Respondents Brief — Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1824 (2016) (No. 15-927)
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No, 16-927
In THE
1 Supreme Gaurt of the Brited States
FEET
12 20%
(EPR OF THe Pia F
SCA HYGIENE PropuctTs AKTIEBOLAG
AND SCA PERSONAL CARE, INC.,
Petitioners,
v,
FIRST QUALITY BABY PropuctTs, LLC, FIRST QUALITY
HYGIENIC, INC., FinsT QUALITY PRODUCTS, INC.,,
AND FIRST QUALITY RETAIL SERVICES, LLC,
Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES OOURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS
MARE C. FLEMING
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP
60 State Street
Boston, MA 02100
KENNETH P. GEORGE
CHARLES R. MACEDO
MARK BERKOWITZ
AMSTER, ROTHSTEIN
& EBENSTEIN LLP
90 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10016
SETH P. WAXMAN
Counsel of Record
THOMAS G, SAUNDERS
MATTHEW GUARNIERI
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP
1876 Permsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 663-6000
seth. waxman@wilmerhale.com
JASON D, HIRSCH
HANNA A. BAEK
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
7 Wall ade Center”
Now Yark NY 10007
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether laches is available as a defense under the
Patent Act to bar claims for damages.
(i)
ale
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
First Quality Baby Products, LLC; First Quality
Hygienic, Inc.; First Quality Products, Inc.; and First
Quality Retail Services, LLC are privately held com-
panies, and no publicly held company owns 10% or more
of the stock of any of them.
(ii)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED...............ccccccccscssssessssssessesseseoes i
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT............. il
ee FD PS vi
IIT Siatinorescsesnerecsnnessncointninimiasiinninnnnmannealail l
ET Sntirisparinnicninticininnenemntiinimenenmiidll 2
A. Statutory Background.................:scsesesesesseneees 2
B. Factual Background ................0ccscccsccscesssessseseees 7
CC. FRR I titececceccccccscscvcccscevesesonnstnesccsennene 9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..................cccccccssseseereeseees 13
REIS crrtreceninecimnnnmmnnnnnnmmnanan 16
I. CONGRESS CODIFIED LACHES AS A DE-
FENSE TO DAMAGES CLAIMS IN § 282 OF
pT SR eae 16
A. Before 1952, The Federal Courts Uni-
formly Recognized Laches As A Bar
To Recovering Damages For Patent
1. Laches barred recovery of patent
damages before the merger of law
2. Laches was also available as a de-
fense in the rare patent actions
I GP cetccsesnsncecsenscansesnnsenctvnvennenceceees 21
3. The consensus view of laches as a
bar to damages persisted after the
1938 merger of law and equity.................... 23
(iii)
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
4. SCA’s attempt to rebut this judi-
cial consensus fails ................0ss00--eesereeeeee- 24
B. The Text, Purpose, And History Of
The 1952 Act Demonstrate That Con-
gress Intended To Preserve Laches As
A Defense To Damages .....................cccecseesceeseees 28
C. Since 1952, Congress Has Altered The
Patent Act Repeatedly Without Dis-
a 33
ll. SCA MISREADS PETRELLA AND MISCON-
STRUES § 286 OF THE PATENT ACT ..........0000cc00000000- 36
A. Petrella’s Concern For Respecting
Legislative Intent Supports Retaining
B. Congress Had Good Reason For A Dif-
ferent Approach To Laches In Patent
1. Section 286 is not a statute of limi-
tations and does not measure a pa-
SE eetcnescnecsncsncenssccnmnsesmctssasescesees 40
2. SCA’s other textual arguments
premised on § 286 are unfounded .............. 42
3. SCA ignores numerous other dis-
tinctions between patent and copy-
EEE ee 44
C. SCA’s Policy Arguments Are Un-
Ea 49
Vv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
III. THE PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE AFTER
Six YEARS OF DELAY SHOULD BE RE-
EE RS ALE LA a oe Re a 51
— _——
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
A.C. Aukerman Co. v. Miller Formless
Co., 693 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1982)..........0.000-+-
A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides
Construction Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed.
CR Fi iii crevenscrecesssensosesensvesesrusssnnnenssnassereseeesces
A.R. Mosler & Co. v. Lurie, 209 F. 364 (2d
Ceo ep canenssnnccsonzcnssnenssnnsennqnuseussaceenssneseseness
A. Stucki Co. v. Buckeye Steel Castings
Co., 963 F.2d 360 (Fed. Cir. 1992)..............-
Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S.
American Home Products Corp. v.
Lockwood Manufacturing Co., 483
F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1973) ........-.-.-.ccsse-veeeeesees
Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961)........
Arrowood v. Symington-Gould Corp., 71 F
Supp. 693 (S.D.N.Y 1946) ....cccccssssssssossseese
Baker Manufacturing Co. v. Whitewater
Manufacturing Co., 430 F.2d 1008 (7th
CUR BaP rccsecccnsersecsncsnecenscsnsenesesscesssnmmnseasscvseces
Ball v. Gibbs, 118 F.2d 958 (8th Cir. 1941)........
Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ..............0-csesscseresseseseeees
Banker v. Ford Motor Co., 3 F. Supp. 737
I,
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Banker v. Ford Motor Co., 69 F.2d 665 (3d
Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning
Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of
California, Inc., 522 U.S. 192 (1997) .........2......00000- 40
Beach vy. Ocwen Federal Bank, 523 US.
St dnticierthitniceansinnnieniehintatttgsensenicemmenmmennnests 41
Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64 (1876) .................cceceeseeee 2
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) ..............ccccceceeee 29
Brennan v. Hawley Products Co., 182 F.2d
ee 23, 28
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501
cr 47
Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610
STITT las siniicaciaineaniineteaaieamsaiiataeinieiatithtttiatnaidanintaiatenenteneetmmmmnens 5
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
SO ehaercecsirieeinianettingeengiitenphdesentumsiimmeensneseenmmeenees 29
Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v.
Best Seam Inc., 694 F.2d 570 (9th Cir.
ET SARE RS RS 34
Celastic Corp. v. McClellan Shoe Specialty
Co., 15 F Supp. 1048 (D. Del. 1936)......................... 19
Cheney v. United States District Court for
District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Hughes
Tool Co., 192 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1961).............-000 23
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
City of Concord v. Norton, 16 F. 477
re i crrrcnnctcnemnncesemmntnenenegneentcensecmennes 27
Continental Coatings Corp. v. Metco, Inc.,
464 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1972) ...........cccsecsseeesseseseeeees 34
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175
I cencecesenessentsestinssnmmvnmmnensensemenmamnmmmacnnsenes 41, 42
Cummings v. Wilson & Willard
Manufacturing Co., 4 F.2d 453 (9th
Dallas Machinery & Locomotive Works,
Inc. v. Willamette-Hyster Co., 28 F
et inretcentttnsrernnetneninnsznccccscencneseses 19
Delaney Patents Corp. v. Johns-Manville,
29 F. Supp. 431 (S.D. Cal. 1989)................ccccccserseeees 23
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303
ti hnconinvesessincnatnetieniinsiiininsiuemsbisentannemmnmmensecein 32, 33
Dock & Terminal Engineering Co. v.
Pennsylvania Railroad, 82 F.2d 19 (3d
EES Sa ae 18
Dwight & Lloyd Sintering Co. v.
Greenawalt, 27 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1928) ....... 18, 19, 21
Enelow v. New York Life Insurance Co.,
ES Ce 24
Federal Housing Financial Agency v.
UBS Americas Inc., 712 F.3d 136 (2d
2 ee 41
Feinstein v. 1.T.S. Co., 68 F. Supp. 15 (N.D.
Ne I rcterrecencncenenencesemeensnintiabationanmausmnnemnnnmenrne 23
—C
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340
ee 45
Ford v. Huff, 296 F. 652 (5th Cir. 1924)............. 21, 22, 24
France Manufacturing Co. v. Jefferson
Electric Co., 106 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1939)................. 21
Frank F. Smith Hardware Co. v. S.H.
Pomeroy Co., 299 F. 644 (2d Cir. 1924)................... 19
Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368 (1892)...............c000000 28
George J. Meyer Manufacturing Co. v.
Miller Manufacturing Co., 24 F.2d 505
TT sicrtiseecthiceeetasicnnennmanniiinamsesenmenqnemene 19
Gillons v. Shell Co. of California, 86 F.2d
600 (9th Cir. 1936)............ccccecceceeeeeees 18, 19, 21, 28, 52
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,
A ET 45
Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics,
TE 17
Hartford-Empire Co. v. Swindeil Bros., 96
gg ET 19
Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident
Insurance Co., 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013)..............cccccee 41
Holman v. Oil Well Supply Co., 83 F.2d
ee 18
Huff v. Ford, 289 F. 858 (S.D. Fla. 1923) .............ccccsssee 24
X
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Jensen v Western Irrigation & Manu-
facturing, Inc., 650 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.
Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC,
8 ee 36
Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68 (1880) .......0...0cccccccecceeeeee 25
Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193
Si iertinteteenaiienneipinncuntetsnetensmatneninsntntentaimuccenesees 5, 44
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
I ctresincncnnersnnscemnsiantanessersemeceenennts 40
Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank,
TT insrsctichinticnncnenendesetnaestocssoanneenvens 22
Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 768 (1985) ...........c.cccceeeeeeeeee 36
Lukens Steel Co. v. American Locomotive
Co., 197 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1962) ............cccccceseeseeeneees 23
Marlatt v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 70
F.. Supp. 426 (S.D. Cal. 1947)..0.......cccccccccceseseeeeee 23, 28
Mather v. Ford Motor Co., 40 F. Supp. 589
TTT siccohicininstinteensendneneninibnanghsencnctwenceseses 22
McLaughlin v. People’s Railway Co., 21 F
PS Cassels IIMS Bete cocecsccczscssensececesoseecsccssecsccesceee 19
Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514 (1888) ................ccceeeeeee 44
Meyrountz Manufacturing Co. v. Eccleston,
98 F 437 (C.C.D. Mass. 1899)..............cccceccecceseeseeeeee 19
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 564
I cichncssntuinettaistintatinianeteintaiinnmanisia passim
m .
xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Middleton v. Wiley, 195 F.2d 844 (8th Cir.
FE sincneneceescscsonemernssussenmaseatintatemnnatpramemesevesseosnacsces 27
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v.
Berwick Industries, Inc., 532 F.2d 330
I I iicrnisccecinsnnteseccdeninmpinnighsinsinneiennnsvecmenncees 34
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Clair, 123 F.2d
I iinsecesisiericsinnninenpesencenmnensnsemncsnessacent 19
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) ..............cceseccesseseeseeeeens 39
Nazon Telesign Corp. v. Bunker Ramo
Corp., 686 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1982)... 34
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) ............c-c0e0e00 29
North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S.
ise hsirnisscuntntensecenedisntsiahasisiatinieluneabdatinnmincmsnincmmnenits 36
Oroz v. American President Lines, Ltd.,
IS, Hi atccnccscncsecctesncnecsccesccesecrees 52
Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270 (Fed.
oR: Ee een HO 33
Peerless Weighing & Vending Machine
Corp. v. International Ticket Scale
Corp., 37 F. Supp. 582 (D. Del. 1941)................:00000 23
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,
ts III coicicncircegeeninticccecesccvesncsnceee passim
POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.,
eI tiriabivntederinsancriicccnicnecanseniossninnnss 43
xii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Potash Co. of America v. International
Minerals & Chemical Corp., 213 F.2d
I EE ichscttictienitesnsctgnitnteinstonnmetncessenmnesenene 35
Potter Instrument Co. v. Storage
Technology Corp., 641 F.2d 190 (4th
EEE TESS Se: SR A 34
Reisz v. Harvey, 33 F Supp. 192 (N.D.
TT diidesiaibccinnineddshisnsitnibiiienasieiabiinunionennnccsenasite 23
Remington Rand, Inc. v. Acme Card
System Co., 29 F. Supp. 192 (S.D. Ohio
ERE SPER ESE SES DARE SSSR, Ee 19
Richardson v. D.M. Osborne & Co., 93 F
TE ee 19, 28
Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Manufactur-
ing Corp., 719 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir.
SII chicccnieestiaihapuntibameiecibidiisstiapicheatialdsiagatimepmetecasemecssae 20
Rome Grader & Machinery Corp. v. J.D.
Adams Manufacturing Co., 135 F.2d
a 23
Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v.
Consolidated Car Heating Co., 174 F.
RN ciincliicrcrianicteeheninatatiqnibatoniesccnemeesece 19, 20
Seghers v. Gardella, 55 F Supp. 914 (N.D.
AEE NT 23
Serdarevic v. Advanced Medical Optics,
Inc., 582 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ..............cccc000 51
Shaffer v. Rector Well Equipment Co., 155
a IE eicernicrcrnnntanssensencenserntcccssseesostecs 23
xiii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Skinner v. Aluminum Co. of America, 105
ee 23
Smith v. Sinclair Refining Co., 257 F.2d
IN rcnintinscsiasinaseasmumnnentinniienmemnececcsase 35
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)...........cccccccceerseeenee 49
Standard Oil Co. v. Nippon Shokubai
Kagaku Kogyo Co., 754 F.2d 345 (Fed.
ee ihicicidintneintnencevcendnasntineinasainneitniepenasscetcenvmanete 41
Starrett v. J. Stevens Arms & Tool Co., 96
lets BIND IIE crcceccccscesesenceneseecreecseccsecese 19
Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. East-
man Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir.
