Reply Brief — U.S. Army Corp of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015) (No. 15-290)
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In the Supreme Court of
UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
PETITIONER
Vv.
HAWKES Co., INC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR.
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20540-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@ usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
OFC Gi it 0
ee ee oo
7”
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. A jurisdictional determination is not “final agency
CORNED cccscenngesensssesmansinsrscnsmnesnnnennnmnemmenenipnnenimessnaanen 3
A. Ajurisdictional determination is an informa-
tional tool that assists landowners in assess-
ing their rights and obligations under
B. A jurisdictional determination is not “final
agency action” because it does not determine
legal rights or obligations, or impose legal
1. Agency action is not final unless it
determines legal rights or obligations,
or imposes legal consequences ......................+. 5
2. A jurisdictional determination does not
alter legal rights or impose legal con-
C. The asserted practical consequences of a
jurisdictional determination do not render
eB cctrerntncncecencesssestnensamnomensseses 16
II. Respondents have adequate alternative oppor-
tunities to obtain judicial resolution of CWA-
SI FR iccecccecncscnesecsccensensstscssnmssenssssessesssctsncerscen 20
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)...............0000+- 8
Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632
eS hiccersemnencsnesennenencemansneseennnsemsensenemnmnaees 6, 15, 17
Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA,
aE 6
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. United States, 790 F.2d 938
Tis TANTEI TIIITTI etteinleertiandeensiaahedncennieniatininaniaipineiaainanatiniiianaianie 22
II
Cases—Continued: Page
American Fed’n of Gov't Emps., AFL-CIO v.
O'Connor, 747 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985) ...........ccccesceeseeseeseeseeneees 16
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)............cccccceeceeeeeeeeee 5, 7
Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340
clandestine thle data nareiaeeatiieraemnaes 22
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States,
TET A 8
Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994)..........ccccccceceeees 6, 7, 14
FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232
ree ceercannescasenonesnanencssnsnnstanaseemnnenenannesesesensemenete passim
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992)... 5, 6, 7, 14
Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40
Eee ea ae 16
Golden & Zimmerman, LLC v. Domenech,
I tT sscrrnsencresenenmnsenneameanenenennesesesete 15
Holistic Candlers & Consumers Ass'n v. FDA,
664 F.3d 940 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 497
SE hiciestresiniveniicesattecntatanneeniennaninenemmaauictienntsnenesnmnsccnntencnacnen 15
Independent Equip. Dealers Ass'n v. EPA,
372 F.3d 420 (D.C. Cir. 2004)..........cscscccsecessesessseseees 6, 15, 16
Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871
ee iserncssnessenseneenenmnteenpusenensneseniennsrenatecenensenesmnmnananesente 8
New Jersey v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 526 F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 2008)................-cceccceeseeeseeees 15
Port of Boston Marine Terminal Association v.
Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62
ee atcreentcccsnntnnaininaiananeninmnannamenatenamnedtenangpenemmens 9, 16
Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125
Sra hicirinesniecnstiesatineteceanentaiuitesiianiedanasatincnmenniedeisinimaneemenintenns 8
III
Cases—Continued: Page
Stillwater of Crown Point Homeowner's Ass'n v.
Kovich, 820 F Supp. 2d 859 (N.D. Ind. 2011).................. 13
Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158
Sra hceseniceaniieciihiechiatdehgia hentia iantaaiy 8
United States v. Cooper, 482 F3d 658 (4th Cir. 2007)........ 13
Statutes and regulations:
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.............. 2
Ee Le 1, 20, 22
ce 19
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. .........c.ccccscssecesesesenees 1
ETERS NEEL ee nC 3
SAAT an ree 3
rine ata linicia 3
a na TEED 11
ae en ED 11
8 EE a ee Ee eee 18
I i alealies 13
ee 13, 23
EEE ne: ee ER 11
eRe 3
ne ea ne 3
Ee TE 11
EE ee De 1]
ET a a nN ee ET 11
I i 3
33 C.F-.R.:
Pt. 320:
TE cc trnicrtieiaicientinibanecicariataianiianidaieal i]
ETS aR ne ae ea 21
Regulations—Continued: Page
Pt. 325:
ETE SE 21
TE ee TE TEC 21
Pt. 330:
I iii 18
EET ae a 18
EE SE ee ee ae ee 15
ities tantra naeacitatiatealinitniated 9, 10
TS ne eR 10
Si ish tirciernidassictainenseniianenneiaminmionadinannantentnennitianedies 15
Miscellaneous:
Administrative Authority to Construe § 404 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 43 Op. Att’y
irae acinar iri eren aaa tciatdcteearcrtas 12
Dep’t of the Army, Annual Report Fiscal Year 2011
of the Secretary of the Army on Civil Works
Activities (1 October 2010-30 September 2011),
http-//edm16021.contentdm.ocle.org/cdm/
compoundobject/collection/p16021coll6/id/1548/
RE SRESERRTERS Sear aneceoee are NoPE ee eA eT OID id a 21
Monsuadien of yon Between the Depart-
ment of the Army and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency Concerning Federal Enforcement for
the Section 404 Program of the Clean Water Act
(1989), http:/Avwww.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/
civilworks/mous/enfimoa. pdf ...............c-eeseseeseseeseseesessesesees 11
Miscellaneous—-Continued: Page
Memorandum of Agreement: Exemptions Under
Section 404(f) of the Clean Water Act (1989),
https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/memorandum-
agreement-exemptions-under-section-404f-
i iccieerecteennntisctmiatennitiesanintinininemnemntnmans 12
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs:
Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 90-06 (Aug. 14,
SUITE cterscininnindghiinemmnsiiinamipitainenee 15
Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 05-02 (June 14,
il hicsecnninnsienisiniesiaseniniisuniamaiateiapiniinmanuninnnnimasease 12
Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 08-02 (June 26,
2008), http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/
2/doces/civilworks/RGLS/rgl08-02. pdf ................... 14
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 15-290
UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
PETITIONER
vz.
