Opposition Brief — Shultz v. Cooper

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in, 86406 , AUG 22 196

JOSEPH F. SPA

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED me hence

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ie

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE,

Petitioner,

— »

MARGUERITE COOPER, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

fer the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

BRUCE J. TERRIS

(counsel of Record)

KAREN H. EDGECOMBE

ELLEN KABCENELL WAYNE

Terris, Edgecombe,

Hecker & Wayne

1121 12th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202)682-2100

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .cccccccccccecee il

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .ccccccccccccee 1

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ........ 11

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT......2252252- 11

I. THE GOVERNMENT'S PETITION

RAISES NO IMPORTANT ISSUES

WARRANTING REVIEW BY THIS

COURT ccccccccccccepecccccsecs 14

II. THIS COURT'S DECISION IN

PENNSYLVANIA v. DELAWARE

VALLEY CITIZENS' COUNCIL FOR

CLEAN AIR DID NOT CHANGE THE

LAW WITH RESPECT TO AN

UPWARD ADJUSTMENT FOR

QUALITY AND DOES NOT JUSTIFY

A REMAND .cccccccccccccccccce 21

III. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY

CERTIORARI ON THE ISSUE OF

THE CONTINGENCY ADJUSTMENT... 32

TV. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE

TO ADDRESS AN ISSUE NOT

RAISED BEFORE OR ADDRESSED

BY THE COURT OF APPEALS ..... 37

CONCLUSION -ccccccccccccccccnssecccees 40

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,

398 U.S. 144 (1970)......-2222-- 39, 40

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886

Dit ce cree e see gecsescoes PROSGIN

Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d

880 (D.C. Cir 1980)............ 15, 16

Duignan v. United States,

274 U.S. 195 (1927) ....-- 22 eee 39

EEOC v. Federal Labor Relations

Authority, 54 U.S.L.W. 4408

Ca BPG LEGG) ccc veces scvcccs 39

Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d

ver (446c Cir. 1964)...... beow ee 29

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

teh, 33 eee ee. Se eee eee passim

Huty v. United States, 282 U.S.

i Gs ehh veh een eeeeeces 39

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.

a0 F.20 4 {0.C. Cir. 19394),

certiorari denied, 105 S. Ct.

i re ee ke eke a én eee 6 0 8 eee

Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S.

Soe NESSO i cebucs hay) Se a 39

Library of Congress v. Shaw,

54 U.S.L.W. 4951 (July 1,

Dl cieebaw ee Cee ede esessecees 8

Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v.

American Radiator Standard

Sanitary Corp., 48/7 F.2d 161

PEs BOI OP cbc ensaseninesese 16

ii

Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v.

American Radiator Standard

Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102

(30 Cis LPFG sctcececsetanseses 15, 16

Magnum Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159

. (1923) cc reece cereccccesescecee 20

Murray v. Weinberger, 741 F.2d

1423 (D.C. Cir. 1984)........-. 36

National Ass'n of Concerned

Veterans v. Secretary of

Defense, 675 F.2d 1319 (D.C.

Clr. 1982)... cee eeeeeeeeeeseeee 15

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley

Citizens' Council for Clean

Air, 54 U.S.L.W. 5017

(JULY 2, 1966) .csccccos TeTereT passim

Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613

SROWET bee 4 Woks boRS enesteeeeance oF

STATUTES

Civil Rights Act of 1964,

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e,

Ct SCGeceseeeeeee (aseveestevsess £26 32

RULES

Rules of the Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit

Rule G(£) axcves TESTE TT TCC err 19

TREATISES

Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court

Practice (Sth Bau, i878) ccc cwus 33

iii

No. 86-86

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE,

Petitioner,

Vv.

MARGUERITE COOPER, 1/ ET AL.,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

/

Respondents, on behalf of a class of

female Foreign Service Officers ("FSOs")

and female applicants to become FSOs,

1/ The case was originally captioned

"Marguerite Cooper King, et al. v. United

States, et al." in the district court.

