Supplemental Brief — Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 138 S. Ct. 293 (2017) (No. 16-1275)
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VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., et al.,
Petitioners,
.
JOHN WARREN, et al.,
Respondents.
ee
a
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Fourth Circuit
MARK R. HERRING Topsy J. HEYTENS
Attorney General Solicitor General!
AC Counsel of Record
Deputy Attorney General MATTHEW R. MCGUIRE
PAUL KUGELMAN Deputy
Senior Assistant OFFICE OF THE VIRGINIA
Attorney Genera! Hye yo
202 North Street
J eee Richmond, VA 23219
Attorney (804) 786-7240
General solicitorgeneral@vag state.va_us
April 23, 2018
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
pF Be i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................-.2--000+ ii
ET chertiriinsteieitnninttiensenscnonnesdniniinuetnimenss 4
A 4
B. This case is a poor vehicle for addressing
preemption under the AEA ....................... 6
C. This case raises no issue of general or ur-
I I ccscenscsssnscsnenesseesnsssecessesees 11
ELE ae ee 13
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
Le ee 6
Bond v. United States,
EEE EE EET a een a a 10
Cooper v. Harris,
TT Aaa aT 8
Easley v. Cromartie,
I intra et erene en einitanmmieiaininel i)
English v. General Elec. Co.,
ee a 5
Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumilin,
733 F.3d BOS (Bd Cir. 2O1B) .............ccccccccccccecerereeeeeees 4
Hartman v. Moore,
| 9
Massachusetts v. United States,
EE Ee 7
Nordlinger v. Hahn,
EE eee 9
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n,
461 U.S. 190 (1983) ...............00c0cccccceee 3, 4, 5, 8,9, 11
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp..,
464 US. ee 5
Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson,
376 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1060 (2005) ............................ 4
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
U.S. Bank NA. v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC,
No. 15-1509 (Mar. 5, 2018) ..............22.cccccccceeeeeeeeeneee 10
Wyeth v. Levine,
| ITT EE LOT a Em 8
STATUTES
Atomic Energy Act (AEA)
a rcenicnnssnicsseninrenninntiiniiatonsl 1
iii niitinertastebecnsenianiinnidemamiidiibiaéatd 5
ee i rceencitiriinninaresenincsamcnsasiisadinttinaiiiniimmaans 12
RULES
Be Es i i enecnnsmneetanpnensncensoennsnnsenssmsctasctansnememscumenetl 6
l
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., ET AL.,
PETITIONERS,
Vv.
JOHN WARREN, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS
The federal government argues that a 36-year-old
Virginia policy that went unchallenged for 33 years
might (or might not) be preempted by a federal statute
that has been on the books for 54 years based on a con-
struction of that statute given in a 35-year-old decision
of this Court—a decision that, like all decisions of this
Court interpreting that same federal statute, held that
it did not preempt the allegedly usurped state law.
To be clear: This case does not involve whether the
Commonwealth of Virginia may impose a moratorium
on conventional uranium mining. The federal govern-
ment acknowledges that it does not, has never, and in-
deed cannot regulate such mining. U.S. Br. 3, 13, 23.
The federal government also admits that, notwith-
standing the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011 et seq., States may regulate uranium mining,
including by banning it altogether. U.S. Br. 18. Indeed,
2
the government even agrees that States may ban con-
ventional uranium mining based on concerns about the
safety of the mining process itself. See U.S. Br. 16
(“State regulation of conventional uranium mining is
permissible if that regulation is grounded on concerns
about mining itself, which is not subject to NRC regu-
lation.”); accord U.S. Br. 12-13, 18.
But even though States have plenary power over
conventional uranium mining, the federal government
argues that both lower courts erred—and the case
should move forward—based on petitioners’ allega-
tions about the Virginia legislature’s motives and a
concession we have never made. As for the former, the
government asserts that petitioners “have adequately
alleged that ... the Commonwealth has banned ura-
nium mining not because of concerns about mining
per se, but because of fears about radiological hazards
associated with the next steps of the uranium-
development process, which NRC regulates under the
AEA.” U.S. Br. 12. The government also suggests we
“have conceded that, for purposes of [our] motion to
dismiss,” U.S. Br. 23, the courts should take as true pe-
titioners’ allegations that Virginia’s moratorium was
motivated “solely” by radiological safety concerns asso-
ciated with milling and tailings. U.S. Br. 22. As a result,
says the government, this Court “need not decide what
evidence would be necessary or sufficient to prove
those allegations” were the case to proceed beyond the
motion-to-dismiss stage. U.S. Br. 23.
These arguments illustrate the weakness of the
government’s position and the untenable situation it
3
would create for States. They also highlight why this is
a poor case for addressing the preemptive scope of the
AEA. As this Court has explained in evaluating that
very same statute, “inquiry into legislative motive’—
itself always a potentially “unsatisfactory venture”—
can be “particularly pointless” where (as here) there
are no doubts about a State’s ability to achieve a par-
ticular result and the only question is whether the
State has relied on a proper justification for doing so.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserva-
tion & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 216 (1983) (Pacific
Gas). The problems will only be compounded if claims
about what motivated a particular State’s legislature
to enact (or fail to repeal) a longstanding state policy
are treated as allegations of fact that must be pre-
sumed true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. And
the problems will only multiply if the list of state poli-
cies open to challenge is expanded to include not only
those touching on matters regulated by the federal
government but also state policies regulating activities
that are, themselves, “subject to state rather than fed-
eral regulation.” U.S. Br. 23.
Fortunately, there is no need for the Court to wade
into those matters because there is no need for the
Court to take this case. Both lower courts agreed about
the proper outcome here, and their decisions upho.ding
Virginia’s three-decade-old moratorium on uranium
mining do not conflict with either the decisions of this
Court or another court of appeals. Nor does this peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari raise any issue of general
importance. Despite vague expressions of concerns, see
4
U.S. Br. 22, the government identifies no tangible
harms caused by Virginia’s moratorium and no actual
projects or activities that would be impeded were this
Court simply to leave undisturbed the status quo that
has prevailed since 1982. In short, “it is for Congress
to rethink the division of regulatory authority in light
of its possible exercise by the States to undercut a fed-
eral objective” and “[t]he courts should not assume the
role which our system assigns to Congress.” Pacific
Gas, 461 US. at 223.
ARGUMENT
A. There is no conflict
The government suggests that the lower courts’
resolution of this case conflicts with three others: this
Court’s decision in Pacific Gas; the Tenth Circuit’s de-
cision in Skull Valley;' and the Second Circuit’s deci-
sion in Entergy.” U.S. Br. 19-21. But those cases are all
distinguishable for the same basic reason: each arose
directly out of activities that are themselves identified
in the text of the AEA for regulation by the federal gov-
ernment. Pacific Gas involved the construction of new
nuclear power plants. Skull Valley involved storage fa-
cilities for spent nuclear fuel. And Entergy involved
rules governing existing nuclear power plants. This
* Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d
1223 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1060 (2005).
* Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393
(2d Cir. 2013).
5
case, in contrast, involves conventional uranium min-
ing—an entire category of activity that the federal gov-
ernment acknowledges remains “subject to state
control.” U.S. Br. 9; accord U.S. Br. 13, 16.
That distinction matters for reasons that are both
textual and intensely practical. Textual because the
clearest statutory basis for preemption based on the
underlying “purpose” of a state regulation—42 U.S.C.
§ 2021(k)—is part of a broader provision whose entire
function is to expand state regulatory authority by per-
mitting States to regulate in areas that otherwise
would be under exclusive federal control. Practical be-
cause all of the difficulties with—and disruptions
threatened by—judicial inquiries into legislative mo-
tive would only be compounded by expanding their
scope to include state regulation of “antecedent ac-
tivitlies]” (U.S. Br. 9) not otherwise under federal con-
trol. See infra Part B.
The claimed conflict with Pacific Gas also fails for
another reason. Like the decision below—and like the
two other decisions of this Court that followed it—Pa-
cific Gas rejected a preemption claim and upheld the
challenged state laws. 461 U.S. at 216; accord English
v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990); Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 258 (1984). It is at
least arguable that some of the language in Pacific Gas
was “unnecessary to the Court’s holding” and thus “dic-
tum.” Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 223-24 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
But regardless of how that question is answered, the
fact remains that this Court has never invalidated a
6
state law based on the preemption theory urged here.
For that reason, too, there is no “conflict| |” between the
decision below and the “relevant decisions of this
Court.” S. Ct. R. 10(c).
B. This case is a poor vehicle for addressing
preemption under the AEA
The government further errs in contending that
“|t]his case presents a suitable vehicle to address the
question presented.” U.S. Br. 23. The linchpin of the
government’s vehicle analysis is its assertion that we
“have conceded . . . for purposes of [our] motion to dis-
miss [that] the courts should take as true petitioners’
allegation that the Virginia moratorium was moti-
vated by radiological-safety concerns.” U.S. Br. 23.
1. Because the point may prove critical were this
Court to grant review, it is important to be clear about
what we have and have not “conceded.” Like any party
who moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we
“take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as
true.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In var-
ious filings in this case, we also have assumed that “one
of the purposes behind enacting [the moratorium] was
to address potential radiological safety concerns.”
Resp’t Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 15 (emphasis
added; footnotes omitted).
That said, we have never conceded that legislative
purpose is purely a question of fact (historical or oth-
erwise). Nor have we conceded, even for purposes of
the underlying motion to dismiss, that the Virginia
7
legislature’s sole purpose in imposing a moratorium on
conventional uranium mining was based on radiologi-
cal safety concerns associated with uranium milling
and tailings. See, e.g., Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss
& Resp. to Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. 8 n.9 (noting that
“much of the evidence highlighted by the [petitioners]
speaks not to radiation or radiological issues, but gen-
eral concerns about health, safety and welfare”).*
2. The government is similarly wrong in assur-
ing the Court that it could simply assume that Vir-
ginia’s law was wholly motivated by an allegedly
improper purpose, while leaving for another day all
thorny questions about “what evidence would be nec-
essary or sufficient” to prove such allegations. U.S. Br.
* The Fourth Circuit identified no basis for saying we “con-
cede|d|” that the Commonwealth “lacks a non-safety rationale for
banning uranium mining.” Pet. App. 10a. Such a concession would
be irrelevant in any event because the federal government
acknowledges that Virginia may ban uranium mining based on
safety concerns—even radiological safety concerns—so long as
those concerns are grounded in the safety of the mining process
rather than milling and tailings. See U.S. Br. 16.
As Judge Traxler noted in dissent, a footnote in our court of
appeals’ brief states—in response to a claim about what would
happen if this case reached the summary judgment stage—that
we have “conceded the truth of |petitioners’] claims about legislu-
tive motive only for purposes of their Rule 12(b\6) motion.” Resp.
C.A. Br. 15 1.58 (cited in Pet. App. 29a n.9). Even if this statement
could reasonably be construed as broader than others we have
made about how Rule 12 operates —and it should not—this Court
is not bound by “concessions” involving the proper operation of
Rule 12(bX6). See, e.g., Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S.
611, 624 n.23 (1948) (explaining that this Court is “not bound to
accept [a legal concession] as either sound or conclusive of the lit-
igation. It is not, even in terms, a confession of error.”).
8
23. For one thing, as explained above, respondents vig-
orously challenge the assumption that provides the
predicate for those assurances.
But the government’s assurances also are wrong
because they attempt to skate over several difficult
questions about how analysis of legislative purpose
works in this context. For now, consider just two:
In this context, is legislative “purpose” a question
of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question? In Wyeth
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), for example, this Court
analyzed Congress’s purpose in a preemption case
without giving any deference to (or even referencing)
any trial court findings. Jd. at 566-68, 573-81. In the
voting rights context, however, this Court has treated
legislative intent in drawing electoral districts as a fac-
tual question that is reviewed for clear error, and, as a
result, state legislators often are deposed and forced to
testify. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1466,
1473-75 (2017). The gover~-ment’s brief simply as-
sumes that this context fs 4 into the question-of-fact
bucket. But none of this Court’s previous decisions
clearly answers that question.‘
* The government errs in describing Pacific Gas as “deferring
to lower court’s factual assessments” of the purpose of the chal-
lenged state law. U.S. Br. 15 (emphasis added). What this Court
actually said was that its “general practice is to place considerable
confidence in the interpretations of state law reached by the fed-
eral courts of appeals.” Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 214 (emphasis
added). Courts of appeals, of course, have no power to make fac-
tual findings.
9
Or take another question: What is the required re-
lationship between an allegedly invalid purpose and
any other purposes that may also have motivated the
challenged state action? Does the challenger need to
prove: (a) that the alleged improper purpose was the
but-for cause of the legislative enactment, cf. Hartman
v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006); (b) that the improper
purpose predominated over other valid purposes, cf.
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001); (c) that
there is no rational purpose for the law other than the
improper purpose, cf. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 US. 1, 6
(1992); or (d) something else? None of the Court’s pre-
vious decisions in this area squarely address that
question—though Pacific Gas says that where (as
here) it is clear that Congress did not displace the
States’ traditional authority to reach a given outcome
(here, a moratorium on conventional uranium mining)
“it should be up to Congress to determine whether a
State has misused the authority left in its hands.” Pa-
cific Gas, 461 U.S. at 216.
In our view, the better answers are that this type
of inquiry is more akin to a legal question than a fac-
tual one and that the relevant materials show that the
Virginia legislature had a variety of concerns in mind
when enacting the moratorium. Pet. App. 178a, 182a-
88a. The government's question-of-fact position ig-
nores the profound difficulties posed by attempting to
discover facts underlying a nearly 40-year-old enact-
ment by a state legislature that maintains a paucity
of legislative history. Even more troublingly, the ques-
tion-of-fact view could create the untenable situation
10
where district courts reach different conclusions about
whether a given state law is preempted and those dif-
fering conclusions are then subject to clear-error re-
view on appeal. Cf. U.S. Bank NA. v. Vill. at Lakeridge,
LLC, No. 15-1509, slip op. at 8 (Mar. 5, 2018) (“[Wljhen
applying the law involves developing auxiliary legal
principles of use in other cases|,| appellate courts
should typically review a decision de novo.”). But re-
gardless of whether this Court agrees with our assess-
ment, those are the types of questions that would need
to be answered before petitioners could be granted any
relief.
3. It also is worth noting the breadth of the fed-
eral government’s position. In its view, a preemption
challenge to a state law regulating an activity commit-
ted entirely to the States’ control could survive a mo-
tion to dismiss as long as the plaintiff alleges an
improper legislative motive for passing an otherwise
facially valid law. Such a rule would permit virtually
any preemption challenge to advance to discovery, sub-
jecting the State and its officials to potentially intru-
sive inquiries about what motivated a state legislature
to adopt a law regulating activities that are themselves
entirely unregulated by the federal government. But
“|t}he allocation of powers in our federal system pre-
serves the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty
of the States,” Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221
(2011), and the federal government offers nothing but
speculation to justify why such an intrusion in state
sovereignty is necessary. This is especially true given
that Congress retains ample authority “to rethink the
11
division of regulatory authority” if it disagrees with
Virginia’s longstanding policies about conventional
uranium mining. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 223.°
C. This case raises no issue of general or ur-
gent importance
It bears repeating that Virginia’s moratorium on
conventional uranium mining has been in place since
President Reagan’s first term and went completely un-
challenged until the end of the second Obama Admin-
istration. At worst, that sort of delay could give rise to
a defense of laches or the like. But even at best, it badly
undermines any claim about the urgency of this issue.
The federal government has not identified any
pressing need for this Court’s intervention. The gov-
ernment makes no claim that the actual policy at issue
in this case—Virginia’s moratorium on conventional
uranium mining—.is, has, or can be expected to cause
any harm whatsoever to the national interest. Tell-
ingly, the government offers no support to petitioners’
overheated claims of dire harm to “our economy [and}
° As we pointed out to both courts below, Congress undertook
a substantial revision of the AEA early this century with the pas-
sage of the 2005 Energy Policy Act without disturbing the ura-
nium mining moratorium in Virginia or any other State. See, e.z.,
Resp’t Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 11. This too undermines
the federal government’s implicit contention that the “clear and
manifest purpose of Congress” was to displace Virginia’s exercise
of its sovereign police power. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 206.
12
national security.” Compare Pet. Cert. Reply 10-12,
with US. Br. 22.°
The government vaguely suggests that the ques-
tion presented here is “likely to recur in other nuclear-
safety contexts,” U.S. Br. 9, and that “the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s analysis” might permit other States to take other
steps that might be harmful to federal interests. U.S.
Br. 22. But the government fails to identify any con-
crete state policies that have been enacted—or even
general proposals that have been made—during the 14
months since the Fourth Circuit’s decision in this case
or the 28 months since the district court’s decision.
Better to let sleeping dogs lie.
® Nor could it, given the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s
plenary power to conduct mining operations to meet national se-
curity needs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2096.
13
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be de-
nied.
