Amicus Curiae Brief — U.S. Army Corp of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015) (No. 15-290)

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No. 15-290

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

+

UNITED STATES

ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,

Petitioner,

HAWKES CoO., INC., et al.,

Respondents.

+

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

e

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE NATIONAL FEDERATION

OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS SMALL BUSINESS

LEGAL CENTER IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

+

Luke A. Wake Karen R. Harned

Counsel of Record NFIB SMALL BUSINESS

NFIB SMALL BUSINESS LEGAL CENTER

LEGAL CENTER 1201 F Street, N.W., Suite 200

921 11th Street, Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20004

Sacramento, California 95814 (202) 314-5048

(916) 448-9904 karend.harned@nfib.org

luke.wake@nfib.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

NFIB Small Business Legal Center Dated: March 2, 2016

THE LEX GROUP®"© ¢ 1825 K Street, N.W. @ Suite 103 @ Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 955-0001 @ (800) 856-4419 @ Fax: (202) 955-0022 @ www.thelexgroup of COO

aw Livery

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Is a Jurisdictional Determination, that is conclusive

as to federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act,

and binding on all parties, subject to judicial review

under the Administrative Procedures Act?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED...................ccccscsesseeeseeseeeeees i

IE GUISE cccecscccevccsscessensecesenssesssesenecnees ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ..................-ccccccsseseeeeeesees iv

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE........0...0.........c0ee. 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................-:ccceccesseeeeeeees 2

ITE tdihitennntiendennssnsnnecsnenssnnssemnneneesecssccssecoeoten 4

I. The Agency Would Require Landowners

to Either Submit to a Prohibitively

Expensive and Potentially Unnecessary

Permitting Regime, or Risk a Ruinous

I a nleetenenemanens 4

A. Judicial Review is Necessary to Keep

B. A Wrongful Assertion of Jurisdiction

Causes an Immediate Constitutional

i. A Jurisdictional Determination

Necessarily ‘Determines’ the

ii. Without Opportunity for Pre-

Enforcement Judicial Review, a

Landowners Only Choice is to

Abandon Development Plans or to

Pursue a Costly Permit........................ 10

1. Individual Permits Are

Exorbitantly Expensive .................. 12

2. General Permits Burden

Constitutionally Protected

Py Gi iccincncnsceneninninasnieeninsi 14

Il. The Administrative Procedures Act

Should Not be Construed in a Manner

that Would Facilitate Violations of Due

A. The Agency Inappropriately

Presupposes its Jurisdictional Powers .....18

B. It is the Exclusive Role of the Courts

to Determine Legal Rights and

TT i sscescieshiicicttasinichaiahinseeiiehinsinioaneed 19

FTI cnsenscsnsmsssmsesnnssssnssenssnsnsnesenmnensenmmainnntei 22

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

keane 10

Barnum Timber Co. v.

Environmental Protection Agency,

633 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2013)......................... 8-9

Bennett v. Spear,

SL SIE OTT on cretninrieinttitesiemapapipaiieeumadian 8

Crowell v. Benson

3 En 21, 22

Ex Parte Young,

Is tical eaaa 11

Harris v. Cty. of Riverside,

904 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1990).......................... 15

In re U.S. Dep’t of Def., U.S. E.PA. Final Rule:

Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of U.S.,

No. 15-3839,

2016 WL 723241 (6th Cir., Feb. 22, 2016)...... 5

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) ................... 19, 20

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,

14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816)......................... 20

Moore v. United States,

943 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. Va. 1996) .................. 14

Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm'n,

402 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2005) ........................... 15

N. Dakota v. U.S. E.P.A.,

No. 3:15-CV-59,

2015 WL 5060744 (D.N.D. Aug. 27, 2015)...... 5

Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v.

City of Sterling Heights,

949 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1991).......................... 15

Ng Fung Ho v. White,

EN Nee c 21

Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough,

Lee 20

Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v.

Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic,

EE EEN eee 8

Rapanos v. United States,

4 ) &. | ace passim

Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,

FEELS ERT eeee 22

Res. Investments, Inc. v. United States,

85 Fed. Cl. 447 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................. 7,19

Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency,

132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) ................... 4,10, 11,18

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v.

