Amicus Curiae Brief — Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 783 (2019) (No. 17-1625)
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No. 17-1625
In the Supreme Court of the Anited States
RIMINI STREET, INC. AND SETH RAVIN,
Petitioners,
Vv.
ORACLE USA, INC., ORACLE AMERICA, INC., AND
ORACLE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF OF BSA | THE SOFTWARE ALLIANCE
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT
OF RESPONDENTS
ANDREW J. PINCUS
Counsel of Record
PAUL W. HUGHES
MATTHEW A. WARING
Mayer Brown LLP
1999 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 263-3000
apincus@mayerbrown.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
5 eR SSR eta a Fa et II ESET ILO
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. .....................cccccccceceeeeees ii
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE.................... 1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
PITTI sictininssinisilincedhibenhieteniidpemeaniainiidenmedeneuimmosesnoets 2
TENSES ARP Ten cme ee 3
Costs Not Taxable Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 Are
Recoverable Under The Copyright Act.......................3
A. Appropriate Enforcement Of Software
Copyrights Is Important To The U.S.
SUIT ciceniecthsdiieneshionsienenatdatiamutineshertnsceceescoesecenees 4
1. Software innovations fuel the
nation’s economic growth. ........................... 4
2. Software R&D relies on copyright
TT cinierrisnintinsicteenatneniaiieatesiiindansencicesentees 5
B. Balanced Copyright Enforcement
Requires District Court Discretion To
Award Prevailing Copyright Litigants
All Of Their Costs, Not Just Generally-
C. Section 505’s Provision For “Full Costs”
Includes Authority To Award
1. The statutory term “full costs”
means an award of all litigation
expenses, in accordance with
prevailing practice at the time of its
Ee cnnsencennsencencnsmmmcssensnenmmstecssecresees 11
2. Petitioners’ Treading of this Court’s
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Arlington Central School District Board
of Education v. Murphy,
Os Se i cciesccccanccsvcnscoscnssvessconssosees 15, 16
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
a bisiiiccintnterisercenseinescncesneensensegete 8
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons,
Inc.,
I erated ceaecaciae 14, 15, 16
Denton v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,
645 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (N.D. Ga.
ITs tibia hal aieiedihdsadlinthabaietibiohdenndaneecensdadienbesnmntsans 10
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,
Ee ea aa 9
Kappos v. Hyatt,
eee 12
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
Se 2,9
Marmo v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc.,
457 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2006)...............ccccccccceeeeeeeees )
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Inc. v. Manning,
a en 11
il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page(s)
S-1 By and Through P-1 v. State Bd. of
Educ. of N.C.,
6 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 19938)..................cccccccccoseccovee 10
Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff's
Dep't,
447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006).................:.cccccesecseeeee 6
West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc.
v. Casey,
a ee a i iieterecenienatneniebiidie eee 15
Statutes, Rules and Regulations
SB CE Bo il icecannsinicnnipctninnniitnsssanticéandamaiamas 13
BG as 0 STD iscnssnnccemcceuttcchtiinnmistceaiiaialanee 13
LES ET 13
By Ces i i ccnssiisnnssnesodtaneneittidiseieaieita ieee passim
BaP Welty OF INI siccsnseccnbesenepenpdsniatiniadendsidaataiadaanee 16
SP as Ee sentirntcsinccniainisindetiiinmeerianaee passim
a lee Oe Se Rickceccrssnenneniecisisiiscaiineatumteea ae 10
Be Cd Te II niesinesiincsnssscsinbunsitiinnesensighi nue tae 13
GB UBL. GOTT O ID ccceceicnssvrseniscintiisiadanisetanios’ 13
GD Es © Re cincitcitciinenscnitiesnaeiiese ee 15
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page(s)
Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat.
