Petitioners Brief — Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Dep't of Def., 137 S. Ct. 811 (2017) (No. 16-299)

Supreme Court brief2017

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

{ APR 27 2017

BRIEFS | No. 16-299 | eres of

Hn the Supreme Court of the GAnited States

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS,

Petitioner,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, AND

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

MICHAEL B. KIMBERLY TIMOTHY S. BISHOP

Mayer Brown LLP Counsel of Record

1999 K Street, NW CHAD M. CLAMAGE

Washington, DC 20006 JED GLICKSTEIN

(202) 263-3127 Mayer Brown LLP

71 South Wacker Drive

LINDA E. KELLY Chicago, Illinois 60606

QUENTIN RIEGEL (312) 782-0600

LELAND P. FROST tbishop@mayerbrown.com

Manufacturers’ Center

for Legal Action

733 10th Street, NW, Ste 700

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 637-3000

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the court of appeals has original

jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) over a petition

for review challenging a regulation that defines the

scope of the term “waters of the United States” in the

Clean Water Act.”

* This is the Question Presented by the Solicitor General in his

brief in opposition. The Question Presented in the petition for

certiorari asked whether the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that it

had jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F). In the brief in

opposition, the Solicitor General also defended the judgment on

the alternative ground— presented below but rejected by the court

of appeals—that the court of appeals had original jurisdiction

under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(E). Petitioner therefore has

rephrased the question pursuant to this Court’s Rule 24.1(a) to

more accurately reflect the procedural posture of the case.

Jurisdiction under both Subsections was briefed and decided

below, briefed by the parties at the certiorari stage, and petitioner

addresses both in this brief.

11

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

After the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation

consolidated the petitions for review in the Sixth

Circuit (Consolidation Order, Dkt. No. 3, MCP No. 135

(JPML July 28, 2015)), the Sixth Circuit permitted

petitioner here, the National Association of Manufac-

turers, to intervene as a respondent. Order, No. 15-

3751 cons. (Sept. 16, 2015).

Respondents below—the federal agency respon-

dents here—are the U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency; E. Scott Pruitt, in his official capacity as EPA

Administrator; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;

Lieutenant General Todd T. Semonite, in his official

capacity as the Corps’ Chief of Engineers and Com-

manding General; the Acting Assistant Secretary of

the Army (Civil Works) in his or her official capacity;

and Robert M. Speer, in his official capacity as Acting

Secretary of the Army.

State intervenor-respondents below and respon-

dents here are the States of New York, Connecticut,

Hawaii, Massachusetts, Oregon, Vermont, Washing-

ton, and the Districi of Columbia.

Over 100 other parties filed 22 petitions for review

below, and intervened in other petitions, and many of

those petitioners moved to dismiss their own and other

petitions for review for want of jurisdiction. Those

petitioners below, respondents here, are as follows:

No. 15-3751: Murray Energy Corporation.

No. 15-3799: States of Ohio, Michigan, and Ten-

nessee.

No. 15-3817: National Wildlife Federation.

No. 15-3820: Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc.

No. 15-3822: State of Oklahoma.

1V

No. 15-3823: Chamber of Commerce of the United

States; National Federation of Independent Business;

State Chamber of Oklahoma; Tulsa Regional Chamber;

and Portland Cement Association.

No. 15-3831: States of North Dakota, Alaska,

Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Missouri, Mon-

tana, Nebraska, Nevada, South Dakota, Wyoming,

New Mexico Environment Department, New Mexico

State Engineer.

No. 15-3837: Waterkeeper Alliance; Center for

Biological Diversity; Center for Food Safety; Humboldt

Baykeeper; Russian Riverkeeper; Monterey Coast-

keeper; Upper Missouri Waterkeeper, Inc.; Snake

River Waterkeeper, Inc.; Turtle Island Restoration

Network, Inc.

No. 15-3839: Puget SoundKeeper; Sierra Club.

No. 15-3850: American Farm Bureau Federation;

American Forest & Paper Association; American Pet-

roleum Institute; American Road and Transportation

Builders Association; Greater Houston Builders

Association; Leading Builders of America; Matagorda

County Farm Bureau; National Alliance of Forest

Owners; National Association of Home Builders;

National Association of Realtors; National Cattlemen’s

Beef Association; National Corn Growers Association;

National Mining Association; National Pork Producers

Council; National Stone, Sand, and Gravel Association;

Public Lands Council; Texas Farm Bureau; and U.S.

Poultry & Egg Association.

No. 15-3853: States of Texas, Louisiana, and

Mississippi; Texas Department of Agriculture; Texas

Commission on Environmental Quality; Texas Depart-

ment of Transportation; Texas General Land Office;

Railroad Commission of Texas; Texas Water Develop-

ment Board.

Vv

No. 15-3858: Utility Water Act Group.

No. 15-3885: Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc.;

Georgia Agribusiness Council, Inc.; Greater Atlanta

Homebuilders Association, Inc.

No. 15-3887: States of Georgia, West Virginia,

Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Kansas; Commonwealth of

Kentucky; North Carolina Department of Environment

and Natural Resources; States of South Carolina,

Utah, and Wisconsin.

No. 15-3948: One Hundred Miles; South Carolina

Coastal Conservation League.

No. 15-4159: Southeast Stormwater Association,

Inc.; Florida Stormwater Association, Inc.; Florida

Rural Water Association, Inc., and Florida League of

Cities, Inc.

No. 15-4162: Michigan Farm Bureau.

No. 15-4188: Washington Cattlemen’s Association;

California Cattlemen’s Association; Oregon Cattle-

men’s Association; New Mexico Cattle Growers As-

sociation; New Mexico Wool Growers, Inc.; New Mexico

Federal Lands Council; Coalition of Arizona/New

Mexico Counties for Stable Economic Growth; Duarte

Nursery, Inc.; Pierce Investment Company; LPF

Properties, LLC; Hawkes Company, Inc.

No. 15-4211: Association of American Railroads;

Port Terminal Railroad Association.

No. 15-4234: Texas Alliance for Responsible

Growth, Environment and Transportation.

No. 15-4305: American Exploration & Mining

Association.

No. 15-4404: Arizona Mining Association; Arizona

Farm Bureau; Association of Commerce and Industry;

New Mexico Mining Association; Arizona Chamber of

vi

Commerce & Industry; Arizona Rock Products Associa-

tion; and New Mexico Farm & Livestock Bureau.

Many of these petitioners in the court of appeals

also filed complaints in district courts. Those actions

are North Dakota v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-59 (D.N.D.);

Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 1:15-cv-110 (N.D. W.

Va.); Ohio v. EPA, 2:15-cv-2467 (S.D. Ohio); Am. Farm

Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-165 (S.D. Tex.);

Texas v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-162 (S.D. Tex.); Ass’n of Am.

Railroads vy. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-266 (S.D. Tex.); Georgia

v. McCarthy, No. 2:15-cv-79 (S.D. Ga.); Oklahoma ex

rel. Pruitt v. EPA, No. 4:15-cv-381 (N.D. Okla.);

Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, No. 4:15-cv-386 (N.D.

Okla.); Southeastern Legal Foundation v. EPA, No.

1:15-cv-2488-TCB (N.D. Ga.); Washington Cattlemen’s

Association v. EPA, No. 0:15-cv-3058 (D. Minn.); Puget

Soundkeeper Alliance v. McCarthy, No. 2:15-cv-1342

(W.D. Wash.); Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA, No. 3:15-

cv-3927 (N.D. Cal.); Natural Resources Defense Council

v. EPA, No. 1:15-cv-1324 (D.D.C.); Am. Exploration &

Mining Ass’n v. EPA, No. 1:15-cv-1323 (D.D.C.); and

Arizona Mining Ass’n v. EPA, No. 2:15-cv-1752 (D.

Az.).

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Petitioner National Association of Manufacturers is

a not-for-profit public advocacy group. It has no parent

corporation and does not issue stock.

es

TABLE OF CONTENTS

a csnesmninmienenenineieneins i

Parties to the Proceedings Below ............................. ill

Corporate Disclosure Statement ........................2..... v1

ESE RET eee 1

SSSR NINE SEE SS a RS TE 1

Statutes and Regulation Involved .....................0..0.0... 2

ESSE SSS Ae Ee ee 2

EET EAC OA AR a ERR ONT 2

EE SEO 6

C. The Waters of the United States Rule........... 10

D. Judicial Review of the Rule..................0......... 12

E. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision........................... 14

Summary of the Argument ..................2......-.ccceeeee eee 16

aah acehetaiielieiiiiiisbitatntaccitimishiiiiuntnichiainiirinibpaeenidinimndsmaseienie 19

I. The Sixth Circuit Lacks Jurisdiction Under

The Plain Language Of Section 1369(b). ............ 20

A. The Sixth Circuit Erroneously

Exercised Jurisdiction Under Section

i cdesnonin 20

1. The WOTUS Rule Falls Outside The

Unambiguous Language Of

RI EE ER 20

2. Subsection (F) Does Not Extend To

EPA Actions That Merely Affect The

Issuing Or Denying Of Permits. ............... 22

B. The Sixth Circuit Correctly Held That It

Lacks Jurisdiction Under

ee 28

1. The WOTUS Rule Falls Outside The

Plain Language Of Subsection (E)............ 28

2. Subsection (E) Does Not Extend To

EPA. Actions That Merely Impact

Point Source Operators Or

C. Congress’s Specific And Narrow Focus

In Section 1369(b) Confirms That The

Sixth Circuit Lacks Jurisdiction. ................... 40

D. The Legislative History Suggests That

Congress Did Not Intend The Courts Of

Appeals To Review All Nationwide

Il. Policy Considerations Favor Interpreting

Section 1369(b) Textually To Exclude The

REAR IRAE IN E A 43

A. Interpreting Section 1369(b) Textually

Promotes Jurisdictional Clarity..................... 44

B. A Narrow Reading Is Necessary Due To

Section 1369(b)’s Preclusion Provision. ......... 48

C. A Narrow Reading Offers Parties,

Agencies, And Courts The Benefits Of

Multilateral Review Of Agency

en csintcemitonnntind 50

D. Judge McKeague’s Efficiency

Arguments Are Unpersuasive........................ 52

ES IEA Sr ae ARS PT I I 55

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,

TL a 34, 49

Alaska Eskimo Whaling Comm'n v. EPA,

791 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2015)...........................00. 21

Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA,

890 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1989)........0...00..00.000.. passim

Arkansas v. Oklahoma,

I eieedioline 7

Atchison, Topeka & San‘a Fe Ry. Co. v.

Pena,

44 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 1994), affd, 516

a | cauiebininseibameseiebndeidlionl 51

Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.,

EE EE ES 40

Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA,

538 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1976) .......... sannsiiiindis 32, 38, 40

Bowen v. Massachusetts,

TTT EI OEE RT a 52

California v. Carney,

iri esdiuicincenninieteingsnsiinnnsimninhenes 50

x

Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout

Unlimited v. EPA,

8 F. Supp. 3d 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d,

846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017) ................ccccceeeees 33, 53

Circuit City Stores, Inc. vy. Adams,

Pe ee i circceindccccksinsscercevticussentianmasnaiael 30

Clark v. Rameker,

pe ee err 27

In re Clean Water Rule,

MDL No. 2663, Dkt. 163 (JPML Oct. 13,

Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska

Conservation Council,

ae Cs ee i tesicsannrenscucinicsosntiinsctatunadosaioamiiania 8

Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle,

OE Ces Se idetiienescnsastninssntinnsumsapabanih passim

Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.,

Ae He Py SEE I ircecincnsvecinctontner medicines passim

E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co. v. Train,

Gr Cr Be iiiticcksviccccctadinssiniacickiciaenia passim

Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury,

Oe ee Se cccnneecdnsecenssnensmecsunnauaiadl 44, 45

Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion,

SF ee. Ce ccdrtcntnitticitrsanctisestssnsiaittnindenian 54

Friends of Earth v. EPA,

333 F.3d 184 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ........ccccccccceeeeee 38, 39

xi

Friends of the Everglades v. EPA,

699 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2012).................... passim

Georgia v. McCarthy,

2015 WL 5092568 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 27,

SuIIIIIAll iat aliiddhnhedbcdedimeseotdencuscssececcesece savecseess 13

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,

Nee esusbenti 43

Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P.,

EE 44

Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,

EE ee 30

Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake

Bay Found., Inc.,

EET 20

Hertz Corp. v. Friend,

ee 5, 44, 45, 47

Inv. Co. Inst. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed.

Reserve Sys.,

661 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1977)............................ 13

Jimenez v. Quarterman,

I, In... scnescsesncsctonsees Dae 22

Kloeckner v. Solis,

a cstuabecionnsounen 43

Kucana v. Holder,

Se 20, 54

xll

Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga.,

ER RS SS een 5, 44

Leocal v. Ashcroft,

EA ee eee Mee 49

Lockhart v. United States,

a 25

Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen,

980 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1992).................. 38, 40, 48

Mathis v. United States,

136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016)................-cecceeesevees ssecbionind 40

McDonnell v. United States,

| ———_—_—_— ENCEEE TTT ETT EE 38

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.

v. Manning,

ee Se cncnsinnincescnunsdibicininbesnenneniinnans 45

Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’

Sea Clammers Ass'n,

a cuiaas 2

Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA,

2015 WL 5062506 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 26,

Bee iledeiectaivtsichy tchasnctsenanteiphseminpiiniiaaieanbiaiinineniiin 13

Nader v. EPA,

850 F.2d 747 (Oth Cir. 1968)..............00..0...000000000 54

Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA,

808 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 2015) ....................c.cceeeeeees 21

xii

National Cotton Council of America v. EPA,

553 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009).......................... 15, 16

NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc.,

187 S. Ct. GBD CBOIT)..........-.0.2.-.0.0.c0ceces0ce-eees 24, 27

North Dakota vy. EPA,

127 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (D.N.D. 2015).............. 13, 25

NRDC v. EPA,

673 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1982)........................ 39, 45

Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. EPA,

537 F.3d 1006 (Sth Cir. 2008)....................000000000 23

Obergefell v. Hodges,

a ceescnamanion = eaten 50

Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust,

a nineicineiebinaindiied 22

Rapanos v. United States,

4 EA 7, 8, 10, 34

Roll Coater, Inc. v. Reilly,

932 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1991).......................... 13, 50

Sackett v. EPA,

ET eae ae 38, 48, 55

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook

County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,

ee RRR EE 10, 49

South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee

Tribe,

A ee Oe 6

XiV

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co.,

a clttpemiesinsemunnnebs 48

United States v. Bean,

I eeieinmetelll 41

United States v. Mendoza,

a cpceisealanngd 50

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,

pe 10

Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States,

Le ace 54

Upper Blackstone Water Pollution

Abatement Dist. v. EPA,

ED SE, BIE cccccccatodocsecunsecconsseascsonses 21

VEPCO v. Costle,

566 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1977).................00..cccccceee0 39

