Amicus Curiae Brief — U.S. Army Corp of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015) (No. 15-290)

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No. 15-290 a

FILED

nan

KT HK 2 2c ")

In The OFFICE OF THT oir ty

Supreme Court of the Anited States

SJ

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,

Petitioner,

Vv.

HAWKES CO., INC., ET AL.,

Respondents.

+

On Writ Of Certiorari To The

United States Court Of Appeals

For The Eighth Circuit

S

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF

MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

«

STEVEN J. LECHNER

Counsel of Record

GINA M. CANNAN

MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION

2596 South Lewis Way

Lakewood, Colorado 80227

(303) 292-2021

lechner@mountainstateslegal.com

gina@mountainstateslegal.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225 6964

WWW .COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the United States Army Corps of Engi-

neers’ determination that the property at issue con-

tains “waters of the United States” protected by the

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7); see 33 U.S.C.

§ 1251 et seq., constitutes “final agency action for

which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,”

5 U.S.C. § 704, and is therefore subject to judicial

review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5

U.S.C. § 701 et seq.

li

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED......................::ceceeeeeees i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................cccccceseeeeeees iv

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS

SETI incssesssicedinninishdinbiuishabieiiiiiinseenitihdanabitiipmaiiniatins 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.........................0.200 3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......0..............cceeeees 4

EE vcistrsttpncecegititsavtsaidunintuniimmnuniniianeuies 6

I. THE APA PROVIDES A BROAD PRE-

II.

ITI.

SUMPTION FAVORING JUDICIAL RE-

VIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ....

A JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION

UNDER THE CWA IS THE QUINTES-

SENTIAL FINAL AGENCY ACTION

SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW UN-

Fy ee veccndsncicinstcnatenmnentintcicocerneiie

A. A Jurisdictional Determination Is Fi-

ee I aicintitnttesiniinntertanincnnemne

B. There Is No Adequate Remedy In

Court Following The Issuance Of A

Jurisdictional Determination..............

THE CORPS’ ATTEMPT TO LIMIT

JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE APA

TO AGENCY ACTIONS THAT COMPEL

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS UNSUP-

PORTED BY THE CASE LAW AND IS

IN DEROGATION OF PRIVATE PROP-

er CIE setevscencssnmnansomesesesesmentniienes

11

11

21

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS -— Continued

Page

IV. BROAD JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY

ACTION SERVES IMPORTANT PUBLIC

PS TIE i iccrscnsceseccccncsevecenssesien 28

NP ceiialiiidssicsiitsninveinnitciinnniiinniniaiinnsinmennse 34

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136

STI ediciideiisiasbidniddenintansnnianimasessnndsansinbinaneuienian passim

Appalachian Power Co. v. E.P.A., 208 F.3d 1015

I TUITITTTTITTTTTT iis cesenieiiastieslbiihendiabldnadbanmaniddneniing 26, 30

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................008 17

Barrick Goldstrike Mines Inc. v. Browner, 215

I i ani aciiniericliinteenwniduniitids 14, 29

Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773 (1983).............c0c00+- 16

Belle Co., L.L.C. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engi-

neers, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014).....................000 4

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) ............... passim

Better Gov't Ass’n v. Dept. of State, 780 F.2d 86

i aclsinennl 29

Bland v. United States, 412 U.S. 909 (1973)....... 11, 23

Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467

I ieee ase natin databamnineis 7

Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. SEC, 883

ET Re ee 11

Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988)........... 23

Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physi-

A ree Ie GE tcicciienitteinersnecsnsecnnsnscnssnconnes 7

Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).................00088 9

Center for Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509

F.3d 1310 (10th Cir. 2007) ............0200.0000000.. 15, 16, 26

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430 (D.C.

GAIT Ga scssosinssnosececinsssedpesisebunscusatiaiaiamiadiaiest Aaa 11, 30

Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993) ............... 10, 22

Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.,___. U.S. __, 133

hs CR, Be iiccctinscsicccncninceenctenpiininiabialiniiimmaaiaa 2,19

Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).................. 7

In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015) ...................cceeee

ETC. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232

Fier ovecscssenscsensienasicniiasiaiunsiaaieansenaisaaiaaiiaan 13, 14

Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps

of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 2008)............... 4,17

First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Comptroller of

Currency of U.S., 956 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir.

ITT vsisccsscnsnssevatcsnsnensinnininisiammieinsadeiaidiiinman 19, 29

Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788

Coie vchicesensiestasnnmneieiiiiniasacuiiineaminiiammaaadaiial 11, 14, 15

Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Over-

sight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010)................ccccccse00 20, 25

Frozen Food Exp. v. United States, 351 U.S. 40

iia el ccavisicesesnecesensstetnaiiemseenationanaienimiaaaas 18

Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102

Pie sccccccssiccccsnnsesesssstnneiininieninanneienaiiaaanniaa 31

Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578

FIED incvecenussesosontennnennnntiniiiemanmiinapeiiahelaaa seus aaeanas 15

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)..............0cccceeee 9

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F.3d 809 (6th Cir.

iat rrcenerenannnnnaneennennsenens 2, 25

Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y,

errant 7

Johnson v. U.S. EPA, No. 15-147 (D. Wyo.)................. 2

Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.

eee enamine 27, 28

Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.0.C., __. U.S. __,

ee 7

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137

I ata a esintaenmannnanenenninnnnel 8

Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 670

F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2011), as amended (Mar. 7,

EEE ESTEE Ee 2, 26

Mount Royal Joint Venture v. Kempthorne, 477

ncn erntanaancitnnnennesenenes 2

Mountain States Legal Found. v. Nat. Wildlife

Ey Cy EIT cccecescnscccenscascenssseenensesccces 2

Nat'l Ass’n of Home Builders v. E.P.A., 667 F.3d

i ererertenene 19

Nat'l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers, 417 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir.

aera mnnnenernnannnens 26

Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)................... 17

Northcoast Environmental Center v. Glickman,

196 F.3d GEO (Sti Cir. 1906) ..........ccccccccccccccccsccceees. 24

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Northwest Mining Ass’n v. Babbitt, 5 F. Supp.

I i a a 2

Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest

Service, 465 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006)...................... 26

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393

icici acca iaiaclaae 27

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715

IT iiconsdintehabaaiiipeiisdeisiianiaeidaiimsbdiibagiaiindadindieiiuii 2, 31, 32, 33

Riverside Irr. Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508

IR aici hich ial iale ad tian aadidl 2

Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962) ............cccccccceceeeeeeeees i)

Sackett v. E.PA., 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012)............ passim

Shuler v. Babbitt, 49 F.Supp. 2d 1165 (D.

