Respondents Brief — Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1824 (2016) (No. 15-927)

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No, 16-927

In THE

1 Supreme Gaurt of the Brited States

FEET

12 20%

(EPR OF THe Pia F

SCA HYGIENE PropuctTs AKTIEBOLAG

AND SCA PERSONAL CARE, INC.,

Petitioners,

v,

FIRST QUALITY BABY PropuctTs, LLC, FIRST QUALITY

HYGIENIC, INC., FinsT QUALITY PRODUCTS, INC.,,

AND FIRST QUALITY RETAIL SERVICES, LLC,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES OOURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

MARE C. FLEMING

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

60 State Street

Boston, MA 02100

KENNETH P. GEORGE

CHARLES R. MACEDO

MARK BERKOWITZ

AMSTER, ROTHSTEIN

& EBENSTEIN LLP

90 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10016

SETH P. WAXMAN

Counsel of Record

THOMAS G, SAUNDERS

MATTHEW GUARNIERI

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

1876 Permsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 663-6000

seth. waxman@wilmerhale.com

JASON D, HIRSCH

HANNA A. BAEK

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

7 Wall ade Center”

Now Yark NY 10007

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether laches is available as a defense under the

Patent Act to bar claims for damages.

(i)

ale

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

First Quality Baby Products, LLC; First Quality

Hygienic, Inc.; First Quality Products, Inc.; and First

Quality Retail Services, LLC are privately held com-

panies, and no publicly held company owns 10% or more

of the stock of any of them.

(ii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED...............ccccccccscssssessssssessesseseoes i

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT............. il

ee FD PS vi

IIT Siatinorescsesnerecsnnessncointninimiasiinninnnnmannealail l

ET Sntirisparinnicninticininnenemntiinimenenmiidll 2

A. Statutory Background.................:scsesesesesseneees 2

B. Factual Background ................0ccscccsccscesssessseseees 7

CC. FRR I titececceccccccscscvcccscevesesonnstnesccsennene 9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..................cccccccssseseereeseees 13

REIS crrtreceninecimnnnmmnnnnnnmmnanan 16

I. CONGRESS CODIFIED LACHES AS A DE-

FENSE TO DAMAGES CLAIMS IN § 282 OF

pT SR eae 16

A. Before 1952, The Federal Courts Uni-

formly Recognized Laches As A Bar

To Recovering Damages For Patent

1. Laches barred recovery of patent

damages before the merger of law

2. Laches was also available as a de-

fense in the rare patent actions

I GP cetccsesnsncecsenscansesnnsenctvnvennenceceees 21

3. The consensus view of laches as a

bar to damages persisted after the

1938 merger of law and equity.................... 23

(iii)

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

4. SCA’s attempt to rebut this judi-

cial consensus fails ................0ss00--eesereeeeee- 24

B. The Text, Purpose, And History Of

The 1952 Act Demonstrate That Con-

gress Intended To Preserve Laches As

A Defense To Damages .....................cccecseesceeseees 28

C. Since 1952, Congress Has Altered The

Patent Act Repeatedly Without Dis-

a 33

ll. SCA MISREADS PETRELLA AND MISCON-

STRUES § 286 OF THE PATENT ACT ..........0000cc00000000- 36

A. Petrella’s Concern For Respecting

Legislative Intent Supports Retaining

B. Congress Had Good Reason For A Dif-

ferent Approach To Laches In Patent

1. Section 286 is not a statute of limi-

tations and does not measure a pa-

SE eetcnescnecsncsncenssccnmnsesmctssasescesees 40

2. SCA’s other textual arguments

premised on § 286 are unfounded .............. 42

3. SCA ignores numerous other dis-

tinctions between patent and copy-

EEE ee 44

C. SCA’s Policy Arguments Are Un-

Ea 49

Vv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

III. THE PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE AFTER

Six YEARS OF DELAY SHOULD BE RE-

EE RS ALE LA a oe Re a 51

— _——

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

A.C. Aukerman Co. v. Miller Formless

Co., 693 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1982)..........0.000-+-

A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides

Construction Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed.

CR Fi iii crevenscrecesssensosesensvesesrusssnnnenssnassereseeesces

A.R. Mosler & Co. v. Lurie, 209 F. 364 (2d

Ceo ep canenssnnccsonzcnssnenssnnsennqnuseussaceenssneseseness

A. Stucki Co. v. Buckeye Steel Castings

Co., 963 F.2d 360 (Fed. Cir. 1992)..............-

Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S.

American Home Products Corp. v.

Lockwood Manufacturing Co., 483

F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1973) ........-.-.-.ccsse-veeeeesees

Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top

Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961)........

Arrowood v. Symington-Gould Corp., 71 F

Supp. 693 (S.D.N.Y 1946) ....cccccssssssssossseese

Baker Manufacturing Co. v. Whitewater

Manufacturing Co., 430 F.2d 1008 (7th

CUR BaP rccsecccnsersecsncsnecenscsnsenesesscesssnmmnseasscvseces

Ball v. Gibbs, 118 F.2d 958 (8th Cir. 1941)........

Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d

1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ..............0-csesscseresseseseeees

Banker v. Ford Motor Co., 3 F. Supp. 737

I,

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Banker v. Ford Motor Co., 69 F.2d 665 (3d

Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning

Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of

California, Inc., 522 U.S. 192 (1997) .........2......00000- 40

Beach vy. Ocwen Federal Bank, 523 US.

St dnticierthitniceansinnnieniehintatttgsensenicemmenmmennnests 41

Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64 (1876) .................cceceeseeee 2

Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) ..............ccccceceeee 29

Brennan v. Hawley Products Co., 182 F.2d

ee 23, 28

Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501

cr 47

Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610

STITT las siniicaciaineaniineteaaieamsaiiataeinieiatithtttiatnaidanintaiatenenteneetmmmmnens 5

Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.

SO ehaercecsirieeinianettingeengiitenphdesentumsiimmeensneseenmmeenees 29

Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v.

Best Seam Inc., 694 F.2d 570 (9th Cir.

ET SARE RS RS 34

Celastic Corp. v. McClellan Shoe Specialty

Co., 15 F Supp. 1048 (D. Del. 1936)......................... 19

Cheney v. United States District Court for

District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367

Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Hughes

Tool Co., 192 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1961).............-000 23

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

City of Concord v. Norton, 16 F. 477

re i crrrcnnctcnemnncesemmntnenenegneentcensecmennes 27

Continental Coatings Corp. v. Metco, Inc.,

464 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1972) ...........cccsecsseeesseseseeeees 34

CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175

I cencecesenessentsestinssnmmvnmmnensensemenmamnmmmacnnsenes 41, 42

Cummings v. Wilson & Willard

Manufacturing Co., 4 F.2d 453 (9th

Dallas Machinery & Locomotive Works,

Inc. v. Willamette-Hyster Co., 28 F

et inretcentttnsrernnetneninnsznccccscencneseses 19

Delaney Patents Corp. v. Johns-Manville,

29 F. Supp. 431 (S.D. Cal. 1989)................ccccccserseeees 23

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303

ti hnconinvesessincnatnetieniinsiiininsiuemsbisentannemmnmmensecein 32, 33

Dock & Terminal Engineering Co. v.

Pennsylvania Railroad, 82 F.2d 19 (3d

EES Sa ae 18

Dwight & Lloyd Sintering Co. v.

Greenawalt, 27 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1928) ....... 18, 19, 21

Enelow v. New York Life Insurance Co.,

ES Ce 24

Federal Housing Financial Agency v.

UBS Americas Inc., 712 F.3d 136 (2d

2 ee 41

Feinstein v. 1.T.S. Co., 68 F. Supp. 15 (N.D.

Ne I rcterrecencncenenencesemeensnintiabationanmausmnnemnnnmenrne 23

—C

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural

Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340

ee 45

Ford v. Huff, 296 F. 652 (5th Cir. 1924)............. 21, 22, 24

France Manufacturing Co. v. Jefferson

Electric Co., 106 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1939)................. 21

Frank F. Smith Hardware Co. v. S.H.

Pomeroy Co., 299 F. 644 (2d Cir. 1924)................... 19

Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368 (1892)...............c000000 28

George J. Meyer Manufacturing Co. v.

Miller Manufacturing Co., 24 F.2d 505

TT sicrtiseecthiceeetasicnnennmanniiinamsesenmenqnemene 19

Gillons v. Shell Co. of California, 86 F.2d

600 (9th Cir. 1936)............ccccecceceeeeeees 18, 19, 21, 28, 52

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,

A ET 45

Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics,

TE 17

Hartford-Empire Co. v. Swindeil Bros., 96

gg ET 19

Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident

Insurance Co., 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013)..............cccccee 41

Holman v. Oil Well Supply Co., 83 F.2d

ee 18

Huff v. Ford, 289 F. 858 (S.D. Fla. 1923) .............ccccsssee 24

X

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Jensen v Western Irrigation & Manu-

facturing, Inc., 650 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.

Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC,

8 ee 36

Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68 (1880) .......0...0cccccccecceeeeee 25

Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193

Si iertinteteenaiienneipinncuntetsnetensmatneninsntntentaimuccenesees 5, 44

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

I ctresincncnnersnnscemnsiantanessersemeceenennts 40

Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank,

TT insrsctichinticnncnenendesetnaestocssoanneenvens 22

Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 768 (1985) ...........c.cccceeeeeeeeee 36

Lukens Steel Co. v. American Locomotive

Co., 197 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1962) ............cccccceseeseeeneees 23

Marlatt v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 70

F.. Supp. 426 (S.D. Cal. 1947)..0.......cccccccccceseseeeeee 23, 28

Mather v. Ford Motor Co., 40 F. Supp. 589

TTT siccohicininstinteensendneneninibnanghsencnctwenceseses 22

McLaughlin v. People’s Railway Co., 21 F

PS Cassels IIMS Bete cocecsccczscssensececesoseecsccssecsccesceee 19

Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514 (1888) ................ccceeeeeee 44

Meyrountz Manufacturing Co. v. Eccleston,

98 F 437 (C.C.D. Mass. 1899)..............cccceccecceseeseeeeee 19

Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 564

I cichncssntuinettaistintatinianeteintaiinnmanisia passim

m .

xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Middleton v. Wiley, 195 F.2d 844 (8th Cir.

FE sincneneceescscsonemernssussenmaseatintatemnnatpramemesevesseosnacsces 27

Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v.

Berwick Industries, Inc., 532 F.2d 330

I I iicrnisccecinsnnteseccdeninmpinnighsinsinneiennnsvecmenncees 34

Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Clair, 123 F.2d

I iinsecesisiericsinnninenpesencenmnensnsemncsnessacent 19

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) ..............cceseccesseseeseeeeens 39

Nazon Telesign Corp. v. Bunker Ramo

Corp., 686 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1982)... 34

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) ............c-c0e0e00 29

North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S.

ise hsirnisscuntntensecenedisntsiahasisiatinieluneabdatinnmincmsnincmmnenits 36

Oroz v. American President Lines, Ltd.,

IS, Hi atccnccscncsecctesncnecsccesccesecrees 52

Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270 (Fed.

oR: Ee een HO 33

Peerless Weighing & Vending Machine

Corp. v. International Ticket Scale

Corp., 37 F. Supp. 582 (D. Del. 1941)................:00000 23

Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,

ts III coicicncircegeeninticccecesccvesncsnceee passim

POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.,

eI tiriabivntederinsancriicccnicnecanseniossninnnss 43

xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Potash Co. of America v. International

Minerals & Chemical Corp., 213 F.2d

I EE ichscttictienitesnsctgnitnteinstonnmetncessenmnesenene 35

Potter Instrument Co. v. Storage

Technology Corp., 641 F.2d 190 (4th

EEE TESS Se: SR A 34

Reisz v. Harvey, 33 F Supp. 192 (N.D.

TT diidesiaibccinnineddshisnsitnibiiienasieiabiinunionennnccsenasite 23

Remington Rand, Inc. v. Acme Card

System Co., 29 F. Supp. 192 (S.D. Ohio

ERE SPER ESE SES DARE SSSR, Ee 19

Richardson v. D.M. Osborne & Co., 93 F

TE ee 19, 28

Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Manufactur-

ing Corp., 719 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir.

SII chicccnieestiaihapuntibameiecibidiisstiapicheatialdsiagatimepmetecasemecssae 20

Rome Grader & Machinery Corp. v. J.D.

Adams Manufacturing Co., 135 F.2d

a 23

Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v.

Consolidated Car Heating Co., 174 F.

RN ciincliicrcrianicteeheninatatiqnibatoniesccnemeesece 19, 20

Seghers v. Gardella, 55 F Supp. 914 (N.D.

AEE NT 23

Serdarevic v. Advanced Medical Optics,

Inc., 582 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ..............cccc000 51

Shaffer v. Rector Well Equipment Co., 155

a IE eicernicrcrnnntanssensencenserntcccssseesostecs 23

xiii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Skinner v. Aluminum Co. of America, 105

ee 23

Smith v. Sinclair Refining Co., 257 F.2d

IN rcnintinscsiasinaseasmumnnentinniienmemnececcsase 35

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City

Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)...........cccccccceerseeenee 49

Standard Oil Co. v. Nippon Shokubai

Kagaku Kogyo Co., 754 F.2d 345 (Fed.

ee ihicicidintneintnencevcendnasntineinasainneitniepenasscetcenvmanete 41

Starrett v. J. Stevens Arms & Tool Co., 96

lets BIND IIE crcceccccscesesenceneseecreecseccsecese 19

Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. East-

man Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir.

