Motion — Smith v. City of Philadelphia

.. Supreme Court, U.S.

mm i EILED

‘> oF

No. 86-1122 ~ | FEB 4 1987

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

IN THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1986

RUTH V. SMITH, Administratrix of the

Estate of HARRY F. SMITH, Deceased

and

RITA LADZENSKY, Administratrix of the

Estate of GERALD LADZENSKY, Deceased

and

CHARLES ALEXANDER SCOTT,

Appellants

_.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

and

PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS

and

PHILADELPHIA FACILITIES MANAGEMENT

CORPORATION,

Appellees

ON APPEAL FROM

THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MOTION OF APPELLEES PHILADELPHIA

GAS WORKS AND PHILADELPHIA

FACILITIES MANAGEMENT

CORPORATION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

RUTH RUDBARG WESSEL

OBERMAYER, REBMANN, MAXWELL & HIPPEL

14th Floor, Packard Building

15th and Chestnut Streets

Philadelphia, PA 19102 (215) 665-3232

Counsel of Record for Appellees

Philadelphia Gas Works and Philadelphia

Facilities Management Corporation

PACKARD PRESS / LEGAL DIVISION, 10th & SPRING GARDEN STREETS, PHILA., PA. 19123 (215) 236-2000

wre bo

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SEI ok Pen uss aad Rhea) Ss eee ii

Motion to Dismiss or Affirm........... Hee ee |

oe ys sacs dee dae ees a eee ke 1

at ih ties nis A ow 0 0-* a-ee-E Orho A 2

ES. weet ech ieee ceweNerde kee 11

Appendix:

Table of State Statutory Provisions Limiting

Damage Recoveries Against Governmental En-

SEG R AL pier ee wee rere ee Se ne eee Eee A-1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: : Page

Cauley v. City of Jacksonville, 403 So. 2d 379 (Fla.

ROB)... . is 5c 00 ka ash cee eee 3,9

Consoli v. Municipio de San Juan, 408 F. Supp. 384

CEPR. S76). cli Fibs aint eee 6, 9

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S. Ct.

1153, 26 L.Ed 28 403 COG). ee 2,6

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study

Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 90 S. Ct. 2620, 57

LE. 2d 40) CHPAGE iss cssaeseamees 3, 6,7

Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 611,

406 A.2d 704, appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 921

(1088) 2.0 Ga eee 3,9

Hallett v. Town of Wrentham, 499 N.E. 2d 1189

(Mass. 1606)... . sick vavasdudnseee eee ao 8

Home Indemnity v. Anders, 459 So. 2d 836 (Ala.

bd) PP ra proet e 3, 6, 9

Lee v. The Colorado Department of Health, 718 P.2d

22 (Cate. 1006) . 0.55 cn8s ba eee 4.5.9

Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111

GL: < ) es 3, 5,9

Jetton v. Jacksonville Electric Authority, 399 So. 2d

306 (Fim. 1063) .. os icc ead ee 5

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S. Ct.

£101, 6 L.EG@. Se Ses CAG cae ee 4,5

McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 85 S. Ct. 283

CROBR) ooo ina nk ccd ueeneeeeeeeee 4

Opinion of the Justices, 493 A.2d 1182 (N.H. 1985) 6

Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 99 S. Ct. 1742

CIOTO). «6.5 ass 00 és bee 3, 7,8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—(Contii:ued )

Cases: Page

Pfost v. Montana, 713 P.2d 495 (Mont. 1985).... 9

Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 197 Wis. 2d 356, 293

N.E. 2d 504, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035

SSeS ere lag Otay ereassccbabas 3, 5,9

Seifert v. Standard Paving Co., 64 Ill, 2d 109, 355

I ON i dks viele ob gjb eee. 3 3

State v. Kallio, 92 Nev. 665, 557 P.2d 705

TS ey eer ae 3, 6,9

Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S. Ct. 939

ar ics haku wks ao Awe 3,7,8

Constitution and statutes:

Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims

Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §8541 et seq. 53 P.S.

