Amicus Curiae Brief — Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 43 (2017) (No. 16-1276)

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No. 16-1276 DCT 17 2017

Or FICE OF THE CLERK

Du The

Supreme Court of the Binited: States

*

DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

PAUL SOMERS,

Respondent.

*

On Writ Of Certiorari To The

United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

«

BRIEF OF TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD

EDUCATION FUND AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

o-

JACKLYN DEMAR CLAIRE M. SYLVIA

TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD Counsel of Record

EDUCATION FUND ALEXANDER WESTERFIELD

1220 19th St., N.W., PHILLIPS & COHEN LLP

Suite 501 100 The Embarcadero,

Washington, DC 20036 Suite 300

(202) 296-4826 San Francisco, CA 94105

(415) 836-9000

csylvia@phillipsandcohen.com

SEAN X. MCKESSsy

DAVID JOCHNOWITZ

JOHN W. TREMBLAY

PHILLIPS & COHEN LLP

2000 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

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COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225 6964

WWW .COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE..............0...004. 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................. 1

STE cad chpiiiastedahiicasiltninnarnabesesnusnpastnceksaviess 4

I. At the time it enacted Dodd-Frank, Con-

gress understood that the failure to en-

courage and respond to whistleblowers

had undermined protection of investors

EERE ES SEE SO PPO EOE 4

A. Whistleblowers sought to expose the

fraud and noncompliance that led to

the Madoff scandal and the financial

crisis but were ignored and suffered

I carstathiekcotseteeccdecsss dacsovcks haious 4

B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act failed to pre-

vent the financial crisis or adequately

protect whistleblowers .....................6+. 6

©

Whistleblowers generally raise concerns

internally and often suffer retaliation

BO nick misecinanansdstenndneeneesdinaacaictases 7

Il. Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank whistle-

blower provisions to curb fraud and protect

investors by encouraging both internal re-

porting and reporting to the government

through interrelated incentives and protec-

ND co nlineted cats Gannett ccabarbcvsscneuarevencaheeinese 10

ITT,

IV.

li

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued

Page

Both industry and the Commission under-

stood the anti-retaliation provision to

protect internal reporting regardless of

whether an individual also reported to the

COIIIIIID. i icciccncscscocccesiasdinsdetasnsatiaananicnen

The contemporaneous understanding of

the anti-retaliation provision is consistent

with the statute’s text, structure, and the

underlying congressional policy ................

A. The term “whistleblower” can have dif-

ferent meanings within the statute even

if the statute defines the term..............

1. The term “whistleblower” must take

a different meaning in the anti-

retaliation provision than it does in

the reward provision to give full ef-

fect to the statute’s protections for

whistleblowers.................:-0.ceeseeseeers

2. The statute’s design also supports

context-specific definitions.............

B. Applying Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation

protections to persons who report inter-

nally furthers Congress’s purpose in en-

suring that information about potential

Grn BD SOE oovcccccnssccciecsuinistinanaien

12

15

15

17

19

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued

Page

C. Petitioner’s reading of the statute would

frustrate Congress’s purpose by render-

ing it less likely that whistleblowers

will report misconduct.....................0606 24

ri ccecesininansconnceseassesasseses 27

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S.

I cconstscoumccnccsesnctitcsdinuecsenteiabaiaiiedidealand 15, 23

Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561

ESSE ees aera rene ween ms 15

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997).......... 16, 19

Star Athletica L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137

Bh Re IE iccccesidsinictinacessinininiaeatiiantaaniant 26

United States v. Heirs of Boisdoré, 49 U.S. (8

I Ss sc cccineiniichaceaiecheridictinceiepammtiaiamndinaihihae 26

Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct.

EERE TPIS SERS eee 16, 17, 19, 21, 22

Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074

ee ear ean ee ae ae eee oars 21 n.5, 22

STATUTES

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer

Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,

124 Stat. 1376 (2010)

A re liicckcncsintinsiaemiintensnaiatniogandy passim

ee ee BD givccresccsenstasnsesensietoniinentiiaicadl 17

Be Ps Oe PD sesetesecccsccenccecccescenecses 10, 20, 22

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d (2A) .... 2.0. 11, 18, 25 n.6

15 U.S.C. § T8u-G(EM2MB) ............2eceeecerceceerenees 11 n.2

BEE Cie OO PID bn ncccecccncccccncccscccsscnsssctveenes 12

15 U.S.C. § 78u-GCh)(1 (ANGI)... eee cece eee 20 n.4

15 U.S.C. § 78u-60h)(1 (A)GID....... eee 20, 23

gt oh St | eee 11,18

BE CEG, F Fe Pi ccc cc escscecenessnbscosssccsenccnsensevonsennns 10

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ~— Continued

Page

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,

Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745

§ 302, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241.................00......... 6

§ 404, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 ................ccccc cece 6

§ 806, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A............... 6, 7, 12

§ 906, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350...............0...0...0.... 6

ne oe anniediaaemamonens 12

REGULATIONS

17 C.FR. § 240.21F-2.......... ASA A et SS passim

gk 8) | EE ae een 22

Pe ee I ccticiernniinicnnntbinemianengeatn 14, 23

17 C.LE.R. § 240.21 F-2(DX1Ni)............2-00-0e-reeeeeeeee 21n.5

py gk e BY 8 15

OTHER AUTHORITIES

155 Cong. Rec. S4412 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2009)............ 8

Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme & Regulatory

Failures: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on

Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov't Sponsored En-

ters. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong.

