Appendix — City of Akron v. Ohio Manufacturers' Ass'n

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) FILED

IN THE JAN 28 DST

Supreme Court of the Tuners *

OCTOBER TERM, 19

Crry oF AKRON, STATE OF OHIO; HEALTH COMMISSION,

Crry oF AKRON; HEALTH DEPARTMENT, CITY OF

AKRON; C. WILLIAM KECK, as Director of Health of

the City of Akron; HAROLD K. StTusss, as Director of

Law of the City of Akron,

. Appellants,

OHIO MANUFACTURERS’ ASSOCIATION ;

AKRON SELLE COMPANY,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States Court

of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

APPENDIX TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

JERRY D. ANKER

WALD, HARKRADER & Ross

1300 Nineteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 828-1200

Counsel of Record

HAROLD K. STUBBS

Director of Law

JANICE EF. CROSSLAND

Assistant Director of Law

161 South High Street

202 Ocasek Government Office

Building

Akron, Ohio 44308

(216) 375-2030

Attorneys for Appellants

January 28, 1987

(NS Sen TTY

W#Leon - Epes PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

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Opinion of the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division ............ 22a

Judgment of the Court of Appeals ......................-......------ 60a

Order of the Court of Appeals Denying Rehearing........ 6la

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Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.. 63a

Chapter 1830, Codified Ordinances of the City of

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Occupation Safety and Health Act of 1970 2.000000... 89a

Hazard Communication Standard ........00000000000000eeee ee 100a

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 86-3191

OHIO MANUFACTURERS’ ASSOCIATION ;

AKRON SELLE COMPANY,

Plaintiffs-Appellunts,

Vv.

CITY OF AKRON, STATE OF OHIO; HEALTH COMMISSION,

CITY OF AKRON; HEALTH DEPARTMENT, CITY OF

AKRON; C. WILLIAM KECH, as Director of Health of

the City of Akron; HAROLD K. STusss, as Director of

Law of the City of Akron,

Defendants-A ppellees-

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio

Decided and Filed September 17, 1986

Before: MARTIN and GUY, Circuit Judges; and

BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge.

GUY, Circuit Judge, Plaintiffs appeal the district

cwirt’s judgment in favor of defendants entered after the

court determined that the Akron “Right to Know” Ordi-

nance, regulating hazardous and toxic substances in the

workplace, was not preempted by the Occupational Safety

and Health Act (OSH Act) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651,

et seq., or the Occupational Safety and Health Agency’s

(OSHA) Hazard Communication Standard, 29 C.F.R.

§ 1910.

2a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

Plaintiffs are the Ohio Manufacturers’ Association, a

non-profit membership association representing 61 em-

ployers in the City of Akron, classified within Standard

Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes 20 through 39, and

Akron Selle Company, an Akron contract metal stamping

company employing 20 persons and classified within SIC

Code 34.1 Defendants are the City of Akron; Akron’s

Health Commission; Akron’s Health Department; C. Wil-

liam Kech, M.D., Director of Health; and Harold K.

Stubbs, Director of Law. The latter four defendants

share responsibility for the enforcement of the ordinance.

Plaintiffs brought suit, claiming that the Akron ordinance

is preempted by federal law.? Although we reject many

of plaintiffs’ contentions, as did the trial court, we none-

theless find preemption and reverse.

I.

A. The Akron Right to Know Ordinance

Akron’s Right to Know Ordinance, enacted in Decem-

ber of 1984, regulates the presence of hazardous and

1SIC Codes 20 through 39~-consist primarily of categories of

manufacturers as set forth in the Standard Industrial Classifica-

tion Manual published by the United States Office of Management

and Budget.

2In the district court and on appeal, amici curiae briefs were

submitted by several Akron community groups, including the Rub-

ber Manufacturers’ Association; the Chemical Manufacturers’ As-

sociation; the National Paint and Coatings Association Inc.; the

Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc.; Flexible Packaging Associa-

tion and the National Screw Machine Products Association

(jointly) ; and by the Akron Catholic Commission; The Akron-

Medina County Labor Council, (AFL-C1O); the Ohio Public In-

terest Campaign; the Opportunity Parish Ecumenical Neighbor-

hood Ministry; the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Work-

ers of America and the United Rubber Workers, Local 2 Retirees

(jointly). On appeal the Secretary of Labor was permitted to file

an amicus curiae brief.

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Opinion of the Court of Appeals

toxic substances in the workplace. The purposes of the

ordinance are twofold: to protect workers by requiring

employers to provide information to their employees and

designated representatives about hazardous chemicals to

which the employees may be exposed; and to protect pub-

lic health officials, and the public in general, by requiring

employers to provide information to the City’s Fire Divi-

sion and Health Department about the hazardous chemi-

cals manufactured, used, or stored inside the workplace

and the hazardous chemicals discharged from the work-

place or stored as chemical waste.

The Akron Health Commission is charged with admin-

istration and enforcement of the ordinance. The commis-

sion is first directed to compile a master list of hazardous

chemicals including all of the chemicals listed in (1)

OSHA’s list of Toxic or Hazardous Substances, at 29

C.F.R. 1910. Subpart Z: (2) the United States Depart-

ment of Transportation’s Hazardous Materials Table, 49

C.F.R. § 172.101; (3) the American Conference of Gov-

ernmental and Industrial Hygenists’ list entitled “Thresh-

old Limit Value for Chemical Substances and Physical

Agents in the Workplace;” (4) the International Agency

for Research on Cancer’s sublist entitled “Substances

found to have at least sufficient evidence of carcinoge-

nicity in animals;” and (5) the National Toxicology Pro-

gram’s list of chemicals published in the annual report

on carcinogens.

Under the ordinance, employers are required to post

signs notifying employees that they have a right to in-

formation from their employers regarding the toxic or

hazardous effects of the chemicals and the circumstances

under which these effects may be produced. Employers

are also required to ensure that each container of hazard-

ous chemicals in the workplace is labeled, tagged, or

marked: (1) with the chemical name, if not a trade

secret; (2) with the Department of Transportation’s re-

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Opinion of the Court of Appeals

quired labels for substances it regulates; (3) with a

cancer warning for all materials that pose a cancer haz-

ard; and (4) with warnings for materials which pose a

reproductive hazard.

The ordinance also imposes employer filing and report-

ing requirements. Each January, employers are ordered

to file with the Health Department a list of all work

areas where hazardous chemicals are manufactured, used,

or stored, specifying by chemical name all such chemi-

cals in each work area. Furthermore, employers must

immediately report to the Health Department informa-

mation concerning any spill, leak, discharge, or emission

of any hazardous substance which is required to be re-

ported to or filed with any federal or state agency under

applicable !aw.

Employers are required to obtain or develop a material

safety data sheet (MSDS) for each hazardous chemical

which they manufacture, use, or store. Each MSDS must

contain, among other things, the following information:

(1) the identity used on the label and, except as necessary

to protect trade secrets, whether the chemical is a single

substance or a mixture which has been tested as a whole

to determine iis hazards, its chemical and common names;

or, if the hazardous chemical is a mixture, the chemical

and common names of all ingredients; and the chemical

and common names of all ingredients set forth on the

master list which have been determined to be physical

hazards; (2) the physical and chemical characteristics

of the hazardous chemical, including its potential for fire,

explosion, and reactivity; (3) the known acute and

chronic health effects of exposure to the hazardous chemi-

cal; (4) the primary route of entry and permissible ex-

posure limit for hazardous chemicals; (5) any precau-

tions for safe handling and use which are known to the

employer or preparer; (6) any control measures which

are known to the employer or preparer; and (7) emer-

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Opinion of the Court of Appeals

gency and first aid procedure. A MSDS is required to be

updated within 90 days of the employer obtaining new

and significant information regarding the health hazard

of a chemical. Employees are entitled to be given a copy

of a MSDS upon request. :

The ordinance requires that employers maintain an em-

ployee training and education program designed to pro-

vide employees who may be exposed to hazardous sub-

stances or mixtures the information necessary to under-

stand their hazards. Training must also include the

hazard communication methods used by the employer,

appropriate work practices, protective measures, emer-

gency procedures, and the methods employees may use to

receive information under the ordinance.

In addition to enforcing the ordinance, the commission

is charged with the obligation of forwarding all informa-

tion to the Fire Department pertinent to the performance

of its duties. A provision also speaks to the protection of

trade secrets.

The final substantive provision enumerates employee

rights under the ordinance, including the employee’s right

to receive requested information, protection from dis-

charge for filing a complaint, requests for inspection by

the Health Commission, and the right to maintain a pri-

vate cause of action for violations of the ordinance.

B. The OSH Act and The Hazard Communication

Standard

Section 6 of the OSH Act directs the Secretary of

Labor to promulgate occupational safety and health

standards to further the purpose of the Act ‘to assure

so far as possible every working man and woman in

the Nation safe and healthful working conditions... .”

29 U.S.C. § 651(b). To that end, the Secretary of Labor

has established the Hazard Communication Standard,

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Opinion of the Court of Appeals

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (7), and set forth at 29

C.F.R. § 1910. The relevant history of the promulgation

of this standard began in 1974, when the National Insti-

tute for Occupational Safety and Health, an agency cre-

ated by section 22 of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. § 671,

recommended that the Secretary promulgate a standard

requiring employers to inform employees of potentially

hazardous materials in the workplace, 47 Fed. Reg. 12095

(1982). Later that year the Secretary appointed an ad-

visory committee to develop standards for implementa-

tion of the statutory provision requiring labels or other

appropriate forms of warning. That advisory committee

issued its report on June 6, 1975, recommending a classi-

fication of hazards, the use of warning devices such as

labels and placards, disclosure of chemical data, and

employee training programs. Id. at 12096.

On January 16, 1981, OSHA published a notice of pro-

posed rulemaking entitled “Hazards Identification.” 46

Fed. Reg. 4412-53. This initial proposal was withdrawn

by the Secretary on February 12, 1981, for further con-

sideration of regulatory alternatives, 46 Fed. Reg. 12214.

On March 19, 1982, a notice of proposed rulemaking en-

titled “Hazards Communication” was published, 47 Fed.

Reg. 12091.

The standard was published in its final form on No-

vember 25, 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 53280. It requires that

chemical manufacturers and importers “evaluate chemi-

cals produced in their workplaces or imported by them to

determine if they are hazardous.” 29 U.S.C. § 1910.1200

(d) (1). It refers to several compilations of toxic ma-

terials. These lists establish certain toxic substances

which chemical manufacturers or importers must treat

as hazardous. Id. at § 1910.1200(d) (3). Chemicals not

included in the designated compilations must be evalu-

ated to determine if they are hazardous by reference to

“available scientific evidence.” Id. at § 1910.1200(d). A

Mieie in.

Ta,

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

manufacturer or importer of hazardous chemicals must

“ensure that each container . . . leaving the workplace

is labeled” with the chemica! identity, with appropriate

hazard warnings, and with the name and address of the

source. Jd. at § 1910.1200(f) (1). Manufacturers or im-

porters must also prepare a material safety data sheet

(MSDS) containing the chemical common names of each

hazardous ingredient, and information necessary for safe

use of the product. Id. at § 1910.1200(g). The MSDS

must be provided to each employer in the manufacturing

sector (SIC Codes 20-39) purcnasing a hazardous chem-

ical. That employer must in turn make the MSDS avail-

able for employee inspection, id. at § 1910.1200(g) (8).

and “shall provide employees with information and train-

ing on hazardous chemicals in their work area... .” Id.

at § 1910.1200(h). The rvie allows an exception from

the labeling and MSDS ingredient disclosure require-

ments when a chemical manufacturer or importer claims

that the chemical identity is a trade secret, id. at

§ 1910.1200(i), and sets forth the procedure for disclo-

sure of trade secrets when necessary. Id.

The rule provides expressly that

[t]his occupational safety and health standard is

intended to address comprehensively the issue of

evaluating and communicating hazards to employ-

ees in the manufacturing sector, and to preempt any

state law pertaining to this subject.

29 C.F.R. § 1019.1200 (a) (2).

II.

The supremacy clause of article VI of the Constitution

is the source of the federal doctrine of preemption of

state law. Under the supremacy clause, federal preemp-

tion may occur in a number of ways. Preemption can be

express or implied, “explicitly stated in the statute’s lan-

SR 6

8a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

guage or implicitly contained in its structure and pur-

pose,” Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525

(1977). First, when acting within constitutional limits,

Congress is empowered to preempt state law by so stat-

ing in express terms. Jd. at 525. In the absence of

express preemptive language, Congress’ intent to pre-

empt all state law in a particular area may be inferred

where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently

comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that

Congress “left no room” for supplementary state regula-

tion, Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Auto. Med. Labs., 105

S. Ct. 2371, 2375 (1985). Preemption of a whole field also

will be inferred where the field is one in which “the fed-

eral interest is so dominant that the federal system will

be assumed to preclude enforcement of state law on the

same subject.” Jd. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator

Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Even where Congress

has not completely displaced state regulation in a spe-

cific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it

actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises

when “compliance with both federal and state regula-

tions is a physical impossibility,” Florida Lime & Avo-

cado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 182, 142-43 (1963),

or when state law “stands as an obstacle to the accom-

plishment and execution of the full purposes and ob-

jectives of Congress,” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,

67 (1941). Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly

held that state laws can be preempted by federal regula-

tions as well as by federal statutes. Hillsborough County,

105 S. Ct. at 2375.

In the present case, two of these “varieties” of pre-

emption are alleged: express congressional preemption

and express agency preemption.

A. Preemption by Congress

Plaintiffs contend that the Akron ordinance has been

expressly preempted by Congress in the OSH Act. The

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Opinion of the Court of Appeals

Act does provide that once the Secretary of Labor has

promulgated a standard, states are expressly preempted

from regulating in that field except pursuant to section

18:

(a) Nothing in this Chapter shall prevent any

state agency or court from asserting jurisdiction

under state law over any occupational safety or

health issue with respect to which no standard is

in effect under section 655 of this title.

(b) Any State which, at any time, desires to

assume responsibility for development and enforce-

ment therein of occupational safety and health stand-

ards relating to any occupational safety or health

issue with respect to which a Federal standard has

been promulgated under section 655 of this title

shall submit a State plan for the development of

such standards and their enforcement.

29 U.S.C. § 667. The courts which have addressed the

question have found that state “Right to Know” statues

are preempted by the Hazard Communication Standard

as applied to employers in SIC Codes 20-39. United

Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d

Cir. 1985); New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v.

Hughey, 774 F.2d 587, 593 (8d Cir. 1985).

Plaintiffs argue that since states are preempted from

regula:ing once OSHA issues a standard, a state’s politi-

cal subdivisions are necessarily precluded as well. Be-

cause political subdivisions are simply extensions of the

state, which derive their power from the state, preemp-

tion must extend to these agencies of the state. De-

fendants, on the other hand, rely on the definition of

state set forth in the OSH Act as section 3, where state

is defined to “[include] a State of the United States, the

District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,

American Samoa, Guam, and the Trust Territory of the

Pacific Islands,” 29 U.S.C. § 652(7). Defendants point

no

10a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

out that Congress could easily have defined “states” to

include their political subdivisions if it wished to pre-

clude local regulation.

Plaintiffs also argue that because section 3 provides

that the term “state” includes a State of the United

States, etc., that the use of the word “includes” indicates

that Congress foresaw an expansive reading of the term

“state.” In this regard, plaintiffs rely on Mayor of Boon-

ton v. Drew Chemical Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663 (D. N.J.

1985), where the court addressed whether municipalities

could recover under the Comprehensive Environmental

Response. Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),

42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seg. In CERCLA, as in the OSH

Act, state is defined to “include the several States of the

United States, the District of Columbia, the Common-

wealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the

United States Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the

Northern Marianas, and any other territory or posses-

sion over which the United States has jurisdiction,” 42

U.S.C. § 960127). Nevertheless, the Drew court held

that since Congress employed the term “include,” the

definitional section explicitly contemplated an expansion

of the illustrative list by the courts to the fullest extent,

621 F. Supp. at 666.

The trial judge rejected plaintiffs’ position. As to the

first argument, that “states” necessarily includes their

political subdivisions, the trial court pointed out that in

numerous other statutes, Congress has expressly pre-

empted “states and their political subdivisions” from reg-

ulating. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,

42 U.S.C. § 7543 (1982); Medical Device Amendments

of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 860k (1982); Poison Prevention

Packaging Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1476 (1982); Lead-Based

Paint Poison Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4846 (1982);

Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C.