Respectfully submitted,
MARK R. HERRING Tosy J. HEYTENS
Att C , Solicitor G j
STEPHEN A. CoBB Counsel of Record
Deputy Attorney General MATTHEW R. MCGUIRE
Pan, Rucmsan Deputy Solicitor General
Senior Assistant OFFICE OF THE VIRGINIA
Attorney General ATTORNEY GENERAL
202 North Ninth Street
J. per eee ee . Richmond, VA 23219
Gane (804) 786-7240
sohicitorgeneral@vag state.va.us
No. 16-1275
In the Supreme Court of the Anited States
VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
JOHN WARREN, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS
NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicit
General
Counsel of Record
JEFFREY H. Woop
General
MALCOLM L. STEWART
Deputy Solicitor General
ANN - t meryny on
ANDREW P. AVERBACH é = a tettor
CHARLES E. MULLINS VARU CHILAKAMARRI
JEREMY M. SUTTENBERG Attorney
Attorneys Department of Justice
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
Commission SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj. gov
Washington, D.C. 20555 (202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA),
42 U.S.C. 2011 et seg., preempts state laws that prohibit
activities within a State’s regulatory jurisdiction (here,
conventional uranium mining) when such laws are
grounded in radiological-safety concerns about related
activities that are federally regulated under the AEA
(here, the milling of uranium ore and disposal of “tail-
ings” byproduct).
(1)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Eehowent of the United Bieteti cccccccscccscscscessccsesesesvescessecsensscccsseneeess 1
Statement saceupenqensapuemuiannenesersatonsmmnmnes 1
A. Regulatory background. ................c.csecseeseeeeneenenes 1
BF ee il ccresccncnnsccsenssscnssecsssasensensesssencccoss 7
C. The proceedings below ..............<<c<cssssssssssesses0e000s 9
Ff 12
RR ccs csemmnnssecnesssseecscssensesnerenasssnesessmmmessesnessuneneesnaneneernenete 14
I. The Atomic Energy Act occupies the field of
nuclear-safety regulation, and it preempts any
state uranium-mining ban that is motivated by
concerns about the radiological safety of federally
regulated uranium milling and tailings
SRR IIEIGEE, cccncsserecesssnsrsesesesanevensensensenensnsnssesessesccssosccsees 15
A. The federal government has exclusive
authority to regulate nuclear safety except
to the extent that it has delegated that
SE EE a 15
B. State laws that are grounded in nuclear-
safety concerns about AE A-regulated activities
are preempted 18
C. Because petitioners have credibly alleged that
Virginia’s uranium-mining ban was motivated
by nuclear-safety concerns about federally
regulated milling and tailings management,
their complaint should not have been dismissed . 22
Il. Lf Virginia’s uranium-mining ban was motivated
conflict-preemption
inconsistent with the judgment of federal
authorities that uranium milling and tailings
management can be safely conducted if performed
CITIES ccitcnsiscnnsctinnntenimeninnesneernenatn ss enetetiiinimatiets 34
(111)
IV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
American Trucking Ass'ns v. City of Los Angeles,
re TT iininicsinrsconerenncetindeieenbicaienaedieiammcencemnenes 29
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc.,
438 U.S. 59 (1978) =
Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality
Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004) 29
English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990) ..... passim
Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin,
733 F.3d 398 (2d Cir. 2013) 33
Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n,
cr 34
Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 486 US.
(1988) 3
Hydro Res., Inc., In re, 6 N.R.C. 510 (2006) 4
National Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452 (2012)......... 29
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conser-
vation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190
(1983) passim
Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552
U.S. 364 (2008) 30
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. (1984)....... 18
Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson,
376 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546
U.S. 1060 (2005) 27, 28, 33
Constitution, statutes, regulations, and rule:
U.S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2 sioleeseslsisiamtatinpmtannimensenennies 14
Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073:
§ 1, 68 Stat. 921 —
§ 2(d), 68 Stat. 921 15
Vv
Statutes, regulations, and rule—Continued: Page
§ 271, 68 Stat. 960 15
Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, 73 Stat.
6
Act of Aug. 24, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-135,
EE 2
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724:
§ 1(b)(4), 60 Stat. 756 : 2,15
§ K(a)(1), 60 Stat. 760 2
§ K(b)(1), 60 Stat. 761 2
§ K(b)(2), 60 Stat. 761 2
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq. ..........1, 2
42 U.S.C. 2111-2114 4
42 U.S.C. 2012(d) 15
42 U.S.C. 2013(d) 2, 12, 31
42 US.C. 2014(e)(1)(4) 4
42 U.S.C. 2014(e(2) 5, 9, 16, 23
42 U.S.C. 2014(v) 4
42 U.S.C. 2014(z) 3, 16
42 U.S.C. 2014(aa) 3
42 US.C. 2014cc) 4
42 U.S.C. 2018 2, 15, 20, 25
42 U.S.C. 2021 passim
42 U.S.C. 2021(aX(1) 6, 16
42 U.S.C. 2021(b) 6, 7, 16
42 U.S.C. 2021(c) 7, 33
42 U.S.C. 2021(e)(1) 19, 24
42 U.S.C. 2021(d)(1)(2) 6
42 U.S.C. 2021(k) passim
42 U.S.C. 2021() 7, 33
42 U.S.C. 2021(0)(2) 32
42 U.S.C. 2021b(9AX(i) 33
VI
Statutes, regulations, and rule—Continued: Page
42 U.S.C. 2022 3
42 U.S.C. 2022012) ceeccccseneeeeeeceeee cove 5
42 U.S.C. 2023(a) 32, 33
42 U.S.C. 2073-2074 (2012 & Supp. III (2015))...............3
42 U.S.C. 2092 3,4
42 U.S.C. 2098
42 U.S.C. 2099
42 U.S.C. 2111
42 U.S.C. 2111-2114
42 U.S.C. 2131-2133
42 U.S.C. 2201(b)
Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. 601 et seq............
42 U.S.C. 5811-5813
42, U.S.C. 5841-5845
42 U.S.C. T151(a)
Cal. Pub. Res. Code (West 1977):
wt Bom mm we oe
§ 25524. 1(b) 25
§ 255242 25
1981 Va. Acts 1404 7
1982 Va. Acts 426 7
1983 Va. Acts 3 s
10 C.F.R.:
Pt.8 18
Section 8.4 18
Pts. 30-39 4
Pt. 40 3
Section 40.1-40.3 6
Section 40.3 4,
Section 40.4 3, 4, 6
Section 40.13(b) — 4
Section 40.20-4021 — 6
Vil
i
Regulations and rule—Continued:
Section 40.26-40.28
Section 40.31(h)
Section 40.32
Section 40.51
App. A
Pt. 50
Pt. 52
Pt. 70
Pt. 72
40 C.F.R.:
Pt. 192 5
Section 192.32(a)(1) 6
Section 192.32(a)(2) 6
Section 192.32(a)(3)i) 6
6
27
ee wOkrh DAAAR AH
Section 192.32(a)(4)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 22,
Miscellaneous:
34 Fed. Reg. 7273 (May 3, 1969) 18
62 Fed. Reg. 46,517 (Sept. 3, 1997) 32
77 Fed. Reg. 21,625 (Apr. 11, 2012) 18
H.R. Rep. No. 1480, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. (1978):
Pt.I 5
Pt.2 5
S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959).................. 7,17
U.S. NRC, Conventional Uranium Mills, (May 15,
2017), https-//Awww-nre.gov/materials/uranium-
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 16-1275
VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.
JOHN WARREN, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
This case concerns whether the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 (AEA), 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seg., preempts a state
law that prohibits an activity within a State’s regulatory
jurisdiction, when such a law is motivated by radiological-
safety concerns about related activities that are feder-
ally regulated under the AEA. Because this case di-
rectly implicates federal regulatory responsibilities, the
United States has a substantial interest in the Court’s
resolution of the preemption issue. At the Court’s invi-
tation, the United States filed an amicus brief at the pe-
tition stage of this case.
STATEMENT
A. Regulatory Background
1. In 1946, Congress created a federal-government
monopoly over the production, ownership, and use of
“fissionable material,” including enriched uranium and
(1)
2
other materials that are “capable of releasing substantial
quantities of energy through nuclear chain reaction.”
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (1946 Act), ch. 724, §§ 1(b)(4),
5(a)(1), 60 Stat. 756, 760. To implement this federal mo-
nopoly, Congress restricted the transfer, delivery, and
receipt of nuclear “source materials” like uranium.
§ 5(b)(1) and (2), 60 Stat. 761.
In 1954, through the AEA, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.,
Congress eliminated the federal government’s monop-
oly over the “use, control, and ownership of nuclear
technology,” Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 206
(1983) (Pacific Gas), in order “to encourage widespread
participation in the development and utilization of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum
extent consistent with the common defense and security
and with the health and safety of the public,” 42 U.S.C.
2013(d). The AEA preserves the States’ authority to
regulate “with respect to the generation, sale, or trans-
mission of electric power produced through the use of nu-
clear facilities licensed by the [NRC].” 42 U.S.C. 2018;
see Act of Aug. 30, 1954 (1954 Act), ch. 1073, § 1, 68 Stat.
921. In 1965, Congress clarified that the AEA’s preser-
vation of state regulatory authority “shall not be
deemed to confer upon any Federal, State, or local
agency any authority to regulate, control, or restrict
any activities of the [NRC].” 42 U.S.C. 2018; see Act of
Aug. 24, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-135, 79 Stat. 551.
In order to promote private-sector development of
nuclear energy, subject to strict federal control, Con-
gress has fashioned a comprehensive scheme for the
regulation and development of nuclear energy. Pacific
Gas, 461 U.S. at 193; see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
3
Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 63 (1978). Respon-
sibility for implementing the AEA is currently shared
among the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
which serves as the principal licensing and safety regula-
tor, see 42 U.S.C. 5841-5845; the U.S. Department of En-
ergy (DOE), which oversees federal research and promo-
tional activities, see 42 U.S.C. 5811-5813, 7151(a); and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which estab-
lishes generally applicable standards for certain radiation
hazards, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 2022.'
Among other responsibilities, NRC licenses and regu-
lates the transfer, possession, use, and disposal of nuclear
materials throughout the nuclear fuel cycle, as needed to
“promote the common defense and security” and to “pro-
tect health or to minimize danger to life or property.”
42 U.S.C. 2201(b). “(Slource material,” including ura-
nium, is regulated upon removal from its place of deposit
in nature. 42 U.S.C. 2092; see 42 U.S.C. 2014(z) (defining
“source material’” to include “uranium”); 10 C.F.R. 40.4
(same). “{Njo person may transfer or receive in inter-
state commerce * * * any source material after removal
from its place of deposit in nature” unless such actions
are “authorized by a general or specific license issued by
[INRC}.” 42 U.S.C. 2092; see 42 U.S.C. 2093, 2099;
10 C.F.R. Pt. 40 (implementing regulations).
The AEA requires similar licenses for the transfer or
possession of “‘special nuclear material,’” which includes
uranium that has been “enriched in the isotope 233 or in
the isotope 235.” 42 U.S.C. 2014(aa); see 42 U.S.C. 2073-
2074 (2012 & Supp. III 2015) (licensing requirements);
10 C.F.R. Pt. 70 (implementing regulations). The AEA
' Those functions were allocated among NRC, DOE, and EPA in
the 1970s, after the Atomic Energy Commission was abolished. See
Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 486 U.S. 663, 666 n.4 (1988).
4
also requires licenses for the transfer or possession of
any “byproduct material” that is generated during nu-
clear-fuel production or use. See 42 U.S.C. 2014(e)(1)-(4)
(defining several categories of “byproduct material”);
42 U.S.C. 2111-2114 (licensing requirements); 10 C.F .R.
Pts. 30-39 (implementing regulations). NRC also re-
quires licenses for the operation of nuclear utilization
and production facilities, including nuclear power plants,
uranium-enrichment facilities, and fuel-fabrication facil-
ities, as well as spent-nuclear-fuel storage installations.
See 42 U.S.C. 2014(v) and (cc), 2131-2133; 10 C.F.R. Pts.
50, 52, 72 (implementing regulations).
2. Nuclear source material may be obtained through
several means. This case concerns conventional ura-
nium recovery, through which uranium ore is excavated
from the ground through open-pit or underground min-
ing and then subjected to above-ground chemical pro-
cessing. Pet. App. 4a. NRC does not regulate the phys-
ical excavation of uranium ore through conventional
mining (as opposed to other, “in situ” methods of ura-
nium recovery). See Jn re Hydro Res., Inc., 63 N.R.C.
510, 512-513 (2006).” NRC requirements begin to apply
once uranium is removed from its “place of deposit in
nature.” 42 U.S.C. 2092; 10 C.F.R. 40.3.; p. 3, supra.*
* “In situ” recovery involves injecting chemicals directly into the
earth and pumping the resulting uranium-infused solution to the
surface. Pet. App. 4a n.1, 54a-55a. This method is feasible only in
certain geological settings, which are not alleged to be present in
Virginia. /d. at 22a n.2 (Traxler, J., dissenting). NRC regulates the
process of “in situ” recovery. See Jn re Hydro Res., Inc., 63 N.R.C.
at 512-513.
® NRC has exempted from regulation “unrefined and unprocessed
ore containing source material,” but any such ore may not. be refined
or processed without a license. 10 C.F.R. 40.13(b); see 10 C.F_R.
5
Once excavated, the uranium ore is transferred by
truck or conveyor belt to a nearby mill for processing.
See U.S. NRC, Conventional Uranium Mills (May 15,
2017), https://www.nre.gov/materials/uranium-recovery/
extraction-methods/conventional-mills.html. “Uranium
mills are a part of the nuclear fuel cycle,” as “[t}hey ex-
tract uranium from ore for eventual use in nuclear
weapons and powerplants.” H.R. Rep. No. 1480, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 2, at 25 (1978). “[Miilling” involves
physically grinding the ore into particles and then apply-
ing chemicals that separate the uranium from the sur-
rounding rock. Pet. App. 54a-55a. This process generates
a small quantity of concentrated uranium known as “‘yel-
lowcake,”” as well as a large amount of sandy waste known
as “[tlailings.” /d. at 4a, 54a-55a & n.2 (citation omitted);
see H.R. Rep. No. 1480, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. I, at 11
(1978) (noting that milling 2000 pounds of uranium ore
yields “only 1 to 5 pounds of usable uranium”). Tailings
are classified as a “byproduct material” under the AEA.
42 U.S.C. 2014e)(2).
The yellowcake is “sold and shipped off-site for en-
richment,” Pet. App. 23a (Traxler, J., dissenting), while
the tailings are typically stored at a nearby site. Because
uranium mill tailings contain several substances that are
potentially hazardous to human health, id. at 205a, 210a,
they are subject to extensive federal regulation. EPA is
processing and disposal of uranium mill tailings.
42 U.S.C. 2022(b)(1)-(2); see 40 C.F .R. Pt. 192 (containing
40.4 (defining “[u)nrefined and unprocessed ore” as “ore in its natu-
ral form prior to any processing, such as grinding, roasting or ben-
eficiating, or refining”) (emphases omitted).
6
standards). NRC implements those standards through
regulations and _ site-specific licensing conditions.
42 U.S.C. 2111 (requiring licenses for byproduct materi-
als); 10 C.F.R. 40.1-40.3, 40.20-40.21, 40.26-40.28,
40.31(h), 40.32, 40.51 (regulating tailings “[blyproduct
[mJaterial” as defined in 10 C.F.R. 40.4); 10 C.F.R. Pt.
40 App. A (establishing “criteria relating to the opera-
tion of uranium mills and the disposition of tailings or
wastes” from milling) (capitalization omitted).
3. In 1959, Congress amended the AFA to “clarify
the respective responsibilities * * * of the States and the
|federal government] with respect to the regulation of
byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials.”
42 U.S.C. 2021(a)(1); see Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L.
No. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688. That amendment empowered
NRC to enter agreements that authorize States to li-
cense and regulate the transfer, possession, use, and dis-
posal of nuclear source material, byproduct material,
and/or sub-critical quantities of special nuclear material.
42 U.S.C. 2021(b). NRC approves such an agreement un-
der Sectivun 2021 if the State has developed a regulatory
program that is both “adequate to protect the public
health and safety with respect to the materials within the
State covered by the proposed agreement” and “compat-
ible with [NRC’s] program for the regulation of such ma-
terials.” 42 U.S.C. 2021(d)(1)(2). A State that enters
‘ For example, EPA has specified technical requirements for the
design of surface impoundments that store tailings, 40 C.F.R.
192.32(a)(1); set maximum allowable groundwater concentrations
for specified hazardous substances, 40 C.F.R. 192.32(a)(2); required
the installation of a “permanent radon barrier” around nonopera-
tional impoundments, 40 C.F .R. 192.32(a)(3)(i); and mandated mon-
itoring and analysis of radon levels, 40 C.F.R. 192.32(a)(4).
7
into a Section 2021 agreement may “regulate the materi-
als covered by the agreement for the protection of the
public health and safety from radiation hazards.”
42 U.S.C. 2021(b); S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., ist Sess.
12 (1959) (Senate Report) (stating that, absent such an
agreement, NRC “has exclusive authority to regulate
for protection against radiation hazards”).
Certain responsibilities, including regulation of “the
construction and operation” of nuclear power plants and
uranium-enrichment facilities, are reserved to NRC
and cannot be delegated to a State. 42 U.S.C. 2021(c).