Temco Manufacturing Co. v. National

Electric Ticket Register Co., 33 F.2d

| TE 19, 20

Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegeniz,

Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ..............00ccee0e 46

Thorpe v. Wm. Filene’s Sons Co., 40 F.2d

TT ES 27

Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136 (1888) ............ccs00 2

Todd v. Russell, 104 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1939) ................. 28

Triplex Safety Glass Co. of North America

v. Kolb, 53 F.2d 1062 (E.D. Pa. 1931) ..................00. 28

TWM Manufacturing Co. v. Dura Corp.,

592 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1979) ................cccc-eesseeeess 35, 52

xiv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Ultimax Cement Manufacturing Corp. v.

CTS Cement Manufacturing Corp.,

587 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ..............00-sccseseeeeesees 29

Union Shipbuilding Co. v. Boston Iron &

Metal Co., 93 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1938)............... 18, 28

United Drug Co. v. Ireland Candy Co., 51

fc 19

United States ex rel. Arant v. Lane, 249

IIT ictintssicnicindbiserhbicntnteieseatabidaiainmnemaonestens 40

United States v. Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1 (1997)................. 29

United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009).................. 29

United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480 (1935)................... 27

United States v. New Orleans Pacific Rail-

way Co., 248 U.S. GOT (1919) ............c.ccccrseseerecsecssseeee 28

Universal Coin Lock Co. v. American

Sanitary Lock Co., 104 F.2d 781 (7th

I iain iitiiacinideatietiasinsnled icteastidimadbenetiecienmnsennios 22

Van Alen v. Aluminum Co. of America, 43

F. Supp. 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) ...........cccessscesceesereoseoee 23

Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis

Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) ................. 32, 33, 34

Watkins v. Northwestern Ohio Tractor

Pullers Ass'n, 630 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir.

XV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Westco-Chippewa Pump Co. v. Delaware

Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v. New York

Air Brake Co., 111 F. 741 (N.D.N.Y.

EEE sccscnnesnsveemensnnmmenensmemeaniemeciiniemmeiannnesessnne 19, 20

Wheatley v. Rex-Hide, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 543

SE Ne I ticriiesninsineininneciategeiniestiinienlisbaateecennnmses 19, 20

Whitman v. Walt Disney Productions,

Inc., 263 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1968) ...............ccccceeceeeees 35

Wilkie v. Manhattan Rubber Manufactur-

ing Co., 8 F.2d 785 (D.N J. 192B)..........00-cecccceeseseeees 19

Window Glass Machine Co. v. Pittsburgh

Plate Glass Co., 46 F.2d 484 (W.D. Pa.

Window Glass Machine Co. v. Pittsburgh

Plate Glass Co., 284 F. 645 (3d Cir.

Wolf Mineral Process Corp. v. Minerals

Separation North American Corp., 18

IS SID Sicesinniceinntnipeinnininnsesccmscesvenscess 18

Wolf, Sayer & Heller, Inc. v. United States

Slicing Machine Co., 261 F. 195 (7th

STN iidlictictiinpiditiinninissinhiniantndaiatiamebigtincinienenctacnniine 18

Wollensak v. Reiher, 115 U.S. 96 (1885) ...............0........ 28

Woodmanse & Hewitt Manufacturing Co.

v. Williams, 68 F. 489 (6th Cir. 1895)................ 19, 20

Yates v. Smith, 271 F 27 (D.N.J. 1920).................... 19, 20

Xvi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Young v. General Electric Co., 96 F. Supp.

re aicicteiencnsitecintiintciininticntaninenenccensseconness 23

DOCKETED CASES

Dock & Terminal Engineering Co. v.

Pennsylvania Railroad, No. 5,757 (3d

EU cictechsnadiisieniiniaendnesiiebbbibtiatenindisaenilapnainenesiteenemessececsnssoene 20

Union Shipbuilding Co. v. Boston Iron &

Metal Co., No. 4,203 (4th Cir.).........cccccccssresseesessceees 20

Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,

|__| ST en 39

STATUTES AND LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

17 U.S.C.

INI cinatipeicihapsedatheteallibetinieteninisensancesaniel 48

in ni sesstaiiecatitirhdnancialaenameetnieimmamnnntniill 49

I daisies entices itnenatanmainesdemaiiadael 38

ITT occ sscetiiisisit cit sclsbetattinaeicieadiateimababienaiiil 37, 40

35 U.S.C.

STII isenininnicictinmidaiicinseintnsintednbidipmnnnteaionentia 4

STITT ciictidtscinenicecitaiiainmsiinpheninnteasaieiiiaiidioanenidiaantagiaite 48

TIT Nissin iinhasttduenscipitaieniinhtneuitndammmesenntdaninenmiiaiiial 45

TIT iidistsinhteannsesniencsmintisiomnmnannmnnmeiiiiaial 49

IIE ntlk iccetcticestinthindieivesiohtaipaiienimmmandenieinetiiil passim

STII iiniicrcnstctdiminnanenienienninsssiinatapenienmasnnnaialaae 44

I esi namcenaiaariaed cteniiatalindinal 5, 6, 31, 43

ST laithascccesieinebiaeesiceinininisiniiaioneeniauaeleal passim

Sn acla eciecietsiciaieindiatpanlibiihailsintasnnbtidibiainidisinesnindieinl 43, 46

Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198................. 3, 6, 17

Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 391, 29 Stat. 692 ...0.........cccccseseeee 4

XVii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) ..0.........cccseeees 39

Pub. L. No. 63-278, 38 Stat. 956 (1915) ............cccccceceeeeee 21

Pub. L. No. 67-147, 42 Stat. 389 (1922) ............cccccceseeeeeees 5

Pub. L. No. 79-687, 60 Stat. 778 (1946) ..............ccccceeeeeees 5

Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66

BUTI Weil hciosnieiciitarssiianesvdesnapaischinigeniataciciaientiniancted 6, 28, 29

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term

Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.

ee es Si iacircednasencntseressnsnsctenevesscscenesscenes 35

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.

No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) ............ccccccecesseneeseees 35

Rev. Stat. (1874)

SUT iciilisinicecncicnennapiecitaiasibiasasdduniaiieianiensaaimaphinmnaaalila 3, 4,6

I iicscesiocnsscetsqneusiniicneespinciniiininianininingedinndaaiill 6

Spat diaundistrnsceninistenetenapintiatianiniinnbiniaimiadiingl 3, 4, 5, 6

H.R. 7794, 82d Cong. § 282 (as passed by

SE 31

H.R. 7794, 82d Cong. § 282 (as passed by S.

Comm. on the Judiciary, June 27, 1962).................. 31

H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923 (1962)................csccesee 6, 30, 31, 32

a crriniccmmcerensesnssunscsnnntnitsiinaaaniniin 31

Se, Rh a teciitiitaltcnseseacictencniiasccrinitnii 31, 32

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Beauchamp, Christopher, The First Patent

Litigation Explosion, 125 Yale L.J. 848

etl hicoiicntnstecesshinddinaiosianeamianattinuletitaiiesinitedlegaiammecaaitaitaios 4,17, 25

XViil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

SL 50

Federico, P.J., Commentary on the New

Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1 (West 1954),

reprinted in 75 J. Pat. & Trademark

I ridacietectnrenscennetetsenmnessnsescccoescocects 32

Heard, Nathan, The New Rules of Civil

Procedure as Affecting Patent

Litigation, 20 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 895

EEL 3

Hoar, Roger Sherman, Patent Tactics and

EE 30

Judicial Conference of the United States,

Report of the Division of Procedural

Studies and Statistics, in Annual Re-

Laycock, Dougies, 7 The Le Triumph i“ Equity,

56 L. & Contemp. Probs. 53 (Summer

ETS 25

Lee, William F., & Douglas Melamed,

Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent

Damages, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 385

Lemley, Mark A., Why Do Juries Decide If

Patents Are Valid?, 99 Va. L. Rev.

EEE A 3

Lutz, Karl B., Evolution of the Claims of

U.S. Patents, 20 J. Pat. Off. Soce’y 457

nail intasiaiadeeilddintnieeirdacentiaitinctinencientantninensenseenesentenee 3

ra

xix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Robinson, William C., The Law of Patents

for Useful Inventions (1890).............cccecceeeeeeenres 17

Selinger, Jerry R., A Survey of Article III

Procedural Issues Considered at The

Federal Circuit During Its First

Decade, 27 J. Marshall L. Rev. 25

ES St ee 51

Walker on Patents (Deller’s ed., Supp.

SEED tncisinecnseansdnessnnecnsaspuisiinseusendunsnnimmuatiniitintenenemenenes 25

INTRODUCTION

By the time Congress enacted the Patent Act of

1952, courts had been applying laches to bar damages in

patent infringement cases for over fifty years, along-

side the separate six-year limit on damages now found

in 35 U.S.C. § 286. Congress codified that longstanding

judicial consensus—that a patent is rendered unen-

forceable when a patentee’s unreasonable delay in filing

suit prejudices the defendant—in § 282 of the Patent

Act, which provides that existing “unenforceability”

defenses, such as laches, are available “in any action.”

Every court of appeals to consider the question since

1962 has agreed that laches is a defense to damages in

patent infringement cases. During that same period,

Congress has repeatedly modified § 282 and other rele-

vant provisions of the patent laws without ever ex-

pressing any disagreement with the uniform consensus

that laches is available to bar damages claims.

SCA’s effort to upend that century-old consensus

and escape the consequences of its unreasonable and

prejudicial delay should be rejected. SCA’s entire case

depends on extending Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-

Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), to patent law. But

the unique text, history, and purpose of the Patent Act

all distinguish this case from Petrella. SCA’s attempt

to gloss over those differences ignores that Petrella

rests at bottom on a concern for respecting congres-

sional judgment. Congress’s different judgment in the

Patent Act thus calls for a different result from the one

reached under the Copyright Act. Nothing in Petrella

suggested that Congress could not retain both an outer

limit for recovery of patent infringement damages, 35

U.S.C. § 286, as well as equitable defenses, such as

laches, that may bar damages within that period, id.

2

§ 282.' That is exactly what Congress did here, acting

against the backdrop of settled judicial practice.

It is SCA’s desired rule, not that of the court below,

that would “jettison Congress’ judgment,” Petrella, 134

S. Ct. at 1967, destabilize the law, and invite abusive

practices. The court of appeals’ judgment upholding

the district court’s finding of laches should be affirmed.

STATEMENT

A. Statutory Background

1. Before 1870, a patentee seeking both an injunc-

tion and damages was forced to bring duplicative pro-

ceedings in equity and at law. A federal court sitting in

equity could not directly compensate the patentee for

its past losses; rather, the court was limited to ordering

an infringer to disgorge any “gains and profits.”

Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 148 (1888). This

remedy proved incomplete whenever the patentee’s

losses exceeded the infringer’s gains. See, e.g., Birdsall

v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 69-70 (1876).

Congress addressed that shortcoming in the Patent

Act of 1870, which authorized federal courts sitting in

equity to award the same damages available at law:

|Tjhe court shall have power, upon bill in equi-

ty ... to grant injunctions according to the

course and principles of courts of equity, ... and

upon a decree being rendered in any such case

for an infringement, the [patentee] shall be en-

titled to recover, in addition to the profits to be

accounted for by the defendant, the damages

: Except as otherwise noted, all citations to title 35 are to the

2010 edition applicable to this case. Pet. App. 18a n.2.

3

the complainant has sustained thereby, ... and

the court shall have the same powers to in-

crease the same in its discretion that are given

by this act to increase the damages found by

verdicts in actions upon the case ....

Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206 (em-

phasis added) (codified as amended at Rev. Stat. § 4921

(1874)). Congress did not give courts of law the power

to issue injunctions; a separate provision of the 1870

Act instead limited courts of law to awarding “actual

damages.” Id. § 59, 16 Stat. at 207 (codified as amended

at Rev. Stat. § 4919). Accordingly, a patentee could ob-

tain both an injunction and damages in equity, but only

damages at law.

Patentees predictably responded by “resort{ing] to

actions at law with decreasing frequency” after 1870,

“until finally the jurisdiction of equity over infringe-

ment suits became for all practical purposes exclusive.”

Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J.

Pat. Off. Soc’y 457, 470 (1938). Indeed, “virtually none

of the patent cases decided in this period” were tried at

law. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are

Valid?, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1673, 1704 (2013); see also

Heard, The New Rules of Civil Procedure as Affecting

Patent Litigation, 20 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 895, 895 (1938)

(“Patent cases are very seldom tried as actions at

law.”). Actions at law were reserved only for the rare

cases in which equity jurisdiction could not be in-

voked—for example, because the patent had already

expired and thus could no longer be infringed. The

“dominance of equity” in patent law persisted through

the merger of law and equity in 1938 and the adoption

of the Patent Act of 1952. See Lemley, 99 Va. L. Rev.

at 1704 (“only 2.5% of patent suits were tried to a jury”

in 1940); Judicial Conference of the United States, Re-

1

port of the Division of Procedural Studies and Statis-

tics, in Annual Report 67, 134 tbl. C4 (1952) (87 bench

trials to 4 jury trials in 1962 fiscal year).

As a result, “[mJuch of the overall body of patent

jurisprudence was developed within the equity frame-

work”; patent law is accordingly suffused with “equita-

ble approaches to judicial reasoning and lawmaking,”

including “such explicitly equity-based doctrines as pa-

tent misuse, inequitable conduct, and laches.” Beau-

champ, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125

Yale L.J. 848, 913 (2016). Equitable principles also in-

formed the development of other doctrines that contin-

ue to this day, including the doctrine of equivalents, pa-

tent exhaustion, the experimental use exception, and

prosecution laches.