Ssetic IIIT ticitsiiiineieiiteiiasiheieeminneabnaiiniasa 2

Sierra Club v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Comm’n, 825 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1987).................. 17

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159

Serie tciciensininrapmeuniaialibhtietintiaicinaammeaiatieiaasiinameasiitiidinsiia 33

Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) .................. 25

Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 988 F. Supp. 1055

Se Ses Ti a cinpiuitchnnnstidsenecinnsinseienndmaiennnianadesingibei 2

In re U.S. Dep't of Def., U.S. EPA Final Rule:

Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of

U.S., No. 15-3839, 2016 WL 723241, at *1

4 ee 2,31

eer

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v. Glickman,

123 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1997).............ccccccsesssereeessees 23

Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,

ee ee ee itccninenasnsnatsereniiteneninaniennsnensemmens 18

STATUTES

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et

GBD. cccnnnscecncesssnnsesesessscnsnserenssnnsvensscsacanessenesnsnente passim

ET OF Wl ntistncmnesicnsininnnienennninienaninenisnmicmnusianbin 7

ee BD diicinctincsinnnicinctnitnnsssinenitiainiamsitininiinianiiie 7

ee Be cniccrnninccchenitissiceniinininabeinicuiniinisiid 6,9

SEE an TTT cccrinnsiienienenanditnnadintdpintineummmneenindaell 9

eS OF See iataniivitisinienincennicnnaniinnvitispinnintiieiiags passim

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. ......... passim

Re 3

I A SEIT sciicenismccniendattcncsiitincciiieinninsiiiciniiiingn 22

fe ee 3, 14, 22

ey Oe STEED ncnnnesnensnsesentonnniesitnenioimenementaneani 22

ee Ue i ciiconidvtnnndesininesceninnnevintininineeniebniananiiagl 3

ey Ur TUITE Niiicicinnincciiniceinitinisiesiiniesineihitateaadiadaicaniaatinniaantie 19

RULES

SS TEE 1

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Supreme Court Rule 37.3(a)...................sssssssesseeeeeeeeeees 1

Ee een 17

REGULATIONS

I ll 4

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Administrative Procedure Act, Hearings on

H.R. 184, H.R. 339, H.R. 1117, H.R. 1203,

H.R. 1206, and H.R. 2602 Before the H.

Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong., Ist

nts CERT tisichisinistnsiitiuiiridaihdieaiaandienteinitinmiogndannensenes 10

Administrative Procedure Act: Hearings on S. 7

Before the House and Senate, 79th Cong. 2d

I 8, 10

Final Report of Attorney General’s Comm. on

Administrative Procedure, S. Doc. No. 8

SETAE EE ee a Te 10

f 5 5 = TTT CENTER 7,8,9

Be Se icnenececncmenennicreenmennennteneeal 8, 31

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Attorney General’s Manual on the Administra-

tive Procedure Act, 94 (1947) ..........cccccccccccsecceeeceeees 23

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

E. Gates Garrity-Rokous, Preserving Review of

Undeclared Programs: A Statutory Redefini-

tion of Final Agency Action, 101 Yale L. J.

Richard E. Levy et al., Administrative Proce-

dure and the Decline of the Trial, 51 U. Kan.

Bis Se EEE chiiieieriniintadutsinnniuenenninnonssiananmaeasuel 28

1

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF

MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION

IN SUPPORT OF HAWKES

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3, Mountain

States Legal Foundation (“MSLF”) respectfully sub-

mits this amicus curiae brief, on behalf of itself and

its members, in support of Respondents.’

°

IDENTITY AND INTEREST

OF AMICUS CURIAE

MSLF is a nonprofit, public-interest legal foun-

dation organized under the laws of the State of Colo-

rado. MSLF is dedicated to bringing before the courts

those issues vital to the defense and preservation of

individual liberties, the right to own and use proper-

ty, the free enterprise system, and limited and ethical

government. MSLF has members who reside, own

property, and work in all 50 states.

Since its creation in 1977, MSLF and its attor-

neys have been actively involved in litigation regard-

ing the proper interpretation and implementation of

the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C.

' Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3(a), all parties

consent to the filing of this amicus curiae brief. The undersigned

further affirms that no counsel for a party authored this brief in

whole or in part, and no person or entity, other than MSLF, its

members, or its counsel, made a monetary contribution specifi-

cally for the preparation or submission of this brief.

2

§ 551 et seg. E.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v.

Nat. Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 1020 (1990). In fact, a

substantial portion of the cases in which MSLF

attorneys provide representation involved clients who

are challenging agency action under the generous

judicial] review provisions of the APA. E.g., Herr v.

U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 2015);

Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236

(83d Cir. 2011), as amended (Mar. 7, 2012); Mount

Royal Joint Venture v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 745

(D.C. Cir. 2007); Northwest Mining Ass’n v. Babbitt, 5

F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1998); Shuler v. Babbitt, 49

F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Mont. 1998); Stupak-Thrall v.

Glickman, 988 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mich. 1997).

MSLIF and its attorneys have also been — and are

currently — involved in litigation regarding the proper

interpretation and implementation of the Clean

Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. E.g.,

Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.,__. U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct.

1326 (2013); Sackett v. EPA, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct.

1367 (2012); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715

(2006) (plurality); Riverside Irr. Dist. v. Andrews, 758

F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985); In re U.S. Dep't of Def., U.S.

EPA Final Rule: Clean Water Rule: Definition of

Waters of U.S., No. 15-3839, 2016 WL 723241 (6th

Cir. Feb. 22, 2016) (“In re: Definition of ‘Waters of the

United States’”); Johnson v. U.S. EPA, No. 15-147 (D.

Wyo.). MSLF brings a unique perspective to the case

at bar by addressing the APA’s presumption of judi-

cial review, the courts’ interpretation of the

APA as providing for broad judicial review, and the

3

importance of judicial review to protect private prop-

erty owners from unlawful agency action.

°

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The CWA grants the Corps jurisdiction to regu-

late discharges into navigable waters, or “waters of

the United States.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(7).

Under the CWA, a permit is required for certain

discharges into waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342. The CWA imposes fines and penalties for

unpermitted discharges, and knowing violations can

incur civil and/or criminal penalties to the tune of

$50,000 a day and up to three years imprisonment. 33

U.S.C. § 1819(c).

Hawkes Co., Inc. wishes to mine peat from a 530-

acre property in northwestern Minnesota owned by

two affiliated companies (collectively, “Hawkes”).

Petitioner’s Appendix (“Pet. App.”) at la, 5a. Hawkes

met with the Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) to

discuss agency jurisdiction and, exercising an abun-

dance of caution, also applied for a CWA permit. Pet.

App. at 6a. The Corps issued an approved jurisdic-

tional determination concluding the subject property

was a water of the United States because of its “sig-

nificant nexus” to the Red River, a traditional navi-

gable water some 120 miles away. Pet. App. at 7a.

Hawkes timely filed an administrative appeal of the

approved jurisdictional determination. Pet. App. at

7a. On appeal, the jurisdictional determination was

4

reversed, but the Corps issued a revised jurisdictional

determination with essentially the same information

and findings.’ Pet. App. at 7a, 45a-47a.