Army Corps of Engineers,

ee Se NE hccrisncnenesneccnsintsninennisnniinnsannss 5

St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,

EO 19, 20

United States v. Bayview Homes,

on ane 5

STATUTES

33 U.S.C. § 1319.............. svninanmninteaindaeniataibiiniainianae 9

ee ey a hticnsinocisinincinnssinininincinninahenininaniniiais 9

ee ee eitiiniitectenicinnpeininntsinnietindsanians passim

ey Oe I csiicsiitieinloiainiininssciiaienesiaiaisiiotaieiininisiaies 13

RULES

hs aes MEL csssceseiieiinctnceeianeanceiiineeaasdeenaeiieligutaliiaite 1

Sens SORTRs Anis CEN UaaEiinschcchoieinintielieaieiinaatipceiatallciaaai 1

REGULATION

ite ha 7

OTHER AUTHORITIES

80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) .........02.......eeeeeee 5

Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Property Rights,

and the Due Process Deficit in Environmental

Law, Cato Sup. Ct. Rev., 2011-2012 (2012)............... 5

Sir William’ Blackstone, 1 WILLIAM

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE

LAWS OF ENGLAND, 137 (Oxford, Clarendon

SN STITT sc innisnienieitieiieiinaineiaeininitiatidtaitcaerimiiimeiinal 20

Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell,

Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale

Sees TEE IIIE cccstisenscnuntaciniininiiapndnninitbintiiemmibuian 20-21

Steven G. Davison, General Permits Under

Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 26 Pace

BOGE. Te, BROW. BB GI vecccccccccceccccccecescccssocccccscces 15, 16

H. Michael Keller, Look Before You Fill! Dredge

and Fill Permitting Under § 404 of the

Clean Water Act, 17-Nov. Utah Bar BQ.

SPT cineissiinidepinhannipesiadiaiaienmaibemmeiiiienaiumdietis 14, 15

Damien M. Schiff, Luke A. Wake, Leveling the

Playing Field in David v. Goliath: Remedies to

Agency Overreach, 17 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol.

Suet cdicertndtsiinenieeiacbincuiontnibabibabeniennnidaiapigniasdinnietnides 11

Bernard H. Siegan, PROPERTY RIGHTS:

FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2001).................... 10

Sunding & Zilberman, The Economics of

Environmental Regulation by Licensing: An

Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland

Permitting Process, 42 Natural Resources J.

GP Gia hcececcccsscccessccencesecevenecssescsessnssensenes 13, 14, 16, 17

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Regulatory

Guidance Letter, No. 08-02 (June 26, 2008)............... 8

U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor

Statistics, _ a online at

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE!

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37, the

National Federation of Independent Business Small

Business Legal Center (NFIB Legal Center) submits

this brief amicus curiae in support of Respondents,

Hawkes Co. Inc. et al. The NFIB Legal Center is a

nonprofit, public interest law firm established to

provide legal resources and be the voice for small

businesses in the nation’s courts’ through

representation on issues of public interest affecting

small businesses. The National Federation of

Independent Business (NFIB) is the nation’s leading

small business association, representing members in

Washington, D.C., and all 50 state capitals. Founded

in 1943 as a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization,

NFIB’s mission is to promote and protect the rights

of its members to own, operate and grow their

businesses.

NFIB represents 325,000 members businesses

nationwide, and its membership spans the spectrum

of business operations, ranging from sole proprietor

enterprises to firms with hundreds of employees.

While there is no standard definition of a “small

business,” the typical NFIB member employs 10

people and reports gross sales of about $500,000 a

year. The NFIB membership is reflection of

American small business.

1 Counsels of record have both filed blanket consents to amicus

filings in this case. In accordance with Rule 37.6, NFIB Legal

Center states that no counsel for a party authorized any

portion of this brief and no counsel or party made a monetary

contribution intended to fund the briefs preparation or

submission.

To fulfill its role as the voice for small

business, the NFIB Legal Center frequently files

amicus briefs in cases that will impact small

businesses. The Legal Center files in this case

because small business property owners have a great

interest in preserving and protecting their property

rights in the face of aggressive—and potentially

erroneous—assertions of federal jurisdiction under

the Clean Water Act (CWA). Of special concern here,

small business property owners typically have

limited financial resources and cannot afford the

exorbitant costs of pursuing a Section 404 permit

application where those costs are imposed as an

effective condition for obtaining judicial review of an

errant jurisdictional determination.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Petitioner, Army Corps of Engineers

(Corps), and the Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) enforce the Clean Water Act (CWA) with the

threat of shock-and-awe penalties and criminal

prosecution. But, unlike most federal regulatory

regimes, the scope of the CWA’s prohibition is vague

at best. While the Act is clear in prohibiting

unpermitted dredging or filling activities within

areas deemed jurisdictional, it is anything but clear

in spelling out jurisdiction.

