Jurisdictional Statement — Humphrey v. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n

Supreme Court brief1985

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| office Supreme Court, USL

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No. 84- ! JAN vy 1985

, * STEVAS,

IN THE CLERK J

- Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

MARK A. HUMPHREY AND F REDD J. HAAS

d/b/a HUMPHREY & HAAS,

Appellants,

We

COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT

OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,

Appellee.

On Appeal from a Judgment of

the Iowa Supreme Court

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

MARK W. BENNETT CHARLES A. HorSkKy *

BABICH, BENNETT & DAVID H. REMES

_ NICKERSON COVINGTON & BURLING

5835 Grand Ave. 1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Suite 202 P.O. Box 7566

Des Moines, Iowa 50312 Washington, D.C. 20044

CHARLEs S. SIMS (202) 662-6000

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES M. ANNE WILCOX

UNION FOUNDATION RALPH OGDEN

132 West 43d St. 227 Lamb Lane

New York, N.Y. 10036 Golden, Colo. 80401

Counsel for Appellants

January 17, 1985 * Counsel of Record

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a state law restricting television advertis-

ing by lawyers to displays of words and numbers, ac-

companied only by a single “nondramatic” voice, violates

the First Amendment, on its face and as applied.

2. Whether a state law forbidding lawyers to com-

municate truthful, non-deceptive information unless “spe-

cifically permitted” by rule violates the First Amend-

ment, on its face and as applied.

3. Whether a state law banning the use of “dramatic”

voices and “self-laudatory” statements in lawyer adver-

tising is impermissibly vague or otherwise violates the

First Amendment, on its face or as applied.

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES IN-

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STATEMGN: OF THE CASE. ........................2..--..0c0000.-

Bi ee III sonnei cases geensencnnensaenen evans

2. The Complaint and Answer ...................--2--.----+++

a tee meenuery FOATING ......................-............

4

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1. Truthful, Non-Deceptive Information May

I i ik occ cacesniits babdntmonaeencsons

2. The Ads Here Were Not ee Mis-

end

C. The Ban on “Dramatic” Voices and “Self-

Laudatory” Statements ......................2..-..0-.-00

CONCLUSION ........ fabian Saniiealeealtcbiibeuncaspaibinintincctciete

APPENDICES*

APPENDIX A—Opinion of Iowa Supreme Court........

APPENDIX B—Notice of Appeal ..................2222....002---+-

* The appendices are separately bound.

(iii)

25a

| iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

APPENDIX C—Order Extending Time for Docketing

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APPENDIX D—lIowa Code of Professional Responsi-

bility for Lawyers

Se eS eI acti ccetneicceasbiececseniaciasoumrsmdecctecimnens

DR 2-105: Description and Limitation of Practice..

APPENDIX E—Plaintiff’s Petition for Injunction....

APPENDIX F—Defendants’ Answer and Counter-

"SESE IES ECE ve RN ECE E Tey aN

APPENDIX G—Order of Sept. 14, 1982, Temporarily

Enjoining Airing of Advertisements...

APPENDIX H—Order of Sept. 28, 1982, Appointing

Commissioner to Conduct Evidentiary

Hearing

APPENDIX I—Commissioner’s Report (filed Nov. 16,

LALIT METI OL eh EN

Ala

45a

5la

53a

‘Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) .................. passim

Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 103 S. Ct.

Be IIE soiccsuiscctcinicscsidanincohpdansesipieabtuctiaoatenamiankoii 13, 17

Consolidated Edison Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 530

CI: iiicensnnslibicsecdtanissiniesinciiccbadaronidabteespcahiaiiverebpninesatohenn 17

First National Bank v. Bellotti, 485 U.S. 765

kT Cree NCA ER RPT ET wo ICSuNS OMe «fu rtar coiar oe 15

Gomez V. Perez, 409 U.S. 5385 (1973) —...00002222.0..2... 2

Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S.

A | SRETE STR RS SE Ret ceed MU ord leper oreo erm 15

Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willing-

epee: EE Te OD ais ct cccincincee 14

Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) .......... 2

Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).......... 19

Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 447

CIE itis ccipctenteigsiatiaiinieitan etaaani lial ctaihan:niistch pumetobiosaddacs 13

In re Primus, 486 U.S. 412 (1978) .......................... 18, 15

In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) ..........................- passim

In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) 0002222. 19

Thomas V. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) ....0...022... 15

Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199

CRT scinsaceinntibnnedies Pakiihdadicehiteisadieas 19

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS:

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Be II vik vassdhicenssisicicbarnniolaenctiateuiceleebenatels 2

Court Rules:

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Disciplinary Rules:

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vi 4

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

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Lis sied picsiticaninsinsistsiabshechsaitaniapaniliinsiantdinea stadia

TET AC IR OAT

Vt. DR 2-101 (D) ........ Sicpcddinsndebaebainacasdiuinladesnia-oiaikaiatsiainsins

I I tcc cs cecnpesntesniducntubaniageidamnitantin

MISCELLANEOUS:

ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility

i

ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.2 (a)..

Federal Trade Commission, Cleveland Regional

Office and Bureau of Economics, Improving

Consumer Access to Legal Services: The Case

for Removing Restrictions on Truthful Adver-

RE. Me IEEE Mtn eesteislaciccias wre eanncicneeemies 9,10

ow OO CO

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984 \

No. 84-

MARK A. HUMPHREY AND FREDD J. HAAS

d/b/a HUMPHREY & HAAS,

Appellants,

Vv.

COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT

OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,

Appellee.

On Appeal from a Judgment of

the Iowa Supreme Court

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Iowa Supreme Court is reported at

355 N.W.2d 565 and appears as Appendix A. (App. 1la-

24a.)

JURISDICTION

The proceeding below was brought as an original ac-

tion in the Iowa Supreme Court to enjoin appellants

Humphrey and Haas, two Iowa lawyers, from airing

certain television advertisements alleged to violate two

rules of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for

\

2

Lawyers, DR 2-101 and DR 2-105. Finding that the ads

in question violated the rules, the Iowa Supreme Court

permanently enjoined Humphrey and Haas from airing

them or any other ads that violate those rules. The court

rejected their contention that the rules, both on their

face and as applied, violate the First and Fourteenth

Amendments. (App. la.)

The Iowa Supreme Court’s judgment, embodied in its

opinion, was issued on September 19, 1984. (App. 1a.)

A notice of appeal was timely filed on November 19,

1984. (App. 25a.) By an order of December 6, 1984, the

time for docketing the appeal was extended to January

17, 1985. (App. 27a.) This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).1. Because appellee is a com-

mission of the Iowa Supreme Court (see Iowa Court

Rule 118.2), we believe that 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) is

inapplicable. See Sup. Ct. R. 28.4(c).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

AND RULES INVOLVED

U.S. Const., Amend. I:

“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the free-

dom of speech, or of the press... .”

U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1:

“(Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

DR 2-101 and DR 2-105 of the Iowa Code of Profes-

sional Responsibility for Lawyers are set forth in Ap- |

pendix D (App. 28a-40a). |

1 Insofar as any subsidiary questions presented may properly be

here on certiorari, this Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28

U.S.C. § 1257(3), and we ask that the notation of probable juris- |

diction “be understood as a grant of the writ” on them. Mishkin

v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 512 (1966); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. |

535, 687 n.2 (1973).

reine

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. The Advertisements ;

Over a three-day period in early September 1382, the

law firm of Humphrey, Haas & Gritzner aired three ad-

vertisements over WHO-TV in Des Moines, Iowa. The

first ad featured an actor and actress portraying a

physician and a nurse in an examination room. While

the nurse looked at an X-ray, the doctor addressed the

viewer:

“We see first-hand injuries caused by the neglect of

others. If you’re seriously injured through the negli-

gence of others, you should be talking to a lawyer.

The choice of a lawyer could be important. That’s

something to think about.”

The second ad featured an actor portraying a printer.

Standing in front of a printing press, he addressed the

viewer:

“I suffered loss of wages, incurred staggering medi-

cal bills and endured pain and suffering all through

the negligence of others. I wasn’t aware of my legal

rights. I should have been talking to a lawyer.”

The third ad featured two actors portraying bowling

partners. The following conversation took place at the

lanes:

“Bowler #1: I’ve got to throw like that body, we’re

one man short.

Bowler #2: He was injured through the negligence

of others.

Bowler #1: He should be talking to a lawyer.

Bowler #2: The choice of that lawyer will be im-

portant.

Bowler #1: That’s something to think about.”

After the dramatization, the scene in each ad shifted

to the reception area of a law office, with an actress

4

portraying a receptionist. As the name, address, and

phone number of the firm were superimposed on this

picture, an off-camera announcer said:

“If you’re injured through the negligence of others,

call the law firm of Humphrey, Haas & Gritzner.

Cases involving auto accidents, work comp, serious

personal injuries and wrongful death handled on a

percentage basis. No charge for the initial consulta-

tion. Call now at 288-0102.”

2. The Complaint and Answer

The three ads were scheduled to run four days a

week for 47 weeks. (Tr. 25.)* After three days on the

air, however, they were discontinued by the station at

the request of the Committee on Professional Ethics and

Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association. (Tr. 29.)*

The Committee then brought an original action in the

Iowa Supreme Court, alleging that the three ads violated

DR 2-101 and DR 2-105 of the Iowa Code of Professional

Responsibility for Lawyers. The Committee alleged that

the ads violated DR 2-101 because they

“contain more than a single nondramatic voice, have

background sound and visual displays of two or more

people characterizing themselves as clients which

make laudatory comments as to Defendants’ serv-

ices.” (App. 42a.) *

2“Tr.” refers to the transcript of the evidentiary hearing ordered

by the Iowa Supreme Court in this case. See pp. 6-9, below.

3The Committee consists of two members appointed by the

Iowa Supreme Court and five appointed by the Iowa State Bar

Association. All seven must be confirmed by the Iowa Supreme

Court. The Committee members sit as commissioners of that court

“to initiate or receive, and process complaints against any attorney

licensed to practice law in [Iowa] for alleged violations of the Iowa

Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers and the laws of

the United States or the state of Iowa.” Iowa Court Rule 118.2.

¢ DR‘2-101(B), which lists information that “may be communi-

cated to the public,” provides that the approved information may

be communicated on television—

|

5

The Committee alleged that the ads violated DR 2-105,

which, at the time, authorized lawyers in print advertise-

ments to list not more than three fields of practice and

required such listings to be accompanied by a disclaimer

of expertise. (App. 42a.)°

The Committee asked that the Iowa Supreme Court

permanently enjoin the lawyers from airing the ads in

question or any other ads that violate the Code. (App.

48a-44a.) On September 14, 1982, the Iowa Supreme

Court, on the Committee’s ex parte application, enjoined

Humphrey and Haas from airing their ads pending fur-

ther proceedings. (App. 5la-52a.)*

Humphrey and Haas admitted that the ads used more

than a single voice and contained background sounds and

visual displays. But they urged that DR 2-101’s restric-

tions of lawyer advertising violate the First and Four-

“in words and numbers only, articulated only by a single non-

dramatic voice, not that of a lawyer, and with no other back-

ground sound. ... [N]o visual display shall be allowed except

that allowed in print as articulated by the announcer.” (App.

29a.)

DR 2-101(A) limits lawyer advertising to the information “spe-

cifically permitted” by the rule. It bans any “false, fraudulent,

misleading, deceptive or unfair statements.” (App. 28a.)

5 After its judgment here was entered, the Iowa Supreme Court

amended DR 2-105(A) (2) to permit the listing of fields of practice

in broadcast as well as print advertising. (See App. 36a-38a.) The

amended rule violates the First Amendment because it arbitrarily

limits to three the number of fields of practice that may be listed

in any advertisement and impermissibly restricts the designations

that may be used. (See pp. 16-17, below.) Its required disclaimer

(see App. 39a) is unjustifiably burdensome as well.

6 After the Committee commenced its action, Gritzner withdrew

from the firm and was dismissed as a defendant. Meanwhile,

the Committee instituted disciplinary proceedings against Hum-

phrey and Haas, which have been stayed pending disposition of this

action. Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct, Jn re

Humphrey and Haas, File No. 8283-58 (notice of complaint issued

Sept. 16, 1982).

6

teenth Amendments, both facially and as applied, and

that the rule’s ban on the use of “dramatic” voices and

“self-laudatory” statements is impermissibly vague. They

contended that DR 2-105 also violates the First and

Fourteenth Amendments, facially and as applied. Al-

leging that the disciplinary rules violated their constitu-

tional rights, they counterclaimed for declaratory and in-

junctive relief. (App. 46a-50a.)

3. The Evidentiary Hearing

Two weeks after the Iowa Supreme Court entered the

ex parte injunction, it appointed a commissioner to con-

duct an evidentiary hearing and to prepare a written

summary of the evidence, but not to make any findings

of fact or reach any conclusions of law. (App. 58a.)

Following discovery, the hearing was held, and the Com-

missioner’s summary was filed with the court on Novem-

ber 16, 1983. (App. 55a.) The evidentiary hearing focused

entirely on the state’s justification for DR 2-101’s general

prohibition of dramatization in lawyer advertising on

television, and on the supposedly objectionable charac-

teristics of the three ads.

The Committee’s principal justification for DR 2-101’s

prohibition was that dramatizations may appeal to a

viewer’s “emotions,” interfering with “rational” choice,

and are “unnecessary” to convey pertinent information.

Former Justice Robert Allbee, a witness for the Commit-

tee, explained that the likely viewers of such advertising

“are ordinarily of a lower intellectual category and they

are less able to make an objective conclusion from some-

thing that is passed by them in dramatic form.” (Tr.

95.)7

7 Former Justice Allbee was a member of the Iowa Supreme Court

when it adopted the ban on dramatized television advertising in

1980 on the Committee’s recommendation. In addition to “pre-

vent[ing] purely emotional reactions or emotional impact in the

selection of lawyers” (Tr. 86-87), Justice Allbee testified that the

7

The Committee made no claim that the ads were in fact

false, deceptive, or misleading. To the contrary, Dr.

Richard Haynes, an expert retained by the Committee,

testified that he saw nothing inherently misleading or

deceptive in the use of dramatization (Tr. 210-12; see

App. 61a), and that the ads in question had not been

perceived as misleading or deceptive by a group of view-

ers paid by him to watch them. (Tr. 210, 258; see App.

60a.) He conceded that dramatization is effective pre-

cisely because it “involve[s] and interest[s] the viewer”

(Tr. 276) ; indeed, he found that 75 percent of the view-

ers paid to watch the ads rated them as a fair-to-excellent

way of educating viewers about their rights. (Tr. 265.)

The Committee’s counsel repeatedly sought to elicit tes-

timony that dramatization in television advertising can

generate an exaggerated sense of need for a lawyer’s

services, and can imply distinctions between lawyers that

are no more genuine than the distinctions between name-

brand and generic aspirin. But none of the evidence sug-

gested that any such effects are either inherent in or

peculiar to dramatized television advertising. Nor was

there any evidence that the ads here caused such effects

or that such effects, if they were to occur, would contami-

nate consumer choice. The defense proffered extensive

testimony that lawyer advertising does not create a need

for legal services and that a consumer’s exercise of choice

is inevitably more deliberate in hiring a lawyer than in

purchasing bathroom tissue.*

The Committee did not controvert the extensive de

fense evidence that dramatization is critical for effective

television advertising. The evidence demonstrated, to the

ban was intended “to guard the public against deception either

inadvertent or intended, and in turn to protect the trust and in-

tegrity that we want the public to have in the legal profession.

That the public not obtain the view that merchandising legal serv-

ices is like merchandising vintage wine.” (Tr. 87; see App. 59a.)