With respect to those responsibilities, Section 2021
gives States an advisory role, allowing them to be heard
by NRC before such activities commence within a State.
42 U.S.C. 2021(D. Section 2021 also contains a savings
clause, which provides that “[njothing in this section
shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or
local agency to regulate activities for purposes other
than protection against radiation hazards.” 42 U.S.C.
2021(k) (emphasis added).
B. The Virginia Law
1. In the late 1970s, the “largest known uranium de-
posit in the United States” was discovered in Pittsylvania
County, Virginia. Pet. App. 5a, 216a. Following that dis-
covery, the Virginia General Assembly directed a commis-
sion to “evaluate the environmental effects of uranium ex-
ploration, mining and milling,” and to identify “any possi-
ble detriments” from those activities to the “health,
safety, and welfare of Virginia citizens.” 1981 Va. Acts
1404 (Pet. App. 169a-170a). In 1982, the General Assem-
bly enacted a law that permitted uranium exploration but
imposed a one-year moratorium on uranium mining. See
1982 Va. Acts 426 (Pet. App. 170a-177a).
8
In 1983, the General Assembly extended the morato-
rium indefinitely. See 1983 Va. Acts 3 (1983 Act) (Pet.
App. 177a-189a). It found that, “while uranium mining
and milling activity can generate substantial benefits, it
also raises a wide range of environmental and other lo-
cal concerns.” Pet. App. 178a. The 1983 Act directed
that “permit applications for uranium mining shall not
be accepted by any agency of the Commonwealth * * *
until a program for permitting uranium mining is estab-
lished by statute.” /d. at 177a-178a (emphasis omitted).
The 1983 Act also created a working group to consider,
inter alia, the costs and benefits of permitting develop-
ment of the Pittsylvania deposit, including considera-
tion of the risk that “radionuclides” generated by “min-
ing, milling and tailings management” could contami-
nate the surrounding water, air, and plant and animal
life. Jd. at 183a-184a.
In 1985, Lhe commission and working group issued
their final report. Pet. App. 219a. The working group
observed that “there was no area where [it] had greater
concern than on the potential effects of radiation which
would be produced by [a] uranium development facility.”
D. Ct. Doe. 48-14, at 15 (Sept. 11, 2015). A majority of
participants recommended lifting the moratorium, but
only if the General Assembly “simultaneously” adopted
certain recommendations “to assure adequate state reg-
ulation of uranium mining and milling.” D. Ct. Doc.
48-17, at 8 (Sept. 11, 2015). Those included the “essen-
tial” recommendation that Virginia become an “agree-
ment state” under Section 2021, with the right to regu-
late milling and tailings storage, id. at 6; cf. 42 U.S.C.
2021, as well as proposed technical limits on radiological
emissions from milling and tailings-storage activities,
9
see D. Ct. Doc. 48-17, at 6-7. Despite those recommen-
dations, the General Assembly neither lifted the mora-
torium nor enacted a “comprehensive mining, milling
and tailing statute.” See D. Ct. Doc. 48-14, at 7.
In 2009, Virginia signed a Section 2021 agreement
with NRC. The Commonwealth thereby acquired reg-
ulatory authority over “[sjource materials,” “[s|pecial
nuclear materials,” and specified categories of “[bly-
product materials” within the Commonwealth, Pet.
App. 300a; see id. at 298a-305a; but the agreement ex-
pressly excluded the regulation of uranium mill tailings,
see id. at 301a (excluding “(t]he regulation of byproduct
material as defined in Section 1 1le.(2) of the [AE A]”); ef.
42 U.S.C. 2014(e)(2) (classifying tailings as byproduct
material).
2. For several decades after the discovery of the
Pittsylvania County uranium deposit, the owners of that
deposit did not pursue efforts to overturn the Common-
wealth’s mining moratorium. In the mic “* 0s, how-
ever, uranium prices rose sharply and the :andowners
lobbied for a repeal of the ban. Pet. App. 222a. The
General Assembly, the Governor, and Commonwealth
agencies commissioned studies addressing the feasibil-
ity, benefits, and risks of potential uranium develop-
ment. See id. at 222a-223a, 227a-228a. In 2013, bills to
lift the moratorium were introduced in the General As-
sembly, but those legislative efforts failed. /d. at 228a-
229a.
C. The Proceedings Below
Petitioners are the current landowners of the
Pittsylvania County uranium deposit. In 2015, petition-
ers brought suit in federal district court, asserting that
the Commonwealth’s moratorium was preempted by
10
the AEA, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
Pet. App. 190a-238a.
1. The district court dismissed petitioners’ com-
plaint for failure to state a claim. Pet. App. 53a-82a.
The court noted petitioners’ allegation that the morato-
rium rested on “radiolog ice! safety concerns” associated
with milling and tailings management. /d. at 68a. The
court concluded, however, that the moratorium was not
preempted because it applied only to mining, and con-
ventional uranium mining is not regulated by NRC. /d.
at 7la-80a. The court recognized that the mining ban
“might obviate one’s decision to mill and manage the
mill tailings” in Virginia, but it suggested that “such a
consequence [wa]s too far attenuated” to result in
preemption. /d. at 80a.
2. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. la-52a.
a. The court of appeals agreed with the district court
that petitioners had failed to state a claim that Vir-
ginia’s moratorium is preempted. Pet. App. 13a-19a.
The court of appeals recognized that “uranium milling
and tailings storage” are “regulated by the NRC,” and
that under Section 2021(k), “[S]tates may therefore not
regulate them except for purposes other than protec-
tion against radiation hazards.” /d. at 13a-l4a. The
court found it dispositive, however, that “the plain lan-
guage of the Commonwealth’s ban does not mention
uranium milling or tailings storage,” and it declined to
“look past the statute’s plain meaning to decipher
whether the legislature was motivated to pass the ban
by a desire to regulate uranium milling or tailings stor-
age.” Jd. at 14a. The court described this Court’s deci-
sion in Pacific Gas, supra, as “warn[ing] against the
‘unsatisfactory venture’ of ‘inquiry into legislative mo-
tive.”” Pet. App. 14a (quoting Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at
11
216). The court of appeals also stated that it would be
pointless to invalidate the statute based on a finding of
improper purpose because the Commonwealth could
simply reenact the law “with a different motive.” /bid.
The court of appeals further held that Virginia’s mor-
atorium was not preempted under conflict-preemption
principles. Pet. App. 18a-19a. The court concluded that
the moratorium would not pose an obstacle to Con-
gress’s objective of encouraging the development and
use of nuclear energy because most uranium used in the
United States’ atomic-energy industry is imported, and
because many uranium-extraction facilities in the
United States—those on federal lands and those that
use “in situ” recovery—are already licensed by NRC
and thus beyond the reach of any state ban. /d. at 19a.
b. Judge Traxler dissented. Pet. App. 20a-52a. He
explained that “established Supreme Court law makes
clear that the AEA preempts state statutes enacted for
the purpose of protecting against the radiological dan-
gers of activities the AEA regulates,” including “ura-
nium milling and tailings management.” /d. at 52a; see
id. at 32a-38a. He further noted that, if the allegations
in petitioners’ complaint were taken as true, the Com-
monweslith had “banned uranium mining only as a
means to prevent milling and tailings management from
occurring in Virginia.” /d. at 27a; see id. at 21a n.1, 40a-
4la. Because “Congress has taken away a state’s ability
to limit mining for th[at] particular reason,” id. at 20a,
Judge Traxler concluded that petitioners had stated a
valid preemption claim.
Judge Traxler further concluded that petitioners
had stated a claim of preemption under conflict-
preemption principles. He explained that a uranium-
mining ban premised on radiological-safety concerns
12
would stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
Corgress’s objective to permit the private sector to de-
velop nuclear energy “to the maximum extent con-
sistent with the common defense and security and with
the health and safety of the public.” Pet. App. 47a (quot-
ing 42 U.S.C. 2013(d)). He expressed the view that Vir-
ginia had sought to prevent the private sector from de-
veloping nuclear energy because the State did “not
trust|] that the federal government has sufficiently pro-
tected against the radiological dangers of uranium mill-
ing and tailings management.” /d. at 47a-48a.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Petitioners have alleged that Virginia’s uranium-
mining moratorium is motivated by concern that ura-
nium milling and tailings-management activities may
pose nuclear-safety risks. If that allegation is true, the
moratorium is preempted because Congress has en-
trusted such nuclear-safety regulation exclusively to
the federal government. The courts below therefore
erred in ordering, and upholding, dismissal of petition-
ers’ complaint.
A. The AEA’s text and structure demonstrate Con-
gress’s intent to reserve for the federal government
control over the management of all radiation hazards
stemming from activities licensed under the statute.
The accompanying legislative history and subsequent
agency interpretations confirm the federal government’s
primacy in this field.
B. The AEA’s preemptive effect depends in part on
the purpose of the state law at issue. State laws that are
“grounded in safety concerns” about AE A- ac-
tivities encroach upon the field occupied by the federal
government, even if the State purports to act within an
area of traditional state authority. Pacific Gas & Elec.
13
Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n,
461 U.S. 190, 213 (1983). That purpose-based approach
to field preemption in this sphere is rooted in the text of
Section 2021(k), which preserves the States’ authority
to regulate certain activities “for purposes other than
protection against radiation hazards.” 42 U.S.C.
2021(k).
C. Petitioners have credibly alleged that Virginia
banned uranium mining for the purpose of guarding
against the radiation hazards posed by uranium milling
and tailings management, which are activities regulated
under the AEA. Accordingly, petitioners’ complaint
should not have been dismissed.
Il. If Virginia’s uranium-mining ban rests on a leg-
islative judgment that uranium milling and tailings
management canno’ be conducted safely, it is
preempted for the additional reason that it conflicts
with federal law.
A. In enacting the AEA, Congress sought to ensure
that nuclear technology would be safe enough for wide-
spread development and use. State regulation prem-
ised on a contrary judgment that an aspect of nuclear
development cannot safely be undertaken stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Con-
gress’s objectives.
B. The AEA establishes alternative mechanisms
threugh which States can participate in federal regula-
tion of nuclear development. Allowing a State to ad-
dress radiation hazards by banning uranium mining
would conflict with Congress’s decision that States
should utilize other specific methods to participa» in
that regulatory process.
14
ARGUMENT
Because federal law is “the supreme Law of the
Land,” U.S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2, congressional enact-
ments can preempt otherwise permissible state laws.
See, e.g., English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78
(1990). In the absence of express statutory language
that defines the scope of a federal law’s preemptive ef-
fect, state law can be preempted in two ways. /d. at 79.
First, “state law is pre-empted where it regulates con-
duct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Gov-
ernment to occupy exclusively.” /bid. Second, state law
is “pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts
with federal law,” including when “state law ‘stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” /bid. (cita-
tion omitted).
Under the AEA, the federal government “has occu-
pied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except
[for] the limited powers expressly ceded to the States.”
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserva-
tion & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983). Lf, as pe-
titioners allege, Virginia banned uranium mining as a
means of addressing the radiological hazards associated
with uranium milling and tailings management, the Vir-
ginia law would fall squarely within the preempted field,
even though the immediate object of the ban (uranium
mining) is outside the NRC’s jurisdiction. A state law
motivated by such concerns would also conflict with Con-
gress’s determination—buttressed by the conclusions of
the expert technical agencies assigned responsibility for
such matters—that uranium milling and tailings manage-
ment can be conducted safely under federal regulation.
15
L THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OCCUPIES THE FIELD OF
NUCLEAR-SAFETY REGULATION, AND IT PREEMPTS
ANY STATE URANIUM-MINING BAN THAT MOTI-
VATED BY CONCERNS ABOUT THE RADIOLOGICAL
SAFETY OF FEDERALLY REGULATED URANIUM MILL-
ING AND TAILINGS MANAGEMENT
A. The Federal Government Has Exclusive Authority To
Regulate Nuclear Safety Except To The Extent That It
Has Delegated That Authority To States
1. Through the AEA, the federal government “occu-
pie|s] the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except
|for] the limited powers expressly ceded to the States.”
Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 212. Congress first regulated
nuclear safety in 1946 by creating a “program for Gov-
ernment control” of nuclear technology that excluded
both the private sector and the States. 1946 Act § 1(b)(4),
60 Stat. 756.
When Congress ended that monopoly in 1954 to per-
mit private development of nuclear energy, it did not re-
linquish federal control over the safety risks related to
nuclear energy production, but instead concluded that
nuclear source materials must continue to “be regulated
in the national interest in order to provide for the com-
mon defense and security and to protect the health and
safety of the public.” 42 U.S.C. 2012(d); see 1954 Act
§ 2(d), 68 Stat. 921. The 1954 Act created a comprehen-
sive regulatory and licensing scheme that vested a fed-
eral agency with responsibility for the radiological safety
of each aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle. See pp. 2-6,
supra. Although States retained their traditional au-
thorities with respect to “the generation, sale, [and]
transmission of electric power,” 42 U.S.C. 2018; see 1954
16
Act § 271, 68 Stat. 960, “no significant role was contem-
plated for the States” regarding “‘national security, pub-
lic health, and safety,’” English, 496 U.S. at 81.
In 1959, by establishing the Section 2021 agreement
program, Congress created a limited path for States to
manage the radiation hazards of activities licensed under
the AEA. 42 U.S.C. 2021(b). Under Section 2021, NRC
may delegate to a State NRC’s regulatory jurisdiction
over the transfer, possession, use, and disposal of nuclear
source material (including uranium ore), byproduct ma-
terial (including tailings), and small quantities of special
nuclear material (such as enriched uranium). /bid.; see
42 U.S.C. 2014(e)(2) and (z). Pursuant to such an agree-
ment, the State may “regulate the materials covered by
the agreement for the protection of the public health and
safety from radiation hazards.” 42 U.S.C. 2021(b).
In establishing that cooperative program and “clar-
ify{ing] the respective responsibilities under [the AEA]
of the States and the [NRC] with respect to the regula-
tion of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials,”
42 U.S.C. 2021(a)(1), Congress provided that nothing in
the Section 2021 program would affect the authority of
States “to regulate activities for purposes other than
protection against radiation hazards.” 42 U.S.C.
2021(k) (emphasis added). The italicized language “un-
derscore[s] the distinction * * * between the spheres
of activity left respectively to the Federal Government
and the States.” Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 210. Under
that division of responsibilities, absent an agreement
between a State and the federal government, “the Fed-
eral Government maintains complete control of the
safety and ‘nuclear’ aspects of energy generation,”
while “the States exercise their traditional authority
over the need for additional generating capacity, the
17
type of generating facilities to be licensed, land use,
ratemaking, and the like.” /d. at 212; see id. at 205.
2. The legislative history of the 1959 AEA amend-
ments confirms Congress’s intent that the federal gov-
ernment would maintain its primacy in the field of nu-
clear safety, even with the introduction of state regula-
tion through Section 2021 agreements. The Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy explained that Section 2021(k)
was “intended to make it clear that the bill does not im-
pair the State authority to regulate activities of AEC
| Atomic Energy Commission] licensees for the manifold
health, safety, and economic purposes other than radia-
tion protection.” Senate Report 12 (emphasis added).
Under that approach, the federal government would re-
tain “exclusive authority to regulate for protection
against radiation hazards until such time as the State en-
ters into an agreement with the Commission to assume
such responsibility.” /bid. That explanation reinforces
the conclusion that Congress intended to maintain fed-
eral control over radiological safety risks, except where
the authority to regulate such risks has been delegated
to a State by agreement. Absent such an agreement,
States would remain free to regulate the activities of
AEC licensees, but not for the purpose of protecting
against radiological safety risks.
3. An interpretation by the AEC, the federal agency
originally charged with regulating nuclear safety under
the AEA, further confirms federal supremacy in the
regulation of radiological safety risks. In 1969, the AEC
issued a regulation setting forth its general counsel’s
understanding of Section 2021(k). The regulation states
that Congress, “in enacting [Section 2021(k)], intended
to preempt to the Federal Government the total respon-
18
sibility and authority for regulating, from the stand-
point of radiological health and safety, the specified nu-
clear facilities and materials.” 34 Fed. Reg. 7273, 7274
(May 3, 1969).° That understanding reinforces the con-
clusion that Congress left no room for States to en-
croach upon the preempted radiological-safety field.
B. State Laws That Are Grounded In Nuclear-Safety
Concerns About AE A-Regulated Activities Are Preempted
This Court has addressed the AEA’s preemptive
reach on several occasions and has determined that the
statute’s preemptive effect depends in part on the pur-
pose of the state law at issue. Under that framework,
state laws that are “grounded in safety concerns” about
AEA-regulated activities like uranium milling and tail-
ings management encroach upon the field occupied by
the federal government and are preempted. Pacific
Gas, 461 U.S. at 213.
1. In Pacific Gas, the Court considered a California
law that banned new construction of nuclear power
plants until a method for permanent disposal of nuclear
waste became available. 461 U.S. at 198. After review-
ing the relevant statutory provisions and legislative his-
tory, the Court concluded that “the Federal Govern-
ment has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety con-
cerns, except [for] the limited powers expressly ceded
to the States.” /d. at 212; see Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 240-241 (1984) (explaining that the
Court in Pacific Gas had “examined the relationship be-
tween federal and state authority in the nuclear energy
* This rule was codified at 10 C.F.R. 8.4. Although 10 C.F.R. Part
8 was subsequently removed, NRC “continues to adhere to the sub-
stance of the interpretation in § 84.” 77 Fed. Reg. 21,625, 21,627
(Apr. 11, 2012).
