Amicus Curiae Brief — U.S. Army Corp of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015) (No. 15-290)
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No. 15-290
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
+
UNITED STATES
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
Petitioner,
HAWKES CoO., INC., et al.,
Respondents.
+
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
e
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS SMALL BUSINESS
LEGAL CENTER IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
+
Luke A. Wake Karen R. Harned
Counsel of Record NFIB SMALL BUSINESS
NFIB SMALL BUSINESS LEGAL CENTER
LEGAL CENTER 1201 F Street, N.W., Suite 200
921 11th Street, Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20004
Sacramento, California 95814 (202) 314-5048
(916) 448-9904 karend.harned@nfib.org
luke.wake@nfib.org
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
NFIB Small Business Legal Center Dated: March 2, 2016
THE LEX GROUP®"© ¢ 1825 K Street, N.W. @ Suite 103 @ Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 955-0001 @ (800) 856-4419 @ Fax: (202) 955-0022 @ www.thelexgroup of COO
aw Livery
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Is a Jurisdictional Determination, that is conclusive
as to federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act,
and binding on all parties, subject to judicial review
under the Administrative Procedures Act?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED...................ccccscsesseeeseeseeeeees i
IE GUISE cccecscccevccsscessensecesenssesssesenecnees ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ..................-ccccccsseseeeeeesees iv
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE........0...0.........c0ee. 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................-:ccceccesseeeeeeees 2
ITE tdihitennntiendennssnsnnecsnenssnnssemnneneesecssccssecoeoten 4
I. The Agency Would Require Landowners
to Either Submit to a Prohibitively
Expensive and Potentially Unnecessary
Permitting Regime, or Risk a Ruinous
I a nleetenenemanens 4
A. Judicial Review is Necessary to Keep
B. A Wrongful Assertion of Jurisdiction
Causes an Immediate Constitutional
i. A Jurisdictional Determination
Necessarily ‘Determines’ the
ii. Without Opportunity for Pre-
Enforcement Judicial Review, a
Landowners Only Choice is to
Abandon Development Plans or to
Pursue a Costly Permit........................ 10
1. Individual Permits Are
Exorbitantly Expensive .................. 12
2. General Permits Burden
Constitutionally Protected
Py Gi iccincncnsceneninninasnieeninsi 14
Il. The Administrative Procedures Act
Should Not be Construed in a Manner
that Would Facilitate Violations of Due
A. The Agency Inappropriately
Presupposes its Jurisdictional Powers .....18
B. It is the Exclusive Role of the Courts
to Determine Legal Rights and
TT i sscescieshiicicttasinichaiahinseeiiehinsinioaneed 19
FTI cnsenscsnsmsssmsesnnssssnssenssnsnsnesenmnensenmmainnntei 22
iV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
keane 10
Barnum Timber Co. v.
Environmental Protection Agency,
633 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2013)......................... 8-9
Bennett v. Spear,
SL SIE OTT on cretninrieinttitesiemapapipaiieeumadian 8
Crowell v. Benson
3 En 21, 22
Ex Parte Young,
Is tical eaaa 11
Harris v. Cty. of Riverside,
904 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1990).......................... 15
In re U.S. Dep’t of Def., U.S. E.PA. Final Rule:
Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of U.S.,
No. 15-3839,
2016 WL 723241 (6th Cir., Feb. 22, 2016)...... 5
Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) ................... 19, 20
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816)......................... 20
Moore v. United States,
943 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. Va. 1996) .................. 14
Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm'n,
402 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2005) ........................... 15
N. Dakota v. U.S. E.P.A.,
No. 3:15-CV-59,
2015 WL 5060744 (D.N.D. Aug. 27, 2015)...... 5
Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v.
City of Sterling Heights,
949 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1991).......................... 15
Ng Fung Ho v. White,
EN Nee c 21
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough,
Lee 20
Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v.
Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic,
EE EEN eee 8
Rapanos v. United States,
4 ) &. | ace passim
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,
FEELS ERT eeee 22
Res. Investments, Inc. v. United States,
85 Fed. Cl. 447 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................. 7,19
Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency,
132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) ................... 4,10, 11,18
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v.