8 F.g., Tr. 335, 618-19, 699.

8

contrary, that dramatization enables advertisers to cap-

ture viewers’ attention,® causes viewers to remember the

message being conveyed,” and “break[s] down the barrier

that exists between the public and lawyers.” +The Com-

mittee offered no evidence to rebut the testimony of de-

fense witnesses that ads conforming to the restrictions

of DR 2-101 are more likely to mislead viewers than

dramatized ads precisely because they look less like ads

than those employing dramatization.* As one defense

witness stated, ads conforming to DR 2-101—just printed

words and numbers on the screen, accompanied by a

“nondramatic” voice—could readily be perceived as a

public-service announcement, “a statement with some sort

of authority behind it.”

Lori Andrews, research attorney for the American Bar

Foundation and former staff director of the ABA Com-

mission on Advertising, testified that more than 40 states

permit lawyer advertising on television using dramatiza-

tion, visual displays, background sounds, and the like.

(Tr. 330-31; see App. 61a.) She pointed out that DR

2-101 contains independent prohibitions against false, de-

® E.g., Tr. 378, 562, 686.

10 F.g., Tr. 281, 379, 712.

11 Tr, 457. See also, e.g., Tr. 709-10. As Norton Frickey, who

heads the firm that produced the ads, testified in explaining their

design, “we try to find something that the average guy can com-

municate with and relate to[.]” (Tr. 451; see App. 63a.)

12 F.g., Tr. 688, 690, 754.

13 Tr, 691. The witness observed:

“[T]hat has a greater chance to mislead the public than some-

thing which has drama, which has action, which has visuals

and color in it that everybody knows it’s an advertisement.

When I see it, I know it’s an ad. If I see this other thing,

I might think that could be anything from a newscast to a

message from the Bar.”

Id. (testimony of Dr. Gene W. Murdock, Assistant Professor of

Business Administration, University of Wyoming).

9

ceptive, and misleading statements or claims (Tr. 334),

and she noted that the trend is simply to forbid such

statements or claims and to permit ads of the type aired

in this case. (Tr. 8332; see App. 62a.) **

14 Ags of January 1985, only five states—Alabama, New Jersey,

Ohio, Vermont, and West Virginia—imposed restricticns on tele-

vision advertising by lawyers comparable to Iowa’s or more severe.

See Ala. DR 2-102(A) (7) (d); N.J. Rule 7.2; Ohio DR 2-101(B) ;

Vt. DR 2-101(D); W. Va. DR 2-101(B). Indiana proscribes ad-

vertisements containing “a photograph or other pictorial repre-

sentation of any person other than the attorney or member of the

firm,” Ind. DR 2-101(D) (4), while Montana permits television ads

only with the advance approval of the state bar association’s Ethics

Committee. See Mont. DR 2-101(C) (as construed).

Rule 7.2(a) of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct

(adopted in August 1983) permits lawyer advertising through any

public media, including television, subject only to the restriction

that the advertising not be false or misleading. The Comment

on the Rule states:

“Television is now one of the most powerful media for getting

information to the public, particularly persons of low or mod-

erate income; prohibiting television advertising, therefore,

would impede the flow of information about legal services to

many sectors of the public. Limiting the information that may

be advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can

accurately forecast the kind of information that the public

would regard as relevant.”

ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, reprinted in ABA/

BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, p. 01:166

(1984). DR 2-101(B) of the ABA’s Model Code of Professional

Responsibility also permitted lawyer advertising on television, with-

out special restrictions based on the lawyer’s choice of medium.

See id. at p. 01:310.

In November 1984, the Staff of the FTC’s Cleveland Regional

Office and the FTC’s Bureau of Economics issued a report con-

cluding that content-based and media-based restrictions on lawyer

advertising inhibit the extent of advertising and result in sig-

nificantly higher prices for legal services. Improving Consumer

Access to Legal Services: The Case for Removing Restrictions on

Truthful Advertising 126-27 (Nov. 1984). The report, based on

10

4. The Decision

On the basis of this record, the lowa Supreme Court

sustained the restrictions sought to be enforced by the

Committee and enjoined Humphrey and Haas from air-

ing the ads in question. Disclaiming any suggestion “that

the advertisements here were deceitful” (App. lla), the

court justified its injunction on the ground that, “in the

medium defendants chose, the public could well be mis-

led by [the ads].” (Jd.) The court did not identify any

feature of “the medium defendants chose” that rendered

any particular aspect of any of the ads potentially mis-

leading.”®

an empirical study of the effects of lawyer advertising restrictions

in 17 representative states, urges elimination of all restrictions that

limit “the free flow of truthful information to consumers.” Id. at

172. Its recommended approach is even less restrictive than the

ABA’s Model Rule 7.2. See id. at 150-53. ;

The Federal Trade Commission, in its amicus brief in the Iowa

Supreme Court, argued that the restrictions at issue in this case

“are likely to diminish the effectiveness with which attorneys can

[truthfully] inform consumers about the availability of legal serv-

ices.” FTC amicus brief at 14. It stated that “in addition to the

complete absence of evidence to suggest that the advertisements in

question were misleading or deceptive, there is no evidence in the

record to support the premise generally that the technique of using

dramatizations, background sounds or more than one non-dramatic

voice in a television advertisement for lawyer services would be in-

herently misleading.” Jd. at 15. The FTC stated that “[t]he use of

dramatizations containing characterizations, visual displays and

background sound can provide a truthful, non-deceptive and effective

means of conveying important information about legal rights and

the availability and cost of legal services.” Jd. See also id. at 17.

16 The court seemed to accept the Committee’s assertion, made

for the first time in its brief but without support in the evidentiary

record, that the ads could “mislead people into believing that pur-

suing the listed cases is a cost-free venture.” (App. lla.) The court

also seemed to accept the Committee’s claim, also made for the

first time in its brief but without any support in the evidentiary

record, that the ads might be misleading because they implied

11

The court rejected Humphrey and Haas’s contention

that DR 2-101’s ban on dramatization is more restrictive

than necessary to serve any compelling state interest.

“All that is prohibited,” the court stated, “are the tools

which would manipulate the viewer’s mind and will.”

(App. 18a.) Stating that the situation presented by the

ads “is exactly what the United States supreme court

had in mind when it referred to the ‘special problems’ in

electronic media advertising” (App. lla), the Iowa court

justified DR 2-101’s ban on dramatization as a prophy-

lactic against “intrusion, intimidation, overreaching, or

undue influence.” (App. 12a.)

The court agreed with the Committee that “the Bates

rationale does not apply to irrelevant information,” and

opined that “the ads here would not aid the public in

making the informed decision which is subject to the pro-

tection recognized in Bates.” (Id.) Because DR 2-101’s

restriction prohibits only “irrelevant” information, the

court found that the rule “does not impede, [but] in fact

advances, the fostering of rational decision making and

maintaining of the bar’s professionalism.” (Jd.)

The court summarily dismissed Humphrey and Haas’s

claim that the limitation on lawyer advertising to in-

formation “specifically permitted” by rule violates the

First Amendment. “We specifically allow[ ] dissemina-

tion of all information necessary to assist the public

in seeking and selecting counsel. As previously men-

tioned, a procedure is in place for considering any sug-

gested additions of useful information.” (App. 18a.)

Finally, the court rejected the contention that DR 2-

101’s ban on “dramatic” voices and “self-laudatory”

statements is impermissibly vague. It did so merely by

remarking that the phrase “nondramatic voice” is “a

that Humphrey and Haas were more experienced than they in fact

were. (Jd.) The court did not explain how “the medium defendants

chose” was responsible for either supposed misrepresentation, or on

what basis the court accepted the Committee’s claims.

12

simple [one] which we think is commonly understood”

(App. 14a), and noting simply that “[t]he dictionary

meaning of ‘laudatory’ is ‘expressing praise.’” (Jd.)

Two justices dissented, condemning the rule as “un-

necessarily restrictive because it prohibits dissemination

of basic information necessary for an informed judgment

about the selection of an attorney and the protection of

basic legal rights.” (App. 15a.) They added that the

rule’s ban on dramatization is “in fact a prescription for

dullness, prohibiting all background music, dramatiza-

tion, and other methods of stimulating viewer interest.”

(Id.) The dissent stated:

“It is undisputed that the effect of these limitations

on technique is to substantially diminish the effec-

tiveness of any television advertising. The combined

effect of the rules is to inhibit dissemination of rele-

vant information without a showing of a substantial

state interest. This violates . . . the first amend-

ment.” (Jd.)

The dissent stressed that the Committee’s own expert

had testified that dramatization is not inherently mis-

leading, and that the ads in fact were not misleading to

the survey group. (App. 16a.) The dissenters rejected the

majority’s conclusion that “because television is the

medium, a mere chance of deceit is sufficient” to sustain

the restrictions at issue. (App. 17a.) They instead read

this Court’s cases as teaching that “regardless of the

medium used, advertising must be more than ‘possibly’

misleading in order to be denied first amendment pro-

tection.” (App. 17a-18a.)

The dissent pointed out that this Court’s statements

recognizing the value of fostering rational, intelligent,

and voluntary decisionmaking were meant “to expand

the scope of lawyer advertising, not to throttle it.” ( App.

21a.) “In providing information for the formation of

an informed judgment,” Justice Larson wrote, “it seems

13

to me that it is preferable to provide an excess of in-

formation, rather than too little. Viewers are sophisti-

cated enough to accept or reject it as they see fit.” (App.

22a.)

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE SUBSTANTIAL

A. The Ban on Dramatization

In sustaining DR 2-101’s restriction on lawyer adver-

tising on television to pictures of printed words and num-

bers, accompanied only by an off-screen “nondramatic”

voice, the Iowa court disobeyed the teachings of this

Court’s lawyer advertising cases, In re R.M.J., 455 U.S.

191 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S.

447 (1978); In re Primus, 486 U.S. 412 (1978) ; Bates v.

State Bar, 433 U.S. 850 (1977). Those cases teach that

a state may impose restrictions on lawyer advertising

“where the particular advertising is inherently likely to

deceive or where the record indicates that a particular

form or method of advertising has in fact been deceptive.”

In re R.M.J., supra, 455 U.S. at 202.

Although a state may restrict such advertising to pre-

vent “fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching

and other forms of ‘vexatious conduct,’” id., such re-

strictions “must be narrowly drawn and the State may

regulate only to the extent regulation furthers the State’s

substantial interest.” Jd. at 203. And, as with restric-

tions on other forms of speech, “[t]he party seeking to

uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the

burden of justifying it.” Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products

Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2875, 2882 n.20 (1983). The Court has

sustained prophylactic restrictions only in situations

which are “inherently conducive to overreaching and other

forms of misconduct,” Ohralik, supra, 436 U.S. at 464,

where requiring proof of actual harm would render a

lawyer’s conduct “virtually immune to effective oversight

and regulation by the State or by the legal profession.”

Id. at 466.

14

There is no claim that the ads here were false, mis-

leading, or deceptive. To the contrary, the Committee’s

expert witness specifically testified that the ads were not

in fact misleading or deceptive, and the Iowa Supreme

Court itself disclaimed any suggestion “that the adver-

tisements here were deceitful.” ** Thus, the question pre-

sented is whether the state may enforce a prophylactic

rule to enjoin Humphrey and Haas from airing these ads

on the theory that other dramatized television ads by

lawyers might be deceptive.

The First Amendment permits no such prophylactic

rule here. The Committee’s expert witness himself testi-

fied that he found nothing inherently misleading or de-

ceptive in the use of dramatization, and he conceded that

dramatization is effective in television advertising pre-

cisely because it “involve[s] and interest[s] the viewer.”

The Iowa Supreme Court offered no record support for

any contrary view. It upheld DR 2-101’s prohibition

solely on the basis of its unsubstantiated belief that tele-

vision dramatization “manipulate[s] the viewer’s mind

and will,” despite this Court’s admonition that “com-

mercial speech cannot be banned because of an unsub-

stantiated belief that its impact is ‘detrimental.’” Lin-

mark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431

U.S. 85, 92 n.6 (1977).

The Iowa court may have upheld DR 2-101 on the

supposition that the likely viewers of lawyer advertising

on television “are ordinarily of a lower intellectual cate-

gory and [thus] less able to make an objective conclusion

from something that is passed by them in dramatic form.”

(See p. 6 & n.7, above.) But this Court has squarely

rejected restrictions premised on the assumption “that

the public is not sophisticated enough to realize the limita-

tions of advertising.” Bates, supra, 433 U.S. at 375. It

\

16 As for the court’s view that the ads might be misleading in

certain respects because of “the medium defendants chose” (App.

lla), see pp. 17-19, below.

15

has refused to restrict lawyer advertising when the re-

striction “rests on an underestimation of the public.” Jd.

“If the naiveté of the public will cause advertising by

attorneys to be misleading, then it is the bar’s role to

assure that the populace is sufficiently informed as to

enable it to place advertising in the proper perspective.”

Id.

Nor is there any foundation in the First Amendment

for distinguishing between speech that appeals to the

“emotions” and speech that appeals to “reason.” As the

evidence in this case demonstrates, drama can facilitate

effective communication by capturing a viewer’s atten-

tion through a sympathetic appeal to the viewer's needs:

—an approach that the Iowa court condemned as manipu-

lative—while dry recitations of fact can generate irra-

tional emotional responses. Moreover, as the evidence

showed, viewers may be more easily misled by advertis-

ing that purports to be “objective” than by advertising

that makes no secret of its commercial aims.

This Court has already held that any distinction be-

tween speech that informs and speech that: persuades is

analytically indefensible. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.

516, 5385 (1945). See also Primus, supra, 436 U.S. at

431-32. And the Court has frequently stressed that the

fact that speech may persuade “is hardly a reason to

suppress it.” First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.

765, 790 (1978) ; Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents,

360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959). The Iowa Supreme Court

believed that DR 2-101 draws a permissible line “between

what informs the public and what promotes the lawyer,”

but the rule is in fact “a prescription for dullness,” and

its effect is “to inhibit dissemination of relevant informa-

tion without a showing of substantial state interest.”

(See p. 12, above.) Because television is such a critical

medium of communication, and because DR 2-101 so

drastically restricts the use of that medium, the First

16

Amendment question presented here is urgent and im-

portant.

B. The Ban on Information Not “Specifically Permitted”

1. Truthful, Non-Deceptive Information

May Not Be Suppressed |

In enjoining Humphrey and Haas from airing tele-

vision ads that communicate truthful, non-deceptive in-

formation not “specifically permitted” to be conveyed, the

Iowa Supreme Court disregarded this Court’s teaching

that such restrictions are flatly impermissible. Indeed,

like DR 2-105(A) (2), one of the rules at issue in R.M.J.

limited the fields of practice that a lawyer might list.

The lawyer in that case was charged, inter alia, with

publishing ads that listed fields other than those per-

mitted by the Advisory Committee of the Missouri Su-

preme Court, but the Advisory Committee was unable to

suggest any substantial interest promoted by the limita-

tion. This Court concluded that the limitation was “an

invalid restriction upon speech as applied to [the law-

yer’s] advertisement.” 455 U.S. at 205.

Here neither the Committee nor the Iowa court has

suggested any substantial interest promoted by the rule’s

prohibition against communicating truthful, non-deceptive

information not “specifically permitted” by rule. The

only asserted justification for this approach is that the

rule permits all “relevant” information to be conveyed;

but the rule precludes lawyers from advertising informa-

tion that is indisputably “relevant” 7; and in any event |

the state has no substantial interest in suppressing “ir-

relevant” information. It is the very essence of paternal-

ism for the state to decide what a consumer “needs to

know” to make an informed decision. As the ABA has /

atu iene nen.

17 As the dissent observed, the Iowa rules do not permit lawyers

to include in their advertisements “such matters as statutes of

limitation, the early filing requirements of [Iowa’s] tort claims act,

and the problems of uninformed releases of claims.” (App. 22a.)

ee OE NT

17

observed, moreover, there is no reason to suppose “that

the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information

that the public would regard as relevant.” (See p. 9,

n.14, above.) 7®

Because the rule is both irrational and contrary to

this Court’s decisions, the Iowa court’s judgment uphold-

ing and enforcing it should not be allowed to stand.