Hawkes filed suit seeking judicial review of the

jurisdictional determination as a final agency action

under the APA. Joint Appendix (“Joint App.” at 7-8).

The Corps filed a motion to dismiss, and the district

court granted that motion. Pet. App. 20a-3la. The

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and rejected

the district court’s reliance on Fairbanks N. Star

Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586

(9th Cir. 2008) and Belle Co., L.L.C. v. Army Corps of

Engineers, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014) as contrary to

this Court’s decision in Sackett. Pet. App. lla-16a.

Under Sackett, the Eighth Circuit held that a juris-

dictional determination is a final agency action for

which there is no other adequate judicial remedy

under 5 U.S.C. § 704. Pet. App. 16a-17a. The Corps

timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari. To resolve

the circuit split, this Court granted certiorari.

+

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The narrow issue presented by this case is

whether the Corps has overcome the APA's strong

presumption favoring judicial review of agency action.

* The revised jurisdictional determination stated that it was

a “final Corps permit decision in accordance with 33 C.F.R.

§ 331.10.” Pet. App. at 45a.

5

As the legislative history of the APA demonstrates,

Congress intended the APA’s judicial review provi-

sions to be an important check on federal agencies’

proclivity to exercise their powers arbitrarily or

assume powers not granted. Indeed, Congress recog-

nized that, in some circumstances, judicial review

would be the only available protection against unwar-

ranted governmental expansion into citizens’ private

lives.

The practical effect of a jurisdictional determina-

tion demonstrates that it does not fall within one of

the APA’s limited, enumerated exceptions to judicial

review. The Corps’ argument that a jurisdictional

determination is not final agency action eschews the

pragmatic interpretation of finality mandated by this

Court, fails to appreciate the measurable legal conse-

quences that flow from issuance of a jurisdictional

determination, and ignores the Corps’ own treatment

of the jurisdictional determination as binding and

final. The direct and immediate impact of the juris-

dictional determination on Hawkes’ use of its private

property for peat mining ipso facto demonstrates that

such determination constitutes final agency action.

The thrust of the Corps’ argument rests on its

erroneous attempt to distinguish between agency

orders that compel affirmative action — which the

Corps concedes are subject to judicial review — and

agency orders that prohibit regulated parties from

taking otherwise lawful action, which the Corps

asserts are not subject to judicial review. The Corps’

view of the APA conflicts with countless other

6

interpretations of the finality requirement of 5 U.S.C.

§ 704 and ignores the fundamental right of property

owners to use their private property.

Finally, judicial review of agency actions such as

jurisdictional determinations serves important public

policy interests, especially in the context of agency

attempts to assert jurisdiction under the CWA. In the

absence of judicial review, agencies will be able to

strong-arm private property owners into compliance

with their decisions — no matter how arbitrary or

abusive — because of the lack of other adequate reme-

dies. Therefore, judicial review of jurisdictional

determinations is necessary to protect regulated

parties from agency overreach.

+

ARGUMENT

I. THE APA PROVIDES A BROAD PRESUMP-

TION FAVORING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION.

The APA provides a right of judicial review of all

“final agency action for which there is no other ade-

quate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704.’ Thus, the

* There are only two limited exceptions to the APA’s broad

provision of judicial review: (1) where the statute precludes

review; and (2) where agency action is committed to agency

discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a\(1), (2); Bennett v. Spear, 520

U.S. 154, 175 (1997) (“The APA, by its terms, provides a right to

judicial review of all ‘final agency action for which there is no

other adequate remedy in a court,’ and applies universally

(Continued on following page)

7

APA “creates a ‘presumption favoring judicial review

of administrative action. ’°” Sackett, 132 S.Ct. at

1373 (quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Insti-

tute, 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984)). Recently, this Court

unanimously emphasized that “Congress rarely

intends to prevent courts from enforcing its directives

to federal agencies. For that reason, this Court ap-

plies a ‘strong presumption’ favoring judicial review

of administrative action.” Mach Mining, LLC uv.

E.E.0.C., __. U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015)

(quoting Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family

Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)) (emphasis

added). And while the presumption is rebuttable, the

agency bears a “‘heavy burden’” to show that a

plaintiff is not entitled to judicial review. Jd. (quoting

Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975));

Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S.

221, 230 n.4 (1986) (holding that a “right of action” is

“expressly created” by 5 U.S.C. § 704 “absent some

clear and convincing evidence” to the contrary).

When Congress passed the APA, it did so in

hopes of reining in what President Roosevelt referred

to as the “‘fourth branch’ of the Government for

which there is no sanction in the Constitution.” S.

Doc. No. 79-248, at 299 (1946). Senator McCarran,

the architect of the bill, described one of the APA’s

four main functions as “set[ting] forth a simplified

‘except to the extent that [§ 701 applies).’”) (quoting 5 U.S.C.

§§ 704, 701(a)). The Corps has not asserted that either 5 U.S.C.

§ 701 exception applies here.

8

statement of judicial review designed to afford a

remedy for every legal wrong.” Administrative Proce-

dure Act: Hearings on S. 7 Before the House and

Senate, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 304 (1946) (“Hearings”)

(emphasis added). In recommending the bill to Con-

gress, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that

judicial review was “indispensable[,] since its mere

existence generally precludes the arbitrary exercise of

powers or assumption of powers not granted.” S. Rep.

No. 79-752, at 217 (1945). Congress’s adoption of the

APA recognized that judicial review is deeply rooted

in American jurisprudence, and to allow the “barnacle

growth” of unchecked agency authority could “foull ]”

“the ship of state” and “endanger| ]” “our institutions.”

S. Doc. No. 79-248, at 350 (1946); see also Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (“[WJhat

is there, in the exalted station of an officer, which

shall bar a citizen from asserting, in a court of justice,

his legal rights, or shall forbid a court to listen to the

claim ?”).

It is apparent from the APA’s legislative history

that Congress viewed judicial oversight of agency

actions as the central mechanism by which the APA

would protect Americans from agency overreach and

abuse. S. Doc. No. 79-248, at 305 (1946) (Senator

McCarran emphasizing that judicial review is “some-

thing in which the American public has been and is

much concerned, harkening back, if we may, to the

Constitution of the United States, which sets up the

judicial branch of the Government for the redress of

human wrongs and for the enforcement of human

9

rights.”); id. at 347 (Representative Michener stating

that “[t]he only aim and purpose of this bill is to see

that the rank and file of American people receive the

justice which our system of jurisprudence attempts to

guarantee to them.”). And this Court has consistently

interpreted the APA as requiring judicial review of

almost all agency actions. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470

U.S. 821, 843-44 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring)

(“The legislative material elucidating [the APAI]

manifests a congressional intention that it cover a

broad spectrum of administrative actions, and this

Court has echoed that theme by noting that the

[APA]’s ‘generous review provisions’ must be given

a ‘hospitable interpretation. ’°” (quoting Abbott

Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967),

overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430

U.S. 99 (1977))); Califano, 430 U.S. at 104 (The APA

“undoubtedly evinces Congress[’s] intention and

understanding that judicial review should be widely

available to challenge the actions of federal adminis-

trative officials.”).

