Motion — Maresca v. Cuomo
Supreme Court brief1985
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No. 85-4 ~/ eer =
AUG 6 wo
IN THE :
Supreme Court of the United See: Mie
OcrosBerR TERM, 1985
Sealtiithin eat tent leanne
OREST V. MARESCA, SIDNEY ROSEN, JOSE RAMOS-LOPEZ,
MICHAEL WOLLIN, and WILLIAM C. BRENNAN,
Appellants,
VS.
MARIO CUOMO, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
EDWARD V. REGAN, NEW YORK STATE EMPLOYEES’ RETIRE-
MENT SYSTEM, POLICEMEN’S AND FIREMEN’S RETIREMENT
SYSTEM, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRA-
TION, NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF ELECTIONS, PHYLLIS
GANGEL JACOB, ANTONIO I. BRANDVEEN, CAROL
AARONOFF, ROBERT SILVERSON, RICHARD GUGLIATTO,
PHILIP C. MODESTO, SEYMOUR GERSCHWER, SIDNEY B.
LEVITT, CHARLES RAMOS, WILSON GRAVES AND
ENRIQUE CALDERON,
Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
MOTION BY APPELLEES MARIO CUOMO,
EDWARD V. REGAN AND NEW YORK STATE
EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM
TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM
ROBERT ABRAMS
Attorney for General of the
RoBert HERMANN State of New York
Solicitor General Attorney for Appellees
Cuomo, Regan and
OQ. PereR SHERWOOD
Retirement System
Deputy Solicitor General
Room 49-27
ARNOLD D. FLEISCHER* Two World Trade Center
Assistant Attorney General New York, New York 10047
Of Counsel (212) 488-7402
*Counsel of Record
Questions Presented
1. Whether Article VI, Section 25(b) of the New York State
Constitution and Section 23 of the New York State Judiciary
Law, in providing for expiration of the term of office of most
State judges on the last day of December in the year in which
they reach the age of seventy, are reasonably related to a
legitimate State purpose and thus within the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?
2. Whether Article VI, Section 25(b) of the New York State
Constitution, in providing that judges of the State Court of Ap-
peals and justices of the State Supreme Court may be certified
to perform the duties of a State Supreme Court justice until the
age of seventy-six, is reasonably related to a legitimate State pur-
pose and thus within the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment?
Table of Contents
Page
ee i
EE iii
irae vn ook ve ede wev ees ewes 1
CN . 2
EE 4
A. Appellants’ Jurisdictional Statement Is
eT he hee i ine x 6 SoH 84 5 0 4
B. This Case Raises No Substantial Federal
SS 5
grt Se F 7
Appendix
Remittitur of the Court of Appeals of the State
ee NG 4 oye kde ened vas A-l
ill
Table of Authorities
Cases Page
Alvord v. United States, 99 U.S. 593 (1878) ..... 4
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
U.S. , 53 U.S.L.W. 5022 (July 1, 1985) 5
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) ..... 6
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975).......... 7
Malmed wv. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 955 (1980) .......... ry 6
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,
I 8 iis vas See pk cae eae 5
Mcllvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U.S. 986 (1974),
dismissing appeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d
ere Deered Uawaneau eee cs ms 6
Palmer v. Ticcione, 576 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1978) . 7
People v. Brundage, 78 N.Y. 403 (1879)......... 3
People v. Gardner, 45 N.Y. 812 (1871).......... 3
Rubino v. Ghezzi, 512 F.2d 431 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 891 (1975) ....,............ 6
Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906 (1979) ............ 6, 7
Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U.S. 940 (1975), aff'g 383
F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974) (3-judge court) ... 6
Constitutions
United States Constitution 14th Amendment ..... passim
New York State Constitution of 1777 Art. XXIV.. 2
New York State Constitution Art. VI, Sect. 25(b). passim
iv
Page
Statutes
New York State Judiciary Law
le ee passim
GE a ee ee ae 2, 3
a $.3
Rules
United States Supreme Court Rules
ee be we tv awh coke coun cus 4
NN leis ss cas sha pds ene ON hws 4
NS oe oid ors Cdn od Seo ode oc eo oe 4
Miscellaneous
Plan of the Temporary Commission on the
SE ee 3
Record of 1967 New York State Constitutional
ES eee he eS: 3
Record of 1983 New York State Constitutional
MI, OS BE oes ores cc cucevccbhce, 3
No. 85-4
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcToBER TERM, 1985
OREST V. MARESCA, SIDNEY ROSEN, JOSE RAMOS-
LOPEZ, MICHAEL WOLLIN, and WILLIAM C. BRENNAN,
Appellants,
vs.