2. The Ads Here Were Not Potentially Misleading

Humphrey and Haas also seek review of the lowa

court’s conclusion that, “in the medium defendants chose,”

their ads were potentially misleading with respect to fees

and quality of service. First, the court offered no sup-

port for its conclusion that the ads might “mislead people

into believing that pursuing the listed cases is a cost-free

venture” (App. lla), nor any explanation for its view

that television was responsible for this supposed decep-

tion. Moreover, as the dissent observed (App. 19a-20a),

the Iowa rules themselves do not “require disclaimers or

explanations tv avoid false hopes,” R.M.J., supra, 455

U.S. at 200 n.11, where percentage rates are advertised.

With respect to any apprehension that the ads were poten-

tially misleading, “we deal with a silent record.” Jd. at

206.*° For the Iowa court to enjoin the ads as potentially

misleading on this ground violated the First Amendment.

18To the extent that the Iowa court’s holding rested on the

supposition that some members of the audience might be irritated

by dramatized ads, such a supposition could not support the chal-

lenged restriction. Viewers who encounter ads they dislike “may

‘effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply

by averting their eyes.’” Consolidated Edison Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S.

530, 542 (1980) (citation omitted); Bolger, supra, 103 S. Ct. at

2883. They may leave the room, change the channel, shut off the

volume, or turn off the set.

19 As the dissent observed, “any lack of understanding about this

matter, or any other matter relevant to the terms of a lawyer’s

employment, would logically be resolved at the initial conference,

which, in this case, was advertised as being free of cost.” (App.

20a.) See Bates, supra, 433 U.S. at 373 n.28.

18

Second, nothing in the ads overstated Humphrey and

Haas’s qualifications in the fields of practice they listed,

and the Iowa court did not explain how they did. At

most, the ads implied that they were qualified in those

fields, and, as the dissent noted, “there is no evidence,

nor even a claim, that they were in fact not qualified.”

(App. 20a.)*° Offering no discussion, the majority merely

speculated that—because of “the medium defendants

chose”—viewers might think Humphrey and Haas more

able than they are. (App. lla.) Its conclusion that the ads

were potentially misleading in this respect was wholly

unsupported, and to enjoin the ads on this ground vio-

lated the First Amendment.**

Third, wholly apart from the First Amendment ob-

stacles to the Iowa court’s conclusion that the ads were

potentially misleading, it plainly violated due process for

the court to enjoin them on this ground. The Commit-

tee’s complaint did not allege that the ads were mislead-

ing in any respect, and it presented no evidence on these

matters at the hearing before the commissioner. It first

raised these claims in its brief to the Iowa court, ob-

* Humphrey, a 1979 Drake Law School graduate, had been

editor-in-chief of the law review and had clerked for a federal

magistrate during law school. Haas, also a 1979 Drake Law School

graduate, was also on the law review and served as student bar

president. As of the summer of 1983, the two lawyers (who had

formed their firm in November 1980) had handled or were handling

over 150 personal injury cases, in addition to their workers’ com-

pensation cases.

21 Even if the First Amendment had permitted the Iowa court

to conclude on this record that the ads were potentially misleading

with respect to fees or quality, the proper remedy would have been

to require appropriate disclaimers. As this Court has repeatedly

stressed, “the preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than

less.” R.M.J., supra, 455 U.S. at 201.

19

viously groping for some solid basis for the relief

it had requested. Thus, this was not even a case in

which “the charges are amended on the basis of .. .

testimony” adduced during a trial (see Jn re Ruffalo,

890 U.S. 544, 551 (1968)); it is a case in which the

charges are amended after the trial because the hearing

produced no evidence to support the state’s claims. But

it has long been settled that “the right to a hearing em-

braces not only the right to present evidence but also a

reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the op-

posing party and to meet them.” Morgan v. United

States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1988). This requirement is

doubly important in this context, where there must be

record support for a finding that an ad is misleading.

R.M.J., supra, 455 U.S. at 202, 205-07. The Iowa

court’s judgment therefore violated due process.

C. The Ban on “Dramatic” Voices and

“Self-Laudatory” Statements

The Iowa court sustained DR 2-101’s ban on “dramatic”

voices without analysis; to it, the meaning of the term

is “commonly understood,” and therefore DR 2-101’s ban

could not be condemned as vague. Humphrey and Haas

submit that the court was wrong. A ban on the use of

“dramatic” voices is inherently vague, for there is no

voice that cannot be considered “dramatic,” and no prin-

cipled basis for distinguishing between the voice that is

“dramatic” and a voice that is not. Indeed, by prohibit-

ing a lawyer from speaking in his own television ads,

the rule requires a lawyer to employ an actor if he

desires to have his message heard; and it is hard to

22 See also Thompson Vv. City of Louisville, 8362 U.S. 199, 204-06

(1960).

20

imagine how an actor’s voice could be regarded as any-

thing other than “dramatic.”

No test of intonation or other criterion is provided by

the rule for determining when a voice is “dramatic,” and

the rule’s proscription is thus a recipe for arbitrary and

discriminatory treatment of lawyers who advertise on

television. This case is a perfect illustration. There was

no shouting in the ads in question; there were no his-

trionics. The ads involved actors playing everyday people,

speaking in everyday language about everyday needs, in

perfectly measured tones. If there was anything “dra-

matic” about their voices, neither the Committee nor the

Iowa Supreme Court explained what it was.*

Nor could Humphrey and Haas ever have suspected

that the ads would be deemed “self-laudatory.” Their

ads made no claim as to the quality of their services, did

not recite their credentials (although the rules permit

credentials to be listed), and did not claim or suggest

that the firm would render better service than other

firms. If these ads were “self-laudatory,” then all ads

are “self-laudatory,” and the ban on “self-laudatory”

statements amounts to a ban on all ads. Applied to

enjoin these ads on the ground that they contain “self-

laudatory” statements in violation of DR 2-101(A), the

rule is impermissibly vague—equivalent to the blanket

advertising prohibitions held impermissible by Bates and

its progeny.

23 Humphrey and Haas maintain that a ban on “dramatic” voices

would be constitutionally infirm even if it were possible to define

the term clearly, for the state has shown no substantial interest in

suppressing voices merely because they are “dramatic.” (See p. 18,

above.)

21

CONCLUSION

Probable jurisdiction should be noted and either the

judgment should be summarily reversed or the appeal

should be set for briefing and argument on the merits.

Respectfully submitted,

MARK W. BENNETT CHARLES A. HORSKY *

BABICH, BENNETT & DAVDD H. REMES

NICKERSON COVINGTON & BURLING

5835 Grand Ave. 1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Suite 202 P.O. Box 7566

Des Moines, Iowa 50312 Washington, D.C. 20044

CHARLEs S. SIMS (202) 662-6000

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES M. ANNE WILCOX

UNION FOUNDATION RALPH OGDEN

182 West 48d St. 227 Lamb Lane

New York, N.Y. 10036 Golden, Colo. 86401

Counsel for Appellants

January 17, 1985 * Counsel of Record

APPENDIX —

d 3 PW vw Tt a en eae

es GO TY foes

ALEXANDER (er

No. 84-

Ramnsnnshis ome

. = ——

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

MARK A. HUMPHREY AND FREDD P. HAAS

d/b/a HUMPHREY & HAAS,

Appellants,

V.

COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT

OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,

Appellee.

On Appeal from a Judgment of

the Iowa Supreme Court

APPENDIX TO

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

MARK W. BENNETT CHARLES A. HORSKY *

BABICH, BENNETT & DAviD H. REMES

NICKERSON COVINGTON & BURLING

5835 Grand Ave. 1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Suite 202 P.O. Box 7566

Des Moines, Iowa 50312 Washington, D.C. 20044

CHARLEs S. SIMS (202) 662-6000

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES M. ANNE WILCOX

UNION FOUNDATION RALPH OGDEN

132 West 43d St. 227 Lamb Lane

New York, N.Y. 10036 Golden, Colo. 80401

Counsel for Appellants

January 17, 1985 * Counsel of Record

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX A—Opinion of Iowa Supreme Court........

APPENDIX B—Notice of Appeal -..................2....::002-000

APPENDIX C—-Order Extending Time for Docketing

PD sects choaniesdieciibanindinrabbioueinieie isles

APPENDIX D—lIowa Code of Professional Responsi-

bility for Lawyers

Be eS II heaicindivenhccesaicissinizsbonaninninsnctitnansehinnensinns

DR 2-105: Description and Limitation of Practice..

APPENDIX E—Plaintiff’s Petition for Injunction....

APPENDIX F—Defendants’ Answer and Counter-

claim .. SN

APPENDIX G—Order of Sept. 14, 1982, Temporarily

Enjoining Airing of Ads ......................

APPENDIX H—Order of Sept. 28, 1982, Appointing

Commissioner to Conduct Evidentiary

| ee

APPENDIX I—Commissioner’s Report saussee Nov. 16,

1983) ...... os os

27a

28a

35a

4la

45a

5la

53a

55a

la

APPENDIX A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

167

69088

COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT

OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

VS.

MarK A. HUMPHREY, FREDD J. HAAS,

and JAMES E. GRITZNER, d/b/a

HUMPHREY, HAAS AND GRITZNER,

Defendants.

Filed September 19, 1984

Original action.

Proceeding to enjoin lawyers from airing certain tele-

vision advertisements. A counterclaim asks that our

advertising rule be declared unconstitutional. INJUNC-

TION ISSUED.

Nick Critelli of Critelli and Sherburne, Des Moines,

and Frank A. Comito of Comito and Capps, Des Moines,

for plaintiff.

Mark W. Bennett of Babich, Bennett & Nickerson, Des

Moines, and Wilcox & Ogden, Golden, Colorado, for de-

fendants.

Erwin G. Krasnow and Barry D. Umansky, Washing-

ton, D.C., for amici curiae, Iowa Broadcasters Associa-

tion and National Association of Broadcasters.

2a

John W. Carley, general counsel, and William W.

Jacobs, and Brenda W. Doubrava, Cleveland, Ohio, for

amicus curiae, Federal Trade Commission.

Considered en bance.

HARRIS, J.

Our rule on lawyer advertising expressly prohibits

television advertisements which contain background

sound, visual displays, more than a single, nondramatic

voice or self-laudatory statements. Believing the rule ex-

ceeded the standards outlined by the United States Su-

preme Court, defendant lawyers bought and aired tele-

vision advertisements in clear violation. of it. Plaintiff

committee then brought this original action before us to

enjoin the advertisements. Defendants answered and

counterclaimed, asking that the rule, to the extent of the

violation, be set aside as unconstitutional. We think the

rule passes constitutional muster ard order issuance of a

permanent injunction.

The factual background can be briefly stated. In Sep-

tember of 1982, Des Moines attorneys Mark A. Hum-

phrey, Fredd J. Haas, and James E. Gritzner, without

seeking prior permission, aired the advertisements over

a Des Moines television station for a three-day period.

‘hey had purchased the ads from a Denver corporation.

The ads were of three types. The first featured an

actor and actress portraying a physician and nurse in an

examination room. While the “nurse” looks at an X-ray,

the “physician” says:

We see first-hand injuries caused by the neglect

of others. If you’re seriously injured through the

negligence of others, you should be talking to a law-

yer. The choice of lawyer could be important.

That’s something to think about.

The second ad featured an actor portraying a printer

standing in front of a press. The “printer” says:

3a

I suffered loss of wages, incurred staggering medi-

cal bills, and endured pain and suffering all through

the negligence of others. I wasn’t aware of my legal

rights. I should have been talking to a lawyer.

The third featured actors portraying bowlers. The fol-

lowing conversation takes place at the lanes:

Bowler 1: I’ve got to throw like that today; we’re

one man short.

Bowler 2: He was injured through the negligence

of others.

Bowler 1: He should be talking to a lawyer.

Bowler 2: The choice of that lawyer will be

important.

Bowler 1: That’s something to think about.

In each of the advertisements, after the brief drama-

tization, the picture switches to a person portraying a

receptionist in a law office. The name, address, phone

number, and areas of practice of defendants’ law firm

are superimposed over the picture, and a voice says:

If you’re injured through the negligence of others,

call the law firm of Humphrey, Haas & Gritzner.

Cases involving auto accidents, work comp, serious

personal injury and wrongful death handled on a

percentage basis. No charge for initial consultation.

Call now at 288-0102.

The voice repeats the phone number twice.

The television station discontinued the advertisements

following a request from the ethics committee. The com-

mittee then commenced this action, requesting us to

enjoin defendants from using the ads because they violate

our professional canons DR 2-101 and DR 2-105. We

granted a temporary injunction.

4a

By answer and counterclaim, based on 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, defendants Humphrey and Haas,’ asserted that

DR 2-101 and DR 2-105 violate the first and fourteenth

amendments of the United States constitution. They

also asserted the phrase “nondramatic voice’ in DR

2-101(B) and the phrase “self-laudatory” in DR 2-101 (A)

are void for vagueness under the first and fourteenth

amendments.

In July 19838, an evidentiary hearing was held before

the Honorable C. Edwin Moore. We appointed senior

judge Moore as commissioner of this court to conduct the

hearing and summarize the evidence. The matter is be-

fore us on the record made before him.

Prior to 1977 Iowa’s canons of ethics, in common with

most such canons, strictly forbade lawyer advertising.

The prohibition for the most part was never questioned.

Indeed, prior to relatively recent times, the United States

Supreme Court viewed regulation of commercial speech

as tantamount to the regulation of a business activity:

wholly permissible and without the protection of the first

amendment. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62

S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed.2d 1262 (1942).

Commercial free speech, however, was recognized by

the court in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Con-

sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d

346 (1976). The right was first applied for lawyers in

Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 483 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct.

2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977), which held that no longer

could a state absolutely prohibit lawyer advertising. It

could only regulate it. The Bates opinion was later ex-

plained by the court in the case of Jn re R.M.J., 455 U.S.

191, 199-202, 102 S.Ct. 929, 935-37, 71 L.Ed.2d 64, 71-74

(1982) :

1Gritzner had withdrawn from the firm by this time and, in

October 1982, we dismissed the action as to him.

5a

The Bates Court held that ... lawyer advertising

was a form of commercial speech, protected by the

First Amendment and that ‘advertising’ by attor-

neys may not be subject to blanket suppression.

[Citing Bates]

More specifically, the Bates Court held that law-

yers must be permitted to advertise the fees they

charge for certain ‘routine’ legal services. The court

concluded that this sort of press advertising was not

‘inherently’ misleading, and therefore could not be

prohibited on that basis. The court also rejected a

number of other justifications for broad restrictions

on advertising including the potential adverse effect

of advertising on professionalism, on the administra-

tion of justice, and on the cost and quality of the

legal services, as well as the difficulties of enforcing

standards short of an outright prohibition. None of

these interests was found to be sufficiently strong or

sufficiently affected by lawyer advertising to justify

a prohibition.

But the decision in Bates nevertheless was a nar-

row one. The Court emphasized that advertising by

lawyers still could be regulated. False, deceptive, or

misleading advertising remains subject to restraint,

and the court recognized that advertising by the

professions poses special risks of deception—‘[B]e-

cause the public lacks sophistication concerning legal

services, misstatements that might be overlooked or

deemed unimportant and other advertising may be

found quite inappropriate in legal advertising.’