EE 12
Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481 ................... 12
Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 12, 4
ET ESS a EN 3, 11, 12
Fee Act of 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161................... 12, 16
EES 14
ee 14
U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Small
Claims: A Report of the Register of
Copyrights (Sept. 2013), perma.cc/
EEE 7
Other Authorities
Clark D. Asay, Transformative Use in
Software, 70 Stan. L. Rev. Online 9
EE gS A 6
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright
Infringement Markets, 113 Colum. L.
rcs eat iinentninaennnnesenencnces 7,8
BSA, The $1 Trillion Economic Impact
of Software (Jume 2016) ..................ccccccceeeeeeneees 4,5
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page(s)
Bureau of Lab. Stat., Occupational
Outlook Handbook: Software
Developers, perma.ce/77V A-2MHQ .......... oo. 5
Barry Jaruzelski et al., PwC, Software-
as-a-Catalyst, strategy+business
Productivity Puzzle: The Role of
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
BSA | The Software Alliance is an association of
the world’s leading software and hardware technology
companies. On behalf of its members, BSA promotes
policies that foster innovation, growth, and a compet-
itive marketplace for commercial software and related
technologies. Because copyright policy is vitally im-
portant to promoting the innovation that has made
the United States the world’s leader in software de-
velopment, BSA members have a strong stake in the
proper functioning of the U.S. copyright system. '!
BSA members are among the Nation’s leading
technology companies, producing much of the hard-
ware and software that power computer and telecom.
munication networks. Due to the complexity and com-
mercial success of their products, these companies are
frequently the subject of copyright infringement
claims. At the same time, by virtue of their software
development activities, BSA members hold numerous
copyrights that they enforce against infringers in ap-
propriate circumstances. Because BSA members are
both innovators as well as substantial copyright hold-
ers, and are both plaintiffs and defendants in infringe-
ment actions, they have a particularly acute interest
in ensuring that the cost-shifting rules for copyright
litigation are fair and promote sound copyright policy.
The members of BSA include Adobe, Akamai, AN-
SYS, Apple, Autodesk, Bentley Systems, Box, CA
' Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amicus affirms that no counsel for a
party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person
other than amicus and its counsel made a monetary contribution
to its preparation or submission. The parties have filed blanket
consents to the filing of amicus briefs with the Clerk’s office.
2
Technologies, Cadence, CNC/Mastercam, DataStax,
DocuSign, IBM, Informatica, MathWorks, Microsoft,
Okta, Oracle, PTC, salesforce.com, SAS Institute, Sie-
mens PLM Software, Slack, Splunk, Symantec,
TrendMicro, Trimble Solutions Corporation, Twilio,
and Workday.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Copyright Act provision governing awards of
costs and attorneys’ fees, 17 U.S.C. § 505, should be
interpreted to “encourage the types of lawsuits that
promote th{e] purposes” of the Copyright Act—which
are “encouraging and rewarding authors’ creations
while also enabling others to build on that work.”
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 8. Ct. 1979,
1986 (2016).
Amicus and its members—leading companies in
the U.S. software industry—recognize the importance
of both of these goals. If software creators fear that
they will not be able to afford to bring infringement
litigation when their copyrights are infringed, they
will be deterred from making the investments needed
to create new software. And if companies fear that
they will incur substantial costs in defending against
abusive infringement claims, they will be chilled from
building upon others’ copyrighted software in the
manner permitted by fair use and other copyright
principles—thereby frustrating innovation.
The reading of Section 505 that best promotes
both goals of the Copyright Act—encouraging merito-
rious infringement lawsuits while discouraging abu-
sive claims—is that district courts have discretion in
appropriate cases to award to prevailing parties all
3
costs of litigation, including generally nontaxable
costs.
Litigating a copyright suit to judgment imposes
significant costs on both plaintiffs and defendants.
Shifting all of those costs where appropriate is neces-
sary to ensure that both plaintiffs and defendants
with meritorious positions will be incentivized to
press to a decision on the merits, and are not forced to
abandon meritorious claims or defenses due to cost
pressures.