Army Corps of Engineers,
ee Se NE hccrisncnenesneccnsintsninennisnniinnsannss 5
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,
EO 19, 20
United States v. Bayview Homes,
on ane 5
STATUTES
33 U.S.C. § 1319.............. svninanmninteaindaeniataibiiniainianae 9
ee ey a hticnsinocisinincinnssinininincinninahenininaniniiais 9
ee ee eitiiniitectenicinnpeininntsinnietindsanians passim
ey Oe I csiicsiitieinloiainiininssciiaienesiaiaisiiotaieiininisiaies 13
RULES
hs aes MEL csssceseiieiinctnceeianeanceiiineeaasdeenaeiieligutaliiaite 1
Sens SORTRs Anis CEN UaaEiinschcchoieinintielieaieiinaatipceiatallciaaai 1
REGULATION
ite ha 7
OTHER AUTHORITIES
80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) .........02.......eeeeeee 5
Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Property Rights,
and the Due Process Deficit in Environmental
Law, Cato Sup. Ct. Rev., 2011-2012 (2012)............... 5
Sir William’ Blackstone, 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND, 137 (Oxford, Clarendon
SN STITT sc innisnienieitieiieiinaineiaeininitiatidtaitcaerimiiimeiinal 20
Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell,
Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale
Sees TEE IIIE cccstisenscnuntaciniininiiapndnninitbintiiemmibuian 20-21
Steven G. Davison, General Permits Under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 26 Pace
BOGE. Te, BROW. BB GI vecccccccccceccccccecescccssocccccscces 15, 16
H. Michael Keller, Look Before You Fill! Dredge
and Fill Permitting Under § 404 of the
Clean Water Act, 17-Nov. Utah Bar BQ.
SPT cineissiinidepinhannipesiadiaiaienmaibemmeiiiienaiumdietis 14, 15
Damien M. Schiff, Luke A. Wake, Leveling the
Playing Field in David v. Goliath: Remedies to
Agency Overreach, 17 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol.
Suet cdicertndtsiinenieeiacbincuiontnibabibabeniennnidaiapigniasdinnietnides 11
Bernard H. Siegan, PROPERTY RIGHTS:
FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2001).................... 10
Sunding & Zilberman, The Economics of
Environmental Regulation by Licensing: An
Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland
Permitting Process, 42 Natural Resources J.
GP Gia hcececcccsscccessccencesecevenecssescsessnssensenes 13, 14, 16, 17
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Regulatory
Guidance Letter, No. 08-02 (June 26, 2008)............... 8
U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor
Statistics, _ a online at
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE!
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37, the
National Federation of Independent Business Small
Business Legal Center (NFIB Legal Center) submits
this brief amicus curiae in support of Respondents,
Hawkes Co. Inc. et al. The NFIB Legal Center is a
nonprofit, public interest law firm established to
provide legal resources and be the voice for small
businesses in the nation’s courts’ through
representation on issues of public interest affecting
small businesses. The National Federation of
Independent Business (NFIB) is the nation’s leading
small business association, representing members in
Washington, D.C., and all 50 state capitals. Founded
in 1943 as a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization,
NFIB’s mission is to promote and protect the rights
of its members to own, operate and grow their
businesses.
NFIB represents 325,000 members businesses
nationwide, and its membership spans the spectrum
of business operations, ranging from sole proprietor
enterprises to firms with hundreds of employees.
While there is no standard definition of a “small
business,” the typical NFIB member employs 10
people and reports gross sales of about $500,000 a
year. The NFIB membership is reflection of
American small business.
1 Counsels of record have both filed blanket consents to amicus
filings in this case. In accordance with Rule 37.6, NFIB Legal
Center states that no counsel for a party authorized any
portion of this brief and no counsel or party made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the briefs preparation or
submission.
To fulfill its role as the voice for small
business, the NFIB Legal Center frequently files
amicus briefs in cases that will impact small
businesses. The Legal Center files in this case
because small business property owners have a great
interest in preserving and protecting their property
rights in the face of aggressive—and potentially
erroneous—assertions of federal jurisdiction under
the Clean Water Act (CWA). Of special concern here,
small business property owners typically have
limited financial resources and cannot afford the
exorbitant costs of pursuing a Section 404 permit
application where those costs are imposed as an
effective condition for obtaining judicial review of an
errant jurisdictional determination.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Petitioner, Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps), and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) enforce the Clean Water Act (CWA) with the
threat of shock-and-awe penalties and criminal
prosecution. But, unlike most federal regulatory
regimes, the scope of the CWA’s prohibition is vague
at best. While the Act is clear in prohibiting
unpermitted dredging or filling activities within
areas deemed jurisdictional, it is anything but clear
in spelling out jurisdiction.
