibits gratuities) but have not

been permitted to work. The evidence suggested that no male

referred by the Union has ever been refused employment at the

City Club.

38. It was «»:ablished that for the years 1978, 1979, and 1980,

Respondent has no documents in its possession, custody or control

which either measure applicant flow for its employment positions

or record employee transfer and promotion requests.

A-51

39. Respondent does not require applications for its cook, ©

bartender and foodserver positions at the City Club; it does

require applications for most other positions. The Club first

required applications for Grove employment in 1980. Prior to that

time, the Club’s policy was to employ all males referred by the

Union unless the Club had previously advised the Union in

writing to not refer a particular person.

40. It was established that between May 18, 1978, and May,

1980, Respondent included in its employment application forms

inquiries concerning applicants’ sex, marital status and citizen-

ship. Respondent’s current forms include inquiries concerning

applicants’ citizenship, physical condition, and whether applicants

have received Worker's Compensation payments or have ever

worked at the Bohemian Grove. Nothing on the forms suggests

that the Club attempts to or can ascertain whether an applicant

could satisfactorily participate in the Club’s associational activi-

ties or “interrelate” with Club members and guests. It is evident

that the Club does not attempt to screen potential employees for

any qualifications other than their ability to perform the mechani-

cal aspects of the particular job.

41. It was established that employees are prohibited from

fraternizing with members and their guests; that they participate

in Club associational activities only on rare occasions; that they

are often excluded from associational activities; and that some

employees interrelate with members and some do not. Neither

the ability to satisfactorily participate, nor the ability to interrelate

with members beyond that required in any employment context,

nor male gender constitutes an accurate description of the qualifi-

cations relevant to perform the duties of the positions in issue. It

is found that these traits in employees are not necessary to

preserve the essence of the Club.

42. It is found that there is no factual basis to believe that the

employment of females in those positions from which they are

presently excluded would add a measurable element of sexuality

beyond that which currently exists in the Club, nor that this

element would stifle fruition of Club goals. Sexuality currently

exists in the Club and the Club has not evidenced any consequent

difficulties.

A-52

43. Itis found that there is no factual basis to believe that the

employment of females in those positions from which they are

presently excluded would inhibit the Club members’ participation

in Club associational activities. Members’ testimony at hearing to

tnat effect constitutes unfounded speculation and is devoid of a

factual basis. |

44. It is found that the members’ speculation at hearing as to

what other members might speculate would be the impact of the

proposed female employment was insufficient to establish that all

or substantially all members object to such employment. The

evidence established that the members have never been polled on

the issue and that at least one member has affirmatively indicated

his acceptance of female foodservers.

45. It was established that the only factual experience the

Club has had in employing women in the associational areas is its

prior employment of females during World War II, and its

current employment of Lily Lum. It was also established that Ms.

Lum works in the Main Dining Room during Club associational

activities and that members have neither complained about her

presence nor restricted their participation on account thereof. It

was further established that the sole female cook employed in the

City Club’s kitchen is in a position to view costumed members as

they walk through the corridor linking the Grove Room to the

Main Dining Room, and no evidence was presented to suggest

that members are deterred from participating in associational

activities on account thereof.

46. It is found that the refusal of members to fully participate

in Club associational activities would contravene the purpose,

Constitution, By-Laws, and traditions of the Club (as stated in

Findings 15 and 16, ante) and would, for that reason, not occur

were the Club to employ more women in associational areas. It is

further found that this fact vitiates the credibility of the Club

meinbers’ testimory on this issue.

47. The Club failed to establish factual bases for its conten-

tions that the dynamics which give fruition to the Club’s associa-

tional interests necessarily require the exclusion of female

employees at Club associational activities and that the introduc-

A-53

tion of female employees in positions from which they are

presently excluded would radically alter the nature of the Club or

profoundly affect the assuviational activities, camaraderie, and

fellowship of Club members. It is found that the Club’s prior and

current experience of employing women in those positions which

the Club has traditionally restricted to male employees did not

and does not affect the Club’s ability to exist as an associational

enclave for men. It is further found that female employees would

extend as much loyalty and exhibit as much discretion as do

current male employees.

48. The Club failed to establish that women, or substantially

all women, are not possessed of these undefined and unexplained

employee qualities which the Club contends are necessary for its

continued success. The Club further failed to establish that it is

impracticable to test or screen employee applicants for those

qualities, whatever they might be.

49. The Club failed to establish that it has attempted to

accommodate female employees at the Grove. Although a num-

ber of Grove employees are required under current practice to

enter individual camps and adjacent areas in the performance of a

wide variety of duties—delivering baggage, mail, messages and

supplies from a central, in-camp commissary around the Grove to

the individual camps; gathering and delivering wood supplies for

camps throughout the Grove; performing maintenance work in-

volving repairs of plumbing, wiring and carpentry, moving furni-

ture and pianos; serving food and drinks at the regular dining

areas and, for extra wages, at camp parties; driving buses (which

are the only transportation for members and guests inside the

Grove); etc.—it was not established that these duties cannot be

assigned in such a way so as to minimize the number of Grove

positions which require employee presence at associational activi-

ties. It was not established that such specialized assignments

would require the employment of additional personnel. Further-

more, it was not established that employees who work in those

positions which are already specialized, such as cooks, cannot be

isolated from the Club’s associational activities. The evidence did

establish that the employment of women as security guards and

A-54

adminstrators would not influence members’ participation in the

Grove’s associational activities.

50. Respondent failed to establish that it cannot arrange

scheduling at the City Club so as to exclude employees from its

associational activities.

51. Respondent failed to establish that the maintenance of

employee positions is necessary for successful operation of the

Club.

DETERMINATION OF ISSUES

JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE

Respondent contends that the Commission lacks jurisdiction of

this matter because the Club is not an “employer” within the

meaning of Government Code section 12926, subdivision (c),

which reads as follows:

“ ‘Employer,’ except as hereinafter provided, includes any

person regularly employing five or mor

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

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