[Citing Bates] The Court suggested that claims as

to quality or in-person solicitation might be so likely

to mislead as to warrant restriction. And the Court

noted that a warning or disclaimer might be appro-

priately required, even in the context of advertising

as to price, in order to dissipate the possibility of

consumer confusion or deception. ‘[T]he bar retains

6a

the power to correct omissions that have the effect

of presenting an inaccurate picture, [although] the

preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than

less. [Citing Bates]

In short, although the Court in Bates was not per-

suaded that price advertising for ‘routine’ services

was necessarily or inherently misleading, and al-

though the Court was not receptive to other justifi-

cations for restricting such advertising, it did not by

any means foreclose restrictions on potentially or

demonstrably misleading advertising. Indeed, the

Court recognized the special possibilities for decep-

tion presented by advertising for professional serv-

ices. The public’s comparative lack of knowledge,

the limited ability of the professions to police them-

selves, and the absence of any standardization in the

‘product’? renders advertising for professional serv-

ices especially susceptible to abuses that the States

have legitimate interest in controlling.

Thus, the Court has made clear in Bates and

subsequent cases that regulation—and imposition of

discipline—are permisssible where the particular ad-

vertising is inherently likely to deceive or where the

record indicates that a particular form or method of

advertising has in fact been deceptive. Jd.

Other cases, in which the court considered restrictions

on lawyer advertising, were In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,

98 S.Ct. 1898, 56 L.Ed.2d 417 (1978) (political expres-

sion or association by lawyer working for American

Civil Liberties Union called for “exacting scrutiny appli-

cable to limitations on core first amendment rights” in

reviewing lawyer solicitation rule) and Ohralik v. Ohio

State Bar Association, 486 U.S. 447, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56

L.Ed.2d 444 (1978) (lower level of judicial scrutiny

required for rule prohibiting in-person solicitation by

lawyer).

7a

To summarize the foregoing cases, the court set aside,

as a special category, advertising which is misleading or

which experience has proved to be inherently misleading.

Commercial speech in this category can be appropriately

restricted. Misleading advertising can be prohibited.

Other lawyer a'‘vertising can be regulated if the state

first demonstrates a compelling interest. But any restric-

tions must be narrowly drawn, and the state may regu-

late only to the extent regulation furthers substantial

state interest.

Commercial free speech challenges to advertising rules

are to be reviewed under the four-part analysis specified

in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm’n, 447

U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2348, 2351, 65 L.Ed.2d 341, 351

(1980). As we shall point out, a special problem is rec-

ognized in advertising by way of the electronic media.

We took some care in responding to the Bates opinion.

We asked the ethics committee’ to conduct public hear-

ings, to investigate the matter of lawyer advertising, and

to file with us a report with recommended advertising

rules fcr the profession. After hearings and considerable

study, the committee filed its report with us on January

18, 1980. Following our own extended study and consid-

eration, we entered an order on May 6, 1980, which in

effect adopted the committee’s report and recommenda-

tions.

Despite objection voiced before the committee and

later carefully considered by us, the rules contain the

provision challenged here. DR 2-101 specifies in consider-

able detail what advertising is and is not prohibited.

DR 2-101(A) generally prohibits:

2 The committee on professional ethics and conduct of the Iowa

state bar association. Seven lawyer members of the committee are

appointed, subject to our confirmation, by the Iowa state bar as-

sociation. We appoint two lay members of the committee. See

Iowa Court Rule 118.2.

8a

[A]ny form of public communication which contains

a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-

laudatory or unfair statement, which contains any

statement or claim relating to the quality of...

legal services, which appeals to the emotions, prej-

udices, or likes and dislikes of a person, or which

contains any claim that is not verifiable ....

DR 2-101(B) separately deals with newspapers or

periodicals, telephone directories, radio, and television.

The rule lists 19 items thought to be useful to the public

(names, fields of practice, office and telephone answering

service hours, hourly fee rate, fixed fees, range of fees

for specific legal services, date ana place of bar admis-

sions, various licenses and memberships, ete.). Only the

listed items may be communicated to the public. As to

television advertising the rule provides:

The same information, ir words and numbers only,

articulated by a single non-dramatie voice, not that

of the lawyer, and with no other background sound,

may be communicated on television. In the case of

television, no visual display shall be allowed except

that allowed in print as articulated by the an-

nouncer. All such communications on radio and tele-

vision, to the extent possible, shall be made only in

the geographical area in which the lawyer maintains

offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer’s

clientele resides. Any such information shall be

presented in a dignified manner....

I. Our advertis..i1g rule encompasses the “safe harbor”

concept. The listed items may be communicated by the

manner specified. A lawyer who feels constrained by the

rules may petition to have them changed. The commit-

tee, as our commissioner acting on its own motion or

upon the request of any Iowa lawyer, is to consider pro-

posed amendments to the advertisement rules. See DR

2-101(D). Any recommended changes are to be consid-

9a

ered by us and a prompt appeal to us is provided from

the committee’s rejection of requested changes. Id.

This proceeding, of course, is no such appeal. Rather

than proposing rule changes which would authorize their

television advertisements, defendants chose to violate the

rule and defend their violation by challenging its con-

stitutionality. Accordingly, we are dealing only with the

rule’s constitutionality, not with its wisdom. It should be

scarcely necessary to point out that any lawyer asserting

the wisdom of a rule change, should present the proposal

to the committee under the procedure we have provided.

The professional disciplinary system would be in utter

chaos if violations could be defended on the ground the

lawyer involved could think of a better rule.

Because the challenge is limited to its constitutional

basis, we have set aside a number of criticisms that go

only to the wisdom of the rule.

II. The United States Supreme Court seems not to

have specifically addressed the use of sound, visual dis-

plays, and dramatization, but seems to clearly have rec-

ognized the electronic use of those devices as potentially

misleading. It has referred to the “special problems” of

television advertising:

[T]he special problems of advertising on the elec-

tronic broadcast media will warrant special consid-

eration. Cf. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell;

333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. 1971), aff’d sub nom. Capital

Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405

U.S. 1000, 31 L.2d 472, 92 S.Ct. 1289 (1972).3

8 The case cited by the Court coutains the following statement:

The fact is that there are significant differences between the

electronic media and print. As the court noted in Banzhaf

[v. F.C.C., 182 U.S. App. D.C. 14, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01

(1968), cert. den., 396 U.S. 842], written messages are not

communicated unless they are read, and reading requires an

affirmative act. Broadcast messages, in contrast, are ‘in the

air’. In an age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely breathes

10a

Bates, 483 U.S. at 384, 97 S.Ct. at 2709, 53 L.Ed.2d at

836.

In several cases, the court has described the broadcast

media as uniquely pervasive or intrusive. Federal Com-

munications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.

726, 748, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3039, 57 i..Ed.2d 1673, 1093

(1978) (“the broadcast media has established a uniquely

pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.’’) ;

Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Na-

tional Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 127, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2098,

36 L.Ed.2d 772, 798 (1973) (“viewers constitute a ‘cap-

tive audience.’”’) ; Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,

453 U.S. 490, 501, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 2889, 69 L.Ed.2d 800,

811 (1981) (“Each method of communicating ideas is ‘a

law unto itself’? and that law must reflect the ‘differing

natures, values, abuses, and dangers’ of each method.”’)

It is in view of these “special problems” that the com-

mittee argues two ways in which it feels the public

might be misled* by defendant’s television ads. First,

a citizen who does not know some part of a leading cigarette

jingle by heart. ... It is difficult to calculate the subliminal

impact of this pervasive propaganda, which may be heard even

if not listened to, but it may reasonably be thought greater

than the impact of the written word.

Capital Broadcasting Co., 333 F. Supp. at 586.

*The proposed model rule of professional conduct 7.1 defines a

“false or misleading’? communication as follows:

A communication is false or misleading if it:

(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law,

or omits a fact necessary to make the statement con-

sidered as a whole not materially misleading;

(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about

results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies

that the lawyer can achieve results by means that

violate the rules of professional conduct or other law;

or

(c) compares the lawyer’s services with other lawyers’

services, unless the comparison can be factually sub-

stantiated.

|

lla

the ad states that certain cases are handled on a percent-

age basis and there is no other charge for initial con-

sultation. The committee thinks these statements mis-

lead people into believing that pursuing the listed cases

is a cost-free venture. It points out that the ads are

“conspicuously” silent with regard to payment of expert

witness fees and of other costs of litigation. The com-

mittee asserts defendants, like the defendant in Ohralik

v. Ohio State Bar Association, 486 U.S. at 467, 98 S.Ct.

at 1924, 56 L.Ed.2d at 461, used the contingency fee as

a lure:

He emphasized that his fee would come out of the

recovery, thereby tempting the young women with

what sounded like a cost-free and therefore irresist-

ible offer.

The second way the committee thinks defendant’s ads

are misleading stems from the statements which are

thought to be self-laudatory comment on the advertisers’

expertise. The committee argued that the firm’s experi-

ence did not match their representation:

Defendants had little in the way of experience when

the commercials were broadcast. After graduation

from law school, Mr. Humphrey had tried six cases,

the nature of which are unknown, all while under

the supervision of another Des Moines law firm.

Mr. Haas had virtually no trial experience. To-

gether, defendants Humphrey and Haas had only

tried one case.

Without suggesting that the advertisements here were

deceitful, we do agree with the committee that, in the

medium defendants chose, the public could well be misled

by them. We think the situation is exactly what the

United States supreme court had in mind when it re-

ferred to the “special problems” in electronic media

advertising. We think the challenged rule falls clearly

within the area left to us by the Bates opinion.

12a

The court has said that the state can regulate those

types of advertising which result in instrusion, intimida-

tion, overreaching, or undue influence. See Ohralik, 436

U.S. at 462, 98 S.Ct. at 1921, 56 L.Ed.2d at 457. A

state can regulate advertisements which are inherently

likely to deceive, or which the experience has proven to

be subject to abuse. See R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 202-03, 102

S.Ct. at 937, 71 L.Ed.2d at 73-74.

The court in Bates condemned those advertising rules

which amounted to restrictions on the flow of “relevant

information needed to reach an informed decision.”

Bates, 483 U.S. at 874, 97 S.Ct. at 2704, 53 L.Ed.2d at

829-30. The committee’s position is that the Bates rationale

does not apply to irrelevant information. Information is

not relevant if it makes no contribution to informed deci-

sion making. In other words, prohibition of such in-

formation does not impede, and in fact advances, the

fostering of rational decision making and maintaining of

the bar’s professionalism.

We think the ads here would not aid the public in

making the informed decision which is subject to the

protection recognized in Bates. This was the holding in

Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 521 F. Supp.

1219, 1229 (S.D. Iowa 1981), which rejected a similar

challenge to our rule, as it relates to television adver-

tising.

The gist of the Bishop holding, as we understand, is

that electronic promotional advertising can be prohibited.

This was our understanding when we considered and

adopted our advertising rule. It is no insult to the ad-

vertising industry, or to the electronic media, to believe

that, when their efforts are combined on behalf of a law-

yer, a line can and should be drawn between what in-

forms the public and what promotes the lawyer. We

thought the cases we have discussed allowed, even

encouraged, us to draw such a line and we carefully

13a

tried to draw it in such a way that the public would be

informed and not misled. We think the rule is constitu-

tional.

III. It is perhaps unnecessary, under our analysis, to

explore the state interests involved. We do think the

state interests in the challenged provisions of the rule

are substantial. One such interest was recognized in

Bates: fostering rational, intelligent, and voluntary deci-

sion making in determining the need for legal services

and selecting a lawyer. Bates, 483 U.S. at 377, 97 S.Ct.

at 2705, 58 L.Ed.2d at 881. See also R.M.J., 55 U.S. at

200-01, 101 S.Ct. at 936, 71 L.Ed.2d at 72-73. We think

the rule directly advances the state interest by aiding the

citizen in making an intelligent selection of counsel.

IV. We reject defendants’ contention that the prohibi-

tion against background sound, visual displays, multiple

dramatic statements, and self-laudatory statements is

more extensive than necessary to serve the state inter-

ests. All that is prohibited are the tools which would

manipulate the viewer’s mind and will.

Neither do we agree with defendants’ criticism of

what they call our “laundry list” approach. We specifi-

cally allowed dissemination of all information necessary

to assist the public in seeking and selecting counsel. As

previously mentioned, a procedure is in place for consid-

ering any suggested additions of useful information.

Neither do we find merit in defendants’ vagueness

defense. In their brief, defendants fail to mention why

they believe “nondramatic voice” and “self-laudatory”

are vague phrases. In its amicus brief, however, F.T7.C.

asserts that all advertisements are, to some degree, self-

laudatory, and that all defendants’ ads are no more self-

laudatory than the information allowed under the rule.

The commissioner also fears the prohibition against

“self-laudatory” statements sets up an inherently subjec-

l4a

tive standard that can result in inconsistent treatment of

identical conduct.

We explained the vagueness standard in Incorporated

City of Denison v. Clabaugh, 306 N.W.2d 748, 751-52

(1981) :

A civil statute is unconstitutionally vague under

the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment

of the United States constitution when its language

does not convey a sufficiently definite warning of

proscribed conduct, when measured by common un-

derstanding or practice. [Authority.] Thus, when

persons must necessarily guess at the meaning of

the statute and its applicability, the statute is un-

constitutionally vague. [Authority.] However, ‘[a]

statute is not vague when the meaning of the words

used can be fairly ascertained by reference to simi-

lar statutes, other judicial determinations, refer-

enced common law, or to the dictionary, or if the

words themselves have a common and generally

accepted meaning.’ State v. Donner, 2438 N.W.2d

850, 853 (Iowa 1976).

“Nondramatic voice” is a simple phrase which we

think is commonly understood. The dictionary meaning

of “laudatory” is “expressing praise.” Websters New

International Dictionary, third ed. (1964). The terms

are not vague.

It is unnecessary to discuss defendants’ counterclaim

which asks that we declare our rule to be unconstitu-

tional. Because we find that the rule withstands defend-

ants’ constitutional challenge, we order that a writ issue,

restraining defendants from continuing to place the ad-

vertisements.

WRIT ISSUED.

All justices concur except Larson and McCormick, JJ.,

who dissent.

— —

—

l5a

LARSON, J. (dissenting).

I believe the laundry list of allowable advertising con-

tent is unnecessarily restrictive because it prohibits dis-

semination of basic information necessary for an in-

formed judgment about the selection of an attorney and

the protection of basic legal rights. As to the restric-

tions on technique, these are in fact a prescription for

dullness, prohibiting all background music, dramatiza-

tion, and other methods of stimulating viewer interest.

It is undisputed that the effect of these limitations on

technique is to substantially diminish the effectiveness

of any television advertising. The combined effect of the

rules is to inhibit dissemination of relevant information

without a showing of a substantial state interest. This

violates the free speech clause of the first amendment.

As the outset, we as lawyers must accept the reality

that despite this perceived assault on the “professional-

ism” of the bar, and despite the exemption of commercial

speech previously existing, lawyer advertising is here,

and it is here in constitutional dimensions. It is here

because of the Supreme Court interpretation of the free

speech clause of the first amendment of the United

States Constitution in both Bates v. State Bar of Ari-

zona, 4383 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 538 L.Ed.2d 810

(1977) and In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 102 S.Ct. 929,

71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982).

First amendment protection of commercial speech,

while not as extensive as that accorded other forms of

speech, is nevertheless broad in its reach, and the prin-

ciples to be applied are quite straightforward. Central

Hudson sets forth the four-part test we must apply:

(1) Do the ads concern an unlawful activity, or

are they misleading? If the answer to either ques-

tion is in the affirmative, first amendment protection

is not allowed. If the answers to both questions are

in the negative, the following tests apply:

l6a

(2) Is the governmental interest, asserted

through these disciplinary rules, substantial?

(3) Does this regulation directly advance that

governmental interest?

(4) Is the regulation more extensive than neces-

sary to serve that interest?

See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv-

ice Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2848, 2351,

65 L.Ed.2d 341, 351 (1980).

Although the majority recognizes the Central Hudson

test, the opinion does not make it clear whether first

amendment protection is unavailable for the defendant’s

advertisements because they are “misleading” under the

first segment of the test or whether there is a substan-

tial state interest which is directly advanced by those

regulations under steps two and three of the Central

Hudson test. I believe the majority is on shaky ground

under either approach.

