Amicus Curiae Brief — Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 914 (2019) (No. 18-389)

No. 18-389

In the Supreme Court of the United States

PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LTD.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

BRIAN NEWTON

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF FREEPORT-MCMORAN OIL & GAS LLC,

AMPLIFY ENERGY CORP., BETA OPERATING

COMPANY, LLC, DCOR, LLC, ENSIGN UNITED

STATES DRILLING (CALIFORNIA), INC., ARDENT

COMPANIES, INC., AMERICAN PETROLEUM IN-

STITUTE, CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT PETRO-

LEUM ASSOCIATION, INDEPENDENT PETRO-

LEUM ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, NATIONAL AS-

SOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, NATIONAL

OCEAN INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, OFFSHORE

OPERATORS COMMITTEE, and WESTERN STATES

PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION AS AMICI CURIAE IN

SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

BALDWIN J. LEE JOHN P. ELWOOD

ALLEN MATKINS LECK GAM- KEVIN A. GAYNOR

BLE MALLORY & NATSISLLP JEREMY C. MARWELL

Three Embarcadero Ctr. Counsel of Record

12th Floor VINSON & ELKINS LLP

San Francisco, CA 94111 2200 Pennsylvania Ave.,

(415) 273-7446 NW, Suite 500W

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 639-6500

jmarwell@velaw.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

[Additional counsel listed inside cover]

KEVIN W. BROOKS

VINSON & ELKINS LLP

2001 Ross Ave., Suite 3900

Dallas, TX 75201

(214) 220-7805

Counsel for Amici Curiae

GEORGE W. ABELE

PAUL HASTINGS LLP

515 South Flower St,

25th Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90071

(213) 683-6131

Counsel for Beta Operating

Company, LLC (dba BETA

OFFSHORE) and Amplify En-

ergy Corp.

DAVID J. COOPER

CATHERINE E, BENNETT

VANESSA FRANCO CHAVEZ

KLEIN, DENATALE, GOLDNER,

COOPER, ROSENLIEB & KIM.

BALL, LLP

4550 California Ave.,

2nd Floor

Bakersfield, CA 93309

(661) 395-1000

Counsel for Ensign United

States Drilling (California),

Inc.

DAVID C, MCDERMOTT

DCOR, LLC

290 Map!e Court

Suite 290

Ventura, CA 93003

(805) 535-2073

Counsel for DCOR, LLC

STACY R. LINDEN

MATTHEW A, HAYNIE

AMERICAN PETROLEUM

INSTITUTE

1220 L St., NW

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 828-8000

Counsel for American

Petroleum Institute

BENJAMIN G. SHATZ

MANATT, PHELPS &

PHILLIPS, LLP

11355 W. Olympic Blvd.

Los Angeles, CA 90064

(310) 312-4383

Counsel for California

Independent Petroleum

Association

JOSHUA D, KIENITZ

LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.

1255 Treat Blud, Suite 600

Walnut Creek, CA 94597

(415) 399-8451

Counsel for Ardent Compa-

nies, Inc.

BARRY RUSSELL

INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

1201 15th St, NW

Suite 300

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 857-4722

Counsel for Independent Pe-

troleum Association of Amer-

ica

EVAN H, ZIMMERMAN

OFFSHORE OPERATORS

COMMITTEE

2400 Veterans Memorial

Blod., Suite 206

Kenner, LA 70062

(504) 904-7966

Counsel for the Offshore Oper-

ators Committee

PETER C, TOLSDORF

MANUFACTURERS’ CEN.

TER FOR LEGAL ACTION

733 10th Street, NW,

Suite 700

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 637-3133

Counsel for National As-

sociation of Manufactur-

ers

RANDALL LUTHI

NATIONAL OCEAN INDUS.

TRIES ASSOCIATION

1120 G Street, NW, Suite

900

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 347-6900

Counsel for the National

Ocean Industries Associ-

ation

OYANGO A, SNELL

WESTERN STATES PE-

TROLEUM ASSOCIATION

1415 L Street, Suite 900

Sacramento, CA 95814

(916) 325-3115

Counsel for Western

States Petroleum Associ-

ation

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EERSTE I ii

RS Gr FAIS CRIFIIID cccccccccccccscecccccscccsccccesscesvesees l

Introduction and Summary of Argument ............... 2

ER SIS SAE ES Ss ee oR 4

I. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Rejects

Decades Of Settled Law .......................cc0e0000+ 6

Il. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Disrupts

Employment Relationships Formed In

Reliance On Settled Law.........................006 13

Ill. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Gives States

Supremacy Over Federal Law, And Invites

Efforts To Frustrate Federal Policy............ 19

ee ea ES ORNS Ss 25

(i)

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page(s)

Aera Energy LLC v. Salazar,

— fe fT Lae Re ) | ee 18

Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc. v. Throop,

181 P.3d 1084 (Alaska 2008)..................000..00000. 12

Bonner v. City of Prichard,

661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981)...........00....000000..... 9

Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,

So EF a aan 7,9, 12,14

Cont'l Oil Co. v. London S.S. Owners’

Mut. Ins. Ass’n,

417 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1969)..................... passim

EP Operating Ltd. P’ship v. Placid Oil Co.,

26 F.3d 663 (Gth Cir. 1904).................0.200.0000c00000 18

Espinoza y. Beta Operating Co.,

No. 15-cv-4659 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2015) ............. 9

Garcia vy. Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas LLC,

No. 16-cv-4320 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2016) ........... 3)

Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,

ee Ce I paitatcccincteciecnictueseendnenensennse passim

Jefferson v. Beta Operating Co.,

No. 15-cv-4966 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2015).............. 9

Leo Sheep Co. v. United States,

a accion 22

Maryland vy. Louisiana,

eee 9, 21, 22

Meadows v. Latshaw Drilling Co.,

866 F.3d 307 (Sth Cir. 2017) ..............ccscecccsseeees 14

ill

Cases—Continued: Page(s)