I Da aii awed bse was an bos ee

United States Constitution,

Fourteenth Amendment.............. 2, 6, 8, 10

iil

er cam

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

Appellees Philadelphia Gas Works and Philadelphia

Facilities Management Corporation move this Court to

dismiss the appeal herein, or, in the alternative, to affirm

the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on

the grounds that the question on which the cause de-

pends is so insubstantial as not to need further argu-

ment, there is an absence of conflict of opinions

regarding the question presented and the decision below

is so obviously correct as to warrant no further review.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On May 11, 1979, a gas explosion occurred in the

Bridesburg section of Philadelphia. The explosion gen-

erated forty-six lawsuits seeking damages for personal

injury and property damage from various Defendants,

including Appellees City of Philadelphia and the Phila-

delphia Gas Works. In all forty-six cases, the City of Phil-

adelphia and the Philadelphia Gas Works asserted the

defenses and immunities available to them under the

provisions of a Pennsylvania statute, the Political Subdi-

vision Tort Claims Act.! The Political Subdivision Tort

Claims Act establishes tort immunity for political subdi-

visions, but partially abrogates immunity by creating

eight categories of cases in which government entities

may be sued for damages up to a $500,000 per occur-

rence cap. Appellee Philadelphia Facilities Management

Corporation? was named Defendant in seven cases and

also asserted the defenses and immunities available to it

under the Act.

1. Act of November 26, 1978, P.L. 1399. No. 330, 5101 et seq.,

effective January 25, 1979 formerly 53 P.S. §5311.101 et seq., re-

pealed by Act of October 5, 1980 P.L. 693. Similar provisions are

now found in 42 Pa. C.S. §8541 et seq.

2. Philadelphia Facilities Management Corporation is a non-

profit corporation created by virtue of City ordinance to manage the

operations of the Philadelphia Gas Works.

l

2

Appellants are Plaintiffs in three of the personal in-

jury cases who jointly instituted this collateral declara-

tory judgment action to determine the validity of the

damage cap. Appellants filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment in the trial court requesting a declaration that

§5311.402 of the Tort Claims Act, which provides that

damages arising from the same occurrence may not be

recovered against a political subdivision in an amount in

excess of $500,000 in the aggregate, is violative of the

Pennsylvania Constitution and the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution. The trial court granted the Motion

for Summary Judgment and declared the damage cap

unconstitutional on the state and federal grounds. The

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed on all theories

holding, inter alia, that the statute fully complies with

the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. Appel-

lants now ask this Court to review the decision of the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. For the reasons which

follow, Appellee submits that this Court should either

dismiss this appeal or affirm the decision of the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania.

Il. ARGUMENT

A. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS SO INSUB-

STANTIAL AS NOT TO NEED FURTHER

ARGUMENT.

1. It Is Manifest That The Damage Cap Does Not ‘

Violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-

teenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution.

This Court has repeatedly and consistently held that

the rational relationship test is the proper standard of re-

view for equal protection challenges to statutes such as

the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act which impact

economic areas. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90

Beal

3

S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) (upholding state law

placing an upper limit on the number of children for

which any family can receive subsistance payments);

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study

Group, 438 U.S. 59, 90 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595

(1978) (upholding statute imposing monetary limit on

liability for nuclear accidents); Vance v. Bradley, 440

U.S. 93, 99 S. Ct. 939 (1979) (upholding statute impos- |

ing a mandatory retirement age of 60 on some federal

employees and not on others); Parham v. Hughes, 441

U.S. 347, 99 S. Ct. 1742 (1979) (upholding state law

precluding a father who has not legitimated a child from

suing for wrongful death of child). Although this Court

has not specifically reviewed an equal protection chal-

lenge to a state statute limiting tort damages recoverable

against governmental entities, the appellate courts of nu-

merous states have applied the principles enunciated by

this Court and used the rational relationship test to con-

sider equal protection challenges to such statutes. See,

e.g., Cauley v. City of Jacksonville, Florida, 403 So.2d

379 (Fla. 1981); Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659

P.2d 111 (1983); Seifert v. Standard Paving Co., 64

Ill.2d 109, 355 N.E.2d 537 (1976); State v. Kallio, 92

Nev. 665, 557 P.2d 705 (1976); Estate of Cargil v. City

of Rochester, N.H., 406 A.2d 704 (N.H. 1979), appeal

dismissed 445 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 1304, 53 L.Ed.2d 754

(1980); Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis.2d 356, 293

N.W.2d 504 (1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1035, 101

S.Ct. 61, 66 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); Lee v. The Colorado

Department of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986); Home

Indemnity v. Anders, 459 So. 2d 836 (Ala. 1984); Hallett

v. Town of Wrentham, 499 N.E. 2d 1189 (Mass. 1986).

