Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 306 (2018) (No. 17-8151)

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No. 17-

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

RUSSELL BUCKLEW,

Petitioner,

Vv.

ANNE PRECYTHE, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR MARCH 20, 2018

CHERYL A. PILATE ROBERT N. HOCHMAN *

MORGAN PILATE LLC RAECHEL J. BIMMERLE

926 Cherry Street KELLY J. HUGGINS

Kansas City, MO 64106 MATTHEWJ. SALDANA

(816) 471-6694 HEATHER B. SULTANIAN

DANIEL R. THIES

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

One South Dearborn Street

Chicago, IL 60603

(312) 853-7000

rhochman@sidley.com

Counsel for Petitioner

March 15, 2018 * Counsel of Record

CAPITAL CASE

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Should a court evaluating an as-applied challenge

to a state’s method of execution based on an inmate’s

rare and severe medical condition assume that medi-

cal personnel are competent to manage his condition

and that the procedure will go as intended?

Must evidence comparing a state’s proposed method

of execution with an alternative proposed by an in-

mate be offered via a single witness, or should a court

at summary judgment look to the record as a whole to

determine whether a factfinder could conclude that

the two methods significantly differ in the risks they

pose to the inmate?

Does the Eighth Amendment require an inmate to

prove an adequate alternative method of execution

when raising an as-applied challenge to the state’s

proposed method of execution based on his rare and

severe medical condition?

(i)

il

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Petitioner is Russell Bucklew. Respondents are

Anne L. Precythe, David Dormire, and Troy Steele,

personnel with the Missouri Department of Correc-

tions. No party is a corporation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED...................0cccccceeseeees

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND RULE

SG EIITS exczznsscscscserecnscnvecocszesnszscenoneees

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................cccceeeeeeerees

IPOD cccrecennsscssvensescsvesennsssensanssenses

IED cxcentenserssansensesmsnsmemummemmensnensesens

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PRO-

ne ae ccnnstniscrenserecensavsereecseesenese

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................cccc0ee0e000

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND .....000.0.0......000005.

A. Bucklew’s Rare Medical Condition...........

B. Missouri's Execution Procedure ...............

E. The Lethal Gas Alternative......................

PROCEEDINGS BELOW ..................0..00.0006

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION...

I. THIS CASE PRESENTS URGENT QUES-

TIONS REGARDING LITIGATION OF

AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES TO A

METHOD OF EXECUTION .......00000.......c0c000

(iii)

21

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—continued

Page

A.Whether Courts Evaluating An As-

Applied Method-Of-Execution Claim

Should Assume That Medical Personnel

Are Competent To Handle An Inmate’s

Rare And Severe Medical Condition,

And That The Execution Will Go As In-

tended, Warrants Review ......................... 21

B. Whether The Evidence Comparing The

Risks Of Proposed Methods Of Execu-

tion Must Come From A Single Witness

ID SEINE cxssnecsneccenssensenssensnssesmnenees 26

C.Whether An Inmate Raising An As-

Applied Challenge To A Method Of Exe-

cution Must Prove An Available Alterna-

tive Method That Will Substantially Re-

duce His Risk Of Suffering Also War-

EET SAE Oe ae 29

ll. THIS CASE IS A STRONG VEHICLE FOR

ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES .................. 32

STIS cca acne ee ee 33

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 17-

3052 (8th Cir. Mar. 15, 2018)..............cc.seecceeeees la

APPENDIX B: Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 17-

3052, 2018 WL 1163360 (8th Cir. Mar. 6,

PEP cceszcecescssvescssssovecesesnesnecsesnennsounesnenesonesecseveces 3a

APPENDIX C: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-

8000-CV-W-BP (W.D. Mo. June 15, 2017)........ 26a

APPENDIX D: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-

8000-CV-W-BP (W.D. Mo. Aug. 21, 2017) ........ 39a

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS—continued

Page

APPENDIX E: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-

8000-CV-W-BP (W.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2017) ........ 44a

APPENDIX F: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-

8000-CV-W-BP (W.D. Mo. Apr. 11, 2017)......... 53a

APPENDIX G: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-

2163 (8th Cir. Mar. 6, 2015)...................ccceeeeeee 72a

APPENDIX H: Affidavit of Alana Boyles ........... 89a

APPENDIX |: Hamm Expert Report .................. 9la

APPENDIX J: Zivot Supplemental Report......... 106a

APPENDIX K: Medical Summary ...................... 144a

APPENDIX L: Missouri Execution Protocol....... 145a

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Anderson v. Dep't of Transp., FAA, 827 F.2d

ee 28

Arthur v. Dunn, 137 8S. Ct. 725 (2017).......... 7, 31

Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008)............... passim

Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-1800-CV-W-

BP, 2014 WL 2736014 (W.D. Mo. May 9,

2014), rev'd, 565 F. App’x 562 (8th Cir.

SI cnisnauiltinciesciniableastaeltitea lie oeninilabddeaaidaa bined 16

Bucklew v. Lombardi, 565 F. App’x 562 (8th

Cir. 2014), vacated on rehearing (May 20,

STITT acivecesiniicninnapbdianeiiladiieisditaidiatastatmniiiaiaetnietiniatinine 16

Bucklew v. Lombardi, 134 S. Ct. 2333

| ERNE aS SRS Ae 16

In re Campbell, 874 F.3d 454 (6th Cir.

a vicicesincistenitetniansheiisnihadaiaincaaiaaitiaiinaiipeattmeasinte 7

Correll v. State, 184 So. 3d 478 (Fla. 2015).. 7

DG&G, Inc. v. FlexSol Packaging Corp. of

Pompano Beach, 576 F.3d 820 (8th Cir.

STE Didtaititieriniainsshiiasitiendiatinlinubsaacnaitainisiandubietiaiesiaanets 28

Dixon v. Penn Cent. Co., 481 F.2d 833 (6th

TA SIU Ticionintatinieatanattedeesdeumenatiensinnminiineentes 28

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)........... 5, 22

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)..... 7, 31

Gissendaner v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep't of Corr.,

803 F.3d 565 (11th Cir. 2015).................... 7

Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726

ST iceonpsinenninnteitinnininiindapanntagrennainads 3, 6, 23, 30

Hall v. Florida, 134 8. Ct. 1986 (2014)......... 31

Hamm v. Dunn, 138 8S. Ct. 828 (2018).......... 5, 25

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) ..................00000+ 6, 28

Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017)......... 31

Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) ....... 6, 28

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page

Ringo v. Lombardi, No. 09-4095-BP (W.D.

Mo. filed May 17, 2009).....................-...0000 17

Trademark Props., Inc. v. A&E TV

Networks, 422 F. Appx 199 (4th Cir.

FE I cS 28

United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163 (3d

SITET ictenicvegtiienduienumatzaniabiateummnniniamsanane 28

United States v. Candie, 974 F.2d 61 (8th

ac MN cicdibisiitinbiesialitdehidiabindaihesiigebibamtaniaiinaiapinne 28

United States v. Clevenger, 733 F.2d 1356

i eiemiie 28

United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312

ne I IT ia steicinitcncticeianticdeainainetninniatiindes 28

United States v. Gonzalez-Velez, 587 F.3d

I, ST iontiicncireniintieitasnsiniatiapsscenns 28

United States v. Merida, 765 F.2d 1205 (5th

ET TI ciiccacintdesinenbienitessinsaicncisialateesiistabdeemhianans 28

United States v. Norman, 776 F.3d 67 (2d

Bis ST icciinncsisieinitianieminiaeaietiaaehiaicit abetted 28

United States v. Prince, 883 F.2d 953 (11th

Rs Shack tcenntataiintnaeheacesaiitcdedehisie aa lanaladiliastaatitin 28

United States v. Ransom, 691 F. App’x 504

(IN: TIEN TI stint nertnsnbeipanchetbiagipiaticbbeneabens 28

United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820 (7th

GIG, SII a lacinscasosschisitisetcartiemienetitibaiieniiianthindamasibiaintiinn 28

Zink v. Lombardi, No. 12-4209-BP (W.D.

By SIE: Wik CIEE cinesiricsiiccncsncensctntencese 15, 17

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTE

ey I I ns cesidaeneiel 1

Mo. Stat. Ann. § 546.720.1 ................c0eee00000 1, 10

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

OTHER AUTHORITIES Page

AMA Code of Medical Ethics (2016),

https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/

files/media-browser/code-of-medical-

ethice-chapter-O. pil .............0c.-sscccccessseseeese 31

Minhua Wang, MD et al., Cavernous

Hemangioma of the Uvula: Report a Rare

Case with Literature Review, 8 N. Am. J.

of Med. & Sci. 56 (2015) ..................ccse0eeeee- 8

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Russell Bucklew petitions for a writ of certiorari to

review the decision of the Eighth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Eighth Circuit is reported at —

F.3d —, No. 17-3052, 2018 WL 1163360 (8th Cir.

Mar. 6, 2018) and is reproduced in the appendix to

this petition at Pet. App. 3a—25a. The opinion of the

district court is not reported and is reproduced at Pet.

App. 26a—38a.

JURISDICTION

The Western District of Missouri had jurisdiction

over Bucklew’s Section 1983 claim pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1343. The Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

The Eighth Circuit entered judgment on March 6,

2018, Pet. App. 3a, and denied Mr. Bucklew’s petition

for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc on March

15, 2018, Pet. App. la—2a. This Court has jurisdic-

tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution

provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,

nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual

punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

Missouri's death penalty statute, Mo. Stat. Ann.

§ 546.720.1, provides in relevant part:

The manner of inflicting the punishment of

death shall be by the administration of lethal gas

2

or by means of the administration of lethal injec-

tion. And for such purpose the director of the de-

partment of corrections is hereby authorized and

directed to provide a suitable and efficient room

or place, enclosed from public view, within the

walls of a correctional facility of the department

of corrections, and the necessary appliances for

carrying into execution the death peralty by

means of the administration of lethal gas or by

means of the administration of lethal injection.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Russell Bucklew is scheduled to be executed on

March 20 by a method that is very likely to cause him

needless suffering. Neither the district court nor the

court of appeals denies that. Bucklew’s very likely

suffering stems from an exceedingly rare disease

called cavernous hemangioma. The disease is pro-

gressive, and has caused unstable, blood-filled tumors

to grow in his head, neck, and throat. Those highly

sensitive tumors easily rupture and bleed. The tumor

in his throat often blocks his airway, requiring fre-

quent, conscious attention from Bucklew to avoid suf-

focation. His peripheral veins are also compromised.

That means that the lethal drug cannot be adminis-

tered in the ordinary way, through intravenous ac-

cess in his arms. An expert who examined Bucklew

concluded that while undergoing Missouri's lethal in-

jection protocol, Bucklew is “highly likely to experi-

ence ... the excruciating pain of prolonged suffocation

resulting from the complete obstruction of his air-

way.” Pet. App. 109a 4 LIII.E. As he struggles to

breathe through the execution procedure, Bucklew’s

throat tumor will likely rupture. “The resultant

hemorrhaging will further impede Mr. Bucklew’s

airway by filling his mouth and airway with blood,

causing him to choke and cough on his own blood dur-

3

ing the lethal injection process.” Jd. 4 LUI.F. Buck-

lew’s execution will very likely be gruesome and pain-

ful far beyond the pain inherent in the process of an

ordinary lethal injection execution.

In a 2-1 decision, a panel of the Eighth Circuit con-

cluded that this execution is not cruel and unusual

solely because, in its view, Bucklew failed to prove

that his alternative method would substantially re-

duce his risk of needless suffering. (The full Eighth

Circuit denied rehearing en banc, with 4 judges dis-

senting.) That ruling is based on three distinct mis-

readings and dangerous extensions of this Court’s de-

cisions in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality

opinion), and Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).

First, the panel believed that when evaluating the

risks posed by the state’s method of execution in light

of an inmate’s rare and complicating medical condi-

tion, Glossip and Baze require courts to assume that

state personnel are competent to deal with the condi-

tion and that all will go as intended. Pet. App. 17a.

Nothing in Glossip or Baze warrants such an as-

sumption. And such a rule makes no sense in an as-

applied challenge. The whole point of such a chal-

lenge is that a generally lawful method of execution,

when applied to someone with a particular medical

condition, will very likely involve needless suffering.

The claim does not assert that state officials, when

they designed the protocol, intended to make the in-

mate suffer needlessly. When drawing up the proto-

col, state officials surely did not think about an in-

mate with cavernous hemangioma in the throat plus

compromised veins. Nor does the claim assert that

an “isolated mishap” in implementing the protocol

might produce harm that does not qualify as cruel

within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Baze,

553 U.S. at 50 (plurality opinion). The claim asserts

4

that following the protocol will, in light of the in-

mate’s medical condition, very likely produce need-

less suffering.

The issue arises here in the context of a discovery

dispute. The Eighth Circuit approved the district

court’s decision to close off discovery into whether the

medical professionals charged with administering the

execution have the training and knowledge to handle

the known complications that will arise in light of

Bucklew’s rare medical condition. The medical team

has the authority under Missouri's execution protocol

to make discretionary judgments about how to at-

tempt venous access and other details directly rele-

vant to Bucklew’s risk of suffering. Bucklew sought

such discovery (allowing for necessary safeguards to

preserve the anonymity of the medical personnel in-

volved) to establish how the skill and expertise of the

medical team will impact the known risks of suffering

that his condition creates. But he was denied any ac-

cess to the medical personnel and thereby foreclosed

from presenting to the court the full extent of his

risks. The Eighth Circuit agreed that foreclosing

discovery was proper because the court had to as-

sume “that the procedure will go as intended.” Pet.

App. 17a.

Such an assumption is at odds with this Court’s de-

cisions. The plurality opinion in Baze specifically

stated that a claim asserting a known, “objectively

intolerable risk of harm” is, unlike a claim based on

the prospect of a mere mistake, cognizable as a chal-

lenge to a method of execution under the Eighth

Amendment. 553 U.S. at 50 (plurality opinion) (quot-

ing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994)).

The Eighth Circuit’s ruling here prevents an inmate

from proving such a claim.

5

In so doing, it authorizes what amounts to “deliber-

ate indifference” to an inmate's needless suffering.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976) (delib-

erate indifference to inmate’s medical condition vio-

lates the Eighth Amendment). As detailed below, the

record establishes that Missouri's execution medical

team will be unaware of petitioner's condition and

will take steps that will cause petitioner to experi-

ence needless pain and a prolonged sense of suffoca-

tion. The record already establishes that the execu-

tion will not go as intended. As Justice Ginsburg re-

cently noted, in advance of the botched execution of

Doyle Lee Hamm, there is no substitute for adversar-

ial testing of the skills and qualifications of the

state’s medical team to handle problems that we al-

ready know will arise. Hamm v. Dunn, 138 8. Ct. 828

(2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). To assume that all

will go as intended is to altogether assume away as-

applied challenges to methods of execution. This

Court should accept review to clarify how inmates

can prove the risks they face when raising an as-

applied challenge to a method of execution.

Second, the Eighth Circuit understood Glossip to

impose a novel burden at summary judgment in a

method-of-execution case that is at odds with sum-

mary judgment law. As Judge Colloton’s dissent

makes clear, a reasonable factfinder could conclude

on this record that a lethal gas protocol proposed by

Bucklew will substantially reduce Bucklew’s suffer-

ing. Pet. App. 22a. Bucklew’s expert opined that

Bucklew will very likely experience a sense of suffo-

cation for several minutes under the lethal injection

protocol. Respondents’ expert opined that Bucklew

would likely experience a sense of suffocation for

merely 20-30 seconds if lethal gas was used. The

panel majority refused to accept this as evidence

6

comparing the two method: because no single witness

said one method would be better than the other. /d.

at 14a. That is, the panel believed Glossip not only

requires an as-applied challenge to present evidence

comparing the state’s method with an alternative, but

the evidence must come in the form of a single wit-

ness who believes one method is significantly better

than the other.

That is not and should not be the law. The ques-

tion is not whether any one witness compared and

distinguished the risks of lethal injection with the

risks of lethal gas but, as Judge Colloton observed,

whether there is evidence in the record that distin-

guishes between the two. Pet. App. 22a. Judge Col-

loton’s view follows logically from this Court’s repeat-

ed statements that evidence at summary judgment is

evaluated in light of the record as a whole. Ricci v.

DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009); Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986). The panel majority read Glossip to change

that rule exclusively for method-of-execution claims.

Nothing in Glossip suggests such a unique procedural

burden is appropriate. And allowing it to stand

would cripple many method-of-execution claims be-

cause experts for an inmate will often labor under

ethical obligations that preclude them from designing

a “better” way to kill someone.

Third, petitioner respectfully submits that this

Court should not require inmates raising an as-

applied challenge to their methods of execution to de-

sign an alternative “that is ‘feasible, readily imple-

mented, and in fact significantly reduce|s] a substan-

tial risk of severe pain.” Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737

(quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 52). The Court imposed

that burden on inmates in cases raising facial chal-

lenges to their methods of execution. The Eighth Cir-

7

cuit (in a 6-4 en banc ruling) and the Eleventh Circuit

have imposed that burden on inmates raising as-

applied challenges to their methods of execution, and

the Sixth Circuit (in a habeas case) suggested such a

burden exists. Pet. App. 85a—88a; Gissendaner v.