Mendiola v. CPS Sec. Solutions, Inc.,

a i ceil 12

Mersnick v. USProtect Corp.,

No. 06-cv-3993, 2006 WL 3734396

es i I, a ancrnasnnscnnnnnbnsnnnnes 24

Nat Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Dep't of Defense,

I a eeiniadedl 23

Nations v. Morris,

483 F.2d G77 (ith Cir. 1973) ..........00000.00000.00000..... 8

Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire,

Ce OS Se eae 7

Pac. Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid,

I i cceeneeubinniabbes 4, 22

Reyna v. Venoco, Inc.,

No. 15-cv-4525 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2015) ............. 9

Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,

SOB UB. BEB (1GGS) ......0.00cccceccrcc0cs0ceccreceseees passim

Shell Oil Co. v. lowa Dep't of Revenue,

SES passim

Sullivan v. Oracle Corp.,

ef eee 17

Tetra Techs., Inc. v. Cont Ins. Co.,

814 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2016).......................... 8, 10

Texaco Expl. & Prod., Inc. vy. AmClyde

Engineered Prods. Co.,

448 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. 2006) .........................00000:. 8

Texaco Inc. v. Louisiana Land & Expl. Co.,

906 F.2d 43 (Gth Cir. 1903) ..................eccccccsseeeeees 9

iv

Cases—Continued: Page(s)

Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. PLT

Engineering, Inc.,

895 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1990) ...........0000000...... 9, 10

United States v. California,

RE EC ee me 20, 21

United States v. Louisiana,

ee I I iors cccccocinsscsnsccsssnaezesnsesins 20, 21

United States v. Maine,

420 U.S. 515 (1975) .......................0000 4, 20, 21, 22

United States v. Texas,

LR EEL Re eae a ae 20, 21

Williams v. Brinderson Constructors, Inc.,

No. 15-cv-2474, 2015 WL 4747892

re cies 9

Statutes:

es I isissiccinnenricisnnesiaitsihaitaiiidiiabatindiinais 22

I 4

NS SEE a tn a SM 4

alin dneriicins inisnitisiesiianitsiseniicabinieinineniaiands 4

43 U.S.C. $1333(a ZA) ...........ccccccseeeeeseeee 5, 6, 8, 23

SIE SR RE AR BIS INS 18

ee I ion a caincetinaciinadieapdeiamtuelianianisienieddciie 18

Rules:

TEER ER oS eee tne 12, 23

Re ich clatter 18

Other Authorities: Page(s)

Andre Stepankowsky, West Coast States Push

Back on Drilling Proposal, THE DAILY NEWS

SRA AL SE RS RPI ce. SH Senco 24

Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Alaska OCS

ES ES SOT 5 A ne ae ne 12

Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Gulf of Mexico

I snc iesiesiseccaidentiniatncnensitsbabiiianiatilaintedietabinecs 10

Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Pacific OCS

TTI sccicctceindieiisiiesinstsinciiimeasiidemnenin site teaiaieininn ipaesmnasen 12

Eric N. Smith, Louisiana — The Status of the

State: A Report on the Impact of Energy

Activity on the State’s Economy, GREATER

NEW ORLEANS, INC. (2014) .........cc.ccccccceececeeeeeeees 15

H.R. Rep. No. 215 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.

TTT icitaciieh hsantlicedanschcebataerbasiedienialeihdiilpatinieentniimrecieenes 20

International Association of Drilling

Contractors, Life on a Drilling Rig.................... 15

Jeff Daniels, California Gov. Jerry Brown

Moves to Block Trump on Offshore Drilling:

‘Not Here, Not Now,’” CNBC (Sept. 8, 2018)..... 24

Jim Nicholson, The Incredible Economic

Opportunities of Offshore Energy Exploration,

NAT'L REVIEW (Oct. 1, 2018)...............cccccccceeeeeees 15

The Economic Impacts of Allowing Access to the

Eastern Gulf of Mexico for Oil and Natural

Gas Exploration and Development (2018)......... 18

U.S. Dep’t of the Interior and Bureau of Ocean

Energy Mgmt., 2019-2024 National Outer

Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Draft

Proposed Program (Jan. 2018)..................... 11,15

vi

Other Authorities—Continued: Page(s)

Warren M. Christopher, The Outer Continental

Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New Frontier, 6

STAN. L. REV. BB (19GB) ........000:00000000000cc000000 13, 21

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE'

Amici curiae are companies with oil and gas op-

erations on the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) or

in the offshore industry, and trade associations

whose members operate in, serve, or have other in-

terests in that industry. Amici curiae Free-

port-McMoRan Oil & Gas LLC, Amplify Energy

Corp. (partly through its subsidiary Beta Operating

Company, LLC), Ardent Companies, Inc., DCOR,

LLC, and Ensign United States Drilling (California),

Inc., are companies engaged in the acquisition, ex-

ploration, development, and production of oil and

gas properties on the OCS, and which employ indi-

viduals to work on offshore OCS platforms off the

California coast and in the Gulf of Mexico. Several

amici are defendants in pending litigation in which

OCS platform workers assert wage-and-hour claims

under California law. Because those cases will likely

be affected by the disposition of this case, those

amici have a direct and substantial interest in this

case.

Amici the American Petroleum Institute, Calli-

fornia Independent Petroleum Association, Inde-

pendent Petroleum Association of America, National

Association of Manufacturers, National Ocean In-

dustries Association, Offshore Operators Commit-

tee, and Western States Petroleum Association are

trade associations representing business interests

' No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in

part, and no person or entity other than the amici curiae or

their counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund

the preparation of this brief. The parties were given timely

notice and have consented to this filing.

(1)

2

involved or supporting the offshore industry, includ-

ing crude oil and natural gas producers and oil and

natural gas exploration and production companies

with operations on the OCS.

Collectively, amici participate regularly in leg-

islative, regulatory, and judicial proceedings that

may affect their or their members’ interests. Amici

have an interest !n ensuring a stable and predictable

legal framework governing the offshore industry, to

allow businesses and employees to know which labor

and employment practices (among other laws) apply

to U.S. offshore operations. All amici have a strong

and direct interest in the question presented here—

i.e., the circumstances in which state wage-and-hour

laws might apply to operations on the OCS.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

As petitioner Parker Drilling Management Ser-

vices, Ltd. (“Parker”) has demonstrated, this Court's

review is urgently warranted. The decision below

departs from decades of settled law, opens a split

among the federal circuits having jurisdiction over

virtually al/ oil and gas activity on the OCS, and

misconstrues the text, history, and purpose of the

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”). Pet.

