Supplemental Brief — Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 138 S. Ct. 293 (2017) (No. 16-1275)

Supreme Court brief2017

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 16-1275

Ju the

Supreme Court of the Anited States

»

nl

VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

.

JOHN WARREN, et al.,

Respondents.

ee

a

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Fourth Circuit

MARK R. HERRING Topsy J. HEYTENS

Attorney General Solicitor General!

AC Counsel of Record

Deputy Attorney General MATTHEW R. MCGUIRE

PAUL KUGELMAN Deputy

Senior Assistant OFFICE OF THE VIRGINIA

Attorney Genera! Hye yo

202 North Street

J eee Richmond, VA 23219

Attorney (804) 786-7240

General solicitorgeneral@vag state.va_us

April 23, 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

pF Be i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................-.2--000+ ii

ET chertiriinsteieitnninttiensenscnonnesdniniinuetnimenss 4

A 4

B. This case is a poor vehicle for addressing

preemption under the AEA ....................... 6

C. This case raises no issue of general or ur-

I I ccscenscsssnscsnenesseesnsssecessesees 11

ELE ae ee 13

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

Le ee 6

Bond v. United States,

EEE EE EET a een a a 10

Cooper v. Harris,

TT Aaa aT 8

Easley v. Cromartie,

I intra et erene en einitanmmieiaininel i)

English v. General Elec. Co.,

ee a 5

Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumilin,

733 F.3d BOS (Bd Cir. 2O1B) .............ccccccccccccecerereeeeeees 4

Hartman v. Moore,

| 9

Massachusetts v. United States,

EE Ee 7

Nordlinger v. Hahn,

EE eee 9

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.

Conservation & Dev. Comm’n,

461 U.S. 190 (1983) ...............00c0cccccceee 3, 4, 5, 8,9, 11

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp..,

464 US. ee 5

Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson,

376 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004),

cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1060 (2005) ............................ 4

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

U.S. Bank NA. v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC,

No. 15-1509 (Mar. 5, 2018) ..............22.cccccccceeeeeeeeeneee 10

Wyeth v. Levine,

| ITT EE LOT a Em 8

STATUTES

Atomic Energy Act (AEA)

a rcenicnnssnicsseninrenninntiiniiatonsl 1

iii niitinertastebecnsenianiinnidemamiidiibiaéatd 5

ee i rceencitiriinninaresenincsamcnsasiisadinttinaiiiniimmaans 12

RULES

Be Es i i enecnnsmneetanpnensncensoennsnnsenssmsctasctansnememscumenetl 6

l

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., ET AL.,

PETITIONERS,

Vv.

JOHN WARREN, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

The federal government argues that a 36-year-old

Virginia policy that went unchallenged for 33 years

might (or might not) be preempted by a federal statute

that has been on the books for 54 years based on a con-

struction of that statute given in a 35-year-old decision

of this Court—a decision that, like all decisions of this

Court interpreting that same federal statute, held that

it did not preempt the allegedly usurped state law.

To be clear: This case does not involve whether the

Commonwealth of Virginia may impose a moratorium

on conventional uranium mining. The federal govern-

ment acknowledges that it does not, has never, and in-

deed cannot regulate such mining. U.S. Br. 3, 13, 23.

The federal government also admits that, notwith-

standing the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2011 et seq., States may regulate uranium mining,

including by banning it altogether. U.S. Br. 18. Indeed,

2

the government even agrees that States may ban con-

ventional uranium mining based on concerns about the

safety of the mining process itself. See U.S. Br. 16

(“State regulation of conventional uranium mining is

permissible if that regulation is grounded on concerns

about mining itself, which is not subject to NRC regu-

lation.”); accord U.S. Br. 12-13, 18.

But even though States have plenary power over

conventional uranium mining, the federal government

argues that both lower courts erred—and the case

should move forward—based on petitioners’ allega-

tions about the Virginia legislature’s motives and a

concession we have never made. As for the former, the

government asserts that petitioners “have adequately

alleged that ... the Commonwealth has banned ura-

nium mining not because of concerns about mining

per se, but because of fears about radiological hazards

associated with the next steps of the uranium-

development process, which NRC regulates under the

AEA.” U.S. Br. 12. The government also suggests we

“have conceded that, for purposes of [our] motion to

dismiss,” U.S. Br. 23, the courts should take as true pe-

titioners’ allegations that Virginia’s moratorium was

motivated “solely” by radiological safety concerns asso-

ciated with milling and tailings. U.S. Br. 22. As a result,

says the government, this Court “need not decide what

evidence would be necessary or sufficient to prove

those allegations” were the case to proceed beyond the

motion-to-dismiss stage. U.S. Br. 23.

These arguments illustrate the weakness of the

government’s position and the untenable situation it

3

would create for States. They also highlight why this is

a poor case for addressing the preemptive scope of the

AEA. As this Court has explained in evaluating that

very same statute, “inquiry into legislative motive’—

itself always a potentially “unsatisfactory venture”—

can be “particularly pointless” where (as here) there

are no doubts about a State’s ability to achieve a par-

ticular result and the only question is whether the

State has relied on a proper justification for doing so.

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserva-

tion & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 216 (1983) (Pacific

Gas). The problems will only be compounded if claims

about what motivated a particular State’s legislature

to enact (or fail to repeal) a longstanding state policy

are treated as allegations of fact that must be pre-

sumed true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. And

the problems will only multiply if the list of state poli-

cies open to challenge is expanded to include not only

those touching on matters regulated by the federal

government but also state policies regulating activities

that are, themselves, “subject to state rather than fed-

eral regulation.” U.S. Br. 23.

Fortunately, there is no need for the Court to wade

into those matters because there is no need for the

Court to take this case. Both lower courts agreed about

the proper outcome here, and their decisions upho.ding

Virginia’s three-decade-old moratorium on uranium

mining do not conflict with either the decisions of this

Court or another court of appeals. Nor does this peti-

tion for a writ of certiorari raise any issue of general

importance. Despite vague expressions of concerns, see

4

U.S. Br. 22, the government identifies no tangible

harms caused by Virginia’s moratorium and no actual

projects or activities that would be impeded were this

Court simply to leave undisturbed the status quo that

has prevailed since 1982. In short, “it is for Congress

to rethink the division of regulatory authority in light

of its possible exercise by the States to undercut a fed-

eral objective” and “[t]he courts should not assume the

role which our system assigns to Congress.” Pacific

Gas, 461 US. at 223.

ARGUMENT

A. There is no conflict

The government suggests that the lower courts’

resolution of this case conflicts with three others: this

Court’s decision in Pacific Gas; the Tenth Circuit’s de-

cision in Skull Valley;' and the Second Circuit’s deci-

sion in Entergy.” U.S. Br. 19-21. But those cases are all

distinguishable for the same basic reason: each arose

directly out of activities that are themselves identified

in the text of the AEA for regulation by the federal gov-

ernment. Pacific Gas involved the construction of new

nuclear power plants. Skull Valley involved storage fa-

cilities for spent nuclear fuel. And Entergy involved

rules governing existing nuclear power plants. This

* Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d

1223 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1060 (2005).

* Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393

(2d Cir. 2013).

5

case, in contrast, involves conventional uranium min-

ing—an entire category of activity that the federal gov-

ernment acknowledges remains “subject to state

control.” U.S. Br. 9; accord U.S. Br. 13, 16.

That distinction matters for reasons that are both

textual and intensely practical. Textual because the

clearest statutory basis for preemption based on the

underlying “purpose” of a state regulation—42 U.S.C.

§ 2021(k)—is part of a broader provision whose entire

function is to expand state regulatory authority by per-

mitting States to regulate in areas that otherwise

would be under exclusive federal control. Practical be-

cause all of the difficulties with—and disruptions

threatened by—judicial inquiries into legislative mo-

tive would only be compounded by expanding their

scope to include state regulation of “antecedent ac-

tivitlies]” (U.S. Br. 9) not otherwise under federal con-

trol. See infra Part B.

The claimed conflict with Pacific Gas also fails for

another reason. Like the decision below—and like the

two other decisions of this Court that followed it—Pa-

cific Gas rejected a preemption claim and upheld the

challenged state laws. 461 U.S. at 216; accord English

v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990); Silkwood v.

Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 258 (1984). It is at

least arguable that some of the language in Pacific Gas

was “unnecessary to the Court’s holding” and thus “dic-

tum.” Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 223-24 (Blackmun, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

But regardless of how that question is answered, the

fact remains that this Court has never invalidated a

6

state law based on the preemption theory urged here.

For that reason, too, there is no “conflict| |” between the

decision below and the “relevant decisions of this

Court.” S. Ct. R. 10(c).

B. This case is a poor vehicle for addressing

preemption under the AEA

The government further errs in contending that

“|t]his case presents a suitable vehicle to address the

question presented.” U.S. Br. 23. The linchpin of the

government’s vehicle analysis is its assertion that we

“have conceded . . . for purposes of [our] motion to dis-

miss [that] the courts should take as true petitioners’

allegation that the Virginia moratorium was moti-

vated by radiological-safety concerns.” U.S. Br. 23.

1. Because the point may prove critical were this

Court to grant review, it is important to be clear about

what we have and have not “conceded.” Like any party

who moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we

“take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as

true.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In var-

ious filings in this case, we also have assumed that “one

of the purposes behind enacting [the moratorium] was

to address potential radiological safety concerns.”

Resp’t Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 15 (emphasis

added; footnotes omitted).

That said, we have never conceded that legislative

purpose is purely a question of fact (historical or oth-

erwise). Nor have we conceded, even for purposes of

the underlying motion to dismiss, that the Virginia

7

legislature’s sole purpose in imposing a moratorium on

conventional uranium mining was based on radiologi-

cal safety concerns associated with uranium milling

and tailings. See, e.g., Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss

& Resp. to Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. 8 n.9 (noting that

“much of the evidence highlighted by the [petitioners]

speaks not to radiation or radiological issues, but gen-

eral concerns about health, safety and welfare”).*

2. The government is similarly wrong in assur-

ing the Court that it could simply assume that Vir-

ginia’s law was wholly motivated by an allegedly

improper purpose, while leaving for another day all

thorny questions about “what evidence would be nec-

essary or sufficient” to prove such allegations. U.S. Br.

* The Fourth Circuit identified no basis for saying we “con-

cede|d|” that the Commonwealth “lacks a non-safety rationale for

banning uranium mining.” Pet. App. 10a. Such a concession would

be irrelevant in any event because the federal government

acknowledges that Virginia may ban uranium mining based on

safety concerns—even radiological safety concerns—so long as

those concerns are grounded in the safety of the mining process

rather than milling and tailings. See U.S. Br. 16.

As Judge Traxler noted in dissent, a footnote in our court of

appeals’ brief states—in response to a claim about what would

happen if this case reached the summary judgment stage—that

we have “conceded the truth of |petitioners’] claims about legislu-

tive motive only for purposes of their Rule 12(b\6) motion.” Resp.

C.A. Br. 15 1.58 (cited in Pet. App. 29a n.9). Even if this statement

could reasonably be construed as broader than others we have

made about how Rule 12 operates —and it should not—this Court

is not bound by “concessions” involving the proper operation of

Rule 12(bX6). See, e.g., Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S.

611, 624 n.23 (1948) (explaining that this Court is “not bound to

accept [a legal concession] as either sound or conclusive of the lit-

igation. It is not, even in terms, a confession of error.”).

8

23. For one thing, as explained above, respondents vig-

orously challenge the assumption that provides the

predicate for those assurances.

But the government’s assurances also are wrong

because they attempt to skate over several difficult

questions about how analysis of legislative purpose

works in this context. For now, consider just two:

In this context, is legislative “purpose” a question

of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question? In Wyeth

v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), for example, this Court

analyzed Congress’s purpose in a preemption case

without giving any deference to (or even referencing)

any trial court findings. Jd. at 566-68, 573-81. In the

voting rights context, however, this Court has treated

legislative intent in drawing electoral districts as a fac-

tual question that is reviewed for clear error, and, as a

result, state legislators often are deposed and forced to

testify. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1466,

1473-75 (2017). The gover~-ment’s brief simply as-

sumes that this context fs 4 into the question-of-fact

bucket. But none of this Court’s previous decisions

clearly answers that question.‘

* The government errs in describing Pacific Gas as “deferring

to lower court’s factual assessments” of the purpose of the chal-

lenged state law. U.S. Br. 15 (emphasis added). What this Court

actually said was that its “general practice is to place considerable

confidence in the interpretations of state law reached by the fed-

eral courts of appeals.” Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 214 (emphasis

added). Courts of appeals, of course, have no power to make fac-

tual findings.

9

Or take another question: What is the required re-

lationship between an allegedly invalid purpose and

any other purposes that may also have motivated the

challenged state action? Does the challenger need to

prove: (a) that the alleged improper purpose was the

but-for cause of the legislative enactment, cf. Hartman

v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006); (b) that the improper

purpose predominated over other valid purposes, cf.

Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001); (c) that

there is no rational purpose for the law other than the

improper purpose, cf. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 US. 1, 6

(1992); or (d) something else? None of the Court’s pre-

vious decisions in this area squarely address that

question—though Pacific Gas says that where (as

here) it is clear that Congress did not displace the

States’ traditional authority to reach a given outcome

(here, a moratorium on conventional uranium mining)

“it should be up to Congress to determine whether a

State has misused the authority left in its hands.” Pa-

cific Gas, 461 U.S. at 216.

In our view, the better answers are that this type

of inquiry is more akin to a legal question than a fac-

tual one and that the relevant materials show that the

Virginia legislature had a variety of concerns in mind

when enacting the moratorium. Pet. App. 178a, 182a-

88a. The government's question-of-fact position ig-

nores the profound difficulties posed by attempting to

discover facts underlying a nearly 40-year-old enact-

ment by a state legislature that maintains a paucity

of legislative history. Even more troublingly, the ques-

tion-of-fact view could create the untenable situation

10

where district courts reach different conclusions about

whether a given state law is preempted and those dif-

fering conclusions are then subject to clear-error re-

view on appeal. Cf. U.S. Bank NA. v. Vill. at Lakeridge,

LLC, No. 15-1509, slip op. at 8 (Mar. 5, 2018) (“[Wljhen

applying the law involves developing auxiliary legal

principles of use in other cases|,| appellate courts

should typically review a decision de novo.”). But re-

gardless of whether this Court agrees with our assess-

ment, those are the types of questions that would need

to be answered before petitioners could be granted any

relief.

3. It also is worth noting the breadth of the fed-

eral government’s position. In its view, a preemption

challenge to a state law regulating an activity commit-

ted entirely to the States’ control could survive a mo-

tion to dismiss as long as the plaintiff alleges an

improper legislative motive for passing an otherwise

facially valid law. Such a rule would permit virtually

any preemption challenge to advance to discovery, sub-

jecting the State and its officials to potentially intru-

sive inquiries about what motivated a state legislature

to adopt a law regulating activities that are themselves

entirely unregulated by the federal government. But

“|t}he allocation of powers in our federal system pre-

serves the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty

of the States,” Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221

(2011), and the federal government offers nothing but

speculation to justify why such an intrusion in state

sovereignty is necessary. This is especially true given

that Congress retains ample authority “to rethink the

11

division of regulatory authority” if it disagrees with

Virginia’s longstanding policies about conventional

uranium mining. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 223.°

C. This case raises no issue of general or ur-

gent importance

It bears repeating that Virginia’s moratorium on

conventional uranium mining has been in place since

President Reagan’s first term and went completely un-

challenged until the end of the second Obama Admin-

istration. At worst, that sort of delay could give rise to

a defense of laches or the like. But even at best, it badly

undermines any claim about the urgency of this issue.

The federal government has not identified any

pressing need for this Court’s intervention. The gov-

ernment makes no claim that the actual policy at issue

in this case—Virginia’s moratorium on conventional

uranium mining—.is, has, or can be expected to cause

any harm whatsoever to the national interest. Tell-

ingly, the government offers no support to petitioners’

overheated claims of dire harm to “our economy [and}

° As we pointed out to both courts below, Congress undertook

a substantial revision of the AEA early this century with the pas-

sage of the 2005 Energy Policy Act without disturbing the ura-

nium mining moratorium in Virginia or any other State. See, e.z.,

Resp’t Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 11. This too undermines

the federal government’s implicit contention that the “clear and

manifest purpose of Congress” was to displace Virginia’s exercise

of its sovereign police power. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 206.

12

national security.” Compare Pet. Cert. Reply 10-12,

with US. Br. 22.°

The government vaguely suggests that the ques-

tion presented here is “likely to recur in other nuclear-

safety contexts,” U.S. Br. 9, and that “the Fourth Cir-

cuit’s analysis” might permit other States to take other

steps that might be harmful to federal interests. U.S.

Br. 22. But the government fails to identify any con-

crete state policies that have been enacted—or even

general proposals that have been made—during the 14

months since the Fourth Circuit’s decision in this case

or the 28 months since the district court’s decision.

Better to let sleeping dogs lie.

® Nor could it, given the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s

plenary power to conduct mining operations to meet national se-

curity needs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2096.

13

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be de-

nied.

