Joint Appendix — Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986 (2019) (No. 17-1104)

Supreme Court brief2019

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 17-1104

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

AIR AND LIQUID SYSTEMS CORP., CBS

CORPORATION, AND FOSTER WHEELER LLC,

Petitioners,

v.

ROBERTA G. DEVRIES, Administratrix of the Estate

of John B. DeVries, Deceased, and Widow in her own

right,

Respondent.

INGERSOLL RAND COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v.

SHIRLEY MCAFEE, Executrix of the Estate of

Kenneth McAfee, and Widow in her own right,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

JOINT APPENDIX (VOLUME I OF II)

SHAY DVORETZKY RICHARD PHILLIPS MYERS

Counsel of Record Counsel of Record

JONES DAY PAUL, REICH & MYERS

51 Louisiana Ave NW 1608 Walnut Street, Suite 500

Washington, DC 20001 Philadelphia, PA 19103

Tel.: (202) 879-3939 Tel.: (215) 735-9200

sdvoretzky@jonesday.com rmyers@prmpclaw.com

Counsel for Petitioner Counsel for Respondents

CBS Corporation Roberta G. DeVries and

Shirley McAffee

(Additional counsel listed on inside cover)

I TEE

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED JANUARY 31, 2018

CERTIORARI GRANTED MAY 14, 2018

CARTER G. PHILLIPS

Counsel of Record

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

1501 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

Tel.: (202) 736-8270

cphillipe@sidley.com

Counsel for Respondent

General Electric Co.

(continued from front cover)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME I

Docket Entries,

In re: Asbestos Products Liability Litigation

(No. V1), No. 16-2669 (3d Cir.) .............ccccccceeees

Docket Entries,

In re: Asbestos Products Liability Litigation

(No. VI), No. 16-2602 (3d Cir.) .....................0.-.

Docket Entries,

In re: Asbestos Products Liability Litigation

(No. VI), No. 15-2667 (3d Cir.) ....................00--

Docket Entries,

In re: Asbestos Products Liability Litigation

(No. VI), No. 15-1278 (3d Cir.) .................0000000

Docket Entries,

McAfee, et al. v. 20th Century Glove Corp. of

Texas, No. 5:13-cv-06856-GJP (E.D. Pa.) ........

Docket Entries,

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Co,, et al.,

No. 5:13-cv-00474-ER (E.D. Pa.)......................

Materials from District Court Proceedings

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 269-1, pages 2—18) (excerpts of Exhibit

A to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by

Page

— l

—— 3

— 5

— 7

—

13

u

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(continued)

Page

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 269-2, pages 2—38) (excerpts of Exhibit

B to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by

CBS Corporation) ........0cccccccccscssssssssercccesessosscceseses 46

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 270-1, pages 2—53) (excerpts of Exhibit

A to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by

General Electric Company).....................00000000000 90

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 270-2, pages 2—19) (excerpts of Exhibit

B to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by

General Electric Company)........................000000+ 224

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 270-3, pages 7, 25, 33-34, 50-51, 56,

62) (excerpts of Exhibit C to Motion for

Summary Judgment filed by General Elec-

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 273, pages 14—49) (Exhibits A-C to

Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Imo

BN TIIIS, Hi icicessheecindoaniunsinanitrabeevateieminatnanessteiine 266

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(continued)

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 274, page 16) (excerpt of Exhibit A to

Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Air

& Liquid Systems Corporation)......................

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 277-4, pages 1—4) (excerpts of exhibits

to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by

Foster Wheeler LLLC)....................ceccccceeeeeeeeeees

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 291, pages 13, 17, 19-22) (excerpts of

Exhibit A to Answer to Motion for Summary

Judgment of Foster Wheeler LLC).................

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 291, pages 27-29) (excerpts of Exhibit

B to Answer to Motion for Summary Judg-

ment of Foster Wheeler LLC) .........................

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 291, pages 33, 35) (excerpts of Exhibit

C to Answer to Motion for Summary Judg-

ment of Foster Wheeler LLC) .........................

Page

--- 62

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(continued)

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 291-1, pages 1—8) (excerpts of Exhibit

C to Answer to Motion for Summary Judg-

ment of Foster Wheeler LLC, continued)........

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 294, pages 15-19) (excerpts to Exhibit

A of Answer to Motion for Summary Judg-

ment of General Electric Company) ................

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 294-3, pages 3-10) (excerpts to Exhibit

G of Answer to Motion for Summary Judg-

ment of General Electric Company) ................

VOLUME II

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 296, pages 20-22) (excerpts to Exhibit

A of Answer to Motion for Summary Judg-

ment of CBS Corporation).......................0000000«

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 296-1, pages 9-13) (Exhibit C of An-

swer to Motion for Summary Judgment of

SI iccticicicnenstnsitctdamenmstievationsioniwen

Page

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(continued)

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 296-2, pages 18-21) (excerpts of Ex-

hibit F of Answer to Motion for Summary

Judgment of CBS Corporation).......................

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 296-2, pages 30-31, 34—36) (excerpts

of Exhibit G of Answer to Motion for Sum-

mary Judgment of CBS Corporation,

I naianicicictinnieninihinmesshineatiabtiniteneraneenme

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 296-2, page 45 — Doc. 296-3, pages

1—2) (excerpts of Exhibit H of Answer to Mo-

tion for Summary Judgment of CBS

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(excerpts of Exhibit H of Answer to Motion

for Summary Judgment of CBS Corpora-

RR i irtetieanecicnscetanstestentsincsentenetenesens

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 296-3, pages 8-9) (Exhibit I to Answer

to Motion for Summary Judgment of CBS

Page

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(continued)

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 297, pages 16—22, 28-29) (excerpts of

Exhibits B & C of Answer to Motion for Sum-

mary Judgment of IMO Industries, Inc.) ........

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 298, page 19) (excerpts of Exhibit A of

Answer to Motion for Summary Judgment

by Buffalo Pumps, Inc)................ccc0ceceeseeeeeeeees

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 298-2, pages 7—8) (excerpts of Exhibit

D of Answer to Motion for Summary Judg-

ment by Buffalo Pumps, Inc.) ........................6

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 298-4, pages 6-10) (Exhibit J of An-

swer to Motion for Summary Judgment by

ee

McAffee v. 20th Century Glove Corp.,

No. 13-06856-ER (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 171, pages 18-31; 33-43) (excerpts of

Exhibits A & B of Ingersoll Rand Company's

Motion for Summary Judgment) .....................

Page

..463

473

.-480

vil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(continued)

McAffee v. 20th Century Glove Corp.,

No. 13-06856-ER (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 203, pages 16-19, 22—24, 30-31, 37-—

49) (excerpts of Exhibits A, B, & C of An-

swer to Motion for Summary Judgment of

Ingersoll-Rand Company) ..........................--.-

McAffee v. 20th Century Glove Corp.,

No. 13-06856-ER (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 203-1, pages 1—2, 31—50) (excerpts of

Exhibit D of Answer to Motion for Summary

Judgment of Ingersoll-Rand Company) ........

McAffee v. 20th Century Glove Corp.,

No. 13-06856-ER (E.D. Pa.)

(Doc. 203-2) (excerpts of Exhibit D of An-

swer to Motion for Summary Judgment of

Ingersoll-Rand Company, continued)............

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa., October 3,

2014) (order awarding summary judgment

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa., October 3,

2014) (order awarding summary judgment

to IMO Industries, Inc.) ...................ccceeeeeeeee

DeVries, et al. v. General Electric Company,

et al., No. 13-cv-474 (E.D. Pa., October 10,

2014) (order awarding summary judgment

to General Electric Company)........................

Page

wee TOT

Vill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(continued)

Materials from Third Circuit Proceedings

DeVries, et al. v General Electric Company,

et al., No. 15-1278 (3rd Cir.)

(Joint Appendix 729)......................sseseeeeeeeeeeeees

DeVries, et al. v General Electric Company,

et al., No. 15-1278 (3rd Cir.)

(Joint Appendix 1508-12) .00.0......0.....ccccccccceeeeees

DeVries, et al. v General Electric Company,

et al., No. 15-1278 (3rd Cir.)

(Joint Appendix 1540-42) 20000..0....cccccccceceeeeeeeeees

Addendum A to Brief of Defendant-Appellee

General Electric Company,

Ee

Page

..803

1

GENERAL DOCKET

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Court of Appeals Docket #: 16-2669

z***

Appeal From: United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania

zest

In re: Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. V1)

Date Filed Docket Text

06/06/2016 CIVIL CASE DOCKETED. Notice

filed by Appellant Shirley McAfee in

District Court No. 5-13-cv-06856 and

2-01-md-00875. (DW) [Entered:

06/06/2016 02:43 PM]

zs*

06/23/2016 CLERK ORDER The joint motion to

consolidate the appeals at Nos. 16-

2602 & 16-2669 is granted. The ac-

tions are consolidated for all pur-

poses, filed. [16-2602, 16-2669] (CJG)

[Entered: 06/23/2016 11:34 AM}

zat

10/03/2017 PRECEDENTIAL OPINION Coram:

VANASKIE, SHWARTZ and RE-

STREPO, Circuit Judges. Total

Pages: 19. Judge: VANASKIE Au-

thoring. [16-2602, 16-2669] (CJG)

[Entered: 10/03/2017 09:24 AM]

10/03/2017 JUDGMENT, Affirmed In Part as to

Appellants’ strict liability claims.

2

With respect to Appellants’ negli-

gence claims, the cases are Re-

manded to the District Court. Costs

shall not be taxed. [16-2602, 16-2669]

(CJG) (Entered: 10/03/2017 09:25

AM]

***

3

GENERAL DOCKET

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Court of Appeals Docket #: 16-2602

***

Appeal From: United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania

***

In re: Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI)

Date Filed Docket Text

5/31/2016 CIVIL CASE DOCKETED. Notice

filed by Appellant Roberta G. Devries

in District Court No. 5-13-cv-00474,2-

01-md-00875. (CJG) [Entered:

05/31/2016 10:04 AM}

***

06/23/2016 CLERK ORDER The joint motion to

consolidate the appeals at Nos. 16-

2602 & 16-2669 is granted. The ac-

tions are consolidated for all pur-

poses, filed. [16-2602, 16-2669] (CJG)

[Entered: 06/23/2016 11:34 AM]

***

10/08/2017 PRECEDENTIAL OPINION Coram:

VANASKIE, SHWARTZ and RE-

STREPO, Circuit Judges. Total

Pages: 19. Judge: VANASKIE Au-

thoring. [16-2602, 16-2669] (CJG)

[Entered: 10/03/2017 09:24 AM]

A

10/03/2017 JUDGMENT, Affirmed In Part as to

Appellants’ strict liability claims.

With respect to Appellants’ negli-

gence claims, the cases are Re-

manded to the District Court. Costs

shall not be taxed. [16-2602, 16-2669]

(CJG) [Entered: 10/03/2017 09:25

AM]

***

5

GENERAL DOCKET

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Court of Appeals Docket #: 15-2667

Appeal From: United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania

***

In re: Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. V1)

Date Filed

07/16/2015

11/16/2015

11/20/2015

Docket Text

CIVIL CASE DOCKETED. Notice

filed by Appellants Kenneth McAfee

and Shirley McAfee in District Court

No. 5-13-cv-06856 & 2-01-md-00875.

(OM) [Entered: 07/16/2015 05:12 PM]

**f

ECF FILER: ELECTRONIC BRIEF

with Appendix Volume I on behalf of

Appellants Kenneth McAfee and

Shirley McAfee, filed. Certificate of

Service dated 11/16/2015 by ECF. --

[Edited 11/20/2015 by EAF - Text ed-

ited to indicate Appendix attached;

Appendix Volume II removed and re-

fied as of 11/20/15] (REP) (Entered:

11/16/2015 11:23 AM]

**?f

ECF FILER: ELECTRONIC APPEN-

DIX VOLUME II on behalf of Appel-

lants Kenneth McAfee and Shirley

McAfee, filed. Certificate of service

05/12/2016

6

dated 11/20/2015 by ECP. --[Edited

11/20/2015 by EAF - Text edited to

specify volume] (REP) [Entered:

11/20/2015 09:09 AM]

**f

ORDER (VANASKIE, SHWARTZ

and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges)

Upon Consideration of the Argu-

ments by Counsel Presented in their

Briefs, It is Hereby Ordered that the

Case is Summarily Remanded to the

District Court to consider these

items. In the event that a subsequent

appeal is taken after the proceedings

on remand have concluded, any fu-

ture appeal will be considered by this

panel after completion of briefing,

filed. Judge: SHWARTZ Authoring,

(See Order for Full Text). (PDB) [En-

tered: 05/12/2016 04:28 PM]

**f

7

GENERAL DOCKET

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Court of Appeals Docket #: 15-1278

Appeal From: United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania

z***

In re: Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI)

Date Filed Docket Text

2/12/2015 CIVIL CASE DOCKETED. Notice

filed by Appellant Roberta G. Devries

in District Court No. 5-13-cv-00474

and 2-01-md-00875. (ARR) [Entered:

02/12/2015 04:25 PM]

***

06/09/2015 ECF FILER: ELECTRONIC BRIEF

with Volume I of Appendix attached

on behalf of Appellant Roberta G.

Devries, filed. Certificate of Service

dated 06/09/2015 by ECF. [Appendix

Volumes II-VII were removed from

this entry by the Clerk as they were

re-filed separately]--[Edited

06/10/2015 by MS] (REP) [Entered:

06/09/2015 02:27 PM]

*e« 2

06/09/2015 ECF FILER: ELECTRONIC APPEN-

DIX on behalf of Appellant Roberta

G. Devries, filed. Certificate of ser-

vice dated 06/09/2015 by ECF. (REP)

[Entered: 06/09/2015 04:02 PM]

08/10/2015

08/10/2015

02/05/2016

*z***

ECF FILER: JOINT SUPPLE-

MENTAL ELECTRONIC APPEN-

DIX on behalf of Appellees Buffalo

Pumps Inc, CBS Corp, Foster

Wheeler LLC, GE Co, IMO Indus-

tries Inc and Warren Pumps, filed.

Certificate of service dated

08/10/2015 by ECF.--[Edited

08/11/2015 by MCW] (PJS) (Entered:

08/10/2015 03:33 PM]

ECF FILER: ELECTRONIC BRIEF

on behalf of Appellee Foster Wheeler

LLC, filed. Certificate of Service

dated 08/10/2015 by ECF. (L.JJ) [En-

tered: 08/10/2015 04:22 PM]

**t

ORDER (VANASKIE, SHWARTZ

and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges),

summarily remanding this case to

the District Court to determine

whether the District Court: (1) con-

sidered the negligence theory; (2)

concluded that the bare metal de-

fense applies to it and why, or (3)

considered whether the circum-

stances listed in the case cited herein

should apply to a negligence claim

brought under maritime law (and if

not, why not, and if so, why and

whether the record here would sup-

port such a claim). In the event that

a subsequent appeal is taken after

9

the proceedings on remand have con-

cluaed, any future appeal will be con-

sidered by this panel after completion

of briefing, filed. Judge: SHWARTZ

Authoring (ARR) [Entered:

02/05/2016 05:41 PM]

***

10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(ALLENTOWN)

CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE # 5:13-cv-06856-GJP

MCAFEE, et al. v.

20TH CENTURY GLOVE CORP. OF TEXAS

*“**

Date Filed # Docket Text

11/25/2013 1 NOTICE OF REMOVAL by

CBS CORPORATION, GEN-

ERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY

from Philadelphia Common

Pleas, case number 131000205.

Certificate of Service.(Filing fee

$ 400 receipt number

092116)(jwl, ) (Entered:

11/26/2013)

***

08/25/2014 171 First MOTION for Summary

Judgment filed by INGER-

SOLL-RAND & CO..memoran-

dum, certificate of ser-

vice.(RYAN, DANIEL) (En-

tered: 08/25/2014)

***

09/24/2014 203 RESPONSE to Motion

re 171 First MOTION for Sum-

mary Judgment of Ingersoll-

Rand filed by KENNETH E.

MCAFEE. (Attachments:

# 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(PAUL,

10/23/2014

07/08/2015

05/26/2016

218

275

280

1]

ROBERT) (Entered:

09/24/2014)

*z***

ORDER THAT THE MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OF DEFENDANT INGER-

SOLL-RAND & CO. (DOC. NO.

171) IS GRANTED. SIGNED

BY HONORABLE EDUARDO

C. ROBRENO ON

10/22/2014.10/27/2014 EN-

TERED AND COPIES E-

MAILED.(jmg, ) (Entered:

10/27/2014)

zs**

NOTICE OF APPEAL by KEN-

NETH E. MCAFEE. Copies to

Judge, Clerk USCA, Appeals

Clerk and (PAUL, ROBERT)

Modified on 7/10/2015 (fb). (En-

tered: 07/08/2015)

**z*

ORDER THAT THIS COURT

REAFFIRMS IT 10/22/14 EN-

TRY OF JUDGMENT AND DI-

RECTS ANY INTERESTED

PARTIES TO ITS REASON-

ING SET FORTH IN ITS

5/19/16 EXPLANATORY OR-

DER. SIGNED BY HONORA-

BLE EDUARDO C. ROBRENO

ON 5/25/16. 5/26/16 ENTERED

AND COPIES E-

05/31/2016

281

12

MAILED.(mbh, ) (Entered:

05/27/2016)

NOTICE OF APPEAL by KEN-

NETH E. MCAFEE. Fee Not

Paid. Copies to Judge, Clerk

USCA, Appeals Clerk.(PAUL,

ROBERT) Modified on

5/31/2016 (fb). (Entered:

05/31/2016)

***

13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(ALLENTOWN)

CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 5:13-cv-00474-ER

DEVRIES, et al. v.