§1920(a) (1982); Egg Products Inspection Act, 21

lla

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1982); Consumer Products Safety

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2075 (1982); Flammable Fabrics Act,

15 U.S.C. § 1203 (1982). In addition, other portions of

the OSH Act refer to “states and their political subdi-

visions.” See § 655(b) (1) (Secretary may promulgate

standards based upon information submitted by a politi-

cal subdivision) ; § 667(c) (6) (an approved state plan

must assure the Secretary that the state will establish

an occupational safety and health program protecting

employees of political subdivisions) ; § 673(b) (2) (Secre-

tary may make grants to political subdivisions for devel-

opment and administration of statistical programs).

Based on Congress’ practice of explicitly preempting po-

litical subdivisions and the fact that political subdivisions

are referred to in other sections of the OSH Act, the

trial court concluded that Congress did not simply over-

look including political subdivisions or that it implicitly

included them in the word “state.” We concur in the

trial court’s conclusion.

We also reject plaintiffs’ second argument premised

on Drew. The Drew court expansively defined “state,”

finding such a reading to be consistent with Congress’

intent and with the remedial intent of CERCLA:

It would be anomalous for this far reaching reme-

dial statute to give states a cause of action for dam-

ages to natural resources owned by the State but for

it to exclude cities from access to such a cause of

action while expressly including resources owned by

“local governments” within the scope of the pro-

tected subject of § 9607(a) (4) (C). As I have pre-

viously noted in my June 24 ruling, CERCLA should

be given a broad and liberal construction.

621 F. Supp. at 666. Thus, the Drew court identified

several reasons not present here for reading the term

“state” expansively so as to give municipalities a claim

for relief under CERCLA, not the least of which was

et

12a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

that resources owned by local governments were pro-

tected under the Act.

We would also point out that if the term “state,” as

used in section 18 to preempt state regulations in the

absence of an approved state plan implicitly includes

political subdivisions as plaintiffs urge, then political

subdivisions should also be able to regulate by submitting

a “state” plan and obtaining the Secretary’s approval.

Otherwise, plaintiffs’ argument would result in the word

“state” having two different and distinct meanings at the

same time.

The legislative history of section 3 gives no indication

that regulation by political subdivisions was contem-

plated by Congress. When introducing the section which

contains the definition of “state,” Senator Javits of New

York stated:

Mr. President, the sole purpose of this amend-

ment is to make eligible to file what is called a State

plan those territories and possessions of the United

States which are spelled out in the amendment. This

matter is not otherwise defined in the bill.

Subcomm. on Labor of the Sen. Comm. on Labor and

Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History

of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, at

504 (1971) (emphasis added). The only expansive read-

ing indicated by the legislative history would be that

which would encompass “territories” and “possessions”

within the definition.

Plaintiffs also argue that because municipalities are

not sovereigns, but are merely agencies of the state, they

cannot regulate where the state is precluded from regu-

lating. Plaintiffs’ reliance on authorities relating to

other fields of law and on cases discussing the nature

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Opinion of the Court of Appeals

and source of municipal power to legislate is simply not

persuasive in the context of preemption analysis.*

Plaintiffs additionally urge that express congressional

intent to preempt local regulation can be found in Con-

gress’ desire to achieve uniformity of regulation. While

acknowledging that Congress’ primary intent in enacting

the OSH Act was worker safety, plaintiffs argue that a

further purpose, that of uniformity, may be discerned

in certain provisions of the OSH Act and in comments

made by the drafters of the Act. They submit that the

Act’s authors felt that uniformity would be necessary to

promulgate an effective national standard and to avoid

undue burden on interstate commerce.

Congress declared the purpose of the OSH Act in sec-

tion 2:

The Congress declares it to be its purpose and

policy, through the exercise of its powers to regu-

late commerce among the several states and with

foreign nations and to provide for the general wel-

fare, to assure so far as possible every working

man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful

working conditions and to preserve our human re-

sources....

29 U.S.C. § 651(b). In American Textile Manufacturers

Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1980), the Supreme

Court stated that “[w]hen Congress passed the Occu-

3 For instance, plaintiffs and amici argue that in constitutional

analysis, political subdivisions are automatically encompassed with-

in the term “state” for purposes of “state action” under the four-

teenth amendment and other constitutional provisions. While this

is so, political subdivisions are not included within the meaning of

“state” under the eleventh amendment. Mt. Healthy Board of

Education v. Doyle, 427 U.S. 274, 280 (1976). Moreover, in Mt.

Heathy, the Court distinguished Ohio cities and counties, as “politi-

cal subdivisions,” from other types of governmental agencies which

are mere “arms of the state.” Jd.

14a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

pational Safety and Health Act in 1970, it chose to place

pre-eminent value on assuring employees a safe and

healthful working environment, limited only by the feas-

ibility of achieving such an environment.” Id. at 540.

Congress also set forth the considerations to be

weighed by the Secretary when devising standards under

the Act:

The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing

with toxic materials or harmful physical agents

under this subsection, shall set the standard which

most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on

the basis of the best available evidence, that no em-

ployee will suffer material impairment of health or

functional capacity even if such employee has reg-

ular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such stand-

ard for the period of his working life. Develop-

ment of standards under this subsection shall be

based upon research, demonstrations, experiments,

and such other information as may be appropriate.

In addition to the attainment of the highest degree

of Lealth and safety protection for the employee,

other considerations shall be the latest available

scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the

standards, and experience gained under this and

other health and safety laws. Whenever practicable,

the standard promulgated shall be expressed in

terms of objective criteria and of the performance

desired.

§ 655 (b) (5).

While the legislation and its history do illustrate that

a national standard was felt to be essential to achieve the

goals of the Act, they also indicate that this was to as-

sure that the states would at least meet the minimum

requirements of the federal standards, and not attempt

to undercut each other. This conclusion is well supported

by legislative history of section 18:

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Opinion of the Court of Appeals

Moreover, whenever a State wishes to assume respon-

sibility for developing or enforcing standards in an

area where standards have been promulgated under

this act, the State may do so under a state plan ap-

proved by the Secretary of Labor. The plan must

contain assurances that the State will develop and

enforce standards at least as effective as those devel-

oped by the Secretary, that the State will have the

legal authority, personnel and funds necessary to do

the job, and that a right of entry into workplaces is

provided. . . . In addition, the plan must contain

assurances that the State will, to the extent possible

under its law, establish and maintain an occupa-

tional safety and health program applicable to all

employees of the State and its political subdivisions,

and that such program will be as effective as that

applicable to provide employers covered by the plan.

As an encouragement for State action, the bill pro-

vides Federal financial support to assist the States

in assuming their own programs for worker health

and safety. Planning grants with up to 90 percent

Federal participation, and program grants with up

to 50 percent Federal participation are provided.

The 90 percent grant is designed to aid the States

in identifying needs, developing State plans and pro-

grams for collecting statistical data, increasing per-

sonnel capabilities, and improving administration

and enforcement. The 50 percent Federal grant is

made available to assist States in carrying out the

occupational safety and health programs contained

in their plans, as well as programs concerning occu-

pational safety and health statistics.

S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S.

Code Cong. & Ad. News, 5194-95 (1970). This same

Senate Report discusses the preemptive effect of the OSH

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Opinion of the Court of Appeals

Act. Political subdivisions are not mentioned in any re-

gard.

In short, we cannot accept plaintiffs’ contention that

Congress expressly preempted local regulation by these

provisions establishing a national standard. Furthermore,

we agree with the trial court to the extent that express

preemption, by definition, must be clearly manifested,

especially when local health and safety provisions are

endangered. Jones, 430 U.S. at 525. There is, in fact,

little in the legislation or its history to indicate Congress’

intent as to whether state preemption includes preemption

of local acts as well.

B. Preemption by OSHA Regulations

Our inquiry does not end with devining congressional

statutory intent, however, since state (or local) laws can

be preempted by federal regulations as well as by federal

statutes. Hillsborough, 105 S. Ct. at 2373. We must

therefore determine whether the agency itself preempted

local regulation when it promulgated the Hazard Com-

munication Standard. We conclude that it did.

The Hazard Communication Standard is self described

as a comprehensive hazard communication program:

(2) This occupational safety and health standard

is intended to address comprehensively the issue of

evaluating and communicating chemical hazards to

employees in the manufacturing sector, and to pre-

empt any state law pertaining to this subject. Any

state which desires to assume responsibility, in this

area may do so only under the provisions of section

18 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (29

U.S.C. 651 et seq.) which deals with state jurisdic-

tion and state plans.

29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a) (2). Once again, we are faced

with the term “state” and its meaning as intended by

17a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

OSHA. This time, however, some guidance has been pro-

vided.

In the preambles to both the proposed regulations and

the final regulations, OSHA made evident its intent to

preempt both state and local regulations. For instance,

in the final regulations, while making clear that the pri-

mary intent of the standard was to protect employees, the

agency also noted:

Another reason many participants in the rule-

making support the need for a Federal standard is

the recent proliferation of state and local right-

to-know laws. Most companies in the manufacturing

sector have business dealings which involve inter-

state commerce, and are thus subject to numerous

different and potential conflicting regulations.

48 Fed. Reg. 58,283 (1983).

Approximately twelve states and six local govern-

ments have some type of regulation related to the

identification of hazardous substances. About thir-

teen other states and three other local governments

have introduced proposed legislation either in this

legislative session or in previous sessions. They cover

different lists of substances, have different reporting

requirements, serve different purposes, have different

labeling and material safety data sheet requirements,

and have different educational and training require-

ments.

The potential for conflicting or cumulatively bur-

densome State and local laws has been acknowledged

by industry representatives to be immense. As stated

above, this subject was cited in many comments sub-

mitted prior to the hearing, in presentations made

during the hearings, and in post-hearing comments.

18a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

By promulgating a Federal standard, OSHA is in

a position to reduce the regulatory burden posed by

multiple state laws. In the final standard, OSHA

preempts State laws which deal with hazard commu-

nication requirements for employees in the manufac-

turing sector, except in those States with a State

plan which have a standard that regulates in this

area.

Id. at 53,284.

The trial court refused to give effect to OSHA’s inten-

tion to preempt as set forth in the preamble for two

reasons. First, citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.

281 (1979), the court determined that it was prohibited

from relying on the preamble in order to construe

OSHA’s intent in § 1910.1200(a) (2). -This court ruled

that express preemption found outside the text of the

regulations was not effective.

Brown, however, is not controlling. The regulations

under review in Brown were essentially treated by the

agency as interpretative rules, and interested parties

were not afforded the notice of proposed rulemaking re-

quired by substantive rules under the Administrative

Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). Because the regula-

tions were not properly promulgated as substantive rules,

and therefore were not the product of procedures which

Congress prescribed as necessary prerequisites to give a

regulation the binding effect of law, they could not be

relied upon. 441 U.S. at 315.

Here, there is no question as to whether the regulations

were validly promulgated. Moreover, both the proposed

and final regulations, along with the preambles indicating

OSHA’s intent to preempt state and local laws, were pub-

lished, and thus interested parties were given notice. In

Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De La Cuesta,

458 U.S. 141, 158 (1981), the Court made clear that the

preamble to a regulation is valid evidence of the admin-

strative construction of the regulation.

pie Me»

19a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

The trial court rejected De La Cuesta, stating that the

preamble cannot have preemptive effect. We need not

decide whether this is a correct ruling or not since the

preamble here only stands as evidence of OSHA’s intent

as to the regulation which expressly states its compre-

hensive effect. In other words, we look to the preamble

only after it becomes clear that OSHA intended the regu-

lation to have preemptive effect: the preamble does not

establish that intent, hut only assists in determining the

scope of OSHA’s “comprehensive” standard.

The second reason the trial court gave for rejecting

OSHA’s attempt to preempt both state and local regula-

tions was that such preemption would not be within

OSHA’s authority. Relying on the structure, provisions,

and legislative history of the OSH Act, the trial court

concluded that Congress intended that the law of political

subdivisions should not be expressly preempted. Since

OSHA’s attempt to extend the preemptive effect of its

regulations to localities, when localities are not expressly

preempted by section 18 of the OSH Act, contradicted

Congress’ intent as construed by the trial court, the court

held that the regulations could not operate to preempt

the Akron ordinance.

The trial court was correct that OSHA may not pre-

empt local law if that position is inconsistent with clearly

expressed congressional intent. Nevertheless, as indicated

above, we have been able to find no indication of con-

gressional intent on this question. And if Congress has

not directly addressed the precise question at issue, or

the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the spe-

cific issue, the question for the court is whether the

agency’s action is based on a permissible construction of

the statute. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources

Division, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).

“The power of an administrative agency to administer

a congressionally created . . . program necessarily re-

quires the formulation of policy and the making of rules

20a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

to fill any gap left, implictly or explicitly, by Congress.”

Id. (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).

If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency

to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to

the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the

statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations

are given controlling weight unless they are arbi-

trary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the stat-

ute. Sometimes legislative delegation to an agency

on a particular question is implicit rather than ex-

plicit. In such a case, a court may not-substitute its

own construction of a statutory provision for a rea-

sonable interpretation made by the administrator of

an agency.

467 U.S. at 843-44. The Court has long recognized that

considerable weight should be accorded to an executive

department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is en-

trusted to administer, and the principle of deference to

administrative interpretations “has been consistently fol-

lowed by the Court whenever decision as to the meaning

or reach of a stautory policy in the given situation has

depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting

the matters subjected to agency regulations.” Jd. at 844

(citations omitted).

Thus, if the choice made by the agency represents a

reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were

committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should

not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its

legislative history that the accommodation is not one that

Congress would have sanctioned. Jd. at 845. The respon-

sibility for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices

and resolving the struggle between competing views of

the public interest are not judicial ones: “Our Constitu-

tion vests such responsibilities in the political branches.”

Id. at 866 (citing 7VA v. Hill, 487 U.S. 1538, 195

(1978) ).

21a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

OSHA’s desire to achieve uniformity, when not charged

by Congress with such a goal, does not undercut the pre-

emptive effect of the regulation. OSHA could legitimately

determine that uniformity would aid in the administra-

tion and enforcement of, and compliance with, its stand-

ard. In other words, we cannot assume that OSHA has,

in violation of its statutory mandate, put the desire for

uniformity, i.e, minimizing the burden on commerce,

ahead of its mission to provide a safe and healthful work-

place. The regulations do not suggest that this is the case.

In the absence of any clearly expressed congressional in-

tent to the contrary, and giving OSHA the deference to

which it is entitled, we hold that the Hazard Communi-

cation Standard preempts local regulation in SIC Codes

20-39.

III.

Because of the nature of the trial judge’s disposition of

this case, she did not reach the question as to whether the

entire ordinance is preempted. It is clear that the ordi-

nance is preempted to the extent that it attempts to regu-

late employee safety in the workplace in SIC Codes 20-39.

However, the ordinance also had as its purpose protection

of the public and the providing of information to city fire

fighters and public health officials regarding toxic and

hazardous substances. It must also be determined whether

the preemption provisions may be severed from the bal-

ance of the ordinance.

We decline to make the determinations for the first

time on appeal. Rather, we will remand this matter to

the district court to determine which portions of the

ordinance are preempted and whether those portions that

are not preempted are severable.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED to the

district court for further consideration consistent with

this opinion.

ee

22a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Civil Action No. C85-3658A

OHIO MANUFACTURERS’ ASSOCIATION, et al.,

ws. Plaintiffs

CITY OF AKRON, et al.,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

[Filed February 7, 1986]

ALDRICH, J.