Under the rational relationship test, a law which

subjects different classes of individuals to different treat-

ment will be upheld if there is any possible rational basis

for the challenged classification. The burden is on the

party challenging the validity of the classification to

prove that it is arbitrary. McGowan v. Maryland, 366

F

4

U.S. 420, 425-426 (1961). The legislature is presumed to

have acted within its constitutional power and its judg-

ment “is given the benefit of every conceivable circum-

stance which might suffice to characterize the

classification as reasonable rather than arbitrary and in-

vidious.” McLaughlin v., Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191

(1964).

Application of the rational relationship test to the

damage cap provision in the Political Subdivision Tort

Claims Act results in the clear conclusion that the pro-

vision passes constitutional muster. The classifications

resulting from the damage cap are rationally related to

legitimate government objectives and are rationally re-

lated to the achievement of these objectives. Although

the government may have an interest in allowing victims

of government tortfeasors to recover their losses, the gov-

ernment has compelling interests in fiscal ‘stability and

solvency, the preservation of public funds for public ser-

vices and the ability to establish rational fiscal planning

and a balanced operating budget. The only way that

these goals can be accomplished in this age of enormous

jury awards and multiplicity of claims is by placing a lim-

itation on damages. It cannot seriously be questioned

that a limit on governmental damage payments ration-

ally relates to the legitimate government interest in pre-

serving sufficient funds for essential public services

without imposing an insupportable burden upon taxpay-

ers.

The rational relationship between damage caps and ‘

legitimate government objectives has been relied upon

by several state appellate courts to uphold limits on gov-

ernmental liability:

We have no hesitation in concluding that this stat-

utory Classification is reasonably related to the gov-

ernmental objective of providing fiscal certainty in

carrying out the manifold responsibilities of govern-

ment. By limiting the liability of a public entity to a

TT NT

5

fixed amount, the Governmental Immunity Act pro-

tects the public entity against the risk that unfore-

seen and unlimited tort judgments will deplete the

public coffers and result in the termination or sub-

stantial curtzilment of important governmental

functions. The limitations on governmental liability

in section 24-10-114(1) and 24-10-118(1)(b), there-

fore, satisfy equal protection of the laws. Lee v. The

Colorado Department of Health, 718 P.2d at 227,

228.

It is the Legislature’s function to evaluate the risks,

the extent of exposure to liability, the need to com-

pensate victims for injury, the availability of the cost

of insurance, and the financial condition of the gov-

ernmental units. It is the legislature’s function to

structure statutory provisions which will protect the

public interest in reimbursing the victims and main-

taining government services and which will be fair

and reasonable to the victim and at the same time

will be realistic regarding the financial burden to be

placed upon the taxpayers. Giving due deference to

the Legislature, this Court will not set aside a stat-

utory classification ‘if any state of facts reasonably

may be conceived to justify it.. McGowan v. Mary-

land, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Sambs v. City of

Brookfield, 97 Wis.2d 356, 293 N.W.2d 504, 511

(1980).

See also, jetton v. Jacksonville Electric Authority, 399

So.2d 396, 399 (Fla. App. 1981) ($100,000 aggregate

damage can “permitted government units to order their.

fiscal planing” and rational relationship found between

recovery limit and object of the legislation); Hallett v.

Town of Wrentham, 499 N.E. 2d 1189, 1191 (Mass.

“1986) (“Protecting public funds frorn unlimited liability

is a legitimate legislative purpose, and the $100,000 lim-

itation on government liability is reasonably calculated to

further that purpose.”) Leliefeld v. Johnson, supra,

6

($300,000 aggregate limitation upheld); Opinion of the

Justices, 493 A.2d 1182 (N.H. 1985) ($200,000 aggre-

gate limit upheld); State v. Kallio, supra, ($25,000 lim-

itation upheld); Consoli v. Municipio de San Juan, 408

F.Supp. 384 (D.P.R. 1975) ($15,000/$30,000 limit up-

held); Home Indemnity v. Anders, 459 So. 2d 836 (Ala.