Respectfully submitted,

MARK R. HERRING Tosy J. HEYTENS

Att C , Solicitor G j

STEPHEN A. CoBB Counsel of Record

Deputy Attorney General MATTHEW R. MCGUIRE

Pan, Rucmsan Deputy Solicitor General

Senior Assistant OFFICE OF THE VIRGINIA

Attorney General ATTORNEY GENERAL

202 North Ninth Street

J. per eee ee . Richmond, VA 23219

Gane (804) 786-7240

sohicitorgeneral@vag state.va.us

No. 16-1275

In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

JOHN WARREN, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

NOEL J. FRANCISCO

Solicit

General

Counsel of Record

JEFFREY H. Woop

General

MALCOLM L. STEWART

Deputy Solicitor General

ANN - t meryny on

ANDREW P. AVERBACH é = a tettor

CHARLES E. MULLINS VARU CHILAKAMARRI

JEREMY M. SUTTENBERG Attorney

Attorneys Department of Justice

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

Commission SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj. gov

Washington, D.C. 20555 (202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA),

42 U.S.C. 2011 et seg., preempts state laws that prohibit

activities within a State’s regulatory jurisdiction (here,

conventional uranium mining) when such laws are

grounded in radiological-safety concerns about related

activities that are federally regulated under the AEA

(here, the milling of uranium ore and disposal of “tail-

ings” byproduct).

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Eehowent of the United Bieteti cccccccscccscscscessccsesesesvescessecsensscccsseneeess 1

Statement saceupenqensapuemuiannenesersatonsmmnmnes 1

A. Regulatory background. ................c.csecseeseeeeneenenes 1

BF ee il ccresccncnnsccsenssscnssecsssasensensesssencccoss 7

C. The proceedings below ..............<<c<cssssssssssesses0e000s 9

Ff 12

RR ccs csemmnnssecnesssseecscssensesnerenasssnesessmmmessesnessuneneesnaneneernenete 14

I. The Atomic Energy Act occupies the field of

nuclear-safety regulation, and it preempts any

state uranium-mining ban that is motivated by

concerns about the radiological safety of federally

regulated uranium milling and tailings

SRR IIEIGEE, cccncsserecesssnsrsesesesanevensensensenensnsnssesessesccssosccsees 15

A. The federal government has exclusive

authority to regulate nuclear safety except

to the extent that it has delegated that

SE EE a 15

B. State laws that are grounded in nuclear-

safety concerns about AE A-regulated activities

are preempted 18

C. Because petitioners have credibly alleged that

Virginia’s uranium-mining ban was motivated

by nuclear-safety concerns about federally

regulated milling and tailings management,

their complaint should not have been dismissed . 22

Il. Lf Virginia’s uranium-mining ban was motivated

conflict-preemption

inconsistent with the judgment of federal

authorities that uranium milling and tailings

management can be safely conducted if performed

CITIES ccitcnsiscnnsctinnntenimeninnesneernenatn ss enetetiiinimatiets 34

(111)

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

American Trucking Ass'ns v. City of Los Angeles,

re TT iininicsinrsconerenncetindeieenbicaienaedieiammcencemnenes 29

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc.,

438 U.S. 59 (1978) =

Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality

Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004) 29

English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990) ..... passim

Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin,

733 F.3d 398 (2d Cir. 2013) 33

Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n,

cr 34

Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 486 US.

(1988) 3

Hydro Res., Inc., In re, 6 N.R.C. 510 (2006) 4

National Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452 (2012)......... 29

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conser-

vation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190

(1983) passim

Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552

U.S. 364 (2008) 30

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. (1984)....... 18

Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson,

376 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546

U.S. 1060 (2005) 27, 28, 33

Constitution, statutes, regulations, and rule:

U.S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2 sioleeseslsisiamtatinpmtannimensenennies 14

Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073:

§ 1, 68 Stat. 921 —

§ 2(d), 68 Stat. 921 15

Vv

Statutes, regulations, and rule—Continued: Page

§ 271, 68 Stat. 960 15

Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, 73 Stat.

6

Act of Aug. 24, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-135,

EE 2

Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724:

§ 1(b)(4), 60 Stat. 756 : 2,15

§ K(a)(1), 60 Stat. 760 2

§ K(b)(1), 60 Stat. 761 2

§ K(b)(2), 60 Stat. 761 2

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq. ..........1, 2

42 U.S.C. 2111-2114 4

42 U.S.C. 2012(d) 15

42 U.S.C. 2013(d) 2, 12, 31

42 US.C. 2014(e)(1)(4) 4

42 U.S.C. 2014(e(2) 5, 9, 16, 23

42 U.S.C. 2014(v) 4

42 U.S.C. 2014(z) 3, 16

42 U.S.C. 2014(aa) 3

42 US.C. 2014cc) 4

42 U.S.C. 2018 2, 15, 20, 25

42 U.S.C. 2021 passim

42 U.S.C. 2021(aX(1) 6, 16

42 U.S.C. 2021(b) 6, 7, 16

42 U.S.C. 2021(c) 7, 33

42 U.S.C. 2021(e)(1) 19, 24

42 U.S.C. 2021(d)(1)(2) 6

42 U.S.C. 2021(k) passim

42 U.S.C. 2021() 7, 33

42 U.S.C. 2021(0)(2) 32

42 U.S.C. 2021b(9AX(i) 33

VI

Statutes, regulations, and rule—Continued: Page

42 U.S.C. 2022 3

42 U.S.C. 2022012) ceeccccseneeeeeeceeee cove 5

42 U.S.C. 2023(a) 32, 33

42 U.S.C. 2073-2074 (2012 & Supp. III (2015))...............3

42 U.S.C. 2092 3,4

42 U.S.C. 2098

42 U.S.C. 2099

42 U.S.C. 2111

42 U.S.C. 2111-2114

42 U.S.C. 2131-2133

42 U.S.C. 2201(b)

Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. 601 et seq............

42 U.S.C. 5811-5813

42, U.S.C. 5841-5845

42 U.S.C. T151(a)

Cal. Pub. Res. Code (West 1977):

wt Bom mm we oe

§ 25524. 1(b) 25

§ 255242 25

1981 Va. Acts 1404 7

1982 Va. Acts 426 7

1983 Va. Acts 3 s

10 C.F.R.:

Pt.8 18

Section 8.4 18

Pts. 30-39 4

Pt. 40 3

Section 40.1-40.3 6

Section 40.3 4,

Section 40.4 3, 4, 6

Section 40.13(b) — 4

Section 40.20-4021 — 6

Vil

i

Regulations and rule—Continued:

Section 40.26-40.28

Section 40.31(h)

Section 40.32

Section 40.51

App. A

Pt. 50

Pt. 52

Pt. 70

Pt. 72

40 C.F.R.:

Pt. 192 5

Section 192.32(a)(1) 6

Section 192.32(a)(2) 6

Section 192.32(a)(3)i) 6

6

27

ee wOkrh DAAAR AH

Section 192.32(a)(4)

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 22,

Miscellaneous:

34 Fed. Reg. 7273 (May 3, 1969) 18

62 Fed. Reg. 46,517 (Sept. 3, 1997) 32

77 Fed. Reg. 21,625 (Apr. 11, 2012) 18

H.R. Rep. No. 1480, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. (1978):

Pt.I 5

Pt.2 5

S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959).................. 7,17

U.S. NRC, Conventional Uranium Mills, (May 15,

2017), https-//Awww-nre.gov/materials/uranium-

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 16-1275

VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

JOHN WARREN, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

This case concerns whether the Atomic Energy Act

of 1954 (AEA), 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seg., preempts a state

law that prohibits an activity within a State’s regulatory

jurisdiction, when such a law is motivated by radiological-

safety concerns about related activities that are feder-

ally regulated under the AEA. Because this case di-

rectly implicates federal regulatory responsibilities, the

United States has a substantial interest in the Court’s

resolution of the preemption issue. At the Court’s invi-

tation, the United States filed an amicus brief at the pe-

tition stage of this case.

STATEMENT

A. Regulatory Background

1. In 1946, Congress created a federal-government

monopoly over the production, ownership, and use of

“fissionable material,” including enriched uranium and

(1)

2

other materials that are “capable of releasing substantial

quantities of energy through nuclear chain reaction.”

Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (1946 Act), ch. 724, §§ 1(b)(4),

5(a)(1), 60 Stat. 756, 760. To implement this federal mo-

nopoly, Congress restricted the transfer, delivery, and

receipt of nuclear “source materials” like uranium.

§ 5(b)(1) and (2), 60 Stat. 761.

In 1954, through the AEA, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.,

Congress eliminated the federal government’s monop-

oly over the “use, control, and ownership of nuclear

technology,” Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy

Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 206

(1983) (Pacific Gas), in order “to encourage widespread

participation in the development and utilization of

atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum

extent consistent with the common defense and security

and with the health and safety of the public,” 42 U.S.C.

2013(d). The AEA preserves the States’ authority to

regulate “with respect to the generation, sale, or trans-

mission of electric power produced through the use of nu-

clear facilities licensed by the [NRC].” 42 U.S.C. 2018;

see Act of Aug. 30, 1954 (1954 Act), ch. 1073, § 1, 68 Stat.

921. In 1965, Congress clarified that the AEA’s preser-

vation of state regulatory authority “shall not be

deemed to confer upon any Federal, State, or local

agency any authority to regulate, control, or restrict

any activities of the [NRC].” 42 U.S.C. 2018; see Act of

Aug. 24, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-135, 79 Stat. 551.

In order to promote private-sector development of

nuclear energy, subject to strict federal control, Con-

gress has fashioned a comprehensive scheme for the

regulation and development of nuclear energy. Pacific

Gas, 461 U.S. at 193; see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina

3

Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 63 (1978). Respon-

sibility for implementing the AEA is currently shared

among the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),

which serves as the principal licensing and safety regula-

tor, see 42 U.S.C. 5841-5845; the U.S. Department of En-

ergy (DOE), which oversees federal research and promo-

tional activities, see 42 U.S.C. 5811-5813, 7151(a); and the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which estab-

lishes generally applicable standards for certain radiation

hazards, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 2022.'

Among other responsibilities, NRC licenses and regu-

lates the transfer, possession, use, and disposal of nuclear

materials throughout the nuclear fuel cycle, as needed to

“promote the common defense and security” and to “pro-

tect health or to minimize danger to life or property.”

42 U.S.C. 2201(b). “(Slource material,” including ura-

nium, is regulated upon removal from its place of deposit

in nature. 42 U.S.C. 2092; see 42 U.S.C. 2014(z) (defining

“source material’” to include “uranium”); 10 C.F.R. 40.4

(same). “{Njo person may transfer or receive in inter-

state commerce * * * any source material after removal

from its place of deposit in nature” unless such actions

are “authorized by a general or specific license issued by

[INRC}.” 42 U.S.C. 2092; see 42 U.S.C. 2093, 2099;

10 C.F.R. Pt. 40 (implementing regulations).

The AEA requires similar licenses for the transfer or

possession of “‘special nuclear material,’” which includes

uranium that has been “enriched in the isotope 233 or in

the isotope 235.” 42 U.S.C. 2014(aa); see 42 U.S.C. 2073-

2074 (2012 & Supp. III 2015) (licensing requirements);

10 C.F.R. Pt. 70 (implementing regulations). The AEA

' Those functions were allocated among NRC, DOE, and EPA in

the 1970s, after the Atomic Energy Commission was abolished. See

Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 486 U.S. 663, 666 n.4 (1988).

4

also requires licenses for the transfer or possession of

any “byproduct material” that is generated during nu-

clear-fuel production or use. See 42 U.S.C. 2014(e)(1)-(4)

(defining several categories of “byproduct material”);

42 U.S.C. 2111-2114 (licensing requirements); 10 C.F .R.

Pts. 30-39 (implementing regulations). NRC also re-

quires licenses for the operation of nuclear utilization

and production facilities, including nuclear power plants,

uranium-enrichment facilities, and fuel-fabrication facil-

ities, as well as spent-nuclear-fuel storage installations.

See 42 U.S.C. 2014(v) and (cc), 2131-2133; 10 C.F.R. Pts.

50, 52, 72 (implementing regulations).

2. Nuclear source material may be obtained through

several means. This case concerns conventional ura-

nium recovery, through which uranium ore is excavated

from the ground through open-pit or underground min-

ing and then subjected to above-ground chemical pro-

cessing. Pet. App. 4a. NRC does not regulate the phys-

ical excavation of uranium ore through conventional

mining (as opposed to other, “in situ” methods of ura-

nium recovery). See Jn re Hydro Res., Inc., 63 N.R.C.

510, 512-513 (2006).” NRC requirements begin to apply

once uranium is removed from its “place of deposit in

nature.” 42 U.S.C. 2092; 10 C.F.R. 40.3.; p. 3, supra.*

* “In situ” recovery involves injecting chemicals directly into the

earth and pumping the resulting uranium-infused solution to the

surface. Pet. App. 4a n.1, 54a-55a. This method is feasible only in

certain geological settings, which are not alleged to be present in

Virginia. /d. at 22a n.2 (Traxler, J., dissenting). NRC regulates the

process of “in situ” recovery. See Jn re Hydro Res., Inc., 63 N.R.C.

at 512-513.

® NRC has exempted from regulation “unrefined and unprocessed

ore containing source material,” but any such ore may not. be refined

or processed without a license. 10 C.F.R. 40.13(b); see 10 C.F_R.

5

Once excavated, the uranium ore is transferred by

truck or conveyor belt to a nearby mill for processing.

See U.S. NRC, Conventional Uranium Mills (May 15,

2017), https://www.nre.gov/materials/uranium-recovery/

extraction-methods/conventional-mills.html. “Uranium

mills are a part of the nuclear fuel cycle,” as “[t}hey ex-

tract uranium from ore for eventual use in nuclear

weapons and powerplants.” H.R. Rep. No. 1480, 95th

Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 2, at 25 (1978). “[Miilling” involves

physically grinding the ore into particles and then apply-

ing chemicals that separate the uranium from the sur-

rounding rock. Pet. App. 54a-55a. This process generates

a small quantity of concentrated uranium known as “‘yel-

lowcake,”” as well as a large amount of sandy waste known

as “[tlailings.” /d. at 4a, 54a-55a & n.2 (citation omitted);

see H.R. Rep. No. 1480, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. I, at 11

(1978) (noting that milling 2000 pounds of uranium ore

yields “only 1 to 5 pounds of usable uranium”). Tailings

are classified as a “byproduct material” under the AEA.

42 U.S.C. 2014e)(2).

The yellowcake is “sold and shipped off-site for en-

richment,” Pet. App. 23a (Traxler, J., dissenting), while

the tailings are typically stored at a nearby site. Because

uranium mill tailings contain several substances that are

potentially hazardous to human health, id. at 205a, 210a,

they are subject to extensive federal regulation. EPA is

processing and disposal of uranium mill tailings.

42 U.S.C. 2022(b)(1)-(2); see 40 C.F .R. Pt. 192 (containing

40.4 (defining “[u)nrefined and unprocessed ore” as “ore in its natu-

ral form prior to any processing, such as grinding, roasting or ben-

eficiating, or refining”) (emphases omitted).

6

standards). NRC implements those standards through

regulations and _ site-specific licensing conditions.

42 U.S.C. 2111 (requiring licenses for byproduct materi-

als); 10 C.F.R. 40.1-40.3, 40.20-40.21, 40.26-40.28,

40.31(h), 40.32, 40.51 (regulating tailings “[blyproduct

[mJaterial” as defined in 10 C.F.R. 40.4); 10 C.F.R. Pt.

40 App. A (establishing “criteria relating to the opera-

tion of uranium mills and the disposition of tailings or

wastes” from milling) (capitalization omitted).

3. In 1959, Congress amended the AFA to “clarify

the respective responsibilities * * * of the States and the

|federal government] with respect to the regulation of

byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials.”

42 U.S.C. 2021(a)(1); see Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L.

No. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688. That amendment empowered

NRC to enter agreements that authorize States to li-

cense and regulate the transfer, possession, use, and dis-

posal of nuclear source material, byproduct material,

and/or sub-critical quantities of special nuclear material.

42 U.S.C. 2021(b). NRC approves such an agreement un-

der Sectivun 2021 if the State has developed a regulatory

program that is both “adequate to protect the public

health and safety with respect to the materials within the

State covered by the proposed agreement” and “compat-

ible with [NRC’s] program for the regulation of such ma-

terials.” 42 U.S.C. 2021(d)(1)(2). A State that enters

‘ For example, EPA has specified technical requirements for the

design of surface impoundments that store tailings, 40 C.F.R.

192.32(a)(1); set maximum allowable groundwater concentrations

for specified hazardous substances, 40 C.F.R. 192.32(a)(2); required

the installation of a “permanent radon barrier” around nonopera-

tional impoundments, 40 C.F .R. 192.32(a)(3)(i); and mandated mon-

itoring and analysis of radon levels, 40 C.F.R. 192.32(a)(4).

7

into a Section 2021 agreement may “regulate the materi-

als covered by the agreement for the protection of the

public health and safety from radiation hazards.”

42 U.S.C. 2021(b); S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., ist Sess.

12 (1959) (Senate Report) (stating that, absent such an

agreement, NRC “has exclusive authority to regulate

for protection against radiation hazards”).

Certain responsibilities, including regulation of “the

construction and operation” of nuclear power plants and

uranium-enrichment facilities, are reserved to NRC

and cannot be delegated to a State. 42 U.S.C. 2021(c).