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY et al.

***

Date Filed # Docket Text

01/25/2013 1 NOTICE OF REMOVAL by

CBS CORPORATION, GEN-

ERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY

from Philadelphia CCP, case

number December 2012 No.

3661. (Filing fee $ 350 receipt

number 075971), Certificate of

Service.(tj, ) (Additional attach-

ment(s) added on 1/28/2013:

# 1 Exhibits C-E) (tj,). (En-

tered: 01/28/2013)

z***

07/02/2013. 168 AMENDED COMPLAINT with

Certificate of Service against

ALLEN-BRADLEY COM-

PANY, ALLEN-SHERMAN-

HOFF, AMTICO, AURORA

PUMP, AZROCK INDUS-

TRIES, INC., BELL &

GOSSETT/DOMESTIC PUMP,

BRYANT HEATING AND

COOLING, BUFFALO

PUMPS, INC., BURNHAM

LLC, BW/IP, INC., CHICAGO

14

DRYER, CLEAVER BROOKS,

INC., COPES VULCAN,

CRANE CO., CROUSE-

HINDS, DAL-TILE, DENISON

INTERNATIONAL, DOVER

CORPORATION, EDWARDS

VALVE, ELLIOT GROUP U.S.

HEADQUARTERS, FOSTER-

WHEELER LLC, GARDNER-

DENVER-JOY COMPRES-

SORS, GENERAL ELECTRIC

COMPANY, GLASGOW, INC.,

GOODYEAR CANADA,

GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER

CO., GUARD LINE, INC.,

HAMPSHIRE INDUSTRIES,

HARNISCHFEGER CORP.,

HENKLES AND MCCOY,

INC., INSUL CORPORATION,

J.A. SEXAUER, METROPOLI-

TAN LIFE INS. CO., MINNE-

SOTA MINING & MANUFAC-

TURING, OWENS-ILLINOIS,

INC., RILEY STOKER COR-

PORATION, SEPCO CORPO-

RATION, UNITED CON-

VEYOR CORPORATION, UNI-

VERSAL REFRACTORIES,

WARREN PUMPS, WEL

MCLAIN, AMCHEM PROD-

UCTS, IMO INDUSTRIES,

INC., filed by JOHN B.

DEVRIES, ROBERTA G.

DEVRIES.(ti, ) Modified on

10/15/2013

10/15/2013

10/15/2013

10/15/2013

263

269

270

273

15

7/3/2013 (ti, ). (Entered:

07/03/2013)

z**

MOTION for Summary Judg-

ment filed by WARREN

PUMPS.Memorandun,, Certifi-

cate of Service. (Attachments:

# 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B,

# 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D,

# 5Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F,

#7 Exhibit G)()SCHEETS,

JOSHUA) (Entered:

10/15/2013)

**f

MOTION for Summary Judg-

ment filed by CBS CORPORA-

TION.Memorandun, Certifi-

cate of Service. (Attachments:

#1 Exhibit A, # 2 Errata B,

#3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D,

# 5Exhibit E)(MCSHEA,

JOHN) (Entered: 10/15/2013)

MOTION for Summary Judg-

ment filed by GENERAL

ELECTRIC COMPANY.Memo-

randum, Certificate of Service.

(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A,

# 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C,

# 4Exhibit D)(MCSHEA,

JOHN) (Entered: 10/15/2013)

***

MOTION for Summary Judg-

ment filed by IMO INDUS-

10/15/2013

10/15/2013

11/15/2013

274

277

291

16

TRIES, INC..Memoradum, Cer-

tificate of Service.(FONTAK,

JOSEPH) (Entered:

10/15/2013)

MOTION for Summary Judg-

ment filed by BUFFALO

PUMPS, INC..Memorandum,

Certificate of Ser-

vice.(HOWARTH, JOHN) (En-

tered: 10/15/2013)

***

MOTION for Summary Judg-

ment filed by FOSTER-

WHEELER LLC.Memorandum

of Law in Support of Motion for

Summary Judgment and Cer-

tificate of Service. (Attach-

ments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Ex-

hibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Ex-

hibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Ex-

hibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Ex-

hibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Ex-

hibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Ex-

hibit L, # 13Exhibit M, # 14 Ex-

hibit N)\(JANICZEK, LEROY)

(Entered: 10/15/2013)

**s

RESPONSE to Motion

re 277 MOTION for Summary

Judgment of Foster

Wheeler filed by JOHN B.

DEVRIES. (Attachments:

#1 part 2, #2 part 3, #3 part

4, #4 part 5, #5 part 6,

11/15/2013

11/15/2013

11/15/2013

11/15/2013

294

295

296

297

17

# 6 part 7, #7 part 8)(PAUL,

ROBERT) (Entered:

11/15/2013)

*z** 2s

RESPONSE to Motion

re 270 MOTION for Summary

Judgment of General Elec-

tric filed by JOHN B.

DEVRIES. (Attachments:

# 1 part 2, # 2 part 3, # 3 part

4, #4 part 5, #5 part 6)(PAUL,

ROBERT) (Entered:

11/15/2013)

RESPONSE in Opposition

re 270 MOTION for Summary

Judgment of Plaintiffs filed by

GENERAL ELECTRIC COM-

PANY. (Attachments: # 1 Ex-

hibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Ex-

hibit C, # 4 Exhibit

D)(MCSHEA, JOHN) (Entered:

11/15/2013)

RESPONSE to Motion

re 269 MOTION for Summary

Judgment of CBS Corpora-

tion filed by JOHN B.

DEVRIES. (Attachments:

#1 part 2, # 2 part 3, #3 part

4, # 4 part 5, # 5 part 6,

# 6 part 7(PAUL, ROBERT)

(Entered: 11/15/2013)

RESPONSE to Motion

re 273 MOTION for Summary

11/15/2013

11/15/2013

10/06/2014

10/06/2014

298

301

345

346

18

Judgment to IMO filed by

JOHN B. DEVRIES. (Attach-

ments: # 1 part 2)(PAUL, ROB-

ERT) (Entered: 11/15/2013)

RESPONSE to Motion

re 274 MOTION for Summary

Judgment of Buffalo

Pumps filed by JOHN B.

DEVRIES. (Attachments:

#1 part 2, #2 part 3, #3 part

4, #4 part 5(PAUL, ROBERT)

(Entered: 11/15/2013)

s**t

RESPONSE to Motion

re 263 MOTION for Summary

Judgment to Warren

Pumps filed by JOHN B.

DEVRIES. (Attachments:

#1 part 2, # 2 part 3, # 3 part

4)(PAUL, ROBERT) (Entered:

11/15/2013)

*z***

ORDER THAT THE MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OF DEFENDANT WARREN

PUMPS (DOC. NO. 263 ) IS

GRANTED. ETC. SIGNED BY

HONORABLE EDUARDO C.

ROBRENO ON 10/1/14. 10/6/14

ENTERED AND COPIES E-

MAILED.(va, ) (Entered:

10/06/2014)

ORDER THAT THE MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

10/06/20 14

10/15/2014

10/15/2014

347

350

351

19

OF DEFENDANT IMO IN-

DUSTRIES, INC. (DOC.

NO. 273 ) IS GRANTED.

SIGNED BY HONORABLE

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO ON

10/1/14. 10/6/14 ENTERED

AND COPIES E-

MAILED.(va, ) (Entered:

10/06/2014)

ORDER THAT THE MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OF DEFENDANT BUFFALO

PUMPS, INC. (DOC. NO. 274 )

IS GRANTED. ETC. SIGNED

BY HONORABLE EDUARDO

C. ROBRENO ON 10/01/2014.

10/06/2014 ENTERED AND

COPIES E-MAILED. (va, ) (En-

tered: 10/06/2014)

z***

ORDER THAT THE MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OF DEFENDANT CBS COR-

PORATION IS GRANTED.

SIGNED BY HONORABLE

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO ON

10/10/2014. 10/15/2014 EN-

TERED AND COPIES E-

MAILED.(uh, ) (Entered:

10/15/2014)

ORDER THAT THE MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OF DEFENDANT GENERAL

ELECTRIC COMPANY IS

10/15/2014 353

01/26/2015 364

01/26/2015 365

02/12/2015

20

GRANTED. SIGNED BY HON-

ORABLE EDUARDO C.

ROBRENO ON

10/10/2014.10/15/2014 EN-

TERED AND COPIES E-

MAILED.(uh, ) (Entered:

10/15/2014)

s**t

ORDER THAT THE MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OF DEFENDANT FOSTER

WHEELER LLC IS

GRANTED. SIGNED BY HON-

ORABLE EDUARDO C.

ROBRENO ON

10/10/2014.10/15/2014 EN-

TERED AND COPIES E-

MAILED.(uh, ) (Entered:

10/15/2014)

z**e

NOTICE OF APPEAL by

JOHN B. DEVRIES. Copies to

Judge, Clerk USCA, Appeals

Clerk (Entered: 01/26/2015)

Clerk's Notice to USCA

re 364 Notice of Appeal : (ti, )

(Entered: 01/28/2015)

zz

USCA Case Number 15-1278

for 364 Notice of Appeal filed

by JOHN B. DEVRIES. (ahf)

(Entered: 02/13/2015)

**f

03/03/2016

05/19/2016

05/23/2016

368

369

371

21

ORDER of USCA as to 364 No-

tice of Appeal filed by JOHN B.

DEVRIES THAT THE CASE

IS SUMMARILY REMANDED

TO THE DISTRICT COURT

TO CONSIDER THESE

ITEMS; ETC. (ems) (Entered:

03/03/2016)

MEMORANDUM AND/OR

OPINION SIGNED BY HON-

ORABLE EDUARDO C.

ROBRENO ON 5/18/16. 5/19/16

ENTERED AND COPIES

MAILED, E-MAILED.(ti, ) (En-

tered: 05/19/2016)

*z**

NOTICE OF APPEAL by

JOHN B. DEVRIES; no filing

fee paid. Copies to Judge, Clerk

USCA, and Appeals Clerk. (ti, )

Modified on 5/24/2016 (ti, ).

(Entered: 05/24/2016)

z***

22

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: Asbestos Product ) Civil Action No.

Liability Litigation ) MDL 875

)

All Actions )

AFFIDAVIT OF ROGER B, HORNE JR.

RADM USN (RET)

1. Iam a retired Rear Admiral of the United

States Navy, in which I served between 1956 and 1991.

I began my Navy Career in 1956, immediately after

receiving a Bachelor of Science degree in Naval Engi-

neering from the Unites States Naval Academy at An-

napolis, Maryland. I have also received extensive

post-graduate education in naval engineering, includ-

ing a Master of Science Degree in Mechanical Engi-

neering from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, and

have taught Naval Engineering as a Visiting Profes-

sor at the University of Michigan. Throughout my

Navy career, | concentrated in areas of ship design,

engineering, construction, overhaul and inspection.

Ultimately, I achieved the rank of Chief Engineer and

Deputy Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command

(“NAVSEA”) for Ship Design and Ship Systems Engi-

neering. Prior to that, I served as Deputy Commander,

NAVSEA for Facilities and Industrial Management;

Commander, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard; Com-

mander, Engineering Duty Officer School; Production

and Repair Officer, Mare Island Naval Shipyard; Nu-

clear Engineering Manager, Puget Sound Naval Ship-

23

yard; Nuclear Submarine Inspection Officer, Supervi-

sor of Shipbuilding Office, Ingalls Shipyard and Chief

Engineer in the USS Ozbourn (DD 846).

I have been involved in the construction or overhaul

of over 80 ships and su\»marines and served at sea. |

am proud that these vessels have performed many ac-

tivities vital to the national defense. Examples of

these activities during my tenure include at sea task

force operations following the Korean war while doing

joint operations with ships of the Southeast Asia

Treaty Organization (“SEATO”); shipyard positions

including command with significant responsibilities

concerning vessels with vital missions during the Cold

War and Viet Nam war, as well as, senior positions

later in my career with significant responsibility con-

cerning the overall management of industrial facili-

ties in both private and public shipyards as well as the

design of new ships.

2. While in the Navy, I was recognized for

achievements in the field of marine machinery and en-

gineering, and I have received three National Legion

of Merit Awards and three Meritorious Service

Awards for Engineering and Industrial Achievement

and an award from the Marine Machinery Association.

3. In addition to my training and experience in

Navy ship construction as outlined above, upon retire-

ment, I taught part-time at the University of Michi-

gan as a visiting professor in ship construction. Fur-

ther, in civilian life, I had responsibility for the Ma-

rine and Aviation Section at Failure Analysis Associ-

ates located in Menlo Park California. On retirement

from Failure Analysis Associates I have been involved

with many asbestos related legal cases. Exhibit 1 is a

true, complete and correct copy of my curriculum vitae.

24

4. Based on my naval experience and training,

general knowledge and review of the materials sup-

plied me, I submit this Affidavit to attest to (a) the

Navy’s mission and the relevance of equipment design,

engineering, construction, repair, overhaul and in-

spection to that mission; (b) the centrality of equip-

ment and materials such as propulsion turbines, tur-

bine-generator sets and related equipment (“turbines”)

and asbestos thermal insulation to the Navy’s ability

to successfully wage wars in the 20 Century; and (c)

the importance of Navy designed and Navy controlled

asbestos warning procedures.

5. Stated simply, the mission of the Navy is to

win wars, deter aggression and maintain freedom of

the seas. In the interests of the national defense, the

Navy has four primary areas of responsibility con-

cerning ships and submarines: (1) the design and con-

struction of naval forces necessary for effective prose-

cution of national defense; (2) the maintenance of na-

val ships and equipment essential to readiness for na-

val operations; (3) the development of new equipment

and weapon systems; and (4) support for its sailors.

6. The country requires a Navy with offensive

capability that can project power to discourage ag-

gressive action by other nations. There is never a time

when the Navy is not either engaged in combat or pre-

paring for combat by readying its primary war weap-

ons — ships and sailors — for battle. Even in times of

“peace” (when the Country is not officially at war or

when ships are not engaged in combat), the Navy pro-

vides important combat-related services. For example,

Navy submarines patrolling international waters

have been credited with assisting in the collapse of So-

viet Russia during the nuclear arms race between the

25

United States and Russia commonly referred to as the

Cold War.

7. Retaining a trained base of personnel, contin-

ually introducing state-of-the-art equipment and ma-

terials, and keeping in good repair its ships, aircraft

and auxiliary equipment are essential, inextricable

aspects of the Navy’s national responsibilities. For

this reason, the Navy’s effort to design, engineer, con-

struct, repair, and inspect its ships, aircraft and aux-

iliary vessels, whether during operations or in ship-

yards, was and is critical to the Navy’s mission. With-

out continual training of personnel and construction

and repair of its ships and auxiliary equipment, the

Navy would not be capable of deterring aggression

and fighting wars.

8. The Navy has a chain of command which es-

tablishes reporting authority from junior to senior of-

ficers and provides for the communication of instruc-

tion and orders among Navy personnel. To ensure

that all Navy personnel know and understand the

chain of command, enlisted personnel are taught it in

boot camp and officers learn about it in the Naval

Academy and other schools and college programs.

This chain of command is crucial to mission success

because it provides a single, uniform and effective

method of communication. The Navy’s chain of com-

mand enables the Navy to effectively organize its sail-

ors and prepare them to respond to combat situations

and perform a variety of strategic operations at a mo-

ment’s notice. Obviously discipline is a key element

supporting the Navy’s mission. Personne! at all levels

must be relied upon to carry out the lawful orders of

their senior officers. Failure to have this ingrained in

26

the Navy culture would lead to chaos and mission fail-

ure in battle.

9. The Navy chain of command concerning ship

construction involves several layers of authority re-

lated to technical and contractual control over Navy

shipbuilding. The Secretary of the Navy has ultimate

authority over the Navy and Navy shipbuilding; im-

mediately below the Secretary, as has been the case

since the creation of NAVSEA is the Chief of Naval

Operations (“CNO”) to whom NAVSEA reports. Prior

to the establishment of NAVSEA, the Bureau of Ships

(“BUSHIPS”) controlled all combat ship design and

construction and reported to the CNO as well as a ci-

vilian Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Since the cre-

ation of NAVSEA, NAVSEA reports to the CNO for all

military ship design and construction.

10. The CNO is the top military official in the

Navy. The CNO has lead responsibility for all matters

of strategy, tactics and operations. Typically, the

CNO will identify a threat or a special need, and

NAVSEA will design ships and equipment to address

the CNO’s requirement. Designing a new ship is com-

plex and involves the coordination of many engineer-

ing disciplines knowledgeable in the technical state-

of-the-art in their individual professional areas. It is

easy to understand Navy ships must satisfy a variety

of missions and, although some ships can carry out

multiple missions, there will be a need for a variety of

ships with different designs. Generally the need for

ships with specific mission capability will be conveyed

to the NAVSEA by the CNO. NAVSEA will respond

with concept designs. From this phase NAVSEA will

go through a series of design iterations (“design spi-

ral”) in coordination with the CNO’s staff until finally

27

a detailed and a contract design is reached for the ship.