Comm'r, Ga. Dep't of Corr., 803 F.3d 565 (11th Cir.

2015) (per curiam); Jn re Campbell, 874 F.3d 454 (6th

Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The Florida Supreme Court

has done so as well. Correll v. State, 184 So. 3d 478

(Fla. 2015) (per curiam). Several judges dissented in

these cases. The reasons for imposing such a burden

in a case presenting a facial challenge do not and

should not apply to inmates presenting an as-applied

challenge based on an exceedingly rare medical con-

dition. This Court should accept review here and

clarify that inmates presenting an as-applied chal-

lenge need not custom-design their own method of

execution in light of the idiosyncratic reasons the

state’s generally lawful method of execution will

prove cruel as applied to them.

This Court is well aware of the number of attempt-

ed but failed executions that have not gone according

to plan. See Arthur v. Dunn, 137 8S. Ct. 725, 733

(2017) (Mem.) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Some of

the problems that have arisen in the past and pro-

duced excruciating and gruesome results are, as here,

predictable. Only this Court can establish uniform

national standards that will reduce the frequency of

these horrible events. In doing so, this Court would

not only protect the irreducible human dignity of the

inmates bringing such claims. It would also protect

the essential dignity of the sexiety that administers

the death penalty. The Eighth Amendment protects

“the dignity of society itself from ... barbarity.” Ford

v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986). We refuse

to punish with cruelty to protect ourselves against

8

being party to cruelty. We do so even when the temp-

tation is powerful because the crime we are punish-

ing was itself barbaric and cruel, as respondents will

no doubt detail in their opposition. The wisdom of

the Eighth Amendment is that it recognizes the

temptation to be indifferent to the needless suffering

of those society condemns, and demands we resist it.

A society that tolerates stripping any man of his irre-

ducible dignity, even one who merits the ultimate

punishment, takes a fateful step. This Court is

uniquely positioned to defend this sacred value. And

it should do so in this case.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1998, Bucklew was convicted of first degree

murder, kidnapping, burglary, forcible rape, and

armed criminal action. He was sentenced to death.

He does not challenge the validity of his conviction or

death sentence.

A. Bucklew’s Rare Medical Condition

Bucklew suffers from an exceedingly rare medica!

condition—cavernous hemangioma—that causes in-

operable, blood-filled tumors to grow in his throat

and around his face, head, and neck. Pet. App. 6a.

Cavernous hemangiomas occur in only .2% of the

general population, and cavernous hemangiomas in

the oral cavity (affecting the lips, tongue, and palate)

are prevalent in less than 1% of those who have cav-

ernous hemangioma (only .002% of the general popu-

lation). Minhua Wang, MD et al., Cavernous Heman-

gioma of the Uvula: Report a Rare Case with Litera-

ture Review, 8 N. Am. J. of Med. & Sci. 56 (2015). A

case like Bucklew’s, involving the uvula, is “extreme-

ly rare.” Id. at 56.

Bucklew’s tumors are extremely sensitive and sus-

ceptible to rupture. Pet. App. 6a. Merely touching

9

his airway can cause the delicate tissue of his airway

and uvula to leak blood. Pet. App. llla 4 V.A.1-—4,

113a 9 V.B.8. Bucklew’s condition is progressive; his

tumors continue to grow, and his risk of experiencing

a catastrophic hemorrhage increases. I/d. at 113a—

114a ¥ V.B.10; APP0O324 at 48:6—-24; APP0328.' In

May 2014, Bucklew’s medical expert, Dr. Zivot, exam-

ined him and determined that his condition had sig-

nificantly progressed to the extent that his tumors

posed an imminent risk of life-threatening hemor-

rhage. See APP0186—87.

Bucklew’s “grossly enlarged uvula” partially ob-

structs his airway, making it difficult for him to

breathe and causing him to choke and bleed. Pet.

App. 112a 4 V.B.1—3. On the Mallampati classifica-

tion, a scale used to describe how difficult it is to se-

cure a patient’s airway in a medical setting, Buck-

lew’s airway rates a “Class IV,” meaning that his

airway is “very difficult.” Indeed, when Bucklew was

put under general anesthesia during previous surger-

ies, he underwent a tracheotomy to ensure that his

airway would remain secure during the procedures.

Id. at 108a ¥ U11.B, 110a ¥ [V.B—-C. Bucklew’s diffi-

culty breathing is exacerbated when he lies supine,

and, to prevent suffocation, he must consciously mon-

itor and mechanically adjust his breathing to shift his

uvula and permit airflow. Indeed, Bucklew sleeps on

his side and upright to avoid choking and hemorrhag-

ing, and yet still experiences frequent hemorrhages

severe enough that he typically needs to clean blood

off his face in the morning. /d. at 112a 4 V.B.1-—2.

Bucklew also has compromised peripheral veins in

his hands and arms, which make his veins difficult to

' APP citations are from the Appendix to Brief, Bucklew v.

Lombardi, No. 14-3052 (8th Cir. filed Dec. 1, 2017).

10

visualize. Pet. App. 6a. Accordingly, it would likely

take multiple attempts to set an intravenous (IV)

line, and setting an IV in Bucklew’s arms likely will

not be possible at all. /d. at 114a—115a 4VI.E; see al-

so APP0346 at 77:3-21.

B. Missouri’s Execution Procedure

Missouri law authorizes execution by both lethal

gas and lethal injection. Mo. Stat. Ann. § 546.720.1.

Missouri has a written execution procedure for lethal

injection only. Nonetheless, respondents have con-

ceded that lethal gas is a feasible and readily imple-

mented alternative to lethal injection in Missouri.

Pet. App. 13a.

The medical technicians responsible for the execu-

tion, who have been designated “M2” and “M3” to

preserve their anonymity, have substantial discretion

in the execution chamber. APP0341—42 at 43:11—

44:22. Under the execution protocol, medical person-

nel determine the most appropriate locations for IV

lines to inject the lethal drug. The protocol authoriz-

es accessing the vein via a central line, such as the

femoral vein, but only if the medical personnel in-

volved in the execution “have appropriate training,

education, and experience for that procedure.” Pet.

App. 145a.

Not all state medical personnel, and indeed not all

anesthesiologists, are qualified or skilled at perform-

ing a central line procedure. APP0347 at 81:22—24;

APP0362 at 237:11—19. In the past, after failing to

gain peripheral vein access, the medical members of

the execution team have employed an outdated pro-

cedure known as a “cut-down” in the leg. APP0O311—

12 at 55:12—56:17. (A cut-down involves slicing into

the leg to visualize the vein; it is extremely painful.

See APP0350 at 92:23-93:13.) Both Dr. Zivot, Buck-

11

lew’s medical expert, and Dr. Antognini, respondents’

medical expert, agree that a “cut-down” is not the

current preferred method of establishing central line

access. APP0352 at 98:8—23; APP0374 at 71:12—16.

After the medical team gains venous access, a non-

medical member of the execution team will inject the

lethal drug, during which time Bucklew will lose the

ability to consciously manage his airway. Pet. App.

145a—146a; id. at 115a—116a 4 VI.I-J.

C. The Known Risks Bucklew Faces From

Lethal Injection In Missouri

Bucklew’s execution will not go smoothly. He faces

identifiable severe risks from the procedure both be-

fore and after the medical team gains venous access

and the non-medical team begins to administer the

lethal drug.

As noted above, attempts to access Bucklew’s pe-

ripheral veins will very likely fail. Pet. App. 114a—

115a ¥ VI.E; see also APP0346 at 77:3-21. But it is

very likely that medical personnel will try, and re-

peatedly so. Pet. App. 114a—115a 4 VI.E; APP0352 at

99:7-20. The discomfort of repeated failed efforts to

gain venous access will increase Bucklew’s stress,

raising the pace of his breathing and blood pressure,

increasing the risk that his sensitive tumors will rup-

ture. Pet. App. 115a 4 VI.G.

Eventually, the medical team will stop trying to

gain peripheral access, and will turn to a central line,

likely the femoral vein. To access the femoral vein,

the record indicates that M3 will perform a cut-down

procedure; that is what M3 has done in the past when

attempts at peripheral access failed. APP309 at

28:11-22; APP311-12 at 55:20-56:3. During a cut-

down, Bucklew will have to lie flat, at least while the

medical team attempts to access his femoral vein,

12

and possibly throughout the remainder of the execu-

tion. Jd. at 29a; id. at 2la & n.5. He will gag on his

tumor, causing him to struggle and convulse in an

effort to breathe. /d. at 115a 4 VI.H, 116a 4 VILL.

His convulsions will increase the risks associated

with the attempt to gain access through the femoral

vein. Among the risks of attempting femoral vein ac-

cess is piercing the femoral artery. APP0350 at 90:3—

92:22. That risk was recently made especially vivid

during the failed execution of Doyle Lee Hamm in Al-

abama on February 22, 2018. Even though Alabama

certified that it would use personnel qualified to ac-

cess the femoral vein, the medical team punctured

Hamm’s artery. Pet. App. 98a. That execution had to

be abandoned. If, as is likely, Bucklew is violently

struggling to breathe while the team attempts femo-

ral access, his risk of a similar failure increases.

The painful cut-down procedure and struggles to

breathe will further increase the stress of the execu-

tion and further increase the likelihood of Bucklew

rupturing his tumor. There is a significant likelihood

that Bucklew will be choking on his tumor and gag-

ging on his own blood for the (unknown) duration of

the cut-down procedure, before the injection of the

lethal drug even begins. Pet. App. 115a 4 VI.G;

APP0352 at 100:1—12.

After the lethal drug begins to flow, Bucklew will

soon lose the ability to manage his airway. This is

true whether he remains laying flat or whether he is

upright or anything in between. Pet. App. 115a—116a

§ VI.I. He will begin to experience a sense of suffoca-

tion and the extreme pain associated with suffoca-

tion. Id. at 28a—29a. In the unlikely event he has not

already begun choking on his own blood as a result of

struggling while lying flat throughout the cut-down

procedure, the violence of his choking as he slips into

13

unconsciousness will likely cause his tumors to rup-

ture and lead him to aspirate his own blood. Z/d. at

116a 4 VIM).

The parties disagree over how long Bucklew will be

unable to manage his airway while remaining aware

of the sense of suffocation. Bucklew’s expert opines

that Bucklew could be in this state for between 52

and 240 seconds, while respondents’ expert opines

that he would be conscious of suffocation for 20 to 30

seconds. Pet. App. 29a. These estimates are on top of

any period of time Bucklew is suffocating prior to the

administration of the lethal drug.

D. The Medical Team

Any judgments concerning how to handle an inabil-

ity to gain venous access, an inmate choking, gag-

ging, or hemorrhaging blood, or any of the other pre-

dictable complications arising from Bucklew’s condi-

tion are left to the sole discretion of the medical

members of the execution team. APP0O339—40 at

36:11—37:9; APP0299—300 at 93:11—96:9. Nothing in

the record suggests they will be anticipating what

Bucklew will likely experience.

The medical personnel who perform the execution

will not be provided any information concerning

Bucklew’s medical condition beyond a single-page

document summarizing his medical history. In 2014,

as Missouri prepared to execute Bucklew, a one-page

form summarizing Bucklew’s medical issues was pre-

pared. Pet. App. 144a. As relevant here, it reported

his cavernous hemangioma, but only with respect to

his jaw and upper lip. It said nothing about his com-

promised veins, and nothing about the tumor in his

throat that will inhibit his breathing during the exe-

cution and will very likely rupture and cause him to

choke on his blood. Indeed, whoever prepared the

14

form shockingly reported “No” in response to the

question “Does the offender have Asthma, bronchitis,

or any other breathing problem?” Id. (emphasis add-

ed). The medical team will not be provided with any

other medical records, including the MRI images that

reveal the size of the tumors in Bucklew’s airway.

APP0292 at 43:20—44:6.

Missouri has never executed an inmate who suffers

from cavernous hemangioma, APP0448 at Resp. No.

4, and there is no reason to believe that the medical

members of the execution team have ever seen a pa-

tient with cavernous hemangioma, or have ever seen

one with tumors in his throat. Even if they are alert-

ed to the fact of the disease by the medical form,

there is no reason to believe they will be alert to the

rare tumor in Bucklew’s throat and the special suffo-

cation risk it creates.

E. The Lethal Gas Alternative

Bucklew has proposed death by nitrogen hypoxia as

an alternative method of execution. APP0085—87.

Lethal gas requires no venous access at all. So, all the

risks posed by the difficulties of gaining venous ac-

cess, including the painful cut-down procedure, would

vanish. Likewise, lethal gas can be administered

while Bucklew is seated upright, so all the risks of

struggling to breathe and choking on the blood flow-

ing from his throat tumor while lying flat during the

cut-down procedure would also vanish. APP0547;

APP0898—99.

Dr. Antognini opined that, if administered correct-

ly, lethal gas would lead to a quick death. APP0362

at 234:12-21. Specifically, he testified that inhalation

of nitrogen gas “would quickly achieve hypoxia and

cause an inmate to become quickly unconscious”

within about 20 to 30 seconds of breathing pure ni-

15

trogen. APP0O362 at 234:12—21. In addition, there is

reason to believe that breathing 100% nitrogen does

not produce a sense of suffocation. The sense of suf-

focation is caused by a buildup of carbon dioxide in

the blood when a person is unable to expel air.

APP0899. If one breathes in pure nitrogen while ex-

pelling air, death is caused by an absence of oxygen

unaccompanied by a sense of suffocation. APP0O899;

APP0911. Reports of high altitude pilots who lost

consciousness while breathing air low in oxygen and

high in nitrogen is consistent with this view.

APP0547.

Dr. Zivot did not opine on whether lethal gas would

result in significantly less suffering than Missouri's

lethal injection protocol because he is ethically barred

from proposing a method of execution at all. Pet.

App. 108a § I1.B. So, no evidence in the record dis-

putes respondents’ expert’s view that death by lethal

gas would be substantially quicker and less painful

than Bucklew’s expert’s view of the likely suffering

that lethal injection will cause Bucklew.

il. PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A. Procedural History And Discovery

In a Fourth Amended Complaint filed on October

13, 2015, Bucklew challenged the constitutionality of

Missouri's execution protocol as applied to him.

Among other things, he alleged that Missouri’s lethal

injection protocol “presents a substantial risk of caus-

ing excruciating or tortuous pain and inflicting need-

less suffering” and therefore violates the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual pun-

ishment.2 APP0136-37 94 148, 151. He further al-

2 Bucklew was also party to an earlier case styled Zink v.

Lombardi, No. 12-04209-BP (W.D. Mo. filed Aug. 1, 2012), in

16

leged that his “blood-filled tumors are prone to rup-

ture under stress or any rise in blood pressure. When

this occurs, Mr. Bucklew bleeds through his facial ori-

fices and in his throat, further obstructing his airway

and causing him to choke.” APP0O086. Bucklew al-

leged that “the risks arising from Mr. Bucklew’s air-

way are even greater if he is lying flat.” APP0O119

4102. Bucklew’s initial complaint was filed on May

9, 2014, and on May 14, 2014, Bucklew moved for a

stay of his execution, then scheduled for May 21,

2014, to provide adequate time to litigate his claims.

The district court denied Bucklew’s motion for a stay,

and dismissed his complaint, sua sponte. Bucklew v.

Lombardi, No. 14-1800-CV-W-BP, 2014 WL 2736014

(W.D. Mo. May 9, 2014).

With only two days remaining until his scheduled

execution, Bucklew immediately appealed the dismis-

sal of his complaint. An Eighth Circuit panel granted

a stay. Bucklew v. Lombardi, 565 F. App’x 562, 569—

71 (8th Cir. 2014). After the Eighth Circuit, sitting

en banc, vacated the stay on the same day, this Court

entered a stay of execution pending Bucklew’s appeal.

Bucklew v. Lombardi, 134 8. Ct. 2333 (2014) (Mem.).

Roughly ten months later, the en banc Eighth Cir-

cuit reversed the dismissal of Bucklew’s Complaint

and remanded for further proceedings. Pet. App.

72a—88a. The full Eighth Circuit, split 64, rejected

Bucklew’s argument that he need not propose an al-

ternative method of execution because he raised an

as-applied challenge only. /d. at 75a, 84a. On re-

mand, Bucklew amended his complaint to assert that

lethal gas is a “feasible and available alternative

which he and other inmates raised a facial challenge to Mis-

souri’s lethal injection execution protocol.

17

method that will significantly reduce the risk of se-

vere pain.” APP0O137 4 150.

Discovery began and Bucklew sought, among other

things, information about the skills and training of

M2 and M3 to handle the risks that his rare condition

would likely present. APP0224—26. Bucklew indicat-

ed that identifying information in any documents

produced concerning M2 and M3 could be redacted.

APP0224—25. The district court refused to allow

Bucklew any access to the medical team and any in-

formation regarding their skills and training. Pet.

App. 44a—52a.