With respect to those responsibilities, Section 2021

gives States an advisory role, allowing them to be heard

by NRC before such activities commence within a State.

42 U.S.C. 2021(D. Section 2021 also contains a savings

clause, which provides that “[njothing in this section

shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or

local agency to regulate activities for purposes other

than protection against radiation hazards.” 42 U.S.C.

2021(k) (emphasis added).

B. The Virginia Law

1. In the late 1970s, the “largest known uranium de-

posit in the United States” was discovered in Pittsylvania

County, Virginia. Pet. App. 5a, 216a. Following that dis-

covery, the Virginia General Assembly directed a commis-

sion to “evaluate the environmental effects of uranium ex-

ploration, mining and milling,” and to identify “any possi-

ble detriments” from those activities to the “health,

safety, and welfare of Virginia citizens.” 1981 Va. Acts

1404 (Pet. App. 169a-170a). In 1982, the General Assem-

bly enacted a law that permitted uranium exploration but

imposed a one-year moratorium on uranium mining. See

1982 Va. Acts 426 (Pet. App. 170a-177a).

8

In 1983, the General Assembly extended the morato-

rium indefinitely. See 1983 Va. Acts 3 (1983 Act) (Pet.

App. 177a-189a). It found that, “while uranium mining

and milling activity can generate substantial benefits, it

also raises a wide range of environmental and other lo-

cal concerns.” Pet. App. 178a. The 1983 Act directed

that “permit applications for uranium mining shall not

be accepted by any agency of the Commonwealth * * *

until a program for permitting uranium mining is estab-

lished by statute.” /d. at 177a-178a (emphasis omitted).

The 1983 Act also created a working group to consider,

inter alia, the costs and benefits of permitting develop-

ment of the Pittsylvania deposit, including considera-

tion of the risk that “radionuclides” generated by “min-

ing, milling and tailings management” could contami-

nate the surrounding water, air, and plant and animal

life. Jd. at 183a-184a.

In 1985, Lhe commission and working group issued

their final report. Pet. App. 219a. The working group

observed that “there was no area where [it] had greater

concern than on the potential effects of radiation which

would be produced by [a] uranium development facility.”

D. Ct. Doe. 48-14, at 15 (Sept. 11, 2015). A majority of

participants recommended lifting the moratorium, but

only if the General Assembly “simultaneously” adopted

certain recommendations “to assure adequate state reg-

ulation of uranium mining and milling.” D. Ct. Doc.

48-17, at 8 (Sept. 11, 2015). Those included the “essen-

tial” recommendation that Virginia become an “agree-

ment state” under Section 2021, with the right to regu-

late milling and tailings storage, id. at 6; cf. 42 U.S.C.

2021, as well as proposed technical limits on radiological

emissions from milling and tailings-storage activities,

9

see D. Ct. Doc. 48-17, at 6-7. Despite those recommen-

dations, the General Assembly neither lifted the mora-

torium nor enacted a “comprehensive mining, milling

and tailing statute.” See D. Ct. Doc. 48-14, at 7.

In 2009, Virginia signed a Section 2021 agreement

with NRC. The Commonwealth thereby acquired reg-

ulatory authority over “[sjource materials,” “[s|pecial

nuclear materials,” and specified categories of “[bly-

product materials” within the Commonwealth, Pet.

App. 300a; see id. at 298a-305a; but the agreement ex-

pressly excluded the regulation of uranium mill tailings,

see id. at 301a (excluding “(t]he regulation of byproduct

material as defined in Section 1 1le.(2) of the [AE A]”); ef.

42 U.S.C. 2014(e)(2) (classifying tailings as byproduct

material).

2. For several decades after the discovery of the

Pittsylvania County uranium deposit, the owners of that

deposit did not pursue efforts to overturn the Common-

wealth’s mining moratorium. In the mic “* 0s, how-

ever, uranium prices rose sharply and the :andowners

lobbied for a repeal of the ban. Pet. App. 222a. The

General Assembly, the Governor, and Commonwealth

agencies commissioned studies addressing the feasibil-

ity, benefits, and risks of potential uranium develop-

ment. See id. at 222a-223a, 227a-228a. In 2013, bills to

lift the moratorium were introduced in the General As-

sembly, but those legislative efforts failed. /d. at 228a-

229a.

C. The Proceedings Below

Petitioners are the current landowners of the

Pittsylvania County uranium deposit. In 2015, petition-

ers brought suit in federal district court, asserting that

the Commonwealth’s moratorium was preempted by

10

the AEA, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

Pet. App. 190a-238a.

1. The district court dismissed petitioners’ com-

plaint for failure to state a claim. Pet. App. 53a-82a.

The court noted petitioners’ allegation that the morato-

rium rested on “radiolog ice! safety concerns” associated

with milling and tailings management. /d. at 68a. The

court concluded, however, that the moratorium was not

preempted because it applied only to mining, and con-

ventional uranium mining is not regulated by NRC. /d.

at 7la-80a. The court recognized that the mining ban

“might obviate one’s decision to mill and manage the

mill tailings” in Virginia, but it suggested that “such a

consequence [wa]s too far attenuated” to result in

preemption. /d. at 80a.

2. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. la-52a.

a. The court of appeals agreed with the district court

that petitioners had failed to state a claim that Vir-

ginia’s moratorium is preempted. Pet. App. 13a-19a.

The court of appeals recognized that “uranium milling

and tailings storage” are “regulated by the NRC,” and

that under Section 2021(k), “[S]tates may therefore not

regulate them except for purposes other than protec-

tion against radiation hazards.” /d. at 13a-l4a. The

court found it dispositive, however, that “the plain lan-

guage of the Commonwealth’s ban does not mention

uranium milling or tailings storage,” and it declined to

“look past the statute’s plain meaning to decipher

whether the legislature was motivated to pass the ban

by a desire to regulate uranium milling or tailings stor-

age.” Jd. at 14a. The court described this Court’s deci-

sion in Pacific Gas, supra, as “warn[ing] against the

‘unsatisfactory venture’ of ‘inquiry into legislative mo-

tive.”” Pet. App. 14a (quoting Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at

11

216). The court of appeals also stated that it would be

pointless to invalidate the statute based on a finding of

improper purpose because the Commonwealth could

simply reenact the law “with a different motive.” /bid.

The court of appeals further held that Virginia’s mor-

atorium was not preempted under conflict-preemption

principles. Pet. App. 18a-19a. The court concluded that

the moratorium would not pose an obstacle to Con-

gress’s objective of encouraging the development and

use of nuclear energy because most uranium used in the

United States’ atomic-energy industry is imported, and

because many uranium-extraction facilities in the

United States—those on federal lands and those that

use “in situ” recovery—are already licensed by NRC

and thus beyond the reach of any state ban. /d. at 19a.

b. Judge Traxler dissented. Pet. App. 20a-52a. He

explained that “established Supreme Court law makes

clear that the AEA preempts state statutes enacted for

the purpose of protecting against the radiological dan-

gers of activities the AEA regulates,” including “ura-

nium milling and tailings management.” /d. at 52a; see

id. at 32a-38a. He further noted that, if the allegations

in petitioners’ complaint were taken as true, the Com-

monweslith had “banned uranium mining only as a

means to prevent milling and tailings management from

occurring in Virginia.” /d. at 27a; see id. at 21a n.1, 40a-

4la. Because “Congress has taken away a state’s ability

to limit mining for th[at] particular reason,” id. at 20a,

Judge Traxler concluded that petitioners had stated a

valid preemption claim.

Judge Traxler further concluded that petitioners

had stated a claim of preemption under conflict-

preemption principles. He explained that a uranium-

mining ban premised on radiological-safety concerns

12

would stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of

Corgress’s objective to permit the private sector to de-

velop nuclear energy “to the maximum extent con-

sistent with the common defense and security and with

the health and safety of the public.” Pet. App. 47a (quot-

ing 42 U.S.C. 2013(d)). He expressed the view that Vir-

ginia had sought to prevent the private sector from de-

veloping nuclear energy because the State did “not

trust|] that the federal government has sufficiently pro-

tected against the radiological dangers of uranium mill-

ing and tailings management.” /d. at 47a-48a.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. Petitioners have alleged that Virginia’s uranium-

mining moratorium is motivated by concern that ura-

nium milling and tailings-management activities may

pose nuclear-safety risks. If that allegation is true, the

moratorium is preempted because Congress has en-

trusted such nuclear-safety regulation exclusively to

the federal government. The courts below therefore

erred in ordering, and upholding, dismissal of petition-

ers’ complaint.

A. The AEA’s text and structure demonstrate Con-

gress’s intent to reserve for the federal government

control over the management of all radiation hazards

stemming from activities licensed under the statute.

The accompanying legislative history and subsequent

agency interpretations confirm the federal government’s

primacy in this field.

B. The AEA’s preemptive effect depends in part on

the purpose of the state law at issue. State laws that are

“grounded in safety concerns” about AE A- ac-

tivities encroach upon the field occupied by the federal

government, even if the State purports to act within an

area of traditional state authority. Pacific Gas & Elec.

13

Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n,

461 U.S. 190, 213 (1983). That purpose-based approach

to field preemption in this sphere is rooted in the text of

Section 2021(k), which preserves the States’ authority

to regulate certain activities “for purposes other than

protection against radiation hazards.” 42 U.S.C.

2021(k).

C. Petitioners have credibly alleged that Virginia

banned uranium mining for the purpose of guarding

against the radiation hazards posed by uranium milling

and tailings management, which are activities regulated

under the AEA. Accordingly, petitioners’ complaint

should not have been dismissed.

Il. If Virginia’s uranium-mining ban rests on a leg-

islative judgment that uranium milling and tailings

management canno’ be conducted safely, it is

preempted for the additional reason that it conflicts

with federal law.

A. In enacting the AEA, Congress sought to ensure

that nuclear technology would be safe enough for wide-

spread development and use. State regulation prem-

ised on a contrary judgment that an aspect of nuclear

development cannot safely be undertaken stands as an

obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Con-

gress’s objectives.

B. The AEA establishes alternative mechanisms

threugh which States can participate in federal regula-

tion of nuclear development. Allowing a State to ad-

dress radiation hazards by banning uranium mining

would conflict with Congress’s decision that States

should utilize other specific methods to participa» in

that regulatory process.

14

ARGUMENT

Because federal law is “the supreme Law of the

Land,” U.S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2, congressional enact-

ments can preempt otherwise permissible state laws.

See, e.g., English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78

(1990). In the absence of express statutory language

that defines the scope of a federal law’s preemptive ef-

fect, state law can be preempted in two ways. /d. at 79.

First, “state law is pre-empted where it regulates con-

duct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Gov-

ernment to occupy exclusively.” /bid. Second, state law

is “pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts

with federal law,” including when “state law ‘stands as

an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the

full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” /bid. (cita-

tion omitted).

Under the AEA, the federal government “has occu-

pied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except

[for] the limited powers expressly ceded to the States.”

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserva-

tion & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983). Lf, as pe-

titioners allege, Virginia banned uranium mining as a

means of addressing the radiological hazards associated

with uranium milling and tailings management, the Vir-

ginia law would fall squarely within the preempted field,

even though the immediate object of the ban (uranium

mining) is outside the NRC’s jurisdiction. A state law

motivated by such concerns would also conflict with Con-

gress’s determination—buttressed by the conclusions of

the expert technical agencies assigned responsibility for

such matters—that uranium milling and tailings manage-

ment can be conducted safely under federal regulation.

15

L THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OCCUPIES THE FIELD OF

NUCLEAR-SAFETY REGULATION, AND IT PREEMPTS

ANY STATE URANIUM-MINING BAN THAT MOTI-

VATED BY CONCERNS ABOUT THE RADIOLOGICAL

SAFETY OF FEDERALLY REGULATED URANIUM MILL-

ING AND TAILINGS MANAGEMENT

A. The Federal Government Has Exclusive Authority To

Regulate Nuclear Safety Except To The Extent That It

Has Delegated That Authority To States

1. Through the AEA, the federal government “occu-

pie|s] the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except

|for] the limited powers expressly ceded to the States.”

Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 212. Congress first regulated

nuclear safety in 1946 by creating a “program for Gov-

ernment control” of nuclear technology that excluded

both the private sector and the States. 1946 Act § 1(b)(4),

60 Stat. 756.

When Congress ended that monopoly in 1954 to per-

mit private development of nuclear energy, it did not re-

linquish federal control over the safety risks related to

nuclear energy production, but instead concluded that

nuclear source materials must continue to “be regulated

in the national interest in order to provide for the com-

mon defense and security and to protect the health and

safety of the public.” 42 U.S.C. 2012(d); see 1954 Act

§ 2(d), 68 Stat. 921. The 1954 Act created a comprehen-

sive regulatory and licensing scheme that vested a fed-

eral agency with responsibility for the radiological safety

of each aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle. See pp. 2-6,

supra. Although States retained their traditional au-

thorities with respect to “the generation, sale, [and]

transmission of electric power,” 42 U.S.C. 2018; see 1954

16

Act § 271, 68 Stat. 960, “no significant role was contem-

plated for the States” regarding “‘national security, pub-

lic health, and safety,’” English, 496 U.S. at 81.

In 1959, by establishing the Section 2021 agreement

program, Congress created a limited path for States to

manage the radiation hazards of activities licensed under

the AEA. 42 U.S.C. 2021(b). Under Section 2021, NRC

may delegate to a State NRC’s regulatory jurisdiction

over the transfer, possession, use, and disposal of nuclear

source material (including uranium ore), byproduct ma-

terial (including tailings), and small quantities of special

nuclear material (such as enriched uranium). /bid.; see

42 U.S.C. 2014(e)(2) and (z). Pursuant to such an agree-

ment, the State may “regulate the materials covered by

the agreement for the protection of the public health and

safety from radiation hazards.” 42 U.S.C. 2021(b).

In establishing that cooperative program and “clar-

ify{ing] the respective responsibilities under [the AEA]

of the States and the [NRC] with respect to the regula-

tion of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials,”

42 U.S.C. 2021(a)(1), Congress provided that nothing in

the Section 2021 program would affect the authority of

States “to regulate activities for purposes other than

protection against radiation hazards.” 42 U.S.C.

2021(k) (emphasis added). The italicized language “un-

derscore[s] the distinction * * * between the spheres

of activity left respectively to the Federal Government

and the States.” Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 210. Under

that division of responsibilities, absent an agreement

between a State and the federal government, “the Fed-

eral Government maintains complete control of the

safety and ‘nuclear’ aspects of energy generation,”

while “the States exercise their traditional authority

over the need for additional generating capacity, the

17

type of generating facilities to be licensed, land use,

ratemaking, and the like.” /d. at 212; see id. at 205.

2. The legislative history of the 1959 AEA amend-

ments confirms Congress’s intent that the federal gov-

ernment would maintain its primacy in the field of nu-

clear safety, even with the introduction of state regula-

tion through Section 2021 agreements. The Joint Com-

mittee on Atomic Energy explained that Section 2021(k)

was “intended to make it clear that the bill does not im-

pair the State authority to regulate activities of AEC

| Atomic Energy Commission] licensees for the manifold

health, safety, and economic purposes other than radia-

tion protection.” Senate Report 12 (emphasis added).

Under that approach, the federal government would re-

tain “exclusive authority to regulate for protection

against radiation hazards until such time as the State en-

ters into an agreement with the Commission to assume

such responsibility.” /bid. That explanation reinforces

the conclusion that Congress intended to maintain fed-

eral control over radiological safety risks, except where

the authority to regulate such risks has been delegated

to a State by agreement. Absent such an agreement,

States would remain free to regulate the activities of

AEC licensees, but not for the purpose of protecting

against radiological safety risks.

3. An interpretation by the AEC, the federal agency

originally charged with regulating nuclear safety under

the AEA, further confirms federal supremacy in the

regulation of radiological safety risks. In 1969, the AEC

issued a regulation setting forth its general counsel’s

understanding of Section 2021(k). The regulation states

that Congress, “in enacting [Section 2021(k)], intended

to preempt to the Federal Government the total respon-

18

sibility and authority for regulating, from the stand-

point of radiological health and safety, the specified nu-

clear facilities and materials.” 34 Fed. Reg. 7273, 7274

(May 3, 1969).° That understanding reinforces the con-

clusion that Congress left no room for States to en-

croach upon the preempted radiological-safety field.

B. State Laws That Are Grounded In Nuclear-Safety

Concerns About AE A-Regulated Activities Are Preempted

This Court has addressed the AEA’s preemptive

reach on several occasions and has determined that the

statute’s preemptive effect depends in part on the pur-

pose of the state law at issue. Under that framework,

state laws that are “grounded in safety concerns” about

AEA-regulated activities like uranium milling and tail-

ings management encroach upon the field occupied by

the federal government and are preempted. Pacific

Gas, 461 U.S. at 213.

1. In Pacific Gas, the Court considered a California

law that banned new construction of nuclear power

plants until a method for permanent disposal of nuclear

waste became available. 461 U.S. at 198. After review-

ing the relevant statutory provisions and legislative his-

tory, the Court concluded that “the Federal Govern-

ment has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety con-

cerns, except [for] the limited powers expressly ceded

to the States.” /d. at 212; see Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee

Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 240-241 (1984) (explaining that the

Court in Pacific Gas had “examined the relationship be-

tween federal and state authority in the nuclear energy

* This rule was codified at 10 C.F.R. 8.4. Although 10 C.F.R. Part

8 was subsequently removed, NRC “continues to adhere to the sub-

stance of the interpretation in § 84.” 77 Fed. Reg. 21,625, 21,627

(Apr. 11, 2012).