HAWKES Co., INC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
During the four decades since Congress enacted
the Clean Water Act (CWA or Act), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et
seq., the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps) has issued jurisdictional determinations on
request, in order to inform property owners of the
Corps’ view on whether and to what extent their prop-
erty falls within the CWA’s coverage. A jurisdictional
determination is not subject to immediate judicial
review because it is not “final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5
U.S.C. 704. A jurisdictional determination does not
alter the range of legally available options, but simply
gives the landowner additional information to consider
in choosing among those alternatives.
Respondents primarily contend (Br. 16) that an af-
firmative jurisdictional determination (expressing the
Corps’ view that waters protected by the CWA are
(1)
2
present on the relevant tract) should be judicially
reviewable because it creates a strong practical disin-
centive to development of the property. But agency
statements of opinion regarding the legal status of
particular conduct often influence private parties’
decisions; indeed, they are useful for precisely that
reason. Non-binding agency recommendations to a
final decisionmaker outside the agency likewise can
have significant practical impacts. Absent any altera-
tion of legal rights and obligations, however, such
practical effects are insufficient to render agency
communications reviewable under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.
Although the Corps’ longstanding practice of
providing jurisdictional determinations upon request
affords significant benefits to landowners, the CWA
neither mandates nor explicitly references that prac-
tice. If jurisdictional determinations are not subject
to immediate review, a landowner may challenge the
agency's coverage determination if it is denied a per-
mit, is granted a permit on terms that it finds objec-
tionable, or is subjected to an enfcrcement action. In
enacting the CWA without providing for standalone
jurisdictional determinations, Congress _ evidently
contemplated that those avenues of judicial review,
taken together, would provide an adequate means of
resolving disputes about the scope of CWA coverage.
3
I. A JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION IS NOT
“FINAL AGENCY ACTION”
A. A Jurisdictional Determination Is An Informational
Tool That Assists Landowners In Assessing Their
Rights And Obligations Under The CWA
1. The CWA requires that any discharges of pollu-
tants into the “waters of the United States” must be
authorized, either by the statute itself or by a permit.
33 U.S.C. 1362(7); see 33 U.S.C. 1251(a), 1311, 1344. A
potential discharger may seek a permit, which if
granted provides advance assurance that the dis-
charges are lawful; may discharge without a permit if
it is sufficiently confident that one is not required; or
may avoid both potential liability and the costs of the
permitting process by forgoing any discharges into
areas that are even arguably protected by the Act. 33
U.S.C. 1319, 1344(p). That choice is not different in
kind from the choices that regulated parties often face
when the line between lawful and unlawful conduct is
not wholly clear.
Judicial review of the Corps’ final permitting deci-
sion is available under the APA. Alternatively, a
landowner that discharges without a permit may ar-
gue in any subsequent enforcement proceeding that a
permit was unnecessary, either because the discharg-
es were not into CWA-protected waters or because
they were otherwise authorized by the statute. If the
Corps had never adopted its practice of issuing
standalone jurisdictional determinations upon re-
quest, those would clearly be the only available ave-
nues for judicial resolution of CWA-coverage disputes.