Subsequently, Ms. King notified the.

district court that she had legally

changed her name to Marguerite Cooper,

and the caption was modified.

brought this action in 1976 alleging that

the Department of State discriminated

against women both in their opportunities

for hire as FSOs and in their employment

opportunities after hire, in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et

seq. All claims relating to the initial

hiring of female FSOs at the entry ‘level

were resolved on October 12, 1983, when

the District Court for the District of

Columbia approved a consent decree which

provided, inter alia, that petitioner

would appoint 75 class members as FSOs

during the calendar years 1984 through

1987. The district court found that the

settlement "eliminat[ed]) seven previous

years of hiring disparities, and

carr[ied] a conservatively estimated

monetary value of $8.6 million."

a

2/

Pet. App. i2a. The Consent Decree

further provided that its entry by the

court constituted a final ection on the

entry-level hiring portion of the case

and entitled respondents to move the

court for attorneys' fees and costs.

In December 1983, respondents

applied for $416,736.03 in fees and ex-

alae This reguest included hourly

rates ranging from $75 to $150 per hour,

depending on the level of experience of

2/

~ "Pet. App." refers to the Appendices to

the government's Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari. "Pet." refers to the gov-

ernment's brief in support of its

Petition.

3/

Respondents supplemented this request

in July 1984 and again in December 1984,

seeking an additional $52,966.81 in fees

and expenses, thereby bringing respon-

dents' total request to $469,702.84.

the individual attorney, and a 24% con-

tingency adjustment. Respondents did not

at that time seek an upward adjustment

for the quality of representation on the

ground that "[t]he quality of an attor-

ney's work in general is a component of

the reasonable hourly rate." Pl. App.

for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and

Expenses, p. 29 (December 12, 1983).

Petitioner did not oppose either respon-

dents' entitlement to an award of attor-

neys' fees and expenses as a prevailing

party or the reasonableness of the hours

spent by respondents' counsel. It

challenged only the hourly rates at which

compensation was sought, the contingency |

multiplier, and certain expenses.

On September 17, 1984, the gistrict

court awarded attorneys' fees and

expenses for all hours claimed at the

hourly rates sought by respondents but

allowed only a 20% upward adjustment for

contingency rather than the 24% re-

quested. The district covrt found that

respondents' proposed rate schedule,

ranging from $75 to $150 an hour de-

pending upon the individual attorney's

years of experience, was consistent with

prevailing market rates for the

Washington, D.C. community and accurately

reflected both the complexity of the

litigation and the "skill, experience and

reputation" of counsel. Pet. App. 29a-

34a.

Thereafter, the attorneys' fees

litigation in these consolidated cases

followed a tortuous path. Just 11 days

after the district court's September 17,

1984, opinion, the Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit decided

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746

F.2d 4 (1984), certiorari denied, 105

S.Ct. 3488 (1985), which held that an

attorney's actual billing rate is

presumptively the market rate for his

services. Petitioner moved for a stay of

the district court's order awarding fees

and moved for reconsideration in light of

Laffey, supra. Due to the lengthy delay

which would be necessitated by the dis-

trict court's consideration of the new

court of appeals' decision and any subse-

guent appeals, respondents moved the

district court for an interim award of

the uncontested portion of their fees and

expenses. As a result, the district

court made an award of $219,439.40, which

represented the uncontested number of

hours multiplied by counsel for

respondents' actual historic billing rates,

plus expenses. Pet. App. 22a. In addi-

tion, in a separate interim order, the

district court awarded respondents

$38,222.81, which represented the dif-

ference between counsel's current and

historic billing rates for these same

hours. Pet. App. 20a.

Petitioner appealed both of the

district court's interim orders. Peti-

tioner presented no legal arguments in

Support of its appeal of the uncontested

amount. Both orders were summarily

affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit. Pet. App.

18a. Petitioner thereafter paid the

uncontested amount and petitioned for a

writ of certiorari as to the use of cur-

rent rates. This Court granted the peti-

tion and vacated the judgment of the

=

court of appeals as to the use of current

rates as compensation for delay in light

of its decision in Library of Congress v.