Statutes and Regulations

5 U.S.C.

SI saints taicapeisieaaidiensnaniinaninnaincteanienmneabliniin, devine 3

iach dinthabiens Genbednicinseihnbininniiidibilesteiniiepianinieatiaiiakan 3, 52

Sia tiiiicieiiecudetnanndntaunl silk decesamiddintinntitiaabeelieae 52

EERE EEE SE ce aT ee Semen NESE 3

sisi cartaaealednaliaitciabeninniptpinnnpenaniailian 12

28 U.S.C.

ST issiccisiitpstnsiervteniertiiieripainnntiancaeciaidaiimiieinienaiaiiiiidl 2

IIIT ihacriciaitateciaaiienbeianeteiieldaieigattmenabtnntiinideinail 4, 52

SII Lis npcinchtatacadnitndalonsniteeneencdgannasiesinemamannia 52

ESD at ert LAT ioe Ate oer TE 13

| ERS EE eR ARS 3

33 U.S.C.

aia aise dail ied iene ae 2, 34

%SGZ isos 6

SIT icntbintiernnbepemcaieiainapebesieenmmbbeteciundditebaadds 34

EEE 9

SIT Diciendeksnceinontaneiinapealodeuconitiuininteiieniniasniiinindl 34

TEESE a 34

iI sti dhiteachideeinantdiainenintielgadaniaiiaale 34

SIT Coporseniahcidgnnnivensapiineinaibiienniinanajcanenseeniiienlianl 9

STITT riidsiictiasehinnaieaithdatandsiiibbaisnudiieanenaanetebadiiad 34

TESTE SNR E Ee a LE AE eA. 34

STII hcsicistispsduiatahissidiee hiecnsioninasibiasniiniesaididsenmete 34

RIE a ne PORE NMR 9

TIT idiieicihnecipsheesiisibtiigianpbeiatentinamunedaealigumiiaianiaiiinainn 34

SIT tii nccendinuthsiiidententigemeaninitemntentnsiincgammnbiailll passim

SEF SEERA CESSES ote euranmoe 6, 32, 33, 34

STITT ns iienrscsiidaeintheiieiihnaiiiniinebeianacmetdaielteaa 7, 27, 31

IIT iiesliseetadipuscddituanepsenentaiaiieniiiedigngempsngitenaaan 36

ETE Te ME passim

ican ceaceeidteeatintgt tat len 7

SIT iiistsciriesneptntisdiininsiiimalitt eonpcaianipiesmasiiial 38

I ee 38

tsi ceeteaihdcianipaicipssiaiieh autem phaieaicbdenlil 8, 38

IIIT cidslhisionensinmpieshdnicsieionnannenainiiasinsecbeibemsantadadeiall 39

SE tticisnntcisiasaheiiadmnipigpniaiguiidenbineiapiianiaaiel 34, 36

ETS e ae eee te RECT 3, 8, 27

IT sisicinsctadinneasinapsbeaissinniinaidenambvienpendpebesaiiamsiadiatal 34

SII nidhicctcsiseintaddinhtihinageapsiangininennidnsonuioaeiamaiabaiill 9

ECTS RE, SET PRESSES a ao UR A passim

Ti os ctentnécianiuninibianineilecdnnaiiinediiendiengamsasdiniall 31

ARE De ene ree RANT A 27, 46

LETT, as EN eS eT NORTE So 26, 32, 34

EE ESE eA mp 7

IE EEE eee Rane a DICED ee IES > 21

aL Oe Se 37

Sic tailed deicinoedea blepiditesdledinbidiabladeiabamianiaiinduesill 48

EERE ESE A vw a eve Caney nnrD Mare SN eer EDP 34

III sitet iced i atieaseemeamiinbiabsatiemianiss auileeelll 34

EE ES SE Ee Darcie Mee RN 32

IIIT cise idea dditeiaepicinian ninolmibammabiadand 8, 34

SIT isiricconcsiuniaieneidichataaieandeieaiaielsnidtaidbciebinatinnaameeedaliil 9

| EEE nen een ten EES. 34

REESE Sr Cer SASL 5 eM a 9

ET ctiesiticaaiinli nl cadlariaiilhtaleniaddepanmionanpiiliiia passim

SEI ERAS CEN eR Annes MaciieMe wes TAY 7

chi iciade sein ilineeb tines aauiuaeae 3, 7, 26

Si cst eaieiocnostankannisioeneebsbunadeenesincndiieaniiaiaial 6

ERIE a ane er aoa Me passim

ENTE RSE SAS RATE ARNLE 8

ES TCE ae Me one EREN knees 8, 46

TE SRO eaee ney... SS 8

ali idle ace 46

TT liciicciasnccilssibditmaeii ceases ahebdbaniancigteaddmasaidaaiall 46

lash iaseodiclssintesidilicina bated nsiinaiabaniadeiaiael passim

ee 31

TE A TEE ORE Rape mer uIr eS * 34

al aaa lati ellnti aa ae 15, 32, 33

EE AS co aa CREM EB ent 33

SII iitirk sds cduicdediiedaisiiatninigtanthissempadiaduainasa tiie 33

I a carnal 6, 17, 32, 35

Sn tciiiiinctinscleicsenaniuginapstbegsdendesnmenanimiinnane 28

ESE LCA SERS A nS ar eee nee ORCI AE 6, 32, 33

TEETER TEER Ree Meme meee mae”: 6, 33

| ERAS ENTE RSET REYES REBT OE fF” 6

EE Ce a eee eee ENT * 34

SERS A EH ae ctre ee MEN ee ae 4

ESSAI ce BNR mee 15, 36

Ss sgancncdenaigcennenbainninediinnnbniaddebanetitnenten passim

SII Th cecal ciaisscadiiilininiengbensennpeduntiendidaainebsbeniabale 34

SI iiichciaheniheunlidegiiiddissianmieiemiiiackabiidetmbadidiaddaiad 34

SI isiiciscecasscucsahilsibichinandiiianbiiihiihaieissbiaiadibepiiadiencntenias 34

42 U.S.C

I a all 41

Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-

95, 91 Stat. 685 (Aug. 7, 1977) ..................000000000 43

Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-

217, 91 Stat. 1566 (Dec. 27, 1977)...................00.- 42

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500........... 41

33 C.F.R.

i a a cea cel Lal 11

a 11, 12

40 C.F.R.

CSE NR eo ee sais oeas 6, 33, 53

inl stidisdainpiiheininne winhadooodibmmlibtnietaiiadiaae 6

ARTE SN een aEmn NNR REIEE EE Pay 6

aa inal eel 27

TTL inti tinea hate cia aabiddintnadalinegneieedeiaiaimed 7

al 26, 31

Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of

the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054

RIESE PERS Far EE are a passim

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 82 Fed.

es I IS Gl i cincccccsecstesesscussenevescneies 12

xVl1ll

Miscellaneous

Benjamin Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE

DUE, Fe CED cece ceccccscacccccccccsesccceccesses 50

123 Cong. Rec. S. 26,754 (Aug. 4, 1977)................... 42

EPA & U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,

Economic Analysis of the EPA-Army

Clean Water Rule (May 2015)..........................040- 11

EPA, NPDES PERMIT WRITER’S GUIDE

is ccieaabaenanaih 26, 31

The Fiscal Year 2016 EPA Budget: Joint

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy

& Power & the Subcomm. on

Environment & Economy of the House

Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th

RE RC SE 22

H.R Rep. No. 92-911 (1972), reprinted in 1

Leg. Hist. of the Water Pollution Control

Act of 1972 (Comm. Print 1973).......................... 42

Allison LaPlante et al., On Judicial Review

Under the Clean Water Act in the Wake

of Decker v. Northwest Environmental

Defense Center: What We Know Now

and What We Have Yet to Find Out, 43

Re EE a 41

Joseph W. Mead & Nicholas A. Fromherz,

Choosing a Court to Review the

Executive, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2015).....47, 53, 54

xix

Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and

the Administrative Lawmaking System,

138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990) ............................ 50

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,

READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF

Ie II vicdccnacnecccsvnsincetecesensisonccncscseces 30

S. Conf. Rep. 92-1236 (1972), reprinted in

kk SS 28

THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK (Mark A.

ics, GENS BENNIE Mi cnceceneccntenecenescneensecenesenensonss 21

Webster's Third New International

RR A 29

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER!

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1la-

47a) is reported at 817 F.3d 261. The court of appeals’

denial of rehearing en banc, which is unreported, is re-

produced at Pet. App. 51a-52a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals denying all

motions to dismiss the petitions for review for lack of

jurisdiction was entered on February 22, 2016. Pet.

App. 48a-50a. The court of appeals’ order denying

rehearing en banc was entered on April 21, 2016. Id. at

| Petitioner the National Association of Manufacturers (“the

NAM”) filed suit challenging the waters of the United States Rule

in district court as part of a broad-based coalition of 18 industry

groups. Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n, et al. v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-165

(S.D. Tex.). When that coalition also filed a protective petition for

review in the Sixth Circuit, it agreed that the NAM would not join

the petition, so as to ensure that the NAM could challenge the

Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction.

The NAM’s fellow coalition members, petitioners in No. 15-3850,

filed a brief as respondents in support of the NAM’s certiorari

petition. These respondents—the American Farm Bureau

Federation; American Forest & Paper Association; American Pet-

roleum Institute; American Road and Transportation Builders

Association; Greater Houston Builders Association; Leading

Builders of America; Matagorda County Farm Bureau; National

Alliance of Forest Owners; National Association of Home Builders;

National Association of Realtors; National Cattlemen’s Beef

Association; National Corn Growers Association; National Mining

Association; National Pork Producers Council; National Stone,

Sand, and Gravel Association; Public Lands Council; Texas Farm

Bureau; and U.S. Poultry & Egg Association—each fully supports

and joins in the arguments made in this brief and will not be filing

a separate brief.

2

5la. On July 1, 2016, Justice Kagan extended the time

to file a petition for certiorari to September 2, 2016.

This Court granted a timely filed petition for certiorari

on January 13, 2017. Jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1).

STATUTES AND REGULATION INVOLVED

Relevant portions of the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq., are reproduced in an Addendum.

The Waters of the United States Rule (““WOTUS Rule”

or “Rule”) is published at Clean Water Rule: Definition

of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054

(June 29, 2015). =

STATEMENT

A. Introduction

Section 509(b) of the Clean Water Act (“CWA” or

“Act”), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b), provides for “judicial review

in the United States courts of appeals of various

particular actions by the [EPA] Administrator.”

Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Natl Sea

Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1981). The seven

categories of action specified in Section 1369(b)(1) are

EPA Administrator action

(A) in promulgating any standard of perform-

ance under section 1316 of this title [for new

sources of discharges],

(B) in making any determination pursuant to

section 1316(b)(1)(C) of this title,

(C) in promulgating any effluent standard,

prohibition, or pretreatment standard under

section 1317 of this title [for toxic pollutants or

pollutants introduced into treatment works],

3

(D) in making any determination as to a State

permit program submitted under section

1342(b) of this title,

(E) in approving or promulgating any effluent

limitation or other limitation under section

1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345 of this title,

(F) in issuing or denying any permit under

section 1342 of this title, and

(G) in promulgating any individual control

strategy under section 1314(J) of this title [to

address toxic pollutant discharges] * * *.

Jurisdiction in the courts of appeals over challenges to

those EPA actions is not only original, but also

“exclusive.” Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct.

1326, 1334 (2013). And “an application for review must

be lodged in the court of appeals within 120 days of the

Administrator's action, §1369(b)(1).” Ibid.

Challenges to final agency action under the CWA

not covered by Section 1369(b)—including all actions

by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) in

administering permits for discharges of dredged and

fill material under Section 1344—are governed by the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.

(“APA”). The APA provides that “[a] person suffering

legal wrong” or “adversely affected or aggrieved by

agency action” may bring suit in district court for

judicial review of any “final agency action for which

there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C.

§§ 702, 704. An APA suit may be brought within six

years of the challenged agency action. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2401(a).

Section 1369(b) thus “extends only to certain suits

challenging some agency actions” taken by one of the

federal agencies that, along with the States, are

4

responsible for implementing the CWA. Decker, 133 S.

Ct. at 13834 (emphasis added). Litigants whose claims

fall outside those narrow confines may invoke the

jurisdiction of the district court under the APA and 28

U.S.C. § 1331.2

In this case, challengers filed numerous petitions

for review of the final WOTUS Rule promulgated

jointly by EPA and the Corps. 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054

(June 29, 2015). That Rule significantly revised the

scope of the Clean Water Act by redefining the phrase

“the waters of the United States.” Rejecting intervenor

the NAM’s and other motions to dismiss the petitions

for lack of jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit held that it

had original jurisdiction over the rule challenges by

virtue of Section 1369(b)(1)(F). Following circuit

precedent that the judge who supplied the controlling

vote deemed “incorrect” (Pet. App. 44a), the majority

held that the petitions for review fell under Subsection

(F) because they challenged an EPA “regulation

‘governing” permitting pursuant to the National

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”)

established in 33 U.S.C. § 1342. Pet. App. 44a.

The agencies, in their brief in opposition to

certiorari, defended the Sixth Circuit’s judgment on the

additional ground—rejected by the majority below—

that the WOTUS Rule falls under Section 1369(b)(1)(E)

because it “approvies] or promulgaties] any effluent

limitation or other limitation under section 1311, 1312,

1316, or 1345.” See Br. for Fed. Resps. in Opp. 11, 13-

14 (“Fed. BIO”). Accordingly, the applicability of both

2 Section 1365 governs citizen enforcement actions, including

claims that the Administrator failed to perform a non-

discretionary duty. Congress provided that “[t]he district courts

shall have jurisdiction” over such claims. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).

5

Subsections (E) and (F) to the petitions for review is

before this Court.

A majority of the Sixth Circuit panel correctly

recognized that it is “illogical and unreasonable” to

conclude that either Subsection (E) or (F) governs

challenges to the WOTUS Rule. Pet. App. 29a (Griffin,

J., concurring in judgment); see id. at 45a (Keith, J.,

dissenting). The Rule does not fit within the plain and

unambiguous language of either subsection. The Rule

defines a basic jurisdictional term used throughout the

CWA; it does not approve or promulgate an effluent or

other limitation under any of the specified provisions of

the Act, or issue or deny any permit under the NPDES

program. A plain reading of statutory text is enough to

require reversal. And it is the only approach that

produces a “[s]imple jurisdictional rule” that promotes

“predictability” and under which courts “can readily

assure themselves of their power to hear a case.” Hertz

Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010).

Other considerations confirm that conclusion.

Canons of statutory interpretation, statutory structure,

legislative history, the principle that “jurisdictional

rules should be clear” (Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of

Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 621 (2002)), and the

presumption that agency action is reviewable all

contradict the agencies’ position and support reversal.

And contrary to the agencies’ contention, this Court’s

decisions in E.J. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,

430 U.S. 112 (1977), and Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v.

Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980), are readily distinguishable

and in any event cast no doubt on that analysis.

This Court should reverse the judgment of the

court of appeals and order dismissal! of the petitions for

review for want of jurisdiction.

6

B. The Clean Water Act

Congress enacted the Clean Water Act to eliminate

“the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters.”

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1). Section 1311(a) of the Act

generally prohibits “the discharge of any pollutant by

any person” without a permit. A “discharge of a

pollutant” means “any addition of any pollutant to

navigable waters from any point source,” such as a

pipe, ditch or other “confined and discrete conveyance.”

Id. § 1362(12), (14). “Navigable waters,” in turn, are

defined as “the waters of the United States.” Id.

§ 1362(7).

Accordingly, whether a feature qualifies as a

“water of the United States” is only one factor, along

with other complex inquiries—such as whether an

activity involves an “addition” of a “pollutant” from a

“point source”’—that determines whether a CWA

permit is required for an activity. That determination

depends too on whether exclusions to permitting

requirements apply, such as those for certain water

transfers,’ stormwater discharges from most logging

operations,* agricultural return flows,® certain

discharges from mining, oil, or gas operations,® and

others. By itself, determining that a feature is a “water

of the United States” tells one nothing about how land

may be used or whether an activity requires or

qualifies for a permit; instead it leads to a further

inquiry focused on other statutory and regulatory

3 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.30); South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v.

Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95 (2004)

4 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(1)(ii), (b)(14)(ii); Decker, 133 S. Ct.

1326.

5 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(2)(1).

6 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(1)(2), § 1362(6)(b), (24).

7

factors that, together, determine what and how

substantive rules apply.

The CWA permitting programs. The Act establishes

two permitting programs to regulate discharges of

pollutants into the waters of the United States. The

NPDES program established in 33 U.S.C. § 1342

authorizes EPA to issue permits for discharges that do

not involve fill material—generally, effluent

discharges. An NPDES permit imposes effluent limits

based on the technology available to treat the

pollutants. It restricts “the quantities, rates, and

concentrations of specified [pollutants] which are

discharged from point sources.” Arkansas v. Oklahoma,

503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992); see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A)-

(B), 1317(a), 1342(a)(3), (b)(1)(A).

Sometimes technology-based limits are insufficient

to achieve water quality standards “promulgated by

the States [to] establish the desired condition of a

waterway.” Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 101. In that event,

permits also impose any more stringent limits or

strategies necessary to achieve water quality

standards. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1312(a). Most

States administer the Section 1342 permit program

within their own borders, as authorized under Section

1342(b).

Section 1344 establishes a separate permit

program, administered by the Corps of Engineers, for

“the discharge of dredged or fill material into the

navigable waters.” That program applies to discharges

of “solids that do not readily wash downstream”

(Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 723 (2006)

(plurality)) and so “changfe] the bottom elevation” of

water. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2. In determining whether to

issue a Section 1344 permit, the Corps applies criteria

developed by both EPA and the Corps pursuant to

8

Section 1344(b)(1). EPA also has the authority to veto

the specification of a site for discharge of fill material.

33 U.S.C. § 1344(c); see Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast

Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 266-269

(2009). Two States operate the Section 1344 program

under Section 1344(g).

The CWA’s jurisdictional terms define the

geographic scope of the entire statute. The terms

“navigable waters” and “waters of the United States”

define the geographic reach of the Act’s two permitting

schemes, but also that of “the entire statute.” Rapanos,

547 U.S. at 742. Those terms appear repeatedly

throughout the 1972 Act and its later amendments to

establish the geographic scope of regulatory programs

and actions. For example:

e Section 1313(c)(2)(A) requires each State to

establish water quality standards based on “the

designated uses of the navigable waters” within

its borders, subject to EPA oversight and EPA’s

authority to promulgate water quality standards

if the State does not adequately do so. See 33

U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3).

e Section 1314(J requires each State to identify

“all navigable waters in such State” that cannot

meet State water quality standards due to point-

source discharges of toxic pollutants, and to

develop “an individual control strategy” to

address those discharges, which EPA must

approve or reject and which EPA may

promulgate itself if the State fails to do so. See

33 U.S.C. § 1314()(2), (3).

e Section 1329 requires each State to identify

“navigable waters within the state” that cannot

meet State water quality standards “without

additional action to control nonpoint sources of

9

pollution,” and to establish a program of best

management practices and other measures for

controlling such pollution, which EPA may

approve, disapprove, modify, or implement itself

if the State fails to do so. See 33 U.S.C.