2. Respondents contend (Br. 16) that the affirma-
tive jurisdictional determination in this case had “an
inescapable coercive effect on Hawkes” by requiring
4
Hawkes to choose among the three options described
above. But respondents would have been compelled to
choose among the same three options if they had not
sought a jurisdictional determination, if they had
received a negative jurisdictional determination, or if
the Corps had never adopted the practice of issuing
jurisdictional determinations upon request. An af-
firmative or negative jurisdictional determination may
substantially affect the recipient landowner’s assess-
ment of the relative advantages and disadvantages of
the three options described above, but it does not
affect the actual legality or illegality of any pollutant
discharge.
Respondents seek to analogize a jurisdictional de-
termination to “a permit grant or permit denial, which
the Corps admits are reviewable under the APA.”
Resps. Br. 26. As our opening brief explains (at 39-
40), that analogy is inapt. The Corps’ issuance of a
CWA permit does not reflect the agency’s opinion that
the authorized discharges are already lawful; it causes
those discharges to be lawful. That is precisely the
operative legal effect that a jurisdictional determina-
tion lacks.
3. Respondents and their amici suggest that ac-
ceptance of the government’s position would have
disruptive effects on large numbers of landowners
whose activities are potentially subject to the CWA.
Until the decision below, however, no court had held
that a standalone jurisdictional determination is re-
viewable final agency action. Holding that jurisdic-
tional determinations are not immediately reviewable
therefore would not impose any new disability on
landowners, but would simply reaffirm that they may
5
obtain judicial review of CWA-coverage questions only
through the mechanisms they have previously utilized.
B. A Jurisdictional Determination Is Not “Final Agency
Action” Because It Does Not Determine Legal Rights
Or Obligations, Or Impose Legal Consequences
A jurisdictional determination is not immediately
reviewable because it does not have an essential at-
tribute of “final agency action”: it does not determine
“rights or obligations” or impose “legal consequenc-
es.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-178 (1997)
(citations omitted). In resisting that conclusion, re-
spondents argue that the Court should discard or
dilute the well-established “legal consequences” re-
quirement. They also contend that a jurisdictional de-
termination has various legal consequences. Neither
argument has merit.
I. Agency action is not final unless it determines le-
gal rights or obligations, or imposes legal conse-
quences
a. This Court has long held that “two conditions”
“must be satisfied” before agency action is considered
final and reviewable: it “must mark the consumma-
tion of the agency’s decisionmaking process,” and it
“must be one by which rights or obligations have been
determined, or from which legal consequences will
flow.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177-178 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted); see Gov’t Br. 25-26.
Respondents argue (Br. 18-20) that one of those “two
conditions” is enough, and that a jurisdictional deter-
mination should be considered “final agency action” if
it satisfies Bennett’s first prong. That contention
cannot be squared with Bennett, or with other deci-
sions before and after Bennett that have applied the
6
same two-pronged standard. See, e.g., Sackett v.
EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371-1372 (2012); Alaska Dep’t
of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 483
(2004); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 797
(1992); FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 234,
241 (1980).
Bennett’s requirement that the challenged action
must not only be the consummation of agency deci-
sionmaking, but also must actually alter the legal
obligations of regulated entities, serves a critical pur-
pose. Numerous agency actions—for instance, letters
stating an agency’s interpretation of a statutory pro-
vision or its view as to an entity’s obligation—may
represent the consummation of agency decisionmak-
ing with respect to particular issues. See, e.g., Air
Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 644 (6th Cir.
2004) (Sutton, J.). Subjecting every such communica-
tion to immediate judicial review, whether or not it
has any concrete legal effect, would enmesh the courts
in abstract, piecemeal disputes and disrupt agencies’
administrative processes. It would also “muzzle any
informal communications between agencies and their
regulated communities—communications that are
vital to the smooth operation of both government and
business.” /ndependent Equip. Dealers Ass'n v. EPA,
372 F.3d 420, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.).
The same principle applies when one agency pro-
vides a recommendation to another federal actor who
has final decision-making authority. See Franklin,
505 U.S. at 796-799; Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462,
468-471 (1994). Transmittal of the recommendation
may reflect the consummation of the recommending
agency’s work. But if the recipient is legally free to
accept or reject the recommendation, that communica-
7
tion is “not final and therefore not subject to review.”
Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798. The Court in Franklin and
Dalton reached that conclusion even though the con-
sequence was to preclude any non-constitutional re-
view at all, since the President (the official responsible
for making the final decision under both statutory
schemes) is not an “agency” for purposes of the APA.
See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800-801; Dalton, 511 U.S. at
470, 476-477. Here, by contrast, although respondents
contend that alternative avenues of review are inade-
quate, judicial review of CWA-coverage issues is un-
questionably available both in the permitting context
and in enforcement proceedings. See pp. 20-24, infra.
b. Respondents argue (Br. 20-22) that, under Ben-
nett’s second prong, an agency action need not impose
“independent” legal consequences. Although their
argument is somewhat cryptic, respondents appear to
contend that the agency action itself need not “alter
the legal regime” in order to be final. 520 U.S. at 178.