The design will set the needs for turbines along with

other equipment and weapon systems. The Navy has

its own engineers who specialize in turbines (machin-

ery experts) and who are familiar with the state of the

art for commercial turbines. The Navy’s machinery

experts do not actually design turbines themselves,

but they use their expertise to develop a turbine de-

sign concept that contemplates emerging technology

and new materials, as well as military tactical needs.

Once a turbine design concept has been established,

the Navy’s machinery experts will consult with com-

mercial turbine manufacturers concerning their tur-

bine concept. Through a complex, iterative process

the Navy works closely with turbine manufacturers to

attain an ultimate turbine design that meets its new

military requirements. The Navy will use previously

developed military specifications (“MilSpecs”), create

any additional specifications that may be required,

and then issue a request for bids from qualified con-

tractors in an effort to identify a contractor with the

capability and capacity to create a design and to man-

ufacture a turbine that satisfies its new military re-

quirements.

11. The design of turbines and development of

turbine military specifications are essential aspects of

the Navy’s shipbuilding program. These designs and

specifications are built on the totality of the Navy's

experience in fighting and planning for wars — what

works, what is reliable, operation cycles, maintenance

problems, and a multitude of other factors uniquely

related to combat conditions. The ultimate design and

military specifications for turbines developed by the

28

Navy reflect the existing state-of-the-art and demon-

strate the Navy’s operational experience in a variety

of circumstances. They reflect the turbine design

characteristics that directly impact the combat effec-

tiveness of Navy ships and include among many other

attributes the following:

a. Reliability: Turbines must be designed so that

they are efficient and provide reliable power to

enable the ships to travel long distances over ex-

tended periods without undue maintenance.

b. Quietness: Turbines aboard surface ships and,

particularly, submarines must operate quietly

to help protect the ships from enemy detection.

c. “Battle” Hardness: Turbines must be able to

withstand the substantial shock sometimes ex-

perienced in battle. Material selection under

shock requirements often dictates the use of spe-

cial materials not found in commercial turbines.

d. Maintainability: Turbines must be designed so

that they can be easily maintained at sea and

require infrequent repair and overhaul. Tur-

bines also must be designed so that they are

compatible with standardized, replacement

parts (consumable items) carried in the Navy’s

stock system.

12. Further, regarding the Navy’s organization

for controlling material as well as ship construction

and maintenance, under the command of NAVSEA (as

was the case with BUSHIPS) the Navy’s shipbuilding

structure is comprised of several divisions and levels

of authority concerning equipment design, construc-

tion, repair and inspection. The Commander of Naval

29

Sea Systems and the Commander of Naval Supply di-

rect technical and contractual control over shipboard

construction, as ‘well as, equipment and material.

Both organizations have oversight responsibility con-

cerning, among other things, equipment built for

Navy vessels, as well as, the Navy vessel itself. Com-

pliance with the standards and specifications required

for ships and equipment built for Navy use was and is

directly monitored by Naval Machinery Inspectors

(some specializing in turbines) under both of these di-

visions. The Naval Machinery Inspectors are respon-

sible to the Head of the Inspection Department for as-

suring that contractors follow the required military

specifications as they relate to naval machinery. Fur-

ther, the Naval Machinery Inspectors report to their

superiors any violations or failures to comply with

specifications.

13. At times the machinery inspectors under Na-

val Supply have worked on-site at the vendors’ manu-

facturing facility for equipment, and the Supervisor of

Shipbuilding (reporting to BUSHIPS) had Navy in-

spectors that carried out their inspection and contrac-

tual responsibilities at the shipbuilding yards. At one

time in my career, the offices of the Supervisor of

Shipbuilding reported to me for administration of the

contracts for which they were responsible. Inspectors

within the Supervisor of Shipbuilding offices would

report to their superiors any violations or failures to

comply with specifications.

14. Whether aboard ship or in a shipyard, the

Navy Commander is the ultimate authority in all

things related to the ship’s operation or ship’s con-

struction, repair and overhaul, including instructions

30

that might impact the health and safety of Navy sail-

ors or civilian workers engaged in these activities.

The role of civilians both in Navy yards and in private

yards was to carry out work in accordance with mili-

tary specifications. At a Navy Yard, the Navy itself

was directly involved in assuring the specifications

are followed because everyone in a Navy yard is either

an officer or a government contract worker. In a pri-

vate yard, the Navy would have a local office of the

Supervisor of Shipbuilding staffed, with Navy officers

who are responsible for supervising all civilian activi-

ties and for inspecting and verifying purchasing docu-

ments and receiving equipment and material to en-

sure the ship construction and repair in the private

yard conforms to Navy specifications. The Supervisor

has to follow the requirements specified or get formal

waivers to the specifications of interest from

BUSHIPS. Through these means, the Navy has as-

surance that its ships meet the rigorous requirements

of wartime vessels.

15. The attached exhibits illustrate the organiza-

tional lines of command for technical and contractual

control over Navy shipbuilding. (See Exhibits 2 and

3). For a description of the responsibilities of each of

the parties reflected on the attached organizational

charts, refer to Exhibit 4, a document I prepared

which describes in detail each individual’s authority

and responsibilities and explains how each level of

command interrelates in the collective Navy effort to

design, build and maintain our Navy fleet. In addition,

this description identifies the several federal officers

who exercised control over equipment manufacturers,

including Westinghouse Electric Corporation (“West-

inghouse”) and General Electric Company (“GE”),

31

whenever they built and supplied turbines to the

Navy during the past 50 or 60 years.

16. As noted, turbines built for Navy vessels, in-

cluding Westinghouse and GE turbines, were manu-

factured according to plans and specifications pre-

pared, written and issued exclusively by the Navy,

specifically NAVSEA or BUSHIPS. This is my expe-

rience having served as Chief Engineer and Deputy

Commander for NAVSEA’s Ship Design and Engi-

neering Division. I was responsible to the Com-

mander of NAVSEA for developing ship designs and

for overall technical support to the operating fleet,

maintenance of ships, and ships under construction.

Additionally, I was responsible for the maintenance of

Navy ship military specifications and for monitoring

compliance with the specifications by all vendors and

contractors of Navy equipment.

17. The MilSpecs for Navy equipment were

drafted, approved and maintained by the Navy, spe-

cifically NAVSEA, to address shipboard equipment

and materials requirements, and any changes to those

specifications were made by the Navy. NAVSEA

maintained and controlled the MilSpecs largely be-

cause it had superior knowledge of the demands and

requirements of combat-ready vessels. NAVSEA or

BUSHIPS also prepared contract specifications which

incorporated the MilSpecs. These specifications re-

flected the state-of-the-art and the special needs of

combat and combat support vessels destined to deter

or engage in war.

18. The specifications were communicated to

Westinghouse, GE and other similar vendors when

the Navy issued its Request for Proposal for certain

equipment. Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a brief

32

summary of Navy Ship Design and Naval Machinery

Military Specifications, as well as a brief summary of

the Navy Ship Design/Construction Procedures,

which explains how the Navy’s machinery vendors

were governed by the Navy’s specifications.

19. An illustration of the control the Navy exer-

cised over production of its turbines is the process by

which turbines were made for the U.S.S Kitty Hawk,

a Navy aircraft carrier. Examples of the specifications

which applied to shipboard equipment for the U.S_S.

Kitty Hawk are attached hereto as Exhibits 6 and 7.

Exhibit 6 is an excerpt of a Military Specification con-

cerning Turbine, Steam and General Auxiliary equip-

ment (Naval Shipboard Use) identified as MIL-T-

17523A (SHIPS) dated 1 August 1955. Exhibit 7 is

Bureau of Ships Contract Specification for Generator

Set, Steam Turbine, also identified as “SHIPS-G- 1956”

dated 25 April 1955. Exhibit 8, attached hereto, is a

copy of Westinghouse’s purchase order for the tur-

bines for the Kitty Hawk. This is evident based on the

following information: the reference on page | of Ex-

hibit 8 to “CVA 63” is to the ship number assigned by

the Navy to the Kitty Hawk (CVA indicates it is an

aircraft carrier, and 63 is this carrier's number). The

Customer Order No. “NOBS-67530” is a reference to

the Navy’s contract number, i.e. the contract issued by

BUSHIPS to Westinghouse to build the equipment de-

scribed on page | of Exhibit 8. On page 4 of Exhibit 8,

there is a reference to “Bureau of Ships Contract Spec-

ification SHIPS-G-1956, dated 25 April 1955,” which

is Exhibit 7. On page 2 of Exhibit 8 is a reference to

“MIL-T-17523,” which is Exhibit 6, the military spec-

ification described above. These documents mean

that the Navy ordered from Westinghouse the turbine

33

equipment described in Exhibit 8, which incorporates

the specifications in Exhibits 6 and 7, for use aboard

the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk. As referenced throughout Ex-

hibit 8, Westinghouse was to perform its work under

control of the Navy: e.g. “Inspection: At Contractor’s

Plant, Essington, Pennsylvania, By the Inspector of

Machinery, USN, Essington, Pennsylvania, except

Item 2 shall be inspected . . . by the Assistant Inspec-

tor of Naval Material, East Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania”

(Nme #4, p. 3); “Engineering service shall be per-

formed . . . as directed by the Chief, Bureau of Ships

or his duly authorized representative” (p. 4); “Contrac-

tor agrees to enter into a standard government con-

tract .. . from the Bureau of Ships or Department of

the Navy” (p. 5); “Contractor shall furnish the services

of competent engineer(s) . . . as directed by the Chief,

Bureau of Ships, or his duly authorized representa-

tives.” (Item 7, p. 5.)

20. As illustrated by the Kitty Hawk documents,

all Navy vessel equipment, including Westinghouse

and GE turbines, was built according to Navy specifi-

cations and approved for installation aboard these

vessels exclusively by the Navy and its designated of-

ficers.

21. It should be easy to understand, and it is my

experience, that the Navy retained the “final say” over

the design attributes of naval ships and their equip-

ment. As the purchaser, and having the engineering

expertise and experience as to what was needed for

naval combat vessels, the Navy retained final respon-

sibility for the ultimate decision regarding how to re-

solve any disagreement between the Navy and a ship-

builder or an outside equipment supplier. In the case

of private yards the Supervisor of Shipbuilding Office

34

provided the link between the shipbuilder and

BUSHIPS in settling any disputes over Navy require-

ments. If Navy specifications were not followed by the

shipbuilder the Supervisor's inspectors would reject

the shipbuilder’s involved work. All such disputes

were handled formally and any changes required

change orders to the contract or formal waivers to the

specifications.

22. Considering the above, any and all work per-

formed in the construction and repair of Navy ships

noted in this case, as well as, the equipment built and

supplied for these vessels was performed to combat re-

quirements developed and specified by the Navy. Fur-

ther, such work was typically reviewed and inspected

by Navy personnel in the vendors’ plants and in ship-

building and repair yards. Such rigid conformance to

requirements was absolutely necessary for the con-

struction of a warship which was to take our sailors in

harm’s way.

23. The military specifications for turbines en-

sured that each and every turbine ordered by the

Navy, regardless of the identity of the specific contract

manufacturer, was uniform, complied with the Navy’s

combat requirements and would operate in the man-

ner demanded by the Navy. This uniformity was crit-

ical because the Navy cannot take a ship into battle

unless it knows that each component of the ship will

satisfy precisely its specifications including those for

reliability, quietness, battle hardness and maintaina-

bility. These characteristics are vital in total to the

success of the ship’s mission. The Navy cannot put a

ship into harm’s way and have it “dead in the “water”

due to a limitation in its ‘turbines’ capabilities. The

consequences of such problems — which can include

35

death, loss of ship or mission failure — are unaccepta-

ble to the Navy. Certainly the ship’s propulsion plant,

including turbines, are as important as the ships’

weapons during combat.

24. Based on my experience and knowledge, the

Navy required that all turbines be delivered “bare

metal,” meaning that the turbines were not to be ac-

companied by any type of insulation at the time of de-

livery. Pursuant to Navy military specifications, the

turbines were designed by the Navy to include only

metal rails and hooks, the means through which insu-

lation could be attached. It would not have been pos-

sible for contract manufacturers to deliver turbines to

the Navy without these rails and hooks because such

turbines would not conform to military specifications.

Moreover, the Navy did not permit individual turbine

manufacturers to insulate their equipment prior to in-

stallation because it was more economical, efficient

and allowed preoperational inspection and testing to

have the ship’s entire plant insulated at one time than

to have each piece of equipment come with its own in-

sulation. Additionally, the Navy was concerned that

pre-installed insulation on turbines could be easily

damaged during shipment.

25 ~=It was the Navy, not contract manufacturers,

that required the use of asbestos thermal insulation

with turbines intended for installation on Navy ships.

The Navy had its own engineers with expertise in in-

sulation and heat transfer. These engineers devel-

oped their own plans and standards for the insulation

of Navy equipment and, with respect to turbine insu-

lation, these Navy engineers determined that asbes-

tos thermal insulation best met the Navy’s military

36

requirements. Asbestos thermal insulation had char-

acteristics that were essential to the proper operation

of turbines on Navy ships including: optimum heat re-

tention, low weight, fire resistance, resistance to wa-

ter damage and insect infestation, and cost-efficiency.

Weight, in particular, was a significant factor in the

Navy’s determination to use asbestos insulation. Alt-

hough specific amounts varied according to the partic-

ular class of ship and propulsion plant design at issue,

in general, Navy destroyers overall required approxi-

mately 22 tons of asbestos thermal insulation and

Navy aircraft carriers as much 300 tons of asbestos

thermal insulation. Because asbestos had all of the

characteristics critical to insulation on a Navy ship,

the Navy had difficulty identifying satisfactory substi-

tutes. Until acceptable substitutes were identified by

the Navy beginning in the late-1970s, asbestos ther-

mal insulation was critical to naval ship design and

operation. Without proper insulation of the ship’s pro-

pulsion plant (including turbines, boilers and auxil-

iary equipment), the ship’s plant would be inefficient

due to loss of heat and sailors would be burned or un-

able to operate in engineering spaces due to heat lev-

els. Also, every pound of heavier insulation would dis-

place the amount of weapons or fuel that could be

placed aboard ship. For these reasons, Navy specifi-

cations demanded the use of asbestos thermal insula-

tion with its turbines and auxiliary equipment for

most of the 20% Century. If not for the presence of

asbestos thermal insulation, the ship’s efficiency

would not allow it to operate properly including in

combat.

26. In pursuing competitive bids from equipment

vendors such as turbine manufacturers or asbestos

37

suppliers, cost was never the only or over-riding factor

in equipment and material selection. All essential

equipment placed aboard a Navy ship, including tur-

bines and asbestos thermal insulation, had to meet

the requirements of a ship intended to be placed in

harm’s way.

27. There is no way to battle harden a ship to the

extent that no losses to personnel or equipment are

ever sustained. For this reason, the Navy continually

evaluated the combat benefits of specified equipment

and materials against the potential risk to the health

and safety of Navy personnel and civilian workers.

Under the Navy’s command structure, the responsi-

bility for health and safety fell under separate divi-

sions. The CNO was responsible for, and concerned

with, issues seen as immediate threats to safety, and

the Bureau of Medicine (BUMED) was responsible for

medical treatment and issues related to long-term

health hazards. The CNO and BUMED and their

staffs communicate and coordinate on health issues.

At times Navy personnel have to operate in harms

way, and the Navy has to use the best material avail-

able to that end and control with procedures some

health risks if necessary to fulfill its mission. For

most of the 20*6 Century, it is clear that the Navy con-

sidered turbines to be “vital” to its combat mission (see

MIL-T-17600A (SHIPS)) and that asbestos thermal

insulation was essential to safe and efficient oper: tion

of its ships (see Bureau of Ships Manual, Ch. 39, Ther-

mal Insulation (Aug. 24, 1945, Sec. 39-2).

28. The Navy has been aware of the health risk of

exposure to asbestos dust since at least the 1920s.

Until 1975, when it issued a policy aimed at eliminat-

ing the use of asbestos materials where possible, the

38

Navy believed that it had instituted adequate controls

to protect personnel working with or around asbestos

materials. However, even as the Navy moved toward

elimination of asbestos materials in the late 1970s,

the Navy could not immediately eliminate all asbestos

and had to place additional measures believed to be

necessary to control the health risks understood at the

time. Capital steam driven ships had many tons of

insulation and to immediately implement a program

of total asbestos removal would immobilize the Navy

for a lengthy period. Further, replacement material

meeting the Navy’s stringent military specifications

was not available. Rather, the Navy instituted a care-

ful and deliberate asbestos removal program that con-

tinued to protect personnel health to the greatest ex-

tent possible in light of operational demands includ-

ing cost concerns. This program provided for replac-

ing asbestos-containing insulation with non-asbestos

insulation when repairs were required; leaving in

place fixed or intact asbestos-containing insulation

but painting the insulation (magenta with a white

overlay) to identify the presence of potentially hazard-

ous asbestos materials to workers; continuing to use

existing stocks of asbestos-containing insulation in

the Navy supply system; and continuing to accept new

ships delivered with asbestos-containing insulation

into the late 1970s, when a transition could be made

commensurate with material availability and ship

construction schedules.