I. Are the Advertisements “Misleading.”

It is interesting to note that the Committee’s own

expert, Dr. Haynes, testified the ads were not in fact

misleading, and that his survey group, which had actu-

ally viewed the ads, agreed. The Committe’s argument

that they are deceitful is, in fact, an argument that they

might mislead the viewer with respect to possible respon-

sibility for court costs and with respect to the extent of

the experience of Humphrey and Haas, which the Com-

mittee argues is minimal.

The majority specifically concludes that the chance of

deceit is sufficient to deny first amendment protection

“({wlithout suggesting that the advertisements here were

deceitful” because “in the medium defendants chose [tele-

vision] the public could well be misled by them.” It

improvises on the four-prong test of Central Hudson by

17a

saying that because television is the medium, a mere

chance of deceit is sufficient. That theory, however, is

not suggested in Central Hudson nor in any other case.

The majority draws support for this theory solely

from language taken from Bates which, the majority

says “seems to clearly have recognized the electronic use

of [sound, visual displays, and dramatization] as poten-

tially misleading.” Bates, however, did not say there was

more potential for abuse in electronic advertising, only

that “the special problems of advertising on the elec-

tronic media will warrant special consideration.” Bates,

433 U.S. at 384, 97 S.Ct. at 2709, 54 L.Ed.2d at 836.

Neither Bates nor the case it cited on this issue even

mentioned any increased potential of the electronic

media for misleading the public. See Capital Broadcast-

ing Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. 1971), aff'd

sub nom, Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindiest, 405

U.S. 1000, 92 S.Ct. 1289, 31 L.Ed.2d 472 (1972). Cap-

ital Broadcasting illustrates the sort of “special prob-

lems” referred to in Bates in connection with television

advertising. Capital Broadcasting justified a different

rule for television advertising, not because it was likely

to be misleading, but because it was nonselective. In

effect, television was thought to be reaching too large an

audience; children, who were being exposed to intensive

cigarette advertising, were considered likely to be ad-

versely affected by it.

Television advertising by lawyers; on the other hand,

cannot be considered objectionable merely because tele-

vision is nonselective, and the rationale of Capital Broad-

casting is inapposite. Yet, the majority seizes on Bates’

“special problems” language used in connection with the

Court’s reference to Capital Broadcasting as authority

for its broad assertion of power in restricting television

advertising. I do not think this language of Bates was

intended to grant such a broad exercise of state power.

I believe the Supreme Court has actually made it clear

that regardless of the medium used, advertising must be

18a

more than “possibly” misleading in order to be denied

first amendment protection. In Jn re R.M.J., 455 US.

191, 102 S.Ct. 929, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982), the Court

addressed the matter of untruthful advertising:

[T]he Court has made clear in Bates and subsequent

cases that regulation—and imposition of discipline—

are permissible where the particular advertising is

inherently likely to deceive or where the record indi-

cates that a particular form or method of advertis-

ing has in fact been deceptive.

Id. at 202, 102 S.Ct. at 937, 71 L.Ed.2d at 73-74. (Em-

phasis added. )

A further indication that more than a possibility of

deceit would be required is found in R.M.J.’s discussion

of two prior cases in which first amendment protection

was denied for professional advertising or solicitation.

In discussing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436

U.S. 447, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978), the

R.M.J. Court said “the possibility of ‘fraud, undue influ-

ence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of

vexatious conduct’ was so likely in the context of in-

person solicitation” that such solicitation could be pro-

hibited. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 202, 102 S.Ct. at 987 L.Ed.

2d at 74. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, in discussing

Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 887, 59 L.Ed.

2d 100 (1979), the Court noted that first amendment

protection on the use of trade names by Texas optome-

trists could be prohibited “in view of the considerable his-

tory in Texas of deception and abuse worked upon the

consuming public through the use of trade names.”

R.M.J., 455 U.S at 202, 102 S.Ct. at 937, 71 L.Ed.2d at

74. (Emphasis added.)

The Court in R.M.J., after discussing Ohralik and

Friedman, summarized the rule: “[W]hen the particular

content or method of the advertising suggests that it is

ae,

19a

inherently misleading or when experience has proven that

in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the states

may impose appropriate restrictions.” R.M.J., 455 U.S.

at 203, 102 S.Ct. at 987, 71 L.Ed.2d at 74. R.M.J.

involved printed advertising. There is no indication that

a different rule would apply to television advertising, yet

the Committee does not even attempt to meet the test.

Even if I were to accept the plaintiff’s possibility-

of-deceit argument, which I do not, I believe the record

here still falls short of establishing any reasonable likeli-

hood that this would happen.

The majority points to two aspects of the advertise-

ments which it claims “might well be” misleading:

(1) the statement that certain cases will be handled “on

a percentage” basis without mention of court costs might

be construed as an offer of “cost-free” services according

to the majority; and (2) the advertisements could be

construed as a claim of expertise by Humphrey and

Haas which in fact is belied by their lack of actual

experience.

As to the cost issue, it is true the advertisements state

that fees will be assessed on “a percentage basis” (with-

out stating a percentage rate) but do not mention court

costs. To require a statement concerning costs, however,

would go beyond our own advertising rules, which merely

require it in the event the ad specifies a contingent fee

rate. Even then the advertisement is merely required to

disclose “whether percentages are computed before or

after deduction of costs.” See DR 2-101(C). Here, the

defendants represent no contingency rate at all, only that

the fee would be “a percentage.” Significantly, also, DR

2-101(C) allows a lawyer to advertise “[f]ixed fees or

range of fees for specific legal services” without a caveat

about costs, despite the fact that many of the “specific

legal services” listed, such as dissolutions, bankruptcies,

and several real estate services, would necessarily involve

either court costs or recording fees.

20a

The Supreme Court, moreover, has apparently not con-

sidered a cost caveat to be necessary for a full disclosure

on fees. See, e.g., In re R. M. J., 455 US. at 194, n.3,

102 S. Ct. at 933, n.8, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 68, n.3 (fees for

“routine” legal services may be advertised; no mention of

court costs).

As a practical matter, the subject of court costs, af-

fected by the extent of discovery and a myriad of other

factors, is so complex as to make it impractical to explain

in a thirty-second advertisement. (Testimony showed a

thirty-second ad to consist of only about sixty words).

Furthermore, any lack of understanding about this mat-

ter, or any other matter relevant to the terms of a law-

yer’s employment, would logically be resolved at the ini-

tial conference, which, in this case, was advertised as

being free of cost. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 373, n.28, 97

S. Ct. at 2704, n.28, 538 L. Ed.2d at 829, n.28 (1977).

I believe the majority’s conclusion that the advertise-

ments overstated the lawyers’ qualifications is also with-

out support in the evidence. While the record revealed

that these were young lawyers just developing a law prac-

tice, there is no evidence, nor even a claim, that they

were in fact not qualified. While they lacked the experi-

ence of many older lawyers, they did have some experience

in each of the areas listed, and the evidence showed they

possessed above average academic qualifications. The

Committee and the majority seem to equate qualification

with experience, and there is simply no direct correlation.

I believe the claim that this could “well be” false and

misleading is plainly without support.

II. The Public Interest Argument.

If advertising concerns a lawful activity and is not

misleading under the Central Hudson test, a state may

restrict only if (1) the governmental interest is substan-

tial; (2) the regulation directly advances that govern-

mental interest; and (3) the restriction is no more ex-

2la

tensive than necessary to serve that interest. Central

Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S. Ct. at 2350, 65 L. Ed.

2d at 351. I believe the restrictions imposed in this case

fail that test because the Committee has not made the

necessary showing of a substantial state interest.

The majority concludes that the state-interest issue is

only secondary, stating “[i]t is perhaps unnecessary, un-

der our anxlysis, to explore the state interests involved.”

The “analysis” which the majority says makes it unnec-

essary to address the issue is apparently that the adver-

tisements are actually misleading under the first prong

of the Central Hudson test, therefore not subject to any

first amendment protection regardless of « supporting

state interest. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563, 100

S. Ct. at 2350, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 349.

As I have already noted, however, the ads are not even

claimed to be actually misleading, and any risk of pos-

sible misleading is minimal—certainly not sufficient to

justify denial of first amendment protection without even

considering the state interest. I believe, in fact, analysis

of the state interest is the pivotal issue in this case.

What is that interest? The majority ident**es only one

in support of the restrictive rules: “fostering rational,

intelligent, and voluntary decision making in determining

the need for legal services and selecting a lawyer,” citing

Bates and R. M. J.

It is interesting, however, that both Bates and R. M. J.

used this language to expand the scope of lawyer adver-

tising, not to throttle it.

Moreover, there is a strong state interest in what is

essentially a by-product of attorney advertising. This is

the need for members of the public to be informed about

the nature of their legal rights and the means of pursuing

them. As the Supreme Court has said, it would be un-

usual to meet the need for more informed judgments by

reducing the scope of available information:

22a

Advertising does not provide a complete foundation

on which to select an attorney. But it seems peculiar

to deny the consumer, on the ground that the infor-

mation is incomplete, at least some of the relevant

information needed to reach an informed decision.

. Moreover, the argument assumes that the public

is not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations

of advertising, and that the public is better kept in

ignorance than trusted with correct but incomplete

information. We suspect the argument rests on an

underestimation of the public. In any event, we

view as dubious any justification that is based on

for benefits of public ignorance.

Bates, 433 U.S. at 374-75, 97 S. Ct. at 2704, 538 L. Ed. 2d

at 829-30. In providing information for the formation

of an informed judgment, it seems to me that it is prefer-

able to provide an excess of information, rather than too

little. Viewers are sophisticated enough to accept or re-

ject it as they see fit.

Broad areas of information necessary to an informed

judgment are prohibited by our rules. In the present case,

the advertisements inform the viewer that, if one is hurt

through the negligence of others, he should see a lawyer

and imply that recovery for losses might be obtained. One

advertisement points out that legal rights may be lost by

failure to talk to a lawyer. These and many other types

of information including, most obviously, such matters as

statutes of limitation, the early filing requirements of our

tort claims act, and the problems of uninformed releases

of claims are all of great importance to an informed de-

cision of the viewer. Yet these, and all other items of

general information on the rights of litigants are pro-

hibited by the rules, because they are not included in the

“laundry list” of contents.

I believe the state interest served by this type of in-

forination far outweighs any interest in denying it. Bates

and R. M. J. make it clear that present methods of de-

a ee

:

23a

livering legal services are ineffective. In Bates, the court

said:

The absence of advertising may be seen to reflect the

profession’s failure to reach out and serve the com-

munity: Studies reveal that many persons do not ob-

tain counsel even when they perceive a need because

of the feared price of services or because of an in-

ability to locate a competent attorney. Indeed,

cynicism with regard to the profession may be cre-

ated by the fact that it long has publicly eschewed

advertising, while condoning the actions of the at-

torney who structures his social or civic associations

so as to provide contacts with potential clients.

Id. at 370-71, 97 S. Ct. at 2702, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 827-28.

American Bar Association statistics cited in Bates show

that the “middle 70% of our population is not being

reached or served adequately by the [legal] profession.”

Id. at 376, 97 S. Ct. at 2705, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 831.

In Iowa, a recent study shows that there is only one

Legal Services Corporation lawyer for each 8700 eligible

recipients. Equal Access to Services Study, Legal Serv-

ices Corporation of Iowa (1984). Moreover, many of the

traditional points of contact between lawyers and poten-

tial clients, such as the country club or Rotary Club are

simply not viable sources of preliminary legal informa-

tion for a great segment of our population.

I believe the thrust of the Rule 2-101 laundry list

largely misses the point of public information. What

difference does it make to potential litigants when the

lawyer was born, the legal fraternities, societies or bar

association of which the lawyer is a member (especially

since membership usually is not based on any required

level of professional competency) or whether the lawyer

has had military service? This is relatively unimportant

information, in view of the possibility that litigants might

lose their claims, through lack of information, to a statute

24a

of limitation or other legal impediment as to which they

remain ignorant.

I believe our rules, insofar as they ban advertising

which is false or misleading, are valid. This is basically

the model rule of the American Bar Association’? and the

rule of most states. Beyond that, I believe the additional

restrictions of our rules fail the state interest test and

are therefore invalid.

I believe, moreover, that the model rule illustrates the

“less restrictive’ means of control alluded to in Central

Hudson, and that the Committee has failed to show that

they would not be effective here. For that additional

reason, I believe the restrictions imposed here fail the test

of constitutionality.

I would dissolve the injunction and grant judgment for

the defendants on their counterclaim.

McCormick, J., joins this dissent.

1RULE 7.1 Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services

A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about

the lawyer or the lawyer’s services. A communication is false or

misleading if it: .

(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or

omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered

as a whole not materially misleading;

(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results

the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the law-

yer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can

achieve results by means that violate the rules of pro-

fessional conduct or other law; or

(c) compares the lawyer’s services with other lawyers’ serv-

ices, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated.

25a

APPENDIX B

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 69088

COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT

OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MARK HUMPHREY, FREDD J. HAAS, and

JAMES E. GRITZNER, d/b/a HUMPHREY,

HAAS AND GRITZNER,

Defendants.

Mark A. HUMPHREY and FREDD J. HAAS,

individually and doing business as

HUMPHREY AND HAAS,

Counterclaimants,

vs.

COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT

OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,

Defendant to Counterclaim.

[Filed Nov. 19, 1984]

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

Notice is hereby given that Defendants,/Counterclaim-

ants, Mark A. Humphrey and Fredd J. Haas, individually

26a

and doing business as Humphrey and Haas, hereby appeal

to the Supreme Court of the United States from the final

judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa entered in this

action on September 19, 1984, upholding the constitu-

tionality of DR 2-101 of the Iowa Code of Professional

Responsibility for Lawyers, and permanently enjoining

Defendants/Counterclaimants from using television ad-

vertisements that violate that rule.

This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).

/s/ Mark W. Bennett

MARK W. BENNETT

Babich, Bennett & Nickerson

5835 Grand Avenue, Suite 202

Des Moines, Iowa 50312

515-274-3581

Attorney for Defendants/

Counterclaimants, Mark

A. Humphrey and Fredd J.

Hass, individually and doing

business as Humphrey and Haas

Original and two copies

filed; copies mailed to:

Frank A. Comito, Jr.

Attorney at Law

4701 University Avenue

Des Moines, Iowa 50311

Nick Critelli

Attorney at Law

500 United Central Bank Building

Des Moines, Iowa 50309

Attorneys for Plaintiff /

Defendant to Counterclaim

27a

| APPENDIX C

| SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. A-431

MARK A. HUMPHREY AND FREDD J. HAAS,

Appellants,

V.

COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT

OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

ORDER

UPON CONSIDERATION of the application of coun-

sel for the appellants,

IT IS ORDERED that the time for docketing an

appeal in the above-entitled cause be, and the same is

hereby, extended to and including 17 January, 1985.

/s/ Harry A. Blackmun

Associate Justice of the Supreme

Court of the United States

Dated this 6th

day of December 1984.

28a

APPENDIX D

Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers

DR 2-101 Publicity.

(A)

(B)

A lawyer shall not, on the lawyer’s own behalf or

that of a partner, associate or any other lawyer

affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm,

use, or participate in the use of, any form of pub-

lice communication which contains any false,

fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory

or unfair statements, which contains any state-

ments or claim relating to the quality of the law-

yer’s legal services, which appeals to the emo-

tions, prejudices, or likes or dislikes of a person,

or which contains any claim that is not verifiable;

nor shall the lawyer use or participate in the use

of any form of public communication, calculated

to attract clients for the lawyer’s pecuniary gain,

which contains any information not hereafter spe-

cifically permitted. In all communications under

DR 2-101 and DR 2-102 the lawyer may use re-

strained subjective characterizations of rates or

fees such as “reasonable,” “moderate,” and “very

reasonable,” but shall avoid all unrestrained sub-

jective characterizations of rates or fees, such as,

but not limited to, “cut-rate,” “lowest,” “give-

away,” “below-cost,” and “special.” The lawyer

shall further avoid the use of all signs and sym-

bols such as, but not limited to, logos, trademarks,

graphics, design work, and pictures.