19
field” and had “concluded that States are precluded from
regulating the safety aspects of nuclear energy”).
The Court observed that the AEA gives NRC “exclu-
sive jurisdiction to license the transfer, delivery, receipt,
acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear materials,”
Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 207, and permits state regulation
of such materials only if authorized by agreement, id. at
208-209. The court also explained that the AE.A’s preser-
vation of state authority to “regulate activities for pur-
poses other than protection against radiation hazards,”
42 U.S.C. 2021(k), “underscored the distinction” drawn
by Congress “between the spheres of activity left respec-
tively to the Federal Government and the States.” 461
U.S. at 210. Under that division of responsibility, the
federal government “regulate[s] the radiological safety
aspects involved” in AEA-regulated activities—there,
the “construction and operation of a nuclear plant”—
while the States retain their “traditional responsibility”
to “determinje] questions of need, reliability, cost, and
other related state concerns” not involving radiological
safety. Jd. at 205.
The Pacific Gas Court observed that California had
not sought to regulate the manner in which a nuclear
power plant should be constructed or operated, which
would conflict with N RC’s exclusive regulatory authority
over plant construction and operation and would thus be
preempted whether the State had acted out of concern
for radiological-safety hazards or for some other reason.
461 U.S. at 212; see 42 U.S.C. 2021(c)(1). Rather, Cali-
fornia had sought to regulate the antecedent question
whether a plant should be constructed, not how it should
be constructed. 461 U.S. at 212. California had argued
that, “although safety regulation of nuclear plants by
20
States is forbidden,” the State could exercise its tradi-
tional authority over generation to ban new construction
of power plants “until [the State’s] safety concerns are
satisfied.” /bid.; see 42 U.S.C. 2018 (preserving States’
authority to regulate “with respect to the generation,
sale, or transmission of electric power produced through
the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the [NRC]”).
This Court “rejectjed] thjat] line of reasoning.” Pa-
cific Gas, 461 U.S. at 212. The Court explained that, be-
cause the federal government had “occupied the entire
field of nuclear safety concerns,” “[a] state moratorium
on nuclear construction grounded in safety concerns
| would] fall[] squarely within the prohibited field.” Jd. at
212-213. The Court found that California’s moratorium
on construction of new power plants survived preemp-
tion only because the State had explained—
with reference to legislative reports prepared during the
passage of the moratorium—that the purpose of its leg-
islation was to address “economic problems, not radia-
tion hazards.” Jd. at 213; see id. at 213-216. In reaching
that conclusion, however, the Court made clear that, by
giving NRC exclusive responsibility to address nuclear-
safety risks, Congress had preempted States from regu-
lating to protect against radiation hazards, even when a
State purports to act within the scope of its traditional
authority. Jd. at 212.
2. In its subsequent decision in English, supra, the
Court explained that the AEA establishes two related
forms of field preemption. 496 U.S. at 84. Observing
that Pacific Gas had “defined the pre-empted field, in
part, by reference to the motivation behind the state
law,” the Court reaffirmed that a state law “motivated
by safety concerns” about AE A-reguiated activities is
preempted. /bid. The Court noted that this purpose-
21
based “approach to defining the field” finds support in
the text of Section 2021(k), which recognizes continued
state authority “to regulate activities for purposes other
than protection against radiation hazards.” /bid. (quot-
ing 42 U.S.C. 2021(k)).
The Court in English further defined the preempted
field to include state regulations that are “‘enacted out
of nonsafety concerns’” but have a sufficiently “direct
and substantial effect” on NRC licensees’ decisions
“concerning radiological safety levels.” 496 U.S. at 84-
85 (quoting Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 212). Thus, “even
as *** part of the pre-empted field is defined by ref-
erence to the purpose of the state law in question,” an-
other part “is defined by the state law’s actual effect on
nuclear safety.” Jd. at 84 (recognizing that “a finding of
safety motivation” was sufficient, but not necessary, to
“place a state law within the pre-empted field”). The
Court in English thus reaffirmed that state law is
preempted if it is grounded in concerns about the radia-
tion hazards of activities and materials that are regu-
lated under the AEA—a field occupied by the federal
government. /d. at 84-85.
* The Court in English held that the state-law claim at issue, a
tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress brought by
an employee of a nuclear-fuels production facility, was not pre-
empted under either of those rationales. The Court concluded that
the relevant state law was not “motivated by safety concerns,” and
that the effect of imposing tort liability for intentional infliction of
emotional! distress would be neither “direct nor substantial enough”
to cause employers to alter radiological-safety protocols. 496 U.S.
at 84-85.
22
C. Because Petitioners Have Credibly Alleged That
Virginia’s Uranium-Mining Ban Was Motivated By
Nuclear-Safety Concerns About Federally Regulated
Milling And Tailings Management, Their Complaint
Should Not Have Been Dismissed
Respondents conceded below that, for purposes of
their motion to dismiss petitioners’ complaint, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “required [respondents |
to accept as true that Virginia enacted the [uranium-
mining] moratorium based on radiological safety con-
cerns.” J.A. 216. The court of appeals therefore erred
in affirming the district court’s dismissal of petitioners’
complaint. Because petitioners have credibly alleged
that the ban is grounded in radiological-safety concerns
about uranium milling and tailings management, which
are within the federal government’s regulatory jurisdic-
tion, and because regulation of those activities for
radiological-safety purposes has not been delegated to
Virginia in a Section 2021 agreement, petitioners’ com-
plaint states a claim that the ban is preempted. That is
so despite the fact that conventional uranium mining it-
self is not regulated by NRC.
1. Petitioners have adequately alleged that Vir-
ginia’s moratorium falls within the preempted “field of
nuclear safety concerns.” English, 496 U.S. at 82 (cita-
tion omitted). Petitioners contend that the Common-
wealth has banned uranium mining not because of con-
cerns about mining per se, but because of fears about
radiological hazards associated with the next steps of
the uranium-development process, which NRC regu-
lates under the AEA. Petitioners have alleged that the
“true design” of the moratorium is “to act as an absolute
bar on the construction of a tailings management facil-
23
ity,” which Virginia legislators feared would lead to ra-
dioactive contamination of the Commonwealth’s
groundwater and environment. Pet. App. 232a.
If petitioners’ allegations are correct, Virginia’s mor-
atorium is preempted. The radiological safety of milling
and tailings management is subject to exclusive federal
oversight, except to the extent that regulatory author-
ity is expressly delegated to States by agreement. Just
as “[a] state moratorium on nuclear construction * * *
falls squarely within the prohibited field” if it is
“grounded in safety concerns” about the operation of
NRC-licensed nuclear power plants, Pacific Gas, 461
U.S. at 213, a State’s moratorium on uranium mining is
preempted if that moratorium is grounded in safety
concerns about the operation of NRC-licensed milling
and tailings-management facilities.
By entering into a Section 2021 agreement with
NRC, Virginia has acquired regulatory authority over
“(sjource materials,” “(|s|pecial nuclear materials,” and
specified categories of “[blyproduct materials” within
the Commonwealth. Pet. App. 300a; see id. at 298a-
305a. That agreement, however, expressly excludes au-
thority to regulate uranium mill tailings. See id. at 301la
(excluding “[t]he regulation of byproduct material as
defined in Section 11e.(2) of the [AE AJ”); ef. 42 U.S.C.
2014(e)(2) (defining “byproduct material” to include
tailings). Within Virginia, the “field of nuclear safety
concerns” related to tailings management from the pro-
cess of uranium milling therefore remains within the
regulatory jurisdiction of the federal government. E'ng-
lish, 496 U.S. at 82 (citation omitted). If the Common-
wealth’s uranium-mining ban was motivated by such
concerns, it is preempted because it encroaches on that
federally regulated field.
24
2. In holding that Virginia’s moratorium was not
preempted, the court of appeals construed Section
2021(k) to prohibit States from directly regulating, for
purposes of protecting against radiological hazards,
only “activities” that are regulated under the AEA. Pet.
App. lla. Emphasizing that the moratorium “does not
mention uranium milling or tailings storage,” id. at 14a,
the court concluded that the ban is not preempted be-
cause the activity it directly regulates—conventional
uranium mining—is not regulated under the AEA, id.
at lla. The court “decline[d]” to “look past the statute’s
plain meaning to decipher whether the legislature was
motivated” by an impermissible radiological-safety con-
sideration. Jd. at 14a. The court understood the AEA
to preempt state law only when “a state purports to reg-
ulate an activity that is also regulated by the [AE A]”
and the State lacks a “‘non-safety rationale’ for the
state rule.” /d. at 9a (citation omitted). That approach
was misconceived.
a. A State’s purposeful effort to address the radio-
logical hazards that it associates with AE A-regulated
activities is preempted even if the State attempts to
regulate those hazards indirectly, by prohibiting neces-
sary antecedent activities that fall outside direct federal
control. The court of appeals’ contrary understanding
is irreconcilable with Pacific Gas. As explained above
(pp. 19-20, supra), California acknowledged in that case
that it could not enact safety regulations for the con-
struction or operation of power plants because NRC ex-
ercises authority over plant construction and operation.
461 U.S. at 212; see 42 U.S.C. 2021(c)(1). The State in-
stead contended that it could exercise its authority over
generation to ban new construction of power plants alto-
gether “until [the State’s] safety concerns are satisfied.”
25
461 U.S. at 212; see 42 U.S.C. 2018. This Court rejected
that argument, explaining that “[a] state moratorium on
nuclear construction grounded in safety concerns
[would] fall{] squarely within” the federally occupied nu-
clear-safety field, even if the State had purported to act
within the scope of its traditional authority. 461 U.S. at
212-213 (emphasis added).
The court of appeals in this case described the Cali-
fornia law at issue in Pacific Gas as involving an activity
“clearly committed to the NRC’s regulatory authority.”
Pet. App. 10a n.2 (citation omitted). As the foregoing
discussion demonstrates, that is incorrect. Pacific Gas
involved two California laws: Section 25524.1(b), which
required case-by-case approval of a proposed nuclear
power plant’s capacity to store spent nuclear fuel rods,
and Section 25524.2 (Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 25524.1(b),
25524.2 (West 1977)), which banned all new nuclear
power plants until a permanent nuclear-waste disposal
solution was developed. 461 U.S. at 197-198.
The court of appeals suggested that the Court in Pa-
cific Gas had analyzed the first provision, which the
court described as regulating an activity—power-plant
construction—that was committed to NRC’s regulatory
authority. Pet. App. 9a-10a & n.2. That understanding
appears to underlie the court’s determination that pur-
pose-based preemption analysis is appropriate only
when “a state purports to regulate an activity that is
also regulated by the [AEA].” /d. at 9a. In fact, how-
ever, the Court in Pacific Gas analyzed only the second
provision (discussed above) because it determined that
the first was not ripe for review. 461 U.S. at 203. After
concluding that the second provision (barring construc-
tion of nuclear power plants) did not directly regulate a
subject committed to NRC’s regulatory authority, the
26
Court looked to the purpose of the law to determine
whether it encroached on the federal field of nuclear
safety. Jd. at 212-213. Contrary to the court of appeals’
belief, the Court in Pacific Gas thus did not limit pur-
pose-based preemption analysis to direct state regula-
tion of AEA-regulated activities. See id. at 213 (finding
it “necessary to determine whether there [wa]s a non-
safety rationale” for California’s ban on plant construc-
tion); English, 496 U.S. at 84 (reaffirming that “part of
the pre-empted field is defined by reference to the pur-
pose of the state law in question”); 42 U.S.C. 2021(k).
b. The court of appeals also cited other language in
which the Pacific Gas Court had commented on the dif-
ficulty of ascertaining “legislative motive.” Pet. App. 14a
(quoting Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 216). The Pacific Gas
Court made those observations, however, only after stat-
ing that it was “necessary to determine whether there
[wa]s a nonsafety rationale for” the challenged California
law, 461 U.S. at 213; that California had asserted an eco-
nomic, non-safety-related rationale for that law, ibid;
and that the court of appeals in that case had found the
law to be “directed towards purposes other than protec-
tion against radiation hazards,” id. at 214 (citation omit-
ted). Here, by contrast, the Fourth Circuit simply “de-
cline[d] to examine why the Commonwealth chose to ban
uranium mining,” Pet. App. 15a, thus treating as irrele-
vant petitioners’ allegation that Virginia’s mining mora-
torium is intended to address radiological-safety hazards
associated with milling and tailings-management activi-
ties. That was error. Given the relevance of legislative
purpose to the AEA preemption inquiry, and petitioners’
credible allegations that Virginia has banned uranium
mining to address concerns about the radiological-safety
aspects of milling and tailings management, petitioners’
27
complaint states a valid preemption claim and should not
have been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).’
3. Under the approach taken by the court below, a
State could effectively subvert federal regulatory judg-
ments in the field of nuclear safety simply by choosing,
as the immediate object of state regulation, an anteced-
ent activity that is not itself subject to federal regula-
tion under the AEA. That approach would provide an
easy roadmap for evasion of Congress’s judgments re-
garding the States’ carefully defined and limited role in
this sphere.
a. In Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Niel-
son, 376 F.3d 1223 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1060
(2005) (Skull Valley), the Tenth Circuit considered a se-
ries of Utah laws motivated by concerns about the stor-
age and transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF).
Although some of the challenged laws facially regulated
SNF, others did not. One provision converted to state
control a county road that led to a proposed SNF stor-
age site. Jd. at 1251-1252. Another provision restricted
counties’ ability to provide “law enforcement, fire pro-
tection, waste and garbage collection” to SNF storage
facilities. Jd. at 1247. A third provision abolished lim-
ited liability for stockholders in companies operating
SNF facilities. Jd. at 1250-1251.
’ Because petitioners’ complaint was disposed of at the motion-to-
dismiss stage, and the Fourth Circuit took as true petitioners’ alle-
gation that Virginia’s moratorium was grounded in radiological-
safety concerns about uranium milling and tailings management,
this Court need not address what evidence would be necessary or
sufficient to prove those allegations on remand. Rather, the Court
need only decide whether these allegations, if proved, would provide
a sound basis for holding that the Virginia moratorium is pre-
empted.
28
Although the AEA does not regulate state roads, mu-
nicipal services, or shareholder-liability rules, the
Tenth Circuit applied the preemption test set forth in
Pacific Gas and concluded that “a state cannot use its
authority to regulate” such matters “as a means of reg-
ulating radiological hazards” associated with NRC-
licensed activities. Skull Valley, 376 F.3d at 1248. The
court ultimately found each provision preempted, based
on evidence that the State had enacted them to discour-
age the transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel
“for reasons of radiological safety.” Jd. at 1252; see id.
at 1245-1248, 1250-1253. The Tenth Circuit thus cor-
rectly ensured that Utah could not effectively preclude,
based on nuclear-safety concerns, AE A-regulated trans-
portation and storage activities that the State lacked
power to regulate directly.
In this case, the court below attempted to distinguish
Skull Valley by noting that “all but two of the chal-
lenged Utah laws specifically mentioned this NRC-
regulated activity [ce., storage of SNF],” and that the
remaining two provisions “wiere] packaged with two
other transportation regulations targeting [SNF] dir-
ectly.” Pet. App. 16a. But if that distinction is treated
as controlling, a State can effectively prevent federally
regulated conduct that it views as causing nuclear-
safety hazards, by proscribing necessary precursors to
that conduct, so long as it is careful to forgo any express
statutory reference to nuclear-safety concerns or feder-
ally regulated activities. The Fourth Circuit’s approach
would provide an easy means for States to subvert Con-
gress’s determinations regarding the appropriate allo-
cation of power between federal and state governments.
b. This Court has recognized in other contexts that
a State cannot escape preemption simply by regulating
29
a stage of the production process or stream of com-
merce that lies outside the area of direct federal regu-
lation. In National Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452
(2012), the Court considered a California law that pro-
hibited slaughterhouses from selling meat products of
nonambulatory animals. /d. at 459. California argued
that its law was not preempted by the Federal Meat In-
spection Act, 21 U.S.C. 601 et seq., which provides that
States may not impose requirements on slaughterhouse
operations that exceed or differ from federal require-
ments, 565 U.S. at 457, because the challenged state law
focused not on slaughterhouse operations but rather on
commercial sales, which are traditionally subject to
state regulation. /d. at 463-464. The Court rejected
that argument and found the state regulation pre-
empted. The Court explained that, although the state
law nominally regulated sales, its inevitable effect was
to require slaughterhouses to structure their operations
in a different way. /d. at 464.