2. The dominance of equity between 1870 and

1952 is reflected in the fact that when Congress

amended the Patent Act to address issues relating to

damages, it made the amendments exclusively in the

section of the statute governing damages in equity,

Rev. Stat. § 4921.’

First, in 1897, Congress enacted the predecessor to

the six-year damages period now found in 35 U.S.C.

§ 286. Congress placed that limitation in Rev. Stat.

§ 4921 and made it applicable both in equity and at law:

“in any suit or action ... there shall be no recovery of

profits or damages for any infringement committed

more than six years before” filing. Act of Mar. 3, 1897,

’ Congress made no comparable changes to the provision gov-

erning damages at law, which remained unchanged from the 1870s

onwards. Compare Rev. Stat. § 4919, with 36 U.S.C. § 67 (1946).

5

ch. 391, § 6, 29 Stat. 692, 694. Second, in 1922, Con-

gress modified § 4921 to permit equity courts to award

“a reasonable sum” in damages, if a patentee had diffi-

culty proving actual damages or profits in an account-

ing. Pub. L. No. 67-147, § 8, 42 Stat. 389, 392 (1922).

Third, in 1946, Congress eliminated reference to dis-

gorgement of profits and set a floor for damages in

§ 4921 by providing that they be “not less than a rea-

sonable royalty.” Pub. L. No. 79-587, 60 Stat. 778, 778

(1946).

The upshot of these successive changes is that

courts sitting in equity and applying Rev. Stat. § 4921

were awarding the same reasonable-royalty damages

available today, 35 U.S.C. § 284, subject to the same

six-year cutoff, id. § 286.

3. Between 1870 and 1952, federal courts repeat-

edly recognized and applied laches when a patentee un-

reasonably and inexcusably “slept upon his rights” to

the accused infringer’s prejudice. Lane & Bodley Co. v.

Locke, 150 U.S. 198, 201 (1898). In Lane & Bodley,

which arose before Congress enacted the six-year dam-

ages period in 1897, this Court dismissed a suit in equi-

ty after the patentee delayed more than twelve years

before suing. /d. at 200-201. Subsequent patent cases

decided after 1897 held that laches barred the patentee

from recovering profits or damages—whether sought

in equity, as in the vast majority of patent litigation at

the time (infra pp. 17-21 & n.8), or in the rare cases

brought at law (infra pp. 21-22). Courts continued to

*'The 1870 Act had limited a patentee’s window to recover

damages to the patent term plus six years, but that provision was

eliminated in 1874. See Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 165 U.S.

610, 613-614 (1895).

6

apply the same rule after the 1938 merger of law and

equity. /nfra p. 23.

4. Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1952

against that backdrop. Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792.

The purpose of the 1952 Act was to codify existing pa-

tent law, except as otherwise noted. See H.R. Rep. No.

82-1923, at 3 (1952) (explaining “the main purpose of

codification and enactment of title 35 into law, with only

some minor procedural and other changes”).

The 1952 Act consolidated the two damages provi-

sions, Rev. Stat. $§ 4919 and 4921, into a single new

provision, § 284, modeled primarily on the equity side of

the statute. 66 Stat. at 813; H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at

29. Congress also maintained the six-year outer limit

on recovering damages, but placed it in a new

standalone section, § 286. 66 Stat. at 813.

Finally, in § 282 of the 1952 Act, Congress codified

existing defenses to patent infringement. 66 Stat. at

812. The 1870 Act had included a list of five defenses

that could be pleaded, but the list was not exhaustive.

Act of July 8, 1870, §61, 16 Stat. at 208 (codified as

amended at Rev. Stat. § 4920). Rather than attempting

to enumerate each and every defense recognized by the

courts, Congress “omitted and replaced” the prior list

with “a broader paragraph specifying defenses in gen-

eral terms.” H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 29. In particu-

lar, Congress provided in § 282 that the “following shall

be defenses in any action involving the validity or in-

fringement of a patent,” and then listed defenses in-

cluding “Invalidity” and “Noninfringement, absence of

liability for infringement or unenforceability.” 66 Stat.

at 812.

7

B. Factual Background

1. Infringement Accusations. SCA and First

Quality are competitors in the market for adult inconti-

nence products. On October 31, 2003, SCA sent a letter

accusing First Quality of making and selling protective

underwear products that infringed SCA’s U.S. Patent

No. 6,375,646 (“the ’646 patent”). JA54-55.

Three weeks later, on November 21, 2003, First

Quality responded to SCA, also by letter, explaining

that First Quality’s products did not and could not in-

fringe the 646 patent because that patent is invalid.

First Quality’s letter explained that even a “cursory

review” of the prior art revealed that the same claimed

features were already disclosed in U.S. Patent No.

5,415,649 to Watanabe. JA52.

SCA never again accused First Quality of infring-

ing the ’646 patent until SCA brought this suit in Au-

gust 2010, nearly seven years later. But the parties

had several other interactions. In April 2004, SCA ac-

cused a different First Quality product of infringing a

different SCA patent, without mentioning the ’646 pa-

tent. Pet. App. 95a. First Quality responded with a

letter referencing the parties’ prior correspondence re-

garding the ’646 patent, and SCA replied in July 2004,

again without mentioning the ’646 patent. /d. 95a-96a.

SCA’s apparent abandonment of its infringement con-

tentions with respect to the ’646 patent reinforced First

Quality’s belief that the '646 patent was no longer an

issue. /[d. 4a, 116a.

2. Reexamination. SCA had been aware of the

prior art Watanabe patent long before First Quality’s

2003 letter referencing it; SCA knew of Watanabe since

at least 1998, from proceedings on the European coun-

terpart to the ’646 patent. See CAJ A586-587 & n.1, 865-

8

866. However, SCA had failed to disclose the

Watanabe patent to the U.S. Patent and Trademark

Office when obtaining the 646 patent, notwithstanding

its duty to disclose material prior art. CAJA879-880.

In July 2004, after the correspondence described above,

SCA belatedly brought Watanabe to the PTO’s atten-

tion by initiating an ex parte reexamination of the ’646

patent. Pet. App. 4a. SCA did not inform First Quality

of this development. /d.*

The reexamination “took almost three years,” as

SCA notes (at 10), in part because the patent examiner

initially rejected all the ’646 patent claims as anticipat-

ed by Watanabe. CAJA188. SCA ultimately survived

the reexamination by reading the ’646 patent claims

narrowly. CAJA188-190. The reexamination concluded

in March 2007, with the PTO confirming its view of the

patentability of the 646 patent claims and authorizing

additional dependent claims (i.e., claims that are neces-

sarily narrower than the original claims). SJA10-11.

3. SCA’s Monitoring and First Quality’s Preju-

dice. At no point during the reexamination (or for

three years after) did SCA inform First Quality of that

proceeding or suggest that SCA continued to view any

First Quality products as potentially infringing the ’646

patent. But throughout that period, SCA, which is

much larger than First Quality, kept close watch over

First Quality’s business through “an entire department

dedicated solely to competitive intelligence,” which had

“continuously tracked First Quality’s activity since

2003.” Pet. App. 104a. SCA acquired and analyzed

* SCA observes (at 9-10) that notices of reexamination are

open to public inspection. It is undisputed, however, that First

Quality never learned of the reexamination until SCA brought this

suit. Pet. App. 9a.

9

First Quality products and advertisements and kept

abreast of First Quality’s expansion plans. CAJA920,

923-926, 929-931, 939, 941-943, 945-946.

First Quality, meanwhile, invested substantial cap-

ital to expand its market and increase sales of the very

products SCA would later claim infringe the ’646 pa-

tent. Among other steps, First Quality spent hundreds

of millions of dollars to develop new protective under-

wear lines and to acquire one of its competitors, a sub-

sidiary of Covidien. Pet. App. 5a, 70a-7la, 107a-108a.

First Quality’s sales of the accused products during this

period increased eight-fold over the sales levels that

had prompted SCA’s initial letter. CAJA1085.

C. Prior Proceedings

1. District Court Proceedings. In August 2010,

after nearly seven years of delay, SCA brought this

suit seeking an injunction and damages for First

Quality’s alleged infringement of the ’646 patent. JA23.

In an attempt to reach First Quality’s products, SCA

proposed a construction of the 646 patent claims that

was broader than the narrowing gloss it had adopted to

overcome Watanabe during the reexamination.

CAJA189-190. The district court rejected that effort

under the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel.

CAJA190.

At summary judgment, the district court held that

laches barred SCA from recovering any damages that

accrued before suit was filed. Pet. App. llla, 120a.

The court explained that an accused infringer may es-

tablish the defense under settled law by proving two

elements: unreasonable delay by the patentee and re-

sulting prejudice to the accused infringer. Pet. App.

98a-99a (citing A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides

10

Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en

banc)). When the patentee delays for more than six

years, the accused infringer is entitled to a presumption

of unreasonable and prejudicial delay, which the pa-

tentee may rebut by providing evidence to explain its

delay or dispel the prejudice. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at

1035-1036. Applying that presumption, the district

court held that SCA failed to present evidence suffi-

cient to create a genuine issue of fact regarding the un-

reasonableness of its delay or First Quality’s prejudice

from that delay. Pet. App. 105a, 110a-1lla. The court

also ruled that SCA’s three-year delay after the reex-

amination, standing alone and without the benefit of a

presumption, “supporti[ed] a finding of unreasonable

delay” on these facts. /d. 105a n.1.

The court ruled, in particular, that the reexamina-

tion proceeding did not excuse SCA’s delay in this case.

Pet. App. 102a-103a.° The court also “reject{[ed] SCA’s

argument that it needed more than three years,” after

the reexamination proceeding concluded, “to determine

whether it was appropriate to bring infringement

claims against First Quality,” given that “SCA had al-

ready completed its infringement analysis by October

of 2003, when it sent the initial letter to First Quality.”

Id. 104a. Further, SCA’s assertion that it needed three

years to locate U.S. counsel was insufficient, given that

SCA’s U.S. in-house counsel oversaw all its US. litiga-

tion and had already retained U.S. counsel to accuse

* To this day, SCA has never provided any explanation for its

decision not to inform First Quality of the reexamination proceed-

ing, which was prompted by SCA’s own failure to disclose

Watanabe to the PTO during the original prosecution of the '646

patent.

1]

First Quality of infringement in 2003 and to conduct the

reexamination. /d.

The district court also held that First Quality had

established the separate defense of equitable estoppel,

based on SCA’s misleading conduct. Pet. App. 1lla-

119a. Finally, the court dismissed as moot First Quali-

ty’s other pending motions, including two for summary

judgement on non-infringement grounds. /d. 120a.

2. Panel Decision. A panel of the Federal Circuit

affirmed in part and reversed in part. As to laches, the

panel unanimously held that Petrella v. Metro-

Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), did not

abrogate the court’s recognition in Aukerman that

laches could bar a damages claim for patent infringe-

ment, and it ruled that the district court’s laches deci-

sion was correct on the record presented. Pet. App.

75a-84a. The panel also held that SCA had waived its

argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that the

dependent claims issued after reexamination should

have been analyzed differently for laches purposes. /d.

84a-85a.

The panel reversed as to equitable estoppel, con-

cluding that genuine issues of material fact remained as

to whether SCA’s communications misled First Quality

and, if so, whether First Quality’s reliance on those

misrepresentations caused First Quality’s prejudice—a

causation issue relevant only to estoppel, not laches.

Pet. App. 89a.

3. En Banc Decision. The Federal Circuit re-

heard the case en banc to reconsider Aukerman and

12

the viability of a laches defense to a patent infringe-

ment suit for damages in light of Petrella.°

A majority of the en banc court began by acknow!-

edging that § 286 is not a statute of limitations, but it

declined to distinguish Petrella on that basis. Pet. App.

17a-18a. It then turned to a careful examination of the

reasoning of both Petrella and Aukerman. The majori-

ty reaffirmed the core holding of Aukerman that Con-

gress codified laches as a defense to damages in § 282 of

the Patent Act of 1952, in full view of the separate six-

year period in § 286. Jd. 18a, 22a, 35a-36a; Aukerman,

960 F.2d at 1029-1030; cf. Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1974

n.15 (describing Aukerman as “[bjased in part on § 282

and commentary thereon, legislative history, and his-

torical practice’). The en banc majority declined to

second-guess that legislative judgment, finding itself

bound to “apply the law as enacted, which means that

the § 286 damages limitation and the § 282 laches de-

fense must continue to coexist.” Pet. App. 36a. Five

judges dissented from this ruling. Jd. 45a-66a.’

The “cornerstone” (Pet. Br. 15) of the decision be-

low was the text and history of the 1952 Patent Act,

and the uniform pre-1962 judicial consensus that laches

was available as a defense to patent damages claims.

Pet. App. 18a-22a, 29a-34a. The majority’s view was

further confirmed by commentary from P.J. Federico, a

principal draftsman of the 1952 Act, who noted that the

defenses codified in § 282 included “equitable defenses

* The en banc court declined SCA’s request to reconsider the

rebuttable presumption of laches. Opp. 29-30.

’ The en bane court unanimously modified circuit law to clari-

fy that laches may be considered in fashioning appropriate injunc-

tive relief. Pet. App. 40a-41a, 46a n.1.