Shaw, 54 U.S.L.W. 4951 (July 1, 1986).

While the uncontested and current

rates issues were on appeal, the district

court issued its decision on petitioner's

motion for reconsideration in light of

Laffey, supra. Pet. App. 7a. Respon-

dents argued that Laffey did not require ~

the use of counsel's actual billing rates

in this case, but that, if the court

found to the contrary, it should adjust

the lodestar upward by 55% to reflect the

quality of counsel's representation. The

district court found that counsel's

actual current rates should be used to

calculate the lodestar, but adjusted the

lodestar upward by 54.75% in order to

reflect its finding that counsel's

“services were equal in quality to those of

attorneys charging that [higher] rate"

and "far superior to what could be rea-~

sonably expected of attorneys charging a

maximum of $65 per hour for associates

and $80 per hour for partners." Pet.

App. 12a.

The district court's total award

after reconsideration, therefore, did not

differ significantly from its original

award. Since Laffey did mt address the

issue of the use of current versus his-

toric rates, the district court did not

reconsider its decision upholding the use

of current rates. It used the law firm's

current actual billing rates to arrive at

the lodestar, then separately multiplied

the merits lodestar by the 54.75%

adjustment for quality and the 20%

contingency adjustment. No enhancements

were made of the lodestar for the time

spent litigating the attorneys’ fee

application itself.

Petitioner appeaied and respondents

cross-appealed the district court's modi-

fied award. In a brief unpublished

opinion, the court of appeals (Judges

Ginsburg, Scalia and Buckley) suggested

that its own interpretation of Laffey

might have led it to conclude that the

use of counsel's actual billing rates was

not appropriate in this case as "the

firm's own rate may have fallen below the

rate brackets indicated by the charges of

other firms for similar work in this

community." Pet. App. 2a. However, in

light of the “reasonable result achieved"

and the “large respect we owe to

district court assessments in these

10

matters," the court declined to disturb

the award. Ibid.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Respondents submit that the peti-

tion should be denied for the following

reasons:

First, the litigation over this

1984 district court award of attorneys'

fees and expenses has already been pro-

tracted. The government's petition for

a writ of certiorari raises no questions

of substantial importance. In fact, the

government's petition does not even seek

plenary review by this Court but merely

asks the Court for summary reversal and a

remand in light of other recent, and in

the case of the contingency adjustment,

pending decisions by this Court. This

strategy will only serve to further pro-

11

long this litigation and, therefore,

respondents submit that this Court should

deny the government's petition. |

Second, the government seeks a

remand of the upward adjustment for qual-

ity awarded by the district court in

light of this Court's recent decision in

~

Delaware Valley. That case does not

represent any change in the law since

this court's earlier decision in Blum v.

Stenson upon which the district court

relied. Moreover, the award in this

case, namely -- a lodestar based on

counsel's normal hourly rates which the

district court found to be far below

prevailing market rates coupled with a

quality adjustment intended to compensate

counsel at market rates does not result

in double counting and therefore is not

affected by Delawaxe Valley.

12

Third, the government seeks a

remand of the upward adjustment for con-

tingency in light of this court's impend-

ing decision based on reargument in Dela-

ware Valley. The district court cor-

rectly found, pursuant to this court's

decision in Blum v. Stenson, that this

was an exceptional case which justified

an upward adjustment for contingency.

The district court's findings should

therefore only be disturbed if there was

an ébuse of discretion. The government's

petition does not claim such an abuse.

Here, the government seeks certiorari

based only on the possibility of a future

change in the law, which may or may af-

fect the factual findings of the district

court in this case.

Finally, the government seeks

review of the fact that the lodestar, by

13

which the two upward adjustments in this

case were multipled, was calculated based

on counsel's current billing rates as a

form of compensation for delay.

Petitioner failed to present this issue

to the court of appeals and the court,

therefore, did not address it. As this

court has frequently held, issues neither

raised before nor considered by the court

of appeals should not be addressed by

this Court.