29. The Navy's military specifications, which

were enforced through the Navy’s command structure,

were designed to provide clear, concise, directions to

all Navy personnel and civilian contractors working

39

under Navy direction. Not only did military specifica-

tions describe the physical equipment and material to

be used in Navy ships but they also addressed the in-

structions considered essential by the Navy to warn

individuals working with that equipment and mate-

rial about potential hazards. For example, military

specifications included directions for the painting and

labeling of ship systems and equipment as well as the

content of instruction manuals to be used in the oper-

ation and maintenance of equipment.

30. Military Specifications for technical manuals

(MIL 15071) prior to 1957 did not mention warnings.

Fven when later revisions of the specification did

mention warnings (Mil - M- 15071C of 10 Sep. 1957),

it was the Navy’s intent to include only warnings con-

cerning how someone might be immediately physi-

cally injured by their actions or cause serious damage

to equipment. It was also specifically noted that such

warnings were to be used sparingly as was consistent

with real need. These instructions were universally

understood by the Navy not to include long-term

health hazards such as those presented by asbestos.

Even after the hazard of asbestos was more fully un-

derstood by the Navy beginning in the mid to late

1960s, the Navy did not require changes to the tech-

nical manuals. Inst. .d, the Navy invoked effective in-

ternal instructions for the safe handling of asbestos.

The Navy had final say, approved the content of tech-

nical manuals and had state-of-the-art medical under-

standing of the dangers of asbestos. Clearly if the

Navy thought it necessary it could have required a

warning concerning asbestos.

31. Further, the Navy controlled labeling that

went on all equipment and materials. It should be

40

noted that, even with increased knowledge concerning

asbestos after the mid to late 1960's, the Navy did not

require everything containing or associated with as-

bestos materials to be labeled as hazardous. In addi-

tion to the asbestos thermal insulation used in a ship’s

plant (turbines, boilers and auxiliary equipment),

there were miles and miles of insulated pipe and cable;

hundreds, if not thousands, of valves; and other equip-

ment that involved asbestos in some way. Once the

additional hazard of asbestos was understood, the

Navy developed procedures to control work involving

asbestos and to monitor exposure to asbestos dust

while, at the same time, seeking and testing new ma-

terials to be used.

32. I served in shipyards before and after the

Navy’s internal asbestos control instructions came out,

and was in ships under construction and overhaul

daily for many years. It is my opinion that the mili-

tary specifications and naval instructions were effec-

tive in controlling the asbestos hazard while main-

taining the benefits associated with asbestos insula-

tion. Labeling of systems or components containing

asbestos, even with the Navy's increased understand-

ing of the hazards, was not considered practical for

combat and combat support operations and, therefore,

was not directed or allowed by the Navy. Instead, the

Navy chose to control and make personnel aware of

the hazards of asbestos exposures through the strict,

effective, procedures required by military specifica-

tions and personnel training.

33. In summary, the Navy exercised rigid control

over the design, manufacture and installation of es-

sential plant equipment and materials, such as tur-

bines and asbestos insulations, to ensure that this

41

equipment and material would perform as expected

during battle conditions. The Navy also developed

and imposed requirements for warnings and docu-

mentation necessary for the maintenance of this

equipment and material to ensure that personnel,

particularly in combat conditions, received only one

clear set of instructions that had been approved by the

chain of command. Finally the Navy had in place a

formal organization at building and repair facilities,

and also available to inspect at supplier's plants, in

order to assure its combat requirements were met.

34. I can attest that any and all work performed

on turbines built and supplied for Navy ships by ven-

dors such as Westinghouse and GE was performed to

the requirements specified by the Navy and that the

work was reviewed and inspected by Navy personnel

in the vendor’s plant and in the shipbuilding yards to

ensure that the turbines met the Navy’s combat needs.

As noted earlier, in many instances during my career

I personally inspected equipment to verify conform-

ance with the requirements specified, although more

immediate supervision typically was exercised by of-

ficers and other Navy personnel under my command

or the command of NAVSEA or its predecessor,

BUSHIPS.

35. Further in summary, | have’ general

knowledge and extensive Navy experience with the

comprehensive plans, specifications and requirements

that governed the construction of Navy ships and the

equipment placed on them. At one time, the engineers

that prepared specifications and accomplished ship

designs worked under me at NAVSEA. The Navy had

general specifications and detailed specifications, as

42

well as, plans that were invoked by contract. The gen-

eral and detailed specifications and contract plans

also invoked more detailed specifications for the ship

design, as well as, for the equipment and material to

be used in its construction. Frequently, the more de-

tailed specifications and contract plans noted above

would invoke even further specifications so that a

shipbuilder had to comply in all aspects of the con-

struction. Such direction also included material ref-

erenced in the plans and stocked by the Navy. The

Navy developed detailed requirements for the con-

struction, maintenance and operation of warships and

auxiliaries in order to ensure the ship’s continued

ability to operate in combat zones and be maintained

with material specified and stocked by the Navy. Ad-

herence to the Navy’s specifications was mandatory

because lives depended on it.

36. I have extensive experience and knowledge

concerning the control exercised by the Navy during

the construction, repair and overhaul of ships in Navy

yards and private yards. Later in my career, all the

Supervisor of Shipbuilding Offices inspecting Navy

ships and other contracts reported to me (15 offices

nationwide). I have personally inspected ships and

equipment during construction, repair or overhaul, to

verify conformance with the requirements specified

and have given instructions to Navy employed inspec-

tors as to how inspections were to be made. At times

| and my inspectors have rejected items that failed to

meet specifications. For example, | recall rejecting

various piping integrity systems (including valves and

gaskets) for failure to meet specifications because they

proved to leak during system hydrostatic tests. In an-

other case, testing during sea trials revealed a turbine

43

bearing leaked oil due to faulty oil seals. These type

of rejections occurred frequently during ship construc-

tion and repair.

37.

Based on my experience, knowledge and re-

search, my opinions are that:

a.

b.

The fundamental first step to the Navy’s ability

to successfully fight wars is the design and con-

struction of its combat and combat support ves-

sels as an integrated weapons system. The de-

sign of the propulsion plants aboard these ves-

sels, including turbine design and manufacture

and material selection such as insulation, rep-

resent vital military combat-related decisions

commensurate with state-of-the-art knowledge

and industrial capability at the time. Each mil-

itary specification developed by the Navy re-

lated to turbines and asbestos insulation

aboard ship were necessary to meet the tactical

and strategic military characteristics ulti-

mately required by the CNO, the highest Navy

officer. These specifications reflected the state-

of-the-art and the special needs of vessels des-

tined to either engage in or support combat ac-

tivities.

Because of the Navy’s superior knowledge of

the tactical demands and operational require-

ments of combat vessels and of the availability

of processes and materials in support of those

needs, the Navy exclusively controlled the de-

tailed specifications for its equipment in its pro-

pulsion plants and the type of insulation mate-

rials to be used with that equipment. It also

exclusively controlled warnings related to

44

health and safety implications of its selected in-

sulation materials. The Navy could not, and

did not, permit any equipment manufacturer or

material supplier to interfere with mission suc-

cess by supplying turbines or insulation that

did not expressly comply with Navy specifica-

tions or by placing warnings on equipment (or

in instructions or manuals accompanying the

equipment) without Navy approval.

c. The Navy made calculated decisions on the al-

location of its resources in light of its knowledge

of the hazards of asbestos insulation and the

technical and operational demands of war. The

Navy instituted a comprehensive program,

both aboard ship and in shipyards, to address

the hazards of asbestos in a manner consistent

with the unique circumstances of combat and

combat-support ships that require the sensitive

military balancing of tactical, strategic, and

technical needs and budgetary constraints

against the placing of sailors and civilian work-

ers in harm’s way in the defense of the Country.

| declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of

the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and

correct, and that if called as a witness, I could compe-

tently testify to the foregoing facts, all of which are

within my own personal knowledge.

Executed this 19*» day of August, 2013.

45

s/ Roger B. Horne, Jr.

ROGER B. HORNE, JR.

State of Washington

County of

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19% day of

August, 2013.

s/ April R. Ihde

Notary Public

My commission expires: 5/10/2017

46

United States District Court

Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Allentown)

CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE#: 5:13-cv-00474-ER

DEVRIES et al v.

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY et a!

REPORT OF SAMUEL A. FORMAN. M.D.

L. BACKGROUND

1. [am a medical doctor specializing in preven-

tive medicine and occupational medicine. | received a

B.A. degree from the University of Pennsylvania ma-

joring in history and biology, graduating magna cum

laude in 1973. I attended Cornell Medical School,

graduating with an M.D. degree in 1977. | also re-

ceived a degree in public health in 1977 as a result of

a joint program with the Harvard School of Public

Health. Thereafter, I became board certified in occu-

pational medicine after attending a residency at the

Harvard School of Public Health.

2. From 1973 to 1977, I participated in Ensign

1975, a Navy program that permitted me to engage in

active duty service and obtain hands-on training dur-

ing the summers between medical school sessions. My

participation in this program gave me background

and experience different from that of many other pro-

spective medical officers at that time, because very

few medical officers engage in operational and admin-

istrative rotations as part of their service and training.

In the summer of 1974, I engaged in a midshipmen

cruise aboard the USS Shreveport (LPD-12) for the

purpose of obtaining a general understanding of ship

operations outside the medical department. I at-

tended training classes and observed activities in all

47

parts of the ship including the engineering depart-

ment, command information center, commissary de-

partment, supply and repair divisions, and aviation

division. In the summer of 1975, I did a rotation at

the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery

(“BUMED”), known at times as the Naval Medical

Command. While there, I participated in medical ad-

ministration in the office overseeing all medical train-

ing for the Navy and worked directly with a number

of high-ranking officers in BUMED, including William

M. McDermott, who at that time held the rank of Cap-

tain but who later became Deputy Commander of the

Naval Medical Command. During this rotation, I had

an extended assignment to analyze Navy expendi-

tures for medical education at civilian universities to

ensure the Navy’s needs were being met. In the sum-

mer of 1976, I did a clinical rotation on the general

and internal medicine wards at San Diego Naval Hos-

pital, the largest military hospital in the world. By

the time I graduated medical school, I had already ac-

cumulated approximately six months of active duty

service from my summer internships. These intern-

ships gave me a fundamental understanding of the

needs of sailors at sea, a general understanding of

ship operations, including ship propulsion systems,

and insight into the leadership and administrative

side of the Navy.

3. In 1977, | graduated from medical school and

went on full-time active duty in the Navy. | performed

my internship at the Bethesda Naval Medical Center

in Bethesda, Maryland during 1977 and 1978. I re-

mained on active duty in the Navy until 1983. There-

after, | continued to work for the Navy as a civilian

48

employee until 1986. My qualifications and creden-

tials are more fully described in my curriculum vitae

(Exhibit A).

4. Over the course of my active duty service in

the Navy, I served aboard Navy ships whose primary

purpose was to fulfill national defense missions of the

United States. Assignments aboard ship, involving

duty at sea, included, in addition to the Shreveport in

the North Atlantic, USS Duluth (LPD-6) in the East-

ern Pacific, and USS St. Louis (LKA-116) in the West-

ern Pacific. At all times, these ships were performing

missions and activities aimed at preparing for or de-

terring combat. In the military setting, a major goal

of training is combat readiness. This training is in-

tended to simulate combat and combat conditions.

For example, the Navy hands out “battle efficiency”

ribbons to ships that perform well in war exercises.

Even combat support ships are required to remain

ready to assist ships and sailors on the front line and,

at times, these support ships must themselves go into

harm’s way. To achieve its mission, the Navy had to

be willing to put life and limb at risk not just on the

front line but also in support operations.

5. One of the highest profile operations in which

| was involved occurred aboard the St. Louis, which

was an amphibious attack transport ship deployed at

the time to the Western Pacific for the purpose of car-

rying Marines, cargo (including heavily armored Ma-

nne Corps vehicles used in amphibious assault),

equipment and supplies to Navy shore-based facilities.

In March 1979, President Carter ordered the Navy to

rescue a wave of Vietnamese and Southeast Asian ref-

ugees who were escaping communist Vietnam and lo-

cal pirates into the South China Sea. The St. Louis

49

was the first ship of the Seventh Fleet to arrive on the

scene. Fortunately the St. Louis was able to perform

this mission without exchanging hostile fire; however,

in order to perform this humanitarian rescue opera-

tion, the St. Louis had to travel just outside the twelve

mile international limit and sail directly into an area

threatened by actively hostile Communist interests.

This situation represented an intense Cold War sce-

nario, one of but many types of hazardous scenarios

and missions for which the Navy must be prepared.

6. In the course of my active duty service, I also

worked in Navy shore facilities, including shipyards

such as the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. These facil-

ities contributed to the defense of the country by en-

gaging in industrial efforts to construct, repair and

overhaul the Navy’s combat and combat support ves-

sels. My role was to ensure that the Navy personnel

and civilians involved in these efforts performed their

duties as safely as possible.

7. From 1980 to | 982, I ran an occupational

health clinic at the Naval Weapons Station at Seal

Beach, California, and assisted in the medical pro-

grams at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. Among

other responsibilities, I assisted in the asbestos medi-

cal surveillance program for over 2,000 federal Civil

Service employees and uniformed sailors. At any one

time, I was following 200 cases of asbestos disease.

8. In 1982, | was assigned to the Naval Environ-

mental Health Center at Norfolk, Virginia. While sta-

tioned there, I designed occupational medicine pro-

grams with regard to Navy-specific occupational dis-

eases, performed health hazard evaluations, in-

spected the occupational health programs of govern-

ment facilities as part of the Navy Occupational

50

Safety and Health, or “NAVOSH,” program, carried

out epidemiologic studies, and trained Navy doctors

and nurses in occupational medicine.

9. In 1983, a JAG officer for the Naval Medical

Command requested that | become part of a team to

locate, digest and organize government documents for

production in asbestos litigation. Over the next year

and a half, I investigated the Navy’s historical han-

dling and knowledge of various industrial hygiene is-

sues, including asbestos disease.

10. In 1985, pursuant to Navy orders, I completed

my review of Navy knowledge and practice in indus-

trial hygiene, including its awareness of and response

to health hazards of asbestos, as a formal assignment.

My search for documents took me to the National Ar-

chives, other warehouses and storage facilities for rec-

ords of the Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. |

was given full security clearances for and unimpeded

access to these facilities. | also conducted research at

private facilities such as Harvard University’s Count-

way Library of Medicine's section for rare books and

manuscripts.

11. From my review of countless Navy documents

and my studies while employed by the Navy, I ac-

quired extensive knowledge as to the state of Navy

knowledge and awareness regarding the hazards of

asbestos.

12. Following my research, and with the approval

of the U.S. Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, |

published an article entitled “U.S. Navy Shipyard Oc-

cupational Medicine Through World War II” in the

Journal of Occupational Medicine, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Jan.

1988) (Ref. 1).

51

13. Though I no longer hold any formal position

with the Navy, since I left I have been asked on a num-

ber of occasions to speak to Navy medical and safety

personnel on issues relating to the history of occupa-

tional medicine and industrial hygiene in the Navy.

14. lLalso am currently a Visiting Scientist in the

Department of Environmental Health at the Harvard

University School of Public Health.

II. DISCUSSION AND OPINIONS

A. Navy Occupational Health and Industrial

Hygiene Organization

15. The Navy has always taken responsibility for

the health and safety of its uniformed and civilian per-

sonnel. It has consistently exercised its discretion re-

garding hazard recognition and appropriate controls

in Navy workplaces. As Navy Captain Ernest W.

Brown, M.D., recognized as the architect of the Navy's

formal occupational health program prior to World

War II, wrote in 1940: “One of the most important con-

cerns of the Medical Department of the United States

Navy today is industrial hygiene, especially in navy

yard practice.” (Ref. 2).

16. This commitment was reflected in numerous

other Navy statements and documents. In 1943, Sec-

retary of the Navy, Frank Knox, in a statement co-

signed by the Chairman of the U.S. Maritime Com-

mission, KE. 8S. Lamb accompanying “Minimum Re-

quirements for Safety and Industrial Health in Con-

tract Shipyards,” stressed the Navy’s commitment in

this regard:

The necessity for conserving manpower and pro-

moting the physical welfare, health, and safety of

what shortly will amount to one million workers in

52

shipyards required that careful observance of

standards for the prevention of accidents and pro-

tection of health be accorded. Aside from the weight

which must be given humanitarian consideration, it

is simply good common sense that as much care and

attention be given to protecting the human factors

in the war production program as is given machines.

(Ref. 3). Similarly, in a 1955 Naval Institute publica-

tion called The Human Machine, Captain Charles W.

Shilling of the Navy Medical Corps described the “par-

amount importance” of Navy health: “(T]he medical

component of the Navy has a heavy responsibility”

with a mission to promote physical fitness, prevent

and control diseases and injuries and treat and care

for the sick and injured. (Ref. 4).

17. While the formal titles have varied over the

years, the most senior Medical Corps officer in the

Navy is the Navy Surgeon General, who is also the

Chief of BUMED and who reports to the Chief of Na-

val Operations (““CNO”). The Navy Surgeon Genera!

has responsibility to spell out health programs, in-

cluding prevention and injury care, for sailors and ci-

vilian workers (as appropriate). Medical Corps, allied

health professions and enlisted hospital corpsmen are

responsible for advising operational line commands to

carry out preventive practices and to provide special-

ized industrial hygiene services. It is the responsibil-

ity of the Navy line authorities (the operational chain

of command) to carry out these recommendations.