MARIO CUOMO, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, EDWARD V. REGAN, NEW YORK STATE
EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, POLICEMEN’S
AND FIREMEN’S RETIREMENT SYSTEM, NEW YORK
STATE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, NEW
YORK CITY BOARD OF ELECTIONS, PHYLLIS GANGEL
JACOB, ANTONIO I. BRANDVEEN, CAROL AARONOFF,
ROBERT SILVERSON, RICHARD GUGLIATTO, PHILIP C.
MODESTO, SEYMOUR GERSCHWER, SIDNEY B.
LEVITT, CHARLES RAMOS, WILSON GRAVES AND
ENRIQUE CALDERON,
Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
MOTION BY APPELLEES MARIO CUOMO,
EDWARD V. REGAN AND NEW YORK STATE
EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM
TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM
Opinions Below
The opinion of the New York State Court of Appeals is reported
at 64 N.Y.2d 242, 48 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1984). The opinion of the
New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, is reported at 105 A.D.2d 193, 483 N.Y.S.2d 690
(lst Dep’t 1984). The opinion of the New York State Supreme
Court, Special Term, Part I, New York County, is reported in
The New York Law Journal, Dec. 20, 1984, at p. 12, col. 6. These
opinions are set forth at J. la, 14a and 28a, respectively.*
Statement Of The Case
Appellants are four judges of the Civil Court of the City of
New York and one justice of the Supreme Court of the State
of New York. They contend that Article VI, Section 25(b) of
the New York Constitution and Section 23 of the New York
Judiciary Law violate the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.** In effect, these provi-
sions establish a retirement age of seventy for virtually all State
judges. However, Article VI of the State Constitution and Sec-
tions 114 and 115 of the Judiciary Law provide that judges of
the State’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, and justices of
the court with the broadest jurisdiction in the State, the Supreme
Court, may be certified fcr continued service on the bench un-
til age seventy-six.
Article VI, Section 25(b) of the State Constitution, which took
effect September 1, 1962, was an early step in the reorganiza-
tion and unification of the State court system. It continued in
effect a constitutionally mandated judicial retirement age that
for at least certain State court judges has appeared in every State
Constitution since the first New York Constitution of 1777. That
Constitution provided, in Article XXVI, that the judges of the
State Supreme Court and the first judge of every county court
had to relinquish office at age sixty.
Over time, various constitutional amendments have been pro-
posed which would have raised the mandatory retirement age
* References in the form J.____ are to appellants’ Jurisdictional Statement.
** The challenged provisions are set forth at J. 6-7.
to seventy-five, exempted Court of Appeals judges from man-
datory retirement, or eliminated the provision entirely, but none
of these proposals was ever approved by the Legislature and sub-
mitted to the public. See, e.g., Record of the 1983 New York
State Constitutional Convention, Vo. II, pp. 531-534. To the con-
trary, concern over the effects of advancing age on judicial per-
formance has been continually voiced both in the Legislature
and at successive constitutional conventions. See, e.g., Record
of the 1967 New York State Constitutional Convention, IV-845,
858, 887-889, 947-948. Thus, as the State Court of Appeals com-
mented early on, the State Constitution reflects “the apprehen-
sion that, during [a] long [judicial] term, the natural decay of
the powers of the man might at times leave upon the bench an
inefficient judge.” People v. Gardner, 45 N.Y. 812, 819 (1871).
Addressing that apprehension, the State Constitution, “instead
of prohibiting the election [to long judicia! terms] of those who
were too old to serve the full period, [limits] the term in such
cases to the length of time they could serve,” i.e., to age seventy.
People v. Brundage, 78 N.Y. 403, 406 (1879).