3-4. Amici focus here on four particular reasons why

this Court should grant review.

First, in interpreting OCSLA to allow state law

to apply on the OCS even in the absence of a “gap”

in federal law, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected

a rule that is settled law in the Fifth and Eleventh

Circuits. In so doing, it created a square conflict

3

among the federal courts of appeals with territorial

jurisdiction over virtually all U.S. oil and gas opera-

tions on the OCS. This conflict undermines predict-

ability and uniformity for those—like several amici

or their members—with operations in both the Gulf

of Mexico and offshore of the West Coast.

Second, by rejecting a legal standard that has

provided the choice-of-law framework on the OCS for

almost 50 years, the decision disrupted longstanding

and mutually beneficial employment relationships

carefully tailored to the unique circumstances of liv-

ing and working offshore. It has replaced them with

uncertainty and confusion regarding compensation,

benefits and employment relations. And the Ninth

Circuit's decision potentially subjects OCS employ-

ers to hundreds of millions of dollars in retroactive

damages, fines, and penalties—above and beyond

the already generous wages and benefits employees

have enjoyed under existing arrangements.

Third, the Ninth Circuit's decision effectively

accords state law supremacy over federal law in an

area under exclusive federal jurisdiction and control,

contrary to Congress's intent and this Court's

longstanding precedent. This case asks whether

California state law requiring employees to be paid

for non-working (and even sleeping) hours displaces

federal regulations long providing the opposite. But

if the decision below stands, it will give rise to a host

of other conflicts and business uncertainties. For in-

stance, federal law currently instructs an employer

to pay overtime wages only if an employee works

more than 40 hours in a week, while California law

4

requires overtime to be paid for every hour above 8

worked in a single day.

Finally, given the reality that some states will

have different—and even diametrically opposed—

policy preferences than the federal government re-

garding OCS activity, this decision invites strategic

behavior. It allows states to promulgate laws in-

tended to increase the difficulty and cost of OCS op-

erations that the federal government seeks to en-

courage. That result is particularly intolerable,

given Congress's choice to make the OCS an area

within exclusive federal jurisdiction, subject exclu-

sively to federal law.

ARGUMENT

When businesses decide whether and how to in-

vest and operate on the OCS, a key threshold ques-

tion is whether federal or state law applies. The

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §1331

et seq., defines the body of law applicable to the OCS

and the structures there, including drilling and pro-

duction platforms. See Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. &

Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969).

By enacting OCSLA, which extended the juris-

diction of the United States and its laws to the OCS,

“Congress * * * affirm{ed] the Federal Government's

authority and control over the [OCS].” Pac. Opera-

tors Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 565 U.S. 207, 212

(2012) (citing 43 U.S.C. §§1331(a), 1332(1)); see also

United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 522 (1975)

(discussing pre-OCSLA cases holding that the “con-

trol and disposition” of the OCS was “in the first in-

stance * * * the business of the Federal Government

5

rather than the States”). The OCS, and the plat-

forms attached to it, are “subject to the exclusive ju-

risdiction and control of the Federal Government.”

Shell Oil Co. v. lowa Dep't of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19,

27 (1988); accord Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355-357 (“[ijt

is evident * * * that federal law is ‘exclusive’ in its

regulation of” the OCS and the structures fixed

thereon).

Recognizing that federal law might not address

the full range of legal issues potentially arising on

the OCS, Congress included a choice-of-law provi-

sion that this Court and every other court to consider

the question until now have understood to “supple-

ment[] gaps in the federal law with state law.” Ro-

drigue, 395 U.S. at 357 (citing 43 U.S.C.

§1333(a)(2)(A)). Under this provision, “[a]ll law ap-

plicable to the [OCS] is federal law, but to fill the

substantial ‘gaps’ in the coverage of federal law,

OCSLA borrows the ‘applicable and not inconsistent’

laws of the adjacent States as surrogate federal law.”

Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473,

480-481 (1981) (citations omitted); see also Pet. 33-

34 (“state law never applies of its own force under

OCSLA,” because adopted state law becomes “‘the

law of the United States’” (quoting Rodrigue, 395

U.S. at 355-356)).

Contrary to long-settled precedent and widely

held expectations of employers and employees alike,

the Ninth Circuit held here that workers employed

on OCS platforms may bring claims under state

wage-and-hour laws. Pet. App. 1-2. The Ninth Cir-

cuit expressly “reject[ed] the proposition” —first es-

6

tablished in the Fifth Circuit and since accepted na-

tionwide—that state law applies on the OCS only if

“necess|ary] to fill a significant void or gap” in fed-

eral law. Pet. App. 2 (citing Cont'l Oil Co. v. London

S.S. Owners’ Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 417 F.2d 1030, 1036

(5th Cir. 1969)).

The Ninth Circuit's decision is already having—

and if allowed to stand, will continue to have—

far-reaching practical and financial consequences

not only for OCS employers, but also for thousands

of employees working offshore pursuant to generous

contractual and other arrangements predicated on a

legal framework the panel discarded. Under the de-

cision below, the terms of those employment ar-

rangements very likely will no longer be sustainable

or mutually beneficial.

I. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Rejects

Decades Of Settled Law

Half a century ago, the Fifth Circuit articulated

a clear and easily implemented standard for when

state law applies as surrogate federal law under

§1333(a)(2)(A). That standard comports with

OCSLA’s text and purpose, this Court’s precedent,

longstanding industry practice, employee expecta-

tions, and common sense. The Ninth Circuit, how-

ever, explicitly rejected that settled understanding,

creating a square circuit split and introducing desta-

bilizing uncertainty into OCSLA’s governing legal

framework.