This case is before the Court on an expedited basis

following the December 5, 1985 issuance of a Temporary

Restraining Order enjoining defendants from enforcing

Akron, Ohio Codified Ordinnaces ch. 1830 (“Chapter

1830” or “the Akron ordinance’), entitled “Hazardous

and Toxic Substances,” on its effective date of December

17, 1985.’ Plaintiffs are the Ohio Manufacturers’ Asso-

ciation, a non-profit membership association representing

sixty-one employers in the City of Akron which are classi-

fied within Standard Industrial Classification (“SIC’’)

Codes 20 through 39, and Akron Selle Company, an

Akron contract metal stamping company employing twenty

persons and classified within SIC Code 34.? Defendants

1 The parties agreed to abide by the terms of the temporary re-

straining order until plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunc-

tion was resolved by this Court. Subsequently they agreed to con-

solidate the resolution of the motion with a trial on the merits

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a) (2).

2SIC Codes 20 through 39 consist primarily of categories of

manufacturers as set forth in the Standard Industrial Classifica-

23a

Opinion of the District Court

are the city of Akron; Akron’s Health Commission;

Akron’s Health Department; C. William Kech, M.D.,

Director of Health; and Harold K. Stubbs, Director of

Law. The latter four defendants share responsibility for

the enforcement of Chapter 1830. Nine Akron community

groups have been permitted to file a brief as amici

curiae.®

The complaint summarizes the plaintiff’s claims:

The basis for plaintiffs’ action is that Chapter

1830 1) violates the Supremacy Clause of the United

States Constitution in that it conflicts with and has

been preempted by the Occupational Safety and

Health Act (hereinafter “OSH Act’), 29 U.S.C. §651

et seqg., and the Hazard Communication Standard

promulgated pursuant to the OSH Act, 29 C.F.R.

§ 1910.1200; 2) violates the Commerce Clause of

the United States Constitution in that it constitutes

an excessive and undue burden on interstate com-

merce; and 3) violates Article XVIII, Section 3, of

the Ohio Constitution in that certain applications of

it conflict with and have been preempted by Ohio

Revised Code Section 3745.05 (D) (3).

Subsequent to oral argument on January 17, 1986, the

parties stipulated a dismissal of the third cause of action.

However, plaintiffs still seek a declaration that Chapter

tion Manual published by the U.S. Office of Management and

Budget.

3 The amici curiae participating in the brief are the Akron Cath-

oli¢ Commission; the Akron-Medina County Labor Council, AFL-

CIO; Council of Block Club Presidents; International Chemical

Workers Union, AFL-CIO; Ohio Public Interest Campaign; Oppor-

tunity Parish Ecumenical Neighborhood-Ministry (“OPEN-M”);

United Rubber Workers, Local 2 Retirees; United Rubber, Cork,

Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America; and Akron Summit Com-

munity Action Agency. Many of these organizations were active

in the sponsorship, drafting, and review of the Akron Ordinance.

All assert that their constituencies will be affected by the resolution

of this case. Brief of Amici Curiae at 2-6.

—eeeeeee

24a

Opinion of the District Court

1830 is unconstitutional both on its face, and as applied

to certain employers.

Upon consideration, and for the reasons set forth below,

the plaintiffs’ motion is denied, and judgment is entered

for the defendants.

Jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).

I.

A.

Akron’s “Right-to-Known” ordinance, No. 771-1984, is

designated “Chapter 1830: Hazardous and Toxie Sub-

stances.” Its preamble indicates that the ordinance was

promulgated to protect workers, firefighters, other public

officials, and the public against the dangers of toxic sub-

stances used in Akron workplaces. Chapter 1830 is ap-

plicable to employers within the City of Akron which

are categorized by the enumerated Standard Industrial

Classification Codes (“employers”). &§ 1830.01, 1830.03

(i). Among explicitly exempted employers and substances

are federal, state, and local governments and their units

(not including Akron itself) laboratories, goods trans-

ported through Akron, consumer products and food in-

tended for consumption by the general public, and de

minimis amounts of hazardous substances. § 1830.02.

The “hazardous chemicals” regulated by the ordinance

are designated in a master list to be produced by Akron’s

Health Commission in accordance with a minimum list

established by Chapter 1830. §1830.05. The Health Com-

mission is appointed administrator and enforcement agent

of the ordinance. § 1830.04.

Chapter 1830 requires employers to label each con-

tainer of hazardous material with its chemcial name,

any applicable Department of Transportation labels, and

cancer ard reproductive warnings when appropriate

$ 1830.07\a). Placard or signs may replace labels when

25a

Opinion of the District Court

stationary containers within a work area have the same

hazards, or when labels are susceptible to damage.

$§ 1830.07(b), (c).

Each employer is mandated to either obtain or create

a material safety data sheet (“MSDS”) for each hazard-

ous chemical it uses, manufactures or stores. The MSDS

for chemicals not classified as trade secrets must report

relevant health and safety information, including chemi-

cal and common names of ingredients, physical and chemi-

cal characteristics, known acute and chronic health effects

of exposure, primary routes of entry, permissible ex-

posure limits established by the Occupation Safety and

Health Administration (“OSHA”), precautions for safe

handling and use, control measures, and emergency and

first aid procedures. § 1830.10(a). Employees who re-

quest to see an MSDS shall be provided with a copy by

their employers by the end of the next weekday following

the request. § 1830.10(b). Processors, users or storers of

hazardous chemicals who have not been provided with an

MSDS by their suppliers or manufacturers must take

prescribed steps to procure a copy following an employee

request. § 1830.10(d).

Employers governed by Chapter 1830 who manufac-

ture, use, or store hazardous substances must estab-

lish workplace training programs for their employees.

§ 1830.06(b). These programs must explain the hazards

of chemicals to which employees are exposed; the em-

ployer’s method of hazard communication; appropriate

work practices and protective measures; and emergency

procedures. § 1830.11(a). Employees shall also be in-

formed of their rights to receive information on hazard-

ous chemicals in their workplace, to request an inspection

of the workplace, and to be free from retaliatory dis-

charge, discipline, or other discrimination for exercising

a Chapter 1830 right. §§ 1830.11(b), 1830.15.

Each January, employers subject to the ordinance are

required to file a list of all work areas in the workplace

which contain hazardous chemicals. § 1830.09 (a) (1).

SS Ee

26a

Opinion of the District Court

Any spill, leak or emission of a toxic substance which

must be reported to a federal or state agency pursuant

to applicable law must also be reported to Akron’s Health

Commission designee immediately. § 1830.09 (a) (2).

Temporary variances, subject to renewal, to the label-

ing provisions of Chapter 1830 may be obtained upon

either a showing of undue or unnecessary hardship for

a specific employer, workplace, or work area, or for a

pre-existing program in substantial compliance. $1830.08

(a). Trade secret protection is also available to employers

upon special showing. A specific chemical name of an

eligible substance may be withheld if its properties and

effects are disclosed upon the MSDS and if it is not a

designated carcinogen. § 1830.14(a). However, an em-

ployer cannot refuse to provide the specific chemical iden-

tity to medical or fire personnel in an emergency, nor to

an employees who is regularly exposed to the toxin who

agrees to execute a confidentiality agreement. §§ 1830.14

(f), (i). Upon a showing that an employee requesting

the chemical identity of a substance for which trade

secrecy is claimed is eligible for such information, the

Director of Health’s designee may subject the employer

to citation. § 1830.14(n).

Enforcement of Chapter 1880 is delegated to the Health

Department, the Health Commission, and the Law Di-

rector of Akron. §§ 1830.12, 1830.13. Compliance with

the ordinance was required of employers of fifty-one or

more employees within one year of passage, i.e., Decem-

ber 17, 1985, and for employers of fifty or fewer em-

ployees, by June 17, 1986. § 1830.17.

B.

Pursuant to his power to promulgate standards pro-

vided in § 6 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act

of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1982) (“OSH Act”), the Sec-

retary of Labor (‘Secretary’) issued an occupational

27a

Opinion of the District Court

health and safety standards entitled “Hazard Communi-

eation Standard” (“Standard”) on November 25, 1983.

See United Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 763 F.2d

728, 7385 (3d Cir. 1985). The stated purpose of the

Standard is “to ensure that the hazards of all chemicals

produced or imported by chemical manufacturers or im-

porters are evaluated and that information concerning

their hazards is transmitted to affected employers and

employees within the manufacturing sector.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 1910.1200(a) (1985).* The Standard expressly intends

“to preempt any state law pertaining to this subject.

Any state which desires to assume responsibility in this

area may also do so under the provisions of section 18

of the Occupational Safety and Health Act . . . which

deals with state jurisdiction and state plans.” § 1910.1200

(b).

The Standard applies to a specified class of employers

who are involved in manufacturing using hazardous

chemicals. Chemical manufacturers and importers are

required to assess the hazards of their products; dis-

tributors must transmit relevant information with the

products; and employers in SIC Codes 20 through 39 are

instructed to provide information about the hazardous

chemicals to exposed employees. § 1910.1200(b). Regula-

tion of laboratories is less stringent, § 1910.1200(b) (3),

and certain products, such as foods, regulated pesticides,

and tobacco products, are partially or entirely exempted

from regulation by the Standard. §§ 1910.1200(b) (3)-

(5).

Instead w° defining which chemicals are “hazardous”

by the creation of a master list by OSHA or its desig-

nee, the responsibility for making hazard determinations

is delegated to chemical manufacturers and importers.

*Unless otherwise indicated, al! regulations contained in the

Standard are located in Volume 29 of the Code of Federal Regula-

tions, in the 1985 edition.

———————eee een

28a

Opinion of the District Court

§ 1910.1200(d). Employers are expected to make these

determinations only if they choose not to rely upon the

determinations of the chemical manufacturers or im-

porters. § 1910.1200(d)(1). The Standard enumerates

lists of presumptively hazardous chemicals which persons

evaluating chemical dangers should consider established

as hazardous. § 1910.1200(d) (3). While including some

of the same lists of hazardous chemicals as those which

the Akron Health Commission is required to review un-

der the Akron ordinance when creating its master list,

the Standard’s lists are not identical.

The Standard mandates that chemical manufacturers,

importers and distributors label hazardous chemicals

with the substance’s identity, “appropriate” hazard warn-

ings, and their names and addresses. § 1910.1200(f) (1).

Employers must label each container of hazardous chemi-

cals in the workplace with the chemical’s identity and

hazard warnings. § 1910-1200 (f) (4).

MSDS requirements are also part of the Standard.

The federal regulations require a list of information

similar to Akron’s ordinance: chemical and common

names; physical and chemical character; physical haz-

ards; primary route of entry; OSHA permissible expo-

sure limit; potential carcinogens; generally applicable

precautions and controls; and emergency and first aid

procedures. § 1910.1200(g) (2). Chemical manufactur-

ers and importers are directed to provide MSDS’s to

distributors and manufacturing purchasers, § 1910.1200

(g) (6), and employers are expected to make them read-

ily accessible to employees during each work shift.

§ 1910.1200(g) (8).

Employers must develop written communications pro-

grams to administer the labeling, MSDS, and employee

information and training requirements of the Stand-

ard. § 1910.1200(e). Employees must be informed about

the availability of this written program, the require-

29a

Opinion of the District Court

ments of the Standard, and the presence of hazardous

chemicals in their work area. § 1910.1200(h) (1). Em-

ployee training should explain the physical and health

hazards, protective measures available to employees, and

the details of the hazard communications program.

§ 1910.1200 (h) (2).

Like the Akron ordinance, the Standard makes trade

secret protection available when the properties and ef-

fects of an eligible chemical are disclosed and the specific

chemical identity will be made available to health profes-

sionals. § 1910.1200(i). In an emergency, a chemical

manufacturer, importer, or employer must immediately

disclose the chemical identity to treating health profes-

sionals without a written statement of need or an exe-

cuted confidentiality statement. § 1910.1200(i) (2). Ina

non-emergency situation, health professionals may only

learn the identity of a trade secret by submitting an

elaborate written statement and an executed confiden-

tiality agreement. § 1910.1200(i) (3).

The Chemical Hazardous Communication Standard re-

quires chemical manufacturers, importers, and distribu-

tors to be in compliance with its provisions by November

25, 1985. Employers in the manufacturing sector must

comply by May 25, 1986. § 1910.1200(j).

II.

Plaintiffs argue that Chapter 1830 is invalid as ap-

plies to employees in SIC Codes 20 through 39, since

these employers are covered by the federal standard reg-

ulating hazard communication in the workplace.’ First,

they assert that Akron’s ordinance is expressly preempted

by 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1982) and 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(b)

5 Plaintiffs clearly are not challenging the applicability of Chap-

ter 1830 to employers in other SIC Codes. Plaintiffs’ Brief in

Support of Temporary Restraining Order at 20.

Se

80a

Opinion of the District Court

(1985). Alternatively, they argue that Chapter 1830 is

impliedly preempted by the goals of the OSH Act and

the Standard, by Chapter 1830’s “true regulatory in-

tent,” and by a conflict between the two regulations. On

consideration, and for the reasons set forth below, this

Court cannot agree that Chapter 1830 is expressly pre-

empted, and it does not find any portion of the ordinance

is impliedly preempted.

A. Standards for Federal Preemption of States’ Regu-

latory Power

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-

tion provides:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States

which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all

Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the

Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme

Law of the Land; the Judges in every State shall be

bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws

of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. Under the preemption analy-

sis derived from the Supremacy Clause, “[t]he purpose

of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.” Metropolitan

Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, US. ;

, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 2393 (1985) (quoting Malone v.

White Motor Corp., 485 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) ).

“Pre-emption may be either express or imr’ied, and ‘is

compelled whether Congress’ command is exp! .citly stated

in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its

structure and purpose.’” Fidelity Federal Savings &

Loan Association v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-153

(1982) (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U/S.

519, 525 (1977)). Federal regulations are entitled to

the same preemptive effect enjoyed by federal statutes.

Fidelity Federal, 458 U.S. at 153-154.

8la

Opinion of the District Court

Implied preemption is implicated when there is an

“actual conflict” between state and federal law.

Such a conflict arises when “compliance with both

federal and state regulations is a physical impossi-

bility,” Floride Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.

Paul, 373 U.S. 182, 142-143 (1963), or when state

law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and

execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-

gress,” Hines v. Davidowitz, [312 U.S. 52, 67.

(1941)]. See generally Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.

Crisp, 467 U.S. , , 104 S.Ct. 2694,

(1984).

Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Medical Lab-

oratories, Inc., US. : , 105 S.Ct. 2871, 2875

(1985). See also L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d

201, 207 (6th Cir. 1985).

Traditionally states have been permitted considerable

latitude to regulate public health and safety pursuant to

their police power. Metropolitan Life Insurance,

U.S. at , 105 S.Ct. at 2398. To strike down a state’s

health and safety regulation, Congress’ intent must be

clearly manifested. Southern Pacific Co. v. State of Ari-

zona, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945); see Jones, 430 U.S. at

525.

B. Express Preemption by the OSH Act

Plaintiffs rest their argument that Chapter 1830 is

expressly preempted upon §18 of the OSH Act, 29

U.S.C. § 667 (1982) (“§ 18”), which provides:

~(a) Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any State

agency or court from asserting jurisdiction under

State law over any occupational safety or health is-

sue with respect to which no standard is in effect

under Section 655 of this title.

(b) Any State which, at any time, desires to assume

responsibility for development and _ enforcement

therein of occupational safety and health standards

32a

Opinion of the District Court

relating to any occupational safety or health issue

with respect to which a Federal standard has been

promulgated under section 655 of this title shall

submit a State plan for the development of such

standards and their enforcement.

The Secretary of Labor shall approve a state plan sub-

mitted pursuant to §18(b) which meets the conditions

listed in § 18(c). 29 U.S.C. § 667(c) (1982).

Plaintiffs argue that because the Standard regulates

the area of chemical hazard communication and because

Akron has not had, and cannot have, its ordinance ap-

proved by the Secretary, Akron is precluded from using

Chapter 1830 to regulate such matter. They buttress

their contention by citing the Secretary’s regulations in-

terpreting §18. Title 29 C.F.R. § 1901.2 (1985) pro-

vides in relevant part:

Section 18(a) of the Act is read as preventing any

State agency or court from asserting jurisdiction

under State law over any occupational safety or

health issue with respect to which a Federal standard

has been issued under section 6 of the Act.