Temco Manufacturing Co. v. National
Electric Ticket Register Co., 33 F.2d
| TE 19, 20
Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegeniz,
Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ..............00ccee0e 46
Thorpe v. Wm. Filene’s Sons Co., 40 F.2d
TT ES 27
Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136 (1888) ............ccs00 2
Todd v. Russell, 104 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1939) ................. 28
Triplex Safety Glass Co. of North America
v. Kolb, 53 F.2d 1062 (E.D. Pa. 1931) ..................00. 28
TWM Manufacturing Co. v. Dura Corp.,
592 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1979) ................cccc-eesseeeess 35, 52
xiv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Ultimax Cement Manufacturing Corp. v.
CTS Cement Manufacturing Corp.,
587 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ..............00-sccseseeeeesees 29
Union Shipbuilding Co. v. Boston Iron &
Metal Co., 93 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1938)............... 18, 28
United Drug Co. v. Ireland Candy Co., 51
fc 19
United States ex rel. Arant v. Lane, 249
IIT ictintssicnicindbiserhbicntnteieseatabidaiainmnemaonestens 40
United States v. Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1 (1997)................. 29
United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009).................. 29
United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480 (1935)................... 27
United States v. New Orleans Pacific Rail-
way Co., 248 U.S. GOT (1919) ............c.ccccrseseerecsecssseeee 28
Universal Coin Lock Co. v. American
Sanitary Lock Co., 104 F.2d 781 (7th
I iain iitiiacinideatietiasinsnled icteastidimadbenetiecienmnsennios 22
Van Alen v. Aluminum Co. of America, 43
F. Supp. 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) ...........cccessscesceesereoseoee 23
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) ................. 32, 33, 34
Watkins v. Northwestern Ohio Tractor
Pullers Ass'n, 630 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir.
XV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Westco-Chippewa Pump Co. v. Delaware
Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v. New York
Air Brake Co., 111 F. 741 (N.D.N.Y.
EEE sccscnnesnsveemensnnmmenensmemeaniemeciiniemmeiannnesessnne 19, 20
Wheatley v. Rex-Hide, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 543
SE Ne I ticriiesninsineininneciategeiniestiinienlisbaateecennnmses 19, 20
Whitman v. Walt Disney Productions,
Inc., 263 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1968) ...............ccccceeceeeees 35
Wilkie v. Manhattan Rubber Manufactur-
ing Co., 8 F.2d 785 (D.N J. 192B)..........00-cecccceeseseeees 19
Window Glass Machine Co. v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 46 F.2d 484 (W.D. Pa.
Window Glass Machine Co. v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 284 F. 645 (3d Cir.
Wolf Mineral Process Corp. v. Minerals
Separation North American Corp., 18
IS SID Sicesinniceinntnipeinnininnsesccmscesvenscess 18
Wolf, Sayer & Heller, Inc. v. United States
Slicing Machine Co., 261 F. 195 (7th
STN iidlictictiinpiditiinninissinhiniantndaiatiamebigtincinienenctacnniine 18
Wollensak v. Reiher, 115 U.S. 96 (1885) ...............0........ 28
Woodmanse & Hewitt Manufacturing Co.
v. Williams, 68 F. 489 (6th Cir. 1895)................ 19, 20
Yates v. Smith, 271 F 27 (D.N.J. 1920).................... 19, 20
Xvi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Young v. General Electric Co., 96 F. Supp.
re aicicteiencnsitecintiintciininticntaninenenccensseconness 23
DOCKETED CASES
Dock & Terminal Engineering Co. v.
Pennsylvania Railroad, No. 5,757 (3d
EU cictechsnadiisieniiniaendnesiiebbbibtiatenindisaenilapnainenesiteenemessececsnssoene 20
Union Shipbuilding Co. v. Boston Iron &
Metal Co., No. 4,203 (4th Cir.).........cccccccssresseesessceees 20
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,
|__| ST en 39
STATUTES AND LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
17 U.S.C.
INI cinatipeicihapsedatheteallibetinieteninisensancesaniel 48
in ni sesstaiiecatitirhdnancialaenameetnieimmamnnntniill 49
I daisies entices itnenatanmainesdemaiiadael 38
ITT occ sscetiiisisit cit sclsbetattinaeicieadiateimababienaiiil 37, 40
35 U.S.C.
STII isenininnicictinmidaiicinseintnsintednbidipmnnnteaionentia 4
STITT ciictidtscinenicecitaiiainmsiinpheninnteasaieiiiaiidioanenidiaantagiaite 48
TIT Nissin iinhasttduenscipitaieniinhtneuitndammmesenntdaninenmiiaiiial 45
TIT iidistsinhteannsesniencsmintisiomnmnannmnnmeiiiiaial 49
IIE ntlk iccetcticestinthindieivesiohtaipaiienimmmandenieinetiiil passim
STII iiniicrcnstctdiminnanenienienninsssiinatapenienmasnnnaialaae 44
I esi namcenaiaariaed cteniiatalindinal 5, 6, 31, 43
ST laithascccesieinebiaeesiceinininisiniiaioneeniauaeleal passim
Sn acla eciecietsiciaieindiatpanlibiihailsintasnnbtidibiainidisinesnindieinl 43, 46
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198................. 3, 6, 17
Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 391, 29 Stat. 692 ...0.........cccccseseeee 4
XVii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) ..0.........cccseeees 39
Pub. L. No. 63-278, 38 Stat. 956 (1915) ............cccccceceeeeee 21
Pub. L. No. 67-147, 42 Stat. 389 (1922) ............cccccceseeeeeees 5
Pub. L. No. 79-687, 60 Stat. 778 (1946) ..............ccccceeeeeees 5
Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66
BUTI Weil hciosnieiciitarssiianesvdesnapaischinigeniataciciaientiniancted 6, 28, 29
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
ee es Si iacircednasencntseressnsnsctenevesscscenesscenes 35
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) ............ccccccecesseneeseees 35
Rev. Stat. (1874)
SUT iciilisinicecncicnennapiecitaiasibiasasdduniaiieianiensaaimaphinmnaaalila 3, 4,6
I iicscesiocnsscetsqneusiniicneespinciniiininianininingedinndaaiill 6
Spat diaundistrnsceninistenetenapintiatianiniinnbiniaimiadiingl 3, 4, 5, 6
H.R. 7794, 82d Cong. § 282 (as passed by
SE 31
H.R. 7794, 82d Cong. § 282 (as passed by S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, June 27, 1962).................. 31
H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923 (1962)................csccesee 6, 30, 31, 32
a crriniccmmcerensesnssunscsnnntnitsiinaaaniniin 31
Se, Rh a teciitiitaltcnseseacictencniiasccrinitnii 31, 32
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Beauchamp, Christopher, The First Patent
Litigation Explosion, 125 Yale L.J. 848
etl hicoiicntnstecesshinddinaiosianeamianattinuletitaiiesinitedlegaiammecaaitaitaios 4,17, 25
XViil
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
SL 50
Federico, P.J., Commentary on the New
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1 (West 1954),
reprinted in 75 J. Pat. & Trademark
I ridacietectnrenscennetetsenmnessnsescccoescocects 32
Heard, Nathan, The New Rules of Civil
Procedure as Affecting Patent
Litigation, 20 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 895
EEL 3
Hoar, Roger Sherman, Patent Tactics and
EE 30
Judicial Conference of the United States,
Report of the Division of Procedural
Studies and Statistics, in Annual Re-
Laycock, Dougies, 7 The Le Triumph i“ Equity,
56 L. & Contemp. Probs. 53 (Summer
ETS 25
Lee, William F., & Douglas Melamed,
Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent
Damages, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 385
Lemley, Mark A., Why Do Juries Decide If
Patents Are Valid?, 99 Va. L. Rev.
EEE A 3
Lutz, Karl B., Evolution of the Claims of
U.S. Patents, 20 J. Pat. Off. Soce’y 457
nail intasiaiadeeilddintnieeirdacentiaitinctinencientantninensenseenesentenee 3
ra
xix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Robinson, William C., The Law of Patents
for Useful Inventions (1890).............cccecceeeeeeenres 17
Selinger, Jerry R., A Survey of Article III
Procedural Issues Considered at The
Federal Circuit During Its First
Decade, 27 J. Marshall L. Rev. 25
ES St ee 51
Walker on Patents (Deller’s ed., Supp.
SEED tncisinecnseansdnessnnecnsaspuisiinseusendunsnnimmuatiniitintenenemenenes 25
INTRODUCTION
By the time Congress enacted the Patent Act of
1952, courts had been applying laches to bar damages in
patent infringement cases for over fifty years, along-
side the separate six-year limit on damages now found
in 35 U.S.C. § 286. Congress codified that longstanding
judicial consensus—that a patent is rendered unen-
forceable when a patentee’s unreasonable delay in filing
suit prejudices the defendant—in § 282 of the Patent
Act, which provides that existing “unenforceability”
defenses, such as laches, are available “in any action.”
Every court of appeals to consider the question since
1962 has agreed that laches is a defense to damages in
patent infringement cases. During that same period,
Congress has repeatedly modified § 282 and other rele-
vant provisions of the patent laws without ever ex-
pressing any disagreement with the uniform consensus
that laches is available to bar damages claims.
SCA’s effort to upend that century-old consensus
and escape the consequences of its unreasonable and
prejudicial delay should be rejected. SCA’s entire case
depends on extending Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), to patent law. But
the unique text, history, and purpose of the Patent Act
all distinguish this case from Petrella. SCA’s attempt
to gloss over those differences ignores that Petrella
rests at bottom on a concern for respecting congres-
sional judgment. Congress’s different judgment in the
Patent Act thus calls for a different result from the one
reached under the Copyright Act. Nothing in Petrella
suggested that Congress could not retain both an outer
limit for recovery of patent infringement damages, 35
U.S.C. § 286, as well as equitable defenses, such as
laches, that may bar damages within that period, id.
2
§ 282.' That is exactly what Congress did here, acting
against the backdrop of settled judicial practice.
It is SCA’s desired rule, not that of the court below,
that would “jettison Congress’ judgment,” Petrella, 134
S. Ct. at 1967, destabilize the law, and invite abusive
practices. The court of appeals’ judgment upholding
the district court’s finding of laches should be affirmed.
STATEMENT
A. Statutory Background
1. Before 1870, a patentee seeking both an injunc-
tion and damages was forced to bring duplicative pro-
ceedings in equity and at law. A federal court sitting in
equity could not directly compensate the patentee for
its past losses; rather, the court was limited to ordering
an infringer to disgorge any “gains and profits.”
Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 148 (1888). This
remedy proved incomplete whenever the patentee’s
losses exceeded the infringer’s gains. See, e.g., Birdsall
v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 69-70 (1876).
Congress addressed that shortcoming in the Patent
Act of 1870, which authorized federal courts sitting in
equity to award the same damages available at law:
|Tjhe court shall have power, upon bill in equi-
ty ... to grant injunctions according to the
course and principles of courts of equity, ... and
upon a decree being rendered in any such case
for an infringement, the [patentee] shall be en-
titled to recover, in addition to the profits to be
accounted for by the defendant, the damages
: Except as otherwise noted, all citations to title 35 are to the
2010 edition applicable to this case. Pet. App. 18a n.2.
3
the complainant has sustained thereby, ... and
the court shall have the same powers to in-
crease the same in its discretion that are given
by this act to increase the damages found by
verdicts in actions upon the case ....
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206 (em-
phasis added) (codified as amended at Rev. Stat. § 4921
(1874)). Congress did not give courts of law the power
to issue injunctions; a separate provision of the 1870
Act instead limited courts of law to awarding “actual
damages.” Id. § 59, 16 Stat. at 207 (codified as amended
at Rev. Stat. § 4919). Accordingly, a patentee could ob-
tain both an injunction and damages in equity, but only
damages at law.
Patentees predictably responded by “resort{ing] to
actions at law with decreasing frequency” after 1870,
“until finally the jurisdiction of equity over infringe-
ment suits became for all practical purposes exclusive.”
Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J.
Pat. Off. Soc’y 457, 470 (1938). Indeed, “virtually none
of the patent cases decided in this period” were tried at
law. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are
Valid?, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1673, 1704 (2013); see also
Heard, The New Rules of Civil Procedure as Affecting
Patent Litigation, 20 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 895, 895 (1938)
(“Patent cases are very seldom tried as actions at
law.”). Actions at law were reserved only for the rare
cases in which equity jurisdiction could not be in-
voked—for example, because the patent had already
expired and thus could no longer be infringed. The
“dominance of equity” in patent law persisted through
the merger of law and equity in 1938 and the adoption
of the Patent Act of 1952. See Lemley, 99 Va. L. Rev.
at 1704 (“only 2.5% of patent suits were tried to a jury”
in 1940); Judicial Conference of the United States, Re-
1
port of the Division of Procedural Studies and Statis-
tics, in Annual Report 67, 134 tbl. C4 (1952) (87 bench
trials to 4 jury trials in 1962 fiscal year).
As a result, “[mJuch of the overall body of patent
jurisprudence was developed within the equity frame-
work”; patent law is accordingly suffused with “equita-
ble approaches to judicial reasoning and lawmaking,”
including “such explicitly equity-based doctrines as pa-
tent misuse, inequitable conduct, and laches.” Beau-
champ, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125
Yale L.J. 848, 913 (2016). Equitable principles also in-
formed the development of other doctrines that contin-
ue to this day, including the doctrine of equivalents, pa-
tent exhaustion, the experimental use exception, and
prosecution laches.