18. Given the breadth and sophistication of its

military and industrial activities, the Navy recognized

the need to establish departments and bureaus with

specific expertise in scientific and technical areas of

53

importance. The Navy Medical Department (which

encompasses BUMED, among other organizations)

is actively concerned with all phases of life in the

Navy and advises all components of the Navy on

matters which may affect the health and well-being

of naval personnel. . .. There is a Medical School, a

Dental School, and a Medical Research Institute at

the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Mar-

yland. There are also numerous other research

units established in connection with operational ac-

tivities throughout the world. . . . [T]he Medical De-

partment and all of its component parts are work-

ing with the operational forces of the Navy, in all

areas of naval importance.

(Ref. 4 at 275 and 276).

19. In addition to monitoring all health programs

including industrial hygiene in both a quantitative

and qualitative way, the Navy’s Medical Department

also originated extensive research activities:

As it is with other component parts of the Navy, re-

search is an intimate part of the Medical Depart-

ment activity, the importance of which cannot be

overemphasized. Through research we assist in the

development of new equipment, new and better

methods of care and treatment of various diseases

and injuries; help in the problem of adjustment of

naval personnel to all of the new and strange envi-

ronmental situations in which they are placed; and,

in general, provide the knowledge necessary for

more efficient operation of the Navy.

Research under the cognizance of the Bureau of

Medicine and Surgery is accomplished in a large

54

medical research institute, in several research la-

boratories, fleet and shore-based units, and in vari-

ous naval hospitals. The scope of this research is

extremely broad and parallels the total activity of

the Navy.

(Ref. 4 at 277).

20. A 1956 Navy training document entitled “Na-

val Orientation” described the scope of BUMED’s re-

sponsibilities:

The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery is responsible

for safeguarding the health of personnel of the Navy;

the procurement of all medical and dental materials;

research in medicine and dentistry; evaluation of

the performance characteristics, from the physio-

logical standpoint, of equipment designed for the

use in naval service; the determination of standards

of sanitation and hygiene; the professional educa-

tion and training of medical personnel; and the es-

tablishment of professional medical and dental

standards for clinical methods and procedures.

(Ref. 5 at 177).

21. Among the tasks of BUMED in connection

with its research and monitoring activities was the

distillation of the results of that experience into prac-

tical guidance for the rest of the Navy. The transla-

tion of the results of that experience into practices and

procedures for Navy personnel, and the communica-

tion of those practices and procedures, necessarily in-

volved the exercise of judgment by BUMED in deter-

mining what topics, and what specific information on

those topics, should be disseminated to Navy person-

nel. Personnel recipients included officers, enlisted,

civil servants and contractors. The communication of

55

such information was designed to ensure that recipi-

ents received precisely, and only, what was deemed

appropriate in light of their duties and responsibilities,

and the overall mission and operations of the Navy.

22. As a consequence of the Navy’s approach to

such matters, the knowledge of any individual Navy

sailor — even an officer with command responsibilities

~ with respect to an issue like the hazards of asbestos

cannot be taken as representative of the broader

knowledge of the Navy on the topic. By design, that

individual would have possessed only that knowledge

necessary, in the view of BUMED, to the performance

of his or her duties. Put differently, regarding asbes-

tos — as with many other health and safety issues —

there was extensive information regarding .tential

hazards and potential protective measures that were

consciously not shared with the vast majority of Navy

personnel who were deemed not to have a need to

know.

23. As a General Medical Officer, | was not per-

mitted to deviate from the standardized programs de-

veloped by the Navy Surgeon General for the health

of Navy personnel, without approval from a more sen-

ior Navy officer except in extraordinary circumstances,

such as if a ship was isolated or out of contact with

more senior, knowledgeable and experienced officers.

24. All Navy personnel including medical officers

must follow their chain of command to maintain good

order and discipline. Enlisted personnel are indoctri-

nated during boot camp and training with the under-

standing that they must conduct all activities “the

Navy way,” meaning that Navy orders and instruc-

tions supersede any information or directions received

from any source outside the Navy. Sailors must follow

56

orders trusting that their chain of command will have

the mission of the Navy in mind and will address

safety as best as possible. Unlike in the civilian com-

munity, all military personnel who refuse to perform

an order could be subject to various penalties pursu-

ant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”).

Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Navy de-

mands and enforces rigid adherence to the chain of

command. It does so because it is the military's

method for institutionalizing strategic considerations,

highly specialized expertise, and prior experience and

then transforming this information in an effective and

predictable way into programs and orders for all per-

sonnel to follow.

25. Collective and uniform communication and

implementation of Navy programs and orders are key

to the Navy’s operational flexibility. The Navy has

numerous sailors with specialized capabilities. The

Navy also maintains many ships and multiple ship-

yards with specialized capabilities. The Navy strives

to ensure that each sailor is consistently trained, and

that each ship in its fleet is predictably constructed so

that it can rely on both the sailors and the ships to

perform critical operations without endangering sail-

ors any more than is necessary to achieve mission suc-

cess.

B. Navy Knowledge of Asbestos-Related

Health Issues

26. Consistent with the Navy’s interpretation of

the importance of industrial hygiene and occupational!

health, the Navy’s programs in these areas have par-

alleled, and at times led, the development of occupa-

tional medicine and industrial hygiene in general, and

asbestos-related issues in particular. The Navy’s

57

knowledge in the areas of asbestos and associated

health conditions has been quite complete when com-

pared to available knowledge over time, and at least

by the early 1940s, the Navy had become a leader in

the field of occupational medicine relating to, among

other things, asbestos dust inhalation exposure.

27. As early as 1922, the Navy recognized, as ex-

emplified by its instructions to officers published in

the Navy Medical Bulletin, the health hazards associ-

ated with airborne asbestos dust and the appropriate

protective measures to prevent asbestos exposure.

These included the use of water to dampen dust, ex-

haust systems to remove dust, enclosed chambers to

prevent escape of dust and respirators. (Ref. 6). The

Navy’s knowledge of potential asbestos-related health

problems, and of the means to control against them,

continued to expand throughout the following decades,

as senior Navy officers actively assessed, evaluated,

controlled, and made recommendations concerning

Navy policy regarding disease and injury prevention,

including asbestos related occupational health haz-

ards.

28. The Navy’s health and safety apparatus on

the eve of World War II was described in the 1939

Handbook of the Navy Hospital Corps published by

the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery under the direc-

tion of the Secretary of the Navy:

The United State Navy is one of the largest of the

industries maintained by this Government. An or-

ganization has been set up in the Navy to protect its

personnel, both civilian and naval. A safety engi-

neer is provided, who acts directly under the Assis-

tant Secretary of the Navy. He has supervision of

the safety precautions taken to protect the civilian

58

employees in the navy yards, ammunition depots,

torpedo stations and the like. He is also a consult-

ant in all matters pertaining to safety aboard ships,

at training stations and other Navy Department ac-

tivities. A naval medical officer is assigned to his

office for the purpose of consultation in all matters

pertaining to health and safety and to cooperate in

devising means by which health may be protected

and accidents prevented. Aside from this particular

medical officer, all medical officers, dental officers,

members of the Hospital Corps and nurses form the

balance of the medical staff of this organization. It

is essential that each one of these members know

and understand the hazards to be encountered in

the Navy, the steps to be taken to protect against

injury and disease, the treatment of diseases and

injuries arising therefrom and the organization of

the medical personnel for such purposes. Naval

medical personnel are required to perform duties

ashore, at sea, in foreign countries, in the air and

under the sea. In each of these places a variety of

health hazards exist. It is therefore necessary that

this [sic] personnel have a thorough knowledge of

the industry to which they are attached, the haz-

ards presented, the methods of prevention and the

treatment of all injuries occurring.

(Ref. 7).

29. The Handbook of the Navy Hospital Corps

also explained that all Navy yards have a comman-

dant who “is responsible to the Navy Department for

the protection of employees, as well as Navy personnel,

under his command. He is familiar with . . . the health

and accident hazards presented.” Thus, the Comman-

dant was “responsible for the appointment of the

59

safety engineers [who will] make inspections and rec-

ommend proper protective measures.” The Handbook

further called for the Navy medical officer to “advise

the safety engineer and instruct the employees in

safety measures and encourage them to cooperate in

protective measures.” These safety measures included

required “masks for asbestos workers.”

30. Also in 1939, the Annual Report of the Sur-

geon General of the Navy addressed the “Hazard of

Asbestos,” and described asbestosis as “an industrial

disease of the lungs incident to inhalation of asbestos

dust for prolonged periods.” The Report noted the risk

from “continued exposure to present occupational con-

ditions” at Navy facilities, and directed appropriate

methods for preventing such exposures, recommend-

ing the use of local exhaust ventilation to control as-

bestos dust exposure for insulators in the fabrication

shop. (Ref. 8).

31. At about the same time, Navy Captain E.W.

Brown undertook an assessment of asbestos exposure,

and its prevention, in Navy yards. In an article enti-

tled “Industrial Hygiene and the Navy in National De-

fense” published in 1941, Captain Brown prescribed

appropriate measures for the prevention of asbestos

exposure. These included use of respirators, local ex-

haust ventilation, and wetting of asbestos containing

materials. (Ref. 2).

32. The Navy has historically directed all aspects

of policy and procedure addressing the health and

safety of Navy personnel. This direction has encom-

passed policies, practices and procedures to protect

workers from dangers posed by exposure to asbestos.

Indeed, the Navy has on several occasions over time

60

rejected offers of assistance from other leaders in the

field.

33. For example, in 1941, the U.S. Labor Depart-

ment’s Bureau of Labor Standards offered to conduct

inspections of health and safety conditions in Navy

shipyards. Navy leaders rejected this offer. In a mem-

orandum to Navy Surgeon General McIntire, Com-

mander Charles S. Stephenson, head of the Division

of Preventive Medicine within the Navy's Bureau of

Medicine and Surgery, offered “[njotes for considera-

tion when you call on Assistant Secretary |of the Navy

Ralph A.| Bard.” Commander Stephenson advised

Admiral McIntire that Assistant Secretary Bard

asks specifically what the policy is concerning invi-

tation of . . . the Bureau of Labor Standards, Labor

Department into the Navy Yards to make a survey

of the welding and other hazards. | told him that

we had never done that sort of work and recom-

mended against it, as | know who [the Bureau of

Labor Standards] intends to send if it should be

done.

Navy leaders recognized that other government de-

partments had a high level of expertise, while reject-

ing the offers of assistance:

I gave Mr. Bard and the two officers present a com-

plete story of the beginning of this controversy from

the Federal Administrator's letter: that is, that the

United States Public Health Service had four teams

of traveling scientists alleged to be able to make

surveys of all of the Navy Yards and make recom-

mendations for the correction of such hazards as

were discovered.

He then emphasized:

61

I told Mr. Bard that this was not considered the best

policy, due to the fact that we had medical officers

in the Yards and that in practically all instances

recommendations of sound character had been

made by medical officers. We saw no need of invit-

ing the United States Public Health Service on its

own invitation to do this job.

(Ref. 9).

34. The Navy’s reluctance to accept these offers of

assistance was based on concerns regarding possible

upset of labor relations, and also for security at Navy

facilities. Stephenson’s memorandum makes clear

that these concerns originated at the highest levels of

Government:

Likewise, I told him that I had spoken to you and

that you had indicated that President Roosevelt

thought that this might not be the best policy, due

to the fact that they might cause disturbance in the

labor element.

(President Roosevelt was familiar with the structure

and operation of the Navy’s shipyards and other facil-

ities — and in particular with the functioning of the

Navy during wartime - from his tenure as Assistant

Secretary of the Navy from 1913 until 1920. Admiral

McIntire was President Roosevelt's personal physi-

cian in addition to being the Surgeon General of the

Navy.)

35. Stephenson’s positions were taken even in

light of knowledge that not all industrial hazards were

adequately controlled at Navy facilities: “I doubt if

any of our foundries would be tolerated if the State

industrial health people were to make surveys of

them.” Asbestos, too, was discussed as an issue: “I am

62

certain that we are not protecting the men as we

should.”

36. Health and safety issues, including those re-

lating to asbestos exposure, continued to be a major

focus of the Navy and the United States Maritime

Commission throughout World War Il. In 1943, the

Navy, along with the Maritime Commission declared

its responsibility for the safety and health of their

workers and took charge of implementing and staffing

safety and health programs for those workers. Fol-

lowing extensive discussion with various constituen-

cies, the Navy and the Maritime Commission jointly

issued “Minimum Requirements for Safety and Indus-

trial Health in Contract Shipyards” (“Minimum Re-

quirements”). (Ref. 3). The specific requirements im-

posed by the document enunciated for private and

contract shipyards expectations that were already in

effect and implemented at the Navy’s own facilities.

37. The Minimum Requirements identified asbes-

tos-related disease as a potential hazard of shipyard

work, explaining that exposure could result from han-

dling, sawing, cutting, molding and welding rod sal-

vage around asbestos or asbestos mixtures. The doc-

ument advised that such jobs “can be done safely with:

1. Segregation of dusty work and,

2. (a) Special ventilation: Hoods enclosing the

working process and having linear air velocities

at all openings of 100 feet per minute, or

(b) Wearing of special respirators.

3. Periodic medical examination.”

63

The Minimum Requirements also warned that jobs in-

volving exposure to asbestos require “respiratory pro-

tective equipment,” in particular a “dust respirator.”

A ventilation supervisor (the safety engineer) was re-

quired to be trained to handle the entire ventilation

program in the yard, which was to include classes,

demonstrations and short talks on proper procedures.

38. The Minimum Requirements further called

for employee safety training: “the time for the safety

training of an employee to start is at the inception of

his employment.” “Employees shall have in their pos-

session, and be instructed in the proper use of, all nec-

essary personal protective equipment before being

started on any job.” Safety bulletin boards were to be

located at each hull and shop, with “|sjafety posters

and other material on the bulletin boards” changed at

least semi-monthly. The type of safety posters used

in these worker educational campaigns included ma-

terials reinforcing the use of masks for protection

against disease-causing dusts. One such poster stated,

“His mask keeps him on the job.” (Ref. 10).

39. This commitment by the Navy to address the

asbestos-related health concerns of Navy workers, as

set forth in the 1939 Handbook of the Hospital Corps

and the Minimum Requirements document, is further

evidenced by dozens of other documents generated by

the Navy and consultants it retained during the war

years.

40. Later in the war, following extensive study of

asbestos-related health issues, Dr. Philip Drinker, a

Harvard professor and Chief Health Consultant to the

Division of Shipyard Labor Relations and consultant

to the Navy Surgeon General since 1941, wrote on

January 31, 1945 to Captain Thomas J. Carter at the

64

Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. In his letter,

he reported on analyses of airborne dust collected at

Bath Lron Works, a leading contractor for construction

of Navy vessels. Dr. Drinker summarized the results

of the analysis: “This evidence is enough to indicate a

fairly serious dust risk at Bath and to make it very

probable that the same sort of thing will be found in

other plants and yards where the same type of [asbes-

tos] pipe covering materials are used.” (Ref. 11).

41. In addition to asbestos health concerns re-

vealed at Bath Iron Works, experience in some of the

contract shipyards also came to the attention of Dr.

Drinker and Navy authorities:

| suggested to Admiral Mills that it would be very

desirable for Navy to examine men handling the

preparation of [asbestos] pipe coverings and their

installation in at least two Navy Yards and two

Navy contract yards as this is much more a Navy

than a Maritime problem because the materials are

used especially on Navy vessels with high pressure

steam power plants. Admiral Mills agreed that

such studies would be wise before Navy or Maritime

accepted this asbestos risk as being significant in

our general ship construction program.

(Ref. 11).

42. Dr. Drinker and his Navy colleagues pub-

lished the results of the study he had suggested in

W.E. Fleischer, et al., “A Health Survey of Pipe Cov-

ering Operations in Constructing Naval Vessels,” 28

Journal of Industrial Hygiene & Toxicology 9-16 (Jan.

1946). (Ref. 12). The study reaffirmed the Navy’s po-

sition regarding acceptable occupational dust expo-

sure levels and dust control strategies. They offered

65

the conclusion that “|asbestos] pipe covering is not a

dangerous trade.”

43. The conclusions of this study were carried into

practice in Navy workplaces follewing World War II.

The January 1947 issue of the Nawy’s Safety Review

publication noted that “[e]xposure to asbestos dust is

a health hazard which cannot be overlooked in main-

taining an effective industrial hygiene program.” (Ref.

13).

44. Also during the second half of the 1940s, the

American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hy-

gienists (“ACGIH”) evaluated the issue of asbestos ex-

posures. This entity, comprised entirely of industrial

hygienists with links to the government and academia,

published threshold limit values for acceptable expo-

sures to asbestos dust in the workplace. These stand-

ards were periodically updated over the years. Repre-

sentatives of the Navy, trained as industrial hygien-

ists, participated in the ACGIH. In recognition of the

potential hazards associated with exposure to asbes-

tos dust, a 1955 Navy Bureau of Medicine instruction

adopted the ACGIH’s threshold limit value for expo-

sure to asbestos dust among Navy personnel. (Ref. 14).

The 1955 threshold limit value as promulgated in the

Navy instruction was the same level to which the

Navy had sought to control exposures during World

War Il.