13

such as laches, estoppel, and unclean hands.” /d. 20a.

Finally, the court noted that pre-suit delay poses a

unique and recurring risk of hardship in patent law, not

found in copyright law, because delay often forecloses

the infringer from substituting a non-infringing tech-

nology, and the court observed that “[t)his risk likely

explains why the amici in this case—encompassing in-

dustries as diverse as biotechnology, electronics, manu-

facturing, pharmaceuticals, software, agriculture, ap-

parel, health care, telecommunications, and finance—

overwhelmingly support retaining laches in patent

law.” Id. 38a.

The en banc court reinstated the panel’s decision as

to equitable estoppel and remanded the case for further

proceedings. Pet. App. 44a.

4. Subsequent Proceedings. After remand, SCA

moved for a stay pending disposition of its petition to

this Court. JA46. The district court denied SCA’s re-

quest. Order 1-2, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 150. Proceedings in the

district court are thus ongoing, with two potentially

case-dispositive defenses relating to equitable estoppel

and noninfringement pending. See First Quality Ltr. 2-

3, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 153 (summarizing defenses); Order 1,

Dist. Ct. Dkt. 155 (reopening case and reinstating case-

dispositive motions).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. Congress codified laches as a defense to dam-

ages in the Patent Act of 1952. Before 1952, the federal

courts uniformly recognized such a defense in patent

law, alongside the same six-year outer limit on recover-

ing damages now found in 35 U.S.C. § 286. Congress’s

choice in 1870 to allow for the recovery of damages in

courts of equity caused the vast majority of patent liti-

14

gation to be brought in equity, and laches was routinely

applied in those cases to bar recovery of damages.

Laches was also recognized as a defense in the rare pa-

tent actions brought at law. This consensus view of

laches as a defense to damages in patent law continued

unabated after the 1938 merger of law and equity.

SCA’s effort to rebut the judicial consensus by criticiz-

ing the few decisions rendered at law fails on its own

terms, overlooks the many decisions in equity, and does

not account for the post-merger decisions.

Congress codified this settled view of laches in

§ 282 of the Patent Act of 1952 by making “unenforcea-

bility” defenses available “in any action.” By using the

term “unenforceability,” Congress intended to incorpo-

rate the established meaning of that term, which in-

cluded laches as a defense to damages. The history of

the 1952 Act confirms that Congress’s purpose in § 282

was to preserve existing unenforceability defenses and

that Congress anticipated that those defenses would be

available to bar recovery of damages. Furthermore,

the overall purpose of the 1952 Act was to codify exist-

ing law, and Congress’s intent to preserve laches was

perceived immediately.

Every court of appeals to consider the question af-

ter 1952 recognized that laches remained available as a

defense to damages in patent law. Since 1952, Con-

gress has modified the Patent Act in various ways, in-

cluding amendments to § 282, without ever disturbing

the uniform recognition of laches as a defense. Any

changes should be left to Congress.

II. This Court’s decision in Petrella v. Metro-

Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), suppor*s

retaining laches as a defense in patent law because Pet-

rella rests at bottom on an inference of legislative in-

15

tent. The Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limita-

tions, together with other statutory provisions and the

historic role of laches as “gap-filling” in equity, per-

suaded the Court thet Congress had impliedly fore-

closed the defense o/ laches in copyright infringement

actions for damages. The same careful attention to

statutory text and history leads to a different result

here. All the available evidence indicates that Con-

gress intended to preserve laches as a defense to dam-

ages under the Patent Act.

SCA’s contrary view, premised on 35 U.S.C. § 286,

is unfounded. To start, § 286 is not a statute of limita-

tions at all. A statute of limitations requires the plain-

tiff to bring suit within a fixed period of time after the

plaintiff's cause of action accrues. Section 286, by con-

trast, runs backwards from when the defendant is sued

and is not dependent on when the plaintiff knew or

should have known of the defendant’s allegedly infring-

ing activities. In enacting § 286, Congress left ample

room for laches to operate alongside the six-year peri-

od, as had been true for decades before the 1952 Patent

Act. Reading the Patent Act to permit the laches de-

fense within § 286’s six-year period is also consistent

with the text and history of that provision. Laches has

distinct elements and does not shorten the six-year pe-

riod or otherwise undermine § 286. Finally, Congress

had good reason to retain laches as a defense to damag-

es in the Patent Act but not the Copyright Act given

the substantial differences between the two—including

the danger that patentees will unreasonably delay suit

until infringers with no knowledge of the patent are

locked into using the patented technology.

III. The presumption that delay of six years or

more is unreasonable and prejudicial should be re-

tained. The presumption predates the 1952 Act, has

16

been widely recognized in the courts of appeals (not

simply the Federal Circuit), and is consistent with his-

torical practice. It provides a useful benchmark for en-

suring consistency across cases, and it sensibly places

the burden on the patentee to explain long periods of

pre-suit delay. Finally, the presumption made no dif-

ference here, so affirmance is warranted in any event.

ARGUMENT

I. Conaeress CODIFIED LACHES As A DEFENSE TO

DAMAGES CLAIMS IN § 282 OF THE PATENT ACT

When Congress enacted § 282 of the Patent Act of

1952, it codified the longstanding judicial consensus

that laches is available as an unenforceability defense

against damages claims, alongside the six-year period

now found in § 286. For decades prior to the 1952 Act,

courts had routinely recognized laches as a bar to en-

forcing stale claims for damages. Congress intended to

preserve that settled view by codifying laches as one of

the “unenforceability” defenses available “in any ac-

tion” under § 282. Given the overwhelming pre-1952

consensus, it is no surprise that every court to consider

the question after 1952 held that laches is available in

patent litigation to bar damages claims brought after

unreasonable, prejudicial delay. Congress has repeat-

edly amended the Patent Act, including § 282, in full

view of those decisions, without ever seeing fit to modi-

fy laches. At this late date, “[aJny re-calibration” of the

laches defense should be left to Congress. Microsoft

Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 114 (2011).

17

A. Before 1952, The Federal Courts Uniformly

Recognized Laches As A Bar To Recovering

Damages For Patent Infringement

As this Court has recognized, Congress adopted

the 1952 Act as a “codification” of existing law, against

a “backdrop” of decades of patent decisions that shed

light on the Act’s meaning. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse

Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1930 (2016). That is no less

true of § 282, which codified decades of cases recogniz-

ing laches as a defense to patent damages, both before

and after the merger of law and equity.

1. Laches barred recovery of patent

damages before the merger of law and

equity

Patent litigation occurred almost exclusively in eq-

uity from 1870 onwards as a result of a deliberate

choice Congress made that year to allow courts of equi-

ty to award damages for patent infringement. Act of

July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206; see supra

pp. 2-4. This legislative change, combined with other

factors, ushered in a long period in which the over-

whelming majority of cases seeking damages were

brought in equity. Supra pp. 3-4; see also, e.g., 3 Robin-

son, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions § 932 n.5

(1890) (noting “the almost entire substitution of actions

in equity for actions on the case in courts of law where

equity jurisdiction can be claimed”).

This “shift of patent litigation from common law to

equity was deeply important to the evolution of patent

law.” Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explo-

sion, 125 Yale L.J. 848, 912 (2016). As a result, modern

patent law is now “riddled with equitable approaches”

that arose in these formative years, gained general ap-

plication, and remain part of the law today. /d. at 913

18

(collecting examples); see supra p. 4. One of those

longstanding doctrines is the tradition of applying lach-

es as a defense to patent damages.

Far from “a handful of ambiguous lower court deci-

sions” (Pet. Br. 37), a mountain of authority recognized

laches as a defense barring recovery of damages or

profits. See, e.g., Westco-Chippewa Pump Co. v. Dela-

ware Elec. & Supply Co., 64 F.2d 185, 186-188 (3d Cir.

1933) (plaintiff's laches barred recovery after “having

stood by and having done nothing to protect its rights

for seven years while the defendant was building up a

business, which it thought was legitimate”); Dwight &

Lloyd Sintering Co. v. Greenawalt, 27 F.2d 823, 827 (2d

Cir. 1928) (L. Hand, J.) (“delay of 13 years, not other-

wise excused, therefore appears to us fatal to any ac-

counting”); Wolf Mineral Process Corp. vy. Minerals

Separation N. Am. Corp., 18 F.2d 483, 490 (4th Cir.

1927) (“laches shown by the record would be quite suf-

ficient of itself to bar complainant of relief”); Cum-

mings v. Wilson & Willard Mfg. Co., 4 F.2d 453, 455

(9th Cir. 1925) (delay “shows such laches as will clearly

preclude any right to relief’); Wolf, Sayer & Heller,

Inc. v. United States Slicing Mach. Co., 261 F 195, 197-

198 (7th Cir. 1919) (evidence “discloses such laches as to

prevent appellee from collecting damages for past in-

fringements”); A.R. Mosler & Co. v. Lurie, 209 F . 364,

371 (2d Cir. 1913) (patentees cannot remain “supine for

many years,” and then “insist on being granted an ac-

counting for damages and profits during their long pe-

riod of inaction”).*

* See alan Union Shipbuilding Co. v. Boston Iron & Metal

Co., 93 F.2d 781, 783 (4th Cir. 1938), Gillona v. Shell Co. of Cal., 86

F 2d 600, 608-610 (9th Cir. 1936); Holman v. Oil Well Supply Co.,

83 F.2d 638, 588 (3d Cir. 1936) (per curiam); Dock & Terminal

19

Some decisions of this era refer generally to laches

as a bar to “any accounting,” Dwight & Lloyd, 27 F.2d

at 827, or to “relief,”” Gillons v. Shell Co. of Cal., 86

F.2d 600, 610 (9th Cir. 1936). As the court of appeals

explained, however, after Congress authorized equity

courts to award damages, an “accounting” became the

generic term for the calculation of monetary relief, in-

cluding damages, in equity. Pet. App. 29a; see also

Eng’g Co. v. Pennaylvania R.R., 82 F.2d 19, 19-20 (3d Cir. 1936);

George J. Meyer Mfg. Co. v. Miller Mfg. Co., 24 F.2d 606, 507-508

(7th Cir. 1928); Window Glass Mach. Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass

Co., 284 F. 646, 650-661 (3d Cir. 1922); Safety Car Heating & Light-

ing Co. v. Consolidated Car Heating Co., 174 F. 658, 662 (2d Cir.

1909) (per curiam); Richardson v. D.M. Osborne & Co., 93 F. 828,

830-831 (2d Cir. 1899); Woodmanse & Hewitt Mfg. Co. v. Williams,

68 F. 489, 493-494 (6th Cir. 1895); Dallas Mach. & Locomotive

Works, Inc. v. Willamette-Hyster Co., 28 F. Supp. 207, 212-213 (D.

Or. 1939), aff'd on other grounds, 112 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1940);

Wheatley v. Rexr-Hide, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 543, 544-645 (N.D. Il.

1938), aff'd on other grounda, 102 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1939); Reming-

ton Rand, Inc. v. Acme Card Sys. Co., 29 F Supp. 192, 200-201

(S.D. Ohio 1937); Celastic Corp. v. McClellan Shoe Specialty Co.,

15 F. Supp. 1048, 1060 (D. Del. 1936); Temco Mfg. Co. v. National

Elec. Ticket Register Co., 33 F.2d 777, 778 (E.D. Mo. 1928); Wilkie

v. Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co., 8 F.2d 785, 788 (D.N.J. 1925), aff'd

on other grownds, 14 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1926); Yates v. Smith, 271 F.

27, 31-33 (D.NJ. 1920), aff'd on other grounds, 271 F. 33 (3d Cir.

1921); Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v. New York Air Brake Co.,

111 F 741, 742 (N.D.N.Y. 1901); Meyrowitz Mfg. Co. v. Eccleston,

98 F. 437, 4389-440 (C.C._D. Mass. 1899); Starrett v. J. Stevens Arms

& Tool Co., 96 F. 244, 246 (C.C.D. Mass. 1899), aff'd, 100 F. 98 (1st

Cir. 1900), MeLaughlin v. People’s Ry. Co., 21 F. 574, 574

(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1884); cf. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Clair, 123

F.2d 878, 883 (8th Cir. 1941) (laches available but not established

on the facts of the case); Hartford-Empire Co. v. Swindell Broz.,

96 F 2d 227, 232-233 (4th Cir. 1938) (same); United Drug Co. v. Ire-

land Candy Co., 51 F.2d 226, 232 (8th Cir. 1931) (same); Frank F.

Smith Hardware Co. v. S.H. Pomeroy Co., 299 F. 544, 647-549 (2d

Cir 1924) (same).

20

Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305,

1311-1312 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc). Indeed, the briefs

in various decisions that refer simply to an “account-

ing” make clear that patentees were in fact commonly

seeking damages in those cases. E.g., Appellee Br. 12,

Union Shipbuilding Co. v. Boston Iron & Metal Co.,

No. 4,203 (4th Cir. Oct. 26, 1987) (patentee sought to

force defendant “to account for large sums of money as

profits or damages”); Appellee Br. 6, Dock & Terminal

Engg Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., No. 5,757 (3d Cir.

Dec. 6, 1935) (“claim for damages and profits”).

Moreover, when courts were more specific about

the types of monetary relief barred by the patentee’s

laches, there was no question that laches operated to

bar recovery of damages. E.g., Mosler, 209 F. at 371

(barring “accounting for damages and profits”); Safety

Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. Consolidated Car Heat-

ing Co., 174 F. 658, 662 (2d Cir. 1909) (per curiam)

(“profits and damages”); Woodmanse & Hewitt Mfg.