§ 1329(d).

e Section 1252(a) requires the Administrator to

“develop comprehensive programs for prevent-

ing, reducing, or eliminating the pollution of the

navigable waters * * *.”

e Section 1256(e) conditions certain federal grants

to the States on the adequacy of their

monitoring of “the quality of navigable waters.”

e Section 1288(b)(4) provides for State areawide

waste treatment management plans to include

best management practices to control discharges

of “dredged or fill material which adversely

affects navigable waters,” in lieu of obtaining a

Section 1344 permit.

e Section 1315(b) requires each State to provide

regular, detailed reports to EPA on “the water

quality of all navigable waters in such State.”

e Section 1341(a)(1) conditions receipt of any

federal license or permit for any activity “which

may result in any discharge into the navigable

waters” on obtaining “a certification from the

State in which the discharge originates” that the

discharge complies with specified requirements.

Accordingly, the term “waters of the United States”

is one element, albeit an important one, of a reticulated

statutory scheme with many components that work

together. It defines the geographic reach of most of the

CWA’s requirements, but by itself requires no action. It

imposes no obligation except when applied in

conjunction with other, separate statutory concepts.

10

This Court has previously addressed the term

“waters of the United States.” This Court considered

the meaning of the term “waters of the United States”

in the CWA in three cases. In United States v.

Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135

(1985), this Court concluded that the agencies

permissibly interpreted “waters of the United States”

to encompass wetlands that abut traditional navigable

waters. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook

County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159

(2001) “SWANCC”), it struck down the agencies’

“Migratory Bird Rule,” which purported to extend

agency jurisdiction to any waters that are or might be

used as habitat for migratory birds, no matter how

isolated or remote from navigable waters. And in

Rapanos, the Court reversed the agencies’ determin-

ation that they had jurisdiction over wetlands that “lie

near ditches or man-made drains that eventually

empty into traditional navigable waters,” which swept

in “virtually any parcel of land containing a channel or

conduit * * * through which rainwater or drainage may

occasionally or intermittently flow.” 547 U.S. at 722,

729 (plurality); see id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring)

(applying a “significant nexus” test).

C. The Waters of the United States Rule

The WOTUS Rule purports to define “waters of the

United States” within the meaning of the CWA and

Rapanos, SWANCC, and Riverside Bayview. 80 Fed.

Reg. at 37,054. The agencies describe their WOTUS

Rule as “a definitional rule that clarifies the scope of

the Clean Water Act.” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,104. They say

that it “does not establish any regulatory

requirements.” Jd. at 37,054. And they claim it

“imposes no enforceable duty on any state, local, or

tribal governments, or the private sector.” Id. at

37,102; see also EPA & Corps, Economic Analysis of the

11

EPA-Army Clean Water Rule 61 (May 2015) (“The final

rule is not designed to ‘subject’ any entities of any size

to any specific regulatory burden” but “to clarify the

statutory scope of ‘the waters of the United States”);

id. at vii (“This rule does not result in any direct costs

or benefits * * *. A finding of jurisdiction regarding a

particular water does not incur any direct costs”).

The WOTUS Rule separates waters into three

jurisdictional groups. In the first group are waters that

are categorically jurisdictional: (1) traditional

navigable waters, (2) interstate waters, (3) territorial

seas, (4) impoundments of any water deemed to be a

“water of the United States,” (5) certain tributaries,

and (6) certain waters that are “adjacent” to the

foregoing five categories of waters. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).

In the second group are waters “that require a

case-specific significant nexus evaluation” to determine

if they are jurisdictional. 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,073.

Waters that are subject to jurisdiction based on a case-

specific significant nexus determination include:

(A) waters, any part of which are within the 100-year

floodplain of a traditional navigable water, interstate

water, or territorial sea; or (B) waters, any part of

which are within 4,000 feet of the ordinary high water

mark of any of those jurisdictional waters, any

impoundment of those jurisdictional waters, or any

covered tributary. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(8).

In the third group are waters excluded from

jurisdiction. These include: swimming pools, puddles,

ornamental waters, prior converted cropland, waste

treatment systems, some drainage ditches, farm and

stock watering ponds, settling basins, water-filled

depressions incidental to mining or construction

activity, subsurface drainage systems, and certain

wastewater recycling structures. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b).

12

Petitioners challenging the WOTUS Rule have

shown that it is deeply flawed both in substance and

procedure and that the breadth and uncertainty of its

definitions violate this Court’s precedents and the Act.

The Rule is arbitrary and capricious and not in

accordance with law and consequently violates the

APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D). See Br. for the Business

and Municipal Ptrs., In re Clean Water Rule, No. 15-

3751 cons., Dkt. 129-1 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2016).7 The

merits of the Rule, however, are not at issue here.

Merits litigation has been held in abeyance pending

this Court’s ruling on which court has jurisdiction.

The agencies issued a notice of proposed rule-

making announcing their “intention to review and

rescind or revise” the WOTUS Rule. 82 Fed. Reg.

12497 (Mar. 3, 2017). This Court denied the agencies’

motion to hold this case in abeyance pending that

review. Order (Apr. 3, 2017).

D. Judicial Review Of The Rule

Scores of state, municipal, industry, and environ-

mental plaintiffs filed suits challenging the WOTUS

Rule in district courts. See supra p. v. The NAM filed

suit, as part of a coalition of industry groups, in the

Southern District of Texas. See supra n.1.

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation

denied the agencies’ request to consolidate the district

court actions and to transfer them to the District Court

for the District of Columbia. See In re Clean Water

Rule, MDL No. 2663, Dkt. 163 (JPML Oct. 13, 2015).

The Judicial Panel held that transfer was

inappropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 because the

complaints turn on issues of law and “different

7 Except where otherwise indicated, docket references throughout

this brief (“Dkt.”) are to this Sixth Circuit docket.

13

jurisdictional rulings by the involved courts” counseled

against consolidation. Jd. at 2.

Reflecting the uncertainty surrounding the scope of

Section 1369(b) and the exclusivity of its grant of

jurisdiction, many plaintiffs who filed district court

actions (but not petitioner the NAM) also filed

“protective” petitions for review in various courts of

appeals, as courts have acknowledged is appropriate.

E.g., Inv. Co. Inst. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve

Sys., 551 F.2d 1270, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (If any

doubt as to the proper forum exists, careful counsel

should file suit in both the court of appeals and the

district court”); Roll Coater, inc. v. Reilly, 932 F.2d 668,

671 (7th Cir. 1991) (“careful counsel must respond to

the combination of uncertain opportunities for review

and § [1369(b)(2)] by filing buckshot petitions”). Those

petitions were consolidated and transferred to the

Sixth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a). Cons.

Order, MCP No. 135 (JPML July 28, 2015).8

The agencies movec to stay or dismiss cases in the

district courts in favor of the circuit court litigation.

Some district courts held that the Sixth Circuit had

exclusive jurisdiction. E.g., Murray Energy Corp. v.

EPA, 2015 WL 5062506 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 26, 2015);

Georgia v. McCarthy, 2015 WL 5092568 (S.D. Ga. Aug.

27, 2015), case stayed on appeal, 833 F.3d 1317 (11th

Cir. 2016). The District Court for the District of North

Dakota, by contrast, held it had jurisdiction. North

Dakota v. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1053 (D.N.D.

2015) (“If the exceptionally expansive view” of Section

1369(b) “advocated by the government is adopted, it

would encompass virtually all EPA actions under the

8 The 22 petitions for review and more than 100 petitioners are

identified supra pp. ii-v.

14

Clean Water Act”); id., 3:15-cv-59, Dkt. 156 (D.N.D.

May 24, 2016) (staying case “pending further decision

by the Courts of Appeals or Supreme Court”).

E. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision

The NAM successfully moved to intervene as a

respondent in the Sixth Circuit. Dkt. 8 (Sept. 16, 2015).

It then moved to dismiss the petitions for want of

jurisdiction (Dkt. 39 (Oct. 2, 2015)), as did many

parties that had filed protective petitions or

intervened.

The Sixth Circuit concluded, in a fractured 1-1-1

decision, that it and not the district courts had

jurisdiction to hear the rule challenges. The panel

agreed that Subsections (E) and (F’) were the “only two

provisions of § 1369(b)(1)” that “potentially apply” (Pet.

App. 8a), but otherwise splintered.

Judge McKeague’s opinion. Judge McKeague

recognized that the agencies’ textual arguments as to

Subsection (E) were “not compelling.” Pet. App. 9a.

“[T]he Rule’s clarified definition,” he wrote, does not

“approve or promulgate any limitation that imposes

ipso facto any restriction or requirement on point

source operators or permit issuers.” Jbid. (emphasis

added). “Rather,” it is “a definitional rule that, operat-

ing in conjunction with other regulations, will result in

imposition of such limitations.” Ibid.

Judge McKeague nevertheless concluded that

jurisdiction lies in the court of appeals under Sub-

section (E), citing this Court’s decision in E.J. du Pont

de Nemours & Co. v. Train, supra. He believed that du

Pont “eschewed” a “literal reading” of Section 1369-

(b)(1) in favor of a “more generou[s]” interpretation

that “further[ed] Congress’s evident purposes.” Pet.

App. 10a, 13a, 26a. Judge McKeague believed this

interpretation encompasses the WOTUS Rule because

15

the Rule’s “practical effect will be to indirectly produce

various limitations on point-source operators and

permit issuing authorities.” Id. at 17a.

Turning to Subsection (F), Judge McKeague

recognized that the Rule does not “issue” or “deny” any

permits, but declined to give the provision “a strict

literal application.” Pet. App. 17a. He pointed to this

Court’s opinion in Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle,

supra, and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in National

Cotton Council of America v. EPA, 653 F.3d 927 (6th

Cir. 2009), as supporting direct review in the circuit

courts of any regulation that “affects permitting

requirements.” Pet. App. 19a (emphasis added).

Judge Griffin’s concurrence. Judge Griffin

concurred in the judgment only. He concluded that the

Sixth Circuit lacked jurisdiction under the “plain text”

of Subsection (E) because the Rule is not an “effluent

limitation or other limitation,” and also “does not

emanate from” Sections 1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345, but

“is 2 phrase used in the Act’s definitional section,

§ 1362,” which “is not mentioned in § 1369.” Pet. App.

30a-31a. He read du Pont to authorize review under

Subsection (E) of EPA regulations that “promulgate

effluent limitations,” no more. Id. at 34a.

Judge Griffin further concluded that “[o]n its face,

subsection (F) clearly does not apply” because the Rule

“neither issues nor denies a permit under the NPDES.”

Pet. App. 39a. But he concurred in the judgment

because, in his view, the Sixth Circuit’s earlier (and

“incorrect’) decision in “National Cotton dictates [the]

conclusion” that Subsection (F) encompasses the

WOTUS Rule. Id. at 42a, 44a. Judge Griffin

nevertheless criticized that conclusion because it

means that Subsection (F)’s “jurisdictional reach” has

16

“no end,” catching “anything relating to permitting.”

Id. at 42a.

Judge Keith’s dissent. Judge Keith dissented. He

joined Judge Griffin in holding Subsection (E£)

inapplicable on its face. Pet. App. 45a. Turning to

Subsection (F), he refused to read National Cotton to

authorize original jurisdiction over “all rules ‘relating’

to [permitting] procedures, such as the one at issue

here,” which “merely defines the scope of the term

‘waters of the United States.” Id. at 46a.

The Sixth Circuit denied rehearing. Pet. App. 51a-

52a. It held merits briefing in abeyance after this

Court granted certiorari. Dkt. 171-2 (Jan. 25, 2017).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I. The Sixth Circuit’s erroneous exercise of

jurisdiction under Section 1369(b) violates the statute’s

plain language and structure.

A. Contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, it lacks

jurisdiction under Section 1369(b)(1)(F). It is

undisputed that the WOTUS Rule does not “issu[e] or

den[y] any permit under section 1342.” It therefore lies

outside Subsection (F)’s unambiguous text. That fact

should end the analysis.

In stretching Subsection (F) to reach all EPA

actions that affect the granting or denying of Section

1342 permits, Judge McKeague misread this Court’s

decision in Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, supra,

which did involve EPA’s denial of a permit. His

rewriting of Subsection (F) would cover most agency

action under the CWA and render superfluous

Subsections (A), (C), (D), (E), and (G) of Section

1369(b)(1).

B. A majority of the panel correctly determined

that Section 1369(b)(1)(E) does not confer jurisdiction

17

on the court of appeals. The Rule falls outside

Subsection (E)’s plain language because it is not a

“limitation,” it is not an “other limitation” within the

meaning of Subsection (E), and it was not issued

“ynder section 1311.” To the contrary, the Rule

addresses a phrase in Section 1362(7) that defines the

geographic scope of the Act as a whole and thus

impacts dozens of CWA provisions just as or more

directly than Section 1311. And it limits no action: any

limitation arises only when multiple additional

statutory terms, like “addition,” “pollutant,” and “point

source,” also apply, and when exclusions from

permitting requirements are ruled out.

In eschewing a literal reading, Judge McKeague

misinterpreted Subsection (E) to extend to any EPA

action that merely affects point source operators or

permit issuers. In doing so he misread this Court’s

decision in E.J. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,

supra, which involved industry-wide effluent

limitations issued under Section 1311. His analysis has

no stopping point, conflicts with this Court’s recent

holdings, and would render other provisions

redundant.

C. Section 1369(b)’s structure confirms the Sixth

Circuit’s lack of jurisdiction. Congress enacted seven

narrow bases for original jurisdiction in the courts of

appeals. Its specific focus shows that Congress did not

intend Section 1369(b) to provide courts of appeals

with original jurisdiction to review all nationwide rule-

making under the CWA. Congress's markedly different

language in the Clean Air Act’s judicial review

provisions reinforces this conclusion. There, Congress

granted courts of appeals jurisdiction to review all

nationally, regionally, or locally applicable regulations.

Congress’s omission of similarly broad language from

the CWA must be given meaning.

18

D. Legislative history bolsters this conclusion.

Although there is scant legislative history surrounding

the enactment of Section 1369(b) in 1972, in 1977,

Senator Kennedy attempted, with EPA support, to

expand Section 1369(b) to cover nationwide

rulemaking. He was unsuccessful, yet that same

Congress expanded the Clean Air Act’s direct judicial-

review provisions to include nationwide rulemaking.

The negative implication raised by Congress’s

disparate actions is compelling.

II. Because Section 1369(b)’s plain language

resolves this case, there is no need to consider the

policy implications of Congress’s allocation of

jurisdiction. There are, nevertheless, strong policy

reasons that support Congress’s choice.

A. This Court has emphasized that jurisdictional

rules must be clear and administrable. Reading Section

1369(b) textually produces a_e straightforward

jurisdictional standard. Judge McKeague’s approach,

by contrast, fosters uncertainty over jurisdiction that

leads to wasteful litigation. By limiting Section 1369(b)

to its text, this Court can put an end to the wasteful

practice of duplicative district court and circuit court

challenges to agency action under the CWA.

B. Section 1369(b)’s preclusion provision compels a

narrow interpretation of the statute. Section 1369(b)(2)

prohibits parties in criminal and civil enforcement

proceedings from challenging agency action that could

have been reviewed under Section 1369(b)(1). A broad

interpretation of Section 1369(b)(1) exacerbates the

CWA’s crushing penalties and creates due process

concerns by foreclosing judicial review of unlawful

agency action. A broad reading also increases Section

1369(b)(2)’s perverse incentive for parties to petition

19

for review of all agency action that conceivably falls

within Section 1369(b)(1).

C. A plain-language reading of Section 1369(b)

allows district courts and multiple courts of appeals to

review agency action and thereby improves the quality

of judicial decision-making. Disagreement among lower

courts increases the probability of correct decisions.

And having multiple courts review agency action will

ensure full percolation of issues in the lower courts and

improve this Court’s ability to decide which cases to

review. There is no reason to think that multi-court

review is less appropriate for agency action than for

other cases, such as those involving the meaning or

constitutionality of federal statutes.

D. Judge McKeague greatly overstated efficiency

gains under his atextual reading of Section 1369(b).

Whether review lies under Section 1369(b) or the APA,

challenges to important agency action typically will be

filed quickly. And parties often coordinate their rule

challenges to avoid duplicative litigation. District

courts are efficient in reviewing agency action and

adept at finding any facts relevant to such review. In

any event, efficiency concerns cannot override the plain

language of Section 1369(b). This Court should reverse

the Sixth Circuit's judgment and remand with

instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

ARGUMENT

The Sixth Circuit erred in ruling that it had

jurisdiction under Section 1369(b). “Section 1369(b)

extends only to certain suits challenging some agency

actions,” which the provision clearly identifies. Decker,

133 S. Ct. at 1334. It does not extend to suits

challenging the WOTUS Rule.