This reading of Section 505 is also the one com-
pelled by principles of statutory interpretation. Con-
gress adopted the “full costs” language in the Copy-
right Act of 1831 as a departure from other statutes
that allowed for “single costs” or expressly incorpo-
rated state law. Although Congress has since adopted
a narrower definition of the costs that are taxable by
default in federal court (see 28 U.S.C. § 1920), it has
left the statutory provision for award of “full costs” un-
changed in every successive version of the Copyright
Act. That text should therefore be interpreted to mean
what Congress originally intended—permitting a dis-
trict court to award to the prevailing party all costs of
the litigation, including otherwise nontaxable costs.
ARGUMENT
Costs Not Taxable Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 Are Re-
coverable Under The Copyright Act.
This Court should affirm the decision below and
hold that Section 505 confers upon district courts the
discretion, in appropriate cases, to award to prevail-
ing parties otherwise-nontaxable costs. Congress in-
tended that such costs be awardable to prevailing cop-
yright litigants, and shifting these costs when war-
4
ranted is necessary to enable both victims of infringe-
ment and noninfringing innovators to vindicate their
rights under the Copyright Act.
A. Appropriate Enforcement Of Software
Copyrights Is Important To The U.S.
Economy.
1. Software innovations fuel the nation’s
economic growth.
Software is a key driver—if not the driver—of the
U.S. economy today. The software industry contrib-
utes more than one trillion dollars to the U.S. economy
every year. BSA, The $1 Trillion Economic Impact of
Software 3 (June 2016), perma.cc/L28J-D8X5. That
number includes $475.3 billion in direct GDP contri-
butions and over $525 billion in indirect and induced
contributions attributable to the software industry.
Ibid.
Software innovations play an especially important
role in increasing American economic productivity.
“|A]ging economies,” like the United States’, “depend
on productivity gains to drive economic growth.” See,
e.g., McKinsey Global Inst., Solving the Productivity
Puzzle: The Role of Demand and the Promise of Digit-
ization 1 (Feb. 2018), perma.cc/A3W5-7F2R. And soft-
ware is a key contributor to American productivity
gains in virtually every industry sector. Id. at 7. In-
deed, software has enabled enormous breakthroughs
in a range of fields, from transportation and logistics,
to medicine, to agriculture, to cloud computing. The $/
Trillion Economic Impact of Software, supra, at 6-9.
The software industry also contributes to eco-
nomic growth through its significant investments in
research and development (“R&D”). Companies have
responded to “the supercharged pace of improvement
5
in what software can do” by “strengthen|[ing] their
software and service offerings,” and this “rapid change
is powerfully affecting the mix of R&D spending.”
Barry Jaruzelski et al., PwC, Software-as-a-Catalyst,
strategy+business (Oct. 25, 2016), perma.cc/8SAH-
WDTX. Software is the fastest growing category of
R&D spending in the entire economy (ibid.), and now
accounts for more than $50 billion of R&D spending
per year. The $1 Trillion Economic Impact of Soft-
ware, supra, at 4.
Finally, the software industry supports nearly 10
million American jobs. The $1 Trillion Economic Im-
pact of Software, supra, at 3. Of those jobs, 2.5 million
are created directly by the software industry. These
are high-quality, high-paying jobs: Software develop-
ers earned an average of $108,760 in 2014—more than
twice the average annual wage for all U.S. occupa-
tions. Jd. at 1. And the industry’s growth is expected
to create even more of these jobs in the coming years:
the Department of Labor projects that, as a result of
“increased demand for computer software,” “[e]mploy-
ment of software developers is projected to grow 24
percent from 2016 to 2026, much faster than the aver-
age for all occupations.” Bureau of Lab. Stat., Occupa-
tional Outlook Handbook: Software Developers,
perma.cc/77VA-2MHQ.
2. Software R&D relies on _ copyright
protection.
Companies’ ability to continue investing these
huge sums in software development—and, therefore,
the continued growth of the software industry’s con-
tribution to the economy—depends on appropriate,
balanced judicial enforcement of copyright law.