Likewise in Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. South
Coast Air Quality Management District, 541 U.S. 246
(2004), the Court considered a set of local rules that
barred public and private fleet operators from buying
vehicles that did not comply with the city’s emission re-
quirements. /d. at 249. The Court found the local rules
preempted by a federal law that prohibited any state or
local “standard|[s] relating to the control of emissions
from new motor vehicles.” /d. at 251. The Court ex-
plained that, although the local rules did not compel
manufacturers of new motor vehicles to meet any new
emissions limits, the manufacturer’s federally protected
right to sell vehicles would be “meaningless in the ab-
sence of a purchaser’s right to buy them.” J/d. at 255;
see American Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles,
30
569 U.S. 641, 652 (2013) (“We have often rejected efforts
by States to avoid preemption by shifting their regula-
tory focus from one company to another in the same
supply chain.”); Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor
Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 371-373 (2008) (finding
preemption even though the State’s regulation “tjold]
shippers what to choose rather than carriers what to do”).
So too here, where Congress has excluded States
from the management of nuclear-safety hazards, Vir-
ginia cannot escape preemption simply by precluding a
necessary antecedent activity (uranium mining) instead
of acting on the nuclear fuel cycle itself. If petitioners
can show that Virginia has banned uranium mining in
order to prevent radiation hazards posed by uranium
milling and tailings management, then Virginia has en-
croached on a field reserved for the federal government
and the state law is preempted.
IL. IF VIRGINIA’S URANIUM-MINING BAN WAS MOTIVATED
BY RADIOLOGICAL-SAFETY CONCERNS, IT IS BARRED
BY CONFLICT-PREEMPTION PRINCIPLES BECAUSE
IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE JUDGMENT OF
FEDERAL AUTHORITIES THAT URANIUM MILLING
AND TAILINGS MANAGEMENT CAN BE SAFELY
CONDUCTED IF PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS
A state law that bans uranium mining based on
radiological-safety concerns about milling and tailings
management also runs afoul of conflict- preemption
principles. Under the AEA, one of Congress’s primary
objectives is to ensure that nuclear technology is
safe enough for widespread development and use.
Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 213. A state law that aims to
protect against radiation hazards by preventing nuclear
development—as Virginia’s ban is alleged to have done
31
here—would “stand|] as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution” of that objective. English, 496
U.S. at 79 (citation omitted).
A. This Court recognized in Pacific Gas that “[a]
state prohibition on nuclear construction for safety rea-
sons” would “be in the teeth of the [AEA|’s objective to
insure that nuclear technology be safe enough for wide-
spread development and use—and would be pre-empted
for that [additional] reason.” 461 U.S. at 213. Such a
state prohibition would subvert the federal govern-
ment’s implementation of the AEA because “a state
judgment that nuclear power is not safe enough to be
further developed would conflict directly with the coun-
tervailing judgment of the NRC.” Jbid.
In eliminating the federal monopoly over nuclear
technology, Congress sought to encourage private par-
ties to develop and use nuclear energy, consistent with
public health and safety. 42 U.S.C. 2013(d). Here, Vir-
ginia has allegedly “interfere[d] with the objective of
the federal regulation” by deciding for itself that milling
and tailings management cannot be safely undertaken,
Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 219, thus “unilaterally * * *
prevent{ing] the involvement of the very private-sector
forces that the [AEA] was designed to unleash.” Pet.
App. 47a-48a (emphasis omitted) (Traxler, J., dissent-
ing). Congress committed those safety considerations
to the federal government’s oversight. If petitioners’
allegations are true, Virginia’s moratorium has “cir-
cumvented the AEFA’s requirements and frustrated its
objectives” by intentionally “preventjing] the occur-
rence of” activities that Congress intended the federal
government to regulate, for reasons committed to the
federal government’s jurisdiction. /d. at 21a, 52a.
32
To be sure, “Congress did not intend that nuclear
power be developed ‘at all costs,’” and it generally left
States free to address concerns other than radiological
safety. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 200; see id. at 222-223.
be undertaken safely under federal regulations. /d. at
213. A moratorium intended to render such activities in-
feasible, based on a State’s disagreement with that fed-
eral safety judgment, “stands as an obstacle” to the ful-
fillment of Congress’s objectives. English, 496 U.S. at 79
(citation omitted).
B. A state law that bans uranium mining in order to
prevent radiological hazards purportedly associated
with downstream AEA-regulated activities also cua-
fliects with Congress’s chosen system for state participa-
tion in the regulatory field of nuclear-safety concerns.
Under the AEA, any State that is concerned about ra-
diological hazards from uranium milling and tailings
management may seek N RC’s authorization to regulate
uranium mill tailings. See pp. 6-7, supra; 42 U.S.C.
2021. If granted that authority, a State may even im-
pose radiological-safety standards that are “more strin-
gent than” those adopted and enforced by NRC.
42 U.S.C. 2021(0)(2). NRC continues to regulate these
activities in the national interest, however, and “{i}f the
NRC determines that a State has a program that dis-
rupts the orderly pattern of regulation among the col-
lective regulatory efforts of the NRC and other Agree-
ment States, i.e., creates conflicts, gaps, or duplication
in regulation, the program would be found not compati-
ble.” 62 Fed. Reg. 46,517, 46,521 (Sept. 3, 1997).
Congress has separately permitted States to address
certain low-level radiation hazards. 42 U.S.C. 2023(a).
33
Thus, States may directly regulate “on the basis of radi-
ological hazard” the disposal or off-site incineration of
low-level radioactive waste, “if the [NRC] * * * exempts
such waste from regulation.” J/bid.; see 42 U.S.C.
202 1b(9)(A)(i) (excluding uranium mill tailings from the
definition of “low-level radioactive waste”). States con-
cerned about the safety of AEA-regulated activities
may also participate in NRC licensing and rulemaking
proceedings and may seek judicial review of NRC’s de-
terminations if they are aggrieved. See Entergy Nu-
clear Vermont Yankee, LLC v Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393
(2d Cir. 2013); Skull Valley, 376 F.3d at 1254. And even
with respect to the construction and operation of nu-
clear power plants, where Congress has prohibited the
federal government from delegating regulatory author-
ity to a State, see 42 U.S.C. 2021(c), NRC must notify a
State of any license application filed with NRC and
eee ee ee ee
press its view concerning whether the application
should be granted. 42 U.S.C. 2021(D.
Congress has thus established very specific mecha-
nisms for state involvement in addressing radiological-
safety hazards. Pursuant to one such statutory method,
Virginia has entered into a Section 2021 agreement with
NRC, but the Commonwealth declined to seek author-
ity to regulate the radiological-safety aspects of urani-
um mill tailings. See pp. 9, 23, supra. Petitioners allege
that the Commonwealth has attempted to address the
same concerns through the alternative means of ban-
ning uranium mining. If that was in fact the Common-
wealth’s motivation, Virginia has impermissibly second-
guessed the federal government’s judgment that ura-
nium milling and tailings management are safe enough
34
to proceed under federal standards. See Gade v. Na-
tional Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98-101
(1992) (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (holding that federal
law preempted an Illinois attempt to enforce training
standards for hazardous-waste workers that were
stricter than federal standards without using the man-
dated process of an approved state plan). That conflict
with the judgment of federal regulatory authorities, and
ena nage pr ar ag gem =
the sphere of nuclear safety, provides an additional
ground for concluding that petitioners’ complaint states
a claim of federal preemption.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
reversed, and the case should be remanded for further
proceedings.
Respectfully submitted.
NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor G.
JEFFREY H. Woop
General
ANDREW P. AVERBACH MALCOLM L. STEWART
Solicit Deputy Solicitor G. |
CHARLES E. MULLINS ANN O'CONNELL
JEREMY M. SUTTENBERG Assistant to the Solicitor
Attorneys General
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory VARU CHILAKAMARRI
Commission Attorney
JULY 2018
No. 16-1275
3n the
Supreme Court of the United States
VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
JOHN WARREN, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
STEVEN P. LEHOTSKY ERIN E. MURPHY
MICHAEL B. SCHON Counsel of Record
U.S. CHAMBER ANDREW C. LAWRENCE
LITIGATION CENTER KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
1615 H Street, NW 655 Fifteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20062 Washington, DC 20005
(202) 879-5000
erin.murphy@kirkland.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
July 26, 2018
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ..............:0ssssssssssessesossessees i
STATEMENT OF INTEREST .....................0cceceeeeeeeees 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT? 00000000... ccceceeeeeneennes 2
NT 5
I. Congress Has Made The Eminently Sensible
Judgment That The Federal Government Is
Best Positioned To Regulate The Complex
Field Of Nuclear Safety Concerns. ..................... 5
Il. The Decision Below Is Impossible To
Reconcile With This Court’s Atomic Energy
Ill. The Decision Below Provides A Roadmap For
State And Local Governments To Evade The
Preemptive Force Of Federal Law.................... 12
eI cxsusencssmacnstnscasuniiinntiunséisensenntiesincenminis 17
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,
a ee 12
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
Ca si irri ermrisinasamaenonndinin 12
Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good,
EN Ce ane 2
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
icin cicdscniciamdscindatinndnsnernnnreconens 1,14
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC,
EE ay Ce an ED 1
Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils,
gg ES 1
Engine Mfr. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality
Mgemt. Dist.,
Bs esslinccinmihrmeteniannipsnain 15
English v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
| Se ae passim
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,
GEER ae 13
Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
asi ead camnrincianianilts 1
Haywood v. Drown,
ES none meee 4,16
Howlett v. Rose,
a 12,17
Kindred Nursing Ctrs. L.P. v. Clark,
gf EL EA oe Severs 1,13
ili
N. Nat. Gas Co.
v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan.,
SE 14
Natl Meat Ass'n v. Harris,
ces cosecnomenenesneine 1, 14, 15
Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg,
8 1
Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.,
EE eee 14
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
OR passim
Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust,
ls I cccacrladieasummbennidondenineeszsesndennes 1
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,
| a 2
Schneidewind v. ANR Pip'tine Co.,
a. sreeetbacneugannnnonts 14
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
| ea 2,5,6,9
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
ee ic eareinincinncednisabeasenepannenionten 2
Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc.,
RT ES cS 1
Wyeth v. Levine,
I i a crn eneeennenainminentia 2
Statutes and Regulation
Nin siciceranitiiimmnanddaneemiepentiionts 7
Saas I ceceicsesccsccccevessnsecsscsoscnenssscncsenseene 10
iv
ON
Re
ili racccnniancetgenstinnsinnnibiiensiend
GEE aCe een ree
Other Authorities
Energy Futures Initiative, Inc., The U.S.
Nuclear Energy Enterprise: A Key National
Security Enabler (Aug. 2017),
https//bit.ly/2LoCEEP.................0ssssseeeseeseeeeees
Expand Nuclear Energy Use and Commit to
a Nuclear Waste Solution, U.S. Chamber
of Commerce Inst. for 21st Century
Energy, http://bit.ly/InyGPOlI
(last visited July 24, 2018) ...................000..00000
Int’] Atomic Energy Agency,
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
https://bit.ly/2u0ofDq
(last visited July 24, 2018) ...........ccccccceeceeeeeees
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Backgrounder on National Security,
https://bit.ly/2mG6Lde
(last visited July 24, 2018) .............2.....02..:00000
STATEMENT OF INTEREST:
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America is the world’s largest business federation.
It represents 300,000 direct members and indirectly
represents the interests of more than 3 million
companies and professional organizations of every
size, in every economic sector, and from every region
of the country.
An important function of the Chamber is to
represent the interests of its members in matters
before the courts, Congress, and the Executive
Branch. To that end, the Chamber regularly files
amicus curiae briefs in cases that raise issues of
concern to the Nation’s business community. The
Chamber has participated as amicus curiae in nearly
every significant federal preemption case decided by
this Court over the past decade. See, e.g., Kindred
Nursing Ctrs. L.P. v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017);
Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 137 8. Ct.
1190 (2017); Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free
Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016); Gobeille v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016); Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg,
134 S. Ct. 1422 (2014); Natl Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 565
U.S. 452, 455 (2012); AT&T Mobility LLC ov.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Williamson v. Mazda
Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323 (2011); Bruesewitz v.
Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine, 555
' No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in
part, and no entity or person, aside from amicus curiae, its
members, and its counsel, made any monetary contribution
toward the preparation or submission of this brief. Counsel of
record for all parties have consented to this filing in letters on file
with the Clerk’s office.
2
U.S. 555 (2009); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70
(2008); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
The Chamber and its members have a strong
interest in this case, as the decision below poses a
threat both to the Nation’s nuclear energy industry
and to preemption doctrine as a whole.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Atomic Energy Act assigns the federal
government “broad regulatory authority over the
development of nuclear energy.” Vi. Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 525-26 (1978). Indeed, this Court concluded more
than 30 years ago that the federal government has
“occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns,”
and that the Atomic Energy Act accordingly preempts
any state law “grounded in safety concerns” arising
from the production of nuclear energy. Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n (“PG&E’), 461 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1983). In
the decades since, the Court has reaffirmed that
conclusion, reiterating that state laws “motivated by
safety concerns” stemming from nuclear-related
activities fall squarely within the field reserved to the
federal government. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496
U.S. 72, 84 (1990); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238, 249 (1984).
Congress’ decision to reserve the safety-related
regulation of nuclear power development to the
federal government makes eminent sense, as that is a
field that the federal government is uniquely well
suited to regulate. Because nuclear technology began
as an exclusively federal enterprise, the states do not
have any traditional experience, let alone expertise,
3
with determining how to manage the safety risks that
the development of nuclear energy may pose.
Moreover, in large part because this is an area with
which they may be unfamiliar, states have an
unfortunate tendency to succumb to local “not in my
backyard” complaints about the perceived (unfounded
as they may be) safety risks of in-state nuclear power
development. Such local impediments to the
development of nuclear power pose a risk not just to
the Nation’s energy grid and the economy it supports,
but to the national security and defense interests that
domestic development of nuclear power advances. In
short, the development of nuclear energy is a matter
of both abiding federal expertise and abiding federal
interest.
The decision below poses a grave threat to the
safety-regulation role that Congress has reserved to
the federal government. This Court has held time and
again that the preemption inquiry in this context
turns not just on what a state seeks to regulate, but
why. That should have made this an easy case, as
Virginia has banned mining of the Nation’s single
largest uranium deposit not for economic or other non-
preempted reasons, but simply because Virginia
determined that uranium production is not safe
enough. Indeed, at least at this motion-to-dismiss
stage, the state does not dispute that it banned
uranium mining at the Coles Hill deposit as a
prophylactic safety measure to prevent radiation
exposure allegedly associated with uranium milling
and tailings management—activities that everyone
agrees may be regulated only by the federal
government. But that is not a judgment for Virginia
to make, as any state law “grounded in [radiological]
4
safety concerns falls squarely within the prohibited
field” occupied by the federal government. PG&E, 461
U.S. at 213.
In concluding otherwise, the Fourth Circuit not
only ran afoul of the Atomic Energy Act and this
Court’s decisions interpreting it, but created a
roadmap for evading the preemptive force of federal
law. According to the Fourth Circuit, even assuming
Virginia’s mining ban rests on precisely the kind of
safety judgment forbidden to the states, it is not
preempted because the ban does not say on its face
that the state has prohibited uranium mining to
prevent purportedly unsafe milling and tailings
management from occurring at Coles Hill. In other
words, according to the Fourth Circuit, a state may
escape the preemptive force of federal law through the
simple expedient of declining to make explicit in its
laws its preempted motivations. The decision below
thus creates a loophole not just in the Atomic Energy
Act, but in all manner of federal statutes and
regulations, as it effectively invites states to use labels
and form to try to circumvent federal law.
That result cannot be reconciled with the long line
of decisions from this Court reiterating that the
“Supremacy Clause cannot be evaded by formalism.”
Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 742 (2009). Simply
put, when a state admittedly regulates for the specific
purpose of countermanding federal judgments in an
exclusive federal field, its actions are preempted no
matter what label or form it may use. By concluding
otherwise, the decision below threatens to disrupt not
just the Atomic Energy Act and the critical industry of
5
nuclear power generation, but preemption doctrine as
a whole.
ARGUMENT
I. Congress Has Made The Eminently Sensible
Judgment That The Federal Government Is
Best Positioned To Regulate The Complex
Field Of Nuclear Safety Concerns.
Nuclear energy is unusual among energy sources
in that it began as an exclusively federal enterprise.
At the dawn of the atomic age 75 years ago, the federal
government maintained a “federal monopoly” on “the
use, control, and ownership of all nuclear technology.”
English, 496 U.S. at 80. When Congress passed the
Atomic Energy Act in 1954, it “relaxed” that federal
monopoly, “determin[ing] that the national interest
would be best served if the Government encouraged
the private sector to become involved in the
development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes
under a program of federal regulation and licensing.”
PG&E, 461 U.S. at 194, 207. And with that relaxation
came the introduction of a regulatory role for the
states in “determining questions of need, reliability,
cost and other related state concerns.” Id. at 205. But
while Congress left states free to “exercise their
traditional authority” in these areas, id. at 212,
Congress jealously guarded for the federal
government “extensive control over the manner in
which thie] development [of nuclear energy] occur|s},”
Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 249. In doing so, Congress
reserved to the federal government exclusive
authority to “regulate [nuclear] activities for
purposes” of “protection against radiation hazards.”
42 U.S.C. §2021(k).
6
That division of authority makes eminent sense.