The uncertain reach of the CWA, in turn, has
a coercive chilling effect. In light of the ruinous
penalties that EPA and the Corps threaten for even
negligent violations, prudent counsel would advise
against developing any portion of land that is even
arguably jurisdictional without first obtaining a
negative Jurisdictional Determination (JD) from the
Corps. That is the only safe way to proceed with
development plans because a final JD is binding on
the agency and civil litigants for a period of five
years. The only other option—for an owner wishing
to make use of the land—is to obtain a Section 404
permit from the Corps at great cost.
But if the owner has gone through the trouble
of obtaining an expert opinion that the property is
non-jurisdictional, it would be absurd to expect the
owner to apply for a Section 404 permit that may be
unnecessary. This is especially true given that the
permitting process is exorbitantly expensive—often
costing hundreds-of-thousands of dollars. Given
those severe costs, most small business landowners
are forced to abandon their plans for any portion of
their property that might be _ considered
jurisdictional—which means the property is treated
as if it were effectively subject to a federal
conservation easement. Simply put, the regime is
cost-prohibitive for all but major corporations.
Nonetheless the Corps insists that landowners
must submit to the CWA’s burdensome permitting
process even in cases where the agency may
potentially lack jurisdiction. Yet, once the Corps
determines, with the issuance of an approved JD,
that a property is subject to CWA regulation, the
owner should have an immediate right to contest
that assertion of jurisdiction. To be sure, it is the
exclusive role of the judicial branch—not the
executive—to determine the rights and obligations of
individuals. Any contrary rule would result in due
process violations, which is why the Administrative
Procedures Act authorizes judicial review whenever
a final agency action purports to speak to an
individual’s rights or obligations under federal law.
And there can be no question, in this case,
that the JD determined Respondent’s rights and
obligations under the CWA. With issuance of an
affirmative JD, the Corps effectively asserted an
environmental easement over the land—
demarcating what portions the owner was forbidden
from using without the Corps’ express approval. But
if the Corps has wrongfully asserted jurisdiction,
then this effective restriction on use was imposed
without due process of law. Thus judicial review is
required under the APA, and is fundamentally
necessary in order to avoid a potential constitutional
violation.
ARGUMENT
I. The Agency Would Require Landowners
to Either Submit to a Prohibitively
Expensive and Potentially Unnecessary
Permitting Regime, or Risk a Ruinous
Enforcement Action
A. Judicial Review is Necessary to
Keep the Agency From
Overstepping its Authority
The jurisdictional “reach of the Clean Water
Act [CWA] is notoriously unclear.” Sackett v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367,
1375 (2012) (observing that “[a]ny piece of land that
is wet at least part of the year is in danger of being
classified ... as wetlands covered by the Act...”).2 On
three occasions this Court has attempted to clarify
the CWA’s reach, but has been unable to agree upon
a single test for determining the scope of CWA
jurisdiction. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715
(2006); Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v.
Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001);
United States v. Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121
(1985). In Rapanos, a plurality would have held
that, in order to assert jurisdiction, the agencies
must establish a “continuous surface connection”
between the property in question and traditionally
2 Some scholars have suggested that the CWA’s jurisdictional
provisions are so vague that they fail to provide
constitutionally adequate notice to some affected landowners.
See Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Property Rights, and the Due
Process Deficit in Environmental Law, Cato Sup. Ct. Rev.,
2011-2012, 139, 161-62 (2012) (arguing that “[Mjen of common
intelligence’ lack notice that federal regulation of ... [waters of
the United States] may reach private lots in the middle of
residential subdivisions that are completely dry much, if not
most, of the year and lack any discernible nexus to navigable
waters. ... [E]ven well-informed landowner{s] could be unclear
as to how far federal regulatory jurisdiction extends.”).
3’ NFIB is among the numerous organizations and states
challenging the legality of the recently promulgated “Waters of
the United States” (WOTUS) Rule, through which EPA and the
Corp now seek a radical expansion of CWA jurisdiction. 80 Fed.
Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015). Accordingly, this Court may soon
be called upon—once again—to decide whether these agencies
are overreaching, and related questions. Compare N. Dakota v.
U.S. E.P.A., No. 3:15-CV-59, 2015 WL 5060744, at *1 (D.N.D.
Aug. 27, 2015) (holding original jurisdiction to challenge the
WOTUS Rule rests in the district courts); with In re U.S. Dep't
of Def., U.S. E.P.A. Final Rule: Clean Water Rule: Definition of
Waters of U.S., No. 15-3839, 2016 WL 723241, at *114 (6th Cir.,
Feb. 22, 2016) (holding the Sixth Circuit has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear challenges to the WOTUS Rule).
navigable interstate waters. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715
(2006). By contrast, Justice Kennedy’s significant
nexus test would require a more complicated
assessment of the “chemical, biological and
hydrological connection between the property and
other regulated waters.” Id. at 779-80 (J. Kennedy
concurring) (emphasis added).