That is incorrect.
Quoting the APA’s exhaustive definition of “agency
action,” respondents assert (Br. 21) that the “lan-
guage of the APA does not require ‘agency action’ to
have ‘independent’ legal consequences.” Respondents
do not identify the specific language in the APA defi-
nition that they believe supports their argument. In
any event, this Court has squarely held that, in order
to constitute “final agency action” under the APA, a
particular action “must be one by which rights or
obligations have been determined,” or from which
“legal consequences will flow.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at
178 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court in Bennett distinguished Franklin and
Dalton on precisely that ground. See ibid. (“Unlike
8
the reports in Franklin and Dalton, which were pure-
ly advisory and in no way affected the legal rights of
the relevant actors, the Biological Opinion at issue
here has direct and appreciable legal consequences.”).
In accord with that formulation, the agency actions
this Court has held to be final have themselves altered
the pertinent legal regimes by determining parties’
rights or obligations. A published rule, for instance, is
final when it has the “status of law,” 2e., when it is
intended to impose binding legal obligations. See, e.g.,
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151-152 (1967);
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S.
407, 418 (1942).' The EPA compliance order at issue
in Sackett was final because it directed the recipient to
take particular actions and imposed penalties for
violating the compliance order itself. 132 S. Ct. at
1371-1372; see Gov't Br. 42-43. An agency order (such
as a CWA permit) that determines whether a party’s
activities are exempted from or subject to a statutory
prohibition is final because it “render[s] the prohibi-
tions of the statute inoperative” or operative. Roches-
ter Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 133
(1939). In that situation, as respondents point out (Br.
22), the regulated party’s obligations are set forth in
the statute rather than the agency’s order. But the
agency’s action nevertheless determines the actual
' Although a published rule having the force of law is “final
agency action” within the meaning of the APA, the susceptibility of
such a rule to pre-enforcement review depends on a separate
ripeness inquiry. See Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 158, 162-165 (1967) (holding that published agency regulation
was “final agency action” but was not ripe for judicial review); see
generally Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891
(1990); Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152.
9
legality of the party’s conduct by resolving whether
the party must conform to the statutory requirements.
In arguing that an agency action can be immediate-
ly reviewable even if it does not have independent
legal effect, respondents rely (Br. 21-22) on Port of
Boston Marine Terminal Association v. Rederiaktie-
bolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62 (1970). That deci-
sion is consistent with the Court’s other “final agency
action” precedents. The Federal Maritime Commis-
sion had authority to review the legality of filed tariffs
under the Shipping Act and to modify, prohibit, or
approve them. /d. at 65 & n.9. The Court held that an
order establishing that the tariff was legal and en-
forceable was final. /d. at 65-66, 71. As respondents
point out (Br. 22), the Court observed that the order
was not “coercive,” in that it did not affirmatively
direct any party to take any particular action. Port of
Boston, 400 U.S. at 71. But the order nonetheless
determined rights or obligations by establishing that
the tariff could be enforced.
2. A jurisdictional determination does not alter legal
rights or impose legal consequences
a. A jurisdictional determination does not affect a
landowner’s ability to obtain a permit, see Gov't Br.
27-29, and it does not opine on whether the landown-
er’s planned activities (of which the Corps may be
unaware) would require a permit or predict whether a
permit would be granted, see 33 C.F.R. 331.2. Re-
spondents are therefore incorrect in arguing (Br. 24)
that a jurisdictional determination “determines what
exemptions and permits apply” if the landowner wish-
es to discharge pollutants into waters on its lands.
Respondents rely (Br. 24-25) on a Corps regulation
that states that the “Corps has authorized its district
10
engineers to issue formal determinations concerning
the applicability of the [CWA] * * * and the applica-
bility of general permits or statutory exemptions.” 33
C.F.R. 320.1(a)(6). That language simply defines the
responsibilities of Corps district engineers to include
both sorts of determinations; it does not suggest that
the second determination is encompassed within the
first. Another Corps regulation unambiguously re-
futes respondents’ reading of Section 320.1(a)(6) by
stating that jurisdictional determinations “do not
include determinations that a particular activity re-
quires a [Corps] permit.” 33 C.F.R. 331.2.