45. During the 1950s, the Navy continued to pre-

scribe safe work practices to address potential ship-

yard hazards associated with exposure to asbestos

dust. For example, a 1950 General Safety Rules Man-

ual issued by the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in-

66

structed workers to “[w]jear dust type or air-fed respi-

rators for .. . handling amosite [asbestos] insulating

materials. .. .” (Ref. 15).

46. In 1957, the Navy convened at the Boston Na-

val Shipyard a “Pipe and Copper Shop Master Me-

chanics’ Conference” to address issues of concerns to

those in the pipefitters’ trade. At the conference were

personnel from all twelve Navy shipyards and the

Navy’s Bureau of Ships in Washington, D.C.

47. The prepared remarks of a Long Beach Naval

Shipyard official, included in the Minutes of the Con-

ference reflect the Navy’s stated policy that pipe insu-

lators and laggers who handle asbestos products

should wear respirators:

Asbestos, when handled dry, produces vast

amounts of silica dust. . . . [T]he material can be

dampened to reduce the amount of dust liberated.

However, the specified type of amosite [asbestos] for

use on cold water piping is water repellent. Also

material which must be removed from an existing

installation is dry and powdery, being an excellent

dust producer. .. .

[Djuring 1956 eleven deaths from asbestosis were

reported on the Pacific Coast alone. . . .

I know that two of my insulators are now afflicted

with this condition. How many more will become

afflicted is something which I hesitate to predict.

Again the solution is obvious. Remove the cause by

substituting other products. .. .

In the meantime, the answer is the wearing of res-

pirators by all who handle asbestos products.

(Ref. 16).

67

48. A New York Naval Shipyard official added

that if those working with asbestos insulation have

not been “told . . . to put on masks, you are more or

less the cause of their trouble.” That same official

added:

I think everyone, who has people doing this type

work, should warn their people regarding the han-

dling of this material. With the proper handling of

it on the job, and it has always posed a very big

problem, because the men don’t want to wear the

masks, or get this dread disease. It is difficult to

protect them. After a couple of years of mandatory

wearing masks, I think they should realize the dan-

ger. I think everyone ought to enforce the wearing

of masks. Don’t forget this is something that in-

jures people’s health. We should do something

about it- and fast, and I am convinced that what we

are doing is not enough. We should not have people

handle this material withou|t] protection.

49. On January 7, 1958, the Department of the

Navy issued a “Safety Handbook for Pipefitters,”

which explicitly addressed the asbestos hazard and

again set forth Navy policy for controlling this hazard.

(Ref. 17). This handbook — one of many safety hand-

books issued by the Navy — stressed that “[a]sbestos

dust is injurious if inhaled,” and warned those work-

ing with asbestos insulation materials to “[wjear an

approved dust respirator for protection against this

hazard.”

50. During this time period, study of asbestos-re-

lated health issues was ongoing at various Navy facil-

ities. For example, Occupational Health Hazards Re-

leases from the Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Sur-

gery on February 1, 1961 (Ref. 18) and May 1, 1961

68

(Ref. 19) reported on studies of personnel engaged in

the handling of asbestos-containing materials and on

recom mendations, including the use of respirators, ex-

haust systems and worker training at Puget Sound

Naval Shipyard. A 1961 Marine Pipe Covering and

Insulating Manual at Puget Sound set forth “General

Safety and Health Practices” that included instruc-

tions to “[hjandle amosite . . . materials carefully to

avoid [its] dust[],” “sprinkle amosite with water when-

ever possible to keep dust down,” and “[s]ee that your

chest is X-rayed at least once a year to detect the pos-

sibility of . . . asbestosis.” (Ref. 20).

51. Concurrently, similar activities were ongoing

at Long Beach Naval Shipyard, which had “continu-

ous health education program for . . . asbestos workers

at Long Beach Naval Shipyard, including a showing

of a film entitled “The Air We Breath,” followed by “a

short discussion of the hazards of breathing asbestos

fibers and the use of dust respirators.” (Ref. 21). Be-

ginning in 1958, health personnel at the yard had be-

gun “a study . . . of pipecoverers (asbestos) working

conditions” at Long Beach Naval Shipyard. The study

had commenced in 1958, and it included “[cjhest x-

rays and vital capacity test[s] . . . on [792] asbestos

workers. The report also noted that at the time the

study began, a “former [Long Beach] employee was re-

ceiving compensation for asbestosis.” (Ref. 22).

52. Similar investigation and study was ongoing

at other Navy facilities. In September 1962, a Navy

Department Occupational Health Hazards Release re-

ported that at Boston Naval Shipyard “[a] study was

conducted to obtain current data for evaluating the

exposure of pipecoverers to asbestos containing dust.”

The study involved the collection of samples taken in

69

the pipecoverers’ shop and also aboard ship. The re-

sults showed that “[d]ust concentrations found in the

general atmosphere of the shop were within permissi-

ble exposure limits at the time of sampling,” but that

“(t]he excessive dust counts obtained aboard ship, em-

phasized the need for the wearing of approved dust

respirators by pipecoverers.” (Ref. 23). A few years

later, another Release described the results of “[rjan-

dom dust counts . . . aboard ship during the removal

of amosite insulation from two fire room boilers” by

two pipecoverers. Navy personnel observed that

“lo|jther tradesmen working the same work area as

pipecoverers are also quite often exposed to the asbes-

tos containing dust and usually remain in the area

sometime after the pipecoverers,” and “emphasized

that respiratory protection should be provided when-

ever long exposures to high dust concentrations” occur.

(Ref. 24).

53. The ongoing development of the Navy’s poli-

cies and practices to protect workers from asbestos-

related health concerns during the early 1960s was re-

flected, for example, in an article entitled “Asbestosis”

published in the October 1962 issue of the Navy’s In-

ternal Safety Review publication by Captain H.M.

Robbins, a Navy physician, and W.T. Marr, a Navy in-

dustrial hygienist from the Long Beach Naval Ship-

yard. The article addressed the potential for exposure

to asbestos aboard ships:

Aboard ship, a great variety of insulation is per-

formed. Insulation blocks are shaped with a saw,

pads are supplied to fittings, insulation cement is

applied to blocks and covered with asbestos cloth.

These and other operations take place in nearly all

compartments; however, most work is done in the

70

machinery spaces. By far the greatest potential ex-

posure to asbestos fibers occurs during ripout of old

insulation for ship overhaul or reconversions.

The article concluded that “[t]he worker’s best protec-

tion is to avoid careless creation of dusty conditions,

use damp material when possible, and wear respira-

tory protection constantly.” (Ref. 25).

54. In 1968, the Navy came under scrutiny for its

handling of asbestos-related health issues. On July 30,

1968, Murray C. Brown, Medical Director of the Pub-

lic Health Service, wrote to Vice-Admiral R.B. Brown,

the Chief of the Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Sur-

gery, stating that “[o|ne of our grantees, Dr. Irving Se-

likoff of New York University, has recently completed

a study of non-insulation shipyard workers’ exposure

to asbestos,” and that “Dr. Selikoff reports he has

some interesting data and has requested that we ar-

range an information meeting with your Department

and the U.S. Department of Labor to discuss his find-

ings.” (Ref. 26). On December 5 of that same year, Ad-

miral Brown reported to others in the Navy health es-

tablishment that “Doctor LJ. Selikoff of Mount Sinai

Hospital, through the news media, stated that he has

warned the Navy and other Federal departments of

his findings relating to the unusual incidence of as-

bestosis among shipyard asbestos workers. The news-

paper articles stated that the Federal agencies includ-

ing the Navy have not publicized the hazards.” (Ref.

27).

55. In a “Hazard Analysis” commissioned in re-

sponse to this external criticism of the Navy’s safety

practices, Commander Rosenwinkel of the Navy’s Bu-

reau of Medicine assured that:

71

[T]he Navy’s shipyards have for many years been

aware of the hazards of asbestos and have initiated

appropriate safety precautions. Insofar as possible,

all fabrication work [with insulation] is performed

in the shops where adequate safety precautions can

be observed. These precautions include controlled

ventilation, use of respirators, and wetting down of

the material. During “rip out” operations, respira-

tors are worn and ventilation is controlled as far as

possible.

Similar language was prepared “for inclusion in a

statement to be issued by Rear Admiral J.J. Stilwell,

Shipyard Management Directorate”:

The United States Navy is well aware of the haz-

ards of asbestos to its employees engaged in ship

construction and ship repair at naval shipyards.

Hazard control measures implemented by the ship-

yard medical departments and practices are in ac-

cordance with accepted standards of industrial hy-

giene practices in the United States. Stringent ef-

forts are directed at keeping the concentration of air

borne asbestos dust below the level recommended

by the American Conference of Governmental In-

dustrial Hygienists. An energetic periodic physical

examination program insures the health of person-

nel exposed to this hazard.

For more than two years, the Naval Ship Systems

Command and the Commander of Boston Naval

Shipyard have been cooperating with a prominent

investigator in a study whose ultimate goal is to de-

fine safe working conditions with respect to air

home asbestos. Upon the development of further

objective, well founded recommendations for the

control of this hazard, the Naval Ship Systems

72

Command, in cooperation with the Bureau of Med-

icine and Surgery, will take the necessary steps to

implement them at the naval shipyards and all na-

val activities.

(Ref. 28). The message was clear, and consistent: the

Navy would handle asbestos issues in its own way and

through its own channels.

56. The development of the Navy’s policy towards

asbestos-related health issues, and of its program for

addressing asbestos exposure to Navy personnel, con-

tinued into the 1970s. On February 9, 1971, the Com-

mander of the Navy’s Ship Systems Command issued

to numerous Navy bureaus and commands its Instruc-

tion 5100.26. That document began by recognizing

that:

[t]he most critical use of asbestos in the Navy from

a safety viewpoint is in the fabrication, installation,

repair or removal of pipe and boiler insulation ma-

terials. Some workers sustain accidental contacts

either while employed in various capacities where

asbestos products are processed or when working in

plant areas in which an environmental pollution of

the air exists due to asbestos.

In light of these concerns, the purpose of the document

was “to prescribe appropriate safety precautions dur-

ing the use of asbestos,” and it decreed that:

[t]he following safety precautions will be observed

by all supervisors and workers engaged in the fab-

rication, installation and/or removal (ripout) of as-

bestos-containing insulation material. The provi-

sions of this instruction will be effective as of this

date. The provisions in this instruction are consid-

ered as minimum health and safety requirements.

73

More stringent restrictions may be applied by local

commanders.

The document then listed nearly fifty specific work

practices to be employed to protect workers from as-

bestos exposure in handling or working in the vicinity

of asbestos-containing products. (Ref. 29).

57. In the years that followed, Navy authorities

promulgated a series of expansions and refinements

of its program for addressing asbestos exposure to

Navy personnel. Among the numerous iterations

were the following:

a. BUMED Instruction 6260.14 (June 7,

1973) (Ref. 30);

b. OPNAV Instruction 6260.1 (April 9,

1974) (Ref. 31);

c. NAVSEA Instruction 5100.2 (October 24,

1975) (Ref. 32); and

d. NAVSEA Instruction 5100.2A (Septem-

ber 11, 1979) (Ref. 33).

58. Despite the promulgation of such control pro-

cedures, there continued to be instances of airborne

asbestos dust for certain operations, exceeding then-

current standards, inconsistent use of respirators and

other control measures even when recommended by

Navy authorities, and incomplete understanding of

the hazard by the workers involved. The Navy was

aware that execution of its own programs in this re-

gard was uneven despite its efforts.

59. Similarly, a January 23, 1974 Navy Depart-

ment of Occupational Health Hazards Release re-

ported that at Charleston Naval Shipyard “[{a] survey

was made aboard ship while Temporary Service Shop

74

electricians were preparing and installing asbestos

cloth and rope under a boiler. . . .” Measured dust con-

centrations exceeded the permissible exposure limit.

Navy personnel observed an “ill-fitting” respirator on

one of the workers, and described work methods that

improper for control of asbestos dust. No signs were

posted to warn that asbestos dust was being gener-

ated and that dust respirators were required. As-

bestos waste .. . w[as} handled with poor technique

and not conductive [sic] to minimizing asbestos dust

generation. . . . An immediate conference was held

with the cognizant General Foreman and all viola-

tions of asbestos control instructions, poor work

techniques, fit of respirators, and asbestos disposal!

were discussed.

It was also noted that “[rjemoval of asbestos lagging

aboard ship creates a high asbestos fiber concentra-

tion in the work environment.” Navy personnel ob-

served that “[{cjontrol of asbestos dust contamination

throughout the rest of the ship is not guaranteed, and

unfiltered exhaust ventilation to the outside of the

ship is undesirable,” and recommended purchase of a

“portable exhaust blower, equipped with and EPA ap-

proved cleaning system.” (Ref. 34).

60. The same Release also reported that at Long

Beach Naval Shipyard

|djuring routine monitoring of pipecoverers and in-

sulators performing ripout of asbestos insulation in

posted engineering spaces, it has been observed

that ship’s personnel frequently ignore the warning

signs and move through the restricted areas. Ship’s

75

personnel also have been observed removing asbes-

tos insulation without using respiratory protection

and using air hoses to blow down spaces contami-

nated with insulation dust. An increased effort is

being made to indoctrinate the shipboard personnel

regarding the dangers of exposure to asbestos dust.

(Ref. 34).

61. The Navy was committed to maintaining com-

plete control over existing military specifications, pol-

icies and procedures with respect to asbestos-contain-

ing materials and worker practices with those materi-

als. The Navy maintained a fierce autonomy over haz-

ard recognition and control, because the Navy consid-

ered itself the ultimate authority on naval systems

and military workplaces. Regardless of the source of

other information, the Navy viewed its unique

knowledge as a strategic advantage in addressing

hazard identification and control in its workplaces.

70. In the effort to achieve its mission, the Navy

made trade-offs between the use of asbestos and the

potential health impact on personnel. In the Navy's

judgment, the beneficial aspects of asbestos from an

engineering standpoint (technical performance, cost,

weight, etc.) made it the best thermal insulation avail-

able and a critical war material. As knowledge of as-

bestos health risks evolved, the Navy made sensitive

military mission-related decisions about deriving the

benefits of asbestos while controlling its risks. More-

over, when the hazards of asbestos became more fully

known to the Navy and the scientific community in

the late 1960s, the Navy determined not to do an im-

mediate fleet-wide elimination of asbestos. At the

time, Navy leaders were concerned that a large scale,

immediate asbestos removal program would pose at

76

least three problems: excessive cost; mission impair-

ment; and increased health hazards to removal crews

from disturbing fixed, in-place asbestos.

71. The Navy asserted for itself the role as final

arbiter of what was best with respect to industrial hy-

giene in its unique workplaces to carry out its national

defense mission. The Navy's reasons for this ap-

proach include: harmonizing industrial hygiene with

its overall operations; maintaining security of its fa-

cilities; and unifying communications to its workers.

72. The Navy rejected participation from manu-

facturers in its efforts to alert its personnel to poten-

tial asbestos hazards in Navy operations. The Navy

pursued the issue in its own way. Professor Drinker

recorded:

I met with the manufacturers of the materials used

at Bath and they stated they would be glad to get

out a brief statement of precautions which should

be taken in the light of their own experience and

that they would inform their competitors that I had

asked them to do so. I understand that neither

Navy nor Maritime wants any change in the speci-

fications as the performance with the present mate-

rials is entirely satisfactory. From a health stand-

point we do not believe any specification changes

are needed.

(Ref. 11.)

73. BUMED, through a litany of instructions, bul-

letins and other communications, developed work

practices and procedures designed to take what

BUMED deemed to be appropriate precautions

against workplace and environmental hazards to

Navy personnel.

77

74. Not surprisingly, in my research, I have not

located a single instance in which the Navy, at any

time during the 1930s through the 1960s, instructed

or permitted a supplier of engineering equipment to a

vessel or facility to affix or provide any asbestos- re-

lated warning with its equipment. The Navy has not

depended on equipment warnings in its workplaces

concerning long-term occupational health issues. Ra-

ther than depending on equipment signage or labeling,

the Navy put its efforts into work practice training,

specifications for materials being used in its unique

workplaces, and the hierarchy of industrial hygiene

controls.

75. The Navy’s approach to the protection of its

personnel from health hazards — and the lack of a

role for equipment manufacturers in that process — is

exemplified by the Uniform Labeling Program, SEC-

NAV [Secretary of the Navy] Instruction 6260.3. (Ref.

44).

76. The Uniform Labeling Program had as its

stated purpose “to standardize on [sic] labeling re-

quirements for hazardous chemical products. .. .” It

did not require any actions of parties outside of the

Navy, including manufacturers of equipment. It is

also clear that the Navy’s Uniform Labeling Program

was strictly an internal document. In other words, the

program was designed by the Navy, for implementa-

tion by the Navy. It was not intended as a set of re-

quirements governing the activities of outside parties.

The Uniform Labeling Program is an internal Navy

program whose addressees are Navy Commands:

“Scope: The instruction applies to the labeling of all

hazardous materials throughout the Naval Establish-

ment wherever distribution of hazardous chemical

78

and materials is made to the actual consumer (shop,

office, or unit).” (Ref. 44).