20

I. The Sixth Circuit Lacks Jurisdiction Under

The Plain Language Of Section 1369(b).

“A statute affecting federal jurisdiction ‘must be

construed both with , recision and with fidelity to the

terms by which Congress has expressed its wishes.”

Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 252 (2010). That

simple principle resolves this case. As Judges Griffin

and Keith explained, the Sixth Circuit lacks

jurisdiction under the unambiguous language of

Subsections 1369(b)(1)(E) and (F). See Pet. App. 29a

(Griffin, J.) (“it is illogical and unreasonable to read the

text of either subsection (E) or (F) as creating

jurisdiction in the courts of appeals”), 45a (Keith, J.)

(“under the plain meaning of the statute, neither

subsection (E) nor (F) * * * confers original jurisdiction

on the appellate courts”). The Sixth Circuit should

have dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction.

A. The Sixth Circuit Erroneously Exercised

Jurisdiction Under Section 1369(b)(1)(F).

We begin with Section 1369(b)(1)(F), under which

the Sixth Circuit took jurisdiction. Subsection (F)

grants courts of appeals original jurisdiction to review

“the Administrator’s action * * * in issuing or denying

any permit under section 1342.” As a matter of plain

statutory language and precedent, the Sixth Circuit

lacks jurisdiction under Subsection (F).

I. The WOTUS Rule Falls Outside The

Unambiguous Language Of Subsection

(F).

The WOTUS Rule is not an EPA action “issuing or

denying any permit under section 1342.” Permits

under Section 1342 “authoriz[e] the discharge of

pollutants” into jurisdictional waters “in accordance

with specified conditions.” Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.

v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 52 (1987).

21

Section 1342 permits contain “five general types of

provisions: technology-based effluent limitations,

water-quality-based effluent limitations, monitoring

and reporting requirements, standard conditions, and

special conditions.” THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK

33 (Mark A. Ryan ed., 3d ed. 2011). They are

enforceable by administrative actions and citizen suits.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1365.

There are plenty of examples in which EPA

actually issues or denies a permit under Section 1342;

those EPA actions may be directly reviewed by the

courts of appeals.®

Here, however, it is undisputed that the WOTUS

Rule does not issue or deny a Section 1342 permit. The

panel was unanimous on this point. Judge Griffin

observed that the WOTUS Rule “neither issues nor

denies a permit” and thus, “[{o]n its face, subsection (F)

clearly does not apply.” Pet. App. 39a. Judge Keith

agreed, writing that the Sixth Circuit lacks jurisdiction

“under the plain meaning” of Subsection (F). Jd. at 45a.

Even Judge McKeague conceded the point, admitting

that our reading is “consonant with the plain

language” of Subsection (F). Id. at 23a-24a.

The agencies have never claimed that the WOTUS

Rule issues or denies a Section 1342 permit. EPA’s

then-Administrator Gina McCarthy admitted that the

Rule does not do so: “[T]he Clean Water Rule is a

® See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 808 F.3d 566, 562 & n.4

(2d Cir. 2015) (challenging grant of Section 1342 permit to

vessels); Alaska Eskimo Whaling Comm'n v. EPA, 791 F.3d 1088,

1090-1091 (9th Cir. 2015) (challenging grant of Section 1342

permit to oil and gas exploration facilities); Upper Blackstone

Water Pollution Abatement Dist. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 9, 11, 20 (ist

Cir. 2012) (challenging grant of Section 1342 permit to sewage

treatment plant).

22

jurisdictional rule. It doesn’t result in automatic

permit decisions.” The Fiscal Year 2016 EPA Budget:

Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Power

& the Subcomm. on Environment & Economy of the

House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. 70

(Feb. 25, 2015).

The fact that the WOTUS Rule does not issue or

deny permits “should end the analysis.” Pet. App. 39a

(Griffin, J.). Statutory interpretation “begins ‘with the

language of the statute itself,’ and that ‘is also where

the inquiry should end,’ for ‘the statute’s language is

plain.” Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust,

136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016); accord Jimenez v.

Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009) (‘when the

statutory language is plain, we must enforce it

according to its terms”). Because the WOTUS Rule is

not an EPA action “issuing or denying any permit

under section 1342,” jurisdiction is lacking under

Section 1369(b)(1)(F).

2. Subsection (F) Does Not Extend To EPA

Actions That Merely Affect The Issuing

Or Denying Of Permits.

a. Despite conceding a lack of textual support,

Judge McKeague interpreted Section 1369(b)(1)(F) to

encompass any EPA action that “impacts the granting

and denying of permits.” Pet. App. 2la (emphasis

added). He believed that this Court’s decision in Crown

Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle “opened the door to

constructions other than a strict literal application”

and had allowed “the scope of direct circuit court

review [to] gradually expan[d]” over the decades. Id. at

17a, 26a. Judge McKeague misread Crown Simpson.

In Crown Simpson, EPA vetoed Section 1342

permits that a California agency had issued to pulp

mills in Eureka, California after EPA had delegated

23

permitting authority to the State. 445 U.S. at 194-195

& n.3. This Court held that the Ninth Circuit had

jurisdiction under Section 1369(b)(1)(F) to review the

mills’ challenges to EPA’s vetoes because the vetoes

were “functionally similar to [EPA’s] denial of a permit

in States which do not administer an approved permit-

issuing program” and had “the precise effect” of denying

the permits. Id. at 196 (emphasis added). The Court

explained that the CWA did not create “a seemingly

irrational bifurcated system” in which “denials of

NPDES permits would be reviewable at different levels

of the federal-court system depending on the fortuitous

circumstance of whether the State in which the case

arose was or was not authorized to issue permits.” Jd.

at 196-197.

EPA has successfully argued in other cases that

Crown Simpson was superseded by the 1977

amendments to the CWA.!° Regardless, “[t}]he facts of

[Crown Simpson] make clear that the Court

understood functional similarity in a narrow sense.”

Pet. App. 40a (Griffin, J.) (quoting Nw. Envil.

Advocates v. EPA, 537 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008)).

‘© The 1977 amendments gave EPA the power to iasue Section

1342 permits directly when States failed to revise State-proposed

permits to meet EPA's objections. See Crown Simpson, 445 U.S. at

194 n.2. The challenge in Crown Simpson preceded the

amendments, the impact of which this Court expressly “d[id] not

consider.” Ibid. Courts of appeals have since agreed with EPA that

the 1977 amendments supersede Crown Simpson's holding. As the

Seventh Circuit explained in Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 890

F.2d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 1989), the amendments “fundamentally

altered the underpinnings of’ Crown Simpson. “Under the old

system, an EPA objection effectively denied a permit.” Ibid. The

1977 amendments “allowjed] the EPA to issue a permit” on

revised terms “if the state refuses to modify its proposed permit,”

so that “an EPA objection to a proposed state permit is no longer

‘functionally similar’ to denying a permit.” Ibid.

24

In Crown Simpson, EPA denied Section 1342 permits:

EPA decided that specific permits proposed by a state

agency would not issue.

Crown Simpson thus merely held that EPA’s veto

of a state-issued permit is the denial of a Section 1342

permit covered by Subsection (F). That unexceptional

ruling cannot plausibly be read to authorize a vast

expansion of Subsection (F) to “apply to any

‘regulations relating to permitting” (Pet. App. 43a), as

Judge McKeague held here. Pet. App. 18a-24a.

Unlike the permit veto at issue in Crown Simpson,

the WOTUS Rule does not deny permits. The Rule

instead purports to define one aspect of the scope of the

CWA—its geographical reach. Nothing in Crown

Simpson suggests that a jurisdictional rule affecting

one factor that goes into a determination whether

permits are or are not required—along with other

factors such as whether there is an “addition” of a

“pollutant” from a “point source,” or whether any

statutory or regulatory exclusion from the permitting

requirement applies—is itself a permit denial or

issuance covered by Subsection (F).

Reading Crown Simpson expansively, as the

Eleventh Circuit concluded, “is contrary to the

statutory text.” Friends of the Everglades v. EPA, 699

F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2012). Congress could have

written Subsection (F) to apply to any EPA action

“relating to permitting” or “affecting when permits may

be required under Section 1342.” Its failure to “adopt

[that] readily available and apparent alternative

strongly supports’ the conclusion” that Section 1369(b)

does not authorize such broad court of appeals

jurisdiction. NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 1378. Ct. 929, 939

(2017).

25

b. As Judges Griffin and Keith recognized, it is

difficult to imagine any case in which Judge

McKeague’s expansive rewriting of Subsection (F)

would not confer jurisdiction. See Pet. App. 42a

(Griffin, J.) (Subsection (F)’s “jurisdictional reach”

would have “no end”); id. at 47a (Keith, J.) (ruling

“expands the jurisdictional reach of subsection (F) in

an all-encompassing, limitless fashion”).

Most provisions of the CWA have some impact on

permitting. Definitions of “pollutant,” “person,” and

“point source,” the term “addition,” lists of toxic

pollutants or new sources, rules about best

management practices, definitions of various

exclusions to permitting requirements, and countless

other regulatory pronouncements would be

encompassed by an “impacts-the-granting-or-denying-

of-permits” test for Subsection (F) jurisdiction. Any

EPA action regarding any of those provisions concerns

either the scope of permitting authority or the terms on

which permits are issued.

If Subsection (F) were expanded beyond the

issuance or denial of NPDES permits to cover any EPA

action affecting permitting, the “foreseeable

consequence” would be that the courts of appeals

“would exercise original subject-matter jurisdiction

over all things related to the Clean Water Act.” Pet.

App. 47a (Keith, J.). That “exceptionally expansive

view” is “precisely contrary to Section 1369(b)(1)(F)’s

grant of jurisdiction.” North Dakota, 127 F. Supp. 3d at

1051.

c. Because most other CWA provisions relate in

some way to permit issuance or denial, Judge

McKeague’s interpretation also “run[s] headlong into

the rule against superfluity.” Lockhart v. United

States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 966 (2016). Under his approach,

26

most of the other designations Congress made in

Section 1369(b) would be unnecessary because they

would be covered by Subsection (F).

Section 1369(b)(1)(D), for example, grants the

courts of appeals jurisdiction to review EPA actions “in

making any determination as to a State permit

program submitted under section 1342(b).” By its very

nature, EPA’s determinatiun about the authority of a

State to run the NPDES permitting program will

“impact the granting and denying of permits” (Pet.

App. 21la) and thus satisfy Judge McKeague’s

standard. If that impact were enough to trigger

jurisdiction under Section 1369(b)(1)(F), there would be

no need for Section 1369(b)(1)(D).

Other superfluities abound. The “standards of

performance,” “pretreatment standards” and “effluent

limitations” referred to in Subsections (A), (C) and (E)

are incorporated into, and therefore plainly “impac[t]

the granting and denying of,” Section 1342 permits.

Pet. App. 2la. Satisfying Section 1316’s new source

performance standards, referenced in Section

1369(b)(1)(A), is a condition of any NPDES permit. 40

C.F.R. § 401.12(i). “(T]he requirements to develop and

implement a [Publicly Owned Treatment Works]

pretreatment program” under Section 1317, referenced

in Section 1369(b)(1)(C), likewise “are included as

enforceable conditions in the POTW’s NPDES permit.”

EPA, PERMIT WRITER’S GUIDE at 9-10 (Sept. 2010).11

“Effluent standards” and “limitations” referred to in

Subsections (C) and (E) likewise are written into

permits. Jd. at 5-1 (“NPDES permit writers [are

required] to develop technology-based treatment

11 https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/20 15-09/documents/

pwm_chapt_09.pdf.

27

requirements, consistent with CWA section [1311(b)],

that represent the minimum level of control that must

be imposed in a permit. * * * [Plermit writers [also]

must include in permits additional or more stringent

effluent limitations and conditions, including those

necessary to protect water quality”).!”

As if that were not enough, the State-developed

“individual control strategies” for toxic pollutants that

EPA approves or disapproves pursuant to Section

1314()—referred to in Section 1369(b)(1)(G)—also are

integrated into NPDES permits. Indeed, EPA

regulations specify that “the term individual control

strategy, as set forth in section [1314()] of the CWA,

means a final NPDES permit with supporting

documentation” showing “that applicable water quality

standards will be met ***.” 40 C.F.R. § 123.46(c)

(emphasis added).

Accordingly, if Subsection (F) covers all EPA action

that impacts permitting, Subsections (A), (C), (E) and

(G) are unnecessary because they each concern EPA

action on requirements that become NPDES permit

conditions. Judge McKeague’s interpretation flatly

violates the principle that “a statute should be

construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so

that no part will be inoperative or superfluous.” Clark

v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. 2242, 2248 (2014). This Court

should “avoid” an interpretation that “makes a mess

of” Section 1369(b) in this way. SW Gen., 137 S. Ct. at

941.13

12 https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/20 1 5-09/documents/

pwm_chapt_05.pdf

18 Section 1369(b)(1)(B) is not included in our list of subsections

rendered superfluous by an “affects permitting” test because the

CWA provision referred to there, 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(C), never

became law. That provision would have given EPA authority to

28

This Court should hold that the Sixth Circuit erred

in exercising jurisdiction under Section 1369(b)(1)(F).

B. The Sixth Circuit Correctly Held That It

Lacks Jurisdiction Under Subsection (E).

The Sixth Circuit correctly concluded that Section

1369(b)(1)(E) does not confer jurisdiction. The agencies

nonetheless invoke Subsection (E) as an alternative

ground for affirmance. Fed. BIO 11. They misread that

provision.

I. The WOTUS Rule Falls Outside The

Plain Language Of Subsection (E).

Subsection (E) grants jurisdiction to courts of

appeals to review “the Administrator’s action” in

“approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or

other limitation under section 1311, 1312, 1316,

or 1346.” It is undisputed that the WOTUS Rule is not

an “effluent limitation,” which is a “restriction * * * on

quantities, rates, and concentrations” of pollutants

discharged into navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11);

see Pet. App. 8a-9a. It also is undisputed that the Rule

was not issued under Sections 1312, 1316, or 1345. 80

Fed. Reg. at 37,055; Fed. BIO 13-14. The agencies’ sole

argument has been that the WOTUS Rule is an “other

limitation under section 1311.” Gov't Opp. to Mots. to

Dismiss 15, Dkt. 58 (Oct. 23, 2015). That argument

fails under the “plain and unambiguous text” of

Subsection (E). Pet. App. 33a (Griffin, J.).

a. The WOTUS Rule is not a “limitation” in any

ordinary sense of the word. Limitation is most

naturally defined in Section 1369(b)(1)(E) to mean “a

make a determination exempting sources from new source

standards of performance, and thus would have impacted

permitting had it been adopted. It was “elminated,” however,

before enactment. S. Conf. Rep. 92-1236, at 3805 (1972), reprinted

in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776.

29

restriction or restraint imposed” by EPA. Webster's

Third New International Dictionary 1312 (1971);

accord Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1286

(“Black’s Law Dictionary defines a ‘limitation’ as a

‘restriction”). That definition does not capture the

WOTHUS Rule. The agencies admitted in promulgating

the Rule that it “does not establish any regulatory

requirements” and “imposes no enforceable duty” on

“the private sector.” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054, 37,102. It

“is definitional only and does not directly impose any

restriction or limitation.” Pet. App. 15a (McKeague, J.);

see 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,104 (it is “a definitional rule that

clarifies the scope of the Clean Water Act”).

The Rule also “is not self-executing.” Pet. App. 31a

(Griffin, J.). It “operates in conjunction with other

sections scattered throughout the Act to define when

[the Act’s other] restrictions * * * apply.” Ibid.; accord

id. at 9a (McKeague, J.) (only “operating in conjunction

with other regulations [will the Rule] result in

imposition of such limitations”).

Furthermore, Judge Griffin recognized, the Rule “is

not a ‘limitation’ on the discharge of pollutants into

waters of the United States; rather, it sets the

jurisdictional reach for whether the discharge

limitations even apply in the first place.” Pet. App. 32a.

It would be “circular” to read a rule establishing the

Act’s geographical boundaries as a “limitatio[n]’ under”

the Act. Ibid.

b. The Rule also is not an “other limitation” within

the meaning of Subsection (E). Congress’s use of the

phrase “any effluent limitation or other limitation”

makes clear that it intended “other limitation” to have

a similar meaning to “effluent limitation.” That is true

under the ejusdem generis canon, which reads a

general term following a specific term as “embrac{ing]

30

only objects similar in nature to those objects

enumerated by the preceding specific words.” Circuit

City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-115

(2001). It is equally true under the noscitur a sociis

canon, which “avoid[s] ascribing to one word a meaning

so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying

words.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575

(1995). Both canons reflect the common-sense notion

that Congress would not have said “any effluent

limitation or other li. 1itation” if what it meant was

“any limitation.” A contrary reading would render

“superfluous” the “specific word|[s]” effluent limitation.

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE

INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 206 (2012). The

Seventh Circuit thus got it right when it “interpret[ed]

the ‘other limitation’ language of subsection

1369(b)(1)(E) as restricted to limitations directly

related to effluent limitations.” Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v.

