Jurisdictional Statement — Humphrey v. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n
Supreme Court brief1985
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No. 84- ! JAN vy 1985
, * STEVAS,
IN THE CLERK J
- Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1984
MARK A. HUMPHREY AND F REDD J. HAAS
d/b/a HUMPHREY & HAAS,
Appellants,
We
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT
OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
Appellee.
On Appeal from a Judgment of
the Iowa Supreme Court
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
MARK W. BENNETT CHARLES A. HorSkKy *
BABICH, BENNETT & DAVID H. REMES
_ NICKERSON COVINGTON & BURLING
5835 Grand Ave. 1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Suite 202 P.O. Box 7566
Des Moines, Iowa 50312 Washington, D.C. 20044
CHARLEs S. SIMS (202) 662-6000
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES M. ANNE WILCOX
UNION FOUNDATION RALPH OGDEN
132 West 43d St. 227 Lamb Lane
New York, N.Y. 10036 Golden, Colo. 80401
Counsel for Appellants
January 17, 1985 * Counsel of Record
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether a state law restricting television advertis-
ing by lawyers to displays of words and numbers, ac-
companied only by a single “nondramatic” voice, violates
the First Amendment, on its face and as applied.
2. Whether a state law forbidding lawyers to com-
municate truthful, non-deceptive information unless “spe-
cifically permitted” by rule violates the First Amend-
ment, on its face and as applied.
3. Whether a state law banning the use of “dramatic”
voices and “self-laudatory” statements in lawyer adver-
tising is impermissibly vague or otherwise violates the
First Amendment, on its face or as applied.
(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES IN-
iii a setaplonenntosnnaseantendidedntgianesdncavbiceine=
STATEMGN: OF THE CASE. ........................2..--..0c0000.-
Bi ee III sonnei cases geensencnnensaenen evans
2. The Complaint and Answer ...................--2--.----+++
a tee meenuery FOATING ......................-............
4
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tit lcdicilndafaienasisesintcn macstinnetncrncieodinsintueniatnnnons
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1. Truthful, Non-Deceptive Information May
I i ik occ cacesniits babdntmonaeencsons
2. The Ads Here Were Not ee Mis-
end
C. The Ban on “Dramatic” Voices and “Self-
Laudatory” Statements ......................2..-..0-.-00
CONCLUSION ........ fabian Saniiealeealtcbiibeuncaspaibinintincctciete
APPENDICES*
APPENDIX A—Opinion of Iowa Supreme Court........
APPENDIX B—Notice of Appeal ..................2222....002---+-
* The appendices are separately bound.
(iii)
25a
| iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
APPENDIX C—Order Extending Time for Docketing
MIE siiecbichisicbesicid sand cheshscitatiienipdsAtamcnnteabalbed
APPENDIX D—lIowa Code of Professional Responsi-
bility for Lawyers
Se eS eI acti ccetneicceasbiececseniaciasoumrsmdecctecimnens
DR 2-105: Description and Limitation of Practice..
APPENDIX E—Plaintiff’s Petition for Injunction....
APPENDIX F—Defendants’ Answer and Counter-
"SESE IES ECE ve RN ECE E Tey aN
APPENDIX G—Order of Sept. 14, 1982, Temporarily
Enjoining Airing of Advertisements...
APPENDIX H—Order of Sept. 28, 1982, Appointing
Commissioner to Conduct Evidentiary
Hearing
APPENDIX I—Commissioner’s Report (filed Nov. 16,
LALIT METI OL eh EN
Ala
45a
5la
53a
‘Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) .................. passim
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 103 S. Ct.
Be IIE soiccsuiscctcinicscsidanincohpdansesipieabtuctiaoatenamiankoii 13, 17
Consolidated Edison Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 530
CI: iiicensnnslibicsecdtanissiniesinciiccbadaronidabteespcahiaiiverebpninesatohenn 17
First National Bank v. Bellotti, 485 U.S. 765
kT Cree NCA ER RPT ET wo ICSuNS OMe «fu rtar coiar oe 15
Gomez V. Perez, 409 U.S. 5385 (1973) —...00002222.0..2... 2
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S.
A | SRETE STR RS SE Ret ceed MU ord leper oreo erm 15
Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willing-
epee: EE Te OD ais ct cccincincee 14
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) .......... 2
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).......... 19
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 447
CIE itis ccipctenteigsiatiaiinieitan etaaani lial ctaihan:niistch pumetobiosaddacs 13
In re Primus, 486 U.S. 412 (1978) .......................... 18, 15
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) ..........................- passim
In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) 0002222. 19
Thomas V. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) ....0...022... 15
Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199
CRT scinsaceinntibnnedies Pakiihdadicehiteisadieas 19
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS:
pie a er RRR ero en passim
pee Me ee” + ef Beene eee NemnEN IE passim
I rca tsibemmnnions 2
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Be II vik vassdhicenssisicicbarnniolaenctiateuiceleebenatels 2
Court Rules:
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PI i ee penttrbaoindanias 2,4
Disciplinary Rules:
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TI I sans kas bi ovienivrcin acipenlticecedhtnelaidnaionlehactaaeall passim
BUI III sss cssnccesenesdinsdecnccbinmieasssibidadarceueuniaaial passim
vi 4
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
eI IEIAD ahtciisasinccnbancihionieceniieiennrdishesienioiiuil
Lis sied picsiticaninsinsistsiabshechsaitaniapaniliinsiantdinea stadia
TET AC IR OAT
Vt. DR 2-101 (D) ........ Sicpcddinsndebaebainacasdiuinladesnia-oiaikaiatsiainsins
I I tcc cs cecnpesntesniducntubaniageidamnitantin
MISCELLANEOUS:
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
i
ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.2 (a)..
Federal Trade Commission, Cleveland Regional
Office and Bureau of Economics, Improving
Consumer Access to Legal Services: The Case
for Removing Restrictions on Truthful Adver-
RE. Me IEEE Mtn eesteislaciccias wre eanncicneeemies 9,10
ow OO CO
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1984 \
No. 84-
MARK A. HUMPHREY AND FREDD J. HAAS
d/b/a HUMPHREY & HAAS,
Appellants,
Vv.
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT
OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
Appellee.
On Appeal from a Judgment of
the Iowa Supreme Court
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Iowa Supreme Court is reported at
355 N.W.2d 565 and appears as Appendix A. (App. 1la-
24a.)
JURISDICTION
The proceeding below was brought as an original ac-
tion in the Iowa Supreme Court to enjoin appellants
Humphrey and Haas, two Iowa lawyers, from airing
certain television advertisements alleged to violate two
rules of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for
\
2
Lawyers, DR 2-101 and DR 2-105. Finding that the ads
in question violated the rules, the Iowa Supreme Court
permanently enjoined Humphrey and Haas from airing
them or any other ads that violate those rules. The court
rejected their contention that the rules, both on their
face and as applied, violate the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. (App. la.)
The Iowa Supreme Court’s judgment, embodied in its
opinion, was issued on September 19, 1984. (App. 1a.)
A notice of appeal was timely filed on November 19,
1984. (App. 25a.) By an order of December 6, 1984, the
time for docketing the appeal was extended to January
17, 1985. (App. 27a.) This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).1. Because appellee is a com-
mission of the Iowa Supreme Court (see Iowa Court
Rule 118.2), we believe that 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) is
inapplicable. See Sup. Ct. R. 28.4(c).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND RULES INVOLVED
U.S. Const., Amend. I:
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press... .”
U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1:
“(Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
DR 2-101 and DR 2-105 of the Iowa Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility for Lawyers are set forth in Ap- |
pendix D (App. 28a-40a). |
1 Insofar as any subsidiary questions presented may properly be
here on certiorari, this Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28
U.S.C. § 1257(3), and we ask that the notation of probable juris- |
diction “be understood as a grant of the writ” on them. Mishkin
v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 512 (1966); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. |
535, 687 n.2 (1973).
reine
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. The Advertisements ;
Over a three-day period in early September 1382, the
law firm of Humphrey, Haas & Gritzner aired three ad-
vertisements over WHO-TV in Des Moines, Iowa. The
first ad featured an actor and actress portraying a
physician and a nurse in an examination room. While
the nurse looked at an X-ray, the doctor addressed the
viewer:
“We see first-hand injuries caused by the neglect of
others. If you’re seriously injured through the negli-
gence of others, you should be talking to a lawyer.
The choice of a lawyer could be important. That’s
something to think about.”
The second ad featured an actor portraying a printer.
Standing in front of a printing press, he addressed the
viewer:
“I suffered loss of wages, incurred staggering medi-
cal bills and endured pain and suffering all through
the negligence of others. I wasn’t aware of my legal
rights. I should have been talking to a lawyer.”
The third ad featured two actors portraying bowling
partners. The following conversation took place at the
lanes:
“Bowler #1: I’ve got to throw like that body, we’re
one man short.
Bowler #2: He was injured through the negligence
of others.
Bowler #1: He should be talking to a lawyer.
Bowler #2: The choice of that lawyer will be im-
portant.
Bowler #1: That’s something to think about.”
After the dramatization, the scene in each ad shifted
to the reception area of a law office, with an actress
4
portraying a receptionist. As the name, address, and
phone number of the firm were superimposed on this
picture, an off-camera announcer said:
“If you’re injured through the negligence of others,
call the law firm of Humphrey, Haas & Gritzner.
Cases involving auto accidents, work comp, serious
personal injuries and wrongful death handled on a
percentage basis. No charge for the initial consulta-
tion. Call now at 288-0102.”
2. The Complaint and Answer
The three ads were scheduled to run four days a
week for 47 weeks. (Tr. 25.)* After three days on the
air, however, they were discontinued by the station at
the request of the Committee on Professional Ethics and
Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association. (Tr. 29.)*
The Committee then brought an original action in the
Iowa Supreme Court, alleging that the three ads violated
DR 2-101 and DR 2-105 of the Iowa Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers. The Committee alleged that
the ads violated DR 2-101 because they
“contain more than a single nondramatic voice, have
background sound and visual displays of two or more
people characterizing themselves as clients which
make laudatory comments as to Defendants’ serv-
ices.” (App. 42a.) *
2“Tr.” refers to the transcript of the evidentiary hearing ordered
by the Iowa Supreme Court in this case. See pp. 6-9, below.
3The Committee consists of two members appointed by the
Iowa Supreme Court and five appointed by the Iowa State Bar
Association. All seven must be confirmed by the Iowa Supreme
Court. The Committee members sit as commissioners of that court
“to initiate or receive, and process complaints against any attorney
licensed to practice law in [Iowa] for alleged violations of the Iowa
Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers and the laws of
the United States or the state of Iowa.” Iowa Court Rule 118.2.
¢ DR‘2-101(B), which lists information that “may be communi-
cated to the public,” provides that the approved information may
be communicated on television—
|
5
The Committee alleged that the ads violated DR 2-105,
which, at the time, authorized lawyers in print advertise-
ments to list not more than three fields of practice and
required such listings to be accompanied by a disclaimer
of expertise. (App. 42a.)°
The Committee asked that the Iowa Supreme Court
permanently enjoin the lawyers from airing the ads in
question or any other ads that violate the Code. (App.
48a-44a.) On September 14, 1982, the Iowa Supreme
Court, on the Committee’s ex parte application, enjoined
Humphrey and Haas from airing their ads pending fur-
ther proceedings. (App. 5la-52a.)*
Humphrey and Haas admitted that the ads used more
than a single voice and contained background sounds and
visual displays. But they urged that DR 2-101’s restric-
tions of lawyer advertising violate the First and Four-
“in words and numbers only, articulated only by a single non-
dramatic voice, not that of a lawyer, and with no other back-
ground sound. ... [N]o visual display shall be allowed except
that allowed in print as articulated by the announcer.” (App.
29a.)
DR 2-101(A) limits lawyer advertising to the information “spe-
cifically permitted” by the rule. It bans any “false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive or unfair statements.” (App. 28a.)
5 After its judgment here was entered, the Iowa Supreme Court
amended DR 2-105(A) (2) to permit the listing of fields of practice
in broadcast as well as print advertising. (See App. 36a-38a.) The
amended rule violates the First Amendment because it arbitrarily
limits to three the number of fields of practice that may be listed
in any advertisement and impermissibly restricts the designations
that may be used. (See pp. 16-17, below.) Its required disclaimer
(see App. 39a) is unjustifiably burdensome as well.
6 After the Committee commenced its action, Gritzner withdrew
from the firm and was dismissed as a defendant. Meanwhile,
the Committee instituted disciplinary proceedings against Hum-
phrey and Haas, which have been stayed pending disposition of this
action. Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct, Jn re
Humphrey and Haas, File No. 8283-58 (notice of complaint issued
Sept. 16, 1982).
6
teenth Amendments, both facially and as applied, and
that the rule’s ban on the use of “dramatic” voices and
“self-laudatory” statements is impermissibly vague. They
contended that DR 2-105 also violates the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, facially and as applied. Al-
leging that the disciplinary rules violated their constitu-
tional rights, they counterclaimed for declaratory and in-
junctive relief. (App. 46a-50a.)
3. The Evidentiary Hearing
Two weeks after the Iowa Supreme Court entered the
ex parte injunction, it appointed a commissioner to con-
duct an evidentiary hearing and to prepare a written
summary of the evidence, but not to make any findings
of fact or reach any conclusions of law. (App. 58a.)
Following discovery, the hearing was held, and the Com-
missioner’s summary was filed with the court on Novem-
ber 16, 1983. (App. 55a.) The evidentiary hearing focused
entirely on the state’s justification for DR 2-101’s general
prohibition of dramatization in lawyer advertising on
television, and on the supposedly objectionable charac-
teristics of the three ads.
The Committee’s principal justification for DR 2-101’s
prohibition was that dramatizations may appeal to a
viewer’s “emotions,” interfering with “rational” choice,
and are “unnecessary” to convey pertinent information.
Former Justice Robert Allbee, a witness for the Commit-
tee, explained that the likely viewers of such advertising
“are ordinarily of a lower intellectual category and they
are less able to make an objective conclusion from some-
thing that is passed by them in dramatic form.” (Tr.
95.)7
7 Former Justice Allbee was a member of the Iowa Supreme Court
when it adopted the ban on dramatized television advertising in
1980 on the Committee’s recommendation. In addition to “pre-
vent[ing] purely emotional reactions or emotional impact in the
selection of lawyers” (Tr. 86-87), Justice Allbee testified that the
7
The Committee made no claim that the ads were in fact
false, deceptive, or misleading. To the contrary, Dr.
Richard Haynes, an expert retained by the Committee,
testified that he saw nothing inherently misleading or
deceptive in the use of dramatization (Tr. 210-12; see
App. 61a), and that the ads in question had not been
perceived as misleading or deceptive by a group of view-
ers paid by him to watch them. (Tr. 210, 258; see App.
60a.) He conceded that dramatization is effective pre-
cisely because it “involve[s] and interest[s] the viewer”
(Tr. 276) ; indeed, he found that 75 percent of the view-
ers paid to watch the ads rated them as a fair-to-excellent
way of educating viewers about their rights. (Tr. 265.)
The Committee’s counsel repeatedly sought to elicit tes-
timony that dramatization in television advertising can
generate an exaggerated sense of need for a lawyer’s
services, and can imply distinctions between lawyers that
are no more genuine than the distinctions between name-
brand and generic aspirin. But none of the evidence sug-
gested that any such effects are either inherent in or
peculiar to dramatized television advertising. Nor was
there any evidence that the ads here caused such effects
or that such effects, if they were to occur, would contami-
nate consumer choice. The defense proffered extensive
testimony that lawyer advertising does not create a need
for legal services and that a consumer’s exercise of choice
is inevitably more deliberate in hiring a lawyer than in
purchasing bathroom tissue.*
The Committee did not controvert the extensive de
fense evidence that dramatization is critical for effective
television advertising. The evidence demonstrated, to the
ban was intended “to guard the public against deception either
inadvertent or intended, and in turn to protect the trust and in-
tegrity that we want the public to have in the legal profession.