Thus, the APA affords broad judicial review of

agency action unless: (1) the agency action is not

final; (2) existing statutes preclude judicial review; or

(3) the agency action is committed to agency discre-

tion by law. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(1), (2), 704. Only upon

a showing of “‘clear and convincing evidence’” that

one of these exceptions applies “should the courts

restrict access to judicial review.” Abbott Laborato-

ries, 387 U.S. at 141 (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U'S.

367, 379-80 (1962)). The limited exceptions to judicial

10

review in the APA demonstrate Congress’s intent that

such review serve as “a check against excess of power

and abusive exercise of power in derogation of private

right.” Final Report of Attorney General’s Comm. on

Administrative Procedure, S. Doc. No. 8, at 76 (1941);

see also Hearings at 307 (“In light of the great expan-

sion of governmental activities into the private lives

of our citizens, some protection of the citizen against

these agencies should be provided. It is long overdue.”

(statement of Sen. Reed)).

Congress also intended agency action to be

considered final for purposes of judicial review

“whether or not there has been presented or deter-

mined an application for a declaratory order, for any

form of reconsideration, or, unless the agency other-

wise requires by rule and provides that the action

meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior

agency authority.” 5 U.S.C. § 704; Administrative

Procedure Act, Hearings on H.R. 184, H.R. 339, H.R.

1117, H.R. 1203, H.R. 1206, and H.R. 2602 Before the

H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 76

(1945) ‘statement of Sen. McCarran); cf. Darby v.

Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 137 (1993) (federal courts do

not have the authority to require exhaustion of ad-

ministrative remedies before a plaintiff may seek

judicial review under the APA, where neither the

relevant statute nor agency rules specifically man-

date exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial review).

There is no indication in the legislative history that

Congress intended the finality requirement to be

applied in a “hypertechnical fashion” — to the contrary,

11

“the legislative history of [5 U.S.C.) § 704 suggestis]

that Congress was merely codifying the self-imposed

judicial practice of exercising restraint in reviewing

tentative agency action.” Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA,

801 F.2d 430, 435 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The APA’s

broad presumption of judicial review is therefore the

starting point for any inquiry regarding an agency’s

claim that its action is not yet final. Bland v. United

States, 412 U.S. 909, 912 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissent-

ing from denial of certiorari) (“[UJnder the [APA]

judicial review of the exercise of executive discretion

is the rule and unreviewability is the exception.”

(internal quotation omitted)).

Il. A JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION

UNDER THE CWA IS THE QUINTESSEN-

TIAL FINAL AGENCY ACTION SUBJECT

TO JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE APA.

A. AJurisdictional Determination Is Final

Agency Action.

Although judicial review under the APA is avail-

able only for “final” agency actions, 5 U.S.C. § 704,

the APA’s finality requirement is interpreted in a

“flexible” and “pragmatic way.” Abbott Laboratories,

387 U.S. at 149-51; see also Ciba-Geigy, 801 F.2d at

435 & n.7 (recognizing that 5 U.S.C. § 704 does not

“convey|] some settled, inflexible meaning that

precludes pragmatic or functional considerations.”);

Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. S.E.C., 883 F.2d

525, 530 (7th Cir. 1989) (“‘Finality is a practical

concept[ |” that takes into consideration whether the

12

regulated individual or entity must “dance to [the

agency's] tune”). The “core question” in determining

finality “is whether the agency has completed its

decisionmaking process, and whether the result of

that process is one that will directly affect the par-

ties.” Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 797

(1992). In Bennett, this Court synthesized its prior

precedents into a two-pronged inquiry, holding that

agency action is final if it: (1) represents the con-

summation of agency decision-making on the matter;

and (2) fixes legal rights or obligations, or is one from

which legal consequences will flow. 520 U.S. at 177-

78.

In the case at bar, the Corps concedes that the

first prong of the Bennett test is satisfied. Corps’ Br.

at 25-26. However, the Corps argues that an approved

jurisdictional determination under the CWA is not

final because it does not “impose legal consequences”

under the second Bennett prong. Corps’ Br. at 26. The

Corps’ argument eschews a “pragmatic” interpreta-

tion of the finality requirement in favor of a rigid

view that requires the plaintiff to demonstrate “legal

consequences” or “penalties” as a result of the agency

action. Corps’ Br. at 26. Under the Corps’ myopic

interpretation, the jurisdictional determination is

divorced from the CWA — the statute under which

the Corps issued the jurisdictional determination in

the first place ~— because any obligation to avoid

discharge of pollutants into “waters of the United

States” flows independently from the CWA itself,

rather than the jurisdictional determination. Corps’

13

Br. at 27. According to the Corps, the jurisdictional

determination merely expresses the Corps’ opinion

that a pre-existing obligation to avoid such discharges

exists. Corps’ Br. at 27-28.

In determining whether the agency action at

issue “fixes legal rights or obligations,” or is one from

which legal consequences flow, Bennett, 520 U.S. at

177-78, this Court looks primarily to whether the

agency's position is “definitive” and whether it has a

“‘direct and immediate effect on the day-to-day

business’” of the parties challenging the action. F-'T:C.

v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 239 (1980)

(quoting Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 152). Final

agency actions have “the status of law” and “immedi-

ate compliance with their terms [is] expected.” Abbott

Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 152. A jurisdictional deter-

mination is clearly “definitive” in that it is the agen-

cy’s final word on a specific property’s jurisdictional

status, and such determination will not be reconsid-

ered during the CWA permitting process. Sackett, 132

S. Ct. at 1374 (agency’s determination “that it has

regulatory authority over [the] property” is a “defini-

tive[ ]” ruling on that question) (Ginsburg, J., concur-

ring). A jurisdictional determination also clearly

conveys the impression that “compliance [is] expected”

because the Corps does not contend that private

property owners are free to disregard the jurisdic-

tional determination and commence peat mining

without consequences. See Abbott Laboratories, 387

U.S. at 151. To the contrary, violations for discharges

into waters of the United States without a permit can

14

incur civil and/or criminal penalties of $50,000 a day

and up to three years imprisonment. See 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(c). As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, where a

landowner “will be subject to an enforcement action

and fines” if it does not conform to the agency’s view —

here, that Hawkes’ property contains jurisdictional

wetlands — then “the finality of [the agency’s] position

is clear enough.” Barrick Goldstrike Mines Inc. v.