6
Intellectual property protection is especially im-
portant to the software industry. “Software funda-
mentally differs from more traditional forms of me-
dium, such as print or phonographic materials, in
that software can be both{] more readily and eas-
ily copied on a mass scale in an extraordinarily short
amount of time and relatively inexpensively.” Wall
Data Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 781
(9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). In-
deed, the ease and speed with which software can be
copied “make[] it extraordinarily vulnerable to ille-
gal copying and piracy.” J/bid. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Thus, absent legal protection against
unauthorized copying and use, software developers
would be unable to recoup the costs of their invest-
ment in their software.
At the same time, software creators must have ap-
propriate breathing room to borrow from prior soft-
ware developments in lawful, noninfringing ways. De-
velopers frequently reuse pieces of others’ software or
code in new software that builds on those elements,
and copyright law authorizes such conduct through
the fair use defense. See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, Trans-
formative Use in Software, 70 Stan. L. Rev. Online 9,
19 (2017) (“Software reuse is an important means by
which to spur robust software innovation. Copyright
law’s fair use defense is one important means of ena-
bling such reuse.”). Copyright law should encourage
this innovative conduct, which yields tremendous eco-
nomic benefits when undertaken lawfully.
7
B. Balanced Copyright Enforcement
Requires District Court Discretion To
Award Prevailing Copyright Litigants
All Of Their Costs, Not Just Generally-
Taxable Costs.
The copyright system can properly balance these
competing goals only if district courts are able, in ap-
propriate cases, to make prevailing litigants whole for
all costs associated with litigation—not just the sub-
set of “taxable costs” enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
Without the availability of such relief, many copyright
litigants will face the prospect of substantial financial
loss even if they prevail in litigation—which opens the
door to gamesmanship and abuse in the litigation sys-
tem.
Copyright infringement litigation is an especially
costly form of litigation for both sides of a case. As of
2013, the average cost of litigating a copyright case
through trial ranged “from $384,000 to over $2 mil-
lion, for both plaintiffs and defendants.”
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright Infringement
Markets, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 2277, 2288 (2013). And
copyright cases are especially likely to go to trial given
the “necessarily fact-intensive nature” of the issues,
including whether copying occurred, whether two
works are “substantially similar,” and whether a use
qualified as a fair use. /d. at 2289.
These high costs burden both plaintiffs and de-
fendants. “Copyright owners whose works are in-
fringed often are deterred from enforcing their rights
due to the burden and expense of pursuing litigation
in the federal system.” U.S. Copyright Office, Copy-
right Small Claims: A Report of the Register of Copy-
rights 24, 97 (Sept. 2013), perma.cc/8VLG-BFRJ. A
8
determined defendant can threaten to draw out litiga-
tion and thus frustrate a plaintiffs legitimate in-
fringement claim.
High costs are also a threat to copyright defend-
ants, because they “discourage defendants from con-
testing palpably frivolous and overbroad infringement
claims by copyright owners.” Balganesh, 113 Colum.
L. Rev. at 2291. Faced with the high cost of litigating
a copyright claim to judgment (and of proving fair use,
which is an affirmative defense (see Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994))), a
defendant that has engaged i in lawful, non-infringing
innovation may agree to pay an unjustified settlement
rather than defending its conduct through summary
judgment and trial.
Although the Copyright Act unquestionably al-
lows prevailing parties to recover generally-taxable
costs and attorneys’ fees, shifting those costs alone of-
ten may not be sufficient to alleviate the problem of
high costs in copyright litigation. Indeed, as this case
illustrates, precluding the recovery of nontaxable
costs would leave many prevailing copyright litigants
uncompensated for a significant portion of litigation
expenses.
Here, respondents were awarded $12.7 million in
nontaxable costs, as opposed to only $3.4 million in
taxable costs. Pet. App. 33a-34a. And the nontaxable
costs awarded were 25% less than respondents had
sought (id. at 71a)}—indicating that respondents’ ac-
tual nontaxable costs were even higher. Allowing dis-
trict courts to award prevailing parties all of their lit-
igation costs—including generally-nontaxable costs—
is therefore necessary to ensure that victims of in-
9
fringement can be made whole and that innocent de-
fendants have proper incentives to resist and defeat
unjustified infringement lawsuits.