1984) ($100,000/$300,000 limit upheld).

Appellants’ entire argument is based on the errone-

ous contention that the damage cap violates the Equal

Protection Clause because the cap may operate to create

distinctions between various claimants which are not

drawn on the basis of their individual injuries or losses.

In fact, there are innumerable constitutionally valid stat-

utes which create categories and distinctions without re-

gard to the individual circumstances of those affected by

the law. Contrary to Appellants’ contentions, the Equal

Protection Clause does not require that a statute address

the varying situations of the victims. In fact, there is an

abundance of authority which directly refiites the posi-

tion taken by Appellants. In Dandridge v. Williams, 297

U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161 (1970), this Court upheld

against an equal protection challenge a Maryland De-

partment of Public Welfare regulation placing an abso-.

lute limit of $250 per month on the amount of welfare

grants a family may receive regardless of the size of the

family or its actual need, holding that the regulation was

rationally related to the State’s interest in encouraging

employment and in avoiding discrimination between

welfare families and the families of the working poor:

In the area of economics and social welfare, a State

does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely

4. Appellants Jurisdictional Statement suggests that the dam-

age cap does not meet the Due Process requirements of the Fifth

Amendment as set forth in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ-

mental Study, supra. Appellants’ suggestion is without substance or

merit. Further, the issue may not be considered by this Court as it

was never raised or argued below.

7

because the classifications made by its laws are im-

perfect. If the classification has some “reasonable

basis,” it does not offend the Constitution simply be-

cause the classification “is not made with mathemat-

ical nicety or because in practice it results in some

inequality.” Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,

220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369.

“The problems of government are practical ones and

may justify, if they do not require, rough accommo-

dations — illogical, it may be, and unscientific.” Me-

tropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61,

69-70, 33 S.Ct. 441, 443, 57 L.Ed. 730. “A statutory

discrimination will not be set aside if any state of

facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101,

1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393.

See also, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental

Study, supra; Vance v. Bradley, supra; Parham uv.

Hughes, supra.

Although the aggregate nature of the damage limi-

tation can create distinctions between victims of govern-

mental tortfeasors because the amount of recovery may

be affected by the number of co-victims of the same oc-

currence and the extent of their injuries, there is a ra-

tional relationship between the aggregate nature of the

cap and the purpose of the statute. The aggregate cap

obviously facilitates budgeting, risk management and

fiscal stability. In fact, in light of the clear relationship

between the cap and important governmental objectives,

the contention that a damage cap is unconstitutional be-

cause it contains an aggregate liability ceiling “is but a

thinly disguised version of the contention” that the

amount of the cap “is inadequate.” Duke, 438 U.S. at 91,

98 S.Ct. at 2640. Any argument that the cap should be

struck down because the amount is inadequate should

be rejected by the Court as an intrusion into legislative

prerogatives.

8

The complete lack of supporting authority for Appel-

-lants’ argument that the damage cap violates the Equal

Protection Clause demonstrates that this appeal does not

present a substantial question for review. Appellants

_ cannot dispute that the legislative classifications result-

ing from the damage cap are justified by tie compelling

interest of the government to engage in rac‘onal fiscal

planning and administration, and to preserve sufficient

public funds to guarantee government services for the

common good.

It is well established that a statute will not be over-

turned under the rational relationship test “unless the

varying treatment of different groups or persons is so un-

related to the achievement of any combination of legiti-

mate purposes that we can only conclude that the

legislature’s actions were irrational.” Vance v. Bradley,

440 U.S. at 97, 99 S.Ct. at 943. Appellants have not and

cannot make a credible argument that the damage cap is

unrelated to a legitimate governmental goal or is irration-

al. The purposes of the cap, the preservation of sufficient

funds for essential public services, rational fiscal plan-

ning, and avoidance of an undue burden on the tax-

payers, are, indisputedly, important governmental

objectives. Despite the Appellants’ pleas for judicial leg-

islation, this Court “is not free under the aegis of the

Equal Protection Clause to substitute its judgment for

~the will of the people of a state as expressed in the laws

passed by their popularly elected legislatures.” Parham

v. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 351, 99 S.Ct. at 1742. Therefore,

this Court should dismiss this appeal or, in the alterna-

tive, affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania.