The Standard itself indicates its preemptive effect:

This occupational safety and health standard is

intended to address comprehensively the issue of eval-

uating and communicating chemical hazards to em-

ployees in the manufacturing section, and to prevent

any state law pertaining to this subject. Any state

which desires to assume responsibility in this area

may only do so under the provisions of section 18

of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (29

U.S.C. 651 et seg.) which deals with state jurisdic-

tion and state plans.

29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a) (2) (1985) (“§ 1910.1200 (a)

(2)”).

The courts which have considered the preemption of

state right-to-know acts by the Hazard Communication

—————

33a

Opinion of the District Court

Standard have held that these state statutes are pre-

empted as applied to employers in SIC Codes 20 through

39 on matters of workplace safety dealt with in the

Standard. Auchter, 763 F.2d at 736, cited in New Jersey

State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587,

593 (3d Cir. 1985) (New Jersey Right-to-Know Act) ;

Manufacturers Association of Tri-County v. Knepper,

No. 85-1027, slip op. (M.D. Pa. Dee. 12, 1985) (Pennsyl-

vania Right-to-Know Act). Defendants, however, distin-

guish these cases as involving state, rather than munici-

pal, right-to-know statutes.

Defendants’ contention is that the word “state” as it

is used in the preemption provisions of the OSH Act and

the Secretary’s regulations excludes political subdivisions

such as the City of Akron. They rely upon the definition

of “State” set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 652(7) (1982):

The term “State” includes a State of the United

States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the

Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and the

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

The failure to include politiical subdivisions within this

definition, the defendants argue, means that Congress did

not intend to preempt municipalities in § 18. The legis-

lative history, however, demonstrates that the definition

of “state” was not drafted with the intent of exempting

political subdivisions from preemption. When introducing

this definition as an amendment, Senator Javits of New

York stated:

Mr. President, the sole purpose of this amendment

is to make eligible to file what is called a State plan

those territories and possessions of the United States

which are spelled out in the amendment. This matter

is not otherwise defined in the bill.

Subcomm. on Labor of the Sen. Comm. on Labor and

Public Welfare, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., Legislative History

aii

84a

Opinion of the District Court

of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, at

504 (1971) (emphasis added). Given Senator Javits’

purpose for defining “state”, the definition obviously does

not reflect at all upon Congress’ willingness or unwill-

ingness to preempt municipal ordinances.

Nevertheless, the absence of language regarding the

preemption of laws of political subdivisions in the OSH

Act is remarkable. As defendants point out, Congress

has explicitly included political subdivisions in other pro-

visions of the OSH Act 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1) (1982)

(Secretary may promulgate standards based upon infor-

mation submitted by a political subdivision) ; 29 U.S.C.

§ 667(c) (6) (1982) (an approved state plan must assure

the Secretary that the state will establish an occupational

safety and health program protecting employees of polit-

ical subdivisions) ; 29 U.S.C. § 673(b) (2) (1982) (See-

retary may make grants to political subdivisions for de-

velopment and administration of statistical programs).

Furthermore, countless federal regulatory statutes con-

tain preemption provisions whieh explicitly include politi-

cal subdivisions. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of

1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7548 (1982), Medical Device Amend-

ments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1982); Poison Preven-

tion Packaging Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1476 (1982) ; Lead-Based

Paint Poison Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4846 (1982) ;

Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15

U.S.C. § 1920(a) (1982); Egg Products Inspection Act,

21 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1982); Consumer Products Safety

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2075 (1982); Flammable Fabrics Act,

lo U.S.C. § 1203 (1982) ° Congress’ practice of explicitly

®In their brief, plaintiffs cite Rollins Environmental Services,

Inc. v. Parish of Saint James, 775 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1985), and

Warren County v. State of North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276

(E.D.N.C. 1981), for the proposition that federal regulations pre-

empting state law also preempt the laws of political subdivisions.

Defendants correctly respond that these cases interpreted §18 of

the Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a) (2) (B)

35a

Opinion of the District Court

preempting political subdivisions, then, militates against

the inferences that Congress either forgot to include polit-

ical subdivisions in § 18 or implicitly included them in the

9 7

word “state’’.

The purposes of the OSH Act also support the conclu-

sion that § 18 does not include political subdivisions. The

statute provides:

The Congress declares it to be its purpose and

policy, through the exercise of its powers to regulate

commerce among the several States and with foreign

nations and to provide for the general welfare, to

assure so far as possible every working man and

woman in the Nation safe and healthful working

conditions and to preserve our human resources... .

29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982). This overriding purpose of

the OSH Act is exhaustively documented. See e.g., S.

Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S.

(1982), which specifically preempts laws of a “State or political

subdivision of a State.”

™The absence of discussion of the preemption of the laws of

political subdivision in the 1277-page legislative history of the

OSH Act also undermines the assertion that Congress meant to

expressly include political subdivisions in the preemption provision.

At oral argument, plaintiffs proffered the Privileges and Im-

munities Clause of the Fourteenth Aniendment to the United

States Constitution as an example of language which has been

interpreted to apply to localities as well as states, although words

denoting political subdivisions do not appear in the text. Plaintiffs

might just as aptly point out that the First Amendment applies to

the states, although it purports to limit the activities of Congress.

These examples of constitutional interpretation are inapposite to

determine whether “Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the

statute’s language.” Jones, 480 U.S. at 525. Plaintiffs’ argument,

in the words of defendants’ counsel, “asks the Court to find express

what is not express.” The doctrine of express preemption by its

terms requires strict construction, rather than the expansive con-

struction routinely applied to constitutional provisions.

—_—

36a

Opinion of the District Court

Code Cong. & Ad. News 5117 (1970); McClintock, Fore-

word, and Meeds, A Legislative History of OSHA, 9

Gonz. L. Rev. 317, 327 (1974).

Plaintiffs argue, however, that another important goal

of the OSH Act was “to establish healthy work environ-

ments in a uniform way with minimum burden on inter-

state commerce.” Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Tempo-

rary Restraining Order at 22. The Third Circuit Court

of Appeals has acknowledged that a desire to reduce regu-

latory burdens is apparent in the Standard, but it con-

cluded:

That purpose is arguably at odds with congres-

sional intention that the OSH Act provide a federal

f.oor for safety in the workplace. Reduction of bur-

dens posed by mulitple state laws does not appear to

have been a significant congressional concern; rather,

Congress favored a uniform federal law so that those

states providing vigorous protection would not be dis-

advantaged by those that did not. Subcomm, on

Labor of the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Public Wel-

fare, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., Legislative History of the

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub.L.

No. 91-596, at 144, 418, 444 (1971).

Auchter, 763 F.2d at 734. See also Hughey, 774 F.2d

at 593. This viewpoint is shared by at least one com-

mentator, who dismissed the argument that the OSH Act

intended to minimize regulatory burdens:

Inconvenience to employers is an invalid objection,

because Congress did not intent to protect employers’

convenience. If it had, Congress would have pre-

empted all state standards.

Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in

Regulatory Federalism, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1429, 1431, 1457-

1458 (1984).

-

87a

Opinion of the District Court

In a different context, the Supreme Court has ruled

that the OSH Act’s purpose was to provide protection to

workers, despite high costs to business. In American

Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490

(1981), the Court construed § 6(b) (5) of the OSH Act,

which provides in pertinent part:

The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing

with toxic materials or harmful physical agents

under this subsection, shall set the standard which

most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the

basis of the best available evidence, that no employee

will suffer material impairment of health or func-

tional capacity even if such employee has regular

exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard

for the period of his working life. . . .

29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5) (1982). In order to reach its

holding that this provision required the Secretary to con-

duct a feasibility analysis rather than a cost-benefit anal-

ysi , the Court found that Congress placed “the ‘benefit’

of worker health above all other considerations save those

making attainment of this ‘benefit’ unachievable.” Jd. at

509. This holding was mandated by the Court’s lengthy

and painstaking review of the legislaitve history of the

OSH Act:

The congressional Reports and debates certainly

confirm that Congress meant “feasible” and nothing

else in using that term. Congress was concerned that

the Act might be thought to require achievement of

absolute safety, an impossible standard, and there-

fore insisted that health and safety goals be capable

of economic and technological accomplishment. Per-

haps most telling is the absence of any indication

whatsoever that Congress intended OSHA to conduct

its own cost-benefit analysis before promulgating a

toxic material or harmful physical agent standard.

The legislative history demonstrates conclusively that

38a

Opinion of the District Court

Congress was fully aware that the Act would impose

real and substantial costs of compliance on industry,

and believed that such costs were part of the cost of

doing business.

Id. at 514 (emphasis added). The Court concluded,

“When Congress passed the Occupational Safety and

Health Act in 1970, it chose te place pre-eminent value on

assuring employees a safe and healthful working environ-

ment, limited only by the feasibility of achieving such an

environment.” Jd. at 540.*

The conclusion that worker safety, rather than a con-

cern about regulatory burden created by inconsistency,

motivated Congress to pass the OSH Act is substantially

supported by legislative history, academic commentary,

and the OSH Act itself. Section 18 of the OSH Act sets

a federal floor on occupational health and safety that

covers every state and territory of this country. With

the floor established, states are free to enact more strin-

gent requirements via a § 18(c) approved plan. See 29

_U.S.C. 667(c) (2) (1982) (standards promulgated under

approved state plan must be “at least as effective in pro-

viding safe healthful employment and places of employ-

ment as the standards promulgated under section 655.

. .”’). A municipality’s freedom to also promulgate

higher standards would not undercut that floor, but would

support the policy of creating safer workplaces.’

Plaintiffs advance numerous unpersuasive reasons for

not interpreting Congress’ purpose as one of providing

* The Supreme Court's construction of the OSH Act in Donovan

is similar to the method used by this Court. The Supreme Court

contrasted other federal statutes explicitly requiring cost benefit

analysis, id. at 510-511, and it analyzed the policy of the OSH Act

to reach the decision that the word “feasible” should be strictly

construed.

* Less stringent municipal standards would be impliedly pre-

empted, since they would act as an obstacle to Congressional policy.

See discussion of standards for implied preemption, supra at 11.

39a

Opinion of the District Court

a “federal floor’. -They argue that legislative history

demonstrates that Congress rejected the idea that the

OSH Act should operate as a floor, apparently relying

upon the following statement:

Both versions of the bill allowed agreements be-

tween the Secretary and a State whereby the State

could continue enforcement of its health and safety

standards pending final action on the State plan. The

Senate bill limited such agreements to standards

which were not in conflict with Federal standards.

The Senate bill also provided that a State standard

which was more stringent than a Federal standard

was not to be regarded as one in conflict with that

Federal standard. The Senate receded.

S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S.

Code Cong. & Ad. News, at 5238 (1970). However, this

Court cannot agree that Congress’ failure to adopt the

Senate’s bill indicates an over-riding interest in uniform-

ity, particularly in light of its willingness to permit states

to enforce their own more stringent rules after the Sec-

retary has approved their programs pursuant to § 18(b).

Second, plaintiffs argue that if the OSH Act were in-

tended to provide only minimum protections for workers,

there would be no reason for Congress to include § 18,

since the OSH Act itself would accomplish that goal in

the absence of state participation. The legislative history

shows, however, that Congress intended to shift the en-

foreement of occupational health and safety regulations

to the states, and that it promulgated § 18 with that in-

tention:

As an encouragement for State action, the bill pro-

vides Federal financial support to assist the States

in assuming their own programs for worker health

and safety. Planning grants with up to 90 percent

Federal participation, and program grants up to 50

percent Federal participation are provided.

40a

Opinion of the District Court

The 90 percent grant is designed to aid the States

in identifying needs, developing State plans and pro-

grams for collecting statistical data, increasing per-

sonnel capabilities, and improving administration and

enforcement. The 50 percent Federal grant is made

available to assist States in carrying out the occupa-

tional safety and health programs contained in their

plans, as well as programs concerning occupational

safety and health statistics.

S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S.

Code Cong. & Ad. News, at 5195 (1970). Moreover, an

appellate court construing § 18 observed:

In the application of a new federal statute, there

is a likely Congressional contemplation of maximiz-

ing use of existing state machinery. “Federalism”

cannot be invoked categorically where it would defeat

the national objective. A sensitivity to state partici-

pation has value, however, where the state adminis-

tration can be integrated with federal application—

either as a supplement, or as a stopgap measure, or

as a delegation under federal control.

American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial

Organizations, Industrial Union Department v. Marshall,

570 F.2d 1030, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Given the obvious

rationale for § 18, plaintiffs’ contention that there would

be no purpose for § 18 if the OSH Act meant to provide

minimum, rather than uniform, standards is wholly un-

tenable.

Third, plaintiffs cite the remarks of several senators

in the legislative history for the proposition that uni-

formity was an intent when they wrote the OSH Act.

The Court is not persuaded that these few statements of

individual debaters indicate that the OSH Act has the

subsidiary purpose plaintiffs attribute to it. Further-

more, the Court is not convinced that all of the state-

4la

Opinion of the District Court

ments refer to the unfairness of regulatory burden on

employers rather than the unfairness that “efforts of the

more vigorous states are inevitably undermined by the

shortsightedness of others.” S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong.,

2d Sess., reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, at

5180 (1970).

Finally, plaintiffs rely on Township of Greenwich v.

Mobil Oil Corp., 504 F. Supp. 1275 (D.N.J. 1981), in

which the court held that the township’s right to enforce

its zoning ordinance and building code was not preempted

by the OSH Act. Enroute to its decision that preemption

of those ordinances would be contrary to Congressional

intent as evidenced in the legislative history, the court

stated, “We agree that if plaintiff Township sought,

through the issuance of Notices of Violation, to control

the working areas of defendant Mobil’s refinery, plain-

tiff’s attempt to regulate would be preempted by the Oc-

cupational Safety and Health Act.’’ This remark was un-

necessary to the resolution of the Greenwich case, and

this Court doubts that the issue was subjected to the

exhaustive briefing and argument afforded in this case.

The Court, therefore, is unpersuaded by the dictum of the

New Jersey district court.

Plaintiffs also cite a multitude of cases holding that

preemptions of state law are to be broadly construed in

order to give life to the Supremacy Clause. However, this

argument ignores the fact that express preemption, by

definition, must be clearly manifested, especially when

local health and safety provisions are endangered. Jones,

430 U.S. at 525. When § 18 of the OSH Act is construed

in light of its motivating purpose—worker safety—and

in comparison to other federal preemptory provisions

which routinely preempt the laws of political subdivisions

in explicit terms, this Court cannot conclude that Con-

gress’ intent to preempt laws such as Chapter 1830 is

“clearly manifested.” Accordingly, this Court holds that

dng

42a

Opinion of the District Court

§ 18 does not expressly preempt Akron’s ordinance, which

regulates matters already regulated in OSHA’s standard.

C. Express Preemption by the Standard

Plaintiffs urge that in the event this Court finds that

the Akron ordinance is not expressly preempted by § 18

of the OSH Act, it should construe § 1910.1200(a) (2) of

the Standard as expressly preempting Chapter 1830 by

virtue of OSHA’s language reported in the Federal Reg-

ister and the Congressional Record. This Court does not

agree that interpretative language which is not part of

the regulation accords the Standard preemptive effect,

over political subdivisions. Moreover, even if such lan-

guage could be construed to mean that the regulations

were intended by OSHA to have preemptive effect over

municipalities, this Court would not accept such an in-

terpretation because of its obvious inconsistency with the

clear Congressional policy in the OSH Act.

1.