The following information, in words and num-

bers only, may be communicated to the public in

newspapers, periodicals, trade journals, “shop-

pers” and other similar advertising media, pub-

lished and disseminated in the geographic area in

which the lawyer maintains offices or in which a

29a

significant part of the lawyer’s clientele resides

or in the classified advertising section of the tele-

phone directory distributed in the geographic area

in which the lawyer maintains offices or in which

a significant part of the lawyer’s clientele resides

or in reputable legal directories generally available

in such area. The same information may be com-

municated by direct mail. The same information,

in words and numbers only, articulated only by a

single non-dramatic voice, not that of the lawyer,

and with no other background sound, may be com-

municated by radio. The same information, in

words and numbers only, articulated by a single

non-dramatic voice, not that of the lawyer, and

with no other background sound, may be commu-

nicated by television. In the case of television, no

visual display shall be allowed except that al-

lowed in print as articulated by the announcer.

All such communications on radio and television,

to the extent possible, shall be made only in the

geographic area in which the lawyer maintains

offices or in which a significant part of the law-

yer’s clientele resides. Any such information

shall be presented in a dignified manner:

(1) Name, including name of law firm and

names of professional associates, addresses

and telephone numbers and the designation

“lawyer”, “attorney”, “law firm” or the

like;

(2) Fields of practice, limitation of practice

or specialization, but only to the extent

permitted by DR 2-105;

(3) Date and place of birth;

(4) Date and place of admission to the bar of

state and federal courts;

(5) Schools attended, with dates of graduation,

degrees and other scholastic distinctions;

(C)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

(19)

(20)

80a

Public or quasi-public offices;

Military service;

Legal authorships;

Legal teaching position;

Memberships, offices and committee assign-

ments in bar associations;

Membership and offices in legal fraterni-

ties and legal societies;

Technical and professional licenses;

Memberships in scientific, technical and

professional associations and societies;

Foreign language ability;

Names and addresses of bank references;

With their written consent, names of

clients regularly represented;

Subject to DR 2-103, prepaid or group

legal services programs in which the law-

yer participates;

Whether credit cards or other credit ar-

rangements are accepted;

Office and telephone answering service

hours;

Race, sex, religion, or ethnic background.

Nothing contained herein shall prohibit a lawyer

from permitting the inclusion in reputable law

lists and law directories intended primarily for

the use of the legal profession of such informa-

tion as traditionally has been included in these

publications.

The following fee information, in words and

numbers only, may be communicated to the pub-

8la

lic in the manner permitted by DR 2-101(B).

Any such information shall be presented in a

dignified manner:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Fee for an initial consultation;

Availability upon request of either a writ-

ten schedule of fees or an estimate of the

fee to be charged for specific services, or

both;

Contingent fee rates subject to DR 2-106

(C), provided that the statement discloses

whether percentages are computed before

or after deduction of costs;

Fixed fees or range of fees for specific

legal services or hourly fee rates provided

that, in print size at least equivalent to the

largest print used in setting forth the

fee information, the statement disclosed:

(a) that the stated fixed fees or range of

fees will be available only to clients

whose matters are encompassed within

the described services, and

(b) if the client’s matters are not encom-

passed within the described services, or

if an hourly fee rate is stated, the

client is entitled, without obligation, to

a specific written estimate of the fees

likely to be charged.

(D) For purposes of this rule, the term “specific legal

services” shall be limited to the following serv-

ices:

(1)

(2)

Abstract examinations and title opinions

not including services in clearing title;

Uncontested dissolutions of marriage involv-

ing no disagreement concerning custody of

32a

children, alimony, child support or prop-

erty settlement [see DR 5-105(A)];

(3) Wills leaving all property outright to one

beneficiary and contingently to one bene-

ficiary or one class of beneficiaries;

(4) Income tax returns for wage earners;

(5) Uncontested personal bankruptcies;

(6) Changes of name;

(7) Simple residential deeds;

(8) Residential purchase and sale agreements;

(9) Residential leases;

(10) Residential mortgages and notes;

(11) Powers of attorney;

(12) Bills of sale.

The committee on professional ethics and con-

duct of the Iowa State Bar Association, acting

as commissioners of the supreme court as pro-

vided by court rule 118, on its own motion or

upon the request of a lawyer admitted to prac-

tice in this state, shall, from time to time, con-

sider and recommend to the court proposed

amendments to the Code, expanding or constrict-

ing the above list of “specific legal services”. In

considering such amendments the committee shall

apply the following criteria which have guided

the supreme court in determining which services

should be included in the above list:

(1) The description of the service would not be

misunderstood by the average layperson or

be misleading or deceptive;

(2) Substantially all of the service normally

can be performed in the lawyer’s office with

(EK)

33a

the aid of standardized forms and office

procedures ;

(3) The service does not normally involve a

substantial amount of legal research, draft-

ing of unique documents, investigation,

court appearances or negotiation with other

parties or their attorneys; and

(4) Competent performance of the service nor-

mally does not depend upon ascertainment

and consideration of more than a few vary-

ing factual circumstances.

The committee shall adopt regulations, subject to

the approval of the supreme court, to provide a

procedure to receive and consider such requests

from lawyers, and for the prompt submission to

this court of any appeal from a determination

adverse to such request. Said committee may

further issue, subject to the approval of the su-

preme court, regulations further defining or de-

scribing “specific legal services” within the mean-

ing of this rule.

Unless otherwise specified in the public com-

munication concerning fees, the lawyer shall be

bound, in the case of fee advertising in the classi-

fied section of the telephone directory, for a

period of at least the time between printings of

the directory in which the fee advertisement ap-

pears and in the case of all other fee advertising

for a period of at least ninety days thereafter,

to render the stated legal service for the fee

stated in the communication unless the client’s

matters do not fall into the described services.

In that event, or if a range of fees is stated, he

shall render the service for the estimated fee

given the client in advance of rendering the

service.

(F)

(G)

(H)

34a

A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his

partners, associates or any other lawyer affili-

ated with him or his firm, use the public com-

munication of fee information concerning specific

legal services as an indirect means of attracting

clients for whom he performs other legal services

not related to the specific legal services publi-

cized; nor may the term “clinic’”’ or any similar

term be used in any communication to the public

unless the practice of the lawyer or his firm is

limited to routine matters for which costs of

rendering the service can be substantially re-

duced because of the repetitive nature of the

services performed and the use of standardized

forms and office procedures. Whether or not it

contains fee information, a lawyer shall preserve

in his office a copy of each advertisement placed

in a newspaper, the classified section of the tele-

phone directory, or periodical and a tape of the

radio or television commercial or recording for

at least three years and a record of the date or

dates and name of the publication in which it

appeared or the name of the station upon which

it was aired.

A lawyer recommended by, paid by or whose legal

services are furnished by, a qualified legal as-

sistance organization may authorize or permit or

assist such organization to use means of dignified

commercial publicity, which does not identify any

lawyer by name, to describe the availability or

nature of its legal services or legal service bene-

fits.

This rule does not prohibit limited and dignified

identification of a lawyer as a lawyer as well as

by name:

(1) In political advertisements when his pro-

fessional status is germane to the political

campaign or to a political issue; —

35a

(2) In public notices when the name and pro-

fession of a lawyer are required or au-

thorized by law or are reasonably pertinent

for a purpose other than the attraction of

potential clients;

(3) In routine reports and announcements of a

bona fide business, civic, professional, or

political crganization in which he serves as

a director or officer;

(4) In and on legal documents prepared by him;

(5) In and on legal textbooks, treatises, and

other legal publications, and in dignified

advertisements thereof; and

(6) In communications by a qualified legal as-

sistance organization, along with the bio-

graphical information permitted under DR

2-101(B), directed to a member or bene-

ficiary of such organization.

(I) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything

of value to representatives of the press, radio,

television or other communication medium in an-

ticipation of or in return for professional pub-

licity in a news item nor voluntarily give any

information to such representatives which, if

published in a news item, would be in violation

of DR 2-101(A).

[Court Order February 28, 1977; February 17, 1978;

July 24, 1979; May 6, 1980; Oct. 10, 1984.]

* * 7. 2s

DR 2-105. Description and Limitation of Practice

(A) A lawyer may hold himself out publicly as prac-

ticing in or limiting his practice to certain fields

of law as follows:

36a

(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the

United States Patent and Trademark Office

may use the designation “Patents”, “Patent

Attorney”, “Patent Lawyer”, or “Regis-

tered Patent Attorney” or any combination |

of those terms, on his professional card,

letterhead, office sign, professional notice or /

announcement, and telephone directory list-

ings, all as otherwise allowed by DR 2-102

(A), and in newspapers, periodicals and

legal directories, as otherwise allowed by

DR 2-101(B). In addition to use of the

designation “Patents”, “Patent Attorney”,

“Patent Lawyer”, and “T.egistered Patent

Attorney”, a lawyer admitted to practice

before the United States Patent and Trade-

mark Office may use the designation “Trade-

marks”, “Trademarks and Copyright Mat-

ters”, “Trademark Attorney”, “Trademark

Lawyer”, cr any combination of those terms

on his professional card, letterhead, office

sign, professional notice or announcement

and telephone directory listing, all as other-

wise allowed by DR 2-102(A), and in news-

papers, periodicals and legal directories as

otherwise allowed by DR 2-101(B), pro-

vided the lawyer satisfies the eligibility re-

quirements of DR 2-105(A) (4) in any one

of the fields of practice of “Patents, Trade-

marks or Copyright Matters” or combina-

tion thereof.

(2) An individual lawyer who, in fact, limits

practice to certain fields of law or who

is limiting this practice primarily to cer-

tain fields of law, and whe satisfies the

eligibility requirements of DR 2-105(A)

(4), may indicate such limitation or de-

AAT VEE SCE RAISE

37a

’

scription of practice by listing, in the man-

ner provided by DR 2-105(A) (3), not more

than three of the following fields of law

practice in any communication otherwise

allowed by DR 2-102(A) and DR 2-101(B):

Administrative Agency Matters

Admiralty

Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Appellate Practice

Banking and Creditor Law

Constitutional Law

Consumer Claims and Protection

Corporate Finance and Securities Law

Corporation and Business Law

Criminal Law

Debt and Bankruptcy Matters

Domestic Relations and Family Law

Environmental Law

Health Law

Immigration and Customs

Insurance

International and Foreign Law

Job Discrimination and Civil Rights

Labor Law

Legislative Matters

Military Law

Municipal and Local Government Law and

Finance

Pension, Profit Sharing and Employee Bene-

fit Plans

Personal Injury and Property Damage

Claims

Public Utility Matters

Real Estate Law

Taxation Law

Trademarks and Copyright Matters

Transportation Law

38a

Trial Practice

Wills, Estate Planning and Probate Mat-

ters

Workers Compensation

The committee on professional ethics and conduct

of the Iowa State Bar Association, acting as

Commissioners of the supreme court as provided

by court rule 118, on its own motion or upon the

request of a lawyer admitted to practice in this

state, shall, from time to time, consider and

recommend to the court proposed amendments to

the Code expanding or restricting the permitted

list of fields of law practice.

(3) Description or indication of limitation of

practices permitted by DR 2-105(A) (2)

Shall be only in the following manner:

(a) If the lawyer accepts only legal mat-

ters in his listed fields of law practice,

such listing of fields of law practice

shall be preceded by the words “Prac-

tice limited to... .”; or

(b) If the lawyer is practicing primarily

in his listed fields of law practice but

he also accepts other types of legal

matters, such listing of fields of law

practice shall be preceded by the words

“Practicing primarily in. . .”;

and shall, in the case of a description or

indication of limitation of practice com-

municated to the public in the classified

section of telephone directories, or in news-

papers, periodicals and legal directories,

contain within such communication, or have

prominently displayed on the same page of

such communication, a “Notice to the Pub-

lic’ in the following form:

hee om ee

a

(4)

39a

(ec) “A description or indication of limita-

tion of practice does not mean that

any agency or board has certified such

lawyer as a specialist or expert in an

indicated field of law practice nor does

it mean that such lawyer is necessarily

any more expert or competent than any

other lawyer. All potential clients are

urged to make their own independent

investigation and evaluation of any

lawyer being considered. This notice is

required by rule of the Supreme Court

of Iowa.”

In the case of a description or indication of

limitation of practice communicated to the

public in the classified section of telephone

directories, a lawyer shall not permit his

name to be listed under a heading or

classification other than “Attorneys” or

“Lawyers”.

Prior to communication of a description or

indication of limitation of practice per-

mitted by DR 2-105(A) (2), a lawyer shall

report his compliance with the following

eligibility requirements each year in the

written report required to be submitted to

the Commission on Continuing Legal Edu-

cation:

(a) The lawyer must have devoted the

greater of 200 hours or twenty percent

of his time spent in actual law prac-

tice to each separate indicated field of

practice for each of the last two cal-

endar years; and

(b) The lawyer must have completed at

least ten hours of accredited Continu-

ing Legal Education courses of study

40a

in each separate indicated field of prac-

tice during the preceding calendar year.

The first report of compliance may be made

in 1979. In reporting compliance with sub-

section (a), a statement of compliance is

sufficient. In reporting compliance with

subsection (b), the lawyer shall identify

the specific courses and hours which apply

to each indicated field of practice. Contents

of the portion of the report required by this

rule shall be public information.

(B) A lawyer may communicate the name of state

and federal courts in which he or she is cur-

rently permitted to practice on his professional

card, letterhead, office sign, professional notice or

announcement, and telephone directory listings,

all as otherwise aliowed by DR 2-102(A), and in

newspapers, periodicals and legal directories, as

otherwise allowed by DR 2-101(B).

If, due to hardship or extenuating circum-

stances, a lawyer is unable to complete the hours

of accredited continuing legal education during

the preceding calendar year as required by DR

.2-105(A) (4) (b), the lawyer may apply to the

Commission on Continuing Legal Education for

an extension of time in which to complete the

hours. No extension of time shall be granted un-

less written application therefor shall be made on

forms prescribed by the Commission. Extensions

of time within which to fulfill the minimum edu-

cational requirements may, in individual cases

involving hardship or extenuating circumstances,

be granted by the Commission for a period not

to exceed six months immediately following ex-

piration of the year in which the requirements

were not met.

{Amended Feb. 17, 1978; Oct. 11, 1978; Mar. 5, 1979;

May 29, 1979; Oct. 10, 1984.]

Mla

APPENDIX E

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 69088

COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT

OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff

vs.

MARK A. HUMPHREY, FREDD J;HAAS

and JAMES E. GRITZNER, dba

HUMPHREY, HAAS AND GRINTZNER,

Defendants

[Filed Sept. 14, 1982]

PETITION FOR INJUNCTION

Comes now the Plaintiff, the Committee on Professional

Ethics and Conduct of The Iowa State Bar Association,

and pursuant to Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, and for

| its Petition for Injunction states:

1. That the Plaintiff, the Committee on Professional

Ethics and Conduct of The Iowa State Bar Association, is

a regularly appointed standing Committee of The Iowa

State Bar Association the members of which are Commis-

sioners of the Supreme Court, whose Chairman is James

E. Cooney of Des Moines, Iowa.

2. That the Defendants, Mark A. Humphrey, Fredd J.

Haas and James E. Gritzner, individuals who are licensed

to practice law in various courts of the State of Iowa,

|

42a

who practice under the firm name of Humphrey, Haas

and Gritzner, and all times material hereto, reside and

have offices for the practice of law in Des Moines, Polk

County, Iowa.