Respondents are also incorrect in asserting (Br. 27)
that “the Corps is legally bound by the [jurisdictional
determination] during the permit process.” While the
Corps is unlikely as a practical matter to revisit
a recent jurisdictional determination during the per-
mitting process, the applicant may trigger a re-
assessment by presenting new information. See Gov’t
Br. 5. And even without new information, the appli-
cant may dispute the Corps’ regulatory jurisdiction
over a particular site in an administrative appeal of a
permit denial, even if it has previously (and unsuccess-
fully) pursued an administrative appeal from the
standalone jurisdictional determination. 33 C.F.R.
331.5(a)(2); Gov’t Br. 29 n.7. In either circumstance, if
the Corps is persuaded by the applicant’s showing, it
may reverse its earlier jurisdictional determination
and conclude that no permit is necessary because
CWA-protected waters are not present at the relevant
site.
b. A jurisdictional determination also does not al-
ter the recipient’s potential legal exposure to CWA
11
liability, or alter the range of enforcement mecha-
nisms the landowner might face. See Gov’t Br. 29-33.
Respondents argue (Br. 27-28) that a jurisdictional
determination gives rise to legal consequences be-
cause it is binding on the government? in subsequent
enforcement actions. That is incorrect. When the
Corps or EPA considers enforcement action after the
Corps has already issued a standalone jurisdictional
determination, the agencies will as a matter of prac-
tice “rely” (Resps. Br. 27) on that determination and
ordinarily will not revisit the determination absent
some reason for doing so. But no statutory or regula-
tory provision legally binds either the Corps or the
EPA to treat an existing jurisdictional determination
as controlling if the agency comes to believe it is in-
correct.”
The Corps’ regulations do not limit its authority to
revisit its own jurisdictional determinations, and it
* The EPA or the Corps may institute a proceeding for adminis-
trative penalties, 33 U.S.C. 1319(g); the EPA may issue a compli-
ance order, 33 U.S.C. 131%a), or initiate a judicial enforcement
action, 33 U.S.C. 1319(b); and the Corps may issue an order requir-
ing compliance with a permit, 33 U.S.C. 1344(s)(1), or initiate a
civil action seeking compliance with a permit and a penalty, 33
U.S.C. 1344(s)(3) and (4). In general, the Corps has primary en-
forcement authority for violations of Corps-issued permits and
some unpermitted discharges, and the EPA handles more serious
unpermitted discharges. See Memorandum of Agreement Be-
tween the Department of the Army and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency Concerning Federal Enforcement for the Section 404
Program of the Clean Water Act (1989), http://www.usace.army.
mil/Portals/2/docs/civitworks/mous/enfmoa.pdf. If respondents,
without requesting a permit, had commenced peat-mining opera-
tions on the relevant tract, the decision whether to initiate an ad-
ministrative enforcement action would have been entrusted to the
EPA.
12
will do so if new information warrants. Corps, Regu-
latory Guidance Letter No. 05-02, 1 1 (June 14, 2005).
And the EPA is not legally bound by Corps jurisdic-
tional determinations because the EPA has final au-
thority, as between the two agencies, to construe the
scope of the CWA’s coverage. See Administrative
Authority to Construe § 404 of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 197, 202
(1979). The Corps’ issuance of a negative jurisdiction-
al determination therefore would not preclude the
EPA from instituting an enforcement action if it be-
lieved that CWA-protected waters were present at the
relevant site and that the landowner had discharged
pollutants into those waters.*
Respondents argue (Br. 28-29) that, in an enforce-
ment action for unauthorized discharges, the govern-
ment might introduce an affirmative jurisdictional
determination as evidence of the landowner’s know-
* The agencies have established separate practices governing the
division of authority in certain rare “special cases” not at issue
here, ie., determinations of jurisdiction made by the EPA in
limited circumstances “where significant issues or technical diffi-
culties are anticipated or exist.” Memorandum of Agreement:
Exemptions Under Section 404(f) of the Clean Water Act § III.A
(1989), https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/memorandum-agreement-
exemptions-under-section-404f-clean-water-act (MOA). The MOA
provides that “determinations * * * made pursuant to this MOA
or the 1980 Memorandum of Understanding on Geographic Juris-
diction of the Section 404 Program,” which also addressed, in
relevant part, “special case[]” determinations, “will be binding on
the Government and represent the Government’s position.” /d.
§ VI.A. That statement establishes that an EPA “special case[]”
determination will contro] within the government. The MOA does
not address mine-run Corps jurisdictional determinations of the
sort at issue here, or suggest that all jurisdictional determinations
are legally “binding” on the agencies.
13
ledge of the CWA’s applicability. But, to the extent
that the defendant’s knowledge of particular waters’
CWaA-protected status is relevant to any liability or
penalty issue arising under the Act, the defendant’s
receipt of an affirmative jurisdictional determination
would not conclusively establish that such knowledge
existed.‘ The defendant would remain free to argue
that, although he knew of the Corps’ view that par-
ticular waters were covered by the Act, he believed
that view to be wrong.