The uncertain reach of the CWA, in turn, has

a coercive chilling effect. In light of the ruinous

penalties that EPA and the Corps threaten for even

negligent violations, prudent counsel would advise

against developing any portion of land that is even

arguably jurisdictional without first obtaining a

negative Jurisdictional Determination (JD) from the

Corps. That is the only safe way to proceed with

development plans because a final JD is binding on

the agency and civil litigants for a period of five

years. The only other option—for an owner wishing

to make use of the land—is to obtain a Section 404

permit from the Corps at great cost.

But if the owner has gone through the trouble

of obtaining an expert opinion that the property is

non-jurisdictional, it would be absurd to expect the

owner to apply for a Section 404 permit that may be

unnecessary. This is especially true given that the

permitting process is exorbitantly expensive—often

costing hundreds-of-thousands of dollars. Given

those severe costs, most small business landowners

are forced to abandon their plans for any portion of

their property that might be _ considered

jurisdictional—which means the property is treated

as if it were effectively subject to a federal

conservation easement. Simply put, the regime is

cost-prohibitive for all but major corporations.

Nonetheless the Corps insists that landowners

must submit to the CWA’s burdensome permitting

process even in cases where the agency may

potentially lack jurisdiction. Yet, once the Corps

determines, with the issuance of an approved JD,

that a property is subject to CWA regulation, the

owner should have an immediate right to contest

that assertion of jurisdiction. To be sure, it is the

exclusive role of the judicial branch—not the

executive—to determine the rights and obligations of

individuals. Any contrary rule would result in due

process violations, which is why the Administrative

Procedures Act authorizes judicial review whenever

a final agency action purports to speak to an

individual’s rights or obligations under federal law.

And there can be no question, in this case,

that the JD determined Respondent’s rights and

obligations under the CWA. With issuance of an

affirmative JD, the Corps effectively asserted an

environmental easement over the land—

demarcating what portions the owner was forbidden

from using without the Corps’ express approval. But

if the Corps has wrongfully asserted jurisdiction,

then this effective restriction on use was imposed

without due process of law. Thus judicial review is

required under the APA, and is fundamentally

necessary in order to avoid a potential constitutional

violation.

ARGUMENT

I. The Agency Would Require Landowners

to Either Submit to a Prohibitively

Expensive and Potentially Unnecessary

Permitting Regime, or Risk a Ruinous

Enforcement Action

A. Judicial Review is Necessary to

Keep the Agency From

Overstepping its Authority

The jurisdictional “reach of the Clean Water

Act [CWA] is notoriously unclear.” Sackett v.

Environmental Protection Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367,

1375 (2012) (observing that “[a]ny piece of land that

is wet at least part of the year is in danger of being

classified ... as wetlands covered by the Act...”).2 On

three occasions this Court has attempted to clarify

the CWA’s reach, but has been unable to agree upon

a single test for determining the scope of CWA

jurisdiction. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715

(2006); Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v.

Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001);

United States v. Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121

(1985). In Rapanos, a plurality would have held

that, in order to assert jurisdiction, the agencies

must establish a “continuous surface connection”

between the property in question and traditionally

2 Some scholars have suggested that the CWA’s jurisdictional

provisions are so vague that they fail to provide

constitutionally adequate notice to some affected landowners.

See Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Property Rights, and the Due

Process Deficit in Environmental Law, Cato Sup. Ct. Rev.,

2011-2012, 139, 161-62 (2012) (arguing that “[Mjen of common

intelligence’ lack notice that federal regulation of ... [waters of

the United States] may reach private lots in the middle of

residential subdivisions that are completely dry much, if not

most, of the year and lack any discernible nexus to navigable

waters. ... [E]ven well-informed landowner{s] could be unclear

as to how far federal regulatory jurisdiction extends.”).

3’ NFIB is among the numerous organizations and states

challenging the legality of the recently promulgated “Waters of

the United States” (WOTUS) Rule, through which EPA and the

Corp now seek a radical expansion of CWA jurisdiction. 80 Fed.

Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015). Accordingly, this Court may soon

be called upon—once again—to decide whether these agencies

are overreaching, and related questions. Compare N. Dakota v.

U.S. E.P.A., No. 3:15-CV-59, 2015 WL 5060744, at *1 (D.N.D.

Aug. 27, 2015) (holding original jurisdiction to challenge the

WOTUS Rule rests in the district courts); with In re U.S. Dep't

of Def., U.S. E.P.A. Final Rule: Clean Water Rule: Definition of

Waters of U.S., No. 15-3839, 2016 WL 723241, at *114 (6th Cir.,

Feb. 22, 2016) (holding the Sixth Circuit has exclusive

jurisdiction to hear challenges to the WOTUS Rule).

navigable interstate waters. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715

(2006). By contrast, Justice Kennedy’s significant

nexus test would require a more complicated

assessment of the “chemical, biological and

hydrological connection between the property and

other regulated waters.” Id. at 779-80 (J. Kennedy

concurring) (emphasis added).