19

field” and had “concluded that States are precluded from

regulating the safety aspects of nuclear energy”).

The Court observed that the AEA gives NRC “exclu-

sive jurisdiction to license the transfer, delivery, receipt,

acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear materials,”

Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 207, and permits state regulation

of such materials only if authorized by agreement, id. at

208-209. The court also explained that the AE.A’s preser-

vation of state authority to “regulate activities for pur-

poses other than protection against radiation hazards,”

42 U.S.C. 2021(k), “underscored the distinction” drawn

by Congress “between the spheres of activity left respec-

tively to the Federal Government and the States.” 461

U.S. at 210. Under that division of responsibility, the

federal government “regulate[s] the radiological safety

aspects involved” in AEA-regulated activities—there,

the “construction and operation of a nuclear plant”—

while the States retain their “traditional responsibility”

to “determinje] questions of need, reliability, cost, and

other related state concerns” not involving radiological

safety. Jd. at 205.

The Pacific Gas Court observed that California had

not sought to regulate the manner in which a nuclear

power plant should be constructed or operated, which

would conflict with N RC’s exclusive regulatory authority

over plant construction and operation and would thus be

preempted whether the State had acted out of concern

for radiological-safety hazards or for some other reason.

461 U.S. at 212; see 42 U.S.C. 2021(c)(1). Rather, Cali-

fornia had sought to regulate the antecedent question

whether a plant should be constructed, not how it should

be constructed. 461 U.S. at 212. California had argued

that, “although safety regulation of nuclear plants by

20

States is forbidden,” the State could exercise its tradi-

tional authority over generation to ban new construction

of power plants “until [the State’s] safety concerns are

satisfied.” /bid.; see 42 U.S.C. 2018 (preserving States’

authority to regulate “with respect to the generation,

sale, or transmission of electric power produced through

the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the [NRC]”).

This Court “rejectjed] thjat] line of reasoning.” Pa-

cific Gas, 461 U.S. at 212. The Court explained that, be-

cause the federal government had “occupied the entire

field of nuclear safety concerns,” “[a] state moratorium

on nuclear construction grounded in safety concerns

| would] fall[] squarely within the prohibited field.” Jd. at

212-213. The Court found that California’s moratorium

on construction of new power plants survived preemp-

tion only because the State had explained—

with reference to legislative reports prepared during the

passage of the moratorium—that the purpose of its leg-

islation was to address “economic problems, not radia-

tion hazards.” Jd. at 213; see id. at 213-216. In reaching

that conclusion, however, the Court made clear that, by

giving NRC exclusive responsibility to address nuclear-

safety risks, Congress had preempted States from regu-

lating to protect against radiation hazards, even when a

State purports to act within the scope of its traditional

authority. Jd. at 212.

2. In its subsequent decision in English, supra, the

Court explained that the AEA establishes two related

forms of field preemption. 496 U.S. at 84. Observing

that Pacific Gas had “defined the pre-empted field, in

part, by reference to the motivation behind the state

law,” the Court reaffirmed that a state law “motivated

by safety concerns” about AE A-reguiated activities is

preempted. /bid. The Court noted that this purpose-

21

based “approach to defining the field” finds support in

the text of Section 2021(k), which recognizes continued

state authority “to regulate activities for purposes other

than protection against radiation hazards.” /bid. (quot-

ing 42 U.S.C. 2021(k)).

The Court in English further defined the preempted

field to include state regulations that are “‘enacted out

of nonsafety concerns’” but have a sufficiently “direct

and substantial effect” on NRC licensees’ decisions

“concerning radiological safety levels.” 496 U.S. at 84-

85 (quoting Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 212). Thus, “even

as *** part of the pre-empted field is defined by ref-

erence to the purpose of the state law in question,” an-

other part “is defined by the state law’s actual effect on

nuclear safety.” Jd. at 84 (recognizing that “a finding of

safety motivation” was sufficient, but not necessary, to

“place a state law within the pre-empted field”). The

Court in English thus reaffirmed that state law is

preempted if it is grounded in concerns about the radia-

tion hazards of activities and materials that are regu-

lated under the AEA—a field occupied by the federal

government. /d. at 84-85.

* The Court in English held that the state-law claim at issue, a

tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress brought by

an employee of a nuclear-fuels production facility, was not pre-

empted under either of those rationales. The Court concluded that

the relevant state law was not “motivated by safety concerns,” and

that the effect of imposing tort liability for intentional infliction of

emotional! distress would be neither “direct nor substantial enough”

to cause employers to alter radiological-safety protocols. 496 U.S.

at 84-85.

22

C. Because Petitioners Have Credibly Alleged That

Virginia’s Uranium-Mining Ban Was Motivated By

Nuclear-Safety Concerns About Federally Regulated

Milling And Tailings Management, Their Complaint

Should Not Have Been Dismissed

Respondents conceded below that, for purposes of

their motion to dismiss petitioners’ complaint, Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “required [respondents |

to accept as true that Virginia enacted the [uranium-

mining] moratorium based on radiological safety con-

cerns.” J.A. 216. The court of appeals therefore erred

in affirming the district court’s dismissal of petitioners’

complaint. Because petitioners have credibly alleged

that the ban is grounded in radiological-safety concerns

about uranium milling and tailings management, which

are within the federal government’s regulatory jurisdic-

tion, and because regulation of those activities for

radiological-safety purposes has not been delegated to

Virginia in a Section 2021 agreement, petitioners’ com-

plaint states a claim that the ban is preempted. That is

so despite the fact that conventional uranium mining it-

self is not regulated by NRC.

1. Petitioners have adequately alleged that Vir-

ginia’s moratorium falls within the preempted “field of

nuclear safety concerns.” English, 496 U.S. at 82 (cita-

tion omitted). Petitioners contend that the Common-

wealth has banned uranium mining not because of con-

cerns about mining per se, but because of fears about

radiological hazards associated with the next steps of

the uranium-development process, which NRC regu-

lates under the AEA. Petitioners have alleged that the

“true design” of the moratorium is “to act as an absolute

bar on the construction of a tailings management facil-

23

ity,” which Virginia legislators feared would lead to ra-

dioactive contamination of the Commonwealth’s

groundwater and environment. Pet. App. 232a.

If petitioners’ allegations are correct, Virginia’s mor-

atorium is preempted. The radiological safety of milling

and tailings management is subject to exclusive federal

oversight, except to the extent that regulatory author-

ity is expressly delegated to States by agreement. Just

as “[a] state moratorium on nuclear construction * * *

falls squarely within the prohibited field” if it is

“grounded in safety concerns” about the operation of

NRC-licensed nuclear power plants, Pacific Gas, 461

U.S. at 213, a State’s moratorium on uranium mining is

preempted if that moratorium is grounded in safety

concerns about the operation of NRC-licensed milling

and tailings-management facilities.

By entering into a Section 2021 agreement with

NRC, Virginia has acquired regulatory authority over

“(sjource materials,” “(|s|pecial nuclear materials,” and

specified categories of “[blyproduct materials” within

the Commonwealth. Pet. App. 300a; see id. at 298a-

305a. That agreement, however, expressly excludes au-

thority to regulate uranium mill tailings. See id. at 301la

(excluding “[t]he regulation of byproduct material as

defined in Section 11e.(2) of the [AE AJ”); ef. 42 U.S.C.

2014(e)(2) (defining “byproduct material” to include

tailings). Within Virginia, the “field of nuclear safety

concerns” related to tailings management from the pro-

cess of uranium milling therefore remains within the

regulatory jurisdiction of the federal government. E'ng-

lish, 496 U.S. at 82 (citation omitted). If the Common-

wealth’s uranium-mining ban was motivated by such

concerns, it is preempted because it encroaches on that

federally regulated field.

24

2. In holding that Virginia’s moratorium was not

preempted, the court of appeals construed Section

2021(k) to prohibit States from directly regulating, for

purposes of protecting against radiological hazards,

only “activities” that are regulated under the AEA. Pet.

App. lla. Emphasizing that the moratorium “does not

mention uranium milling or tailings storage,” id. at 14a,

the court concluded that the ban is not preempted be-

cause the activity it directly regulates—conventional

uranium mining—is not regulated under the AEA, id.

at lla. The court “decline[d]” to “look past the statute’s

plain meaning to decipher whether the legislature was

motivated” by an impermissible radiological-safety con-

sideration. Jd. at 14a. The court understood the AEA

to preempt state law only when “a state purports to reg-

ulate an activity that is also regulated by the [AE A]”

and the State lacks a “‘non-safety rationale’ for the

state rule.” /d. at 9a (citation omitted). That approach

was misconceived.

a. A State’s purposeful effort to address the radio-

logical hazards that it associates with AE A-regulated

activities is preempted even if the State attempts to

regulate those hazards indirectly, by prohibiting neces-

sary antecedent activities that fall outside direct federal

control. The court of appeals’ contrary understanding

is irreconcilable with Pacific Gas. As explained above

(pp. 19-20, supra), California acknowledged in that case

that it could not enact safety regulations for the con-

struction or operation of power plants because NRC ex-

ercises authority over plant construction and operation.

461 U.S. at 212; see 42 U.S.C. 2021(c)(1). The State in-

stead contended that it could exercise its authority over

generation to ban new construction of power plants alto-

gether “until [the State’s] safety concerns are satisfied.”

25

461 U.S. at 212; see 42 U.S.C. 2018. This Court rejected

that argument, explaining that “[a] state moratorium on

nuclear construction grounded in safety concerns

[would] fall{] squarely within” the federally occupied nu-

clear-safety field, even if the State had purported to act

within the scope of its traditional authority. 461 U.S. at

212-213 (emphasis added).

The court of appeals in this case described the Cali-

fornia law at issue in Pacific Gas as involving an activity

“clearly committed to the NRC’s regulatory authority.”

Pet. App. 10a n.2 (citation omitted). As the foregoing

discussion demonstrates, that is incorrect. Pacific Gas

involved two California laws: Section 25524.1(b), which

required case-by-case approval of a proposed nuclear

power plant’s capacity to store spent nuclear fuel rods,

and Section 25524.2 (Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 25524.1(b),

25524.2 (West 1977)), which banned all new nuclear

power plants until a permanent nuclear-waste disposal

solution was developed. 461 U.S. at 197-198.

The court of appeals suggested that the Court in Pa-

cific Gas had analyzed the first provision, which the

court described as regulating an activity—power-plant

construction—that was committed to NRC’s regulatory

authority. Pet. App. 9a-10a & n.2. That understanding

appears to underlie the court’s determination that pur-

pose-based preemption analysis is appropriate only

when “a state purports to regulate an activity that is

also regulated by the [AEA].” /d. at 9a. In fact, how-

ever, the Court in Pacific Gas analyzed only the second

provision (discussed above) because it determined that

the first was not ripe for review. 461 U.S. at 203. After

concluding that the second provision (barring construc-

tion of nuclear power plants) did not directly regulate a

subject committed to NRC’s regulatory authority, the

26

Court looked to the purpose of the law to determine

whether it encroached on the federal field of nuclear

safety. Jd. at 212-213. Contrary to the court of appeals’

belief, the Court in Pacific Gas thus did not limit pur-

pose-based preemption analysis to direct state regula-

tion of AEA-regulated activities. See id. at 213 (finding

it “necessary to determine whether there [wa]s a non-

safety rationale” for California’s ban on plant construc-

tion); English, 496 U.S. at 84 (reaffirming that “part of

the pre-empted field is defined by reference to the pur-

pose of the state law in question”); 42 U.S.C. 2021(k).

b. The court of appeals also cited other language in

which the Pacific Gas Court had commented on the dif-

ficulty of ascertaining “legislative motive.” Pet. App. 14a

(quoting Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 216). The Pacific Gas

Court made those observations, however, only after stat-

ing that it was “necessary to determine whether there

[wa]s a nonsafety rationale for” the challenged California

law, 461 U.S. at 213; that California had asserted an eco-

nomic, non-safety-related rationale for that law, ibid;

and that the court of appeals in that case had found the

law to be “directed towards purposes other than protec-

tion against radiation hazards,” id. at 214 (citation omit-

ted). Here, by contrast, the Fourth Circuit simply “de-

cline[d] to examine why the Commonwealth chose to ban

uranium mining,” Pet. App. 15a, thus treating as irrele-

vant petitioners’ allegation that Virginia’s mining mora-

torium is intended to address radiological-safety hazards

associated with milling and tailings-management activi-

ties. That was error. Given the relevance of legislative

purpose to the AEA preemption inquiry, and petitioners’

credible allegations that Virginia has banned uranium

mining to address concerns about the radiological-safety

aspects of milling and tailings management, petitioners’

27

complaint states a valid preemption claim and should not

have been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).’

3. Under the approach taken by the court below, a

State could effectively subvert federal regulatory judg-

ments in the field of nuclear safety simply by choosing,

as the immediate object of state regulation, an anteced-

ent activity that is not itself subject to federal regula-

tion under the AEA. That approach would provide an

easy roadmap for evasion of Congress’s judgments re-

garding the States’ carefully defined and limited role in

this sphere.

a. In Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Niel-

son, 376 F.3d 1223 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1060

(2005) (Skull Valley), the Tenth Circuit considered a se-

ries of Utah laws motivated by concerns about the stor-

age and transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF).

Although some of the challenged laws facially regulated

SNF, others did not. One provision converted to state

control a county road that led to a proposed SNF stor-

age site. Jd. at 1251-1252. Another provision restricted

counties’ ability to provide “law enforcement, fire pro-

tection, waste and garbage collection” to SNF storage

facilities. Jd. at 1247. A third provision abolished lim-

ited liability for stockholders in companies operating

SNF facilities. Jd. at 1250-1251.

’ Because petitioners’ complaint was disposed of at the motion-to-

dismiss stage, and the Fourth Circuit took as true petitioners’ alle-

gation that Virginia’s moratorium was grounded in radiological-

safety concerns about uranium milling and tailings management,

this Court need not address what evidence would be necessary or

sufficient to prove those allegations on remand. Rather, the Court

need only decide whether these allegations, if proved, would provide

a sound basis for holding that the Virginia moratorium is pre-

empted.

28

Although the AEA does not regulate state roads, mu-

nicipal services, or shareholder-liability rules, the

Tenth Circuit applied the preemption test set forth in

Pacific Gas and concluded that “a state cannot use its

authority to regulate” such matters “as a means of reg-

ulating radiological hazards” associated with NRC-

licensed activities. Skull Valley, 376 F.3d at 1248. The

court ultimately found each provision preempted, based

on evidence that the State had enacted them to discour-

age the transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel

“for reasons of radiological safety.” Jd. at 1252; see id.

at 1245-1248, 1250-1253. The Tenth Circuit thus cor-

rectly ensured that Utah could not effectively preclude,

based on nuclear-safety concerns, AE A-regulated trans-

portation and storage activities that the State lacked

power to regulate directly.

In this case, the court below attempted to distinguish

Skull Valley by noting that “all but two of the chal-

lenged Utah laws specifically mentioned this NRC-

regulated activity [ce., storage of SNF],” and that the

remaining two provisions “wiere] packaged with two

other transportation regulations targeting [SNF] dir-

ectly.” Pet. App. 16a. But if that distinction is treated

as controlling, a State can effectively prevent federally

regulated conduct that it views as causing nuclear-

safety hazards, by proscribing necessary precursors to

that conduct, so long as it is careful to forgo any express

statutory reference to nuclear-safety concerns or feder-

ally regulated activities. The Fourth Circuit’s approach

would provide an easy means for States to subvert Con-

gress’s determinations regarding the appropriate allo-

cation of power between federal and state governments.

b. This Court has recognized in other contexts that

a State cannot escape preemption simply by regulating

29

a stage of the production process or stream of com-

merce that lies outside the area of direct federal regu-

lation. In National Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452

(2012), the Court considered a California law that pro-

hibited slaughterhouses from selling meat products of

nonambulatory animals. /d. at 459. California argued

that its law was not preempted by the Federal Meat In-

spection Act, 21 U.S.C. 601 et seq., which provides that

States may not impose requirements on slaughterhouse

operations that exceed or differ from federal require-

ments, 565 U.S. at 457, because the challenged state law

focused not on slaughterhouse operations but rather on

commercial sales, which are traditionally subject to

state regulation. /d. at 463-464. The Court rejected

that argument and found the state regulation pre-

empted. The Court explained that, although the state

law nominally regulated sales, its inevitable effect was

to require slaughterhouses to structure their operations

in a different way. /d. at 464.

Likewise in Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. South

Coast Air Quality Management District, 541 U.S. 246

(2004), the Court considered a set of local rules that

barred public and private fleet operators from buying

vehicles that did not comply with the city’s emission re-

quirements. /d. at 249. The Court found the local rules

preempted by a federal law that prohibited any state or

local “standard|[s] relating to the control of emissions

from new motor vehicles.” /d. at 251. The Court ex-

plained that, although the local rules did not compel

manufacturers of new motor vehicles to meet any new

emissions limits, the manufacturer’s federally protected

right to sell vehicles would be “meaningless in the ab-

sence of a purchaser’s right to buy them.” J/d. at 255;

see American Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles,

30

569 U.S. 641, 652 (2013) (“We have often rejected efforts

by States to avoid preemption by shifting their regula-

tory focus from one company to another in the same

supply chain.”); Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor

Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 371-373 (2008) (finding

preemption even though the State’s regulation “tjold]

shippers what to choose rather than carriers what to do”).