Co. v. Williams, 68 F. 489, 490 (6th Cir. 1895) (“an ac-

counting as to damages and profits”); Wheatley v. Rex-

Hide, Inc., 25 F Supp. 543, 645 (N.D. Ill. 1938) (laches

“bars his right to recover damages”); Temco Mfg. Co. v.

National Elec. Ticket Register Co., 33 F.2d 777, 778

(E.D. Mo. 1928) (“laches may preclude a judgment for

damages”); Yates v. Smith, 271 F 27, 27 (D.N.J. 1920)

(“accounting of profits and damages”); Westinghouse

Air Brake Co. v. New York Air Brake Co., 111 F. 741,

742 (N.D.N.Y. 1901) (complainant cannot “collect dam-

ages”).

All of these decisions, after 1897, involved only

claims not otherwise barred by the six-year outer limit

for recovery Congress enacted that year—the prede-

cessor to § 286. Supra pp. 4-5. In fact, courts expressly

considered and rejected the argument that laches

21

should not operate as a defense within that period. In

Gillons, for example, the patentee maintained that his

delay had effectively benefited the infringer by giving it

a free license for use of the invention outside the six-

year window. 86 F.2d at 606-607. The Ninth Circuit

rejected that argument and held that “injury [to the

infringer] is presumed” after six years, as is true today.

Id. at 608; see also France Mfg. Co. v. Jefferson Elec.

Co., 106 F.2d 605, 609 (6th Cir. 1939) (“relief may be

denied on the ground of laches” after “delay in institut-

ing suit, notwithstanding the statute of limitations”);

Dwight & Lloyd, 27 ¥ .2d at 827 (laches barred recovery

for “even the earliest of the 6 years to which recovery

is in any event limited”); Window Glass Mach. Co. v.

Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 46 F.2d 484, 485 (W.D. Pa.

1921) (similar), aff'd, 284 F. 645 (3d Cir. 1922).

2. Laches was also available as a defense in

the rare patent actions brought at law

Only a handful of patent decisions before 1952 ad-

dressed laches as a defense at law because actions at

law were rare and patent damages were predominantly

awarded in equity. Even so, decisions at law also rec-

ognized laches as an available defense.

The leading case was Ford v Huff, 296 F. 652 (5th

Cir. 1924), in which the patentee sued Henry Ford at

law after more than fourteen years of delay—a period

coinciding with Ford’s massive success with the Model

T, see id. at 654. Ford sought to plead laches as a de-

fense under the procedures of Judicial Code § 274b,

which permitted equitable defenses to be “interposed

by answer” in an action at law, “without the necessity

of filing a bill on the equity side of the court.” Pub. L.

No. 63-278, 38 Stat. 956, 956 (1915) (amending Judicial

22

Code § 274b).’ The Fifth Circuit held that a defendant

sued at law who filed “a bill in equity disclosing the

state of facts alleged” by Ford would have been “enti-

tled to prevent the enforcement of the claim” at law, as

the “plaintiff's conduct had been such as to deprive him

of the right to enforce that claim.” 296 F. at 658. Ac-

cordingly, under Judicial Code §274b, a defendant

could raise the same laches defense directly, without

needing to file a separate bill in equity to enjoin the ac-

tion at law.

Ford involved claims for breach of a patent license,

but subsequent decisions involving infringement claims

at law were to the same effect. In Banker v. Ford Mo-

tor Co., 69 F.2d 665, 666 (3d Cir. 1934), for exarnple, the

court noted that, “[hjad the [patentee’s] suit been in

equity, the evidence would have been ample for holding

that recovery was barred because of laches,” and that

the patentee could not avoid the consequences of his

unreasonable delay by instead filing at law. See id.

(“that contention is met by section 274b” (citing Ford));

see also Universal Coin Lock Co. v. American Sani-

tary Lock Co., 104 F.2d 781, 781-783 (7th Cir. 1939)

(laches, raised in action at law under Judicial Code

§ 274b, barred damages claims); Mather v. Ford Motor

Co., 40 F. Supp. 589, 593 (E.D. Mich. 1941) (same).

* Previously, a defendant could raise an equitable defense to a

legal claim only by filing a separate “bill in equity to enjoin the ...

suit at law until the equitable defense was decided” in equity (i.e.,

by the court, not a jury). A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides

Conatr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1031 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc); see

Pet. App. 27a, 30a-3la. The 1915 amendments preserved that

same sequence: Equitable defenses pleaded under § 274b would

“first be disposed of as in a court of equity,” by the judge, with a

subsequent jury trial only “if an issue of law remains.” Liberty Oil

Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 236, 242 (1922).

23

3. The consensus view of laches as a bar to

damages persisted after the 1938 merger

of law and equity

The judicial recognition of laches as a defense to

stale patent infringement claims for damages continued

unabated after the 1938 merger of law and equity in

federal courts. Lukens Steel Co. v. American Locomo-

tive Co., 197 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1962); Brennan v.

Hawley Prods. Co., 182 F.2d 945, 948 (7th Cir. 1950);

Rome Grader & Mach. Corp. v. J.D. Adams Mfg. Co.,

135 F.2d 617, 619-620 (7th Cir. 1943); Skinner v. Alu-

minum Co. of Am., 105 F. Supp. 635, 687 (W.D. Pa.

1952); Young v. General Elec. Co., 96 F. Supp. 109, 139-

140 (N.D. Ill. 1951); Marlatt v. Mergenthaler Linotype

Co., 70 F. Supp. 426, 432-434 (S.D. Cal. 1947); Arrowood

v. Symington-Gould Corp., 71 F. Supp. 693, 696-696

(S.D.N.Y. 1946); Feinstein v. 1.T.S. Co., 68 F. Supp. 15,

16 (N.D. Ohio 1946); Seghers v. Gardella, 55 F. Supp.

914, 915 (N.D. Ohio 1944); Van Alen v. Aluminum Co.

of Am., 43 F Supp. 833, 837-838 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Peer-

less Weighing & Vending Mach. Corp. v. International

Ticket Scale Corp., 37 F. Supp. 582, 583 (D. Del. 1941),

affd on other grounds, 126 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1942);

Reisz v. Harvey, 33 F Supp. 192, 194 (N.D. Ohio 1940);

Delaney Patents Corp. v. Johns-Manville, 29 F. Supp.

431, 436 (S.D. Cal. 1989). Other patent decisions con-

tinued to recognize laches in general, even while hold-

ing that it was not available on the particular facts pre-

sented. E.g., Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Hughes

Tool Co., 192 F.2d 620, 625 (10th Cir. 1951); Shaffer v.

Rector Well Equip. Co., 155 F.2d 344, 345-347 (5th Cir.

1946).

24

4. SCA’s attempt to rebut this judicial con-

fails

SCA does not seriously grapple with this long tra-

dition of applying laches as a defense to damages

claims. Instead, it focuses on criticizing the reasoning

of the few pre-merger cases decided at law. That criti-

cism is unfounded and, in any event, ultimately irrele-

vant to the question before this Court.

a. As an initial matter, SCA’s attempts to distin-

guish the leading cases applying laches at law are mis-

guided. SCA contends (at 42-43) that Ford was an es-

toppel case, but the decision was reasoned and decided

on the basis of laches. 296 F . at 657 (“laches”), rev’g 289

F. 858, 874 (S.D. Fila. 1923) (“question of laches”). SCA

is also wrong to suggest (at 43) that the Ford and

Banker decisions were abrogated by Enelow v. New

York Life Insurance Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935). Quite the

opposite: Enelow cites the relevant portion of Ford

approvingly. /d. at 383 (citing Ford, 296 F. at 658).

More broadly, SCA misunderstands the question pre-

sented in Enelow and the import of that decision.

Enelow held that fraud could not be raised as an equi-

table defense under Judicial Code § 274b in an insur-

ance dispute at law because the same defense was

“completely available in [an] action at law” and, there-

fore, should have been tried to a jury rather than de-

cided by the court. /d. at 385. Under § 274b, the “de-

fendant’s rights to a hearing in equity are ‘the same,’

not greater.” /d. at 383.

That holding does not speak to laches or patent law,

nor does it call into question Ford, Banker, or the other

decisions cited above. Raising laches as a defense un-

der the Judicial Code did nothing to “change the sub-

stantive law” (Pet. Br. 43) because laches was already

25

available as a bar to recovering patent damages. Many

other doctrines that originated in equity similarly came

to be applied at law, especially in patent infringement

cases—notably including equitable estoppel, inequita-

ble conduct, unclean hands, prosecution laches, and the

doctrine of equivalents. Beauchamp, 125 Yale LJ. at

913; see, e.g., Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68, 78 (1880)

(equitable estoppel); Laycock, The Triumph of Equity,

56 L. & Contemp. Probs. 53, 70-71 (Summer 1993) (ad-

ditional examples).

Accordingly, as of the 1951 supplement to the

Walker treatise, it was understood that in patent law,

“{Ijaches ... may be interposed in an action at law.”

Pet. App. 33a (quoting 3 Walker on Patents 106 (Del-

ler’s ed., Supp. 1951)).

b. More importantly, even if there had not been a

single case applying laches at law before the merger of

law and equity, it would not affect the analysis. The

tradition of applying laches as a defense to patent dam-

ages was well established through numerous other de-

cisions in equity. Supra pp. 17-21 & n.8; Pet. App. 29a-

33a; see also A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Con-

str. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1029 & n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en

banc).

SCA tries to dismiss these cases by arguing (at 40)

that “the Federal Circuit erred in failing to distinguish

between the patent holder’s right to collect damages

and its right to collect damages in a court of equity.”

But SCA ignores the overwhelming predominance of

equity during the relevant period.'® For decades, pa-

SCA also incorrectly suggests (at 41 n.2) that a patentee

whose damages claims were held to be barred by laches in a court

of equity could simply re-file those same claims at law. That

speculation is belied by the absence of a single reported example of

26

tent damages were awarded almost exclusively by

courts of equity. The Federal Circuit properly consid-

ered these cases because they represented the actual

historical practice with respect to damages in patent

litigation.

SCA offers no reason to think Congress would have

ignored that backdrop when codifying unenforceability

defenses in 1952. Indeed, when Congress wanted to

make changes that affected patent damages between

1870 and 1952—including to add the six-year damages

period and to expressly codify the type of “reasonable

royalty” damages SCA seeks in this case—it exclusive-

ly amended the equity side of the statute. Supra pp. 4-

5. In concept and in practice, patent damages were

damages in equity.

Furthermore, SCA disregards the cases applying

laches after the 1938 merger of law and equity. Had

any distinction remained between the laches defense

applicable to patent damages as a legal or equitable

remedy, courts would have begun rejecting the defense

following the merger. Instead, courts continued apply-

ing laches to damages just as before. Supra p. 23.

Thus, by the time Congress codified the case law in

1952, it was well established that laches was a defense

to damages in all cases, not just cases in equity.

c. As the en banc majority noted below, SCA and

its amici have never identified “a single appellate-level

patent infringement case stating—much less holding—

that laches is inapplicable to legal damages.” Pet. App.

33a. SCA tacitly acknowledges that point by relying

principally (at 43-44) on two cases from a single district

any patentee ever doing so, despite numerous decisions barring

patent damages due to laches before the 1938 merger.

27

court, Thorpe v. Wm. Filene’s Sons Co., 40 F.2d 269 (D.

Mass. 1930), and City of Concord v. Norton, 16 F. 477

(C.C.D. Mass. 1883). Those outliers were not subject to

appellate review and were contrary to the great weight

of authority. The sole circuit decision SCA identifies

likewise did not consider established precedent and ul-

timately concluded only that “the elements of laches

were not proven in that case,” which involved a delay of

only two years. Pet. App. 32a n.9; see Middleton v.

Wiley, 195 F.2d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 1952) (“There is no

basis in this case for applying the doctrine of laches.”).

SCA’s argument is premised on supposed “historic

practice” and “longstanding principles” of the common

law. Pet. Br. 37, 38. However, the decisions cited

above applying laches to bar damages reflect the views

of scores of judges and lawyers actually steeped in and

familiar with common law traditions and procedures.

The dearth of any historical support for SCA’s view is

dispositive here.

SCA seeks to sidestep that fact by relying instead

(at 39-40) on this Court’s decisions reciting the general

proposition that laches was not traditionally a defense

at law. See, e.g., United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480,

489 (1935) (dicta); Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U.S. 314,

326 (1894) (dicta). None of those decisions addressed

patent law. Congress channeled nearly all patent liti-

gation into the equity side of the federal courts, and

courts responded by applying laches as a bar to enforc-

ing stale demands for infringement damages. That is

the relevant backdrop for the 1952 Act.

28

B. The Text, Purpose, And History Of The 1962

Act Demonstrate That Congress Intended To

Preserve Laches As A Defense To Damages

In keeping with decades of patent precedent, Con-

gress codified laches as a defense to patent damages in

§ 282 of the Patent Act of 1952. Pet. App. 18a. Specifi-

cally, the 1952 Act preserved laches as a defense “in

any action” under the general category of “unenforcea-

bility” defenses. Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 282, 66 Stat. 792,

812 (1952); see supra p. 6.