“Congress’ decision to prohibit the states from
regulating the safety aspects of nuclear development
was premised on its belief that the [federal
government] was more qualified to determine what
type of safety standards should be enacted in this
complex area.” Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 250. And
understandably so, as the federal government's
historical monopoly over nuclear technology left states
without the experience or expertise to regulate the
process of developing nuclear power. To be sure,
states may be better positioned to make non-safety-
related judgments about which mix of power, and in
what locations, best serves local economic and other
interests. But states simply did not have—and in
most instances still do not have—the extensive
experience the federal government has acquired in
“determin|[ing] what type of safety standards” are
most appropriate “in this complex area.” /d.
That federal expertise, moreover, has only grown
over time. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(“NRC”) has been acclaimed for its “high technical
competence,” which “cover|s] a wide range of technical
areas.” Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, https://bit.ly/2u00fDq (last
visited July 24, 2018); see also U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Backgrounder on National
Security, https://bit.ly/2mG6Lde (last visited July 24,
2018) (NRC-regulated nuclear facilities are
considered among the most secure of the nation’s
critical infrastructure.”). And the federal government
has developed considerable experience with nuclear
technology through the military—experience that
states simply are not in a position to develop. It is thus
7
little surprise that Congress reserved to the federal
government “the entire field of nuclear safety
concerns,” PG&E, 461 U.S. at 212-13; this is an area
that the federal government is simply better suited to
regulate.
Of course, nuclear power is also an area in which
the federal government has a uniquely strong interest,
as nuclear energy is indispensable to our national
security. That much is clear from the text of the
Atomic Energy Act itself, which repeatedly
emphasizes that one of its core purposes is to promote
“the common defense and security.” 42 U.S.C.
§2013(c)-(e). In the decades since Congress passed the
Atomic Energy Act, the importance of nuclear power
to national security and defense has only grown. See,
e.g., Energy Futures Initiative, Inc., The U.S. Nuclear
Energy Enterprise: A Key National Security Enabler
15 (Aug. 2017), https://bit.ly/2LoCEEP (“A vibrant
domestic nuclear energy industry, including a healthy
supply chain ..., is essential for the achievement of
U.S. national security objectives.”). To take just two
examples, “[ujJranium is the predominant source of
fuel for ... fissile material for nuclear warheads,”
Pet.App.4a, and “the U.S. Navy’s nuclear-powered
submarines and aircraft carriers are fueled with
{highly enriched uranium] and rely upon its
availability,” Pet. App.348a.
Nuclear energy is also critical to the national
economy. Reactors fueled by uranium are responsible
for fully 20% of the electricity produced in this
country, Pet.App.202a, and nuclear energy offers
many benefits that confirm its value to a diversified
energy economy. For example, nuclear power
8
“accounts for nearly two-thirds of the country’s
emissions-free power generation,” and nuclear
reactors “operate at about a 90% capacity factor,
higher than any other fuel type.” Expand Nuclear
Energy Use and Commit to a Nuclear Waste Solution,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Inst. for 21st Century
Energy, http://bit.ly/InyGPOI (last visited July 24,
2018). In no small part because of these benefits, the
United States “has the greatest number of nuclear
reactors in the world at present, and therefore the
greatest demand for nuclear fuel.” CA4 JA236.2 Any
disruption in the production of nuclear power thus
poses a grave threat not just to individual states, but
to the national economy.
Finally, this is also an area particularly well
suited to federal regulation because states have an
unfortunate tendency to yield to often very vocal “not
in my backyard” constituencies when it comes to the
development of nuclear energy within their borders.
This is a case in point. Coles Hill is the single “largest
natural deposit of uranium in the United States and
one of the largest in the world,” with an estimated 119
million pounds of uranium ore. Pet.App.20la. It is
thus no exaggeration to say that whether the deposit
may be mined will have a massive impact on the
entirety of the Nation’s nuclear power industry. And
the impact is even more profound for Virginia and its
residents, as estimates suggest that mining the Coles
Hill deposit could “generate $4.8 billion of net revenue
for Virginia businesses.” Pet.App.202a. Yet the state
is still unwilling to allow Coles Hill to be mined, out of
? Citations to “CA4 JA” refer to the Joint Appendix filed in the
Fourth Circuit.
9
professed concerns that the development of uranium
can never be made safe enough for Virginians. That
extraordinary hostility to the prospect of local nuclear
energy development is powerful evidence of the
wisdom of Congress’ decision to give the federal
government the power to “determine what type of
safety standards should be enacted in this complex
area.” Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 250.
In short, the development of nuclear energy is a
matter of both abiding federal expertise and abiding
federal interest. It is thus imperative that courts
guard just as jealously as Congress has the federal
government’s exclusive authority over “the entire field
of nuclear safety concerns.” PG&E, 461 U.S. at 212-
13.
Il. The Decision Below Is Impossible To
Reconcile With This Court’s Atomic Energy
Act Cases.
The decision below poses a grave threat to the
federal government's authority to regulate the
development of nuclear power, as it guts the Atomic
Energy Act of a core element of its preemptive force.
The Atomic Energy Act is unusual in that “the pre-
empted field” under the Act is defined, “in part,
by ...the motivation behind the state law’—
specifically, whether it is animated by concerns about
radiological safety. English, 496 U.S. at 84 (emphasis
added). That is clear on the face of the statute. Not
only does the Act give the federal government the
power to regulate nuclear power plants and the
antecedent activities of uranium “milling” (i.e., the
extraction of uranium from ore) and “tailings
management” (i.e., the handling of radioactive waste
10
products generated by uranium milling). See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. §§2111(a), 2014(e)(2), 2133; 10 C.F.R. pt. 40,
app. A. The Act also expressly provides that states
retain the power to regulate nuclear energy-related
activities only “for purposes other than protection
against radiation hazards.” 42 U.S.C. §2021(k)
(emphasis added). It is thus not only appropriate, but
essential, for courts to identify the purpose of state
regulation in this area, as that is the only way to
determine if it is preempted.
This Court’s decision in PG&E is illustrative.
There was no dispute in that case about what the state
was trying to regulate: It wanted to impose a
moratorium on nuclear power plants. But to answer
the question of whether that moratorium was
preempted, this Court had to determine why the state
imposed it, and “whether there [wa]s a non-safety
rationale.” PG&E, 461 U.S. at 213. If there was not,
then the moratorium could not stand, as any state
regulation “grounded in [radiological] safety concerns
falls squarely within the prohibited field” occupied
exclusively by the federal government. I/d.; accord
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 13 (“a
State’s moratorium on uranium mining is preempted
if that moratorium is grounded in safety concerns
about the operation of NRC-licensed milling and
tailings-management facilities”). Simply put, “a state
judgment that nuclear power is not safe enough to be
further developed would conflict directly with the
countervailing judgment” of Congress. PG&E, 461
U.S. at 213.
That should have made this an easy case.
Virginia does not contest (and cannot contest, at this
11
motion to dismiss stage) petitioners’ allegations that
the state “legislature banned uranium mining only as
a means to prevent milling and tailings management
from occurring in Virginia,” out of professed concerns
about the safety of those federally regulated activities.
Pet.App.26a-27a. Virginia’s ban thus “conflict|s]
directly with the countervailing judgment” of
Congress and the NRC that existing federal regulation
suffices to address safety concerns about milling and
tailings management. PG&E, 461 U.S. at 213. Yet
the Fourth Circuit concluded that petitioners’
preemption claim failed as a matter of law, “declin[ing]
the invitation” to “look past the statute’s plain
meaning to decipher whether the legislature was
motivated to pass the ban by” concerns about the
safety of milling and tailings management.
Pet.App. 14a.
That reasoning is impossible to reconcile with this
Court’s decisions in PG&E and English. As those
cases confirm, petitioners’ request that the courts
determine the purpose behind Virginia’s ban is no
mere “invitation.” It is the inexorable command of the
Atomic Energy Act and this Court’s precedents
interpreting it. See, eg., PG&E, 461 U.S. at 213;
English, 496 U.S. at 84. Lower courts may no more
“decline” the “invitation” to make that determination
than they may “decline” the “invitation” to apply the
Supremacy Clause. By refusing to answer the very
question that this Court has deemed central to
determining whether state regulation in this area is
preempted, the decision below deprives the Atomic
Energy Act of its core preemptive force.
12
Ill. The Decision Below Provides A Roadmap
For State And Local Governments To Evade
The Preemptive Force Of Federal Law.
The Fourth Circuit’s decision not only guts the
Atomic Energy Act of much of its preemptive force, but
also provides a roadmap to states seeking to evade the
preemptive force of all manner of federal statutes. As
this Court has admonished time and again, it is the
substance of a state law, not its form, that controls the
preemption inquiry. See, e.g., Aetna Heaith Inc. v.
Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 214-15 (2004); Howlett v. Rose,
496 U.S. 356, 382-83 (1990); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985). States thus cannot
evade the Supremacy Clause through the simple
expedient of labeling their laws something other than
what they are. To be sure, in many preemption cases,
the substantive inquiry turns on the effect of a state
law, not its purpose. But when Congress chooses, as
it did in the Atomic Energy Act, to define “the pre-
empted field, in part, by ... the motivation behind the
state law,” English, 496 U.S. at 84, then courts must
look beyond labels and form to determine the purpose
behind the challenged law. Otherwise, states could
avoid preemption merely by declining to make their
true motivations explicit—as Virginia has now
succeeded in doing here.
Indeed, even accepting the Fourth Circuit's
mistaken conclusion that it matters only what
Virginia sought to regulate, not why, the decision
below still cannot be reconciled with the principle that
preemption turns on substance, not form. Here, the
state does not dispute that the “legislature banned
uranium mining only as a means to prevent milling
13
and tailings management from occurring in Virginia,”
Pet.App.26a-27a (emphasis added)—two activities
that no one disputes may be regulated only by the
federal government, «ze Pet.App.12a-13a. In other
words, the state does aot dispute that it sought to ban
mining only as a means to regulate (or, more aptly,
prohibit) the very activities that everyone agrees it
may not regulate. Yet the Fourth Circuit nonetheless
concluded that the state’s ban was not preempted,
simply because the “the plain language of the ... ban
does not mention uranium milling or tailings storage.”
Pet.App.14a (emphasis added). Thus, under the
Fourth Circuit’s view, a state is free to countermand
federal regulation to its heart’s content, so long as it is
smart enough not to “mention” preempted fields on the
face of its law.
That reasoning finds no support in any of this
Court’s preemption jurisprudence. Take this Court’s
cases involving the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).
Just this past Term, this Court reiterated that states
may not “target arbitration either by name or by more
subtle methods, such as by (‘interferjing] with
fundamental attributes of arbitration.” Epic Sys.
Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018) (emphasis
added). Just as the FAA “preempts any state rule
discriminating on its face against arbitration,” so, too,
the FAA “displaces any rule that covertly accomplishes
the same objective by disfavoring contracts that (oh so
coincidentally) have the defining features of
arbitration agreements.” Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Lid.
P’ship v. Clark, 137 8S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017) (emphasis
added). Thus, if a state adopts a “rule classifying as
unconscionable arbitration agreements that fail to
abide by the Federal Rules of Evidence, or that
14
disallow an ultimate disposition by a jury (perhaps
termed ‘a panel of twelve lay arbitrators’ to help avoid
preemption),” the rule is preempted all the same,
regardless of whether it happens to “mention”
arbitration. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563
U.S. 333, 342 (2011).
This Court’s cases interpreting the Natural Gas
Act (“NGA”)}—an area of law implicating similar
interests as this case—reflect the same principle.
Under the NGA, the regulation of wholesale natural-
gas prices lies with the federal government, while the
regulation of retail natural-gas , rices remains with
the states. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591,
1594 (2015). But that does not mean that the analysis
begins and ends with determining what a state seeks
to regulate. While state laws that “direct/ly]
regulatie] the prices of [interstate] wholesales of
natural gas” are preempted, the same is true of “state
regulations which would indirectly achieve the same
result,” “whether or not framed to achieve ends ...
ordinarily within the ambit of state power.” N. Nat.
Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan., 372 U.S. 84,
90-91 (1963); see also, e.g., Schneidewind v. ANR
Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 308 (1988) (“the things Act
144 regulation is directed at, the control of rates and
facilities of natural gas companies, are precisely the
things over which FERC has _ comprehensive
authority” (emphasis added)).
This Court’s decision in National Meat
Association v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452 (2012), is also
illustrative. There, the Court addressed whether the
Federal Meat Inspection Act (“FMIA”)}—which
preempts state statutes addressing the front-end
15
processes of inspecting, handling, and slaughtering
livestock—preempted a state statute that prohibited
slaughterhouses, at the back-end, from selling meat
that satisfied all federal requirements. /d. at 455, 463-
64. Although “the FMIA’s preemption clause does not
usually foreclose ‘state regulation of the commercial
sales activities of slaughterhouses,” id. at 463, the
Court nonetheless held the state law preempted, for
any other conclusion would allow “any State [to]
impose any regulation on slaughterhouses just by
framing it as a ban on the sale of meat produced in
whatever way the State disapproved.” /d. at 463-64.
That, the Court explained, “would make a mockery of
the FMIA’s preemption provision.” /d. at 464.
The same logic carried the day in Engine
Manufacturers Association v. South Coast Air Quality
Management District, 541 U.S. 246 (2004). There, the
Court considered whether the Clean Air Act, which
prohibits states from adopting or enforcing
“standard[s] relating to the control of emissions,”
preempted local regulations requiring fleet operators
to buy only those vehicles satisfying state pollution
standards that far exceeded federal requirements. /d.
at 249, 251. Addressing the argument that the rules
escaped preemption because they targeted the
purchase of vehicles, and did not directly regulate the
manufacturing process, the Court concluded that such
a distinction “would make no sense” “for pre-emption
purposes.” Jd. at 255. As the Court explained, “[t]he
manufacturer's right to sell federally approved
vehicles is meaningless in the absence of a purchaser’s
right to buy them.” /d.
16
Haywood v. Drown likewise “confirms that the
Supremacy Clause cannot be evaded by formalism.”
556 U.S. at 742. There, the Court considered whether
a state—“[ml]otivated by the belief that damages suits
filed by prisoners against state correction officers were
by and large frivolous and vexatious”—could shield
those officers from lawsuits under §1983 by stripping
state courts of jurisdiction to hear them. 556 U.S. at
731, 733. Although the Court acknowledged that, as a
formal matter, a state has inherent “authority to
organize its courts,” the Court concluded that “a
State’s invocation of ‘jurisdiction” could not be a
“trump that ends the Supremacy Clause inquiry.” /d.
at 740-41. As the Court explained, Congress made a
judgment through §1983 that “all persons who violate
federal rights while acting under color of state law
shall be held liable for damages,” id. at 737, and a
state cannot countermand that judgment through “an
immunity statute cloaked in jurisdictional garb,” id. at
742.
Of course, these are but a handful of the cases in
which this Court has made clear that states cannot
evade the preemptive force of federal law through the
simple expedient of including or omitting magic words
in their legislation. Yet that is precisely the result
that the Fourth Circuit’s decision below countenances.
So long as a state “does not mention” on the face of its
law its intent to target an area reserved by Congress
to the federal government, the preemption inquiry is
at an end. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit allowed
Virginia’s ban to escape preemption even though the
state admits (at least at this stage) that the ban rests
on a judgment that milling and tailings management
pose too great of radiological safety concerns—a
17
judgment that “conflict/s| directly with the
countervailing judgment” of Congress and the NRC.
PG&E, 461 U.S. at 213.
This Court should therefore reverse the decision
below, restore the full preemptive force of the Atomic
Energy Act, and reaffirm that “[t]he force of the
Supremacy Clause is not so weak that it can be evaded
by mere mention of [one] word” instead of another.
Howlett, 496 U.S. at 382-83. Any other disposition not
only will provide a roadmap for states to impede
Congress’ efforts to encourage domestic uranium
mining, but will embolden them to employ the same
clever labeling and workarounds in all manner of
other federally regulated areas. Neither outcome has
anything to recommend it.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should
reverse the judgment below.
Respectfully submitted,
STEVEN P. LEHOTSKY ERIN E. MURPHY
MICHAEL B. SCHON Counsel of Record
U.S. CHAMBER ANDREW C. LAWRENCE
LITIGATION CENTER KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
1615 H Street, NW 655 Fifteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20062 Washington, DC 20005
(202) 879-5000
erin.murphy@kirkland.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
July 26, 2018
No. 16-1275
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
JOHN WARREN, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
BRIEF OF SENATOR TOM COTTON,
SENATOR JIM INHOFE, AND
SENTATOR TED CRUZ AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
GORDON D. Topp *
KIMBERLY A. LEAMAN
T.J. HERRON
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
1501 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 736-8000
gtodd@sidley.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
July 26, 2018 * Counsel of Record
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........................00000- ii
ETT HUEY SUI sttnictccnenendenvendtnvstininntibinainici |
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......000000000.000.. ee.