Under both tests the burden of proof rests on
the agency asserting jurisdiction. Jd. at 780-82
(emphasizing that the agency must assess
jurisdiction “on a case-by-case basis,” and must
demonstrate the requisite connection to navigable
waters). Nonetheless, as a practical matter, once an
agency definitively asserts that a property contains
jurisdictional waters, it has effectively shifted the
onus to the landowner to go to court if he or she
disagrees. That would not be a problem if it were
simply a matter of filing a complaint, as the agency
would then have to justify its assertion of
jurisdiction—based on facts in the record—in a court
of law. And, facing the prospect of judicial review,
the agency would therein have an incentive to make
good faith assessments of jurisdiction. But the Corps’
maintains that it should be insulated from judicial
review.
The Corps holds out the possibility that a
landowner might eventually be allowed to contest its
jurisdiction in court—but only if the owner first
pursues a Section 404 permit. The agency knows
that this will effectively prevent the vast majority of
landowners from contesting its assertion of
jurisdiction—regardless of how egregiously wrong it
may be in claiming regulatory authority over any
given property. This is because the Corps will not
process a Section 404 permit application until it is
deemed complete, and the process for completing
such an application is exorbitantly difficult and
expensive. See Res. Investments, Inc. v. United
States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 460 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(explaining that federal regulations require the
Corps to commence with public notice and review
“within 15 days of days of the submission of a 404
permit application, but only if the application is
[deemed] complete[,]” and noting an inexplicable 18
month delay during which time the Corps
maintained a permit application was incomplete.)
(citing 33 C.F.R. § 325.2). As such, the Corps
“exercises the discretion of an enlightened despot,”
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 720, knowing that it will not
likely be held to account for a wrongful assertion of
jurisdiction because—realistically—landowners of
modest means cannot afford to jump _ these
regulatory hurdles, much less litigate a case against
the federal government after expending thousands of
dollars on a potentially unnecessary permitting
process.
B. A Wrongful Assertion of
Jurisdiction Causes an Immediate
Constitutional Injury
i. A Jurisdictional
Determination Necessarily
‘Determines’ the Landowners’
Rights and Obligations
The Corps contends that an affirmative
jurisdictional assessment is of no legal consequence
because it merely clarifies the reach of the CWA.
Pet. Opening Br. at 27. But even assuming that the
agency is correct in its delineation of CWA
jurisdiction, with regard to the property in question,
it is sheer fantasy say that it has not therein
“determined” the owner’s “right or obligations.” See
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (holding
that a final agency action may be challenged if
“rights or obligations have been determined,’ or [if it
is an action] from which ‘legal consequences will
flow[.]”) (citing Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn.
v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71
(1970)) (emphasis added). For one, in definitively
determining the scope of CWA jurisdiction, the
agency has made clear what portion of the property
the landowner is foreclosed from using in the
absence of a federally issued permit. Pet. Opening
Br. at 28-30 (acknowledging that the Corps will not
revisit a final JD, except on the basis of new
information). Conversely this delineation necessarily
determines what portions of land the owner may
safely develop without obtaining a permit.‘ See U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, Regulatory Guidance
Letter, No. 08-02 (June 26, 2008) (providing that an
approved JD “can be relied upon ... for five years.”).
Moreover, in many cases, once a jurisdictional
assessment is made, that determination
automatically triggers additional restrictions under
state law, further limiting permissible uses of the
land. See e.g., Barnum Timber Co. v. Environmental
4 Given how difficult it is for an ordinary person to understand
the geographical reach of the CWA, most landowners will—as a
practical matter—rely on the Corps’ assessment. The Corps
acknowledges that few landowners even seek to appeal an
initial jurisdictional assessment within the agency. Pet.
Opening Br. at 5-6.
Protection Agency, 633 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding that a landowner had standing to challenge
EPA action under the CWA because it triggered
restrictions under California law, which resulted in
devaluation of the property's value).
Yet, even if the owner should disagree with
the Corps’ conclusion that the land contains
jurisdictional waters, the owner is practically bound.
