Reply Brief — Thomas v. Outboard Marine Corp.

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ha SEP 2 198

| YOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

No. 85-1735 \—_ / CLERK

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Su the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

LEE M. THOMAS, ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY, AND THE UNITED STATES

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONERS

v.

OUTBOARD MARINE CORPORATION

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

FRANCIS S. BLAKE

General Counsel

Environmental Protection Agency

Washington, D.C. 20460

ETAT: ELE LG EI OE TD INT ES DI, BIER BEI NIE ELIE AIOE IN EER TE I BE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

United States v. Commonweaith Edison Co., 620

i 3

United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d

a ee 3, 4

Statutes and regulations:

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-

pensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp.

II) 9601 et seq.:

§ 101(9) (B), 42 U.S.C. 9601 (9) (B) 2.

§ 101(14), 42 U.S.C. 9601 (14) 2.

ee ts I sapicecenteciccactenstcanancvssaieninnniainndas

Oe i Be es I cercsecccntcsnsieetinesiven tenses 1, 3, 4, 5,

§ 104(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. 9604 (a) (1) 0.

§ 104(a) (1) (A), 42 U.S.C. 9604(a) (1) (A)...

§ 104(a) (1) (B), 42 U.S.C. 9604(a) (1) (B)....

a I ides ccecctseiiciincinhssinensticetennices

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.

(& Supp. II) 1151 e¢ seq.:

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§ 311 (b) (2) (A), 33 U.S.C. 1821 (b) (2) (A)...

Solid Waste Disposal Act, as added by the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L.

No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (42 U.S.C. (& Supp.

BS ERNE Rec REE en

Tucker Act:

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Be INS TIT sstcseceteeccdicotensiiccocamonsesncictinte TE ate t oe

EASES ee IO IN Leal ROE EN

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Rr II oie vioeccendentoscentnncdonene ELA CORSE

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Miscellaneous:

48 Fed. Reg. (1983) :

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$u the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

No. 85-1735

LEE M. THOMAS, ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY, AND THE UNITED STATES

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONERS

v.

OUTBOARD MARINE CORPORATION

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

The question presented for review is whether Sec-

tion 104 of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-

sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),

42 U.S.C. 9604, which authorizes the Environmental

Protection Agency to take response actions to clean

up releases of hazardous substances, authorizes access

to private property to design and implement the re-

medial action. Respondent Outboard Marine Corpo-

ration opposes review of this question on the basis

that CERCLA does not authorize such access absent

a showing of imminent and substantial endangerment,

and on the basis of several peripheral issues.

(1)

2

1. Respondent contends (Br. in Opp. 7-9) that no

public purpose would be served by permitting EPA

access to its property because there is no imminent

and substantial danger to the public health or wel-

fare. As we explain in our petition (at 10-12), how-

ever, Section 104 was enacted precisely to provide an

alternative to the relief available, upon a showing of

imminent and substantial endangerment, through

Section 106. Since EPA sought access to respondent’s

property under Section 104(a)(1)(A),’ there was no

need to establish the existence of any imminent and

substantial endangerment.’

1We note that while respondent states (Br. in Opp. 5)

that EPA acted “without warning to OMC,” EPA repeatedly

attempted to obtain voluntary access for design work, and

sought a warrant only after the negotiations failed (Pet.

App. 3a-5a).

2Section 104(a)(1) of CERCLA authorizes EPA to act

whenever “‘(A) any hazardous substance is released or there

is a substantial threat of such a release into the environ-

ment, or (B) there is a release or substantial threat of re-

lease into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant

which may present an imminent and substantial danger to

the public health or welfare” (emphasis supplied). Respond-

ent does not dispute that there has been a release of PCBs,

which are hazardous substances under CERCLA. Section

101(14) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9601(14), defines hazardous

substances to include substances regulated under several

other statutes and includes toxic pollutants listed and sub-

stances designated under Sections 307(a) and 311(b) (2)

(A) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.

1317(a) and 1321(b) (2) (A). PCBs are listed as toxic pol-

lutants under Section 307(a), 40 C.F.R. 401.15, and desig-

nated as hazardous substances under Section 311, 40 C.F.R.