EPA, 890 F.2d 869, 877 (7th Cir. 1989).

Effluent limitations “dictate in specific and

technical terms the amount of each pollutant that a

point source may emit.” Am. Paper Inst., 890 F.2d at

876. Other limitations like effluent limitations include,

for example, non-numerical operational practices or

equipment specifications. See infra p. 31. But the Rule,

a regulatory definition of “waters of the United States,”

is not remotely simular in nature to an effluent limita-

tion.

The WOTUS Rule is not an “other limitation” for a

second reason. As Judge Griffin explained, “the

‘limitations’ set forth in §§ 1311, 1312, 1316, and 1345

provide the boundaries for what constitutes an effluent

or other limitation.” Pet. App. 30a. Each of those sec-

tions addresses effluent limitations or effluent limita-

tion-like rules. Section 1311 governs “effluent limita-

tions.” Section 1312 governs “water quality related

31

effluent limitations,” which are additional effluent

limitations that may be imposed where other limita-

tions fail to achieve water quality standards. Section

1316 governs effluent controls for new sources of

discharges. And Section 13465 restricts the discharge of

sewage sludge. Confirming that these are all effluent

limitations or similar to them, all are incorporated into

NPDES permits. See 40 C.F.R. § 401.12(i) (permits are

conditioned on satisfying requirements of Sections

1311, 1312, and 1316); NPDES PERMIT WRITER'S

MANUAL 9-1 (Sept. 2010) (“special conditions” in

permits include “NPDES programmatic requirements”

such as those concerning “sewage sludge” under

Section 1345).

And there are “other limitations” within these

sections—limitations that the statute does not describe

as “effluent limitations.” Section 1311(b)(1)(C) allows

EPA to issue “any more stringent limitation({s]” if

technology-based effluent limitations cannot “meet

water quality standards, treatment standards, or

schedules of compliance.” Section 1316(a)(1) permits

EPA to use “alternatives” to achieve effluent reductions

for new sources if “control technology, processes, [and]

operating methods” are insufficient. Section 1345(d)(3)

provides that, if “it is not feasible to prescribe or

enforce a numerical limitation” on pollutants in sewage

sludge, EPA may “promulgate a design, equipment,

management practice, or operational standard.”

Using “other limitation[s],” EPA may issue “highly

specific and detailed provisions that direc[t] the point

sources to engage in specific types of activity.” Am.

Paper Inst., 890 F.2d at 877. But those “limitations”

are nothing like the WOTUS Rule, which attempts to

define where the CWA does and does not apply.

32

c. The WOTUS Rule does not properly fall “under

section 1311.” Section 1311, titled “Effluent limita-

tions,” sets standards for effluent and other limitations

on many subjects, including existing point sources;

publicly owned treatment works; toxic pollutants;

radiological, chemical, or biological warfare agents; and

innovative technologies. This Court held in du Pont

that Section 1311 “unambiguously provides” EPA with

authority to establish “effluent limitations.” 430 U.S. at

127. Because Section 1311 plainly “authorizes EPA to

issue effluent limitations, the reference in section

[1369](b)(1)(E)” to Section 1311 “is readily under-

standable.” Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 538 F.2d

513, 516 (2d Cir. 1976).

The WOTUS Rule falls outside that readily

understandable reference. The phrase “waters of the

United States” does not appear in Section 1311. “It isa

phrase used in the Act’s definitional section, § 1362.”

Pet. App. 31a (Griffin, J.). Judge Griffin thus reached

the unassailable conclusion that WOTUS Rule “does

not emanate from” Section 1311. Ibid.

Indeed, it is inconceivable that Congress intended

a regulatory definition of one phrase in Section 1362 to

constitute an EPA action “under section 1311.” It takes

multiple steps to get from Section 1311 to the phrase

“waters of the United States.” Section 131 1(a) provides

that, “[e])xcept as in compliance with this section and

sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this

title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall

be unlawful.” Section 1362(12), in turn, defines the

phrase “discharge of a pollutant” to include “any

addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any

point source.” Next, Section 1362(7) states that “[t]he

term ‘navigable waters’ means the waters of the United

States, including the territorial seas.” The WOTUS

Rule defines a portion of that last sentence, and but

33

one factor among many that feeds into the Section

1311(a) prohibition.

If that chain of references were enough to make the

WOTUS Rule an “other limitation” “under” Section

1311(a), then any regulation addressing the other key

terms that appear in Section 1311(a)—‘“discharge,”

“pollutant,” and “person”—would equally be an “other

limitation.” And so would EPA action addressing the

meaning of the concepts used in Section 1362 in

defining those terms. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (defining

“person”); § 1362(6) (defining “pollutant”); § 1362(12)

(defining “discharge” as an “addition of any pollutant to

navigable waters from any point source”); § 1362(14)

(defining “point source”).

For example, EPA’s Water Transfers Rule, 40

C.F.R. § 122.3G), clarifies that a water transfer that

“conveys or connects waters of the United States” does

not involve an “addition” of pollutants to navigable

waters and so is not a “discharge” that requires a

permit, unless the transfer “subject[s] the transferred

water to intervening industrial, municipal, or

commercial use.” The Eleventh Circuit held that the

Water Transfers Rule is not an “other limitation”

covered by Section 1369(b)(1)(E) and dismissed

petitions for review for want of jurisdiction. Friends of

the Everglades, 699 F.3d 1280. Challenges to the rule

were then litigated in district court in New York.

Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. EPA,

8 F. Supp. 3d 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d, 846 F.3d 492

(2d Cir. 2017). Under the agencies’ theory, that case

was litigated in the wrong court: any rule defining

what is and is not an “addition” or “discharge” is a

limitation under Section 1311 because it governs the

meaning of terms central to that provision. The

breathtaking scope of that expansion would surely

shock the drafters of Section 1369(b). Definitions of the

34

many individual constituent elements directly or

indirectly referred to in Section 1311 are not plausibly

“limitations” “under” that provision.

d. Finally, the WOTUS Rule is not an “other

limitation under section 1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345”

because it is a definitional rule that “applies across the

entire Act.” Pet. App. 41a (Griffin, J.); see Rapanos,

547 U.S. at 742 (“the same definition of ‘navigable

waters’ applies to the entire statute”) (plurality).

The phrases “waters of the United States” and

“navigable water” are used throughout the CWA. And

they have no special relationship to the sections

identified in Subsection (E). See supra pp. 8-9 (listing

examples). “Waters of the United States” does not

appear in Section 1311, but it is used in Sections 1272,

1293a, 1321, 1322, and 1342. And while Section

1311(a) does not contain the term “navigable waters,”

that term is used in Sections 1251, 1252, 1256, 1272,

1288, 1293a, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1315, 1321, 1322, 1329,

1341, 1342, 1344, 1345, and 1371. The phrase

“discharge of any pollutant” in Section 1311(a) appears,

with slight variants, in Sections 1251, 1254, 1255,

1281, 1312, 1314, 1315, 1316, 1317, 1342, 1344, 1364,

1370, 1371, and 1375. Thus, the WOTUS Rule affects

dozens of CWA provisions as or more directly than it

affects Section 1311(a).'4

4 For all these reasons, it is immaterial that the agencies cited

Section 1311 among the provisions under which they purported to

have issued the Rule. 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,055 (asserting that “[t}he

authority for this rule is the [CWA]” in its entirety, “including”

Sections 1311, 1314, 1921, 1341, 1342, 1344, and 1361); cf. Adamo

Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 283 (1978)

(“[Congress] did not empower the [EPA] Administrator, after the

manner of Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking-Glass, to

make a regulation an ‘emission standard’ by his mere

designation”).

35

Congress could have listed Section 1362(7) within

Section 1369(b)’s grant of jurisdiction to the courts of

appeals—an omission that “counsels heavily against a

finding of jurisdiction.” Pet. App. 3la (Griffin, J.). Or

Congress could have said that any EPA action “directly

or indirectly affecting section 1311” is reviewable in the

courts of appeals—in which case all EPA actions likely

would be reviewable by the courts of appeals. But the

language that Congress actually used—-EPA actions “in

approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or

other limitation under section 1311, 1312, 1316, or

1345”—does not extend to a regulation that defines a

phrase in Section 1362(7) which underlies the entire

Act and imposes no limitation unless a slew of other

statutory and regulatory provisions also apply. The

Sixth Circuit correctly held that it lacks jurisdiction

under Section 1369(b)(1)(E).

2. Subsection (E) Does Not Extend To EPA

Actions That Merely Impact Point

Source Operators Or Regulators.

a. In casting the sole vote to exercise jurisdiction

under Section 1369(b)(1)(E), Judge McKeague con-

strued that provision “not in a strict literal sense,” but

instead to cover any EPA action “whose practical effect

will be to indirectly produce various limitations on

point-source operators and permit issuing authorities.”

Pet. App. 17a, 26a. Judge McKeague claimed support

for this atextual interpretation in this Court’s du Pont

decision, which he said “eschewed a strict, literal

reading” and granted courts “a license to construe

Congress’s purposes in § 1369(b)(1) more generously

than its language would indicate.” Id. at 10a, 13a. That

view of du Pont is incorrect.

Du Pont is a straightforward application of Section

1369(b)(1)(E)’s plain language. Petitioners there

36

challenged industry-wide effluent limitations issued

under Section 1311. 430 U.S. at 124. They argued that

EPA lacked authority to impose binding industry-wide

effluent limitations by regulation under Section 1311,

that EPA could only issue “guidelines” under Section

1314, and that court of appeals jurisdiction was

therefore lacking under Subsection (E). Jd. at 124-125.

The jurisdictional issue was thus “subsidiary” to and

“intertwined with the issue of EPA’s power to issue”

binding industry-wide regulations under Section 1311.

Ibid. This Court first held that Section 1311

empowered EPA to impose industry-wide effluent

limitations by regulation. Jd. at 126-136. And that

holding “necessarily resolve[d] the jurisdictional issue”

because Section 1369(b)(1)(E) “unambiguously

authorizfes]” the court of appeals to review Section

1311 effluent limitations. Jd. at 136.

This Court in du Pont also rejected petitioners’

fallback jurisdictional argument that Section

1369(b)(1)(E)’s reference to “section 1311” should be

understood to refer only to Section 1311(c), which

allows for individual variances from effluent

limitations. 430 U.S. at 136. The Court explained that,

“in other portions of [Section 1369], Congress referred

to specific subsections” and “presumably would have

specifically mentioned” Section 1311(c) if petitioners’

reading were correct. Ibid. The Court also noted that

its holding avoided “the truly perverse situation in

which” courts of appeals could review NPDES

permitting decisions under Section 1342 “but would

have no power of direct review of the basic regulations”

under Section 1311 that “govern[ed] those individual

actions.” Ibid. And the Court had “no doubt that

Congress intended review of’ effluent limitations on

existing sources under Section 1311 “to be had in the

same forum” as review of effluent limitations on new

37

sources under Section 1316 (id. at 136-137)—an

obvious conclusion because Section 1369(b)(1)(E)

expressly applies to “effluent limitations” issued “under

section 1311” and “1316.”

Judge McKeague misread du Pont. He believed

that “the challenged regulation fin du Pont] was

promulgated under” a provision that was not one of the

“enumerated sections” listed in Subsection (E). Pet.

App. 10a. But that was petitioners’ argument in du

Pont, which this Court rejected. This Court held

instead that EPA had issued the challenged

regulations establishing effluent limitations under

Section 1311. 430 U.S. at 126-136. Judge McKeague

also mistakenly claimed that this Court “eschewed a

strict, literal reading” of Section 1369(b)(1)(E). Pet.

App. 10a. In fact, this Court applied Subsection (E)’s

“unambiguou[s]” text. 430 U.S. at 136. To be sure, this

Court mentioned policy, but the “policy reason came

after a plain textual rejection of the industry’s

position.” Pet. App. 35a (Griffin, J.).

As Judge Griffin explained, it is “a far stretch to

take [du Pont’s] dicta and expand it” to “find

jurisdiction proper when a regulation’s ‘practical effect’

only sets forth ‘indirect’ limits.” Pet. App. 35a.

“(Ujnlike” du Pont, the agencies here “admit they have

not promulgated an effluent limitation.” Jbid. Du Pont

does not authorize Sixth Circuit jurisdiction under

Subsection (E)’s “other limitation” provision.

b. There is no stopping point to Judge McKeague’s

logic. Nearly any EPA action under the CWA can be

said to “indirectly produce various limitations on point-

source operators and permit issuing authorities.” Pet.

App. 17a. For example, an EPA administrative

enforcement order under Section 1319{a){1) certainly

will impact the permit holder and the permitting

38

authority and has no more tenuous a connection to

Section 1311 than the WOTUS Rule. Judge

McKeague’s ruling therefore would vest the courts of

appeals with exclusive jurisdiction to review the order.

Yet that result contradicts this Court’s holding in

Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120 (2012), that landowners

may challenge EPA’s administrative enforcement

orders in the district courts under the APA.

Similarly, Section 1313 authorizes EPA to approve

or promulgate water quality standards. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1313(b), (c)(3). Those standards impact point source

operators and permitting authorities indirectly under

Section 1311, because effluent limitations must be

designed to meet water quality standards. Id.

§ 1311(b)(1)(C). Yet the courts of appeals have

uniformly agreed with EPA that Section 1313

standards do not fall within Section 1369(b)(1)(E). See

Friends of Earth v. EPA, 333 F.3d 184, 186 (D.C. Cir.

2003); Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d

1307, 1311 (9th Cir. 1992); Bethlehem Steel, 538 F.2d

at 514.

c. Judge McKeague’s reading also renders super-

fluous parts of Subsection (E). Section 1312 water-

quality-based effluent limitations impact point source

operators and regulators indirectly under Section 1311

“because [Section 1312 limitations] are limitations

‘necessary to meet water quality standards” under

Section 1311(b)(1)(C). Friends of Earth, 333 F.3d at

190. Yet “section 1369(b)(1) expressly provides for

original appellate court review of section 1312 actions,”

with the result that Judge McKeague’s reading renders

that Subsection’s “specific reference to section 1312

duplicative and unnecessary.” Ibid. Judge McKeague’s

reading fails to “compor|t] with the presumption ‘that

statutory language is not superfluous.” McDonnell v.

United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2369 (2016).

39

d. To be sure, some courts, like Judge McKeague,

have read Crown Simpson and du Pont to authorize “a

practical rather than a cramped construction” of

Section 1369(b)(1) that expands courts of appeals’

jurisdiction beyond EPA’s issuance or denial of permits

or imposition of effluent-like limitations. NRDC v.

EPA, 673 F.2d 400, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In NRDC, the

court held that a challenge to Consolidated Permit

Regulations that established “procedures for issuing or

denying NPDES permits” fell under Subsection (F)

because they were “a limitation on point sources and

permit issuers” and “a restriction on the untrammeled

discretion of the industry.” Id. at 402, 405. Similarly,

in VEPCO v. Costle, 566 F.2d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 1977),

the court held that standards regulating the

construction of cooling water intakes were an “other

limitation” because they set forth “information that

must be considered in determining the type of intake

structures that individual point sources may employ.”

These influential decisions—from a period when

courts claimed more authority to deviate from plain

statutory language than is now the case—can be

parsed, explained, and distinguished. See, e.g., Friends

of the Earth v. EPA, 333 F.3d 184, 191 n.15 (D.C. Cir.

2003). But it is soundest instead to reject their

approach. Straying from the plain terms Congress used

has only led to uncertainty over jurisdiction, duplicate

filings and wasteful litigation, and judicial contortions

in which appeals to “policy” are necessary to override

the “technical criteria” specified in Section 1369(b)(1).

NRDC, 673 F.2d at 405 n.15. More recent decisions

rely on the “plain language,” canons of construction,

and “structural” guides to meaning that we advocate

here. Friends of the Earth, 333 F.3d at 189-192

(holding that a Section 1313(d) total maximum daily

load was not an “other limitation” within Subsection

40

(E)); Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1286-1288

(rejecting EPA contention that water transfers rule fell

under Subsections (E) and (F) as “contrary to the

statutory text”).

C. Congress’s Specific And Narrow Focus In

Section 1369(b) Confirms That The Sixth

Circuit Lacks Jurisdiction.

Congress “drafted seven carefully defined bases for

original jurisdiction in the appellate courts” (Pet. App.

46a (Keith, J.)), which embody “fine” “distinctions.”

Longview Fibre, 980 F.2d at 1313. Its use of this

structure “justiffies] the inference” that a general grant

of jurisdiction to courts of appeals over all agency

action under the CWA was “excluded by deliberate

choice, not inadvertence.” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal

Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003). As the Second Circuit

put it, “the complexity and specificity” of Section

1369(b) “suggests that not all [EPA] actions” are

reviewable in the courts of appeals; Congress’s

“specifying particular actions and leaving out others” is

incompatible with cramming most EPA action under

the CWA into Section 1369(b). Bethlehem Steel, 538

F.2d at 517; see also Longview Fibre, 980 F.2d at 1313

(“No sensible person accustomed to the use of words in

laws would speak so narrowly and precisely of

particular statutory provisions, while meaning to imply

a more general and broad coverage than the statutes

designated”).