A jurisdictional determination also does not impose
legal consequences in citizen suits. Respondents con-
tend (Br. 27) that, in a citizen suit alleging that partic-
ular discharges violated the CWA, the plaintiff “can
rely on the [affirmative jurisdictional determination]
as prima facie evidence of a violation of the” CWA.
But while an affirmative jurisdictional determination
(like a private consultant’s report) might be intro-
duced as evidence in such a suit, it would not alter the
plaintiff’s burden of establishing each of the elements
of a CWA violation, including the presence of waters
of the United States. See Stillwater of Crown Point
Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Kovich, 820 F Supp. 2d 859,
899 (N.D. Ind. 2011). By the same token, the recipient
* The courts of appeals generally have recognized that, because
the status of particular waters as “waters of the United States” is a
“jurisdictional element” of a CWA violation, the defendant in a
criminal case need not be proved to have known the facts estab-
lishing CWA coverage in order to be found guilty of “knowingly
violat{ing]” the Act. 33 U.S.C. 1319(c)(2)(A); see, e.g., United
States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 665-668 (4th Cir. 2007) (Wilkinson,
J.). The court may consider the defendant’s knowledge of such
facts, and of the relevant waters’ CWA-protected status, in as-
sessing an appropriate penalty within the applicable statutory
range. See 33 U.S.C. 1319(c) and (d).
14
of a negative jurisdictional determination might intro-
duce it as evidence that any discharge did not occur
into waters of the United States, see Corps, Regulato-
ry Guidance Letter No. 08-02, 1 2.b(3) (June 26, 2008),
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/
RGLS/rgl08-02.pdf (a negative jurisdictional determi-
nation “can be used and relied on by the recipient” in
defending against a citizen suit), but a negative juris-
dictional determination does not preclude the imposi-
tion of liability as a matter of law, and the court is not
required to give it any particular weight.
c. Respondents assert (Br. 25) that a jurisdictional
determination has the “earmarks of final agency ac-
tion” because it reflects a considered decision made
after a relatively formal, structured agency process.
But the APA requires finality, not formality. In Dal-
ton, for example, the Court held that an official De-
partment of Defense report recommending base clo-
sures was not final, despite the extensive formal pro-
cedures it reflected, because it was not binding on the
President and accordingly had no operative legal
effect. 511 U.S. at 469-470; see Franklin, 505 U.S. at
797; Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 234, 241-243.
The procedural attributes on which respondents
rely—that a jurisdictional determination reflects an
“official” rather than “[(pjreliminary” view, reached
after careful scientific investigation, and that the
Corps’ regulations describe a jurisdictional deter-
mination as “final” (Br. 25)—reinforce the conclusion
that the jurisdictional determination represents the
consummation of agency decisionmaking and there-
fore satisfies Bennett’s first prong. They do not es-
tablish, however, that it has legal effect. See Gov’t Br.
33-35 & n.8. Respondents also observe (Br. 25) that a
15
jurisdictional determination is “valid” for five years.°
33 C.F.R. Pt. 331, App. C. But the relevant question
is not how long a jurisdictional determination remains
valid, but whether it has binding legal effect during
that period. For the reasons discussed above and in
the government’s opening brief, it does not. See pp. 9-
14, supra; see also Gov’t Br. 25-41.
d. A Corps jurisdictional determination thus is
analogous to agency communications that inform
regulated parties of the agency’s view of the legal
status of particular private conduct. Although this
Court has not had occasion to address the question,
the courts of appeals have repeatedly held that such
statements are not final agency action because they do
not effect legal consequences apart from those already
imposed by the statute. See, e.g., Golden & Zimmer-
man, LLC v. Domenech, 599 F.3d 426, 432-433 (4th
Cir. 2010); see also Holistic Candlers & Consumers
Ass’n v. FDA, 664 F.3d 940, 941-946 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 497 (2012); New Jersey v. United
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 526 F.3d 98, 102
(3d Cir. 2008); Independent Equip. Dealers Ass'n, 372
F.3d at 428; Air Brake Sys., 357 F.3d at 644. Those
decisions reflect the recognition that, while agency
guidance is likely to influence a regulated party’s
conduct, that effect on a party’s own assessment of its
® The five-year validity period reflects the Corps’ conclusion
that, once the agency has undertaken the investigation necessary
to make the jurisdictional determination, it generally will not be an
efficient use of resources to revisit the question whether waters of
the United States are present on a particular tract. Absent con-
trary evidence, the Corps therefore presumes that physical condi-
tions on the site are unlikely to change significantly during the
ensuing five years. See Corps, Regulatory Guidance Letter No.