Browner, 215 F.3d 45, 47-48 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

This Court has also considered whether the

challenge to agency action presented a legal issue

“fit for judicial resolution” and whether the parties

bringing the challenge “represented almost all the

parties affected,” in which case, “‘a pre-enforcement

challenge [is] calculated to speed enforcement’ of the

relevant Act.” Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 239 (quoting

Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 150). A final agency

action is “‘a final and binding determination’” rather

than “‘a tentative recommendation. ’*” Bennett, 520

U.S. at 178 (quoting Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798). The

jurisdictional determination at issue here is analo-

gous to other final agency actions. For example, in

Bennett, the agency action at issue was a biological

opinion and accompanying incidental take statement

issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service (““FWS”).* Id.

* Notably, the biological opinion and incidental take state-

ment at issue in Bennett were far more attenuated than the

jurisdictional determination at issue here because they did not

purport to apply to individual regulated parties but instead

applied to other agencies. 520 U.S. at 157.

15

at 157. This Court held that the FWS’s action met the

second prong of its test because the action “alter/s]

the legal regime to which the action agency is subject,

authorizing it to take the endangered species if (but

only if) it complies with the prescribed conditions.”

Id. at 178. Much like the legal effects that flowed

from the biological opinion in Bennett, the legal

effects that flow from the jurisdictional determination

here is that Hawkes is ible to commence peat mining

activities if (but only if) it applies for and receives a

CWA permit. Petitioner’s Appendix (“Pet. App.”) at

lla-13a; see Pet. App. at 83a (Jurisdictional determi-

nation expressly rejecting Hawkes’ position that the

land at issue was not a “waters of the United States”).

Thus, the jurisdictional determination is “‘a final and

binding determination’” rather than “‘a tentative

recommendation[.]’” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178 (quot-

ing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798); see also Ciba-Geigy

Corp., 801 F.2d at 436 (“Once the agency publicly

articulates an unequivocal position and expects

regulated entities to alter their primary conduct to

conform to that position, the agency has voluntarily

relinquished the benefit of postponed judicial re-

view.”); Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S.

578, 586 (1980) (Agency’s decision was final when it

“rendered its last word on the matter.”).

An analogous circuit court decision is Center for

Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.3d 1310 (10th Cir.

2007), where the Forest Service had issued annual

operating instructions (“AOIs”) but not grazing per-

mits for a specific area. Jd. at 1328-29. Environmental

16

groups challenged the AOIs as final agency action

under the APA. Id. The Tenth Circuit held the second

prong of the Bennett test was satisfied because the

AOlIs set forth certain findings independent from —

and not available in — the grazing permits, and thus

conferred certain legal obligations. Jd. at 1330. The

court explained that AOIs are the agency’s “last word”

and “undoubtedly have clear and definite conse-

quences” on regulated parties. Id. The same rationale

is applicable to the jurisdictional determination here:

While a CWA permit has not yet been granted or

denied, the CWA permit process does not offer any

opportunity for revision of the jurisdictional determi-

nation, and the Corps characterizes the jurisdictional

determination as a discrete agency decision distinct

from a CWA permit. Corps’ Br. at 8-10.

Issuance of a jurisdictional determination also

“presents a ‘legal issue fit for judicial resolution.’”

Center for Native Ecosystems, 509 F.3d at 1330

(Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 239). The jurisdictional

determination at issue here is the Corps’ stand-alone

pronouncement of the jurisdictional status of Hawkes’

property. Corps’ Br. at 8-10. Thus, judicial review

would not disrupt any ongoing administrative pro-

cess. See Bel’ v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 779-80

(1983) (Agency action is final notwithstanding “[t]he

possibility of further proceedings in the agency” on

related issues, so long as “judicial review at the time

[would not] disrupt the administrative process.”).

The Corps argues that its jurisdictional determi-

nation is not final agency action because it is the

17

CWA that requires landowners to obtain permits to

discharge into waters of the United States, not the

jurisdictional determination. See Corps’ Br. at 27

This argument is unavailing, because it contradicts

the Corps’ treatment of jurisdictional determinations

as binding during its permit process.’ Compare Fair-

banks, 543 F.3d at 593 (“An approved jurisdictional

determination upheld on administrative appeal is

the agency’s ‘last word’ on whether it views the

property as a wetland subject to regulation under

the CWA.” (quoting Sierra Club v. U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Comm’n, 825 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir.

1987))), with Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178 (agency rec-

ommendations that are “binding” are final agency

action). An agency’s treatment of its own decision as

final is a clear indication that it is, in fact, final.

* Additionally, because Hawkes’ allegations must be taken

as true for purposes of the Corps’ motion to dismiss, this Court

must take as true Hawkes’ contention that their property does

not contain jurisdictional wetlands that fall within the definition

of “waters of the United States” under the CWA. See Joint App.

at 8; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 696 (2009) (in considering a

motion to dismiss, the court “assum[es] the factual allegations

are true”); Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (“Rule

12(bX(6) does not countenance dismissals based on a judge’s

disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations.”). Therefore, it is

the jurisdictional determination that (erroneously) purports to

impose a permitting requirement on Hawkes, not the CWA. Pet.

App. at 13a (“[TJhe {jurisdictional determination) alters and

adversely affects [Hawkes’s] right to use [its] property in

conducting a lawful business activity. The adverse effect is

caused by agency action, not simply by the existence of the

CWA..”).

18

Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S.

457, 478-79 (2001). Indeed, even where an agency

“has not dressed its decision with the conventional

procedural accoutrements of finality, its own behavior

[may] belly] the claim that its interpretation is not

final.” Jd. (holding that EPA’s “interim implementa-

tion policy” for national ambient air quality stan-

dards was final, given the agency’s refusal to

reconsider it in subsequent rulemakings, representa-

tion to commenters that its interpretation was con-

clusive, and adoption of the interpretation under the

heading “final decision”).

As a practical matter, the jurisdictional determi-

nation is final as to its effect on Hawkes’ inability to

use its property. Indeed, whether Hawkes chose to

apply for a permit or proceed with peat mining with-

out a permit and face the consequences, a jurisdic-

tional determination would undoubtedly form the

basis of the Corps’ permitting process or, alternative-

ly, the Corps’ enforcement action. See Frozen Food

Exp. v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 44 (1956) (Agency

decision is not “abstract, theoretical, or academic”

where it forms “the basis for [regulated entities] in

ordering and arranging their affairs.”). When an

agency decision is practically treated as final and

binding as to both the agency and regulated parties,

as jurisdictional determinations are, the impact “is

sufficiently direct and immediate as to render the

issue appropriate for judicial review. ” Abbott

Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 152.

19

Moreover, legal consequences flow from a site-

specific jurisdictional determination because it “sub-

stantially increase[s] the risk of regulation or en-

forcement relating to particular property. ™ Nat’

Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 667 F.3d 6, 13-14

(D.C. Cir. 2011); see also First Nat. Bank of Chicago v.