As even the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, see

Pet. App. 11-14, any understanding of OCSLA must

begin with Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,

7

395 U.S. 352 (1969). After exhaustively considering

the statutory text, history, and purpose, Rodrigue

concluded that OCSLA “makes it clear that federal

law, supplemented by state law of the adjacent

State, is to be applied to * * * artificial islands [af-

fixed on the OCS] as though they were federal en-

claves in an upland State.” Jd. at 355.

Turning first to the statutory text, this Court

found it “evident * * * that federal law is ‘exclusive’

in its regulation of [the OCS],” and that state law is

adopted as surrogate federal law only when neces-

sary to “supplement|] gaps in the federal law.” /d.

at 357. The statute’s history, this Court concluded,

also “makes it clear that state law could be used to

fill federal voids” but that ultimately “federal law

should prevail.” See id. at 357-359. However, “for

federal law to oust adopted state law|,| federal law

must first apply.” /d. at 359. On the facts of that

case, this Court concluded that federal law did not

apply, see id. at 359-366, thus “remov|ing] any ob-

stacle to the application of state law,” see id. at 355,

366. In other words, because federal law did not ap-

ply at all, “a substantial ‘gap’ in federal law’ existed,

to be “filled with the applicable body of state law.”

See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 101

(1971) (discussing Rodrigue, 395 U.S. 352); see also

Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207,

217-218 (1986) (explaining that in Rodrigue, federal

law did not apply, and thus did not “preclude the ap-

plication of state law as adopted federal law through

OCSLA”).

8

Shortly after Rodrigue, the Fifth Circuit ad-

dressed whether state law is “applicable and not in-

consistent” under §1333(a)(2)(A) when existing fed-

eral law does provide a comprehensive governing

scheme. Applying “the recurring theme of Ro-

drigue,” the Fifth Circuit concluded that “the delib-

erate choice of federal law, federally administered,

requires that ‘applicable’ [in §1333(a)(2)(A)] be read

in terms of necessity—necessity to fill a significant

void or gap” in federal law. Cont’l Oil, 417 F.2d at

1036. Otherwise put, when federal law provides

both a right and a remedy, the application of state

law is neither “needed [njor permitted” under

OCSLA. Id. at 1035-1036; see also Nations v. Mor-

ris, 483 F.2d 577, 590 (5th Cir. 1973) (when a com-

prehensive federal statutory scheme applies on the

OCS, “[t]here is no need to bring aboard” state law

“to cause liability to be fixed where Congress never

intended it”).

Since 1969, the Fifth Circuit has consistently

held that “OCSLA adopts the law of the adjacent

state *** as surrogate federal law’ only “[wjhen

there are ‘gaps in the federal law[.|’” Tetra Techs.,

Inc. vy. Cont'l Ins. Co., 814 F.3d 733, 738 (5th Cir.

2016) (quoting Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 357); see also,

e.g., Texaco Expl. & Prod., Inc. v. AmClyde Engi-

neered Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 760, 772 (5th Cir. 2006)

(“OCSLA extends federal law to the [OCS] and bor-

rows adjacent state law as a gap-filler.”). This Court

also similarly reaffirmed Rodrigue’s central prem-

ise—namely, that the laws of the adjacent States ap-

ply under OCSLA only when necessary “to fill the

substantial ‘gaps’ in the coverage of federal law.”

Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 480-481; see also, e.g.,

9

Maryland vy. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 752 n.26

(1981); Huson, 404 U.S. at 103-105. Continental Oil

itself is sufficiently longstanding that it also serves

as binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. See

Pet. 11-12, 18; see also Bonner v. City of Prichard,

661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). And

the decision had been consistently followed by dis-

trict courts in the Ninth Circuit.? In other words,

until this case, the Continental Oil standard gov-

erned virtually all offshore oil and gas operations on

the OCS.

Despite the panel’s suggestion that the Fifth

Circuit has departed from this settled framework,

Continental Oil remains good law today. See Pet.

18-20. Notably, the very case the Ninth Circuit cited

as creating uncertainty, Union Texas Petroleum

Corp. v. PLT Engineering, Inc., 895 F.2d 1043 (5th

Cir. 1990), acknowledged the central holding of both

Rodrigue and Continental Oil, emphasizing that

Congress intended for “the OCS [to] be treated as an

area of exclusive federal jurisdiction *** where

state law will apply to fill in the gaps in the federal

law.”® Id. at 1052 (emphasis added). PLT did not

® See, e.g., Garcia v. Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas LLC, No.

16-cv-4320 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2016); Jefferson v. Beta Operat-

ing Co., No. 15-cv-4966 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2015); Espinoza v.

Beta Operating Co., No. 15-cv-4659 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2015);

Reyna v. Venoco, Inc., No. 15-cv-4525 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2015);

Williams v. Brinderson Constructors, Inc., No. 15-cv-2474,

2015 WL 4747892 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2015).

8 Even if PLT had purported to overrule Continental Oil,

which the opinion gave no hint of doing, see Pet. 18, Continen-

tal Oil would still control. See Texaco Inc. v. Louisiana Land

& Expl. Co., 995 F.2d 43, 44 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[i}n the event of

10

focus on whether a gap existed in federal law be-

cause—unlike in this case, in which the Fair Labor

Standards Act (“FLSA”) provides a comprehensive

scheme, see Pet. 8-9, 30-32—there was no federal

law to apply. See PLT, 895 F.2d at 1047 (“Rodrigue

made clear that ‘for federal law to oust adopted state

law, federal law must first apply’” (quoting Ro-

drigue, 395 U.S. at 359)). Moreover, as even the

panel below ultimately acknowledged, Continental

Oil and PLT can be reconciled in a way that pre-

serves the full force of the Continental Oil rule, “such

that the PLT conditions come into play only if there

is a significant gap or void in federal law.” Pet. App.

19 (citing Tetra Techs., 814 F.3d at 738). The direct

conflict between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, on

one hand, and the Ninth Circuit’s decision, on the

other, strongly supports this Court’s review.