To support its position that OSHA expressly preempts

laws of political subdivisions despite § 1910.1200(a) (2)’s

failure to explicitly mention them, plaintiffs rely heavily

upon OSHA’s preambles to interim and final drafts of the

Standard. In particular, they cite OSHA’s language ex-

plaining the purposes of the Standard, which explicitly

states policies of uniformity. In the preamble to its reg-

ulations, OSHA states that its purpose was “to establish

uniform requirements for hazard communication in one

segment of industry, the manufacturing division.” 48

Fed. Reg. 53281 (1983). Various statements throughout

the report echo the rationale that “the promulgation of

a cost-effective federal standard is likely to reduce the

cost of complying with the various state and local right-

to-knew laws.” 48 Fed. Roe. 53329 (1983). Plaintiffs

identify “OSHA’s strongest expression of preemptive

48a

Opinion of the District Court

effect” as its explanation of the preemption lauguage in

its summary of the Standard as promulgated:

This preemption will serve to reduce the burden

on interstate commerce produced by conflicting state

and local regulations and will insure that all em-

ployees in the manufacturing sector are accorded the

same degree of protection. OSHA will examine care-

fully any state requests to regulate in this area to

determine any potentially burdensome impact on in-

terstate commerce as well as to ascertain whether

there is a compelling need for separate regulation.

48 Fed. Reg. 53334 (1983).

Plaintiffs also rely upon two cases in which the Su-

preme Court evaluated language in preambles to regula-

tions to decide what preemptive effect the regulations had.

In Fidelity Federal, 458 U.S. at 141, the Court looked at

the preamble accompanying a regulation promulgated by

the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to resolve “any

ambiguity in [the regulation’s] language... .” In Hills-

borough County, Florida, USS. at , 105 S.Ct. at

2371, the Court evaluated language in the preamble of

regulations promulgated by the Food and Drug Adminis-

tration to determine that local regulation of the collec-

tion of blood plasma was not intended to be preempted by

the agency.

However, the Supreme Court had earlier held that giv-

ing administrative language which was not within the

body of the regulations the same effect as if it were part

of the regulations violates the Administrative Procedure

Act, 5 U.S.C. §$§ 551-559. Chrysier Corp v. Brown, 441

U.S. 281 (1979). When asked to interpret the phrase

“authorized by law” in § 7(b) of the Trade Secrets Act,

18 U.S.C. § 1905 (“§ 7(b)”), the Court refused to read

“interpretive regulation of general statement of agency

policy” as authorization for purposes of § 7(b). Jd. at

44a

Opinion of the District Court

315-316. It distinguished interpretive language from

the substantive portions of regulations, since “such reg-

ulations are not properly promulgated as substantive

rules, and therefore not the product of procedures which

Congress prescribed as necessary prerequisites to giving

a regulation the binding effect of law.” Jd. at 315 (foot-

note omitted). Thus, the Court found that the failure

to subject interpretive language of the agency to public

scrutiny during rulemaking as required by 5 U.S.C. § 553

(b) precluded reliance on this language.

In light of Brown, the cases relied upon by plaintiffs

are distinguishable. The Court in Fidelity Federal, 458

U.S. at 158, n .18, recognizes the continuped vitality of

Chrysler Corp.:

Citing Chrysler Corp v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 315-

316 (1979), appellees characterize the preamble as

an interpretive regulation that does not have the

binding force of law and therefore cannot pre-empt

state law. But Chrysler Corp. is not on point be-

cause we conclude that § 545.8-3(f) itself supersedes

contrary state due-on-sale law; we look to the pre-

amble only for the administrative construction of the

regulation, to which “deference is . . . clearly in

order.” Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). We

need not consider, therefore, the pre-emptive effect

of the preamble standing alone.

In the present case, the plain words of § 1910.1200(a)

(2), without considering the preamble, will not support

an inference that, the Standard has a larger preemptive

effect than § 18 of the OSH Act. In effect, the plaintiffs

urge this Court to construe the Standard to preempt the

laws of political subdivisions because of OSHA’s inter-

pretation and analysis of its regulations—precisely the

case distinguished by the Court in Fidelity Federal.

Furthermore, plaintiffs’ citation to Hillsborough is also

inapposite. Hillsborough did not involve the interpreta-

See ey oe

Pl ee et ea ea |

45a

Opinion of the District Court

tion of an ostensibly “expressly” preemptive regulation;

instead, it looked to the interpretive language of an

agency to determine whether its comprehensive regula-

tion of the field was intended to preempt all state and

local regulation:

Moreover, because agencies normally address prob-

lems in a detailed manner and can speak through a

variety of means, including regulations, preambles,

interpretive statements, and responses to comments,

we can expect that they will make their intentions

clear if they intend for their regulations to be ex-

elusive. Thus, if an agency does not speak to the

question of pre-emption, we will pause before saying

that the mere volume and complexity of its regula-

tions indicate that the agency did in fact intend to

pre-empt.

—— US. at , 105 S.C. at 2377. Determining

whether a regulatory scheme is so exhaustive that it is

meant to preempt state or local regulation in its field of

law is an inexact science at best. Reliance on interpretive

statements by the agency is justified by the nature of the

analysis. Deciding whether preemption is express is, by

its terms, a much narrower inquiry. Thus, Hillsborough

does not require the conclusion that an agency’s preamble

to regulations can be read in conjunction with its pre-

emption provision to find that the regulations expressly

preempt local law.

Chrysler Corp., then, prohibits this Court from con-

struing § 1910.1200(a) (2) by reading OSHA’s preambles

into the Standard. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate

that Chrysler Corp. has been eroded, or that express pre-

emption may be found by reading language outside the

text of the regulations.

2.

Even if this Court could construe the Standard as ex-

pressly preempting the laws of political subdivisions such

46a

Opinion of the District Court

as Chapter 1830, it would not agree that OSHA was

within its authority when assigning the Standard such a

preemptive effect. It is true that a preemptive regula-

tion’s force does not depend upon express Congressional

authorization to replace state law. Fidelity Federal, 458

U.S. at 154. However, when reviewing OSHA’s construc-

tion of the OSH Act, this Court must first consider

whether Congress has already directly addressed this

issue. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end

of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must

give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-

gress.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-

fense Council, Inc., US. ’ , 104 S.Ct. 2778,

2781-2782, reh’g denied, —— U.S. ——, 105 S.Ct. 28-

29 (1984). The judiciary, rather than the agency, is the

final interpreter of statutory meaning, and it must re-

ject administrative interpretations which are contrary to

clear Congressional intent. Jd. at 2782, n. 9. If a court,

employing traditional tools of statutory construction, de-

cides that Congress had an intent regarding a specific

issue, that intention must be given effect. Jd.

In the present case, this Court has reviewed the struc-

ture, provisions, and legislative history of the OSH Act

before concluding that Congress intended that the law

of political subdivisions should not be expressly pre-

empted. OSHA’s contrary interpretation, then, is not

afforded the deference due when it is filling interstices

created by Congress. Since OSHA’s attempt to extend the

preemptive effect of its regulations to localities, which

are not expressly preempted by $18 of the OSH Act,

contradicts Congress’ intent as construed by this Court,

the regulations cannot operate to expressly preempt

Chapter 1830.

Courts have consistently refused to abrogate the clear

intent of Congress, even where the rejection of an

agency’s actions or construction of the statute would

ee oe ee

a

47a

Opinion of the District Court

prove very troublesome and costly. In the celebrated

“snail darter case,” Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,

437 U.S. 158 (1978), the Supreme Court was urged to

prohibit the completion and operation of the Tellico Dam

in Tennessee because of the threat to the existence of a

species of three-inch fish known as snail darters, which

were protected by the Endangered Species Act of 1973,

16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1548. Although Congress had already

expended more than $100 million on the nearly-built dam,

the Court enjoined its completion. In doing so, it relied

upon the plain terms of the statutory provision. Jd. at

173. Although the Court’s majority did not believe that

it was necessary to look at the legislative history of the

Endangered Species Act since the statute was plain and

unambiguous on its face, id. at 184, n. 29, it stated:

While there is no discussion in the legislative his-

tory of precisely this problem, the totality of con-

gressional action makes it abundantly clear that the

result we reach today is wholly in accord with both

the words of the statute and the intent of Congress.

The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute

was to halt and reverse the trend towards species

extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not

only in the state policies of the Act, but in literally

every section of the statute.

Id. at 184.

As the Supreme Court in Hill did, this Court must

enforce the decisions made by Congress when the OSH

Act was promulgated over fifteen years ago. Congress

clearly intended in the OSH Act to further the policies

of worker health and safety, not to reduce the adminis-

trative burden on business caused by a lack of uniformity.

Both the legislative history and the plain words of the

statute compel the conclusion that Congress did not in-

tend to expressly preempt laws of municipalities. Thus,

48a

Opinion of the District Court

this Court must hold that § 1910.1200(a) (2) of the

Standard does not expressly preempt Chapter 1830.

D. Implied Preemption

Since Chapter 1830 is not expressly preempted by the

OSH Act, each disputed provision ® of the Akron ordi-

nance must be analyzed in light of the federal regula-

tions to determine whether Chapter 1830 produces an

“actual conflict,” making compliance a “physical im-

possibility,” or frustrates the federal policy of the OSH

Act. Hillsborough, —— US. at , 105 8.Ct. at 2375.

The unlikelihood of making either finding when evaluat-

ing a local regulatory standard which is more stringent

than corresponding federal regulations was noted by the

Third Circuit in its review of the New Jersey Right-to-

Know legislation. Auchter, 763 F.2d at 734. Moreover,

the Supreme Court has observed the incongruity of “pre-

vent[ing] States from taking supplementary efforts” to-

wards Congressional goals, thus “interpret[ing] federal

statutes to negate their own stated purposes.” New

York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino,

413 U.S. 405, 419-420 (1973).

1) Exemptions

Plaintiffs submit that some of the employers and sub-

stances exempted by § 1830.02 from regulation under the

10 The following provisions either are uncontested by plaintiffs

or raise no plausible preemption issue:

1830.01 Application

1830.03 (a)-(h), (j), (1)-(0)

Definitions

1830.04 Powers and Duties of the Commission

1830.06 Hazard Determination and Communication Program

1830.08 Variances

1830.16 Sunset Provision

1830.18 Conflict and Invalidity

1830.19 Separability

1830.20 Penalties

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49a

Opinion of the District Court

Akron ordinance are only exempted from labeling require-

ments under the Standard. In addition, some substances

exempted by the Standard are regulated by Chapter

1830. Complaint at 24. This discrepancy does not,

however, make compliance a “physical impossibility.”

The OSH Act, rather than Akron, creates the federal

floor on hazard communications by promulgation of the

Hazard Communication Standard, so it is not necessary

for Chapter 1830 to regulate all potentially hazardous

substances. Further, since §18(a) of the OSH Act re-

veals Congress’ intention to permit states to fill inter-

stices in federal law, Akron’s regulation of substances

exempted by the Standard does not frustrate the federal

policy of the OSH Act, but rather contributes to the goal

of worker safety.”

2) Application to “Employers”

The term “employer,” characterizing the persons and

entities to which Chapter 1830 is made applicable by

§ 1830.01, is defined as ‘“‘the City of Akron and any per-

son, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other

entity in the City of Akron which is in any of the fol-

lowing Standard Industrial Codes (SIC): 7, 13 through

17, 20 through 39, 41, 42, 45, 48 through 50, 53, 54, 55,

70, 72, 516, 517, 7333, 7342, 7349, 75, 80, 863.” § 1830.03

(i). As discussed above, this classification results in the

application of Chapter 1830 to a much broader group

of employers than the Standard, which is limited to the

manufacturing sector. It is indisputable that this ex-

11 This Court has accepted the premise that worker health and

safety, rather than the alleviation of regulatory burdens on em-

ployers, is the policy animating the OSH Act. See supra at 15-20.

Since any more stringent provision of the Akron ordinance will

generally foster that goal, the Court will not repetitively announce

that most of the provisions do not frustrate the policy of the OSH

Act. Rather, consistency with federal policy will be discussed in

the text only when there is a plausible argument to be weighed.

50a

Opinion of the District Court

pansion of employers subject to hazard communication

laws is valid. Hughey, 774 F.2d at 593; Knepper, slip

op. at 11-12.

3) Determination of “Hazardous Chemicals”

The “hazardous chemicals” which will be regulated by

Chapter 1830 are defined as those contained on a list

promulgated by the Health Commission pursuant to

$1830.05. §1830.03(k). This “Master List of Hazardous

Chemicals” (‘Master List’) shall include chemicals on

lists developed by various governmental and research

groups identifying hazardous substances, and the Com-

mission is entitled to recommend revisions to the list.

§1830.05. In contrast, substances regulated by the Stand-

ard are to be determined by chemical manufacturers and

importers in accordance with the procedure set forth in

§1910.1200(d). These different_methods of determining

which substances are toxic will probabiy result in differ-

ent chemicals being regulated by the Standard and Chap-

ter 1830. Nevertheless, Chapter 1830’s list will not ‘“con-

flict”’ with those chemicals requiring warnings under the

Standard, but merely supplement them. Hughey, 774

F.2d at 594.

4) Labeling and Placards

Section 1830.07 mandates that each container of haz-

ardous chemicals be labeled, or in some situations marked

with a sign or placard, with its chemical name, Depart-

ment of Transportation required labels, and cancer and

reproductive warnings when applicable. Section 1910.1200

12 The Third Circuit has ordered the Secretary to consider ap-

plying the Standard to other SIC Codes and to order its applica-

tion if he cannot advance reasons why that is not feasible. Auchter,

763 F.2d at 739. Since municipalities are not expressly preempted

by § 18, however, such an expanded application of the Standard

would have little, if any, effect on the validity of Akron’s ordinance.

5la

Opinion of the District Court

of the Standard requires that each container leaving a

chemical manufacturer, importer, or distributor be labeled

with the chemical’s identity, “appropriate hazard warn-

ing” and the company’s name and address. Employers

are responsible for ensuring the labeling of the first two

requirements. The Akron and federal provisions do not

appear to be at all inconsistent. The Standard specifically

requires labeling consistent with Department of Trans-

portation regulations. § 1910.1200(f) (2). Furthermore,

“appropriate hazard warnings” must include information

on carcinogenic and reproductive risks, since such charac-

teristics require a finding that a substance is a “hazard-

ous chemical” under the Standard. § 1910.1200(c). There

does not appear to be an actual conflict between these

labeling provisions. See Hughey, 774 F.2d at 595-596;

Knepper, slip op. at 18 (both cases holding that labeling

requirements of a state law are not preempted by federal

law except as applied to the manufacturing sector).

Plaintiffs argue, however, that the Standard’s provision

establishing responsibility for compiling MSDS’s and its

effective dates make compliance with the labeling require-

ment impossible for the employers for whom Chapter

1830 was scheduled to become effective in December, 1985.

The Standard provides that MSDS8’s shall be produced by

chemical manufacturers and importers and provided to

distributors and manufacturing purchasers. § 1910.1200

(g) (6). The Standard became effective in November,

1985 for the manufacturers and importers, and it will not

become applicable to “downstream” employers until May

12, 1986. Plaintiffs assert that this six-month period be-

tween effective dates was designed to permit the down-

stream employers to have ample time to receive the infor-

mation from their suppliers. They argue that this infor-

mation may not yet be available to employers for whom

Chapter 1830 was scheduled to become effective in De-

cember, 1985. Defendants cogently respond that there

are other avenues for employers to obtain information

52a

Opinion of the District Court

needed to comply with Chapter 1830’s labeling require-

ments, such as requesting chemical names for substances

found on the Master List from the International Union of

Pure and Applied Chemistry or the Chemical Abstract

Service. Moreover, there is apparently no relation what-

soever between the effective date of the Akron ordinance

and the date on which the Standard would be applied.

Chapter 1830 was not scheduled to become effective as to

any employer until one year after its enactment.

§1830.17. Certainly this passage of time should have been

ample for large employers to gather the information

which they are needed for compliance. The Court does not

agree that the need to independently take steps to obtain

information which would later become available through

the operation of the Standard makes compliance with the

two regulations “physically impossible.” **

Plaintiffs wishing to contend that the labeling require-

ments will “confuse” workers who are bombarded with a

myriad of information, must present evidence on this

factual issue. Hughey, 774 F.2d at 596. Plaintiffs here

have not done so. Accordingly, the labeling requirements

of Chapter 1830 are not preempted by the Standard.