So too here, where Congress has excluded States

from the management of nuclear-safety hazards, Vir-

ginia cannot escape preemption simply by precluding a

necessary antecedent activity (uranium mining) instead

of acting on the nuclear fuel cycle itself. If petitioners

can show that Virginia has banned uranium mining in

order to prevent radiation hazards posed by uranium

milling and tailings management, then Virginia has en-

croached on a field reserved for the federal government

and the state law is preempted.

IL. IF VIRGINIA’S URANIUM-MINING BAN WAS MOTIVATED

BY RADIOLOGICAL-SAFETY CONCERNS, IT IS BARRED

BY CONFLICT-PREEMPTION PRINCIPLES BECAUSE

IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE JUDGMENT OF

FEDERAL AUTHORITIES THAT URANIUM MILLING

AND TAILINGS MANAGEMENT CAN BE SAFELY

CONDUCTED IF PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH

FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS

A state law that bans uranium mining based on

radiological-safety concerns about milling and tailings

management also runs afoul of conflict- preemption

principles. Under the AEA, one of Congress’s primary

objectives is to ensure that nuclear technology is

safe enough for widespread development and use.

Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 213. A state law that aims to

protect against radiation hazards by preventing nuclear

development—as Virginia’s ban is alleged to have done

31

here—would “stand|] as an obstacle to the accomplish-

ment and execution” of that objective. English, 496

U.S. at 79 (citation omitted).

A. This Court recognized in Pacific Gas that “[a]

state prohibition on nuclear construction for safety rea-

sons” would “be in the teeth of the [AEA|’s objective to

insure that nuclear technology be safe enough for wide-

spread development and use—and would be pre-empted

for that [additional] reason.” 461 U.S. at 213. Such a

state prohibition would subvert the federal govern-

ment’s implementation of the AEA because “a state

judgment that nuclear power is not safe enough to be

further developed would conflict directly with the coun-

tervailing judgment of the NRC.” Jbid.

In eliminating the federal monopoly over nuclear

technology, Congress sought to encourage private par-

ties to develop and use nuclear energy, consistent with

public health and safety. 42 U.S.C. 2013(d). Here, Vir-

ginia has allegedly “interfere[d] with the objective of

the federal regulation” by deciding for itself that milling

and tailings management cannot be safely undertaken,

Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 219, thus “unilaterally * * *

prevent{ing] the involvement of the very private-sector

forces that the [AEA] was designed to unleash.” Pet.

App. 47a-48a (emphasis omitted) (Traxler, J., dissent-

ing). Congress committed those safety considerations

to the federal government’s oversight. If petitioners’

allegations are true, Virginia’s moratorium has “cir-

cumvented the AEFA’s requirements and frustrated its

objectives” by intentionally “preventjing] the occur-

rence of” activities that Congress intended the federal

government to regulate, for reasons committed to the

federal government’s jurisdiction. /d. at 21a, 52a.

32

To be sure, “Congress did not intend that nuclear

power be developed ‘at all costs,’” and it generally left

States free to address concerns other than radiological

safety. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 200; see id. at 222-223.

be undertaken safely under federal regulations. /d. at

213. A moratorium intended to render such activities in-

feasible, based on a State’s disagreement with that fed-

eral safety judgment, “stands as an obstacle” to the ful-

fillment of Congress’s objectives. English, 496 U.S. at 79

(citation omitted).

B. A state law that bans uranium mining in order to

prevent radiological hazards purportedly associated

with downstream AEA-regulated activities also cua-

fliects with Congress’s chosen system for state participa-

tion in the regulatory field of nuclear-safety concerns.

Under the AEA, any State that is concerned about ra-

diological hazards from uranium milling and tailings

management may seek N RC’s authorization to regulate

uranium mill tailings. See pp. 6-7, supra; 42 U.S.C.

2021. If granted that authority, a State may even im-

pose radiological-safety standards that are “more strin-

gent than” those adopted and enforced by NRC.

42 U.S.C. 2021(0)(2). NRC continues to regulate these

activities in the national interest, however, and “{i}f the

NRC determines that a State has a program that dis-

rupts the orderly pattern of regulation among the col-

lective regulatory efforts of the NRC and other Agree-

ment States, i.e., creates conflicts, gaps, or duplication

in regulation, the program would be found not compati-

ble.” 62 Fed. Reg. 46,517, 46,521 (Sept. 3, 1997).

Congress has separately permitted States to address

certain low-level radiation hazards. 42 U.S.C. 2023(a).

33

Thus, States may directly regulate “on the basis of radi-

ological hazard” the disposal or off-site incineration of

low-level radioactive waste, “if the [NRC] * * * exempts

such waste from regulation.” J/bid.; see 42 U.S.C.

202 1b(9)(A)(i) (excluding uranium mill tailings from the

definition of “low-level radioactive waste”). States con-

cerned about the safety of AEA-regulated activities

may also participate in NRC licensing and rulemaking

proceedings and may seek judicial review of NRC’s de-

terminations if they are aggrieved. See Entergy Nu-

clear Vermont Yankee, LLC v Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393

(2d Cir. 2013); Skull Valley, 376 F.3d at 1254. And even

with respect to the construction and operation of nu-

clear power plants, where Congress has prohibited the

federal government from delegating regulatory author-

ity to a State, see 42 U.S.C. 2021(c), NRC must notify a

State of any license application filed with NRC and

eee ee ee ee

press its view concerning whether the application

should be granted. 42 U.S.C. 2021(D.

Congress has thus established very specific mecha-

nisms for state involvement in addressing radiological-

safety hazards. Pursuant to one such statutory method,

Virginia has entered into a Section 2021 agreement with

NRC, but the Commonwealth declined to seek author-

ity to regulate the radiological-safety aspects of urani-

um mill tailings. See pp. 9, 23, supra. Petitioners allege

that the Commonwealth has attempted to address the

same concerns through the alternative means of ban-

ning uranium mining. If that was in fact the Common-

wealth’s motivation, Virginia has impermissibly second-

guessed the federal government’s judgment that ura-

nium milling and tailings management are safe enough

34

to proceed under federal standards. See Gade v. Na-

tional Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98-101

(1992) (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (holding that federal

law preempted an Illinois attempt to enforce training

standards for hazardous-waste workers that were

stricter than federal standards without using the man-

dated process of an approved state plan). That conflict

with the judgment of federal regulatory authorities, and

ena nage pr ar ag gem =

the sphere of nuclear safety, provides an additional

ground for concluding that petitioners’ complaint states

a claim of federal preemption.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

reversed, and the case should be remanded for further

proceedings.

Respectfully submitted.

NOEL J. FRANCISCO

Solicitor G.

JEFFREY H. Woop

General

ANDREW P. AVERBACH MALCOLM L. STEWART

Solicit Deputy Solicitor G. |

CHARLES E. MULLINS ANN O'CONNELL

JEREMY M. SUTTENBERG Assistant to the Solicitor

Attorneys General

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory VARU CHILAKAMARRI

Commission Attorney

JULY 2018

No. 16-1275

3n the

Supreme Court of the United States

VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

JOHN WARREN, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE CHAMBER

OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

STEVEN P. LEHOTSKY ERIN E. MURPHY

MICHAEL B. SCHON Counsel of Record

U.S. CHAMBER ANDREW C. LAWRENCE

LITIGATION CENTER KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP

1615 H Street, NW 655 Fifteenth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20062 Washington, DC 20005

(202) 879-5000

erin.murphy@kirkland.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

July 26, 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ..............:0ssssssssssessesossessees i

STATEMENT OF INTEREST .....................0cceceeeeeeeees 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT? 00000000... ccceceeeeeneennes 2

NT 5

I. Congress Has Made The Eminently Sensible

Judgment That The Federal Government Is

Best Positioned To Regulate The Complex

Field Of Nuclear Safety Concerns. ..................... 5

Il. The Decision Below Is Impossible To

Reconcile With This Court’s Atomic Energy

Ill. The Decision Below Provides A Roadmap For

State And Local Governments To Evade The

Preemptive Force Of Federal Law.................... 12

eI cxsusencssmacnstnscasuniiinntiunséisensenntiesincenminis 17

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,

a ee 12

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,

Ca si irri ermrisinasamaenonndinin 12

Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good,

EN Ce ane 2

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,

icin cicdscniciamdscindatinndnsnernnnreconens 1,14

Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC,

EE ay Ce an ED 1

Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils,

gg ES 1

Engine Mfr. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality

Mgemt. Dist.,

Bs esslinccinmihrmeteniannipsnain 15

English v. Gen. Elec. Co.,

| Se ae passim

Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,

GEER ae 13

Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,

asi ead camnrincianianilts 1

Haywood v. Drown,

ES none meee 4,16

Howlett v. Rose,

a 12,17

Kindred Nursing Ctrs. L.P. v. Clark,

gf EL EA oe Severs 1,13

ili

N. Nat. Gas Co.

v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan.,

SE 14

Natl Meat Ass'n v. Harris,

ces cosecnomenenesneine 1, 14, 15

Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg,

8 1

Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.,

EE eee 14

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.

Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,

OR passim

Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust,

ls I cccacrladieasummbennidondenineeszsesndennes 1

Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,

| a 2

Schneidewind v. ANR Pip'tine Co.,

a. sreeetbacneugannnnonts 14

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,

| ea 2,5,6,9

Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.

v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

ee ic eareinincinncednisabeasenepannenionten 2

Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc.,

RT ES cS 1

Wyeth v. Levine,

I i a crn eneeennenainminentia 2

Statutes and Regulation

Nin siciceranitiiimmnanddaneemiepentiionts 7

Saas I ceceicsesccsccccevessnsecsscsoscnenssscncsenseene 10

iv

ON

Re

ili racccnniancetgenstinnsinnnibiiensiend

GEE aCe een ree

Other Authorities

Energy Futures Initiative, Inc., The U.S.

Nuclear Energy Enterprise: A Key National

Security Enabler (Aug. 2017),

https//bit.ly/2LoCEEP.................0ssssseeeseeseeeeees

Expand Nuclear Energy Use and Commit to

a Nuclear Waste Solution, U.S. Chamber

of Commerce Inst. for 21st Century

Energy, http://bit.ly/InyGPOlI

(last visited July 24, 2018) ...................000..00000

Int’] Atomic Energy Agency,

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

https://bit.ly/2u0ofDq

(last visited July 24, 2018) ...........ccccccceeceeeeeees

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Backgrounder on National Security,

https://bit.ly/2mG6Lde

(last visited July 24, 2018) .............2.....02..:00000

STATEMENT OF INTEREST:

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States

of America is the world’s largest business federation.

It represents 300,000 direct members and indirectly

represents the interests of more than 3 million

companies and professional organizations of every

size, in every economic sector, and from every region

of the country.

An important function of the Chamber is to

represent the interests of its members in matters

before the courts, Congress, and the Executive

Branch. To that end, the Chamber regularly files

amicus curiae briefs in cases that raise issues of

concern to the Nation’s business community. The

Chamber has participated as amicus curiae in nearly

every significant federal preemption case decided by

this Court over the past decade. See, e.g., Kindred

Nursing Ctrs. L.P. v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017);

Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 137 8. Ct.

1190 (2017); Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free

Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016); Gobeille v. Liberty Mut.

Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016); Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg,

134 S. Ct. 1422 (2014); Natl Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 565

U.S. 452, 455 (2012); AT&T Mobility LLC ov.

Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Williamson v. Mazda

Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323 (2011); Bruesewitz v.

Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine, 555

' No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in

part, and no entity or person, aside from amicus curiae, its

members, and its counsel, made any monetary contribution

toward the preparation or submission of this brief. Counsel of

record for all parties have consented to this filing in letters on file

with the Clerk’s office.

2

U.S. 555 (2009); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70

(2008); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).

The Chamber and its members have a strong

interest in this case, as the decision below poses a

threat both to the Nation’s nuclear energy industry

and to preemption doctrine as a whole.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Atomic Energy Act assigns the federal

government “broad regulatory authority over the

development of nuclear energy.” Vi. Yankee Nuclear

Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.

519, 525-26 (1978). Indeed, this Court concluded more

than 30 years ago that the federal government has

“occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns,”

and that the Atomic Energy Act accordingly preempts

any state law “grounded in safety concerns” arising

from the production of nuclear energy. Pac. Gas &

Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.

Comm'n (“PG&E’), 461 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1983). In

the decades since, the Court has reaffirmed that

conclusion, reiterating that state laws “motivated by

safety concerns” stemming from nuclear-related

activities fall squarely within the field reserved to the

federal government. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496

U.S. 72, 84 (1990); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464

U.S. 238, 249 (1984).

Congress’ decision to reserve the safety-related

regulation of nuclear power development to the

federal government makes eminent sense, as that is a

field that the federal government is uniquely well

suited to regulate. Because nuclear technology began

as an exclusively federal enterprise, the states do not

have any traditional experience, let alone expertise,

3

with determining how to manage the safety risks that

the development of nuclear energy may pose.

Moreover, in large part because this is an area with

which they may be unfamiliar, states have an

unfortunate tendency to succumb to local “not in my

backyard” complaints about the perceived (unfounded

as they may be) safety risks of in-state nuclear power

development. Such local impediments to the

development of nuclear power pose a risk not just to

the Nation’s energy grid and the economy it supports,

but to the national security and defense interests that

domestic development of nuclear power advances. In

short, the development of nuclear energy is a matter

of both abiding federal expertise and abiding federal

interest.

The decision below poses a grave threat to the

safety-regulation role that Congress has reserved to

the federal government. This Court has held time and

again that the preemption inquiry in this context

turns not just on what a state seeks to regulate, but

why. That should have made this an easy case, as

Virginia has banned mining of the Nation’s single

largest uranium deposit not for economic or other non-

preempted reasons, but simply because Virginia

determined that uranium production is not safe

enough. Indeed, at least at this motion-to-dismiss

stage, the state does not dispute that it banned

uranium mining at the Coles Hill deposit as a

prophylactic safety measure to prevent radiation

exposure allegedly associated with uranium milling

and tailings management—activities that everyone

agrees may be regulated only by the federal

government. But that is not a judgment for Virginia

to make, as any state law “grounded in [radiological]

4

safety concerns falls squarely within the prohibited

field” occupied by the federal government. PG&E, 461

U.S. at 213.

In concluding otherwise, the Fourth Circuit not

only ran afoul of the Atomic Energy Act and this

Court’s decisions interpreting it, but created a

roadmap for evading the preemptive force of federal

law. According to the Fourth Circuit, even assuming

Virginia’s mining ban rests on precisely the kind of

safety judgment forbidden to the states, it is not

preempted because the ban does not say on its face

that the state has prohibited uranium mining to

prevent purportedly unsafe milling and tailings

management from occurring at Coles Hill. In other

words, according to the Fourth Circuit, a state may

escape the preemptive force of federal law through the

simple expedient of declining to make explicit in its

laws its preempted motivations. The decision below

thus creates a loophole not just in the Atomic Energy

Act, but in all manner of federal statutes and

regulations, as it effectively invites states to use labels

and form to try to circumvent federal law.

That result cannot be reconciled with the long line

of decisions from this Court reiterating that the

“Supremacy Clause cannot be evaded by formalism.”

Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 742 (2009). Simply

put, when a state admittedly regulates for the specific

purpose of countermanding federal judgments in an

exclusive federal field, its actions are preempted no

matter what label or form it may use. By concluding

otherwise, the decision below threatens to disrupt not

just the Atomic Energy Act and the critical industry of

5

nuclear power generation, but preemption doctrine as

a whole.

ARGUMENT

I. Congress Has Made The Eminently Sensible

Judgment That The Federal Government Is

Best Positioned To Regulate The Complex

Field Of Nuclear Safety Concerns.

Nuclear energy is unusual among energy sources

in that it began as an exclusively federal enterprise.

At the dawn of the atomic age 75 years ago, the federal

government maintained a “federal monopoly” on “the

use, control, and ownership of all nuclear technology.”

English, 496 U.S. at 80. When Congress passed the

Atomic Energy Act in 1954, it “relaxed” that federal

monopoly, “determin[ing] that the national interest

would be best served if the Government encouraged

the private sector to become involved in the

development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes

under a program of federal regulation and licensing.”

PG&E, 461 U.S. at 194, 207. And with that relaxation

came the introduction of a regulatory role for the

states in “determining questions of need, reliability,

cost and other related state concerns.” Id. at 205. But

while Congress left states free to “exercise their

traditional authority” in these areas, id. at 212,

Congress jealously guarded for the federal

government “extensive control over the manner in

which thie] development [of nuclear energy] occur|s},”

Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 249. In doing so, Congress

reserved to the federal government exclusive

authority to “regulate [nuclear] activities for

purposes” of “protection against radiation hazards.”

42 U.S.C. §2021(k).

6

That division of authority makes eminent sense.