No reasonable person would proceed with
development plans within an area deemed
jurisdictional by the Corps without. either
(a) obtaining a judicial decision making clear that
the property is non-jurisdictional, or (b) obtaining a
federal permit to proceed. Any competent attorney
would emphatically counsel against ignoring an
affirmative JD because—once the Corps has made
known its position that the property contains
jurisdictional waters—a violation would no longer be
deemed negligent.
At that point an unpermitted discharge would
be deemed a “knowing violation,” which would
almost assuredly mean heavier civil penalties, if not
criminal liability. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (authorizing
penalties of up to $50,000 per day, and
imprisonment for up to three years, for knowing
violations). And it can be no answer that EPA and
the Corps might choose—in their benevolent
discretion—to show restraint because they are
statutorily bound to enforce the CWA. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(a)(3) (providing that when EPA “finds that
any person is in violation” of the CWA, the agency
“shall issue an order requiring such person to comply
with [the Act] [and typically ordering the owner to
10
pay for environmental remediation], or ... shall bring
a civil action [to enforce the Act].”). To be sure, the
EPA made a similar argument in Sackett, suggesting
it only rarely seeks the statutory maximum when
bringing a civil action, to which Justice Scalia
quipped: “I’m not going to bet my house on that.”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 30-31, Sackett, 132
S. Ct. 1367 (No. 10-1062).
ii. Without Opportunity for Pre-
Enforcement Judicial
Review, a Landowner’s Only
Choice is to Abandon
Development Plans or to
Pursue a Costly Permit
In this case, as in Sackett, the property owner
maintains that the agency has wrongfully asserted
jurisdiction. If that is true, then the agency utterly
lacks any basis in the law to regulate the subject
property at all.5 See Bernard H. Siegan, PROPERTY
RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 16-17 (2001)
(explaining due process requires that a deprivation
of property rights be founded in “legitimately
enacted law.”). But by virtue of the Corps’
affirmative JD the owner is understandably afraid to
proceed with development plans because the agency
has implicitly threatened an enforcement action if he
or she should disregard the Corps’ determination. As
in Sackett, the agency means to “scare the owners
into compliance—regardless of whether their
5 Moreover, the facts alleged in a complaint must be presumed
true at this stage of litigation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
663 (2009).
11
property [is] [or is not] a jurisdictional wetland...”
Damien M. Schiff, Luke A. Wake, Leveling the
Playing Field in David v. Goliath: Remedies to
Agency Overreach, 17 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 97, 123
(2012).
In Sackett, this Court unequivocally rejected
the suggestion that an individual should have to risk
the threat of an enforcement action and “wait for the
agency to drop the hammer” in order to obtain
judicial review. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372. That was
deemed an inadequate remedy because it would
expose the Sacketts to “tens of thousands of dollars
in civil penalties per day...” Jd. at 1374 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring). A requirement to risk ruinous
penalties in order to have an opportunity to contest
an erroneous assertion of jurisdiction is simply
“unthinkable” “[i]n a nation that values due process,
not to mention private property...” Jd. at 1375 (Alito,
J., concurring); see also Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 146-47 (1908).
But here the Corps maintains that immediate
judicial review of an affirmative jurisdictional
determination is inappropriate because’ the
Respondent may obtain judicial review after
“applying ... for a permit and then filing suit under
the APA if [the application] is denied...” Sackett, 132
S. Ct. at 1372. While the Court was unanimous in
holding this an insufficient remedy in Sackett, the
Corps maintains that the prospect of judicial review
of a permit denial should be sufficient here
because—unlike in Sackett—no compliance order
has been issued. Pet. Opening Br. at 42-43. Thus the
agency maintains that Respondents, Hawkes Co.
12
Inc, et al. (Hawkes), stand in a different position
than the Sacketts because: (a) the company has not
been required to remediate any alleged violation;
and (b) in the absence of a compliance order, Hawkes
has no special burden to meet in order to qualify for
a Section 404 permit. Yet this misses the point
entirely because it ignores the reality that the Corps’
assertion of jurisdiction has already interfered with
the owner's right to freely use and enjoy the
property.
1. Individual Permits Are
Exorbitantly Expensive
The reality is that when faced with an
affirmative JD, a small business landowner has only
one option if pre-enforcement judicial review is
unavailable. The owner must submit to a potentially
illegally imposed regulatory regime.* Accordingly,
most small business property owners will feel
compelled to either abandon whatever development
plans they might have in mind, or to pursue a
federal permit to carry-out those plans. Either way,
their constitutionally protected common law
property rights are infringed, as if the property was
deemed subject to a federal conservation easement.