Comptroller of Currency of U.S., 956 F.2d 1360, 1364

(7th Cir. 1992) (holding that comptroller’s opinion

letter to bank was final agency action because “the

bank requested not advice, perhaps on a purely

hypothetical course of action, but permission to go

forward with a concrete proposal. The Comptrol-

ler turned the bank down. He did not offer a

merely tentative view.”). Thus, jurisdictional deter-

minations are not only “definitive,” but also have a

“direct and immediate effect on the day-to-day

business” of affected property owners because they

constitute direct pronouncements on the Corps’

jurisdiction over the subject property. See Abbott

Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 151-52.

The Corps repeatedly argues that, if judicial

review of jurisdictional determinations is permitted,

the Corps (and other agencies) will be discouraged

from issuing jurisdictional determinations or conducting

* As a practical matter, even if the Corps does not bring an

enforcement action, a jurisdictional determination ipso facto

subjects Hawkes to a greater risk of litigation under the CWA’s

citizen suit provisions because a decree that the subject property

contains waters of the United States would provide the basis for

such suit. 33 U.S.C. § 1365; see, e.g., Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1326.

20

other agency actions not mandated by statute. Corps’

Br. at 24-25 (Asserting that, if jurisdictional determi-

nations are considered final agency actions, “the

Corps might reconsider the practice, or at least revisit

its willingness to provide an approved jurisdictional

determination to anyone who requests it.”). However,

this is the exact same argument unanimously reject-

ed in Sackett, 132 S.Ct. at 1374, where the EPA

“warn(ed] that [it] is less likely to use [compliance]

orders if they are subject to judicial review.” This

Court reasoned, “[t]hat may be true — but it will be

true for all agency actions subjected to judicial re-

view. The APA’s presumption of judicial review is a

repudiation of the principle that efficiency of regula-

tion conquers all.” Jd. And, as with the compliance

order at issue in Sackett, judicial determinations will

remain an effective means of informing private

property owners of the presence of judicial waters of

the United States in cases where “there is no sub-

stantial basis to question their validity.” Jd. The

Corps’ desire to issue jurisdictional determinations

without fear of judicial review is not sufficient reason

to deprive Hawkes of its day in court. Cf. Free Enter.

Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.

477, 499 (2010) (“[T]hat a given law or procedure is

efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating func-

tions of government, standing alone, will not save it if

it is contrary to the Constitution, for convenience and

efficiency are not the primary objectives — or the

hallmarks — of democratic government.” (quotations

and alteration omitted)).

21

B. There Is No Adequate Remedy In

Court Following The Issuance Of A Ju-

risdictional Determination.

The APA provides that judicial review under the

APA is available where “there is no other adequate

remedy in a court. A preliminary, procedural, or

intermediate agency action or ruling not directly

reviewable is subject to review on the review of the

final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. The Corps argues

that, although Hawkes has exhausted its administra-

tive remedies and the jurisdictional determination

is now final, Hawkes has other adequate recourse

because it may now apply for a CWA permit.’ Corps’

Br. at 44-45. Then, the Corps argues, “[w]hen the

Corps denies a permit, or issues a permit subject to

conditions that the applicant opposes, the applicant

may seek judicial review of that decision” and may

argue at that time that the jurisdictional determina-

tion was erroneous. Corps’ Br. at 45.

” Alternatively, the Corps argues that Hawkes may decline

to apply for a permit and may wait for the Corps to bring an

enforcement action. Corps’ Br. at 50. Sackett essentially rejected

this option as an adequate remedy. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372

(noting that each day the regulated parties “wait for the agency

to drop the hammer” following the issuance of a compliance

order, “exorbitant civil and criminal penalties accrue”); see also

id. at 1375 (The CWA’s “draconian penalties for the sort of

violations alleged in this case” leave property owners “with little

practical alternative but to dance to the [agency’s] tune.”) (Alito,

J., concurring).

22

As a preliminary matter, the very fact that the

Corps has an administrative appeal process in place

to review jurisdictional determinations and that

Hawkes exhausted its administrative remedies

counsels in favor of judicial review. Darby v. Cisneros,

509 U.S. 137, 146 (1993) (“When an aggrieved party

has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly

prescribed by statute or agency rule, the agency

action is ‘final for purposes of [5 U.S.C. § 704) and

therefore ‘subject to judicial review. ’°” (quoting 5

U.S.C. §704)). Furthermore, the Corps’ proffered

“remedy” would be onerous and wasteful, and it fails

to address Hawkes’ contention that it is not legally

required to apply for a CWA permit in the first place.*

Upon receiving the Corps’ judicial determination,

Hawkes would face the unenviable choice of either

proceeding with the CWA permit process — which

Corps employees advised Hawkes would be costly,

lengthy, and ultimately futile; see Pet. App. at 6a-7a —

or proceeding with peat mining activities and facing

civil and/or criminal penalties of up to $50,000 per

day for knowing violations of the CWA (not to men-

tion imprisonment for up to three years). See 33

U.S.C. § 1319(b), (c). Surely the APA’s provision of

judicial review sought to avoid exactly this Hobson’s

* As Judge Kelly noted in her concurrence below, “what

happens if Hawkes is, after all, granted a permit yet maintains

it never needed one in the first place? It must decline the permit

and challenge the original jurisdiction in court. This roundabout

process does not seem to be an ‘adequate remedy. ~’” Pet. App.

at 20a.

23

Choice. See Bland, 412 U.S. at 912 (Douglas, J.,

dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“One needs no

reminder that government too can be lawless, that

government cannot lead the way in law and order

when it is the great malefactor. The [APA] is indeed

part of the citizen’s arsenal against lawless govern-

ment.”).

According to this Court, the “adequate remedy”

requirement merely “makes it clear that Congress did

not intend the general grant of review in the APA to

duplicate existing procedures for review of agency

action.” Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903

(1988). The Corps fails to explain how judicial review

of a jurisdictional determination would duplicate

existing procedures — there are no “special statutory

procedures” in place regarding jurisdictional deter-

minations. Id. Indeed, as the Corps vehemently

argues, there is no authorization in the CWA for

jurisdictional determinations at all. Corps’ Br. at 3-4.

