Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 306 (2018) (No. 17-8151)
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No. 17-
In THE
Supreme Court of the United States
RUSSELL BUCKLEW,
Petitioner,
Vv.
ANNE PRECYTHE, et al.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR MARCH 20, 2018
CHERYL A. PILATE ROBERT N. HOCHMAN *
MORGAN PILATE LLC RAECHEL J. BIMMERLE
926 Cherry Street KELLY J. HUGGINS
Kansas City, MO 64106 MATTHEWJ. SALDANA
(816) 471-6694 HEATHER B. SULTANIAN
DANIEL R. THIES
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
One South Dearborn Street
Chicago, IL 60603
(312) 853-7000
rhochman@sidley.com
Counsel for Petitioner
March 15, 2018 * Counsel of Record
CAPITAL CASE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Should a court evaluating an as-applied challenge
to a state’s method of execution based on an inmate’s
rare and severe medical condition assume that medi-
cal personnel are competent to manage his condition
and that the procedure will go as intended?
Must evidence comparing a state’s proposed method
of execution with an alternative proposed by an in-
mate be offered via a single witness, or should a court
at summary judgment look to the record as a whole to
determine whether a factfinder could conclude that
the two methods significantly differ in the risks they
pose to the inmate?
Does the Eighth Amendment require an inmate to
prove an adequate alternative method of execution
when raising an as-applied challenge to the state’s
proposed method of execution based on his rare and
severe medical condition?
(i)
il
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
Petitioner is Russell Bucklew. Respondents are
Anne L. Precythe, David Dormire, and Troy Steele,
personnel with the Missouri Department of Correc-
tions. No party is a corporation.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED...................0cccccceeseeees
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND RULE
SG EIITS exczznsscscscserecnscnvecocszesnszscenoneees
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................cccceeeeeeerees
IPOD cccrecennsscssvensescsvesennsssensanssenses
IED cxcentenserssansensesmsnsmemummemmensnensesens
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PRO-
ne ae ccnnstniscrenserecensavsereecseesenese
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................cccc0ee0e000
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND .....000.0.0......000005.
A. Bucklew’s Rare Medical Condition...........
B. Missouri's Execution Procedure ...............
E. The Lethal Gas Alternative......................
PROCEEDINGS BELOW ..................0..00.0006
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION...
I. THIS CASE PRESENTS URGENT QUES-
TIONS REGARDING LITIGATION OF
AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES TO A
METHOD OF EXECUTION .......00000.......c0c000
(iii)
21
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—continued
Page
A.Whether Courts Evaluating An As-
Applied Method-Of-Execution Claim
Should Assume That Medical Personnel
Are Competent To Handle An Inmate’s
Rare And Severe Medical Condition,
And That The Execution Will Go As In-
tended, Warrants Review ......................... 21
B. Whether The Evidence Comparing The
Risks Of Proposed Methods Of Execu-
tion Must Come From A Single Witness
ID SEINE cxssnecsneccenssensenssensnssesmnenees 26
C.Whether An Inmate Raising An As-
Applied Challenge To A Method Of Exe-
cution Must Prove An Available Alterna-
tive Method That Will Substantially Re-
duce His Risk Of Suffering Also War-
EET SAE Oe ae 29
ll. THIS CASE IS A STRONG VEHICLE FOR
ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES .................. 32
STIS cca acne ee ee 33
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 17-
3052 (8th Cir. Mar. 15, 2018)..............cc.seecceeeees la
APPENDIX B: Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 17-
3052, 2018 WL 1163360 (8th Cir. Mar. 6,
PEP cceszcecescssvescssssovecesesnesnecsesnennsounesnenesonesecseveces 3a
APPENDIX C: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-
8000-CV-W-BP (W.D. Mo. June 15, 2017)........ 26a
APPENDIX D: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-
8000-CV-W-BP (W.D. Mo. Aug. 21, 2017) ........ 39a
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS—continued
Page
APPENDIX E: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-
8000-CV-W-BP (W.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2017) ........ 44a
APPENDIX F: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-
8000-CV-W-BP (W.D. Mo. Apr. 11, 2017)......... 53a
APPENDIX G: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-
2163 (8th Cir. Mar. 6, 2015)...................ccceeeeeee 72a
APPENDIX H: Affidavit of Alana Boyles ........... 89a
APPENDIX |: Hamm Expert Report .................. 9la
APPENDIX J: Zivot Supplemental Report......... 106a
APPENDIX K: Medical Summary ...................... 144a
APPENDIX L: Missouri Execution Protocol....... 145a
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
Anderson v. Dep't of Transp., FAA, 827 F.2d
ee 28
Arthur v. Dunn, 137 8S. Ct. 725 (2017).......... 7, 31
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008)............... passim
Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-1800-CV-W-
BP, 2014 WL 2736014 (W.D. Mo. May 9,
2014), rev'd, 565 F. App’x 562 (8th Cir.
SI cnisnauiltinciesciniableastaeltitea lie oeninilabddeaaidaa bined 16
Bucklew v. Lombardi, 565 F. App’x 562 (8th
Cir. 2014), vacated on rehearing (May 20,
STITT acivecesiniicninnapbdianeiiladiieisditaidiatastatmniiiaiaetnietiniatinine 16
Bucklew v. Lombardi, 134 S. Ct. 2333
| ERNE aS SRS Ae 16
In re Campbell, 874 F.3d 454 (6th Cir.
a vicicesincistenitetniansheiisnihadaiaincaaiaaitiaiinaiipeattmeasinte 7
Correll v. State, 184 So. 3d 478 (Fla. 2015).. 7
DG&G, Inc. v. FlexSol Packaging Corp. of
Pompano Beach, 576 F.3d 820 (8th Cir.
STE Didtaititieriniainsshiiasitiendiatinlinubsaacnaitainisiandubietiaiesiaanets 28
Dixon v. Penn Cent. Co., 481 F.2d 833 (6th
TA SIU Ticionintatinieatanattedeesdeumenatiensinnminiineentes 28
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)........... 5, 22
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)..... 7, 31
Gissendaner v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep't of Corr.,
803 F.3d 565 (11th Cir. 2015).................... 7
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726
ST iceonpsinenninnteitinnininiindapanntagrennainads 3, 6, 23, 30
Hall v. Florida, 134 8. Ct. 1986 (2014)......... 31
Hamm v. Dunn, 138 8S. Ct. 828 (2018).......... 5, 25
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) ..................00000+ 6, 28
Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017)......... 31
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) ....... 6, 28
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page
Ringo v. Lombardi, No. 09-4095-BP (W.D.
Mo. filed May 17, 2009).....................-...0000 17
Trademark Props., Inc. v. A&E TV
Networks, 422 F. Appx 199 (4th Cir.
FE I cS 28
United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163 (3d
SITET ictenicvegtiienduienumatzaniabiateummnniniamsanane 28
United States v. Candie, 974 F.2d 61 (8th
ac MN cicdibisiitinbiesialitdehidiabindaihesiigebibamtaniaiinaiapinne 28
United States v. Clevenger, 733 F.2d 1356
i eiemiie 28
United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312
ne I IT ia steicinitcncticeianticdeainainetninniatiindes 28
United States v. Gonzalez-Velez, 587 F.3d
I, ST iontiicncireniintieitasnsiniatiapsscenns 28
United States v. Merida, 765 F.2d 1205 (5th
ET TI ciiccacintdesinenbienitessinsaicncisialateesiistabdeemhianans 28
United States v. Norman, 776 F.3d 67 (2d
Bis ST icciinncsisieinitianieminiaeaietiaaehiaicit abetted 28
United States v. Prince, 883 F.2d 953 (11th
Rs Shack tcenntataiintnaeheacesaiitcdedehisie aa lanaladiliastaatitin 28
United States v. Ransom, 691 F. App’x 504
(IN: TIEN TI stint nertnsnbeipanchetbiagipiaticbbeneabens 28
United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820 (7th
GIG, SII a lacinscasosschisitisetcartiemienetitibaiieniiianthindamasibiaintiinn 28
Zink v. Lombardi, No. 12-4209-BP (W.D.
By SIE: Wik CIEE cinesiricsiiccncsncensctntencese 15, 17
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTE
ey I I ns cesidaeneiel 1
Mo. Stat. Ann. § 546.720.1 ................c0eee00000 1, 10
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
OTHER AUTHORITIES Page
AMA Code of Medical Ethics (2016),
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/
files/media-browser/code-of-medical-
ethice-chapter-O. pil .............0c.-sscccccessseseeese 31
Minhua Wang, MD et al., Cavernous
Hemangioma of the Uvula: Report a Rare
Case with Literature Review, 8 N. Am. J.
of Med. & Sci. 56 (2015) ..................ccse0eeeee- 8
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Russell Bucklew petitions for a writ of certiorari to
review the decision of the Eighth Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Eighth Circuit is reported at —
F.3d —, No. 17-3052, 2018 WL 1163360 (8th Cir.
Mar. 6, 2018) and is reproduced in the appendix to
this petition at Pet. App. 3a—25a. The opinion of the
district court is not reported and is reproduced at Pet.
App. 26a—38a.
JURISDICTION
The Western District of Missouri had jurisdiction
over Bucklew’s Section 1983 claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1343. The Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
The Eighth Circuit entered judgment on March 6,
2018, Pet. App. 3a, and denied Mr. Bucklew’s petition
for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc on March
15, 2018, Pet. App. la—2a. This Court has jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
Missouri's death penalty statute, Mo. Stat. Ann.
§ 546.720.1, provides in relevant part:
The manner of inflicting the punishment of
death shall be by the administration of lethal gas
2
or by means of the administration of lethal injec-
tion. And for such purpose the director of the de-
partment of corrections is hereby authorized and
directed to provide a suitable and efficient room
or place, enclosed from public view, within the
walls of a correctional facility of the department
of corrections, and the necessary appliances for
carrying into execution the death peralty by
means of the administration of lethal gas or by
means of the administration of lethal injection.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Russell Bucklew is scheduled to be executed on
March 20 by a method that is very likely to cause him
needless suffering. Neither the district court nor the
court of appeals denies that. Bucklew’s very likely
suffering stems from an exceedingly rare disease
called cavernous hemangioma. The disease is pro-
gressive, and has caused unstable, blood-filled tumors
to grow in his head, neck, and throat. Those highly
sensitive tumors easily rupture and bleed. The tumor
in his throat often blocks his airway, requiring fre-
quent, conscious attention from Bucklew to avoid suf-
focation. His peripheral veins are also compromised.
That means that the lethal drug cannot be adminis-
tered in the ordinary way, through intravenous ac-
cess in his arms. An expert who examined Bucklew
concluded that while undergoing Missouri's lethal in-
jection protocol, Bucklew is “highly likely to experi-
ence ... the excruciating pain of prolonged suffocation
resulting from the complete obstruction of his air-
way.” Pet. App. 109a 4 LIII.E. As he struggles to
breathe through the execution procedure, Bucklew’s
throat tumor will likely rupture. “The resultant
hemorrhaging will further impede Mr. Bucklew’s
airway by filling his mouth and airway with blood,
causing him to choke and cough on his own blood dur-
3
ing the lethal injection process.” Jd. 4 LUI.F. Buck-
lew’s execution will very likely be gruesome and pain-
ful far beyond the pain inherent in the process of an
ordinary lethal injection execution.
In a 2-1 decision, a panel of the Eighth Circuit con-
cluded that this execution is not cruel and unusual
solely because, in its view, Bucklew failed to prove
that his alternative method would substantially re-
duce his risk of needless suffering. (The full Eighth
Circuit denied rehearing en banc, with 4 judges dis-
senting.) That ruling is based on three distinct mis-
readings and dangerous extensions of this Court’s de-
cisions in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality
opinion), and Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
First, the panel believed that when evaluating the
risks posed by the state’s method of execution in light
of an inmate’s rare and complicating medical condi-
tion, Glossip and Baze require courts to assume that
state personnel are competent to deal with the condi-
tion and that all will go as intended. Pet. App. 17a.
Nothing in Glossip or Baze warrants such an as-
sumption. And such a rule makes no sense in an as-
applied challenge. The whole point of such a chal-
lenge is that a generally lawful method of execution,
when applied to someone with a particular medical
condition, will very likely involve needless suffering.
The claim does not assert that state officials, when
they designed the protocol, intended to make the in-
mate suffer needlessly. When drawing up the proto-
col, state officials surely did not think about an in-
mate with cavernous hemangioma in the throat plus
compromised veins. Nor does the claim assert that
an “isolated mishap” in implementing the protocol
might produce harm that does not qualify as cruel
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Baze,
553 U.S. at 50 (plurality opinion). The claim asserts
4
that following the protocol will, in light of the in-
mate’s medical condition, very likely produce need-
less suffering.
The issue arises here in the context of a discovery
dispute. The Eighth Circuit approved the district
court’s decision to close off discovery into whether the
medical professionals charged with administering the
execution have the training and knowledge to handle
the known complications that will arise in light of
Bucklew’s rare medical condition. The medical team
has the authority under Missouri's execution protocol
to make discretionary judgments about how to at-
tempt venous access and other details directly rele-
vant to Bucklew’s risk of suffering. Bucklew sought
such discovery (allowing for necessary safeguards to
preserve the anonymity of the medical personnel in-
volved) to establish how the skill and expertise of the
medical team will impact the known risks of suffering
that his condition creates. But he was denied any ac-
cess to the medical personnel and thereby foreclosed
from presenting to the court the full extent of his
risks. The Eighth Circuit agreed that foreclosing
discovery was proper because the court had to as-
sume “that the procedure will go as intended.” Pet.
App. 17a.
Such an assumption is at odds with this Court’s de-
cisions. The plurality opinion in Baze specifically
stated that a claim asserting a known, “objectively
intolerable risk of harm” is, unlike a claim based on
the prospect of a mere mistake, cognizable as a chal-
lenge to a method of execution under the Eighth
Amendment. 553 U.S. at 50 (plurality opinion) (quot-
ing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994)).
The Eighth Circuit’s ruling here prevents an inmate
from proving such a claim.
5
In so doing, it authorizes what amounts to “deliber-
ate indifference” to an inmate's needless suffering.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976) (delib-
erate indifference to inmate’s medical condition vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment). As detailed below, the
record establishes that Missouri's execution medical
team will be unaware of petitioner's condition and
will take steps that will cause petitioner to experi-
ence needless pain and a prolonged sense of suffoca-
tion. The record already establishes that the execu-
tion will not go as intended. As Justice Ginsburg re-
cently noted, in advance of the botched execution of
Doyle Lee Hamm, there is no substitute for adversar-
ial testing of the skills and qualifications of the
state’s medical team to handle problems that we al-
ready know will arise. Hamm v. Dunn, 138 8. Ct. 828
(2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). To assume that all
will go as intended is to altogether assume away as-
applied challenges to methods of execution. This
Court should accept review to clarify how inmates
can prove the risks they face when raising an as-
applied challenge to a method of execution.
Second, the Eighth Circuit understood Glossip to
impose a novel burden at summary judgment in a
method-of-execution case that is at odds with sum-
mary judgment law. As Judge Colloton’s dissent
makes clear, a reasonable factfinder could conclude
on this record that a lethal gas protocol proposed by
Bucklew will substantially reduce Bucklew’s suffer-
ing. Pet. App. 22a. Bucklew’s expert opined that
Bucklew will very likely experience a sense of suffo-
cation for several minutes under the lethal injection
protocol. Respondents’ expert opined that Bucklew
would likely experience a sense of suffocation for
merely 20-30 seconds if lethal gas was used. The
panel majority refused to accept this as evidence
6
comparing the two method: because no single witness
said one method would be better than the other. /d.
at 14a. That is, the panel believed Glossip not only
requires an as-applied challenge to present evidence
comparing the state’s method with an alternative, but
the evidence must come in the form of a single wit-
ness who believes one method is significantly better
than the other.
That is not and should not be the law. The ques-
tion is not whether any one witness compared and
distinguished the risks of lethal injection with the
risks of lethal gas but, as Judge Colloton observed,
whether there is evidence in the record that distin-
guishes between the two. Pet. App. 22a. Judge Col-
loton’s view follows logically from this Court’s repeat-
ed statements that evidence at summary judgment is
evaluated in light of the record as a whole. Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009); Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986). The panel majority read Glossip to change
that rule exclusively for method-of-execution claims.
Nothing in Glossip suggests such a unique procedural
burden is appropriate. And allowing it to stand
would cripple many method-of-execution claims be-
cause experts for an inmate will often labor under
ethical obligations that preclude them from designing
a “better” way to kill someone.
Third, petitioner respectfully submits that this
Court should not require inmates raising an as-
applied challenge to their methods of execution to de-
sign an alternative “that is ‘feasible, readily imple-
mented, and in fact significantly reduce|s] a substan-
tial risk of severe pain.” Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737
(quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 52). The Court imposed
that burden on inmates in cases raising facial chal-
lenges to their methods of execution. The Eighth Cir-
7
cuit (in a 6-4 en banc ruling) and the Eleventh Circuit
have imposed that burden on inmates raising as-
applied challenges to their methods of execution, and
the Sixth Circuit (in a habeas case) suggested such a
burden exists. Pet. App. 85a—88a; Gissendaner v.