After additional discovery revealed the extent of

discretionary authority granted to M2 and M3 during

an execution, Bucklew filed a Motion to Compel out-

lining the need for discovery concerning the training

and qualifications of M2 and M3. The district court

again denied Bucklew access to this discovery. Pet.

App. 57a, 71a.

M2 and M3 have been deposed in prior capital liti-

gation, specifically in 2010 in Ringo v. Lombardi, No.

09-4095-BP (W.D. Mo. filed May 17, 2009), and in

2013 and 2014 in Zink v. Lombardi, No. 12-4209-BP

(W.D. Mo. filed Aug. 1, 2012). Bucklew’s appointed

counsel, Ms. Pilate, represented Bucklew in those

proceedings (which raised facial challenges, not as-

applied challenges to Missouri’s execution protocol),

and «> believes that the contents of those deposi-

tions are directly relevant to disputed factual issues

in this case. APP0O278. The district court, however,

refused to permit Ms. Pilate to share the deposition

transcripts with Sidley Austin or to use the tran-

scripts in connection with this case. APP0285—86.

18

B. The Lower Court Decisions

The district court granted respondents summary

judgment on June 15, 2017. The district court as-

sumed that the record demonstrated “a substantial

risk that [Bucklew] will experience choking and an

inability to breathe for up to four minutes.” Pet. App.

34a. The court also noted that “Defendants do not

argue that [Bucklew’s proposed alternative] method

of execution is not feasible or readily implemented.”

Id. However, the district court concluded that the

record did not present a triable dispute concerning

whether execution by nitrogen gas would significant-

ly reduce Bucklew’s risk of needless suffering, as

compared to Missouri’s lethal injection protocol. /d.

at 35a. The district court also denied a motion to re-

consider. Jd. at 39a—43a.

On November 21, 2017, while Bucklew’s appeal was

pending and before the parties had fully briefed the

issues, at the state’s urging, the Missouri Supreme

Court reset Bucklew’s execution date to March 20,

2018. Shortly thereafter, the Eighth Circuit set the

appeal for argument on February 2, 2018.

On March 6, 2018, a divided panel of the Eighth

Circuit affirmed the district court. The panel majori-

ty concluded that Bucklew provided no evidence prov-

ing that lethal gas would substantially reduce his

risk of severe pain. It acknowledged evidence from

Bucklew’s expert that lethal injection would cause

him to experience a sense of suffocation for several

minutes. Pet. App. 14a. It also acknowledged that it

was undisputed that lethal gas would cause him to

experience a sense of suffocation for, at most, 20—30

seconds. Jd. And it nowhere disputed that the differ-

ence would be significant enough to warrant relief.

Instead, the panel declared that Bucklew’s claim

failed because the evidence showing a difference be-

19

tween the two methods had not come from any one

witness. /d. That is, the panel interpreted this

Court’s requirement of “comparative” evidence to

mean that an inmate must point to a single witness

who does the comparison. /d.

Judge Colloton dissented. In surveying the evi-

dence and interpreting it in the light most favorable

to Bucklew, Judge Colloton concluded: “If the fact-

finder accepted Dr. Zivot’s testimony as to the effect

of pentobarbital, and Dr. Antognini’s uncontroverted

testimony as to the effect of nitrogen gas, then Buck-

lew’s proposed alternative method would significantly

reduce the substantial risk of severe pain ....” Pet.

App. 22a. Judge Colloton observed that the general

rule allows the trier of fact to accept all or just a part

of any witness’ testimony, and that on summary

judgment one party can rely on a portion of the op-

posing party’s expert’s testimony to create a genuine

issue of material fact. Jd. Accordingly, Judge Col-

loton would have remanded the case to the district

court to hold a trial and make factual findings.

The panel majority also affirmed the district court’s

denial of any discovery into the qualifications of the

medical personnel who will participate in Bucklew’s

execution. The panel majority, interpreting Buck-

lew’s argument as resting on the “premise that M2

and M3 may not be qualified for the positions for

which they have been hired,” refused to “assume that

M.osouri employs personnel who are incompetent or

uu.qualified” or to permit discovery into “[t]he poten-

tiality that something may go wrong in an execution.”

Pet. App. 17a. Instead, the panel majority insisted

that the court’s analysis must be based on the as-

sumption “that those responsible for carrying out the

sentence are competent and qualified to do so, and

that the procedure will go as intended.” /d.

20

Three days after the decision, Bucklew petitioned

for a panel rehearing or rehearing en banc, and

moved for an emergency stay. In opposing the stay

request, Respondents submitted a new factual affida-

vit from Alana Boyles, which stated that, during

Bucklew’s execution, “the Department will adjust the

gurney so that Mr. Bucklew is not lying fully supine

at the time the Department administers the lethal

chemicals.” Pet. App. 89a. The affidavit was pre-

pared after the Eighth Circuit panel had already is-

sued its decision, and was thus submitted without

any opportunity for Bucklew to investigate Ms.

Boyle’s role in the execution protocol or her authority

to make decisions concerning how that protocol will

be applied to Bucklew. The affidavit made no repre-

sentations about how Bucklew would be positioned

prior to the time the Department administers the le-

thal chemicals, including during a cut-down proce-

dure.

On March 15, 2018, the Eighth Circuit declined to

rehear Mr. Bucklew’s appeal. Pet. App. la.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This case presents an opportunity to resolve three

important questions arising out of the Eighth Cir-

cuit’s misinterpretation of this Court’s decisions in

firm that courts evaluating an as-applied challenge to

a state’s method of execution should not assume that

an execution will go as intended for an inmate with a

discovery into the training and skills of relevant med-

ical personnel. Second, this Court can reaffirm that

the traditional summary judgment standard applies

in challenges to methods of execution, and that an

inmate need not present a single witness to provide

21

comparative evidence distinguishing the state's

method of execution from the inmate’s proposed al-

ternative. Third, this Court can declare that inmates

need not propose an alternative execution procedure

when raising an as-applied challenge to a state's

method of execution. These questions are critical to

the fairness of procedures for inmates facing execu-

tion protocols that, as applied to them, pose known

and severe risks of needless suffering.

I. THIS CASE PRESENTS URGENT QUES-

TIONS REGARDING LITIGATION OF AS-

APPLIED CHALLENGES TO A METHOD

OF EXECUTION.

A. Whether Courts Evaluating An As

Applied Method-Of-Execution Claim

Should Assume That Medical Personne!

Are Competent To Handle An Inmate’s

Rare And Severe Medical Condition,

And That The Execution Will Go As In-

tended, Warrants Review.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of discovery

into the training and qualifications of the medical

personnel who will make critical decisions affecting

the length and severity of Bucklew’s suffering during

the execution. It did so because it concluded that the

training and qualifications of the medical team are

irrelevant. It ruled that a court evaluating an in-

mate’s as-applied challenge under Baze and Glossip

“must ... assum|[e] that those responsible for carrying

out the sentence are competent and qualified to do 20,

and that the procedure will go as intended.” Pet.

App. 17a. A challenge to a method of execution based

on the inmate’s medical condition necessarily asserts

that the procedure will not go as intended. If such

claims are cognizable at all, the Eighth Circuit's rule

cannot stand.

22

This Court has already indicated that such claims

are cognizable. The plurality opinion in Baze

acknowledged the possibility that some executions

might entail an “objectively intolerable risk of harm

that officials may not ignore.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 50

(plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omit-

ted). Nothing in Glossip undermines that view. And

for good reason. The rule follows logically from this

Court’s longstanding view that “deliberate indiffer-

ence” to an inmate’s medical condition can rise to the

level of cruel and unusual punishment within the

meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Gamble, 429

U.S. at 104. Here, medical personnel charged with

administering Missouri's execution protocol on an

inmate with a rare and severe medical condition will

be ignorant of material details about that condition,

yet empowered to make critical decisions during the

procedure that will increase the inmate’s suffering.

Respondents refuse even to provide access to those

medical professionals for discovery. All of this evinces

deliberate indifference to Bucklew’s condition and the

risks that lethal injection poses to him.

Importantly, Bucklew does not claim, as the Eighth

Circuit suggested, that “M2 and M3 may not be quali-

fied for the positions for which they have been hired.”

Pet. App. 17a. Bucklew presently has no reason to

believe they lack the qualifications to do what the ex-

cals,” “determine the most appropriate locations for

intravenous (IV) lines,” “monitor the prisoner during

the execution,” among other things. /Jd. at 145a—146a

77 B, C.1, D.2. But the execution protocol also em-

powers the medical team to attempt to access the

femoral vein “provided they have appropriate train-

ing, education, and experience for that procedure.”

Id. at 145a 4 C.1. That is, the execution protocol does

23

not assume the training and experience of the medi-

cal team members to handle one of the procedures

that the experts agree will likely be required here:

obtaining access to the femoral vein. Assuming that

medical team members will do so and all will go “as

intended,” as the Eighth Circuit has done here, is not

only contrary to law, but is contrary to the protocol

itself.

The execution protocol at issue here is nothing like

the protocols this Court had before it in Baze and

Glossip. Both of those protocols included “several

important safeguards,” Baze, 553 U.S. at 55 (plurality

opinion), to protect against the possibility of error in

administering the drugs. Indeed, Oklahoma’s stand-

ards considered in Glossip, adopted after the horrific

execution of Clayton Lockett, included “detailed pro-

visions with respect to the training and preparation

of the execution team.” 135 S. Ct. at 2735. Not only

does Missouri’s protocol lack any details regarding

the training and preparation of the execution team,

but Bucklew was wrongfully denied the chance to fill

that critical gap through discovery.

That denial is all the more egregious in light of the

testimony that makes clear how much discretionary

authority medical team members have during the ex-

ecution. Anne Precythe, who as Director of Correc-

tions is nominally in charge, repeatedly stated during

her deposition that she knows nothing about Buck-

lew’s medical condition and would defer to M2 and

M3 regarding how to handle any issues that arise

during the execution. APP0O338—40 at 35:12—37:9;

APP0341—42 at 43:11-—44:22. This includes not only

the decision whether to attempt venous access

through a central line like the femoral vein, but also

how many attempts will be made on peripheral veins,

and what procedure will be used to attempt femoral

24

vein access. It also includes how to position Bucklew

during attempts to gain venous access and beyond.

See Pet. App. 20a—21a & n.5.

Under Missouri’s vague procedures, and Precythe’s

deference to medical team members, the risk of trying

and failing to gain venous access through a peripher-

al vein, and then likely attempting access through

the outdated cut-down procedure that medical per-

sonnel previously performed, is not the prospect of a

mere “isolated mishap,” as the Eighth Circuit sup-

posed. Pet. App. 17a (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 50).

This risk is all but certain. It will lengthen the exe-

cution procedure. It will increase the stress of the

procedure on Bucklew, which increases the risk that

his tumors will rupture and he will begin to bleed

from them, likely gagging on his own blood even be-

fore the lethal drug can be administered. /d. at 114a—

115a 4 VI.E—G, 109a ¥ LIL.F. Convulsing uncontrol-

lably during a cut-down procedure surely increases

the risk that the femoral artery will be punctured, or

that the IV line will be positioned so that the lethal

drug leaks into neighboring tissue, causing intense

pain.

Even though we know these risks are substantial,

we have no reason to believe medical team members

will be alert to them. There is no reason to believe

M2 or M3 have ever seen a patient with cavernous

hemangioma, or have ever seen one with tumors in

his throat. There is reason to believe that neither M2

nor M3 will be alerted to Bucklew’s compromised

veins, the tumor in Bucklew’s throat, or the nature

and extent of the risk of suffocation Bucklew faces.

The single page form previously prepared in anticipa-

tion of an earlier execution date for Bucklew failed to

report any of these known problems. Pet. App. 144a.

25

Respondents tacitly conceded that the record inad-

equately supports their assurances that all will go

smoothly by submitting, at the rehearing stage in the

Eighth Circuit, a new affidavit of a new witness pur-

porting to provide minimal (and inadequate) assur-

ance that Bucklew will not be “fully supine at the

time the Department administers the lethal chemi-

cals.” Pet. App. 89a. The affidavit makes no repre-

sentation about Bucklew’s position during the painful

cut-down procedure he will endure. There remains

every reason to believe Bucklew will be forced to lie

“fully supine” during that procedure, which necessari-

ly occurs before the lethal chemicals are adminis-

tered. Bucklew had no opportunity to investigate Ms.

Boyles’ role in the execution protocol or her authority

to make decisions concerning how that protocol will

be applied to Bucklew. And the respondents’ gesture

reflects their mistaken insistence that Bucklew’s risk

of suffocating is present only when “fully supine.”

That is wrong. /d. at 115a—116a 4 VI1.I-—J); id. at 20a.

In the end, the affidavit only underscores respond-

ents’ deliberate indifference to the full range of risks

Bucklew faces. It illustrates why “[ajn adversarial

process should ... test[{] the risk of ‘serious illness and

needless suffering.” Hamm, 138 8S. Ct. at 828-29

(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

That adversarial process can include safeguards to

protect the anonymity of execution team members.

Bucklew has never asserted otherwise. See, e.z.,

APP0224—25 at IV.1.1.3. Indeed, such safeguards

have been used in the past when similar discovery

was allowed. The fact that the court barred Ms. Pi-

late, who has seen that discovery and believes it is

relevant here, from using it in this case, dramatically

demonstrates the fundamental unfairness of the dis-

covery ruling. This Court’s review is warranted.

26

B. Whether The Evidence Comparing The

Risks Of Proposed Methods Of Execu-

tion Must Come From A Single Witness

Warrants Review.

The Eighth Circuit has ruled that an inmate rais-

ing an as-applied challenge to a method of execution

must plead and prove that a feasible and readily

available alternative method of execution would sub-

stantially reduce his risk of needless suffering. Pet.

App. 75a, 84a. For the reasons discussed below,

Bucklew maintains that ruling was error. But even

assuming that is correct, the Eighth Circuit has lay-

ered an additional evidentiary burden on inmates

challenging a state’s proposed method of execution.

According to the panel majority, and over the dissent

of Judge Colloton, the Eighth Circuit now requires

inmates to present a single witness who compares the

risks posed by the two methods of execution and who

concludes that the inmate’s proposal substantially

reduces the risks posed by the state’s method. /d. at

13a—14a. This novel evidentiary standard, at odds

with settled summary judgment law, warrants re-

view.

What the parties’ experts concluded is clear regard-

ing the risks Bucklew faces after the lethal drug is

administered. Bucklew’s expert (Dr. Zivot) opines

that Bucklew will experience a sense of suffocation

for several minutes if lethal injection is used. Re-

spondents’ expert (Dr. Antognini) thinks Bucklew will

experience a sense of suffocation for 20-30 seconds if

lethal injection is used. Dr. Zivot did not opine on

how long Bucklew would experience pain if executed

by lethal gas. Dr. Antognini opined that lethal gas

would leave Bucklew insensate to pain within 20-30

seconds.

27

The Eighth Circuit panel majority correctly stated

Bucklew’s argument: “the district court should have

compared Dr. Zivot’s opinion [about lethal injection]

with Dr. Antognini’s testimony [about lethal gas.]”

Pet. App. 14a. Judge Colloton, in dissent, did just

that: “If the factfinder accepted Dr. Zivot’s testimony

as to the effect of pentobarbital, and Dr. Antognini’s

uncontroverted testimony as to effect of nitrogen gas,

then Bucklew’s proposed alternative method would

significantly reduce the substantial risk of severe

pain ....” Id. at 22a. The panel majority does not de-

ny that the difference between experiencing suffoca-

tion for 20-30 seconds, and experiencing suffocation

for several minutes, is significant and would warrant

relief. Instead, it refused to compare Dr. Zivot’s opin-

ion about lethal injection with Dr. Antognini’s opinion

about lethal gas. Put simply, the panel majority re-

jected Bucklew’s argument because “his expert” did

not compare the two methods himself. /d. at 13a—

14a.

This was legal error. Glossip requires a comparison

between the state’s method and a petitioner’s alter-

native method. But it nowhere requires that a single

witness compare the two. As Judge Colloton ex-

plained, a witness’s testimony may be credited in

whole or in part, and a plaintiff may rely on the de-

fendant’s evicence, including the defendant’s expert

witness, if that evidence is helpful. Pet. App. 22a (cit-

§ The panel majority also erroneously stated Bucklew’s con-

cern about suffocation “rests on” whether he will be forced to lie

supine. Pet. App. 15a. In fact, Dr. Zivot notes that Bucklew’s

choking is worse when lying flat. Jd. at 112a 4 V.B.1-—2). Dr.

Zivot also clearly stated that once Bucklew loses full conscious-

ness, he will be unable to manage his airway and will choke. /d.

at 115a—116a 4 VL.I.

28

ing cases). Petitioner is aware of no federal court of

appeals that has ruled to the contrary.‘

The panel majority provided no citation for its novel

rule. The previously unquestioned rule of law relied

upon by Judge Colloton follows logically from the

standard for summary judgment: only when “the rec-

ord taken as a whole” creates no genuine issue of ma-

terial fact should a court enter summary judgment.