1. Congress codified existing “unenforceability”

defenses in § 282. At the time, laches was widely un-

derstood as such a defense. E.g., United States v. New

Orleans Pac. Ry. Co., 248 U.S. 507, 511 (1919) (agree-

ment was “unenforceable by reason of inexcusable

laches”); Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 373 (1892)

(laches is “a question of the inequity of permitting the

claim to be enforced”). In particular, courts routinely

found patents “unenforceable” or declined to “enforce”

an otherwise valid and infringed patent due to laches.

E.g., Brennan, 182 F.2d at 948 (“inequitable to allow

plaintiff to enforce his claim for infringement”); Banker

v. Ford Motor Co., 3 F. Supp. 737, 742 (W.D. Pa. 1933)

(laches “has the effect of barring, or rendering unen-

forceable against a defendant in a suit, the claim as-

serted by the plaintiff therein’”).''

'' See also, e.g., Union Shipbuilding, 93 F 2d at 781; Gillons,

86 F 2d at 610; Richardson, 93 F . at 830; Triplex Safety Glaas Co.

of N. Am. v. Kolb, 53 F 2d 1062, 1065 (E.D. Pa. 1931); Marlatt, 70

F. Supp. at 433; cf. Wollensak v. Reiher, 115 U.S. 96, 99 (1885)

(laches in prosecuting re-issued patent bars patentee “from enforc-

ing it”); Ball v. Gibba, 118 F.2d 968, 961 (8th Cir. 1941) (non-patent

case describing laches as rendering claims “unenforceable”), Todd

v. Russell, 104 F.2d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1939) (similar), aff'd, 309 U.S.

280 (1940). The same terminology is still used: A patent is “unen-

29

When “Congress uses terms that have accumulated

settled meaning,” Congress presumably “means to in-

corporate the established meaning of these terms.”

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Indeed, this Court has ap-

plied that well-established rule of construction to other

terms in the very same section of the 1952 Act, holding

in i141 that Congress incorporated into § 282 the pre-

1952 standard of proof for overcoming a patent’s pre-

sumption of validity. 564 U.S. at 104. By using terms

already freighted with judicial meaning, Congress

“meant to incorporate ‘the cluster of ideas’ attached” to

those terms. /d. at 103.

That this Court did not have an occasion to address

the availability of laches as a defense to damages claims

in patent law does not alter the presumption (or reality)

that Congress intended to codify the existing circuit-

court consensus. Congress would have looked to the

patent decisions when codifying patent defenses in the

Patent Act, not to the unrelated decisions that SCA

cites (at 39-40). The Court has often concluded in other

contexts that Congress intended to codify a consensus

among the courts of appeals. £E.g., United States v.

Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 424-425 (2009); Bragdon v. Abbott,

524 U.S. 624, 644-645 (1998); Cannon v. University of

Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696-698 (1979).

Congress underscored its intent by making unen-

forceability defenses, such as laches, available “in any

action” under § 282—not simply as a bar to equitable

relief. 66 Stat. at 812 (emphasis added). “Read natural-

ly, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning{.]” United

forceable due to laches” after unreasonable, prejudicial delay. L/-

timaz Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F 3d

1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

30

States v. Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997); see, e.g., Ali v.

Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 220 (2008)

(“Congress’ use of ‘any’ to modify ‘other law enforce-

ment officer’ is most naturally read to mean law en-

forcement officers of whatever kind.”). Had Congress

wished to make a sharp departure from pre-1952 law

and to limit laches and other unenforceability defenses

to equitable relief, it would have said so.

SCA’s contrary reading of the text (at 34-36) is un-

tenable. It is true that § 282 “makes no mention of

laches.” Pet. Br. 34. It also makes no mention of other

unenforceability defenses that are well established,

such as inequitable conduct/unclean hands, equitable

estoppel, and patent exhaustion. That is because Con-

gress chose to use a broader term (“unenforceability”)

that encompassed both laches and other recognized de-

fenses. Under established principles of statutory con-

struction, Congress need not spell out the term “laches”

to codify it when using other, broader terms. In fact,

the Court rejected the same argument in 714i with re-

spect to the same section of the 1952 Act. 564 U.S. at

100-101 (observing that § 282 contains “no express ar-

ticulation of the standard of proof,” but also that the

“statutory inquiry ... cannot simply end there”).

2. The history of the 1952 Act confirms that Con-

gress intended to preserve the status quo by codifying

existing “unenforceability” defenses and permitting

them to bar damages. The prior statute had contained

a list of five defenses, but an exhaustive catalog of all

defenses was impractical. Supra p. 6; see also, e.g.,

Hoar, Patent Tactics and Law (3d ed. 1950) (“ex-

press enumeration” of five defenses “does not preclude

any other sufficient ground,” including “laches”). In

§ 282, Congress replaced the prior list with “a broader

paragraph specifying defenses in general terms.” H.R.

31

Rep. No. 82-1923, at 29 (1952). Both the House and

Senate Reports confirm that Congress’s purpose was to

restate existing defenses “in general terms,” without

“materially changing the substance” of any defense. /d.

at 10; S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 9 (1952). SCA’s observa-

tion (at 34-35) that the prior list of five defenses did not

include laches misses the point of these reforms. The

prior list was incomplete, and Congress broadened it in

§ 282 by using categorical terms.

The drafting history also speaks directly to the cod-

ification of unenforceability defenses to damages

claims. When the House passed what would become

the 1952 Act, the bill omitted the term “unenforceabil-

ity.” H.R. 7794, 82d Cong. § (May 12, 19652). That

term was added by the Senate Judiciary Committee.

H.R. 7794, 82d Cong. § 282 (June 27, 1952). Senator

McCarran explained that the purpose of the amend-

ment—one of only four the Senate made—was to “place

in the code this word which has been used in numero’'s

court decisions under the section in question.” 98 Cong.

Rec. 9323, 9323 (1952). The “numerous court decisions”

Congress intended to capture include the laches deci-

sions catalogued above.

When the Senate inserted the word “unenforceabil-

ity” into § 282, it also made a corresponding amend-

ment to the damages provision, § 284. The prior bill

had provided that damages would be available “(ujpon

adjudging a patent valid and infringed.” H.R. 7794, 82d

Cong. § 284 (May 12, 1952). The Senate amended § 284

so that damages would be available “[{u}pon finding for

the claimant.” H.R. 7794, 82d Cong. § 284 (June 27,

1962). As explained by Senator McCarran, the change

was necessary to make clear that damages are not

available if the patent is unenforceable (even if it is val-

id and infringed). 98 Cong. Rec. at 9323 (“The change

32

in language proposed in committee amendment No. 4 is

for the purpose of avoiding a possible construction that

judgment must be entered by a court even in a case

where a patent is found unenforceable.”). He empha-

sized that “[t]his will preserve the present rule of law

in this regard.” /d. Such a change would have been su-

perfluous if laches and other equitable grounds for find-

ing a patent unenforceable could not bar damages.

3. The overall purpose of the 1952 Act supports

Congress’s intent to retain the existing laches defense,

which barred damages. The Act was intended to codify

existing law, except where departures were clearly

noted. H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 3; supra p. 6. This

Court has accordingly construed the Act on several oc-

casions to preserve pre-1952 patent law as Congress

found it. E.g., ii, 564 U.S. at 103-105 (clear-and-

convincing standard for proving invalidity); Warner-

Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davia Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,

26-27 (1997) (doctrine of equivalents); Diamond v.

Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 308, 309 (1980) (non-

patentability of abstract ideas). The same result is

warranted here. Reading the 1952 Act to sweep away,

surreptitiously, decades of judicial recognition of laches

as a defense to damages in patent law would contra-

vene a basic purpose of the Act.

4. Congress’s intent to preserve laches was per-

ceived immediately, as demonstrated in a widely cited

commentary on the 1952 Act by PJ. Federico. The

commentary explained that “unenforceability” was

“added by amendment in the Senate for greater clari-

ty,” and that, as amended, the defenses in § 282 “would

include ... equitable defenses such as laches, estoppel

and unclean hands.” Federico, Commentary on the

New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 55 (West 1954) (empha-

33

sis added), reprinted in 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off.

Soe’y 161, 215 (1998).

SCA’s attacks on this commentary (at 44-45) are

misplaced. Federico, then serving as Examiner-in-

Chief of the Patent Office, was a “principal draftsman

of the 1952 recodification.” Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309

n.6. He “wrote the first draft of the Act himself,” at the

request of legislators, and “actively participated for the

next two years in every detail of its revisions.” Paulik

v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Rich,

J., concurring). For that reason, his views on the Pa-

tent Act are an important source of guidance that this

Court itself has consulted, as have numerous other

courts. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement

Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342 n.8 (1961); Warner-Jenkinson,

520 U.S. at 28; see Pet. App. 21a (collecting cases).

* * *

In sum, the signals from Congress and the case law

are clear and all point in the same direction. Laches

had been available to bar stale demands for damages in

patent law for decades before 1952, and Congress pre-

served that status quo.

C. Since 1962, Congress Has Altered The Patent

Act Repeatedly Without Disturbing Laches

Developments in the courts and Congress since

aE or = i lg agree

in patent infringement cases. Every court of

to consider the question has held that laches is

eee 0 Sn Sa eee

year period in § 286. Congress revisited and altered

an Nahas eb aun Ones dale fuk onane

without ever disagreeing. “Congress can legislate”

34

laches “out of existence any time it chooses,” Warner-

Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28, but it has not done so.

1. SCA implies (at 18, 39) that recognition of lach-

es as a defense to damages claims is “unique” to the

Federal Circuit and thus represents merely “a contro-

versial practice of the bare majority of a single lower

court.” That is demonstrably false.

In the decades after 1952, “[w]ithout exception, all

circuits recognized laches as a defense to a charge of

patent infringement despite the reenactment of the

damages limitation in the 1952 statute.” Aukerman,

960 F.2d at 1030; see, e.g., Potter Instrument Co. v.

Storage Tech. Corp., 641 F.2d 190, 191 (4th Cir. 1981)

(“laches defense ‘may be invoked where the plaintiff

has unreasonably and inexcusably delayed in prosecut-

ing its rights and where that delay has resulted in ma-

terial prejudice to the defendant””’); Studiengesellschaft

Kohle mbH v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1325

(5th Cir. 1980) (consequence of laches is “to withhold

damages for infringement which occurred prior to the

filing of the suit”); American Home Prods. Corp. v.

Lockwood Mfg. Co., 483 F.2d 1120, 1122-1125 (6th Cir.

1973) (“the doctrine of laches is applicable to patent

cases”); Continental Coatings Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 464

F.2d 1375, 13879 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J.) (patentee

“lost the right to recover damages for past infringe-

ment,” by “reason of laches”).'? All those courts recog-

'2 See also Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v. Best

Seam Inc., 694 F.2d 570, 680 (9th Cir. 1982); Naxon Telesign Corp.

v. Bunker Ramo Corp., 686 F 2d 1258, 1263 (7th Cir. 1982); Jensen

v. Western Irrigation & Mfg., Inc., 650 F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir.

1980); Watkins v. Northwestern Ohio Tractor Pullers Ass'n, 630

F.2d 1155, 1169 (6th Cir. 1980); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.

Berwick Indua., Inc., 5382 F 2d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 1976); Baker Mfg.

Co. v. Whitewater Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 1008, 1009-1010, 1015 (7th

35

nized laches as a defense within the six-year damages

period in § 286, as Aukerman explained. See, e.g.,

TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 592 F.2d 346, 348-349

(6th Cir. 1979).

SCA and its amici entirely neglect to mention, let

alone address, these post-1952 decisions. This is not a

case about simply “the Federal Circuit’s practice” (Pet.

Br. 38), but rather about the practice of every circuit to

consider the question, before and after 1952.

2. Congress has allowed this uniform recognition

of laches as a defense to patent infringement damages

- to stand for deeades, even while it “has often amended

§ 282” and other provisions of the Patent Act. i,i, 564

U.S. at 118. Those numerous amendments include care-

ful recalibrations of the defenses available under the

statute. See, ¢.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent

Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,

§ 203, 98 Stat. 1585, 1608 (adding new invalidity de-

fense). Indeed, in the recent Leahy-Smith America In-

vents Act—the most significant reworking ef patent

law since the 1952 Act—Congress reorganized § 282

into separate subsections and eliminated another de-

fense the statute had previously permitted. Pub. L.

No. 112-29, § 15(a), 125 Stat. 284, 328 (2011) (abolishing

the “best mode” defense). Yet Congress reenacted,

without change, the “unenforceability” language that

had been repeatedly held to codify laches as a defense

to damages. Id. § 20(¢)(2\B), 125 Stat. at 334.

36

The reenactment of this statutory language and the

long history of congressional attention to the patent

laws, while leaving laches intact, would independently

warrant the conclusion that Congress intended to per-

mit laches as a defense, even if Congress had not al-

ready done so in the 1952 Act itself. E.g., North Star

Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995) (presump-

tion that Congress is aware of relevant precedents and

“expect|s| its enactment{s] to be interpreted in con-

formity with them”’); Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 768,

782 (1985) (“presumption that Congress intended to

embody [prior judicial construction] in the amended

version” of statute). For that reason, this case is quite

unlike the “congressional silence” decisions on which

SCA relies (at 38-39). Congress made various adjust-

ments over the years, but declined to make the one

SCA advocates.

Now that Congress “has allowed the Federal Cir-

cuit’s correct interpretation of § 282 to stand” for more

than thirty years, “[a]ny re-calibration” of laches should

be left to Congress, which is better situated to weigh

the policy consequences of such a change. 141, 564 U.S.

at 114; accord Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S.