ARGUMENT

I. THE GOVERNMENT'S PETITION RAISES NO

IMPORTANT ISSUES WARRANTING REVIEW BY

THIS COURT

The courts have repeatedly warned

against making attorneys' fee litigation

as complex and difficult as the litiga-

tion on the merits. As this Court stated

in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,

437 (1983), and reiterated in Blum v.

1.4

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 902, n. 19 (1984)

a "request for attorney's fees should not

result in a second major litigation."

See also National Ass'n of Concerned

Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675

F.2€ 1319, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Cope-

land v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 896 (D.C.

Cir. 1980) (Copeland III); Lindy Bros.

Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator

Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102,

116 (3rd Cir. 1976) (Lindy II"). As the

Third Circuit stated in Lindy II, supra

(540 F.2d at 116):

[W]e did not and do not intend

that a district court, in

setting an attorneys' fee, be-

come enmeshed in a meticulous

analysis of every detailed

facet of the professional

representation. It was not

and is not our intent.on that

the inguiry into the adequacy

of the fee assume massive

proportions, perhaps even

dwarfing the case in chief.

a

15

|

The courts have also repeatedly

emphasized that, in reviewing attorneys'

fee awards, appellate courts should not

reverse unless the district court has

committed a clear abuse of discretion.

As this Court stated in Hensley, supra,

461 U.S. at 437:

We reemphasize that the district

court has discretion in determining

the amount of a fee award. This is

appropriate in view of the district

court's superior understanding of

the litigation and the desirability

of avoiding frequent appellate re-

view of what essentially are

factual matters.

See also Blum v. Stenson, supra, 465 U.S.

at 886; Copeland v. Marshall, supra, 641

F.2d at 901; Lindy II, supra, 540 F.2d at

116; Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Ameri-

Can Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,

487 F.2d 161, 166 (3rd Cir. 1973) ("Lindy

5”) .

The broad discretion of the district

16

f

courts in making attorneys' tee awards is

based on two considerations. First, the

district court has far more familiarity

with both the case and the activities and

skill of counsel in the case. Hensley,

supra, 461 U.S. at 437; Blum, supra, 465

U.S. at 886. Second, if the appellate

courts substitute their judgment for that

of the district courts, the losing

parties will be encouraged to appeal

all awards in the hope that the appellate

court will come to a different result on

at least some part of the district

court's decision. The result will be to

protract further attorneys' fee litiga-

tion and to burden further the caseloads

of the appellate courts contrary to the

frequently stated desires of the courts.

We submit that this Court should not

encourage the government to prolong the

17

"second major litigation" it has already

created in this case by granting this

petition for certiorari. There are no

special and important reasons for

granting a writ of certiorari from the

decision of the court of appeals. R. of

S.Ct. 17. It raises no important, novel

or recurring questions, nor does it

present a conflict among the federal

courts of appeals. Instead, this case

basically involves whether there has been

an abuse of discretion by the district

court on what are essentially factual

matters.

The court of appeals stated that the

issues presented “occasion no need for an

Opinion by this court." Pet. App. la.

Consequently, the court issued a one-

paragraph memorandum in support of its

affirmance of the district court's

18

decision awarding attorneys' fees and

expenses to respondents. According to

the Rules of the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit, this unpub-

lished memorandum may not be cited in

briefs or memoranda of counsel as prece-

dent, except for such purposes as appli-

cation of the doctrines of res judicata,

collateral estoppel and law of the case.

D.C. Cir. R. 8(f£). Therefore, the gov-

ernment is in effect asking this Court to

review a district court decision which

the court of appeals did not even deem of

enough general importance to warrant a

published opinion.

Moreover, the government is not

asking this Court to decide any of the

issues it has presented, but merely to

remand the case to the lower courts for

further consideration. It is not un-

19

ee

likely that, after such reconsideration,

the losing party will seek review in this

Suck The opportunity for continued

delay in the final resolution of the

attorneys' fees at issue here is obvious.

As stated by this Court in Magnum Co. v.

Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 163 (1923):

The jurisdiction [of the

Supreme Court to review cases

by way of certiorari] was not

conferred upon this Court

merely to give the defeated

party in the Circuit Court of

Appeals another hearing.