Making nontaxable costs available would not open
the door to massive awards in every case. Rather, the
amount of costs to be awarded in a particular case
would be committed to district courts’ discretion, as
Section 505 directs. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (“[T]he court
in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by
or against any party.”) (emphasis added). In exercis-
ing this discretion, district courts—like the district
court here (Pet. App. 60a)—are properly guided by the
standard this Court outlined for attorneys’ fee claims
under Section 505 in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S.
517 (1994), and Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
136 S. Ct. 1979 (2016).
That approach, as Kirtsaeng clarified, gives “sub-
stantial weight” to the objective reasonableness of the
losing party’s litigation position (136 S. Ct. at 1986),
but also looks to a number of other “nonexclusive fac-
tors,” including “frivolousness, motivation, * * * and
the need in particular circumstances to advance con-
siderations of compensation and deterrence.” Fogerty,
510 U.S. at 534 n.19 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). This multi-factor approach allows district courts
to award a prevailing party all of its litigation costs
when the circumstances warrant, while giving courts
flexibility to award reduced costs (or no costs) in less
egregious cases.
Petitioners object that permitting awards of non-
taxable costs would create administrability problems
and lead to “significant post-trial litigation.” Pet. Br.
46. But that concern is misplaced. What qualifies as a
“taxable cost” under Section 1920 in any given case is
already subject to debate. See, e.g., Marmo v. Tyson
10
Fresh Meats, Inc., 457 F.3d 748, 763 (8th Cir. 2006)
(district court did not abuse discretion in refusing to
tax costs related to witnesses who were withdrawn by
plaintiff or ruled inadmissible); Denton v. Daim-
lerChrysler Corp., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1227 (N.D.
Ga. 2009) (concluding that “shipping and handling
charges and the costs of obtaining exhibits” for depo-
sitions were recoverable costs under Section 1920(2)
but that “incidental expenses associated with deposi-
tions,” such as CD-ROMs, rough transcripts, etc.,
were not recoverable).
Similarly, “legal battles over attorneys’ fees” can
often require “another round of protracted litigation”
to resolve. See S-1 By and Through P-1 v. State Bd. of
Educ. of N.C., 6 F.3d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1993) (Wil-
kinson, J., dissenting), adopted by 21 F.3d 49, 52 (4th
Cir. 1994) (en banc). And parties can seek to have
courts award nontaxable costs pursuant to thei> in-
herent authority—which would lead to additional liti-
gation. See Resp. Br. 52.
Cost awards require nothing more than a
straightforward exercise of the district court’s discre-
tion, informed by the same equitable analysis that a
district court already will be applying to the prevail-
ing party’s attorneys’ fee request. For that reason, al-
lowing awards of generally-nontaxable costs would
not add any meaningful additional litigation burden.
C. Section 505’s Provision For “Full Costs”
Includes Authority To Award Otherwise-
Nontaxable Costs.
Awarding nontaxable costs to prevailing copyright
litigants is not only the proper approach as a matter
of policy—it is the approach that best comports with
11
the text of Section 505 and the context in which the
provision was originally enacted.
1. The statutory term “full costs” means an
award of all litigation expenses, in
accordance with prevailing practice at the
time of its enactment.
Section 505 is distinctive in its use of the phrase
“full costs”; most of the cost-shifting provisions in the
U.S. Code refer only to “costs,” either alone or in con-
junction with other terms (Pet. Br. 24 n.1).
This intentional choice of words is crucial to re-
solving the question presented. As this Court has of-
ten stated, “when Congress enacts a statute that uses
different language from a prior statute, we normally
presume that Congress did so to convey a different
meaning.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.
v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 1578 (2016). Thus, Sec-
tion 505 should be read in light of its particular lan-
guage, which authorizes the award of a broader range
of litigation costs than those available under other
statutes that refer simply to “costs.”