2. The dominance of equity between 1870 and
1952 is reflected in the fact that when Congress
amended the Patent Act to address issues relating to
damages, it made the amendments exclusively in the
section of the statute governing damages in equity,
Rev. Stat. § 4921.’
First, in 1897, Congress enacted the predecessor to
the six-year damages period now found in 35 U.S.C.
§ 286. Congress placed that limitation in Rev. Stat.
§ 4921 and made it applicable both in equity and at law:
“in any suit or action ... there shall be no recovery of
profits or damages for any infringement committed
more than six years before” filing. Act of Mar. 3, 1897,
’ Congress made no comparable changes to the provision gov-
erning damages at law, which remained unchanged from the 1870s
onwards. Compare Rev. Stat. § 4919, with 36 U.S.C. § 67 (1946).
5
ch. 391, § 6, 29 Stat. 692, 694. Second, in 1922, Con-
gress modified § 4921 to permit equity courts to award
“a reasonable sum” in damages, if a patentee had diffi-
culty proving actual damages or profits in an account-
ing. Pub. L. No. 67-147, § 8, 42 Stat. 389, 392 (1922).
Third, in 1946, Congress eliminated reference to dis-
gorgement of profits and set a floor for damages in
§ 4921 by providing that they be “not less than a rea-
sonable royalty.” Pub. L. No. 79-587, 60 Stat. 778, 778
(1946).
The upshot of these successive changes is that
courts sitting in equity and applying Rev. Stat. § 4921
were awarding the same reasonable-royalty damages
available today, 35 U.S.C. § 284, subject to the same
six-year cutoff, id. § 286.
3. Between 1870 and 1952, federal courts repeat-
edly recognized and applied laches when a patentee un-
reasonably and inexcusably “slept upon his rights” to
the accused infringer’s prejudice. Lane & Bodley Co. v.
Locke, 150 U.S. 198, 201 (1898). In Lane & Bodley,
which arose before Congress enacted the six-year dam-
ages period in 1897, this Court dismissed a suit in equi-
ty after the patentee delayed more than twelve years
before suing. /d. at 200-201. Subsequent patent cases
decided after 1897 held that laches barred the patentee
from recovering profits or damages—whether sought
in equity, as in the vast majority of patent litigation at
the time (infra pp. 17-21 & n.8), or in the rare cases
brought at law (infra pp. 21-22). Courts continued to
*'The 1870 Act had limited a patentee’s window to recover
damages to the patent term plus six years, but that provision was
eliminated in 1874. See Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 165 U.S.
610, 613-614 (1895).
6
apply the same rule after the 1938 merger of law and
equity. /nfra p. 23.
4. Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1952
against that backdrop. Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792.
The purpose of the 1952 Act was to codify existing pa-
tent law, except as otherwise noted. See H.R. Rep. No.
82-1923, at 3 (1952) (explaining “the main purpose of
codification and enactment of title 35 into law, with only
some minor procedural and other changes”).
The 1952 Act consolidated the two damages provi-
sions, Rev. Stat. $§ 4919 and 4921, into a single new
provision, § 284, modeled primarily on the equity side of
the statute. 66 Stat. at 813; H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at
29. Congress also maintained the six-year outer limit
on recovering damages, but placed it in a new
standalone section, § 286. 66 Stat. at 813.
Finally, in § 282 of the 1952 Act, Congress codified
existing defenses to patent infringement. 66 Stat. at
812. The 1870 Act had included a list of five defenses
that could be pleaded, but the list was not exhaustive.
Act of July 8, 1870, §61, 16 Stat. at 208 (codified as
amended at Rev. Stat. § 4920). Rather than attempting
to enumerate each and every defense recognized by the
courts, Congress “omitted and replaced” the prior list
with “a broader paragraph specifying defenses in gen-
eral terms.” H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 29. In particu-
lar, Congress provided in § 282 that the “following shall
be defenses in any action involving the validity or in-
fringement of a patent,” and then listed defenses in-
cluding “Invalidity” and “Noninfringement, absence of
liability for infringement or unenforceability.” 66 Stat.
at 812.
7
B. Factual Background
1. Infringement Accusations. SCA and First
Quality are competitors in the market for adult inconti-
nence products. On October 31, 2003, SCA sent a letter
accusing First Quality of making and selling protective
underwear products that infringed SCA’s U.S. Patent
No. 6,375,646 (“the ’646 patent”). JA54-55.
Three weeks later, on November 21, 2003, First
Quality responded to SCA, also by letter, explaining
that First Quality’s products did not and could not in-
fringe the 646 patent because that patent is invalid.
First Quality’s letter explained that even a “cursory
review” of the prior art revealed that the same claimed
features were already disclosed in U.S. Patent No.
5,415,649 to Watanabe. JA52.
SCA never again accused First Quality of infring-
ing the ’646 patent until SCA brought this suit in Au-
gust 2010, nearly seven years later. But the parties
had several other interactions. In April 2004, SCA ac-
cused a different First Quality product of infringing a
different SCA patent, without mentioning the ’646 pa-
tent. Pet. App. 95a. First Quality responded with a
letter referencing the parties’ prior correspondence re-
garding the ’646 patent, and SCA replied in July 2004,
again without mentioning the ’646 patent. /d. 95a-96a.
SCA’s apparent abandonment of its infringement con-
tentions with respect to the ’646 patent reinforced First
Quality’s belief that the '646 patent was no longer an
issue. /[d. 4a, 116a.
2. Reexamination. SCA had been aware of the
prior art Watanabe patent long before First Quality’s
2003 letter referencing it; SCA knew of Watanabe since
at least 1998, from proceedings on the European coun-
terpart to the ’646 patent. See CAJ A586-587 & n.1, 865-
8
866. However, SCA had failed to disclose the
Watanabe patent to the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office when obtaining the 646 patent, notwithstanding
its duty to disclose material prior art. CAJA879-880.
In July 2004, after the correspondence described above,
SCA belatedly brought Watanabe to the PTO’s atten-
tion by initiating an ex parte reexamination of the ’646
patent. Pet. App. 4a. SCA did not inform First Quality
of this development. /d.*
The reexamination “took almost three years,” as
SCA notes (at 10), in part because the patent examiner
initially rejected all the ’646 patent claims as anticipat-
ed by Watanabe. CAJA188. SCA ultimately survived
the reexamination by reading the ’646 patent claims
narrowly. CAJA188-190. The reexamination concluded
in March 2007, with the PTO confirming its view of the
patentability of the 646 patent claims and authorizing
additional dependent claims (i.e., claims that are neces-
sarily narrower than the original claims). SJA10-11.
3. SCA’s Monitoring and First Quality’s Preju-
dice. At no point during the reexamination (or for
three years after) did SCA inform First Quality of that
proceeding or suggest that SCA continued to view any
First Quality products as potentially infringing the ’646
patent. But throughout that period, SCA, which is
much larger than First Quality, kept close watch over
First Quality’s business through “an entire department
dedicated solely to competitive intelligence,” which had
“continuously tracked First Quality’s activity since
2003.” Pet. App. 104a. SCA acquired and analyzed
* SCA observes (at 9-10) that notices of reexamination are
open to public inspection. It is undisputed, however, that First
Quality never learned of the reexamination until SCA brought this
suit. Pet. App. 9a.
9
First Quality products and advertisements and kept
abreast of First Quality’s expansion plans. CAJA920,
923-926, 929-931, 939, 941-943, 945-946.
First Quality, meanwhile, invested substantial cap-
ital to expand its market and increase sales of the very
products SCA would later claim infringe the ’646 pa-
tent. Among other steps, First Quality spent hundreds
of millions of dollars to develop new protective under-
wear lines and to acquire one of its competitors, a sub-
sidiary of Covidien. Pet. App. 5a, 70a-7la, 107a-108a.
First Quality’s sales of the accused products during this
period increased eight-fold over the sales levels that
had prompted SCA’s initial letter. CAJA1085.
C. Prior Proceedings
1. District Court Proceedings. In August 2010,
after nearly seven years of delay, SCA brought this
suit seeking an injunction and damages for First
Quality’s alleged infringement of the ’646 patent. JA23.
In an attempt to reach First Quality’s products, SCA
proposed a construction of the 646 patent claims that
was broader than the narrowing gloss it had adopted to
overcome Watanabe during the reexamination.
CAJA189-190. The district court rejected that effort
under the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel.
CAJA190.
At summary judgment, the district court held that
laches barred SCA from recovering any damages that
accrued before suit was filed. Pet. App. llla, 120a.
The court explained that an accused infringer may es-
tablish the defense under settled law by proving two
elements: unreasonable delay by the patentee and re-
sulting prejudice to the accused infringer. Pet. App.
98a-99a (citing A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides
10
Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en
banc)). When the patentee delays for more than six
years, the accused infringer is entitled to a presumption
of unreasonable and prejudicial delay, which the pa-
tentee may rebut by providing evidence to explain its
delay or dispel the prejudice. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at
1035-1036. Applying that presumption, the district
court held that SCA failed to present evidence suffi-
cient to create a genuine issue of fact regarding the un-
reasonableness of its delay or First Quality’s prejudice
from that delay. Pet. App. 105a, 110a-1lla. The court
also ruled that SCA’s three-year delay after the reex-
amination, standing alone and without the benefit of a
presumption, “supporti[ed] a finding of unreasonable
delay” on these facts. /d. 105a n.1.
The court ruled, in particular, that the reexamina-
tion proceeding did not excuse SCA’s delay in this case.
Pet. App. 102a-103a.° The court also “reject{[ed] SCA’s
argument that it needed more than three years,” after
the reexamination proceeding concluded, “to determine
whether it was appropriate to bring infringement
claims against First Quality,” given that “SCA had al-
ready completed its infringement analysis by October
of 2003, when it sent the initial letter to First Quality.”
Id. 104a. Further, SCA’s assertion that it needed three
years to locate U.S. counsel was insufficient, given that
SCA’s U.S. in-house counsel oversaw all its US. litiga-
tion and had already retained U.S. counsel to accuse
* To this day, SCA has never provided any explanation for its
decision not to inform First Quality of the reexamination proceed-
ing, which was prompted by SCA’s own failure to disclose
Watanabe to the PTO during the original prosecution of the '646
patent.
1]
First Quality of infringement in 2003 and to conduct the
reexamination. /d.
The district court also held that First Quality had
established the separate defense of equitable estoppel,
based on SCA’s misleading conduct. Pet. App. 1lla-
119a. Finally, the court dismissed as moot First Quali-
ty’s other pending motions, including two for summary
judgement on non-infringement grounds. /d. 120a.
2. Panel Decision. A panel of the Federal Circuit
affirmed in part and reversed in part. As to laches, the
panel unanimously held that Petrella v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), did not
abrogate the court’s recognition in Aukerman that
laches could bar a damages claim for patent infringe-
ment, and it ruled that the district court’s laches deci-
sion was correct on the record presented. Pet. App.
75a-84a. The panel also held that SCA had waived its
argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that the
dependent claims issued after reexamination should
have been analyzed differently for laches purposes. /d.
84a-85a.
The panel reversed as to equitable estoppel, con-
cluding that genuine issues of material fact remained as
to whether SCA’s communications misled First Quality
and, if so, whether First Quality’s reliance on those
misrepresentations caused First Quality’s prejudice—a
causation issue relevant only to estoppel, not laches.
Pet. App. 89a.
3. En Banc Decision. The Federal Circuit re-
heard the case en banc to reconsider Aukerman and
12
the viability of a laches defense to a patent infringe-
ment suit for damages in light of Petrella.°
A majority of the en banc court began by acknow!-
edging that § 286 is not a statute of limitations, but it
declined to distinguish Petrella on that basis. Pet. App.
17a-18a. It then turned to a careful examination of the
reasoning of both Petrella and Aukerman. The majori-
ty reaffirmed the core holding of Aukerman that Con-
gress codified laches as a defense to damages in § 282 of
the Patent Act of 1952, in full view of the separate six-
year period in § 286. Jd. 18a, 22a, 35a-36a; Aukerman,
960 F.2d at 1029-1030; cf. Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1974
n.15 (describing Aukerman as “[bjased in part on § 282
and commentary thereon, legislative history, and his-
torical practice’). The en banc majority declined to
second-guess that legislative judgment, finding itself
bound to “apply the law as enacted, which means that
the § 286 damages limitation and the § 282 laches de-
fense must continue to coexist.” Pet. App. 36a. Five
judges dissented from this ruling. Jd. 45a-66a.’
The “cornerstone” (Pet. Br. 15) of the decision be-
low was the text and history of the 1952 Patent Act,
and the uniform pre-1962 judicial consensus that laches
was available as a defense to patent damages claims.
Pet. App. 18a-22a, 29a-34a. The majority’s view was
further confirmed by commentary from P.J. Federico, a
principal draftsman of the 1952 Act, who noted that the
defenses codified in § 282 included “equitable defenses
* The en banc court declined SCA’s request to reconsider the
rebuttable presumption of laches. Opp. 29-30.
’ The en bane court unanimously modified circuit law to clari-
fy that laches may be considered in fashioning appropriate injunc-
tive relief. Pet. App. 40a-41a, 46a n.1.
13
such as laches, estoppel, and unclean hands.” /d. 20a.