“Congress’ decision to prohibit the states from

regulating the safety aspects of nuclear development

was premised on its belief that the [federal

government] was more qualified to determine what

type of safety standards should be enacted in this

complex area.” Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 250. And

understandably so, as the federal government's

historical monopoly over nuclear technology left states

without the experience or expertise to regulate the

process of developing nuclear power. To be sure,

states may be better positioned to make non-safety-

related judgments about which mix of power, and in

what locations, best serves local economic and other

interests. But states simply did not have—and in

most instances still do not have—the extensive

experience the federal government has acquired in

“determin|[ing] what type of safety standards” are

most appropriate “in this complex area.” /d.

That federal expertise, moreover, has only grown

over time. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(“NRC”) has been acclaimed for its “high technical

competence,” which “cover|s] a wide range of technical

areas.” Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, US Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, https://bit.ly/2u00fDq (last

visited July 24, 2018); see also U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Backgrounder on National

Security, https://bit.ly/2mG6Lde (last visited July 24,

2018) (NRC-regulated nuclear facilities are

considered among the most secure of the nation’s

critical infrastructure.”). And the federal government

has developed considerable experience with nuclear

technology through the military—experience that

states simply are not in a position to develop. It is thus

7

little surprise that Congress reserved to the federal

government “the entire field of nuclear safety

concerns,” PG&E, 461 U.S. at 212-13; this is an area

that the federal government is simply better suited to

regulate.

Of course, nuclear power is also an area in which

the federal government has a uniquely strong interest,

as nuclear energy is indispensable to our national

security. That much is clear from the text of the

Atomic Energy Act itself, which repeatedly

emphasizes that one of its core purposes is to promote

“the common defense and security.” 42 U.S.C.

§2013(c)-(e). In the decades since Congress passed the

Atomic Energy Act, the importance of nuclear power

to national security and defense has only grown. See,

e.g., Energy Futures Initiative, Inc., The U.S. Nuclear

Energy Enterprise: A Key National Security Enabler

15 (Aug. 2017), https://bit.ly/2LoCEEP (“A vibrant

domestic nuclear energy industry, including a healthy

supply chain ..., is essential for the achievement of

U.S. national security objectives.”). To take just two

examples, “[ujJranium is the predominant source of

fuel for ... fissile material for nuclear warheads,”

Pet.App.4a, and “the U.S. Navy’s nuclear-powered

submarines and aircraft carriers are fueled with

{highly enriched uranium] and rely upon its

availability,” Pet. App.348a.

Nuclear energy is also critical to the national

economy. Reactors fueled by uranium are responsible

for fully 20% of the electricity produced in this

country, Pet.App.202a, and nuclear energy offers

many benefits that confirm its value to a diversified

energy economy. For example, nuclear power

8

“accounts for nearly two-thirds of the country’s

emissions-free power generation,” and nuclear

reactors “operate at about a 90% capacity factor,

higher than any other fuel type.” Expand Nuclear

Energy Use and Commit to a Nuclear Waste Solution,

U.S. Chamber of Commerce Inst. for 21st Century

Energy, http://bit.ly/InyGPOI (last visited July 24,

2018). In no small part because of these benefits, the

United States “has the greatest number of nuclear

reactors in the world at present, and therefore the

greatest demand for nuclear fuel.” CA4 JA236.2 Any

disruption in the production of nuclear power thus

poses a grave threat not just to individual states, but

to the national economy.

Finally, this is also an area particularly well

suited to federal regulation because states have an

unfortunate tendency to yield to often very vocal “not

in my backyard” constituencies when it comes to the

development of nuclear energy within their borders.

This is a case in point. Coles Hill is the single “largest

natural deposit of uranium in the United States and

one of the largest in the world,” with an estimated 119

million pounds of uranium ore. Pet.App.20la. It is

thus no exaggeration to say that whether the deposit

may be mined will have a massive impact on the

entirety of the Nation’s nuclear power industry. And

the impact is even more profound for Virginia and its

residents, as estimates suggest that mining the Coles

Hill deposit could “generate $4.8 billion of net revenue

for Virginia businesses.” Pet.App.202a. Yet the state

is still unwilling to allow Coles Hill to be mined, out of

? Citations to “CA4 JA” refer to the Joint Appendix filed in the

Fourth Circuit.

9

professed concerns that the development of uranium

can never be made safe enough for Virginians. That

extraordinary hostility to the prospect of local nuclear

energy development is powerful evidence of the

wisdom of Congress’ decision to give the federal

government the power to “determine what type of

safety standards should be enacted in this complex

area.” Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 250.

In short, the development of nuclear energy is a

matter of both abiding federal expertise and abiding

federal interest. It is thus imperative that courts

guard just as jealously as Congress has the federal

government’s exclusive authority over “the entire field

of nuclear safety concerns.” PG&E, 461 U.S. at 212-

13.

Il. The Decision Below Is Impossible To

Reconcile With This Court’s Atomic Energy

Act Cases.

The decision below poses a grave threat to the

federal government's authority to regulate the

development of nuclear power, as it guts the Atomic

Energy Act of a core element of its preemptive force.

The Atomic Energy Act is unusual in that “the pre-

empted field” under the Act is defined, “in part,

by ...the motivation behind the state law’—

specifically, whether it is animated by concerns about

radiological safety. English, 496 U.S. at 84 (emphasis

added). That is clear on the face of the statute. Not

only does the Act give the federal government the

power to regulate nuclear power plants and the

antecedent activities of uranium “milling” (i.e., the

extraction of uranium from ore) and “tailings

management” (i.e., the handling of radioactive waste

10

products generated by uranium milling). See, e.g., 42

U.S.C. §§2111(a), 2014(e)(2), 2133; 10 C.F.R. pt. 40,

app. A. The Act also expressly provides that states

retain the power to regulate nuclear energy-related

activities only “for purposes other than protection

against radiation hazards.” 42 U.S.C. §2021(k)

(emphasis added). It is thus not only appropriate, but

essential, for courts to identify the purpose of state

regulation in this area, as that is the only way to

determine if it is preempted.

This Court’s decision in PG&E is illustrative.

There was no dispute in that case about what the state

was trying to regulate: It wanted to impose a

moratorium on nuclear power plants. But to answer

the question of whether that moratorium was

preempted, this Court had to determine why the state

imposed it, and “whether there [wa]s a non-safety

rationale.” PG&E, 461 U.S. at 213. If there was not,

then the moratorium could not stand, as any state

regulation “grounded in [radiological] safety concerns

falls squarely within the prohibited field” occupied

exclusively by the federal government. I/d.; accord

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 13 (“a

State’s moratorium on uranium mining is preempted

if that moratorium is grounded in safety concerns

about the operation of NRC-licensed milling and

tailings-management facilities”). Simply put, “a state

judgment that nuclear power is not safe enough to be

further developed would conflict directly with the

countervailing judgment” of Congress. PG&E, 461

U.S. at 213.

That should have made this an easy case.

Virginia does not contest (and cannot contest, at this

11

motion to dismiss stage) petitioners’ allegations that

the state “legislature banned uranium mining only as

a means to prevent milling and tailings management

from occurring in Virginia,” out of professed concerns

about the safety of those federally regulated activities.

Pet.App.26a-27a. Virginia’s ban thus “conflict|s]

directly with the countervailing judgment” of

Congress and the NRC that existing federal regulation

suffices to address safety concerns about milling and

tailings management. PG&E, 461 U.S. at 213. Yet

the Fourth Circuit concluded that petitioners’

preemption claim failed as a matter of law, “declin[ing]

the invitation” to “look past the statute’s plain

meaning to decipher whether the legislature was

motivated to pass the ban by” concerns about the

safety of milling and tailings management.

Pet.App. 14a.

That reasoning is impossible to reconcile with this

Court’s decisions in PG&E and English. As those

cases confirm, petitioners’ request that the courts

determine the purpose behind Virginia’s ban is no

mere “invitation.” It is the inexorable command of the

Atomic Energy Act and this Court’s precedents

interpreting it. See, eg., PG&E, 461 U.S. at 213;

English, 496 U.S. at 84. Lower courts may no more

“decline” the “invitation” to make that determination

than they may “decline” the “invitation” to apply the

Supremacy Clause. By refusing to answer the very

question that this Court has deemed central to

determining whether state regulation in this area is

preempted, the decision below deprives the Atomic

Energy Act of its core preemptive force.

12

Ill. The Decision Below Provides A Roadmap

For State And Local Governments To Evade

The Preemptive Force Of Federal Law.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision not only guts the

Atomic Energy Act of much of its preemptive force, but

also provides a roadmap to states seeking to evade the

preemptive force of all manner of federal statutes. As

this Court has admonished time and again, it is the

substance of a state law, not its form, that controls the

preemption inquiry. See, e.g., Aetna Heaith Inc. v.

Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 214-15 (2004); Howlett v. Rose,

496 U.S. 356, 382-83 (1990); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.

Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985). States thus cannot

evade the Supremacy Clause through the simple

expedient of labeling their laws something other than

what they are. To be sure, in many preemption cases,

the substantive inquiry turns on the effect of a state

law, not its purpose. But when Congress chooses, as

it did in the Atomic Energy Act, to define “the pre-

empted field, in part, by ... the motivation behind the

state law,” English, 496 U.S. at 84, then courts must

look beyond labels and form to determine the purpose

behind the challenged law. Otherwise, states could

avoid preemption merely by declining to make their

true motivations explicit—as Virginia has now

succeeded in doing here.

Indeed, even accepting the Fourth Circuit's

mistaken conclusion that it matters only what

Virginia sought to regulate, not why, the decision

below still cannot be reconciled with the principle that

preemption turns on substance, not form. Here, the

state does not dispute that the “legislature banned

uranium mining only as a means to prevent milling

13

and tailings management from occurring in Virginia,”

Pet.App.26a-27a (emphasis added)—two activities

that no one disputes may be regulated only by the

federal government, «ze Pet.App.12a-13a. In other

words, the state does aot dispute that it sought to ban

mining only as a means to regulate (or, more aptly,

prohibit) the very activities that everyone agrees it

may not regulate. Yet the Fourth Circuit nonetheless

concluded that the state’s ban was not preempted,

simply because the “the plain language of the ... ban

does not mention uranium milling or tailings storage.”

Pet.App.14a (emphasis added). Thus, under the

Fourth Circuit’s view, a state is free to countermand

federal regulation to its heart’s content, so long as it is

smart enough not to “mention” preempted fields on the

face of its law.

That reasoning finds no support in any of this

Court’s preemption jurisprudence. Take this Court’s

cases involving the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).

Just this past Term, this Court reiterated that states

may not “target arbitration either by name or by more

subtle methods, such as by (‘interferjing] with

fundamental attributes of arbitration.” Epic Sys.

Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018) (emphasis

added). Just as the FAA “preempts any state rule

discriminating on its face against arbitration,” so, too,

the FAA “displaces any rule that covertly accomplishes

the same objective by disfavoring contracts that (oh so

coincidentally) have the defining features of

arbitration agreements.” Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Lid.

P’ship v. Clark, 137 8S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017) (emphasis

added). Thus, if a state adopts a “rule classifying as

unconscionable arbitration agreements that fail to

abide by the Federal Rules of Evidence, or that

14

disallow an ultimate disposition by a jury (perhaps

termed ‘a panel of twelve lay arbitrators’ to help avoid

preemption),” the rule is preempted all the same,

regardless of whether it happens to “mention”

arbitration. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563

U.S. 333, 342 (2011).

This Court’s cases interpreting the Natural Gas

Act (“NGA”)}—an area of law implicating similar

interests as this case—reflect the same principle.

Under the NGA, the regulation of wholesale natural-

gas prices lies with the federal government, while the

regulation of retail natural-gas , rices remains with

the states. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591,

1594 (2015). But that does not mean that the analysis

begins and ends with determining what a state seeks

to regulate. While state laws that “direct/ly]

regulatie] the prices of [interstate] wholesales of

natural gas” are preempted, the same is true of “state

regulations which would indirectly achieve the same

result,” “whether or not framed to achieve ends ...

ordinarily within the ambit of state power.” N. Nat.

Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan., 372 U.S. 84,

90-91 (1963); see also, e.g., Schneidewind v. ANR

Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 308 (1988) (“the things Act

144 regulation is directed at, the control of rates and

facilities of natural gas companies, are precisely the

things over which FERC has _ comprehensive

authority” (emphasis added)).

This Court’s decision in National Meat

Association v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452 (2012), is also

illustrative. There, the Court addressed whether the

Federal Meat Inspection Act (“FMIA”)}—which

preempts state statutes addressing the front-end

15

processes of inspecting, handling, and slaughtering

livestock—preempted a state statute that prohibited

slaughterhouses, at the back-end, from selling meat

that satisfied all federal requirements. /d. at 455, 463-

64. Although “the FMIA’s preemption clause does not

usually foreclose ‘state regulation of the commercial

sales activities of slaughterhouses,” id. at 463, the

Court nonetheless held the state law preempted, for

any other conclusion would allow “any State [to]

impose any regulation on slaughterhouses just by

framing it as a ban on the sale of meat produced in

whatever way the State disapproved.” /d. at 463-64.

That, the Court explained, “would make a mockery of

the FMIA’s preemption provision.” /d. at 464.

The same logic carried the day in Engine

Manufacturers Association v. South Coast Air Quality

Management District, 541 U.S. 246 (2004). There, the

Court considered whether the Clean Air Act, which

prohibits states from adopting or enforcing

“standard[s] relating to the control of emissions,”

preempted local regulations requiring fleet operators

to buy only those vehicles satisfying state pollution

standards that far exceeded federal requirements. /d.

at 249, 251. Addressing the argument that the rules

escaped preemption because they targeted the

purchase of vehicles, and did not directly regulate the

manufacturing process, the Court concluded that such

a distinction “would make no sense” “for pre-emption

purposes.” Jd. at 255. As the Court explained, “[t]he

manufacturer's right to sell federally approved

vehicles is meaningless in the absence of a purchaser’s

right to buy them.” /d.

16

Haywood v. Drown likewise “confirms that the

Supremacy Clause cannot be evaded by formalism.”

556 U.S. at 742. There, the Court considered whether

a state—“[ml]otivated by the belief that damages suits

filed by prisoners against state correction officers were

by and large frivolous and vexatious”—could shield

those officers from lawsuits under §1983 by stripping

state courts of jurisdiction to hear them. 556 U.S. at

731, 733. Although the Court acknowledged that, as a

formal matter, a state has inherent “authority to

organize its courts,” the Court concluded that “a

State’s invocation of ‘jurisdiction” could not be a

“trump that ends the Supremacy Clause inquiry.” /d.

at 740-41. As the Court explained, Congress made a

judgment through §1983 that “all persons who violate

federal rights while acting under color of state law

shall be held liable for damages,” id. at 737, and a

state cannot countermand that judgment through “an

immunity statute cloaked in jurisdictional garb,” id. at

742.

Of course, these are but a handful of the cases in

which this Court has made clear that states cannot

evade the preemptive force of federal law through the

simple expedient of including or omitting magic words

in their legislation. Yet that is precisely the result

that the Fourth Circuit’s decision below countenances.

So long as a state “does not mention” on the face of its

law its intent to target an area reserved by Congress

to the federal government, the preemption inquiry is

at an end. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit allowed

Virginia’s ban to escape preemption even though the

state admits (at least at this stage) that the ban rests

on a judgment that milling and tailings management

pose too great of radiological safety concerns—a

17

judgment that “conflict/s| directly with the

countervailing judgment” of Congress and the NRC.

PG&E, 461 U.S. at 213.

This Court should therefore reverse the decision

below, restore the full preemptive force of the Atomic

Energy Act, and reaffirm that “[t]he force of the

Supremacy Clause is not so weak that it can be evaded

by mere mention of [one] word” instead of another.

Howlett, 496 U.S. at 382-83. Any other disposition not

only will provide a roadmap for states to impede

Congress’ efforts to encourage domestic uranium

mining, but will embolden them to employ the same

clever labeling and workarounds in all manner of

other federally regulated areas. Neither outcome has

anything to recommend it.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should

reverse the judgment below.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN P. LEHOTSKY ERIN E. MURPHY

MICHAEL B. SCHON Counsel of Record

U.S. CHAMBER ANDREW C. LAWRENCE

LITIGATION CENTER KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP

1615 H Street, NW 655 Fifteenth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20062 Washington, DC 20005

(202) 879-5000

erin.murphy@kirkland.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

July 26, 2018

No. 16-1275

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

JOHN WARREN, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF OF SENATOR TOM COTTON,

SENATOR JIM INHOFE, AND

SENTATOR TED CRUZ AS AMICI CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

GORDON D. Topp *

KIMBERLY A. LEAMAN

T.J. HERRON

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

1501 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 736-8000

gtodd@sidley.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

July 26, 2018 * Counsel of Record

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........................00000- ii

ETT HUEY SUI sttnictccnenendenvendtnvstininntibinainici |

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......000000000.000.. ee.