Thomas L. Carson et al., Whistle-Blowing for

Profit: An Ethical Analysis of the False Claims

Act, 77 J. Bus. Ethics 361 (2008)................cc0cccecceeeees 8

William D. Cohan, Was this Whistle-Blower

Muzzled?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2013, at SR4 .......... 5

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Comment Letter from Association of Corporate

Counsel to Secretary Murphy (Dec. 15, 2010),

https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-

Comment Letter from Davis Polk & Wardwell

LLP to Secretary Murphy (Dec. 17, 2010),

https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s733 10-

Comment Letter from Thompson Hine LLP to

Secretary Murphy (Dec. 3, 2010), https://www.

sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-26.pdf........

Comment Letter from U.S. Chamber of Com-

merce and U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal

Reform to Secretary Murphy (Dec. 17, 2010),

https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s733 10-

Terry Morehead Dworkin et al., Internal vs. Ex-

ternal Whistleblowers: A Comparison of Whis-

tleblowing Processes, 17 J. Bus. Ethics 1281

Ethics Res. Ctr., Inside the Mind of a Whistle-

blower: A Supplemental Report of the 2011

National Business Ethics Survey (2012)...........

The False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007:

Joint Hearing on H.R. 4854 Before the Sub-

comm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual

Prop. and the Subcomm. on Commercial and

Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,

ee EEE BOT 0F ce

Page

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

The False Claims Act Correction Act (S. 2041):

Strengthening the Government’s Most Effec-

tive Tool Against Fraud for the 21st Century,

Hearing on S. 2041, The False Claims Act Cor-

rection Act Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-

I, Fee Ne rctrseietimieicmiceteinnisandatetncasssnncts 8

Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Cri-

RP I re CE sirscvemcncicsistnseviceiemsesemccnss Kt

Mark Jickling, Cong. Research Serv., RL32718,

Barriers to Corporate Fraud: How They Work,

ET ST: ae 8

Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus et al., Whistleblow-

ing in Organizations: An Examination of Cor-

relates of Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions,

& Retaliation, 62 J. Bus. Ethics 277 (2005) ............. 9

Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations:

An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley

Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 Wm. & Mary L.

Be ET neccsiscnbsveiivintseedenandedeaietidanibeselaadibetieblinetansnis 7

Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the

Lehman Examiner: Hearing Before the H.

Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. (2010) ............... 5

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 2016 Annual Report to

Congress on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower

FE GEE skctscadainenciniaiiechinatinniagvamieliks 24, 25

Subprime Lending & Securitization & Gov’t-

Sponsored Entities: Hearing Before the Fin.

Crisis Inquiry Comm ’n (2010) ...........sc000eeceeeeeeeees 4,5

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE'

Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund

(“TAFEF”) respectfully submits this brief as amicus

curiae.

TAFEF is a nonprofit, tax-exempt organization

dedicated to advancing and protecting whistleblower

approaches to fraud enforcement by federal and state

authorities. TAFEF consulted with legislative and

agency stakeholders in drafting the whistleblower pro-

visions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and

Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) and the ac-

companying rules and regulations. TAFEF’s members

regularly make whistleblower submissions to the Se-

curities and Exchange Commission (the “Commis-

sion”) on behalf of individuals to protect investors and

markets through a public-private partnership.

°

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case calls for the application of a well-settled

principle: when interpreting a statute, courts and

agencies should look to the whole statute to best

effectuate Congress’s intent. When the statutory def-

inition of a term is in tension with the statute’s

substantive provisions, courts and agencies adopt

1 No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part,

and no persons or entities other than amicus, its members, or its

counsel, made a monetary contribution intended to fund the prep-

aration or submission of this brief. All parties have consented to

the filing of this brief.

2

context-appropriate definitions to resolve this ten-

sion. Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provision, 15 U.S.C.

§ 78u-6, defines “whistleblower” as an individual who

reports to the Commission. By not referencing in-

dividuals who raise concerns internally, however, this

definition undermines the statute’s operation and

the clear legislative intent behind it. The Commission,

by adopting context-appropriate definitions of “whis-

tleblower” to protect internal whistleblowers against

retaliatior, 17 C.F_R. § 240.21F-2, addressed this prob-

lem as it should: by giving full effect to the statute Con-

gress enacted.

I. Rule 21F-2 recognizes that Congress passed

Dodd-Frank to solve particular problems. Congress

heard a series of similar stories while investigating the

2008 financial crisis and the Madoff Ponzi scheme:

whistleblowers tried to alert their employers and the

government to massive securities frauds, but were

both ignored and retaliated against. Whistleblowers

lost their jobs and were blacklisted by the financial ser- °

vices industry. The frauds that whistleblowers sought

to expose eventually collapsed, costing investors tril-

lions and bringing global capital markets nearly to a

halt.