90-06, 1 2 (Aug. 14, 1990).
16
options does not amount to a legal consequence. /n-
dependent Equip. Dealers Ass’n, 372 F.3d at 428. If
agency guidance were immediately reviewable, more-
over, agencies would hesitate to devote limited re-
sources to “giving * * * needed advice.” American
Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. O'Connor, 747 F.2d
748, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (R.B. Ginsburg, J.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985).
Respondents rely (Br. 33-35) on decisions involving
agency actions that, unlike jurisdictional determina-
tions, had operative legal effects. In Frozen Food
Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 41-45 (1956),
the Court held that an Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion (ICC) order identifying the commodities that the
ICC deemed to be exempted from regulation under
the Interstate Commerce Act was final because it
effectively functioned as a rule. The order was func-
tionally equivalent to an “administrative regulation[]”
interpreting the scope of the statutory exemption for
“agricultural commodities,” Standard Oil, 449
U.S. at 240 & n.8 (discussing Frozen Food Express),
and thus “set{] the standard” governing how “an im-
portant segment of the trucking” industry would be
permitted to do business. Frozen Food Express, 351
U.S. at 44. Similarly, the order at issue in Port of
Boston was final because it determined the extent to
which a tariff could go into effect. 400 U.S. at 65-66,
71. A jurisdictional determination has no comparable
legal effect.
C. The Asserted Practical Consequences Of A Jurisdic-
tional Determination Do Not Render It Final Agency
Action
Respondents argue (Br. 30-39) that a jurisdictional
determination’s likely practical effect on a landown-
17
er’s decisionmaking is sufficient to render the juris-
dictional determination immediately reviewable. That
argument lacks merit.
1. When an agency action does not alter the legal
regime, even significant practical consequences do not
render it reviewable. In Standard Oil, the Court held
that an FTC complaint finding “reason to believe”
that a party had violated the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act was not final, even though it imposed the
“substantial” “burden” of defending against the agen-
cy proceeding—a burden that entailed significant
expense as well as reputational harm. 449 U.S. at 242;
see Air Brake Sys., 357 F.3d at 645 (“[A]dverse eco-
nomic effects accompany many forms of indisputably
non-final government action[,] * * * but that does
not make the agency’s action final.”). In Dalton and
Franklin, the Court held that the agency recommen-
dations at issue were non-reviewable because they
were not legally binding; the Court did not assess the
practical impact those recommendations were likely to
have on the President’s decisionmaking.
Respondents’ arguments illustrate why it would be
unworkable to treat the practical incentives created
by agency action as a sufficient basis for immediate
judicial review. Respondents primarily contend (Br.
16) that immediate review is necessary because the
cost of seeking a permit would be prohibitive for them.
Even assuming that is an accurate description of their
particular circumstances (respondents have not sup-
ported those assertions with evidence), it is doubtless
not true for all or even most potential dischargers.
The vast majority of discharges fall within general
permits, and either can be undertaken without provid-
ing advance notice to the Corps (and therefore without
18
expending any resources on a permit request), 33
C.F.R. 330.1(e), or after completing the abbreviated,
relatively inexpensive general-permit verification
process, 33 C.F.R. 330.1(f). See Gov’t Br. 8 (more
than 54,000 general-permit verifications issued in
2015, compared with 3100 individual permits and 97
applications denied); id. at 47-48. The cost of obtain-
ing an individual permit varies widely based on the
circumstances, but it will sometimes be only slightly
greater than for a general-permit verification, and
even a substantial cost will sometimes be a small per-
centage of the applicant’s planned expenditures for
the project. See id. at 48. Generalized assertions that
permitting costs may exceed an undefined threshold
for an unknown number of potential dischargers pro-
vide no basis for holding that all jurisdictional deter-
minations are immediately reviewable.
Respondents suggest in the alternative (Br. 37)
that the finality analysis “should take into account the
facts of this case,” including the fact that respondents’
own proposed peat-mining activities would require an
individual permit. See id. at 38, 40. Under that ap-
proach, the same jurisdictional determination for the
same property might have been treated as non-final if
respondents had expressed a desire to undertake a
more modest project for which a general permit might
apply. Respondents cite no decision in which the
Court has analyzed finality in that manner. That
approach would also create an evident potential for
manipulation, particularly if (as respondents contend,
see id. at 38) the allegations in a plaintiff's complaint
must be taken as true in assessing the practical im-
pact of the challenged agency conduct.