The need to interpret Section 1369(b) narrowly

according to its plain terms takes on special force

because “Congress well knows how to” grant the courts

of appeals broad jurisdiction to review EPA’s actions:

“In [anJother statut/e], using different language, it has

done just that.” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct.

2243, 2252 (2016).

41

In the CWA’s sister statute, the Clean Air Act,

Congress authorized the courts of appeals to review

specific categones of agency action—some that must be

reviewed by the D.C. Circuit and others that must be

reviewed hy the regional circuits. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(b)(1). Congress then went further by granting

the D.C. Circwt original! jurisdiction to review “any

other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or

final action taken, by the Administrator under this

chapter” and granted regional! circuits jurisdiction to

review “any other final action of the Administrator

under this chapter * * * which is locally or regionally

applicable.” Ibid. (emphases added). Similarly broad

jurisdictional language is conspicuously absent from

the CWA.

Congress’s decision to use different “judicial

review” language in the Clean Air Act is yet another

reason “counseling against construing” Section 1369(b)

as embracing all nationally applicable rulemaking

under the CWA. United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 76

n.4 (2002) (“The use of different terms within related

statutes generally implies that different meanings

were intended”).

D. The Legislative History Suggests That

Congress Did Not Intend The Courts Of

Appeals To Review All Nationwide Rules.

Section 1369(b) was originally enacted as part of

the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments

of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500. “The legislative history for

the 1972 amendments reveals little about Congress's

intent behind the CWA’s judicial review provisions.”

Allison LaPlante et al., On Judicial Review Under the

Clean Water Act in the Wake of Decker v. Northwest

Environmeutal Defense Center: What We Now Know

42

and What We Have Yet to Find Out, 43 ENVTL. L. 767,

776 (2013).

The agencies have repeatedly cited a fragment of

an early House Report stating that the purpose of

Section 1369(b) was “to establish a clear and orderly

process for judicial review.” H.R Rep. No. 92-911, at

136 (1972), reprinted in 1 Leg. Hist. of the Water

Pollution Control Act of 1972 at 823 (Comm. Print

1973); e.g., Fed. BIO 4-5, 19. That phrase by itself says

nothing about what process is clear and orderly. And

the agencies failed to acknowledge that the House at

that time had proposed placing judicial review “in the

district court[s]," and had emphasized that “the

inclusion of section [1369] is not intended to exclude

judicial review” that is “otherwise permitted by law,”

including under the APA. H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, at 136

(1972), 1 Leg. Hist. at 823. The House Report does not

suggest that Congress intended that the courts of

appeals would review nationwide regulations other

than those it narrowly specified in Section 1369(b).

More illuminating are Congress’s actions in

passing the 1977 amendments to the CWA, which

modified many parts of the Act. See Clean Water Act of

1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (Dec. 27, 1977).

Congress did not amend Section 1369. And it was not

for lack of trying. With the EPA Administrator's

“strong support,” Senator Kennedy introduced an

amendment that would have broadened Section

1369(b) to cover “national regulations promulgated

under the [CWA]” and would have required those

regulations to be challenged in the D.C. Circuit. 123

Cong. Rec. S. 26,754, 26,756 (Aug. 4, 1977). Senator

Kennedy emphasized several times during the debate

that his proposed amendment was similar to the Clean

Air Act’s judicial review provision. Jd. at 26,755-56,

26,759, 26,761. He encountered strong opposition,

43

including concern about trying to “nickel and dime the

district courts of the United States out of business.” Jd.

at 26,759. The amendment was tabled and never

enacted. Id. at 26,761.

Three days later, the Clean Air Act Amendments of

1977 became law, with modified judicial review

language. See supra p. 41; Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat.

685, 776 (Aug. 7, 1977). This Court “cannot ignore

Congress’ decision to amend [the Clean Air Act's}

relevant provisions but not make similar changes to

the [CWA].” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S.

167, 174 (2009). “When Congress amends one statutory

provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted

intentionally.” Ibid. Indeed, “negative implications

raised by disparate provisions are strongest’ when the

provisions were ‘considered simultaneously when the

language raising the implication was inserted,” as they

were here. Id. at 175.

In short, all considerations based on the text,

structure, related statutes, and legislative history lead

to the same place: the WOTUS Rule falls outside of

Section 1369(b)(1)" $ provisions, and the Sixth Circuit

erred in exercising jurisdiction.

II. Policy Considerations Favor Interpreting

Section 1369(b) Textually To Exclude The

WOTHUS Rule.

The agencies contend that rules that are national

in scope “are best reviewed directly in the courts of

appeals.” Dkt. 58, at 57 (Oct. 23, 2015). They also say

they prefer to avoid having to defend rules in more

than one forum, to husband their resources and avoid

the risk that different courts will reach different

conclusions. Jd. at 58-59. Even if these policy

considerations were valid, they “could not overcome the

clarity [evident] in the statute’s text.” Kloeckner v.

44

Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596, 607 n.4 (2012). But there are

stronger policy reasons for interpreting Section 1369(b)

according to its plain text.

A. Interpreting Section 1369(b) Textually

Promotes Jurisdictional Clarity.

1. This Court has emphasized countless times that

“jurisdictional rules should be clear.” Lapides, 535 U.S.

at 621. “[A]dministrative simplicity is a major virtue in

a jurisdictional statute.” Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94.

“[Cjourts benefit from straightforward rules under

which they can readily assure themselves of their

power to hear a case.” Ibid. Litigants benefit because

clearer jurisdictional lines “promote greater predict-

ability.” Ibid. “[J]urisdictional rule[s]” should be

interpreted in such a way as to provide litigants and

courts with “clear guidance about the proper forum for

[a particular claim] at the outset of the case.” Elgin v.

Dep’t of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2135 (2012).

Nebulous standards, by contrast, “invit[e] greater

litigation"—as WOTUS Rule litigation illustrates.

Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94. They “complicate a case, eating

up time and money as the parties litigate, not the

merits of their claims, but which court is the right

court to decide those claims.” Ibid. “Uncertainty

regarding the question of jurisdiction is particularly

undesirable, and collateral litigation on the point

particularly wasteful.” Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global

Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 582 (2004).

In light of those concerns, this Court “place[s]

primary weight upon the need for judicial admin-

istration of a jurisdictional statute to remain as simple

as possible.” Hertz, 559 U.S. at 80. A standard that is

“more straightforward and administrable than the

alternative” best “serves the goals [that this Court has]

consistently underscored in interpreting jurisdictional

45

statutes.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.

Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 1573 (2016).

Our textual reading of Section 1369(b) offers a

straightforward standard to determine whether

jurisdiction exists under Section 1369(b)(1)(F). A court

need ask only whether EPA has issued or denied a

Section 1342 permit. If, as in this case, EPA has made

no determination regarding a specific permit, then

there is no jurisdiction under Section 1369(b)(1)(F). It

is similarly straightforward to decide jurisdiction

under Section 1369(b)(1)(E). A court need ask only

whether EPA has issued an effluent or effluent-like

limitation under Sections 1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345. If

EPA has not issued an effluent or similar limitation, or

if its action arises out of another section of the CWA or

out of the statute as a whole (see 80 Fed. Reg. at

37,055), then the courts of appeals lack jurisdiction

under Section 1369(b)(1)(E).

By contrast, Judge McKeague’s “‘functional’ ap-

proach,” which attempts to divine how “Congress’s

manifest purposes are best fulfilled” (Pet. App. 4a), or

the NRDC court's “practical rather than a cramped”

construction, produce uncertainty and endless

litigation. Courts and parties will puzzle over whether

“Congress must have intended” for review by “the

circuit courts” based on “the indirect effect” of EPA

action (Pet. App. 15a), and over what result is

“practical.” Those “approach[es are] at war with

administrative simplicity” (Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92),

leading to a jurisdictional “line [that] is hazy at best

and incoherent at worst.” Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2135.

2. To say that the meaning of each subsection in

Section 1369(b) is plain on its face is not to say that the

list is coherent or readily explicable by some over-

arching theory about what issues are best resolved at

46

which level of the court system. The list can be

criticized as odd or arbitrary.

For example, the reference in Subsection (B) to

Section 1316(b)(1)(C), though that provision was

dropped in conference, suggests a lack of care in

drafting.

Another example. It is unclear why review of EPA’s

issuance or denial of NPDES permits should belong in

the courts of appeals under Subsection (F), but review

of agency action in issuing or denying dredged or fill

permits under Section 1344 remains in the district

courts. As the agencies have pointed out (Dkt. 58 at

45), though the Corps generally processes dredge or fill

permits, nevertheless “EPA plays a substantial role.”

Yet even EPA actions under Section 1344 that are

parallel to NPDES program actions covered by Section

1369(b) are left to the district courts. See 33 U.S.C.

§ 1344(h) (EPA determination as to adequacy of State

program), § 1344(i) (EPA authority to issue permit

after disapproval of proposed State permit), § 1344(c)

(EPA may determine in advance of permit application

to prohibit or restrict use of a location for discharges).

Section 1369(b) draws other distinctions that are

hard to fathom. Review of EPA’s promulgation of a

standard of performance under Section 1316 goes to

the courts of appeals (Subsection (A)), as does its

determination as to the adequacy of a State NPDES

program (Subsection (D)). Yet an EPA determination

under Section 1316(c) to approve a State procedure for

applying and enforcing standards of performanc. .s not

listed in Section 1369(b) and hence is reviewed by the

district courts.

But Section 1369(b) is not unusual in this regard.

“(T]he United States Code is replete with thousands of

compromises dividing initial review of agency decisions

47

between district and circuit courts.” Joseph W. Mead &

Nicholas A. Fromherz, Choosing a Court to Review the

Executwe, 67 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 2 (2015). Congress

generally “declines to explain its choice of forum,” and

“Congress's choices have varied dramatically—without

apparent rhyme or reason-—from statute to statute,

year to year, and even within particular legislation.”

Id. at 15-16. “Horse Protection Act regulations can be

challenged in district court, but adjudications go to the

circuit court.” Id. at 17. Department of Health and

Human Services decisions regarding the approval of

Medicaid state plans are challenged in district court,

except that a state may challenge an adverse decision

in the court of appeals. Jbid. Bizarre examples pepper

the U.S. Code. See id. at 15-19. The sorts of

“anomall[ies]” that the agencies want to try to eradicate

by adoption of a “pragmatic construction” that looks to

a statute’s “objectives” (Fed. BIO 11) would lead to

judicial rewriting of thousands of jurisdictional

statutes. It would be an endless and ultimately

arbitrary task for the courts to try to impose

rationality by deducing how “Congress’s manifest

purposes are best fulfilled.” Pet. App. 4a. The only way

to make sense of jurisdictional provisions, and give

parties and courts predictability, is to apply the

language as written.

“[T]he necessity of having aclea[r] rule” governing

the CWA is compelling. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 96. As this

Court observed in du Pont, parties have been filing

duplicative district and circuit court challenges to EPA

actions since 1974. 430 U.S. at 123 n.11. Far too much

ink has been spilled, and far too many public and

private resources wasted, in attempting to infer

whether Congress would have wanted the courts of

appeals to review EPA actions that fall outside Section

1369(b)’s plain language. The Court should put an end

48

to this misguided practice by limiting Section 1369(b)

to its text.

B. A Narrow Reading Is Necessary Due To

Section 1369(b)’s Preclusion Provision.

The Court should reject the agencies’ invitation to

read Section 1369(b) broadly because “[rjeviewability

under section 1369 carries a peculiar sting.” Longview

Fibre, 980 F.2d at 1313. Parties have “120 days” to

challenge EPA actions that fall within Section

1369(b)(1) unless the challenge is “based solely on

grounds which arose after such 120th day.” Actions

that could have been challenged “shall not be subject to

judicial review in any civil or criminal proceeding for

enforcement.” Id. § 1369(b)(2); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at

1334 (if “available,” review under Section 1369(b) is

“exclusive”).

Armed with Section 1369(b)’s preclusion provision,

the Government might criminally prosecute someone

for violating an unlawful EPA regulation while

attempting to bar that person from challenging the

regulation’s lawfulness. And a conviction could result

in “substantial” penalties. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v.

Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1812 (2016). Negligent

violations of the Act are punishable by up to 2 years’

imprisonment, and knowing violations are punishable

by fine> up to $50,000 per day and up to 3 years in

prison. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)-(2). “[T] he consequences

to landowners even for inadvertent violations can be

crushing.” Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1816 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring).

Accepting the Sixth Circuit’s judgment would “have

a significant bearing on whether the Clean Water Act

comports with due process.” Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1817

(Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Sackett, 132 S. Ct.

at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting “due process”

49

concerns if the CWA barred landowners from

challenging enforcement orders). It is “totally

unrealistic to assume that more than a fraction of the

persons and entities affected by a regulation” would

“have knowledge of its promulgation or familiarity

with or access to the Federal Register.” Adamo

Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 290 (1978)

(Powell, J., concurring). It is even more unrealistic to

assume that these persons and entities will monitor

and then challenge within 120 days all CWA

regulations that, years or decades later, might result in

a “civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement” against

them. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2). The Court accordingly

should interpret Subsections (E) and (F) “as written to

avoid the significant constitutional * * * questions

raised by [Judge McKeague’s] interpretation.”

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.

The rule of lenity also requires a narrow reading of

Section 1369(b) because its preclusion provision

explicitly applies in a “criminal prosecution.” See

Adamo Wrecking, 434 U.S. at 285 (applying rule of

lenity in interpreting Clean Air Act’s preclusion

provision); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11.8 (2004)

(applying rule of lenity in a civil case “[blecause we

must interpret the statute consistently” in both a

“criminal or noncriminal context”). Thus, if there is

even “some doubt” as to the meaning of Subsections (E)

and (F), that doubt must be resolved in favor of a

narrow interpretation to avoid prejudicing criminal

defendants. Adamo Wrecking, 434 U.S. at 285.

For pragmatic reasons as well, Section 1369(b)’s

preclusion provision should “dissuad[e] [the Court]

from reading § [1369](b)(1) broadly.” Am. Paper Inst.,

882 F.2d at 289. As Judge Easterbrook explained, “the

more [a court] pull[s} within § [1369](b)(1), the more

arguments will be knocked out by inadvertence later

50

on—and the more reason firms will have to petition for

review of everything in sight.” Ibid. This Court should

“express great reluctance to multiply the occasions for

review [under Section 1369(b)(1)], especially when

careful counsel must respond to the combination of

uncertain opportunities for review and § [1369](b)(2) by

filing buckshot petitions.” Roll Coaier, 932 F.2d at 671.

The best way to do so is by reading Section 1369(b)

textually.

C. A Narrow Reading Offers Parties, Agencies,

And Courts The Benefits Of Multilateral

Review Of Agency Rulemaking.

Under the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, challenges to

important CWA regulations would be funneled to a

single court of appeals, without the benefit of initial

consideration by the district courts or the opinions of

other federal courts of appeals on the same issues. On

some of the most critical issues under the CWA—like

the regulation here—the quality of legal decision-

making, and of this Court’s ability to decide which

cases to review, would be diminished.

Percolation among lower courts “helps to explain

and formulate the underlying principles” this Court

“must consider.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,

2597 (2015). It also “winnows out the unnecessary and

discordant elements of doctrine.” California v. Carney,

471 U.S. 386, 400-401 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)

(citing Benjamin Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE

JUDICIAL PROCESS 179 (1921)). Accordingly, this Court

typically “permit[s] several courts of appeals to explore

a difficult question before [it] grants certiorari.” United

States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984).

The benefits of multi-court review accrue as clearly

in the review of administrative rules as in other types

of cases. See Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and

51

the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L.

REV. 1111, 1155 (1990) (explaining “[w]hy [we] should

* * * take uniform administrative decisions and subject

them to review in the various regional circuit courts

under a system that makes it possible for these courts

to disagree with one another”). These benefits include

that “the possibility of intercircuit disagreement

provides a simple device for signaling that certain bard

cases are worthy of additional judicial resources”; that

“the doctrinal dialogue that occurs when a court of

appeals addresses the legal reasoning of another and

reaches a contrary conclusion *** improves the

quality of legal decisions”; and that exploration of an

issue by multiple courts aids this Court “both in its

consideration of the legal merits of an issue and in its

case selection decisions.” Jd. at 1156-1157.

Thus, any judicial disagreements that may arise

from initial consideration in multiple district courts

“increase the probability of a correct disposition”

(Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pena, 44 F.3d

437, 447 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)),

and tee up issues more thoroughly for this Court’s

consideration. There is nothing about agency regula-

tions that makes this process less appropriate for rule

challenges than for other types of cases, like those

involving the meaning or constitutionality of federal

statutes. The benefits of multi-court consideration

would be lost if Section 1369(b) were stretched beyond

the defined categories of agency action that Congress

designated for original court of appeals review.