II. In response to these crises, Congress passed

Dodd-Frank to prevent similar problems in the future.

A key component of Dodd-Frank is its whistleblower

program, for which Congress drew upon testimony and

other evidence before it, including its experience with

other whistleblower laws. Congress was aware that fi-

nancial rewards alone would not encourage whistle-

blowers to step forward: whistleblowers—particularly

3

those in the financial services sector—also needed

more robust protections against retaliation than those

offered by Sarbanes-Oxley. Dodd-Frank’s whistle-

blower provision includes both incentives to report and

protections from retaliation to encourage whistleblow-

ers to speak up about securities fraud. The whistle-

blower protections include confidentiality provisions

aimed at preventing industry blacklisting.

III. When the Commission adopted rules imple-

menting Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions, the

regulated community and the Commission agreed that

Congress intended to protect whistleblowers who re-

ported potential securities laws violations, regardless

of whether the reports were made internally or to the

Commission or both. The Commission’s Rule, 17 C.F.R.

§ 240.21F-2, implements this shared understanding of

the whistleblower provisions.

IV. Rule 21F-2 likewise comports with the stat-

ute’s text, structure, and underlying policy. Mechanica]

application of the statutory definition, as Petitioner

urges, ignores the structure of Section 78u-6 by render-

ing its anti-retaliation and confidentiality provisions

incompatible. Petitioner also ignores much of the stat-

ute’s text, and its reading produces results that ad-

vance no apparent legislative purpose. Confronted

with similar circumstances, this Court has adopted

context-appropriate definitions over statutory defini-

tions and has ordered that agencies do the same. Rule

21F-2 follows this command.

The decision below should be affirmed.

a

4

ARGUMENT

I. At the time it enacted Dodd-Frank, Con-

gress understood that the failure to encour-

age and respond to whistleblowers had

undermined protection of investors and the

markets.

A. Whistleblowers sought to expose the

fraud and noncompliance that led to

the Madoff scandal and the financial

crisis but were ignored and suffered re-

taliation.

The 2008 financial crisis and the Madoff scheme

collectively destroyed trillions of dollars in wealth. In

response, Congress held hearings and created the Fi-

nancial Crisis Inquiry Commission (*“FCIC”) to inves-

tigate the causes of the crisis. As Congress considered

how to prevent these problems from reoccurring, it

heard testimony from whistleblowers who had tried to

stop the misconduct and to alert the government to the

wrongdoing, but who went unheeded and were left un-

protected.

The FCIC heard testimony from Richard M.

Bowen, III, who shared his experiences as a Citigroup

whistleblower. See Subprime Lending & Securitization

& Gov’t-Sponsored Entities: Hearing Before the Fin.

Crisis Inquiry Comm’n (2010) (statement of Richard

M. Bowen, III). Mr. Bowen had emailed senior man-

agement in November 2007 to warn of “significant

but possibly unrecognized financial losses existing

5

within Citigroup.” Jd. at 2. He identified, among other

things, tens of billions in risky loans that the company

had warranted to investors and that Citigroup may

have been required to repurchase if the borrowers de-

faulted. Jd. First he was ignored, then he was stripped

of most of his responsibilities, and finally he was fired.

William D. Cohan, Was this Whistle-Blower Muzzled?,

N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2013, at SR4. Within a year of Mr.

Bowen’s email, Citigroup’s stock fell by more than

ninety-five percent.

Congress heard directly from several whistleblow-

ers, including Matthew Lee, who had been with Leh-

man Brothers for 14 years. Public Policy Issues Raised

by the Report of the Lehman Examiner: Hearing Before

the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 75-77 (2010)

(statement of Matthew Lee). Lee alerted senior man-

agement to accounting and valuation irregularities

that made the firm appear to be on stronger financial

footing than it was. Jd. He was fired within a week. Jd.

Two other Lehman whistleblowers suffered the same

fate. Jd. at 68 (statement of Rep. Kilroy). Months later,

Lehman filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection af-

ter 158 years of operation.

The most prominent pre-crisis whistleblower, Harry

Markopolos, told Congress that he had alerted the

Securities and Exchange Commission to the Madoff

Ponzi scheme in 2000. Assessing the Madoff Ponzi

Scheme & Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before the H.

Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored

Enters. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 5

6

(2009) (statement of Harry Markopolos) (“Markopolos

Testimony”). After determining that Madoff’s claimed

returns were impossible, Mr. Markopolos reported to

the Commission in 2000, 2001, 2005, 2007, and 2008,

but nothing happened. Jd. In 2008, after investors had

entrusted over $50 billion to Madoff’s management,

the scheme collapsed. Jd. For speaking up, Mr. Mar-

kopolos was blacklisted from the financial industry. Jd.

at 38-39.

B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act failed to pre-

vent the financial crisis or adequately

protect whistleblowers.

As Congress set out to address these issues, it was

not working on a blank slate. Congress had enacted the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116

Stat. 745 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”), to prevent the kinds of

serious public harm that followed massive frauds at

public companies, most notably Enron and WorldCom.

With Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress sought to compel com-

panies to establish processes—such as audit proce-

dures and internal reporting—to discover and stop

wrongdoing. Among other provisions, Sarbanes-Oxley

mandated increased internal controls relating to fi-

nancial reporting, see id. §§ 302, 404, 906, to protect

shareholders by encouraging publicly-held companies

to engage in greater self-regulation. See Fin. Crisis

Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report

60 (2011). For similar reasons, Sarbanes-Oxley also

included modest protections for whistleblowers at

publicly-traded companies. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 806.

7

Of relevance here, these protections included protec-

tions from retaliation for raising concerns about sus-

pected wrongdoing internally. See id. § 806(a)(1)(C)

(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C)).

But the Sarbanes-Oxley approach of reliance on

self-regulation proved ineffective and did not prevent

the financial crisis of 2008. Nor did the Act adequately

protect whistleblowers. A study reviewing the first

three years of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases

found them “remarkably one-sided,” with less than

seven percent of whistleblowers winning their cases.

Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Em-

pirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers

Rarely Win, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 65, 91 (2007).

C. Whistleblowers generally raise concerns

internally and often suffer retaliation as

a result.

While Congress was investigating the causes of

the 2008 financial crisis, it was learning more about

experiences of whistleblowers generally.

The 111th Congress, which enacted Dodd-Frank,

also passed the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act

of 2009 (*“FERA”), Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617,

to amend the False Claims Act. In the FERA debates,

Congress considered the experiences of False Claims

Act whistleblowers, who often raised concerns inter-

nally notwithstanding the potential financial rewards

for reporting to the government. As Senator Grassley

stated, “[mlost of the whistleblowers whom I know

8

about did not even know about whistleblower protec-

tion laws, did not even know about false claims laws

until they go into it.” 155 Cong. Rec. $4412 (daily ed.

Apr. 20, 2009). And indeed, studies had found “no evi-

dence” that the financial incentives of the False Claims

Act discourage internal whistleblowing. Thomas L.

Carson et al., Whistle-Blowing for Profit: An Ethical

Analysis of the False Claims Act, 77 J. Bus. Ethics 361,

367 (2008).

Reports to and testimony before Congress empha-

sized that whistleblowers raised concerns internally

at their peril. For example, a 2004 Cong. Research

Serv. report described the difficulties of pointing out

suspected wrongdoing in a corporate setting and iden-

tified the types of retaliation that whistleblowers

suffered. See Mark Jickling, Cong. Research Serv.,

RL32718, Barriers to Corporate Fraud: How They

Work, Why They Fail 31 (2004). In hearings before the

110th Congress, a False Claims Act whistleblower

described her termination for raising concerns inter-

nally and urged Congress to adopt “comprehensive

retaliation protections.” The False Claims Act Correc-

tion Act (S. 2041): Sirengthening the Government’s

Most Effective Tool Against Fraud for the 21st Century,

Hearing on S. 2041, The False Claims Act Correction

Act Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th

Cong. 19-21 (2008) (statement of Tina M. Gonter). The

111th Congress also heard that entire industries

can retaliate against whistleblowers. See Markopolos

Testimony at 15, 38-39, 42 (whistleblowers blacklisted

from the financial services industry for speaking up).

9

Social science supported this testimony. A study

pre-dating Dodd-Frank noted that in “circumstances

where an organization is dependent upon the continu-

ation of the wrongdoing or when they are not depend-

ent upon the whistleblower ... the organization is

more likely to retaliate against the whistleblower and

continue the wrongdoing.” Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus,

et al., Whistleblowing in Organizations: An Examina-

tion of Correlates of Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions,

& Retaliation, 62 J. Bus. Ethics 277, 281 (2005). That

same study also found that whistleblowers who report

significant and/or frequent wrongdoing face greater

risks of retaliation. Jd. at 292. Retaliation against

internal whistleblowers is swift, and often occurs

immediately after they report internally. See Terry

Morehead Dworkin et al., Internal vs. External Whis-

tleblowers: A Comparison of Whistleblowing Processes,

17 J. Bus. Ethics 1281, 1296 (1998).

Congress had known about these threats to whis-

tleblowers for decades, and had historically legislated

to protect against them. In hearings before the 110th

Congress, Representative Linda Sanchez noted that

Congress added anti-retaliation provisions to the False

Claims Act in 1986 after “witnesses testified that they

didn’t blow the whistle on fraud because there was no

anti-retaliation protection.” The False Claims Act Cor-

rection Act of 2007: Joint Hearing on H.R. 4854 Before

the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual

Prop. and the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin.

Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 124

(2008).

10

II. Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank whistle-

blower provisions to curb fraud and protect

investors by encouraging both internal re-

porting and reporting to the government

through interrelated incentives and protec-

tions.

In Dodd-Frank, Congress addressed each of the

hurdles facing whistleblowers through comprehensive

legislation with provisions that work in tandem to bet-

ter protect investors by incentivizing and protecting

whistleblowers.