116.4. PCB also has been designated as a hazardous sub-

stance under Section 102 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9602. See

40 C.F.R. 302.4.

3

Respondent also incorrectly asserts that we have

conceded that the PCB contamination produced by

respondent * has “‘no identifiable adverse effects what-

soever” (Br. in Opp. 9), relying on responses to re-

quests for admissions filed in September 1982. Those

responses stated only that at that time no individual

had been identified who had been harmed by respond-

ent’s release of PCBs, and that the air in the area

and the drinking water of Waukegan, Illinois were

safe (Br. in Opp. App. C). as the court of appeals

recognized in affirming the government’s voluntary

dismissal of its Section 106 action, the government

“did net admit that the PCB then present would not

cause a significant health problem to humans in the

future, or that the PCB did not present a present risk

to the ecological life of the harbor or Lake Michigan,

or that the PCB will not harm the fish and aquatic

life in the area.” United States v. Outboard Marine

Corp., 789 F.2d 497, 505 (7th Cir. 1986). Indeed,

there is abundant evidence that PCBs have a variety

of toxic effects on humans and other organisms, and

are extremely persistent in the environment. See 47

Fed. Reg. 37342, 37344 (1982); United States v.

Commonwealth Edison Co., 620 F. Supp. 1404, 1406

(N.D. Ill. 1985) (summarizing effects). It is accord-

ingly not surprising that PCBs are defined as haz-

ardous substances under CERCLA (see note 2,

supra).

Respondent suggests that EPA has no need for

access under Section 104 because it may proceed un-

* Although respondent attempts (Br. in Opp. 8) to suggest

that it is merely a disinterested observer of the PCB contam-

ination of Waukegan Harbor, respondent does not dispute

that its operations were the source of the PCBs now dispersed

on its property and in the Harbor. See, e.g., Br. in Opp. 3-4.

4

der Section 106, 42 U.S.C. 9606, on a showing of im-

minent and substantial endangerment (Br. in Opp.

10-11). Congress, however, established two separate

approaches for addressing hazardous waste contam-

ination, with differing methods and standards for

taking action.* Section 106 authorizes EPA to com-

pel private parties to conduct their own cleanup,

where there is an imminent and substantial endanger-

ment to the public health or welfare or the environ-

ment because of an actual or threatened release of a

hazardous substance.* Section 104, in contrast, au-

thorizes EPA to undertake cleanups whenever there

is a release or substantia] threat of release of a haz-

ardous substance. The availability of relief under

Section 106 in appropriate cases does not negate

EPA’s right to act, and to obtain access, under Sec-

tion 104 in other situations.

The court of appeals’ interpretation of Section 104

leaves EPA in virtually the same disadvantageous

position it was in before Congress enacted Section

104. Under earlier statutes," EPA had the authority

to regulate hazardous waste disposal sites and to

*The court of appeals recognized the distinctions between

Sections 104 and 106 in its subsequent affirmance of EPA’s

decision to dismiss its injunctive action against OMC, includ-

ing a Section 106 count, and to conduct its own PCB cleanup

under Section 104. United States v. Outboard Marine Corp..,

supra.

* Respondent errs in asserting (Br. in Opp. 10) that “EP Ae

claims that Section 106 provides it with no authority to ob-

tain access to remedial sites.” EPA has not and does not

so claim (see Pet. 11).

* E.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act, as added by the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580,

90 Stat. 2795 (42 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 6901 et segq.).

5

bring suit to force cleanup by responsible parties, but

it lacked the clear legal authority to respond to haz-

ardous substance threats without establishing liabil-

ity and (taining an injunction to force cleanup by

the responsible party. Section 104 of CERCLA was

designed to remedy this situation by providing EPA

with both the authority and the funding mechanisms

necessary to undertake hazardous substance cleanups

on its own, without requiring a showing of imminent

and substantial endangerment. By limiting EPA’s

access authority to that available under the imminent

and substantial endangerment standard of Section

106, the court of appeals would turn back the clock.