The district court, which had exten-

sive first-hand knowledge of this case

and of the work of respondents' counsel

over seven years of litigation, carefully

4/

~ For this reason, respondents request

that, in the event this Court agrees to

grant a writ of certiorari, it should

grant plenary review rather than simply

remand the case to the court of appeals

for further consideration. See

Respondents' Cross-Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari, pp. 17-21.

20

set forth its reasoning for each aspect

of its award. The court of appeals found

(Pet. App. 2a):

In view of the large respect

we owe to district court

assessments in these matters,

and the reasonable result ac-

hieved, we can find no abuse

of discretion in the fees and

expenses awarded in the order

on review.

Respondents submit that this Court

should similarly give substantial weight

to the well-exercised discretion of the

district court and finally resolve this

portion of the litigation by denying the

government's petition for a writ of

certiorari.

II. THIS COURT'S DECISION IN

PENNSYLVANIA v. DELAWARE VALLEY

CITIZENS' COUNCIL FOR CLEAN AIR DID

NOT CHANGE THE LAW WITH RESPECT TO

AN UPWARD ADJUSTMENT FOR QUALITY AND

DOES NOT JUSTIFY A REMAND

Petitioner contends (Pet. 8) that a

writ of certiorari should be granted and

21

a remand ordered concerning the upward

adjustment made by the district court for

quality of representation because of this

court's recent decision in Pennsylvania

v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council

for Clean Air, 54 U.S.L.W. 5017 (July 2,

1986). We submit that Delaware Valley

did not change significantly, if at all,

the prior law on this issue and a remand

is not warranted. Both Blum v. Stenson,

Supra, and Delaware Valley, 54 U.S.L.W.

at 5022, hold that "considerations con-

cerning the quality of a prevailing

party's counsel's representation normally

are reflected in the reasonable hourly

rate * * *" used to calculate the lode-

star. Indeed, the government's petition

for a writ of certiorari quotes Delaware

Valley, which, in turn, is quoting Blum.

Pet. 7. On this issue, therefore, there

22

has been no change in the law since Blum

was decided in 1984.

Moreover, Blum was decided prior to

the district court's consideration of

respondents' fee request and was correct-

ly applied by that court. This Court

held in Blum that (465 U.S. at 896, n.

ll):

[T]he burden is on the fee appli-

cant to produce satisfactory evi-

dence--in addition to the attor-

ney's own affidavits--that the re-

quested rates are in line with

those prevailing in the community

for similar services by lawyers of

reasonably comparable skill, exper-

ience and reputation. A rate

determined in this way is normally

deemed to be reasonable, and is re-

ferred to--for convenience--as the

prevailing market rate.

In its original opinion, the dis-

trict court found that "[s]ome firms,

including plaintiffs' counsel, charge

rates that are ‘reduced to reflect the

financial constraints of their

23

clientele,' * * * and others--the ‘public

interest' bar-- charge nothing at all"

(citation omitted). Pet. App. 3la.

Citing Blum, the district court con-

cluded that "actual rates do not neces-

sarily reflect 'market value,' and market

value is the touchstone of the fee

inquiry." Id. at 32a.

In its subsequent opinion on recon-

Sideration in light of Laffey, the dis-

trict court felt constrained by the

holding of that case to apply the firm's

actual rates in its calculation of the

5/

lodestar. Pet. App. lla. It held,

5/

~ Respondents believe that the district

court erred insofar as it held that

Laffey required it automatically to apply

the rates charged by respondents' counsel

rather than market rates despite the fact

that the evidence showed that the rates

charged by respondents' counsel were far

below prevailing market rates. This

issue is dealt with in respondents’

cross-petition for a writ of certiorari,

at pages 11-17.