That the public not obtain the view that merchandising legal serv-
ices is like merchandising vintage wine.” (Tr. 87; see App. 59a.)
8 F.g., Tr. 335, 618-19, 699.
8
contrary, that dramatization enables advertisers to cap-
ture viewers’ attention,® causes viewers to remember the
message being conveyed,” and “break[s] down the barrier
that exists between the public and lawyers.” +The Com-
mittee offered no evidence to rebut the testimony of de-
fense witnesses that ads conforming to the restrictions
of DR 2-101 are more likely to mislead viewers than
dramatized ads precisely because they look less like ads
than those employing dramatization.* As one defense
witness stated, ads conforming to DR 2-101—just printed
words and numbers on the screen, accompanied by a
“nondramatic” voice—could readily be perceived as a
public-service announcement, “a statement with some sort
of authority behind it.”
Lori Andrews, research attorney for the American Bar
Foundation and former staff director of the ABA Com-
mission on Advertising, testified that more than 40 states
permit lawyer advertising on television using dramatiza-
tion, visual displays, background sounds, and the like.
(Tr. 330-31; see App. 61a.) She pointed out that DR
2-101 contains independent prohibitions against false, de-
® E.g., Tr. 378, 562, 686.
10 F.g., Tr. 281, 379, 712.
11 Tr, 457. See also, e.g., Tr. 709-10. As Norton Frickey, who
heads the firm that produced the ads, testified in explaining their
design, “we try to find something that the average guy can com-
municate with and relate to[.]” (Tr. 451; see App. 63a.)
12 F.g., Tr. 688, 690, 754.
13 Tr, 691. The witness observed:
“[T]hat has a greater chance to mislead the public than some-
thing which has drama, which has action, which has visuals
and color in it that everybody knows it’s an advertisement.
When I see it, I know it’s an ad. If I see this other thing,
I might think that could be anything from a newscast to a
message from the Bar.”
Id. (testimony of Dr. Gene W. Murdock, Assistant Professor of
Business Administration, University of Wyoming).
9
ceptive, and misleading statements or claims (Tr. 334),
and she noted that the trend is simply to forbid such
statements or claims and to permit ads of the type aired
in this case. (Tr. 8332; see App. 62a.) **
14 Ags of January 1985, only five states—Alabama, New Jersey,
Ohio, Vermont, and West Virginia—imposed restricticns on tele-
vision advertising by lawyers comparable to Iowa’s or more severe.
See Ala. DR 2-102(A) (7) (d); N.J. Rule 7.2; Ohio DR 2-101(B) ;
Vt. DR 2-101(D); W. Va. DR 2-101(B). Indiana proscribes ad-
vertisements containing “a photograph or other pictorial repre-
sentation of any person other than the attorney or member of the
firm,” Ind. DR 2-101(D) (4), while Montana permits television ads
only with the advance approval of the state bar association’s Ethics
Committee. See Mont. DR 2-101(C) (as construed).
Rule 7.2(a) of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(adopted in August 1983) permits lawyer advertising through any
public media, including television, subject only to the restriction
that the advertising not be false or misleading. The Comment
on the Rule states:
“Television is now one of the most powerful media for getting
information to the public, particularly persons of low or mod-
erate income; prohibiting television advertising, therefore,
would impede the flow of information about legal services to
many sectors of the public. Limiting the information that may
be advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can
accurately forecast the kind of information that the public
would regard as relevant.”
ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, reprinted in ABA/
BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, p. 01:166
(1984). DR 2-101(B) of the ABA’s Model Code of Professional
Responsibility also permitted lawyer advertising on television, with-
out special restrictions based on the lawyer’s choice of medium.
See id. at p. 01:310.
In November 1984, the Staff of the FTC’s Cleveland Regional
Office and the FTC’s Bureau of Economics issued a report con-
cluding that content-based and media-based restrictions on lawyer
advertising inhibit the extent of advertising and result in sig-
nificantly higher prices for legal services. Improving Consumer
Access to Legal Services: The Case for Removing Restrictions on
Truthful Advertising 126-27 (Nov. 1984). The report, based on
10
4. The Decision
On the basis of this record, the lowa Supreme Court
sustained the restrictions sought to be enforced by the
Committee and enjoined Humphrey and Haas from air-
ing the ads in question. Disclaiming any suggestion “that
the advertisements here were deceitful” (App. lla), the
court justified its injunction on the ground that, “in the
medium defendants chose, the public could well be mis-
led by [the ads].” (Jd.) The court did not identify any
feature of “the medium defendants chose” that rendered
any particular aspect of any of the ads potentially mis-
leading.”®
an empirical study of the effects of lawyer advertising restrictions
in 17 representative states, urges elimination of all restrictions that
limit “the free flow of truthful information to consumers.” Id. at
172. Its recommended approach is even less restrictive than the
ABA’s Model Rule 7.2. See id. at 150-53. ;
The Federal Trade Commission, in its amicus brief in the Iowa
Supreme Court, argued that the restrictions at issue in this case
“are likely to diminish the effectiveness with which attorneys can
[truthfully] inform consumers about the availability of legal serv-
ices.” FTC amicus brief at 14. It stated that “in addition to the
complete absence of evidence to suggest that the advertisements in
question were misleading or deceptive, there is no evidence in the
record to support the premise generally that the technique of using
dramatizations, background sounds or more than one non-dramatic
voice in a television advertisement for lawyer services would be in-
herently misleading.” Jd. at 15. The FTC stated that “[t]he use of
dramatizations containing characterizations, visual displays and
background sound can provide a truthful, non-deceptive and effective
means of conveying important information about legal rights and
the availability and cost of legal services.” Jd. See also id. at 17.
16 The court seemed to accept the Committee’s assertion, made
for the first time in its brief but without support in the evidentiary
record, that the ads could “mislead people into believing that pur-
suing the listed cases is a cost-free venture.” (App. lla.) The court
also seemed to accept the Committee’s claim, also made for the
first time in its brief but without any support in the evidentiary
record, that the ads might be misleading because they implied
11
The court rejected Humphrey and Haas’s contention
that DR 2-101’s ban on dramatization is more restrictive
than necessary to serve any compelling state interest.
“All that is prohibited,” the court stated, “are the tools
which would manipulate the viewer’s mind and will.”
(App. 18a.) Stating that the situation presented by the
ads “is exactly what the United States supreme court
had in mind when it referred to the ‘special problems’ in
electronic media advertising” (App. lla), the Iowa court
justified DR 2-101’s ban on dramatization as a prophy-
lactic against “intrusion, intimidation, overreaching, or
undue influence.” (App. 12a.)
The court agreed with the Committee that “the Bates
rationale does not apply to irrelevant information,” and
opined that “the ads here would not aid the public in
making the informed decision which is subject to the pro-
tection recognized in Bates.” (Id.) Because DR 2-101’s
restriction prohibits only “irrelevant” information, the
court found that the rule “does not impede, [but] in fact
advances, the fostering of rational decision making and
maintaining of the bar’s professionalism.” (Jd.)
The court summarily dismissed Humphrey and Haas’s
claim that the limitation on lawyer advertising to in-
formation “specifically permitted” by rule violates the
First Amendment. “We specifically allow[ ] dissemina-
tion of all information necessary to assist the public
in seeking and selecting counsel. As previously men-
tioned, a procedure is in place for considering any sug-
gested additions of useful information.” (App. 18a.)
Finally, the court rejected the contention that DR 2-
101’s ban on “dramatic” voices and “self-laudatory”
statements is impermissibly vague. It did so merely by
remarking that the phrase “nondramatic voice” is “a
that Humphrey and Haas were more experienced than they in fact
were. (Jd.) The court did not explain how “the medium defendants
chose” was responsible for either supposed misrepresentation, or on
what basis the court accepted the Committee’s claims.
12
simple [one] which we think is commonly understood”
(App. 14a), and noting simply that “[t]he dictionary
meaning of ‘laudatory’ is ‘expressing praise.’” (Jd.)
Two justices dissented, condemning the rule as “un-
necessarily restrictive because it prohibits dissemination
of basic information necessary for an informed judgment
about the selection of an attorney and the protection of
basic legal rights.” (App. 15a.) They added that the
rule’s ban on dramatization is “in fact a prescription for
dullness, prohibiting all background music, dramatiza-
tion, and other methods of stimulating viewer interest.”
(Id.) The dissent stated:
“It is undisputed that the effect of these limitations
on technique is to substantially diminish the effec-
tiveness of any television advertising. The combined
effect of the rules is to inhibit dissemination of rele-
vant information without a showing of a substantial
state interest. This violates . . . the first amend-
ment.” (Jd.)
The dissent stressed that the Committee’s own expert
had testified that dramatization is not inherently mis-
leading, and that the ads in fact were not misleading to
the survey group. (App. 16a.) The dissenters rejected the
majority’s conclusion that “because television is the
medium, a mere chance of deceit is sufficient” to sustain
the restrictions at issue. (App. 17a.) They instead read
this Court’s cases as teaching that “regardless of the
medium used, advertising must be more than ‘possibly’
misleading in order to be denied first amendment pro-
tection.” (App. 17a-18a.)
The dissent pointed out that this Court’s statements
recognizing the value of fostering rational, intelligent,
and voluntary decisionmaking were meant “to expand
the scope of lawyer advertising, not to throttle it.” ( App.
21a.) “In providing information for the formation of
an informed judgment,” Justice Larson wrote, “it seems
13
to me that it is preferable to provide an excess of in-
formation, rather than too little. Viewers are sophisti-
cated enough to accept or reject it as they see fit.” (App.
22a.)
THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE SUBSTANTIAL
A. The Ban on Dramatization
In sustaining DR 2-101’s restriction on lawyer adver-
tising on television to pictures of printed words and num-
bers, accompanied only by an off-screen “nondramatic”
voice, the Iowa court disobeyed the teachings of this
Court’s lawyer advertising cases, In re R.M.J., 455 U.S.
191 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S.
447 (1978); In re Primus, 486 U.S. 412 (1978) ; Bates v.
State Bar, 433 U.S. 850 (1977). Those cases teach that
a state may impose restrictions on lawyer advertising
“where the particular advertising is inherently likely to
deceive or where the record indicates that a particular
form or method of advertising has in fact been deceptive.”
In re R.M.J., supra, 455 U.S. at 202.
Although a state may restrict such advertising to pre-
vent “fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching
and other forms of ‘vexatious conduct,’” id., such re-
strictions “must be narrowly drawn and the State may
regulate only to the extent regulation furthers the State’s
substantial interest.” Jd. at 203. And, as with restric-
tions on other forms of speech, “[t]he party seeking to
uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the
burden of justifying it.” Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2875, 2882 n.20 (1983). The Court has
sustained prophylactic restrictions only in situations
which are “inherently conducive to overreaching and other
forms of misconduct,” Ohralik, supra, 436 U.S. at 464,
where requiring proof of actual harm would render a
lawyer’s conduct “virtually immune to effective oversight
and regulation by the State or by the legal profession.”
Id. at 466.
14
There is no claim that the ads here were false, mis-
leading, or deceptive. To the contrary, the Committee’s
expert witness specifically testified that the ads were not
in fact misleading or deceptive, and the Iowa Supreme
Court itself disclaimed any suggestion “that the adver-
tisements here were deceitful.” ** Thus, the question pre-
sented is whether the state may enforce a prophylactic
rule to enjoin Humphrey and Haas from airing these ads
on the theory that other dramatized television ads by
lawyers might be deceptive.
The First Amendment permits no such prophylactic
rule here. The Committee’s expert witness himself testi-
fied that he found nothing inherently misleading or de-
ceptive in the use of dramatization, and he conceded that
dramatization is effective in television advertising pre-
cisely because it “involve[s] and interest[s] the viewer.”
The Iowa Supreme Court offered no record support for
any contrary view. It upheld DR 2-101’s prohibition
solely on the basis of its unsubstantiated belief that tele-
vision dramatization “manipulate[s] the viewer’s mind
and will,” despite this Court’s admonition that “com-
mercial speech cannot be banned because of an unsub-
stantiated belief that its impact is ‘detrimental.’” Lin-
mark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85, 92 n.6 (1977).
The Iowa court may have upheld DR 2-101 on the
supposition that the likely viewers of lawyer advertising
on television “are ordinarily of a lower intellectual cate-
gory and [thus] less able to make an objective conclusion
from something that is passed by them in dramatic form.”
(See p. 6 & n.7, above.) But this Court has squarely
rejected restrictions premised on the assumption “that
the public is not sophisticated enough to realize the limita-
tions of advertising.” Bates, supra, 433 U.S. at 375. It
\
16 As for the court’s view that the ads might be misleading in
certain respects because of “the medium defendants chose” (App.
lla), see pp. 17-19, below.
15
has refused to restrict lawyer advertising when the re-
striction “rests on an underestimation of the public.” Jd.
“If the naiveté of the public will cause advertising by
attorneys to be misleading, then it is the bar’s role to
assure that the populace is sufficiently informed as to
enable it to place advertising in the proper perspective.”
Id.
Nor is there any foundation in the First Amendment
for distinguishing between speech that appeals to the
“emotions” and speech that appeals to “reason.” As the
evidence in this case demonstrates, drama can facilitate
effective communication by capturing a viewer’s atten-
tion through a sympathetic appeal to the viewer's needs:
—an approach that the Iowa court condemned as manipu-
lative—while dry recitations of fact can generate irra-
tional emotional responses. Moreover, as the evidence
showed, viewers may be more easily misled by advertis-
ing that purports to be “objective” than by advertising
that makes no secret of its commercial aims.
This Court has already held that any distinction be-
tween speech that informs and speech that: persuades is
analytically indefensible. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 5385 (1945). See also Primus, supra, 436 U.S. at
431-32. And the Court has frequently stressed that the
fact that speech may persuade “is hardly a reason to
suppress it.” First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 790 (1978) ; Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents,
360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959). The Iowa Supreme Court
believed that DR 2-101 draws a permissible line “between
what informs the public and what promotes the lawyer,”
but the rule is in fact “a prescription for dullness,” and
its effect is “to inhibit dissemination of relevant informa-
tion without a showing of substantial state interest.”
(See p. 12, above.) Because television is such a critical
medium of communication, and because DR 2-101 so
drastically restricts the use of that medium, the First
16
Amendment question presented here is urgent and im-
portant.
B. The Ban on Information Not “Specifically Permitted”
1. Truthful, Non-Deceptive Information
May Not Be Suppressed |
In enjoining Humphrey and Haas from airing tele-
vision ads that communicate truthful, non-deceptive in-
formation not “specifically permitted” to be conveyed, the
Iowa Supreme Court disregarded this Court’s teaching
that such restrictions are flatly impermissible. Indeed,
like DR 2-105(A) (2), one of the rules at issue in R.M.J.
limited the fields of practice that a lawyer might list.
The lawyer in that case was charged, inter alia, with
publishing ads that listed fields other than those per-
mitted by the Advisory Committee of the Missouri Su-
preme Court, but the Advisory Committee was unable to
suggest any substantial interest promoted by the limita-
tion. This Court concluded that the limitation was “an
invalid restriction upon speech as applied to [the law-
yer’s] advertisement.” 455 U.S. at 205.
Here neither the Committee nor the Iowa court has
suggested any substantial interest promoted by the rule’s
prohibition against communicating truthful, non-deceptive
information not “specifically permitted” by rule. The
only asserted justification for this approach is that the
rule permits all “relevant” information to be conveyed;
but the rule precludes lawyers from advertising informa-
tion that is indisputably “relevant” 7; and in any event |
the state has no substantial interest in suppressing “ir-
relevant” information. It is the very essence of paternal-
ism for the state to decide what a consumer “needs to
know” to make an informed decision. As the ABA has /
atu iene nen.