The history of the language “full costs” confirms
that Congress intended the term to encompass more
than the costs now identified as taxable under Section
1920. At the time Congress enacted the Copyright Act
of 1831, there was no generally applicable federal
statute governing cost-shifting in federal court. In-
stead, Congress had enacted statutes that expressly
incorporated state law, or otherwise limited which
costs were recoverable. Resp. Br. 37. The 1831 Act, by
contrast, broadly provided that “in all recoveries un-
der this act, either for damages, forfeitures, or penal-
ties, full costs shall be allowed thereon, any thing in
12
any former act to the contrary notwithstanding.” Cop-
yright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 12, 4 Stat. 436, 438-39.
In 1853, Congress passed the Fee Act, which pro-
vided that “in lieu of the compensation now allowed by
law,” only certain fixed categories of costs would be
taxable by federal courts. Fee Act of 1853, ch. 80, 10
Stat. 161, 161. But that law did not disturb the broad,
preexisting language of the 1831 Copyright Act, and
Congress has not done so since.
Congress’s preservation of the 1831 Act’s lan-
guage is a strong indicator that it intended to preserve
the 1831 Act’s broad provision for award of all costs.
See, e.g., Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 440-41 (2012)
(holding that because the “core language” of a statute
later incorporated into the Patent Act “remains
largely unchanged,” the predecessor statute “and the
judicial decisions interpreting that statute should in-
form our understanding of” the current statute).?
2. Petitioners’ reading of this Court’s
precedents is wrong.
Petitioners’ argument that “full costs” under Sec-
tion 505 are limited to taxable costs under Section
2 The United States observes that the States in 1831 regulated
the amounts of costs that could be recovered and their rates, and
as erts that, in providing for “full costs,” “Congress signaled that
costs in copyright suits should be taxed at the listed state-law
rates—no more and no less.” U.S. Br. 21. But that ignores the
fact that Congress chose to incorporate state law explicitly when
it wished to do so—and it did not do so in the 1831 Copyright Act.
See, e.g., Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 332, 333. The
1831 Congress’s determination that the “full” amount of such
costs should be recoverable, a determination that has never been
overturned, supports a broad construction of Section 505.
13
1920 rests on a flawed reading of this Court’s prece-
dents.
In petitioners’ view, those precedents impose a
rigid, three-category structure for litigation-related
expenses: “costs,” which means only the costs taxable
under Section 1920; “fees,” meaning amounts charged
by attorneys and other professionals; and “expenses,”
a catchall for other types of expenditures. Pet. Br. 20.
Petitioners contend that the term “costs” never refers
to any expenditures other than the taxable costs enu-
merated in Section 1920 and, as a result, a statute us-
ing the term “costs” presumptively does not authorize
awarding any other kind of costs unless—and only to
the extent that—it also refers to “fees” or “expenses.”
Id. at 25.
Petitioners’ approach is an incorrect oversimplifi-
cation. There is no ironclad rule that applies to every
instance of fee-shifting language in the U.S. Code be-
cause Congress itself does not consistently employ the
three terms in petitioners’ rigid structure. In some in-
stances, it speaks of “costs” as separate from “fees” or
“expens«s.” See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(n) (referring to
“any costs, attorneys’ fees, or expenses incurred”); 15
U.S.C. § 2618(d) (referring to “costs of suit and reason-
able fees for attorneys and expert witnesses”). But in
other instances, Congress speaks of “costs” or “ex-
penses” as including “fees.” See, eg., 15 U.S.C.
§ 2087(b)(7)(B) (“costs of litigation (including reason-
able attorneys’ and expert witness fees)”); 30 U.S.C.
§ 938(c) (“all costs and expenses (including the attor-
ney’s fees)”); 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(9) (“reasonable ex-
penses * * * including a reasonable attorney’s fee”).
In sum, there is no one definition of “costs” that
applies in every situation; rather, the question
14
whether a statute authorizes awarding generally-non-
taxable costs must be determined on the basis of each
statute’s particular text and context. Here, for the rea-
sons explained above, that context demonstrates that
Congress’s intent, when it adopted the language now
found in Section 505, was to provide for awards of all
kinds of litigation costs.*
Petitioners also invoke a trio of this Court’s prec-
edents—but none offers support for their position that
“full costs” excludes nontaxable costs.