Comm'r, Ga. Dep't of Corr., 803 F.3d 565 (11th Cir.
2015) (per curiam); Jn re Campbell, 874 F.3d 454 (6th
Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The Florida Supreme Court
has done so as well. Correll v. State, 184 So. 3d 478
(Fla. 2015) (per curiam). Several judges dissented in
these cases. The reasons for imposing such a burden
in a case presenting a facial challenge do not and
should not apply to inmates presenting an as-applied
challenge based on an exceedingly rare medical con-
dition. This Court should accept review here and
clarify that inmates presenting an as-applied chal-
lenge need not custom-design their own method of
execution in light of the idiosyncratic reasons the
state’s generally lawful method of execution will
prove cruel as applied to them.
This Court is well aware of the number of attempt-
ed but failed executions that have not gone according
to plan. See Arthur v. Dunn, 137 8S. Ct. 725, 733
(2017) (Mem.) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Some of
the problems that have arisen in the past and pro-
duced excruciating and gruesome results are, as here,
predictable. Only this Court can establish uniform
national standards that will reduce the frequency of
these horrible events. In doing so, this Court would
not only protect the irreducible human dignity of the
inmates bringing such claims. It would also protect
the essential dignity of the sexiety that administers
the death penalty. The Eighth Amendment protects
“the dignity of society itself from ... barbarity.” Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986). We refuse
to punish with cruelty to protect ourselves against
8
being party to cruelty. We do so even when the temp-
tation is powerful because the crime we are punish-
ing was itself barbaric and cruel, as respondents will
no doubt detail in their opposition. The wisdom of
the Eighth Amendment is that it recognizes the
temptation to be indifferent to the needless suffering
of those society condemns, and demands we resist it.
A society that tolerates stripping any man of his irre-
ducible dignity, even one who merits the ultimate
punishment, takes a fateful step. This Court is
uniquely positioned to defend this sacred value. And
it should do so in this case.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1998, Bucklew was convicted of first degree
murder, kidnapping, burglary, forcible rape, and
armed criminal action. He was sentenced to death.
He does not challenge the validity of his conviction or
death sentence.
A. Bucklew’s Rare Medical Condition
Bucklew suffers from an exceedingly rare medica!
condition—cavernous hemangioma—that causes in-
operable, blood-filled tumors to grow in his throat
and around his face, head, and neck. Pet. App. 6a.
Cavernous hemangiomas occur in only .2% of the
general population, and cavernous hemangiomas in
the oral cavity (affecting the lips, tongue, and palate)
are prevalent in less than 1% of those who have cav-
ernous hemangioma (only .002% of the general popu-
lation). Minhua Wang, MD et al., Cavernous Heman-
gioma of the Uvula: Report a Rare Case with Litera-
ture Review, 8 N. Am. J. of Med. & Sci. 56 (2015). A
case like Bucklew’s, involving the uvula, is “extreme-
ly rare.” Id. at 56.
Bucklew’s tumors are extremely sensitive and sus-
ceptible to rupture. Pet. App. 6a. Merely touching
9
his airway can cause the delicate tissue of his airway
and uvula to leak blood. Pet. App. llla 4 V.A.1-—4,
113a 9 V.B.8. Bucklew’s condition is progressive; his
tumors continue to grow, and his risk of experiencing
a catastrophic hemorrhage increases. I/d. at 113a—
114a ¥ V.B.10; APP0O324 at 48:6—-24; APP0328.' In
May 2014, Bucklew’s medical expert, Dr. Zivot, exam-
ined him and determined that his condition had sig-
nificantly progressed to the extent that his tumors
posed an imminent risk of life-threatening hemor-
rhage. See APP0186—87.
Bucklew’s “grossly enlarged uvula” partially ob-
structs his airway, making it difficult for him to
breathe and causing him to choke and bleed. Pet.
App. 112a 4 V.B.1—3. On the Mallampati classifica-
tion, a scale used to describe how difficult it is to se-
cure a patient’s airway in a medical setting, Buck-
lew’s airway rates a “Class IV,” meaning that his
airway is “very difficult.” Indeed, when Bucklew was
put under general anesthesia during previous surger-
ies, he underwent a tracheotomy to ensure that his
airway would remain secure during the procedures.
Id. at 108a ¥ U11.B, 110a ¥ [V.B—-C. Bucklew’s diffi-
culty breathing is exacerbated when he lies supine,
and, to prevent suffocation, he must consciously mon-
itor and mechanically adjust his breathing to shift his
uvula and permit airflow. Indeed, Bucklew sleeps on
his side and upright to avoid choking and hemorrhag-
ing, and yet still experiences frequent hemorrhages
severe enough that he typically needs to clean blood
off his face in the morning. /d. at 112a 4 V.B.1-—2.
Bucklew also has compromised peripheral veins in
his hands and arms, which make his veins difficult to
' APP citations are from the Appendix to Brief, Bucklew v.
Lombardi, No. 14-3052 (8th Cir. filed Dec. 1, 2017).
10
visualize. Pet. App. 6a. Accordingly, it would likely
take multiple attempts to set an intravenous (IV)
line, and setting an IV in Bucklew’s arms likely will
not be possible at all. /d. at 114a—115a 4VI.E; see al-
so APP0346 at 77:3-21.
B. Missouri’s Execution Procedure
Missouri law authorizes execution by both lethal
gas and lethal injection. Mo. Stat. Ann. § 546.720.1.
Missouri has a written execution procedure for lethal
injection only. Nonetheless, respondents have con-
ceded that lethal gas is a feasible and readily imple-
mented alternative to lethal injection in Missouri.
Pet. App. 13a.
The medical technicians responsible for the execu-
tion, who have been designated “M2” and “M3” to
preserve their anonymity, have substantial discretion
in the execution chamber. APP0341—42 at 43:11—
44:22. Under the execution protocol, medical person-
nel determine the most appropriate locations for IV
lines to inject the lethal drug. The protocol authoriz-
es accessing the vein via a central line, such as the
femoral vein, but only if the medical personnel in-
volved in the execution “have appropriate training,
education, and experience for that procedure.” Pet.
App. 145a.
Not all state medical personnel, and indeed not all
anesthesiologists, are qualified or skilled at perform-
ing a central line procedure. APP0347 at 81:22—24;
APP0362 at 237:11—19. In the past, after failing to
gain peripheral vein access, the medical members of
the execution team have employed an outdated pro-
cedure known as a “cut-down” in the leg. APP0O311—
12 at 55:12—56:17. (A cut-down involves slicing into
the leg to visualize the vein; it is extremely painful.
See APP0350 at 92:23-93:13.) Both Dr. Zivot, Buck-
11
lew’s medical expert, and Dr. Antognini, respondents’
medical expert, agree that a “cut-down” is not the
current preferred method of establishing central line
access. APP0352 at 98:8—23; APP0374 at 71:12—16.
After the medical team gains venous access, a non-
medical member of the execution team will inject the
lethal drug, during which time Bucklew will lose the
ability to consciously manage his airway. Pet. App.
145a—146a; id. at 115a—116a 4 VI.I-J.
C. The Known Risks Bucklew Faces From
Lethal Injection In Missouri
Bucklew’s execution will not go smoothly. He faces
identifiable severe risks from the procedure both be-
fore and after the medical team gains venous access
and the non-medical team begins to administer the
lethal drug.
As noted above, attempts to access Bucklew’s pe-
ripheral veins will very likely fail. Pet. App. 114a—
115a ¥ VI.E; see also APP0346 at 77:3-21. But it is
very likely that medical personnel will try, and re-
peatedly so. Pet. App. 114a—115a 4 VI.E; APP0352 at
99:7-20. The discomfort of repeated failed efforts to
gain venous access will increase Bucklew’s stress,
raising the pace of his breathing and blood pressure,
increasing the risk that his sensitive tumors will rup-
ture. Pet. App. 115a 4 VI.G.
Eventually, the medical team will stop trying to
gain peripheral access, and will turn to a central line,
likely the femoral vein. To access the femoral vein,
the record indicates that M3 will perform a cut-down
procedure; that is what M3 has done in the past when
attempts at peripheral access failed. APP309 at
28:11-22; APP311-12 at 55:20-56:3. During a cut-
down, Bucklew will have to lie flat, at least while the
medical team attempts to access his femoral vein,
12
and possibly throughout the remainder of the execu-
tion. Jd. at 29a; id. at 2la & n.5. He will gag on his
tumor, causing him to struggle and convulse in an
effort to breathe. /d. at 115a 4 VI.H, 116a 4 VILL.
His convulsions will increase the risks associated
with the attempt to gain access through the femoral
vein. Among the risks of attempting femoral vein ac-
cess is piercing the femoral artery. APP0350 at 90:3—
92:22. That risk was recently made especially vivid
during the failed execution of Doyle Lee Hamm in Al-
abama on February 22, 2018. Even though Alabama
certified that it would use personnel qualified to ac-
cess the femoral vein, the medical team punctured
Hamm’s artery. Pet. App. 98a. That execution had to
be abandoned. If, as is likely, Bucklew is violently
struggling to breathe while the team attempts femo-
ral access, his risk of a similar failure increases.
The painful cut-down procedure and struggles to
breathe will further increase the stress of the execu-
tion and further increase the likelihood of Bucklew
rupturing his tumor. There is a significant likelihood
that Bucklew will be choking on his tumor and gag-
ging on his own blood for the (unknown) duration of
the cut-down procedure, before the injection of the
lethal drug even begins. Pet. App. 115a 4 VI.G;
APP0352 at 100:1—12.
After the lethal drug begins to flow, Bucklew will
soon lose the ability to manage his airway. This is
true whether he remains laying flat or whether he is
upright or anything in between. Pet. App. 115a—116a
§ VI.I. He will begin to experience a sense of suffoca-
tion and the extreme pain associated with suffoca-
tion. Id. at 28a—29a. In the unlikely event he has not
already begun choking on his own blood as a result of
struggling while lying flat throughout the cut-down
procedure, the violence of his choking as he slips into
13
unconsciousness will likely cause his tumors to rup-
ture and lead him to aspirate his own blood. Z/d. at
116a 4 VIM).
The parties disagree over how long Bucklew will be
unable to manage his airway while remaining aware
of the sense of suffocation. Bucklew’s expert opines
that Bucklew could be in this state for between 52
and 240 seconds, while respondents’ expert opines
that he would be conscious of suffocation for 20 to 30
seconds. Pet. App. 29a. These estimates are on top of
any period of time Bucklew is suffocating prior to the
administration of the lethal drug.
D. The Medical Team
Any judgments concerning how to handle an inabil-
ity to gain venous access, an inmate choking, gag-
ging, or hemorrhaging blood, or any of the other pre-
dictable complications arising from Bucklew’s condi-
tion are left to the sole discretion of the medical
members of the execution team. APP0O339—40 at
36:11—37:9; APP0299—300 at 93:11—96:9. Nothing in
the record suggests they will be anticipating what
Bucklew will likely experience.
The medical personnel who perform the execution
will not be provided any information concerning
Bucklew’s medical condition beyond a single-page
document summarizing his medical history. In 2014,
as Missouri prepared to execute Bucklew, a one-page
form summarizing Bucklew’s medical issues was pre-
pared. Pet. App. 144a. As relevant here, it reported
his cavernous hemangioma, but only with respect to
his jaw and upper lip. It said nothing about his com-
promised veins, and nothing about the tumor in his
throat that will inhibit his breathing during the exe-
cution and will very likely rupture and cause him to
choke on his blood. Indeed, whoever prepared the
14
form shockingly reported “No” in response to the
question “Does the offender have Asthma, bronchitis,
or any other breathing problem?” Id. (emphasis add-
ed). The medical team will not be provided with any
other medical records, including the MRI images that
reveal the size of the tumors in Bucklew’s airway.
APP0292 at 43:20—44:6.
Missouri has never executed an inmate who suffers
from cavernous hemangioma, APP0448 at Resp. No.
4, and there is no reason to believe that the medical
members of the execution team have ever seen a pa-
tient with cavernous hemangioma, or have ever seen
one with tumors in his throat. Even if they are alert-
ed to the fact of the disease by the medical form,
there is no reason to believe they will be alert to the
rare tumor in Bucklew’s throat and the special suffo-
cation risk it creates.
E. The Lethal Gas Alternative
Bucklew has proposed death by nitrogen hypoxia as
an alternative method of execution. APP0085—87.
Lethal gas requires no venous access at all. So, all the
risks posed by the difficulties of gaining venous ac-
cess, including the painful cut-down procedure, would
vanish. Likewise, lethal gas can be administered
while Bucklew is seated upright, so all the risks of
struggling to breathe and choking on the blood flow-
ing from his throat tumor while lying flat during the
cut-down procedure would also vanish. APP0547;
APP0898—99.
Dr. Antognini opined that, if administered correct-
ly, lethal gas would lead to a quick death. APP0362
at 234:12-21. Specifically, he testified that inhalation
of nitrogen gas “would quickly achieve hypoxia and
cause an inmate to become quickly unconscious”
within about 20 to 30 seconds of breathing pure ni-
15
trogen. APP0O362 at 234:12—21. In addition, there is
reason to believe that breathing 100% nitrogen does
not produce a sense of suffocation. The sense of suf-
focation is caused by a buildup of carbon dioxide in
the blood when a person is unable to expel air.
APP0899. If one breathes in pure nitrogen while ex-
pelling air, death is caused by an absence of oxygen
unaccompanied by a sense of suffocation. APP0O899;
APP0911. Reports of high altitude pilots who lost
consciousness while breathing air low in oxygen and
high in nitrogen is consistent with this view.
APP0547.
Dr. Zivot did not opine on whether lethal gas would
result in significantly less suffering than Missouri's
lethal injection protocol because he is ethically barred
from proposing a method of execution at all. Pet.
App. 108a § I1.B. So, no evidence in the record dis-
putes respondents’ expert’s view that death by lethal
gas would be substantially quicker and less painful
than Bucklew’s expert’s view of the likely suffering
that lethal injection will cause Bucklew.
il. PROCEEDINGS BELOW
A. Procedural History And Discovery
In a Fourth Amended Complaint filed on October
13, 2015, Bucklew challenged the constitutionality of
Missouri's execution protocol as applied to him.
Among other things, he alleged that Missouri’s lethal
injection protocol “presents a substantial risk of caus-
ing excruciating or tortuous pain and inflicting need-
less suffering” and therefore violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.2 APP0136-37 94 148, 151. He further al-
2 Bucklew was also party to an earlier case styled Zink v.
Lombardi, No. 12-04209-BP (W.D. Mo. filed Aug. 1, 2012), in
16
leged that his “blood-filled tumors are prone to rup-
ture under stress or any rise in blood pressure. When
this occurs, Mr. Bucklew bleeds through his facial ori-
fices and in his throat, further obstructing his airway
and causing him to choke.” APP0O086. Bucklew al-
leged that “the risks arising from Mr. Bucklew’s air-
way are even greater if he is lying flat.” APP0O119
4102. Bucklew’s initial complaint was filed on May
9, 2014, and on May 14, 2014, Bucklew moved for a
stay of his execution, then scheduled for May 21,
2014, to provide adequate time to litigate his claims.
The district court denied Bucklew’s motion for a stay,
and dismissed his complaint, sua sponte. Bucklew v.
Lombardi, No. 14-1800-CV-W-BP, 2014 WL 2736014
(W.D. Mo. May 9, 2014).
With only two days remaining until his scheduled
execution, Bucklew immediately appealed the dismis-
sal of his complaint. An Eighth Circuit panel granted
a stay. Bucklew v. Lombardi, 565 F. App’x 562, 569—
71 (8th Cir. 2014). After the Eighth Circuit, sitting
en banc, vacated the stay on the same day, this Court
entered a stay of execution pending Bucklew’s appeal.
Bucklew v. Lombardi, 134 8. Ct. 2333 (2014) (Mem.).
Roughly ten months later, the en banc Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed the dismissal of Bucklew’s Complaint
and remanded for further proceedings. Pet. App.
72a—88a. The full Eighth Circuit, split 64, rejected
Bucklew’s argument that he need not propose an al-
ternative method of execution because he raised an
as-applied challenge only. /d. at 75a, 84a. On re-
mand, Bucklew amended his complaint to assert that
lethal gas is a “feasible and available alternative
which he and other inmates raised a facial challenge to Mis-
souri’s lethal injection execution protocol.
17
method that will significantly reduce the risk of se-
vere pain.” APP0O137 4 150.
Discovery began and Bucklew sought, among other
things, information about the skills and training of
M2 and M3 to handle the risks that his rare condition
would likely present. APP0224—26. Bucklew indicat-
ed that identifying information in any documents
produced concerning M2 and M3 could be redacted.