SEO OE eenccntnriactiniemsncsntesseccsiiiaiiinaiiniuepeimiat

1. RESTRICTING THE ACT’S PREEMPTIVE

SCOPE TO ACTIVITIES REGULATED BY

THE ACT WITHOUT REGARD TO PUR-

POSE OR EFFECT WOULD UNDERMINE

IMPLEMENTATION OF UNIFORM FED-

ERAL POLICY OVER ISSUES OF NA-

TIONAL IMPORTANCE .....0.0.....cccccccceeeeeeees 5

A. The Act’s Preemption Framework Re-

flects Congress’s Careful Determination

Of Federal And State Competencies Bal-

anced Against Federal And State Inter-

DD cacssnrcncssorccinicnstsactintsinvideiiseniibenmaiennntine 5

B. Formalistic Limits To The Act’s Preemp-

tive Scope Upset The Federal/State Ju-

risdictional Balance And Permit State

And Local Governments To Override The

Federal Government On Issues Of Na-

tional Importance............................c00e0000+ 12

C. Domestic Production Of Uranium Is A

National Strategic Interest....................... 16

D.Uranium Is A Critical And Strategic

Mineral Warranting Of Federal Over-

(i)

‘i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745

CE 7, 25

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study

Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) .................... 6

English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72

Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC ov.

Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013)...... 13, 14

Huffman o. W. Nuclear, Inc., 486 U.S. 663

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.

Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.

ELE 12, 13

Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v.

Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004)... 14

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control

Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-604, 92 Stat.

EEE a 15

Private Ownership of Special Nuclear

Materials Act, Pub. L. No. 88-489, 78

SS aR 26

Defense Production Act of 1950, ch. 932, 64

EEE 24

Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat.

Sil daiitieneitesinnetcecentascensetannseuterseereeenenseeeues 6

SEE 12

Sa 9, 10, 16

§ 2201(v)(B)Gii) (1988).................. 26

ET 22

§ 2296b-6(a)D) ....... cence. 22

AS 3

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page

50 U.S.C. app. § 4502(a)(4) ........................... 25

ae EE tnthlttictinitntennencaprnnsnninsemnenens 16

U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Final List of

Critical Minerals 2018, 83 Fed. Reg.

23,306 Cay 18, BO1G)..........00.0000.00.000.-222--- 27

39 Fed. Reg. 38,016 (Oct. 21, 1974) .............. 27

31 Fed. Reg. 16,479 (Dec. 19, 1966).............. 27

EXECUTIVE ORDERS

Exec. Order No. 13,817, 82 Fed. Reg. 60

Seer earn 27, 28

Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093

GN EE er 22

Exec. Order No. 13,603, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,651

En 26

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Jared T. Brown & Daniel H. Else, Cong.

Research Serv., R43767, The Defense

Production Act of 1950: _ History,

Energy Field: Hearings Before the Joint

Comm. on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong. 25

EEE SEES SS reer passim

S. Rep. No. 88-1325 (1964)........................... 26, 29

S. Rep. No. 86-870 (1959)............................. 10, 11

S. Rep. No. 83-1699 (1954).........................0. 12

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

SCHOLARLY AUTHORITIES

William Brice Fiske, Virginia’s Moratori-

um: Is Uranium Mining on the Horizon in

the Commonwealth?, 37 WM. & MARY

ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 289 (2012) ............

H. Hamilton Hackney Ill, Comment, Recent

Congressional Proposals for Providing

Relief to the Domestic Uranium Industry:

Saving Grace or Just Another Expensive

Bailout?, 10 J. ENerGy L. & POoL’y 171

Byron S. Miller, A Law is Passed — The

Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 15 U. Cui. L.

Arthur W. Murphy & D. Bruce La Pierre,

Nuclear “Moratorium” Legislation in the

States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case

of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REV.

TE ncinrtnitiinnininimmnendnmaneenenrsen

Ronald H. Rosenberg, Uranium Mining and

Milling in Virginia: An Analysis of Reg-

ulatory Choice, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES

Be Be tl inircccntnarenniimimetsidieainintospaninemes

James R. Wilch, Comment, GATT and the

Half-Life of Uranium Industry Protection,

10 N.W. J. INTL L. & Bus. 150 (1989)........

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Trump's Navy Warship Expansion Plan

Faces Major Obstacles, Newsweek (Mar.

20, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/

donald-trump-navy-warships-navy-

Page

15

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page

Associated Press, Proposed East Coast

Uranium Mine Dividing Va., USA Today

(Jan. 26, 2013), https://www.usatoday.

com/story/news/nation/2013/01/26/

virginia-uranium-mine/1866489/ .............. 15

George David Banks & Michael Wallace,

Ctr. for Strategic & Int'l Studies,

Recapturing U.S. Leadership in Uranium

Enrichment (Nov. 2013), http://cdn.accf.

org/wp-content/uploads/20 16/12/131125_

Banks _RecapturingUSLeadership Web.

Anthony Capaccio, Fleet of 12 Nuclear

Submarines in Line for Pentagon Appro-

val, Bloomberg @Jan. 4, 2017), https://

www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/20 1 7-

01-05/new-nuclear-armed-subs-win-

pentagon-approval-before-obama-leaves.. 19

CBS News, Inside the U.S. Navy’s Newest

Fastest Submarines (May 10, 2017),

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-navy-

newest-submarine-squad-virginia-class/.. 19

Centrus, Megatons to Megawatts, http://

www.centrusenergy.com/who-we-are/

history/megatons-to-megawatts/ (last

visited July 2, 2018) ....................---ceeeeeeeeees 17

Jon. J. Indall, Rocky Mountain Mineral

Law Found., 2006 No. 2 RMMLF-Inst.

Paper No. 16, A Historical Review of the

Relationship Between The Federal

Government and the Domestic Uranium

Industry and Current Uranium Activities

and Issues in New Mexico (2006)............... 25

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Ana Komnenic, Amid Fierce Political

Opposition, US Uranium Miner Suspends

Mine Plans, mining.com (Dec. 15, 2013),

http://www.mining.com/amid-fierce-

political-opposition-us-uranium-miner-

gives-up-on-one-of-the-worlds-largest-

uranium-deposits-664 17 ...........................-

KTAR Newsroom, Drive to Mine Uranium

in Va. Comes to Quiet Pause, KTAR News

(Dec. 14, 2013), http://ktar.com/story/

112903/drive-to-mine-uranium-in-va-

Regulatory Affairs, Exec. Office of the

President, M-17-24, Guidance for Section

2 of Executive Order 13783, Titled

“Promoting Energy Independence and

Economic Growth” (2017), https://www.

whitehouse. gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/

omb/memoranda/2017/M-17-24.pdf...........

Robert S. Palmer, Rocky Mountain Mineral

Law Inst., 2 RMMLF- Inst. 4, Problems

Page

15

15

23

Ge ccsccsscscassnscesssecrencssnsenevescenensncssnsenscesaus 24, 25

Sonal Patel, More Premature Nuclear Unit

Retirements Loom, POWER Magazine

(Feb. 1, 2018), http://)www.powermag.com/

more-premature-nuclear-unit-retirements

eT

M. Vv. Ramana, Nuclear power and the

public, 67 Bull. of the Atomic Scientists,

4 5 ee ee.

vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page

The Statistics Portal, Leading countries in

nuclear energy consumption in 2017 (in

million metric tons of oil equivalent),

https://www.statista.com/statistics/

265539/nuclear-energy-consumption-in-

leading-countries/ (last visited July 2,

TT cdiricsinsatiencaiibinntniiaiaiinsitiaaaniidemmaniaiiiaiiiaiaaeee 20

Anthony J. Thompson & Christopher S.

Pugsley, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law

Found., 2006 No. 2 RMMLF-Inst. Paper

No. 3, United States Federal / State

Licensing / Permitting Regimes Implicat-

ed By Uranium Development (2006).......... 24

Uranium Energy Corp., Uranium Energy

Corp 2018 Letter to Shareholders (Jan.

29, 2018), http://www.uraniumenergy.

com/news/releases/index.php?content_id=

GE canccedcienionsetnsimennnshinniginamimentimeenen 18

USGS, Interior Releases 2018's Final List of

35 Minerals Deemed Critical to U.S.

National Security and the Economy (May

18, 2018), https://www.usgs.gov/news/

interior-releases-2018-s-final-list-35-

minerals-deemed-critical-us-national-

U.S. Dep’t of Agric., EO 13783 USDA Final

Report; Recommendations Sorted by

Priority (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.fs.

fed.us/sites/default/files/appendix-b-usda-

eo-13783-final-report-10.11.17.xlsx........... 23

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Final Report Pursuant

to Executive Order 13783 on Promoting

Energy Independence and Economic

Growth (Oct. 11, 2017), https://

www.fs.fed.us/sites/default/files/eo- 13783-

usda-final-report-10.11.17.pdf...................

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., China Expected

to Account for More than Half of World

Growth in Nuclear Power Through 2040,

Today in Energy (Sept. 28, 2016), https://

www.cia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id

GEiksreccenteiunsnicdsiennsvastmeiiniinbatesnsvesione

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Domestic Urani-

um Production Report — Annual, Nuclear

& Uranium (May 22, 2018), https://www.

eia.gov/uranium/production/annual .........

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Fort Calhoun

Becomes Fifth U.S. Nuclear Plant to

Retire in Past Five Years, Today in

Energy (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.cia.

gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=28572 ...

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Nuclear

Capacity and Generation Expected to

Decline as Existing Generators Retire,

Today in Energy (May 12, 2017), https://

www.eia. gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id

SITET isidintnatnaminpntdetedeniiseredaicsiesnenminitapesnedes

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Uranium

Marketing Annual Report (May 31,

2018), https://www.eia.gov/uranium/

I cncencibetiiehincneincestancinminntansnetacnsinsae

Page

23

21

18

21

21

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Jonathon Wilson, Rural Community De-

bates Pros and Cons of Uranium Mining,

WAMU (Mar. 29, 2013), http://wamu.org/

story/13/03/29/rural_community_debates

_pros_and _ cons_of_uranium _mining/ Seneiegs

World Nuclear Ass’n, Nuclear Power in the

USA, http://www.world-nuclear.org/

information-library/country-profiles/

countries-t-z/usa-nuclear-power.aspx (last

updated June 2018)...................ccccccceeeeeeeees

World Nuclear Ass’n, US Nuclear Fuel

Cycle, http://www.world-nuclear.org/

information-library/country-profiles/

countries-t-z/usa-nuclear-fuel-cycle.aspx

Page

21

(last updated July 2018) .......................... 17, 20

World Nuclear News, American Centrifuge

Demonstration Plan Completes Oper-

ations (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.world-

nuclear-news.org/C-American-Centrifuge-

demonstration-plant-completes-

operations-2202167. html ...........................

INTEREST OF AMICI’

Amici curiae are three currently serving United

States Senators, with distinct interests in the nation-

al security and federalism issues presented by this

case. Specifically, amici have an interest in the prop-

er interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act’s preemp-

tive scope, to ensure that local interests do not cir-

cumvent federal priorities on issues of national con-

cern. Domestically produced uranium is one such is-

sue. Not only is a domestic supply of uranium critical

to the United States’ security and defense strategy, it

also affects the Nation’s status as an independent

and forward-looking leader on the global stage. Ami-

ci are responsible for developing federal legislation

related to nuclear policy, making them uniquely situ-

ated to address the strategic importance of uranium.

Amici further have a vested interest in ensuring that

federal law on this issue is both respected and effec-

tuated.

Senator Tom Cotton, an army veteran, represents

the State of Arkansas and serves on the Senate

Committee on Armed Services and the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence. His assignments afford

him a distinct perspective on the need for nuclear

material as it relates to military defense and readi-

ness in today’s geopolitical climate. He is keenly

aware of the risks in failing to meet that need.

' No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in

part, and no party or counsel for a party made a monetary con-

tribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this

brief. No one other than amici curiae, its members, or its coun-

sel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submis-

sion of this brief. Amici certify that all parties have consented

to the filing of this brief.

2

Senator Jim Inhofe represents the State of Okla-

homa and serves on the Senate Committee on Armed

Services. He also chairs the Subcommittee on Readi-

ness and Management Support, where he is respon-

sible for overseeing policy relating to military readi-

ness and construction, defense energy and environ-

mental programs, and conventional ammunition pro-

curement. Senator Inhofe has a particular interest in

the role nuclear energy plays in defense readiness.

Senator Ted Cruz represents the State of Texas and

serves on the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

As part of his work on that Committee, Senator Cruz

is responsible for advancing policy related to the De-

partment of Defense, military research and develop-

ment, and nuclear energy. Senator Cruz has long

been an advocate for a strong and cohesive national

defense, which in turn requires a well-articulated nu-

clear regulatory framework.

As part of their service on the Committee on Armed

Services, amici are also members of the Subcommit-

tee on Strategic Forces, which steers federal policy on

nuclear and strategic forces, nuclear defense, defense

environmental management programs, and arms con-

trol and non-proliferation programs. The Subcom-

mittee also has oversight over several agencies devot-

ed to nuclear safety and defense. Accordingly, amici

are intimately familiar with the issues that drove

Congress to allocate responsibility for nuclear safety

between the federal government and the states, and

amici continue to work on matters committed to the

federal government by the Atomic Energy Act.

In light of their deep experience, amici agree that

national interests require the Atomic Energy Act’s

jurisdictional balance between the federal govern-

ment and the states be respected. Because the deci-

sion below upsets that balance and jeopardizes na-

3

tional interests, amici agree with Petitioners that the

Court should reverse the Fourth Circuit.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Fourth Circuit’s determination that the Com-

monwealth of Virginia’s ban on uranium mining is

not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act (the “Act”)

solely because the ban’s literal text addresses an ac-

tivity not covered by the Act provides states a clear

path to nullify federal policy in favor of local prefer-

ences through creative backchannels and artful word-

ing. Tying the Act’s preemptive scope to the strict

language of a statute disregards Congress’s prior de-

cision to vest regulation of radiological hazards with

the federal government and undermines federal polli-

cy concerning assets, like uranium, that are critical to

our Nation’s security and defense.

The Act and its amendments memorialize Con-

gress’s cumulative attempt to grapple with the mili-

tary, political, social, and economic consequences of

harnessed nuclear power and to allocate oversight re-

sponsibility for those consequences in a workable

regulatory framework. The Act’s legislative history

demonstrates the careful consideration with which

Congress allocated federal and state responsibilities

for regulating nuclear safety. In early amendments

to the Act, Congress committed oversight responsibil-

ity of radiological hazards to the federal government.

However, Congress also created an agreement-based

scheme whereby the civilian-led Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (“the Commission”) can transfer certain

2 The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5801 et

seq., abolished the Atomic Energy Con:mission and transferred

its regulatory functions to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

References to “the Commission” shall refer to both agencies.

4

of its regulatory functions to the states. Absent

transfer of authority pursuant to a valid agreement,

the federal government retains exclusiv~ authority to

regulate activities covered by the Act for purposes of

radiological safety. That is, federal law preempts

state law.

Pursuant to this Court’s precedents, which require

consideration of the purpose and effect of a state

statute vis-a-vis radiological safety, Virginia’s ban is

preempted by the Act. The ban purports to regulate

an activity that is properly within Virginia’s jurisdic-

tion: uranium mining on nonfederal lands. In pur-

pose and effect, however, the ban actually targets

post-mining activities (uranium milling and tailings

storage and disposal) because of those activities’ per-

ceived radiological hazards. However, such post-

mining activities are not accounted for in Virginia’s

current agreement with the Commission, making

regulation of those activities for purposes of radiolog-

ical safety the exclusive province of the federal gov-

ernment.

The Act’s legislative history demonstrates the care-

ful consideration with which Congress allocated fed-

eral and state responsibilities for regulating nuclear

safety. In willfully blinding itself to the purpose of

Virginia’s ban, the Fourth Circuit upended the Act’s

deliberate jurisdictional balance without any consid-

eration for the national and international conse-

quences that flow from the military, political, and

economic interests that drove Congress to assign reg-

ulatory responsibility in the manner it did. The

Fourth Circuit also disregarded the Court’s prior

teachings and refused to consider the plethora of evi-

dence disclosing the motivation behind the ban: per-

ceived radiological hazards associated with uranium

milling and tailings management.

5

Restricting the Act’s preemptive scope would per-

mit states to do indirectly what they cannot do direct-

ly, carrying far-reaching and serious risks. In this

case, local-based preferences threaten the implemen-

tation of uniform federal policy over uranium, a stra-

tegic national resource, at a critical time. Domestic

production and development of uranium is at historic

lows, exacerbated in no small part by Virginia’s ill-

conceived blockade of the largest known uranium de-

posit in the United States. But an unduly formalistic

approach that eschews any analysis of purpose or pol-

icy would extend well beyond this case, affecting a

host of nuclear-related activities covered by the Act,

and no less critical to our common national interests.

Accordingly, amici urge the Court to reverse the

Fourth Circuit and reaffirm that the Act’s preemptive

scope encompasses both the purpose and effect of any

state regulation.

ARGUMENT

I. RESTRICTING THE ACT’S PREEMPTIVE

SCOPE TO ACTIVITIES REGULATED sY

THE ACT WITHOUT REGARD TO PUR-

POSE OR EFFECT WOULD UNDERMINE

IMPLEMENTATION OF UNIFORM FED-

ERAL POLICY OVER ISSUES OF NATION-

AL IMPORTANCE.

A. The Act’s Preemption Framework Re-

flects Congress’s Careful Determination

Of Federal And State Competencies Bal-

anced Against Federal And State Inter-

ests.