Finally, the court noted that pre-suit delay poses a
unique and recurring risk of hardship in patent law, not
found in copyright law, because delay often forecloses
the infringer from substituting a non-infringing tech-
nology, and the court observed that “[t)his risk likely
explains why the amici in this case—encompassing in-
dustries as diverse as biotechnology, electronics, manu-
facturing, pharmaceuticals, software, agriculture, ap-
parel, health care, telecommunications, and finance—
overwhelmingly support retaining laches in patent
law.” Id. 38a.
The en banc court reinstated the panel’s decision as
to equitable estoppel and remanded the case for further
proceedings. Pet. App. 44a.
4. Subsequent Proceedings. After remand, SCA
moved for a stay pending disposition of its petition to
this Court. JA46. The district court denied SCA’s re-
quest. Order 1-2, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 150. Proceedings in the
district court are thus ongoing, with two potentially
case-dispositive defenses relating to equitable estoppel
and noninfringement pending. See First Quality Ltr. 2-
3, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 153 (summarizing defenses); Order 1,
Dist. Ct. Dkt. 155 (reopening case and reinstating case-
dispositive motions).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Congress codified laches as a defense to dam-
ages in the Patent Act of 1952. Before 1952, the federal
courts uniformly recognized such a defense in patent
law, alongside the same six-year outer limit on recover-
ing damages now found in 35 U.S.C. § 286. Congress’s
choice in 1870 to allow for the recovery of damages in
courts of equity caused the vast majority of patent liti-
14
gation to be brought in equity, and laches was routinely
applied in those cases to bar recovery of damages.
Laches was also recognized as a defense in the rare pa-
tent actions brought at law. This consensus view of
laches as a defense to damages in patent law continued
unabated after the 1938 merger of law and equity.
SCA’s effort to rebut the judicial consensus by criticiz-
ing the few decisions rendered at law fails on its own
terms, overlooks the many decisions in equity, and does
not account for the post-merger decisions.
Congress codified this settled view of laches in
§ 282 of the Patent Act of 1952 by making “unenforcea-
bility” defenses available “in any action.” By using the
term “unenforceability,” Congress intended to incorpo-
rate the established meaning of that term, which in-
cluded laches as a defense to damages. The history of
the 1952 Act confirms that Congress’s purpose in § 282
was to preserve existing unenforceability defenses and
that Congress anticipated that those defenses would be
available to bar recovery of damages. Furthermore,
the overall purpose of the 1952 Act was to codify exist-
ing law, and Congress’s intent to preserve laches was
perceived immediately.
Every court of appeals to consider the question af-
ter 1952 recognized that laches remained available as a
defense to damages in patent law. Since 1952, Con-
gress has modified the Patent Act in various ways, in-
cluding amendments to § 282, without ever disturbing
the uniform recognition of laches as a defense. Any
changes should be left to Congress.
II. This Court’s decision in Petrella v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), suppor*s
retaining laches as a defense in patent law because Pet-
rella rests at bottom on an inference of legislative in-
15
tent. The Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limita-
tions, together with other statutory provisions and the
historic role of laches as “gap-filling” in equity, per-
suaded the Court thet Congress had impliedly fore-
closed the defense o/ laches in copyright infringement
actions for damages. The same careful attention to
statutory text and history leads to a different result
here. All the available evidence indicates that Con-
gress intended to preserve laches as a defense to dam-
ages under the Patent Act.
SCA’s contrary view, premised on 35 U.S.C. § 286,
is unfounded. To start, § 286 is not a statute of limita-
tions at all. A statute of limitations requires the plain-
tiff to bring suit within a fixed period of time after the
plaintiff's cause of action accrues. Section 286, by con-
trast, runs backwards from when the defendant is sued
and is not dependent on when the plaintiff knew or
should have known of the defendant’s allegedly infring-
ing activities. In enacting § 286, Congress left ample
room for laches to operate alongside the six-year peri-
od, as had been true for decades before the 1952 Patent
Act. Reading the Patent Act to permit the laches de-
fense within § 286’s six-year period is also consistent
with the text and history of that provision. Laches has
distinct elements and does not shorten the six-year pe-
riod or otherwise undermine § 286. Finally, Congress
had good reason to retain laches as a defense to damag-
es in the Patent Act but not the Copyright Act given
the substantial differences between the two—including
the danger that patentees will unreasonably delay suit
until infringers with no knowledge of the patent are
locked into using the patented technology.
III. The presumption that delay of six years or
more is unreasonable and prejudicial should be re-
tained. The presumption predates the 1952 Act, has
16
been widely recognized in the courts of appeals (not
simply the Federal Circuit), and is consistent with his-
torical practice. It provides a useful benchmark for en-
suring consistency across cases, and it sensibly places
the burden on the patentee to explain long periods of
pre-suit delay. Finally, the presumption made no dif-
ference here, so affirmance is warranted in any event.
ARGUMENT
I. Conaeress CODIFIED LACHES As A DEFENSE TO
DAMAGES CLAIMS IN § 282 OF THE PATENT ACT
When Congress enacted § 282 of the Patent Act of
1952, it codified the longstanding judicial consensus
that laches is available as an unenforceability defense
against damages claims, alongside the six-year period
now found in § 286. For decades prior to the 1952 Act,
courts had routinely recognized laches as a bar to en-
forcing stale claims for damages. Congress intended to
preserve that settled view by codifying laches as one of
the “unenforceability” defenses available “in any ac-
tion” under § 282. Given the overwhelming pre-1952
consensus, it is no surprise that every court to consider
the question after 1952 held that laches is available in
patent litigation to bar damages claims brought after
unreasonable, prejudicial delay. Congress has repeat-
edly amended the Patent Act, including § 282, in full
view of those decisions, without ever seeing fit to modi-
fy laches. At this late date, “[aJny re-calibration” of the
laches defense should be left to Congress. Microsoft
Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 114 (2011).
17
A. Before 1952, The Federal Courts Uniformly
Recognized Laches As A Bar To Recovering
Damages For Patent Infringement
As this Court has recognized, Congress adopted
the 1952 Act as a “codification” of existing law, against
a “backdrop” of decades of patent decisions that shed
light on the Act’s meaning. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse
Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1930 (2016). That is no less
true of § 282, which codified decades of cases recogniz-
ing laches as a defense to patent damages, both before
and after the merger of law and equity.
1. Laches barred recovery of patent
damages before the merger of law and
equity
Patent litigation occurred almost exclusively in eq-
uity from 1870 onwards as a result of a deliberate
choice Congress made that year to allow courts of equi-
ty to award damages for patent infringement. Act of
July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206; see supra
pp. 2-4. This legislative change, combined with other
factors, ushered in a long period in which the over-
whelming majority of cases seeking damages were
brought in equity. Supra pp. 3-4; see also, e.g., 3 Robin-
son, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions § 932 n.5
(1890) (noting “the almost entire substitution of actions
in equity for actions on the case in courts of law where
equity jurisdiction can be claimed”).
This “shift of patent litigation from common law to
equity was deeply important to the evolution of patent
law.” Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explo-
sion, 125 Yale L.J. 848, 912 (2016). As a result, modern
patent law is now “riddled with equitable approaches”
that arose in these formative years, gained general ap-
plication, and remain part of the law today. /d. at 913
18
(collecting examples); see supra p. 4. One of those
longstanding doctrines is the tradition of applying lach-
es as a defense to patent damages.
Far from “a handful of ambiguous lower court deci-
sions” (Pet. Br. 37), a mountain of authority recognized
laches as a defense barring recovery of damages or
profits. See, e.g., Westco-Chippewa Pump Co. v. Dela-
ware Elec. & Supply Co., 64 F.2d 185, 186-188 (3d Cir.
1933) (plaintiff's laches barred recovery after “having
stood by and having done nothing to protect its rights
for seven years while the defendant was building up a
business, which it thought was legitimate”); Dwight &
Lloyd Sintering Co. v. Greenawalt, 27 F.2d 823, 827 (2d
Cir. 1928) (L. Hand, J.) (“delay of 13 years, not other-
wise excused, therefore appears to us fatal to any ac-
counting”); Wolf Mineral Process Corp. vy. Minerals
Separation N. Am. Corp., 18 F.2d 483, 490 (4th Cir.
1927) (“laches shown by the record would be quite suf-
ficient of itself to bar complainant of relief”); Cum-
mings v. Wilson & Willard Mfg. Co., 4 F.2d 453, 455
(9th Cir. 1925) (delay “shows such laches as will clearly
preclude any right to relief’); Wolf, Sayer & Heller,
Inc. v. United States Slicing Mach. Co., 261 F 195, 197-
198 (7th Cir. 1919) (evidence “discloses such laches as to
prevent appellee from collecting damages for past in-
fringements”); A.R. Mosler & Co. v. Lurie, 209 F . 364,
371 (2d Cir. 1913) (patentees cannot remain “supine for
many years,” and then “insist on being granted an ac-
counting for damages and profits during their long pe-
riod of inaction”).*
* See alan Union Shipbuilding Co. v. Boston Iron & Metal
Co., 93 F.2d 781, 783 (4th Cir. 1938), Gillona v. Shell Co. of Cal., 86
F 2d 600, 608-610 (9th Cir. 1936); Holman v. Oil Well Supply Co.,
83 F.2d 638, 588 (3d Cir. 1936) (per curiam); Dock & Terminal
19
Some decisions of this era refer generally to laches
as a bar to “any accounting,” Dwight & Lloyd, 27 F.2d
at 827, or to “relief,”” Gillons v. Shell Co. of Cal., 86
F.2d 600, 610 (9th Cir. 1936). As the court of appeals
explained, however, after Congress authorized equity
courts to award damages, an “accounting” became the
generic term for the calculation of monetary relief, in-
cluding damages, in equity. Pet. App. 29a; see also
Eng’g Co. v. Pennaylvania R.R., 82 F.2d 19, 19-20 (3d Cir. 1936);
George J. Meyer Mfg. Co. v. Miller Mfg. Co., 24 F.2d 606, 507-508
(7th Cir. 1928); Window Glass Mach. Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 284 F. 646, 650-661 (3d Cir. 1922); Safety Car Heating & Light-
ing Co. v. Consolidated Car Heating Co., 174 F. 658, 662 (2d Cir.
1909) (per curiam); Richardson v. D.M. Osborne & Co., 93 F. 828,
830-831 (2d Cir. 1899); Woodmanse & Hewitt Mfg. Co. v. Williams,
68 F. 489, 493-494 (6th Cir. 1895); Dallas Mach. & Locomotive
Works, Inc. v. Willamette-Hyster Co., 28 F. Supp. 207, 212-213 (D.
Or. 1939), aff'd on other grounds, 112 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1940);
Wheatley v. Rexr-Hide, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 543, 544-645 (N.D. Il.
1938), aff'd on other grounda, 102 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1939); Reming-
ton Rand, Inc. v. Acme Card Sys. Co., 29 F Supp. 192, 200-201
(S.D. Ohio 1937); Celastic Corp. v. McClellan Shoe Specialty Co.,
15 F. Supp. 1048, 1060 (D. Del. 1936); Temco Mfg. Co. v. National
Elec. Ticket Register Co., 33 F.2d 777, 778 (E.D. Mo. 1928); Wilkie
v. Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co., 8 F.2d 785, 788 (D.N.J. 1925), aff'd
on other grownds, 14 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1926); Yates v. Smith, 271 F.
27, 31-33 (D.NJ. 1920), aff'd on other grounds, 271 F. 33 (3d Cir.
1921); Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v. New York Air Brake Co.,
111 F 741, 742 (N.D.N.Y. 1901); Meyrowitz Mfg. Co. v. Eccleston,
98 F. 437, 4389-440 (C.C._D. Mass. 1899); Starrett v. J. Stevens Arms
& Tool Co., 96 F. 244, 246 (C.C.D. Mass. 1899), aff'd, 100 F. 98 (1st
Cir. 1900), MeLaughlin v. People’s Ry. Co., 21 F. 574, 574
(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1884); cf. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Clair, 123
F.2d 878, 883 (8th Cir. 1941) (laches available but not established
on the facts of the case); Hartford-Empire Co. v. Swindell Broz.,
96 F 2d 227, 232-233 (4th Cir. 1938) (same); United Drug Co. v. Ire-
land Candy Co., 51 F.2d 226, 232 (8th Cir. 1931) (same); Frank F.
Smith Hardware Co. v. S.H. Pomeroy Co., 299 F. 544, 647-549 (2d
Cir 1924) (same).
20
Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305,
1311-1312 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc). Indeed, the briefs
in various decisions that refer simply to an “account-
ing” make clear that patentees were in fact commonly
seeking damages in those cases. E.g., Appellee Br. 12,
Union Shipbuilding Co. v. Boston Iron & Metal Co.,
No. 4,203 (4th Cir. Oct. 26, 1987) (patentee sought to
force defendant “to account for large sums of money as
profits or damages”); Appellee Br. 6, Dock & Terminal
Engg Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., No. 5,757 (3d Cir.
Dec. 6, 1935) (“claim for damages and profits”).
Moreover, when courts were more specific about
the types of monetary relief barred by the patentee’s
laches, there was no question that laches operated to
bar recovery of damages. E.g., Mosler, 209 F. at 371
(barring “accounting for damages and profits”); Safety
Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. Consolidated Car Heat-
ing Co., 174 F. 658, 662 (2d Cir. 1909) (per curiam)
(“profits and damages”); Woodmanse & Hewitt Mfg.