Moreover, the Corps’ interpretation is in stark con-

trast to Congress’s clear intent in including the

“adequate remedy” proviso: “The second sentence of

[5 U.S.C. § 704) was designed ‘to negative any

intention to make reviewable merely preliminary or

procecural orders where there is a subsequent and

adequate remedy at law available. ’” Attorney

General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure

Act, 103 (1947) (quoting S. Doc. No. 79-248 at 37

(1946)) (listing as examples “intermediate orders such

as orders setting matters for hearing”); see, e.g.,

Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v. Glickman, 123

24

F.3d 1189, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 1997) (Forest Service's

notice proposing construction of an access road was

not final agency action because it was preliminary to

a decision whether to build the road); Northcoast

Environmental Center v. Glickman, 136 F.3d 660,

669-70 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the Forest Ser-

vice’s preliminary research and development efforts

to manage a specific tree do not constitute final

agency action). The jurisdictional determination at

issue was clearly not preliminary or intermediate. It

purports to settle, once and for all, the question of

whether the Corps has jurisdiction over Hawkes’

property under the CWA. By the Corps’ own charac-

terization, it was final and binding, Pet. App. at 45a,

and Hawkes exhausted the administrative review

process before filing suit. Pet. App. at 8a. Therefore,

the jurisdictional determination constituted final

agency action for which there was no other adequate

remedy, and the Corps has failed to overcome the

APA’s strong presumption of judicial review.

Ill. THE CORPS’ ATTEMPT TO LIMIT JUDI-

CIAL REVIEW UNDER THE APA TO

AGENCY ACTIONS THAT COMPEL AF-

FIRMATIVE ACTION IS UNSUPPORTED

BY THE CASE LAW AND IS IN DEROGA-

TION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS.

The court below properly rejected the Corps’

attempt to distinguish “between an agency order that

compels affirmative action, and an order that prohib-

its a party from taking otherwise lawful action.” Pet.

25

App. at lla. The Corps would have this Court effec-

tively limit Sackett to its facts and hold that, unless

an agency action immediately imposes civil and/or

criminal penalties on the regulated party, it is not

final agency action under the second Bennett prong.

See Corps’ Br. at 25-27 (arguing that, until the recipi-

ent of a jurisdictional determination discharges

pollutants at the relevant site and the agency decides

to initiate enforcement proceedings, agency action is

not final because the jurisdictional determination

“does not contain any directives” or “alter the land-

owner’s exposure to penalties”).’

The Corps’ proffered interpretation contradicts

the basic principle that a party “may challenge [a]

regulation without waiting for enforcement proceed-

ings.” Herr, 803 F.3d at 822 (“[Cjourts ‘normally do

not require plaintiffs to bet the farm by taking the

violative action before testing the validity of the

law.’” (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 490-91));

Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459-60 (1974)

* As the court below recognized, the jurisdictional determi-

nation does in fact alter Hawkes’ exposure to penalties. Pet. App.

at 14a-15a (“Because appellants were forthright in undertaking

to obtain a permit, choosing now to ignore the [jurisdictional

determination) and commence peat mining without the permit it

requires would expose them to substantial criminal monetary

penalties and even imprisonment for a knowing CWA viola-

tion.”). This impact is sufficient to render the jurisdictional

determination final agency action. See Sackett, 132 S.Ct. at

1372 (the fact that an agency action exposed the regulated

parties “to double penalties in a future enforcement proceed-

ing{ J” demonstrated that ‘he second Bennett prong was satisfied).

26

(plaintiff was not required to violate statute and risk

actual prosecution before he could seek a declaratory

judgment regarding the constitutionality of a stat-

ute). The Corps’ interpretation of the APA is also

contradicted by the lower courts’ frequent grants of

judicial review to challenges of agency action that do

not compel regulated parties to take affirmative

action. See, e.g., Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S.

Forest Service, 465 F.3d 977, 982-83 (9th Cir. 2006)

(rejecting agency's argument that action is not final

because it “is not a rule, order, license, sanction, or

relief[ ]”); Center for Native Ecosystems, 509 F.3d at

1330 (annual operating instructions are final because

they are “the last word before grazing begins and

undoubtedly have clear and definite consequences for

permittees, who need to make their plans based on

what the [annual operating instructions) authorize”);

Minard Run, 670 F.3d at 247-49 (agency statement

that prohibited the exercise of private mineral rights

was final agency action subject to judicial review);

Nat! Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers, 417 F.3d 1272, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2005)

(Rejecting Corps’ argument that nationwide permits

were not final agency action because the Corps did

not deny authorization to specific dischargers, and

holding that nationwide permits “are not a definitive,

but otherwise idle, statement of agency policy — they

carry easily-identifiable legal consequences for

would-be dischargers.”); Appalachian Power Co. v.

EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Holding

that EPA guidance is final agency action because it

27

“reflect[s] a settled agency position which has legal

consequences both for agencies administering

their permit programs and for companies who

must obtain permits in order to continue operat-

ing.”). Each of these cases applied Bennett’s two-prong

test, and none of them held that an agency’s action

must compel affirmative action in order to be consid-

ered final under 5 U.S.C. § 704.

Moreover, the Corps’ interpretation ignores the

simple fact that Hawkes’ right to own property is a

hollow right indeed without the right to use it. Lucas

v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017

(1992) (“For what is the land but the profits thereof?”

(internal quotation omitted)); Pennsylvania Coal Co.

v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (“For practical

purposes, the right to coal consists in the right to

mine it. | To make it commercially impracticable to

mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for

constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroy-

ing it.”). This Court has recognized that imposing

restrictions on the right to use property is a slippery

slope. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (If “the uses of private

property were subject to unbridled, uncompensated

qualification under the police power, ‘the natural

tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the

qualification more and more until at last private

property disappear(ed].’” (quoting Pennsylvania Coal

Co., 260 U.S. at 415) (alterations in original)). It

makes no practical difference to Hawkes whether the

Corps’ action is tantamount to an order that compels

affirmative action, as in Sackett; or an order that

28

prohibits otherwise lawful action, as in this case.

Either way, the agency’s action “requir[es] land to be

left substantially in its natural state heighten[ing

the) risk that private property is being pressed into

some form of public service under the guise of miti-

gating serious public harm.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.

And in either situation, “the property owners are at

the agency’s mercy.” Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 (Alito,

J., concurring). Thus, judicial review of agency action

is warranted regardless of whether the action at issue

requires affirmative action or prohibits otherwise

lawful action.

IV. BROAD JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY

ACTION SERVES IMPORTANT PUBLIC

POLICY INTERESTS.

As a matter of public policy, the APA’s presump-

tion of judicial review is more important today than

ever before. There is an “evolution toward increasing-

ly informal decisionmaking processes” underway in

federal agencies. E. Gates Garrity-Rokous, Preserving

Review of Undeclared Programs: A Statutory Re-

definition of Final Agency Action, 101 Yale L. J. 643,

656 (1991); Richard E. Levy et al., Administrative

Procedure and the Decline of the Trial, 51 U. Kan. L.