Several features of OCS oil and gas operations

and OCSLA litigation exacerbate the practical con-

sequences of the circuit split. The Fifth, Eleventh,

and Ninth Circuits collectively have jurisdiction

over virtually all existing operations on the OCS in

the United States—i.e., the Pacific Coast (including

Alaska) and the Gulf Coast. The vast majority of

America’s coastal waters currently open to offshore

oil and gas production activity are located off the

coasts of States within the territorial jurisdiction of

the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.‘ To the extent drill-

conflicting panel opinions * * *, the earlier one controls” (cita-

tions and internal quotation marks omitted)).

‘ See Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Gulf of Mexico OCS

Region, https://www.boem.gov/Gulf-of-Mexico-Region/ (areas

1]

ing occurs elsewhere, it is located almost entirely off-

shore of States within the Ninth Circuit's jurisdic-

tion.© As a result, OCSLA litigation occurs all but

exclusively in these circuits. Moreover, for compa-

nies with offshore operations in both regions, enter-

prise-wide policies and employer-employee relation-

ships are subject to Fifth, Eleventh, and Ninth Cir-

cuit jurisdiction simultaneously. The Ninth Cir-

cuit’s decision means that such companies and their

employees will face inconsistent choice-of-law anal-

ysis—and ultimately inconsistent substantive obli-

gations—depending on where operations are lo-

cated, undermining uniformity in the implementa-

tion of OCSLA.

The Ninth Circuit's decision could significantly

disrupt oil and gas operations on the OCS. Employ-

ers and employees associated with drilling and pro-

duction platforms have structured employment rela-

tionships in reliance on the long-settled line of cases

including Rodrigue and Continental Oil. If the deci-

sion here stands, operations along the Pacific Coast

will be governed by different choice-of-law rules than

those in the Gulf, undermining expectations and dis-

rupting contractual and other arrangements.

off the coasts of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama

“generatle] about 97% of all OCS oil and gas production’).

5 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of the Interior and Bureau of Ocean

Energy Mgmt., 2019-2024 National Outer Continental Shelf

Oil and Gas Leasing Draft Proposed Program (Jan. 2018),

https://www.boem.gov/NP-Draft-Proposed-Program-2019-

2024/.

12

Even within the Ninth Circuit, OCS operations

now face different legal rules, depending on their lo-

cation. Four States within the Ninth Circuit's juris-

diction—California, Oregon, Washington, and

Alaska—are adjacent to offshore OCS oil and gas ac-

tivity.© Stark differences exist in their laws. For ex-

ample, courts of those states have reached diametri-

cally opposing views about compensation for employ-

ees who reside on an employer's premises for ex-

tended periods of time. Compare Mendiola v. CPS

Sec. Solutions, Inc., 340 P.3d 355, 362-363 (Cal.

2015) (under state law, on-call hours, including

“sleep time,” represent “hours worked” for overtime

purposes), with Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc. v.

Throop, 181 P.3d 1084, 1092-1094 (Alaska 2008)

(sleep and recreation time need not be compensated

as overtime work).’

To be sure, Congress recognized in OCSLA that

in some circumstances, an interest in “national uni-

formity” would give way to other considerations.

Pet. App. 38 (quoting Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 487;

Huson, 404 U.S. at 104); Warren M. Christopher,

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key toa New

® See Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Pacific OCS Region,

https://www.boem.gov/Pacific-Region/; Bureau of Ocean En-

ergy Mgmt., Alaska Oocs Region,

https://www.boem.gov/Alaska-Region/

7 Federal regulations addressing compensation for employees

who reside on their employers’ premises “for extended periods

of time” provide that employees are “not considered as working

all the time [they are] on the premises,” and give effect to “any

reasonable agreement of the parties” concerning wages for

overtime work. 29 C.F.R. §785.23.

13

Frontier, 6 STAN. L. REV. 23, 40-41 (1953). But Con-

gress assured a minimum degree of uniformity by

“incorporati[ng] * * * the law of adjacent States to fil/

gaps in federal law.” See Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at

479 n.7, 486-488 (emphasis added). This Court's re-

view is essential to ensure uniformity and predicta-

bility in the choice-of-law framework, in a manner

consistent with OCSLA’s text and intent.®

Il. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Disrupts

Employment Relationships Formed In

Reliance On Settled Law

For decades, employers and employees on OCS

drilling and production platforms have implemented

compensation and benefit structures under a shared

understanding of substantive background law.

Whether by arms-length negotiated contracts, col-

lective bargaining, or other arrangements, these pol-

icies have been tailored to the offshore industry, rec-

ognizing (among other things) that workers often

temporarily reside on premises. The terms of these

arrangements generally are far more favorable—in-

cluding with respect to wages, overtime, and other

benefits—than those seen in non-OCS industries

typically covered by state wage-and-hour laws. By

rejecting the legal principles on which these rela-

tionships were based, and potentially exposing em-

ployers to massive retroactive liability for reasona-

* The possibility of expanded OCS operations under current

U.S. policy will only heighten the need for uniformity and con-

sistency in the governing legal framework. See supra n.5.

14

bly relying on longstanding law, the panel under-

mined the stability of those relationships, with tre-

mendous practical and financial consequences.°

Oil and gas operations on the OCS present

unique opportunities and challenges. Production

platforms affixed to the OCS operate 24 hours a day

and are often in remote locations miles from the

coast. While some employees may have the option

to return home each night, in other instances, it may

be impractical or undesirable to commute. For ex-

ample, employees may prefer not to commute given

travel time and logistics. Others may not reside

near enough to allow commuting, for instance choos-

ing to live in a less expensive inland area rather

than in a California coastal city such as Santa Bar-

bara. Asa result, employees often work agreed-upon

shifts, or “hitches,” in which the employees work,

eat, sleep, and live on the platforms for a specified

number of days—typically followed by an equal

number of days off. See Pet. App. 3 (14-day shifts on

the platform with employees scheduled to work 12

hours during a 24-hour period, followed by 14 days

at home); see also Meadows v. Latshaw Drilling Co.,

866 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2017).

In recognition of the particular circumstances of

work on OCS drilling platforms, employees receive

and enjoy above-market salaries, generous benefits,

® The Ninth Circuit reserved for the district court to decide

in the first instance “whether [the] holding should be applied

retrospectively.” Pet. App. 43 (citing Huson, 404 U.S. at 106-

107).