Under both tests the burden of proof rests on

the agency asserting jurisdiction. Jd. at 780-82

(emphasizing that the agency must assess

jurisdiction “on a case-by-case basis,” and must

demonstrate the requisite connection to navigable

waters). Nonetheless, as a practical matter, once an

agency definitively asserts that a property contains

jurisdictional waters, it has effectively shifted the

onus to the landowner to go to court if he or she

disagrees. That would not be a problem if it were

simply a matter of filing a complaint, as the agency

would then have to justify its assertion of

jurisdiction—based on facts in the record—in a court

of law. And, facing the prospect of judicial review,

the agency would therein have an incentive to make

good faith assessments of jurisdiction. But the Corps’

maintains that it should be insulated from judicial

review.

The Corps holds out the possibility that a

landowner might eventually be allowed to contest its

jurisdiction in court—but only if the owner first

pursues a Section 404 permit. The agency knows

that this will effectively prevent the vast majority of

landowners from contesting its assertion of

jurisdiction—regardless of how egregiously wrong it

may be in claiming regulatory authority over any

given property. This is because the Corps will not

process a Section 404 permit application until it is

deemed complete, and the process for completing

such an application is exorbitantly difficult and

expensive. See Res. Investments, Inc. v. United

States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 460 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

(explaining that federal regulations require the

Corps to commence with public notice and review

“within 15 days of days of the submission of a 404

permit application, but only if the application is

[deemed] complete[,]” and noting an inexplicable 18

month delay during which time the Corps

maintained a permit application was incomplete.)

(citing 33 C.F.R. § 325.2). As such, the Corps

“exercises the discretion of an enlightened despot,”

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 720, knowing that it will not

likely be held to account for a wrongful assertion of

jurisdiction because—realistically—landowners of

modest means cannot afford to jump _ these

regulatory hurdles, much less litigate a case against

the federal government after expending thousands of

dollars on a potentially unnecessary permitting

process.

B. A Wrongful Assertion of

Jurisdiction Causes an Immediate

Constitutional Injury

i. A Jurisdictional

Determination Necessarily

‘Determines’ the Landowners’

Rights and Obligations

The Corps contends that an affirmative

jurisdictional assessment is of no legal consequence

because it merely clarifies the reach of the CWA.

Pet. Opening Br. at 27. But even assuming that the

agency is correct in its delineation of CWA

jurisdiction, with regard to the property in question,

it is sheer fantasy say that it has not therein

“determined” the owner’s “right or obligations.” See

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (holding

that a final agency action may be challenged if

“rights or obligations have been determined,’ or [if it

is an action] from which ‘legal consequences will

flow[.]”) (citing Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn.

v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71

(1970)) (emphasis added). For one, in definitively

determining the scope of CWA jurisdiction, the

agency has made clear what portion of the property

the landowner is foreclosed from using in the

absence of a federally issued permit. Pet. Opening

Br. at 28-30 (acknowledging that the Corps will not

revisit a final JD, except on the basis of new

information). Conversely this delineation necessarily

determines what portions of land the owner may

safely develop without obtaining a permit.‘ See U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers, Regulatory Guidance

Letter, No. 08-02 (June 26, 2008) (providing that an

approved JD “can be relied upon ... for five years.”).

Moreover, in many cases, once a jurisdictional

assessment is made, that determination

automatically triggers additional restrictions under

state law, further limiting permissible uses of the

land. See e.g., Barnum Timber Co. v. Environmental

4 Given how difficult it is for an ordinary person to understand

the geographical reach of the CWA, most landowners will—as a

practical matter—rely on the Corps’ assessment. The Corps

acknowledges that few landowners even seek to appeal an

initial jurisdictional assessment within the agency. Pet.

Opening Br. at 5-6.

Protection Agency, 633 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2013)

(holding that a landowner had standing to challenge

EPA action under the CWA because it triggered

restrictions under California law, which resulted in

devaluation of the property's value).

Yet, even if the owner should disagree with

the Corps’ conclusion that the land contains

jurisdictional waters, the owner is practically bound.