24

however, that those rates did not ade-

quately reflect the quality of counsel's

representation and the excellent results

obtained. Id. at 12a. Moreover, it

noted that, pursuant to its original

opinion, it viewed counsel's services as

of the caliber of firms charging pre-

vailing market rates in the Washington,

D.C. legal community for similarly com-

nlex federal litigation. The court's

decision was based on considerable evi-

dence in the record as to prevailing

market rates, as well as its first-hand

knowledge of the case and of counsel's

work throughout the seven-year duration

of the litigation. See Pet. App. 12a,

33a-34a. These findings should not be

disturbed unless they are clearly er-

roneous.

In Blum, this Court held that "[t]Jhe

25

'guality of representation[]' * * *

generally is reflected in the reasonable

hourly rate" which in that case was

found to be $95 to $105 per hour for

attorneys who had 1 1/2 years of ex-

perience or less as practicing attorneys.

It therefore held that it was improper

for the district court to award an

additional 50% upward adjustment for the

quality of representation, which would

have been a clear example of double-

counting.

Here, in contrast, the district

court clearly did not engage in double-

counting. Having previowsly determined

that the work of respondents' counsel was

superior and justified an award at pre-

vailing Washington, D.C. rates (Pet. App.

33a), but believing itself constrained to

award respondents' counsel a lodestar

26

amount based on substantially lower hour-

ly rates, the court found that an upward

adjustment equal to the difference

between these two sets of rates was

justified. The district court's use of

an upward adjustment for quality was,

therefore, simply a means of compensating

for the fact that the lodestar amount did

not reflect "the reasonable hourly rate"

for respondents' counsel's services.

Delaware Valley is likewise inappo-

site. In that case this Court noted that,

although the lower court had found the

quality of representation to be superior,

this finding was contradicted by the

court's finding that only 324 out of 620

hours should be compensated. 54 U.S.L.W.

at 5022. In contrast, in this case, the

government conceded the reasonableness of

the hours expended. In addition, the

27

district court independently reviewed the

hours and found all hours claimed to be

justified (Pet. App. 28a, n. 1):

Plaintiffs claim a total of

2746.63 hours devoted to merits

issues, and 642.25 hours to the fee

litigation. The application care-

fully distinguishes between time

devoted to the 'employee' and to

the 'applicant' portions of the

case, and offers a reasonable

method for compensating efforts

common to both claims. Further-

more, counsel's ‘billing judgment,'

as articulated and as applied,

cannot be criticized. Counsel

exercised it in a conscientious

and fair manner throughout.

[citations omitted]

In Delaware Valley, this Court also

considered the fact that the lower court

found that a substantial number of hours

were performed by a more experienced

attorney but "could have been done by an

attorney working at the associate

level" and other work "required little or

no legal ability." 54 U.S.L.W. at 5022.

28

LDN es MN OD ti oes

ne ee ee

In contrast, in this case, the district

court found that "[b]ecause of the firm's

policy of assigning primary responsibili-

ty at any given time to one or two asso-

Cliates, attorneys in the 4-7 and 8-10

year categories ($95-110) [per hour]

performed most of the work." Pet. App.

29a.

Furthermore, the opinions of the

courts below in this case are fully con-

sistent with the only other court of

appeals' decision since Blum on this

issue. Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727,

739-740 (lst Cir. 1984), is remarkably

Similar to the case at bar. In that

case, the district court had awarded

lodestar hourly rates of $60 per hour and

$45 per hour based on counsels' normal

billing rates and then adjusted the lode-

Star upward to reflect the quality of the

29

representation and the exceptional re-

sults. Id. at 739. While suggesting, as

did the court of appeals in this case,

that “certain of the qualities sought to

be recognized by the bonuses might better

have been recognized by means of more

adequate hourly rates," the Firsc Circuit

affirmed the lower court's award due to

the fact that there was no double count-

ing, there were exceptional results and

both counsel's request and the district

court's decision were well documented.

Id. at 740.

Similarly, in this case, there was

no double counting. The district court's

award of an upward adjustment does no

more than bring counsel's rates up to the

level of prevailing market rates. More-

over, the district court found the re-

sults to be exceptional and pointed out

30

ye

that the settlement "eliminat[ed] seven

previous years of hiring disparities, and

carr[ied] a conservatively estimated

monetary value of $8.6 million." Pet.

