Reply Brief — Thomas v. Outboard Marine Corp.
Supreme Court brief1986
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ha SEP 2 198
| YOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
No. 85-1735 \—_ / CLERK
ae -
Su the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
LEE M. THOMAS, ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, AND THE UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONERS
v.
OUTBOARD MARINE CORPORATION
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217
FRANCIS S. BLAKE
General Counsel
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
ETAT: ELE LG EI OE TD INT ES DI, BIER BEI NIE ELIE AIOE IN EER TE I BE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
United States v. Commonweaith Edison Co., 620
i 3
United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d
a ee 3, 4
Statutes and regulations:
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp.
II) 9601 et seq.:
§ 101(9) (B), 42 U.S.C. 9601 (9) (B) 2.
§ 101(14), 42 U.S.C. 9601 (14) 2.
ee ts I sapicecenteciccactenstcanancvssaieninnniainndas
Oe i Be es I cercsecccntcsnsieetinesiven tenses 1, 3, 4, 5,
§ 104(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. 9604 (a) (1) 0.
§ 104(a) (1) (A), 42 U.S.C. 9604(a) (1) (A)...
§ 104(a) (1) (B), 42 U.S.C. 9604(a) (1) (B)....
a I ides ccecctseiiciincinhssinensticetennices
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
(& Supp. II) 1151 e¢ seq.:
ee Bek 8 a |G | re
§ 311 (b) (2) (A), 33 U.S.C. 1821 (b) (2) (A)...
Solid Waste Disposal Act, as added by the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (42 U.S.C. (& Supp.
BS ERNE Rec REE en
Tucker Act:
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Be INS TIT sstcseceteeccdicotensiiccocamonsesncictinte TE ate t oe
EASES ee IO IN Leal ROE EN
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Rr II oie vioeccendentoscentnncdonene ELA CORSE
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Miscellaneous:
48 Fed. Reg. (1983) :
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$u the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
No. 85-1735
LEE M. THOMAS, ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, AND THE UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONERS
v.
OUTBOARD MARINE CORPORATION
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
The question presented for review is whether Sec-
tion 104 of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),
42 U.S.C. 9604, which authorizes the Environmental
Protection Agency to take response actions to clean
up releases of hazardous substances, authorizes access
to private property to design and implement the re-
medial action. Respondent Outboard Marine Corpo-
ration opposes review of this question on the basis
that CERCLA does not authorize such access absent
a showing of imminent and substantial endangerment,
and on the basis of several peripheral issues.
(1)
2
1. Respondent contends (Br. in Opp. 7-9) that no
public purpose would be served by permitting EPA
access to its property because there is no imminent
and substantial danger to the public health or wel-
fare. As we explain in our petition (at 10-12), how-
ever, Section 104 was enacted precisely to provide an
alternative to the relief available, upon a showing of
imminent and substantial endangerment, through
Section 106. Since EPA sought access to respondent’s
property under Section 104(a)(1)(A),’ there was no
need to establish the existence of any imminent and
substantial endangerment.’
1We note that while respondent states (Br. in Opp. 5)
that EPA acted “without warning to OMC,” EPA repeatedly
attempted to obtain voluntary access for design work, and
sought a warrant only after the negotiations failed (Pet.
App. 3a-5a).
2Section 104(a)(1) of CERCLA authorizes EPA to act
whenever “‘(A) any hazardous substance is released or there
is a substantial threat of such a release into the environ-
ment, or (B) there is a release or substantial threat of re-
lease into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant
which may present an imminent and substantial danger to
the public health or welfare” (emphasis supplied). Respond-
ent does not dispute that there has been a release of PCBs,
which are hazardous substances under CERCLA. Section
101(14) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9601(14), defines hazardous
substances to include substances regulated under several
other statutes and includes toxic pollutants listed and sub-
stances designated under Sections 307(a) and 311(b) (2)
(A) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
1317(a) and 1321(b) (2) (A). PCBs are listed as toxic pol-
lutants under Section 307(a), 40 C.F.R. 401.15, and desig-
nated as hazardous substances under Section 311, 40 C.F.R.