As was the case before CERCLA’s enactment, the

court of appeals’ holding would take away EPA’s

ability to respond to the release or threat of a release

of a hazardous substances before the need for action

becomes acute, and again allow EPA’s response to be

delayed by complex and lengthy legal proceedings.’

As explained in our petition (at 8-14), prompt access

is critical to EPA’s ability to protect the public and

the environment through remedial action under Sec-

tion 104 and is implicit in the broad authority

granted by that Section. It is inconceivable that Con-

gress would have created direct response authority

and established a $1.6 billion Trust Fund primarily

to support such responses without intending that EPA

could enter private property—with or without the

consent of the landowner—to undertake remedial

actions necessary to protect public health and the

environment.

7 OMC’s vague reference (Br. in Opp. 10-11) to “state pow-

ers over private property * * * available to the EPA” sim-

ilarly ignores Section 104’s clear mandate. Congress author-

ized EPA to act on its own authority under CERCLA, not

to have to rely on whatever state powers may be available.

6

2. In urging that its Waukegan Harbor facility

is not a “typical contaminated Superfund site” (Br.

in Opp. 8), respondent attempts to deflect the Court’s

attention from the facts that the property is con-

taminated and that respondent is the source of the con-

tamination in Waukegan Harbor. See, e.g., id. at 4.

Respondent is not, as it seems to suggest, simply some

unaffected bystander whose property is to be enlisted

in efforts to clean up a situation for which it bears

no responsibility. In this context, respondent’s efforts

to subdivide its property into contaminated and un-

contaminated portions is singularly unpersuasive;

nothing in CERCLA suggests that EPA’s authority

to respond te a release is limited to the contaminated

portions of the responsible party’s property. As the

district court recognized, “it cannot be argued that

the EPA is limited in its planning investigation only

to those areas contaminated by PCBs. Since the re-

sponse authority includes the construction of on-site

structures, the search of appropriate areas contigu-

ous to contaminated areas, especially where the con-

taminated areas are bodies of water, for purposes of

such construction is proper” (Pet. App. 33a-34a).

The court of appeals did not disagree (Pet. App. 9a).

Respondent’s related suggestion that CERCLA

“was passed primarily as a response to abandoned

and inactive waste sites, which were not covered un-

der prior law” (Br. in Opp. 12 (emphasis added) ),

even if correct, does not establish that it applies only

to such sites, and the statutory language is flatly incon-

sistent with such a limitation. Section 104(a)(1)(B)

refers to the “owner or operator of the vessel or facility

from which the release emanates,” and Section 101

(9)(B), 42 U.S.C. 9601(9) (B), defines “facility” to

include “any site or area where a hazardous sub-

stance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or

7

placed, or otherwise come to be located; but [it] does

not include any consumer product in consumer use

or any vessel” (emphasis added). In light of this

broad definition with its very narrow exceptions,

Congress could not have intended to limit the scope

of the Act to abandoned or inactive sites.

3. Finally, respondent asserts that EPA’s exer-

cise of its response authority under Section 104 to

implement a remedy on respondent’s property con-

stitutes an unauthorized taking of that property.* As

explained in our petition (Pet. 14 n. 20) and above,

EPA’s entry and remedial work on respondent’s prop-

erty are actions authorized under Section 104 and any

taking claim alleged to arise from EPA’s exercise of

its Section 104 authority must be brought pursuant

to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 1491.

For the reasons stated above and in the petition,

it is therefore respectfully submitted that the peti-

tion for a writ of certiorari should be granted.’

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

FRANCIS 8. BLAKE

General Counsel

Environmental Protection Agency

SEPTEMBER 1986

* Contrary to respondent’s implications (Br. in Opp. 5-6),

the proposed cleanup actions are narrowly tailored to correct

the situation created by respondent’s failure to control the

hazardous substances it uses, and nothing in this record sug-

gests otherwise.

® There have not as yet been significant developments in

Congress, beyond those described in our petition (at 16-17

& n.22). We will promptly inform the Court of future legis-

lative action affecting this case.

v. &. CoOvEenmenT peimtine orrice, 1906 491507 20309

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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