APP0224—25. The district court refused to allow
Bucklew any access to the medical team and any in-
formation regarding their skills and training. Pet.
App. 44a—52a.
After additional discovery revealed the extent of
discretionary authority granted to M2 and M3 during
an execution, Bucklew filed a Motion to Compel out-
lining the need for discovery concerning the training
and qualifications of M2 and M3. The district court
again denied Bucklew access to this discovery. Pet.
App. 57a, 71a.
M2 and M3 have been deposed in prior capital liti-
gation, specifically in 2010 in Ringo v. Lombardi, No.
09-4095-BP (W.D. Mo. filed May 17, 2009), and in
2013 and 2014 in Zink v. Lombardi, No. 12-4209-BP
(W.D. Mo. filed Aug. 1, 2012). Bucklew’s appointed
counsel, Ms. Pilate, represented Bucklew in those
proceedings (which raised facial challenges, not as-
applied challenges to Missouri’s execution protocol),
and «> believes that the contents of those deposi-
tions are directly relevant to disputed factual issues
in this case. APP0O278. The district court, however,
refused to permit Ms. Pilate to share the deposition
transcripts with Sidley Austin or to use the tran-
scripts in connection with this case. APP0285—86.
18
B. The Lower Court Decisions
The district court granted respondents summary
judgment on June 15, 2017. The district court as-
sumed that the record demonstrated “a substantial
risk that [Bucklew] will experience choking and an
inability to breathe for up to four minutes.” Pet. App.
34a. The court also noted that “Defendants do not
argue that [Bucklew’s proposed alternative] method
of execution is not feasible or readily implemented.”
Id. However, the district court concluded that the
record did not present a triable dispute concerning
whether execution by nitrogen gas would significant-
ly reduce Bucklew’s risk of needless suffering, as
compared to Missouri’s lethal injection protocol. /d.
at 35a. The district court also denied a motion to re-
consider. Jd. at 39a—43a.
On November 21, 2017, while Bucklew’s appeal was
pending and before the parties had fully briefed the
issues, at the state’s urging, the Missouri Supreme
Court reset Bucklew’s execution date to March 20,
2018. Shortly thereafter, the Eighth Circuit set the
appeal for argument on February 2, 2018.
On March 6, 2018, a divided panel of the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court. The panel majori-
ty concluded that Bucklew provided no evidence prov-
ing that lethal gas would substantially reduce his
risk of severe pain. It acknowledged evidence from
Bucklew’s expert that lethal injection would cause
him to experience a sense of suffocation for several
minutes. Pet. App. 14a. It also acknowledged that it
was undisputed that lethal gas would cause him to
experience a sense of suffocation for, at most, 20—30
seconds. Jd. And it nowhere disputed that the differ-
ence would be significant enough to warrant relief.
Instead, the panel declared that Bucklew’s claim
failed because the evidence showing a difference be-
19
tween the two methods had not come from any one
witness. /d. That is, the panel interpreted this
Court’s requirement of “comparative” evidence to
mean that an inmate must point to a single witness
who does the comparison. /d.
Judge Colloton dissented. In surveying the evi-
dence and interpreting it in the light most favorable
to Bucklew, Judge Colloton concluded: “If the fact-
finder accepted Dr. Zivot’s testimony as to the effect
of pentobarbital, and Dr. Antognini’s uncontroverted
testimony as to the effect of nitrogen gas, then Buck-
lew’s proposed alternative method would significantly
reduce the substantial risk of severe pain ....” Pet.
App. 22a. Judge Colloton observed that the general
rule allows the trier of fact to accept all or just a part
of any witness’ testimony, and that on summary
judgment one party can rely on a portion of the op-
posing party’s expert’s testimony to create a genuine
issue of material fact. Jd. Accordingly, Judge Col-
loton would have remanded the case to the district
court to hold a trial and make factual findings.
The panel majority also affirmed the district court’s
denial of any discovery into the qualifications of the
medical personnel who will participate in Bucklew’s
execution. The panel majority, interpreting Buck-
lew’s argument as resting on the “premise that M2
and M3 may not be qualified for the positions for
which they have been hired,” refused to “assume that
M.osouri employs personnel who are incompetent or
uu.qualified” or to permit discovery into “[t]he poten-
tiality that something may go wrong in an execution.”
Pet. App. 17a. Instead, the panel majority insisted
that the court’s analysis must be based on the as-
sumption “that those responsible for carrying out the
sentence are competent and qualified to do so, and
that the procedure will go as intended.” /d.
20
Three days after the decision, Bucklew petitioned
for a panel rehearing or rehearing en banc, and
moved for an emergency stay. In opposing the stay
request, Respondents submitted a new factual affida-
vit from Alana Boyles, which stated that, during
Bucklew’s execution, “the Department will adjust the
gurney so that Mr. Bucklew is not lying fully supine
at the time the Department administers the lethal
chemicals.” Pet. App. 89a. The affidavit was pre-
pared after the Eighth Circuit panel had already is-
sued its decision, and was thus submitted without
any opportunity for Bucklew to investigate Ms.
Boyle’s role in the execution protocol or her authority
to make decisions concerning how that protocol will
be applied to Bucklew. The affidavit made no repre-
sentations about how Bucklew would be positioned
prior to the time the Department administers the le-
thal chemicals, including during a cut-down proce-
dure.
On March 15, 2018, the Eighth Circuit declined to
rehear Mr. Bucklew’s appeal. Pet. App. la.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
This case presents an opportunity to resolve three
important questions arising out of the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s misinterpretation of this Court’s decisions in
firm that courts evaluating an as-applied challenge to
a state’s method of execution should not assume that
an execution will go as intended for an inmate with a
discovery into the training and skills of relevant med-
ical personnel. Second, this Court can reaffirm that
the traditional summary judgment standard applies
in challenges to methods of execution, and that an
inmate need not present a single witness to provide
21
comparative evidence distinguishing the state's
method of execution from the inmate’s proposed al-
ternative. Third, this Court can declare that inmates
need not propose an alternative execution procedure
when raising an as-applied challenge to a state's
method of execution. These questions are critical to
the fairness of procedures for inmates facing execu-
tion protocols that, as applied to them, pose known
and severe risks of needless suffering.
I. THIS CASE PRESENTS URGENT QUES-
TIONS REGARDING LITIGATION OF AS-
APPLIED CHALLENGES TO A METHOD
OF EXECUTION.
A. Whether Courts Evaluating An As
Applied Method-Of-Execution Claim
Should Assume That Medical Personne!
Are Competent To Handle An Inmate’s
Rare And Severe Medical Condition,
And That The Execution Will Go As In-
tended, Warrants Review.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of discovery
into the training and qualifications of the medical
personnel who will make critical decisions affecting
the length and severity of Bucklew’s suffering during
the execution. It did so because it concluded that the
training and qualifications of the medical team are
irrelevant. It ruled that a court evaluating an in-
mate’s as-applied challenge under Baze and Glossip
“must ... assum|[e] that those responsible for carrying
out the sentence are competent and qualified to do 20,
and that the procedure will go as intended.” Pet.
App. 17a. A challenge to a method of execution based
on the inmate’s medical condition necessarily asserts
that the procedure will not go as intended. If such
claims are cognizable at all, the Eighth Circuit's rule
cannot stand.
22
This Court has already indicated that such claims
are cognizable. The plurality opinion in Baze
acknowledged the possibility that some executions
might entail an “objectively intolerable risk of harm
that officials may not ignore.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 50
(plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Nothing in Glossip undermines that view. And
for good reason. The rule follows logically from this
Court’s longstanding view that “deliberate indiffer-
ence” to an inmate’s medical condition can rise to the
level of cruel and unusual punishment within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Gamble, 429
U.S. at 104. Here, medical personnel charged with
administering Missouri's execution protocol on an
inmate with a rare and severe medical condition will
be ignorant of material details about that condition,
yet empowered to make critical decisions during the
procedure that will increase the inmate’s suffering.
Respondents refuse even to provide access to those
medical professionals for discovery. All of this evinces
deliberate indifference to Bucklew’s condition and the
risks that lethal injection poses to him.
Importantly, Bucklew does not claim, as the Eighth
Circuit suggested, that “M2 and M3 may not be quali-
fied for the positions for which they have been hired.”
Pet. App. 17a. Bucklew presently has no reason to
believe they lack the qualifications to do what the ex-
cals,” “determine the most appropriate locations for
intravenous (IV) lines,” “monitor the prisoner during
the execution,” among other things. /Jd. at 145a—146a
77 B, C.1, D.2. But the execution protocol also em-
powers the medical team to attempt to access the
femoral vein “provided they have appropriate train-
ing, education, and experience for that procedure.”
Id. at 145a 4 C.1. That is, the execution protocol does
23
not assume the training and experience of the medi-
cal team members to handle one of the procedures
that the experts agree will likely be required here:
obtaining access to the femoral vein. Assuming that
medical team members will do so and all will go “as
intended,” as the Eighth Circuit has done here, is not
only contrary to law, but is contrary to the protocol
itself.
The execution protocol at issue here is nothing like
the protocols this Court had before it in Baze and
Glossip. Both of those protocols included “several
important safeguards,” Baze, 553 U.S. at 55 (plurality
opinion), to protect against the possibility of error in
administering the drugs. Indeed, Oklahoma’s stand-
ards considered in Glossip, adopted after the horrific
execution of Clayton Lockett, included “detailed pro-
visions with respect to the training and preparation
of the execution team.” 135 S. Ct. at 2735. Not only
does Missouri’s protocol lack any details regarding
the training and preparation of the execution team,
but Bucklew was wrongfully denied the chance to fill
that critical gap through discovery.
That denial is all the more egregious in light of the
testimony that makes clear how much discretionary
authority medical team members have during the ex-
ecution. Anne Precythe, who as Director of Correc-
tions is nominally in charge, repeatedly stated during
her deposition that she knows nothing about Buck-
lew’s medical condition and would defer to M2 and
M3 regarding how to handle any issues that arise
during the execution. APP0O338—40 at 35:12—37:9;
APP0341—42 at 43:11-—44:22. This includes not only
the decision whether to attempt venous access
through a central line like the femoral vein, but also
how many attempts will be made on peripheral veins,
and what procedure will be used to attempt femoral
24
vein access. It also includes how to position Bucklew
during attempts to gain venous access and beyond.
See Pet. App. 20a—21a & n.5.
Under Missouri’s vague procedures, and Precythe’s
deference to medical team members, the risk of trying
and failing to gain venous access through a peripher-
al vein, and then likely attempting access through
the outdated cut-down procedure that medical per-
sonnel previously performed, is not the prospect of a
mere “isolated mishap,” as the Eighth Circuit sup-
posed. Pet. App. 17a (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 50).
This risk is all but certain. It will lengthen the exe-
cution procedure. It will increase the stress of the
procedure on Bucklew, which increases the risk that
his tumors will rupture and he will begin to bleed
from them, likely gagging on his own blood even be-
fore the lethal drug can be administered. /d. at 114a—
115a 4 VI.E—G, 109a ¥ LIL.F. Convulsing uncontrol-
lably during a cut-down procedure surely increases
the risk that the femoral artery will be punctured, or
that the IV line will be positioned so that the lethal
drug leaks into neighboring tissue, causing intense
pain.
Even though we know these risks are substantial,
we have no reason to believe medical team members
will be alert to them. There is no reason to believe
M2 or M3 have ever seen a patient with cavernous
hemangioma, or have ever seen one with tumors in
his throat. There is reason to believe that neither M2
nor M3 will be alerted to Bucklew’s compromised
veins, the tumor in Bucklew’s throat, or the nature
and extent of the risk of suffocation Bucklew faces.
The single page form previously prepared in anticipa-
tion of an earlier execution date for Bucklew failed to
report any of these known problems. Pet. App. 144a.
25
Respondents tacitly conceded that the record inad-
equately supports their assurances that all will go
smoothly by submitting, at the rehearing stage in the
Eighth Circuit, a new affidavit of a new witness pur-
porting to provide minimal (and inadequate) assur-
ance that Bucklew will not be “fully supine at the
time the Department administers the lethal chemi-
cals.” Pet. App. 89a. The affidavit makes no repre-
sentation about Bucklew’s position during the painful
cut-down procedure he will endure. There remains
every reason to believe Bucklew will be forced to lie
“fully supine” during that procedure, which necessari-
ly occurs before the lethal chemicals are adminis-
tered. Bucklew had no opportunity to investigate Ms.
Boyles’ role in the execution protocol or her authority
to make decisions concerning how that protocol will
be applied to Bucklew. And the respondents’ gesture
reflects their mistaken insistence that Bucklew’s risk
of suffocating is present only when “fully supine.”
That is wrong. /d. at 115a—116a 4 VI1.I-—J); id. at 20a.
In the end, the affidavit only underscores respond-
ents’ deliberate indifference to the full range of risks
Bucklew faces. It illustrates why “[ajn adversarial
process should ... test[{] the risk of ‘serious illness and
needless suffering.” Hamm, 138 8S. Ct. at 828-29
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
That adversarial process can include safeguards to
protect the anonymity of execution team members.
Bucklew has never asserted otherwise. See, e.z.,
APP0224—25 at IV.1.1.3. Indeed, such safeguards
have been used in the past when similar discovery
was allowed. The fact that the court barred Ms. Pi-
late, who has seen that discovery and believes it is
relevant here, from using it in this case, dramatically
demonstrates the fundamental unfairness of the dis-
covery ruling. This Court’s review is warranted.
26
B. Whether The Evidence Comparing The
Risks Of Proposed Methods Of Execu-
tion Must Come From A Single Witness
Warrants Review.
The Eighth Circuit has ruled that an inmate rais-
ing an as-applied challenge to a method of execution
must plead and prove that a feasible and readily
available alternative method of execution would sub-
stantially reduce his risk of needless suffering. Pet.
App. 75a, 84a. For the reasons discussed below,
Bucklew maintains that ruling was error. But even
assuming that is correct, the Eighth Circuit has lay-
ered an additional evidentiary burden on inmates
challenging a state’s proposed method of execution.
According to the panel majority, and over the dissent
of Judge Colloton, the Eighth Circuit now requires
inmates to present a single witness who compares the
risks posed by the two methods of execution and who
concludes that the inmate’s proposal substantially
reduces the risks posed by the state’s method. /d. at
13a—14a. This novel evidentiary standard, at odds
with settled summary judgment law, warrants re-
view.
What the parties’ experts concluded is clear regard-
ing the risks Bucklew faces after the lethal drug is
administered. Bucklew’s expert (Dr. Zivot) opines
that Bucklew will experience a sense of suffocation
for several minutes if lethal injection is used. Re-
spondents’ expert (Dr. Antognini) thinks Bucklew will
experience a sense of suffocation for 20-30 seconds if
lethal injection is used. Dr. Zivot did not opine on
how long Bucklew would experience pain if executed
by lethal gas. Dr. Antognini opined that lethal gas
would leave Bucklew insensate to pain within 20-30
seconds.
27
The Eighth Circuit panel majority correctly stated
Bucklew’s argument: “the district court should have
compared Dr. Zivot’s opinion [about lethal injection]
with Dr. Antognini’s testimony [about lethal gas.]”
Pet. App. 14a. Judge Colloton, in dissent, did just
that: “If the factfinder accepted Dr. Zivot’s testimony
as to the effect of pentobarbital, and Dr. Antognini’s
uncontroverted testimony as to effect of nitrogen gas,
then Bucklew’s proposed alternative method would
significantly reduce the substantial risk of severe
pain ....” Id. at 22a. The panel majority does not de-
ny that the difference between experiencing suffoca-
tion for 20-30 seconds, and experiencing suffocation
for several minutes, is significant and would warrant
relief. Instead, it refused to compare Dr. Zivot’s opin-
ion about lethal injection with Dr. Antognini’s opinion
about lethal gas. Put simply, the panel majority re-
jected Bucklew’s argument because “his expert” did
not compare the two methods himself. /d. at 13a—
14a.
This was legal error. Glossip requires a comparison
between the state’s method and a petitioner’s alter-
native method. But it nowhere requires that a single
witness compare the two. As Judge Colloton ex-
plained, a witness’s testimony may be credited in
whole or in part, and a plaintiff may rely on the de-
fendant’s evicence, including the defendant’s expert
witness, if that evidence is helpful. Pet. App. 22a (cit-
§ The panel majority also erroneously stated Bucklew’s con-
cern about suffocation “rests on” whether he will be forced to lie
supine. Pet. App. 15a. In fact, Dr. Zivot notes that Bucklew’s
choking is worse when lying flat. Jd. at 112a 4 V.B.1-—2). Dr.
Zivot also clearly stated that once Bucklew loses full conscious-
ness, he will be unable to manage his airway and will choke. /d.
at 115a—116a 4 VL.I.