116.4. PCB also has been designated as a hazardous sub-
stance under Section 102 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9602. See
40 C.F.R. 302.4.
3
Respondent also incorrectly asserts that we have
conceded that the PCB contamination produced by
respondent * has “‘no identifiable adverse effects what-
soever” (Br. in Opp. 9), relying on responses to re-
quests for admissions filed in September 1982. Those
responses stated only that at that time no individual
had been identified who had been harmed by respond-
ent’s release of PCBs, and that the air in the area
and the drinking water of Waukegan, Illinois were
safe (Br. in Opp. App. C). as the court of appeals
recognized in affirming the government’s voluntary
dismissal of its Section 106 action, the government
“did net admit that the PCB then present would not
cause a significant health problem to humans in the
future, or that the PCB did not present a present risk
to the ecological life of the harbor or Lake Michigan,
or that the PCB will not harm the fish and aquatic
life in the area.” United States v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 789 F.2d 497, 505 (7th Cir. 1986). Indeed,
there is abundant evidence that PCBs have a variety
of toxic effects on humans and other organisms, and
are extremely persistent in the environment. See 47
Fed. Reg. 37342, 37344 (1982); United States v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 620 F. Supp. 1404, 1406
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (summarizing effects). It is accord-
ingly not surprising that PCBs are defined as haz-
ardous substances under CERCLA (see note 2,
supra).
Respondent suggests that EPA has no need for
access under Section 104 because it may proceed un-
* Although respondent attempts (Br. in Opp. 8) to suggest
that it is merely a disinterested observer of the PCB contam-
ination of Waukegan Harbor, respondent does not dispute
that its operations were the source of the PCBs now dispersed
on its property and in the Harbor. See, e.g., Br. in Opp. 3-4.
4
der Section 106, 42 U.S.C. 9606, on a showing of im-
minent and substantial endangerment (Br. in Opp.
10-11). Congress, however, established two separate
approaches for addressing hazardous waste contam-
ination, with differing methods and standards for
taking action.* Section 106 authorizes EPA to com-
pel private parties to conduct their own cleanup,
where there is an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to the public health or welfare or the environ-
ment because of an actual or threatened release of a
hazardous substance.* Section 104, in contrast, au-
thorizes EPA to undertake cleanups whenever there
is a release or substantia] threat of release of a haz-
ardous substance. The availability of relief under
Section 106 in appropriate cases does not negate
EPA’s right to act, and to obtain access, under Sec-
tion 104 in other situations.
The court of appeals’ interpretation of Section 104
leaves EPA in virtually the same disadvantageous
position it was in before Congress enacted Section
104. Under earlier statutes," EPA had the authority
to regulate hazardous waste disposal sites and to
*The court of appeals recognized the distinctions between
Sections 104 and 106 in its subsequent affirmance of EPA’s
decision to dismiss its injunctive action against OMC, includ-
ing a Section 106 count, and to conduct its own PCB cleanup
under Section 104. United States v. Outboard Marine Corp..,
supra.
* Respondent errs in asserting (Br. in Opp. 10) that “EP Ae
claims that Section 106 provides it with no authority to ob-
tain access to remedial sites.” EPA has not and does not
so claim (see Pet. 11).
* E.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act, as added by the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580,
90 Stat. 2795 (42 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 6901 et segq.).
5
bring suit to force cleanup by responsible parties, but
it lacked the clear legal authority to respond to haz-
ardous substance threats without establishing liabil-
ity and (taining an injunction to force cleanup by
the responsible party. Section 104 of CERCLA was
designed to remedy this situation by providing EPA
with both the authority and the funding mechanisms
necessary to undertake hazardous substance cleanups
on its own, without requiring a showing of imminent
and substantial endangerment. By limiting EPA’s
access authority to that available under the imminent
and substantial endangerment standard of Section
106, the court of appeals would turn back the clock.