Ricci, 557 U.S. at 586; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

Evidence is evidence, whether proffered by the party

seeking or opposing summary judgment. At sum-

mary judgment, a party may rely upon an opponent’s

expert to support or defeat the motion. DG&G, Inc. v.

FlexSol Packaging Corp. of Pompano Beach, 576 F.3d

820, 826-27 (8th Cir. 2009). There is and should be

no special burden placed on inmates under sentence

of death challenging a method of execution in light of

a rare medical condition. The panel majority misread

Glossip and improperly imposed a _ proffer-all-the-

comparative-evidence-yourself rule on Bucklew.

Indeed, it is especially inappropriate to impose this

special burden in an as-applied method of execution

‘ Every Circuit agrees with Judge Colloton. United States v.

Gonzalez- Velez, 587 F.3d 494, 504 (ist Cir. 2009); United States

v. Norman, 776 F.3d 67, 78 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v.

Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 189 (3d Cir. 2002); Trademark Props., Inc.

v. A&E TV Networks, 422 F. App’x 199, 212 (4th Cir. 2011);

United States v. Merida, 765 F.2d 1205, 1220 (5th Cir. 1985);

Dixon v. Penn Cent. Co., 481 F.2d 833, 837 (6th Cir. 1973); Unit-

ed States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 836 (7th Cir. 2008); United

States v. Candie, 974 F.2d 61, 65 (8th Cir. 1992); United States

v. Clevenger, 733 F.2d 1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 1984); United States

v. Ransom, 691 F. App’x 504, 506 (10th Cir. 2017); United States

v. Prince, 883 F.2d 953, 959 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989); United States

v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc); Ander-

son v. Dep't of Transp., FAA., 827 F.2d 1564, 1570 (Fed. Cir.

1987) (per curiam).

29

case. Dr. Zivot explained why he could not opine on a

method of execution that would result in significantly

less suffering than the lethal injection protocol pro-

posed by the State: he is ethically barred from propos-

ing a method of execution at all. Pet. App. 108a

4 11.B. The law should not require an inmate to find

an expert who is willing to violate his or her oath by

custom-designing a method of execution that will

substantially reduce the inmate’s idiosyncratic rea-

sons for excessive suffering.

This Court should grant this petition and restore

the generally applicable rules for evaluating evidence

at summary judgment to inmates bringing an as-

applied challenge to their methods of execution.

C. Whether An Inmate Raising An As-

Applied Challenge To A Method Of Exe-

cution Must Prove An Available Alterna-

tive Method That Will Substantially Re-

duce His Risk Of Suffering Also War-

rants Review.

The Eighth Circuit requires an inmate raising an

as-applied, method-of-execution challenge to propose

a “feasible, readily implemented alternative proce-

dure that will significantly reduce a substantial risk

of severe pain and that the State refuses to adopt.”

Pet. App. 84a. Its 6-4 en banc ruling on this issue

mis-applied a rule announced in cases raising facial

challenges to the critically different context of an as-

applied challenge. The extension of the rule to as-

applied challenges, also adopted by the Eleventh Cir-

cuit, the Florida Supreme Court, and suggested by

the Sixth Circuit, is unwarranted. The reasons justi-

fying the alternative method requirement are linked

with the character of facial challenges.

30

Both Baze and Glossip start from the premise that

because the Constitution permits capital punishment,

it must also permit a method of carrying out the

death sentence. Baze, 553 U.S. at 48-49 (plurality

opinion); Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2739. The implications

for that premise are broader when the Court is con-

sidering a facial challenge than when it is considering

an as-applied challenge.

A facial challenge asks the Court to declare a meth-

od of execution unconstitutional for use against any-

one. Such a challenge runs the risk of being a dis-

guised effort to render the death penalty itself uncon-

stitutional. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2739. But that

risk is not present at all when the inmate raises an

as-applied challenge. Such a claim implicates the

lawfulness of the state’s method for no other inmate.

Bucklew’s claim is rooted in his idiosyncratic medical

condition and the risks posed specifically to him. He

does not seek a judgment that would require Missouri

to alter its execution protocol as to any other inmate.

Nothing about his claim even implicitly questions the

lawfulness of capital punishment.

And nothing about Bucklew’s claim seeks to “trans-

form courts into boards of inquiry charged with de-

termining ‘best practices’ for executions.” Baze, 553

U.S. at 51 (plurality opinion). Because only Buck-

lew’s execution is at stake, his claim does not ask the

courts to displace state officials from their task as de-

signers of a state’s protocol for carrying out capital

punishment. State legislatures would continue to

evaluate the best scientific evidence available to ap-

prove the most humane methods of execution. /d.

Courts would remain focused on a task for which they

are well suited: evaluating whether a general state

rule (the state’s execution protocol) applied to partic-

ular facts (the medical condition of the inmate) satis-

31

fies the Constitution’s legal standard (the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruelty).

Practical considerations also weigh in favor of re-

lieving inmates with rare, complicating medical con-

ditions from having to design their own execution

protocol. State officials naturally have a firmer grasp

of the modifications to a protocol that the state can

accommodate. State officials will also have greater

experience with the complications that can arise dur-

ing executions, and thus will have better knowledge

of what practices are likely to provide relief, at least

in circumstances that can recur. And inmates will of-

ten be frustrated in their efforts to obtain expert

guidance in custom-designing a method of execution

that accounts for their particular medical issues.

Most professionals with medical training are barred

by ethical standards from “participating in” an execu-

tion, which includes a bar on designing a method of

execution that is “better” than the one proposed by

the state. See, e.g., AMA Code of Medical Ethics, tit.

9.7.3 “Capital Punishment” (2016), https://www.ama-

assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-of-

medical-ethics-chapter-9.pdf.

This Court has already ruled that certain individu-

als, based on their mental health, are categorically

ineligible for the death penalty. Ford, 477 U.S. at

410 (plurality opinion) (“The Eighth Amendment

prohibits the State from inflicting the penalty of

death upon a prisoner who is insane.”); Moore v. Tex-

as, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017) (holding that indi-

viduals with certain mental deficiencies cannot be

constitutionally executed); Hall v. Florida, 134 8. Ct.

1986, 1992 (2014) (“[Plersons with intellectual disa-

bility may not be executed.”). It should not be sur-

prising, then, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits

the execution of some individuals by a particular

32

method based on their physical condition. That is all

Bucklew asserts here. Bucklew’s physical condition

should not condemn him to state indifference to his

suffering, even if Bucklew is unable to design an al-

ternative that convincingly shows the promise of sub-

stantially reduced suffering. Rather, his proof that

his idiosyncratic condition means the state will im-

pose unconstitutional suffering on him should lead to

a court order preventing the state from doing so. The

law should not “bar a death-row inmate from vindi-

cating a right guaranteed by the Eighth Amend-

ment .... even if [he] can prove that the State plans to

kill him in an intolerably cruel manner.” Arthur, 137

S. Ct. at 729 (Mem.) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

Such a judgment would leave Missouri free to design

a lethal gas protocol that meets Eighth Amendment

standards.

ll. THIS CASE IS A STRONG VEHICLE FOR

ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES.

This case is on direct appeal from final judgment.

The Eighth Circuit’s decision adopts novel rules of

law that frustrate method-of-execution claims. The

issues are cleanly presented.

Throughout this litigation, respondents have per-

sistently suggested otherwise. They have asserted

that Bucklew failed to plead his claim, and that his

claim is barred by res judicata and the statute of lim-

itations because he could have and should have

brought his claim earlier, in a proceeding that raised

a facial challenge. No judge has agreed with re-

spondents. Judge Colloton thoroughly and accurately

rejected their arguments. Bucklew need not repeat

. ose reasons in full here. But, in brief: (1) Bucklew

specifically pleaded that lethal injection would cause

him to experience a prolonged sense of suffocation,

and (2) Bucklew was repeatedly denied the resources

33

to investigate the severity of the risks he faced from

lethal injection in light of his condition, and did not

learn the facts necessary to assert his claim until it

wa3 too late to include his as-applied challenge in the

case raising a facial challenge to lethal injection.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant

the petition for a writ of certiorari.

CHERYL A. PILATE

MORGAN PILATE LLC

926 Cherry Street

Kansas City, MO 64106

(816) 471-6694

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Robert N. Hochman _

ROBERT N. HOCHMAN *

RAECHEL J. BIMMERLE

KELLY J. HUGGINS

MATTHEW J. SALDANA

HEATHER B. SULTANIAN

DANIEL R. THIES

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

One South Dearborn Street

Chicago, IL 60603

(312) 853-7000

rhochman@sidley.com

Counsel for Petitioner

March 15, 2018

* Counsel of Record

No. 17-

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

RUSSELL BUCKLEW,

Petitioner,

Vv.

ANNE PRECYTHE, et ai.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit

PETITION APPENDIX

EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR MARCH 20, 2018

CHERYL A. PILATE ROBERT N. HOCHMAN *

MORGAN PILATE LLC RAECHEL J. BIMMERLE

926 Cherry Street KELLY J. HUGGINS

Kansas City, MO 64106 MATTHEW J. SALDANA

(816) 471-6694 HEATHER B. SULTANIAN

DANIEL R. THIES

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

One South Dearborn Street

Chicago, [L 60603

(312) 853-7000

rhochman@sidley.com

Counsel for Petitioner

March 15, 2018 * Counsel of Record

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPENDIX A: Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 17-

3052 (8th Cir. Mar. 15, 2018)...............2.....00000+- la

APPENDIX B: Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 17-

3052, 2018 WL 1163360 (8th Cir. Mar. 6,

IS Se reat enn a 3a

APPENDIX C: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-

8000-CV-W-BP (W.D. Mo. June 15, 2017)........ 26a

APPENDIX D: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-

8000-CV-W-BP (W.D. Mo. Aug. 21, 2017) ........ 39a

APPENDIX E: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-

8000-CV-W-BP (W.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2017) ........ 44a

APPENDIX F: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-

8000-CV-W-BP (W.D. Mo. Apr. 11, 2017)......... 53a

APPENDIX G: Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-

2163 (8th Cir. Mar. 6, 2015)................2.ccc0c000000 72a

APPENDIX H: Affidavit of Alana Boyles ........... 89a

APPENDIX I: Hamm Expert Report .................. 9la

APPENDIX J: Zivot Supplemental Report......... 106a

APPENDIX K: Medial Summary_........................ 144a

APPENDIX L: Missouri Execution Protocol....... 145a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No: 17-3052

Russell Bucklew

Appellant

Vv

Anne L. Precythe, Director of the Department of Corrections, et al

Appellees

Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

(4:14-cv-8000-BP)

ORDER

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, LOKEN, COLLOTON, GRUENDER, SHEPHERD,

KELLY, ERICKSON, GRASZ and STRAS, Circuit Judges

Appellant Bucklew’s petition for rehearing by panel is denied. Judge Colloton would

grant the petition for rehearing by panc!l

Appellant Bucklew’s petition for rehearing en banc has been considered by the court and

the petition is denied. Chief Judge Smith and Judge Kelly would grant the petition. Judge

Colloton and Judge Gruender would grant rehearing en banc on Point | of the petition for

rehearing en banc

Judge Duane Benton took no part in the consideration or decision of the petition for

rehearing en banc

KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc

| would grant Russeil Bucklew’s petition for rehearing en banc——and reverse the district

court’s grant of summary judgment——for the reasons stated in the dissent from the panel opinion

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Appellate Case: 17-3052 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/15/2018 Entry ID: 4639783

in this case. See Bucklew vy. Precythe. F.3d , 2018 WL 1163360, at *7 (8th Cir. 2018)

(Colloton, J., dissenting). | would also grant Bucklew’s petition to the extent it seeks

reconsideration of this court’s conclusion, in Bucklew vy. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120, 1128 (8th

Cir. 2015) (en banc), that those sentenced to death must plead a “feasible, readily implemented

alternative procedure” for carrying out their sentence in order to state a plausible as-applied

claim under the Eighth Amendment. | continue to believe that “|flacial and as-applied

challenges to execution protocols are different,” that death row inmates “need not plead a readily

available alternative method of execution” to bring an as-applied challenge, and that “[a] state

cannot be excused from taking into account a particular inmate’s existing physical disability or

health condition when assessing the propricty of its execution method.” See id. at 1129 (Bye, J.,

concurring in the result). “While the Supreme Court has been clear on the general proposition

that, so long as a state-imposed death penalty is constitutional, there must be some way for states

to carry out executions, the Supreme Court has also been clear that some individuals cannot be

executed.” Id. at 1130 (collecting cases); see also Madison v. Alabama, 138 S. Ct. , 2018

WL 514241 (Feb. 26, 2018); Dunn v. Madison, 138 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2017) (Ginsburg, J.,

concurring). In my view, neither Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015), nor any subsequent

case from the United States Supreme Court dictates the result this court reached on this issue in

Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc).

March 15, 2018

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

p /s/ Michael E. Gans

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Appellate Case: 17-3052 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/15/2018 Entry ID: 4639783

Gnited States Court of Appeals

For the Cighth Circuit

No. 17-3052

Russell Bucklew

Plaintiff - Appellant

Anne L. Precythe, Director of the Department of Corrections, et al.

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

Submitted: February 2, 2018

Filed: March 6, 2018

Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

LOKEN, Circuit Judge

The issue is whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as applied, bar

Missouri officials from employing a procedure that is authorized by Missouri statute

to execute Russell Bucklew.

In March 2006, Bucklew stole a car; armed himself with pistols, handcuffs, and

a roll of duct tape; and followed his former girlfriend, Stephanie Ray, to the home of

003a

Appellate Case: 17-3052 Page:1 Date Filed: 03/06/2018 Entry ID: 4636271

Michael Sanders, where she was living. Bucklew knocked and entered the trailer

with a pistol in each hand when Sanders’s son opened the door. Sanders took the

children to the back room and grabbed a shotgun. Bucklew began shooting. Two

bullets struck Sanders, one piercing his chest. Bucklew fired at Sanders’s six-year-

old son, but missed. As Sanders bled to death, Bucklew struck Ray in the face with

a pistol, handcuffed Ray, dragged her to the stolen car, drove away, and raped Ray

in the back seat of the car. He was apprehended by the highway patrol after a

gunfight in which Bucklew and a trooper were wounded.

A Missouri state court jury convicted Bucklew of murder, kidnaping, and rape

The trial court sentenced Bucklew to death, as the jury had recommended. His

conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Bucklew, 973

S.W.2d 83 (Mo. banc 1998). The trial court denied his petition for post-conviction

relief, and the Supreme Court of Missouri again affirmed. Bucklew v. State, 38

S.W.3d 395 (Mo. banc 2001). We subsequently affirmed the district court’s denial

of Bucklew’s petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus. Bucklew v. Luebbers, 436

F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court of Missouri issued a writ of execution

for May 21, 2014. Bucklew filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that

execution by Missouri’s lethal injection protocol, authorized by statute, would

constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments as applied to him because of his unique medical condition. Bucklew

appeals the district court’s' grant of summary judgment in favor of the state

defendants because Bucklew failed to present adequate evidence to establish his

claim under the governing standard established by the Supreme Court in Baze v.

Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), and Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). Reviewing

the grant of summary judgment de novo, we affirm.

'The Honorable Beth Phillips, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

_™

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Missouri’s method of execution is by injection of a lethal dose of the drug

pentobarbital. Two days before his scheduled execution in 2014, the district court

denied Bucklew’s motion for a stay of execution and dismissed this as-applied action

sua sponte. On appeal, a divided panel granted a stay of execution, Bucklew v.

Lombardi, 565 Fed. Appx. 562 (8th Cir. 2014); the court en banc vacated the stay.

Bucklew applied to the Supreme Court for a stay of execution, and the Court issued

an Order granting his application “for stay pending appeal in the Eighth Circuit.”

This court, acting en banc, reversed the sua sponte dismissal of Bucklew’s as-applied

Eighth Amendment claim and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120, 1128 (8th Cir. 2015) (“Bucklew I”). On the

same day, the en banc court affirmed the district court’s dismissal on the merits of a

facial challenge to Missouri’s lethal injection protocol filed by several inmates

sentenced to death, including Bucklew. Zink vy. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1114 (8th

Cir.), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 2941 (2015).’

*““The doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion bars relitigation of a § 1983

claim if the prior judgment was a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of

competent jurisdiction, and if the same cause of action and the same parties or their

privies were involved.” Baker vy. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 2007), cert

denied, 554 U.S. 902 (2008). As Bucklew was a plaintiff in Zink, any facial

challenge to the current method of execution in this case is precluded. Defendants

argue that Bucklew’s as-applied challenge is also precluded because it could have

been raised in Zink. See Brown v. St. Louis Police Dep’t, 691 F.2d 393, 396 (8th Cir.

1982). Like the district court, we decline to address this complex issue. See Bucklew

1, 783 F.3d at 1122 n.1; cf. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct 2292,

2305 (2016). We likewise decline to address defendants’ claim that Bucklew’s as-

applied challenge is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Boyd v.

Warden, Holman Corr. Facility, 856 F.3d 853, 874-76 (11th Cir. 2017).