App. 12a. Respondents' request for

fees was also well-documented (Pet. App.

45a):

In this case plaintiffs filed a

comprehensive, reasonable and

thoroughly documented fee request.

Plaintiffs attached all the

required baggage. There are affi-

davits, resumes, and time slips.

It was an eminently professional

effort, fully in accord with the

letter and spirit of Copeland III

[Copeland v. Marshall, supra] and

Concerned Veterans [National

Association of Concerned Veterans

Ve Secretary of Defense, supra].

In short, the district court faith-

fully followed the law on quality adjust-

ments as promulgated by this Court. It

made all the relevant findings based on a

careful review of the evidence. Its

proper exercise of discretion should not

31

be disturbed.

III. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY CERTIORARI

ON THE ISSUE OF THE CONTINGENCY

ADJUSTMENT

Petitioner asserts (Pet. 8) that

this case should either be held in this

Court or remanded to the court of appeals

and held there until the issue of con-

tingency adjustments in Delaware Valley

has been decided by this Court in the

6 /

coming Term. 54 U.S.L.W. at 5023.

6/

~ Respondents submit that, due to the

interrelationship of the issues in this

case, it is undesirable that a portion of

this litigation be retained by this Court

while other issues are summarily re-

manded, as requested by petitioner.

Fragmentation of this case, while pro-

posed as a means of expediting considera-

tion of those issues that appeared to be

relatively simple, has resulted in the

division of the attorneys' fee litigation

in this case into several smaller cases

that have proceeded independently through

the court system. Respondents urge the

Court not to fragment this portion of the

case even further.

Pe Ge Nine

Respondents submit that this issue does

not justify further delay in the resolu-

tion of the attorneys' fee issues in this

case.

This Court, of course, does not sit

to correct all errors which might be

contained in lower court decisions, but

only to decide important questions of

law. See, e.g., Stern & Gressman,

Supreme Court Practice,:p. 258 (5th ed.

1978). Here, the important issues as to

contingency adjustments will be decided

in another case. The amount involved in

this case ($36,364.03) is plainly not

enough to make this case of intrinsic

importance separate from any legal issues

7/

involved. Consequently, regardless how

7/

While this sum is insignificant in the

context of the United States Government's

budget, it is by no means insignificant

33

the issues regarding contingency ad-

justments are resolved in Delaware Val-

ley, there is no reason for granting the

petition for a writ of certiorari here

because of the contingency adjustment.

Moreover, the district court issued

a careful, well-reasoned opinion justi-

fying the 20% upward adjustment for

to respondents’ counsel and we strenuous-

ly object to the jovernment's assertion

that “withholding a final disposition

here pending the outcome in Delaware

Valley would not delay payment in an

inequitable manner." Pet. 8, n. 6. The

inequity is even clearer now in light of

this Court's decision in Library of Con-

ress v. Shaw, supra, that sovereign

immunity bars a Claim for post-judgment

interest on the sums at issue in this

case. The district court's initial award

was made almost two years ago. Even

assuming a modest simple interest rate of

8%, the delay has already cost respon-

dents and their counsel almost $25,000 in

lost earning power. Further delay of the

entire case for the purely speculative

purpose of awaiting reargument in Dela-

ware Valley of an issue which is con-

tained in only a part of the present case

is obviously inequitable.

34

ee aor Ne

contingency in this case. Pet. App. 36a-

43a. This analysis was undertaken subse-

guent to this Court's decision in Blum,

which made clear that such adjustments

were only appropriate in exceptional

cases. The district court's findings

that such exceptional circumstances ex-

isted in this case should, therefore,

only be disturbed if there was an abuse

of discretion.

The court stated several cogent

reasons why a 20% upward adjustment for

contingency was appropriate. First, as

the court noted, there was both legal and

factual uncertainty "on the critical

issue of employment test validation."

Pet. App. 43a. Second, Title VII

"[c]lass actions involve efforts beyond

those associated with an ordinary law-

suit," including the need for massive and

35

expensive expert statistical evidence.