3. That the Iowa Supreme Court has by Court Order

promulgated certain rules governing the practice of law,

said rules are known as The Iowa Code of Professional

Responsibility for Lawyers.

4, That contained in the Iowa Code of Professional

Responsibility for Lawyers are DR2-101 which governs

Publicity and DR2-105 which governs Description and

Limitation of Practice.

5. That pursuant to DR2-101(D) the Plaintiff did as

part of their rules establish and obtain confirmation by

Supreme Court Order of procedures for lawyers to obtain

advance approval of publicity which is at variance with

the provisions of DR2-101 and DR2-105 or to apply to

have said rules changed. Said procedures are set out in

Rules 5.1 through 5.6 of the Rules of Procedure Profes-

sional Ethics and Conduct Committee of The Iowa State

Bar Association.

6. That the Defendants have contracted with Palmer

Communications, Inc. (WHO-TV) to televise three differ-

ent commercials advertising their services.

7. That the television commercials violate the pro-

visions of DR2-101 in that said commercials contain

more than a single non-dramatic voice, have background

sound and visual displays of two or more people char-

acterizing themselves as clients which make laudatory

comment as to Defendants’ services.

8. That the television commercials violate the provi-

sions of DR-105 in that they list four areas of practice

and contain no disclaimer.

9. That the said commercials have been shown on tele-

vision station WHO-TV eleven (11) times in the past and

43a

is [sic] scheduled to be shown for a total period of forty-

seven (47) weeks.

10. That the Defendants at no time sought or received

any advance approval for either a change in DR2-101 or

DR2-105, nor did they seek or receive approval for the

specific commercials shown by Palmer Communications,

Inc. (WHO-TV).

11. That Chapter 610 of the Iowa Code and Supreme

Court Rule 118 provides procedures for disciplining law-

yers who violate the Iowa Code of Professional Respon-

sibility for Lawyers, but these procedures by necessity

take long periods of time, and do not provide for any

procedures to stop the continued violation of said rules.

12. That the Plaintiff herein is charged with the duty

and responsibility to investigate and bring appropriate

action against lawyers who violate any provisions of the

Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers.

13. That the Plaintiff has received, through communi-

cations to its staff, information that Defendants intend

to continue to show the commercials either on WHO-TV

or some other television station in the Des Moines view-

ing area.

14. That unless restrained the Defendants will con-

tinue in their violation of DR2-101 and DR2-105, said

conduct causing irreparable damage'and thereby causing

any judgment ineffectual.

15. That there is no other adequate remedy at law in

which to restrain said violation.

16. That this Petition has not been presented to or

refused in whole or in part by any other Judge or

Justice.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court issue

a temporary injunction without notice enjoining the De-

fendants from advertising by use of the television com-

| senshi ttasriea

44a

mercial advertisements currently in the possession of Pal-

mer Communiactions, Inc. or by any advertisement in

conflict with the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility

for Lawyers and for an order commanding the Defend-

ants to withdraw forthwith the television commercials

heretofore shown by Palmer Communications, Inc. (WHO-

TV).

Plaintiff further prays that the Court issue a perma-

nent injunction and that the Court set the matter of

permanent injunction for hearing and prescribe notice

and that on hearing the Court permanently enjoin the

Defendants from further violation of the Iowa Code of

Professional Responsibility for Lawyers via television

commercials.

Plaintiff further prays that the Court set bond as pro-

vided by the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff further prays for such other and further re-

lief as the Court may deem just and equitable in consid-

eration of the premises.

/s/ Frank A. Comito, Jr.

FRANK A. COMITO, JR.

Comito and Capps

4701 University Avenue

Des Moines, Iowa 50311

(515) 274-4105

45a

APPENDIX F

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 69088

COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT

OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MarK A. HUMPHREY, FREDD J. HAAS,

and JAMES E. GRITZNER, d/b/a

HUMPHREY, HAAS AND GRITZNER,

Defendants.

MARK A. HUMPHREY and FREDD J. HAAS,

individually and doing business as

HUMPHREY AND HAAS,

Counterclaimants,

vs.

COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT

OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,

Defendant to

Counterclaim.

[Filed Sept. 30, 1982]

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM

2 a

46a

ANSWER

COME NOW Defendants, Mark A. Humphrey and Fredd

J. Haas, individually and doing business as Humphrey

and Haas (hereinafter referred to as the “Defendants”),

and for their Answer to Plaintiff’s Petition for Injunc-

tion, respectfully state to the Court as follows:

1. The Defendants admit the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, 18, 15 and 16 of Plain-

tiff’s Petition for Injunction.

2. The Defendants admit the allegations contained in

paragraph 2 of Plaintiff’s Petition for Injunction, but

affirmatively state that as of September 13, 1982, James

EK. Gritzner was no longer associated with their law firm,

and the name of the firm is now “Humphrey and Haas”.

3. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in

paragraph 6 of Plaintiff’s Petition for Injunction.

4. In response to paragraph 7 of Plaintiff’s Petition

for Injunction, the Defendants admit that the television

commercials contain more than a single voice and have

background sounds and visual displays, but deny that

the advertisements depict two or more people character-

izing themselves as clients of Defendants, and further

deny that the advertisements meke laudatory comments

as to the Defendants’ services.

5. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in

paragraph 8 of Plaintiff’s Petition for Injunction.

6. In response to paragraph 11 of Plaintiff’s Petition

for Injunction, the Defendants admit that Chapter 610,

Code of Iowa (1981), and Supreme Court Rule 118, pro-

vide procedures for disciplining lawyers who violate the

Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility, but deny that

these procedures “by necessity take long periods of time”,

and “do not provide for any procedures to stop the con-

tinued violation of said rules’.

' Ala

7. In response to paragraph 14 of Plaintiff’s Petition

for Injunction, the Defendants state that they would

have continued to run television advertisements “unless

restrained”, but specifically deny that the continuation

of their television advertising has, would or could cause

any irreparable damage.

First Affirmative Defense

DR 2-101 of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsi-

bility for Lawyers, entitled “Publicity”, is facially un-

constitutional, and is unconstitutional as applied to De-

fendants’ television advertising, in violation of Defend-

ants’ rights of freedom of speech under the First Amend-

ment to the United States Constitution.

Second Affirmative Defense

The phrase “tiondramatic voice” contained in DR 2-

101(B) of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility

for Lawyers, is void for vagueness, in violation of the

First and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.

Third Affirmative Defense

The phrase “self-laudatory” contained in DR 2-101(A)

of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Law-

yers, is void for vagueness, in violation of the First and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu-

tion.

Fourth Affirmative Defense

DR 2-105 of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsi-

bility for Lawyers, entitled “Description and Limitations

of Practice”, is facially unconstitutional, and is uncon-

| stitutional as applied to Defendants’ television advertis-

ing, in violation of Defendants’ rights of freedom of

speech under the First Amendment to the United States

Constitution.

WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff’s Peti-

tion for Injunction be dismissed at Plaintiff’s costs.

= |

48a

COUNTERCLAIM

COME NOW Mark A. Humphrey and Fredd J. Haas,

individually and doing business as Humphrey and Haas,

and for their Counterclaim herein, respectfully state to

the Court as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION.

1. Counterclaimants seek declaratory and injunctive

relief that the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility

for Lawyers, as it relates to television advertising, is un-

constitutional and violates the First and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Il. PARTIES.

2. Counterclaimants are lawyers licensed to practice

law in various courts in the State of Iowa, and practice

under the firm name of “Humphrey and Haas”. At all

times material to this action, Counterclaimants have re-

sided and have had offices for the practice of law in Des

Moines, Iowa.

3. Defendant to Counterclaim is a regularly appointed

standing committee of the Iowa State Bar Association,

the members of which are commissioners of the Iowa Su-

preme Court, and as such, are charged with the duty

and responsibility of initiating and investigating viola-

tions of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for

Lawyers.

Ill. JURISDICTION.

4. Jurisdiction of this counterclaim is predicated upon

42-U.S.C. § 1983, and Rules 29 and 30 of the Iowa Rules

of Civil Procedure.

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.

5. Commencing on September 6, 1982, Counterclaim-

ants engaged in television advertisements on behalf of

their law firm.

49a

6. On September 14, 1982, Defendant te Counterclaim

initiated a Petition for Injunction in this Court and ob-

tained a temporary injunction against the Counterclaim-

ants, enjoining them from using television commercials

alleged to be in violation of the Iowa Code of Profes-

sional Responsibility for Lawyers.

7. Counterclaimants desire to continue to engage in

television advertising on behalf of their law firm, which

would be in violation of the Iowa Code of Professional

Responsibility for Lawyers, specifically DR 2-101 and

DR 2-105, as they relate to television advertising.

8. The actions of Defendant to Counterclaim in en-

forcing the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for

Lawyers, as it relates to television advertising by law-

yers, and in filing the Petition for Injunction in this

matter, arise under color of state law.

9. Counterclaimants are suffering irreparable injury

as a result of the denial of their right to run their tele-

vision advertisements and the imposition of Disciplinary

Rules which unconstitutionally restrict their rights to

freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the

United States Constitution.

10. The enforcement of the unconstitutional restric-

tions contained in the lowa Code of Professional Respon-

sibility for Lawyers, and the filing of the Petition for

Injunction by Defendant to Counterclaim, are the proxi-

mate cause of the vioiations of Counterclaimants’ First

Amendment rights.

V. ALLEGATIONS OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.

11. DR 2-101 of the Iowa Code of Professional Re-

sponsibility for Lawyers entitled “Publicity”, and DR

2-105 of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for

} Lawyers, entitled “Description and Limitation of Prac-

tice’, are unconstitutional, in violation of the freedom

of speech clause of the First Amendment to the United

sae

50a

States Constitution, and the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

VI. RELIEF.

12. Counterclaimants respectfully pray that this Court

issue a declaratory judgment pursuant to Iowa Rule of

Civil Procedure 261, declaring that DR 2-101 and DR

2-105 of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for

Lawyers, as they relate to television advertising, uncon-

stitutionally restrict Counterclaimants’ First Amendment

freedoms and violate the due process clause of the Four-

teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

13. Counterclaimants respectfully pray for a perma-

nent injunction, pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Proce-

dure 320, enjoining the Defendant to Counterclaim from

enforcing, either facially or as applied, those portions of

DR 2-101 and DR 2-105 of the Iowa Code of Profes-

sional Responsibility for Lawyers, as they relate to teie-

vision advertising, which violate Counterclaimants’ First

and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

14. Counterclaimants respectfully pray for reasonable

attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorneys

Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

WHEREFORE, Counterclaimants respectfully pray for

the relief set forth above.

/s/ Mark W. Bennett

MARK W. BENNETT

Babich, Bennett & Nickerson

5835 Grand Avenue, Suite 202

Original and two copies Des Moines, Iowa 50312

a P 515-274-3581

filed ; iled to:

ed; copy mailed to Attorney for Defendants

Frank A. Comito, Jr. and Counterclaimants,

Attorney at Law Mark A. Humphrey and

4701 University Avenue Fredd J. Haas, Individually

Des Moines, Iowa 50311 and Doing Business as

Attorney for Plaintiff Humphrey and Haas

5la

APPENDIX G

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 69088

COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT

OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

Vs.

MARK A. HUMPHREY, FREDD J. HAAS

and JAMES E. GRITZNER, dba

HUMPHREY, HAAS AND GRITZNER,

Defendants.

[Filed Sept. 14, 1982]

ORDER FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

AND NOTICE OF HEARING ON

PERMANENT INJUNCTION

NOW on this 14th day of Sept., 1982, this matter

comes to the attention of this Court upon the verified

Petition of the Plaintiff seeking both a temporary and

permanent injunction against the Defendants enjoining

them from using television commercials alleged to be in

violation of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility

for Lawyers. That based upon the information contained

in the verified Petition the Court finds that it has juris-

diction of the parties and the subject matter. Further

that a temporary injunction should issue without notice

and that the matter of the permanent injunction of the

parties should be set down for hearing and notice be

given to the Defendants.

52a

IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED that the Defendants are temporarily en-

joined from using the television commercials currently in

the possession of Palmer Communications, Inc. for the

purpose of advertising their services, and shall forthwith

withdraw the same from further use.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED that the matter of the permanent injunction

prayed for by the Plaintiff in its Petition be set down

for hearing on the 23 day of Sept., 1982, at 3:00 o’clock

p.m. before the Iowa Supreme Court, State Capitol Build-

ing, Des Moines, Iowa, and that notice of said hearing

shall be had by serving a copy of the Petition and the

Order upon the Defendants by personal service at least

7 days prior to the time set for hearing.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED that any Defendant may file an application

to have the matter as to the sufficiency of evidence rela-

tive to the temporary injunction be set down for hear-

ing prior to the time set for hearing on the permanent

injunction.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED that said temporary injunction shall issue

upon Plaintiff’s filing bond with surety approved by the

Clerk in the penal sum of $500.00.

/s/ Mark McCormick

Justice of the

Iowa Supreme Court

53a

APPENDIX H

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 69088

COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT

-OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,

ae Plaintiff,

MARK A. HUMPHREY, FREDD J. HAAS,

and JAMES E. GRITZNER, d/b/a

HUMPHREY, HAAS AND GRITZNER,

Defendants.

[Filed Sept. 28, 1982]

ORDER

On September 14, 1982 defendants were temporarily

enjoined from using the television commercials in the

possession of Palmer Communications, Inc. for the pur-

pose of advertising their services, and ordered to with-

draw the same from further use. The permanent injunc-

tion issue was scheduled for hearing September 22, 1982.

Defendants Mark A. Humphrey and Fredd J. Haas have

consented to continuance of the temporary injunction un-

til an evidentiary hearing and final ruling by this court.

The court finds the hearing should be continued so that

an evidentiary hearing may be held. The Honorable C.

Edwin Moore is hereby appointed a Commissioner of this

court to conduct a hearing in the above matter at a

time and place to be selected by him.

The proceedings shall be reported and a transcript

thereof filed with the clerk of this court by a certified

shorthand reporter selected by the Commissioner and paid

by the State of Iowa.

54a

The Commissioner shall prepare a written summary of

the evidence, but shall make no findings of fact or reach

any conclusions of law. The summary shall be filed with

the clerk of this court. Both parties may obtain dis-

covery, if necessary, by those methods and under such

conditions as shall be determined by the Commissioner

upon motion.

Done this 28th day of September, 1982.

THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

By /s/ W. W. Reynoldson

W. W. REYNOLDSON

Chief Justice

Copies to:

Frank A. Comito, Jr.

Comito and Capps

4701 University Avenue

Des Moines, Iowa 50311

Humphrey & Haas

808 5th Avenue

Des Moines, Iowa 50309

Mark W. Bennett

Babich, Bennett & Nickerson

5885 Grand Avenue, Suite 202

Des Moines, Iowa 50312

James E. Gritzner

1549 N.W. 91st Street

Des Moines, Iowa 50322

Members of the Supreme Court

Honorable C. Edwin Moore

Polk County Courthouse

Des Moines, Iowa 50309

55a

APPENDIX I

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 69088

COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT

OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MARK A. HUMPHREY, FREDD J. HAAS,

and JAMES E. GRITZNER, d/b/a

HUMPHREY, HAAS AND GRITZNER,

Defendants.

MARK A. HUMPHREY and FReEDD J. HAAs, individually

and doing business as HUMPHREY AND HAAS,

Counterclaimants,

vs.

COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT

OF THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,

Defendant to Counterclaim.

[Filed Nov. 16, 1983]

\

REPORT OF HEARING COMMISSIONER

Mr. -Chief Justice and Members of the Iowa Supreme

Court:

The undersigned appointed Hearing Commissioner sub-

mits the attached summary of the evidence taken in the

above entitled cause.