Article VI, Section 25(b) also permits mandatorily retired
judges of the State Court of Appeals and justices of the State
Supreme Court, but not judges of the Civil Court, to apply for
certification to perform the duties of a Supreme Court justice
for as many as three two-year terms, but in any event not beyond
age seventy-six. Together with the new Sections 114 and 115 of
the Judiciary Law,* Article VI, Section 25(b) thereby replaced
the official referee, an anomalous position abolished in the
reorganization of the courts, and at the same time sought to
make better use of the talents of former Court of Appeals judges
and Supreme Court justices. Plan of the Temporary Commis-
sion on the Courts, July 2, 1956, p. 57.
* Sections 114 and 115 of the Judiciary Law, both added by L. 1962, c. 704,
§ 2, provide that State Court of Appeals judges (§ 114) and State Supreme
Court justices (§ 115) retired pursuant to Article VI, Section 25(b) of the State
Constitution may be certified for continued service upon findings that they
have the requisite mental and physical capacity and that their services are
necessary to expedite the business of the State Supreme Court.
Appellants brought this action seeking a declaration that Ar-
ticle VI, Section 25(b), and Judiciary Law, Section 23, violate
the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The State Supreme Court, at Special Term, granted
appellants’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief, but on ap-
peal, the Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously
reversed and dismissed the complaint. In the order which ap-
pellants seek to appeal to this Court, the State Court of Appeals
unanimously determined that Article VI, Section 25(b), and
Judiciary Law, Section 23, are reasonably related to a legitimate
State purpose and, accordingly, modified the Appellate Divi-
sion’s order to declare these provisions constitutional.
Argument
A. Appellants’ Jurisdictional Statement Is Untimely
The Rules of this Court provide that an appellant must docket
a case by inter alia filing a jurisdictional statement with proof
of service within ninety days after entry of the judgment ap-
pealed from. U.S. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 12.1, 12.3. The remit-
titur of the New York State Court of Appeals was entered in
the Office of the County Clerk, New York County, on January
8, 1985. Appendix to Appellees’ Motion To Dismiss or Affirm,
infra, at A-1. Accordingly, appellants were required to file their
Jurisdictional Statement on or before April 8, 1985.
Appellants’ Jurisdictional Statement was not filed, however,
until July 3, 1985. It is therefore untimely by almost three
months. Appellants never moved for an enlargement of time pur-
suant to Rule 12.2 of the Rules of this Court, and they fail to
offer a reasonable excuse for their untimely docketing. Although
appellants’ counsel of record disclaims awareness of or respon-
sibility for this delay, J. 3-5, he has been appellants’ attorney
throughout this action, and he is ultimately responsible for com-
pliance with the Rules of this Court. “Counsel who enter their
appearance...must understand that the court will hold-*them
responsible for all that such an entry implies until they relieve
themselves from the obligation they assume, by substitution or
otherwise.” Alvord v. United States, 99 U.S. 593 (1878).
Therefore, the appeal should be dismissed as untimely docketed.
ee eee Oe
B. This Case Raises No Substantial Federal Questions
According to appellants this case raises two substantial federal
questions which warrant review by this Court. The first con-
cerns age discrimination claims of judges, J. 15, and the second
concerns the level of scrutiny to be applied under the Fourteenth
Amendment to age-based classifications, id.
We submit that neither is a substantial federal question
meriting plenary review. The mere fact that redress is being
sought by judges and not janitors does not render the questions
in the case substantial. Moreover, on July 1, 1985, this Court
reaffirmed the rule that differential treatment based on age is
subject to neither “strict” nor “heightened” scrutiny in deter-
mining compliance with the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
US. , 53 US.LW. 5022, 5024 (1985); see also,
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313
(1976). Thus, contrary to appellants’ suggestion, there is no need
to “clarify for the nation the question of ... whether age is now
a suspect class.” J. 15.
Appellants argue that Article VI, Section 25(b) of the State
Constitution and Section 23 of the Judiciary Law deny them
equal protection in three ways:
(1) by unreasonably discriminating between judges over the
age of seventy and judges under the age of seventy without
regard to individual competence;
(2) by unreasonably discriminating between judges and all
other elected and appointed public officials in the State and its
political subdivisions who are not subject to a mandatory retire-
ment age;
(3) by unreasonably discriminating between judges of the Civil
Court and justices of the State Supreme Court, since the latter,
but not the former, may apply for certification to perform the
functions of a State Supreme Court justice for successive two-
year terms until age seventy-six.