77. The internal nature of the Uniform Labeling

Program is evident from its provisions:

(a) The Navy Department Standardiza-

tion Office was directed to assign a Navy project to

“standardize the printed labels in respect to qual-

ity of paper, size, color, shape, insignia, wording,

and design; quality of the glue; specifications for

inks including colors of inks); and other related

matters.” (Ref. 44 at 4.a.);

(b) The Navy's Bureau of Supplies and

Accounts was directed to “initiate procedures to

have the necessary labels stocked as General Store

items for use by all naval activities.” (Ref. 44 at

4.b.);

(c) Classification of hazardous chemicals

was to “be accomplished through the joint efforts

of the technical bureaus in that each Bureau shall

be responsible for passing on those aspects, of any

single item, which fall within its technical pur-

view.” (Ref. 44 at 4.c.).

(d) The document listed the responsibili-

ties of a Navy Safety Precautions Board, and of

Navy bureaus and offices, and of the Marine Corps,

in implementing the program. (Ref. 44 at 4.d &

4.e.).

78. The Uniform Labeling Program expressly

states that it does not impose any requirements on

manufacturers of products. Consistent with its focus

on chemical materials and substances, the document

makes reference to container labeling that may be

necessary for intrastate or interstate shipping, and to

79

labeling by “manufacturers of chemicals” in accord-

ance with Manufacturing Chemists’ Association

guidelines. (Ref. 44 at 2.a.).

79. The Uniform Labeling Program was prompted

by “|t]he rapid development of new chemical products

and the introduction of new chemical processes,” and

by the Navy’s view that “[w]arning labels affixed to

containers of hazardous chemicals are one of the most

practical means of accomplishing thle] objective” of

ensuring that Navy personnel take “precautionary

measures... during the handling of toxic and danger-

ous chemicals.” (Ref. 44 at 3).

80. Throughout the SECNAV Instruction describ-

ing the Uniform Labeling Program, the focus is on

chemical products, and on the appropriate labeling for

containers of chemical products. The document in-

cludes as an enclosure an alphabetical listing of mate-

rials it covers, all of which are toxic chemicals or ma-

terials. There is no mention of or suggestion that the

program has any applicability to equipment such as

pumps or valves, or to products such as gaskets or

packing, or does the Uniform Labeling Program any-

where mention asbestos.

81. The documents referenced in the Uniform La-

beling Program also refer to labeling of containers of

hazardous chemicals. For instance, there is reference

to the Manufacturing Chemists’ Association’s Manual

Ll, “A Guide for the Preparation of Warning Labels for

Hazardous Chemicals.” (Ref. 45). Like the Uniform

Labeling Program itself, Manual L1 expressly states

that it is intended to provide information to “every

person using, handling or storing chemicals.” It ex-

presses the view that “[t]he most practical means” of

80

disseminating such information is “by warnings af-

fixed to containers of hazardous chemicals.” (Ref. 45

at 5 (emphasis supplied)). There is nothing in the doc-

ument to suggest that it relates to instructional or

other documentation accompanying machinery or

equipment, or that it relates to finished products such

as gaskets or packing.

82. That the Uniform Labeling Program imposed

neither internally within the Navy nor on manufac-

turers of machinery or equipment any responsibility

for labeling of asbestos-containing materials is belied

by the Navy’s own implementation of the program is

exemplified by a January 15, 1960 Occupational Haz-

ards Release summarizing significant information on

occupational health and industrial hygiene from

through the Navy and distributed by the Chief of the

Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. The docu-

ment reported on the review by a Navy shipyard of

new products “[i]n accordance with SECNAV Instruc-

tion 6260.3 and BUSHIPS Instruction 6260.3 on la-

belling toxic materials.” With respect to “Hy-Temp

Block Insulation,” an insulating material containing

12—15% asbestos, the Navy concluded as follows: “No

label.” (Ref. 46). The fact that the Navy determined

that no hazard label was appropriate for an asbestos-

containing insulation material of the type whose haz-

ards it had been aware of and discussing since the

1920s is inconsistent with the notion that the Navy

sought, or would have accepted, asbestos-related

warnings affixed to equipment or machinery or in

technical documentation relating to such items.

83. The Navy’s 1969 Consolidated Hazardous

Item List, NAVSUP Publication 4500 issued more

than a decade later, had the same focus and purpose

81

as the Uniform Labeling Program. (Ref. 47). The doc-

ument expressly governed the labeling of “containers,”

and it stated that the purpose of labeling it requires is

“to warn users of the potential dangers involving the

use of the material in the container.” (Ref. 47 at VJJI).

There was no suggestion that the document applied to

equipment or its manufacturers. Like the Uniform

Labeling Program, the Consolidated Hazardous Item

List is an internal Navy document, describing proce-

dures intended to be implemented by the Navy.

84. Nor were military specifications among the

means by which the Navy sought to protect its person-

nel against long-term health issues such as asbestos

exposure. Rather, protection against such hazards

was undertaken, through the Navy’s Bureau of Medi-

cine & Surgery, through a comprehensive system

aimed at identifying evaluating potential threats to

the long-term well-being of Navy personnel and devel-

oping appropriate training and procedures to mitigate

those threats. While military specifications were out-

ward looking — directed to vendors outside the Navy —

development and implementation of protective

measures regarding asbestos was viewed as an inter-

nal Navy issue.

85. The language in military specifications gov-

erning technical manuals for equipment is consistent

with my overall experience that the Navy did not view

manufacturer labeling or warning as an important, or

in many instances an appropriate, means of protect-

ing against exposure to ubiquitous, well-known, long-

term potential health hazards such as asbestos. For

example, MIL-M-15071D, dated June 6, 1961 and gov-

erning “Manual, Service (Instruction Books) for Ship-

board Electrical and Mechanical Equipment” stated

82

that use of cautionary language “should be as sparing

as is consistent with real need.” (Ref. 48 at para. 3.3.6).

86. Consistent with my experience that the Navy

saw little value, and much potential for confusion, in

extensive use of caution labels addressing common

hazards or conditions, particularly when no threat of

immediate injury or harm to individuals or equipment

was present, the Navy’s directed that warnings in

technical manuals be “sparing.” Rather than depend-

ing on equipment signage or labeling, the Navy put its

efforts into work practice training, specifications for

materials being used in its unique workplaces, and

the hierarchy of industrial hygiene controls.

87. The kinds of warnings the Navy did permit in

equipment technical manuals underscore that the

Navy’s focus in this regard was on immediate hazards

to life and equipment operation as being appropriate

for inclusion in equipment manuals. Such warnings

were related to materials that presented immediate

hazards to life and equipment, including, for example,

solvents which have long been recognized as materia!

that present both inhalation and flammability haz-

ards. Both of these hazards can, of course, result in

immediate, severe injury or damage.

88. Similarly, carbon tetrachloride which, while a

solvent, is not flammable, is hazardous based in part

on its potential to break down and release toxic phos-

gene gas at elevated temperatures. The release of

phosgene gas, which was used as a chemical weapon

during World War I, presents a risk to users or others

in the vicinity of poisoning.

89. The potential for immediate injury due to in-

halation or explosion presented by solvents presents a

83

hazard fundamentally different from the type of dis-

ease risk that the Navy has long known to be associ-

ated with exposure to asbestos.

90. An acute injury or accident hazard of the type

associated with solvents is a type of “safety” risk long

viewed by the Navy as the responsibility of safety of-

ficer and the line command. By contrast, asbestos pre-

sents a long-term, environment threat to “health” of

personnel. The Navy has traditionally handled such

health risks under the technical purview of the medi-

cal department. The fundamental distinction be-

tween safety and industrial health is evident, for ex-

ample, from the “Minimum Requirements for Safety

and Industrial Health in Contract Shipyards” (Ref. 3),

which present separately “Minimum Requirements

for Industrial Health” and “Minimum Requirements

for Safety.”

91. As aconsequence, the fact that the Navy per-

mitted, or perhaps required, warnings regarding sol-

vents in some equipment technical manuals does not

mean that the Navy likewise wanted, or would have

permitted, asbestos-related cautionary language in

those documents during the period in question.

92. Despite numerous opportunities, Navy health

authorities declined to adopt requirements for product

labeling relative to asbestos-related health hazards

within the Navy, much less as a requirement for sup-

pliers of equipment for inclusion in technical manuals

or other documentation.

93. For instance, the Navy’s 1922 Navy Medical

Bulletin lists “four effective methods [wet methods,

exhaust systems, enclosures and respirators] that

84

may be used to prevent the inhalation of dust gener-

ated during industrial processes.” While the document

states that “[n]o one of these can apply to all condi-

tions” and “the particular method to be used must be

adapted to the peculiarities of the process,” there is no

mention among the potential protective measures of

labels or warnings on packages or instructions for as-

bestos-containing materials. (Ref. 6).

94. Similarly, the “Minimum Requirements”

adopted by the Navy and the Maritime Commission in

1943 contained no reference to or recommendation for

labeling on packages or instructions among its recom-

mended safety practices for handling asbestos-con-

taining materials. Rather, the document stressed seg-

regation of work areas, ventilation, respirators, and

periodic medical examinations for workers handling

asbestos-containing insulation materials. The only

references any kind of signage was to “posters and

other material” to be posted on bulletin boards on

ships and in land-based facilities. (Ref. 2).

95. Decades later, the Department of the Navy's

Instruction 5100.26, while comprehensive, made no

recommendation and imposed no requirement that

packaging or instructions for asbestos-containing

products contain warnings regarding potential haz-

ards. Among dozens of required work practices and

procedures, the Instruction required the posting of

“adequate warning signs” at the entrance to insula-

tion fabrication shops and around areas where re-

moval of asbestos-containing insulation was being

conducted:

1. RESTRICTED ACCESS

ASBESTOS FABRICATION AREA

85

2. RESTRICTED ACCESS

ASBESTOS INSTALLATION/RIP OUT

WEARING OF RESPIRATORS REQUIRED

Thus, the Navy continued its practice of controlling

asbestos exposure through restrictions on access,

training and implementation of appropriate work

practices and equipment. (Ref. 36).

96. Only in 1973, in BUMED’s Instruction

6260.14, did the Navy direct its personnel that

[c]aution labels shall be affixed to all raw materials,

mixtures, scrap waste, debris, and other products

containing asbestos fibers, or to their containers,

except that no label is required where asbestos fi-

bers have been modified by a bonding agent, coating,

binder, or other material so that during any reason-

ably foreseeable use, handling, storage, disposal,

processing, or transportation, no airborne concen-

trations of asbestos fibers occur in excess of the per-

missible exposure concentration.

The Navy specified the content of the required caution

labels. I am not aware that at that time the Navy took

any steps to require manufacturers of equipment to

place asbestos-related warnings on their products or

in literature that accompanied them. (Ref. 37).

C. Gaskets and Packing

97. With specific reference to potential hazards

associated with the handling of asbestos-containing

gaskets and packing, | am aware from my research

and from my personal experience in the Navy that

these materials were regarded as negligible sources of

asbestos exposure. For example, a December 9, 1968

U.S. Department of the Navy Memorandum regarding

“Hazards of Asbestos” stated that

86

[ajll of the asbestos in [gasket and packing materi-

als] is fabricated as cloth, rope or compressed sheet

with binders, so that the items are not friable when

they are cut. Thus, these items do not cause dust

in shipboard applications. In addition, in many in-

stances, they are received already incorporated in

the finished assembly such as a valve, and do not

require fabrication by the shipyard. For these rea-

sons, packings and gaskets containing asbestos are

not considered to be a significant health hazard.

(Ref. 32).

98. This conclusion was reaffirmed in the pub-

lished literature by P.G. Harries, who made extensive

study of asbestos exposure in shipyards in the United

Kingdom. In “Asbestos Dust Concentrations in Ship

Repairing: A Practical Approach to Improving Asbes-

tos Hygiene in Naval Dockyards,” Ann Occup Hyg 14:

241-254 (1971), Harries concluded that asbestos-con-

taining gaskets, which he referred to as “high temper-

ature jointing and packing materials,” presented “[njo

health hazard in forms used in shipyard applications.”

He also noted that “[n]o substitute heat-resistant ma-

terial is available” for asbestos in these applications.

(Ref. 49).

99. A 1973 publication of the International

Agency for Research on Cancer — Biological Effects of

Asbestos — stated that “[t]here is no conceivable health

risk in the use of asbestos-based gasket materials.”

(Ref. 50 at p. 325). Well-known asbestos researcher

and health advocate Dr. Irving Selikoff wrote, in his

1978 book Asbestos and Disease that “[h]igh tempera-

ture jointing and packing materials” containing

“lalsbestos fiber” and “(clompressed asbestos fiber”

87

present “[njo health hazard in forms used in shipyard

applications.” (Ref. 51 at p. 267).

100. The lack of concern for asbestos exposure from

asbestos-containing gaskets and packing expressed in

Navy documents and the writings of researchers such

as Hanies and Selikoff is entirely consistent with my

experience as a uniformed and civilian Navy occupa-

tional medicine physician.

101. In addition to the documents referenced and

discussed above, the development of the Navy's

knowledge of asbestos-related health issues and of ap-

propriate workplace practices and controls to prevent

exposure to elevated levels of airborne asbestos also is

reflected, among others, in the documents listed Ex-

hibit B, which comprise part of the bases for my opin-

ions on these topics.

fil. CONCLUSIONS

102. Although my opinions are set forth through-

out the entirety of this report, the paragraphs below

provide a general summary of my opinions.

103. The Navy made its decisions with respect to

the use of asbestos in accordance with Navy operating

requirements and in furtherance of Navy missions,

and in light of the Navy’s knowledge of associated

health hazards at the time and of its perception of the

requirements of federal law. The Navy's extensive

and evolving knowledge of the hazards of exposure to

asbestos and the means to control those hazards were

weighed by the Navy against the benefits provided by

its use. These benefits included meeting national de-

fense needs in a standardized, efficient and low-cost

manner that would not delay or hinder ship availabil-

88

ity, especially during times of war. The Navy was in-

formed in this decision-making by close contacts and

liaison with relevant academic communities, profes-

sional organizations and other government agencies.

104. Similarly, the Navy’s handling of and pro-

grams regarding workplace safety and hazard com-

munication, as they related to asbestos and other is-

sues, reflected the Navy’s balance of various consider-

ations, including combat readiness, maintenance of

the necessary command structure, the needs of disci-

pline and the hierarchy of risks presented by life and

work aboard a combat vessel. In general, the Navy

chose to address long-term workplace health issues in

the course of training for various trades and jobs, ra-

ther than using labeling or other written materials to

accompany products into the workplace.

105. The Navy’s occupational health program in no

way depended upon, required or sought advice from

equipment manufacturers regarding long-term occu-

pational health issues, including those posed by expo-

sure to asbestos dust. I have not uncovered — nor

based on my research and experience and the extent

of the Navy’s knowledge in these areas would I have

expected to — situations in which the Navy solicited

from suppliers of shipboard equipment any infor-

mation or guidance regarding the appropriate meth-

ods for the prevention of exposure to asbestos. Given

the Navy’s state-of-the-art knowledge concerning as-

bestos related hazards and its robust safety and

health program, it would be unreasonable to assume

that the Navy would have accepted any advice per-

taining to asbestos related safety precautions from a

manufacturer of equipment.

106. My opinions set forth herein are held to a rea-

sonable degree of scientific certainty.

90

DECLARATION OF LAWRENCE STILWELL

BETTS, MD, PhD

| have been asked by legal counsel to expand my

discussion of several areas which | have previously

addressed in trial and deposition testimony, and in

prior declarations, affidavits, and reports. To this end,

|, Lawrence Stilwell Betts, MD, PhD, CIH, FACOEM,

declare that:

1. I retired from the United States Navy as a

Captain in 2001, and now have a very active profes-

sional practice in science and medicine based in

Poquoson, Virginia. As reflected in my Curriculum

Vitae (Betts, 2012), I am the President of my own

medical and scientific practice. I routinely consult on,

or work with, difficult and complex medical cases

where treatment, or exposure or possible conse-

quences of exposure, are in question. My professional]

associations include a wide variety of government, in-

dustry, and professional organizations, as well as ac-

ademically — and privately — practicing professionals.

I also teach, mentor, perform research, develop pre-

vention and treatment protocols, and write medical

articles and text chapters. I am a Clinical Professor

at the Eastern Virginia Medical School where I have

had a continuous academic relationship and have

been teaching toxicology, previously with the approval

of the US Navy while I was on active duty, since 1979.

| serve on several national committees addressing

broad, as well as specific, issues in occupational and

environmental health. I am board certified in both oc-

cupational medicine by the American Board of Pre-

ventive Medicine, and in the comprehensive practice

of industrial hygiene by the American Board of Indus-

trial Hygiene. Together with the late W. Clark Cooper,

91

MD, and Mitchel R. Zavon, MD, | am one of the origi-

nal three “medical scientists” to have ever been

elected to Fellowship in both the American College of

Occupational and Environmental Medicine and the

American Industrial Hygiene Association; a fourth,

Sidney Siu, MD, was recently added to this short list

of physicians who are also Certified Industrial Hy-

gienists, in 2012. The anticipation, recognition, eval-

uation, and control of hazardous conditions are the

fundamentals of industrial hygiene and my practice of

preventive medicine and public health. The emphasis

of my entire career has been the prevention of illness

and the promotion of health through the application

of the professional tools of my scientific and medical

knowledge and experience. After my retirement from

the US Navy, I was presented the VADM Richard A.