17 As the dissent observed, the Iowa rules do not permit lawyers
to include in their advertisements “such matters as statutes of
limitation, the early filing requirements of [Iowa’s] tort claims act,
and the problems of uninformed releases of claims.” (App. 22a.)
ee OE NT
17
observed, moreover, there is no reason to suppose “that
the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information
that the public would regard as relevant.” (See p. 9,
n.14, above.) 7®
Because the rule is both irrational and contrary to
this Court’s decisions, the Iowa court’s judgment uphold-
ing and enforcing it should not be allowed to stand.
2. The Ads Here Were Not Potentially Misleading
Humphrey and Haas also seek review of the lowa
court’s conclusion that, “in the medium defendants chose,”
their ads were potentially misleading with respect to fees
and quality of service. First, the court offered no sup-
port for its conclusion that the ads might “mislead people
into believing that pursuing the listed cases is a cost-free
venture” (App. lla), nor any explanation for its view
that television was responsible for this supposed decep-
tion. Moreover, as the dissent observed (App. 19a-20a),
the Iowa rules themselves do not “require disclaimers or
explanations tv avoid false hopes,” R.M.J., supra, 455
U.S. at 200 n.11, where percentage rates are advertised.
With respect to any apprehension that the ads were poten-
tially misleading, “we deal with a silent record.” Jd. at
206.*° For the Iowa court to enjoin the ads as potentially
misleading on this ground violated the First Amendment.
18To the extent that the Iowa court’s holding rested on the
supposition that some members of the audience might be irritated
by dramatized ads, such a supposition could not support the chal-
lenged restriction. Viewers who encounter ads they dislike “may
‘effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply
by averting their eyes.’” Consolidated Edison Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S.
530, 542 (1980) (citation omitted); Bolger, supra, 103 S. Ct. at
2883. They may leave the room, change the channel, shut off the
volume, or turn off the set.
19 As the dissent observed, “any lack of understanding about this
matter, or any other matter relevant to the terms of a lawyer’s
employment, would logically be resolved at the initial conference,
which, in this case, was advertised as being free of cost.” (App.
20a.) See Bates, supra, 433 U.S. at 373 n.28.
18
Second, nothing in the ads overstated Humphrey and
Haas’s qualifications in the fields of practice they listed,
and the Iowa court did not explain how they did. At
most, the ads implied that they were qualified in those
fields, and, as the dissent noted, “there is no evidence,
nor even a claim, that they were in fact not qualified.”
(App. 20a.)*° Offering no discussion, the majority merely
speculated that—because of “the medium defendants
chose”—viewers might think Humphrey and Haas more
able than they are. (App. lla.) Its conclusion that the ads
were potentially misleading in this respect was wholly
unsupported, and to enjoin the ads on this ground vio-
lated the First Amendment.**
Third, wholly apart from the First Amendment ob-
stacles to the Iowa court’s conclusion that the ads were
potentially misleading, it plainly violated due process for
the court to enjoin them on this ground. The Commit-
tee’s complaint did not allege that the ads were mislead-
ing in any respect, and it presented no evidence on these
matters at the hearing before the commissioner. It first
raised these claims in its brief to the Iowa court, ob-
* Humphrey, a 1979 Drake Law School graduate, had been
editor-in-chief of the law review and had clerked for a federal
magistrate during law school. Haas, also a 1979 Drake Law School
graduate, was also on the law review and served as student bar
president. As of the summer of 1983, the two lawyers (who had
formed their firm in November 1980) had handled or were handling
over 150 personal injury cases, in addition to their workers’ com-
pensation cases.
21 Even if the First Amendment had permitted the Iowa court
to conclude on this record that the ads were potentially misleading
with respect to fees or quality, the proper remedy would have been
to require appropriate disclaimers. As this Court has repeatedly
stressed, “the preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than
less.” R.M.J., supra, 455 U.S. at 201.
19
viously groping for some solid basis for the relief
it had requested. Thus, this was not even a case in
which “the charges are amended on the basis of .. .
testimony” adduced during a trial (see Jn re Ruffalo,
890 U.S. 544, 551 (1968)); it is a case in which the
charges are amended after the trial because the hearing
produced no evidence to support the state’s claims. But
it has long been settled that “the right to a hearing em-
braces not only the right to present evidence but also a
reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the op-
posing party and to meet them.” Morgan v. United
States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1988). This requirement is
doubly important in this context, where there must be
record support for a finding that an ad is misleading.
R.M.J., supra, 455 U.S. at 202, 205-07. The Iowa
court’s judgment therefore violated due process.
C. The Ban on “Dramatic” Voices and
“Self-Laudatory” Statements
The Iowa court sustained DR 2-101’s ban on “dramatic”
voices without analysis; to it, the meaning of the term
is “commonly understood,” and therefore DR 2-101’s ban
could not be condemned as vague. Humphrey and Haas
submit that the court was wrong. A ban on the use of
“dramatic” voices is inherently vague, for there is no
voice that cannot be considered “dramatic,” and no prin-
cipled basis for distinguishing between the voice that is
“dramatic” and a voice that is not. Indeed, by prohibit-
ing a lawyer from speaking in his own television ads,
the rule requires a lawyer to employ an actor if he
desires to have his message heard; and it is hard to
22 See also Thompson Vv. City of Louisville, 8362 U.S. 199, 204-06
(1960).
20
imagine how an actor’s voice could be regarded as any-
thing other than “dramatic.”
No test of intonation or other criterion is provided by
the rule for determining when a voice is “dramatic,” and
the rule’s proscription is thus a recipe for arbitrary and
discriminatory treatment of lawyers who advertise on
television. This case is a perfect illustration. There was
no shouting in the ads in question; there were no his-
trionics. The ads involved actors playing everyday people,
speaking in everyday language about everyday needs, in
perfectly measured tones. If there was anything “dra-
matic” about their voices, neither the Committee nor the
Iowa Supreme Court explained what it was.*
Nor could Humphrey and Haas ever have suspected
that the ads would be deemed “self-laudatory.” Their
ads made no claim as to the quality of their services, did
not recite their credentials (although the rules permit
credentials to be listed), and did not claim or suggest
that the firm would render better service than other
firms. If these ads were “self-laudatory,” then all ads
are “self-laudatory,” and the ban on “self-laudatory”
statements amounts to a ban on all ads. Applied to
enjoin these ads on the ground that they contain “self-
laudatory” statements in violation of DR 2-101(A), the
rule is impermissibly vague—equivalent to the blanket
advertising prohibitions held impermissible by Bates and
its progeny.
23 Humphrey and Haas maintain that a ban on “dramatic” voices
would be constitutionally infirm even if it were possible to define
the term clearly, for the state has shown no substantial interest in
suppressing voices merely because they are “dramatic.” (See p. 18,
above.)
21
CONCLUSION
Probable jurisdiction should be noted and either the
judgment should be summarily reversed or the appeal
should be set for briefing and argument on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
MARK W. BENNETT CHARLES A. HORSKY *
BABICH, BENNETT & DAVDD H. REMES
NICKERSON COVINGTON & BURLING
5835 Grand Ave. 1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Suite 202 P.O. Box 7566
Des Moines, Iowa 50312 Washington, D.C. 20044
CHARLEs S. SIMS (202) 662-6000
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES M. ANNE WILCOX
UNION FOUNDATION RALPH OGDEN
182 West 48d St. 227 Lamb Lane
New York, N.Y. 10036 Golden, Colo. 86401
Counsel for Appellants
January 17, 1985 * Counsel of Record
APPENDIX —
d 3 PW vw Tt a en eae
es GO TY foes
ALEXANDER (er
No. 84-
Ramnsnnshis ome
. = ——
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1984
MARK A. HUMPHREY AND FREDD P. HAAS
d/b/a HUMPHREY & HAAS,
Appellants,
V.
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT
OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
Appellee.
On Appeal from a Judgment of
the Iowa Supreme Court
APPENDIX TO
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
MARK W. BENNETT CHARLES A. HORSKY *
BABICH, BENNETT & DAviD H. REMES
NICKERSON COVINGTON & BURLING
5835 Grand Ave. 1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Suite 202 P.O. Box 7566
Des Moines, Iowa 50312 Washington, D.C. 20044
CHARLEs S. SIMS (202) 662-6000
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES M. ANNE WILCOX
UNION FOUNDATION RALPH OGDEN
132 West 43d St. 227 Lamb Lane
New York, N.Y. 10036 Golden, Colo. 80401
Counsel for Appellants
January 17, 1985 * Counsel of Record
TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX A—Opinion of Iowa Supreme Court........
APPENDIX B—Notice of Appeal -..................2....::002-000
APPENDIX C—-Order Extending Time for Docketing
PD sects choaniesdieciibanindinrabbioueinieie isles
APPENDIX D—lIowa Code of Professional Responsi-
bility for Lawyers
Be eS II heaicindivenhccesaicissinizsbonaninninsnctitnansehinnensinns
DR 2-105: Description and Limitation of Practice..
APPENDIX E—Plaintiff’s Petition for Injunction....
APPENDIX F—Defendants’ Answer and Counter-
claim .. SN
APPENDIX G—Order of Sept. 14, 1982, Temporarily
Enjoining Airing of Ads ......................
APPENDIX H—Order of Sept. 28, 1982, Appointing
Commissioner to Conduct Evidentiary
| ee
APPENDIX I—Commissioner’s Report saussee Nov. 16,
1983) ...... os os
27a
28a
35a
4la
45a
5la
53a
55a
la
APPENDIX A
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
167
69088
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT
OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff,
VS.
MarK A. HUMPHREY, FREDD J. HAAS,
and JAMES E. GRITZNER, d/b/a
HUMPHREY, HAAS AND GRITZNER,
Defendants.
Filed September 19, 1984
Original action.
Proceeding to enjoin lawyers from airing certain tele-
vision advertisements. A counterclaim asks that our
advertising rule be declared unconstitutional. INJUNC-
TION ISSUED.
Nick Critelli of Critelli and Sherburne, Des Moines,
and Frank A. Comito of Comito and Capps, Des Moines,
for plaintiff.
Mark W. Bennett of Babich, Bennett & Nickerson, Des
Moines, and Wilcox & Ogden, Golden, Colorado, for de-
fendants.
Erwin G. Krasnow and Barry D. Umansky, Washing-
ton, D.C., for amici curiae, Iowa Broadcasters Associa-
tion and National Association of Broadcasters.
2a
John W. Carley, general counsel, and William W.
Jacobs, and Brenda W. Doubrava, Cleveland, Ohio, for
amicus curiae, Federal Trade Commission.
Considered en bance.
HARRIS, J.
Our rule on lawyer advertising expressly prohibits
television advertisements which contain background
sound, visual displays, more than a single, nondramatic
voice or self-laudatory statements. Believing the rule ex-
ceeded the standards outlined by the United States Su-
preme Court, defendant lawyers bought and aired tele-
vision advertisements in clear violation. of it. Plaintiff
committee then brought this original action before us to
enjoin the advertisements. Defendants answered and
counterclaimed, asking that the rule, to the extent of the
violation, be set aside as unconstitutional. We think the
rule passes constitutional muster ard order issuance of a
permanent injunction.
The factual background can be briefly stated. In Sep-
tember of 1982, Des Moines attorneys Mark A. Hum-
phrey, Fredd J. Haas, and James E. Gritzner, without
seeking prior permission, aired the advertisements over
a Des Moines television station for a three-day period.
‘hey had purchased the ads from a Denver corporation.
The ads were of three types. The first featured an
actor and actress portraying a physician and nurse in an
examination room. While the “nurse” looks at an X-ray,
the “physician” says:
We see first-hand injuries caused by the neglect
of others. If you’re seriously injured through the
negligence of others, you should be talking to a law-
yer. The choice of lawyer could be important.
That’s something to think about.
The second ad featured an actor portraying a printer
standing in front of a press. The “printer” says:
3a
I suffered loss of wages, incurred staggering medi-
cal bills, and endured pain and suffering all through
the negligence of others. I wasn’t aware of my legal
rights. I should have been talking to a lawyer.
The third featured actors portraying bowlers. The fol-
lowing conversation takes place at the lanes:
Bowler 1: I’ve got to throw like that today; we’re
one man short.
Bowler 2: He was injured through the negligence
of others.
Bowler 1: He should be talking to a lawyer.
Bowler 2: The choice of that lawyer will be
important.
Bowler 1: That’s something to think about.
In each of the advertisements, after the brief drama-
tization, the picture switches to a person portraying a
receptionist in a law office. The name, address, phone
number, and areas of practice of defendants’ law firm
are superimposed over the picture, and a voice says:
If you’re injured through the negligence of others,
call the law firm of Humphrey, Haas & Gritzner.
Cases involving auto accidents, work comp, serious
personal injury and wrongful death handled on a
percentage basis. No charge for initial consultation.
Call now at 288-0102.
The voice repeats the phone number twice.
The television station discontinued the advertisements
following a request from the ethics committee. The com-
mittee then commenced this action, requesting us to
enjoin defendants from using the ads because they violate
our professional canons DR 2-101 and DR 2-105. We
granted a temporary injunction.
4a
By answer and counterclaim, based on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, defendants Humphrey and Haas,’ asserted that
DR 2-101 and DR 2-105 violate the first and fourteenth
amendments of the United States constitution. They
also asserted the phrase “nondramatic voice’ in DR
2-101(B) and the phrase “self-laudatory” in DR 2-101 (A)
are void for vagueness under the first and fourteenth
amendments.
In July 19838, an evidentiary hearing was held before
the Honorable C. Edwin Moore. We appointed senior
judge Moore as commissioner of this court to conduct the
hearing and summarize the evidence. The matter is be-
fore us on the record made before him.
Prior to 1977 Iowa’s canons of ethics, in common with
most such canons, strictly forbade lawyer advertising.
The prohibition for the most part was never questioned.
Indeed, prior to relatively recent times, the United States
Supreme Court viewed regulation of commercial speech
as tantamount to the regulation of a business activity:
wholly permissible and without the protection of the first
amendment. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62
S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed.2d 1262 (1942).
Commercial free speech, however, was recognized by
the court in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d
346 (1976). The right was first applied for lawyers in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 483 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct.
2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977), which held that no longer
could a state absolutely prohibit lawyer advertising. It
could only regulate it. The Bates opinion was later ex-
plained by the court in the case of Jn re R.M.J., 455 U.S.
191, 199-202, 102 S.Ct. 929, 935-37, 71 L.Ed.2d 64, 71-74
(1982) :
1Gritzner had withdrawn from the firm by this time and, in
October 1982, we dismissed the action as to him.
5a
The Bates Court held that ... lawyer advertising
was a form of commercial speech, protected by the
First Amendment and that ‘advertising’ by attor-
neys may not be subject to blanket suppression.
[Citing Bates]
More specifically, the Bates Court held that law-
yers must be permitted to advertise the fees they
charge for certain ‘routine’ legal services. The court
concluded that this sort of press advertising was not
‘inherently’ misleading, and therefore could not be
prohibited on that basis. The court also rejected a
number of other justifications for broad restrictions
on advertising including the potential adverse effect
of advertising on professionalism, on the administra-
tion of justice, and on the cost and quality of the
legal services, as well as the difficulties of enforcing
standards short of an outright prohibition. None of
these interests was found to be sufficiently strong or
sufficiently affected by lawyer advertising to justify
a prohibition.