Ct. 2401, 2410-2411 (2015) (noting Congress’s “continual

reworking of the patent laws,” and expressing particu-

lar reluctance to “unsettle stable law” in this area).

Il. SCA MISREADS PETRELLA AND MISCONSTRUES § 286

Or THE PATENT ACT

The Court’s decision in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-

Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), is consistent with

and supports retaining laches as a defense alongside

the six-year period in 35 U.S.C. § 286. Petrella rests at

bottom on respecting congressional intent, and it is

clear that Congress intended to retain laches as a de-

37

fense to damages under the Patent Act. Preserving the

status quo is thus entirely faithful to Petrella, as well as

to the text and purpose of § 286. Congress had good

reason to authorize laches in patent law but not copy-

right law, given the substantial differences between the

two, and that legislative judgment should be respected.

A. Petrelia's Concern For Respecting Legislative

Intent Supports Retaining Laches Here

In Petrella, the Court began with the text of the

Copyright Act, which contains a conventional statute of

limitations (unlike the Patent Act, see infra pp. 40-42):

“The Copyright Act provides that ‘[nJo civil action shall

be maintained under the [Act] unless it is commenced

within three years after the claim accrued.” 134 S. Ct.

at 1967 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 507(b)). It then noted sev-

eral additional “aspects of copyright law” bearing on

the question presented, including the long copyright

term, currently from creation to seventy years after

the author’s death, and renewal rights that transfer to

an author’s heirs. /d. at 1968-1969. The Court further

explained that, “[t]o comprehend how the Copyright

Act’s limitations period works, one must understand

when a copyright infringement claim accrues,” and pro-

ceeded to review the “separate-accrual rule” that ap-

plies in copyright law. /d. at 1969. Under that rule, the

three-year limitations period is applied by “start{ing] a

new limitations period” and counting forward three

years for “each infringing act.” /d.

Those provisions together persuaded the Court

that Congress had already “take[n] account of delay” in

17 U.S.C. § 507(b) and had impliedly foreclosed any

laches defense within that three-year period. 134 S. Ct.

at 1973. Congress “must have been aware,” given the

long copyright term and inheritance of renewal rights,

38

that infringement actions would arise from time to time

decades after the initial infringing acts, but it tolerated

that problem to advance other aims specific to copy-

right law. Jd. at 1976-1977. Other provisions of the

Copyright Act confirmed as much—in particular, the

ability of an infringer to deduct, from a damages award,

expenses “attributable to its own enterprise.” /d. at

1973 (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 504(b)). “Last, but hardly

least,” the Court noted that laches was historically “de-

veloped by courts of equity” and applied to “claims of

an equitable cast for which the Legislature has provid-

ed no fixed time limitation.” /d.

The historical view of laches as “gap-filling” in eq-

uity, in the absence of a limitations period, was thus

merely one consideration among many the Court cited.

134 S. Ct. at 1974. SCA suggests (at 25) that Petrella

merely applied a “well-established rule” that laches is

unavailable whenever Congress enacts “a statute of

limitations provision applicable to legal damages

claims.” If that were true, much of Petrella’s discussion

of various features of the Copyright Act would have

been superfluous.

Instead, Petrella rests on careful attention to the

statutory text and history of the Copyright Act and a

concern that courts not disregard the judgments Con-

gress made in that Act. The same tools of statutory

construction favor retaining laches as a defense to

damages under the Patent Act. Pet. App. 36a-36a. As

set forth above, the text, history, and purpose of the

Patent Act of 1952 all demonstrate that Congress in-

tended to preserve the pre-1952 status quo—including

the availability of laches as an unenforceability defense

39

barring damages within the six-year period in § 286.'°

Petrella’s animating concern for respecting the will of

Congress thus counsels a different result in this case

under the Patent Act.

Congress’s decision to permit laches as a defense to

damages under the Patent Act is hardly “unique.” Pet.

Br. 33. Petrella itself noted that the Lanham Act pro-

vides for laches as a defense, though it does not contain

a limitations period. 134 S. Ct. at 1974 n.15. Moreover,

although Petrella observed that the Court has “never

applied laches to bar in their entirety claims for dis-

crete wrongs occurring within a federally prescribed

limitations period,” id. at 1975, the cases it discusses

recognize a degree of flexibility inconsistent with the

ironclad rule SCA proposes.

In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,

536 U.S. 101, 121-122 (2002), for example, the Court

held that an employer may raise laches as a defense to

bar an employment discrimination claim for damages

'> Nothing comparable could be said for the Copyright Act.

While Congress at one point permitted courts of equity to award

damages for copyright infringement, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §§ 26-27,

35 Stat. 1075, 1082 (1909), copyright law did not follow the same

trajectory as patent law, which presumably explains why no party

or amicus brought those provisions to the attention of the Court in

Petrella. Patent law had many more laches cases, which allowed a

robust consensus to emerge regarding the application of laches to

damages claims. Nor is there any statutory basis to conclude that

Congress codified laches or general “unenforceability” defenses in

the Copyright Act, as it did in the Patent Act. The respondents in

Petrella relied instead on the putative “inherent” power of federal

courts to entertain a laches defense. Resp. Br. 15, No. 12-1315

(U.S. Dee. 16, 2013). Finally, in contrast to the century of consen-

aus among courts of appeals regarding the role of laches in patent

law, the circuits had divided before Petrella about the availability

of laches under the Copyright Act. 134 S. Ct. at 1972 n.12.

40)

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, when the claim

is based on a hostile work environment beginning be-

fore the limitations period. See also Ledbetter v. Good-

year Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 657 (2007) (Gins-

burg, J., dissenting) (the “defense of laches may be in-

voked to block an employee’s suit”). In Bay Area

Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v.

Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 205 (1997), the Court

recognized laches as a defense in proceedings under the

Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, despite

Congress having required such proceedings to be initi-

ated “as soon as practicable.””"*

B. Congress Had Good Reason For A Different

Approach To Laches In Patent Law

Several other distinctive features of patent law and

the Patent Act—including § 286 itself—confirm that

Congress did not impliedly foreclose a laches defense in

the 1952 Patent Act. Indeed, the numerous differences

between patent law and copyright law help explain why

Congress chose to retain laches as a defense to damag-

es under one but not the other.

l. Section 286 is not a statute of limitations

and does not measure a patentee’s delay

The six-year period in § 286 of the Patent Act is un-

like the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations, 17

U.S.C. § 507(b), in ways that bear directly on the rea-

soning and rationale of Petrella. As an initial matter,

'* The Court has also long recognized laches as a defense in

suits for mandamus—historically a form of legal relief, available by

writ from a court of law. Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for

D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 379 (2004) (laches may “bar a petition for a writ

of mandamus”); United States ex rel. Arant v. Lane, 2A9 US. 367,

371 (1919) (laches in mandamus action for wrongful discharge).

41

§ 286 is not properly considered a statute of limitations

at all. As the Court has explained, a statute of limita-

tions “establish[es} the period of time within which a

claimant must bring an action,” measured from the time

“the cause of action ‘accrues’—that is, when ‘the plain-

tiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Heimeshoff v. Hart-

ford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 134 §. Ct. 604, 610 (2013); ac-

cord Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 416

(1998). Congress enacts a statute of limitations when it

wishes to “require plaintiffs to pursue ‘diligent prosecu-

tion of known claims.” CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134

S. Ct. 2176, 2183 (2014).

Section 286 of the Patent Act does not operate that

way. Unlike a statute of limitations, which runs for-

ward from the date a cause of action accrues, § 286 runs

backward from the time of suit: “Except as otherwise

provided by law, no recovery shall be had for any in-

fringement committed more than six years prior to the

filing of the complaint or counterclaim for infringe-

ment in the action.” (Emphasis added); see Aukerman,

960 F.2d at 1032.'° For that reason, the Federal Circuit

has repeatedly recognized that § 286 is not a statute of

limitations, e.g., A. Stucki Co. v. Buckeye Steel Cast-

ings Co., 963 F.2d 360, 363 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Stand-

ard Oil Co. v. Nippon Shokubai Kagaku Kogyo Co., 754

F.2d 345, 347-348 (Fed. Cir. 1985), although the court

'S SCA observes (at 8, 22-23) that the legislative history of

§ 286 refers to it as a “statute of limitations,” but that is hardly

dispositive. Both Congress and the courts sometimes use the term

“statute of limitations” in a generic sense. See, e.g., CTS, 134 S. Ct.

at 2185 (“Congress has used the term ‘statute of limitations’ when

enacting statutes of repose.”); Federal Hous. Fin. Agency v. UBS

Ams. Inc., 712 F.3d 136, 143 & nn.3-4 (2d Cir. 2013) (collecting ex-

amples).

42

failed to appreciate the significance of that distinction

for this case (Pet. App. 17a-18a).

The distinction is important. Petrel/a rests in part

on an inference of congressional intent specific to a true

statute of limitations: When Congress enacts such a

statute, it can be viewed as having made a considered

judgment about how much delay may occur after a

plaintiff knows of a cause of action (i.e., after accrual)

before the plaintiff must bring suit—thus potentially

leaving no room for judges to evaluate the reasonable-

ness of a plaintiff's delay on a case-by-case basis under

laches. 134 S. Ct. at 1973. The same certainly cannot

be said for § 286, which was not intended to measure

the patentee’s delay after accrual. Rather, like a stat-

ute of repose, § 286 turns only on when the infringer is

sued, regardless of when the patentee learned of the

infringement. See CTS, 134 S. Ct. at 2183 (statutes of

repose reflect a different “legislative judgment,” serve

“a distinct purpose,” and “target{] ... a different ac-

tor”). Congress thus left ample room for laches to play

a gap-filling role under § 282, as it had done for decades

before the 1952 Act alongside the predecessor to § 286.

2. SCA’s other textual arguments premised

on § 286 are unfounded

Attempting to stretch Petrella to cover this case,

SCA makes various other arguments about what Con-

gress intended by enacting § 286, but none justifies

abolishing laches.

To start, notwithstanding SCA’s persistent effort

to pretend otherwise, the “text” or “plain meaning” of

§ 286 does not address the question presented. Pet. Br.

20-25. Section 286 says nothing at all about laches or

other unenforceability defenses within the six-year pe-

43

riod contemplated by the statute."° Nor does § 286

provide an affirmative guarantee that a patentee may

always recover damages for the preceding six years.

By its terms, § 286 is merely a limitation on recovery:

“no recovery shall be had” for any infringement outside

the six-year window. The statute also contemplates

recovery only “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,”

anticipating that a patentee’s ability to recover damag-

es would be affected by other provisions, such as a fail-

ure to mark, § 287, or a finding that the patent is invalid

or unenforceable, § 282—a reading confirmed by the

legislative history of the damages provision, § 284. See

supra pp. 31-32. The three-year statute of limitations

in the Copyright Act contains no comparable language.

SCA’s reliance on the “purpose” of § 286 is similar-

ly misplaced. Pet. Br. 29-30, 46. Congress enacted the

six-year damages window to provide a uniform federal

time period, rather than borrowing potentially discrep-

ant state-law periods. But that purpose is equally well

served by retaining laches as a defense under § 282.

POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228,

2239 (2014) (“variation in outcome” resulting from case-

by-case application of a federal standard “is quite dif-

ferent from the disuniformity” arising from a “multi-

tude of state laws”). Moreover, the same outer bounda-

ry for recovery of damages applies in all cases. Apply-

ing laches within that period does not “carve[) out an

exception,” create a “unique hybrid statute of limita-

tions/laches test,” or “delegate [the] power to abridge

section 286.” Pet. Br. i9, 33, 34. Laches has distinct

' Por that reason, the canon of construction favoring the spe-

cific over the general (Pet. Br. 35-36) has no application here. The

text of § 286 does not address laches at all, let alone more specifi-

cally than § 282.

44

elements and does not depend merely on the passage of

time.

The separate-accrual rule is also not offended by

applying laches to bar damages claims within § 286’s

six-year period. Pet. Br. 26-28. Applying laches is not

inconsistent with the broader principle of treating each

act of making, using, or selling the invention as a sepa-

rate act of infringement. This Court has, for example,

applied laches to bar enforcement of a patent notwith-

standing that principle, without examining each infring-

ing act individually. Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150

U.S. 198, 201 (1893); see also Menendez v. Holt, 128

U.S. 514, 524 (1888) (trademark). The many decisions

collected above likewise applied laches as a single de-

fense with respect to infringing acts of the same gen-

eral nature—just as continuing torts are treated as sin-

gle claims in other contexts, like claim preclusion.

Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1031.

Finally, SCA’s reading of § 286 is not bolstered by

35 U.S.C. § 283, which authorizes courts to “grant in-

junctions in accordance with the principles of equity.”

SCA argues (at 23) that § 283’s express reference to

“principles of equity” forecloses application of equitable

doctrines under any other provision of the Patent Act.

But accepting that argument—one that SCA never de-

veloped below—would upend many other settled equi-

table doctrines in patent law. Supra pp. 4, 25.

3. SCA ignores numerous other distinctions

between patent and copyright law

The Patent Act lacks all of the distinctive features

of the Copyright Act that the Court considered and re-

lied on in Petrella. As noted, the Patent Act does not

have a true statute of limitations. It also contains no

45

provision for reversionary renewal rights, and the pa-

tent term is considerably shorter (currently, twenty

years) than the copyright term—thus undercutting any

inference comparable to the one drawn in Petrella that

Congress “must have been aware” that some infringe-

ment actions would be brought after long delay. 134 S.