6 The owner is faced with a Hobson’s choice: either (a) ignore
the jurisdictional determination, and risk crippling daily fines
and or imprisonment, or; (b) submit to a potentially unlawful
regulatory regime. This is an ultimatum with constitutionally
repugnant choices on both sides of the equation. Yet, to the
extent a choice must be made, any reasonable person would
yield to the Corps’ implicit directive to either: (i) leave the
affected portions of the land undeveloped, or (ii) pursue a
permit.
13
To be sure, if CWA jurisdiction is assumed
without opportunity for judicial review, the owner
has no choice but to operate within that regulatory
framework. Under such a regime the owner is no
longer free to proceed even with the most basic of
plans. Something as simple as laying down mulch
would be considered a “discharge of pollutants,” and
might result in crippling penalties. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(6). For this reason, the owner must be
abundantly sure that he or she is covered by either a
general or individual permit for any contemplated
use.
In this case the Corps told Hawkes that it
would need a special permit, which would cost over
$100,000. Reply Br. of Resp. at 11. But, as of 2002
the average cost of pursuing an individual permit
was $271,596. With inflation that figure must be
adjusted upward to $357,826.7 These figures include
the cost of man-hours invested in working toward
permit approval, as well as the cost of hiring outside
experts to assist with compliance—including
environmental testing and project redesigns.
Sunding & Zilberman, The Economics of
Environmental Regulation by Licensing: An
Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland
Permitting Process, 42 Natural Resources J. 59, 60
(2002).
Further, these regulatory hurdles prevent the
owner from beginning any sort of development for
7 Amicus relies on the CPI Inflation Calculator provided by the
U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, available
online at http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation calculator.htm (last
visited Feb. 29, 2016).
14
years at a time. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721 (noting
that individual permits take on average 788 days).
And that is assuming the Corps might eventually
issue a permit. But, until the Corps deems a permit
application complete, there is no end to the
permitting process. Sunding & Zilberman, 42
Natural Resources J. at 64. For the affected
landowner, that means development rights are
restricted indefinitely. Cf. Moore v. United States,
943 F. Supp. 603, 612 (E.D. Va. 1996) (recounting
testimony from former officials that—in order to
avoid judicial review—the Corps rarely denies a
permit application outright, but will instead
typically request “more and more information ...
until eventually the applicant loses. staying
power...”).
2. General Permits Burden
Constitutionally
Protected Property
Rights
The Corps seeks to downplay’ these
compliance costs, in part by insisting that
“individual permits are the exception, not the rule,
especially for smaller projects likely to be
undertaken by individuals or small businesses.” Pet.
Br. at 47. Instead the Corps suggests that most
small projects may be carried out under a “general
permit,” which authorizes “specific categor[ies] of
activities deemed to have minimal [environmental]
impacts.” H. Michael Keller, Look Before You Fill!
Dredge and Fill Permitting Under § 404 of the Clean
Water Act, 17-Nov. Utah Bar B.J. 26, 32 (2004).
Accordingly, a landowner might proceed with a
15
specified project under a general permit, but only if
he or she is sure that the project is fully compliant
with regulatory restrictions imposed as a condition of
the Corps’ approval. Id.
The situation is no different than if municipal
authorities should purport to impose zoning
restrictions on a specific parcel while denying the
owner the right to contest the validity of those
restrictions.’ In this case, however, the landowner
risks losing his or her home, or going to jail, if he or
she should choose to ignore the authorities. To be
sure, the landowner is not at all free—under this
imposed regime—to exercise common law property
rights. The requirement to obtain a general permit
means that the landowner may only use the property
on the Corps’ terms. Steven G. Davison, General
Permits Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 26
Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 35, 68 (2009).
Thus for example, the owner may not initiate
many projects without first providing the Corps with
8 There is no requirement to apply for a permit in order to ripen
a due process claim. Such a claim ripens as soon as the
restriction is definitively imposed. See Murphy v. New Milford
Zoning Comm'n, 402 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding a
restriction may be challenged immediately if there is no
procedure for variance); see also Harris v. Cty. of Riverside, 904
F.2d 497, 501 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing a ripe due process
claim where landowner was “deprived of the commercial use of
his land and [required to] pay $2,400 to $3,000 to either regain
that use, or prompt the County to make a final determination
of how he can use the land.”); Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v. City
of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding a
due process claim ripe because the landowner was “placed in a
position where he would be required to expend considerable
time, effort, and money to restore the quo ante.”).
16
pre-construction notice at least 30 days. Jd. at 69-70.