Furthermore, Section 1369(b) must be read in light

of the default rule that Congress established in the

APA, which is that agency action is subject to

multilateral judicial review. “[I]n the absence or in-

adequacy” o/ a “special statutory review proceeding,”

any “person suffering legal wrong because of agency

52

action” is “entitled to judicial review” “in a court of

competent jurisdiction.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-703. A plaintiff

generally may file suit where it resides. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331, 1391(e); see also Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487

U.S. 879, 904 (1988) (Congress “inten[ded] that [the

APA] cover a broad spectrum of administrative actions,

and this Court has echoed that theme by noting that

the [APA’s] ‘generous review provisions’ must be given

a ‘hospitable’ interpretation”).

In the absence of a clear statement from Congress

in Section 1369(b), the Sixth Circuit should not have

upended the APA judicial review process. This Court

should restore APA review to CWA rulemaking outside

the specific categories that Congress identified in

Section 1369(b).

D. Judge McKeague’s Efficiency Arguments

Are Unpersuasive.

Judge McKeague believed that review of the

WOTHUS Rule under Section 1369(b) was necessary for

“efficiency, judicial economy, clarity, uniformity and

finality” (Pet. App. 23a), considerations urged too by

the agencies. Fed. BIO 15-16. Those policy arguments

carry little weight in practice.

Despite the APA’s lengthier statute of limitations,

in most cases rule challenges will be initiated very soon

after the rule’s promulgation. The most likely

challengers are often closely involved in the notice and

comment process and eager to mount challenges

quickly, before a harmful rule takes effect. As a

practical matter, an APA challenge is likely to come

within days or weeks, not years. That is especially true

for rules that have sweeping nationwide impacts, like

the WOTUS Rule. The agencies issued the Rule in

June 2015, and within that same year 16 district court

53

challenges were filed, most of them very quickly after

the Rule’s issuance. See supra p. v.

Parties may coordinate their challenges to EPA

actions to avoid litigation in many different forums.

For example, in litigation over EPA’s Water Transfers

Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 122.30), some environmental

organizations quickly filed an APA challenge in the

Southern District of New York. Nine States and a

Canadian province filed a second challenge in the same

court, which consolidated the actions. Eleven States,

New York City, many Western water districts, and

others intervened as defendants in support of the rule.

See Catskill Mountains, 846 F.3d at 500-501 & n.6,

505-506. Environmental groups that had filed APA

actions in the Southern District of Florida voluntarily

dismissed those suits and intervened as plaintiffs in

the New York suits. See Joint Notice of Voluntary

Dismissal, Friends of the Everglades v. EPA, No. 1:08-

cv-21785 consol. (S.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2012). Thus,

although multiple parties from across the country

challenged the same EPA regulation, only one district

court ruled on the merits of their challenges. There is

reason to expect that, where CWA rule challenges

proceed in district court, there will be some degree of

voluntary consolidation.

It is in any event hardly certain that Judge

McKeague’s ruling i increases efficiency. “[T]he case for

direct review in circuit courts has little in the way of

theoretical or empirical heft.” Mead & Fromherz,

supra, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. at 5. And “district courts are

generally as capable—and usually more efficient—than

their counterparts at the circuit level.” Jbid. It is also

more efficient to have the district court rather than the

appellate court resolve factual disputes, such as

whether the challenger has Article III standing and

whether the agency has prepared a complete record.

54

Id. at 29, 55. In this case, the parties spent months

litigating whether the agencies had provided a

complete record, which caused the Sixth Circuit to hold

the briefing deadlines in abeyance. See Motions to

Supplement Certified Record, Dkts. 103-105 (July 8,

2016); Opinion & Order on Administrative Record, Dkt

119 (Oct. 4, 2016); see also Order, Dkt. 116 (Sept. 22,

2016); see also Mead & Fromherz, supra, 67 ADMIN. L.

REV. at 29-30. For these and other reasons,

commentators have concluded that, all things

considered, district courts generally should undertake

original review of agency actions. Jd. at 22-59.

Regardless, efficiency concerns carry no weight in

this case because “policy arguments cannot supersede

the clear statutory text.” Universal Health Servs., Inc.

v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016). “[N]o

law pursues its purpose at all costs, and ... the textual

limitations upon a law’s scope are no less a part of its

‘purpose’ than its substantive authorizations.” Kucana,

558 U.S. at 252. Jurisdiction is “governed by the intent

of Congress” as expressed in the statutory text, “and

not by any views [courts] may have about sound

policy.” Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729,

746 (1985).'5 Stretching the text of Section 1369(b) past

its breaking point to increase efficiency undermines

the very purpose of the APA. “The APA’s presumption

'§s Judge McKeague erroneously read this Court's decision in

Florida Power to establish in all cases a “strong preference” in

favor of “direct circuit court review of agency action.” Pet. App.

23a. His reliance on that “non-Clean Water Act case” is

“unavailing,” as Judge Griffin explained. Jd at 43a. Florida Power

found the relevant “statute ambiguous on its face” 470 U.S. at

737. And its “holding depended on its lengthy exegesis of those

specific statutes; nowhere did the Court intimate that it was

ruling as a matter of general administrative procedure ” Nader v.

EPA, 859 F.2d 747, 764 (9th Cir. 1988).

55

of judicial review is a repudiation of the principle that

efficiency of regulation conquers all.” Sackett, 132 S.

Ct. at 1374. Section 1369(b)’s plain language controls,

and that language does not vest the Sixth Circuit with

jurisdiction to review the WOTUS Rule.

CONCLUSION

The judgment should be reversed and the case

remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted.

MICHAEL B. KIMBERLY TIMOTHY 8S. BISHOP

Mayer Brown LLP Counsel of Record

1999 K Street, NW CHAD M. CLAMAGE

Washington, DC 20006 JED GLICKSTEIN

(202) 263-3127 Mayer Brown LLP

71 South Wacker Drive

Chicago, Illinois 60606

(312) 782-0600

thishop@mayerbrown.com

LINDA E. KELLY

QUENTIN RIEGEL

LELAND P. FROST

Manufacturers’ Center

for Legal Action

733 10th Street, NW, Ste 700

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 637-3000

Counsel for Petitioner

APRIL 2017

ADDENDUM OF

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

la

33 U.S.C. § 1311. Effluent Limitations

(a) Illegality of pollutant discharges except in

compliance with law

Except as in compliance with this section and sec-

tions 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this

title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person

shall be unlawful.

(b) Timetable for achievement of objectives

In order to carry out the objective of this chapter

there shall be achieved—

(1){A) not later than July 1, 1977, effluent limita-

tions for point sources, other than publicly owned

treatment works, (i) which shall require the ap-

plication of the best practicable control technology

currently available as defined by the Admunistra-

tor pursuant to section 1314(b) of this title, or (ii)

in the case of a discharge into a publicly owned

treatment works which meets the requirements of

subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, which shall

require compliance with any applicable pretreat-

ment requirements and any requirements under

section 1317 of this title; and

(B) for publicly owned treatment works in ex-

istence on July 1, 1977, or approved pursuant

to section 1283 of this title prior to June 30,

1974 (for which construction must be complet-

ed within four years of approval), effluent lim-

itations based upon secondary treatment as

defined by the Administrator pursuant to sec-

tion 1314(d)(1) of this title; or,

(C) not later than July 1, 1977, any more

stringent limitation, including those necessary

to meet water quality standards, treatment

2a

standards, or schedules of compliance, estab-

lished pursuant to any State law or regula-

tions (under authority preserved by section

1370 of this title) or any other Federal law or

regulation, or required to implement any ap-

plicable water quality standard established

pursuant to this chapter.

(2)(A) for pollutants identified in subparagraphs

(C), (D), and (F) of this paragraph, effluent limita-

tions for categories and classes of point sources,

other than publicly owned treatment works,

which (i) shall require application of the best

available technology economically achievable for

such category or class, which will result in rea-

sonable further progress toward the national goal

of eliminating the discharge of all pollutants, as

determined in accordance with regulations issued

by the Administrator pursuant to section

1314(b)(2) of this title, which such effluent limita-

tions shall require the elimination of discharges

of all pollutants if the Administrator finds, on the

basis of information available to him (including

information developed pursuant to section 1325 of

this title), that such elimination is technologically

and economically achievable for a category or

class of point sources as determined in accordance

with regulations issued by the Administrator

pursuant to section 1314(b)(2) of this title, or (ii)

in the case of the introduction of a pollutant into

a publicly owned treatment works which meets

the requirements of subparagraph (B) of this par-

agraph, shall require compliance with any appli-

cable pretreatment requirements and any other

requirement under section 1317 of this title;

xk*eeek

3a

(C) with respect to all toxic pollutants referred

to in table 1 of Committee Print Numbered 95-

30 of the Committee on Public Works and

Transportation of the House of Representa-

tives compliance with effluent limitations in

accordance with subparagraph (A) of this par-

agraph as expeditiously as practicable but in

no case later than three years after the date

such limitations are promulgated under sec-

tion 1314(b) of this title, and in no case later

than March 31, 1989;

(D) for all toxic pollutants listed under para-

graph (1) of subsection (a) of section 1317 of

this title which are not referred to in subpara-

graph (C) of this paragraph compliance with

effluent limitations in accordance with sub-

paragraph (A) of this paragraph as expedi-

tiously as practicable, but in no case later than

three years after the date such limitations are

promulgated under section 1314(b) of this ti-

tle, and in no case later than March 31, 1989;

(E) as expeditiously as practicable but in no

case later than three years after the date such

limitations are promulgated under section

1314(b) of this title, and in no case later than

March 31, 1989, compliance with effluent limi-

tations for categories and classes of point

sources, other than publicly owned treatment

works, which in the case of pollutants identi-

fied pursuant to section 1314(a)(4) of this title

shall require application of the best conven-

tional pollutant control technology as deter-

mined in accordance with regulations issued

by the Administrator pursuant to section

1314(b)(4) of this title; and

4a

(F) for all pollutants (other than those subject

to subparagraphs (C), (D), or (E) of this para-

graph) compliance with effluent limitations in

accordance with subparagraph (A) of this par-

agraph as expeditiously as practicable but in

no case later than 3 years after the date such

limitations are established, and in no case lat-

er than March 31, 1989.

(3){A) for effluent limitations under paragraph

(1)(A)G) of this subsection promulgated after Jan-

uary 1, 1982, and requiring a level of control sub-

stantially greater or based on fundamentally dif-

ferent control technology than under permits for

an industrial category issued before such date,

compliance as expeditiously as practicable but in

no case later than three years after the date such

limitations are promulgated under section

1314(b) of this title, and in no case later than

March 31, 1989; and

(B) for any effluent limitation in accordance

with paragraph (1)(A)Q@), (2)(A)(@), or (2)(E) of

this subsection established only on the basis of

section 1342(a)(1) of this title in a permit is-

sued after February 4, 1987, compliance as

expeditiously as practicable but in no case lat-

er than three years after the date such limita-

tions are established, and in no case later than

March 31, 1989.

xk**x# kek

5a

(e) All point discharge source application of ef-

fluent limitations

Effluent limitations established pursuant to this sec-

tion or section 1312 of this title shall be applied to all

point sources of discharge of pollutants in accordance

with the provisions of this chapter.

(f) legality of discharge of radiological, chem-

ical, or biological warfare agents, high-level

radioactive waste, or medical waste

Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter

it shall be unlawful to discharge any radiological,

chemical, or biological warfare agent, any high-level

radioactive waste, or any medical waste, into the

navigable waters.

kx keke

(k) Innovative technology

In the case of any facility subject to a permit under

section 1342 of this title which proposes to comply

with the requirements of subsection (b)(2)(A) or

(b)(2)(E) of this section by replacing existing produc-

tion capacity with an innovative production process

which will result in an effluent reduction significant-

ly greater than that required by the limitation oth-

erwise applicable to such facility and moves toward

the national goal of eliminating the discharge of all

pollutants, or with the installation of an innovative

control technique that has a substantial likelihood

for enabling the facility to comply with the applicable

effluent limitation by achieving a significantly great-

er effluent reduction than that required by the appli-

cable effluent limitation and moves toward the na-

tional goal of eliminating the discharge of all pollu-

tants, or by achieving the required reduction with an

6a

innovative system that has the potential for signifi-

cantly lower costs than the systems which have been

determined by the Administrator to be economically

achievable, the Administrator (or the State with an

approved program under section 1342 of this title, in

consultation with the Administrator) may establish a

date for compliance under subsection (b)(2)(A) or

(b)(2)(E) of this section no later than two years after

the date for compliance with such effluent limitation

which would otherwise be applicable under such sub-

section, if it is also determined that such innovative

system has the potential for industrywide applica-

tion.

*x*exekk

33 U.S.C. § 1312. Water Quality Related

Effluent Limitations

(a) Establishment

Whenever, in the judgment of the Administrator or

as identified under section 1314(J) of this title, dis-

charges of pollutants from a point source or group of

point sources, with the application of effluent limita-

tions required under section 1311(b)(2) of this title,

would interfere with the attainment or maintenance

of that water quality in a specific portion of the navi-

gable waters which shall assure protection of public

health, public water supplies, agricultural and in-

dustrial uses, and the protection and propagation of

a balanced population of shellfish, fish and wildlife,

and allow recreational activities in and on the water,

effluent limitations (including alternative effluent

control strategies) for such point source or sources

shall be established which can reasonably be ex-

pected to contribute to the attainment or mainte-

nance of such water quality.

7a

x***2z*kkzx*

33 U.S.C. § 1314. Information and Guidelines

x**xe ne

(1) Individual control strategies for toxic pollu-

tants

(1) State list of navigable waters and devel-

opment of strategies

Not later than 2 years after February 4, 1987, each

State shall submit to the Administrator for review,

approval, and implementation under this subsec-

tion—

(A) a list of those waters within the State

which after the application of effluent limita-

tions required under section 1311(b)(2) of this

title cannot reasonably be anticipated to attain

or maintain (i) water quality standards for

such waters reviewed, revised, or adopted in

accordance with section 1313(c)(2)(B) of this ti-

tle, due to toxic pollutants, or (ii) that water

quality which shal] assure protection of public

health, public water supplies, agricultural and

industrial uses, and the protection and propa-

gation of a balanced population of shellfish,

fish and wildlife, and allow recreational activi-

ties in and on the water;

(B) a list of all navigable waters in such State

for which the State does not expect the appli-

cable standard under section 1313 of this title

will be achieved after the requirements of sec-

tions 1311(b), 1316, and 1317(b) of this title

are met, due entirely or substantially to dis-

charges from point sources of any toxic pollu-

8a

tants listed pursuant to section 1317(a) of this

title;

(C) for each segment of the navigable waters

included on such lists, a determination of the

specific point sources discharging any such

toxic pollutant which is believed to be prevent-

ing or impairing such water quality and the

amount of each such toxic pollutant dis-

charged by each such source; and

(D) for each such segment, an individual con-

trol strategy which the State determines will

produce a reduction in the discharge of toxic

pollutants from point sources identified by the

State under this paragraph through the estab-

lishment of effluent limitations under section

1342 of this title and water quality standards

under section 1313(c)(2)(B) of this title, which

reduction is sufficient, in combination with ex-

isting controls on point and nonpoint sources

of pollution, to achieve the applicable water

quality standard as soon as possible, but not

later than 3 years after the date of the estab-

lishment of such strategy.

(2) Approval or disapproval

Not later than 120 days after the last day of the

2-year period referred to in paragraph (1), the

Administrator shall approve or disapprove the

control strategies submitted under paragraph (1)

by any State.

(3) Administrator’s action

If a State fails to submit control strategies in ac-

cordance with paragraph (1) or the Administrator

does not approve the control strategies submitted

9a

by such State in accordance with paragraph (1),

then, not later than 1 year after the last day of

the period referred to in paragraph (2), the Ad-

ministrator, in cooperation with such State and

after notice and opportunity for public comment,

shall implement the requirements of paragraph

(1) in such State. In the implementation of such

requirements, the Administrator shall, at a min-

imum, consider for listing under this subsection

any navigable waters for which any person sub-

mits a petition to the Administrator for listing not

later than 120 days after such last day.

x**e kee

33 U.S.C. § 1316. National Standards of

Performance

(a) Definitions

For purposes of this section:

(1) The term “standard of performance” means a

standard for the cont: ol of the discharge of pollu-

tants which reflects the greatest degree of efflu-

ent reduction which the Administrator deter-

mines to be achievable through application of the

best available demonstrated control technology,

processes, operating methods, or other alterna-

tives, including, where practicable, a standard

permitting no discharge of pollutants.

(2) The term “new source” means any source, the

construction of which is commenced after the pub-

lication of proposed regulations prescribing a

standard of performance under this section which

will be applicable to such source, if such standard

is thereafter promulgated in accordance with this

section.

10a

(3) The term “source” means any building, struc-

ture, facility, or installation from which there is

or may be the discharge of pollutants.