No reasonable person would proceed with

development plans within an area deemed

jurisdictional by the Corps without. either

(a) obtaining a judicial decision making clear that

the property is non-jurisdictional, or (b) obtaining a

federal permit to proceed. Any competent attorney

would emphatically counsel against ignoring an

affirmative JD because—once the Corps has made

known its position that the property contains

jurisdictional waters—a violation would no longer be

deemed negligent.

At that point an unpermitted discharge would

be deemed a “knowing violation,” which would

almost assuredly mean heavier civil penalties, if not

criminal liability. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (authorizing

penalties of up to $50,000 per day, and

imprisonment for up to three years, for knowing

violations). And it can be no answer that EPA and

the Corps might choose—in their benevolent

discretion—to show restraint because they are

statutorily bound to enforce the CWA. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(a)(3) (providing that when EPA “finds that

any person is in violation” of the CWA, the agency

“shall issue an order requiring such person to comply

with [the Act] [and typically ordering the owner to

10

pay for environmental remediation], or ... shall bring

a civil action [to enforce the Act].”). To be sure, the

EPA made a similar argument in Sackett, suggesting

it only rarely seeks the statutory maximum when

bringing a civil action, to which Justice Scalia

quipped: “I’m not going to bet my house on that.”

Transcript of Oral Argument at 30-31, Sackett, 132

S. Ct. 1367 (No. 10-1062).

ii. Without Opportunity for Pre-

Enforcement Judicial

Review, a Landowner’s Only

Choice is to Abandon

Development Plans or to

Pursue a Costly Permit

In this case, as in Sackett, the property owner

maintains that the agency has wrongfully asserted

jurisdiction. If that is true, then the agency utterly

lacks any basis in the law to regulate the subject

property at all.5 See Bernard H. Siegan, PROPERTY

RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 16-17 (2001)

(explaining due process requires that a deprivation

of property rights be founded in “legitimately

enacted law.”). But by virtue of the Corps’

affirmative JD the owner is understandably afraid to

proceed with development plans because the agency

has implicitly threatened an enforcement action if he

or she should disregard the Corps’ determination. As

in Sackett, the agency means to “scare the owners

into compliance—regardless of whether their

5 Moreover, the facts alleged in a complaint must be presumed

true at this stage of litigation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

663 (2009).

11

property [is] [or is not] a jurisdictional wetland...”

Damien M. Schiff, Luke A. Wake, Leveling the

Playing Field in David v. Goliath: Remedies to

Agency Overreach, 17 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 97, 123

(2012).

In Sackett, this Court unequivocally rejected

the suggestion that an individual should have to risk

the threat of an enforcement action and “wait for the

agency to drop the hammer” in order to obtain

judicial review. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372. That was

deemed an inadequate remedy because it would

expose the Sacketts to “tens of thousands of dollars

in civil penalties per day...” Jd. at 1374 (Ginsburg,

J., concurring). A requirement to risk ruinous

penalties in order to have an opportunity to contest

an erroneous assertion of jurisdiction is simply

“unthinkable” “[i]n a nation that values due process,

not to mention private property...” Jd. at 1375 (Alito,

J., concurring); see also Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.

123, 146-47 (1908).

But here the Corps maintains that immediate

judicial review of an affirmative jurisdictional

determination is inappropriate because’ the

Respondent may obtain judicial review after

“applying ... for a permit and then filing suit under

the APA if [the application] is denied...” Sackett, 132

S. Ct. at 1372. While the Court was unanimous in

holding this an insufficient remedy in Sackett, the

Corps maintains that the prospect of judicial review

of a permit denial should be sufficient here

because—unlike in Sackett—no compliance order

has been issued. Pet. Opening Br. at 42-43. Thus the

agency maintains that Respondents, Hawkes Co.

12

Inc, et al. (Hawkes), stand in a different position

than the Sacketts because: (a) the company has not

been required to remediate any alleged violation;

and (b) in the absence of a compliance order, Hawkes

has no special burden to meet in order to qualify for

a Section 404 permit. Yet this misses the point

entirely because it ignores the reality that the Corps’

assertion of jurisdiction has already interfered with

the owner's right to freely use and enjoy the

property.

1. Individual Permits Are

Exorbitantly Expensive

The reality is that when faced with an

affirmative JD, a small business landowner has only

one option if pre-enforcement judicial review is

unavailable. The owner must submit to a potentially

illegally imposed regulatory regime.* Accordingly,

most small business property owners will feel

compelled to either abandon whatever development

plans they might have in mind, or to pursue a

federal permit to carry-out those plans. Either way,

their constitutionally protected common law

property rights are infringed, as if the property was

deemed subject to a federal conservation easement.