28
ing cases). Petitioner is aware of no federal court of
appeals that has ruled to the contrary.‘
The panel majority provided no citation for its novel
rule. The previously unquestioned rule of law relied
upon by Judge Colloton follows logically from the
standard for summary judgment: only when “the rec-
ord taken as a whole” creates no genuine issue of ma-
terial fact should a court enter summary judgment.
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 586; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
Evidence is evidence, whether proffered by the party
seeking or opposing summary judgment. At sum-
mary judgment, a party may rely upon an opponent’s
expert to support or defeat the motion. DG&G, Inc. v.
FlexSol Packaging Corp. of Pompano Beach, 576 F.3d
820, 826-27 (8th Cir. 2009). There is and should be
no special burden placed on inmates under sentence
of death challenging a method of execution in light of
a rare medical condition. The panel majority misread
Glossip and improperly imposed a _ proffer-all-the-
comparative-evidence-yourself rule on Bucklew.
Indeed, it is especially inappropriate to impose this
special burden in an as-applied method of execution
‘ Every Circuit agrees with Judge Colloton. United States v.
Gonzalez- Velez, 587 F.3d 494, 504 (ist Cir. 2009); United States
v. Norman, 776 F.3d 67, 78 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v.
Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 189 (3d Cir. 2002); Trademark Props., Inc.
v. A&E TV Networks, 422 F. App’x 199, 212 (4th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Merida, 765 F.2d 1205, 1220 (5th Cir. 1985);
Dixon v. Penn Cent. Co., 481 F.2d 833, 837 (6th Cir. 1973); Unit-
ed States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 836 (7th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Candie, 974 F.2d 61, 65 (8th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Clevenger, 733 F.2d 1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Ransom, 691 F. App’x 504, 506 (10th Cir. 2017); United States
v. Prince, 883 F.2d 953, 959 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc); Ander-
son v. Dep't of Transp., FAA., 827 F.2d 1564, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (per curiam).
29
case. Dr. Zivot explained why he could not opine on a
method of execution that would result in significantly
less suffering than the lethal injection protocol pro-
posed by the State: he is ethically barred from propos-
ing a method of execution at all. Pet. App. 108a
4 11.B. The law should not require an inmate to find
an expert who is willing to violate his or her oath by
custom-designing a method of execution that will
substantially reduce the inmate’s idiosyncratic rea-
sons for excessive suffering.
This Court should grant this petition and restore
the generally applicable rules for evaluating evidence
at summary judgment to inmates bringing an as-
applied challenge to their methods of execution.
C. Whether An Inmate Raising An As-
Applied Challenge To A Method Of Exe-
cution Must Prove An Available Alterna-
tive Method That Will Substantially Re-
duce His Risk Of Suffering Also War-
rants Review.
The Eighth Circuit requires an inmate raising an
as-applied, method-of-execution challenge to propose
a “feasible, readily implemented alternative proce-
dure that will significantly reduce a substantial risk
of severe pain and that the State refuses to adopt.”
Pet. App. 84a. Its 6-4 en banc ruling on this issue
mis-applied a rule announced in cases raising facial
challenges to the critically different context of an as-
applied challenge. The extension of the rule to as-
applied challenges, also adopted by the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, the Florida Supreme Court, and suggested by
the Sixth Circuit, is unwarranted. The reasons justi-
fying the alternative method requirement are linked
with the character of facial challenges.
30
Both Baze and Glossip start from the premise that
because the Constitution permits capital punishment,
it must also permit a method of carrying out the
death sentence. Baze, 553 U.S. at 48-49 (plurality
opinion); Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2739. The implications
for that premise are broader when the Court is con-
sidering a facial challenge than when it is considering
an as-applied challenge.
A facial challenge asks the Court to declare a meth-
od of execution unconstitutional for use against any-
one. Such a challenge runs the risk of being a dis-
guised effort to render the death penalty itself uncon-
stitutional. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2739. But that
risk is not present at all when the inmate raises an
as-applied challenge. Such a claim implicates the
lawfulness of the state’s method for no other inmate.
Bucklew’s claim is rooted in his idiosyncratic medical
condition and the risks posed specifically to him. He
does not seek a judgment that would require Missouri
to alter its execution protocol as to any other inmate.
Nothing about his claim even implicitly questions the
lawfulness of capital punishment.
And nothing about Bucklew’s claim seeks to “trans-
form courts into boards of inquiry charged with de-
termining ‘best practices’ for executions.” Baze, 553
U.S. at 51 (plurality opinion). Because only Buck-
lew’s execution is at stake, his claim does not ask the
courts to displace state officials from their task as de-
signers of a state’s protocol for carrying out capital
punishment. State legislatures would continue to
evaluate the best scientific evidence available to ap-
prove the most humane methods of execution. /d.
Courts would remain focused on a task for which they
are well suited: evaluating whether a general state
rule (the state’s execution protocol) applied to partic-
ular facts (the medical condition of the inmate) satis-
31
fies the Constitution’s legal standard (the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruelty).
Practical considerations also weigh in favor of re-
lieving inmates with rare, complicating medical con-
ditions from having to design their own execution
protocol. State officials naturally have a firmer grasp
of the modifications to a protocol that the state can
accommodate. State officials will also have greater
experience with the complications that can arise dur-
ing executions, and thus will have better knowledge
of what practices are likely to provide relief, at least
in circumstances that can recur. And inmates will of-
ten be frustrated in their efforts to obtain expert
guidance in custom-designing a method of execution
that accounts for their particular medical issues.
Most professionals with medical training are barred
by ethical standards from “participating in” an execu-
tion, which includes a bar on designing a method of
execution that is “better” than the one proposed by
the state. See, e.g., AMA Code of Medical Ethics, tit.
9.7.3 “Capital Punishment” (2016), https://www.ama-
assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-of-
medical-ethics-chapter-9.pdf.
This Court has already ruled that certain individu-
als, based on their mental health, are categorically
ineligible for the death penalty. Ford, 477 U.S. at
410 (plurality opinion) (“The Eighth Amendment
prohibits the State from inflicting the penalty of
death upon a prisoner who is insane.”); Moore v. Tex-
as, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017) (holding that indi-
viduals with certain mental deficiencies cannot be
constitutionally executed); Hall v. Florida, 134 8. Ct.
1986, 1992 (2014) (“[Plersons with intellectual disa-
bility may not be executed.”). It should not be sur-
prising, then, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the execution of some individuals by a particular
32
method based on their physical condition. That is all
Bucklew asserts here. Bucklew’s physical condition
should not condemn him to state indifference to his
suffering, even if Bucklew is unable to design an al-
ternative that convincingly shows the promise of sub-
stantially reduced suffering. Rather, his proof that
his idiosyncratic condition means the state will im-
pose unconstitutional suffering on him should lead to
a court order preventing the state from doing so. The
law should not “bar a death-row inmate from vindi-
cating a right guaranteed by the Eighth Amend-
ment .... even if [he] can prove that the State plans to
kill him in an intolerably cruel manner.” Arthur, 137
S. Ct. at 729 (Mem.) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Such a judgment would leave Missouri free to design
a lethal gas protocol that meets Eighth Amendment
standards.
ll. THIS CASE IS A STRONG VEHICLE FOR
ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES.
This case is on direct appeal from final judgment.
The Eighth Circuit’s decision adopts novel rules of
law that frustrate method-of-execution claims. The
issues are cleanly presented.
Throughout this litigation, respondents have per-
sistently suggested otherwise. They have asserted
that Bucklew failed to plead his claim, and that his
claim is barred by res judicata and the statute of lim-
itations because he could have and should have
brought his claim earlier, in a proceeding that raised
a facial challenge. No judge has agreed with re-
spondents. Judge Colloton thoroughly and accurately
rejected their arguments. Bucklew need not repeat
. ose reasons in full here. But, in brief: (1) Bucklew
specifically pleaded that lethal injection would cause
him to experience a prolonged sense of suffocation,
and (2) Bucklew was repeatedly denied the resources
33
to investigate the severity of the risks he faced from
lethal injection in light of his condition, and did not
learn the facts necessary to assert his claim until it
wa3 too late to include his as-applied challenge in the
case raising a facial challenge to lethal injection.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant
the petition for a writ of certiorari.
CHERYL A. PILATE
MORGAN PILATE LLC
926 Cherry Street
Kansas City, MO 64106
(816) 471-6694
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Robert N. Hochman _
ROBERT N. HOCHMAN *
RAECHEL J. BIMMERLE
KELLY J. HUGGINS
MATTHEW J. SALDANA
HEATHER B. SULTANIAN
DANIEL R. THIES
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
One South Dearborn Street
Chicago, IL 60603
(312) 853-7000
rhochman@sidley.com
Counsel for Petitioner
March 15, 2018
* Counsel of Record
No. 17-
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
RUSSELL BUCKLEW,
Petitioner,
Vv.
ANNE PRECYTHE, et ai.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit
PETITION APPENDIX
EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR MARCH 20, 2018
CHERYL A. PILATE ROBERT N. HOCHMAN *
MORGAN PILATE LLC RAECHEL J. BIMMERLE
926 Cherry Street KELLY J. HUGGINS
Kansas City, MO 64106 MATTHEW J. SALDANA
(816) 471-6694 HEATHER B. SULTANIAN
DANIEL R. THIES
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
One South Dearborn Street
Chicago, [L 60603
(312) 853-7000
rhochman@sidley.com
Counsel for Petitioner
March 15, 2018 * Counsel of Record
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
APPENDIX A: Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 17-
3052 (8th Cir. Mar. 15, 2018)...............2.....00000+- la
APPENDIX B: Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 17-
3052, 2018 WL 1163360 (8th Cir. Mar. 6,
IS Se reat enn a 3a
APPENDIX C: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-
8000-CV-W-BP (W.D. Mo. June 15, 2017)........ 26a
APPENDIX D: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-
8000-CV-W-BP (W.D. Mo. Aug. 21, 2017) ........ 39a
APPENDIX E: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-
8000-CV-W-BP (W.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2017) ........ 44a
APPENDIX F: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-
8000-CV-W-BP (W.D. Mo. Apr. 11, 2017)......... 53a
APPENDIX G: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-
2163 (8th Cir. Mar. 6, 2015)................2.ccc0c000000 72a
APPENDIX H: Affidavit of Alana Boyles ........... 89a
APPENDIX I: Hamm Expert Report .................. 9la
APPENDIX J: Zivot Supplemental Report......... 106a
APPENDIX K: Medial Summary_........................ 144a
APPENDIX L: Missouri Execution Protocol....... 145a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No: 17-3052
Russell Bucklew
Appellant
Vv
Anne L. Precythe, Director of the Department of Corrections, et al
Appellees
Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
(4:14-cv-8000-BP)
ORDER
Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, LOKEN, COLLOTON, GRUENDER, SHEPHERD,
KELLY, ERICKSON, GRASZ and STRAS, Circuit Judges
Appellant Bucklew’s petition for rehearing by panel is denied. Judge Colloton would
grant the petition for rehearing by panc!l
Appellant Bucklew’s petition for rehearing en banc has been considered by the court and
the petition is denied. Chief Judge Smith and Judge Kelly would grant the petition. Judge
Colloton and Judge Gruender would grant rehearing en banc on Point | of the petition for
rehearing en banc
Judge Duane Benton took no part in the consideration or decision of the petition for
rehearing en banc
KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc
| would grant Russeil Bucklew’s petition for rehearing en banc——and reverse the district
court’s grant of summary judgment——for the reasons stated in the dissent from the panel opinion
OOla
Appellate Case: 17-3052 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/15/2018 Entry ID: 4639783
in this case. See Bucklew vy. Precythe. F.3d , 2018 WL 1163360, at *7 (8th Cir. 2018)
(Colloton, J., dissenting). | would also grant Bucklew’s petition to the extent it seeks
reconsideration of this court’s conclusion, in Bucklew vy. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120, 1128 (8th
Cir. 2015) (en banc), that those sentenced to death must plead a “feasible, readily implemented
alternative procedure” for carrying out their sentence in order to state a plausible as-applied
claim under the Eighth Amendment. | continue to believe that “|flacial and as-applied
challenges to execution protocols are different,” that death row inmates “need not plead a readily
available alternative method of execution” to bring an as-applied challenge, and that “[a] state
cannot be excused from taking into account a particular inmate’s existing physical disability or
health condition when assessing the propricty of its execution method.” See id. at 1129 (Bye, J.,
concurring in the result). “While the Supreme Court has been clear on the general proposition
that, so long as a state-imposed death penalty is constitutional, there must be some way for states
to carry out executions, the Supreme Court has also been clear that some individuals cannot be
executed.” Id. at 1130 (collecting cases); see also Madison v. Alabama, 138 S. Ct. , 2018
WL 514241 (Feb. 26, 2018); Dunn v. Madison, 138 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2017) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). In my view, neither Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015), nor any subsequent
case from the United States Supreme Court dictates the result this court reached on this issue in
Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
March 15, 2018
Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
p /s/ Michael E. Gans
002a
Appellate Case: 17-3052 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/15/2018 Entry ID: 4639783
Gnited States Court of Appeals
For the Cighth Circuit
No. 17-3052
Russell Bucklew
Plaintiff - Appellant
Anne L. Precythe, Director of the Department of Corrections, et al.
Defendants - Appellees
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
Submitted: February 2, 2018
Filed: March 6, 2018
Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
LOKEN, Circuit Judge
The issue is whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as applied, bar
Missouri officials from employing a procedure that is authorized by Missouri statute
to execute Russell Bucklew.
In March 2006, Bucklew stole a car; armed himself with pistols, handcuffs, and
a roll of duct tape; and followed his former girlfriend, Stephanie Ray, to the home of
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Michael Sanders, where she was living. Bucklew knocked and entered the trailer
with a pistol in each hand when Sanders’s son opened the door. Sanders took the
children to the back room and grabbed a shotgun. Bucklew began shooting. Two
bullets struck Sanders, one piercing his chest. Bucklew fired at Sanders’s six-year-
old son, but missed. As Sanders bled to death, Bucklew struck Ray in the face with
a pistol, handcuffed Ray, dragged her to the stolen car, drove away, and raped Ray
in the back seat of the car. He was apprehended by the highway patrol after a
gunfight in which Bucklew and a trooper were wounded.
A Missouri state court jury convicted Bucklew of murder, kidnaping, and rape
The trial court sentenced Bucklew to death, as the jury had recommended. His
conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Bucklew, 973
S.W.2d 83 (Mo. banc 1998). The trial court denied his petition for post-conviction
relief, and the Supreme Court of Missouri again affirmed. Bucklew v. State, 38
S.W.3d 395 (Mo. banc 2001). We subsequently affirmed the district court’s denial
of Bucklew’s petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus. Bucklew v. Luebbers, 436
F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court of Missouri issued a writ of execution
for May 21, 2014. Bucklew filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
execution by Missouri’s lethal injection protocol, authorized by statute, would
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments as applied to him because of his unique medical condition. Bucklew
appeals the district court’s' grant of summary judgment in favor of the state
defendants because Bucklew failed to present adequate evidence to establish his
claim under the governing standard established by the Supreme Court in Baze v.
Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), and Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). Reviewing
the grant of summary judgment de novo, we affirm.
'The Honorable Beth Phillips, United States District Judge for the Western
District of Missouri.
_™
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Missouri’s method of execution is by injection of a lethal dose of the drug
pentobarbital. Two days before his scheduled execution in 2014, the district court
denied Bucklew’s motion for a stay of execution and dismissed this as-applied action
sua sponte. On appeal, a divided panel granted a stay of execution, Bucklew v.
Lombardi, 565 Fed. Appx. 562 (8th Cir. 2014); the court en banc vacated the stay.
Bucklew applied to the Supreme Court for a stay of execution, and the Court issued
an Order granting his application “for stay pending appeal in the Eighth Circuit.”
This court, acting en banc, reversed the sua sponte dismissal of Bucklew’s as-applied
Eighth Amendment claim and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120, 1128 (8th Cir. 2015) (“Bucklew I”). On the
same day, the en banc court affirmed the district court’s dismissal on the merits of a
facial challenge to Missouri’s lethal injection protocol filed by several inmates
sentenced to death, including Bucklew. Zink vy. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1114 (8th
Cir.), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 2941 (2015).’
*““The doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion bars relitigation of a § 1983
claim if the prior judgment was a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, and if the same cause of action and the same parties or their
privies were involved.” Baker vy. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 2007), cert
denied, 554 U.S. 902 (2008). As Bucklew was a plaintiff in Zink, any facial
challenge to the current method of execution in this case is precluded. Defendants
argue that Bucklew’s as-applied challenge is also precluded because it could have
been raised in Zink. See Brown v. St. Louis Police Dep’t, 691 F.2d 393, 396 (8th Cir.
1982). Like the district court, we decline to address this complex issue. See Bucklew
1, 783 F.3d at 1122 n.1; cf. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct 2292,
2305 (2016). We likewise decline to address defendants’ claim that Bucklew’s as-
applied challenge is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Boyd v.