Ct. at 1976; see 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (patent term); sx-

pra pp. 37-38. Congress also did not provide any mech-

anism for a patent infringer to deduct its expenses from

a damages award in the same way that occurs in copy-

right law. Numerous other distinctions between patent

and copyright also help explain why Congress chose to

authorize laches in one context but not the other.

First, as the court of appeals explained, Congress

chose to impose liability under the Patent Act, but not

the Copyright Act, even for “innocent” infringement.

Pet. App. 37a-38a. A copyright plaintiff must demon-

strate that the accused infringer had access to and cop-

iea the plaintiff's work. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v.

Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). Inde-

pendent creation of a work is a complete defense in

copyright. 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 12.11[D}[1)

(2015). Not so in patent law: Making, using, or selling

the patented invention constitutes direct infringement

even if the infringer is unaware that the patent exists.

See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 US.

754, 761 n.2 (2011) (“{A] direct infringer’s knowledge or

intent is irrelevant.”).

Laches plays a critical role in preventing patentees

from unfairly taking advantage of such innocent in-

fringement. Had Congress not retained laches as a de-

fense, nothing would stop a patentee from sitting silent-

ly on its rights while an innocent infringer invests sub-

stantial time and resources to develop and commercial-

ize a product independently, “only to have [the] patent-

46

ee emerge six years later to seek the most profitable

six years of revenues.” Pet. App. 38a.

SCA contends (at 49-50) that Congress addressed

this problem with the marking requirement, 35 U.S.C.

§ 287, but that is mistaken. Section 287, which requires

a patentee to mark its own products with the patent

number, provides only a limited form of constructive

notice to potential infringers. The requirement does

not apply if there is no product to mark—e.g., because

the patentee does not produce anything, Texas Digital

Sys., Inc. v. Telegeniz, Inc., 308 F.3d 1198, 1219-1220

(Fed. Cir. 2002), or the patent covers a method or pro-

cess, Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578,

1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Moreover, even a defendant

aware of a patent via marking may be unaware of po-

tential infringement. As SCA’s amicus explains, de-

termining whether a patent is infringed requires a

complex “technical evaluation” and “prolonged analy-

sis” of the patent specification, claims, and art—unlike

copyright infringement. Alliance of Inventor Groups

Br. 15."" Marking indicating that a patentee thinks its

own product practices its own patent is a far cry from

notice that a potential defendant’s product infringes.

The limited notice provided by § 287 thus cannot take

the place of laches in protecting innocent infringers

from unfair delay.

'’ Por similar reasons, even when a potential defendant is

sent a notice letter, the possibility of a declaratory judgment ac-

tion (Pet. Br. 50) does not prevent a patentee from unfairly lying in

wait. Many “high tech” businesses “receive demand letters every

day” asserting infringement, and it is “often impractical for com-

panies to determine which claims have merit,” let alone seek de-

claratory relief from all of them. Pet. App. 38a.

47

Second, patent law is subject to endemic “lock-in”

problems not found in copyright law. Competing tech-

nologies are often close substitutes, and an innovative

business might incorporate any one of them into a

product ex ante. However, having chosen one and built

a product around it, the business becomes locked into

using the technology, and substitution of an alternative

is difficult ex post—especially if the technology is in-

corporated into an industry-wide standard, requires

regulatory approval, or is capital-intensive. £.9.,

Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310

(3d Cir. 2007) (“Industry participants who have invest-

ed significant resources developing products and tech-

nologies that conform to the [industry] standard will

find it prohibitively expensive to abandon their invest-

ment and switch to another standard.”); Lee & Mela-

med, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages,

101 Cornell L. Rev. 385, 409-410 (2016) (discussing lock-

in costs). The prospect of such “lock-in” gives unscru-

pulous patentees a significant incentive to wait to bring

suit until an accused infringer has “lost the meaningful

ability to choose between alternative technologies,”

greatly magnifying potential infringement damages be-

yond the patent’s actual value. Pet. App. 38a; see

Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 310; Lee & Melamed, 101 Cor-

nell L. Rev. at 410-411. Laches serves, in part, to pre-

vent such unfair gamesmanship, and abolishing the de-

fense will only exacerbate abusive litigation tactics.

Indeed, that is precisely what happened here. Be-

cause of SCA’s delay, First Quality was foreclosed from

pursuing different business strategies to avoid the al-

legedly infringing products, which would have been

available had SCA timely asserted its infringement

claims. See Pet. App. 109a (“First Quality would not

have invested millions of dollars in acquiring and re-

48

tooling [one of its facilities] if it was embroiled in a law-

suit with SCA relating to [the allegedly infringing]

products.”); id. (“First Quality could have either de-

manded that Covidien resolve all issues with respect to

SCA’s claims prior to” First Quality’s acquisition of

Covidien’s subsidiary, or forgone “purchase of the

product lines accused of infringement.”).

Third, the consequences of delay are asymmetrical-

ly harmful to the defendant in patent law, unlike copy-

right law. As Petrella explained, delay in bringing suit

for copyright infringement “is at least as likely” to

prejudice the plaintiff, who bears the burden of proving

copying—i.e., access to the work and substantial simi-

larity. 134 S. Ct. at 1977. In contrast, because direct

patent infringement is a strict liability offense, the pas-

sage of time is less likely to prejudice the patentee’s

ability to prove its infringement case. Delay can have a

devastating effect, however, on the ability of the ac-

cused infringer to mount the defenses Congress pro-

vided under the Patent Act—for example, by depriving

the defendant of evidence needed to prove that a patent

is invalid because the invention it describes was al-

ready in public use or for sale before the relevant date,

35 U.S.C. § 102(a). See Electronic Frontier Foundation

Br. 5-11 (additional examples).

Fourth, infringement can have very different ef-

fects on the value of the plaintiff's intellectual property

in copyright law versus patent law. A copyright con-

fers the exclusive right to authorize derivative works,

17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which can complement and increase

sales of the original—as, for example, with “[flan sites

prompted by a book or film,” Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at

1976. In that unique context, there may be nothing

“untoward about waiting to see whether an infringer’s

exploitation undercuts the value of the copyrighted

49

work, has no effect on the original work, or even com-

plements it.” Jd. The Patent Act reflects no similar

judgment.

Fifth, the broader scope of protection Congress af-

forded under the Patent Act, as compared to the Copy-

right Act, weighs in favor of retaining laches as a bul-

wark against unfair, prejudicial delay that could harm

third parties. A copyright-holder cannot forbid mere

“use” or private performance or display of the protect-

ed work. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,

Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447 (1984) (“An unlicensed use of the

copyright is not an infringement unless it conflicts with

one of the specific exclusive rights conferred by the

copyright statute.”); 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(6) (copyright

owner’s exclusive public performance and display

rights). Thus, in Petrella the Court noted that

“{ajllowing Petrella’s suit to go forward ... will work no

unjust hardship on innocent third parties, such as con-

sumers who have purchased copies of Raging Bull.”

134 S. Ct. at 1978. A patentee, by contrast, can sue for

any unauthorized “use[]” of the invention. 35 U.S.C.

§ 271(a). An innocent consumer who purchases a device

from an unauthorized seller will continue to commit

new acts of infringement every time it is used.

C. SCA’s Policy Arguments Are Unfounded

SCA’s contention (at 46-48) that abolishing laches

in patent cases will serve important policy goals is be-

lied by the near-unanimous support for retaining the

defense from major stakeholders in patent law:

“{Ijndustries as diverse as biotechnology, electronics,

manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, software, agriculture,

apparel, health care, telecommunications, and finance”

all “overwhelmingly” supported retaining the defense

in the proceedings below (Pet. App. 38a), and First

5O

Quality expects a similar showing in this Court. Even

the leading organization of patent owners—the individ-

uals and firms against whom laches is typically assert-

ed—supports retaining the defense. IPO Br. 1-3.

SCA’s and its amici’s specific concern that laches

causes a rush to court or discourages settlement is

wrong. Laches by definition does not penalize reasona-

ble delay, such as a delay for bona fide infringement

analysis or settlement negotiations. See, e.g., Auker-

man, 960 F.2d at 1033 (listing circumstances for rea-

sonable delay); 6A Chisum on Patents § 19.05(2)[b]

(2016) (same)."* And the Court need not speculate

counterfactually whether laches “would encourage”

these putative problems. Pet. Br. 47. History provides

a record. Laches has long been available as a defense

to damages claims in patent litigation. SCA offers no

evidence that laches has sparked precipitous litigation

or impaired the willingness of parties to settle their

disputes out of court.

Nor do the facts of this case support abolishing

laches, as SCA contends (at 48). SCA finds itself in this

position only because of its own calculated decisions

and unreasonable delay. SCA was aware of First Qual-

ity’s alleged infringement for nearly seven years and

carefully monitored First Quality’s products through-

out that period, watching as First Quality invested and

expanded. SCA’s delay continued after the reexamina-

tion—a proceeding that might have provided a reason-

'* SCA’s amicus suggests that license negotiations “will not

necessarily excuse delay” (ABA Br. 11), but it misreads the rele-

vant case law, see A.C. Aukerman Co. v. Miller Formless Co., 693

F.2d 697, 700-701 (7th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff's sporadic efforts to de-

mand that defendant take a license did not excuse delay, where the

“exchanges were all unfruitful” and one-sided).

51

able excuse for part of SCA’s delay under existing law,

had SCA provided any indication of the proceeding to

First Quality. Serdarevic v. Advanced Med. Optics,

Inc., 582 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (delay for

PTO proceedings was reasonable where infringer still

““‘had reason to believe it was likely to be sued’ after the

... proceedings concluded”). Laches properly protects a

party like First Quality against such unfair and preju-

dicial delay.

IIL THE PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE AFTER Six YEARS

Or DELAY SHOULD BE RETAINED

Under settled law, an accused infringer must

demonstrate both unreasonable delay and prejudice to

establish laches. If, however, the patentee delays suit

for more than six years after the patentee knew or

should have known of the infringement, unreasonable

delay and prejudice are presumed. Pet. App. 9a. The

patentee must then come forward with some evidence

to rebut the presumption. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1037,

1038. The Court should decline SCA’s conclusory re-

quest (at 50-52) to abolish that presumption, for several

reasons.

First, the six-year presumption is not “unique” to

the Federal Circuit. Pet. Br. 50. The presumption

“was embraced by virtually all circuits prior to the cre-

ation” of the Federal Circuit and predates the 1952 Act.

Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1035; see Selinger, A Survey of

Article III Procedural Isswes Considered at The Fed-

eral Circuit During Its First Decade, 27 J. Marshall L.

Rev. 25, 58 (1993) (“[FJederal appellate courts had al-

most uniformly recognized and adopted the rebuttable

presumption that a delay of more than six years was

prejudicial and unreasonable.”); Studiengeselischaft

Kohle, 616 F.2d at 1326 (collecting cases). In 1936, for

52

example, the Ninth Circuit explained that, “[wJhen the

suit is filed after the statutory period” of six years, “in-

jury is presumed.” Gillons, 86 F.2d at 608; see also

Baker Mfg. Co. v. Whitewater Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 1008,

1009-1010 (7th Cir. 1970) (additional examples).

Second, the six-year presumption is well grounded

in equity practice, in which courts historically “consid-

er{ed] the passage of time equivalent to a comparable

statute of limitations as presumptive of laches.” TWM,

592 F.2d at 348; cf. Oroz v. American President Lines,

Ltd., 259 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1958) (analogous “rule-

of-thumb” in admiralty).

Third, even considering the matter afresh, the six-

year presumption is sensible and should be retained.

The patent owner is best positioned to come forward

with a legitimate explanation for its lengthy delay,

something SCA was unable to do here. The presump-

tion also provides the very clarity and predictability

that SCA claims to want (at 46-48), by giving courts “a

yardstick for reaching comparable results in compara-

ble circumstances,” Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1035. Par-

ties know, in advance, that six years’ delay carries with

it particular consequences in patent law, and they can

make business and litigation decisions accordingly. At

the same time, the presumption still permits flexibility

in individual cases. Satisfying the presumption “does

not mandate recognition of a laches defense,” which in-

stead always “remains an equitable judgment of the

trial court in light of all the circumstances.” /d. at 1036.

Fourth, even if the Court were inclined to revisit

the six-year presumption, this case would be a poor oc-

casion to do so. The en banc court declined to consider

the issue below (supra n.6), so it has not received sig-

nificant attention. The presumption also made no dif-

53

ference in this case. The district court held that SCA’s

three-year delay after reexamination would serve to

establish laches under the particular facts of this case

even without the presumption. Pet. App. 105a n.1.

That alternative and unchallenged holding would sup-

port affirmance here even were the Court to modify the

presumption. SCA’s deliberate and unreasonable delay

prejudiced First Quality and justifies the application of

laches to bar SCA from recovering damages.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

MARK C. FLEMING SETH P. WAXMAN

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING Counsel of Record

HALE AND DORR LLP THOMAS G. SAUNDERS

60 State Street MATTHEW GUARNIERI

Boston, MA 02109 WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

KENNETH P. GEORGE 1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

CHARLES R. MACEDO Washington, DC 20006

MARK BERKOWITZ (202) 663-6000

AMSTER, ROTHSTEIN seth.waxman@wilmerhale.com

& EBENSTEIN LLP

90 Park Avenue JASON D. HIRSCH

HANNA A. BAEK

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

7 World Trade Center

250 Greenwich Street

New York, NY 10007

New York, NY 10016

SEPTEMBER 2016

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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