6 The owner is faced with a Hobson’s choice: either (a) ignore

the jurisdictional determination, and risk crippling daily fines

and or imprisonment, or; (b) submit to a potentially unlawful

regulatory regime. This is an ultimatum with constitutionally

repugnant choices on both sides of the equation. Yet, to the

extent a choice must be made, any reasonable person would

yield to the Corps’ implicit directive to either: (i) leave the

affected portions of the land undeveloped, or (ii) pursue a

permit.

13

To be sure, if CWA jurisdiction is assumed

without opportunity for judicial review, the owner

has no choice but to operate within that regulatory

framework. Under such a regime the owner is no

longer free to proceed even with the most basic of

plans. Something as simple as laying down mulch

would be considered a “discharge of pollutants,” and

might result in crippling penalties. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(6). For this reason, the owner must be

abundantly sure that he or she is covered by either a

general or individual permit for any contemplated

use.

In this case the Corps told Hawkes that it

would need a special permit, which would cost over

$100,000. Reply Br. of Resp. at 11. But, as of 2002

the average cost of pursuing an individual permit

was $271,596. With inflation that figure must be

adjusted upward to $357,826.7 These figures include

the cost of man-hours invested in working toward

permit approval, as well as the cost of hiring outside

experts to assist with compliance—including

environmental testing and project redesigns.

Sunding & Zilberman, The Economics of

Environmental Regulation by Licensing: An

Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland

Permitting Process, 42 Natural Resources J. 59, 60

(2002).

Further, these regulatory hurdles prevent the

owner from beginning any sort of development for

7 Amicus relies on the CPI Inflation Calculator provided by the

U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, available

online at http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation calculator.htm (last

visited Feb. 29, 2016).

14

years at a time. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721 (noting

that individual permits take on average 788 days).

And that is assuming the Corps might eventually

issue a permit. But, until the Corps deems a permit

application complete, there is no end to the

permitting process. Sunding & Zilberman, 42

Natural Resources J. at 64. For the affected

landowner, that means development rights are

restricted indefinitely. Cf. Moore v. United States,

943 F. Supp. 603, 612 (E.D. Va. 1996) (recounting

testimony from former officials that—in order to

avoid judicial review—the Corps rarely denies a

permit application outright, but will instead

typically request “more and more information ...

until eventually the applicant loses. staying

power...”).

2. General Permits Burden

Constitutionally

Protected Property

Rights

The Corps seeks to downplay’ these

compliance costs, in part by insisting that

“individual permits are the exception, not the rule,

especially for smaller projects likely to be

undertaken by individuals or small businesses.” Pet.

Br. at 47. Instead the Corps suggests that most

small projects may be carried out under a “general

permit,” which authorizes “specific categor[ies] of

activities deemed to have minimal [environmental]

impacts.” H. Michael Keller, Look Before You Fill!

Dredge and Fill Permitting Under § 404 of the Clean

Water Act, 17-Nov. Utah Bar B.J. 26, 32 (2004).

Accordingly, a landowner might proceed with a

15

specified project under a general permit, but only if

he or she is sure that the project is fully compliant

with regulatory restrictions imposed as a condition of

the Corps’ approval. Id.

The situation is no different than if municipal

authorities should purport to impose zoning

restrictions on a specific parcel while denying the

owner the right to contest the validity of those

restrictions.’ In this case, however, the landowner

risks losing his or her home, or going to jail, if he or

she should choose to ignore the authorities. To be

sure, the landowner is not at all free—under this

imposed regime—to exercise common law property

rights. The requirement to obtain a general permit

means that the landowner may only use the property

on the Corps’ terms. Steven G. Davison, General

Permits Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 26

Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 35, 68 (2009).

Thus for example, the owner may not initiate

many projects without first providing the Corps with

8 There is no requirement to apply for a permit in order to ripen

a due process claim. Such a claim ripens as soon as the

restriction is definitively imposed. See Murphy v. New Milford

Zoning Comm'n, 402 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding a

restriction may be challenged immediately if there is no

procedure for variance); see also Harris v. Cty. of Riverside, 904

F.2d 497, 501 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing a ripe due process

claim where landowner was “deprived of the commercial use of

his land and [required to] pay $2,400 to $3,000 to either regain

that use, or prompt the County to make a final determination

of how he can use the land.”); Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v. City

of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding a

due process claim ripe because the landowner was “placed in a

position where he would be required to expend considerable

time, effort, and money to restore the quo ante.”).

16

pre-construction notice at least 30 days. Jd. at 69-70.