As was the case before CERCLA’s enactment, the
court of appeals’ holding would take away EPA’s
ability to respond to the release or threat of a release
of a hazardous substances before the need for action
becomes acute, and again allow EPA’s response to be
delayed by complex and lengthy legal proceedings.’
As explained in our petition (at 8-14), prompt access
is critical to EPA’s ability to protect the public and
the environment through remedial action under Sec-
tion 104 and is implicit in the broad authority
granted by that Section. It is inconceivable that Con-
gress would have created direct response authority
and established a $1.6 billion Trust Fund primarily
to support such responses without intending that EPA
could enter private property—with or without the
consent of the landowner—to undertake remedial
actions necessary to protect public health and the
environment.
7 OMC’s vague reference (Br. in Opp. 10-11) to “state pow-
ers over private property * * * available to the EPA” sim-
ilarly ignores Section 104’s clear mandate. Congress author-
ized EPA to act on its own authority under CERCLA, not
to have to rely on whatever state powers may be available.
6
2. In urging that its Waukegan Harbor facility
is not a “typical contaminated Superfund site” (Br.
in Opp. 8), respondent attempts to deflect the Court’s
attention from the facts that the property is con-
taminated and that respondent is the source of the con-
tamination in Waukegan Harbor. See, e.g., id. at 4.
Respondent is not, as it seems to suggest, simply some
unaffected bystander whose property is to be enlisted
in efforts to clean up a situation for which it bears
no responsibility. In this context, respondent’s efforts
to subdivide its property into contaminated and un-
contaminated portions is singularly unpersuasive;
nothing in CERCLA suggests that EPA’s authority
to respond te a release is limited to the contaminated
portions of the responsible party’s property. As the
district court recognized, “it cannot be argued that
the EPA is limited in its planning investigation only
to those areas contaminated by PCBs. Since the re-
sponse authority includes the construction of on-site
structures, the search of appropriate areas contigu-
ous to contaminated areas, especially where the con-
taminated areas are bodies of water, for purposes of
such construction is proper” (Pet. App. 33a-34a).
The court of appeals did not disagree (Pet. App. 9a).
Respondent’s related suggestion that CERCLA
“was passed primarily as a response to abandoned
and inactive waste sites, which were not covered un-
der prior law” (Br. in Opp. 12 (emphasis added) ),
even if correct, does not establish that it applies only
to such sites, and the statutory language is flatly incon-
sistent with such a limitation. Section 104(a)(1)(B)
refers to the “owner or operator of the vessel or facility
from which the release emanates,” and Section 101
(9)(B), 42 U.S.C. 9601(9) (B), defines “facility” to
include “any site or area where a hazardous sub-
stance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or
7
placed, or otherwise come to be located; but [it] does
not include any consumer product in consumer use
or any vessel” (emphasis added). In light of this
broad definition with its very narrow exceptions,
Congress could not have intended to limit the scope
of the Act to abandoned or inactive sites.
3. Finally, respondent asserts that EPA’s exer-
cise of its response authority under Section 104 to
implement a remedy on respondent’s property con-
stitutes an unauthorized taking of that property.* As
explained in our petition (Pet. 14 n. 20) and above,
EPA’s entry and remedial work on respondent’s prop-
erty are actions authorized under Section 104 and any
taking claim alleged to arise from EPA’s exercise of
its Section 104 authority must be brought pursuant
to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 1491.
For the reasons stated above and in the petition,
it is therefore respectfully submitted that the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari should be granted.’
CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
FRANCIS 8. BLAKE
General Counsel
Environmental Protection Agency
SEPTEMBER 1986
* Contrary to respondent’s implications (Br. in Opp. 5-6),
the proposed cleanup actions are narrowly tailored to correct
the situation created by respondent’s failure to control the
hazardous substances it uses, and nothing in this record sug-
gests otherwise.
® There have not as yet been significant developments in
Congress, beyond those described in our petition (at 16-17
& n.22). We will promptly inform the Court of future legis-
lative action affecting this case.
v. &. CoOvEenmenT peimtine orrice, 1906 491507 20309
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