First, in Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons,
Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987), the Court held that prevail-
ing defendants in antitrust actions could not obtain
expert witness fees beyond the limited reimbursement
authorized by Section 1920. The district court in that
case had awarded expert witness fees in excess of
those available under Section 1920, purporting to act
pursuant to its discretion under Rule 54(d). Jd. at 439.
This Court rejected this use of Rule 54(d), holding that
“(Section] 1920 defines the term ‘costs’ as used in Rule
54(d).” Id. at 441.
Crawford Fitting thus established that in cases in
which Rule 54(d) and Section 1920 govern awards of
costs, the taxable costs enumerated in Section 1920
are the only costs that a court may award. But the
Court did not hold that Section 1920 precludes awards
of other types of costs in cases governed by a statute
whose text and context departs from Rule 54(b) and
5 That conclusion is corroborated by the fact that four other fed-
eral statutory provisions, all of which were enacted after 1976,
also use the phrase “full costs”—and as respondents note, the
legislative history of one of these provisions indicates that Con-
gress understood the term to include more than the costs that
are taxable under Section 1920. Resp. Br. 7.
15
Section 1920. To the contrary, the Court acknowl-
edged that its default rule could be displaced by “ex-
plicit statutory or contractual authorization.” 482 U.S.
at 445. That is precisely the circumstance here.
Next, in West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc.
v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), the Court considered
whether 42 U.S.C. § 1988—which at the time author-
ized “a reasonable attorney's fee”—also allowed for
awards of expert witness fees. The Court held that it
did not, concluding based on statutory and judicial us-
age that the term “attorney’s fee” was not ordinarily
used to refer to expert witness fees and thus did not
give “explicit statutory authority” to award expert
fees. That unremarkable proposition is the most that
Casey can be read to hold—and it is irrelevant here,
given that Section 505 entitles prevailing parties to
“full costs,” a term that at the time of its adoption
meant all costs associated with litigation.
Finally, in Arlington Central School District
Board of Education v. Murphy, the Court held that ex-
pert witness fees could not be recovered under the In-
dividuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”),
which provided that a court could award “reasonable
attorneys’ fees as part of the costs.” 548 U.S. 291, 293
(2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court’s decision in Murphy turned on essentially the
same reasoning as Casey: indeed, Murphy noted that,
in order to award expert witness fees to the plaintiffs,
the Court would have had to “hold that the relevant
language in the IDEA * * * exactly the opposite of
what the nearly identical language in 42 U.S.C. § 1988
was held to mean in Casey.” Id. at 302. Thus, Murphy
is inapposite here for the same reasons as Casey.
To be sure, Murphy referred to “the principle, rec-
ognized in Crawford Fitting, that no statute will be
16
construed as authorizing the taxation of witness fees
as costs unless the statute ‘refer[s] explicitly to wit-
ness fees.” 548 U.S. at 301 (quoting Crawford Fitting,
482 U.S. at 445). But to the extent that Crawford Fit-
ting recognized such a “principle,” it was one that
looked forward from the enactment of Section 1920:
the Crawford Court was loath to “infer that Congress
has repealed §§ 1920 and 1821” through a statute “not
referring explicitly to witness fees.” 482 U.S. at 445.
Such a forward-looking rule makes perfect sense—for
legislation enacted after Section 1920, it is logical to
understand Congress to have departed from Section
1920’s taxable cost baseline only where it said it was
doing so.
But the relevant language of Section 505 of the
Copyright Act long predates Section 1920—indeed, as
noted above, that language predates even the original
Fee Act. Congress’s clear intent in the 1831 Act to pro-
vide for full shifting of litigation costs should not be
abrogated based on an interpretive rule grounded in a
statute (Section 1920) that was enacted more than one
hundred years later.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be af-
firmed.
Respectfully submitted.
ANDREW J. PINCUS
Counsel of Record
PAUL W. HUGHES
MATTHEW A. WARING
Mayer Brown LLP
1999 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 263-3000
apincus@mayerbrown.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
DECEMBER 2018
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.