5) Employer Filing and Reporting Requirements

Section 1830.09 contains provisions compelling the fil-

ing of reports annually and after spillage or leakage of

a hazardous chemical. Employers must also file certain

construction or operating permits and pay an annual fil-

ing fee. These filings are made available to the fire

department pursuant to § 1830.12(g). There are no com-

parable provisions within the Standard, so there are no

18The Court also rejects plaintiffs’ assertion that the labeling

provision of Chapter 1830 frustrates the policy of the federal law

by placing oneorous costs upon employers who must comply with

additional labeling requirements. Worker safety is the goal which

the OSH Act fostered; administrative ease is not.

:

:

:

_

53a

Opinion of the District Court

actual conflicts. Moreover, since these reports can be

utilized for providing information to fire and other public

officials, § 1830.09 may be construed as a regulation pro-

tecting environmental, rather than workplace, health and

safety." A funding provision similar to that in the Akron

ordinance was specifically upheld by the Third Circuit

Court of Appeals because it did not “interfere with com-

pliance with the OSH Act or impose obstacles to the ac-

complishment of the OSH Act’s purposes.” Hughey, 774

F.2d at 595.

6) Material Safety Data Sheets

Chapter 1830 requires each employer to develop or

obtain an MSDS for each hazardous chemical the em-

ployer manufactures, uses, or stores. § 1830.10(a). The

information it shall contain is similar, though not iden-

tical, to the MSDS’s prescribed by the Standard. See. x

§1830.10(b) and §1910.1200(g) (2). There is no conflict

14 Notwithstaanding plaintiffs’ characterization of the purpose

of these provisions, many of these regulations protect the com-

munity as well as workers. The regularity of chemical spills and

fires which destroy large areas or cause many illnesses is con-

sistently documented by the media. Moreover, Frank Slayton of

the Akron Health Department testified that the information col-

lected pursuant to Chapter 1830 will be used to trace latent dis-

eases; for zoning purposes (to regulate the proximity of toxic

chemicals to population areas, schools, and nurseries) ; and to avoid

contamination of the environment. Captain Charles Strum of the

Akron Fire Department testified that Chapter 1830’s labeling re-

quirements would help firefighters to identify chemicals on sight

and to know the location of hazardous chemicals before going to

the scene of a fire. Captain Strum’s affidavit confirms that such

information would protect firefighters’ safety and permit them to

make informed evaluations about danger to the community. But see

Hughey, 774 F.2d at 595 (recognizing that furnishing workplace

surveys to firefighter and other officials implicates a “broader pur-

pose” than the Standard, but holding such a requirement expressly

preempted because New Jersey has distinguished between environ-

mental and workplace surveys).

54a

Opinion of the District Court

between the two provisions, and the Akron MSD§8’s will

not undercut the federal policy of worker safety.

Section 1830.10(b) requires that any employee, his or

her designated representative, and the Health Commis-

sion are entitled to receive a copy of the MSDS8’s by the

close of business on the next weekday after their requests.

If an MSDS is not avaifable from a supplier, a down-

stream employer may be exempted from this requirement

by a renewed application to the supplier within ten days

of a request. In contrast, the Standard mandates that an

MSDS be made available to a requesting employee within

fifteen days of his or her request. §§ 1910.1200(g) (10),

1910.20(e). Obviously, an employer can comply with both

regulations by providing the requested MSDS’s by the end

of the business day following the employee’s request.

Plaintiffs argue that compliance with Akron’s regulation

may be impossible if large companies with many MSDS§8’s

are forced to gather them within twenty-four hours.

Regardless of the correctness of that assessment, implied

preemption occurs when compliance with a federal law is

impossible when one attempts to also comply with a com-

peting state or local law, not because compliance with the

local law itself is impossible: Instead of asserting pre-

emption, employers in a situation where they cannot

physically comply with such a rule should argue that the

ordinance does not satisfy minimal due process require-

ments, since the regulation as applied would have no

“rational relationship” with Akron’s objective. See Wil-

liamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 43 (1955).

7) Employer Training Program and Employee Rights

Section 1830.11(6) requires that employers subject to

the ordinance create a training program to explain the

hazards of the substances to which employees are exposed;

the availability and function of labels, MSDS’s and any

other hazard communication devices; appropriate work

practice; protective measures and emergency procedures.

55a

Opinion of the District Court

The components of the employee training program man-

dated by the Standard are substantially identical. Thus,

there is no conflict which preempts the Akron provision.

Employers are also required to supply employees with

a copy of § 1830.15, dealing with employee rights.

§ 1830.11(b). That provision guarantees an employee

the opportunity to inspect, information which the em-

ployer is required by Chapter 1830 to release; protects

an employee from discrimination or discipline for exer-

cising any rights under the Chapter, and permits the

commencement of legal action if rights are violated; and

allows an employee to request an inspection by the en-

forcement agents when the employee believes there is a

violation of Chapter 1830 in the workplace. § 1830.15.

There are no comparable requirements in the Standard,

but the facilitation of the federal worker safety goal by

these provisions is obvious.

8) Enforcement of Chapter 1830

Section 1830.12 establishes enforcement procedures for

the Health Commission and the Health Department to

implement, including random inspections, investigations

prompted by employee complaints, and reporting duties

to the Akron City Council. The Law Director is also

given authority to institute legal actions involving the

Akron ordinance. § 1830.13. Plaintiffs adduce no evi-

dence that the enforcement of Chapter 1830 by these

Akron officials would impede the enforcement efforts of

federal regulators. Indeed, an additional set of enforce-

ment agents may well deter violations of the Standard

as well as of Chapter 1830.

9) Protection of Trade Secrets

Chapter 1830 contains a carefully drafted trade secret

protection provision which exempts disclosure of the spe-

cific chemical identity of eligible substances, but which

56a

Opinion of the District Court

also permits otherwise protected information to be di-

vulged to fire fighters, health professionals and exposed

employees in certain situations. § 1830.14. Its trade

secret provisions deviate from those of the Standard in

several respects. First, the Standard does not share

Chapter 1830’s requirement that a chemical must be non-

carcinogenic to be afforded trade secret protection. See

1830.14(a) and § 1910.1200(i) (1). This difference can-

not be preemptive, however, since the Third Circuit has

held that the Standard cannot afford broader substantive

trade secret protection than state law. Auchter, 763

F.2d at 741.

The Standard allows exceptions to trade secret protec-

tion only for treating physicians and nurses in emer-

gency situations, and for various medical personnel treat-

ing employees in non-emergency situations and who follow

enumerated procedural steps $$ 1910.1200(i) (2) and (i)

(3). Akron’s ordinance permits access to trade secrets

by both fire and medical personnel involved in an emer-

gency where the information is needed for treatment or

where the personnel will be exposed to hazardous chemi-

cals, and to employees regularly exposed to the substance

who execute confidentiality statements. Although the pro-

visions of Chapter 1830 and the Standard which permit

different categories of persons to have access to trade

secrets appear to be inconsistent, the Third Circuit has

invalidated the Standard’s limitations of access to trade

secret information to health professions. Auchter, 763

F.2d at 743. Further, permitting medical and fire person-

nel who are exposed to hazardous chemicals in an emer-

gency to learn the specific chemical identity of those

substances implicates a community, rather than work-

place, purpose. Since plaintiffs have not demonstrated

how this access to information by endangered emergency

personne] presents an obstacle to the federal purposes of

the Hazard Communication Standard, such provision is

not preempted.

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57a

Opinion of the District Court

Chapter 1830 also requires that Akron’s Director ot

Health be automatically supplied by the employer with a

copy of a written request for a specific chemical identity,

a copy of the written denial furnished to the requesting

person, and reasons for the decision, within thirty days

of a denial if this information was requested by a regu-

larly exposed employee, or if the denial was based upon

a decision that a substance has trade secret protection.

§§ 1830.14(c) and (k). The Standard permits a health

professional denied trade secret access to initiate a re-

view by OSHA. § 1910.1200(i) (a). Neither the review

of a denial by Akron’s Health Director nor the manda-

tory nature of the review create a conflict with a review

by OSHA. In addition, this additional reviewing pro-

cedure provided by the Akron ordinance supports the

federal policy of denying access to trade secret informa-

tion only where appropriate.

No other sections of § 1830.14 present preemption

problems.

This Court cannot find, then, that ary of the provi-

sions of Chapter 1830 are impliedly preempted by the

Standard. In fact, most of them supplement the Standard

admirably. The Court now turns to plaintiffs’ argument

that Chapter 1830 violates the commerce clause.

III.

Plaintiffs’ second cause of action alleges that the dupli-

cative and costly nature of Akron’s system for regulat-

ing hazardous chemicals communications constitutes an

undue burden on interstate commerce. When presented

with similar arguments, the court reviewing Pennsy]l-

vania’s Right-to-Know statute responded:

In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 187, 142,

25 L.Ed.2d 174, 178, 90 S.Ct. 844, 847 (1970) the

Supreme Court established the following criteria for

determining whether a state statute violates the

Commerce Clause:

58a

Opinion of the District Court

Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to

effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and

its effects on interstate commerce are only inci-

dental, it will be upheld unless the burden im-

posed on such commerce is clearly excessive in

relation to the putative local benefits. Huron

Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 US 440, 448, 4 L

Ed2d 852, 856, 80 S. Ct. 813, 78 ALR2d 1294.

We should also note that safety regulations are en-

titled to “a strong presumption of validity,” Bibb v.

Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524, 3 L.

Ed.2d 1003, 1007, 79 S.Ct. 962, 965 (1959). Kassell

v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 750 U.S. 662, 67

L.Ed.2d 580, 101 S.Ct. 1309 (1981).

In the instant case, the Right to Know Act op-

erates evenhandedly and thus the relevant inquiry is

whether the burden on interstate commerce out-

weighs the local benefit. Plaintiffs have failed to

demonstrate that the Right to Know Act will sub-

stantially burden interstate commerce. While we

recognize that implementation of the Act may be

costly and in that sense may burden interstate com-

merce, we cannot conclude that the burden outweighs

the benefit. As a result we find that the Right to

Know Act does not violate the Commerce Clause.

Knepper, slip op. at 25-26. This Court is confronted

with a similar evidentiary situation. Plaintiffs have

proffered no evidence of the effect of Chapter 1830 on

interstate commerce. Therefore, the extent of any impact

upon interstate commerce is speculative, at best, while

the benefits to Akron workers and the community are

tangible and direct. Thus, this Court cannot find that

the burden of Chapter 1830 upon interstate commerce

is excessive in comparison to the local benefits. Since the

regulation is “evenhanded,” Chapter 1830 does not vio-

late the commerce clause.

59a

Opinion of the District Court

IV.

This Court concludes that Chapter 1830 (Akron’s

“right-to-know” ordinance) is not preempted by federal

law, nor does it violate the commerce clause of the fed-

eral Constitution. Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary in-

junction is denied; judgment is entered for the defend-

ants; defendants’ motion to assess costs against plaintiffs

is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Ann Aldrich

ANN ALDRICH

United States District Judge

60a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 86-3191

[Filed September 17, 1986]

OHIO MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION ;

AKRON SELLE COMPANY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Vv.

City oF AKRON, STATE OF OHIO, et al.,

Defendants-A ppellees.

Before: MARTIN and Guy, Circuit Judges; and BROWN,

Senior Circuit Judge.

JUDGMENT

ON APPEAL from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio.

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record from

the said District Court and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here

ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of

the said District Court in this case be and the same is

hereby reversed and the case is remanded for further

consideration consistent with this opinion.

It is further ordered that Plaintiffs-Appellants recover

from Defendants-Appellees the costs on appeal, as itemized

below, and that execution thereof issue out of said Dis-

trict Court, if necessary.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

/s/ John P. Hehman

JOHN P. HEHMAN

Clerk

6la

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 86-3191

{Filed October 31, 1986]

OHIO MANUFACTURERS’ AsSoc., et al.,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

v.

CITY OF AKRON, et al.,

Defendants-A ppellees

ORDER

Before: MARTIN and Guy, Circuit Judges and Brown,

Senior Circuit Judge

The Court having received a petition for rehearing en

bane, and the petition having been circulated not only to

the original panel members but also to all other active

judges of this Court, and no judge of this Court having

requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc,

this petition for rehearing has been referred to the origi-

nal hearing panel.

The panel has further reviewed the petition for rehear-

ing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition

were fully considered upon the original submission and

decision of the case. Accordingly, the petition is denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

/s/ John P. Hehman

JOHN P. HEHMAN

Clerk

62a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 86-3191

[Filed January 7, 1987]

OHIO MANUFACTURERS’ ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants

Vv.

CITY OF AKRON, et al.,

Defendants-A ppellees

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Notice is hereby given that Defendants-Appellees, the

City of Akron, the Health Commission of: the City of

Akron, the Health Department of the City of Akron, -

C. William Keck as Director of Health for the City of

Akron, and Harold K. Stubbs as Director of Law of the

City of Akron, hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of

the United States from the final judgment of this Court

entered on October 17, 1986, reversing the judgment of

the District Court.

This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2).

Respectfully submitted,

HAROLD K. STUBBS

_ Director of Law

/s/ Janice E. Crossland

JANICE E. CROSSLAND

Assistant Director of Law

202 Ocasek Government Bldg.

161 S. High Street

Akron, OH 44308

(216) 375-2030

Attorneys for Defendants-

Appellees

63a

ARTICLE IV, CLAUSE 2 OF THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States

which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all

Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-

thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law

of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be s

bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of

any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

64a

THE ARRON ORDINANCE

ORDINANCE NO. 771-1984 amending and/or supple-

menting the Codified Ordinances of the City of Akron,

Ohio, 1975, by the addition of a new Chapter 1830, en-

titled “Hazardous and Toxic Substances;” and declaring

an emergency

WHEREAS, there are numerous chemicals used in the

work places within the City of Akron which may be

hazardous to employees and the public; and

WHEREAS, the City firefighters in the course of their

duties frequently require information concerning toxic or

hazardous substances; and

WHEREAS, the labeling of toxic and hazardous sub

stances and the availability of information about such

substances to employees, public ‘officials and other affected

persons is essentia! to protect the public safety and health

of the citizens of Akron.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ENACTED by the Coun-

cil of the City of Akron:

Section 1. That the Coditied Ordinances of the City of

Akron, Ohio, 1975, are hereby amended and/or supple-

mented by the addition of a new Chapter 1830, “Hazard-

ous and Toxic Substances” which shall read as follows:

“CHAPTER 1830

“HAZARDOUS TOXIC SUBSTANCES

“1830.01 Application.

“1830.02 Exemptions.

“1830.03 Definitions.

“1830.04 Powers and Duties of the Commission.

“1830.05 Master List of Toxic and Hazardous Sub-

stances.

“1830.06 Hazard Determination and Communication

Program.

65a

Codified Ordinances of Akron

“1830.07 Labels and Placards.

“1830.08 Variances.

“1830.09 Employer Filing and Reporting Require-

ments.

“1830.10 Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS).

“1830.11 Employer Training Program.

“1830.12 Enforcement Authority of the Commission

and Health Department.

“1830.18 Remedies Available to Law Director.

“1830.14 Trade Secrets.

“1830.15 Employee Rights.

“1830.16 Sunset Provision.

“1830.17 Compliance Dates.

“1830.18 Conflict and Invalidity.

“1830.19 Separability.

“1830.20 Penalties.

“1830.01 APPLICATION.

“(a) This Chapter, in appropriate sections, requires

employers to provide information to their employees and

the designated representatives of these employees about

hazardous chemicals to which these employees are ex-

posed by means of a hazard communication program,

labels, placards, work area hazardous chemical list, ma-

terial safety data sheets, and information training.

“(b) This Chapter in appropriate sections, requires

employers to provide information to the City’s Fire Di-

vision and Health Department about the hazardous chemi-

cals manufactured, used or stored inside the workplace

and the hazardous chemicals discharged from the work-

place or stored as chemical waste at the workplace by

means of hazardous chemical lists, hazardous chemical

discharge permits and reports and material safety data

sheets, if requested.