But the decision in Bates nevertheless was a nar-
row one. The Court emphasized that advertising by
lawyers still could be regulated. False, deceptive, or
misleading advertising remains subject to restraint,
and the court recognized that advertising by the
professions poses special risks of deception—‘[B]e-
cause the public lacks sophistication concerning legal
services, misstatements that might be overlooked or
deemed unimportant and other advertising may be
found quite inappropriate in legal advertising.’
[Citing Bates] The Court suggested that claims as
to quality or in-person solicitation might be so likely
to mislead as to warrant restriction. And the Court
noted that a warning or disclaimer might be appro-
priately required, even in the context of advertising
as to price, in order to dissipate the possibility of
consumer confusion or deception. ‘[T]he bar retains
6a
the power to correct omissions that have the effect
of presenting an inaccurate picture, [although] the
preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than
less. [Citing Bates]
In short, although the Court in Bates was not per-
suaded that price advertising for ‘routine’ services
was necessarily or inherently misleading, and al-
though the Court was not receptive to other justifi-
cations for restricting such advertising, it did not by
any means foreclose restrictions on potentially or
demonstrably misleading advertising. Indeed, the
Court recognized the special possibilities for decep-
tion presented by advertising for professional serv-
ices. The public’s comparative lack of knowledge,
the limited ability of the professions to police them-
selves, and the absence of any standardization in the
‘product’? renders advertising for professional serv-
ices especially susceptible to abuses that the States
have legitimate interest in controlling.
Thus, the Court has made clear in Bates and
subsequent cases that regulation—and imposition of
discipline—are permisssible where the particular ad-
vertising is inherently likely to deceive or where the
record indicates that a particular form or method of
advertising has in fact been deceptive. Jd.
Other cases, in which the court considered restrictions
on lawyer advertising, were In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,
98 S.Ct. 1898, 56 L.Ed.2d 417 (1978) (political expres-
sion or association by lawyer working for American
Civil Liberties Union called for “exacting scrutiny appli-
cable to limitations on core first amendment rights” in
reviewing lawyer solicitation rule) and Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association, 486 U.S. 447, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56
L.Ed.2d 444 (1978) (lower level of judicial scrutiny
required for rule prohibiting in-person solicitation by
lawyer).
7a
To summarize the foregoing cases, the court set aside,
as a special category, advertising which is misleading or
which experience has proved to be inherently misleading.
Commercial speech in this category can be appropriately
restricted. Misleading advertising can be prohibited.
Other lawyer a'‘vertising can be regulated if the state
first demonstrates a compelling interest. But any restric-
tions must be narrowly drawn, and the state may regu-
late only to the extent regulation furthers substantial
state interest.
Commercial free speech challenges to advertising rules
are to be reviewed under the four-part analysis specified
in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm’n, 447
U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2348, 2351, 65 L.Ed.2d 341, 351
(1980). As we shall point out, a special problem is rec-
ognized in advertising by way of the electronic media.
We took some care in responding to the Bates opinion.
We asked the ethics committee’ to conduct public hear-
ings, to investigate the matter of lawyer advertising, and
to file with us a report with recommended advertising
rules fcr the profession. After hearings and considerable
study, the committee filed its report with us on January
18, 1980. Following our own extended study and consid-
eration, we entered an order on May 6, 1980, which in
effect adopted the committee’s report and recommenda-
tions.
Despite objection voiced before the committee and
later carefully considered by us, the rules contain the
provision challenged here. DR 2-101 specifies in consider-
able detail what advertising is and is not prohibited.
DR 2-101(A) generally prohibits:
2 The committee on professional ethics and conduct of the Iowa
state bar association. Seven lawyer members of the committee are
appointed, subject to our confirmation, by the Iowa state bar as-
sociation. We appoint two lay members of the committee. See
Iowa Court Rule 118.2.
8a
[A]ny form of public communication which contains
a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-
laudatory or unfair statement, which contains any
statement or claim relating to the quality of...
legal services, which appeals to the emotions, prej-
udices, or likes and dislikes of a person, or which
contains any claim that is not verifiable ....
DR 2-101(B) separately deals with newspapers or
periodicals, telephone directories, radio, and television.
The rule lists 19 items thought to be useful to the public
(names, fields of practice, office and telephone answering
service hours, hourly fee rate, fixed fees, range of fees
for specific legal services, date ana place of bar admis-
sions, various licenses and memberships, ete.). Only the
listed items may be communicated to the public. As to
television advertising the rule provides:
The same information, ir words and numbers only,
articulated by a single non-dramatie voice, not that
of the lawyer, and with no other background sound,
may be communicated on television. In the case of
television, no visual display shall be allowed except
that allowed in print as articulated by the an-
nouncer. All such communications on radio and tele-
vision, to the extent possible, shall be made only in
the geographical area in which the lawyer maintains
offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer’s
clientele resides. Any such information shall be
presented in a dignified manner....
I. Our advertis..i1g rule encompasses the “safe harbor”
concept. The listed items may be communicated by the
manner specified. A lawyer who feels constrained by the
rules may petition to have them changed. The commit-
tee, as our commissioner acting on its own motion or
upon the request of any Iowa lawyer, is to consider pro-
posed amendments to the advertisement rules. See DR
2-101(D). Any recommended changes are to be consid-
9a
ered by us and a prompt appeal to us is provided from
the committee’s rejection of requested changes. Id.
This proceeding, of course, is no such appeal. Rather
than proposing rule changes which would authorize their
television advertisements, defendants chose to violate the
rule and defend their violation by challenging its con-
stitutionality. Accordingly, we are dealing only with the
rule’s constitutionality, not with its wisdom. It should be
scarcely necessary to point out that any lawyer asserting
the wisdom of a rule change, should present the proposal
to the committee under the procedure we have provided.
The professional disciplinary system would be in utter
chaos if violations could be defended on the ground the
lawyer involved could think of a better rule.
Because the challenge is limited to its constitutional
basis, we have set aside a number of criticisms that go
only to the wisdom of the rule.
II. The United States Supreme Court seems not to
have specifically addressed the use of sound, visual dis-
plays, and dramatization, but seems to clearly have rec-
ognized the electronic use of those devices as potentially
misleading. It has referred to the “special problems” of
television advertising:
[T]he special problems of advertising on the elec-
tronic broadcast media will warrant special consid-
eration. Cf. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell;
333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. 1971), aff’d sub nom. Capital
Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405
U.S. 1000, 31 L.2d 472, 92 S.Ct. 1289 (1972).3
8 The case cited by the Court coutains the following statement:
The fact is that there are significant differences between the
electronic media and print. As the court noted in Banzhaf
[v. F.C.C., 182 U.S. App. D.C. 14, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01
(1968), cert. den., 396 U.S. 842], written messages are not
communicated unless they are read, and reading requires an
affirmative act. Broadcast messages, in contrast, are ‘in the
air’. In an age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely breathes
10a
Bates, 483 U.S. at 384, 97 S.Ct. at 2709, 53 L.Ed.2d at
836.
In several cases, the court has described the broadcast
media as uniquely pervasive or intrusive. Federal Com-
munications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726, 748, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3039, 57 i..Ed.2d 1673, 1093
(1978) (“the broadcast media has established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.’’) ;
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 127, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2098,
36 L.Ed.2d 772, 798 (1973) (“viewers constitute a ‘cap-
tive audience.’”’) ; Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,
453 U.S. 490, 501, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 2889, 69 L.Ed.2d 800,
811 (1981) (“Each method of communicating ideas is ‘a
law unto itself’? and that law must reflect the ‘differing
natures, values, abuses, and dangers’ of each method.”’)
It is in view of these “special problems” that the com-
mittee argues two ways in which it feels the public
might be misled* by defendant’s television ads. First,
a citizen who does not know some part of a leading cigarette
jingle by heart. ... It is difficult to calculate the subliminal
impact of this pervasive propaganda, which may be heard even
if not listened to, but it may reasonably be thought greater
than the impact of the written word.
Capital Broadcasting Co., 333 F. Supp. at 586.
*The proposed model rule of professional conduct 7.1 defines a
“false or misleading’? communication as follows:
A communication is false or misleading if it:
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law,
or omits a fact necessary to make the statement con-
sidered as a whole not materially misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about
results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies
that the lawyer can achieve results by means that
violate the rules of professional conduct or other law;
or
(c) compares the lawyer’s services with other lawyers’
services, unless the comparison can be factually sub-
stantiated.
|
lla
the ad states that certain cases are handled on a percent-
age basis and there is no other charge for initial con-
sultation. The committee thinks these statements mis-
lead people into believing that pursuing the listed cases
is a cost-free venture. It points out that the ads are
“conspicuously” silent with regard to payment of expert
witness fees and of other costs of litigation. The com-
mittee asserts defendants, like the defendant in Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Association, 486 U.S. at 467, 98 S.Ct.
at 1924, 56 L.Ed.2d at 461, used the contingency fee as
a lure:
He emphasized that his fee would come out of the
recovery, thereby tempting the young women with
what sounded like a cost-free and therefore irresist-
ible offer.
The second way the committee thinks defendant’s ads
are misleading stems from the statements which are
thought to be self-laudatory comment on the advertisers’
expertise. The committee argued that the firm’s experi-
ence did not match their representation:
Defendants had little in the way of experience when
the commercials were broadcast. After graduation
from law school, Mr. Humphrey had tried six cases,
the nature of which are unknown, all while under
the supervision of another Des Moines law firm.
Mr. Haas had virtually no trial experience. To-
gether, defendants Humphrey and Haas had only
tried one case.
Without suggesting that the advertisements here were
deceitful, we do agree with the committee that, in the
medium defendants chose, the public could well be misled
by them. We think the situation is exactly what the
United States supreme court had in mind when it re-
ferred to the “special problems” in electronic media
advertising. We think the challenged rule falls clearly
within the area left to us by the Bates opinion.
12a
The court has said that the state can regulate those
types of advertising which result in instrusion, intimida-
tion, overreaching, or undue influence. See Ohralik, 436
U.S. at 462, 98 S.Ct. at 1921, 56 L.Ed.2d at 457. A
state can regulate advertisements which are inherently
likely to deceive, or which the experience has proven to
be subject to abuse. See R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 202-03, 102
S.Ct. at 937, 71 L.Ed.2d at 73-74.
The court in Bates condemned those advertising rules
which amounted to restrictions on the flow of “relevant
information needed to reach an informed decision.”
Bates, 483 U.S. at 874, 97 S.Ct. at 2704, 53 L.Ed.2d at
829-30. The committee’s position is that the Bates rationale
does not apply to irrelevant information. Information is
not relevant if it makes no contribution to informed deci-
sion making. In other words, prohibition of such in-
formation does not impede, and in fact advances, the
fostering of rational decision making and maintaining of
the bar’s professionalism.
We think the ads here would not aid the public in
making the informed decision which is subject to the
protection recognized in Bates. This was the holding in
Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 521 F. Supp.
1219, 1229 (S.D. Iowa 1981), which rejected a similar
challenge to our rule, as it relates to television adver-
tising.
The gist of the Bishop holding, as we understand, is
that electronic promotional advertising can be prohibited.
This was our understanding when we considered and
adopted our advertising rule. It is no insult to the ad-
vertising industry, or to the electronic media, to believe
that, when their efforts are combined on behalf of a law-
yer, a line can and should be drawn between what in-
forms the public and what promotes the lawyer. We
thought the cases we have discussed allowed, even
encouraged, us to draw such a line and we carefully
13a
tried to draw it in such a way that the public would be
informed and not misled. We think the rule is constitu-
tional.
III. It is perhaps unnecessary, under our analysis, to
explore the state interests involved. We do think the
state interests in the challenged provisions of the rule
are substantial. One such interest was recognized in
Bates: fostering rational, intelligent, and voluntary deci-
sion making in determining the need for legal services
and selecting a lawyer. Bates, 483 U.S. at 377, 97 S.Ct.
at 2705, 58 L.Ed.2d at 881. See also R.M.J., 55 U.S. at
200-01, 101 S.Ct. at 936, 71 L.Ed.2d at 72-73. We think
the rule directly advances the state interest by aiding the
citizen in making an intelligent selection of counsel.
IV. We reject defendants’ contention that the prohibi-
tion against background sound, visual displays, multiple
dramatic statements, and self-laudatory statements is
more extensive than necessary to serve the state inter-
ests. All that is prohibited are the tools which would
manipulate the viewer’s mind and will.
Neither do we agree with defendants’ criticism of
what they call our “laundry list” approach. We specifi-
cally allowed dissemination of all information necessary
to assist the public in seeking and selecting counsel. As
previously mentioned, a procedure is in place for consid-
ering any suggested additions of useful information.
Neither do we find merit in defendants’ vagueness
defense. In their brief, defendants fail to mention why
they believe “nondramatic voice” and “self-laudatory”
are vague phrases. In its amicus brief, however, F.T7.C.
asserts that all advertisements are, to some degree, self-
laudatory, and that all defendants’ ads are no more self-
laudatory than the information allowed under the rule.
The commissioner also fears the prohibition against
“self-laudatory” statements sets up an inherently subjec-
l4a
tive standard that can result in inconsistent treatment of
identical conduct.
We explained the vagueness standard in Incorporated
City of Denison v. Clabaugh, 306 N.W.2d 748, 751-52
(1981) :
A civil statute is unconstitutionally vague under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
of the United States constitution when its language
does not convey a sufficiently definite warning of
proscribed conduct, when measured by common un-
derstanding or practice. [Authority.] Thus, when
persons must necessarily guess at the meaning of
the statute and its applicability, the statute is un-
constitutionally vague. [Authority.] However, ‘[a]
statute is not vague when the meaning of the words
used can be fairly ascertained by reference to simi-
lar statutes, other judicial determinations, refer-
enced common law, or to the dictionary, or if the
words themselves have a common and generally
accepted meaning.’ State v. Donner, 2438 N.W.2d
850, 853 (Iowa 1976).
“Nondramatic voice” is a simple phrase which we
think is commonly understood. The dictionary meaning
of “laudatory” is “expressing praise.” Websters New
International Dictionary, third ed. (1964). The terms
are not vague.
It is unnecessary to discuss defendants’ counterclaim
which asks that we declare our rule to be unconstitu-
tional. Because we find that the rule withstands defend-
ants’ constitutional challenge, we order that a writ issue,
restraining defendants from continuing to place the ad-
vertisements.
WRIT ISSUED.
All justices concur except Larson and McCormick, JJ.,
who dissent.
— —
—
l5a
LARSON, J. (dissenting).
I believe the laundry list of allowable advertising con-
tent is unnecessarily restrictive because it prohibits dis-
semination of basic information necessary for an in-
formed judgment about the selection of an attorney and
the protection of basic legal rights. As to the restric-
tions on technique, these are in fact a prescription for
dullness, prohibiting all background music, dramatiza-
tion, and other methods of stimulating viewer interest.
It is undisputed that the effect of these limitations on
technique is to substantially diminish the effectiveness
of any television advertising. The combined effect of the
rules is to inhibit dissemination of relevant information
without a showing of a substantial state interest. This
violates the free speech clause of the first amendment.
As the outset, we as lawyers must accept the reality
that despite this perceived assault on the “professional-
ism” of the bar, and despite the exemption of commercial
speech previously existing, lawyer advertising is here,
and it is here in constitutional dimensions. It is here
because of the Supreme Court interpretation of the free
speech clause of the first amendment of the United
States Constitution in both Bates v. State Bar of Ari-
zona, 4383 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 538 L.Ed.2d 810
(1977) and In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 102 S.Ct. 929,
71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982).
First amendment protection of commercial speech,
while not as extensive as that accorded other forms of
speech, is nevertheless broad in its reach, and the prin-
ciples to be applied are quite straightforward. Central
Hudson sets forth the four-part test we must apply:
(1) Do the ads concern an unlawful activity, or
are they misleading? If the answer to either ques-
tion is in the affirmative, first amendment protection
is not allowed. If the answers to both questions are
in the negative, the following tests apply:
l6a
(2) Is the governmental interest, asserted
through these disciplinary rules, substantial?