Congress recognized that Sarbanes-Oxley pre-

sented an unattractive risk-benefit ratio to financial

services whistleblowers and sought to address this fail-

ure with Section 78u-6. Before Dodd-Frank, whistle-

blowers had no financial incentive to come forward

to the Commission. Although some whistleblowers

had contacted the government anyway, Congress was

aware that many who knew of the conduct that precip-

itated the financial crisis had not. Section 78u-6 made

reporting to the government more appealing by offer-

ing whistleblowers ten to thirty percent of any Com-

mission recovery over one million dollars that resulted

from their information. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1). To ad-

dress whistleblowers’ concern that the Commission

would ignore their information, Congress mandated

that the Commission create an Office of the Whistle-

blower to administer Section 78u-6. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-

7(d).

11

In response to the financial service industry's

blacklisting of whistleblowers, Congress enacted two

confidentiality provisions to protect their identities.

First, Section 78u-6 provides that whistleblowers may

submit information to the Commission anonymously.

15 US.C. § 78u-6(d)(2A). Second, it prohibits the

Commission from “disclos{ing] any information, in-

cluding information provided by a whistleblower to the

Commission, which could reasonably be expected to re-

veal the identity of a whistleblower” absent excep-

tional circumstances. Jd. § 78u-6(h)\(2)(A).?

Finally, Congress adopted a provision that pro-

tects whistleblowers in the circumstances in which

they typically face retaliation. Section 78u-6 provides

that:

No employer may discharge, demote, suspend,

threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in

any other manner discriminate against, a

whistleblower in the terms and conditions of

employment because of any lawful act done by

the whistleblower—

(i) in providing information to the Com-

mission in accordance with this section;

(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assist-

ing in any investigation or judicial or ad-

ministrative action of the Commission

2 Although whistleblowers must reveal their identities to the

Commission before payment of an award, this has no bearing on

the Commission’s obligation to kee» confidential any information

that might identify the whistleblower. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d)(2)(B).

12

based upon or related to such infor-

mation; or

(iii) in making disclosures that are re-

quired or protected under the Sarbanes-

Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.),

this chapter, including section 78j-1(m) of

this title, section 1513(e) of Title 18, and

any other law, rule, or regulation subject

to the jurisdiction of the Commission.

Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). Subdivision (iii) references Sar-

banes-Oxley, which addresses internal reporting, see

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(aX1\(C), and Section 1513(e), which

addresses assistance to the government not reached by

Subdivision (ii), see 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e). The remaining

references serve as a catchall to address other required

and protected reports.

Ill. Both industry and the Commission un-

derstood the anti-retaliation provision to

protect internal reporting regardless of

whether an individual also reported to the

Commission.

Upon Dodd-Frank’s enactment, both industry ac-

tors and the Commission agreed that Section 78u-6’s

anti-retaliation provisions protected whistleblowers

who reported internally regardless of whether they

reported to the Commission. In a Commission rulemak-

ing for the statute’s implementing regulations, regu-

lated entities and their legal representatives argued

that the Commission should require internal reporting

as a condition for receiving awards. They claimed that

13

mandatory internal reporting supported internal com-

pliance programs without undermining whistleblower

protections because whistleblowers were protected

against retaliation under Section 78u-6:

e “(An internal reporting] requirement

would not significantly disadvantage

valid whistleblowers because of .. . safe-

guards against retaliation for internal re-

porting contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley

Act and the whistleblower provisions [of

Dodd-Frank]. . . .” Comment Letter from

Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP to Secretary

Murphy (Dec. 17, 2010), https://Awww.sec.

gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-200. pdf.

* “We recognize the valid concern that

some employees will fear retaliation for

blowing the whistle. The solution to that

problem is not, however, a scheme to un-

dermine important and effective internal

compliance and reporting systems; ra-

ther, employees who fear retaliation may

rely on the anti-retaliation provision con-

temporaneously enacted by Congress.”

Comment Letter from Association of Cor-

porate Counsel to Secretary Murphy (Dec.

15, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/comments/

s7-33-10/s73310-126.pdf;

e “An internal reporting requirement is

unlikely to have a negative effect on the

proposed rules, as companies would be

given a more immediate opportunity to

cure or mitigate potential violations and

14

the whistleblower would remain pro-

tected by the anti-retaliation provisions

in the Dodd-Frank Act.” Comment Letter

from Thompson Hine LLP to Secretary

Murphy (Dec. 3, 2010), https://Awww.sec.

gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-26.pdf.

The Commission’s final rule—Rule 21F-2—also re-

flects the view that the statute’s anti-retaliation pro-

visions protect internal reporting. See 17 C.FR.

§ 240.21F-2(b).

Ironically, industry's main argument that the

Commission should require internal reporting was

that whistleblowers would otherwise bypass internal

compliance and go straight to the Commission to ob-

tain an award. See, eg., Comment Letter from US.

Chamber of Commerce and U.S. Chamber Institute for

Legal Reform to Secretary Murphy (Dec. 17, 2010),

https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-194.pdf

(“Businesses have a strong self-interest in detecting

and eliminating illegal conduct within their organiza-

tions. ... For these reasons, large numbers of compa-

nies have implemented strong internal reporting

systems to obtain information about potential wrong-

doing. .. . And we have no objection to the establish-

ment of a reasonable whistleblower program that

allows individuals to bring actionable information to

the attention of the SEC when the company itself is

unwilling or unable to engage in effective self-polic-

ing.”). Exactly this result, however, would follow from

Petitioner’s reading of the statute—that employees

15

must report to the Commission to benefit from the

anti-retaliation protections of Dodd-Frank.