Co. v. Williams, 68 F. 489, 490 (6th Cir. 1895) (“an ac-
counting as to damages and profits”); Wheatley v. Rex-
Hide, Inc., 25 F Supp. 543, 645 (N.D. Ill. 1938) (laches
“bars his right to recover damages”); Temco Mfg. Co. v.
National Elec. Ticket Register Co., 33 F.2d 777, 778
(E.D. Mo. 1928) (“laches may preclude a judgment for
damages”); Yates v. Smith, 271 F 27, 27 (D.N.J. 1920)
(“accounting of profits and damages”); Westinghouse
Air Brake Co. v. New York Air Brake Co., 111 F. 741,
742 (N.D.N.Y. 1901) (complainant cannot “collect dam-
ages”).
All of these decisions, after 1897, involved only
claims not otherwise barred by the six-year outer limit
for recovery Congress enacted that year—the prede-
cessor to § 286. Supra pp. 4-5. In fact, courts expressly
considered and rejected the argument that laches
21
should not operate as a defense within that period. In
Gillons, for example, the patentee maintained that his
delay had effectively benefited the infringer by giving it
a free license for use of the invention outside the six-
year window. 86 F.2d at 606-607. The Ninth Circuit
rejected that argument and held that “injury [to the
infringer] is presumed” after six years, as is true today.
Id. at 608; see also France Mfg. Co. v. Jefferson Elec.
Co., 106 F.2d 605, 609 (6th Cir. 1939) (“relief may be
denied on the ground of laches” after “delay in institut-
ing suit, notwithstanding the statute of limitations”);
Dwight & Lloyd, 27 ¥ .2d at 827 (laches barred recovery
for “even the earliest of the 6 years to which recovery
is in any event limited”); Window Glass Mach. Co. v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 46 F.2d 484, 485 (W.D. Pa.
1921) (similar), aff'd, 284 F. 645 (3d Cir. 1922).
2. Laches was also available as a defense in
the rare patent actions brought at law
Only a handful of patent decisions before 1952 ad-
dressed laches as a defense at law because actions at
law were rare and patent damages were predominantly
awarded in equity. Even so, decisions at law also rec-
ognized laches as an available defense.
The leading case was Ford v Huff, 296 F. 652 (5th
Cir. 1924), in which the patentee sued Henry Ford at
law after more than fourteen years of delay—a period
coinciding with Ford’s massive success with the Model
T, see id. at 654. Ford sought to plead laches as a de-
fense under the procedures of Judicial Code § 274b,
which permitted equitable defenses to be “interposed
by answer” in an action at law, “without the necessity
of filing a bill on the equity side of the court.” Pub. L.
No. 63-278, 38 Stat. 956, 956 (1915) (amending Judicial
22
Code § 274b).’ The Fifth Circuit held that a defendant
sued at law who filed “a bill in equity disclosing the
state of facts alleged” by Ford would have been “enti-
tled to prevent the enforcement of the claim” at law, as
the “plaintiff's conduct had been such as to deprive him
of the right to enforce that claim.” 296 F. at 658. Ac-
cordingly, under Judicial Code §274b, a defendant
could raise the same laches defense directly, without
needing to file a separate bill in equity to enjoin the ac-
tion at law.
Ford involved claims for breach of a patent license,
but subsequent decisions involving infringement claims
at law were to the same effect. In Banker v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 69 F.2d 665, 666 (3d Cir. 1934), for exarnple, the
court noted that, “[hjad the [patentee’s] suit been in
equity, the evidence would have been ample for holding
that recovery was barred because of laches,” and that
the patentee could not avoid the consequences of his
unreasonable delay by instead filing at law. See id.
(“that contention is met by section 274b” (citing Ford));
see also Universal Coin Lock Co. v. American Sani-
tary Lock Co., 104 F.2d 781, 781-783 (7th Cir. 1939)
(laches, raised in action at law under Judicial Code
§ 274b, barred damages claims); Mather v. Ford Motor
Co., 40 F. Supp. 589, 593 (E.D. Mich. 1941) (same).
* Previously, a defendant could raise an equitable defense to a
legal claim only by filing a separate “bill in equity to enjoin the ...
suit at law until the equitable defense was decided” in equity (i.e.,
by the court, not a jury). A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides
Conatr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1031 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc); see
Pet. App. 27a, 30a-3la. The 1915 amendments preserved that
same sequence: Equitable defenses pleaded under § 274b would
“first be disposed of as in a court of equity,” by the judge, with a
subsequent jury trial only “if an issue of law remains.” Liberty Oil
Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 236, 242 (1922).
23
3. The consensus view of laches as a bar to
damages persisted after the 1938 merger
of law and equity
The judicial recognition of laches as a defense to
stale patent infringement claims for damages continued
unabated after the 1938 merger of law and equity in
federal courts. Lukens Steel Co. v. American Locomo-
tive Co., 197 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1962); Brennan v.
Hawley Prods. Co., 182 F.2d 945, 948 (7th Cir. 1950);
Rome Grader & Mach. Corp. v. J.D. Adams Mfg. Co.,
135 F.2d 617, 619-620 (7th Cir. 1943); Skinner v. Alu-
minum Co. of Am., 105 F. Supp. 635, 687 (W.D. Pa.
1952); Young v. General Elec. Co., 96 F. Supp. 109, 139-
140 (N.D. Ill. 1951); Marlatt v. Mergenthaler Linotype
Co., 70 F. Supp. 426, 432-434 (S.D. Cal. 1947); Arrowood
v. Symington-Gould Corp., 71 F. Supp. 693, 696-696
(S.D.N.Y. 1946); Feinstein v. 1.T.S. Co., 68 F. Supp. 15,
16 (N.D. Ohio 1946); Seghers v. Gardella, 55 F. Supp.
914, 915 (N.D. Ohio 1944); Van Alen v. Aluminum Co.
of Am., 43 F Supp. 833, 837-838 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Peer-
less Weighing & Vending Mach. Corp. v. International
Ticket Scale Corp., 37 F. Supp. 582, 583 (D. Del. 1941),
affd on other grounds, 126 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1942);
Reisz v. Harvey, 33 F Supp. 192, 194 (N.D. Ohio 1940);
Delaney Patents Corp. v. Johns-Manville, 29 F. Supp.
431, 436 (S.D. Cal. 1989). Other patent decisions con-
tinued to recognize laches in general, even while hold-
ing that it was not available on the particular facts pre-
sented. E.g., Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Hughes
Tool Co., 192 F.2d 620, 625 (10th Cir. 1951); Shaffer v.
Rector Well Equip. Co., 155 F.2d 344, 345-347 (5th Cir.
1946).
24
4. SCA’s attempt to rebut this judicial con-
fails
SCA does not seriously grapple with this long tra-
dition of applying laches as a defense to damages
claims. Instead, it focuses on criticizing the reasoning
of the few pre-merger cases decided at law. That criti-
cism is unfounded and, in any event, ultimately irrele-
vant to the question before this Court.
a. As an initial matter, SCA’s attempts to distin-
guish the leading cases applying laches at law are mis-
guided. SCA contends (at 42-43) that Ford was an es-
toppel case, but the decision was reasoned and decided
on the basis of laches. 296 F . at 657 (“laches”), rev’g 289
F. 858, 874 (S.D. Fila. 1923) (“question of laches”). SCA
is also wrong to suggest (at 43) that the Ford and
Banker decisions were abrogated by Enelow v. New
York Life Insurance Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935). Quite the
opposite: Enelow cites the relevant portion of Ford
approvingly. /d. at 383 (citing Ford, 296 F. at 658).
More broadly, SCA misunderstands the question pre-
sented in Enelow and the import of that decision.
Enelow held that fraud could not be raised as an equi-
table defense under Judicial Code § 274b in an insur-
ance dispute at law because the same defense was
“completely available in [an] action at law” and, there-
fore, should have been tried to a jury rather than de-
cided by the court. /d. at 385. Under § 274b, the “de-
fendant’s rights to a hearing in equity are ‘the same,’
not greater.” /d. at 383.
That holding does not speak to laches or patent law,
nor does it call into question Ford, Banker, or the other
decisions cited above. Raising laches as a defense un-
der the Judicial Code did nothing to “change the sub-
stantive law” (Pet. Br. 43) because laches was already
25
available as a bar to recovering patent damages. Many
other doctrines that originated in equity similarly came
to be applied at law, especially in patent infringement
cases—notably including equitable estoppel, inequita-
ble conduct, unclean hands, prosecution laches, and the
doctrine of equivalents. Beauchamp, 125 Yale LJ. at
913; see, e.g., Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68, 78 (1880)
(equitable estoppel); Laycock, The Triumph of Equity,
56 L. & Contemp. Probs. 53, 70-71 (Summer 1993) (ad-
ditional examples).
Accordingly, as of the 1951 supplement to the
Walker treatise, it was understood that in patent law,
“{Ijaches ... may be interposed in an action at law.”
Pet. App. 33a (quoting 3 Walker on Patents 106 (Del-
ler’s ed., Supp. 1951)).
b. More importantly, even if there had not been a
single case applying laches at law before the merger of
law and equity, it would not affect the analysis. The
tradition of applying laches as a defense to patent dam-
ages was well established through numerous other de-
cisions in equity. Supra pp. 17-21 & n.8; Pet. App. 29a-
33a; see also A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Con-
str. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1029 & n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en
banc).
SCA tries to dismiss these cases by arguing (at 40)
that “the Federal Circuit erred in failing to distinguish
between the patent holder’s right to collect damages
and its right to collect damages in a court of equity.”
But SCA ignores the overwhelming predominance of
equity during the relevant period.'® For decades, pa-
SCA also incorrectly suggests (at 41 n.2) that a patentee
whose damages claims were held to be barred by laches in a court
of equity could simply re-file those same claims at law. That
speculation is belied by the absence of a single reported example of
26
tent damages were awarded almost exclusively by
courts of equity. The Federal Circuit properly consid-
ered these cases because they represented the actual
historical practice with respect to damages in patent
litigation.
SCA offers no reason to think Congress would have
ignored that backdrop when codifying unenforceability
defenses in 1952. Indeed, when Congress wanted to
make changes that affected patent damages between
1870 and 1952—including to add the six-year damages
period and to expressly codify the type of “reasonable
royalty” damages SCA seeks in this case—it exclusive-
ly amended the equity side of the statute. Supra pp. 4-
5. In concept and in practice, patent damages were
damages in equity.
Furthermore, SCA disregards the cases applying
laches after the 1938 merger of law and equity. Had
any distinction remained between the laches defense
applicable to patent damages as a legal or equitable
remedy, courts would have begun rejecting the defense
following the merger. Instead, courts continued apply-
ing laches to damages just as before. Supra p. 23.
Thus, by the time Congress codified the case law in
1952, it was well established that laches was a defense
to damages in all cases, not just cases in equity.
c. As the en banc majority noted below, SCA and
its amici have never identified “a single appellate-level
patent infringement case stating—much less holding—
that laches is inapplicable to legal damages.” Pet. App.
33a. SCA tacitly acknowledges that point by relying
principally (at 43-44) on two cases from a single district
any patentee ever doing so, despite numerous decisions barring
patent damages due to laches before the 1938 merger.
27
court, Thorpe v. Wm. Filene’s Sons Co., 40 F.2d 269 (D.
Mass. 1930), and City of Concord v. Norton, 16 F. 477
(C.C.D. Mass. 1883). Those outliers were not subject to
appellate review and were contrary to the great weight
of authority. The sole circuit decision SCA identifies
likewise did not consider established precedent and ul-
timately concluded only that “the elements of laches
were not proven in that case,” which involved a delay of
only two years. Pet. App. 32a n.9; see Middleton v.
Wiley, 195 F.2d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 1952) (“There is no
basis in this case for applying the doctrine of laches.”).
SCA’s argument is premised on supposed “historic
practice” and “longstanding principles” of the common
law. Pet. Br. 37, 38. However, the decisions cited
above applying laches to bar damages reflect the views
of scores of judges and lawyers actually steeped in and
familiar with common law traditions and procedures.
The dearth of any historical support for SCA’s view is
dispositive here.
SCA seeks to sidestep that fact by relying instead
(at 39-40) on this Court’s decisions reciting the general
proposition that laches was not traditionally a defense
at law. See, e.g., United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480,
489 (1935) (dicta); Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U.S. 314,
326 (1894) (dicta). None of those decisions addressed
patent law. Congress channeled nearly all patent liti-
gation into the equity side of the federal courts, and
courts responded by applying laches as a bar to enforc-
ing stale demands for infringement damages. That is
the relevant backdrop for the 1952 Act.
28
B. The Text, Purpose, And History Of The 1962
Act Demonstrate That Congress Intended To
Preserve Laches As A Defense To Damages
In keeping with decades of patent precedent, Con-
gress codified laches as a defense to patent damages in
§ 282 of the Patent Act of 1952. Pet. App. 18a. Specifi-
cally, the 1952 Act preserved laches as a defense “in
any action” under the general category of “unenforcea-
bility” defenses. Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 282, 66 Stat. 792,
812 (1952); see supra p. 6.