Warden, Holman Corr. Facility, 856 F.3d 853, 874-76 (11th Cir. 2017).
-%
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Our decision in Buckiew | set forth in considerable detail the allegations in
Bucklew’s as-applied complaint regarding his medical condition. 783 F.3d at 1124-
26. Bucklew has long suffered from a congenital condition called cavernous
hemangioma, which causes clumps of weak, malformed blood vessels and tumors to
grow in his face, head, neck, and throat. The large, inoperable tumors fill with blood,
periodically rupture, and partially obstruct his airway. In addition, the condition
affects his circulatory system, and he has compromised peripheral veins in his hands
and arms. In his motion for a stay of execution in Bucklew |, Bucklew argued:
Dr. Joel Zivot, a board-certified anesthesiologist . . . concluded after
reviewing Mr. Bucklew’s medical records that a substantial risk existed
that, because of Mr. Bucklew’s vascular malformation, the lethal drug
will likely not circulate as intended, creating a substantial risk of a
“prolonged and extremely painful execution.” Dr. Zivot also concluded
that a very substantial risk existed that Mr. Bucklew would hemorrhage
curing the execution, potentially choking on his own blood -- a risk
greatly heightened by Mr. Bucklew’s partially obstructed airway.
+ * * . *
{The Department of Corrections has advised it would not use a dye in
flushing the intravenous line because Dr. Zivot warned that might cause
a spike in Bucklew’s blood pressure.| Reactionary changes at the
eleventh hour, without the guidance of imaging or tests, create a
substantial risk to Mr. Bucklew, who suffers from a complex and severe
medical condition that has compromised his veins.
7 . * * *
The DOC seems to acknowledge they agree with Dr. Zivot that Mr.
Bucklew’s obstructed airway presents substantial risks of needless pain
and suffering, but what they plan to do about it is a mystery. Will they
execute Mr. Bucklew in a seated position? . . . The DOC should be
required to disclose how it plans to execute Mr. Bucklew so that this
Court can properly assess whether additional risks are present. . . . Until
-4-
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Mr. Bucklew knows what protocol the DOC will use to kill him, and
until the DOC is required to conduct the necessary imaging and testing
to quantify the expansion of Mr. Bucklew’s hemangiomas and the extent
of his airway obstruction, it is not possible to execute him without
substantial risk of severe pain and needless suffering.
Defendants’ Suggestions in Opposition argued that Bucklew’s “proposed changes . . .
with the exception of his complaint about [dye], which Missouri will not use in
Bucklew’s execution, are not really changes in the method of execution.”
Glossip and Baze established two requirements for an Eighth Amendment
challenge to a method of execution. First, the challenger must “establish that the
method presents a risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless
suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers.” Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737
(emphasis in original), citing Baze, 553 U.S. at 50. This evidence must show that the
pain and suffering being risked is severe in relation to the pain and suffering that is
accepted as inherent in any method of execution. Id. at 2733. Second, the challenger
must “identify an alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact
significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain.” Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737,
citing Baze, 553 U.S. at 52. This two-part standard governs as-applied as well as
facial challenges to a method of execution. See, e.g., Jones v. Kelley, 854 F.3d 1009,
1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2017); Williams v. Kelley, 854 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2017);
Johnson v. Lombardi, 809 F.3d 388, 390 (8th Cir. 2015); Bucklew I, 783 F.3d at
1123, 1127. As a panel we are bound by these controlling precedents. Bucklew
argues the second Baze/Glossip requirement of a feasible alternative method of
execution that substantially reduces the risk of suffering should not apply to “an
individual who is simply too sick and anomalous to execute in a constitutional
manner,” like those who may not be executed for mental health reasons. See, e.g.,
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986). The Supreme Court has not
recognized a categorical exemption from the death penalty for individuals with
physical ailments or disabilities. Thus, in the decision on appeal, the district court
ie
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properly applied the Baze/Glossip two-part standard in dismissing Bucklew’s as-
applied claim.
We concluded in Bucklew I, based on a record “which went well beyond the
four corners of Bucklew’s complaint,” that the complaint’s allegations, bolstered by
defendants’ concession “that the Department’s lethal injection procedure would be
changed on account of his condition by eliminating the use of methylene blue dye,”
sufficiently alleged the first requirement of an as-applied challenge to the method of
execution -- “a substantial risk of serious and imminent harm that is sure or very
likely to occur.” 783 F.3d at 1127. We further concluded the district court’s sua
sponte dismissal was premature because these detailed allegations made it
inappropriate “to assume that Bucklew would decline an invitation to amend the as-
applied challenge” to plausibly allege a feasible and more humane alternative method
of execution, the second requirement under the Baze/Glossip standard. Id. In
remanding, we directed that further proceedings “be narrowly tailored and
expeditiously conducted to address only those issues that are essential to resolving”
the as-applied challenge. Id. at 1128. We explained:
Bucklew’s arguments on appeal raise an inference that he is
impermissibly seeking merely to investigate the protocol without taking
a position as to what is needed to fix it. He may not be “permitted to
supervise every step of the execution process.” Rather, at the earliest
possible time, he must identify a feasible, readily implemented
alternative procedure that will significantly reduce a substantial risk of
severe pain and that the State refuses to adopt. . . . Any assertion that all
methods of execution are unconstitutional does not state a plausible
claim under the Eighth Amendment or a cognizable claim under § 1983.
Id. (quotation omitted; emphasis in original).
--
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On remand, consistent with our directive, the district court first ordered
Bucklew to file an amended complaint that adequately identified an alternative
procedure. Twice, Bucklew filed amended complaints that failed to comply with this
order. Given one last chance to comply or face dismissal, on October 13, 2015,
Bucklew filed a Fourth Amended Complaint. As relevant here, it alleged:
106. Based on Mr. Bucklew’s unique and severe condition, there
is no way to proceed with Mr. Bucklew’s execution under Missouri’s
lethal injection protocol without a substantial risk to Mr. Bucklew of
suffering grave adverse events during the execution, including
hemorrhaging, suffocating or experiencing excruciating pain.
107. Under any scenario or with any of lethal drug, execution by
lethal injection poses an enormous risk that Mr. Bucklew will suffer
extreme, excruciating and prolonged pain -- all accompanied by choking
and struggling for air.
128. In May 2014, the DOC also proposed a second adjustment
in its protocol, offering to adjust the gurney so that Mr. Bucklew is not
lying completely prone.’ . . . As a practical matter, no adjustment would
likely be sufficient, as the stress of the execution may unavoidably cause
Mr. Bucklew’s hemangiomas to rupture, leading to hemorrhaging,
bleeding in his throat and through his facial orifices, and coughing and
choking on his own blood.
129. In order to fully evaluate and establish the risks to Mr.
Bucklew from execution by lethal injection, a full and complete set of
imaging studies must be conducted.
*In their answer to paragraph 128, defendants alleged: “Defendants admit that
the Defendants offered to have the anesthesiologist position the angle of the gurney
in a proper position.” Thus, this fect was established by the pleadings.
x x
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139. Mr. Bucklew is mindful of the Court’s directive to allege a
feasible, readily implemented alternative procedure .... Mr. Bucklew
has complied . . . by researching and proposing execution by lethal gas,
which is specifically authorized by Missouri law and which Missouri’s
Attorney General has stated the DOC is prepared to implement.
150. In adherence with the pleading requirements set forth in
Glossip, and as stated above, Mr. Bucklew specifically alleges lethal gas
as a feasible and available alternative method that will significantly
reduce the risk of severe pain to Mr. Bucklew.
In other words, Bucklew took the position that no modification of Missouri’s lethal
injection method of execution could be constitutionally applied to execute Bucklew.
He proposed massive discovery allegedly needed to establish the first Baze/Glossip
requirement. But his legal theory is that alternative procedures such as adjusting the
gurney’s position are irrelevant because no lethal injection procedure would be
constitutional, only a change to the use of lethal gas would be adequate.
Bucklew’s as-applied claim focused on two aspects of his medical condition.
First, Bucklew’s experts initially opined that his peripheral veins are so weak that
injection of a lethal dose of pentobarbital would not adequately circulaic, leading to
a prolonged and painful execution. The district court concluded that discovery and
expert opinions developed on remand refuted this claim. The lethal injection protocol
provides that medical personnel may insert the primary intravenous (IV) line “as a
central venous line” and may dispense with a secondary peripheral IV line if “the
prisoner’s physical condition makes it unduly difficult to insert more than one IV.”
Bucklew’s expert Dr. Zivot conceded, and Defendants’ expert, Dr. Joseph Antognini,
agreed, that the central femoral vein can circulate a “fair amount of fluid” without
serious risk of rupture and that Bucklew’s medical condition will not affect the flow
of pentobarbital after it is injected through this vein.
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Second, Bucklew’s experts opined that his condition will cause him to
experience severe choking and suffocation during execution by lethal injection.
When Bucklew is supine, gravity pulls the hemangioma tumor into his throat which
causes his breathing to be labored and the tumor to rupture and bleed. When
conscious, Bucklew can “adjust” his breathing with repeated swallowing that
prevents the tumor from blocking his airway. But during the “twilight stage” of a
lethal injection execution, Dr. Zivot opined that Bucklew will be aware he is choking
on his own blood and in pain before the pentobarbital renders him unconscious and
unaware of pain. Based on a study of lethal injections in horses, Dr. Zivot estimated
there could be a period as short as 52 seconds and as long as 240 seconds when
Bucklew is conscious but immobile and unable to adjust his breathing; his attempts
to breath will create friction, causiv* the tumor to bleed and possibiy hemorrhage.
In Dr. Zivot’s opinion, there is a “very, very high likelihood” that Bucklew will suffer
“choking complications, including visible hemorrhaging,” if he is executed by any
means of lethal injection, including using the drug pentobarbital.
According to Defendants’ expert, Dr. Antognini, pentobarbital causes death by
“producing rapid, deep unconscious|ness], respiratory depression, followed by . . .
complete absence of respiration, decreased oxygen levels, slowing of the heart, and
then the heart stopping.” In contrast to Dr. Zivot, Dr. Antognini opined that
pentobarbital would cause “rapid and deep unconsciousness” within 20-30 seconds
of entering Bucklew’s blood stream, rendering him insensate to bleeding and choking
sensations. Dr. Antognini also challenged Dr. Zivot’s opinion that a supine Bucklew,
unable to adjust his breathing, will be aware he is choking on his own blood and in
pain from the tumor blocking his airway before the pentobarbital renders him
unconscious. Dr. Antognini noted that, between 2000 and 2003, Bucklew underwent
general anesthesia cight times, at least once in a supine position. In December 2016,
Bucklew lay supine for over an hour undergoing an MRI, with no more than
discomfort. The MRI revealed that his tumor had slightly shrunk since 2010.
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In granting defendants summary judgment, the district court declined to rely
on the first Glossip/Baze requirement because these conflicting expert opinions
“would permit a factfinder to conclude that for as long as four minutes [after the
injection of pentobarbital Bucklew] could be aware that he is choking or unable to
breathe but be unable [to] ‘adjust’ his breathing to remedy the situation.” Rather, the
court held that Bucklew failed to provide adequate evidence that his alternative
method of execution -- lethal gas -- was a “feasible, readily implemented” alternative
that would “in fact significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain” as compared
to lethal injection. Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2737; Baze, 553 U.S. at 52.
To succeed in his challenge to Missouri’s lethal injection execution protocol,
Bucklew must establish both prongs of the Glossip/Baze standard. Glossip, 135 S.
Ct. 2737. The district court held that Bucklew failed to establish the second prong
of Glossip/Baze by showing that an alternative method of execution would “in fact
significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.” As noted, Bucklew argues the
Glossip/Baze standard should not apply to an as-applied challenge to a method of
execution, an argument our controlling precedents have rejected. He raises two
additional issues on appeal.
A. Bucklew first argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment
on the second Glossip/Baze requirement because he presented sufficient evidence that
his proposed alternative method of execution -- death through nitrogen gas-induced
hypoxia -- “would substantially reduce his suffering.” Summary judgment is not
appropriate when there are material issues of disputed fact, and the Supreme Court
in Glossip made clear that this issue may require findings of fact that are reviewed for
clear error. See 135 S. Ct. at 2739-41 (majority opinion) and 2786 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting). However, whether a method of execution “constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment is a question of law.” Swindler v. Lockhart, 885 F.2d 1342, 1350 (8th
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Cir. 1989). Thus, unless there are material underlying issues of disputed fact, it is
appropriate to resolve this ultimate issue of law by summary judgment.
Nitrogen hypoxia is an authorized method of execution under Missouri Law.
See Mo. Stat. Ann. § 546.720. Missouri has not used this method of execution since
1965 and does not currently have a protocol in place for execution by lethal gas. But
there are ongoing studies of the method in other States and at least preliminary
indications that Missouri will undertake to develop a protocol. Defendants do not
argue this is not a feasible and available alternative.
The district court granted summary judgment based on Bucklew’s failure to
provide adequate evidence that execution by nitrogen hypoxia would substantially
reduce the risk of pain or suffering. The court allowed Bucklew extensive discovery
into defendants’ knowledge regarding execution by lethal gas. But Missouri’s lack
of recent experience meant that this discovery produced little relevant evidence and
no evidence that the risk posed by lethal injection is substantial when compared to the
risk posed by lethal gas. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2738; Johnson, 809 F.3d at 391.
Bucklew’s theory is that execution by nitrogen hypoxia would render Bucklew
insensate more quickly than lethal injection and would not cause choking and
bleeding in his tumor-blocked airway. But his expert, Dr. Zivot, provided no support
for this theory. Dr. Zivot’s Supplemental Expert Report explained:
| W Jhile I can assess Mr. Bucklew’s current medical status and render an
expert opinion as to the documented and significant risks associated
with executing Mr. Bucklew under Missouri’s current Execution
Procedure, | cannot advise counsel or the Court on how to execute Mr.
Bucklew in a way that would satisfy Constitutional requirements.
Lacking affirmative comparative evidence, Bucklew relied on Dr. Antognini’s
deposition. In his Expert Report, Dr. Antognini concluded that “the use of lethal gas
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would not significantly lessen any suffering or be less painful than lethal injection in
this inmate.” At his deposition, Dr. Antognini was asked:
Q. Why does lethal gas not hold any advantage compared to lethal
injection.
A. Well . . . there are a lot of types of gases that could be used
.... [U]sing gas would not significantly lessen any suffering or be less
painful. Because, again, their onset of action is going to be relatively
fast, just like Pentobarbital’s onset -- onset of action.
Q. That’s it? Simply because it would happen quickly?
A. Correct.
The district court concluded this opinion provided nothing to compare:
Dr. Antognini specifically stated that he believed there would be no
difference in the “speed” of lethal gas as compared to pentobarbital. . . .
In the absence of evidence contradicting Defendants’ expert and
supporting Plaintiff's theory, there is not a triable issue.
On appeal, Bucklew argues the district court should have compared Dr. Zivot’s
opinion that lethal injection would take up to four minutes to cause Bucklew’s brain
death with Dr. Antognini’s testimony that lethal gas would render him unconscious
in the same amount of time as lethal injection, 20 to 30 seconds. But Dr. Antognini’s
comparative testimony was that both methods would result in unconsciousness in
approximately the same amount of time. Bucklew offered no contrary comparative
evidence and thus the district court correctly concluded that he failed to satisfy his
burden to provide evidence “establishing a known and available alternative that
would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.” McGehee v.
Hutchinson, 854 I’ .3d 488, 493 (8th Cir. 2017).
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In addition, Bucklew’s claim that he will experience choking sensations during
an execution by lethal injection but not by nitrogen hypoxia rests on the proposition
that he could be seated during the latter but not the former. He argues there is
evidence he will be forced to remain supine during an execution by lethal injection,
when his tumor will cause him to sense he is choking on his own blood, whereas he
could remain seated during the administration of lethal gas, which would not cause
a choking sensation. But this argument lacks factual support in the record. Having
taken the position that any lethal injection procedure would violate the Eighth
Amendment, Bucklew made no effort to determine what changes, if any, the DOC
would make in applying its lethal injection protocol in executing Bucklew, other than
defendants advising -- prior to remand by this court -- that dye would not be used.