The Commission agreed that Congress did not in-

tend Dodd-Frank to undermine internal reporting and

subsequently promulgated several regulations to en-

courage, but not require, whistleblowers to report in-

ternally before coming to the Commission. E.g., 17

C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4) (increasing award for whistle-

blowers who first report internally).

IV. The contemporaneous understanding of

the anti-retaliation provision is consistent

with the statute’s text, structure, and the

underlying congressional policy.

A. The term “whistleblower” can have dif-

ferent meanings within the statute even

if the statute defines the term.

The Commission’s regulation applies a context-

appropriate definition of “whistleblower” for the anti-

retaliation provision in Section 78u-6. This Court has

endorsed such an approach when—as here—it best ef-

fectuates Congress’s intent.

Context often forces identical words and phrases

to take different meanings within the same statute,

even when that statute defines them. Although the de-

fault presumption is that a given term has the same

meaning throughout a single statute, e.g., Envtl. Def.

v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007), this pre-

sumption “readily yields” to context, as a single term

may take on different meanings “in the same statute

or even in the same section,” Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v.

16

United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932). And when the

meaning of a term derived from statutory context

clashes with its statutory definition, the contextual

meaning takes precedence. E.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil

Co., 519 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1997).

For example, despite the statutory definition of

“employee” in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, that

term takes on different meanings in the Act’s substan-

tive provisions when those provisions are inconsistent

with the definition. Rod.nson, 519 U.S. at 342-43. Title

VII defines “employee” as “‘an individual employed by

an employer,’” a definition that appears to cover only

current employees. Jd. at 342 (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e(f)). The statute’s substantive provisions, how-

ever, extend protections to “employees” who fall outside

that definition. Title VII provides for the reinstate-

ment and hiring of “employees,” which are remedies

applicable only to former and prospective employees,

respectively. Jd.; see also id. at 343 n.3 (“employee”

plainly covers prospective employees elsewhere in Ti-

tle VII). The Court interpreted “employee” to have

meanings different from the statutory definition as

context required. Id. at 343-44.

Likewise, the Clean Air Act broadly defines “air

pollutant” as “‘any physical, chemical, biological, [or]

radioactive ... substance or matter which is emitted

into or otherwise enters the ambient air.’” Utility Air

Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439 (2014)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g)). But the statute would be-

come impossible to administer if each provision that

employed that term regulated every “air pollutant” as

17

the definition suggests. Id. at 2444. The Court held

that the EPA’s implementing regulations must adopt

different, context-specific definitions for “air pollutant”

to give effect to the whole statute. Jd. at 2442; see also

id. at 2452 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissent-

ing in part).

1. The term “whistleblower” must take

a different meaning in the anti-

retaliation provision than it does in

the reward provision to give full ef-

fect to the statute’s protections for

whistleblowers.

Although Section 78u-6 defines the term “whistle-

blower,” applying that definition to the anti-retaliation

provision precludes the statute’s protective provisions

from operating in tandem, producing results that

Congress could not have intended. The term “whistle-

blower” must take context-specific meanings through-

out Section 78u-6 to give full effect to the statute’s

substantive provisions.

€uction 78u-6 defines “whistleblower” as “any in-

dividual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting

jointly who provide, information relating to a violation

of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner

established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). Petitioner mechanically applies

this definition to the anti-retaliation provision, argu-

ing that it prohibits employers from retaliating against

an employee who has reported internally only if that

employee has reported to the Commission. But the

18

other whistleblower protection provisions in Section

78u-6 reveal the need for context-appropriate defini-

tions.

Petitioner’s reading of the statute denies its confi-

dentiality benefits to internal whistleblowers who also

report to the Commission. The statute provides that

whistleblowers may submit information and award

claims to the Commission anonymously. 15 U.S.C.

§ 78u-6(d)(2)(A). It also prohibits the Commission from

“disclos[ing] any information, including information

provided by a whistleblower to the Commission, which

could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of

a whistleblower” absent exceptional circumstances. /d.

§ 78u-6(h)(2)(A). Applying the statutory definition of

“whistleblower” to the anti-retaliation provision is in-

compatible with these confidentiality provisions: whis-

tleblowers entitled to both types of protections would

be forced to choose between them.

Consider an individual who makes an internal

report protected by Sarbanes-Oxley, later submits in-

formation anonymously to the Commission, and subse-

quently suffers retaliation for the internal report.

Under Petitioner’s reading, the statute protects her

from retaliation: she is a “whistleblower” who reported

to the Commission, and also reported internally. To

plead her anti-retaliation claim, however, she would

have to plead that she qualified as a “whistleblower”

under the statutory definition: i.e., that she submitted

information to the Commission. This would force her

to sacrifice one statutory protection—anonymity in

reporting to the Commission—to secure another—

19

anti-retaliation remedies.’ Moreover, under this read-

ing the confidentiality protections are rendered inco-

herent: she would be required to reveal herself as a

Commission whistleblower, while the Commission

would still be required to keep that information confi-

dential.