1. Congress codified existing “unenforceability”
defenses in § 282. At the time, laches was widely un-
derstood as such a defense. E.g., United States v. New
Orleans Pac. Ry. Co., 248 U.S. 507, 511 (1919) (agree-
ment was “unenforceable by reason of inexcusable
laches”); Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 373 (1892)
(laches is “a question of the inequity of permitting the
claim to be enforced”). In particular, courts routinely
found patents “unenforceable” or declined to “enforce”
an otherwise valid and infringed patent due to laches.
E.g., Brennan, 182 F.2d at 948 (“inequitable to allow
plaintiff to enforce his claim for infringement”); Banker
v. Ford Motor Co., 3 F. Supp. 737, 742 (W.D. Pa. 1933)
(laches “has the effect of barring, or rendering unen-
forceable against a defendant in a suit, the claim as-
serted by the plaintiff therein’”).''
'' See also, e.g., Union Shipbuilding, 93 F 2d at 781; Gillons,
86 F 2d at 610; Richardson, 93 F . at 830; Triplex Safety Glaas Co.
of N. Am. v. Kolb, 53 F 2d 1062, 1065 (E.D. Pa. 1931); Marlatt, 70
F. Supp. at 433; cf. Wollensak v. Reiher, 115 U.S. 96, 99 (1885)
(laches in prosecuting re-issued patent bars patentee “from enforc-
ing it”); Ball v. Gibba, 118 F.2d 968, 961 (8th Cir. 1941) (non-patent
case describing laches as rendering claims “unenforceable”), Todd
v. Russell, 104 F.2d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1939) (similar), aff'd, 309 U.S.
280 (1940). The same terminology is still used: A patent is “unen-
29
When “Congress uses terms that have accumulated
settled meaning,” Congress presumably “means to in-
corporate the established meaning of these terms.”
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Indeed, this Court has ap-
plied that well-established rule of construction to other
terms in the very same section of the 1952 Act, holding
in i141 that Congress incorporated into § 282 the pre-
1952 standard of proof for overcoming a patent’s pre-
sumption of validity. 564 U.S. at 104. By using terms
already freighted with judicial meaning, Congress
“meant to incorporate ‘the cluster of ideas’ attached” to
those terms. /d. at 103.
That this Court did not have an occasion to address
the availability of laches as a defense to damages claims
in patent law does not alter the presumption (or reality)
that Congress intended to codify the existing circuit-
court consensus. Congress would have looked to the
patent decisions when codifying patent defenses in the
Patent Act, not to the unrelated decisions that SCA
cites (at 39-40). The Court has often concluded in other
contexts that Congress intended to codify a consensus
among the courts of appeals. £E.g., United States v.
Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 424-425 (2009); Bragdon v. Abbott,
524 U.S. 624, 644-645 (1998); Cannon v. University of
Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696-698 (1979).
Congress underscored its intent by making unen-
forceability defenses, such as laches, available “in any
action” under § 282—not simply as a bar to equitable
relief. 66 Stat. at 812 (emphasis added). “Read natural-
ly, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning{.]” United
forceable due to laches” after unreasonable, prejudicial delay. L/-
timaz Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F 3d
1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
30
States v. Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997); see, e.g., Ali v.
Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 220 (2008)
(“Congress’ use of ‘any’ to modify ‘other law enforce-
ment officer’ is most naturally read to mean law en-
forcement officers of whatever kind.”). Had Congress
wished to make a sharp departure from pre-1952 law
and to limit laches and other unenforceability defenses
to equitable relief, it would have said so.
SCA’s contrary reading of the text (at 34-36) is un-
tenable. It is true that § 282 “makes no mention of
laches.” Pet. Br. 34. It also makes no mention of other
unenforceability defenses that are well established,
such as inequitable conduct/unclean hands, equitable
estoppel, and patent exhaustion. That is because Con-
gress chose to use a broader term (“unenforceability”)
that encompassed both laches and other recognized de-
fenses. Under established principles of statutory con-
struction, Congress need not spell out the term “laches”
to codify it when using other, broader terms. In fact,
the Court rejected the same argument in 714i with re-
spect to the same section of the 1952 Act. 564 U.S. at
100-101 (observing that § 282 contains “no express ar-
ticulation of the standard of proof,” but also that the
“statutory inquiry ... cannot simply end there”).
2. The history of the 1952 Act confirms that Con-
gress intended to preserve the status quo by codifying
existing “unenforceability” defenses and permitting
them to bar damages. The prior statute had contained
a list of five defenses, but an exhaustive catalog of all
defenses was impractical. Supra p. 6; see also, e.g.,
Hoar, Patent Tactics and Law (3d ed. 1950) (“ex-
press enumeration” of five defenses “does not preclude
any other sufficient ground,” including “laches”). In
§ 282, Congress replaced the prior list with “a broader
paragraph specifying defenses in general terms.” H.R.
31
Rep. No. 82-1923, at 29 (1952). Both the House and
Senate Reports confirm that Congress’s purpose was to
restate existing defenses “in general terms,” without
“materially changing the substance” of any defense. /d.
at 10; S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 9 (1952). SCA’s observa-
tion (at 34-35) that the prior list of five defenses did not
include laches misses the point of these reforms. The
prior list was incomplete, and Congress broadened it in
§ 282 by using categorical terms.
The drafting history also speaks directly to the cod-
ification of unenforceability defenses to damages
claims. When the House passed what would become
the 1952 Act, the bill omitted the term “unenforceabil-
ity.” H.R. 7794, 82d Cong. § (May 12, 19652). That
term was added by the Senate Judiciary Committee.
H.R. 7794, 82d Cong. § 282 (June 27, 1952). Senator
McCarran explained that the purpose of the amend-
ment—one of only four the Senate made—was to “place
in the code this word which has been used in numero’'s
court decisions under the section in question.” 98 Cong.
Rec. 9323, 9323 (1952). The “numerous court decisions”
Congress intended to capture include the laches deci-
sions catalogued above.
When the Senate inserted the word “unenforceabil-
ity” into § 282, it also made a corresponding amend-
ment to the damages provision, § 284. The prior bill
had provided that damages would be available “(ujpon
adjudging a patent valid and infringed.” H.R. 7794, 82d
Cong. § 284 (May 12, 1952). The Senate amended § 284
so that damages would be available “[{u}pon finding for
the claimant.” H.R. 7794, 82d Cong. § 284 (June 27,
1962). As explained by Senator McCarran, the change
was necessary to make clear that damages are not
available if the patent is unenforceable (even if it is val-
id and infringed). 98 Cong. Rec. at 9323 (“The change
32
in language proposed in committee amendment No. 4 is
for the purpose of avoiding a possible construction that
judgment must be entered by a court even in a case
where a patent is found unenforceable.”). He empha-
sized that “[t]his will preserve the present rule of law
in this regard.” /d. Such a change would have been su-
perfluous if laches and other equitable grounds for find-
ing a patent unenforceable could not bar damages.
3. The overall purpose of the 1952 Act supports
Congress’s intent to retain the existing laches defense,
which barred damages. The Act was intended to codify
existing law, except where departures were clearly
noted. H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 3; supra p. 6. This
Court has accordingly construed the Act on several oc-
casions to preserve pre-1952 patent law as Congress
found it. E.g., ii, 564 U.S. at 103-105 (clear-and-
convincing standard for proving invalidity); Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davia Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,
26-27 (1997) (doctrine of equivalents); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 308, 309 (1980) (non-
patentability of abstract ideas). The same result is
warranted here. Reading the 1952 Act to sweep away,
surreptitiously, decades of judicial recognition of laches
as a defense to damages in patent law would contra-
vene a basic purpose of the Act.
4. Congress’s intent to preserve laches was per-
ceived immediately, as demonstrated in a widely cited
commentary on the 1952 Act by PJ. Federico. The
commentary explained that “unenforceability” was
“added by amendment in the Senate for greater clari-
ty,” and that, as amended, the defenses in § 282 “would
include ... equitable defenses such as laches, estoppel
and unclean hands.” Federico, Commentary on the
New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 55 (West 1954) (empha-
33
sis added), reprinted in 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off.
Soe’y 161, 215 (1998).
SCA’s attacks on this commentary (at 44-45) are
misplaced. Federico, then serving as Examiner-in-
Chief of the Patent Office, was a “principal draftsman
of the 1952 recodification.” Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309
n.6. He “wrote the first draft of the Act himself,” at the
request of legislators, and “actively participated for the
next two years in every detail of its revisions.” Paulik
v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Rich,
J., concurring). For that reason, his views on the Pa-
tent Act are an important source of guidance that this
Court itself has consulted, as have numerous other
courts. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342 n.8 (1961); Warner-Jenkinson,
520 U.S. at 28; see Pet. App. 21a (collecting cases).
* * *
In sum, the signals from Congress and the case law
are clear and all point in the same direction. Laches
had been available to bar stale demands for damages in
patent law for decades before 1952, and Congress pre-
served that status quo.
C. Since 1962, Congress Has Altered The Patent
Act Repeatedly Without Disturbing Laches
Developments in the courts and Congress since
aE or = i lg agree
in patent infringement cases. Every court of
to consider the question has held that laches is
eee 0 Sn Sa eee
year period in § 286. Congress revisited and altered
an Nahas eb aun Ones dale fuk onane
without ever disagreeing. “Congress can legislate”
34
laches “out of existence any time it chooses,” Warner-
Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28, but it has not done so.
1. SCA implies (at 18, 39) that recognition of lach-
es as a defense to damages claims is “unique” to the
Federal Circuit and thus represents merely “a contro-
versial practice of the bare majority of a single lower
court.” That is demonstrably false.
In the decades after 1952, “[w]ithout exception, all
circuits recognized laches as a defense to a charge of
patent infringement despite the reenactment of the
damages limitation in the 1952 statute.” Aukerman,
960 F.2d at 1030; see, e.g., Potter Instrument Co. v.
Storage Tech. Corp., 641 F.2d 190, 191 (4th Cir. 1981)
(“laches defense ‘may be invoked where the plaintiff
has unreasonably and inexcusably delayed in prosecut-
ing its rights and where that delay has resulted in ma-
terial prejudice to the defendant””’); Studiengesellschaft
Kohle mbH v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1325
(5th Cir. 1980) (consequence of laches is “to withhold
damages for infringement which occurred prior to the
filing of the suit”); American Home Prods. Corp. v.
Lockwood Mfg. Co., 483 F.2d 1120, 1122-1125 (6th Cir.
1973) (“the doctrine of laches is applicable to patent
cases”); Continental Coatings Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 464
F.2d 1375, 13879 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J.) (patentee
“lost the right to recover damages for past infringe-
ment,” by “reason of laches”).'? All those courts recog-
'2 See also Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v. Best
Seam Inc., 694 F.2d 570, 680 (9th Cir. 1982); Naxon Telesign Corp.
v. Bunker Ramo Corp., 686 F 2d 1258, 1263 (7th Cir. 1982); Jensen
v. Western Irrigation & Mfg., Inc., 650 F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir.
1980); Watkins v. Northwestern Ohio Tractor Pullers Ass'n, 630
F.2d 1155, 1169 (6th Cir. 1980); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Berwick Indua., Inc., 5382 F 2d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 1976); Baker Mfg.
Co. v. Whitewater Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 1008, 1009-1010, 1015 (7th
35
nized laches as a defense within the six-year damages
period in § 286, as Aukerman explained. See, e.g.,
TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 592 F.2d 346, 348-349
(6th Cir. 1979).
SCA and its amici entirely neglect to mention, let
alone address, these post-1952 decisions. This is not a
case about simply “the Federal Circuit’s practice” (Pet.
Br. 38), but rather about the practice of every circuit to
consider the question, before and after 1952.
2. Congress has allowed this uniform recognition
of laches as a defense to patent infringement damages
- to stand for deeades, even while it “has often amended
§ 282” and other provisions of the Patent Act. i,i, 564
U.S. at 118. Those numerous amendments include care-
ful recalibrations of the defenses available under the
statute. See, ¢.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
§ 203, 98 Stat. 1585, 1608 (adding new invalidity de-
fense). Indeed, in the recent Leahy-Smith America In-
vents Act—the most significant reworking ef patent
law since the 1952 Act—Congress reorganized § 282
into separate subsections and eliminated another de-
fense the statute had previously permitted. Pub. L.
No. 112-29, § 15(a), 125 Stat. 284, 328 (2011) (abolishing
the “best mode” defense). Yet Congress reenacted,
without change, the “unenforceability” language that
had been repeatedly held to codify laches as a defense
to damages. Id. § 20(¢)(2\B), 125 Stat. at 334.
36
The reenactment of this statutory language and the
long history of congressional attention to the patent
laws, while leaving laches intact, would independently
warrant the conclusion that Congress intended to per-
mit laches as a defense, even if Congress had not al-
ready done so in the 1952 Act itself. E.g., North Star
Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995) (presump-
tion that Congress is aware of relevant precedents and
“expect|s| its enactment{s] to be interpreted in con-
formity with them”’); Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 768,
782 (1985) (“presumption that Congress intended to
embody [prior judicial construction] in the amended
version” of statute). For that reason, this case is quite
unlike the “congressional silence” decisions on which
SCA relies (at 38-39). Congress made various adjust-
ments over the years, but declined to make the one
SCA advocates.
Now that Congress “has allowed the Federal Cir-
cuit’s correct interpretation of § 282 to stand” for more
than thirty years, “[a]ny re-calibration” of laches should
be left to Congress, which is better situated to weigh
the policy consequences of such a change. 141, 564 U.S.
at 114; accord Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S.