-%

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Our decision in Buckiew | set forth in considerable detail the allegations in

Bucklew’s as-applied complaint regarding his medical condition. 783 F.3d at 1124-

26. Bucklew has long suffered from a congenital condition called cavernous

hemangioma, which causes clumps of weak, malformed blood vessels and tumors to

grow in his face, head, neck, and throat. The large, inoperable tumors fill with blood,

periodically rupture, and partially obstruct his airway. In addition, the condition

affects his circulatory system, and he has compromised peripheral veins in his hands

and arms. In his motion for a stay of execution in Bucklew |, Bucklew argued:

Dr. Joel Zivot, a board-certified anesthesiologist . . . concluded after

reviewing Mr. Bucklew’s medical records that a substantial risk existed

that, because of Mr. Bucklew’s vascular malformation, the lethal drug

will likely not circulate as intended, creating a substantial risk of a

“prolonged and extremely painful execution.” Dr. Zivot also concluded

that a very substantial risk existed that Mr. Bucklew would hemorrhage

curing the execution, potentially choking on his own blood -- a risk

greatly heightened by Mr. Bucklew’s partially obstructed airway.

+ * * . *

{The Department of Corrections has advised it would not use a dye in

flushing the intravenous line because Dr. Zivot warned that might cause

a spike in Bucklew’s blood pressure.| Reactionary changes at the

eleventh hour, without the guidance of imaging or tests, create a

substantial risk to Mr. Bucklew, who suffers from a complex and severe

medical condition that has compromised his veins.

7 . * * *

The DOC seems to acknowledge they agree with Dr. Zivot that Mr.

Bucklew’s obstructed airway presents substantial risks of needless pain

and suffering, but what they plan to do about it is a mystery. Will they

execute Mr. Bucklew in a seated position? . . . The DOC should be

required to disclose how it plans to execute Mr. Bucklew so that this

Court can properly assess whether additional risks are present. . . . Until

-4-

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Mr. Bucklew knows what protocol the DOC will use to kill him, and

until the DOC is required to conduct the necessary imaging and testing

to quantify the expansion of Mr. Bucklew’s hemangiomas and the extent

of his airway obstruction, it is not possible to execute him without

substantial risk of severe pain and needless suffering.

Defendants’ Suggestions in Opposition argued that Bucklew’s “proposed changes . . .

with the exception of his complaint about [dye], which Missouri will not use in

Bucklew’s execution, are not really changes in the method of execution.”

Glossip and Baze established two requirements for an Eighth Amendment

challenge to a method of execution. First, the challenger must “establish that the

method presents a risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless

suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers.” Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737

(emphasis in original), citing Baze, 553 U.S. at 50. This evidence must show that the

pain and suffering being risked is severe in relation to the pain and suffering that is

accepted as inherent in any method of execution. Id. at 2733. Second, the challenger

must “identify an alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact

significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain.” Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737,

citing Baze, 553 U.S. at 52. This two-part standard governs as-applied as well as

facial challenges to a method of execution. See, e.g., Jones v. Kelley, 854 F.3d 1009,

1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2017); Williams v. Kelley, 854 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2017);

Johnson v. Lombardi, 809 F.3d 388, 390 (8th Cir. 2015); Bucklew I, 783 F.3d at

1123, 1127. As a panel we are bound by these controlling precedents. Bucklew

argues the second Baze/Glossip requirement of a feasible alternative method of

execution that substantially reduces the risk of suffering should not apply to “an

individual who is simply too sick and anomalous to execute in a constitutional

manner,” like those who may not be executed for mental health reasons. See, e.g.,

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986). The Supreme Court has not

recognized a categorical exemption from the death penalty for individuals with

physical ailments or disabilities. Thus, in the decision on appeal, the district court

ie

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Appellate Case: 17-3052 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/06/2018 Entry ID: 4636271

properly applied the Baze/Glossip two-part standard in dismissing Bucklew’s as-

applied claim.

We concluded in Bucklew I, based on a record “which went well beyond the

four corners of Bucklew’s complaint,” that the complaint’s allegations, bolstered by

defendants’ concession “that the Department’s lethal injection procedure would be

changed on account of his condition by eliminating the use of methylene blue dye,”

sufficiently alleged the first requirement of an as-applied challenge to the method of

execution -- “a substantial risk of serious and imminent harm that is sure or very

likely to occur.” 783 F.3d at 1127. We further concluded the district court’s sua

sponte dismissal was premature because these detailed allegations made it

inappropriate “to assume that Bucklew would decline an invitation to amend the as-

applied challenge” to plausibly allege a feasible and more humane alternative method

of execution, the second requirement under the Baze/Glossip standard. Id. In

remanding, we directed that further proceedings “be narrowly tailored and

expeditiously conducted to address only those issues that are essential to resolving”

the as-applied challenge. Id. at 1128. We explained:

Bucklew’s arguments on appeal raise an inference that he is

impermissibly seeking merely to investigate the protocol without taking

a position as to what is needed to fix it. He may not be “permitted to

supervise every step of the execution process.” Rather, at the earliest

possible time, he must identify a feasible, readily implemented

alternative procedure that will significantly reduce a substantial risk of

severe pain and that the State refuses to adopt. . . . Any assertion that all

methods of execution are unconstitutional does not state a plausible

claim under the Eighth Amendment or a cognizable claim under § 1983.

Id. (quotation omitted; emphasis in original).

--

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Appellate Case: 17-3052 Page:6 Date Filed: 03/06/2018 Entry ID: 4636271 |

On remand, consistent with our directive, the district court first ordered

Bucklew to file an amended complaint that adequately identified an alternative

procedure. Twice, Bucklew filed amended complaints that failed to comply with this

order. Given one last chance to comply or face dismissal, on October 13, 2015,

Bucklew filed a Fourth Amended Complaint. As relevant here, it alleged:

106. Based on Mr. Bucklew’s unique and severe condition, there

is no way to proceed with Mr. Bucklew’s execution under Missouri’s

lethal injection protocol without a substantial risk to Mr. Bucklew of

suffering grave adverse events during the execution, including

hemorrhaging, suffocating or experiencing excruciating pain.

107. Under any scenario or with any of lethal drug, execution by

lethal injection poses an enormous risk that Mr. Bucklew will suffer

extreme, excruciating and prolonged pain -- all accompanied by choking

and struggling for air.

128. In May 2014, the DOC also proposed a second adjustment

in its protocol, offering to adjust the gurney so that Mr. Bucklew is not

lying completely prone.’ . . . As a practical matter, no adjustment would

likely be sufficient, as the stress of the execution may unavoidably cause

Mr. Bucklew’s hemangiomas to rupture, leading to hemorrhaging,

bleeding in his throat and through his facial orifices, and coughing and

choking on his own blood.

129. In order to fully evaluate and establish the risks to Mr.

Bucklew from execution by lethal injection, a full and complete set of

imaging studies must be conducted.

*In their answer to paragraph 128, defendants alleged: “Defendants admit that

the Defendants offered to have the anesthesiologist position the angle of the gurney

in a proper position.” Thus, this fect was established by the pleadings.

x x

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139. Mr. Bucklew is mindful of the Court’s directive to allege a

feasible, readily implemented alternative procedure .... Mr. Bucklew

has complied . . . by researching and proposing execution by lethal gas,

which is specifically authorized by Missouri law and which Missouri’s

Attorney General has stated the DOC is prepared to implement.

150. In adherence with the pleading requirements set forth in

Glossip, and as stated above, Mr. Bucklew specifically alleges lethal gas

as a feasible and available alternative method that will significantly

reduce the risk of severe pain to Mr. Bucklew.

In other words, Bucklew took the position that no modification of Missouri’s lethal

injection method of execution could be constitutionally applied to execute Bucklew.

He proposed massive discovery allegedly needed to establish the first Baze/Glossip

requirement. But his legal theory is that alternative procedures such as adjusting the

gurney’s position are irrelevant because no lethal injection procedure would be

constitutional, only a change to the use of lethal gas would be adequate.

Bucklew’s as-applied claim focused on two aspects of his medical condition.

First, Bucklew’s experts initially opined that his peripheral veins are so weak that

injection of a lethal dose of pentobarbital would not adequately circulaic, leading to

a prolonged and painful execution. The district court concluded that discovery and

expert opinions developed on remand refuted this claim. The lethal injection protocol

provides that medical personnel may insert the primary intravenous (IV) line “as a

central venous line” and may dispense with a secondary peripheral IV line if “the

prisoner’s physical condition makes it unduly difficult to insert more than one IV.”

Bucklew’s expert Dr. Zivot conceded, and Defendants’ expert, Dr. Joseph Antognini,

agreed, that the central femoral vein can circulate a “fair amount of fluid” without

serious risk of rupture and that Bucklew’s medical condition will not affect the flow

of pentobarbital after it is injected through this vein.

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Second, Bucklew’s experts opined that his condition will cause him to

experience severe choking and suffocation during execution by lethal injection.

When Bucklew is supine, gravity pulls the hemangioma tumor into his throat which

causes his breathing to be labored and the tumor to rupture and bleed. When

conscious, Bucklew can “adjust” his breathing with repeated swallowing that

prevents the tumor from blocking his airway. But during the “twilight stage” of a

lethal injection execution, Dr. Zivot opined that Bucklew will be aware he is choking

on his own blood and in pain before the pentobarbital renders him unconscious and

unaware of pain. Based on a study of lethal injections in horses, Dr. Zivot estimated

there could be a period as short as 52 seconds and as long as 240 seconds when

Bucklew is conscious but immobile and unable to adjust his breathing; his attempts

to breath will create friction, causiv* the tumor to bleed and possibiy hemorrhage.

In Dr. Zivot’s opinion, there is a “very, very high likelihood” that Bucklew will suffer

“choking complications, including visible hemorrhaging,” if he is executed by any

means of lethal injection, including using the drug pentobarbital.

According to Defendants’ expert, Dr. Antognini, pentobarbital causes death by

“producing rapid, deep unconscious|ness], respiratory depression, followed by . . .

complete absence of respiration, decreased oxygen levels, slowing of the heart, and

then the heart stopping.” In contrast to Dr. Zivot, Dr. Antognini opined that

pentobarbital would cause “rapid and deep unconsciousness” within 20-30 seconds

of entering Bucklew’s blood stream, rendering him insensate to bleeding and choking

sensations. Dr. Antognini also challenged Dr. Zivot’s opinion that a supine Bucklew,

unable to adjust his breathing, will be aware he is choking on his own blood and in

pain from the tumor blocking his airway before the pentobarbital renders him

unconscious. Dr. Antognini noted that, between 2000 and 2003, Bucklew underwent

general anesthesia cight times, at least once in a supine position. In December 2016,

Bucklew lay supine for over an hour undergoing an MRI, with no more than

discomfort. The MRI revealed that his tumor had slightly shrunk since 2010.

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In granting defendants summary judgment, the district court declined to rely

on the first Glossip/Baze requirement because these conflicting expert opinions

“would permit a factfinder to conclude that for as long as four minutes [after the

injection of pentobarbital Bucklew] could be aware that he is choking or unable to

breathe but be unable [to] ‘adjust’ his breathing to remedy the situation.” Rather, the

court held that Bucklew failed to provide adequate evidence that his alternative

method of execution -- lethal gas -- was a “feasible, readily implemented” alternative

that would “in fact significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain” as compared

to lethal injection. Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2737; Baze, 553 U.S. at 52.

To succeed in his challenge to Missouri’s lethal injection execution protocol,

Bucklew must establish both prongs of the Glossip/Baze standard. Glossip, 135 S.

Ct. 2737. The district court held that Bucklew failed to establish the second prong

of Glossip/Baze by showing that an alternative method of execution would “in fact

significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.” As noted, Bucklew argues the

Glossip/Baze standard should not apply to an as-applied challenge to a method of

execution, an argument our controlling precedents have rejected. He raises two

additional issues on appeal.

A. Bucklew first argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment

on the second Glossip/Baze requirement because he presented sufficient evidence that

his proposed alternative method of execution -- death through nitrogen gas-induced

hypoxia -- “would substantially reduce his suffering.” Summary judgment is not

appropriate when there are material issues of disputed fact, and the Supreme Court

in Glossip made clear that this issue may require findings of fact that are reviewed for

clear error. See 135 S. Ct. at 2739-41 (majority opinion) and 2786 (Sotomayor, J.,

dissenting). However, whether a method of execution “constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment is a question of law.” Swindler v. Lockhart, 885 F.2d 1342, 1350 (8th

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Cir. 1989). Thus, unless there are material underlying issues of disputed fact, it is

appropriate to resolve this ultimate issue of law by summary judgment.

Nitrogen hypoxia is an authorized method of execution under Missouri Law.

See Mo. Stat. Ann. § 546.720. Missouri has not used this method of execution since

1965 and does not currently have a protocol in place for execution by lethal gas. But

there are ongoing studies of the method in other States and at least preliminary

indications that Missouri will undertake to develop a protocol. Defendants do not

argue this is not a feasible and available alternative.

The district court granted summary judgment based on Bucklew’s failure to

provide adequate evidence that execution by nitrogen hypoxia would substantially

reduce the risk of pain or suffering. The court allowed Bucklew extensive discovery

into defendants’ knowledge regarding execution by lethal gas. But Missouri’s lack

of recent experience meant that this discovery produced little relevant evidence and

no evidence that the risk posed by lethal injection is substantial when compared to the

risk posed by lethal gas. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2738; Johnson, 809 F.3d at 391.

Bucklew’s theory is that execution by nitrogen hypoxia would render Bucklew

insensate more quickly than lethal injection and would not cause choking and

bleeding in his tumor-blocked airway. But his expert, Dr. Zivot, provided no support

for this theory. Dr. Zivot’s Supplemental Expert Report explained:

| W Jhile I can assess Mr. Bucklew’s current medical status and render an

expert opinion as to the documented and significant risks associated

with executing Mr. Bucklew under Missouri’s current Execution

Procedure, | cannot advise counsel or the Court on how to execute Mr.

Bucklew in a way that would satisfy Constitutional requirements.

Lacking affirmative comparative evidence, Bucklew relied on Dr. Antognini’s

deposition. In his Expert Report, Dr. Antognini concluded that “the use of lethal gas

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would not significantly lessen any suffering or be less painful than lethal injection in

this inmate.” At his deposition, Dr. Antognini was asked:

Q. Why does lethal gas not hold any advantage compared to lethal

injection.

A. Well . . . there are a lot of types of gases that could be used

.... [U]sing gas would not significantly lessen any suffering or be less

painful. Because, again, their onset of action is going to be relatively

fast, just like Pentobarbital’s onset -- onset of action.

Q. That’s it? Simply because it would happen quickly?

A. Correct.

The district court concluded this opinion provided nothing to compare:

Dr. Antognini specifically stated that he believed there would be no

difference in the “speed” of lethal gas as compared to pentobarbital. . . .

In the absence of evidence contradicting Defendants’ expert and

supporting Plaintiff's theory, there is not a triable issue.

On appeal, Bucklew argues the district court should have compared Dr. Zivot’s

opinion that lethal injection would take up to four minutes to cause Bucklew’s brain

death with Dr. Antognini’s testimony that lethal gas would render him unconscious

in the same amount of time as lethal injection, 20 to 30 seconds. But Dr. Antognini’s

comparative testimony was that both methods would result in unconsciousness in

approximately the same amount of time. Bucklew offered no contrary comparative

evidence and thus the district court correctly concluded that he failed to satisfy his

burden to provide evidence “establishing a known and available alternative that

would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.” McGehee v.

Hutchinson, 854 I’ .3d 488, 493 (8th Cir. 2017).

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In addition, Bucklew’s claim that he will experience choking sensations during

an execution by lethal injection but not by nitrogen hypoxia rests on the proposition

that he could be seated during the latter but not the former. He argues there is

evidence he will be forced to remain supine during an execution by lethal injection,

when his tumor will cause him to sense he is choking on his own blood, whereas he

could remain seated during the administration of lethal gas, which would not cause

a choking sensation. But this argument lacks factual support in the record. Having

taken the position that any lethal injection procedure would violate the Eighth

Amendment, Bucklew made no effort to determine what changes, if any, the DOC

would make in applying its lethal injection protocol in executing Bucklew, other than

defendants advising -- prior to remand by this court -- that dye would not be used.

Based on Bucklew’s argument to the en banc court, we expected that the core

of the proceedings on remand would be defining what changes defendants would

make on account of Bucklew’s medical condition and then evaluating that modified

procedure under the two-part Baze/Glossip standard. On remand, Director of

Corrections Ann Precythe testified that the medical members of the execution team

are provided a prisoner’s medical history in preparing for the execution. Precythe has

authority to make changes in the execution protocol, such as how the primary IV line

will be inserted in the central femoral vein or how the gurney will be positioned, if

the team advises that changes are needed. While Bucklew sought and was denied

discovery of the identities of the execution team’s medical members, he never urged

the district court to establish a suitable fact-finding procedure -- for example, by

anonymous interrogatories or written deposition questions to the execution team

members -- for discovery of facts needed for the DOC to define the as-applied lethal

injection protocol it intends to use for Bucklew. As Bucklew did not pursue these

issues, the pleadings established that defendants have proposed to reposition the

gurney during Bucklew’s deposition, and Director Precythe testified that she has

authority to make this type of change in the execution protocol based on the execution

team’s advice based on review of Bucklew’s medical history, but the record does not

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disclose whether Bucklew will in fact be supine during the execution,‘ nor does it

disclose that a “cut-down” procedure will not be used to place the primary IV line in

his central femoral vein, a procedure Dr. Antognini opined was unnecessary.