(3) Does this regulation directly advance that
governmental interest?
(4) Is the regulation more extensive than neces-
sary to serve that interest?
See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv-
ice Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2848, 2351,
65 L.Ed.2d 341, 351 (1980).
Although the majority recognizes the Central Hudson
test, the opinion does not make it clear whether first
amendment protection is unavailable for the defendant’s
advertisements because they are “misleading” under the
first segment of the test or whether there is a substan-
tial state interest which is directly advanced by those
regulations under steps two and three of the Central
Hudson test. I believe the majority is on shaky ground
under either approach.
I. Are the Advertisements “Misleading.”
It is interesting to note that the Committee’s own
expert, Dr. Haynes, testified the ads were not in fact
misleading, and that his survey group, which had actu-
ally viewed the ads, agreed. The Committe’s argument
that they are deceitful is, in fact, an argument that they
might mislead the viewer with respect to possible respon-
sibility for court costs and with respect to the extent of
the experience of Humphrey and Haas, which the Com-
mittee argues is minimal.
The majority specifically concludes that the chance of
deceit is sufficient to deny first amendment protection
“({wlithout suggesting that the advertisements here were
deceitful” because “in the medium defendants chose [tele-
vision] the public could well be misled by them.” It
improvises on the four-prong test of Central Hudson by
17a
saying that because television is the medium, a mere
chance of deceit is sufficient. That theory, however, is
not suggested in Central Hudson nor in any other case.
The majority draws support for this theory solely
from language taken from Bates which, the majority
says “seems to clearly have recognized the electronic use
of [sound, visual displays, and dramatization] as poten-
tially misleading.” Bates, however, did not say there was
more potential for abuse in electronic advertising, only
that “the special problems of advertising on the elec-
tronic media will warrant special consideration.” Bates,
433 U.S. at 384, 97 S.Ct. at 2709, 54 L.Ed.2d at 836.
Neither Bates nor the case it cited on this issue even
mentioned any increased potential of the electronic
media for misleading the public. See Capital Broadcast-
ing Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. 1971), aff'd
sub nom, Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindiest, 405
U.S. 1000, 92 S.Ct. 1289, 31 L.Ed.2d 472 (1972). Cap-
ital Broadcasting illustrates the sort of “special prob-
lems” referred to in Bates in connection with television
advertising. Capital Broadcasting justified a different
rule for television advertising, not because it was likely
to be misleading, but because it was nonselective. In
effect, television was thought to be reaching too large an
audience; children, who were being exposed to intensive
cigarette advertising, were considered likely to be ad-
versely affected by it.
Television advertising by lawyers; on the other hand,
cannot be considered objectionable merely because tele-
vision is nonselective, and the rationale of Capital Broad-
casting is inapposite. Yet, the majority seizes on Bates’
“special problems” language used in connection with the
Court’s reference to Capital Broadcasting as authority
for its broad assertion of power in restricting television
advertising. I do not think this language of Bates was
intended to grant such a broad exercise of state power.
I believe the Supreme Court has actually made it clear
that regardless of the medium used, advertising must be
18a
more than “possibly” misleading in order to be denied
first amendment protection. In Jn re R.M.J., 455 US.
191, 102 S.Ct. 929, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982), the Court
addressed the matter of untruthful advertising:
[T]he Court has made clear in Bates and subsequent
cases that regulation—and imposition of discipline—
are permissible where the particular advertising is
inherently likely to deceive or where the record indi-
cates that a particular form or method of advertis-
ing has in fact been deceptive.
Id. at 202, 102 S.Ct. at 937, 71 L.Ed.2d at 73-74. (Em-
phasis added. )
A further indication that more than a possibility of
deceit would be required is found in R.M.J.’s discussion
of two prior cases in which first amendment protection
was denied for professional advertising or solicitation.
In discussing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436
U.S. 447, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978), the
R.M.J. Court said “the possibility of ‘fraud, undue influ-
ence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of
vexatious conduct’ was so likely in the context of in-
person solicitation” that such solicitation could be pro-
hibited. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 202, 102 S.Ct. at 987 L.Ed.
2d at 74. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, in discussing
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 887, 59 L.Ed.
2d 100 (1979), the Court noted that first amendment
protection on the use of trade names by Texas optome-
trists could be prohibited “in view of the considerable his-
tory in Texas of deception and abuse worked upon the
consuming public through the use of trade names.”
R.M.J., 455 U.S at 202, 102 S.Ct. at 937, 71 L.Ed.2d at
74. (Emphasis added.)
The Court in R.M.J., after discussing Ohralik and
Friedman, summarized the rule: “[W]hen the particular
content or method of the advertising suggests that it is
ae,
19a
inherently misleading or when experience has proven that
in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the states
may impose appropriate restrictions.” R.M.J., 455 U.S.
at 203, 102 S.Ct. at 987, 71 L.Ed.2d at 74. R.M.J.
involved printed advertising. There is no indication that
a different rule would apply to television advertising, yet
the Committee does not even attempt to meet the test.
Even if I were to accept the plaintiff’s possibility-
of-deceit argument, which I do not, I believe the record
here still falls short of establishing any reasonable likeli-
hood that this would happen.
The majority points to two aspects of the advertise-
ments which it claims “might well be” misleading:
(1) the statement that certain cases will be handled “on
a percentage” basis without mention of court costs might
be construed as an offer of “cost-free” services according
to the majority; and (2) the advertisements could be
construed as a claim of expertise by Humphrey and
Haas which in fact is belied by their lack of actual
experience.
As to the cost issue, it is true the advertisements state
that fees will be assessed on “a percentage basis” (with-
out stating a percentage rate) but do not mention court
costs. To require a statement concerning costs, however,
would go beyond our own advertising rules, which merely
require it in the event the ad specifies a contingent fee
rate. Even then the advertisement is merely required to
disclose “whether percentages are computed before or
after deduction of costs.” See DR 2-101(C). Here, the
defendants represent no contingency rate at all, only that
the fee would be “a percentage.” Significantly, also, DR
2-101(C) allows a lawyer to advertise “[f]ixed fees or
range of fees for specific legal services” without a caveat
about costs, despite the fact that many of the “specific
legal services” listed, such as dissolutions, bankruptcies,
and several real estate services, would necessarily involve
either court costs or recording fees.
20a
The Supreme Court, moreover, has apparently not con-
sidered a cost caveat to be necessary for a full disclosure
on fees. See, e.g., In re R. M. J., 455 US. at 194, n.3,
102 S. Ct. at 933, n.8, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 68, n.3 (fees for
“routine” legal services may be advertised; no mention of
court costs).
As a practical matter, the subject of court costs, af-
fected by the extent of discovery and a myriad of other
factors, is so complex as to make it impractical to explain
in a thirty-second advertisement. (Testimony showed a
thirty-second ad to consist of only about sixty words).
Furthermore, any lack of understanding about this mat-
ter, or any other matter relevant to the terms of a law-
yer’s employment, would logically be resolved at the ini-
tial conference, which, in this case, was advertised as
being free of cost. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 373, n.28, 97
S. Ct. at 2704, n.28, 538 L. Ed.2d at 829, n.28 (1977).
I believe the majority’s conclusion that the advertise-
ments overstated the lawyers’ qualifications is also with-
out support in the evidence. While the record revealed
that these were young lawyers just developing a law prac-
tice, there is no evidence, nor even a claim, that they
were in fact not qualified. While they lacked the experi-
ence of many older lawyers, they did have some experience
in each of the areas listed, and the evidence showed they
possessed above average academic qualifications. The
Committee and the majority seem to equate qualification
with experience, and there is simply no direct correlation.
I believe the claim that this could “well be” false and
misleading is plainly without support.
II. The Public Interest Argument.
If advertising concerns a lawful activity and is not
misleading under the Central Hudson test, a state may
restrict only if (1) the governmental interest is substan-
tial; (2) the regulation directly advances that govern-
mental interest; and (3) the restriction is no more ex-
2la
tensive than necessary to serve that interest. Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S. Ct. at 2350, 65 L. Ed.
2d at 351. I believe the restrictions imposed in this case
fail that test because the Committee has not made the
necessary showing of a substantial state interest.
The majority concludes that the state-interest issue is
only secondary, stating “[i]t is perhaps unnecessary, un-
der our anxlysis, to explore the state interests involved.”
The “analysis” which the majority says makes it unnec-
essary to address the issue is apparently that the adver-
tisements are actually misleading under the first prong
of the Central Hudson test, therefore not subject to any
first amendment protection regardless of « supporting
state interest. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563, 100
S. Ct. at 2350, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 349.
As I have already noted, however, the ads are not even
claimed to be actually misleading, and any risk of pos-
sible misleading is minimal—certainly not sufficient to
justify denial of first amendment protection without even
considering the state interest. I believe, in fact, analysis
of the state interest is the pivotal issue in this case.
What is that interest? The majority ident**es only one
in support of the restrictive rules: “fostering rational,
intelligent, and voluntary decision making in determining
the need for legal services and selecting a lawyer,” citing
Bates and R. M. J.
It is interesting, however, that both Bates and R. M. J.
used this language to expand the scope of lawyer adver-
tising, not to throttle it.
Moreover, there is a strong state interest in what is
essentially a by-product of attorney advertising. This is
the need for members of the public to be informed about
the nature of their legal rights and the means of pursuing
them. As the Supreme Court has said, it would be un-
usual to meet the need for more informed judgments by
reducing the scope of available information:
22a
Advertising does not provide a complete foundation
on which to select an attorney. But it seems peculiar
to deny the consumer, on the ground that the infor-
mation is incomplete, at least some of the relevant
information needed to reach an informed decision.
. Moreover, the argument assumes that the public
is not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations
of advertising, and that the public is better kept in
ignorance than trusted with correct but incomplete
information. We suspect the argument rests on an
underestimation of the public. In any event, we
view as dubious any justification that is based on
for benefits of public ignorance.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 374-75, 97 S. Ct. at 2704, 538 L. Ed. 2d
at 829-30. In providing information for the formation
of an informed judgment, it seems to me that it is prefer-
able to provide an excess of information, rather than too
little. Viewers are sophisticated enough to accept or re-
ject it as they see fit.
Broad areas of information necessary to an informed
judgment are prohibited by our rules. In the present case,
the advertisements inform the viewer that, if one is hurt
through the negligence of others, he should see a lawyer
and imply that recovery for losses might be obtained. One
advertisement points out that legal rights may be lost by
failure to talk to a lawyer. These and many other types
of information including, most obviously, such matters as
statutes of limitation, the early filing requirements of our
tort claims act, and the problems of uninformed releases
of claims are all of great importance to an informed de-
cision of the viewer. Yet these, and all other items of
general information on the rights of litigants are pro-
hibited by the rules, because they are not included in the
“laundry list” of contents.
I believe the state interest served by this type of in-
forination far outweighs any interest in denying it. Bates
and R. M. J. make it clear that present methods of de-
a ee
:
23a
livering legal services are ineffective. In Bates, the court
said:
The absence of advertising may be seen to reflect the
profession’s failure to reach out and serve the com-
munity: Studies reveal that many persons do not ob-
tain counsel even when they perceive a need because
of the feared price of services or because of an in-
ability to locate a competent attorney. Indeed,
cynicism with regard to the profession may be cre-
ated by the fact that it long has publicly eschewed
advertising, while condoning the actions of the at-
torney who structures his social or civic associations
so as to provide contacts with potential clients.
Id. at 370-71, 97 S. Ct. at 2702, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 827-28.
American Bar Association statistics cited in Bates show
that the “middle 70% of our population is not being
reached or served adequately by the [legal] profession.”
Id. at 376, 97 S. Ct. at 2705, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 831.
In Iowa, a recent study shows that there is only one
Legal Services Corporation lawyer for each 8700 eligible
recipients. Equal Access to Services Study, Legal Serv-
ices Corporation of Iowa (1984). Moreover, many of the
traditional points of contact between lawyers and poten-
tial clients, such as the country club or Rotary Club are
simply not viable sources of preliminary legal informa-
tion for a great segment of our population.
I believe the thrust of the Rule 2-101 laundry list
largely misses the point of public information. What
difference does it make to potential litigants when the
lawyer was born, the legal fraternities, societies or bar
association of which the lawyer is a member (especially
since membership usually is not based on any required
level of professional competency) or whether the lawyer
has had military service? This is relatively unimportant
information, in view of the possibility that litigants might
lose their claims, through lack of information, to a statute
24a
of limitation or other legal impediment as to which they
remain ignorant.
I believe our rules, insofar as they ban advertising
which is false or misleading, are valid. This is basically
the model rule of the American Bar Association’? and the
rule of most states. Beyond that, I believe the additional
restrictions of our rules fail the state interest test and
are therefore invalid.
I believe, moreover, that the model rule illustrates the
“less restrictive’ means of control alluded to in Central
Hudson, and that the Committee has failed to show that
they would not be effective here. For that additional
reason, I believe the restrictions imposed here fail the test
of constitutionality.
I would dissolve the injunction and grant judgment for
the defendants on their counterclaim.
McCormick, J., joins this dissent.
1RULE 7.1 Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about
the lawyer or the lawyer’s services. A communication is false or
misleading if it: .
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or
omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered
as a whole not materially misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results
the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the law-
yer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can
achieve results by means that violate the rules of pro-
fessional conduct or other law; or
(c) compares the lawyer’s services with other lawyers’ serv-
ices, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated.
25a
APPENDIX B
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 69088
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT
OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK HUMPHREY, FREDD J. HAAS, and
JAMES E. GRITZNER, d/b/a HUMPHREY,
HAAS AND GRITZNER,
Defendants.
Mark A. HUMPHREY and FREDD J. HAAS,
individually and doing business as
HUMPHREY AND HAAS,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT
OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
Defendant to Counterclaim.
[Filed Nov. 19, 1984]
NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
Notice is hereby given that Defendants,/Counterclaim-
ants, Mark A. Humphrey and Fredd J. Haas, individually
26a
and doing business as Humphrey and Haas, hereby appeal
to the Supreme Court of the United States from the final
judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa entered in this
action on September 19, 1984, upholding the constitu-
tionality of DR 2-101 of the Iowa Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers, and permanently enjoining
Defendants/Counterclaimants from using television ad-
vertisements that violate that rule.
This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).
/s/ Mark W. Bennett
MARK W. BENNETT
Babich, Bennett & Nickerson
5835 Grand Avenue, Suite 202
Des Moines, Iowa 50312
515-274-3581
Attorney for Defendants/
Counterclaimants, Mark
A. Humphrey and Fredd J.
Hass, individually and doing
business as Humphrey and Haas
Original and two copies
filed; copies mailed to:
Frank A. Comito, Jr.
Attorney at Law
4701 University Avenue
Des Moines, Iowa 50311
Nick Critelli
Attorney at Law
500 United Central Bank Building
Des Moines, Iowa 50309
Attorneys for Plaintiff /
Defendant to Counterclaim
27a
| APPENDIX C
| SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. A-431
MARK A. HUMPHREY AND FREDD J. HAAS,
Appellants,
V.
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT
OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
ORDER
UPON CONSIDERATION of the application of coun-
sel for the appellants,
IT IS ORDERED that the time for docketing an
appeal in the above-entitled cause be, and the same is
hereby, extended to and including 17 January, 1985.
/s/ Harry A. Blackmun
Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States
Dated this 6th
day of December 1984.
28a
APPENDIX D
Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers
DR 2-101 Publicity.