If a statute’s provisions cannot operate in tandem

when a term takes a single meaning, that single mean-

ing yields to a multiplicity of meanings determined by

context, even if the term is defined by the statute. Util-

ity Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2444; Robinson, 519 U.S. at 343-

44. Applying the statutory definition of “whistle-

blower” throughout Section 78u-6 creates precisely

this problem: statutory provisions designed to comple-

ment each other instead conflict, with the activation of

one rendering the other inoperative. Resolving this

tension requires “whistleblower” to take distinct mean-

ings, derived from context, as Rule 21F-2 does.

2. The statute’s design also supports

context-specific definitions.

Section 78u-6’s two distinct policies—incentives

and protection—work in tandem to encourage finan-

cial industry whistleblowers. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6. Apply-

ing context-specific definitions to those provisions

serves these distinct policies.

§ Anti-retaliation claims filed under subdivisions (i) and (ii)

do not present this problem: a whistleblower filing such a claim

has by definition been identified—at least by her employer—as

having contacted the Commission.

20

When Congress wanted only those whistleblowers

who reported to the Commission to benefit from a pol-

icy, it said so in the text of the provision effecting that

policy. The statute’s incentive pivvision mandates

awards for “whistleblowers who voluntarily provided

original information to the Commission that led” to a

successful enforcement action. Jd. § 78u-6(b)(1). Re-

quiring a report to the Commission makes this provi-

sion administrable: to reward a whistleblower for

useful, timely information, the Commission must be

able to trace that information to a whistleblower.

By contrast, the substantive provision protecting

whistleblowers who report internally contains no lan-

guage requiring a report to the Commission, id. § 78u-

6(h)(1)(A)(iii), nor would such a requirement have

anything to do with the goals of Subdivision (iii). Re-

porting to the Commission does not serve any purpose

related to protecting whistleblowers from retaliation.

And reading Subdivision (iii) to require reports to the

Commission—as Petitioner advocates—yields absurd

consequences. On Petitioner’s reading, Subdivision (iii)

protects internal whistleblowers who have also re-

ported to the Commission, but its text requires no

connection whatsoever between the report to the Com-

mission and the internal report. Jd.‘ A whistleblower

* Congress plainly knew how to require such a connection:

the immediately preceding subdivision protects whistleblowers

who assist Commission investigations only when those investiga-

tions are “based upon or related to” information the whistleblower

provides to the Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1 (Ai).

21

could thus report a suspected violation to the Commis-

sion one week, internally report a completely unre-

lated violation the week after, and be entitled to the

anti-retaliation protections of Dodd-Frank for the in-

ternal report only because of the unrelated earlier re-

port to the Commission. There is no reason that

reporting an unrelated violation to the Commission

should make the internal report protected by Dodd-

Frank’s anti-retaliation protections.°

While the statutory definition of “whistleblower”

suggests that reporting to the Commission is a condi-

tion of applying Dodd-Frank’s retaliation protections,

applying this definition to the anti-retaliation provi-

sion furthers no aim apparent from the statute and

produces absurd results. When context-specific defini-

tions better advance a statute’s regulatory design than

statutory definitions, the context-specific definitions

control, Utility Air, 134 8. Ct. at 2440.

5 Petitioner’s fear that, if the statutory definition does not

apply, Subdivision (iii) would protect whistleblowers whose inter-

nal reports have nothing to do with the securities laws, see Br. 38,

is unfounded. First, Rule 21F-2 protects from retaliation only

those internal whistleblowers whose information “relates to a pos-

sible securities law violation” or a violation of Sarbanes-Oxley. See

17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b\1)(i). Second, the context of a statute

imposes .easonable restraints on potentially overbroad language.

See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 (2015) (given

context in which term appears, “tangible object” cannot include

fish).

22

B. Applying Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation

protections to persons who report in-

ternally furthers Congress’s purpose in

ensuring that information about poten-

tial fraud is reported.

The Commission’s rule follows a well-worn path:

“In law as in life .. . the same words, placed in differ-

ent contexts, sometimes mean different things.” Yates,

135 S. Ct. at 1082. Rule 21F-2 accordingly applies

context-specific definitions to effectuate Congress’s

purpose for Section 78u-6: expanding whistleblower

protections so that companies and the government can

more quickly address problems affecting investors and

the markets. “From a legal, administrative, and func-

tional perspective—that is, from a perspective that as-

sumes that Congress was not merely trying to arrange

words on paper but was seeking to achieve a real-world

purpose—|this] way of reading the statute is the more

sensible one.” Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2453 (Breyer, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part).

With its context-specific definitions, the Commis-

sion’s rule gives effect to each provision of Section

78u-6. Rule 21F-2 distinguishes between two types of

whistleblowers: those who seek awards and those who

seek anti-retaliation remedies. Following the text of

the corresponding substantive provision, the rule per-

mits only those individuals who submit information to

the Commission to apply for an award. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-

6(b)(1); 17 C.LF-R. § 240.21F-2(a). Likewise, the rule ex-

tends anti-retaliation protections to any individual

who has reported a possible violation of the securities

23

laws to the Commission or internally. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-

6(h)(1)(A)Gii); 17 C.FLR. § 240.21F-2(b).