15

and abundant time off.'° Long before the decision at

issue here, OCS employees received hourly rates

“well above the state and federal minimum wage”

and “premium rates for overtime hours.” Pet. App.

20. By one recent estimate, offshore oil and gas

workers earn more than 150% of the average hourly

wage of other employees.'! Moreover, during the

non-working (e.g., sleeping and recreation) hours

within a hitch that form the basis for this lawsuit,

employees can use their time as they see fit. The

platforms are equipped with various amenities for

employees to use free of charge, including cable tel-

evision, internet access, and fitness and recreation

facilities, allowing employees to engage cost-free in

many of the same personal and leisure activities

0 See, e.g., International Association of Drilling Contractors,

Life on a Drilling Rig, http://drillingmatters.iadc.org/life-on-a-

drilling-rig/.

'! U.S. Dep't of the Interior and Bureau of Ocean Energy

Mgmt., 2019-2024 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and

Gas Leasing Draft Proposed Program (Jan. 2018),

https://www.boem.gov/NP-Draft-Proposed-Program-2019-

2024/; see also Jim Nicholson, The Incredible Economic Oppor-

tunities of Offshore Energy Exploration, NATL REVIEW (Oct. 1,

2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/10/the-incredi-

ble-economic-opportunities-of-offshore-energy-exploration/

(stating that “natural gas and oil exploration jobs offer average

salaries of $116,000 a year, without necessarily requiring a col-

lege degree”). A study examining the economic impacts of en-

ergy activity in Louisiana estimated that the average wage

earned by employees in the oil and gas extraction area was

180% of the overall average. Eric N. Smith, Louisiana - The

Status of the State: A Report on the Impact of Energy Activity

on the State’s Economy at 46, GREATER NEW ORLEANS, INC.

(2014), http://www.noia.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Fu-

ture_of_Energy_FINAL-GNO-INc. pdf.

16

they enjoy on land. Employees live and eat rent-free

during shifts, with employers providing lodging and

bathing facilities, meals, and cleaning services at no

cost to employees. And when the hitch is over, the

employee returns home to spend an equivalent num-

ber of days off.

Employers and employees in the offshore indus-

try have crafted these mutually beneficial

wage-and-benefit policies based on a shared under-

standing of the governing legal framework, see su-

pra § |, and the industry’s practical and financial re-

alities. By altering the background legal framework,

the Ninth Circuit's decision is all but certain to sig-

nificantly disrupt those relationships. Overnight,

employers in the Ninth Circuit became subject to

state wage-and-hour laws designed for conventional

(e.g., 9-to-5) employment but ill-tailored to the OCS’s

unique working environment.

The disruptive effects are numerous. Offshore

employers are now faced with changing not only

base pay and overtime arrangements, but also a

range of other employment terms, such as benefit

packages. Some benefits provided to offshore work-

ers—such as life insurance policies provided by

third-party financial institutions—are tied to a

worker's base pay. Thus, reducing base pay to offset

the additional cost of paying for sleep time would

have cascading collateral consequences, often to the

employee's detriment. The decision’s ripple effects

stretch beyond employees of platform operators; con-

tractors providing food service, cleaning, and other

services on platforms now face uncertainty about

paying their own employees.

17

Moreover, if applied retroactively, the Ninth

Circuit's decision could inflict hundreds of millions

of dollars of liability on employers who structured

operations in reliance on cases like Rodrigue and

Continental Oil. Such a result would give employ-

ees—already generously compensated under exist-

ing arrangements—a windfall of backpay, plus in-

terest and penalties. Going forward, it is doubtful

that employers could offer such generous compensa-

tion and benefit terms, if relationships are subject to

state-law overtime and other requirements enacted

without regard for the unique circumstances of OCS

work. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's decision not only

creates the potential for significant retroactive lia-

bility, it is disrupting employer-employee relation-

ships, industry-wide.

Both sides would benefit from having a uniform

choice-of-law regime governing the OCS. Otherwise,

both employers and employees will face a different

legal regime depending on whether they are operat-

ing in the Gulf of Mexico or off the Pacific Coast—

and which neighboring state is closest to that loca-

tion. Indeed, because individual employees may

move between the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific

Coast on a short-term basis, they could be subject to

multiple pay structures in a given year or month.'”

Increasing the cost of OCS operations could also

'* For instance, Pacific Coast platform operators may hire

specialist teams from the Gulf of Mexico to perform particular

tasks, such as plugging and abandonment of wells, on a short-

term or extended basis. Such workers could be subject to cer-

tain provisions of California employment law beginning with

their first full day of work. E.g., Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254

P.3d 237 (Cal. 2011).

18

shorten the economic life of some offshore facilities,

harming not only employees, but also the federal

government, and ultimately taxpayers.

The federal government has a substantial “pro-

prietary interest in the OCS.” EP Operating Ltd.

P’ship v. Placid Oil Co., 26 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir.

1994) (citation omitted). OCSLA authorizes the Sec-

retary of the Interior to offer and administer oil and

gas leases on the OCS. Aera Energy LLC v. Salazar,

642 F.3d 212, 214 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Under such

leases, private companies pay “an up-front bonus,

annual rentals, and royalties on oil and natural gas

actually produced” during the lease term. /bid. (cit-

ing 43 U.S.C. §1337(a), (b)); see also 30 C.F.R.

§560.202 (describing bidding systems). Offshore ac-

tivity generates billions in federal revenue. Increas-

ing the costs and potential liability of offshore pro-

duction activity could deprive the federal govern-

ment of significant revenue, not only lowering the

government's annual royalties from existing leases,

but also deterring operators from bidding on new

leases and slowing development on the OCS over-

all.

'8 One recent study estimated that expanding oil and gas

activity in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico alone could increase fed-

eral revenues from royalties, bonus bids, and rents by some

$41.5 billion. See The Economic Impacts of Allowing Access to

the Eastern Gulf of Mexico for Oil and Natural Gas Exploration

and Development at 5 (2018), http://www.noia.org/wp-con-

tent/uploada/2018/04/180309-Calash-Eastern-Gulf-Develop-

ment-Economic-I mpacts-Report-F inal. pdf.