Nelson Award for my career contributions to Navy

and Marine Corps readiness through leadership in

prevention of disease and promotion of health.

2. During my Navy career, I was assigned to bil-

lets with professional duties and increasing responsi-

bilities, initially as a scientist in industrial hygiene

and toxicology, and later as an occupational and envi-

ronmental medicine physician and medical toxicolo-

gist. I became one of the first physicians to qualify

and be designated a Surface Warfare Medical Depart-

ment Officer (SWMDO). I have spent time at sea on

a large number of United States Navy and United

States Naval ships and I have worked in and directed

occupational health programs at Naval shipyards, air

rework facilities, weapons stations, and other major

shore facilities in the San Francisco Bay area and the

Tidewater area of Virginia. I served as a physician on

the USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63) during her extensive

92

Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) in the Phila-

delphia Naval Shipyard from 1987 to 1989. Based

upon my scientific and medical training, and experi-

ence as a Navy officer for three decades, and now as

an active governmental consultant for over a decade,

| am generally familiar with the industrial products

that were used by the Navy and in maritime work en-

vironments, both ashore and afloat. I am also familiar

with the history and practice of the Navy occupational

health program from its early days before World War

Il until the present time. During the four decades of

my professional life, | have also become familiar with,

and evaluated occupational exposures to, asbestos—

containing and other materials used in the electrical

trades, aircraft and aerospace industries, nuclear

power facilities, and several other trades and indus-

trial/commercial activities which are not unique to the

Navy or maritime industries.

3. Based upon my scientific and medical training,

and experience as a US Navy officer for three decades,

I am familiar with the Navy mission, the Navy com-

mand structure for Navy active duty and civil service

personnel, the maritime work environments, both

ashore and afloat, and the industrial products and

equipment that were used in shipbuilding applica-

tions. | am also familiar with the history and practice

of the Navy occupational health program from its

early days before World War II until the present time.

4. I have been asked by counsel to address the

following issues based upon my knowledge, experi-

ence, and research, and to report my findings and con-

clusions:

a. What are the fundamental missions of the

United States Navy (US Navy; Navy) and

93

the Navy Medical Department, and how is

the Navy organized to fulfill those mis-

sions?

b. What role did asbestos (primarily as used

in thermal insulation products) play in

Navy and maritime shipbuilding and

maintenance during the period from be-

fore WWII through the enactment and im-

plementation of the Occupational Safety

and Health Act (PL-91-596) in the 1970s

and thereafter?

c. What did the Navy and other Federal Gov-

ernment Departments and Agencies, pri-

vate shipyards and employers, as well as

organized labor, know regarding the

health hazards of asbestos during this

time period? Additionally, how did this

knowledge affect the use and handling of

asbestos during the post-OSHA era?

d. Was there additional occupational health

information about asbestos, available dur-

ing the relevant periods of time, which

should have been provided by an equip-

ment manufacturer or vendor supplying a

product to the Federal Government in ac-

cordance with specifications, or to a pri-

vate industrial or maritime employer, that

would have meaningfully enhanced exist-

ing knowledge, and that would have been

likely to alter established specifications,

policies, and procedures regarding the

use of asbestos- containing products and

materials?

94

e. In fulfilling its mission, did the Navy en-

gage in “risk-balancing” between issues

critical to mission success and the risks of

asbestos exposure to the health of Navy

Department personnel — both active duty

and civilian?

f. Whether, and to what extent, Navy and

shipyard personnel during the 1940s

through the 1970s typically were exposed

to meaningful amounts of inhalable asbes-

tos dust onboard ships?

5. I have based my professional opinions con-

tained in this report on my Navy and professional

knowledge arising from my training, education, and

experience as 4 scientist, physician, and, now retired,

senior United States Navy officer, as well as my ex-

tensive research regarding the knowledge of, and re-

sponse to, asbestos hazards within the Navy and ship-

yards specifically, and more generally within the sci-

entific and medical communities at large.

95

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE US

NAVY AND NAVY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

6. Although the wording of the mission has

changed and evolved over time, the Navy currently de-

scribes its mission as the following:

“The mission of the Navy is to maintain,

train and equip combat-ready Naval

forces capable of winning wars, deterring

aggression and maintaining freedom of

the seas.” (USN, 2010)

The Navy’s mission is carried out as an integral part

of the overall strategy of the Department of Defense:

“Current U.S. defense strategy calis for

continuing to shape the strategic environ-

ment to advance national interests, main-

taining the capability to respond to the

full spectrum of anticipated current

threats, and preparing for the threats of

tomorrow. Implementation depends on

the fundamentals of military power: qual-

ity people, ready forces, and superior or-

ganization, doctrine, and technology. The

challenge is to construct an effective de-

fense establishment with limited financial

resources in accordance with Department

of Defense guidance.” (NAS, 1998)

In order to fulfill its mission, the Navy must be au-

thorized the funds and personnel to develop and main-

tain resources — the technology, equipment, conditions

- to enable its forces. The Navy maintains a ready

and capable force in mind, spirit, and equipment so

that personnel are able to respond, when called upon,

to a variety of events. In addition to actual combat

96

with a hostile enemy, the Navy must also be able to

respond to natural disasters, humanitarian situations,

and political events. When not responding to actual

combat, the Navy devotes its assets (people, equip-

ment, and funds) to maintaining a state of prepared-

ness and readiness which allows it to be adroit in re-

sponding to any mission. Whether at war or in peace,

the Navy is always engaged in or preparing for its role

in National defense.

7. The ultimate role of the Navy is the projection

of force upon the seas as the naval warfare service

branch of the armed forces. To this end, the Navy

must maintain a constant state of readiness. This is

achieved through the maintenance and preparation of

ships, aircraft, and equipment, and supporting the

shore activities, as well as the personnel manning and

operating these activities. The preparation is accom-

plished through such activities as maintaining and re-

pairing ships, aircraft and other equipment; health

promotion and maintenance; equipping and training

personnel; developing new technologies — both defen-

sive and offensive; logistics; and budgeting. Without

logistics and other support activities, combatant

forces (ships, aircraft and personnel) cannot sustain a

mission.

8. Even before the United States entered WWII,

the Navy Medical Department’s express mission was:

“To keep as many men at as many guns as

many days as possible.”

(BuMED, 1941)

Currently, this mission statement is not as “combat

specific” as manning guns, but still the Navy's Medi-

cal Department’s primary mission is stated as:

97

“OUR MISSION IS FORCE HEALTH PRO-

TECTION. As the preeminent maritime

medical force deployed with our Navy and

Marine Corps warriors throughout the

world, we are capable of supporting the

full range of operations from combat to

humanitarian assistance. We are further

capable of providing superior state of the

art in-garrison health and preventive care

for active duty personnel, our families and

those who have worn the cloth of our na-

tion — our retirees.” (BUMED, 2009)

In support of the Navy’s mission, the Medical Depart-

ment promotes and maintains the health of personnel

through the care and treatment of sick and injured

members of the Naval service and its civil service em-

ployees; prevention and control of diseases and inju-

ries; promotion of physical fitness; as well as perform-

ing training and research programs. If people cannot

operate the equipment or otherwise perform their du-

ties, ships could not get underway, aircraft could not

fly, and other vital operational aspects of the Navy’s

mission could not be performed in support of national

defense.

9. Under civilian leadership (the President, the

Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy),

the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is the senior Na-

val officer with responsibility for every aspect of the

overall operations of the Navy. The CNO is a four—

star admiral and is responsible to the Secretary of the

Navy for the command, utilization of resources, and

operating efficiency of the operating forces of the Navy

and of the Navy shore activities assigned by the Sec-

retary. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),

98

the CNO is the principal Naval adviser to the Presi-

dent and to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct

of war and is the principal adviser and Naval execu-

tive to the Secretary on the conduct of activities of the

Department of the Navy. Assistants include the Vice

Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO), the Deputy Chiefs

of Naval Operations (DCNO), the Assistant Chiefs of

Naval Operations (ACNO), and a number of other

ranking officers. These officers and their staffs are

collectively known as the Office of the Chief of Naval

Operations (OPNAV). In addition to the “war fighting

members” of the office of CNO, the Navy Surgeon Gen-

eral (SG) and others, such as the Chief of Chaplains

and Chief of Information Dominance, also serve to ad-

vise the CNO in matters under their cognizance. The

SG serves a dual role in the Navy as both the principal

advisor to the CNO on medical matters and also the

head of the Navy’s medical department (Chief, Bureau

of Medicine and Surgery (Ch, BUMED)). The CNO

may consult with the SG on medical matters; however,

the final determination on overall operational strat-

egy and mission achievement rests solely with the

CNO (subject to consent of civilian leadership) (USN,

2010).

10. Prior to the 1970s, the Navy’s health and

safety functions were separately operating compo-

nents. This initially started in 1917 with the estab-

lishment of the safety engineer at shipyards, and then

later with the establishment of medical officers at

shipyards in the 1920s. The fundamental advisory

role of the Navy Medical Department was “medicine”

or “health” — not physical safety (such as prevention

of trips and falls; “guards” for tool safety). The “Basic

Rule of Responsibility” states (CNO, 953):

99

“Safety is a command function. Responsi-

bility for the safety of personnel is vested

in the commanding officer.”

The complete text of this rule not only appears in

Chapter 1, but is reprinted on the title page of each

chapter of the 1953 “United States Navy Safety Pre-

cautions”.

11. The Naval chain of command is the Service's

delineation of “authority, responsibility, and account-

ability” extending from top Navy civilian leadership

(Secretary of the Navy) through all levels of Naval

command or “supervision”, and to all Navy personnel.

From the day of entry into Navy service, all Navy per-

sonnel are taught and must strictly adhere to the

chain of command. Using the chain of command, all

personnel receive their orders (assignments) and su-

pervision from their immediate senior or “supervisor”

in the chain of command. This command structure is

important to fulfilling the Navy’s mission because it

(a) defines authority and responsibility from the most

senior to the most junior person in the Service; (b) es-

tablishes administration, support, communication,

and discipline; and (c) organizes forces to carry out op-

erations. The importance of the chain of command to

the Navy’s mission is demonstrated by the applicable

disciplinary actions for Navy personnel who fail to

carry out lawful orders from a senior within the chain

of command. A significant breach in the chain of com-

mand could endanger personnel or equipment, mis-

sion completion or success and, ultimately, the na-

tional defense.

12. It is ultimately the Commanding Officer’s re-

sponsibility to ensure that all personnel and equip-

100

ment, which includes ships, aircraft, and other physi-

cal resources, are prepared to operate and perform

their functions in support of their assigned mission.

The maintenance of good order and discipline is essen-

tial to the Commanding Officer’s ability to meet

his/her responsibilities. If Navy personnel do not fol-

low the military chain of command and perform duties

as directed by his/her operational superior, or if civil-

ian “third-parties” are permitted to interfere with the

Navy command structure, Navy operations and mis-

sion could be endangered. This is simply because the

Commanding Officer would not have confidence that

his/her orders would be followed and, ultimately, that

the Navy’s mission objectives would be met.

13. As I discuss more fully below, the Navy estab-

lished a comprehensive occupational health program

that operated within the overall chain of command to

communicate medical and hazard information.

Whether onboard combatant vessels or in Navy yards

or other shore facilities, the Commanding Officer is

charged with protecting the health of all Naval per-

sonnel and civilian employees (as appropriate) under

his/her command. Navy Medical Department officers

working under a Commanding Officer have the re-

sponsibility for identifying and communicating infor-

mation regarding occupational health hazards.

HISTORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL

OF ASBESTOS HEALTH HAZARDS BY THE US

NAVY, AND IN US SHIPYARDS

14. With respect to naval and maritime activities,

as well as general industry in the United States, the

US Navy and the US Public Health Service (USPHS;

PHS) have cooperated in evaluating asbestos expo-

101

sures and developing exposure control methods for al-

most three-quarters of a century. The US Public

Health Service was established by Congress in 1798

as the provider of health services for the US Merchant

Marines — initially as the Marine Hospital Service;

later the Public Health and Marine Hospital Service;

and currently the Public Health Service. At the re-

quest of the North Carolina State Board of Health and

their Industrial Commission, the US Surgeon General!

assigned Dr. WC Dreessen and his co-workers from

the Public Health Service to perform the first such

evaluation of the developing asbestos textile industry

in the United States. (Dreessen, 1938). Dr. Dreessen,

together with another senior physician in the Public

Health Service, Dr. RR Sayers, disseminated these

findings at the American Public Health Association

meeting in 1938, and later published them in the

American Journal of Public Health in 1939 for the

general scientific and medical communities. Later, at

the joint request of the US Navy and the US Maritime

Commission, Dr. Dreessen worked with Prof. Philip

Drinker and Dr. WF Fleischer, a Navy physician, on

an asbestos exposure evaluation and development of

asbestos exposure control methods and medical prac-

tices for employees at a private US shipyard.

(L. cessen and Fleischer, 1944) A discussion of “what

and when” the US Navy was aware of regarding the

health hazards associated with asbestos and the need

to control exposure to airborne asbestos fibers is thus

forever intertwined with the “what and when” of the

US Public Health Service's parallel awareness and

understanding regarding the protection of the health

of the general public — and civilian mariners.

102

15. The Navy’s development of nuclear power for

ship propulsion systems in the late 1940s led to a close

working relationship and the sharing of information

between the US Navy and the US Atomic Energy

Commission (AEC) — as well as the Public Health Ser-

vice. The AEC later “evolved” into the Nuclear Regu-

latory Commission (NRC), the Energy Research and

Development Administration (ERDA), the Depart-

ment of Energy (DOE), and the National Nuclear Se-

curity Administration (NNSA). These organizational

entities always had a close working relationship with

the Navy’s Bureau of Ships (BuSHIPS) and the Office

of Naval Reactors. A close relationship still exists to-

day between the US Navy and non—Navy (“civilian”)

Governmental Departments and Agencies through

the Navy—Department of Energy Naval Nuclear Pro-

pulsion Program. A working relationship also existed

between major US Governmental Departments and

Agencies and the energy utilities with respect to occu-

pational health and safety. This relationship was en-

hanced by the presence of two notable individuals: Ad-

miral HG Rickover, USN and HE Stokinger, PhD.

ADM Rickover served in joint and overlapping assign-

ments with the US Navy and the early AEC—such as

in his roles in the Division of Reactor Development at

the AEC and as Director of the Naval Reactors. These

roles led to his direct involvement with both the de-

velopment of the Navy’s first nuclear-powered vessel,

the submarine USS NAUTILUS which was commis-

sioned in 1954, and also the Shippingport Atomic

Power Station which powered up on December 18,

1957 as the first commercial, pressurized water reac-

tor nuclear power plant. Dr. Stokinger served initially

in the Industrial Hygiene Section on the Manhattan

103

Project with the Atomic Energy Commission, and

later, in 1951, be became the Chief Toxicologist for the

newly created Division of Occupational Health of the

US Public Health Service. Dr. Stokinger continued

with the Public Health Service until well after the en-

actment of the Occupational Safety and Health Act in

1970 and the establishment of the National Institute

for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). He

served on the American Conference of Governmental!

Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) Threshold Limit

Value (TLV) Committee for twenty- five years—fif-

teen of those years as the Chair. The US Navy had

representation in the ACGIH and also on the TLV

Committee. As discussed throughout this report, the

Navy’s knowledge of the applications and hazards of

asbestos represented what was available and known

by other Federal Departments and Agencies

16. The Navy and the Maritime Commission's use

of asbestos onboard ships generally, and on steam sys-

tems specifically, was not by chance, nor based on any

requirements of the Navy’s equipment manufacturers

and vendors. The use of asbestos was based upon ne-

cessity. Due in large part to the association of one no-

table individual, Professor Philip Drinker of the Har-

vard School of Public Health — and who also served as

the Chief Health Consultant for the US Maritime

by the Navy regarding the use of asbestos since its

early use in steam—generating systems, as well as the

hazards and means of controlling those hazards, was

shared and held by other Federal Departments and

Agencies. As discussed in their landmark paper ad-

dressing the use of asbestos in the Navy, Fleischer

104

and coworkers (1946) wrote with the permission of the

Navy:

“An important ingredient of pipe covering

material used on U.S. Navy vessels is

amosite.... The chief reasons for the wide

use of amosite felt and pipe covering in na-

val work are its low thermal conductivity,

light weight, strength and refractoriness.

When the felt and pipe covering were first

developed, we were still building vessels

under the Washington Treaty of Limita-

tions in Tonnage, and every pound saved

meant that much more armor, guns or am-

munition for a given displacement, to say

nothing of more economic operation for

the weight involved in insulation.

Amosite pipe covering weighs about 14

pounds per cubic foot, with a temperature

limit of 750 F, as compared to magnesia

with a weight of 16 pounds per cubic foot,

and a temperature limit of 500 F, High

temperature amosite pipe covering

weights about 18 pounds per cubic foot as

compared to 26 pounds per cubic foot for

other high temperature insulations. Be-

cause of the lower conductivity and the

higher temperature limit of the amosite

type, leas of it need be used in combination

covering than other types of insulations.

The development of amosite felt started in

1934 when a need existed to secure a ther-

mal insulation lighter in weight and ther-

mally more efficient than the materials

(blocks and cement or asbestos blankets)

105

which were then being used on destroyer

turbines. The Navy ap

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Joint Appendix — Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986 (2019) (No. 17-1104) | Frix