Based on Bucklew’s argument to the en banc court, we expected that the core
of the proceedings on remand would be defining what changes defendants would
make on account of Bucklew’s medical condition and then evaluating that modified
procedure under the two-part Baze/Glossip standard. On remand, Director of
Corrections Ann Precythe testified that the medical members of the execution team
are provided a prisoner’s medical history in preparing for the execution. Precythe has
authority to make changes in the execution protocol, such as how the primary IV line
will be inserted in the central femoral vein or how the gurney will be positioned, if
the team advises that changes are needed. While Bucklew sought and was denied
discovery of the identities of the execution team’s medical members, he never urged
the district court to establish a suitable fact-finding procedure -- for example, by
anonymous interrogatories or written deposition questions to the execution team
members -- for discovery of facts needed for the DOC to define the as-applied lethal
injection protocol it intends to use for Bucklew. As Bucklew did not pursue these
issues, the pleadings established that defendants have proposed to reposition the
gurney during Bucklew’s deposition, and Director Precythe testified that she has
authority to make this type of change in the execution protocol based on the execution
team’s advice based on review of Bucklew’s medical history, but the record does not
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disclose whether Bucklew will in fact be supine during the execution,‘ nor does it
disclose that a “cut-down” procedure will not be used to place the primary IV line in
his central femoral vein, a procedure Dr. Antognini opined was unnecessary.
Bucklew simply asserts that, in comparing execution by lethal injection and by lethal
gas, we must accept his speculation that defendants will employ these risk-increasing
procedures. This we will not do.
Like the district court, we conclude the summary judgment record contains no
basis to conclude that Bucklew’s risk of severe pain would be substantially reduced
by use of nitrogen hypoxia instead of lethal injection as the method of execution.
Evidence that “is equivocal, lacks scientific consensus and presents a paucity of
reliable scientific evidence” does not establish that an execution is sure or very likely
to cause serious illness and needless suffering. Williams v. Kelley, 854 F.3d at 1001
(quotation omitted). Therefore, he failed to establish the second prong of the
Glossip/Baze standard.
B. Bucklew further contends the district court erred in denying his requests for
discovery relating to “M2” and “M3,” two members of the lethal injection execution
team. Bucklew argues he was entitled to discovery of the medical technicians’
qualifications, training, and experience because it would “illuminate the nature and
extent of the risks of suffering he faces.” For example, if M3 was not qualified to
safely place his IV in the central femoral vein, this would directly impact the risk of
*Dr. Zivot surmised that Bucklew will be required to lie flat during lethal
injection based on what he observed at an execution in Georgia. He gave no reason
to believe that pentobarbital could not be injected through a femoral vein while
Bucklew is seated. He merely opined that “[i]t’s more difficult” to administer an
anesthetic to someone who is sitting up. Dr. Antognini, in addition to opining that
Bucklew would be rendered unconscious and insensate within 20 to 30 seconds of
pentobarbital injection, noted that it was not necessary that Bucklew be supine in
order to inject pentobarbital in his femoral vein.
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pain and suffering. We review a district court’s discovery rulings narrowly and with
great deference and will reverse only for a “gross abuse of discretion resulting in
fundamental unfairness.” Marksmeier v. Davie, 622 F.3d 896, 903 (8th Cir. 2010).
Bucklew’s argument proceeds from the premise that M2 and M3 may not be
qualified for the positions for which they have been hired. But we will not assume
that Missouri employs personnel who are incompetent or unqualified to perform their
assigned duties. See Clemons v. Crawford, 585 F.3d 1119, 1128 (8th Cir. 2009). He
further argues that deposition of M2 and M3 is necessary to understand how they will
handle a circumstance in case something goes wrong during Bucklew’s execution.
The potentiality that something may go wrong in an execution does not give rise to
an Eighth Amendment violation. Zink, 783 F.3d at 1101. “Some risk of pain is
inherent in any method of execution -- no matter how humane -- if only from the
prospect of error in following the required procedure. . . . [A jn isolated mishap alone
does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 47, 50.
Thus, the district court’s ruling was consistent with our instruction in remanding that
Bucklew “may not be permitted to supervise every step of the execution process.”
Bucklew |, 783 F.3d at 1128 (quotation omitted). The Baze/Glossip evaluation must
be based on the as-applied pre-execution protocol, assuming that those responsible
for carrying out the sentence are competent and qualified to do so, and that the
procedure will go as intended.
lil. Conclusion
Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude that Bucklew has failed
to establish that lethal injection, as applied to him, constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Therefore, we affirm the
judgment of the district court.
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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Russell Bucklew alleges that the State of Missouri’s method of execution by
lethal injection violates his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He
seeks an injunction prohibiting an execution by that method. The district court
granted summary judgment for the State, but there are genuine disputes of material
fact that require findings of fact by the district court before this dispute can be
resolved. I would therefore remand the case for the district court promptly to conduct
further proceedings.
Bucklew’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires him to prove two elements:
(1) that the State’s method of execution is sure or very likely to cause him severe
pain, and (2) that an alternative method of execution that is feasible and readily
implemented would significantly reduce the substantial risk of severe pain. Glossip
v. Gross, 135 8. Ct. 2726, 2737 (2015); Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F 3d 1120, 1123,
1128 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc). On the first element, the district court concluded that
taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Bucklew, there is a substantial risk
under Missouri’s lethal injection protocol that Bucklew will experience choking and
an inability to breathe for up to four minutes. On the second element, however, the
court ruled as a matter of law that Bucklew’s suggested alternative
method—execution by administration of nitrogen gas——-would not significantly
reduce the substantial risk that the court identified under the first element. In my
view, the district court’s reasoning as to the first element is inconsistent with its
summary disposition of Bucklew’s claim on the second.
On the first element, Bucklew’s theory is that he will suffer severe pain by
prolonged choking or suffocation if the State executes him by lethal injection. He
contends that when he lies supine on the execution gurney, tumors in his throat will
block his airway unless he can “adjust” his positioning to enable breathing. Bucklew
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argues that if an injection of pentobarbital renders him unable to adjust his
positioning while he can still sense pain, then he will choke or suffocate.
In assessing that claim, the district court cited conflicting expert testimony
from Bucklew’s expert, Dr. Joel Zivot, and the State’s expert, Dr. Joseph Antognini.
Dr. Antognini testified that if the State proceeded by way of lethal injection using
pentobarbital, then Bucklew would be unconscious within twenty to thirty seconds
and incapable of experiencing pain at that point. R. Doc. 182-5, at 10, 40-41. Dr.
Zivot, however, differed: “I strongly disagree with Dr. Antognini’s repeated claim
that the pentobarbital injection would result in ‘rapid unconsciousness’ and therefore
Mr. Bucklew would not experience any suffocating or choking.” R. Doc. 182-1, at
147. Zivot opined that Bucklew “would likely experience unconsciousness that sets
in progressively as the chemical circulates through his system,” and that “during this
in-between twilight stage,” Bucklew “is likely to experience prolonged feelings of
suffocation and excruciating pain.” /d.
In his deposition, Dr. Zivot opined that “there will be points,” before Bucklew
dies, “where he’s beginning to experience the effects of the pentobarbital, where his
ability to control and regulate and adjust his airway will be impaired, although there
will still be the experience capable of knowing that he cannot make the adjustment,
and will experience it as choking.” /d. at 81. When directed to Dr. Antognini’s
opinion that Bucklew would be unaware of noxious stimuli within twenty to thirty
seconds of a pentobarbital injection, Dr. Zivot observed that Antognini’s opinion was
based on a study involving dogs from fifty years ago and testified that his “number
would be longer than that.” /d. at 85. When asked for his “number,” Dr. Zivot
pointed to a study on lethal injections administered to horses; he said the study
recorded “a range of as short as fifty-two seconds and as long as about two hundred
and forty seconds before they see isoelectric EEG.” /d. at 85-86. Dr. Zivot noted that
the “number” that he derived from the horse study was “more than twice as long as”
the number suggested by Dr. Antognini. /d. at 86. He defined “isoelectric EEG” as
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“indicative of at least electrical silence on the parts of the brain that the
electroencephalogram has access to.” /d.
The district court observed that “[a]n execution is typically conducted with the
prisoner lying on his back,” and that the record “establishes that [Bucklew] has
difficulty breathing while in that position because the tumors can cause choking or
an inability to breathe.” The court understood Dr. Zivot to mean that “it could be
fifty-two to 240 seconds before the pentobarbital induces a state in which [Bucklew]
could no longer sense that he is choking or unable to breathe.” Thus, the court
concluded that “construing the Record in [Bucklew’s] favor reveals that it could be
fifty-two to 240 seconds before the pentobarbital induces a state in which [Bucklew]
could no longer sense that he is choking or unable to breathe.” Again, the court
reasoned that “the facts construed in [Bucklew’s] favor would permit a factfinder to
conclude that for as long as four minutes | Bucklew]| could be aware that he is choking
or unable to breathe but be unable to ‘adjust’ his breathing to remedy the situation.”
On that basis, the court presumed for purposes of the motion for summary judgment
that “there is a substantial risk that [Bucklew] will experience choking and an
inability to breathe for up to four minutes.”
The State disputes that there is a genuine dispute of material fact on the first
element of Bucklew’s claim, but the district court properly concluded that findings
of fact were required. Bucklew pointed to evidence from Missouri corrections
officials that prisoners have al ways laid flat on their backs during executions by lethal
injection in Missouri. R. Doc. 182-7, at 10; R. Doc. 182-9, at 1; R. Doc. 182-12, at
29, 91. One official testified that he did not know whether the gurney could be
adjusted. R. Doc. 182-12, at 91. * nother official believed that the head of the gurney
“could” be raised (or that a gurney with that capability could be acquired), and that
an anesthesiologist would have “the freedom” to adjust the gurney “if” he or she
determined that it would be in the best medical interest of the offender to do so. R.
Doc. 182-7, at 14. But the State did not present evidence about how it would position
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Bucklew or the gurney during his execution. On a motion for summary judgment, the
district court was required to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
Bucklew. Under that standard, without undisputed evidence from the State that it
would alter its ordinary procedures, the court did not err by concluding that a finder
of fact could infer that the State would proceed as in all other executions, with
Bucklew lying on his back.’
The State argues that the district court erred in discerning a genuine dispute of
material fact on the first element because Dr. Zivot did not specify the length of the
expected “twilight stage” during which Bucklew would be unable to adjust his
positioning yet still sense pain. The State also complains that Dr. Zivot did not
specify that Bucklew’s pain awareness would continue for fifty-two seconds or longer
until brain waves ceased. There certainly are grounds to attack the reliability and
credibility of Dr. Zivot’s opinion, including the imprecision of some of his testimony,
his opposition to all forms of lethal injection, his possible misreading of the horse
study on which he partially relied, and his inaccurate predictions of calamities at prior
executions. But he did orine that Bucklew was likely to “experience prolonged
feelings of suffocation and excruciating pain” if executed by lethal injection, R. Doc.
182-1, at 147, and that there “will be points” before Bucklew dies when his ability to
regulate his airway will be impaired so that he “will experience it as choking.” /d. at
*Bucklew alleged in Paragraph 128 of his complaint that the State had offered
to adjust the gurney so that Bucklew is not lying completely prone, but then
continued as follows immediately thereafter: “Although the stated intent was to
reduce the choking risk to Mr. Bucklew, the DOC has obtained no imaging studies
of Mr. Bucklew since 2010, and therefore has no information on which to base any
decisions about the angle of the gurney.” R. Doc. 53, at 43-44. The district court
noted the State’s suggestion “that the execution could be performed with [Bucklew]
in a different position,” but explained that “there is no evidence whether this has an
effect on the procedure as a whole,” and concluded that the State had “not provided
the Court with a basis for granting summary judgment based on the possibility of
performing the execution with [Bucklew] in a sitting (or other) position.”
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81. The district court did not err in concluding that it could not resolve the dispute
between the experts on summary judgment.
On the second element of Bucklew’s claim, the district court concluded as a
matter of law that Bucklew failed to show that his proposed alternative method of
substantial risk of severe pain that the court recognized under the first element. The
majority affirms the district court’s judgment on this basis. Taking the evidence in
the light most favorable to Bucklew, however, a factfinder could conclude that
nitrogen gas would render Bucklew insensate more quickly than pentobarbital and
would thus eliminate the risk that he would experience prolonged feelings of choking
or suffocation. Dr. Antognini testified that a person who is administered nitrogen gas
“wouid be unconscious very quickly,” and that the onset of action from lethal gas “is
going to be relatively fast, just like Pentobarbital’s onset.” R. Doc. 182-5, at 58-59
(emphasis added). Given Dr. Antognini’s testimony that pentobarbital would render
Bucklew insensate within twenty to thirty seconds, the record in the light most
favorable to Bucklew supports a finding based on Antognini’s testimony that nitrogen
gas would relieve Bucklew from any pain of choking or suffocating within twenty to
thirty seconds. A trier of fact may accept all, some, or none of a witness’s testimony,
United States v. Candie, 974 F.2d 61, 65 (8th Cir. 1992), and a plaintiff may rely on
testimony from the defendant’s expert to meet his burden if the testimony is
advantageous to the plaintiff. See /BEW Local 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co., Inc.,
818 F.3d 775, 782 (8th Cir. 2016). If the factfinder accepted Dr. Zivot’s testimony
as to the effect of pentobarbital, and Dr. Antognini’s uncontroverted testimony as to
effect of nitrogen gas, then Bucklew’s proposed alternative method would
significantly reduce the substantial risk of severe pain that the district court identified
in its analysis of the first element.
For these reasons, there are genuine disputes of material fact that preclude
summary judgment and require findings of fact by the district court. | would
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therefore remand the case for further proceedings. The district court may then
promptly make appropriate factual findings about, among other things, how Bucklew
will be positioned during an execution, whether his airway will be blocked during an
execution, and how pentobarbital (and, if necessary, nitrogen gas) will affect his
consciousness and ability to sense potential pain.
The State contends that we should not reach the merits of Bucklew’s claim
because several procedural obstacles require dismissal of his complaint. The majority
does not rely on these points, and I find them unavailing.
First, the State contends that Bucklew did not raise his present claim in his
fourth amended complaint. Bucklew’s complaint, however, does allege the essence
of his current theory. The complaint asserts that the tumors in Bucklew’s throat
require “t.:m to sleep with his upper body elevated” because if he lies flat, “the tumor
then fully obstructs his airway.” /d. at 18-19. It continued: “Executions are
conducted on a gurney, and the risks arising from Mr. Bucklew’s airway are even
greater if he is lying flat. Because of the hemangiomas, Mr. Bucklew is unable to
sleep in a normal recumbent position because the tumors cause greater obstruction in
that position.” R. Doc. 53, at 35. Bucklew further alleged that execution by lethal
injection “poses an enormous risk that Mr. Bucklew will suffer extreme, excruciating
and prolonged pain — all accompanied by choking and struggling for air.” /d. at 36.
The complaint was adequate under a notice pleading regime to raise a claim that the
execution procedure would result in an obstructed airway and choking or suffocation.
If necessary, moreover, the district court acted within its discretion by treating
the complaint as impliedly amended to include Bucklew’s present claim. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(b)(2). Bucklew clearly notified the State of his contention in his
opposition to the State’s motion for summary judgment. R. Doc. 192-1, at 1-3, 11-17.
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Yet rather than communicate surprise and object that the claim was not pleaded, the
State addressed Bucklew’s contention on the merits. R. Doc. 200, at 4-5. Where a
party has actual notice of an unpleaded issue and has been given an adequate
opportunity to cure any surprise resulting from a change in the pleadings, there is
implied consent to an amendment. Trip Mate, Inc. v. Stonebridge Cas. Ins. Co., 768
F.3d 779, 784-85 (8th Cir. 2014).
Second, the State argues that the five-year statute of limitations bars Bucklew’s
claim, because he was aware of his claim in 2008 and did not file his complaint until
May 9, 2014. A claim under § 1983 accrues when a plaintiff has “a complete and
present cause of action” and “can file suit and obtain reiief.” Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (quoting Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust
Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal.,522 U.S. 192,201 (1997)). Bucklew asserts that he did
not have knowledge of his present claim, and therefore could not have filed suit and
obtained relief, until his medical condition progressed and he was examined by Dr.
Zivot in April 2014. As evidence that Bucklew could have brought his claim earlier,
the State relies on a 2008 petition that Bucklew submitted to the Missouri Supreme
Court. The petition sought funding for an expert witness to investigate the interaction
of the State’s existing execution protocol with Bucklew’s health condition. The
possible claim addressed in the 2008 funding petition, however, focused on the
potential for uncontrolled bleeding and ineffective circulation of drugs within
Bucklew’s body under the State’s former three-drug execution protocol. The petition
does not demonstrate that Bucklew was then on notice of a claim that a future
execution protocol using the single drug pentobarbital would create a substantial risk
of severe pain resulting from tumors blocking his airway while laying supine during
an execution.