Bucklew simply asserts that, in comparing execution by lethal injection and by lethal

gas, we must accept his speculation that defendants will employ these risk-increasing

procedures. This we will not do.

Like the district court, we conclude the summary judgment record contains no

basis to conclude that Bucklew’s risk of severe pain would be substantially reduced

by use of nitrogen hypoxia instead of lethal injection as the method of execution.

Evidence that “is equivocal, lacks scientific consensus and presents a paucity of

reliable scientific evidence” does not establish that an execution is sure or very likely

to cause serious illness and needless suffering. Williams v. Kelley, 854 F.3d at 1001

(quotation omitted). Therefore, he failed to establish the second prong of the

Glossip/Baze standard.

B. Bucklew further contends the district court erred in denying his requests for

discovery relating to “M2” and “M3,” two members of the lethal injection execution

team. Bucklew argues he was entitled to discovery of the medical technicians’

qualifications, training, and experience because it would “illuminate the nature and

extent of the risks of suffering he faces.” For example, if M3 was not qualified to

safely place his IV in the central femoral vein, this would directly impact the risk of

*Dr. Zivot surmised that Bucklew will be required to lie flat during lethal

injection based on what he observed at an execution in Georgia. He gave no reason

to believe that pentobarbital could not be injected through a femoral vein while

Bucklew is seated. He merely opined that “[i]t’s more difficult” to administer an

anesthetic to someone who is sitting up. Dr. Antognini, in addition to opining that

Bucklew would be rendered unconscious and insensate within 20 to 30 seconds of

pentobarbital injection, noted that it was not necessary that Bucklew be supine in

order to inject pentobarbital in his femoral vein.

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pain and suffering. We review a district court’s discovery rulings narrowly and with

great deference and will reverse only for a “gross abuse of discretion resulting in

fundamental unfairness.” Marksmeier v. Davie, 622 F.3d 896, 903 (8th Cir. 2010).

Bucklew’s argument proceeds from the premise that M2 and M3 may not be

qualified for the positions for which they have been hired. But we will not assume

that Missouri employs personnel who are incompetent or unqualified to perform their

assigned duties. See Clemons v. Crawford, 585 F.3d 1119, 1128 (8th Cir. 2009). He

further argues that deposition of M2 and M3 is necessary to understand how they will

handle a circumstance in case something goes wrong during Bucklew’s execution.

The potentiality that something may go wrong in an execution does not give rise to

an Eighth Amendment violation. Zink, 783 F.3d at 1101. “Some risk of pain is

inherent in any method of execution -- no matter how humane -- if only from the

prospect of error in following the required procedure. . . . [A jn isolated mishap alone

does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 47, 50.

Thus, the district court’s ruling was consistent with our instruction in remanding that

Bucklew “may not be permitted to supervise every step of the execution process.”

Bucklew |, 783 F.3d at 1128 (quotation omitted). The Baze/Glossip evaluation must

be based on the as-applied pre-execution protocol, assuming that those responsible

for carrying out the sentence are competent and qualified to do so, and that the

procedure will go as intended.

lil. Conclusion

Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude that Bucklew has failed

to establish that lethal injection, as applied to him, constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Therefore, we affirm the

judgment of the district court.

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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Russell Bucklew alleges that the State of Missouri’s method of execution by

lethal injection violates his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He

seeks an injunction prohibiting an execution by that method. The district court

granted summary judgment for the State, but there are genuine disputes of material

fact that require findings of fact by the district court before this dispute can be

resolved. I would therefore remand the case for the district court promptly to conduct

further proceedings.

Bucklew’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires him to prove two elements:

(1) that the State’s method of execution is sure or very likely to cause him severe

pain, and (2) that an alternative method of execution that is feasible and readily

implemented would significantly reduce the substantial risk of severe pain. Glossip

v. Gross, 135 8. Ct. 2726, 2737 (2015); Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F 3d 1120, 1123,

1128 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc). On the first element, the district court concluded that

taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Bucklew, there is a substantial risk

under Missouri’s lethal injection protocol that Bucklew will experience choking and

an inability to breathe for up to four minutes. On the second element, however, the

court ruled as a matter of law that Bucklew’s suggested alternative

method—execution by administration of nitrogen gas——-would not significantly

reduce the substantial risk that the court identified under the first element. In my

view, the district court’s reasoning as to the first element is inconsistent with its

summary disposition of Bucklew’s claim on the second.

On the first element, Bucklew’s theory is that he will suffer severe pain by

prolonged choking or suffocation if the State executes him by lethal injection. He

contends that when he lies supine on the execution gurney, tumors in his throat will

block his airway unless he can “adjust” his positioning to enable breathing. Bucklew

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argues that if an injection of pentobarbital renders him unable to adjust his

positioning while he can still sense pain, then he will choke or suffocate.

In assessing that claim, the district court cited conflicting expert testimony

from Bucklew’s expert, Dr. Joel Zivot, and the State’s expert, Dr. Joseph Antognini.

Dr. Antognini testified that if the State proceeded by way of lethal injection using

pentobarbital, then Bucklew would be unconscious within twenty to thirty seconds

and incapable of experiencing pain at that point. R. Doc. 182-5, at 10, 40-41. Dr.

Zivot, however, differed: “I strongly disagree with Dr. Antognini’s repeated claim

that the pentobarbital injection would result in ‘rapid unconsciousness’ and therefore

Mr. Bucklew would not experience any suffocating or choking.” R. Doc. 182-1, at

147. Zivot opined that Bucklew “would likely experience unconsciousness that sets

in progressively as the chemical circulates through his system,” and that “during this

in-between twilight stage,” Bucklew “is likely to experience prolonged feelings of

suffocation and excruciating pain.” /d.

In his deposition, Dr. Zivot opined that “there will be points,” before Bucklew

dies, “where he’s beginning to experience the effects of the pentobarbital, where his

ability to control and regulate and adjust his airway will be impaired, although there

will still be the experience capable of knowing that he cannot make the adjustment,

and will experience it as choking.” /d. at 81. When directed to Dr. Antognini’s

opinion that Bucklew would be unaware of noxious stimuli within twenty to thirty

seconds of a pentobarbital injection, Dr. Zivot observed that Antognini’s opinion was

based on a study involving dogs from fifty years ago and testified that his “number

would be longer than that.” /d. at 85. When asked for his “number,” Dr. Zivot

pointed to a study on lethal injections administered to horses; he said the study

recorded “a range of as short as fifty-two seconds and as long as about two hundred

and forty seconds before they see isoelectric EEG.” /d. at 85-86. Dr. Zivot noted that

the “number” that he derived from the horse study was “more than twice as long as”

the number suggested by Dr. Antognini. /d. at 86. He defined “isoelectric EEG” as

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“indicative of at least electrical silence on the parts of the brain that the

electroencephalogram has access to.” /d.

The district court observed that “[a]n execution is typically conducted with the

prisoner lying on his back,” and that the record “establishes that [Bucklew] has

difficulty breathing while in that position because the tumors can cause choking or

an inability to breathe.” The court understood Dr. Zivot to mean that “it could be

fifty-two to 240 seconds before the pentobarbital induces a state in which [Bucklew]

could no longer sense that he is choking or unable to breathe.” Thus, the court

concluded that “construing the Record in [Bucklew’s] favor reveals that it could be

fifty-two to 240 seconds before the pentobarbital induces a state in which [Bucklew]

could no longer sense that he is choking or unable to breathe.” Again, the court

reasoned that “the facts construed in [Bucklew’s] favor would permit a factfinder to

conclude that for as long as four minutes | Bucklew]| could be aware that he is choking

or unable to breathe but be unable to ‘adjust’ his breathing to remedy the situation.”

On that basis, the court presumed for purposes of the motion for summary judgment

that “there is a substantial risk that [Bucklew] will experience choking and an

inability to breathe for up to four minutes.”

The State disputes that there is a genuine dispute of material fact on the first

element of Bucklew’s claim, but the district court properly concluded that findings

of fact were required. Bucklew pointed to evidence from Missouri corrections

officials that prisoners have al ways laid flat on their backs during executions by lethal

injection in Missouri. R. Doc. 182-7, at 10; R. Doc. 182-9, at 1; R. Doc. 182-12, at

29, 91. One official testified that he did not know whether the gurney could be

adjusted. R. Doc. 182-12, at 91. * nother official believed that the head of the gurney

“could” be raised (or that a gurney with that capability could be acquired), and that

an anesthesiologist would have “the freedom” to adjust the gurney “if” he or she

determined that it would be in the best medical interest of the offender to do so. R.

Doc. 182-7, at 14. But the State did not present evidence about how it would position

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Bucklew or the gurney during his execution. On a motion for summary judgment, the

district court was required to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to

Bucklew. Under that standard, without undisputed evidence from the State that it

would alter its ordinary procedures, the court did not err by concluding that a finder

of fact could infer that the State would proceed as in all other executions, with

Bucklew lying on his back.’

The State argues that the district court erred in discerning a genuine dispute of

material fact on the first element because Dr. Zivot did not specify the length of the

expected “twilight stage” during which Bucklew would be unable to adjust his

positioning yet still sense pain. The State also complains that Dr. Zivot did not

specify that Bucklew’s pain awareness would continue for fifty-two seconds or longer

until brain waves ceased. There certainly are grounds to attack the reliability and

credibility of Dr. Zivot’s opinion, including the imprecision of some of his testimony,

his opposition to all forms of lethal injection, his possible misreading of the horse

study on which he partially relied, and his inaccurate predictions of calamities at prior

executions. But he did orine that Bucklew was likely to “experience prolonged

feelings of suffocation and excruciating pain” if executed by lethal injection, R. Doc.

182-1, at 147, and that there “will be points” before Bucklew dies when his ability to

regulate his airway will be impaired so that he “will experience it as choking.” /d. at

*Bucklew alleged in Paragraph 128 of his complaint that the State had offered

to adjust the gurney so that Bucklew is not lying completely prone, but then

continued as follows immediately thereafter: “Although the stated intent was to

reduce the choking risk to Mr. Bucklew, the DOC has obtained no imaging studies

of Mr. Bucklew since 2010, and therefore has no information on which to base any

decisions about the angle of the gurney.” R. Doc. 53, at 43-44. The district court

noted the State’s suggestion “that the execution could be performed with [Bucklew]

in a different position,” but explained that “there is no evidence whether this has an

effect on the procedure as a whole,” and concluded that the State had “not provided

the Court with a basis for granting summary judgment based on the possibility of

performing the execution with [Bucklew] in a sitting (or other) position.”

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81. The district court did not err in concluding that it could not resolve the dispute

between the experts on summary judgment.

On the second element of Bucklew’s claim, the district court concluded as a

matter of law that Bucklew failed to show that his proposed alternative method of

substantial risk of severe pain that the court recognized under the first element. The

majority affirms the district court’s judgment on this basis. Taking the evidence in

the light most favorable to Bucklew, however, a factfinder could conclude that

nitrogen gas would render Bucklew insensate more quickly than pentobarbital and

would thus eliminate the risk that he would experience prolonged feelings of choking

or suffocation. Dr. Antognini testified that a person who is administered nitrogen gas

“wouid be unconscious very quickly,” and that the onset of action from lethal gas “is

going to be relatively fast, just like Pentobarbital’s onset.” R. Doc. 182-5, at 58-59

(emphasis added). Given Dr. Antognini’s testimony that pentobarbital would render

Bucklew insensate within twenty to thirty seconds, the record in the light most

favorable to Bucklew supports a finding based on Antognini’s testimony that nitrogen

gas would relieve Bucklew from any pain of choking or suffocating within twenty to

thirty seconds. A trier of fact may accept all, some, or none of a witness’s testimony,

United States v. Candie, 974 F.2d 61, 65 (8th Cir. 1992), and a plaintiff may rely on

testimony from the defendant’s expert to meet his burden if the testimony is

advantageous to the plaintiff. See /BEW Local 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co., Inc.,

818 F.3d 775, 782 (8th Cir. 2016). If the factfinder accepted Dr. Zivot’s testimony

as to the effect of pentobarbital, and Dr. Antognini’s uncontroverted testimony as to

effect of nitrogen gas, then Bucklew’s proposed alternative method would

significantly reduce the substantial risk of severe pain that the district court identified

in its analysis of the first element.

For these reasons, there are genuine disputes of material fact that preclude

summary judgment and require findings of fact by the district court. | would

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therefore remand the case for further proceedings. The district court may then

promptly make appropriate factual findings about, among other things, how Bucklew

will be positioned during an execution, whether his airway will be blocked during an

execution, and how pentobarbital (and, if necessary, nitrogen gas) will affect his

consciousness and ability to sense potential pain.

The State contends that we should not reach the merits of Bucklew’s claim

because several procedural obstacles require dismissal of his complaint. The majority

does not rely on these points, and I find them unavailing.

First, the State contends that Bucklew did not raise his present claim in his

fourth amended complaint. Bucklew’s complaint, however, does allege the essence

of his current theory. The complaint asserts that the tumors in Bucklew’s throat

require “t.:m to sleep with his upper body elevated” because if he lies flat, “the tumor

then fully obstructs his airway.” /d. at 18-19. It continued: “Executions are

conducted on a gurney, and the risks arising from Mr. Bucklew’s airway are even

greater if he is lying flat. Because of the hemangiomas, Mr. Bucklew is unable to

sleep in a normal recumbent position because the tumors cause greater obstruction in

that position.” R. Doc. 53, at 35. Bucklew further alleged that execution by lethal

injection “poses an enormous risk that Mr. Bucklew will suffer extreme, excruciating

and prolonged pain — all accompanied by choking and struggling for air.” /d. at 36.

The complaint was adequate under a notice pleading regime to raise a claim that the

execution procedure would result in an obstructed airway and choking or suffocation.

If necessary, moreover, the district court acted within its discretion by treating

the complaint as impliedly amended to include Bucklew’s present claim. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(b)(2). Bucklew clearly notified the State of his contention in his

opposition to the State’s motion for summary judgment. R. Doc. 192-1, at 1-3, 11-17.

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Yet rather than communicate surprise and object that the claim was not pleaded, the

State addressed Bucklew’s contention on the merits. R. Doc. 200, at 4-5. Where a

party has actual notice of an unpleaded issue and has been given an adequate

opportunity to cure any surprise resulting from a change in the pleadings, there is

implied consent to an amendment. Trip Mate, Inc. v. Stonebridge Cas. Ins. Co., 768

F.3d 779, 784-85 (8th Cir. 2014).

Second, the State argues that the five-year statute of limitations bars Bucklew’s

claim, because he was aware of his claim in 2008 and did not file his complaint until

May 9, 2014. A claim under § 1983 accrues when a plaintiff has “a complete and

present cause of action” and “can file suit and obtain reiief.” Wallace v. Kato, 549

U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (quoting Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust

Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal.,522 U.S. 192,201 (1997)). Bucklew asserts that he did

not have knowledge of his present claim, and therefore could not have filed suit and

obtained relief, until his medical condition progressed and he was examined by Dr.

Zivot in April 2014. As evidence that Bucklew could have brought his claim earlier,

the State relies on a 2008 petition that Bucklew submitted to the Missouri Supreme

Court. The petition sought funding for an expert witness to investigate the interaction

of the State’s existing execution protocol with Bucklew’s health condition. The

possible claim addressed in the 2008 funding petition, however, focused on the

potential for uncontrolled bleeding and ineffective circulation of drugs within

Bucklew’s body under the State’s former three-drug execution protocol. The petition

does not demonstrate that Bucklew was then on notice of a claim that a future

execution protocol using the single drug pentobarbital would create a substantial risk

of severe pain resulting from tumors blocking his airway while laying supine during

an execution.

Third, the State urges that Bucklew’s claim is barred by res judicata or claim

preclusion, because Bucklew could have litigated his as-applied challenge to the

execution protocol in an earlier case styled Zink v. Lombardi, No. 12-04209-CV-C-

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BP. In Zink, a group of inmates sentenced to death, including Bucklew, brought a

facial challenge to Missouri’s execution protocol. A complaint was filed in August

2012, and the eventual deadline for motions to amend pleadings was January 27,

2014. Principles of claim preclusion do not bar Bucklew’s as-applied challenge if he

was unaware of the basis for the claim in time to include it in the Zink litigation. See

Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 1368. Ct. 2292, 2305 (2016). The State again

points to Bucklew’s 2008 funding petition in support of its preclusion defense, but

for reasons discussed, that petition does not establish that Bucklew’s present claim

was available to him in 2008. At oral argument, the State argued that Bucklew could

have added his as-applied challenge to the Zink litigation after he was examined by

Dr. Zivot in April 2014, because the district court granted the Zink plaintiffs leave to

amend their complaint in May 2014. But the court’s order allowed the Zink plaintiffs

leave to amend only a single count of the complaint to allege a feasible alternative

method of execution. The order did not reopen the pleadings deadline for as-applied

claims by the several individual plaintiffs. See Zink v. Lombardi, No. 12-04209-CV-

C-BP, 2014 WL 11309998, at *4-5, 12 (W.D. Mo. May 2, 2014). The State therefore

has not established that Bucklew’s as-applied claim is barred by res judicata.