For some projects a general permit will only be
issued with express authorization from the agency—
meaning that the Corps will scrutinize the project,
and may require the owner to alter development
plans to minimize potential impacts, or may impose
other conditions restricting permissible uses as
deemed appropriate to protect natural resources. Jd.
at 70. For that matter, most general permit
authorizations are conditioned on a requirement
that the project must not affect more than one-
quarter acre of land. Sunding & Zilberman, 42
Natural Resources J. at 65.
Further, some general permits require specific
design elements—which may require costly project
modifications. Id. at 66 (explaining a requirement
mandating vegetative buffers) And many are
expressly conditioned on a requirement that the
owner must pay to mitigate any perceived impact on
wetlands. Davison, 26 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. at 57.
Thus notwithstanding the fact that a landowner
might adamantly disagree with the Corps’ assertion
of CWA jurisdiction, the owner can only proceed
under such a general permit to the extent he or she
properly pays to mitigate for the alleged
environmental impact—which necessarily imposes
substantial costs.
8 By contrast, other general permits are deemed automatically
granted if the owner proceeds in accordance with the stipulated
conditions. Jd. at 67. But if the Corps makes no individualized
determination as to whether such a general permit should be
issued, then Amicus questions what event would ever trigger
an opportunity for judicial review under the Corps’ theory that
an approved JD may not be challenged in court?
17
And speaking of compliance costs, it is
disingenuous for the Corps to suggest that general
permitting costs are insignificant.!° While it is true
that the process of obtaining a general permit is
more streamlined, the costs are still substantial. As
of 2002 the average cost of a general permit was
$28,915—which amounts to $38,095 in 2016.!!
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721. Such a toll on the right to
use one’s own property can hardly be considered
inconsequential, especially if the requirement is
imposed without any legitimate basis in the law.
10 Also the process is not as straightforward as the Corps would
suggest. For ranchers, farmers, and other ordinary landowners
the process of obtaining a general permit may seem
bewildering. They will typically either rely on direction from
the Corps as to whether they may proceed with a contemplated
project, or will be forced to invest limited time and energy
trying to sort through available guidance, which in all
likelihood will be difficult for someone who is not already well
versed in the intricacies of environmental law.
11 “The range of NWP costs was between $2,000 and $140,076
for $2,635 and $184,549 with inflation]; the median cost was
$11,800 for $15,546 in 2016].” Sunding & Zilberman, 42
Natural Resources J. at 74.
18
Il. The Administrative Procedures Act
Should Not be Construed in a Manner
that Would Facilitate Violations of Due
Process
A. The Agency Inappropriately
Presupposes its Jurisdictional
Powers
The Corps maintains that its jurisdictional
determinations have no legal effect whatsoever. Pet.
Opening Br. at 27. This poker face argument
proceeds on the theory that it was Congress—not the
agency—that chose to impose development
restrictions on the subject property. On this view the
Corps is merely the harbinger of bad news when it
determines that a property contains jurisdictional
waters. But this is a straw man argument. The
Corps never responds to the contention that the
agency has unlawfully asserted regulatory authority
over the property in question.
Instead the Corps engages in question-begging
in much the same way as EPA did when defending
its contention that landowners had no opportunity
for judicial review of an enforcement order. Sackett,
132 S. Ct. at 1373. As in Sackett, the agency
stubbornly defies “the APA’s presumption of
reviewability for all final agency action[.]” 132. S. Ct.
at 1374. But at least in Sackett the agency
attempted to offer a textual argument for why
Congress might not have wanted to allow judicial
review—though this Court ultimately found it
uncompelling. Jd. at 1373-74. Yet, unlike in Sackett,
the agency defends its prerogative to evade judicial
19
review in this case merely be doubling-down on its
(potentially errant) assertion that the property
contains jurisdictional waters.
The Corps operates as if its determination of
jurisdiction is beyond reproach. But the agency is far
from infallible, and may be wrongly asserting
jurisdiction here. See e.g., Res. Investments, Inc., 85
Fed. Cl. at 461-62. (noting that the Corps held up a
project for approximately a decade _ after
“unreasonabl[y] assert{ing] jurisdiction...”). And if
the assertion of regulatory power over this property
is wrongful then the Corps’ JD is the source of the
legal injury—not any act of Congress. But until an
Article III Court is allowed to review the agency’s
assertion of jurisdiction it cannot be said whether or
not the subject property really is subject to the
CWA’s restrictions. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803) (holding that executive
actors are “officers of the law[,]” and that their
actions are subject to judicial review when an
individual's rights are affected).