(4) The term “owner or operator” means any per-

son who owns, leases, operates, controls, or su-

pervises a source.

(5) The term “construction” means any place-

ment, assembly, or installation of facilities or

equipment (including contractual obligations to

purchase such facilities or equipment) at the

premises where such equipment will be used, in-

cluding preparation work at such premises.

(b) Categories of sources; Federal standards of

performance for new sources

(1)(A) The Administrator shall, within ninety

days after October 18, 1972, publish (and from

time to time thereafter shall revise) a list of cate-

gories of sources * * *.

*x*ke eke *

(B) As soon as practicable, but in no case more

than one year, after a category of sources is in-

cluded in a list under subparagraph (A) of this

paragraph, the Administrator shall propose

and publish regulations establishing Federal

standards of performance for new sources

within such category. The Administrator shall

afford interested persons an opportunity for

written comment on such proposed regula-

tions. After considering such comments, he

shall promulgate, within one hundred and

twenty days after publication of such proposed

regulations, such standards with such adjust-

ments as he deems appropriate. The Adminis-

lla

trator shall, from time to time, as technology

and alternatives change, revise such stand-

ards following the procedure required by this

subsection for promulgation of such standards.

Standards of performance, or revisions there-

of, shall become effective upon promulgation.

In establishing or revising Federal standards

of performance for new sources under this sec-

tion, the Administrator shall take into consid-

eration the cost of achieving such effluent re-

duction, and any non-water quality, environ-

mental impact and energy requirements.

xx «ek

(c) State enforcement of standards of perfor-

mance

Each State may develop and submit to the Adminis-

trator a procedure under State law for applying and

enforcing standards of performance for new sources

located in such State. If the Administrator finds that

the procedure and the law of any State require the

application and enforcement of standards of perfor-

mance to at least the same extent as required by this

section, such State is authorized to apply and enforce

such standards of performance (except with respect

to new sources owned or operated by the United

States).

x*“*e kek *

12a

33 U.S.C. § 1317 — Toxic And Pretreatment Ef-

fluent Standards

(a) Toxic Pollutant List; Revision; Hearing;

Promulgation of Standards; Effective Date;

Consultation.

(1) On and after December 27, 1977, the list of

toxic pollutants or combination of pollutants sub-

ject to this chapter shall consist of those toxic pol-

lutants listed in table 1 of Committee Print Num-

bered 95-30 of the Committee on Public Works

and Transportation of the House of Representa-

tives, and the Administrator may revise such list

and the Administrator is authorized to add to or

remove from such list any pollutant. * * *

(2) Each toxic pollutant listed in accordance with

paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be subject

to effluent limitations resulting from the applica-

tion of the best available technology economically

achievable for the applicable category or class of

point sources established in accordance with sec-

tions 1311(b)(2) and 1314(b)(2) of this title.

x**x**x«

(b) Pretreatment Standards; Hearing; Promul-

gation; Compliance Period; Revision; Applica-

tion to State and Local Laws.

(1) The Administrator shall, within one hundred

and eighty days after October 18, 1972, and from

time to time thereafter, publish proposed regula-

tions establishing pretreatment standards for in-

troduction of pollutants into treatment works (as

defined in section 1292 of this title) which are

publicly owned for those pollutants which are de-

termined not to be susceptible to treatment by

l3a

such treatment works or which would interfere

with the operation of such treatment works. Not

later than ninety days after such publication, and

after opportunity for public hearing, the Adminis-

trator shall promulgate such pretreatment stand-

ards. Pretreatment standards under this subsec-

tion shall specify a time for compliance not to ex-

ceed three years from the date of promulgation

and shall be established to prevent the discharge

of any pollutant through treatment works (as de-

fined in section 1292 of this title) which are pub-

licly owned, which pollutant interferes with,

passes through, of otherwise is incompatible with

such works. * * *

(2) The Administrator shall, from time to time, as

control technology, processes, operating methods,

or other alternatives change, revise such stand-

ards following the procedure established by this

subsection for promulgation of such standards.

x**xe keke

(c) New Sources of Pollutants into Publicly

Owned Treatment Works.

In order to insure that any source introducing

pollutants into a publicly owned treatment works,

which source would be a new source subject to

section 1316 of this title if it were to discharge

pollutants, will not cause a violation of the efflu-

ent hmitations established for any such treat-

ment works, the Administrator shall promulgate

pretreatment standards for the category of such

sources simultaneously with the promulgation of

standards of performance under section 1316 of

this title for the equivalent category of new

sources. Such pretreatment standards shall pre-

l4a

vent the discharge of any pollutant into such

treatment works, which pollutant may interfere

with, pass through, or otherwise be incompatible

with such works.

x*“*x****

33 U.S.C. § 1342. National Pollutant Discharge

Elimination System

(a) Permits for discharge of pollutants

(1) Except as provided in sections 1328 and 1344

of this title, the Administrator may, after oppor-

tunity for public hearing issue a permit for the

discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pol-

lutants, notwithstanding section 1311(a) of this

title, upon condition that such discharge will meet

either (A) all applicable requirements under sec-

tions 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, and 1343 of

this title, or (B) prior to the taking of necessary

implementing actions relating to all such re-

quirements, such conditions as the Administrator

determines are necessary to carry out the provi-

sions of this chapter.

(2) The Administrator shall prescribe conditions

for such permits to assure compliance with the

requirements of paragraph (1) of this subsection,

including conditions on data and information col-

lection, reporting, and such other requirements as

he deems appropriate.

(3) The permit program of the Administrator un-

der paragraph (1) of this subsection, and permits

issued thereunder, shall be subject to the same

terms, conditions, and requirements as apply to a

State permit program and permits issued there-

under under subsection (b) of this section.

15a

znkxeekee

(b) State permit programs

At any time after the promulgation of the guidelines

required by subsection (i)(2) of section 1314 of this ti-

tle, the Governor of each State desiring to administer

its own permit program for discharges into navigable

waters within its jurisdiction may submit to the Ad-

ministrator a full and complete description of the

program it proposes to establish and administer un-

der State law or under an interstate compact. In ad-

dition, such State shall submit a statement from the

attorney general (or the attorney for those State wa-

ter pollution control agencies which have independ-

ent legal counsel), or from the chief legal officer in

the case of an interstate agency, that the laws of

such State, or the interstate compact, as the case

may be, provide adequate authority to carry out the

described program. The Administrator shall approve

each submitted program unless he determines that

adequate authority does not exist:

zx**x¥eke

(c) Suspension of Federal program upon sub-

mission of State program; withdrawal of ap-

proval of State program; return of State pro-

gram to Administrator

zx*xe*ek*®

(3) Whenever the Administrator determines after

public hearing that a State is not administering a

program approved under this section in accord-

ance with requirements of this section, he shall so

notify the State and, if appropriate corrective ac-

tion is not taken within a reasonable time, not to

exceed ninety days, the Administrator shall with-

16a

draw approval of such program. The Administra-

tor shall not withdraw approval of any such pro-

gram unless he shall first have notified the State,

and made public, in writing, the reasons for such

withdrawal.

z=****

(d) Notification of Administrator

(1) Each State shall transmit to the Administra-

tor a copy of each permit application received by

such State and provide notice to the Administra-

tor of every action related to the consideration of

such permit application, including each permit

proposed to be issued by such State.

(2) No permit shall issue (A) if the Administrator

within ninety days of the date of his notification

under subsection (b)(5) of this section objects in

writing to the issuance of such permit, or (B) if

the Administrator within ninety days of the date

of transmittal of the proposed permit by the State

objects in writing to the issuance of such permit

as being outside the guidelines and requirements

of this chapter. Whenever the Administrator ob-

jects to the issuance of a permit under this para-

graph such written objection shall contain a

statement of the reasons for such objection and

the effluent limitations and conditions which such

permit would include if it were issued by the Ad-

ministrator.

(3) The Administrator may, as to any permit ap-

plication, waive paragraph (2) of this subsection.

(4) In any case where, after December 27, 1977,

the Administrator, pursuant to paragraph (2) of

this subsection, objects to the issuance of a per-

17a

mit, on request of the State, a public hearing

shall be held by the Administrator on such objec-

tion. If the State does not resubmit such permit

revised to meet such objection within 30 days af-

ter completion of the hearing, or, if no hearing is

requested within 90 days after the date of such

objection, the Administrator may issue the permit

pursuant to subsection (a) of this section for such

source in accordance with the guidelines and re-

quirements of this chapter.

*exe kek *

(1) Limitation on permit requirement

(1) Agricultural return flows

The Administrator shall not require a permit un-

der this section for discharges composed entirely

of return flows from irrigated agriculture, nor

shall the Administrator directly or indirectly, re-

quire any State to require such a permit.

(2) Stormwater runoff from oil, gas, and

mining operations

The Administrator shall not require a permit un-

der this section, nor shall the Administrator di-

rectly or indirectly require any State to require a

permit, for discharges of stormwater runoff from

mining operations or oil and gas exploration, pro-

duction, processing, or treatment operations or

transmission facilities, composed entirely of flows

which are from conveyances or systems of con-

veyances (including but not limited to pipes, con-

duits, ditches, and channels) used for collecting

and conveying precipitation runoff and which are

not contaminated by contact with, or do not come

into contact with, any overburden, raw material,

18a

intermediate products, finished product, byprod-

uct, or waste products located on the site of such

operations.

(3) Silvicultural activities

(A) NPDES permit requirements for silvi-

cultural activities

The Administrator shall not require a permit

under this section nor directly or indirectly re-

quire any State to require a permit under this

section for a discharge from runoff resulting

from the conduct of the following silviculture

activities conducted in accordance with stand-

ard industry practice: nursery operations, site

preparation, reforestation and subsequent cul-

tural treatment, thinning, prescribed burning,

pest and fire control, harvesting operations,

surface drainage, or road construction and

maintenance.

xe eet

(p) Municipal and industrial stormwater dis-

charges

(1) General rule

Prior to October 1, 1994, the Administrator or the

State (in the case of a permit program approved

under this section) shall not require a permit un-

der this section for discharges composed entirely

of stormwater.

(2) Exceptions

Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to the

following stormwater discharges:

19a

(A) A discharge with respect to which a permit

has been issued under this section before Feb-

ruary 4, 1987.

(B) A discharge associated with industrial ac-

tivity.

(C) A discharge from a municipal separate

storm sewer system serving a population of

250,000 or more.

(D) A discharge from a municipal separate

storm sewer system serving a population of

100,000 or more but less than 250,000.

(E) A discharge for which the Administrator

or the State, as the case may be, determines

that the stormwater discharge contributes to a

violation of a water quality standard or is a

significant contributor of pollutants to waters

of the United States.

x****

(6) Regulations

Not later than October 1, 1993, the Administra-

tor, in consultation with State and local officials,

shall issue regulations (based on the results of the

studies conducted under paragraph (5)) which

designate stormwater discharges, other than

those discharges described in paragraph (2), to be

regulated to protect water quality and shall es-

tablish a comprehensive program to regulate such

designated sources. The program shall, at a min-

imum, (A) establish priorities, (B) establish re-

quirements for State stormwater management

programs, and (C) establish expeditious dead-

lines. The program may include performance

standards, guidelines, guidance, and manage-

20a

ment practices and treatment requirements, as

appropriate.

x“* eee

33 U.S.C. § 1345. Disposal or Use of

Sewage Sludge

(a) Permit

Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter

or of any other law, in any case where the disposal of

sewage sludge resulting from the operation of a

treatment works as defined in section 1292 of this ti-

tle (including the removal of in-place sewage sludge

from one location and its deposit at another location)

would result in any pollutant from such sewage

sludge entering the navigable waters, such disposal

is prohibited except in accordance with a permit is-

sued by the Administrator under section 1342 of this

title.

(b) Issuance of permit; regulations

The Administrator shall issue regulations governing

the issuance of permits for the disposal of sewage

sludge subject to subsection (a) of this section and

section 1342 of this title. Such regulations shall re-

quire the application to such disposal of each criteri-

on, factor, procedure, and requirement applicable to

a permit issued under section 1342 of thie title.

(c) State permit program

Each State desiring to administer its own permit

program for disposal of sewage sludge subject to sub-

section (a) of this section within its jurisdiction may

do so in accordance with section 1342 of this title.

x*eeeF

2la

(2) Identification and regulation of toxic pol-

lutants

(A) On basis of available information

(i) Proposed regulations

Not later than November 30, 1986, the

Administrator shall identify those toxic

pollutants which, on the basis of available

information on their toxicity, persistence,

concentration, mobility, or potential for

exposure, may be present in sewage

sludge in concentrations which may ad-

versely affect public health or the envi-

ronment, and propose regulations specify-

ing acceptable management practices for

sewage sludge containing each such toxic

pollutant and establishing numerical lim-

itations for each such pollutant for each

use identified under paragraph (1)(A).

(ii) Final regulations

Not later than August 31, 1987, and after

opportunity for public hearing, the Ad-

ministrator shall promulgate the regula-

tions required by subparagraph (A)(i).

(B) Others

(i) Proposed regulations

Not later than July 31, 1987, the Admin-

istrator shall identify those toxic pollu-

tants not identified under subparagraph

(A)Gi) which may be present in sewage

sludge in concentrations which may ad-

versely affect public health or the envi-

ronment, and propose regulations specify-

ing acceptable management practices for

22a

sewage sludge containing each such toxic

pollutant and establishing numerical lim-

itations for each pollutant for each such

use identified under paragraph (1)(A).

(ii) Final regulations

Not later than June 15, 1988, the Admin-

istrator shall promulgate the regulations

required by subparagraph (B)(i).

(C) Review

From time to time, but not less often than eve-

ry 2 years, the Administrator shall review the

regulations promulgated under this paragraph

for the purpose of identifying additional toxic

pollutants and promulgating regulations for

such pollutants consistent with the require-

ments of this paragraph.

(D) Minimum standards; compliance date

The management practices and numerical cri-

teria established under subparagraphs (A),

(B), and (C) shall be adequate to protect public

health and the environment from any reason-

ably anticipated adverse effects of each pollu-

tant. Such regulations shall require compli-

ance as expeditiously as practicable but in no

case later than 12 months after their publica-

tion, unless such regulations require the con-

struction of new pollution control facilities, in

which case the regulations shall require com-

pliance as expeditiously as practicable but in

no case later than two years from the date of

their publication.

23a

(3) Alternative standards

For purposes of this subsection, if, in the judg-

ment of the Administrator, it is not feasible to

prescribe or enforce a numerical limitation for a

pollutant identified under paragraph (2), the Ad-

ministrator may instead promulgate a design,

equipment, management practice, or operational

standard, or combination thereof, which in the

Administrator's judgment is adequate to protect

public health and the environment from any rea-

sonably anticipated adverse effects of such pollu-

tant. In the event the Administrator promulgates

a design or equipment standard under this sub-

section, the Administrator shall include as part of

such standard such requirements as will assure

the proper operation and maintenance of any

such element of design or equipment.

x*x eet

(f) Implementation of regulations

(1) Through section 1342 permits

Any permit issued under section 1342 of this title

to a publicly owned treatment works or any other

treatment works treating domestic sewage shall

include requirements for the use and disposal of

sludge that implement the regulations estab-

lished pursuant to subsection (d) of this section,

unless such requirements have been included in a

permit issued under the appropriate provisions of

subtitle C of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42

U.S.C.A. § 6921 et seq.], part C of the Safe Drink-

ing Water Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 300h et seq.], the

Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act

of 1972 [33 U.S.C.A. § 1401 et seq.], or the Clean

Air Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 et seq.], or under

24a

State permit programs approved by the Adminis-

trator, where the Administrator determines that

such programs assure compliance with any appli-

cable requirements of this section.

*x*=* *e#2*

U.S.C. § 1369. Administrative Procedure and

Judicial Review

weexeee

(b) Review of Administrator’s actions; selection

of court; fees

(1) Review of the Administrator’s action (A) in

promulgating any standard of performance under

section 1316 of this title, (B) in making any de-

termination pursuant to section 1316(b)(1)(C) of

this title, (C) in promulgating any effluent stand-

ard, prohibition, or pretreatment standard under

section 1317 of this title, (D) in making any de-

termination as to a State permit program submit-

ted under section 1342(b) of this title, (E) in ap-

proving or promulgating any effluent limitation

or other limitation under section 1311, 1312,

1316, or 1345 of this title, (F) in issuing or deny-

ing any permit under section 1342 of this title,

and (G) in promulgating any individual control

strategy under section 1314() of this title, may be

had by any interested person in the Circuit Court

of Appeals of the United States for the Federal

judicial district in which such person resides or

transacts business which is directly affected by

such action upon application by such person. Any

such application shall be made within 120 days

from the date of such determination, approval,

promulgation, issuance or denial, or after such

25a

date only if such application is based solely on

grounds which arose after such 120th day.

(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to

which review could have been obtained under

paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not be sub-

ject to judicial review in any civil or criminal pro-

ceeding for enforcement.

x* ek *&

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.