Rev. 473, 502 (2003) (“[W]ithin both general catego-

ries of agency decisionmaking — rulemaking and

adjudication — the trend has been toward increasingly

informal procedures.”). In Sackett, the EPA sought to

characterize its compliance order as nonfinal “in light

of ‘informal discussion’ and invit[ing) contentions of

29

inaccuracy|,]” but this Court unanimously rejected

that characterization as relevant, stating that those

features “do[] not suffice to make an otherwise final

agency action nonfinal.” 132 S. Ct. at 1372. As Justice

Alito noted in his concurrence, the Sackett issue arose

because Congress had failed to “provide a reasonably

clear rule regarding the reach of the Clean Water Act”

and “the EPA had] not seen fit to promulgate a rule

providing a clear and sufficiently limited definition of

the phrase[,]” so the agency had resorted to “informal

guidance.””’ Id. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring).

The Corps attempts to characterize a jurisdic-

tional determination as analogous to “various types of

informal agency guidance that courts have generally

found to be non-‘final’ under the APA.” Corps’ Br. at

17 However, the lower courts have rejected agency

attempts to avoid judicial review merely by labeling

its action “informal.” See, e.g., Barrick Goldstrike

Mines, 215 F.3d at 47-48 (“[W]e reject{ ] the proposi-

tion that if an agency labels its action an ‘informal’

guideline it may thereby escape judicial review under

the APA.” (citing Better Gov't Ass’n v. Dept. of State,

780 F.2d 86, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1986))); see also First

Nat. Bank of Chicago, 956 F.2d at 1364 (letter from

Comptroller offering an interpretation of banking

The informal guidance defining “waters of the United

States” is now in rule form, but is currently enjoined pending

judicial review. See In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2015).

30

regulations was final agency action regardless of how

“formal” it appeared); Ciba-Geigy, 801 F.2d at 436-39,

438 n.9 (a letter from an agency official stating the

agency’s position and stating the steps the regulated

party would need to take to be in compliance consti-

tuted final agency action). And, even if the Corps’

characterization were taken at face value, it should

not be able to evade judicial review where an “infor-

mal” action is final and binding on private property

owners." See Garrity-Rokous, Preserving Review of

Undeclared Programs, 101 Yale L. J. at 656 (“Admin-

istrative agencies’ evolution toward increasingly

informal decisionmaking processes is legitimate only

if the judiciary maintains the oversight role contem-

plated by the APA.”).

" The D.C. Circuit has aptly described the troubling

evolution of agency guidance that it characterizes as non-final:

The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Con-

gress passes a broadly worded statute. The agency

follows with regulations containing broad language,

open-ended phrases, ambiguous standards and the

like. Then as years pass, the agency issues circulars

or guidance or memoranda, explaining, interpreting,

defining and often expanding the commands in the

regulations. Law is made, without notice and

comment, without public participation, and without

publication in the Federal Register or the Code of

Federal Regulations. The agency may also think

there is another advantage — immunizing its lawmak-

ing from judicial review.

Appalachian Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1020.

31

The CWA in particular presents unique public

* policy concerns that necessitate judicial oversight. As

Sackett noted, “there is no reason to think that the

[CWA] was uniquely designed to enable the strong-

arming of regulated parties into ‘voluntary compli-

ance’ without the opportunity for judicial review —

even judicial review of the question whether the

regulated party is within the EPA’s jurisdiction.” 132

S. Ct. at 1367 Recent litigation disputing the EPA’s

broad assertion of jurisdiction by adopting an almost

limitless definition of “waters of the United States”

highlights the important role of the courts in limiting

agency overreach.” See e.g., In re: Definition of “Wa-

ters of the United States,” 2016 WL 723241, at *1. In

addition, the CWA imposes harsh civil and criminal

penalties for “‘a broad range of ordinary industrial

and commercial activities’” and regulated parties

spend well over $1.7 billion a year attempting to

obtain wetlands permits. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721

(quoting Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102,

1103 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of

certiorari))."° As Justice Alito observed in his concur-

rence in Sackett, judicial review of agency assertions

* As discussed supra and contemplated by the APA's

legislative history, the “mere existence” of judicial review

operates to discourage the agency from “the arbitrary exercise of

powers or assumption of powers not granted.” S. Rep. No. 79-

752, at 217 (1945).

* If wetland permitting was a $1.7 billion per year industry

in 2006 when Rapanos was decided, the cost is necessarily far

greater a decade later.

32

of jurisdiction under the CWA is necessary because

“falny piece of land that is wet at least part of the

year is in danger of being classified by EPA employees

as wetlands covered by the [CWA]. At least [under

the majority’s decision], property owners like peti-

tioners will have the right to challenge the EPA’s

jurisdictional determination under the [APA].” 132

S. Ct. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring).

The combination of the agencies’ broad assertion

of jurisdiction under the CWA and the draconian

penalties imposed for violations of the CWA creates

an administrative nightmare for regulated parties

who wish to simply use their land. As this Court

chillingly foretold in Rapanos:

The[se] enforcement proceedings are a

small part of the immense expansion of fed-

eral regulation of land use that has occurred

under the Clean Water Act — without any

change in the governing statute during the

past five Presidential administrations. In the

last three decades, the Corps and the [EPA]

have interpreted their jurisdiction over “wa-

ters of the United States” to cover 270-to-300

million acres of swampy lands in the United

States — including half of Alaska and an area

the size of California in the lower 48 States.

And that was just the beginning.

547 U.S. at 722 (emphasis added). This Court has

repeatedly been called on to rein in the EPA and the

Corps’ eager assertions of jurisdiction over private

property, no matter how tenuous that property’s

33

connection to jurisdictional waters. Jd.; see also Solid

Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of

Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 167-74 (2001) (rejecting

Corps’ argument that the CWA’s definition of “navi-

gable waters” includes “nonnavigabie, isolated, intra-

state waters”). As the court below reasoned, in the

absence of judicial review, the agencies could prevail

on assertions of jurisdiction unsupported by the CWA

merely by exhausting the resources and patience of

regulated parties:

The prohibitive costs, risk, and delay of these

alternatives to immediate judicial review ev-

idence a transparently obvious litigation

strategy: by leaving appellants with no im-

mediate judicial review and no adequate al-

ternative remedy, the Corps will achieve the

result its local officers desire, abandonment

of the peat mining project, without having to

test whether its expansive assertion of juris-

diction — rejected by one of their own com-

manding officers on administrative appeal —

is consistent with the Supreme Court’s limit-

ing decision in Rapanos.

Pet. App. at 15a. Such dilatory and bad faith tactics

are undoubtedly the ills that Congress had in mind

when it adopted the APA. Therefore, the APA's pre-

sumption of judicial review should be interpreted

broadly to protect the rights of regulated parties who

have no other recourse at law.

¢

34

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should

affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that a jurisdic-

tional determination constitutes final agency action

subject to judicial review under the APA.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN J. LECHNER

Counsel of Record

GINA M. CANNAN

MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION

2596 South Lewis Way

Lakewood, Colorado 80227

(303) 292-2021

lechner@mountainstateslegal.com

gina@mountainstateslegal.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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