Ct. 2401, 2410-2411 (2015) (noting Congress’s “continual
reworking of the patent laws,” and expressing particu-
lar reluctance to “unsettle stable law” in this area).
Il. SCA MISREADS PETRELLA AND MISCONSTRUES § 286
Or THE PATENT ACT
The Court’s decision in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), is consistent with
and supports retaining laches as a defense alongside
the six-year period in 35 U.S.C. § 286. Petrella rests at
bottom on respecting congressional intent, and it is
clear that Congress intended to retain laches as a de-
37
fense to damages under the Patent Act. Preserving the
status quo is thus entirely faithful to Petrella, as well as
to the text and purpose of § 286. Congress had good
reason to authorize laches in patent law but not copy-
right law, given the substantial differences between the
two, and that legislative judgment should be respected.
A. Petrelia's Concern For Respecting Legislative
Intent Supports Retaining Laches Here
In Petrella, the Court began with the text of the
Copyright Act, which contains a conventional statute of
limitations (unlike the Patent Act, see infra pp. 40-42):
“The Copyright Act provides that ‘[nJo civil action shall
be maintained under the [Act] unless it is commenced
within three years after the claim accrued.” 134 S. Ct.
at 1967 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 507(b)). It then noted sev-
eral additional “aspects of copyright law” bearing on
the question presented, including the long copyright
term, currently from creation to seventy years after
the author’s death, and renewal rights that transfer to
an author’s heirs. /d. at 1968-1969. The Court further
explained that, “[t]o comprehend how the Copyright
Act’s limitations period works, one must understand
when a copyright infringement claim accrues,” and pro-
ceeded to review the “separate-accrual rule” that ap-
plies in copyright law. /d. at 1969. Under that rule, the
three-year limitations period is applied by “start{ing] a
new limitations period” and counting forward three
years for “each infringing act.” /d.
Those provisions together persuaded the Court
that Congress had already “take[n] account of delay” in
17 U.S.C. § 507(b) and had impliedly foreclosed any
laches defense within that three-year period. 134 S. Ct.
at 1973. Congress “must have been aware,” given the
long copyright term and inheritance of renewal rights,
38
that infringement actions would arise from time to time
decades after the initial infringing acts, but it tolerated
that problem to advance other aims specific to copy-
right law. Jd. at 1976-1977. Other provisions of the
Copyright Act confirmed as much—in particular, the
ability of an infringer to deduct, from a damages award,
expenses “attributable to its own enterprise.” /d. at
1973 (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 504(b)). “Last, but hardly
least,” the Court noted that laches was historically “de-
veloped by courts of equity” and applied to “claims of
an equitable cast for which the Legislature has provid-
ed no fixed time limitation.” /d.
The historical view of laches as “gap-filling” in eq-
uity, in the absence of a limitations period, was thus
merely one consideration among many the Court cited.
134 S. Ct. at 1974. SCA suggests (at 25) that Petrella
merely applied a “well-established rule” that laches is
unavailable whenever Congress enacts “a statute of
limitations provision applicable to legal damages
claims.” If that were true, much of Petrella’s discussion
of various features of the Copyright Act would have
been superfluous.
Instead, Petrella rests on careful attention to the
statutory text and history of the Copyright Act and a
concern that courts not disregard the judgments Con-
gress made in that Act. The same tools of statutory
construction favor retaining laches as a defense to
damages under the Patent Act. Pet. App. 36a-36a. As
set forth above, the text, history, and purpose of the
Patent Act of 1952 all demonstrate that Congress in-
tended to preserve the pre-1952 status quo—including
the availability of laches as an unenforceability defense
39
barring damages within the six-year period in § 286.'°
Petrella’s animating concern for respecting the will of
Congress thus counsels a different result in this case
under the Patent Act.
Congress’s decision to permit laches as a defense to
damages under the Patent Act is hardly “unique.” Pet.
Br. 33. Petrella itself noted that the Lanham Act pro-
vides for laches as a defense, though it does not contain
a limitations period. 134 S. Ct. at 1974 n.15. Moreover,
although Petrella observed that the Court has “never
applied laches to bar in their entirety claims for dis-
crete wrongs occurring within a federally prescribed
limitations period,” id. at 1975, the cases it discusses
recognize a degree of flexibility inconsistent with the
ironclad rule SCA proposes.
In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
536 U.S. 101, 121-122 (2002), for example, the Court
held that an employer may raise laches as a defense to
bar an employment discrimination claim for damages
'> Nothing comparable could be said for the Copyright Act.
While Congress at one point permitted courts of equity to award
damages for copyright infringement, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §§ 26-27,
35 Stat. 1075, 1082 (1909), copyright law did not follow the same
trajectory as patent law, which presumably explains why no party
or amicus brought those provisions to the attention of the Court in
Petrella. Patent law had many more laches cases, which allowed a
robust consensus to emerge regarding the application of laches to
damages claims. Nor is there any statutory basis to conclude that
Congress codified laches or general “unenforceability” defenses in
the Copyright Act, as it did in the Patent Act. The respondents in
Petrella relied instead on the putative “inherent” power of federal
courts to entertain a laches defense. Resp. Br. 15, No. 12-1315
(U.S. Dee. 16, 2013). Finally, in contrast to the century of consen-
aus among courts of appeals regarding the role of laches in patent
law, the circuits had divided before Petrella about the availability
of laches under the Copyright Act. 134 S. Ct. at 1972 n.12.
40)
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, when the claim
is based on a hostile work environment beginning be-
fore the limitations period. See also Ledbetter v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 657 (2007) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (the “defense of laches may be in-
voked to block an employee’s suit”). In Bay Area
Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v.
Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 205 (1997), the Court
recognized laches as a defense in proceedings under the
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, despite
Congress having required such proceedings to be initi-
ated “as soon as practicable.””"*
B. Congress Had Good Reason For A Different
Approach To Laches In Patent Law
Several other distinctive features of patent law and
the Patent Act—including § 286 itself—confirm that
Congress did not impliedly foreclose a laches defense in
the 1952 Patent Act. Indeed, the numerous differences
between patent law and copyright law help explain why
Congress chose to retain laches as a defense to damag-
es under one but not the other.
l. Section 286 is not a statute of limitations
and does not measure a patentee’s delay
The six-year period in § 286 of the Patent Act is un-
like the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations, 17
U.S.C. § 507(b), in ways that bear directly on the rea-
soning and rationale of Petrella. As an initial matter,
'* The Court has also long recognized laches as a defense in
suits for mandamus—historically a form of legal relief, available by
writ from a court of law. Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for
D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 379 (2004) (laches may “bar a petition for a writ
of mandamus”); United States ex rel. Arant v. Lane, 2A9 US. 367,
371 (1919) (laches in mandamus action for wrongful discharge).
41
§ 286 is not properly considered a statute of limitations
at all. As the Court has explained, a statute of limita-
tions “establish[es} the period of time within which a
claimant must bring an action,” measured from the time
“the cause of action ‘accrues’—that is, when ‘the plain-
tiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Heimeshoff v. Hart-
ford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 134 §. Ct. 604, 610 (2013); ac-
cord Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 416
(1998). Congress enacts a statute of limitations when it
wishes to “require plaintiffs to pursue ‘diligent prosecu-
tion of known claims.” CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134
S. Ct. 2176, 2183 (2014).
Section 286 of the Patent Act does not operate that
way. Unlike a statute of limitations, which runs for-
ward from the date a cause of action accrues, § 286 runs
backward from the time of suit: “Except as otherwise
provided by law, no recovery shall be had for any in-
fringement committed more than six years prior to the
filing of the complaint or counterclaim for infringe-
ment in the action.” (Emphasis added); see Aukerman,
960 F.2d at 1032.'° For that reason, the Federal Circuit
has repeatedly recognized that § 286 is not a statute of
limitations, e.g., A. Stucki Co. v. Buckeye Steel Cast-
ings Co., 963 F.2d 360, 363 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Stand-
ard Oil Co. v. Nippon Shokubai Kagaku Kogyo Co., 754
F.2d 345, 347-348 (Fed. Cir. 1985), although the court
'S SCA observes (at 8, 22-23) that the legislative history of
§ 286 refers to it as a “statute of limitations,” but that is hardly
dispositive. Both Congress and the courts sometimes use the term
“statute of limitations” in a generic sense. See, e.g., CTS, 134 S. Ct.
at 2185 (“Congress has used the term ‘statute of limitations’ when
enacting statutes of repose.”); Federal Hous. Fin. Agency v. UBS
Ams. Inc., 712 F.3d 136, 143 & nn.3-4 (2d Cir. 2013) (collecting ex-
amples).
42
failed to appreciate the significance of that distinction
for this case (Pet. App. 17a-18a).
The distinction is important. Petrel/a rests in part
on an inference of congressional intent specific to a true
statute of limitations: When Congress enacts such a
statute, it can be viewed as having made a considered
judgment about how much delay may occur after a
plaintiff knows of a cause of action (i.e., after accrual)
before the plaintiff must bring suit—thus potentially
leaving no room for judges to evaluate the reasonable-
ness of a plaintiff's delay on a case-by-case basis under
laches. 134 S. Ct. at 1973. The same certainly cannot
be said for § 286, which was not intended to measure
the patentee’s delay after accrual. Rather, like a stat-
ute of repose, § 286 turns only on when the infringer is
sued, regardless of when the patentee learned of the
infringement. See CTS, 134 S. Ct. at 2183 (statutes of
repose reflect a different “legislative judgment,” serve
“a distinct purpose,” and “target{] ... a different ac-
tor”). Congress thus left ample room for laches to play
a gap-filling role under § 282, as it had done for decades
before the 1952 Act alongside the predecessor to § 286.
2. SCA’s other textual arguments premised
on § 286 are unfounded
Attempting to stretch Petrella to cover this case,
SCA makes various other arguments about what Con-
gress intended by enacting § 286, but none justifies
abolishing laches.
To start, notwithstanding SCA’s persistent effort
to pretend otherwise, the “text” or “plain meaning” of
§ 286 does not address the question presented. Pet. Br.
20-25. Section 286 says nothing at all about laches or
other unenforceability defenses within the six-year pe-
43
riod contemplated by the statute."° Nor does § 286
provide an affirmative guarantee that a patentee may
always recover damages for the preceding six years.
By its terms, § 286 is merely a limitation on recovery:
“no recovery shall be had” for any infringement outside
the six-year window. The statute also contemplates
recovery only “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,”
anticipating that a patentee’s ability to recover damag-
es would be affected by other provisions, such as a fail-
ure to mark, § 287, or a finding that the patent is invalid
or unenforceable, § 282—a reading confirmed by the
legislative history of the damages provision, § 284. See
supra pp. 31-32. The three-year statute of limitations
in the Copyright Act contains no comparable language.
SCA’s reliance on the “purpose” of § 286 is similar-
ly misplaced. Pet. Br. 29-30, 46. Congress enacted the
six-year damages window to provide a uniform federal
time period, rather than borrowing potentially discrep-
ant state-law periods. But that purpose is equally well
served by retaining laches as a defense under § 282.
POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228,
2239 (2014) (“variation in outcome” resulting from case-
by-case application of a federal standard “is quite dif-
ferent from the disuniformity” arising from a “multi-
tude of state laws”). Moreover, the same outer bounda-
ry for recovery of damages applies in all cases. Apply-
ing laches within that period does not “carve[) out an
exception,” create a “unique hybrid statute of limita-
tions/laches test,” or “delegate [the] power to abridge
section 286.” Pet. Br. i9, 33, 34. Laches has distinct
' Por that reason, the canon of construction favoring the spe-
cific over the general (Pet. Br. 35-36) has no application here. The
text of § 286 does not address laches at all, let alone more specifi-
cally than § 282.
44
elements and does not depend merely on the passage of
time.
The separate-accrual rule is also not offended by
applying laches to bar damages claims within § 286’s
six-year period. Pet. Br. 26-28. Applying laches is not
inconsistent with the broader principle of treating each
act of making, using, or selling the invention as a sepa-
rate act of infringement. This Court has, for example,
applied laches to bar enforcement of a patent notwith-
standing that principle, without examining each infring-
ing act individually. Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150
U.S. 198, 201 (1893); see also Menendez v. Holt, 128
U.S. 514, 524 (1888) (trademark). The many decisions
collected above likewise applied laches as a single de-
fense with respect to infringing acts of the same gen-
eral nature—just as continuing torts are treated as sin-
gle claims in other contexts, like claim preclusion.
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1031.
Finally, SCA’s reading of § 286 is not bolstered by
35 U.S.C. § 283, which authorizes courts to “grant in-
junctions in accordance with the principles of equity.”
SCA argues (at 23) that § 283’s express reference to
“principles of equity” forecloses application of equitable
doctrines under any other provision of the Patent Act.
But accepting that argument—one that SCA never de-
veloped below—would upend many other settled equi-
table doctrines in patent law. Supra pp. 4, 25.
3. SCA ignores numerous other distinctions
between patent and copyright law
The Patent Act lacks all of the distinctive features
of the Copyright Act that the Court considered and re-
lied on in Petrella. As noted, the Patent Act does not
have a true statute of limitations. It also contains no
45
provision for reversionary renewal rights, and the pa-
tent term is considerably shorter (currently, twenty
years) than the copyright term—thus undercutting any
inference comparable to the one drawn in Petrella that
Congress “must have been aware” that some infringe-
ment actions would be brought after long delay. 134 S.