Rule 21F-2 completely resolves the tension be-

tween the substantive provisions of Section 78u-6.

Consider again the case of an individual who reports

internally, then reports anonymously to the Commis-

sion, and is then fired for her internal report. Under

the Commission’s regulation, she receives each benefit

Congress enacted: she may file an anti-retaliation

claim under Dodd-Frank without having to plead her

contact with the Commission to establish eligibility as

a “whistleblower.” She thus remains anonymous to the

public as a Commission whistleblower, and the Com-

mission’s obligation to keep confidential information

that might identify her is not rendered incoherent.

Rule 21F-2 also recognizes that Congress enacted

Dodd-F rank as a response to crises in the financial ser-

vices industry that whistleblowers had sought to pre-

vent. See Atl. Cleaners, 286 U.S. at 435 (historical

context of statutes informs their interpretation). In the

wake of these crises, Congress intended to prevent fu-

ture violations of the securities laws by enhancing

protections for all whistleblowers—the bulk of whom

report internally—who warn of such violations. Ex-

empting the majority of whistleblowers from these pro-

tections would undermine Congress’s intent.

24

C. Petitioner’s reading of the statute would

frustrate Congress’s purpose by render-

ing it less likely that whistleblowers will

report misconduct.

Petitioner’s reading of Section 78u-6 is flatly at

odds with Congress’s purpose in enacting Dodd-Frank.

Congress was aware that nearly all whistleblowers re-

port internally, and that extending protections to those

whistleblowers would enhance compliance with se-

curities laws and better protect investors. See pp. 7-9,

supra. And whistleblowers continue to report inter-

nally: in the wake of Dodd-Frank, ninety-seven percent

of whistleblowers first reported internally, and eighty-

nine percent escalated first reports internally. Ethics

Res. Ctr., Inside the Mind of a Whistleblower: A Supple-

mental Report of the 2011 National Business Ethics

Survey 13 (2012). Yet under Petitioner’s reading of the

statute, Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision does

not cover internal whistleblowers—by far the largest

group—uniess they report to the Commission before

their employer retaliates against them. This frustrates

the goals of a statute designed to encourage and pro-

tect whistleblowers.

In addition, Petitioner’s reading of the statute

makes the confidentiality protections illusory for indi-

viduals seeking anti-retaliation remedies. Half of all

award recipients eligible to report anonymously do so,

and all whistleblowers enjoy the statute’s confidential-

ity protections. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 2016 Annual Re-

port to Congress on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower

25

Program 18 (2016).* On Petitioner’s reading, whistle-

blowers fired for reporting internally could not pursue

Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation remedies without com-

promising these confidentiality provisions.

Moreover, Petitioner’s reading would produce the

very result that industry urged the Commission to

avoid: undermining internal compliance regimes. The

vast majority of whistleblowers who eventually contact

the Commission first report internally. Sec. & Exch.

Comm’n, 2016 Annual Report to Congress on the Dodd-

Frank Whistleblower Program 18. Yet Petitioner’s

reading of the statute would encourage whistleblowers

to bypass compliance and go straight to the Com-

mission in order to receive the benefit of the anti-

retaliation provision.

Finally, Petitioner’s reading does not serve the

statute’s policies: incentivizing and protecting whistle-

blowers to better protect investors. Applying Dodd-

Frank’s protections to whistleblowers simply looking

to flag and fix misconduct within their organizations

gives them the same robust protections as those who

report to the Commission, making retaliation less

likely. Protecting internal whistleblowers also pre-

serves scarce government resources, allowing the Com-

mission to focus its attention on corporations that fail

to adequately self-regulate. And corporations keep

their chance to correct issues internally, benefitting

® Only whistleblowers represented by counsel at the time of

their submission may report to the Commission anonymously. 15

U.S.C. § 78u-6(d)(2A).

26

their shareholders by avoiding the unwanted expense

and attention of a Commission investigation.

Achieving these benefits requires only the appli-

cation of a long-followed, unexceptional principle: “In

expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a sin-

gle sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the

provisions of the whole law, and to its object and pol-

icy.” United States v. Heirs of Boisdoré, 49 U.S. (8 How.)

113, 122 (1850), quoted in Star Athletica L.L.C. v. Var-

sity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017). This

statute’s “object and policy” is protecting investors by

encouraging all whistleblowers, and that should guide

its interpretation.

27

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

JACKLYN DEMAR CLAIRE M. SYLVIA

TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD Counsel of Record

EDUCATION FUND ALEXANDER WESTERFIELD

1220 19th St., N.W., PHILLIPS & COHEN LLP

Suite 501 100 The Embarcadero,

Washington, DC 20036 Suite 300

(202) 296-4826 San Francisco, CA 94105

(415) 836-9000

csylvia@phillipsandcohen.com

SEAN X. MCKESSY

DAVID JOCHNOWITZ

JOHN W. TREMBLAY

PHILLIPS & COHEN LLP

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

October 17, 2017

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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