Third, the State urges that Bucklew’s claim is barred by res judicata or claim
preclusion, because Bucklew could have litigated his as-applied challenge to the
execution protocol in an earlier case styled Zink v. Lombardi, No. 12-04209-CV-C-
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BP. In Zink, a group of inmates sentenced to death, including Bucklew, brought a
facial challenge to Missouri’s execution protocol. A complaint was filed in August
2012, and the eventual deadline for motions to amend pleadings was January 27,
2014. Principles of claim preclusion do not bar Bucklew’s as-applied challenge if he
was unaware of the basis for the claim in time to include it in the Zink litigation. See
Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 1368. Ct. 2292, 2305 (2016). The State again
points to Bucklew’s 2008 funding petition in support of its preclusion defense, but
for reasons discussed, that petition does not establish that Bucklew’s present claim
was available to him in 2008. At oral argument, the State argued that Bucklew could
have added his as-applied challenge to the Zink litigation after he was examined by
Dr. Zivot in April 2014, because the district court granted the Zink plaintiffs leave to
amend their complaint in May 2014. But the court’s order allowed the Zink plaintiffs
leave to amend only a single count of the complaint to allege a feasible alternative
method of execution. The order did not reopen the pleadings deadline for as-applied
claims by the several individual plaintiffs. See Zink v. Lombardi, No. 12-04209-CV-
C-BP, 2014 WL 11309998, at *4-5, 12 (W.D. Mo. May 2, 2014). The State therefore
has not established that Bucklew’s as-applied claim is barred by res judicata.
For these reasons, | would reverse the judgment of the district court and
remand for further proceedings to be conducted with dispatch.
23.
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Appellate Case: 17-3052 Page: 23 Date Filed: 03/06/2018 Entry ID: 4636271
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
RUSSELL BUCKLEW,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 14-8000-CV-W-BP
Vv
GEORGE A. LOMBARD, et ai,
Defendants.
° -MENT
Pending is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, which secks summary judgment
on the Eighth Amendment Claim presented in Count I' of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Defendants contend that the undisputed facts demonstrate (1) they are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on the merits, (2) Plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations, and (3)
Plaintiff's claim is barred by principles of claim preclusion.’ As discussed below, the Court
agrees that the undisputed facts in the Record establish that Plaintiff cannot prevail on his Eighth
Amendment claim, and for that reason the motion, (Doc. 181), is GRANTED.’
\Gisente 0 on SS ease questeaty Guntenst ty Oo Com (Doc. 63.)
? Defendants also contend the Court should dismiss the case because it lacks jurisdiction. (Doc. 182, pp. 9-10.) The
argument has been presented before, and the Court rejects it for the reasons previously stated. (See Doc. 101.) To
the extent that Defendants’ argument has shifted to contend that the Court lacks jurisdiction because the Record now
proves that Plaintiff will not suffer a redressable injury, the Court rejects this argument as well. Defendants’
argument relates to Plaintiff's ability to prove his clam, not to the Court's sursdiction, and crediting Defendants’
argument would essentially require dismissal (without prejudice) for lack of yurnsdiction anytime a plaintiff fails to
prove his claim. It “is important not to conflate the injury and traceability requirements of a standing analysis with
the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proof as to the issues of damages and causation at a tnal on the merits,” Brown v
Medironic, Inc., 628 F 3d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 2010), and this observation applies equally when the merits are
considered at the summary judgment stage
* The Court does not address the statute of limitations or claim preclusion arguments. These issues were not
addressed before the first appeal, and the Court of Appeals declined to address them im the first instance Hucklew v.
Lombardi, 783 ¥ 3d 1120, 1122 n.1, 1128-29 (8th Cir. 2015) (em banc). Following remand Defendants sought
dismissal on these grounds, but the Court denied the request without prejudice because the Record was not yet
Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP DocumeAt02 Filed 06/15/17 Page 1 of 13
1. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff Russell Bucklew was convicted in state court of first degree murder, kidnapping,
burglary, forcible rape, and armed criminal action. He was sentenced to death for the murder
and various terms of years on the other crimes. State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. 1998) (en
banc), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1082 (1999). His requests for postconviction relief and habeas
relief were denied. Bucklew v. State, 38 S.W.3d 395 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 964
(2001); Bucklew v. Luebbers, 436 F 3d 1010 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1079 (2006).
Plaintiff filed this suit in May 2014. The Court dismissed the case, but the dismissal was
reversed and the case was remanded. Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F 3d 1120, 1128 (8th Cir. 2015)
(en banc). After the Mandate was issued, Bucklew filed a series of Amended Complaints. The
latest — the Fourth Amended Complaint — is the operative pleading, and as noted earlier Count |
is the only remaining count. Count | asserts an Eighth Amendment challenge, contending that
Missouri’s method of execution is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff because of his unique
medical condition.
B. Facts
Plaintiff suffers from a congenital condition known as cavernous hemangioma The
disease causcs clumps of weak, malformed blood vessels and tumors to grow throughout his
body, including his head, face, neck and throat. The tumors are very susceptible to rupture. The
sufficiently developed and various legal complexities (some of which had been identified by the Court of Appeals,
783 F.3d at 1122 n.1) had not been addressed. The Court’s Order explained some of the difficulties involved in
determining whether these doctrines apply. (Doc. 63, pp. 9-13.) The Supreme Court has since discussed the
doctrme of claim preclusion when an as-applied challenge follows an unsuccessful facial challenge Whole
Woman's Health v. Helerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2305 (2016). In reasserting these arguments Defendants have not
addressed any of these factual or legal issues, they have merely cited general pnnciples without explaming how they
apply in this unique situation, and cited to the same facts that were carlier deemed to be incomplete and therefore
insufficient. Given the Court's ruling on the merits there is no need to further delay resolution of this case to
provide Defendants another opportunity to address these issues.
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disease also affects Plaintiffs circulatory system, resulting in (among other effects)
compromised peripheral veins in his hands and arms. The tumors in his throat also make it
difficult for him to breathe, and that difficulty is exacerbated when he is in a supine position.
Plaintiff's condition is incurable, and surgery to alleviate the tumors is not possible due to the
risk of severe bleeding.
Missouri’s death penalty protocol has not been succinctly described, but the parties
implicitly agree (and the Record demonstrates, (e.g, Doc. 182-1, pp. 135-36; Doc. 197-1; Doc.
182-7, pp. 7-9)),* that it involves the intravenous administration of pentobarbital in dosages
sufficient to cause unconsciousness and eventeally death. In terms of the IV’s placement, the
protocol provides as follows:
Medical personnel shall determine the most appropriate locations for intravenous
(IV) lines. Both a primary IV line and a secondary IV line shall be inserted unless
the prisoner’s physical condition makes it unduly difficult to insert more than one
IV. Medical personnel may insert the primary IV line as a peripheral line or a
central venous line (e.g, femoral, jugular, or subclavian) provided they have
appropriate training, education and experience for that procedure. The secondary
IV line ts a peripheral line.
(Doc. 182-1, p. 1.) The parties seem to agree that because of the cavernous hemangioma
Plaintiff's peripheral veins cannot be used in this process because of the risk that they will
rupture (assuming that an |V could be placed in them in the first place). However, the portion of
the protocol quoted above confirms that a central line in the femoral vein may be used instead of
inserting an IV in the peripheral veins. With respect to the risk of Plaintiff's femoral vein
rupturing, Plaintiff's expert, (Dr. Joel Zivot), testified that the femoral vein is large and capable
of “tak|ing| a fair amount of fluid” when the central line is properly placed, and the risk of that
vein rupturing is “unlikely.” (Doc. 182-1, p. 26.) Dr. Zivot also denied having any reason to
believe that Plaintiff's medical condition made his femoral vein more susceptible to rupture than
* all page numbers are those generated by the Court's CM/ECF system
3
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might otherwise be expected, and confirmed that his testimony about the risk of Plaintiff's veins
rupturing was limited to Plaintiff's peripheral veins. (Doc. 182-1, pp. 70-71, 77-78.) Plaintiff
also concedes that there is no evidence in the Record establishing that Plaintiff has any problem
with his veins other than his peripheral veins, including his femoral vein. (Doc. 197, p. 9.)
Finally, the Record confirms that Plaintiff's medical condition will not affect the flow of
chemicals in his bloodstream once they are introduced through the femoral vein, or otherwise
affect his expected response to the pentobarbital. (£.g, Doc. 182-1, pp. 65-66, 213-14, 219.)
An execution is typically conducted with the prisoner lying on his back. The procedure
for inserting a central line is also usually performed with the person in the supine position. The
Record establishes that Plaintiff has difficulty breathing while in that position because the tumors
can cause choking or an inability to breathe. Sometimes the tumors biced, thereby exacerbating
the sensation. When required to be on his back, Plaintiff can “adjust” his breathing so that he
can remain in that position; for instance, Plaintiff was able to lie on his back for approximately
one hour while undergoing an MRI. However, there are factual disputes as to (1) Plaintiff's
ability to adjust his breathing once the pentobarbital begins to take effect, (Doc. 181-1, pp. 81-
82), and (2) how quickly the pentobarbital will deprive Plaintiff of the ability to sense that he is
choking or unable to breathe. On the latter point Dr. Zivot testified that it could be fifty-two to
240 seconds before the pentobarbital induces a state in which Plaintiff could no longer sense that
he is choking or unable to breathe. (E.g., Doc. 182-1, pp. 84-88.) Defendants point out that their
expert, Dr. Joseph Antognini, opined that Plaintiff would be unconscious within twenty to thirty
seconds and at that point would be incapable of experiencing pain. (Doc. 182-1, pp. 198-99;
Doc. 182-5, pp. 60-62.) However, the Court cannot resolve this dispute between the experts on
summary judgment.
4
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ee a...
Defendants also invite the Court to analyze the study Dr. Zivot relied upon to find that
fifty-two seconds of awareness is the worst case scenario because that is when brain death
occurs. (Doc. 200, p. 15.) Dr. Zivot addressed this issue in his deposition, explaining that the
study’s use of the term “brain death” was a “misnomer” because the study marked “brain death”
before measurable brain activity terminated; he then indicated that pain might be felt until
measurable brain activity ceases. (Doc. 182-1, pp. 83-86.)° The Court also cannot resolve this
factual dispute on summary judgment. Therefore, construing the Record in Plaintiff's favor
reveals that it could be fifty-two to 240 seconds before the pentobarbital induces a state in which
Plaintiff could no longer sense that he is choking or unable to breathe.°
IL. DISCUSSION
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment on a claim only upon a showing that
“there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” See generally Williams v. City of St. Louis, 783 F.2d 114, 115 (8th Cir. 1986).
“[W hile the materiality determination rests on the substantive law, it is the substantive law’s
identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, “[o}nly disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Wierman v. Casey’ Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 993 (8th Cir. 201})
(quotation omitted). In applying this standard, the Court must view the evidence in the light
* This may be a generous interpretation of Dr. Zivot’s testimony. However, (1) the Record must be construed in the
light most favorable to Plaintiff and (2) the Court is not required to resolve the clements of Plaintiff's claim in any
particular order. Therefore, the Court deems it appropriate to adopt this interpretation of Dr. Zivot’s testimony im
order to frame the discussion about Plaintiffs proffered alternative method of execution.
* Defendants also suggest that the execution could be performed with Plaintiff in a different position, but there is no
evidence whether this has an effect on the procedure as a whole or the procedure for inserting a central line
specifically. In light of the Record’s silence on these matters, Defendants have not provided the Court with a basis
for granting summary judgment based on the possibility of performing the execution with Plaintiff in a sitting (or
other) position.
5
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most favorable to the non-moving party, giving that party the benefit of all inferences that may
be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); Tyler v. Harper, 744 F.2d 653, 655 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1057 (1985). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not simply deny the
allegations, but must point to evidence in the Record demonstrating the existence of a factual
dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Conseco Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 620 F 3d 902, 909-10 (8th
Cir. 2010).
In Glossip v. Gross, the Supreme Court determined “what a prisoner must establish to
succeed on an Eighth Amendment method-of-cxecution claim.” 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2737 (2015).
“[D]ecisions in this area have been animated in part by the recognition that because it is settled
that capital punishment is constitutional, it necessarily follows that there must be a constitutional
means of carrying it out.” /d at 2732-33. Moreover, “because some risk of pain is inherent tn
any method of execution, we have held that the Constitution does not require the avoidance of all
risk of pain.” /d at 2733. In light of these observations, a prisoner alleging that a particular
form of execution is crucl and unusual within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment must first
establish that the method to be utilized “presents a risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious
illness and needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers.” /d at 2737
(quotations and emphasis delcted). The prisoner must then “identify a known and available
alternative method of execution that entails a lesser risk of pain, a requirement of all Eighth
Amendment method-of-execution claims.” /d. at 2731. The alternative must be “feasible,
readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce| | [the] substantial risk of severe pain.” /d.
at 2737. see also Bucklew, 783 ¥ 3d at 1128. The Court has discretion to decide the order in
which it will address these two components of Plaintiffs claim. Bucklew, 783 F.3d at 1128.
6
Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Document 302 Filed 06/15/17 Page 6 of 13
A. Risk of Serious Iliness or Neediess Suffering
Defendants contend that the uncontroverted facts demonstrate that Plaintiff is not sure or
likely to experience a serious injury or needless suffering. Plaintiff contends that he has
demonstrated a serious risk that he will experience needless pain and suffering because (1) the
weakness in his peripheral veins precludes using them to administer the pentobarbital, and (2) he
will choke or otherwise be unable to breathe for an extended period of time before the
pentobarbital takes full effect. The Court concludes that the Record establishes that (1) the use
of Plaintiff's femoral vein does not present any risk of serious illness or needless suffering, and
(2) the Record does not permit a conclusive determination regarding the risk that Plaintiff will
choke and be unable to breathe for a period of time that would violate the Eighth Amendment.
I. Useo s Fi vei
As discussed in Part |.B, there is an apparent consensus that an IV cannot be safely
inserted in Plaintiff's peripheral veins. However, the execution protocol allows a central line to
be inserted in Plaintiff's femoral vein, and the Record establishes that this can be done without
the risk of complications attributable to Plaintiffs congenital condition. The Court also notes
that Plaintiff's legal argument does not discuss Defendant’s evidence that his femoral vein can be
used to administer the execution drugs. (Doc. 197, pp. 34-43.) Plaintiff discusses the use of his
femoral vein only in the portion of his Opposition that addresses the facts in the Record, and
even in that context he does not present any legal arguments based on those facts. Nonetheless,
the Court will briefly discuss these factual issues.
Generally speaking, Plaintiff addresses the potential difficulty in locating the femoral
vein and the fact that medical personnel might require multiple attempts to locate it.’ This, he
’ To the extent Plaintiff contends that there is no evidence demonstrating that Plaintiffs femoral veins are unaffected
by his disease, this argument does not change the Court’s opinion. If there is no evidence that will establish any
7
Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Docum@At202 Filed 06/15/17 Page 7 of 13
posits, will increase his stress, thereby increasing his breathing rate and making it more likely
that he will choke. Plaintiff also suggests that if the procedure is not performed properly the
drugs might be injected in an artery instead of the vein. (Doc. 197, pp. 18-20.) However,
Plaintiff does not quantify these risks, nor (as stated) does he explain how these facts
independently establish that the current protocol presents a risk of serious illness or needless
suffering. The possibility that Plaintiff might experience increased stress (or, more precisely,
more stress than the situation might otherwise produce) is particularly speculative, as are the
effects of that extra stress. Moreover, on several occasions the Court has observed that Plaintiff
cannot predicate his Eighth Amendment claim on the bare possibility that a medical procedure
might be performed incorrectly.
The uncontroverted facts demonstrate that the lethal injection protocol can be
implemented by using Plaintiff's femoral vein, and that doing so will not create a substantial risk
of serious injury or needless suffering. Therefore, the fact that Plaintiff's peripheral veins cannot
be used will not support the first component of Plaintiff's claim
2. intiff’s O. Airw
As discussed in Part |.B, the facts construed in Plaintiff's favor would permit a factfinder
to conclude that for as long as four minutes Plaintiff could be aware that he is choking or unable
to breathe but be unable “adjust” his breathing to remedy the situation. In seeking summary
judgment Defendants have not contended that such a situation would not satisfy Glossip (and the
Court does not hold whether it does or does not); Defendants’ sole argument is that Plaintiff
would likely experience this sensation for twenty to thirty seconds or, at worst, fifty-two
seconds. As discussed before, this is a factual dispute that the Court cannot resolve on summary
problems with the use of Plaintiffs femoral vein, then there is no reason to have a trial on the issue. Without
evidence, it is a foregone conclusion that Plaintiff cannot prevail on this issuc
8
Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Document 202 Filed 06/15/17 Page 8 of 13
judgment, and would have to be resolved at trial. Therefore, solely for purposes of further
discussion, the Court presumes that there is a substantial risk that Plaintiff will experience
choking and an inability to breathe for up to four minutes.
B. Alternative Measures
Plaintiff contends that death through nitrogen gas-induced hypoxia will significantly
reduce the risks of severe pain and suffering. Defendants do not argue that this method of
execution is not feasible or readily implemented. Instead, Defendants argue that the Record
demonstrates this method of execution will not reduce Plaintiff's risk of pain and suffering.
Plaintiff disputes this point and further contends that he is not required to identify an alternative
method of execution.