Ct. at 1976; see 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (patent term); sx-
pra pp. 37-38. Congress also did not provide any mech-
anism for a patent infringer to deduct its expenses from
a damages award in the same way that occurs in copy-
right law. Numerous other distinctions between patent
and copyright also help explain why Congress chose to
authorize laches in one context but not the other.
First, as the court of appeals explained, Congress
chose to impose liability under the Patent Act, but not
the Copyright Act, even for “innocent” infringement.
Pet. App. 37a-38a. A copyright plaintiff must demon-
strate that the accused infringer had access to and cop-
iea the plaintiff's work. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). Inde-
pendent creation of a work is a complete defense in
copyright. 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 12.11[D}[1)
(2015). Not so in patent law: Making, using, or selling
the patented invention constitutes direct infringement
even if the infringer is unaware that the patent exists.
See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 US.
754, 761 n.2 (2011) (“{A] direct infringer’s knowledge or
intent is irrelevant.”).
Laches plays a critical role in preventing patentees
from unfairly taking advantage of such innocent in-
fringement. Had Congress not retained laches as a de-
fense, nothing would stop a patentee from sitting silent-
ly on its rights while an innocent infringer invests sub-
stantial time and resources to develop and commercial-
ize a product independently, “only to have [the] patent-
46
ee emerge six years later to seek the most profitable
six years of revenues.” Pet. App. 38a.
SCA contends (at 49-50) that Congress addressed
this problem with the marking requirement, 35 U.S.C.
§ 287, but that is mistaken. Section 287, which requires
a patentee to mark its own products with the patent
number, provides only a limited form of constructive
notice to potential infringers. The requirement does
not apply if there is no product to mark—e.g., because
the patentee does not produce anything, Texas Digital
Sys., Inc. v. Telegeniz, Inc., 308 F.3d 1198, 1219-1220
(Fed. Cir. 2002), or the patent covers a method or pro-
cess, Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578,
1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Moreover, even a defendant
aware of a patent via marking may be unaware of po-
tential infringement. As SCA’s amicus explains, de-
termining whether a patent is infringed requires a
complex “technical evaluation” and “prolonged analy-
sis” of the patent specification, claims, and art—unlike
copyright infringement. Alliance of Inventor Groups
Br. 15."" Marking indicating that a patentee thinks its
own product practices its own patent is a far cry from
notice that a potential defendant’s product infringes.
The limited notice provided by § 287 thus cannot take
the place of laches in protecting innocent infringers
from unfair delay.
'’ Por similar reasons, even when a potential defendant is
sent a notice letter, the possibility of a declaratory judgment ac-
tion (Pet. Br. 50) does not prevent a patentee from unfairly lying in
wait. Many “high tech” businesses “receive demand letters every
day” asserting infringement, and it is “often impractical for com-
panies to determine which claims have merit,” let alone seek de-
claratory relief from all of them. Pet. App. 38a.
47
Second, patent law is subject to endemic “lock-in”
problems not found in copyright law. Competing tech-
nologies are often close substitutes, and an innovative
business might incorporate any one of them into a
product ex ante. However, having chosen one and built
a product around it, the business becomes locked into
using the technology, and substitution of an alternative
is difficult ex post—especially if the technology is in-
corporated into an industry-wide standard, requires
regulatory approval, or is capital-intensive. £.9.,
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310
(3d Cir. 2007) (“Industry participants who have invest-
ed significant resources developing products and tech-
nologies that conform to the [industry] standard will
find it prohibitively expensive to abandon their invest-
ment and switch to another standard.”); Lee & Mela-
med, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages,
101 Cornell L. Rev. 385, 409-410 (2016) (discussing lock-
in costs). The prospect of such “lock-in” gives unscru-
pulous patentees a significant incentive to wait to bring
suit until an accused infringer has “lost the meaningful
ability to choose between alternative technologies,”
greatly magnifying potential infringement damages be-
yond the patent’s actual value. Pet. App. 38a; see
Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 310; Lee & Melamed, 101 Cor-
nell L. Rev. at 410-411. Laches serves, in part, to pre-
vent such unfair gamesmanship, and abolishing the de-
fense will only exacerbate abusive litigation tactics.
Indeed, that is precisely what happened here. Be-
cause of SCA’s delay, First Quality was foreclosed from
pursuing different business strategies to avoid the al-
legedly infringing products, which would have been
available had SCA timely asserted its infringement
claims. See Pet. App. 109a (“First Quality would not
have invested millions of dollars in acquiring and re-
48
tooling [one of its facilities] if it was embroiled in a law-
suit with SCA relating to [the allegedly infringing]
products.”); id. (“First Quality could have either de-
manded that Covidien resolve all issues with respect to
SCA’s claims prior to” First Quality’s acquisition of
Covidien’s subsidiary, or forgone “purchase of the
product lines accused of infringement.”).
Third, the consequences of delay are asymmetrical-
ly harmful to the defendant in patent law, unlike copy-
right law. As Petrella explained, delay in bringing suit
for copyright infringement “is at least as likely” to
prejudice the plaintiff, who bears the burden of proving
copying—i.e., access to the work and substantial simi-
larity. 134 S. Ct. at 1977. In contrast, because direct
patent infringement is a strict liability offense, the pas-
sage of time is less likely to prejudice the patentee’s
ability to prove its infringement case. Delay can have a
devastating effect, however, on the ability of the ac-
cused infringer to mount the defenses Congress pro-
vided under the Patent Act—for example, by depriving
the defendant of evidence needed to prove that a patent
is invalid because the invention it describes was al-
ready in public use or for sale before the relevant date,
35 U.S.C. § 102(a). See Electronic Frontier Foundation
Br. 5-11 (additional examples).
Fourth, infringement can have very different ef-
fects on the value of the plaintiff's intellectual property
in copyright law versus patent law. A copyright con-
fers the exclusive right to authorize derivative works,
17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which can complement and increase
sales of the original—as, for example, with “[flan sites
prompted by a book or film,” Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at
1976. In that unique context, there may be nothing
“untoward about waiting to see whether an infringer’s
exploitation undercuts the value of the copyrighted
49
work, has no effect on the original work, or even com-
plements it.” Jd. The Patent Act reflects no similar
judgment.
Fifth, the broader scope of protection Congress af-
forded under the Patent Act, as compared to the Copy-
right Act, weighs in favor of retaining laches as a bul-
wark against unfair, prejudicial delay that could harm
third parties. A copyright-holder cannot forbid mere
“use” or private performance or display of the protect-
ed work. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447 (1984) (“An unlicensed use of the
copyright is not an infringement unless it conflicts with
one of the specific exclusive rights conferred by the
copyright statute.”); 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(6) (copyright
owner’s exclusive public performance and display
rights). Thus, in Petrella the Court noted that
“{ajllowing Petrella’s suit to go forward ... will work no
unjust hardship on innocent third parties, such as con-
sumers who have purchased copies of Raging Bull.”
134 S. Ct. at 1978. A patentee, by contrast, can sue for
any unauthorized “use[]” of the invention. 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a). An innocent consumer who purchases a device
from an unauthorized seller will continue to commit
new acts of infringement every time it is used.
C. SCA’s Policy Arguments Are Unfounded
SCA’s contention (at 46-48) that abolishing laches
in patent cases will serve important policy goals is be-
lied by the near-unanimous support for retaining the
defense from major stakeholders in patent law:
“{Ijndustries as diverse as biotechnology, electronics,
manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, software, agriculture,
apparel, health care, telecommunications, and finance”
all “overwhelmingly” supported retaining the defense
in the proceedings below (Pet. App. 38a), and First
5O
Quality expects a similar showing in this Court. Even
the leading organization of patent owners—the individ-
uals and firms against whom laches is typically assert-
ed—supports retaining the defense. IPO Br. 1-3.
SCA’s and its amici’s specific concern that laches
causes a rush to court or discourages settlement is
wrong. Laches by definition does not penalize reasona-
ble delay, such as a delay for bona fide infringement
analysis or settlement negotiations. See, e.g., Auker-
man, 960 F.2d at 1033 (listing circumstances for rea-
sonable delay); 6A Chisum on Patents § 19.05(2)[b]
(2016) (same)."* And the Court need not speculate
counterfactually whether laches “would encourage”
these putative problems. Pet. Br. 47. History provides
a record. Laches has long been available as a defense
to damages claims in patent litigation. SCA offers no
evidence that laches has sparked precipitous litigation
or impaired the willingness of parties to settle their
disputes out of court.
Nor do the facts of this case support abolishing
laches, as SCA contends (at 48). SCA finds itself in this
position only because of its own calculated decisions
and unreasonable delay. SCA was aware of First Qual-
ity’s alleged infringement for nearly seven years and
carefully monitored First Quality’s products through-
out that period, watching as First Quality invested and
expanded. SCA’s delay continued after the reexamina-
tion—a proceeding that might have provided a reason-
'* SCA’s amicus suggests that license negotiations “will not
necessarily excuse delay” (ABA Br. 11), but it misreads the rele-
vant case law, see A.C. Aukerman Co. v. Miller Formless Co., 693
F.2d 697, 700-701 (7th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff's sporadic efforts to de-
mand that defendant take a license did not excuse delay, where the
“exchanges were all unfruitful” and one-sided).
51
able excuse for part of SCA’s delay under existing law,
had SCA provided any indication of the proceeding to
First Quality. Serdarevic v. Advanced Med. Optics,
Inc., 582 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (delay for
PTO proceedings was reasonable where infringer still
““‘had reason to believe it was likely to be sued’ after the
... proceedings concluded”). Laches properly protects a
party like First Quality against such unfair and preju-
dicial delay.
IIL THE PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE AFTER Six YEARS
Or DELAY SHOULD BE RETAINED
Under settled law, an accused infringer must
demonstrate both unreasonable delay and prejudice to
establish laches. If, however, the patentee delays suit
for more than six years after the patentee knew or
should have known of the infringement, unreasonable
delay and prejudice are presumed. Pet. App. 9a. The
patentee must then come forward with some evidence
to rebut the presumption. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1037,
1038. The Court should decline SCA’s conclusory re-
quest (at 50-52) to abolish that presumption, for several
reasons.
First, the six-year presumption is not “unique” to
the Federal Circuit. Pet. Br. 50. The presumption
“was embraced by virtually all circuits prior to the cre-
ation” of the Federal Circuit and predates the 1952 Act.
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1035; see Selinger, A Survey of
Article III Procedural Isswes Considered at The Fed-
eral Circuit During Its First Decade, 27 J. Marshall L.
Rev. 25, 58 (1993) (“[FJederal appellate courts had al-
most uniformly recognized and adopted the rebuttable
presumption that a delay of more than six years was
prejudicial and unreasonable.”); Studiengeselischaft
Kohle, 616 F.2d at 1326 (collecting cases). In 1936, for
52
example, the Ninth Circuit explained that, “[wJhen the
suit is filed after the statutory period” of six years, “in-
jury is presumed.” Gillons, 86 F.2d at 608; see also
Baker Mfg. Co. v. Whitewater Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 1008,
1009-1010 (7th Cir. 1970) (additional examples).
Second, the six-year presumption is well grounded
in equity practice, in which courts historically “consid-
er{ed] the passage of time equivalent to a comparable
statute of limitations as presumptive of laches.” TWM,
592 F.2d at 348; cf. Oroz v. American President Lines,
Ltd., 259 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1958) (analogous “rule-
of-thumb” in admiralty).
Third, even considering the matter afresh, the six-
year presumption is sensible and should be retained.
The patent owner is best positioned to come forward
with a legitimate explanation for its lengthy delay,
something SCA was unable to do here. The presump-
tion also provides the very clarity and predictability
that SCA claims to want (at 46-48), by giving courts “a
yardstick for reaching comparable results in compara-
ble circumstances,” Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1035. Par-
ties know, in advance, that six years’ delay carries with
it particular consequences in patent law, and they can
make business and litigation decisions accordingly. At
the same time, the presumption still permits flexibility
in individual cases. Satisfying the presumption “does
not mandate recognition of a laches defense,” which in-
stead always “remains an equitable judgment of the
trial court in light of all the circumstances.” /d. at 1036.
Fourth, even if the Court were inclined to revisit
the six-year presumption, this case would be a poor oc-
casion to do so. The en banc court declined to consider
the issue below (supra n.6), so it has not received sig-
nificant attention. The presumption also made no dif-
53
ference in this case. The district court held that SCA’s
three-year delay after reexamination would serve to
establish laches under the particular facts of this case
even without the presumption. Pet. App. 105a n.1.
That alternative and unchallenged holding would sup-
port affirmance here even were the Court to modify the
presumption. SCA’s deliberate and unreasonable delay
prejudiced First Quality and justifies the application of
laches to bar SCA from recovering damages.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
MARK C. FLEMING SETH P. WAXMAN
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING Counsel of Record
HALE AND DORR LLP THOMAS G. SAUNDERS
60 State Street MATTHEW GUARNIERI
Boston, MA 02109 WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP
KENNETH P. GEORGE 1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
CHARLES R. MACEDO Washington, DC 20006
MARK BERKOWITZ (202) 663-6000
AMSTER, ROTHSTEIN seth.waxman@wilmerhale.com
& EBENSTEIN LLP
90 Park Avenue JASON D. HIRSCH
HANNA A. BAEK
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP
7 World Trade Center
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
New York, NY 10016
SEPTEMBER 2016
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