SEO OE eenccntnriactiniemsncsntesseccsiiiaiiinaiiniuepeimiat
1. RESTRICTING THE ACT’S PREEMPTIVE
SCOPE TO ACTIVITIES REGULATED BY
THE ACT WITHOUT REGARD TO PUR-
POSE OR EFFECT WOULD UNDERMINE
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNIFORM FED-
ERAL POLICY OVER ISSUES OF NA-
TIONAL IMPORTANCE .....0.0.....cccccccceeeeeeees 5
A. The Act’s Preemption Framework Re-
flects Congress’s Careful Determination
Of Federal And State Competencies Bal-
anced Against Federal And State Inter-
DD cacssnrcncssorccinicnstsactintsinvideiiseniibenmaiennntine 5
B. Formalistic Limits To The Act’s Preemp-
tive Scope Upset The Federal/State Ju-
risdictional Balance And Permit State
And Local Governments To Override The
Federal Government On Issues Of Na-
tional Importance............................c00e0000+ 12
C. Domestic Production Of Uranium Is A
National Strategic Interest....................... 16
D.Uranium Is A Critical And Strategic
Mineral Warranting Of Federal Over-
(i)
‘i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745
CE 7, 25
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) .................... 6
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72
Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC ov.
Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013)...... 13, 14
Huffman o. W. Nuclear, Inc., 486 U.S. 663
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
ELE 12, 13
Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v.
Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004)... 14
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-604, 92 Stat.
EEE a 15
Private Ownership of Special Nuclear
Materials Act, Pub. L. No. 88-489, 78
SS aR 26
Defense Production Act of 1950, ch. 932, 64
EEE 24
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat.
Sil daiitieneitesinnetcecentascensetannseuterseereeenenseeeues 6
SEE 12
Sa 9, 10, 16
§ 2201(v)(B)Gii) (1988).................. 26
ET 22
§ 2296b-6(a)D) ....... cence. 22
AS 3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page
50 U.S.C. app. § 4502(a)(4) ........................... 25
ae EE tnthlttictinitntennencaprnnsnninsemnenens 16
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Final List of
Critical Minerals 2018, 83 Fed. Reg.
23,306 Cay 18, BO1G)..........00.0000.00.000.-222--- 27
39 Fed. Reg. 38,016 (Oct. 21, 1974) .............. 27
31 Fed. Reg. 16,479 (Dec. 19, 1966).............. 27
EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Exec. Order No. 13,817, 82 Fed. Reg. 60
Seer earn 27, 28
Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093
GN EE er 22
Exec. Order No. 13,603, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,651
En 26
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Jared T. Brown & Daniel H. Else, Cong.
Research Serv., R43767, The Defense
Production Act of 1950: _ History,
Energy Field: Hearings Before the Joint
Comm. on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong. 25
EEE SEES SS reer passim
S. Rep. No. 88-1325 (1964)........................... 26, 29
S. Rep. No. 86-870 (1959)............................. 10, 11
S. Rep. No. 83-1699 (1954).........................0. 12
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
SCHOLARLY AUTHORITIES
William Brice Fiske, Virginia’s Moratori-
um: Is Uranium Mining on the Horizon in
the Commonwealth?, 37 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 289 (2012) ............
H. Hamilton Hackney Ill, Comment, Recent
Congressional Proposals for Providing
Relief to the Domestic Uranium Industry:
Saving Grace or Just Another Expensive
Bailout?, 10 J. ENerGy L. & POoL’y 171
Byron S. Miller, A Law is Passed — The
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 15 U. Cui. L.
Arthur W. Murphy & D. Bruce La Pierre,
Nuclear “Moratorium” Legislation in the
States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case
of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
TE ncinrtnitiinnininimmnendnmaneenenrsen
Ronald H. Rosenberg, Uranium Mining and
Milling in Virginia: An Analysis of Reg-
ulatory Choice, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES
Be Be tl inircccntnarenniimimetsidieainintospaninemes
James R. Wilch, Comment, GATT and the
Half-Life of Uranium Industry Protection,
10 N.W. J. INTL L. & Bus. 150 (1989)........
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Trump's Navy Warship Expansion Plan
Faces Major Obstacles, Newsweek (Mar.
20, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/
donald-trump-navy-warships-navy-
Page
15
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page
Associated Press, Proposed East Coast
Uranium Mine Dividing Va., USA Today
(Jan. 26, 2013), https://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/nation/2013/01/26/
virginia-uranium-mine/1866489/ .............. 15
George David Banks & Michael Wallace,
Ctr. for Strategic & Int'l Studies,
Recapturing U.S. Leadership in Uranium
Enrichment (Nov. 2013), http://cdn.accf.
org/wp-content/uploads/20 16/12/131125_
Banks _RecapturingUSLeadership Web.
Anthony Capaccio, Fleet of 12 Nuclear
Submarines in Line for Pentagon Appro-
val, Bloomberg @Jan. 4, 2017), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/20 1 7-
01-05/new-nuclear-armed-subs-win-
pentagon-approval-before-obama-leaves.. 19
CBS News, Inside the U.S. Navy’s Newest
Fastest Submarines (May 10, 2017),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-navy-
newest-submarine-squad-virginia-class/.. 19
Centrus, Megatons to Megawatts, http://
www.centrusenergy.com/who-we-are/
history/megatons-to-megawatts/ (last
visited July 2, 2018) ....................---ceeeeeeeeees 17
Jon. J. Indall, Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Found., 2006 No. 2 RMMLF-Inst.
Paper No. 16, A Historical Review of the
Relationship Between The Federal
Government and the Domestic Uranium
Industry and Current Uranium Activities
and Issues in New Mexico (2006)............... 25
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Ana Komnenic, Amid Fierce Political
Opposition, US Uranium Miner Suspends
Mine Plans, mining.com (Dec. 15, 2013),
http://www.mining.com/amid-fierce-
political-opposition-us-uranium-miner-
gives-up-on-one-of-the-worlds-largest-
uranium-deposits-664 17 ...........................-
KTAR Newsroom, Drive to Mine Uranium
in Va. Comes to Quiet Pause, KTAR News
(Dec. 14, 2013), http://ktar.com/story/
112903/drive-to-mine-uranium-in-va-
Regulatory Affairs, Exec. Office of the
President, M-17-24, Guidance for Section
2 of Executive Order 13783, Titled
“Promoting Energy Independence and
Economic Growth” (2017), https://www.
whitehouse. gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/
omb/memoranda/2017/M-17-24.pdf...........
Robert S. Palmer, Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Inst., 2 RMMLF- Inst. 4, Problems
Page
15
15
23
Ge ccsccsscscassnscesssecrencssnsenevescenensncssnsenscesaus 24, 25
Sonal Patel, More Premature Nuclear Unit
Retirements Loom, POWER Magazine
(Feb. 1, 2018), http://)www.powermag.com/
more-premature-nuclear-unit-retirements
eT
M. Vv. Ramana, Nuclear power and the
public, 67 Bull. of the Atomic Scientists,
4 5 ee ee.
vil
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page
The Statistics Portal, Leading countries in
nuclear energy consumption in 2017 (in
million metric tons of oil equivalent),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/
265539/nuclear-energy-consumption-in-
leading-countries/ (last visited July 2,
TT cdiricsinsatiencaiibinntniiaiaiinsitiaaaniidemmaniaiiiaiiiaiaaeee 20
Anthony J. Thompson & Christopher S.
Pugsley, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Found., 2006 No. 2 RMMLF-Inst. Paper
No. 3, United States Federal / State
Licensing / Permitting Regimes Implicat-
ed By Uranium Development (2006).......... 24
Uranium Energy Corp., Uranium Energy
Corp 2018 Letter to Shareholders (Jan.
29, 2018), http://www.uraniumenergy.
com/news/releases/index.php?content_id=
GE canccedcienionsetnsimennnshinniginamimentimeenen 18
USGS, Interior Releases 2018's Final List of
35 Minerals Deemed Critical to U.S.
National Security and the Economy (May
18, 2018), https://www.usgs.gov/news/
interior-releases-2018-s-final-list-35-
minerals-deemed-critical-us-national-
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., EO 13783 USDA Final
Report; Recommendations Sorted by
Priority (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.fs.
fed.us/sites/default/files/appendix-b-usda-
eo-13783-final-report-10.11.17.xlsx........... 23
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Final Report Pursuant
to Executive Order 13783 on Promoting
Energy Independence and Economic
Growth (Oct. 11, 2017), https://
www.fs.fed.us/sites/default/files/eo- 13783-
usda-final-report-10.11.17.pdf...................
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., China Expected
to Account for More than Half of World
Growth in Nuclear Power Through 2040,
Today in Energy (Sept. 28, 2016), https://
www.cia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id
GEiksreccenteiunsnicdsiennsvastmeiiniinbatesnsvesione
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Domestic Urani-
um Production Report — Annual, Nuclear
& Uranium (May 22, 2018), https://www.
eia.gov/uranium/production/annual .........
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Fort Calhoun
Becomes Fifth U.S. Nuclear Plant to
Retire in Past Five Years, Today in
Energy (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.cia.
gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=28572 ...
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Nuclear
Capacity and Generation Expected to
Decline as Existing Generators Retire,
Today in Energy (May 12, 2017), https://
www.eia. gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id
SITET isidintnatnaminpntdetedeniiseredaicsiesnenminitapesnedes
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Uranium
Marketing Annual Report (May 31,
2018), https://www.eia.gov/uranium/
I cncencibetiiehincneincestancinminntansnetacnsinsae
Page
23
21
18
21
21
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Jonathon Wilson, Rural Community De-
bates Pros and Cons of Uranium Mining,
WAMU (Mar. 29, 2013), http://wamu.org/
story/13/03/29/rural_community_debates
_pros_and _ cons_of_uranium _mining/ Seneiegs
World Nuclear Ass’n, Nuclear Power in the
USA, http://www.world-nuclear.org/
information-library/country-profiles/
countries-t-z/usa-nuclear-power.aspx (last
updated June 2018)...................ccccccceeeeeeeees
World Nuclear Ass’n, US Nuclear Fuel
Cycle, http://www.world-nuclear.org/
information-library/country-profiles/
countries-t-z/usa-nuclear-fuel-cycle.aspx
Page
21
(last updated July 2018) .......................... 17, 20
World Nuclear News, American Centrifuge
Demonstration Plan Completes Oper-
ations (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.world-
nuclear-news.org/C-American-Centrifuge-
demonstration-plant-completes-
operations-2202167. html ...........................
INTEREST OF AMICI’
Amici curiae are three currently serving United
States Senators, with distinct interests in the nation-
al security and federalism issues presented by this
case. Specifically, amici have an interest in the prop-
er interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act’s preemp-
tive scope, to ensure that local interests do not cir-
cumvent federal priorities on issues of national con-
cern. Domestically produced uranium is one such is-
sue. Not only is a domestic supply of uranium critical
to the United States’ security and defense strategy, it
also affects the Nation’s status as an independent
and forward-looking leader on the global stage. Ami-
ci are responsible for developing federal legislation
related to nuclear policy, making them uniquely situ-
ated to address the strategic importance of uranium.
Amici further have a vested interest in ensuring that
federal law on this issue is both respected and effec-
tuated.
Senator Tom Cotton, an army veteran, represents
the State of Arkansas and serves on the Senate
Committee on Armed Services and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence. His assignments afford
him a distinct perspective on the need for nuclear
material as it relates to military defense and readi-
ness in today’s geopolitical climate. He is keenly
aware of the risks in failing to meet that need.
' No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in
part, and no party or counsel for a party made a monetary con-
tribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this
brief. No one other than amici curiae, its members, or its coun-
sel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submis-
sion of this brief. Amici certify that all parties have consented
to the filing of this brief.
2
Senator Jim Inhofe represents the State of Okla-
homa and serves on the Senate Committee on Armed
Services. He also chairs the Subcommittee on Readi-
ness and Management Support, where he is respon-
sible for overseeing policy relating to military readi-
ness and construction, defense energy and environ-
mental programs, and conventional ammunition pro-
curement. Senator Inhofe has a particular interest in
the role nuclear energy plays in defense readiness.
Senator Ted Cruz represents the State of Texas and
serves on the Senate Committee on Armed Services.
As part of his work on that Committee, Senator Cruz
is responsible for advancing policy related to the De-
partment of Defense, military research and develop-
ment, and nuclear energy. Senator Cruz has long
been an advocate for a strong and cohesive national
defense, which in turn requires a well-articulated nu-
clear regulatory framework.
As part of their service on the Committee on Armed
Services, amici are also members of the Subcommit-
tee on Strategic Forces, which steers federal policy on
nuclear and strategic forces, nuclear defense, defense
environmental management programs, and arms con-
trol and non-proliferation programs. The Subcom-
mittee also has oversight over several agencies devot-
ed to nuclear safety and defense. Accordingly, amici
are intimately familiar with the issues that drove
Congress to allocate responsibility for nuclear safety
between the federal government and the states, and
amici continue to work on matters committed to the
federal government by the Atomic Energy Act.
In light of their deep experience, amici agree that
national interests require the Atomic Energy Act’s
jurisdictional balance between the federal govern-
ment and the states be respected. Because the deci-
sion below upsets that balance and jeopardizes na-
3
tional interests, amici agree with Petitioners that the
Court should reverse the Fourth Circuit.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Fourth Circuit’s determination that the Com-
monwealth of Virginia’s ban on uranium mining is
not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act (the “Act”)
solely because the ban’s literal text addresses an ac-
tivity not covered by the Act provides states a clear
path to nullify federal policy in favor of local prefer-
ences through creative backchannels and artful word-
ing. Tying the Act’s preemptive scope to the strict
language of a statute disregards Congress’s prior de-
cision to vest regulation of radiological hazards with
the federal government and undermines federal polli-
cy concerning assets, like uranium, that are critical to
our Nation’s security and defense.
The Act and its amendments memorialize Con-
gress’s cumulative attempt to grapple with the mili-
tary, political, social, and economic consequences of
harnessed nuclear power and to allocate oversight re-
sponsibility for those consequences in a workable
regulatory framework. The Act’s legislative history
demonstrates the careful consideration with which
Congress allocated federal and state responsibilities
for regulating nuclear safety. In early amendments
to the Act, Congress committed oversight responsibil-
ity of radiological hazards to the federal government.
However, Congress also created an agreement-based
scheme whereby the civilian-led Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (“the Commission”) can transfer certain
2 The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5801 et
seq., abolished the Atomic Energy Con:mission and transferred
its regulatory functions to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
References to “the Commission” shall refer to both agencies.
4
of its regulatory functions to the states. Absent
transfer of authority pursuant to a valid agreement,
the federal government retains exclusiv~ authority to
regulate activities covered by the Act for purposes of
radiological safety. That is, federal law preempts
state law.
Pursuant to this Court’s precedents, which require
consideration of the purpose and effect of a state
statute vis-a-vis radiological safety, Virginia’s ban is
preempted by the Act. The ban purports to regulate
an activity that is properly within Virginia’s jurisdic-
tion: uranium mining on nonfederal lands. In pur-
pose and effect, however, the ban actually targets
post-mining activities (uranium milling and tailings
storage and disposal) because of those activities’ per-
ceived radiological hazards. However, such post-
mining activities are not accounted for in Virginia’s
current agreement with the Commission, making
regulation of those activities for purposes of radiolog-
ical safety the exclusive province of the federal gov-
ernment.
The Act’s legislative history demonstrates the care-
ful consideration with which Congress allocated fed-
eral and state responsibilities for regulating nuclear
safety. In willfully blinding itself to the purpose of
Virginia’s ban, the Fourth Circuit upended the Act’s
deliberate jurisdictional balance without any consid-
eration for the national and international conse-
quences that flow from the military, political, and
economic interests that drove Congress to assign reg-
ulatory responsibility in the manner it did. The
Fourth Circuit also disregarded the Court’s prior
teachings and refused to consider the plethora of evi-
dence disclosing the motivation behind the ban: per-
ceived radiological hazards associated with uranium
milling and tailings management.
5
Restricting the Act’s preemptive scope would per-
mit states to do indirectly what they cannot do direct-
ly, carrying far-reaching and serious risks. In this
case, local-based preferences threaten the implemen-
tation of uniform federal policy over uranium, a stra-
tegic national resource, at a critical time. Domestic
production and development of uranium is at historic
lows, exacerbated in no small part by Virginia’s ill-
conceived blockade of the largest known uranium de-
posit in the United States. But an unduly formalistic
approach that eschews any analysis of purpose or pol-
icy would extend well beyond this case, affecting a
host of nuclear-related activities covered by the Act,
and no less critical to our common national interests.
Accordingly, amici urge the Court to reverse the
Fourth Circuit and reaffirm that the Act’s preemptive
scope encompasses both the purpose and effect of any
state regulation.
ARGUMENT
I. RESTRICTING THE ACT’S PREEMPTIVE
SCOPE TO ACTIVITIES REGULATED sY
THE ACT WITHOUT REGARD TO PUR-
POSE OR EFFECT WOULD UNDERMINE
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNIFORM FED-
ERAL POLICY OVER ISSUES OF NATION-
AL IMPORTANCE.
A. The Act’s Preemption Framework Re-
flects Congress’s Careful Determination
Of Federal And State Competencies Bal-
anced Against Federal And State Inter-
ests.