The Court addresses Plaintiff's second point first. He contends that Glossip does not
apply because that case involved a facial challenge and he presents an as-applied challenge. The
Court disagrees. First, Glossip set forth the requirements for an Eighth Amendment challenge to
an execution method. The Supreme Court did not distinguish between facial and as-applied
challenges, and it did not provide a basis for interpreting Glossip as creating such a distinction.
To the contrary, the Supreme Court specified that the need to “identify a known and available
alternative method of execution that entails a lesser risk of pain [is] a requirement of a// Eighth
Amendment method-of-execution claims.” Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731 (emphasis supplied).
Second, the Eighth Circuit clearly directed that Plaintiff must (1) identify at the pleading stage
and (2) eventually prove that there is an alternative that will significantly reduce the risk.
Bucklew, 783 F.3d at 1128. This is the law of the case, and the Court must adhere to it. Third,
the Eighth Circuit has explicitly rejected Plaintiff's argument in other cases. Williams v. Kelley,
854 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1284 (2017) (citing Johnson v. Lombardi,
9
Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Documeat 202 Filed 06/15/17 Page 9 of 13
809 F.3d 388, 391 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 601 (2015)). For these reasons, the Court
concludes Plaintiff is required to prove that there is a feasible and readily available alternative
that will significantly reduce the risk of suffering that lethal injection will present.
The Court agrees with Defendants that the facts in the Record do not present a triable
dispute on this issue. Given the risk of suffering that the Court iventified as potentially
supported by the Record, (see Part I1.A.2, supra), the question is whether (1) the use of nitrogen
gas will cause Plaintiff to become unaware of his choking and breathing difficulties sooner than
he would under the current protocol, and (2) whether that difference in time is sufficient to
permit the Court to find that nitrogen gas will make a “significant” difference in Plaintiff's
suffering. Put another way: a finder of fact might conclude that if pentobarbital is used, there is a
four minute period of time during which Plaintiff would experience significant suffering. Given
that, could a finder of fact conclude that the use of nitrogen gas will significantly reduce that
period of awareness?
Defendants point to their expert’s supplemental report, wherein he states that “the use of
lethal gas does not hold any advantage compared to lethal injection with respect to pain and
suffering. Both methods would result in minimal pain and suffering.” (Doc. 182-1.) This
requires Plaintiff to identify facts in the Record that create a factual dispute necessitating a trial,
but Plaintiff has not identified any such facts. Dr. Zivot would not address the issue in his
deposition, (Doc. 182-1, pp. 38-40), and Plaintiff does not contend that Dr. Zivot’s testimony
creates a factual dispute. Plaintiff instead relics on Dr. Antognini’s deposition, but the Court has
reviewed the cited testimony and finds nothing that supports Plaintiffs position.” Dr. Antognini
* Plaintiff also attempts to create factual disputes about the Missouri Department of Corrections’ efforts to research
the viability and effects of executing prisoners with nitrogen gas, but the issue is not relevant under the governing
legal principles
10
Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Documerit 42 Filed 06/15/17 Page 10 of 13
was asked to compare the use of pentobarbital to nitrogen gas, but his answer does not indicate
that there are any differences between them. (Doc. 182-5, pp. 58-59.) To the contrary, he stated:
You know, you get — you can get suffering from hypoxia, you know, because
somebody can be awake and realize that they’re not getting enough oxygen. So
depending on — on how it’s used, you might get more suffering from nitrogen gas
than you would from Pentobarbital. Or you might get less suffering, you know,
it depends on how you would use it, | guess.
(Doc. 182-5, p. 59.) As relevant to the claim at issuc, Dr. Antognini specifically stated that he
believed there would be no difference in the “speed” of lethal gas as compared to pentobarbital.
(/Z.) Plaintiff points to Dr. Antognini’s indication that nitrogen gas would “quickly” cause
unconsciousness, (Doc. 182-5, p. 59), but this is unavailing for two reasons. First, Dr. Antognini
said the same thing about pentobarbital; in his opinion, both would “quickly” cause
unconsciousness. Thus, this opinion does not support the proposition that nitrogen hypoxia
would cause unconsciousness sooner than pentobarbital. Second, the premise for Plaintiff's
claim is that there is a period between unconsciousness and brain death during which he will
experience pain. Therefore, establishing the speed with which uncc»sciousness will be achieved
does not support Plaintiff's claim; he must identify evidence establishing how quickly nitrogen-
induced hypoxia will cause brain death so that any such evidence can be contrasted with Dr.
Zivot’s testimony that Plaintiff might be aware that he is choking for up to four minutes. There
is no evidence suggesting that nitrogen hypoxia will be faster than pentobarbital, so there is no
factual dispute to resolve. In the absence of evidence contradicting Defendants’ expert and
supporting Plaintiff's theory, there is not a triable issue.
Plaintiff also points to the fact that Louisiana and Oklahoma have approved the use of
nitrogen gas in their death penalty protocols. This evidence might be relevant in establishing the
feasibility or ready availability of this method of execution, but it does not establish whether
Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Documefit%2 Filed 06/15/17 Page 11 of 13
nitrogen gas will significantly reduce the risk of suffering Plaintiff has described. Plaintiff cites
a report from Oklahoma for the proposition that “high altitude pilots who train to recognize the
symptoms of nitrogen hypoxia in airplane depressurizations do not report any feelings of
suffocation, choking or gagging.” (Doc. 197, p. 48 n.6 (citing Doc. 192-14, p. 78).) Assuming
this is competent evidence that can be considered on summary judgment, Plaintiff is not trained
to recognize the symptoms of nitrogen hypoxia and it is unlikely that the pilots who were trained
to recognize the symptoms of hypoxia also suffered from cavernous hemangioma. Plaintiff
additionally refers to a report from Louisiana, which itself cites other materials for the
proposition that nitrogen hypoxia allows a person to expel carbon dioxide buildup and thereby
reduce suffocation caused by respiratory acidosis. (Doc. 197, p. 48 n.6 (citing Doc. 192-17, p.
19).) Assuming again that this is competent evidence, Plaintiffs theory is that he will
experience suffocation due to his tumors, not due to respiratory acidosis. Finally, none of this
evidence purports to compare the effects of nitrogen gas hypoxia to the effects of pentobarbital,
particularly as related to the speed with which brain death will occur. Therefore, this anecdotal
evidence does not conflict with Dr. Antognini’s testimony and therefore does not create a factual
dispute.”
The Record establishes that the use of nitrogen gas will not act faster than pentobarbital.
Therefore, nitrogen gas will not significantly reduce the risk of suffering Plaintiff faces if he is
executed under Missouri’s current protocol.
* Plaintiff has also provided a “Preliminary Draft” of a document prepared at the request of an Oklahoma State
Representative. (Doc. 199-12, pp. 15-28.) The authors’ qualifications to opine on medical matters are not
established. The report bears the instruction “Do Not Cite.” The report generally discusses the feasibility and
effectivencss of using nitrogen gas in executions, but it does not purport to answer the questions relevant to the case.
For these reasons, this report also does not create a factual dispute
12
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eee
111. CONCLUSION
ne reasotr lorth abov Wetendants’ Motior mmary ipy
is GRANTED
ll ISSO ORDERED
Beth Phillips
BETH PHILLIPS. JUDGI
dA NITED STATES DISTRICT CO
OSs ,
Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Document 302 Filed 06/15/17 Page 13 of 13
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
RUSSELL BUCKLEW, )
Plaintiff, |
v Case No. 14-8000-CV-W-BP
GEORGE A. LOMBARDI, et al,
Defendants ‘
ORDER AND OPINION DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
1 — - -MENT
On June 15, 2017, the Court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the sole
remaining claim from the Fourth Amended Complaint. (Doc. 202.) In that claim, Plaintiff
asserted that the State’s execution protocol as applicd to him would violate the Eighth
Amendment's proscription against cruc! and unusual punishment. Plaintiff has now filed a
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to Rule 59(c). “Rule 59%¢) motions serve the
limited function of correcting manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence.” United States v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 ¥ 3d 930, 933 (8th Cir.
2006). Plaintiff does not seck to present newly discovered evidence. Instead, he contends the
Court (1) overlooked certain facts, (2) applied the wrong legal standard, and (3) limited
discovery in a manner that deprived him of a fair opportunity to support his claims. The Court
discusses cach of these issues below and concludes the motion, (Doc. 210), should be DENIED.
Ll. BACKGROUND
Placing Plaintiffs arguments in context requires a summary of the law governing
Plaintiffs claim and the basis for the Court’s June 15 Order. As *he Court explained,
Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Documeéft221 Filed 08/21/17 Page 1 of 5
a prisoner alleging that a particular form of execution ts crucl and unusual within
the meaning of the Eighth Amendment must first establish that the method to be
utilized presents a risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and
needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers. The prisoner
must then “identify a known and available alternative method of cxecution that
entails a lesser risk of pain, a requirement of all Eighth Amendment method-of-
execution claims. The alternative must be feasible, readily implemented, and in
fact significantly reduce the substantial risk of severe pain.
(Dec. 202, p. 6 (quotations and citations omitted).) The current execution protocol calls for “the
intravenous administration of pentobarbital in dosages sufficient to cause unconsciousness and
eventually death.” (Doc. 202, p. 3.) Plaintiff suffers from a congenital medical condition known
as cavernous hemangioma, which “causes clumps of weak, malformed blood vessels and tumors
to grow throughout his body, including his head, face, neck and throat.” (Doc. 202, p. 2.) He
alleges that his condition makes it difficult to breathe and that after the pentobarbital takes effect
he will experience a choking sensation e\ cn after he is unconscious because he will be unable to
control his breathing.
In granting Defendants’ summary judgment the Court concluded that the Record,
construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, demonstrated that there is a risk that Plaintiff
will experience choking and an inability to breathe for fifty-two to 240 seconds — the time
between unconsciousness and brain death. (Doc. 202, pp. 4-5, 8-9.) The Court then considered
whether Plaintiff's proposed alternative — nitrogen gas — would “cause Plaintiff to become
unaware of his choking and breathing difficulties sooner than he would under the current
protocol, and (2) whether that difference in time is sufficient to permit the Court to find that
nitrogen gas will make a ‘significant’ difference in Plaintiff's suffering.” (Doc. 202, p. 10.)
The Court reviewed the evidence in the Record and determined that the uncontroverted facts
demonstrated that hypoxia induced by nitrogen gas “will not act faster than pentobarbital.
2
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Therefore, nitrogen gas will not significantly reduce the risk of suffering Plaintiff faces if he is
executed under Missouri’s current protocol.” (Doc. 202, p. 12.)
il. DISCUSSION
A. Factual Matters
Plaintiff contends that the Court erred by failing to contrast the effect of him being in a
supine position under the State’s current execution protocol evidence with his ability to be seated
if he is executed with nitrogen gas. As the Court noted. Plaintiff has difficulty breathing, “and
that difficulty is exacerbated when he is in a supine position.” (Doc. 202, p. 3.) However, there
is no evidence in the Record establishing that (1) Plaintiff must be in a supine position after the
IV is inserted, or, more importantly, that (2) sitting while nitrogen gas is administered will make
an appreciable difference in Plaintiff's ability to breathe. As the Court explained, “the premise
for Plaintiff's claim is that there is a period between unconsciousness and brain death during
which he will experience pain” because he will be unable to control his breathing and prevent
choking. (Doc. 202, p. 11.) Plaintiff does not identify any overlooked evidence establishing that
he must remain on his back after the IV is inserted.
He also does not identify any overlooked evidence that there is a significant difference in
his ability to breathe when he is unconscious and sitting as compared to when he ts unconscious
and lying down. To the contrary, as the Court explained, there is no evidence in the Record
establishing that nitrogen gas will cause brain death sooner than pentobarbital, which means that
with nitrogen gas Plaintiff could be aware that he is choking for up to four minutes, just as the
Record (construed in Plaintiff's favor) suggests would be the case with pentobarbital. (Doc. 202.
p. 11.) Thus, even if he could not sit upright after the I'V is inserted. there is no evidence
Suggesting this would cause suffering that would be alleviated through the use of nitrogen was
3
Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Document>21 Filed 08/21/17 Page 3 of 5
Plaintiff also contends the Court misinterpreted an Interim Report from a Grand Jury in
Oklahoma, which heard testimony from a professor that “high altitude pilots who train to
recognize the symptoms of nitrogen hypoxia in airplane depressurizations do not report any
feclings of suffocation, choking, or gagging.” (Doc. 192-14, p. 7%.) The Court noted this
information and observed that “[a]ssuming this is competent evidence that can be considered on
summary judgment, Plaintiff is not trained to recognize the symptoms of nitrogen hypoxia and it
is unlikely that the pilots who were trained to recognize the symptoms of hypoxia also suffered
from cavernous hemangioma” (Doc. 202, p. 12.) Plaintiff argues that the Court
misapprehended the point of this information, which was to establish that even pilots trained to
recognize nitrogen hypoxia do not report choking or suffocation, so it is unlikely that Plaintiff
would notice such effects. With this explanation, Plaimtiff is correct that his lack of training ts
not relevant. However, Plaintiff has not overcome the Court's concems that a professor's
testimony to a grand jury about what pilots have reported 1s not competent medical cvidence
about the effects of nitrogen hypoxia. Relatedly, i remams unlikely that the pilots suffered from
cavernous hemangioma, so their anecdotal reports are not sufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs burden
Plaintiff's clamm required evidence establishing that nitrogen hypoxia produces a shorter
time between unconsciousness and brain death than would pentobarbital. here is no such
evidence in the Record. There is, however, evidence that the time between unconsciousness and
brain death (whatever that interval is) would be the same under both cxecution methods
Accordingly, there is no basis in fact for altering the Court’s judgment.
Plamuf?l contends the Court has “imposed an impossthle standard on Plaintiff” because
his unique medical condijion makes it impossible for him to produce the “side-by-side
4
Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP DocumeHt221 Filed 08/21/17 Page 4 of 5
comparison between the length of time required to produce unconsciousness by lethal injection
versus lethal gas.” (Doc. 210, p. 5.) He also believes he was “penalize|d] . . . because his expert
would not opine on how to kill Plaintiff with lethal gas.” (/d.) While Plaintiff argues against the
legal standard utilized by the Court, he does not contend that it was wrong. That is, Plaintiff
does not argue that the Court failed to follow the governing standard as set forth in such cases as
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015), and Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir
2015) (en banc), and thus has not demonstrated that the Court committed legal error
C. Discovery Issues
Early im the discovery process, the Court issued an Order Regarding the Scope of
Discovery. (Doc. 105.) Plaintiff contends that his “ability to prove his Eighth Amendment claim
has been crippled by” limits on access to information about and from members of the execution
team. (Doc. 210, p. 6.) The Court addressed the issue im the order regarding the scope of
discovery, as well as at other times, (e.2, Doc. 183; Doc. 214), and further discussion of the
isSuc iS unMecessary
lil, CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Plaintiff's motion for relief pursuant to Rule 59(c) is DENIED
rt iS SO ORDERED
/s/ Beth Phillips ll aciieaiiaceataieainiaily
BETH PHILLIPS, JUDGE
DATE: August 21, 2017 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
s
Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Documert?21 Filed 08/21/17 Page 5 of 5
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
RUSSELL BUCKLEW.
Plaintiff,
Case No. 14-08000-C V-W-BP
We
GEORGE A. LOMBARDI,
DAVID DORMIRE, and TROY STEELE,’
Defendants.
Plaintiff was convicted in state court of kidnaping, rape and murder, and was sentenced to
death. He challenges Missouri’s planned method of execution as applied to him, contending that
the current lethal injection protocol will cause him needless suffering and pain in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. At the Court’s direction the parties filed briefs regarding the scope of
discovery, and the parties’ positions conflict in certain respects.
The Court will confine the scope of discovery to the matters alleged in Couni | of the
Fourth Amended Complaint. This Order is intended to provide guidance regarding the proper
scope of discovery.
L_ BACKGROUND
A.
The scope of discovery is informed by the issues involved in the case, so the Court begins
by describing Plaintiff's claim and the governing law. Plaintiff's remaining claim is Count | of
the Fourth Amended Complaint. (Doc. 53; see also Doc. 63 (dismissing Counts I! and II! of the
' Troy Steele has succeeded Terry Russell as the Warden of the Eastern Reception, Diagnostic, and Correctional
Center. Accordingly, Troy Steele is substituted as a Defendant in place of Terry Russell. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). The
Clerk of Court 1s directed to amend the Docket Sheet according}y
Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Document05 Filed 08/11/16 Page 1 of 9
Fourth Amended Complaint).) As has been described in various orders, Plaintiff suffers from
cavernous hemangioma, which is a congenital condition that causes clumps of weak, malformed
blood vessels and tumors to grow throughout his body, including his head, face, neck and throat.
These tumors are very susceptible to rupture. Plaintiff alleges that execution by Icthal injection
is likely to cause the tumors to rupture because Iethal injection depends on the circulatory
system, and that the ruptures can increase his pain and suffering because (1) the chemicals will
not travel through
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