(A)
(B)
A lawyer shall not, on the lawyer’s own behalf or
that of a partner, associate or any other lawyer
affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm,
use, or participate in the use of, any form of pub-
lice communication which contains any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory
or unfair statements, which contains any state-
ments or claim relating to the quality of the law-
yer’s legal services, which appeals to the emo-
tions, prejudices, or likes or dislikes of a person,
or which contains any claim that is not verifiable;
nor shall the lawyer use or participate in the use
of any form of public communication, calculated
to attract clients for the lawyer’s pecuniary gain,
which contains any information not hereafter spe-
cifically permitted. In all communications under
DR 2-101 and DR 2-102 the lawyer may use re-
strained subjective characterizations of rates or
fees such as “reasonable,” “moderate,” and “very
reasonable,” but shall avoid all unrestrained sub-
jective characterizations of rates or fees, such as,
but not limited to, “cut-rate,” “lowest,” “give-
away,” “below-cost,” and “special.” The lawyer
shall further avoid the use of all signs and sym-
bols such as, but not limited to, logos, trademarks,
graphics, design work, and pictures.
The following information, in words and num-
bers only, may be communicated to the public in
newspapers, periodicals, trade journals, “shop-
pers” and other similar advertising media, pub-
lished and disseminated in the geographic area in
which the lawyer maintains offices or in which a
29a
significant part of the lawyer’s clientele resides
or in the classified advertising section of the tele-
phone directory distributed in the geographic area
in which the lawyer maintains offices or in which
a significant part of the lawyer’s clientele resides
or in reputable legal directories generally available
in such area. The same information may be com-
municated by direct mail. The same information,
in words and numbers only, articulated only by a
single non-dramatic voice, not that of the lawyer,
and with no other background sound, may be com-
municated by radio. The same information, in
words and numbers only, articulated by a single
non-dramatic voice, not that of the lawyer, and
with no other background sound, may be commu-
nicated by television. In the case of television, no
visual display shall be allowed except that al-
lowed in print as articulated by the announcer.
All such communications on radio and television,
to the extent possible, shall be made only in the
geographic area in which the lawyer maintains
offices or in which a significant part of the law-
yer’s clientele resides. Any such information
shall be presented in a dignified manner:
(1) Name, including name of law firm and
names of professional associates, addresses
and telephone numbers and the designation
“lawyer”, “attorney”, “law firm” or the
like;
(2) Fields of practice, limitation of practice
or specialization, but only to the extent
permitted by DR 2-105;
(3) Date and place of birth;
(4) Date and place of admission to the bar of
state and federal courts;
(5) Schools attended, with dates of graduation,
degrees and other scholastic distinctions;
(C)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
80a
Public or quasi-public offices;
Military service;
Legal authorships;
Legal teaching position;
Memberships, offices and committee assign-
ments in bar associations;
Membership and offices in legal fraterni-
ties and legal societies;
Technical and professional licenses;
Memberships in scientific, technical and
professional associations and societies;
Foreign language ability;
Names and addresses of bank references;
With their written consent, names of
clients regularly represented;
Subject to DR 2-103, prepaid or group
legal services programs in which the law-
yer participates;
Whether credit cards or other credit ar-
rangements are accepted;
Office and telephone answering service
hours;
Race, sex, religion, or ethnic background.
Nothing contained herein shall prohibit a lawyer
from permitting the inclusion in reputable law
lists and law directories intended primarily for
the use of the legal profession of such informa-
tion as traditionally has been included in these
publications.
The following fee information, in words and
numbers only, may be communicated to the pub-
8la
lic in the manner permitted by DR 2-101(B).
Any such information shall be presented in a
dignified manner:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Fee for an initial consultation;
Availability upon request of either a writ-
ten schedule of fees or an estimate of the
fee to be charged for specific services, or
both;
Contingent fee rates subject to DR 2-106
(C), provided that the statement discloses
whether percentages are computed before
or after deduction of costs;
Fixed fees or range of fees for specific
legal services or hourly fee rates provided
that, in print size at least equivalent to the
largest print used in setting forth the
fee information, the statement disclosed:
(a) that the stated fixed fees or range of
fees will be available only to clients
whose matters are encompassed within
the described services, and
(b) if the client’s matters are not encom-
passed within the described services, or
if an hourly fee rate is stated, the
client is entitled, without obligation, to
a specific written estimate of the fees
likely to be charged.
(D) For purposes of this rule, the term “specific legal
services” shall be limited to the following serv-
ices:
(1)
(2)
Abstract examinations and title opinions
not including services in clearing title;
Uncontested dissolutions of marriage involv-
ing no disagreement concerning custody of
32a
children, alimony, child support or prop-
erty settlement [see DR 5-105(A)];
(3) Wills leaving all property outright to one
beneficiary and contingently to one bene-
ficiary or one class of beneficiaries;
(4) Income tax returns for wage earners;
(5) Uncontested personal bankruptcies;
(6) Changes of name;
(7) Simple residential deeds;
(8) Residential purchase and sale agreements;
(9) Residential leases;
(10) Residential mortgages and notes;
(11) Powers of attorney;
(12) Bills of sale.
The committee on professional ethics and con-
duct of the Iowa State Bar Association, acting
as commissioners of the supreme court as pro-
vided by court rule 118, on its own motion or
upon the request of a lawyer admitted to prac-
tice in this state, shall, from time to time, con-
sider and recommend to the court proposed
amendments to the Code, expanding or constrict-
ing the above list of “specific legal services”. In
considering such amendments the committee shall
apply the following criteria which have guided
the supreme court in determining which services
should be included in the above list:
(1) The description of the service would not be
misunderstood by the average layperson or
be misleading or deceptive;
(2) Substantially all of the service normally
can be performed in the lawyer’s office with
(EK)
33a
the aid of standardized forms and office
procedures ;
(3) The service does not normally involve a
substantial amount of legal research, draft-
ing of unique documents, investigation,
court appearances or negotiation with other
parties or their attorneys; and
(4) Competent performance of the service nor-
mally does not depend upon ascertainment
and consideration of more than a few vary-
ing factual circumstances.
The committee shall adopt regulations, subject to
the approval of the supreme court, to provide a
procedure to receive and consider such requests
from lawyers, and for the prompt submission to
this court of any appeal from a determination
adverse to such request. Said committee may
further issue, subject to the approval of the su-
preme court, regulations further defining or de-
scribing “specific legal services” within the mean-
ing of this rule.
Unless otherwise specified in the public com-
munication concerning fees, the lawyer shall be
bound, in the case of fee advertising in the classi-
fied section of the telephone directory, for a
period of at least the time between printings of
the directory in which the fee advertisement ap-
pears and in the case of all other fee advertising
for a period of at least ninety days thereafter,
to render the stated legal service for the fee
stated in the communication unless the client’s
matters do not fall into the described services.
In that event, or if a range of fees is stated, he
shall render the service for the estimated fee
given the client in advance of rendering the
service.
(F)
(G)
(H)
34a
A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his
partners, associates or any other lawyer affili-
ated with him or his firm, use the public com-
munication of fee information concerning specific
legal services as an indirect means of attracting
clients for whom he performs other legal services
not related to the specific legal services publi-
cized; nor may the term “clinic’”’ or any similar
term be used in any communication to the public
unless the practice of the lawyer or his firm is
limited to routine matters for which costs of
rendering the service can be substantially re-
duced because of the repetitive nature of the
services performed and the use of standardized
forms and office procedures. Whether or not it
contains fee information, a lawyer shall preserve
in his office a copy of each advertisement placed
in a newspaper, the classified section of the tele-
phone directory, or periodical and a tape of the
radio or television commercial or recording for
at least three years and a record of the date or
dates and name of the publication in which it
appeared or the name of the station upon which
it was aired.
A lawyer recommended by, paid by or whose legal
services are furnished by, a qualified legal as-
sistance organization may authorize or permit or
assist such organization to use means of dignified
commercial publicity, which does not identify any
lawyer by name, to describe the availability or
nature of its legal services or legal service bene-
fits.
This rule does not prohibit limited and dignified
identification of a lawyer as a lawyer as well as
by name:
(1) In political advertisements when his pro-
fessional status is germane to the political
campaign or to a political issue; —
35a
(2) In public notices when the name and pro-
fession of a lawyer are required or au-
thorized by law or are reasonably pertinent
for a purpose other than the attraction of
potential clients;
(3) In routine reports and announcements of a
bona fide business, civic, professional, or
political crganization in which he serves as
a director or officer;
(4) In and on legal documents prepared by him;
(5) In and on legal textbooks, treatises, and
other legal publications, and in dignified
advertisements thereof; and
(6) In communications by a qualified legal as-
sistance organization, along with the bio-
graphical information permitted under DR
2-101(B), directed to a member or bene-
ficiary of such organization.
(I) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything
of value to representatives of the press, radio,
television or other communication medium in an-
ticipation of or in return for professional pub-
licity in a news item nor voluntarily give any
information to such representatives which, if
published in a news item, would be in violation
of DR 2-101(A).
[Court Order February 28, 1977; February 17, 1978;
July 24, 1979; May 6, 1980; Oct. 10, 1984.]
* * 7. 2s
DR 2-105. Description and Limitation of Practice
(A) A lawyer may hold himself out publicly as prac-
ticing in or limiting his practice to certain fields
of law as follows:
36a
(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the
United States Patent and Trademark Office
may use the designation “Patents”, “Patent
Attorney”, “Patent Lawyer”, or “Regis-
tered Patent Attorney” or any combination |
of those terms, on his professional card,
letterhead, office sign, professional notice or /
announcement, and telephone directory list-
ings, all as otherwise allowed by DR 2-102
(A), and in newspapers, periodicals and
legal directories, as otherwise allowed by
DR 2-101(B). In addition to use of the
designation “Patents”, “Patent Attorney”,
“Patent Lawyer”, and “T.egistered Patent
Attorney”, a lawyer admitted to practice
before the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office may use the designation “Trade-
marks”, “Trademarks and Copyright Mat-
ters”, “Trademark Attorney”, “Trademark
Lawyer”, cr any combination of those terms
on his professional card, letterhead, office
sign, professional notice or announcement
and telephone directory listing, all as other-
wise allowed by DR 2-102(A), and in news-
papers, periodicals and legal directories as
otherwise allowed by DR 2-101(B), pro-
vided the lawyer satisfies the eligibility re-
quirements of DR 2-105(A) (4) in any one
of the fields of practice of “Patents, Trade-
marks or Copyright Matters” or combina-
tion thereof.
(2) An individual lawyer who, in fact, limits
practice to certain fields of law or who
is limiting this practice primarily to cer-
tain fields of law, and whe satisfies the
eligibility requirements of DR 2-105(A)
(4), may indicate such limitation or de-
AAT VEE SCE RAISE
37a
’
scription of practice by listing, in the man-
ner provided by DR 2-105(A) (3), not more
than three of the following fields of law
practice in any communication otherwise
allowed by DR 2-102(A) and DR 2-101(B):
Administrative Agency Matters
Admiralty
Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Appellate Practice
Banking and Creditor Law
Constitutional Law
Consumer Claims and Protection
Corporate Finance and Securities Law
Corporation and Business Law
Criminal Law
Debt and Bankruptcy Matters
Domestic Relations and Family Law
Environmental Law
Health Law
Immigration and Customs
Insurance
International and Foreign Law
Job Discrimination and Civil Rights
Labor Law
Legislative Matters
Military Law
Municipal and Local Government Law and
Finance
Pension, Profit Sharing and Employee Bene-
fit Plans
Personal Injury and Property Damage
Claims
Public Utility Matters
Real Estate Law
Taxation Law
Trademarks and Copyright Matters
Transportation Law
38a
Trial Practice
Wills, Estate Planning and Probate Mat-
ters
Workers Compensation
The committee on professional ethics and conduct
of the Iowa State Bar Association, acting as
Commissioners of the supreme court as provided
by court rule 118, on its own motion or upon the
request of a lawyer admitted to practice in this
state, shall, from time to time, consider and
recommend to the court proposed amendments to
the Code expanding or restricting the permitted
list of fields of law practice.
(3) Description or indication of limitation of
practices permitted by DR 2-105(A) (2)
Shall be only in the following manner:
(a) If the lawyer accepts only legal mat-
ters in his listed fields of law practice,
such listing of fields of law practice
shall be preceded by the words “Prac-
tice limited to... .”; or
(b) If the lawyer is practicing primarily
in his listed fields of law practice but
he also accepts other types of legal
matters, such listing of fields of law
practice shall be preceded by the words
“Practicing primarily in. . .”;
and shall, in the case of a description or
indication of limitation of practice com-
municated to the public in the classified
section of telephone directories, or in news-
papers, periodicals and legal directories,
contain within such communication, or have
prominently displayed on the same page of
such communication, a “Notice to the Pub-
lic’ in the following form:
hee om ee
a
(4)
39a
(ec) “A description or indication of limita-
tion of practice does not mean that
any agency or board has certified such
lawyer as a specialist or expert in an
indicated field of law practice nor does
it mean that such lawyer is necessarily
any more expert or competent than any
other lawyer. All potential clients are
urged to make their own independent
investigation and evaluation of any
lawyer being considered. This notice is
required by rule of the Supreme Court
of Iowa.”
In the case of a description or indication of
limitation of practice communicated to the
public in the classified section of telephone
directories, a lawyer shall not permit his
name to be listed under a heading or
classification other than “Attorneys” or
“Lawyers”.
Prior to communication of a description or
indication of limitation of practice per-
mitted by DR 2-105(A) (2), a lawyer shall
report his compliance with the following
eligibility requirements each year in the
written report required to be submitted to
the Commission on Continuing Legal Edu-
cation:
(a) The lawyer must have devoted the
greater of 200 hours or twenty percent
of his time spent in actual law prac-
tice to each separate indicated field of
practice for each of the last two cal-
endar years; and
(b) The lawyer must have completed at
least ten hours of accredited Continu-
ing Legal Education courses of study
40a
in each separate indicated field of prac-
tice during the preceding calendar year.
The first report of compliance may be made
in 1979. In reporting compliance with sub-
section (a), a statement of compliance is
sufficient. In reporting compliance with
subsection (b), the lawyer shall identify
the specific courses and hours which apply
to each indicated field of practice. Contents
of the portion of the report required by this
rule shall be public information.
(B) A lawyer may communicate the name of state
and federal courts in which he or she is cur-
rently permitted to practice on his professional
card, letterhead, office sign, professional notice or
announcement, and telephone directory listings,
all as otherwise aliowed by DR 2-102(A), and in
newspapers, periodicals and legal directories, as
otherwise allowed by DR 2-101(B).
If, due to hardship or extenuating circum-
stances, a lawyer is unable to complete the hours
of accredited continuing legal education during
the preceding calendar year as required by DR
.2-105(A) (4) (b), the lawyer may apply to the
Commission on Continuing Legal Education for
an extension of time in which to complete the
hours. No extension of time shall be granted un-
less written application therefor shall be made on
forms prescribed by the Commission. Extensions
of time within which to fulfill the minimum edu-
cational requirements may, in individual cases
involving hardship or extenuating circumstances,
be granted by the Commission for a period not
to exceed six months immediately following ex-
piration of the year in which the requirements
were not met.
{Amended Feb. 17, 1978; Oct. 11, 1978; Mar. 5, 1979;
May 29, 1979; Oct. 10, 1984.]
Mla
APPENDIX E
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 69088
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT
OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff
vs.
MARK A. HUMPHREY, FREDD J;HAAS
and JAMES E. GRITZNER, dba
HUMPHREY, HAAS AND GRINTZNER,
Defendants
[Filed Sept. 14, 1982]
PETITION FOR INJUNCTION
Comes now the Plaintiff, the Committee on Professional
Ethics and Conduct of The Iowa State Bar Association,
and pursuant to Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, and for
| its Petition for Injunction states:
1. That the Plaintiff, the Committee on Professional
Ethics and Conduct of The Iowa State Bar Association, is
a regularly appointed standing Committee of The Iowa
State Bar Association the members of which are Commis-
sioners of the Supreme Court, whose Chairman is James
E. Cooney of Des Moines, Iowa.
2. That the Defendants, Mark A. Humphrey, Fredd J.
Haas and James E. Gritzner, individuals who are licensed
to practice law in various courts of the State of Iowa,
|
42a
who practice under the firm name of Humphrey, Haas
and Gritzner, and all times material hereto, reside and
have offices for the practice of law in Des Moines, Polk
County, Iowa.