For some projects a general permit will only be

issued with express authorization from the agency—

meaning that the Corps will scrutinize the project,

and may require the owner to alter development

plans to minimize potential impacts, or may impose

other conditions restricting permissible uses as

deemed appropriate to protect natural resources. Jd.

at 70. For that matter, most general permit

authorizations are conditioned on a requirement

that the project must not affect more than one-

quarter acre of land. Sunding & Zilberman, 42

Natural Resources J. at 65.

Further, some general permits require specific

design elements—which may require costly project

modifications. Id. at 66 (explaining a requirement

mandating vegetative buffers) And many are

expressly conditioned on a requirement that the

owner must pay to mitigate any perceived impact on

wetlands. Davison, 26 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. at 57.

Thus notwithstanding the fact that a landowner

might adamantly disagree with the Corps’ assertion

of CWA jurisdiction, the owner can only proceed

under such a general permit to the extent he or she

properly pays to mitigate for the alleged

environmental impact—which necessarily imposes

substantial costs.

8 By contrast, other general permits are deemed automatically

granted if the owner proceeds in accordance with the stipulated

conditions. Jd. at 67. But if the Corps makes no individualized

determination as to whether such a general permit should be

issued, then Amicus questions what event would ever trigger

an opportunity for judicial review under the Corps’ theory that

an approved JD may not be challenged in court?

17

And speaking of compliance costs, it is

disingenuous for the Corps to suggest that general

permitting costs are insignificant.!° While it is true

that the process of obtaining a general permit is

more streamlined, the costs are still substantial. As

of 2002 the average cost of a general permit was

$28,915—which amounts to $38,095 in 2016.!!

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721. Such a toll on the right to

use one’s own property can hardly be considered

inconsequential, especially if the requirement is

imposed without any legitimate basis in the law.

10 Also the process is not as straightforward as the Corps would

suggest. For ranchers, farmers, and other ordinary landowners

the process of obtaining a general permit may seem

bewildering. They will typically either rely on direction from

the Corps as to whether they may proceed with a contemplated

project, or will be forced to invest limited time and energy

trying to sort through available guidance, which in all

likelihood will be difficult for someone who is not already well

versed in the intricacies of environmental law.

11 “The range of NWP costs was between $2,000 and $140,076

for $2,635 and $184,549 with inflation]; the median cost was

$11,800 for $15,546 in 2016].” Sunding & Zilberman, 42

Natural Resources J. at 74.

18

Il. The Administrative Procedures Act

Should Not be Construed in a Manner

that Would Facilitate Violations of Due

Process

A. The Agency Inappropriately

Presupposes its Jurisdictional

Powers

The Corps maintains that its jurisdictional

determinations have no legal effect whatsoever. Pet.

Opening Br. at 27. This poker face argument

proceeds on the theory that it was Congress—not the

agency—that chose to impose development

restrictions on the subject property. On this view the

Corps is merely the harbinger of bad news when it

determines that a property contains jurisdictional

waters. But this is a straw man argument. The

Corps never responds to the contention that the

agency has unlawfully asserted regulatory authority

over the property in question.

Instead the Corps engages in question-begging

in much the same way as EPA did when defending

its contention that landowners had no opportunity

for judicial review of an enforcement order. Sackett,

132 S. Ct. at 1373. As in Sackett, the agency

stubbornly defies “the APA’s presumption of

reviewability for all final agency action[.]” 132. S. Ct.

at 1374. But at least in Sackett the agency

attempted to offer a textual argument for why

Congress might not have wanted to allow judicial

review—though this Court ultimately found it

uncompelling. Jd. at 1373-74. Yet, unlike in Sackett,

the agency defends its prerogative to evade judicial

19

review in this case merely be doubling-down on its

(potentially errant) assertion that the property

contains jurisdictional waters.

The Corps operates as if its determination of

jurisdiction is beyond reproach. But the agency is far

from infallible, and may be wrongly asserting

jurisdiction here. See e.g., Res. Investments, Inc., 85

Fed. Cl. at 461-62. (noting that the Corps held up a

project for approximately a decade _ after

“unreasonabl[y] assert{ing] jurisdiction...”). And if

the assertion of regulatory power over this property

is wrongful then the Corps’ JD is the source of the

legal injury—not any act of Congress. But until an

Article III Court is allowed to review the agency’s

assertion of jurisdiction it cannot be said whether or

not the subject property really is subject to the

CWA’s restrictions. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.

(1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803) (holding that executive

actors are “officers of the law[,]” and that their

actions are subject to judicial review when an

individual's rights are affected).