2. There Is An Absence of Conflict of Opinions Re-

garding The Question Presented.

Thirty four states and the Commonwealth of Puerto

Rico presently have statutory damage caps in place

ee

which are similar to the provision at issue in this appeal.

(See Appendix.) In addition to Pennsylvania, equal pro-

tection challenges specific to damage caps on tort recov-

eries against governmental entities have been mounted

in Alabama‘*, Colorado>, Florida®, Idaho’, Massachu-

setts*, Nevada®, New Hampshire!°, Wisconsin!! and

Puerto Rico!2. All of the damage caps have been upheld

as meeting the requirements of the Equal Protection

Clause. The Montana damage cap, Montana Code An-

notated, §2-9-107 (1985), is the only cap which has been

invalidated on any ground. The Montana Cap was struck

down strictly on state law grounds. Pfost v. Montana,

713 P.2d 495 (Mont. 1985). In striking down the law, the

Pfost Court specifically noted that state constitutional

provisions “may be more demanding” than equivalent

federal constitutional provisions and, thus, “states may

interpret their own constitutions to afford greater pro-

tections” than their federal counterparts. Pfost v. Mon-

tana, 713 P.2d at 500.

All of the state appellate decisions extant uniformly

hold or are consistent with the proposition that statutory

4. Home Indemnity Co. v. Anders, 459 So.2d 836 (Ala. 1984).

5. Lee v. The Colorado Department of Health, 718 P.2d 22

(Colo. 1986).

6. Cauley v. City of Jacksonville, 403 So.2d 379 (Fla. 1981);

Jetton v. Jacksonville Electric Authority, 399 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1981).

7. Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983).

8. Hallett v. Wrentham, 499 N.E. 2d 1189 (Mass. 1986).

9. State v. Kallio, 92 Nev. 665, 557 P.2d 705 (1976).

10. Estate of Cargil v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 611, 406

A.2d 704, appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1980).

11. Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 197 Wis. 2d 356, 293 N.E.2d

504, cert. denied. 449 U.S. 1035 (1980).

12. Consoliv. Municipio de San Juan, 408 F.Supp. 384 (D.P.R.

1975).

10

damage caps on tort recoveries from governmental en-

tities meet the requirements of the Federal Equal Pro-

tection Clause. The total absence of conflicting opinions

concerning this issue clearly demonstrates that further

review and argument is not warranted.

3. The Decision Below Is So Obviously Correct As

To Warrant No Further Review.

The decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

is consistently, uncategorically and overwhelmingly sup-

ported by the decisions of this Court and the highest ap-

pellate courts of the states that have considered similar

issues. Further, Appellants have not raised a single le-

gally supportable argument to substantiate this appeal.

In light of Appellants’ failure to cast any doubt on the

validity of the decision below and the clear validity of the

damage cap provision of the Political Subdivision Tort

Claims Act, this Court should dismiss this appeal or af-

firm the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

ee

11

CONCLUSION

For al’ of the reasons set forth above, Appellees Phil-

adelphia Gas Works and Philadelphia Facilities Manage-

ment Corporation respectfully request that this Court

dismiss this appeal or, in the alternative, affirm the de-

cision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Respectfully submitted,

Ruth Rudbarg Wessel

Obermayer, Rebmann, Maxwell

& Hippel

14th Floor, Packard Building

Philadelphia, PA 19102

(215) 665-3232

Counsel of Record for Appellees

Philadelphia Gas Works and

Philadelphia Facilities Management

Corporation

APPENDIX

&

Ss

Table of State Statutory Provisions Limiting Damage

13.

14.