3. That the Iowa Supreme Court has by Court Order
promulgated certain rules governing the practice of law,
said rules are known as The Iowa Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers.
4, That contained in the Iowa Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers are DR2-101 which governs
Publicity and DR2-105 which governs Description and
Limitation of Practice.
5. That pursuant to DR2-101(D) the Plaintiff did as
part of their rules establish and obtain confirmation by
Supreme Court Order of procedures for lawyers to obtain
advance approval of publicity which is at variance with
the provisions of DR2-101 and DR2-105 or to apply to
have said rules changed. Said procedures are set out in
Rules 5.1 through 5.6 of the Rules of Procedure Profes-
sional Ethics and Conduct Committee of The Iowa State
Bar Association.
6. That the Defendants have contracted with Palmer
Communications, Inc. (WHO-TV) to televise three differ-
ent commercials advertising their services.
7. That the television commercials violate the pro-
visions of DR2-101 in that said commercials contain
more than a single non-dramatic voice, have background
sound and visual displays of two or more people char-
acterizing themselves as clients which make laudatory
comment as to Defendants’ services.
8. That the television commercials violate the provi-
sions of DR-105 in that they list four areas of practice
and contain no disclaimer.
9. That the said commercials have been shown on tele-
vision station WHO-TV eleven (11) times in the past and
43a
is [sic] scheduled to be shown for a total period of forty-
seven (47) weeks.
10. That the Defendants at no time sought or received
any advance approval for either a change in DR2-101 or
DR2-105, nor did they seek or receive approval for the
specific commercials shown by Palmer Communications,
Inc. (WHO-TV).
11. That Chapter 610 of the Iowa Code and Supreme
Court Rule 118 provides procedures for disciplining law-
yers who violate the Iowa Code of Professional Respon-
sibility for Lawyers, but these procedures by necessity
take long periods of time, and do not provide for any
procedures to stop the continued violation of said rules.
12. That the Plaintiff herein is charged with the duty
and responsibility to investigate and bring appropriate
action against lawyers who violate any provisions of the
Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers.
13. That the Plaintiff has received, through communi-
cations to its staff, information that Defendants intend
to continue to show the commercials either on WHO-TV
or some other television station in the Des Moines view-
ing area.
14. That unless restrained the Defendants will con-
tinue in their violation of DR2-101 and DR2-105, said
conduct causing irreparable damage'and thereby causing
any judgment ineffectual.
15. That there is no other adequate remedy at law in
which to restrain said violation.
16. That this Petition has not been presented to or
refused in whole or in part by any other Judge or
Justice.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court issue
a temporary injunction without notice enjoining the De-
fendants from advertising by use of the television com-
| senshi ttasriea
44a
mercial advertisements currently in the possession of Pal-
mer Communiactions, Inc. or by any advertisement in
conflict with the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility
for Lawyers and for an order commanding the Defend-
ants to withdraw forthwith the television commercials
heretofore shown by Palmer Communications, Inc. (WHO-
TV).
Plaintiff further prays that the Court issue a perma-
nent injunction and that the Court set the matter of
permanent injunction for hearing and prescribe notice
and that on hearing the Court permanently enjoin the
Defendants from further violation of the Iowa Code of
Professional Responsibility for Lawyers via television
commercials.
Plaintiff further prays that the Court set bond as pro-
vided by the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff further prays for such other and further re-
lief as the Court may deem just and equitable in consid-
eration of the premises.
/s/ Frank A. Comito, Jr.
FRANK A. COMITO, JR.
Comito and Capps
4701 University Avenue
Des Moines, Iowa 50311
(515) 274-4105
45a
APPENDIX F
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 69088
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT
OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MarK A. HUMPHREY, FREDD J. HAAS,
and JAMES E. GRITZNER, d/b/a
HUMPHREY, HAAS AND GRITZNER,
Defendants.
MARK A. HUMPHREY and FREDD J. HAAS,
individually and doing business as
HUMPHREY AND HAAS,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT
OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
Defendant to
Counterclaim.
[Filed Sept. 30, 1982]
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
2 a
46a
ANSWER
COME NOW Defendants, Mark A. Humphrey and Fredd
J. Haas, individually and doing business as Humphrey
and Haas (hereinafter referred to as the “Defendants”),
and for their Answer to Plaintiff’s Petition for Injunc-
tion, respectfully state to the Court as follows:
1. The Defendants admit the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, 18, 15 and 16 of Plain-
tiff’s Petition for Injunction.
2. The Defendants admit the allegations contained in
paragraph 2 of Plaintiff’s Petition for Injunction, but
affirmatively state that as of September 13, 1982, James
EK. Gritzner was no longer associated with their law firm,
and the name of the firm is now “Humphrey and Haas”.
3. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in
paragraph 6 of Plaintiff’s Petition for Injunction.
4. In response to paragraph 7 of Plaintiff’s Petition
for Injunction, the Defendants admit that the television
commercials contain more than a single voice and have
background sounds and visual displays, but deny that
the advertisements depict two or more people character-
izing themselves as clients of Defendants, and further
deny that the advertisements meke laudatory comments
as to the Defendants’ services.
5. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in
paragraph 8 of Plaintiff’s Petition for Injunction.
6. In response to paragraph 11 of Plaintiff’s Petition
for Injunction, the Defendants admit that Chapter 610,
Code of Iowa (1981), and Supreme Court Rule 118, pro-
vide procedures for disciplining lawyers who violate the
Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility, but deny that
these procedures “by necessity take long periods of time”,
and “do not provide for any procedures to stop the con-
tinued violation of said rules’.
' Ala
7. In response to paragraph 14 of Plaintiff’s Petition
for Injunction, the Defendants state that they would
have continued to run television advertisements “unless
restrained”, but specifically deny that the continuation
of their television advertising has, would or could cause
any irreparable damage.
First Affirmative Defense
DR 2-101 of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsi-
bility for Lawyers, entitled “Publicity”, is facially un-
constitutional, and is unconstitutional as applied to De-
fendants’ television advertising, in violation of Defend-
ants’ rights of freedom of speech under the First Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.
Second Affirmative Defense
The phrase “tiondramatic voice” contained in DR 2-
101(B) of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility
for Lawyers, is void for vagueness, in violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Third Affirmative Defense
The phrase “self-laudatory” contained in DR 2-101(A)
of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Law-
yers, is void for vagueness, in violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion.
Fourth Affirmative Defense
DR 2-105 of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsi-
bility for Lawyers, entitled “Description and Limitations
of Practice”, is facially unconstitutional, and is uncon-
| stitutional as applied to Defendants’ television advertis-
ing, in violation of Defendants’ rights of freedom of
speech under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff’s Peti-
tion for Injunction be dismissed at Plaintiff’s costs.
= |
48a
COUNTERCLAIM
COME NOW Mark A. Humphrey and Fredd J. Haas,
individually and doing business as Humphrey and Haas,
and for their Counterclaim herein, respectfully state to
the Court as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION.
1. Counterclaimants seek declaratory and injunctive
relief that the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility
for Lawyers, as it relates to television advertising, is un-
constitutional and violates the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Il. PARTIES.
2. Counterclaimants are lawyers licensed to practice
law in various courts in the State of Iowa, and practice
under the firm name of “Humphrey and Haas”. At all
times material to this action, Counterclaimants have re-
sided and have had offices for the practice of law in Des
Moines, Iowa.
3. Defendant to Counterclaim is a regularly appointed
standing committee of the Iowa State Bar Association,
the members of which are commissioners of the Iowa Su-
preme Court, and as such, are charged with the duty
and responsibility of initiating and investigating viola-
tions of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers.
Ill. JURISDICTION.
4. Jurisdiction of this counterclaim is predicated upon
42-U.S.C. § 1983, and Rules 29 and 30 of the Iowa Rules
of Civil Procedure.
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
5. Commencing on September 6, 1982, Counterclaim-
ants engaged in television advertisements on behalf of
their law firm.
49a
6. On September 14, 1982, Defendant te Counterclaim
initiated a Petition for Injunction in this Court and ob-
tained a temporary injunction against the Counterclaim-
ants, enjoining them from using television commercials
alleged to be in violation of the Iowa Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility for Lawyers.
7. Counterclaimants desire to continue to engage in
television advertising on behalf of their law firm, which
would be in violation of the Iowa Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers, specifically DR 2-101 and
DR 2-105, as they relate to television advertising.
8. The actions of Defendant to Counterclaim in en-
forcing the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers, as it relates to television advertising by law-
yers, and in filing the Petition for Injunction in this
matter, arise under color of state law.
9. Counterclaimants are suffering irreparable injury
as a result of the denial of their right to run their tele-
vision advertisements and the imposition of Disciplinary
Rules which unconstitutionally restrict their rights to
freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
10. The enforcement of the unconstitutional restric-
tions contained in the lowa Code of Professional Respon-
sibility for Lawyers, and the filing of the Petition for
Injunction by Defendant to Counterclaim, are the proxi-
mate cause of the vioiations of Counterclaimants’ First
Amendment rights.
V. ALLEGATIONS OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.
11. DR 2-101 of the Iowa Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility for Lawyers entitled “Publicity”, and DR
2-105 of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for
} Lawyers, entitled “Description and Limitation of Prac-
tice’, are unconstitutional, in violation of the freedom
of speech clause of the First Amendment to the United
sae
50a
States Constitution, and the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
VI. RELIEF.
12. Counterclaimants respectfully pray that this Court
issue a declaratory judgment pursuant to Iowa Rule of
Civil Procedure 261, declaring that DR 2-101 and DR
2-105 of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers, as they relate to television advertising, uncon-
stitutionally restrict Counterclaimants’ First Amendment
freedoms and violate the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
13. Counterclaimants respectfully pray for a perma-
nent injunction, pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 320, enjoining the Defendant to Counterclaim from
enforcing, either facially or as applied, those portions of
DR 2-101 and DR 2-105 of the Iowa Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility for Lawyers, as they relate to teie-
vision advertising, which violate Counterclaimants’ First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
14. Counterclaimants respectfully pray for reasonable
attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorneys
Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
WHEREFORE, Counterclaimants respectfully pray for
the relief set forth above.
/s/ Mark W. Bennett
MARK W. BENNETT
Babich, Bennett & Nickerson
5835 Grand Avenue, Suite 202
Original and two copies Des Moines, Iowa 50312
a P 515-274-3581
filed ; iled to:
ed; copy mailed to Attorney for Defendants
Frank A. Comito, Jr. and Counterclaimants,
Attorney at Law Mark A. Humphrey and
4701 University Avenue Fredd J. Haas, Individually
Des Moines, Iowa 50311 and Doing Business as
Attorney for Plaintiff Humphrey and Haas
5la
APPENDIX G
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 69088
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT
OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff,
Vs.
MARK A. HUMPHREY, FREDD J. HAAS
and JAMES E. GRITZNER, dba
HUMPHREY, HAAS AND GRITZNER,
Defendants.
[Filed Sept. 14, 1982]
ORDER FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
AND NOTICE OF HEARING ON
PERMANENT INJUNCTION
NOW on this 14th day of Sept., 1982, this matter
comes to the attention of this Court upon the verified
Petition of the Plaintiff seeking both a temporary and
permanent injunction against the Defendants enjoining
them from using television commercials alleged to be in
violation of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility
for Lawyers. That based upon the information contained
in the verified Petition the Court finds that it has juris-
diction of the parties and the subject matter. Further
that a temporary injunction should issue without notice
and that the matter of the permanent injunction of the
parties should be set down for hearing and notice be
given to the Defendants.
52a
IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the Defendants are temporarily en-
joined from using the television commercials currently in
the possession of Palmer Communications, Inc. for the
purpose of advertising their services, and shall forthwith
withdraw the same from further use.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the matter of the permanent injunction
prayed for by the Plaintiff in its Petition be set down
for hearing on the 23 day of Sept., 1982, at 3:00 o’clock
p.m. before the Iowa Supreme Court, State Capitol Build-
ing, Des Moines, Iowa, and that notice of said hearing
shall be had by serving a copy of the Petition and the
Order upon the Defendants by personal service at least
7 days prior to the time set for hearing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that any Defendant may file an application
to have the matter as to the sufficiency of evidence rela-
tive to the temporary injunction be set down for hear-
ing prior to the time set for hearing on the permanent
injunction.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that said temporary injunction shall issue
upon Plaintiff’s filing bond with surety approved by the
Clerk in the penal sum of $500.00.
/s/ Mark McCormick
Justice of the
Iowa Supreme Court
53a
APPENDIX H
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 69088
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT
-OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
ae Plaintiff,
MARK A. HUMPHREY, FREDD J. HAAS,
and JAMES E. GRITZNER, d/b/a
HUMPHREY, HAAS AND GRITZNER,
Defendants.
[Filed Sept. 28, 1982]
ORDER
On September 14, 1982 defendants were temporarily
enjoined from using the television commercials in the
possession of Palmer Communications, Inc. for the pur-
pose of advertising their services, and ordered to with-
draw the same from further use. The permanent injunc-
tion issue was scheduled for hearing September 22, 1982.
Defendants Mark A. Humphrey and Fredd J. Haas have
consented to continuance of the temporary injunction un-
til an evidentiary hearing and final ruling by this court.
The court finds the hearing should be continued so that
an evidentiary hearing may be held. The Honorable C.
Edwin Moore is hereby appointed a Commissioner of this
court to conduct a hearing in the above matter at a
time and place to be selected by him.
The proceedings shall be reported and a transcript
thereof filed with the clerk of this court by a certified
shorthand reporter selected by the Commissioner and paid
by the State of Iowa.
54a
The Commissioner shall prepare a written summary of
the evidence, but shall make no findings of fact or reach
any conclusions of law. The summary shall be filed with
the clerk of this court. Both parties may obtain dis-
covery, if necessary, by those methods and under such
conditions as shall be determined by the Commissioner
upon motion.
Done this 28th day of September, 1982.
THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
By /s/ W. W. Reynoldson
W. W. REYNOLDSON
Chief Justice
Copies to:
Frank A. Comito, Jr.
Comito and Capps
4701 University Avenue
Des Moines, Iowa 50311
Humphrey & Haas
808 5th Avenue
Des Moines, Iowa 50309
Mark W. Bennett
Babich, Bennett & Nickerson
5885 Grand Avenue, Suite 202
Des Moines, Iowa 50312
James E. Gritzner
1549 N.W. 91st Street
Des Moines, Iowa 50322
Members of the Supreme Court
Honorable C. Edwin Moore
Polk County Courthouse
Des Moines, Iowa 50309
55a
APPENDIX I
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 69088
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT
OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK A. HUMPHREY, FREDD J. HAAS,
and JAMES E. GRITZNER, d/b/a
HUMPHREY, HAAS AND GRITZNER,
Defendants.
MARK A. HUMPHREY and FReEDD J. HAAs, individually
and doing business as HUMPHREY AND HAAS,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT
OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
Defendant to Counterclaim.
[Filed Nov. 16, 1983]
\
REPORT OF HEARING COMMISSIONER
Mr. -Chief Justice and Members of the Iowa Supreme
Court:
The undersigned appointed Hearing Commissioner sub-
mits the attached summary of the evidence taken in the
above entitled cause.
56a
\
It has been prepared with the assistance of the re-
search department of the court, within the restrictions
set out in the order of my appointment.