66a

Codified Ordinances of Akron

“1830.02 EXEMPTIONS.

“(a) This Chapter shall not apply to any employer

which is an educational institution, a federal, state or

county government, or any department, agency, board, or

commission thereof, but shall apply to the City of Akron,

its agencies, departments and subdivisions.

“(b) This Chapter shall not apply to any laboratory

operated by an otherwise covered employer, including re-

search laboratories, analytical laboratories, medical labor-

atories, so long as the names of materials in such labora-

tories are available to the employees.

“(c) This Chapter shall not apply to any person or

entity who employs domestic workers or casual laborers

solely at a residence.

“(d) This Chapter shall not apply to hazardous chemi-

cals in the process of being transported in, into, or

through the City of Akron.

“(e) This Chapter shall not apply to substances which

are consumer products, food stuffs or tobacco products,

packaged for distribution to, and intended for use by,

the general public. This includes any product used by an

employer in the same physical form, approximate amount,

concentration and manner as used by consumers, and to

which, in the employer’s knowledge, employee exposure is

not significantly greater than that of the consumer in

foreseeable consumer uses of the product.

“(f) This Chapter shall not apply to toxic or hazardous

substances in containers having a volume of one gallon

or less liquid, or a weight of ten pounds or less, except

that such substances must be identified for the employees,

and must be identified on an area list.

“(g) This Chapter does not apply to chemicals which

are foods, drugs, cosmetics, or tobacco products intended

for personal consumption by employees while in the work-

place.

67a

Codified Ordinances of Akron

“1830.03 DEFINITIONS.

“(a) ‘Chemical name’ is the scientific designation in

accordance with the nomenclature system developed by

the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry

(IUPAC) or the Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS)

rules of nomenclature for those substances listed in Sec-

tion 1830.05.

“(b) ‘Commission’ when used in this Chapter means

the Health Commission established by Section 78 of the

Charter of the City of Akron.

“(e) ‘Common name’ means any designation of identi-

fication, such as code name, code number, trade name,

brand name or generic name used to identify a chemical

other than by its chemical name.

“(d) ‘Container’ means any bag, barrel, bottle, box,

ean, cylinder, drum, storage tank, reaction vessel, or the

like that contains a hazardous chemical. For purposes of

this sections, pipes, piping systems or transfer containers

used in production are not considered to be containers.

“(e) ‘Designated representative’ means any individual

or organization to whom an employee gives written au-

thorization to exercise such employee’s rights under this

Chapter. A recognized or certified collective bargaining

agent shall be treatea automatically as a designated rep-_

resentative without regard to written employee authoriza-

tion.

“(f) ‘Discharge’ means the emission of a hazardous

chemical into the air or water, including the sewer sys-

tem, or onto the land.

“(g) ‘Emergency’ means any occurrence such as, but

not limited to, equipment failure, rupture of containers,

or failure of control equipment which may or does result

in an uncontrolled release of a hazardous chemical into

the workplace.

68a

Codified Ordinances of Akron

“(h) ‘Employee’ means a current employee, a tempo-

rary employee, casual employee, or an employee being as-

signed or transferred to workmwhere there will be exposure

to hazardous chemicals. In the case of a deceased or

legally incapacitated employee, the employee’s legal rep-

resentative may directly exercise all the employee’s rights

under this Chapter. Employee includes any worker who

may be exposed, on or after the effective date of this

Chapter, under normal conditions of use or foreseeable

emergencies to hazardous chemicals, including, but not

limited to, production workers, line supervisors, and re-

pair or maintenance personnel. Office workers, grounds

maintenance personnel, security personnel and non-resi-

dent management are excluded unless their job involves

exposure to hazardous chemicals.

“(i) ‘Employer’ means the City of Akron and any

person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other

entity in the City of Akron which is in any of the follow-

ing Standard Industrial Codes (SIC): 7, 13 through 17,

20 through 39, 41, 42, 45, 48 through 50, 53, 54, 55, 70,

72, 516, 517, 7338, 7342, 7349, 75, 80, 863. In construc-

tion situations, ‘employer’ means that person or entity

directly in control of the toxic or hazardous substance in

the workplace.

“‘(j) ‘Exposure’ or ‘exposed’ means that any employee

is subjected to a hazardous chemical in the course of em-

ployment through any route of entry (inhalation, inges-

tion, or skin contact) and includes potential (e.g. acciden-

tal or emergency) exposure, without regard to the use of

personal protective equipment, but does not include situa-

tions where the employer can demonstrate that the haz-

ardous chemical is not used, handled, stored, generated,

or present in the workplace in any manner different from

typical, non-occupational situations.

“(k) ‘Hazardous chemical’ means any substance set

forth on the list promulgated pursuant to Section 1830.05.

69a

Codified Ordinances of Akron

Any mixture which is comprised of at least 1% (by

weight or volume (of any chemical set forth on the list

promulgated pursuant to Section 1830.05, or 0.1% of a

chemical on said list which has been determined to be a

carcinogen, reproductive toxin, mutagen or sensitizer

shall also be considered hazardous for purposes of this

Chapter, unless the mixture has been evaluated as a whole

and the data indicates it is not hazardous.

“(1) ‘Use’ means handle, react, process, package, re-

package, or transport.

“(m) ‘Waste’ includes all hazardous material required

to be reported under Section 1830.07(b) of this Chapter.

“(n) ‘Work area’ means a room or defined space in an

establishment where hazardous chemicals are produced,

used, or where exposure could occur and where employees

are present.

“(o) ‘Workplace’ means an establishment at one geo-

graphical location containing one or more work areas.

“1830.04 POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE COM-

MISSION.

“The Commission shall administer Chapter 1830, and

shall be responsible for its enforcement.

“1830.05 MASTER LIST OF TOXIC AND HAZ-

ARDOUS SUBSTANCES.

“(a) No later than 90 days after the enactment of this

Chapter, the Commission shall compile a Master List of

Hazardous Chemicals including all the chemicals on the

following list.

“(1) The Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-

trator’s list of Toxic and Hazardous Substances, 29

C.F.R. §1910, Subpart Z.

“(2) The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Haz-

ardous Materials Table, 49 C.F.R. §172.101.

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“(3) The American Conference of Governmental and

Industrial Hygenists’ list entitled ‘Threshold Limit

Value for Chemical Substances and Physical Agents

in the Workplace.’

“(4) The International Agency for Research on Can-

cer’s sublist entitled ‘Substances found to have at

least sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in animals.’

“(5) The National Toxicology Program’s list of

chemicals published in the annual report on car-

cinogens.

“(b) The Commission shall recommend to Council any

revisions to such list as it deems necessary.

“(e) Copies of the Master List shall be available to

the public without cost.

“1830.06 HAZARD DETERMINATION AND COM-

MUNICATION PROGRAM.

“(a) Every employer manufacturing, using, or storing

hazardous chemicals in the workplace shall post a sign

in the form attached as Exhibit A at the location or loca-

tions where notices to employees are normally posted to

inform employees that they or their designated represent-

ative have a right to information from their employer

regarding the toxic or hazardous effects of the chemicals

and the circumstances under which these effects may be

produced.

“(b) Each employer shall develop and implement a

hazard communication program for his or her workplace

which meets criteria specified in Section 1830.07 through

1830.11 for labels and placards, material safety data

sheets, employee information and training, and hazardous

chemical lists. The employer may rely on an existing

hazard communication program to comply with this sec-

tion provided it meets the criteria specified in Sections

1830.07 through 1830.11.

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“1830.07 LABELS AND PLACARDS.

“(a) The employer shall ensure that each container of

hazardous chemicals in the workplace is labeled, tagged

or marked:

“(1) With the chemical name where said name is

not a trade secret under Section 1830.14.

“(2) With Department of Transporation (DOT) re-

quired labels for all substances regulated by DOT.

“(3) With a cancer warning for all materials on

lists set forth in subsections 1830.05(a) (4) and

1830.05 (a) (5).

“(4) With a reproductive warning for all materials

on the lists set forth in subsection 1830.05 which pose

a reproductive hazard.

“(b) When stationary containers in the work area

have similar contents and hazards, the employer may post

signs or placards to convey the required information

rather than affixing labels to each individual container.

“(c) Where containers or process equipment contain

hazardous chemicals and contents change frequently, or

where labels would be obscured or destroyed by heat,

spillage or other factors, the employer may post signs or

placards to convey the required information.

“(d) This Chapter does not require labeling for mate-

rials required to be labeled under the following Acts or

Regulations issued under them: Federal Insecticide,

Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (7 U.S.C. 186 et seg.),

Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seg.),

Federal Alcohol Administration Act (27 U.S.C. 201 et

seq.), Consumer Product Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 2051),

Federal Hazardous Substance Act (15 U.S.C. 1261), and

the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.).

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“1830.08 VARIANCES.

“(a) The Director of Public Health shall have the

power, upon written application by an employer, to au-

thorize variances from the labeling provisions of Section

1830.07 which will not be contrary to the public interest

or the intent of this chapter, but only where, (i) owing

to special conditions pertaining to a specific employer,

workplace or work area, the strict application of this

chapter would cause undue or unnecessary hardship, or

(ii) owing to a pre-exisitng program of an employer de-

signed to inform or protect workers, an employer is in

substantial compliance with this Chapter.

“(1) A variance for Undue or unecessary hardship

shall be authorized by the Director of Public Health

when the following facts and conditions exist:

“(a) Exceptional or extraordinary circum-

stances or conditions apply to the subject em-

ployer, workplace, or work area. In making a

finding on this point, the Director of Public

Health shall consider factors, including, but not

limited to, extreme temperature, difficulty of ac-

cess, lack of a permanent work area or work-

place and volatile or rapidly changing conditions

in the work area or workplace; and

“(b) The employer establishes, with approval of

the Director of Public Health alternative meth-

ods of providing information about the toxic or

hazardous substances involved, such as placards,

posting of signs in common areas or entry areas,

and oral and written communication, which shall

be substituted for those requirements that are

waived and which will result in substantial com-

pliance with the intent of this chapter.

“(2) In considering a variance for a pre-existing

program the Director of Public Health shall deter-

mine if the following facts and conditions exist:

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“(a) The program was in existence at the time

of passage of this Chapter;

“(b) The labeling used in the program conveys

information in a manner substantially equal to

or superior to the labeling requirements of the

chapter; and

“(c) Material labeling data sheets which con-

tain the same data as required by this chapter

must be readily accessible to workers.

“(3) In modifying the literal interpretation and

strict application of the provisions of this chapter

and in authorizing a variance therefrom, the Direc-

tor of Public Health shall impose such requirements

and conditions as it may deem essential in order to

carry out the intent and purpose of this chapter, and

to otherwise safeguard the public health, safety and

general welfare.

“(4) Variances granted pucsuant to this section

for undue or unnecessary hardship shall expire one

year from the date of issuance, but may be renewed

by the Director of Health Department upon compli-

ance with all terms of this section. Variances granted

pursuant to this section for preexisting programs

shall be reexamined every five (5) years.

(5) When an employer files an application for a

variance the employer shall notify its employees and

designated representative(s) of such application by

immediately posting a notice of such application.

Such posting shall occur in the same manner as pro-

vided for in Section 1830.06.

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“1830.09 EMPLOYER FILING AND REPORT-

ING REQUIREMENTS.

““(a) Every employer shall:

“(1) File in January of each year with the office or

officer of the Health Department which the Commis-

sion has designated to receive such filings and update

annually a list of all work areas in the workplace

where hazardous chemicals are manufactured, used

or stored specifying, subject to the provisions of Sec-

tion 1830.14, by chemical name all hazardous chemi-

cals in each work area, and

“(2) Immediately report to the office or officer of the

Health Department which the Commission has desig-

nated to receive such reports any information con-

cerning any spill, leak, discharge or emission of any

hazardous substance which is required to be reported

to or filed with any federal or state agency under

applicable law, including but not limited to the Clean

Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conser-

vation and Recovery Act and the Comprehensive En-

vironmental Response Compensation and Liability

Act; and

“(3) File with the office or officer of the Health

Department which the Commission has designated to

receive such filings a copy of any construction or

operating permit insofar as such permit sets forth

conditions for or limitations on the discharge or emis-

sion of any hazardous chemical

“(4) Pay the appropriate annual filing fee to defray

part of the cost of the regulatory program including

inspections.

“(b) This section shall not apply to employers engaged

in the business of construction or reconstruction provided

such employers are in compliance with Section 1830.10

and the quantity of any hazardous chemical manufac-

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tured, used, or stored is less than 55 gallons of liquid or

the equivalent thereof in its solid or gaseous state, based

upon generally accepted chemical measures, per work-

place.

“1830.10 MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS

(MSDS)

“‘(a) Each employer shall obtain or develop a material

safety data sheet for each hazardous chemical which it

manufactures, uses, or stores. Each material safety data

sheet shall contain at least the following information:

(1) The identity used on the label, and, except as

provided in Section 1830.14 governing trade secrets:

“(a) If the hazardous chemical is a single sub-

stance, or a mixture which has been tested as a

whole to determine its hazards, its chemical and

common. names; or

“(b) If the hazardous chemical is a mixture, the

chemical and common names of all ingredients

set forth on the list promulgated pursuant to

Section 1830.05 and which compromise greater

than one percent (1%) of the composition, or

one-tenth percent (0.1%) of the composition for

chemicals determined to be carcinogens; and

“(e) The chemical and common names of all

ingredients set forth on the list promulgated

pursuant to Section 1830.05 which have been

determined to be physical hazards;

“(2) The physical and chemical characteristics of

the hazardous chemical (such as flash point, vapor

pressure) and including the potential for fire, explo-

sion and reactivity ;

(3) The known acute and chronic health effects of

exposure to the hazardous chemical, including signs

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and symptoms of exposure, and any medical condi-

tions which are generally recognized as being aggra-

vated by exposure to the chemical;

“(4) The primary route(s) of entry and permissible

exposure limit (P.E.L.) (for those hazardous chemi-

eals for which O.S.H.A. has promulgated as P.E.L.) ;

“(5) Any precautions for safe handling and use

which are known to the employer or preparer, in-

cluding appropriate hygienic practices, protective

measures during repair and maintenance of contam-

inated equipment, and procedures for clean-up of

spills and leaks;

“(6) Any control measures which are known to the

employer or preparer such as appropriate engineer-

ing controls, work practices, or personal protective

equipment;

“(7) Emergency and first aid procedure;

“(8) The date of preparation of the material safety

data sheet or the last change to it;

“(9) The name, address and telephone number of the

employer or preparer of the sheet;

“(10) If no information is provided for any given

category on the material safety data sheet submitted

by the employer, it shall be marked to indicate no

information was supplied.

“(11) The employer shall update the material safety

data sheet within 90 days of the time employer is

notified by the preparer of the MSDA or within 90

days of the time if the employer becomes aware of

any new and significant information regarding the

health hazard of a chemical.

“(b) The employer shall maintain copies of the most

recent material safety data sheets and shall provide one

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copy to any employee, designated representative, or the

Commission by the close of business on the next weekday

following a request made to the appropriate company

representative.

“(¢e) Subsection (b) hereof shall not apply to employ-

ers engaged in the business of construction or reconstruc-

tion provided such employers ensure that copies of the

material safety data sheets for each hazardous substance

are available during all hours of operation.

“(d) If a material safety data sheet is not available

from a supplier, seller, or manufacturer of a hazardous

chemical, then upon an employee’s request to inspect the

material safety data sheet, an employer who is merely

a processor, user, or storer of the hazardous chemical

shall be deemed to satisfy his obligations under this sec-

tion if:

“(1) Within ten (10) working days of the employ-

ee’s request the employer makes a written inquiry to

the supplier, seller, or manufacturer requesting a

material safety data sheet or equivalent information.

If the employer has made such a written inquiry in

the preceding six months, then an additional inquiry

need not be made; and

“(2) The employer notifies the employee, in writing,

of the date that the inquiry was made, to whom it

was made, and the response, if any, received; and

“(3) The employer notifies the employee of the

availability of the material safety data sheet within

ten (10) working days of receipt of the material

safety data sheet from the supplier, seller or manu-

facturer, or provides a copy of the Material Safety

Data Sheets to the employee within ten working days

of the receipt of the Material Safety Data Sheets.