B. It is the Exclusive Role of the
Courts to Determine Legal Rights
and Obligations
Under Article III, it is the role of the courts to
determine questions of federal law, affecting the
rights of individuals, because otherwise’ the
executive would be allowed to act unchecked—
outside the law. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co., 298 U.S.
38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis J., concurring) (“The
supremacy of law demands that there shall be
opportunity to have some court decide whether an
20
erroneous rule of law was applied...”). A corollary
principle is that an individual has a fundamental
right to judicial review when his or her federal rights
are adversely affected by final agency action. See
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253
U.S. 287, 289 (1920); Cf., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 330-31 (1816) (concluding
that federal courts must be authorized to hear
federal claims). Especially “[w]hen dealing with
constitutional rights... [due process demands that]
there [] be [an] opportunity of presenting ... [to a
court] every question of law raised...” St. Joseph
Stock Yards Co., 298 U.S. at 77 (1936) (Brandeis J.,
concurring); see also Sir. William Blackstone, 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 137 (Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1765-69) (commenting on Chapter 29 of
Magna Carta: “A third subordinate right of every
Englishman is that of applying to the courts of
justice for redress of injuries.”) (alteration of
original).
Thus judicia: review is imperative for any
executive determination of an individual's rights or
obligations where a violation of due process would
result from an errant determination.!? And that is
necessarily the case where the agency's
determination effectively deprives an individual of
liberty, or impairs property rights, without any
legitimate basis in the law. See Nathan S. Chapman
12 Marbury emphasized that “where there is a legal right, there
is also a legal remedy[,]” and thai “the very essence of civil
liberty consists in the right ... to claim the protection of the
laws...” 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163.
21
& Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation
of Powers, 121 Yale LJ. 1672, 1679 (2012)
(“Fundamentally, ‘due process’ meant that the
government may not interfere with established legal
rights without legal authorization...”). Accordingly,
the Corps’ position, in this case, raises grave due
process concerns because it seeks to insulate its
jurisdictional determination from judicial review—
notwithstanding the reality that it has decided upon
a question of law both as to the reach of its authority
and the application of restrictions on the subject
property.
Crowell v. Benson is instructive. 285 U.S. 22
(1932). The case concerned the proper application of
the Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, which
vested a commissioner of the Department of Labor
with authority to issue compensation awards in
cases where an employee was injured in the course
of work occurring upon the “navigable waters of the
United States.” This jurisdictional provision was not
merely a statutory restriction on the commissioner’s
authority, but also a constitutional limit. Jd. at 54-
55. Accordingly, in Crowell, an employer sought to
contest a compensation award on the ground that
the claimant’s injury did not occur during the course
of employment within the “navigable waters of the
United States.” Jd. Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Hughes, was emphatic in affirming the
prerogative of the courts in determining whether the
executive branch had reached beyond its jurisdiction.
Id. at 56; see also Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 US.
276, 285-86 (1922) (holding that due process requires
an opportunity to contest an alleged ultra vires
executive decision affecting liberty or property).
22
These cases affirm that to deny the
opportunity for judicial review would be to deny due
process of law. For this reason the Administrative
Procedures Act must be interpreted—under the
canon of avoidance—so as to allow an affected
landowner an immediate right of judicial review
once the Corps issues a final determination that his
or her property is subject to CWA regulation. See
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 62 (construing a statute as
authorizing judicial review to avoid due process
concerns); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,
419 U.S. 102, 124-25, 134 (1974) (rejecting an
interpretation of the Rail Act that would deny a
judicial remedy for parties alleging a violation of
constitutional rights, in part because of the “grave”
constitutional problems that would arise). This is
imperative both to protect the constitutional rights
of individuals and to ensure that the Corps is acting
within the law.
CONCLUSION
This Court should hold that landowners may
seek judicial review under the Administrative
Procedures Act once the Corps issues an affirmative
JD, and affirm the judgment of the Eighth Circuit.
23
Respectfully submitted,
Luke A. Wake
Counsel of Record
NFIB SMALL BUSINESS LEGAL CENTER
921 11th Street, Suite 400
Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 448-9904 (Telephone)
(615) 916-5104 (Facsimile)
Luke.Wake@nfib.org
Karen R. Harned
NFIB SMALL BUSINESS LEGAL CENTER
1201 F Street, NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 314-5048 (Telephone)
(615) 916-5104 (Facsimile)
Karen.Harned@nfib.org
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.