The development of nuclear energy and technology
in the United States has been uniquely federal in na-
ture. Indeed, the Manhattan Project—the genesis of
the United States’ nuclear program—-was sponsored
6
by the federal government. See Arthur W. Murphy &
D. Bruce La Pierre, Nuclear “Moratorium” Legisla-
tion in the States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case
of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 394—
95 (1976). While the atomic bomb dramatically
demonstrated the military and political implications
of atomic energy, the role atomic energy would come
to play in civilian life was less clear. Congress strug-
gled to develop a legislative framework capable of
handling atomic energy’s unique policy issues. See,
e.g., Byron S. Miller, A Law is Passed — The Atomic
Energy Act of 1946, 15 U. Cut. L. REV. 799 (1948).
Reflecting Congress’s then-judgment that the fed-
eral government was the only body prepared to ad-
dress these policy issues, the inaugural 1946 version
of the Act committed nuclear energy exclusively to
federal authority by way of the Commission. Murphy
& La Pierre, supra, at 395. The 1946 Act further de-
clared a national policy—‘“subject at all times to the
paramount objective of assuring the common defense
and security” —to direct efforts toward “improving the
public welfare, increasing the standard of living,
strengthening free competition in private enterprise,
and promoting world peace.” Atomic Energy Act of
1946, ch. 724, § 1, 60 Stat. 755, 756.
Within a decade, however, Congress “concluded
that the national interest would be best served if the
Government encouraged the private sector to become
involved in the development of atomic energy for
peaceful purposes under a program of federal regula-
tion and licensing.” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina En-
vtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 63 (1978). Accord-
ingly, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, which allowed private entities to own and oper-
ate nuclear facilities that produced and utilized spe-
cial nuclear materials, including uranium. See
7
H. Hamilton Hackney II|, Comment, Recent Congres-
sional Proposals for Providing Relief to the Domestic
Uranium Industry: Saving Grace or Just Another Ex-
pensive Bailout?, 10 J. ENerGy L. & PoL’y 171, 175
(1990).
The 1954 Act encouraged private development “by
opening the door to private construction, ownership,
and operation of commercial nuclear-power reactors
under the strict supervision of the [Commission].”
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 81 (1990).
However, both the 1946 and 1954 versions of the Act
stipulated that the federal government remained “the
sole owner of uranium products.” Atlas Corp. v. Unit-
ed States, 895 F.2d 745, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The
Commission, therefore, maintained “pervasive con-
trol” over all aspects of uranium procurement, pro-
duction, sales, and disposal. /d.
Termination of the federal monopoly on the devel-
opment of nuclear energy exposed states to a variety
of potential health and envircamental hazards that
they had previously been precluded from regulating.
Federal-State Relationships in the Atomic Energy
Field: Hearings Before the J. Comm. on Atomic Ener-
gy, 86th Cong. 25 (1959) (“Hearings”). Consequently,
federal and state agencies endeavored to cooperate in
regulating those hazards, with the federal govern-
ment providing extensive assistance in the form of
information-sharing, training, funding, and mode!
regulations and standards. /d. at 25-26.
Nonetheless, there became evident a “need for clari-
fication of the responsibilities of the Federal and
State Governments for regulating atomic energy.” /d.
at 26; see also, id. at 393. As the nuclear power and
mining industries grew, states pressured the federal
government for the right to regulate those activities
occurring within their borders. Ronald H. Rosenberg,
8
Uranium Mining and Milling in Virginia: An Analy-
sis of Regulatory Choice, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L.
81, 96 (1984). Federal, state, and industry officials
agreed on the need for clarification, but the precise
allocation of authority was hotly debated, in part be-
cause then-existing state efforts and competencies
were far from uniform. See Hearings at 127-31, 394.
Two competing considerations drove the uncertain-
ty as to which government was properly responsible
for regulating nuclear hazards. On the one hand,
providing for the welfare and public health of its citi-
zens had traditionally fallen within the states’ core
police powers. /d. at 20, 274, 289. Conversely, the
legal enforceability of any state regulation of atomic
energy was questionable: “the 1954 act set{ | forth a
directive to the Federal agency to adopt a comprehen-
sive scheme of regulations,” and courts frequently
treated such direction as preempting any correspond-
ing state regulation. /d. at 126. Moreover, “under
the act, the objectives of Federal regulations are to
assure protection of the public while not unduly bur-
dening industrial progress, and thus more restrictive
requirements by the State might be deemed as inter-
ference with national nuclear development policy.”
Id.
An early bill drafted by the Commission “provided
for the exercise of dual or concurrent jurisdiction by
both the [Commission] and the States over activities
licensed by the Commission.” Id. at 27. To minimize
“inconsistency,” the proposed bill excluded licensing
responsibilities already exercised by the Commission
and provided that state requirements “may not be ‘in
conflict with’ those adopted by the Commission.” /d.
at 290. However, the notion of concurrent jurisdic-
tion elicited concerns over duplication of efforts, in-
dustry burden from conflicting and overlapping re-
9
quirements, and whether the federal or a state gov-
ernment would prevail in the event of conflicting
standards or decisions, particularly as it came to
overregulation. /d. at 20, 120, 129, 131. In light of
these concerns, shared federal and state jurisdiction
over radiological safety was rejected. /d. at 290.
Instead, Congress
provide[d] a statutory framework within which
the States may assume an independent regulato-
ry role in extensive areas now occupied by the
Atomic Energy Commission on a basis which will
assure appropriate protection for public health
and safety and compatibility between the regula-
tory programs of the States and those of the
Commission.
Id. at 290. Specifically, the 1959 amendments estab-
lished a program through which the Commission
could transfer to states limited portions of its regula-
tory authority to license and regulate nuclear by-
product materials, source materials (including urani-
um), and certain quantities of special nuclear materi-
als. Qualified states, known as “Agreement States,”
were authorized to enter into an agreement executed
by the Governor of the state and the Chairman of the
Commission under which the state could partially as-
sume the Commission’s regulatory duties. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021(b).
There are several steps to becoming an Agreement
State. The Governor of the applicant state must cer-
tify that the state is willing to “assume regulatory re-
sponsibility” for nuclear material, including uranium.
42 U.S.C. § 2021(d)(1). The Governor must also certi-
fy that the state possesses a “program for the control
of radiation hazards adequate to protect the public
health and safety.” Jd. In turn, the Commission
10
must make several indeve:ident findings, including
that the state’s program 12 compatible with and at
least as restrictive as the Commission’s own rules
and regulations. Jd. § 2021(a)(2); see also S. Rep.
No. 86-870, at 11 (1959). The Commission further
reserves the right to take back all or part of these
regulatory functions from a state upon notice and
hearing, or peremptorily in emergency circumstances.
42 U.S.C. § 20214).
Certain regulatory responsibilities, because of their
nature, were not eligible for transfer to an Agreement
State. The federal government retains exclusive ju-
risdiction over “areas in which the technical safety
considerations are of such complexity that it is not
likely that any State would be prepared to deal with
them during the foreseeable future,” as well as those
“areas as to which interstate, national, or interna-
tional considerations seem to be paramount.” Hear-
ings at 291. Also excepted from the program were ac-
tivities associated with high levels of radioactive haz-
ards, such as managing nuclear reactors. Jd. As re-
ported by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy:
“These are areas which, because of their special haz-
ards, or for reasons of Federal responsibility, are be-
lieved desirable for continued responsibility by the
Commission.” S. Rep. No. 86-870, at 10.
With regard to those responsibilities that may be
devolved to the states, the Act provides that once an
agreement is established, “[djuring the duration of
such an agreement . . . the State shall have authority
to regulate the materials covered by the agreement for
the protection of the public health and safety from
radiation hazards.” 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (emphasis
added). Otherwise, state and local authorities may
only “regulate activities for purposes other than pro-
tection against radiation hazards.” Id. § 2021(k). In
1]
other words, “State laws and regulations concerning
the control of radiation hazards from byproduct,
source, and special nuclear materials shall not be ap-
plicable except pursuant to an agreement entered in-
to with the Commission.”* Hearings at 488; see also S.
Rep. No. 86-870, at 12 (“As indicated elsewhere, the
Commission has exclusive authority to regulate for
protection against radiation hazards until such time
oO en cee en ee oe
mission to assume such responsibility.”); id. at 3
(“[I}n order for a State to so regulate or license |mate-
rials covered by the Act], it must first establish an
adequate program for this purpose and enter into an
agreement with the Commission.”).
The Act’s legislative history demonstrates the care-
ful consideration with which Congress allocated fed-
eral and state responsibilities for regulating nuclear
safety. In so doing, Congress considered both the
competencies of the states as well as the national or
international implications that may flow from an ac-
tivity regulated by the Act. Truly local concerns were
left to the province of the states, while issues of na-
* This language originally appeared in one of the near-final
proposed bilis, but was subsequently removed “as unnecessary,”
because “[w]ith or without this sentence, in order for a State to
so regulate or license [materials under the Act] it must first es-
agreement with the Commission.” S. Rep. No. 86-870, at 3. The
removal was “not intend{ed] to change the substantive effect of
the bill” and was “not intend{[ed] to leave any room for the exer-
cise of concurrent jurisdiction by the States to control radiation
hazards.” Hearings at 500 (emphases added). Rather, it meant
to provide courts with “greater latitude in sustaining certain
types fof laws, (e.g., zoning requirements)] which have purposes
other than control of radiation hazards, even though such re-
quirements might have an incidental effect upon the use” of ma-
terial licensed by the Commission. /d. (emphases added).
12
tional or international significance, including highly
technical and highly hazardous activities, were com-
mitted exclusively to the Commission’s control.
For those regulatory aspects that could potentially
be transferred to the states, the federal government
assumed responsibility for supervising that transi-
tion. As part of that responsibility, the Commission
must ensure that the state has in place a regulatory
scheme that both adequately protects against radio-
logical harms and meets federal expectations for
achieving the purposes of the Act—namely, the pri-
vate development and use of nuclear energy for
peacetime purposes, subject, of course, to the national
interest in common defense and security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2011; S. Rep. No. 83-1699, at 3, 4 (1954).
At bottom, the responsibility for setting policy over
radiological hazards rests with the federal govern-
ment.
B. Formalistic Limits To The Act’s Preemp-
tive Scope Upset The Federal/State Ju-
risdictional Balance And Permit State
And Local Governments To Override
The Federal Government On Issues Of
National Importance.
In preempting a field of regulation, Congress has
determined an area is of such significance or national
import that it must be governed by a single, national
policy for which state or local authorities may not
substitute their own judgments.
Here, “the federal government has occupied the en-
tire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the lim-
ited powers expressly ceded to the States.” Pac. Gas
& Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983). In line with tradi-
tional tenets of preemption that look to “whether ‘the
13
matter on which the State asserts the right to act is
in any way regulated by the Federal Act,” id. at 213
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 236 (1947)), “the Court defined the pre-
empted field, in part, by reference to the motivation
behind the state law,” English, 496 U.S. at 84 (em-
phasis added). The remaining “part of the field is de-
fined by the state law’s actual effect on nuclear safe-
ty.” Id. In other words, “state regulation of matters
directly affecting” aspects of radiological safety com-
mitted exclusively to the federal government also im-
permissibly intrude upon the preempted field. /d.
Taken together, this Court has made clear that the
preemptive scope of the Act is not limited to the
“plain language” of the challenged statute.
And for good reason. Federal preemption could be
rendered meaningless if state or local authorities
could circumvent federal policy through artful word-
ing or other creative backchannels. Cf. Entergy Nu-
clear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 416
(2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that courts do not “blindly
accept the articulated purpose... for preemption
purposes,” because that would permit states to “nulli-
fy nearly all unwanted federal legislation” (quoting
Greater N.Y. Metro. Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani,
195 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 1999))). The danger is par-
ticularly acute here given the public penchant to
stigmatize nuclear development out of fear associated
with the radiological hazards of nuclear material.
See, e.g., M.V. Ramana, Nuclear power and the pub-
lic, 67 Bull. of the Atomic Scientists, July 1, 2011, at
43-51. Any approach to preemption that turns a
blind eye to motive and effect would give state and
local authorities carte blanche to override federal pol-
icy concerning nuclear material and radiological haz-
ards, so long as the pertinent language does not pur-
14
port to regulate activities under the Commission's ex-
clusive jurisdiction.
In fact, some states have previously attempted to
do just that, but were prevented by courts that looked
beyond the text of the statute to understand the mo-
tivating purpose behind the statute. See Entergy Nu-
clear, 733 F.3d 393; Skull Valley Band of Goshute In-
dians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir, 2004). In
Entergy, the Second Circuit held as preempted a
Vermont statute that required state legislative ap-
proval to build a nuclear power plant. 733 F.3d at
403, 428. While the statute purported to regulate the
generation, sale, and transmission of electric power,
the Second Circuit observed that Vermont's legisla-
tive history “expressed concern about radiological
safety” associated with nuclear power plants and fur-
ther “expressed a desire to evade federal preemption.”
Id. at 420. In holding the statute preempted, the
court explicitly noted that the preemption inquiry
“does not end at the text of the statute.” /d. at 416.
Similarly, in Skull Valley, the Tenth Circuit went be-
yond the plain language of a Utah statute that facial-
ly regulated state highways and right-of-way re-
strictions when transporting spent nuclear fuels to
determine that those laws were enacted for the pur-
pose of regulating radiological safety and, thus, were
preempted. 376 F.3d at 1261-53.
Virginia's moratorium on uranium mining is cut
from the same cloth as the statutes at issue in Enter.
ay and Skull Valley. While it purports to regulate ac-
tivities within the Commonwealth's purview, local
concern regarding the radiological hazards associated
with post-mining activities—activities that fall within
the Commission's jurisdiction—-has sustained the ban
15
since its inception.‘ Moreover, the mining ban effec-
tively operates as a ban on those same post-mining
activities allowing Virginia to regulate indirectly
what it may not regulate directly.
Critically, while Virginia is a partial Agreement
State under the Act, the 2009 agreement expressly
carves out uranium mill tailings from the Common.
wealth’s regulatory authority. See William Brice
Fiske, Virginia's Moratorium: Is Uranium Mining on
the Horizon in the Commonwealth?, 37 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y Rev. 289, 307-08 (2012). Nor does
Virginia possess the statutorily required regulatory
structure to assume responsibility for uranium mill-
ings due to its moratorium over conventional mining.
See id. (citing William Robert G. Burnley, How Will
Virginia Regulate Uranium Mining?, 60 VA. LAW., 41,
43 (2011)).° The power to regulate the radiological
‘ See, eg., Pet. App. 239a-207a; Associated Press, Proposed
Kast Coast Uranium Mine Dividing Va., USA Today Gan. 26,
2013), https://www. usatoday.com /story /newa/nation/20 1 1V01/26/
virginia-uranimum-mine/1866489/, Jonathon Wilson, Rural
Community Debates Pros and Cons of Uranium Mining, WAMU
(Mar. 29, 2013), http://wamu.org/atory/13/03/29/rural_
community debatea_proa_and_cona_of uranium mining/,; Ana
Suspends Mine Plans, Mining.com (Dec. 15, 2013), http://
www. mining com/amid-fierce-political-opposition-us-uranium.
miner-gives-up-on-one-of-the-worlds-largest-uranium-deposits-
66417; KTAR Newsroom, Drive to Mine Uranium in Va. Comes
to Quiet Pause, KTAR News (Dec. 14, 2013), http://ktar.com/
story/112903/drive-to-mine-uranium-in-va-comes-to-quiet-
pause/.
*Should a state assume responsibility for tailings manage-
ment, the state is required to comply with federal standards
governing the safety of that material. See Uranium Mill Tail-
ings Radiation Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-604, § 204(e),
92 Stat. 3021 (providing for federal regulation of radiological
hazards associated with uranium tailings left over from the mill-
16
hazards associated with uranium milling and tailing
activities therefore remains exclusively with the
Commission, 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b), (k). Congress and
the Commission have already determined that the
post-mining processing and subsequent waste storage
of uranium is sufficiently safe to license. The Com-
monwealth may not substitute its own judgment re-
garding the safety of post-mining activities by effec-
tively blocking such activities within its borders. Re-
ducing the preemptive inquiry to a text-based analy-
sis would effectively rubberstamp state legislation
challenged under the Act.
C. Domestic Production Of Uranium Is A
National Strategic Interest.
As Judge Traxler observed in his dissent below,
“|t}he stakes in this case are significant.” Pet. App.
Zia. Amici, as sitting Senators and members of the
Senate Committee on Armed Services— including the
subcommittee charged with overseeing nuclear de-
fense policy—are aptly suited to speak to those
stakes.
Moat importantly, the availability and development
of uranium, and particularly, the domestic production
of uranium, is integral to the Nation's security. In-
ternational treaty obligations prohibit the use of im-
ported foreign enriched uranium, or uranium en-
riched on U.S. soil using foreign technology, for de-
fense purposes. George David Banks & Michael Wal-
lace, Ctr. for Strategic & Int'l Studies, Recapturing
U.S. Leadership in Uranium Enrichment 5 (Nov.
2013). Any uranium used for defense purposes must
be “produced by and procured from domestic sources
ing poaseedhs 10 CFR. § 150.31 (requiring state compliance with
any standards promulgated by the Commission or the Environ-
mental Protection Agency pursuant to U
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