19

lil. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Gives

States Supremacy Over Federal Law,

And Invites Efforts To Frustrate Federal

Policy

The Ninth Circuit’s decision effectively gives

state law supremacy over federal law, contrary to

OCSLA’s text and intent. In OCSLA, “Congress em-

phatically implemented its view that the United

States has paramount rights to the seabed beyond

the three-mile limit.” Shell Oil, 488 U.S. at 27 (cita-

tions and internal quotation marks omitted). And

because “the OCS [is] subject to the exclusive juris-

diction and control of the Federal Government,”

ibid., “federal law should prevail” over state law,

particularly where, as here, a federal statutory

scheme does apply. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 358.

Notwithstanding the panel's attempt to down-

play the issue, the Ninth Circuit's decision effec-

tively “accord|[s] state law supremacy over federal

law” and “cede[s] the United States’ jurisdiction over

the OCS to state agencies.” Pet. App. 23. In the

Ninth Circuit’s mistaken view, even when a compre-

hensive federal scheme governs claims arising on

the OCS, state law will control so long as it “per-

tain[s] to the subject matter at hand,” Pet. App.

21-27, and is not “inconsistent with” existing federal

law (under the Ninth Circuit's diluted reading of “in-

consistent,” see Pet. App. 27-39). The Ninth Cir-

cuit’s interpretation, which blesses the wholesale

application of state law on the OCS, cannot be rec-

onciled with OCSLA’s text and purpose.

Beginning in the 1930s, coastal States and the

federal government became locked in a dispute over

20

“territorial jurisdiction and ownership of the OCS.”

Shell Oil, 488 U.S. at 26-27. This Court settled that

debate in 1947, holding that the federal government,

and not the states, had “paramount rights in and

power over” the OCS. United States v. California,

332 U.S. 19, 38-39 (1947). Three years later, this

Court reaffirmed that the OCS

is a national, not a state concern. National

interests, national responsibilities, national

concerns are involved. The problems of

commerce, national defense, relations with

other powers, war and peace focus there.

National rights must therefore be para-

mount in that area.

United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 704 (1950);

see also United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707,

719-720 (1950). These cases established that, as a

matter of constitutional structure, “paramount

rights” to the OCS are “an incident to national sov-

ereignty,” meaning that the control of the OCS is “in

the first instance * * * the business of the Federal

Government rather than the States.” Maine, 420

U.S. at 522.

Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted OCSLA in

an effort “to resolve the ‘interminable litigation’ aris-

ing over the controversy of the ownership of the

lands underlying the marginal sea.” Maine, 420

U.S. at 527 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 215 83rd Cong.,

lst Sess. 2 (1953)); see also Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S.

at 479 n.7. Perhaps “the most challenging question

of legal theory” Congress faced in drafting OCSLA

21

was what law should apply on the OCS. Christo-

pher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 6

STAN. L. REV. at 37."

Congress deliberately rejected a blanket appli-

cation of either maritime law or state law to the

OCS. See Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355, 358-359,

361-366. Opponents of OCSLA, led by Louisiana

Senator Russell Long, had argued in favor of apply-

ing state law on the OCS, enforced by “the officials

of such State.” Jd. at 358-359. But Congress rejected

“the notion of supremacy of state law administered

by state agencies,” Cont Oil, 417 F.2d at 1036 (cit-

ing Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 358), opting instead for “a

unique combination of federal and state laws,”

Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,

6 STAN. L. REV. at 40-41. In adopting this approach,

Congress embraced “the constitutional underpin-

nings” of the Texas, Louisiana, and California cases.

See Maine, 420 U.S. at 524-527; see also Maryland,

451 U.S. at 730.

OCSLA must be understood in the context of

this Court’s decisions resolving “the clash between

national sovereignty and states’ rights” on the OCS.

Cont'l Oil, 417 F.2d at 1036. Indeed, this Court has

consistently and repeatedly interpreted OCSLA in

light of this historical background. See, e.g., Shell

Oil, 488 U.S. at 26-27; Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 479

n.7; accord Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S.

' The choice-of-law issue had “political ramifications” be-

cause “the law to be applied had a bearing on the question

whether the coastal states were to share in the revenues of the

outer Continental Shelf.” Christopher, The Outer Continental

Shelf Lands Act, 6 STAN. L. REV. at 37, 40-41,

22

668, 669 (1979) (“[C]ourts, in construing a statute,

may with propriety recur to the history of the times

when it was passed; and this is frequently necessary,

in order to ascertain the reason as well as the mean-

ing of particular provisions in it.” (citation omitted)).

Congress's choice in OCSLA “to retain exclusive fed-

eral control of the administration of the [OCS],” Gulf

Offshore, 453 U.S. at 479 n.7, “affirm[s] the Federal

Government’s authority and control over the [OCS],”

Pac. Operators, 565 U.S. at 212.'° While Congress

recognized that offshore workers might in some cir-

cumstances have “tie[s]” to adjacent States, Ro-

drigue, 395 U.S. at 355, it struck a balance that

“manifested itself primarily in the incorporation of

the law of adjacent States to fill gaps in federal law.”

Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 479 n.7 (citations omit-

ted).

Despite the fact that Congress expressly re-

jected “the notion of supremacy of state law admin-

istered by state agencies” on the OCS, Cont'l Oil, 417

F.2d at 1036, the Ninth Circuit's decision allows

state law, enforced by state officials, to control on the

OCS. The Ninth Circuit's analysis “accords initially

a superiority to adjacent state law’ because “the

question of federal law comes into play only after

this process excludes state law.” Jd. at 1035-1036;

but cf. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 359 (state law applies

' The same year Congress enacted OCSLA, it passed the

Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§1301-1315, which “con-

firmied] the Federal Government's interest in the area sea-

ward of the 3-mile limit.” Maryland, 451 U.S. at 730; see also

Maine, 420 U.S. at 524.