The development of nuclear energy and technology

in the United States has been uniquely federal in na-

ture. Indeed, the Manhattan Project—the genesis of

the United States’ nuclear program—-was sponsored

6

by the federal government. See Arthur W. Murphy &

D. Bruce La Pierre, Nuclear “Moratorium” Legisla-

tion in the States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case

of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 394—

95 (1976). While the atomic bomb dramatically

demonstrated the military and political implications

of atomic energy, the role atomic energy would come

to play in civilian life was less clear. Congress strug-

gled to develop a legislative framework capable of

handling atomic energy’s unique policy issues. See,

e.g., Byron S. Miller, A Law is Passed — The Atomic

Energy Act of 1946, 15 U. Cut. L. REV. 799 (1948).

Reflecting Congress’s then-judgment that the fed-

eral government was the only body prepared to ad-

dress these policy issues, the inaugural 1946 version

of the Act committed nuclear energy exclusively to

federal authority by way of the Commission. Murphy

& La Pierre, supra, at 395. The 1946 Act further de-

clared a national policy—‘“subject at all times to the

paramount objective of assuring the common defense

and security” —to direct efforts toward “improving the

public welfare, increasing the standard of living,

strengthening free competition in private enterprise,

and promoting world peace.” Atomic Energy Act of

1946, ch. 724, § 1, 60 Stat. 755, 756.

Within a decade, however, Congress “concluded

that the national interest would be best served if the

Government encouraged the private sector to become

involved in the development of atomic energy for

peaceful purposes under a program of federal regula-

tion and licensing.” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina En-

vtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 63 (1978). Accord-

ingly, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, which allowed private entities to own and oper-

ate nuclear facilities that produced and utilized spe-

cial nuclear materials, including uranium. See

7

H. Hamilton Hackney II|, Comment, Recent Congres-

sional Proposals for Providing Relief to the Domestic

Uranium Industry: Saving Grace or Just Another Ex-

pensive Bailout?, 10 J. ENerGy L. & PoL’y 171, 175

(1990).

The 1954 Act encouraged private development “by

opening the door to private construction, ownership,

and operation of commercial nuclear-power reactors

under the strict supervision of the [Commission].”

English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 81 (1990).

However, both the 1946 and 1954 versions of the Act

stipulated that the federal government remained “the

sole owner of uranium products.” Atlas Corp. v. Unit-

ed States, 895 F.2d 745, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The

Commission, therefore, maintained “pervasive con-

trol” over all aspects of uranium procurement, pro-

duction, sales, and disposal. /d.

Termination of the federal monopoly on the devel-

opment of nuclear energy exposed states to a variety

of potential health and envircamental hazards that

they had previously been precluded from regulating.

Federal-State Relationships in the Atomic Energy

Field: Hearings Before the J. Comm. on Atomic Ener-

gy, 86th Cong. 25 (1959) (“Hearings”). Consequently,

federal and state agencies endeavored to cooperate in

regulating those hazards, with the federal govern-

ment providing extensive assistance in the form of

information-sharing, training, funding, and mode!

regulations and standards. /d. at 25-26.

Nonetheless, there became evident a “need for clari-

fication of the responsibilities of the Federal and

State Governments for regulating atomic energy.” /d.

at 26; see also, id. at 393. As the nuclear power and

mining industries grew, states pressured the federal

government for the right to regulate those activities

occurring within their borders. Ronald H. Rosenberg,

8

Uranium Mining and Milling in Virginia: An Analy-

sis of Regulatory Choice, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L.

81, 96 (1984). Federal, state, and industry officials

agreed on the need for clarification, but the precise

allocation of authority was hotly debated, in part be-

cause then-existing state efforts and competencies

were far from uniform. See Hearings at 127-31, 394.

Two competing considerations drove the uncertain-

ty as to which government was properly responsible

for regulating nuclear hazards. On the one hand,

providing for the welfare and public health of its citi-

zens had traditionally fallen within the states’ core

police powers. /d. at 20, 274, 289. Conversely, the

legal enforceability of any state regulation of atomic

energy was questionable: “the 1954 act set{ | forth a

directive to the Federal agency to adopt a comprehen-

sive scheme of regulations,” and courts frequently

treated such direction as preempting any correspond-

ing state regulation. /d. at 126. Moreover, “under

the act, the objectives of Federal regulations are to

assure protection of the public while not unduly bur-

dening industrial progress, and thus more restrictive

requirements by the State might be deemed as inter-

ference with national nuclear development policy.”

Id.

An early bill drafted by the Commission “provided

for the exercise of dual or concurrent jurisdiction by

both the [Commission] and the States over activities

licensed by the Commission.” Id. at 27. To minimize

“inconsistency,” the proposed bill excluded licensing

responsibilities already exercised by the Commission

and provided that state requirements “may not be ‘in

conflict with’ those adopted by the Commission.” /d.

at 290. However, the notion of concurrent jurisdic-

tion elicited concerns over duplication of efforts, in-

dustry burden from conflicting and overlapping re-

9

quirements, and whether the federal or a state gov-

ernment would prevail in the event of conflicting

standards or decisions, particularly as it came to

overregulation. /d. at 20, 120, 129, 131. In light of

these concerns, shared federal and state jurisdiction

over radiological safety was rejected. /d. at 290.

Instead, Congress

provide[d] a statutory framework within which

the States may assume an independent regulato-

ry role in extensive areas now occupied by the

Atomic Energy Commission on a basis which will

assure appropriate protection for public health

and safety and compatibility between the regula-

tory programs of the States and those of the

Commission.

Id. at 290. Specifically, the 1959 amendments estab-

lished a program through which the Commission

could transfer to states limited portions of its regula-

tory authority to license and regulate nuclear by-

product materials, source materials (including urani-

um), and certain quantities of special nuclear materi-

als. Qualified states, known as “Agreement States,”

were authorized to enter into an agreement executed

by the Governor of the state and the Chairman of the

Commission under which the state could partially as-

sume the Commission’s regulatory duties. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2021(b).

There are several steps to becoming an Agreement

State. The Governor of the applicant state must cer-

tify that the state is willing to “assume regulatory re-

sponsibility” for nuclear material, including uranium.

42 U.S.C. § 2021(d)(1). The Governor must also certi-

fy that the state possesses a “program for the control

of radiation hazards adequate to protect the public

health and safety.” Jd. In turn, the Commission

10

must make several indeve:ident findings, including

that the state’s program 12 compatible with and at

least as restrictive as the Commission’s own rules

and regulations. Jd. § 2021(a)(2); see also S. Rep.

No. 86-870, at 11 (1959). The Commission further

reserves the right to take back all or part of these

regulatory functions from a state upon notice and

hearing, or peremptorily in emergency circumstances.

42 U.S.C. § 20214).

Certain regulatory responsibilities, because of their

nature, were not eligible for transfer to an Agreement

State. The federal government retains exclusive ju-

risdiction over “areas in which the technical safety

considerations are of such complexity that it is not

likely that any State would be prepared to deal with

them during the foreseeable future,” as well as those

“areas as to which interstate, national, or interna-

tional considerations seem to be paramount.” Hear-

ings at 291. Also excepted from the program were ac-

tivities associated with high levels of radioactive haz-

ards, such as managing nuclear reactors. Jd. As re-

ported by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy:

“These are areas which, because of their special haz-

ards, or for reasons of Federal responsibility, are be-

lieved desirable for continued responsibility by the

Commission.” S. Rep. No. 86-870, at 10.

With regard to those responsibilities that may be

devolved to the states, the Act provides that once an

agreement is established, “[djuring the duration of

such an agreement . . . the State shall have authority

to regulate the materials covered by the agreement for

the protection of the public health and safety from

radiation hazards.” 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (emphasis

added). Otherwise, state and local authorities may

only “regulate activities for purposes other than pro-

tection against radiation hazards.” Id. § 2021(k). In

1]

other words, “State laws and regulations concerning

the control of radiation hazards from byproduct,

source, and special nuclear materials shall not be ap-

plicable except pursuant to an agreement entered in-

to with the Commission.”* Hearings at 488; see also S.

Rep. No. 86-870, at 12 (“As indicated elsewhere, the

Commission has exclusive authority to regulate for

protection against radiation hazards until such time

oO en cee en ee oe

mission to assume such responsibility.”); id. at 3

(“[I}n order for a State to so regulate or license |mate-

rials covered by the Act], it must first establish an

adequate program for this purpose and enter into an

agreement with the Commission.”).

The Act’s legislative history demonstrates the care-

ful consideration with which Congress allocated fed-

eral and state responsibilities for regulating nuclear

safety. In so doing, Congress considered both the

competencies of the states as well as the national or

international implications that may flow from an ac-

tivity regulated by the Act. Truly local concerns were

left to the province of the states, while issues of na-

* This language originally appeared in one of the near-final

proposed bilis, but was subsequently removed “as unnecessary,”

because “[w]ith or without this sentence, in order for a State to

so regulate or license [materials under the Act] it must first es-

agreement with the Commission.” S. Rep. No. 86-870, at 3. The

removal was “not intend{ed] to change the substantive effect of

the bill” and was “not intend{[ed] to leave any room for the exer-

cise of concurrent jurisdiction by the States to control radiation

hazards.” Hearings at 500 (emphases added). Rather, it meant

to provide courts with “greater latitude in sustaining certain

types fof laws, (e.g., zoning requirements)] which have purposes

other than control of radiation hazards, even though such re-

quirements might have an incidental effect upon the use” of ma-

terial licensed by the Commission. /d. (emphases added).

12

tional or international significance, including highly

technical and highly hazardous activities, were com-

mitted exclusively to the Commission’s control.

For those regulatory aspects that could potentially

be transferred to the states, the federal government

assumed responsibility for supervising that transi-

tion. As part of that responsibility, the Commission

must ensure that the state has in place a regulatory

scheme that both adequately protects against radio-

logical harms and meets federal expectations for

achieving the purposes of the Act—namely, the pri-

vate development and use of nuclear energy for

peacetime purposes, subject, of course, to the national

interest in common defense and security. See

42 U.S.C. § 2011; S. Rep. No. 83-1699, at 3, 4 (1954).

At bottom, the responsibility for setting policy over

radiological hazards rests with the federal govern-

ment.

B. Formalistic Limits To The Act’s Preemp-

tive Scope Upset The Federal/State Ju-

risdictional Balance And Permit State

And Local Governments To Override

The Federal Government On Issues Of

National Importance.

In preempting a field of regulation, Congress has

determined an area is of such significance or national

import that it must be governed by a single, national

policy for which state or local authorities may not

substitute their own judgments.

Here, “the federal government has occupied the en-

tire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the lim-

ited powers expressly ceded to the States.” Pac. Gas

& Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.

Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983). In line with tradi-

tional tenets of preemption that look to “whether ‘the

13

matter on which the State asserts the right to act is

in any way regulated by the Federal Act,” id. at 213

(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331

U.S. 218, 236 (1947)), “the Court defined the pre-

empted field, in part, by reference to the motivation

behind the state law,” English, 496 U.S. at 84 (em-

phasis added). The remaining “part of the field is de-

fined by the state law’s actual effect on nuclear safe-

ty.” Id. In other words, “state regulation of matters

directly affecting” aspects of radiological safety com-

mitted exclusively to the federal government also im-

permissibly intrude upon the preempted field. /d.

Taken together, this Court has made clear that the

preemptive scope of the Act is not limited to the

“plain language” of the challenged statute.

And for good reason. Federal preemption could be

rendered meaningless if state or local authorities

could circumvent federal policy through artful word-

ing or other creative backchannels. Cf. Entergy Nu-

clear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 416

(2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that courts do not “blindly

accept the articulated purpose... for preemption

purposes,” because that would permit states to “nulli-

fy nearly all unwanted federal legislation” (quoting

Greater N.Y. Metro. Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani,

195 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 1999))). The danger is par-

ticularly acute here given the public penchant to

stigmatize nuclear development out of fear associated

with the radiological hazards of nuclear material.

See, e.g., M.V. Ramana, Nuclear power and the pub-

lic, 67 Bull. of the Atomic Scientists, July 1, 2011, at

43-51. Any approach to preemption that turns a

blind eye to motive and effect would give state and

local authorities carte blanche to override federal pol-

icy concerning nuclear material and radiological haz-

ards, so long as the pertinent language does not pur-

14

port to regulate activities under the Commission's ex-

clusive jurisdiction.

In fact, some states have previously attempted to

do just that, but were prevented by courts that looked

beyond the text of the statute to understand the mo-

tivating purpose behind the statute. See Entergy Nu-

clear, 733 F.3d 393; Skull Valley Band of Goshute In-

dians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir, 2004). In

Entergy, the Second Circuit held as preempted a

Vermont statute that required state legislative ap-

proval to build a nuclear power plant. 733 F.3d at

403, 428. While the statute purported to regulate the

generation, sale, and transmission of electric power,

the Second Circuit observed that Vermont's legisla-

tive history “expressed concern about radiological

safety” associated with nuclear power plants and fur-

ther “expressed a desire to evade federal preemption.”

Id. at 420. In holding the statute preempted, the

court explicitly noted that the preemption inquiry

“does not end at the text of the statute.” /d. at 416.

Similarly, in Skull Valley, the Tenth Circuit went be-

yond the plain language of a Utah statute that facial-

ly regulated state highways and right-of-way re-

strictions when transporting spent nuclear fuels to

determine that those laws were enacted for the pur-

pose of regulating radiological safety and, thus, were

preempted. 376 F.3d at 1261-53.

Virginia's moratorium on uranium mining is cut

from the same cloth as the statutes at issue in Enter.

ay and Skull Valley. While it purports to regulate ac-

tivities within the Commonwealth's purview, local

concern regarding the radiological hazards associated

with post-mining activities—activities that fall within

the Commission's jurisdiction—-has sustained the ban

15

since its inception.‘ Moreover, the mining ban effec-

tively operates as a ban on those same post-mining

activities allowing Virginia to regulate indirectly

what it may not regulate directly.

Critically, while Virginia is a partial Agreement

State under the Act, the 2009 agreement expressly

carves out uranium mill tailings from the Common.

wealth’s regulatory authority. See William Brice

Fiske, Virginia's Moratorium: Is Uranium Mining on

the Horizon in the Commonwealth?, 37 WM. & MARY

ENVTL. L. & POL’Y Rev. 289, 307-08 (2012). Nor does

Virginia possess the statutorily required regulatory

structure to assume responsibility for uranium mill-

ings due to its moratorium over conventional mining.

See id. (citing William Robert G. Burnley, How Will

Virginia Regulate Uranium Mining?, 60 VA. LAW., 41,

43 (2011)).° The power to regulate the radiological

‘ See, eg., Pet. App. 239a-207a; Associated Press, Proposed

Kast Coast Uranium Mine Dividing Va., USA Today Gan. 26,

2013), https://www. usatoday.com /story /newa/nation/20 1 1V01/26/

virginia-uranimum-mine/1866489/, Jonathon Wilson, Rural

Community Debates Pros and Cons of Uranium Mining, WAMU

(Mar. 29, 2013), http://wamu.org/atory/13/03/29/rural_

community debatea_proa_and_cona_of uranium mining/,; Ana

Suspends Mine Plans, Mining.com (Dec. 15, 2013), http://

www. mining com/amid-fierce-political-opposition-us-uranium.

miner-gives-up-on-one-of-the-worlds-largest-uranium-deposits-

66417; KTAR Newsroom, Drive to Mine Uranium in Va. Comes

to Quiet Pause, KTAR News (Dec. 14, 2013), http://ktar.com/

story/112903/drive-to-mine-uranium-in-va-comes-to-quiet-

pause/.

*Should a state assume responsibility for tailings manage-

ment, the state is required to comply with federal standards

governing the safety of that material. See Uranium Mill Tail-

ings Radiation Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-604, § 204(e),

92 Stat. 3021 (providing for federal regulation of radiological

hazards associated with uranium tailings left over from the mill-

16

hazards associated with uranium milling and tailing

activities therefore remains exclusively with the

Commission, 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b), (k). Congress and

the Commission have already determined that the

post-mining processing and subsequent waste storage

of uranium is sufficiently safe to license. The Com-

monwealth may not substitute its own judgment re-

garding the safety of post-mining activities by effec-

tively blocking such activities within its borders. Re-

ducing the preemptive inquiry to a text-based analy-

sis would effectively rubberstamp state legislation

challenged under the Act.

C. Domestic Production Of Uranium Is A

National Strategic Interest.

As Judge Traxler observed in his dissent below,

“|t}he stakes in this case are significant.” Pet. App.

Zia. Amici, as sitting Senators and members of the

Senate Committee on Armed Services— including the

subcommittee charged with overseeing nuclear de-

fense policy—are aptly suited to speak to those

stakes.

Moat importantly, the availability and development

of uranium, and particularly, the domestic production

of uranium, is integral to the Nation's security. In-

ternational treaty obligations prohibit the use of im-

ported foreign enriched uranium, or uranium en-

riched on U.S. soil using foreign technology, for de-

fense purposes. George David Banks & Michael Wal-

lace, Ctr. for Strategic & Int'l Studies, Recapturing

U.S. Leadership in Uranium Enrichment 5 (Nov.

2013). Any uranium used for defense purposes must

be “produced by and procured from domestic sources

ing poaseedhs 10 CFR. § 150.31 (requiring state compliance with

any standards promulgated by the Commission or the Environ-

mental Protection Agency pursuant to U

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.