It is clear from appellants’ recitation of the decision by the
New York Court of Appeals, J. 10-15, that all of these claims were
addressed and properly rejected by that court, just as virtually
identical claims have been uniformly rejected by other appellate
courts. See, e.g., Malmed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565, 569 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 955 (1980); Trafelet v. Thompson,
594 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 906 (1979); Rubino
v. Ghezzi, 512 F.2d 431 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 891 (1975).
The State Court of Appeals confirmed that the challenged age
limitation is rationally related to the promotion of a number of
legitimate State interests, J. 9a. The Court also confirmed the
existence of a rational basis for restricting post-retirement ser-
vice in the State Supreme Court — a court of “broad, general
jurisdiction” and “State-wide reach” — to former judges of the
State’s highest two courts, J. 10a. Indeed, the wisdom of New
York’s decision to address only the problems of State Supreme
Court, and the “mathematical nicety” of that decision, are not
appropriate matters for the courts to consider. Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).*
The same reasons that defeat appellants’ equal protection
claims also defeat their claim under the due process clause that
the challenged provisions create an “irrebuttable presumption”
that persons over seventy cannot perform their judicial duties.
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine has no application to cases
of this kind. This Court did not apply it in McIlvaine v. Penn-
sylvania, 415 U.S. 986 (1974), dismissing appeal from 454 Pa. 129,
309 A.2d 801 (1973) (upholding constitutionality of state statute
mandating retirement at age sixty for Pennsylvania State Police)
or Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U.S. 940 (1975), aff'g 383 F. Supp. 933
(D.D.C. 1974) (3-judge court) (upholding constitutionality of
Federal Employee Mandatory Retirement Law [mandating retire-
ment at age seventy]). Such summary affirmances and dismissals
* Appellants lack standing to raise any claims on behalf of individuals who
voted for them. No voter is a party to this action. Such claims, moreover, are
plainly insubstantial, for under New York’s constitutional and statutory scheme,
appellants’ terms were openly delimited from the outset by the mandatory retire-
ment provisions they now contest.
for want of a substantial federal question are rulings on the
merits. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
In short, the doctrine of irrebuttable presumptions is merely
“coextensive with the equal protection clause.” Trafelet v.
Thompson, 594 F. 2d at 630. If “a classification is sustainable
as rationally based, then it should not fall because it might also
be labeled a presumption.” Palmer v. Ticcione, 576 F. 2d 459,
463 (2d Cir. 1978). This appeal, therefore, presents no substan-
tial federal questions for this Court’s determination and should
be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The appeal should be dismissed or in the alternative
the order of the New York State Court of Appeals
should be affirmed.
Dated: New York, New York
July 31, 1985
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT ABRAMS
Attorney General of the
State of New York
Attorney for Appellees
Cuomo, Regan and
Retirement System
ROBERT HERMANN
Solicitor General
O. PETER SHERWOOD
Deputy Solicitor General
ARNOLD D. FLEISCHER
Assistant Attorney General
Of Counsel
Remittitur
Court of Appeals
State of New York
The Hon. Lawrence H. Cooke, Chief Judge, Presiding
No. 698
OresT v. MARESCA, et al.,
Appellants,
v.
Mario Cuomo, Governor &c., et al.,
Respondents.
The appellant(s) in the above entitled appeel appeared by
Giamo & Vreeburg; the respondent(s) appeared by Hon. Robert
Abrams, Attorney General, State of New York; Fried, Frank,
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, Esqs.; Michael Colodner, Esq.;
Nicholas J. Miglino, Esq.; Gaffin & Mayo, P.C.
The Court, after due deliberation, orders and adjudges that
the order is modified, with costs to respondents, in accordance
with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed. Opinion
by Judge Jasen. Judges Jones, Wachtler, Meyer, Simons and
Kaye concur. Chief Judge Cooke took no part.
The Court further orders that the papers required to be fil-
ed and this record of the proceedings in this Court be remitted
to the Supreme Court, New York County,
there to be proceeded upon according to law.
I certify that the proceeding contains a correct record of the
proceedings in this appeal in the Court of Appeals and that the
papers required to be filed are attached.
s/
Donald M. Sheraw, Clerk of the Court
Court of Appeals, Clerk’s Office, Albany, December 31, 1984.
FILED January 8, 1985
County Cierk’s OrFiceE, NEw York
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