Ibid. At the time the Consent Decree was

entered, there were in excess of 30,000

members of the class. Therefore, the

district court concluded that "a contin-

gency adjustment is ‘necessary to facili-

tate the filing’ of cases of this type,

where both the scope of the claims and

the number of complainants are atypical."

Ibid. (quoting Murray v. Weinberger, 741

F.2d 1423, 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1984)}).

Respondents submit that there is no

justification for a writ of certiorari to

be granted simply because of the possi-

bility of a future change in law, which

may or may not affect the facts of this

case. The government's petition offers

no authority for holding a case open in

anticipation of a decision which has not

even been rendered.

36

A aNt eS aie se eehe

Peta ae

aie

IV. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO ADDRESS

AN ISSUE NOT RAISED BEFORE OR

ADDRESSED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioner also requests (Pet. 6-7)

that a writ of certiorari be granted

because the lodestar by which the two

upward adjustments were multiplied was

calculated based on counsel for respon-

dents' current billing rates at the time

of its application for an award of attor-

neys' fees in December 1983 rather than

the appropriate historic rates throughout

the pendency of the litigation on the

merits from 1976 through October 1983.

In its brief in the court of

appeals, petitioner stated the issues it

sought to present to that court as fol-

lows (Gov. C.A. Br., unnumbered page

entitled "Issues Presented"):

Whether the District Court erro-

neously awarded a 54.75% enhance-

ment of the attorneys' fees lode-

37

star for "quality of representa-

tion" concerning the settled por-

tion of the merits of the case, and

a 20% upward adjustment for "con-

tingency," characterizing this case

as “exceptional” under Blum v.

Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984), on

both counts.

Petitioner neither raised, nor sub-

stantively addressed in its brief the

issue whether current billing rates were

appropriately used to arrive at the

merits lodestar to which the multipliers

were added. On the contrary, petitioner

specifically stated tnat "the District

Court's use of current rates to calculate

the attorneys' fees lodestar is not an

issue in this appeal," apparently because

the law concerning that issue in the

District of Columbia was settled. Gov.

C.A. Br. 5, n. 1. Petitioner attempted,

by way of a footnote in its Reply Brief

in the court of appeals, to preserve the

issue by simply asserting that it did not

38

Waive the issue. Gov. C.A. Rep. Br. 10,

n. 5. As a result, the court of

appeals did not even mention this issue

in its opinion.

As this Court has held, issues

neither raised before, nor considered by,

the court of appeals are not properly

before this Court. EEOC v. Federal

Labor Relations Authority, 54 U-S.L.W.

4408, 4409 (April 29, 1986); Rogers v.

Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 628, n. 10 (1982);

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.

144, 147, n. 2 (1970); Lawn v. United

states, 355 U.S. 339, 362-363, n. 16

(1958); Huty v. United States, 282 U.S.

694, 701-702 (1931); Duignan v. United

States, 274 U.S. 195, 200 (1927).

In circumstances similar to those

here, the petitioner in Adickes v. S.H.

Kress & Co., supra, sought to amend his

39

complaint in district court to include a

Claim for liquidated damages under

Sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act

of 1875. The record showed that the

petitioner had never raised the issue

before the court of appeals, apparently

because of the existence of settled law

on point. 398 U.S. at 147, nh. 2. This

Court declined to address the issue on

the grounds that it had not been raised

before or addressed by the court of

appeals. Ibid.

CONCLUSION

None of the Court's reasons for

granting a writ of certiorari are present

in this case. There exists no conflict

among the circuits. There are no ques-

tions of substantial importance under the

Constitution, statutes or treaties of the

United States. There is not even a re-

40

ported decision of the court of appeals

which could serve as precedent in

other, future cases. In these circum-

stances, the government's petition for a

writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

BRUCE J. TERRIS

(Counsel of Record)

KAREN H. EDGECOMBE

ELLEN KABCENELL WAYNE

Terris, Edgecombe,

Hecker & Wayne

1121 12th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 682-2100

August 22, 1986

#124.

41

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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