B. It is the Exclusive Role of the

Courts to Determine Legal Rights

and Obligations

Under Article III, it is the role of the courts to

determine questions of federal law, affecting the

rights of individuals, because otherwise’ the

executive would be allowed to act unchecked—

outside the law. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co., 298 U.S.

38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis J., concurring) (“The

supremacy of law demands that there shall be

opportunity to have some court decide whether an

20

erroneous rule of law was applied...”). A corollary

principle is that an individual has a fundamental

right to judicial review when his or her federal rights

are adversely affected by final agency action. See

Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253

U.S. 287, 289 (1920); Cf., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,

14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 330-31 (1816) (concluding

that federal courts must be authorized to hear

federal claims). Especially “[w]hen dealing with

constitutional rights... [due process demands that]

there [] be [an] opportunity of presenting ... [to a

court] every question of law raised...” St. Joseph

Stock Yards Co., 298 U.S. at 77 (1936) (Brandeis J.,

concurring); see also Sir. William Blackstone, 1

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON

THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 137 (Oxford, Clarendon

Press, 1765-69) (commenting on Chapter 29 of

Magna Carta: “A third subordinate right of every

Englishman is that of applying to the courts of

justice for redress of injuries.”) (alteration of

original).

Thus judicia: review is imperative for any

executive determination of an individual's rights or

obligations where a violation of due process would

result from an errant determination.!? And that is

necessarily the case where the agency's

determination effectively deprives an individual of

liberty, or impairs property rights, without any

legitimate basis in the law. See Nathan S. Chapman

12 Marbury emphasized that “where there is a legal right, there

is also a legal remedy[,]” and thai “the very essence of civil

liberty consists in the right ... to claim the protection of the

laws...” 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163.

21

& Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation

of Powers, 121 Yale LJ. 1672, 1679 (2012)

(“Fundamentally, ‘due process’ meant that the

government may not interfere with established legal

rights without legal authorization...”). Accordingly,

the Corps’ position, in this case, raises grave due

process concerns because it seeks to insulate its

jurisdictional determination from judicial review—

notwithstanding the reality that it has decided upon

a question of law both as to the reach of its authority

and the application of restrictions on the subject

property.

Crowell v. Benson is instructive. 285 U.S. 22

(1932). The case concerned the proper application of

the Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, which

vested a commissioner of the Department of Labor

with authority to issue compensation awards in

cases where an employee was injured in the course

of work occurring upon the “navigable waters of the

United States.” This jurisdictional provision was not

merely a statutory restriction on the commissioner’s

authority, but also a constitutional limit. Jd. at 54-

55. Accordingly, in Crowell, an employer sought to

contest a compensation award on the ground that

the claimant’s injury did not occur during the course

of employment within the “navigable waters of the

United States.” Jd. Writing for the Court, Chief

Justice Hughes, was emphatic in affirming the

prerogative of the courts in determining whether the

executive branch had reached beyond its jurisdiction.

Id. at 56; see also Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 US.

276, 285-86 (1922) (holding that due process requires

an opportunity to contest an alleged ultra vires

executive decision affecting liberty or property).

22

These cases affirm that to deny the

opportunity for judicial review would be to deny due

process of law. For this reason the Administrative

Procedures Act must be interpreted—under the

canon of avoidance—so as to allow an affected

landowner an immediate right of judicial review

once the Corps issues a final determination that his

or her property is subject to CWA regulation. See

Crowell, 285 U.S. at 62 (construing a statute as

authorizing judicial review to avoid due process

concerns); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,

419 U.S. 102, 124-25, 134 (1974) (rejecting an

interpretation of the Rail Act that would deny a

judicial remedy for parties alleging a violation of

constitutional rights, in part because of the “grave”

constitutional problems that would arise). This is

imperative both to protect the constitutional rights

of individuals and to ensure that the Corps is acting

within the law.

CONCLUSION

This Court should hold that landowners may

seek judicial review under the Administrative

Procedures Act once the Corps issues an affirmative

JD, and affirm the judgment of the Eighth Circuit.

23

Respectfully submitted,

Luke A. Wake

Counsel of Record

NFIB SMALL BUSINESS LEGAL CENTER

921 11th Street, Suite 400

Sacramento, CA 95814

(916) 448-9904 (Telephone)

(615) 916-5104 (Facsimile)

Luke.Wake@nfib.org

Karen R. Harned

NFIB SMALL BUSINESS LEGAL CENTER

1201 F Street, NW, Suite 200

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 314-5048 (Telephone)

(615) 916-5104 (Facsimile)

Karen.Harned@nfib.org

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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