Recoveries Against Governmental Entities

Code of Alabama 1975, §11-93-2 (1985) —

$100,000 individual cap, $300,000 aggregate cap

Alaska Statutes 1962, §09-17-010 (Michie, 1986) —

$500,000 individual cap

Colorado Revised Statutes 1973, Volume 101, §24-

10-114 (1982 and 1985 Supp.) — $150,000 individ-

ual cap, $400,000 aggregate cap

Delaware Code, §4013 (1986) — $300,000 aggre-

gate cap or to the extent of liability insurance

Florida Statutes Annotated, §768-28(5) (West

1986)— $100,000 individual cap, $200,000 aggre-

gate cap

Idaho Code, §6-926 (1986 Cum. Supp. (Michie)) —

$500,000 aggregate cap

Indiana Statutes Annotated, §34-4-165-4 (Michie

1986) — $300,000 individual cap, $500,000 aggre-

gate cap

Kansas Statutes Annotated, §75-6105 (1984) —

$500,000 aggregate cap

Kentucky Statutes Annotated, §44.070 (1986) —

$100,000 individual cap, $250,000 aggregate cap

. Maine Revised Statute Annotated, Title 14, §§8105

(Supp. 1986) — $300,000 aggregate cap

. Massachusetts General Laws Annotated, Chapter

158, §2 (Cum. Supp. 1986) — $100,000 individual

cap

Minnesota Statutes Annotated, §3.746, §466.04

(1986) — $200,000 individual cap, $600,000 aggre-

gate cap

Mississippi Code 1972, §11-46-15 (1986 Cum.

Supp.) — $500,000 aggregate cap or to the extent of

liability insurance

Vernon’s Missouri Statutes Annotated, §537.610

(Cum. Supp. 1987) — $100,000 individual cap,

$800,000 aggregate cap

A-1

15.

16.

re

18.

19,

20.

27.

A-2

Montana Rev. Code, Sec. 2-9-105 (1985) —

$300,000 individual cap, $1,000,000 aggregate cap

Revised Statues of Nebraska 1943, §23-2419.01

(1983 and Cum. Supp. 1986) — $1,000,000 individ-

ual cap, $5,000,000 aggregate cap

Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated, §41.035 (1985)

— $50,000 individual cap

New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated 1955,

§507-B:4 (1983 and Cum. Supp. 1986) — $150,000

individual cap, $500,000 aggregate cap

New Mexico Statutes Annotated 1978, §41-4-19

(1986) — $300,000 individual cap, $500,000 aggre-

gate cap

General Statutes of North Carolina, §§143-291,

143-300.1, 160A-485 (Michie, 1983) — $100,000

individual cap or to the extent of liability insurance

coverage

. North Dakota Century Code, §32-12.1-03(2) (1985)

— $250,000 individual cap, $500,000 aggregate cap

. Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, Title 51, §154(A)

(1985) — $100,000 individual cap, $1,000,000 ag-

gregate cap

. Oregon Revised Statutes, Title 3, Chapt. 30.270

(1985) — $100,000 individual cap, $300,000 aggre-

gate cap

. General Laws of Rhode Island, Title 9, Ch. 31,

9-31-3, (1985) — $100,000 individual cap

. Code of Laws of South Carolina 1976, §15-78-120

(1986) — $250,000 individual cap, $500,000 aggre-

gate cap

South Dakota Codified Laws, §21-32-16 (Cum.

Supp. 1986) — recovery limited to amount of public

liability insurance coverage purchased by and pro-

vided to governmental entity

Tennessee Code Annotated (Supp. 1986) — §29-20-

403, $40,000 individual cap, $80,000 aggregate cap

($100,000/$300,000 in motor vehicle cases)

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

A-3

Vernon’s Texas Code Annotated, Civil Practice and

Remedies (1986) — §101.023, $250,000 individual

cap, $500,000 aggregate cap

Utah Code Annotated 1953, §63-30-34 (1986) —

$250,000 individual cap, $500,000 aggregate cap

Vermont Statutes Annotated 1985, Title 29, §§ 1403,

1404, recovery to extent of public liability insurance

coverage

Code of Virginia, §18.01-195.1 et seq. (1983 Supp. )

— $25,000 individual cap or to the extent of liability

insurance coverage

West Virginia Statutes, §29-12A-7 (1985) —

$500,000 individual cap

Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, §893.82 (1985) —

$250,000 individual cap

Wyoming Statutes Annotated (Cum Supp. 1986) —

§1-39-118, $250,000 individual cap, $500,000 ag-

gregate cap