For these reasons, | would reverse the judgment of the district court and

remand for further proceedings to be conducted with dispatch.

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Appellate Case: 17-3052 Page: 23 Date Filed: 03/06/2018 Entry ID: 4636271

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

WESTERN DIVISION

RUSSELL BUCKLEW,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 14-8000-CV-W-BP

Vv

GEORGE A. LOMBARD, et ai,

Defendants.

° -MENT

Pending is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, which secks summary judgment

on the Eighth Amendment Claim presented in Count I' of the Fourth Amended Complaint.

Defendants contend that the undisputed facts demonstrate (1) they are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law on the merits, (2) Plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations, and (3)

Plaintiff's claim is barred by principles of claim preclusion.’ As discussed below, the Court

agrees that the undisputed facts in the Record establish that Plaintiff cannot prevail on his Eighth

Amendment claim, and for that reason the motion, (Doc. 181), is GRANTED.’

\Gisente 0 on SS ease questeaty Guntenst ty Oo Com (Doc. 63.)

? Defendants also contend the Court should dismiss the case because it lacks jurisdiction. (Doc. 182, pp. 9-10.) The

argument has been presented before, and the Court rejects it for the reasons previously stated. (See Doc. 101.) To

the extent that Defendants’ argument has shifted to contend that the Court lacks jurisdiction because the Record now

proves that Plaintiff will not suffer a redressable injury, the Court rejects this argument as well. Defendants’

argument relates to Plaintiff's ability to prove his clam, not to the Court's sursdiction, and crediting Defendants’

argument would essentially require dismissal (without prejudice) for lack of yurnsdiction anytime a plaintiff fails to

prove his claim. It “is important not to conflate the injury and traceability requirements of a standing analysis with

the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proof as to the issues of damages and causation at a tnal on the merits,” Brown v

Medironic, Inc., 628 F 3d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 2010), and this observation applies equally when the merits are

considered at the summary judgment stage

* The Court does not address the statute of limitations or claim preclusion arguments. These issues were not

addressed before the first appeal, and the Court of Appeals declined to address them im the first instance Hucklew v.

Lombardi, 783 ¥ 3d 1120, 1122 n.1, 1128-29 (8th Cir. 2015) (em banc). Following remand Defendants sought

dismissal on these grounds, but the Court denied the request without prejudice because the Record was not yet

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP DocumeAt02 Filed 06/15/17 Page 1 of 13

1. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Russell Bucklew was convicted in state court of first degree murder, kidnapping,

burglary, forcible rape, and armed criminal action. He was sentenced to death for the murder

and various terms of years on the other crimes. State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. 1998) (en

banc), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1082 (1999). His requests for postconviction relief and habeas

relief were denied. Bucklew v. State, 38 S.W.3d 395 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 964

(2001); Bucklew v. Luebbers, 436 F 3d 1010 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1079 (2006).

Plaintiff filed this suit in May 2014. The Court dismissed the case, but the dismissal was

reversed and the case was remanded. Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F 3d 1120, 1128 (8th Cir. 2015)

(en banc). After the Mandate was issued, Bucklew filed a series of Amended Complaints. The

latest — the Fourth Amended Complaint — is the operative pleading, and as noted earlier Count |

is the only remaining count. Count | asserts an Eighth Amendment challenge, contending that

Missouri’s method of execution is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff because of his unique

medical condition.

B. Facts

Plaintiff suffers from a congenital condition known as cavernous hemangioma The

disease causcs clumps of weak, malformed blood vessels and tumors to grow throughout his

body, including his head, face, neck and throat. The tumors are very susceptible to rupture. The

sufficiently developed and various legal complexities (some of which had been identified by the Court of Appeals,

783 F.3d at 1122 n.1) had not been addressed. The Court’s Order explained some of the difficulties involved in

determining whether these doctrines apply. (Doc. 63, pp. 9-13.) The Supreme Court has since discussed the

doctrme of claim preclusion when an as-applied challenge follows an unsuccessful facial challenge Whole

Woman's Health v. Helerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2305 (2016). In reasserting these arguments Defendants have not

addressed any of these factual or legal issues, they have merely cited general pnnciples without explaming how they

apply in this unique situation, and cited to the same facts that were carlier deemed to be incomplete and therefore

insufficient. Given the Court's ruling on the merits there is no need to further delay resolution of this case to

provide Defendants another opportunity to address these issues.

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Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Docum@At 302 Filed 06/15/17 Page 2 of 13

disease also affects Plaintiffs circulatory system, resulting in (among other effects)

compromised peripheral veins in his hands and arms. The tumors in his throat also make it

difficult for him to breathe, and that difficulty is exacerbated when he is in a supine position.

Plaintiff's condition is incurable, and surgery to alleviate the tumors is not possible due to the

risk of severe bleeding.

Missouri’s death penalty protocol has not been succinctly described, but the parties

implicitly agree (and the Record demonstrates, (e.g, Doc. 182-1, pp. 135-36; Doc. 197-1; Doc.

182-7, pp. 7-9)),* that it involves the intravenous administration of pentobarbital in dosages

sufficient to cause unconsciousness and eventeally death. In terms of the IV’s placement, the

protocol provides as follows:

Medical personnel shall determine the most appropriate locations for intravenous

(IV) lines. Both a primary IV line and a secondary IV line shall be inserted unless

the prisoner’s physical condition makes it unduly difficult to insert more than one

IV. Medical personnel may insert the primary IV line as a peripheral line or a

central venous line (e.g, femoral, jugular, or subclavian) provided they have

appropriate training, education and experience for that procedure. The secondary

IV line ts a peripheral line.

(Doc. 182-1, p. 1.) The parties seem to agree that because of the cavernous hemangioma

Plaintiff's peripheral veins cannot be used in this process because of the risk that they will

rupture (assuming that an |V could be placed in them in the first place). However, the portion of

the protocol quoted above confirms that a central line in the femoral vein may be used instead of

inserting an IV in the peripheral veins. With respect to the risk of Plaintiff's femoral vein

rupturing, Plaintiff's expert, (Dr. Joel Zivot), testified that the femoral vein is large and capable

of “tak|ing| a fair amount of fluid” when the central line is properly placed, and the risk of that

vein rupturing is “unlikely.” (Doc. 182-1, p. 26.) Dr. Zivot also denied having any reason to

believe that Plaintiff's medical condition made his femoral vein more susceptible to rupture than

* all page numbers are those generated by the Court's CM/ECF system

3

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Docum@Af902 Filed 06/15/17 Page 3 of 13

might otherwise be expected, and confirmed that his testimony about the risk of Plaintiff's veins

rupturing was limited to Plaintiff's peripheral veins. (Doc. 182-1, pp. 70-71, 77-78.) Plaintiff

also concedes that there is no evidence in the Record establishing that Plaintiff has any problem

with his veins other than his peripheral veins, including his femoral vein. (Doc. 197, p. 9.)

Finally, the Record confirms that Plaintiff's medical condition will not affect the flow of

chemicals in his bloodstream once they are introduced through the femoral vein, or otherwise

affect his expected response to the pentobarbital. (£.g, Doc. 182-1, pp. 65-66, 213-14, 219.)

An execution is typically conducted with the prisoner lying on his back. The procedure

for inserting a central line is also usually performed with the person in the supine position. The

Record establishes that Plaintiff has difficulty breathing while in that position because the tumors

can cause choking or an inability to breathe. Sometimes the tumors biced, thereby exacerbating

the sensation. When required to be on his back, Plaintiff can “adjust” his breathing so that he

can remain in that position; for instance, Plaintiff was able to lie on his back for approximately

one hour while undergoing an MRI. However, there are factual disputes as to (1) Plaintiff's

ability to adjust his breathing once the pentobarbital begins to take effect, (Doc. 181-1, pp. 81-

82), and (2) how quickly the pentobarbital will deprive Plaintiff of the ability to sense that he is

choking or unable to breathe. On the latter point Dr. Zivot testified that it could be fifty-two to

240 seconds before the pentobarbital induces a state in which Plaintiff could no longer sense that

he is choking or unable to breathe. (E.g., Doc. 182-1, pp. 84-88.) Defendants point out that their

expert, Dr. Joseph Antognini, opined that Plaintiff would be unconscious within twenty to thirty

seconds and at that point would be incapable of experiencing pain. (Doc. 182-1, pp. 198-99;

Doc. 182-5, pp. 60-62.) However, the Court cannot resolve this dispute between the experts on

summary judgment.

4

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP DocumeAt302 Filed 06/15/17 Page 4 of 13

ee a...

Defendants also invite the Court to analyze the study Dr. Zivot relied upon to find that

fifty-two seconds of awareness is the worst case scenario because that is when brain death

occurs. (Doc. 200, p. 15.) Dr. Zivot addressed this issue in his deposition, explaining that the

study’s use of the term “brain death” was a “misnomer” because the study marked “brain death”

before measurable brain activity terminated; he then indicated that pain might be felt until

measurable brain activity ceases. (Doc. 182-1, pp. 83-86.)° The Court also cannot resolve this

factual dispute on summary judgment. Therefore, construing the Record in Plaintiff's favor

reveals that it could be fifty-two to 240 seconds before the pentobarbital induces a state in which

Plaintiff could no longer sense that he is choking or unable to breathe.°

IL. DISCUSSION

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment on a claim only upon a showing that

“there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” See generally Williams v. City of St. Louis, 783 F.2d 114, 115 (8th Cir. 1986).

“[W hile the materiality determination rests on the substantive law, it is the substantive law’s

identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, “[o}nly disputes over facts that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of

summary judgment.” Wierman v. Casey’ Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 993 (8th Cir. 201})

(quotation omitted). In applying this standard, the Court must view the evidence in the light

* This may be a generous interpretation of Dr. Zivot’s testimony. However, (1) the Record must be construed in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff and (2) the Court is not required to resolve the clements of Plaintiff's claim in any

particular order. Therefore, the Court deems it appropriate to adopt this interpretation of Dr. Zivot’s testimony im

order to frame the discussion about Plaintiffs proffered alternative method of execution.

* Defendants also suggest that the execution could be performed with Plaintiff in a different position, but there is no

evidence whether this has an effect on the procedure as a whole or the procedure for inserting a central line

specifically. In light of the Record’s silence on these matters, Defendants have not provided the Court with a basis

for granting summary judgment based on the possibility of performing the execution with Plaintiff in a sitting (or

other) position.

5

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Docume? 302 Filed 06/15/17 Page 5 of 13

most favorable to the non-moving party, giving that party the benefit of all inferences that may

be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); Tyler v. Harper, 744 F.2d 653, 655 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470

U.S. 1057 (1985). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not simply deny the

allegations, but must point to evidence in the Record demonstrating the existence of a factual

dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Conseco Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 620 F 3d 902, 909-10 (8th

Cir. 2010).

In Glossip v. Gross, the Supreme Court determined “what a prisoner must establish to

succeed on an Eighth Amendment method-of-cxecution claim.” 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2737 (2015).

“[D]ecisions in this area have been animated in part by the recognition that because it is settled

that capital punishment is constitutional, it necessarily follows that there must be a constitutional

means of carrying it out.” /d at 2732-33. Moreover, “because some risk of pain is inherent tn

any method of execution, we have held that the Constitution does not require the avoidance of all

risk of pain.” /d at 2733. In light of these observations, a prisoner alleging that a particular

form of execution is crucl and unusual within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment must first

establish that the method to be utilized “presents a risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious

illness and needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers.” /d at 2737

(quotations and emphasis delcted). The prisoner must then “identify a known and available

alternative method of execution that entails a lesser risk of pain, a requirement of all Eighth

Amendment method-of-execution claims.” /d. at 2731. The alternative must be “feasible,

readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce| | [the] substantial risk of severe pain.” /d.

at 2737. see also Bucklew, 783 ¥ 3d at 1128. The Court has discretion to decide the order in

which it will address these two components of Plaintiffs claim. Bucklew, 783 F.3d at 1128.

6

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Document 302 Filed 06/15/17 Page 6 of 13

A. Risk of Serious Iliness or Neediess Suffering

Defendants contend that the uncontroverted facts demonstrate that Plaintiff is not sure or

likely to experience a serious injury or needless suffering. Plaintiff contends that he has

demonstrated a serious risk that he will experience needless pain and suffering because (1) the

weakness in his peripheral veins precludes using them to administer the pentobarbital, and (2) he

will choke or otherwise be unable to breathe for an extended period of time before the

pentobarbital takes full effect. The Court concludes that the Record establishes that (1) the use

of Plaintiff's femoral vein does not present any risk of serious illness or needless suffering, and

(2) the Record does not permit a conclusive determination regarding the risk that Plaintiff will

choke and be unable to breathe for a period of time that would violate the Eighth Amendment.

I. Useo s Fi vei

As discussed in Part |.B, there is an apparent consensus that an IV cannot be safely

inserted in Plaintiff's peripheral veins. However, the execution protocol allows a central line to

be inserted in Plaintiff's femoral vein, and the Record establishes that this can be done without

the risk of complications attributable to Plaintiffs congenital condition. The Court also notes

that Plaintiff's legal argument does not discuss Defendant’s evidence that his femoral vein can be

used to administer the execution drugs. (Doc. 197, pp. 34-43.) Plaintiff discusses the use of his

femoral vein only in the portion of his Opposition that addresses the facts in the Record, and

even in that context he does not present any legal arguments based on those facts. Nonetheless,

the Court will briefly discuss these factual issues.

Generally speaking, Plaintiff addresses the potential difficulty in locating the femoral

vein and the fact that medical personnel might require multiple attempts to locate it.’ This, he

’ To the extent Plaintiff contends that there is no evidence demonstrating that Plaintiffs femoral veins are unaffected

by his disease, this argument does not change the Court’s opinion. If there is no evidence that will establish any

7

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Docum@At202 Filed 06/15/17 Page 7 of 13

posits, will increase his stress, thereby increasing his breathing rate and making it more likely

that he will choke. Plaintiff also suggests that if the procedure is not performed properly the

drugs might be injected in an artery instead of the vein. (Doc. 197, pp. 18-20.) However,

Plaintiff does not quantify these risks, nor (as stated) does he explain how these facts

independently establish that the current protocol presents a risk of serious illness or needless

suffering. The possibility that Plaintiff might experience increased stress (or, more precisely,

more stress than the situation might otherwise produce) is particularly speculative, as are the

effects of that extra stress. Moreover, on several occasions the Court has observed that Plaintiff

cannot predicate his Eighth Amendment claim on the bare possibility that a medical procedure

might be performed incorrectly.

The uncontroverted facts demonstrate that the lethal injection protocol can be

implemented by using Plaintiff's femoral vein, and that doing so will not create a substantial risk

of serious injury or needless suffering. Therefore, the fact that Plaintiff's peripheral veins cannot

be used will not support the first component of Plaintiff's claim

2. intiff’s O. Airw

As discussed in Part |.B, the facts construed in Plaintiff's favor would permit a factfinder

to conclude that for as long as four minutes Plaintiff could be aware that he is choking or unable

to breathe but be unable “adjust” his breathing to remedy the situation. In seeking summary

judgment Defendants have not contended that such a situation would not satisfy Glossip (and the

Court does not hold whether it does or does not); Defendants’ sole argument is that Plaintiff

would likely experience this sensation for twenty to thirty seconds or, at worst, fifty-two

seconds. As discussed before, this is a factual dispute that the Court cannot resolve on summary

problems with the use of Plaintiffs femoral vein, then there is no reason to have a trial on the issue. Without

evidence, it is a foregone conclusion that Plaintiff cannot prevail on this issuc

8

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Document 202 Filed 06/15/17 Page 8 of 13

judgment, and would have to be resolved at trial. Therefore, solely for purposes of further

discussion, the Court presumes that there is a substantial risk that Plaintiff will experience

choking and an inability to breathe for up to four minutes.

B. Alternative Measures

Plaintiff contends that death through nitrogen gas-induced hypoxia will significantly

reduce the risks of severe pain and suffering. Defendants do not argue that this method of

execution is not feasible or readily implemented. Instead, Defendants argue that the Record

demonstrates this method of execution will not reduce Plaintiff's risk of pain and suffering.

Plaintiff disputes this point and further contends that he is not required to identify an alternative

method of execution.

The Court addresses Plaintiff's second point first. He contends that Glossip does not

apply because that case involved a facial challenge and he presents an as-applied challenge. The

Court disagrees. First, Glossip set forth the requirements for an Eighth Amendment challenge to

an execution method. The Supreme Court did not distinguish between facial and as-applied

challenges, and it did not provide a basis for interpreting Glossip as creating such a distinction.