The 840 page transcript, the many exhibits listed
therein and the summary have this day been filed with
the clerk.
The clerk of this court shall promptly transmit copies
of this order to the parties, or their attorneys of record,
and all members of the court.
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of November,
1983.
/s/ C. Edwin Moore
C. EDWIN MOORE
Hearing Commissioner
57a
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
1. Various admissions by defendants Humphrey and
Haas were read into the record. (Tr. 14-20). Defendants
contracted for the televising of at least three commer-
cials on a Des Moines station advertising legal services.
Each of the commercials contained the following: more
than a single non-dramatic voice, background sound,
visual displays other than words and numbers, visual
displays beyond that which is allowed in print under
DR 2-101, a list of four fields of law practice, no dis-
claimer of the type required by DR 2-105(A) (3), state-
ments relating to contingent fees without disclosure as
to whether such fees would be computed before or after
deduction of costs. Unless restrained defendants would
continue televising such commercials. Prior to televising
their commercials defendants did not seek advance ap-
proval from the bar association or the supreme court and
did not request amendment of the Code of Professional
Responsibility or changes in the relevant disciplinary
rules.
2. Talmage Eugene Thompson, general sales man-
ager for WHO-TV testified for plaintiff concerning the
circumstances under which defendants’ commercials were
placed and run. (Tr. 22-36). He testified concerning his
general duties as sales manager and stated that WHO’s
geographical viewing area was probably the forty coun-
ties surrounding Des Moines. In August 1982, a na-
tional sales representative firm contacted the station
regarding commercials for defendants’ law firm to run
scattered throughout the day Monday through Thursday
forty-seven weeks out of the year with rotation during
the 9-5 time period to give the benefit of as many pro-
gram possibilities as possible. Thompson testified con-
cerning the demographic’ breakdown of the audience dur-
ing that time period, stating that the viewing audience
was approximately 35,000-40,000 homes. Between 9:00
A.M. and noon the largest group of viewers consisted of
58a
adults 25 and over. That time period had a target
audience of older females while a younger and different
audience tuned in during the afternoon. Defendants’
commercials were screened prior to airing and were run
eleven times, in no particular order of rotation, during
a four day period before airing was discontinued at the
request of the bar association.
3. James Gritzner, an attorney formerly a partner in
defendants’ firm, testified for plaintiff concerning the
firm’s decision to purchase and air the television com-
mercials. (Tr. 36-80). He testified generally concerning
his background in both law and broadcasting and stated
that after joining the firm in October, 1981 he haudled
mostly personal injury and workers’ compensation cases
with some business litigation. After receiving a solicita-
tion by mail from a Denver firm that syndicates legal
advertising the partners discussed the possibility of con-
tracting for the Des Moines area rights to the television
commercials produced by the Denver firm. He testified
that he was unenthusiastic about advertising on tele-
vision but went te Denver, viewed 24 to 30 sample com-
mercials, and was unimpressed by their quality and dis-
approved of the samples’ use of a “hook” or tag line
stating “He’s in your corner.” The purpose of the “hook”
or tag line was stated to be to generate trust on the part
of the target audience of blue collar workers and to
increase viewer awareness of such matters as the fact
that there was no charge for an initial consultation and
that cases would be taken on a contingent fee basis. It
was hoped that the commercials would generate immedi-
ate phone calls to the number shown. Gritzner testified
that he was uncomfortable with both lawyer advertising
generally and the Denver firm’s experience that use of
TV commercials had caused an enormous increase in
case load at the expense of more complex types of cases.
The partners were aware that the TV commercials did
not conform to the Iowa rules but thought that the rules
were unenforceable as a result of a then-recent United
59a
States Supreme Court decision and, as a result, decided
to air the commercials in order to be first in the Des
Moines market without attempting to seek a declaratory
judgment that such commercials would be permissible.
The time for airing was intended to reach hospitalized or
sick persons looking for entertainment. The total cost
of the package was estimated to be approximately $45,000
per year and included a right to refuse any commercial
produced by the Denver firm that was deemed unsuitable.
Gritzner received the first phone call generated by the
commercials, which was of a crank nature. His discom-
fort and embarassment with the concept of televised law-
yer advertising led him to disassociate himself from the
firm shortly thereafter but he stated that in his opinion
defendants were not motivated by greed and a desire to
become a settlement mill but, rather, sought to promote
growth of the firm, and that they were willing and able
to take cases to trial.
4. Robert Allbee, attorney and former supreme court
justice, testified for plaintiff concerning the supreme
court’s adoption of rules regulating televised lawyer ad-
vertising. (Tr. 80-102). He testified concerning his pro-
fesisonal background and appointment to the court and
stated that the current Iowa advertising rules were de-
signed to prevent purely emotional reactions and inad-
vertent or intended deception and that the court order
adopting the rules resulted from general satisfaction with
the report of the bar committee that studied the matter.
Reasons for not permitting dramatization were clearly
enunciated in the report (P. Exh. 14) and, in addition,
there was a larger purpose of protecting the public from
misunderstanding or misapprehension. The objective was
to limit the available information to content that was
objective and informative rather than dramatic, per-
suasive, or promotional.
5. Dr. Richard Haynes, officer of Frank N. Magid
Associates, a Cedar Rapids media research and consulta-
60a
tion firm, testified for plaintiff concerning preparation
and results of a survey conducted for plaintiff in which
reaction to defendants’ commercials was tested. (Tr. 105-
296). He testified generally concerning his professional
background in the field of mass communications and
techniques of assessing the impact of commercials on
viewers. P. Exh. 6 is the firm’s conclusion and findings
with regard to the survey conducted for plaintiff while
P. Exh. 5 is the actual data obtained in the survey.
Cedar Rapids area residents selected by a random digit
dialing telephone procedure were guided through a ques-
tionnaire before and after viewing defendants’ commer-
cials in a manner that the witness stated was in accord-
ance with generally accepted standards of research
science; a focus group discussion was used in conjunction
with the questionnaire. Prior to viewing of the commer-
cial responses indicated a somewhat negative image of
the legal profession that was not notably enhanced after
viewing of the commercials. The pre-viewing average
qualitative opinion of the profession was accompanied by
high expectations. Seventy-one percent of the survey
respondents expected a lawyer to be trustworthy prior to
viewing defendants’ commercials (P. Exh. 2 and 7) while
after viewing the commercials 14% thought that defend-
ants sounded like people who would be trustworthy. The
commercials were found to be informational about such
matters as the name of the firm, its phone number, and
the fact that initial consultation was without charge but
an imagery problem was noted. On cross-examination
relating to the validity and reliability of the survey it
was noted that the commercials were not perceived as
misleading or deceptive nor, in Haynes opinion, were
dramatized television commercials inherently deceptive or
evil. About one-third of those contacted actually par-
ticipated in the survey and the number of unemployed or
unskilled participants did not reflect the percentage of
such persons in the Cedar Rapids area. Viewing of the
commercials was done in a studio rather than at home
6la
and there was no control group exposed to commercials
in compliance with the Iowa advertising rules. On re-
direct examination, it was stated that the potential for
misleading or misinterpreting TV commercials was
greater with dramatization due to the emotional nature
of the response.
6. Lori Andrews, research attorney for the American
Bar Foundation and former staff director of the Ameri-
can Bar Association Commission on Advertising, testi-
fied for defendants concerning various studies relating to
legal advertising and interpretation of the study results
and relevant United States Supreme Court decisions.
(Tr. 298-391, 408). She testified generally concerning
her professiona! background and particular work in the
field of legal advertising. Her testimony was in an indi-
vidual capacity and not as a representative of any or-
ganization. As a result of a survey taken while she was
staff director the ABA Commission on Advertising con-
cluded that the public has a need for information about
lawyers and the cost and availability of legal services
and that advertising provided a means for meeting that
need. Various surveys showed that that need was not
adequately being met by either the organized bar’s efforts
to provide information to the public or lawyer referral
services. Roughly two-thirds of survey respondents ap-
proved of lawyer advertising but survey results showed
that lawyers have an image problem. She opined, based
on survey results, that limits on legal advertising
darkened rather than helped lawyers’ image and that the
public favored advertising including dramatization. She
also opined that emotional appeals do not create a need
for legal services that did not already exist. At least
44 states permit legal ads using dramatization, graphics,
ete., and at least 43 permit background music, actors,
and personal appearances while only one state other than
Iowa limits the voice involved. At least 26 states require
ads to be dignified while 21 allow legal advertising gen-
62a
erally so long as it is not false, fraudulent, misleading,
or deceptive, and no particular problems have been en-
countered enforcing such a rule. She testified that the
number of lawyers engaging in advertising was growing
steadily and that with regard to regulation of such ad-
vertising there was a trend toward simply prohibiting
false, fraudulent, and misleading ads and away from
use of a list approach such as Iowa’s, which she opined
to be unconstitutional. She further opined that Iowa’s
treatment of televised legal advertising would not be
effective in helping the public become aware of either
the availability of legal services or information about
legal rights.
7. Jay Trucks, a practicing attorney from Michigan,
testified for defendants concerning his use of TV com-
mercials including those aired by defendants. (Tr. 392-
407). Ater testifying generally concerning his profes-
sional credentials he stated that his use of commercials
produced by the Denver firm with which defendants con-
tracted caused a dramatic increase in his personal injury
practice due primarily to an influx of new clients from
low income groups who had previously been unaware
and/or ill-educated concerning their legal rights and the
availability of legal services. He had received no com-
plaints concerning his TV commercials and had received
little or no response from an ad he ran in the yellow
pages.
8. John A. DeMay, a practicing attorney from Penn-
sylvania, testified for defendants concerning his use of
commercials produced by the Denver firm. (Tr. 414-438).
He testified generally concerning an influx of new per-
sonal injury clients from low income groups, many of
whom had been unaware of their legal rights prior to
viewing his television commercials. Each commercial
aired generated five to seven calls and approximately
one call out of ten resulted in a new client.
63a
9. Norton Frickey, Denver attorney and head of the
firm producing and syndicating the television commer-
cials aired by defendants, testified for defendants con-
cerning the operation of his business and the effect of
his commercials. (Tr. 439-469). He testified generally
concerning his professional background and development
of the advertising service co-existing with his law prac-
tice. He estimated that he had 91 to 95 current clients
of his legal advertising service and four years experience
with television commercials. He testified that his com-
mercials were effective and directed toward blue collar
persons, and enhanced the credibility of the profession.
His commercials attempt to break down the image of
lawyers as stuffy persons through such means as using
John Madden for a spokesperson.
10. Daniel B. Wackman, professor in the University
of Minnesota school of journalism and mass communica-
tion, testified for defendants concerning perceived de-
ficiencies in the survey conducted by plaintiff’s witness
Hayne. (Tr. 470-566.) He testified generally concerning
his professional credentials and the publications he had
authored. His opinion that the survey lacked validity
was based particularly on the lack of a suitable control
group and lack of a real world setting from which it
would be appropriate to generalize results and the at-
tempt to compare perception of defendants after view of
their commercials with the perception of an ideal lawyer
prior to viewing the commericals.
11. Mark A. Schulman, president of a public opinion
and market research firm and former vice-president of
the Louis Harris polling firm, testified for defendants
concerning perceived deficiencies in the survey conducted
by plaintiff’s witness Hayne (Tr. 566-596). He testified
generally concerning his professional background in po-
litical science and quantitative research, and stated that
he presently conducts surveys for clients of various test
markets. His opinion that the Hayne survey lacked ya-
64a
lidity was based on the allegedly unrepresentative nature
of the sample group as well! as the grounds previously
stated by defendants’ witness Wackman.
12. On recall defendants’ witness Wackman testified
that due to such factors as inattentiveness TV viewers
are less susceptible than is ordinarily assumed to emo-
tional appeals in commercials and that adults from lower
socioeconomic groups, like children whom he had studied,
had learned to be skeptical of emotional sales pitches.
He stated that the decision-making process is different
with regard to the purchase of products like toilet paper
as compared to such products as legal services. (Tr. 598-
652).
13. Gene W. Murdock, assistant professor of business
administration at the University of Wyoming, testified
for defendants concerning perceived deficiencies in the
survey conducted by plaintiff’s witness Hayne. (Tr. 653-
757). He testified generally concerning his professional
background, especially in marketing, including some ex-
perience in the marketing of legal services. His opinion
that the Hayne survey was not valid was based on per-
ceived inadequacy and bias of the questionnaire‘s re-
sponse scales, allegedly poor research design, and lack of
a control group. His opinion that the survey lacked
scientific reliability was based on the allegedly unrepre-
sentative nature of the sample group. He found inade-
quate basis in the survey for the conclusion that the
respondents’ opinion of lawyers diminished after viewing
defendants’ commercials. He opined that obvious drama-
tization may have less tendency to mislead viewers than
more formal and official-looking ads of a type that would
comply with the present Iowa rules. He testified that
surveys indicated a negative attitude toward lawyers
among those having little contact with them and that
commercials of the type aired by defendants convey use-
ful information. He testified, as had defendants’ witness
Wackman, that the decision-making process is different
2 oes Py eee po
—eeo err
65a
when the product in question is legal services rather
than a more impulsive sort of purchase such as toilet
paper. He opined that emotional appeals in television
commercials were not harmful. On cross-examination he
testified that his doctoral research on marketing of legal
services suffered from some of the same deficiencies he
noted in the Hayne survey due to the limited resources
available to him at that time.
14, Mark A. Humphrey, defendant Des Moines attor-
ney, testified for defendants concerning the circumstances
surrounding his firm’s decision to purchase and air tele-
vision commercials. (Tr. 758-801). He testified generally
concerning his profesisonal credentials and the formation
and development of his firm as it sought to focus pri-
marily on practice in the areas of personal injury and
workers’ compensation. Before considering the use of
television commercials the firm tried print ads which
proved ineffectual and awaited both a United States Su-
preme Court decision in a lawyer advertising case and
the Iowa bar’s failure to change Iowa rules as a result
of that decision. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 102 St.Ct.
929, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982). He expressed concerns about
potential clients unaware of matters affecting their legal
rights such as statutes of limitation, and stated that the
firm’s decision to air the commercials without seeking
bar approval was due to the following factors: frustra-
tion stemming from a previous unsuccessful attempt to
obtain bar approval for a print ad that was ultimately
not run, belief that Iowa would either change or not
enforce applicable rules as a result of certain yellow pages
ads that appeared to violate applicable rules without
having prompted disciplinary proceedings, and interpre-
tation of the R.M.J. decision as rendering Iowa’s rules
unconstitutional. He expressed a desire to advertise in
the future to the fullest extent permitted by the first
amendment.
15. Fredd Haas, defendant Des Moines attorney, testi-
fied for defendants concerning the circumstances sur-
66a
rounding his firm’s decision to purchase and air tele-
vision commercials. (Tr. 803-836). He testified generally
concerning his professional credentials and the formation
and development of his firm. He testified that the firm
had participated in the bar association’s lawyer referral
service with little effect and that, in his opinion, some
yellow pages ads placed by other attorneys violated ap-
plicable Iowa rules. Responses to the firm’s televised
commercials were mostly from persons unaware of such
matters affecting their legal rights as statutes of limita-
tion. He testified that the yearly cost to the firm for the
commercials would be upwards of $20,000, of which
$10,000 would go to the Denver firm producing them
_ with the remainder to WHO for air time. He testified
that he maintained a continuing interest in issues relat-
ing to legal advertising and that the firm’s business deci-
sion not to air TV commercials that would comply with
the Iowa rules was due to a lack of resources to inde-
pendently produce such a commercial and doubts as to
the effectiveness of such a commercial. He testified that
the firm had been advised by the bar association that no
change in the Iowa rules was contemplated in the ab-
sence of a challenge to their validity.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.