23

under OCSLA only if federal law does not “first ap-

ply’). This interpretation effectively reads the word

“applicable” out of the statute, “put[ting] almost

100% Emphasis on the not inconsistent with federal

laws element of [§1333(a)(2)(A)],” Cont’? Oil, 417

F.2d at 1035 (internal quotation marks and altera-

tions omitted), an approach this Court has long dis-

favored. See Pet. 27-29; but cf. Nat? Ass'n of Mfrs.

v. Dep't of Defense, 138 S. Ct. 617, 632 (2018) (“[T]he

Court is obliged to give effect, if possible, to every

word Congress used.” (citation and internal quota-

tion marks omitted)).

The practical consequences are real. The Ninth

Circuit’s decision allows California law to control

over a federal regulation explicitly providing that

employees residing on a worksite need not be paid

for time spent sleeping or otherwise off duty. See 29

C.F.R. §785.23. In effectively overruling federal law,

the panel invites workers (and creative plaintiffs

lawyers) to retroactively claim a host of extra-con-

tractual rights based in state employment or other

laws. And if allowed to stand, the decision will trig-

ger new waves of litigation—and the threat of ever-

mounting retroactive liability—every time a state

changes its interpretation of its wage, hour, and

other employment laws.

The federal-state conflict is stark, where (as

here) a federal scheme allows excluding non-work-

ing hours from overtime, see 29 C.F.R. §785.23, but

state law compels the opposite approach. The Ninth

Circuit’s decision departs from cases holding that

California state wage-and-hour laws could not apply

in other federal enclaves, because they conflict with

24

the FLSA. E.g., Mersnick v. USProtect Corp., No. 06-

cv-3993, 2006 WL 3734396, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Dec.

18, 2006); cf. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355 (fixtures on

OCS treated as “federal enclaves in an upland

State”).

In practice, some states have—and likely will al-

ways have—different policy preferences than the

federal government regarding OCS activity. The

panel decision opens the door to strategic behavior,

inviting states to promulgate facially neutral but ef-

fectively targeted laws that increase the difficulty

and cost of OCS operations. The concern is not the-

oretical. E.g., Jeff Daniels, California Gov. Jerry

Brown Moves to Block Trump on Offshore Drilling:

‘Not Here, Not Now,’” CNBC (Sept. 8, 2018),

https://tinyurl.com/y9lrv8m1 (discussing new Cali-

fornia legislation intended “to thwart” federal gov-

ernment’s “efforts to expand offshore oil drilling

along the California coast”); Andre Stepankowsky,

West Coast States Push Back on Drilling Proposal,

THE DAILY News (@an. 5, 2018), https://ti-

nyurl.com/y7e8flxq (quoting joint statement by Gov-

ernors of California, Washington, and Oregon oppos-

ing federal proposal to expand OCS oil and gas oper-

ations).

In short, the Ninth Circuit’s decision transforms

a statute “intended to provide for the orderly devel-

opment of offshore resources,” Shell Oil, 488 U.S. at

27 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),

into a regime of jurisdictional chaos, inviting States

to assert ever-increasing authority over commercial

activities in an area Congress reserved for primary

25

federal jurisdiction and control. This Court’s review

is urgently warranted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should

grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted.

BALDWIN J. LEE JOHN P. ELWOOD

ALLEN MATKINS LECK GAM- KEVIN A. GAYNOR

BLE MALLORY & NATSIS LLP JEREMY C. MARWELL

Three Embarcadero Ctr. VINSON & ELKINS LLP

12th Floor 2200 Pennsylvania

San Francisco, CA 94111 Ave., NW, Suite 500W

(415) 273-7446 Washington, DC 20037

(202) 639-6500

KEVIN W. BROOKS jmarwell@velaw.com

VINSON & ELKINS LLP

2001 Ross Ave., Ste. 3900

Dallas, TX 75201

(214) 220-7805

Counsel for Amici Curiae

26

GEORGE W. ABELE

PAUL HASTINGS LLP

515 South Flower St., 25th

Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90071

(213) 683-6131

Counsel for Beta Operating

Company, LLC and

Amplify Energy Corp.

DAVID J. COOPER

CATHERINE E. BENNETT

VANESSA FRANCO CHAVEZ

KLEIN, DENATALE, GOLD-

NER, COOPER, ROSENLIEB &

Bakersfield, CA 93309

(661) 395-1000

Counsel for Ensign United

States Drilling (Califor-

nia), Inc.

JOSHUA D. KIENITZ

LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.

1255 Treat Blud, Ste. 600

Walnut Creek, CA 94597

(415) 399-8451

Counsel for Ardent Compa-

nies, Inc.

Davip C. MCDERMOTT

DCOR, LLC

290 Maple Court, Ste. 290

Ventura, CA 93003

(805) 535-2073

Counsel for DCOR, LLC

STACY R. LINDEN

MATTHEW A. HAYNIE

AMERICAN PETROLEUM

INSTITUTE

1220 L St., NW

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 828-8000

Counsel for American

Petroleum Institute

BENJAMIN G. SHATZ

MANATT, PHELPS & PHIL-

Lips, LLP

11355 W. Olympic Blvd.

Los Angeles, CA 90064

(310) 312-4383

Counsel for California In-

dependent Petroleum Asso-

ciation

BARRY RUSSELL

INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

1201 15th Street, NW

Suite 300

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 857-4722

Counsel for Independent

Petroleum Association of

America

EVAN H. Z'MMERMAN

OFFSHORE OPERATORS

COMMITTEE

2400 Veterans Memorial

Blvud., Suite 206

Kenner, LA 70062

(504) 904-7966

Counsel for the Offshore

Operators Committee

OCTOBER 2018

27

PETER C. TOLSDORF

MANUFACTURERS’ CENTER

FOR LEGAL ACTION

733 10th St., NW, Ste. 700

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 637-3133

Counsel for National Asso-

ciation of Manufacturers

RANDALL LUTHI

NATIONAL OCEAN

INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION

1120 G Street, NW

Suite 900

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 347-6900

Counsel for the National

Ocean Industries Associa-

tion

OYANGO A. SNELL

WESTERN STATES

PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION

1415 L Street, Suite 900

Sacramento, CA 95814

(916) 325-3115

Counsel for Western States

Petroleum Association