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“1830.11 EMPLOYER TRAINING PROGRAM

“(a) Every employer shall have an employee training

and education program designed to provide to the em-

ployees who may be exposed to such substances or mix-

tures the information necessary to understand the haz-

ards of the substances or mixtures to which they may be

xposed; the hazard communication methods (labels, Ma-

terial Safety Data Sheets, placards, etc.) used by the

employer; appropriate work practice; protective meas-

ures; emergency procedures; and the means by which

employees can receive information under this Chapter.

The specific hazards and circumstances of each work

area should be taken into account in determining both

the complexity of the content and the frequency of repe-

tition of the required training and education program.

“In construction situations, such information must be

given to the employee within six (6) working days, of

the date the employee reports to a job site and may be

in the form of a written notice.

“(b) Every employer shall provide employees with or

post a copy of Sections 1830.15 dealing with Employee

Rights.

“1830.12 ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY OF THE

COMMISSION AND HEALTH DEPART-

MENT.

“(a) The Health Department shall conduct inspections

of the workplaces where hazardous chemicals are used,

manufactured, or stored. The Health Department shall

not attempt a forcible entry should the employer refuse

to consent to such an inspection, but shall seek a proper

search warrant. These inspections which are to be per-

formed at random, shall be for the purpose of deter-

mining that hazardous chemicals are properly labeled

consistent with Section 1830.06 and shall check a random

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sample of material safety data sheets for compliance

with Section 1830.08.

“(b) The Health Department shall investigate, within

three (3) working days, any complaint in which it is

alleged that employees have been ordered to work with

substances which are not labeled as required by this

Chapter or for which material safety data sheets re-

quired by this Chapter are not provided to employees.

Each such complaint shall be in writing, signed by the

complainant and using a form to be supplied by the

Health Department.

“(¢) The Commission shall designate employees of the

Health Department to enforce this chapter. Such em-

ployees shall have authority to:

“(1) Enter upon premises where workplaces con-

tain hazardous chemicals and seek .assistance from

the Department of Law when necessary to obtain

search warrants if entry is refused

“(2) Issue orders to comply as authorized by the

Commission.

“(3) Issue citations for failure to obey order to

comply, for violations of regulations adopted by the

Commission, or for violations of the provisions of

this chapter.

“(d) The Commission shall report to the Council in

January of each year:

“(1) The number of inspections performed during

the previous year.

“(2) The number and type of enforcement actions

undertaken the previous year and, if known, the

final disposition thereof.

“(e) The Commission shall report to the Council by

October 1 of each year proposed annual filing fee sched-

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ules for the coming year calculated to yield revenues

equal to the amount by which budget appropriations for

the administration and enforcement of this program fall

short of anticipated expenses which fee schedules shall,

unless disapproved by Council, be published and become

effective as are ordinances.

“(f) The Commission shall adopt procedures pursuant

to which the Health Department shall maintain for pub-

lic inspection the work area list from each covered em-

ployer for thirty (30) years, and provide copies to the

public at cost.

“(g) The Commission shall assist other City depart-

ments and their divisions in identifying and obtaining

such information as the departments and divisions need

to fulfill their functions and shall promptly forward to

the Fire Division copies of all employer filings required

by Chapter 1830 which the Fire Division deems neces-

sary, desirable, or useful to the performance of their

duties and/or the protection of Fire Division personnel.

“1830.13 REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO LAW DI-

RECTOR.

“The Law Director, or his or her designee, may in-

stitute appropriate legal action, either civil or criminal,

as authorized herein, or as may be otherwise available

and appropriate either at law or in equity, which may

in the judgment of the Law Director or his or her desig-

nee, be necessary for the enforcement of any order or

orders issued pursuant to this Chapter, or the abate-

ment of any nuisance or hazard against which such or-

der was directed. Any such suits or proceedings shall

be brought in the name of the City of Akron and no such

suits or proceedings shall be held to exclude any criminal

or penal remedies which may be authorized by this

ordinance or any of the laws or ordinances in force or

effect in the City of Akron or to exempt any violators

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of this or any other laws or ordinances from any penalty

or penalties as may be prescribed. This section shall not

be construed to eliminate, abridge or detract from any

remedies either at law or in equity which any employee

or other individual may have arising out of any breach

of violations of the provisions of this ordinance.

“1830.14 TRADE SECRETS

“(a) Any employer may withhold the specific chemical

name if:

“(1) The material safety data sheet indicates that

the spsecific chemical identity is being withheld as a

trade secret;

“(2) Information contained in the material safety

data sheet concerning the properties and effects of

the hazardous chemicals is disclosed ;

“(3) The claim that the information withheld is a

trade secret can be supported ;

“(4) The specific chemical identity is made avail-

able in accordance with the applicable provisions of

subsections (f) and (i) of this section; and

“(5) Is not a designated carcinogen on the list iden-

tified in Sections 1830.05(4) and 1830.05 (5).

“(b) Where the employer refuses, upon written re-

quest, to disclose the specific chemical identify pursuant

to subsection (a) of this section and excluding those

requests made pursuant to subsections (f) and (i) of

this section, the denial must:

“(1) be provided to the requesting party within 30

days;

“(2) bein writing;

“(3) state the specific reasons why the request is

being denied; and

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“(4) explain in detail how alternative information

may satisfy the specified medical occupational health

need without revealing the specific identity.

“(c) Where a request for the specific chemical iden-

tity for any hazardous chemical has been denied pursu-

ant to subsection (b) of this section, the employer must

provide to the Director of Health within thirty (30)

days of the request:

“(1) a copy of the written request ;

“(2) a copy of the written denial pursuant to sub-

section (b) of this section;

“(3) evidence to support the claim that the specific

chemical identity is a trade secret

“(d) Within 60 days of receipt of the denial pursuant

to subsection (ce) of this section, the Director of Health,

or his or her designee with the advice of the Director of

Law, or his or her designee shall consider the evidence

to determine if the employer has supported the claim

that the specific chemical identity is a trade secret pur-

suant to subsection (a) of this section.

“(e) If the Director of Health or his or her designee,

determines that the specific chemical identity requested

under subsection (a) of this section is not to be re-

garded as a bona fide trade secret, the employer will be

subject to citation under Section 1830.20 of this Chapter

if the employer does not comply within ten (10) days

of receipt of the decision of the Director of Health.

“(f) No employer shall refuse to disclose to Fire Di-

vision personnel or medical personnel, where the em-

ployer knows that an emergency or accident has occurred

that requires response or treatment by Fire or Health

Division personnel or medical personnel, the specific

chemical identity of any hazardous chemicals to which

said personnel are likely to be exposed or the identity

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of which said personnel deem necessary in order to ren-

der treatment to the person exposed, without regard to

trade secrecy claims and regardless of the existence of a

written statement of need or confidentiality agreement.

The employer may require a written request and con-

fidentiality agreement in accordance with the provisions

of subsection (n) of this section as soon as circum-

stances permit.

“(g) No person shall knowingly claim an accident or

emergency exists where such is not the case for purposes

of subsection (f) of this section.

“(h) Where a request for the specific chemical iden-

tity of any hazardous chemical made pursuant to sub-

section is denied, the employer shall be subject to im-

mediate citation pursuant to Section 1830.20 of this

Chapter.

“(i) No employer shall, upon written request, refuse

to disclose the specific chemical identity otherwise per-

mitted to be withheld under subsection (a) of this sec-

tion to any employee whom the employer knows to be

an employee regularly exposed to such substance. The

employer may require a confidentiality in accordance

with subsection (n) of this section.

““(j) Where the employer refuses to disclose the spe-

cific chemical identify of any hazardous chemical to a

requesting employee pursuant to subsection (i) of this

section, the denial must:

“(1) be provided to the requesting employee within

30 days;

“(2) be in writing;

“(3) state the specific reasons why the request is

being denied.

“(k) Where a request for the specific chemical iden-

tity of any hazardous chemical has been denied pursuant

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to subsection (j) of this section, the employer must

provide to the Director of Health, within 30 days of re-

ceipt of the request:

“(1) a copy of the written request pursuant to sub-

section (i) of this section.

“(2) a copy of the written denial pursuant to sub-

section (j) of this section.

“(3) a copy of the confidentiality agreement, if

any, executed by the requesting employee pursuant

to subsections (i) and (n) of this section. The em-

ployer may delete the specific chemical name from

said copy.

“(1) Within 60 days of receipt of the notice of denial

pursuant to subsection (k) of this section, the Director

of Health, or his or her designee with the advice of the

Director of Law, or his or her designee shall consider the

evidence to determine if:

“(1) the requesting employee has made a written

request to the employer for the specific chemical

identity ;

“(2) the requesting employee is an employee regu-

larly exposed to such substance;

“(3) the requesting employee has executed a con-

fidentiality agreement pursuant to subsections (i)

and (n) of this section.

“(m) If, after consideration of the evidence pursuant

to subsection (m) of this section, the Director of Health

or his his or her designee determines that the specific

chemical identity shall be disclosed, the employer will

be subject to citation under Section 1830.20 of this chap-

ter if the employer does not comply within ten (10) days

of receipt of the decision of the Director of Health.

“(n) The confidentiality agreement provided for in

subsections (f) and (i) of this section and which may

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be required by the employer from other requesting par-

ties:

“(1) May restrict use of the information to health

and treatment purposes consistent with the preserva-

tion of the trade secret information ;

“(2) May provide appropriate legal remedies in the

event of a breach of the agreement but not stipula-

tion of a reasonable pre-estimate of likely damages;

and

“(3) May not include requirements for the posting

of a penalty bond.

“(o) Nothing in this section shall be construed as re-

quiring the disclosure under any circumstances the proc-

ess or percentage of mixture information which is trade

secret.

“(p) Nothing in this section is meant to preclude the

parties from pursuing noncontractual remedies to the

extent permitted by law.

“(q) No officer, employee, agent or contractor of any

City department, board or commission shall knowingly

and intentionally disclose to anyone in any manner, un-

less authorized by the employer claiming the data to be

trade secret information, or by a court of law, any trade

secret information, except as is required to administer

or enforce the provisions of this chapter and perform

official duties. Any person who violates this provision

shall be suspended and/or removed from office or em-

ployment in the manner provided under the provisions

of the Charter of the City of Akron, in addition to any

other applicable proceedings and penalties for violation

of trade secret provisions provided for under existing

law.

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“1830.15 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS.

“(a) Subject to trade secret provisions, employees and

their designated representatives may request, and the

employer or employers shall provide, information relat-

ing to hazardous chemicals which the employer is re-

quired to maintain and release pursuant to this Chapter.

“(b) No employer shall discharge, or cause to be dis-

charged or otherwise disciplined, or in any manner dis-

criminate against any employee for the reason or reasons

that such person has exercised any right, made any claim

or filed any complaint or suit pursuant to this Chapter.

“(c) Any employee or designated representative who

believes that a violation of this Chapter exists may re-

quest an inspection by giving written not‘ce to the office

or officer designated by the Commission to receive such

requests of such violation. Upon the request of the per-

son giving such notice, his or her identity and that of

employees referred to in the notice shall, to the extent

permitted by state law, be confidential information and

shall not be revealed or published.

“(d) Any employee who has been discharged, disci-

plined, or otherwise discriminated against by any em-

ployer in violation of this Chapter may, within one (1)

year the violation occurs or one (1) year after the em-

ployee first obtains knowledge that a violation has oc-

curred, commence an action in any appropriate court of

law.

“(e) A designated representative, if any, shall have

the right to accompany the Health Department to par-

ticipate in any inspection which results from an employee

complaint.

“1830.16 SUNSET PROVISION.

“If the General Assembly of the State of Ohio enacts

legislation providing for employer notification of the man-

ufacture, use, or storage of hazardous or toxic substances

in the work place, this chapter shall continue in effect

only if the Council of the City of Akron shall expressly

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determine within ninety (90) days of the enactment of

the state law whether this chapter continues essential to

the health and welfare of the City of Akron and reenacts

this chapter in whole or pertinent part.

“1830.17 COMPLIANCE DATES.

“Employers employing 51 or more employees shall be

in compliance within one year of passage of this Chapter;

employers with 50 or fewer employees shall be in compli-

ance within 18 months of passage of this Chapter; pro-

vided, however, that all employers employing fifty-one

(51) or more employees shall begin paying the annual

filing fee in January of 1986, and all other employers

shall begin paying the annual filing fee in January of

1987.

“1830.18 CONFLICT AND INVALIDITY.

“In any case where a provision of this chapter is found

to be in conflict with a provision of any zoning, building,

fire safety or health Chapter or code of the City existing

on the effective date of this Chapter, the provision which

establishes the higher standard for the promotion and

protection of the health and safety of the people shall

prevail. In any case, where a provision of this Chapter

is found to be in conflict with a provision of any other

Chapter or code of the City existing on the effective date

of this Chapter, which establishes a lower standard for

the promotion and protection of the health and safety of

the people, the provisions of this Chapter shall prevail.

“1830.19 SEPARABILITY.

“Each provision of this Chapter shall be deemed inde-

pendent of all other provisions herein, and should any

provision of this chapter be declared invalid, all other

provisions hereof shall remain valid and enforceable.

“1830.20 PENALTIES

“Whoever violates or knowingly fails to comply with

any portion of this Chapter shall be fined no more than

$250.00.”

aman

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Section 2. Anything to the contrary hereinbefore estab-

lished notwithstanding, the annual filing fees to be

charged employers during the calendar year 1986 shall

be as follows:

“50 or fewer employees: $25.00 per year

“51 or more employees: $2.00 per employee in ex-

cess of 50 employees per

year, up to a maximum of

$500.00

Section 3. That this ordinance is hereby declared an

emergency measure for the reason that this ordinance

should take effect as soon as possible, and provided this

ordinance receives the affirmative vote of two-thirds of

the members elected or appointed to Council, it shall take

effect and be in force immediately upon its passage and

approval by the Mayor; otherwise, it shall take effect and

be in force at the earliest time allowed by law.

4 es a

89a

PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT

OF 1970

AN ACT

To assure safe and healthful working conditions for work-

ing men and women; by authorizing enforcement of

the standards developed under the Act; by assisting and

encouraging the States in their efforts to assure safe

and healthful working conditions; by providing for

research, information, education, and training in the

field of occupational safety and health; and for other

purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

tives of the United States of America in Congress as-

sembled, That this Act may be cited as the “Occupa-

tional Safety and Health Act of 1970”.

CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND PURPOSE >

Sec. (2) [29 U.S.C. § 651] The Congress finds that

personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work situa-

tions impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hin-

drance to, interstate commerce in terms of lost produc-

tion, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability com-

pensation payments.

(b) The Congress declares it to be its purpose and

policy, through the exercise of its powers to regulate

commerce among the several States and with foreign

nations and to provide for the general welfare, to assure

so far as possible every working man and woman in the

Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to pre-

serve our human resources—

(1) by encouraging employers and employees in

their efforts to reduce the number of occupational

safety and health hazards at their places of employ-

ment, and to stimulate employers and employees to

institute new and to perfect existing programs for

providing safe and healthful working conditions;

90a

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970

(2) by providing that employers and employees

have separate but dependent responsibilities and

rights with respect to achieving safe and healthful

working conditions;

(3) by authorizing the Secretary of Labor to set

mandatory occupational safety and health standards

applicable to businesses affecting interstate com-

merce, and by creating an Occupational Safety and

Health Review Commission for carrying out adjudi-

catory functions under the Act;

(4) by building upon advances already made

through employer and employee initiative for pro-

viding safe and healthful working conditions;

(5) by providing for research in the field of occu-

pational safety and health, including the psychologi-

cal factors involved, and by developing innovative

methods, techniques, and approaches for dealing with

occupational safety and health problems;

(6) by exploring ways to discover latent diseases,

establishing causal connections between diseases and

work in environmental co

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