56a

\

It has been prepared with the assistance of the re-

search department of the court, within the restrictions

set out in the order of my appointment.

The 840 page transcript, the many exhibits listed

therein and the summary have this day been filed with

the clerk.

The clerk of this court shall promptly transmit copies

of this order to the parties, or their attorneys of record,

and all members of the court.

Respectfully submitted this 16th day of November,

1983.

/s/ C. Edwin Moore

C. EDWIN MOORE

Hearing Commissioner

57a

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

1. Various admissions by defendants Humphrey and

Haas were read into the record. (Tr. 14-20). Defendants

contracted for the televising of at least three commer-

cials on a Des Moines station advertising legal services.

Each of the commercials contained the following: more

than a single non-dramatic voice, background sound,

visual displays other than words and numbers, visual

displays beyond that which is allowed in print under

DR 2-101, a list of four fields of law practice, no dis-

claimer of the type required by DR 2-105(A) (3), state-

ments relating to contingent fees without disclosure as

to whether such fees would be computed before or after

deduction of costs. Unless restrained defendants would

continue televising such commercials. Prior to televising

their commercials defendants did not seek advance ap-

proval from the bar association or the supreme court and

did not request amendment of the Code of Professional

Responsibility or changes in the relevant disciplinary

rules.

2. Talmage Eugene Thompson, general sales man-

ager for WHO-TV testified for plaintiff concerning the

circumstances under which defendants’ commercials were

placed and run. (Tr. 22-36). He testified concerning his

general duties as sales manager and stated that WHO’s

geographical viewing area was probably the forty coun-

ties surrounding Des Moines. In August 1982, a na-

tional sales representative firm contacted the station

regarding commercials for defendants’ law firm to run

scattered throughout the day Monday through Thursday

forty-seven weeks out of the year with rotation during

the 9-5 time period to give the benefit of as many pro-

gram possibilities as possible. Thompson testified con-

cerning the demographic’ breakdown of the audience dur-

ing that time period, stating that the viewing audience

was approximately 35,000-40,000 homes. Between 9:00

A.M. and noon the largest group of viewers consisted of

58a

adults 25 and over. That time period had a target

audience of older females while a younger and different

audience tuned in during the afternoon. Defendants’

commercials were screened prior to airing and were run

eleven times, in no particular order of rotation, during

a four day period before airing was discontinued at the

request of the bar association.

3. James Gritzner, an attorney formerly a partner in

defendants’ firm, testified for plaintiff concerning the

firm’s decision to purchase and air the television com-

mercials. (Tr. 36-80). He testified generally concerning

his background in both law and broadcasting and stated

that after joining the firm in October, 1981 he haudled

mostly personal injury and workers’ compensation cases

with some business litigation. After receiving a solicita-

tion by mail from a Denver firm that syndicates legal

advertising the partners discussed the possibility of con-

tracting for the Des Moines area rights to the television

commercials produced by the Denver firm. He testified

that he was unenthusiastic about advertising on tele-

vision but went te Denver, viewed 24 to 30 sample com-

mercials, and was unimpressed by their quality and dis-

approved of the samples’ use of a “hook” or tag line

stating “He’s in your corner.” The purpose of the “hook”

or tag line was stated to be to generate trust on the part

of the target audience of blue collar workers and to

increase viewer awareness of such matters as the fact

that there was no charge for an initial consultation and

that cases would be taken on a contingent fee basis. It

was hoped that the commercials would generate immedi-

ate phone calls to the number shown. Gritzner testified

that he was uncomfortable with both lawyer advertising

generally and the Denver firm’s experience that use of

TV commercials had caused an enormous increase in

case load at the expense of more complex types of cases.

The partners were aware that the TV commercials did

not conform to the Iowa rules but thought that the rules

were unenforceable as a result of a then-recent United

59a

States Supreme Court decision and, as a result, decided

to air the commercials in order to be first in the Des

Moines market without attempting to seek a declaratory

judgment that such commercials would be permissible.

The time for airing was intended to reach hospitalized or

sick persons looking for entertainment. The total cost

of the package was estimated to be approximately $45,000

per year and included a right to refuse any commercial

produced by the Denver firm that was deemed unsuitable.

Gritzner received the first phone call generated by the

commercials, which was of a crank nature. His discom-

fort and embarassment with the concept of televised law-

yer advertising led him to disassociate himself from the

firm shortly thereafter but he stated that in his opinion

defendants were not motivated by greed and a desire to

become a settlement mill but, rather, sought to promote

growth of the firm, and that they were willing and able

to take cases to trial.

4. Robert Allbee, attorney and former supreme court

justice, testified for plaintiff concerning the supreme

court’s adoption of rules regulating televised lawyer ad-

vertising. (Tr. 80-102). He testified concerning his pro-

fesisonal background and appointment to the court and

stated that the current Iowa advertising rules were de-

signed to prevent purely emotional reactions and inad-

vertent or intended deception and that the court order

adopting the rules resulted from general satisfaction with

the report of the bar committee that studied the matter.

Reasons for not permitting dramatization were clearly

enunciated in the report (P. Exh. 14) and, in addition,

there was a larger purpose of protecting the public from

misunderstanding or misapprehension. The objective was

to limit the available information to content that was

objective and informative rather than dramatic, per-

suasive, or promotional.

5. Dr. Richard Haynes, officer of Frank N. Magid

Associates, a Cedar Rapids media research and consulta-

60a

tion firm, testified for plaintiff concerning preparation

and results of a survey conducted for plaintiff in which

reaction to defendants’ commercials was tested. (Tr. 105-

296). He testified generally concerning his professional

background in the field of mass communications and

techniques of assessing the impact of commercials on

viewers. P. Exh. 6 is the firm’s conclusion and findings

with regard to the survey conducted for plaintiff while

P. Exh. 5 is the actual data obtained in the survey.

Cedar Rapids area residents selected by a random digit

dialing telephone procedure were guided through a ques-

tionnaire before and after viewing defendants’ commer-

cials in a manner that the witness stated was in accord-

ance with generally accepted standards of research

science; a focus group discussion was used in conjunction

with the questionnaire. Prior to viewing of the commer-

cial responses indicated a somewhat negative image of

the legal profession that was not notably enhanced after

viewing of the commercials. The pre-viewing average

qualitative opinion of the profession was accompanied by

high expectations. Seventy-one percent of the survey

respondents expected a lawyer to be trustworthy prior to

viewing defendants’ commercials (P. Exh. 2 and 7) while

after viewing the commercials 14% thought that defend-

ants sounded like people who would be trustworthy. The

commercials were found to be informational about such

matters as the name of the firm, its phone number, and

the fact that initial consultation was without charge but

an imagery problem was noted. On cross-examination

relating to the validity and reliability of the survey it

was noted that the commercials were not perceived as

misleading or deceptive nor, in Haynes opinion, were

dramatized television commercials inherently deceptive or

evil. About one-third of those contacted actually par-

ticipated in the survey and the number of unemployed or

unskilled participants did not reflect the percentage of

such persons in the Cedar Rapids area. Viewing of the

commercials was done in a studio rather than at home

6la

and there was no control group exposed to commercials

in compliance with the Iowa advertising rules. On re-

direct examination, it was stated that the potential for

misleading or misinterpreting TV commercials was

greater with dramatization due to the emotional nature

of the response.

6. Lori Andrews, research attorney for the American

Bar Foundation and former staff director of the Ameri-

can Bar Association Commission on Advertising, testi-

fied for defendants concerning various studies relating to

legal advertising and interpretation of the study results

and relevant United States Supreme Court decisions.

(Tr. 298-391, 408). She testified generally concerning

her professiona! background and particular work in the

field of legal advertising. Her testimony was in an indi-

vidual capacity and not as a representative of any or-

ganization. As a result of a survey taken while she was

staff director the ABA Commission on Advertising con-

cluded that the public has a need for information about

lawyers and the cost and availability of legal services

and that advertising provided a means for meeting that

need. Various surveys showed that that need was not

adequately being met by either the organized bar’s efforts

to provide information to the public or lawyer referral

services. Roughly two-thirds of survey respondents ap-

proved of lawyer advertising but survey results showed

that lawyers have an image problem. She opined, based

on survey results, that limits on legal advertising

darkened rather than helped lawyers’ image and that the

public favored advertising including dramatization. She

also opined that emotional appeals do not create a need

for legal services that did not already exist. At least

44 states permit legal ads using dramatization, graphics,

ete., and at least 43 permit background music, actors,

and personal appearances while only one state other than

Iowa limits the voice involved. At least 26 states require

ads to be dignified while 21 allow legal advertising gen-

62a

erally so long as it is not false, fraudulent, misleading,

or deceptive, and no particular problems have been en-

countered enforcing such a rule. She testified that the

number of lawyers engaging in advertising was growing

steadily and that with regard to regulation of such ad-

vertising there was a trend toward simply prohibiting

false, fraudulent, and misleading ads and away from

use of a list approach such as Iowa’s, which she opined

to be unconstitutional. She further opined that Iowa’s

treatment of televised legal advertising would not be

effective in helping the public become aware of either

the availability of legal services or information about

legal rights.

7. Jay Trucks, a practicing attorney from Michigan,

testified for defendants concerning his use of TV com-

mercials including those aired by defendants. (Tr. 392-

407). Ater testifying generally concerning his profes-

sional credentials he stated that his use of commercials

produced by the Denver firm with which defendants con-

tracted caused a dramatic increase in his personal injury

practice due primarily to an influx of new clients from

low income groups who had previously been unaware

and/or ill-educated concerning their legal rights and the

availability of legal services. He had received no com-

plaints concerning his TV commercials and had received

little or no response from an ad he ran in the yellow

pages.

8. John A. DeMay, a practicing attorney from Penn-

sylvania, testified for defendants concerning his use of

commercials produced by the Denver firm. (Tr. 414-438).

He testified generally concerning an influx of new per-

sonal injury clients from low income groups, many of

whom had been unaware of their legal rights prior to

viewing his television commercials. Each commercial

aired generated five to seven calls and approximately

one call out of ten resulted in a new client.

63a

9. Norton Frickey, Denver attorney and head of the

firm producing and syndicating the television commer-

cials aired by defendants, testified for defendants con-

cerning the operation of his business and the effect of

his commercials. (Tr. 439-469). He testified generally

concerning his professional background and development

of the advertising service co-existing with his law prac-

tice. He estimated that he had 91 to 95 current clients

of his legal advertising service and four years experience

with television commercials. He testified that his com-

mercials were effective and directed toward blue collar

persons, and enhanced the credibility of the profession.

His commercials attempt to break down the image of

lawyers as stuffy persons through such means as using

John Madden for a spokesperson.

10. Daniel B. Wackman, professor in the University

of Minnesota school of journalism and mass communica-

tion, testified for defendants concerning perceived de-

ficiencies in the survey conducted by plaintiff’s witness

Hayne. (Tr. 470-566.) He testified generally concerning

his professional credentials and the publications he had

authored. His opinion that the survey lacked validity

was based particularly on the lack of a suitable control

group and lack of a real world setting from which it

would be appropriate to generalize results and the at-

tempt to compare perception of defendants after view of

their commercials with the perception of an ideal lawyer

prior to viewing the commericals.

11. Mark A. Schulman, president of a public opinion

and market research firm and former vice-president of

the Louis Harris polling firm, testified for defendants

concerning perceived deficiencies in the survey conducted

by plaintiff’s witness Hayne (Tr. 566-596). He testified

generally concerning his professional background in po-

litical science and quantitative research, and stated that

he presently conducts surveys for clients of various test

markets. His opinion that the Hayne survey lacked ya-

64a

lidity was based on the allegedly unrepresentative nature

of the sample group as well! as the grounds previously

stated by defendants’ witness Wackman.

12. On recall defendants’ witness Wackman testified

that due to such factors as inattentiveness TV viewers

are less susceptible than is ordinarily assumed to emo-

tional appeals in commercials and that adults from lower

socioeconomic groups, like children whom he had studied,

had learned to be skeptical of emotional sales pitches.

He stated that the decision-making process is different

with regard to the purchase of products like toilet paper

as compared to such products as legal services. (Tr. 598-

652).

13. Gene W. Murdock, assistant professor of business

administration at the University of Wyoming, testified

for defendants concerning perceived deficiencies in the

survey conducted by plaintiff’s witness Hayne. (Tr. 653-

757). He testified generally concerning his professional

background, especially in marketing, including some ex-

perience in the marketing of legal services. His opinion

that the Hayne survey was not valid was based on per-

ceived inadequacy and bias of the questionnaire‘s re-

sponse scales, allegedly poor research design, and lack of

a control group. His opinion that the survey lacked

scientific reliability was based on the allegedly unrepre-

sentative nature of the sample group. He found inade-

quate basis in the survey for the conclusion that the

respondents’ opinion of lawyers diminished after viewing

defendants’ commercials. He opined that obvious drama-

tization may have less tendency to mislead viewers than

more formal and official-looking ads of a type that would

comply with the present Iowa rules. He testified that

surveys indicated a negative attitude toward lawyers

among those having little contact with them and that

commercials of the type aired by defendants convey use-

ful information. He testified, as had defendants’ witness

Wackman, that the decision-making process is different

2 oes Py eee po

—eeo err

65a

when the product in question is legal services rather

than a more impulsive sort of purchase such as toilet

paper. He opined that emotional appeals in television

commercials were not harmful. On cross-examination he

testified that his doctoral research on marketing of legal

services suffered from some of the same deficiencies he

noted in the Hayne survey due to the limited resources

available to him at that time.

14, Mark A. Humphrey, defendant Des Moines attor-

ney, testified for defendants concerning the circumstances

surrounding his firm’s decision to purchase and air tele-

vision commercials. (Tr. 758-801). He testified generally

concerning his profesisonal credentials and the formation

and development of his firm as it sought to focus pri-

marily on practice in the areas of personal injury and

workers’ compensation. Before considering the use of

television commercials the firm tried print ads which

proved ineffectual and awaited both a United States Su-

preme Court decision in a lawyer advertising case and

the Iowa bar’s failure to change Iowa rules as a result

of that decision. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 102 St.Ct.

929, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982). He expressed concerns about

potential clients unaware of matters affecting their legal

rights such as statutes of limitation, and stated that the

firm’s decision to air the commercials without seeking

bar approval was due to the following factors: frustra-

tion stemming from a previous unsuccessful attempt to

obtain bar approval for a print ad that was ultimately

not run, belief that Iowa would either change or not

enforce applicable rules as a result of certain yellow pages

ads that appeared to violate applicable rules without

having prompted disciplinary proceedings, and interpre-

tation of the R.M.J. decision as rendering Iowa’s rules

unconstitutional. He expressed a desire to advertise in

the future to the fullest extent permitted by the first

amendment.

15. Fredd Haas, defendant Des Moines attorney, testi-

fied for defendants concerning the circumstances sur-

66a

rounding his firm’s decision to purchase and air tele-

vision commercials. (Tr. 803-836). He testified generally

concerning his professional credentials and the formation

and development of his firm. He testified that the firm

had participated in the bar association’s lawyer referral

service with little effect and that, in his opinion, some

yellow pages ads placed by other attorneys violated ap-

plicable Iowa rules. Responses to the firm’s televised

commercials were mostly from persons unaware of such

matters affecting their legal rights as statutes of limita-

tion. He testified that the yearly cost to the firm for the

commercials would be upwards of $20,000, of which

$10,000 would go to the Denver firm producing them

_ with the remainder to WHO for air time. He testified

that he maintained a continuing interest in issues relat-

ing to legal advertising and that the firm’s business deci-

sion not to air TV commercials that would comply with

the Iowa rules was due to a lack of resources to inde-

pendently produce such a commercial and doubts as to

the effectiveness of such a commercial. He testified that

the firm had been advised by the bar association that no

change in the Iowa rules was contemplated in the ab-

sence of a challenge to their validity.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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