To the contrary, the Supreme Court specified that the need to “identify a known and available

alternative method of execution that entails a lesser risk of pain [is] a requirement of a// Eighth

Amendment method-of-execution claims.” Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731 (emphasis supplied).

Second, the Eighth Circuit clearly directed that Plaintiff must (1) identify at the pleading stage

and (2) eventually prove that there is an alternative that will significantly reduce the risk.

Bucklew, 783 F.3d at 1128. This is the law of the case, and the Court must adhere to it. Third,

the Eighth Circuit has explicitly rejected Plaintiff's argument in other cases. Williams v. Kelley,

854 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1284 (2017) (citing Johnson v. Lombardi,

9

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Documeat 202 Filed 06/15/17 Page 9 of 13

809 F.3d 388, 391 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 601 (2015)). For these reasons, the Court

concludes Plaintiff is required to prove that there is a feasible and readily available alternative

that will significantly reduce the risk of suffering that lethal injection will present.

The Court agrees with Defendants that the facts in the Record do not present a triable

dispute on this issue. Given the risk of suffering that the Court iventified as potentially

supported by the Record, (see Part I1.A.2, supra), the question is whether (1) the use of nitrogen

gas will cause Plaintiff to become unaware of his choking and breathing difficulties sooner than

he would under the current protocol, and (2) whether that difference in time is sufficient to

permit the Court to find that nitrogen gas will make a “significant” difference in Plaintiff's

suffering. Put another way: a finder of fact might conclude that if pentobarbital is used, there is a

four minute period of time during which Plaintiff would experience significant suffering. Given

that, could a finder of fact conclude that the use of nitrogen gas will significantly reduce that

period of awareness?

Defendants point to their expert’s supplemental report, wherein he states that “the use of

lethal gas does not hold any advantage compared to lethal injection with respect to pain and

suffering. Both methods would result in minimal pain and suffering.” (Doc. 182-1.) This

requires Plaintiff to identify facts in the Record that create a factual dispute necessitating a trial,

but Plaintiff has not identified any such facts. Dr. Zivot would not address the issue in his

deposition, (Doc. 182-1, pp. 38-40), and Plaintiff does not contend that Dr. Zivot’s testimony

creates a factual dispute. Plaintiff instead relics on Dr. Antognini’s deposition, but the Court has

reviewed the cited testimony and finds nothing that supports Plaintiffs position.” Dr. Antognini

* Plaintiff also attempts to create factual disputes about the Missouri Department of Corrections’ efforts to research

the viability and effects of executing prisoners with nitrogen gas, but the issue is not relevant under the governing

legal principles

10

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Documerit 42 Filed 06/15/17 Page 10 of 13

was asked to compare the use of pentobarbital to nitrogen gas, but his answer does not indicate

that there are any differences between them. (Doc. 182-5, pp. 58-59.) To the contrary, he stated:

You know, you get — you can get suffering from hypoxia, you know, because

somebody can be awake and realize that they’re not getting enough oxygen. So

depending on — on how it’s used, you might get more suffering from nitrogen gas

than you would from Pentobarbital. Or you might get less suffering, you know,

it depends on how you would use it, | guess.

(Doc. 182-5, p. 59.) As relevant to the claim at issuc, Dr. Antognini specifically stated that he

believed there would be no difference in the “speed” of lethal gas as compared to pentobarbital.

(/Z.) Plaintiff points to Dr. Antognini’s indication that nitrogen gas would “quickly” cause

unconsciousness, (Doc. 182-5, p. 59), but this is unavailing for two reasons. First, Dr. Antognini

said the same thing about pentobarbital; in his opinion, both would “quickly” cause

unconsciousness. Thus, this opinion does not support the proposition that nitrogen hypoxia

would cause unconsciousness sooner than pentobarbital. Second, the premise for Plaintiff's

claim is that there is a period between unconsciousness and brain death during which he will

experience pain. Therefore, establishing the speed with which uncc»sciousness will be achieved

does not support Plaintiff's claim; he must identify evidence establishing how quickly nitrogen-

induced hypoxia will cause brain death so that any such evidence can be contrasted with Dr.

Zivot’s testimony that Plaintiff might be aware that he is choking for up to four minutes. There

is no evidence suggesting that nitrogen hypoxia will be faster than pentobarbital, so there is no

factual dispute to resolve. In the absence of evidence contradicting Defendants’ expert and

supporting Plaintiff's theory, there is not a triable issue.

Plaintiff also points to the fact that Louisiana and Oklahoma have approved the use of

nitrogen gas in their death penalty protocols. This evidence might be relevant in establishing the

feasibility or ready availability of this method of execution, but it does not establish whether

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Documefit%2 Filed 06/15/17 Page 11 of 13

nitrogen gas will significantly reduce the risk of suffering Plaintiff has described. Plaintiff cites

a report from Oklahoma for the proposition that “high altitude pilots who train to recognize the

symptoms of nitrogen hypoxia in airplane depressurizations do not report any feelings of

suffocation, choking or gagging.” (Doc. 197, p. 48 n.6 (citing Doc. 192-14, p. 78).) Assuming

this is competent evidence that can be considered on summary judgment, Plaintiff is not trained

to recognize the symptoms of nitrogen hypoxia and it is unlikely that the pilots who were trained

to recognize the symptoms of hypoxia also suffered from cavernous hemangioma. Plaintiff

additionally refers to a report from Louisiana, which itself cites other materials for the

proposition that nitrogen hypoxia allows a person to expel carbon dioxide buildup and thereby

reduce suffocation caused by respiratory acidosis. (Doc. 197, p. 48 n.6 (citing Doc. 192-17, p.

19).) Assuming again that this is competent evidence, Plaintiffs theory is that he will

experience suffocation due to his tumors, not due to respiratory acidosis. Finally, none of this

evidence purports to compare the effects of nitrogen gas hypoxia to the effects of pentobarbital,

particularly as related to the speed with which brain death will occur. Therefore, this anecdotal

evidence does not conflict with Dr. Antognini’s testimony and therefore does not create a factual

dispute.”

The Record establishes that the use of nitrogen gas will not act faster than pentobarbital.

Therefore, nitrogen gas will not significantly reduce the risk of suffering Plaintiff faces if he is

executed under Missouri’s current protocol.

* Plaintiff has also provided a “Preliminary Draft” of a document prepared at the request of an Oklahoma State

Representative. (Doc. 199-12, pp. 15-28.) The authors’ qualifications to opine on medical matters are not

established. The report bears the instruction “Do Not Cite.” The report generally discusses the feasibility and

effectivencss of using nitrogen gas in executions, but it does not purport to answer the questions relevant to the case.

For these reasons, this report also does not create a factual dispute

12

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Documefit 902 Filed 06/15/17 Page 12 of 13

eee

111. CONCLUSION

ne reasotr lorth abov Wetendants’ Motior mmary ipy

is GRANTED

ll ISSO ORDERED

Beth Phillips

BETH PHILLIPS. JUDGI

dA NITED STATES DISTRICT CO

OSs ,

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Document 302 Filed 06/15/17 Page 13 of 13

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

WESTERN DIVISION

RUSSELL BUCKLEW, )

Plaintiff, |

v Case No. 14-8000-CV-W-BP

GEORGE A. LOMBARDI, et al,

Defendants ‘

ORDER AND OPINION DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

1 — - -MENT

On June 15, 2017, the Court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the sole

remaining claim from the Fourth Amended Complaint. (Doc. 202.) In that claim, Plaintiff

asserted that the State’s execution protocol as applicd to him would violate the Eighth

Amendment's proscription against cruc! and unusual punishment. Plaintiff has now filed a

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to Rule 59(c). “Rule 59%¢) motions serve the

limited function of correcting manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered

evidence.” United States v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 ¥ 3d 930, 933 (8th Cir.

2006). Plaintiff does not seck to present newly discovered evidence. Instead, he contends the

Court (1) overlooked certain facts, (2) applied the wrong legal standard, and (3) limited

discovery in a manner that deprived him of a fair opportunity to support his claims. The Court

discusses cach of these issues below and concludes the motion, (Doc. 210), should be DENIED.

Ll. BACKGROUND

Placing Plaintiffs arguments in context requires a summary of the law governing

Plaintiffs claim and the basis for the Court’s June 15 Order. As *he Court explained,

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Documeéft221 Filed 08/21/17 Page 1 of 5

a prisoner alleging that a particular form of execution ts crucl and unusual within

the meaning of the Eighth Amendment must first establish that the method to be

utilized presents a risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and

needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers. The prisoner

must then “identify a known and available alternative method of cxecution that

entails a lesser risk of pain, a requirement of all Eighth Amendment method-of-

execution claims. The alternative must be feasible, readily implemented, and in

fact significantly reduce the substantial risk of severe pain.

(Dec. 202, p. 6 (quotations and citations omitted).) The current execution protocol calls for “the

intravenous administration of pentobarbital in dosages sufficient to cause unconsciousness and

eventually death.” (Doc. 202, p. 3.) Plaintiff suffers from a congenital medical condition known

as cavernous hemangioma, which “causes clumps of weak, malformed blood vessels and tumors

to grow throughout his body, including his head, face, neck and throat.” (Doc. 202, p. 2.) He

alleges that his condition makes it difficult to breathe and that after the pentobarbital takes effect

he will experience a choking sensation e\ cn after he is unconscious because he will be unable to

control his breathing.

In granting Defendants’ summary judgment the Court concluded that the Record,

construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, demonstrated that there is a risk that Plaintiff

will experience choking and an inability to breathe for fifty-two to 240 seconds — the time

between unconsciousness and brain death. (Doc. 202, pp. 4-5, 8-9.) The Court then considered

whether Plaintiff's proposed alternative — nitrogen gas — would “cause Plaintiff to become

unaware of his choking and breathing difficulties sooner than he would under the current

protocol, and (2) whether that difference in time is sufficient to permit the Court to find that

nitrogen gas will make a ‘significant’ difference in Plaintiff's suffering.” (Doc. 202, p. 10.)

The Court reviewed the evidence in the Record and determined that the uncontroverted facts

demonstrated that hypoxia induced by nitrogen gas “will not act faster than pentobarbital.

2

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Docume 221 Filed 08/21/17 Page 2 of 5

Therefore, nitrogen gas will not significantly reduce the risk of suffering Plaintiff faces if he is

executed under Missouri’s current protocol.” (Doc. 202, p. 12.)

il. DISCUSSION

A. Factual Matters

Plaintiff contends that the Court erred by failing to contrast the effect of him being in a

supine position under the State’s current execution protocol evidence with his ability to be seated

if he is executed with nitrogen gas. As the Court noted. Plaintiff has difficulty breathing, “and

that difficulty is exacerbated when he is in a supine position.” (Doc. 202, p. 3.) However, there

is no evidence in the Record establishing that (1) Plaintiff must be in a supine position after the

IV is inserted, or, more importantly, that (2) sitting while nitrogen gas is administered will make

an appreciable difference in Plaintiff's ability to breathe. As the Court explained, “the premise

for Plaintiff's claim is that there is a period between unconsciousness and brain death during

which he will experience pain” because he will be unable to control his breathing and prevent

choking. (Doc. 202, p. 11.) Plaintiff does not identify any overlooked evidence establishing that

he must remain on his back after the IV is inserted.

He also does not identify any overlooked evidence that there is a significant difference in

his ability to breathe when he is unconscious and sitting as compared to when he ts unconscious

and lying down. To the contrary, as the Court explained, there is no evidence in the Record

establishing that nitrogen gas will cause brain death sooner than pentobarbital, which means that

with nitrogen gas Plaintiff could be aware that he is choking for up to four minutes, just as the

Record (construed in Plaintiff's favor) suggests would be the case with pentobarbital. (Doc. 202.

p. 11.) Thus, even if he could not sit upright after the I'V is inserted. there is no evidence

Suggesting this would cause suffering that would be alleviated through the use of nitrogen was

3

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Document>21 Filed 08/21/17 Page 3 of 5

Plaintiff also contends the Court misinterpreted an Interim Report from a Grand Jury in

Oklahoma, which heard testimony from a professor that “high altitude pilots who train to

recognize the symptoms of nitrogen hypoxia in airplane depressurizations do not report any

feclings of suffocation, choking, or gagging.” (Doc. 192-14, p. 7%.) The Court noted this

information and observed that “[a]ssuming this is competent evidence that can be considered on

summary judgment, Plaintiff is not trained to recognize the symptoms of nitrogen hypoxia and it

is unlikely that the pilots who were trained to recognize the symptoms of hypoxia also suffered

from cavernous hemangioma” (Doc. 202, p. 12.) Plaintiff argues that the Court

misapprehended the point of this information, which was to establish that even pilots trained to

recognize nitrogen hypoxia do not report choking or suffocation, so it is unlikely that Plaintiff

would notice such effects. With this explanation, Plaimtiff is correct that his lack of training ts

not relevant. However, Plaintiff has not overcome the Court's concems that a professor's

testimony to a grand jury about what pilots have reported 1s not competent medical cvidence

about the effects of nitrogen hypoxia. Relatedly, i remams unlikely that the pilots suffered from

cavernous hemangioma, so their anecdotal reports are not sufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs burden

Plaintiff's clamm required evidence establishing that nitrogen hypoxia produces a shorter

time between unconsciousness and brain death than would pentobarbital. here is no such

evidence in the Record. There is, however, evidence that the time between unconsciousness and

brain death (whatever that interval is) would be the same under both cxecution methods

Accordingly, there is no basis in fact for altering the Court’s judgment.

Plamuf?l contends the Court has “imposed an impossthle standard on Plaintiff” because

his unique medical condijion makes it impossible for him to produce the “side-by-side

4

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP DocumeHt221 Filed 08/21/17 Page 4 of 5

comparison between the length of time required to produce unconsciousness by lethal injection

versus lethal gas.” (Doc. 210, p. 5.) He also believes he was “penalize|d] . . . because his expert

would not opine on how to kill Plaintiff with lethal gas.” (/d.) While Plaintiff argues against the

legal standard utilized by the Court, he does not contend that it was wrong. That is, Plaintiff

does not argue that the Court failed to follow the governing standard as set forth in such cases as

Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015), and Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir

2015) (en banc), and thus has not demonstrated that the Court committed legal error

C. Discovery Issues

Early im the discovery process, the Court issued an Order Regarding the Scope of

Discovery. (Doc. 105.) Plaintiff contends that his “ability to prove his Eighth Amendment claim

has been crippled by” limits on access to information about and from members of the execution

team. (Doc. 210, p. 6.) The Court addressed the issue im the order regarding the scope of

discovery, as well as at other times, (e.2, Doc. 183; Doc. 214), and further discussion of the

isSuc iS unMecessary

lil, CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Plaintiff's motion for relief pursuant to Rule 59(c) is DENIED

rt iS SO ORDERED

/s/ Beth Phillips ll aciieaiiaceataieainiaily

BETH PHILLIPS, JUDGE

DATE: August 21, 2017 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

s

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Documert?21 Filed 08/21/17 Page 5 of 5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

WESTERN DIVISION

RUSSELL BUCKLEW.

Plaintiff,

Case No. 14-08000-C V-W-BP

We

GEORGE A. LOMBARDI,

DAVID DORMIRE, and TROY STEELE,’

Defendants.

Plaintiff was convicted in state court of kidnaping, rape and murder, and was sentenced to

death. He challenges Missouri’s planned method of execution as applied to him, contending that

the current lethal injection protocol will cause him needless suffering and pain in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. At the Court’s direction the parties filed briefs regarding the scope of

discovery, and the parties’ positions conflict in certain respects.

The Court will confine the scope of discovery to the matters alleged in Couni | of the

Fourth Amended Complaint. This Order is intended to provide guidance regarding the proper

scope of discovery.

L_ BACKGROUND

A.

The scope of discovery is informed by the issues involved in the case, so the Court begins

by describing Plaintiff's claim and the governing law. Plaintiff's remaining claim is Count | of

the Fourth Amended Complaint. (Doc. 53; see also Doc. 63 (dismissing Counts I! and II! of the

' Troy Steele has succeeded Terry Russell as the Warden of the Eastern Reception, Diagnostic, and Correctional

Center. Accordingly, Troy Steele is substituted as a Defendant in place of Terry Russell. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). The

Clerk of Court 1s directed to amend the Docket Sheet according}y

Case 4:14-cv-08000-BP Document05 Filed 08/11/16 Page 1 of 9

Fourth Amended Complaint).) As has been described in various orders, Plaintiff suffers from

cavernous hemangioma, which is a congenital condition that causes clumps of weak, malformed

blood vessels and tumors to grow throughout his body, including his head, face, neck and throat.

These tumors are very susceptible to rupture. Plaintiff alleges that execution by Icthal injection

is likely to cause the tumors to rupture because Iethal injection depends on the circulatory

system, and that the ruptures can increase his pain and suffering because (1) the chemicals will

not travel through

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 306 (2018) (No. 17-8151) | Frix