19
2. In any event, immediate judicial review of a
Corps jurisdictional determination would not neces-
sarily provide the certainty respondents seek. A re-
viewing court’s determination that a jurisdictional
determination is “arbitrary [and] capricious,” 5 U.S.C.
706(2)(A)—i.e., that the Corps’ administrative record
did not support a reasonable belief that the property
contains waters of the United States—would not pre-
vent the Corps or the EPA from gathering additional
evidence of CWA coverage and initiating enforcement
action based on that evidence.® And if the court held
that the jurisdictional determination was not arbitrary
and capricious, the landowner could still argue, in a
subsequent civil enforcement action, that the agency
had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
iaat the property in question contained waters of the
United States.
Allowing immediate judicial review of the Corps’
jurisdictional determinations therefore would spawn
piecemeal and potentially duplicative proceedings.
That prospect might deter the Corps from engaging in
an informational practice that is triggered by a land-
owner’s request and is intended to benefit landowners
as well as to promote compliance with the CWA.
* Respondents’ complaint appropriately recognized that, if judi-
cial review is available, it should be “based upon the administrative
record before the Corps at the time the Corps made its decision.”
J.A. 8. Although respondents requested “[{a) declaration that
[their] Property is not subject to the CWA,” J.A. 26, that relief
would be inappropriate even if respondents’ suit is allowed to go
forward and is ultimately successful. The only question properly
before a reviewing court would be whether the Corps’ administra-
tive record adequately supported its jurisdictional determination—
not whether the relevant tract actually contains waters protected
by the CWA.
20
Il. RESPONDENTS HAVE ADEQUATE ALTERNATIVE
OPPORTUNITIES TO OBTAIN JUDICIAL RESOLU-
TION OF CWA-COVERAGE ISSUES
Even if a jurisdictional determination were “final
agency action,” APA review would be unavailable be-
cause a person who disagrees with such a determina-
tion has “other adequate remed[ies) in a court.” 5
U.S.C. 704. The CWA authorizes the Corps and the
EPA to issue permits for discharges that would oth-
erwise violate the Act, and it provides for various
forms of enforcement actions against alleged violators.
Judicial review of CWA-coverage issues is available in
both those contexts. Respondents contend that im-
mediate judicial review of Corps jurisdictional deter-
minations is an essential supplement to those mecha-
nisms. Congress evidently did not share that view,
however, since the CWA does not expressly contem-
plate standalone jurisdictional determinations.
A. Respondents assert (Br. 39-44) that seeking a
permit is prohibitively costly. But cf. pp. 17-18, supra.
That concern provides no basis for second-guessing
Congress’s evident determination that the permitting
process affords an adequate avenue for obtaining pre-
discharge resolution of CWA-coverage issues. Re-
spondents also rely on unrepresentative cost figures,
see Gov't Br. 47-48, and overlook the fact that lower-
cost general permits account for the vast majority of
permit grants. And while respondents assert (Br. 40)
that they must commission studies costing $100,000 to
pursue their own permit application, it is unclear how
substantial those costs are in relation to respondents’
project as a whole, which contemplates peat-mining on
150 acres of high-value wetlands over a 20-year peri-
od. J.A. 27.
21
Respondents suggest (Br. 46-47) that the Corps
will use its control over the duration of the permitting
process, and its requests for additional information
from the applicant, to “wear down the applicant” until
it abandons its permit request.’ In fact, the Corps
uses an iterative process of consultation and infor-
mation requests so that it may reach a resolution that
enables the applicant to implement its project con-
sistent with the CWA and other federal statutes. See
33 C.F.R. 320.4 (Corps balances benefits of the pro-
posed project and private ownership rights with public
interest in preserving waters of the United States);
Gov't Br. 47-49. That is why permits are rarely de-
nied. In addition, Corps regulations protect appli-
cants by establishing default deadlines and limiting
information requests to those “deem[ed] essential.”
33 C.F.R. 325.1(e); see 33 C.F.R. 325.2(d).
Respondents argue (Br. 41-44) that it is “[wJasteful
and [uJnnecessary” to require landowners to under-
take the permitting process even though it “has noth-
ing to do with the question of jurisdiction.” But im-
’ In 2011, the Corps issued approximately 3600 individual per-
mits, approved approximately 53,000 projects under general per-
mits, modified approximately 3100 existing permits, and deter-
mined for approximately 9900 applications that no permit was
required. The Corps denied approximately 134 permit applica-
tions, and approximately 9700 were withdrawn. Permit denials
were infrequent because “[mJost projects which might otherwise
have been denied a permit were modified or conditioned to meet
Corps requirements, scaled down to qualify for approval under
general permits, or withdrawn.” Dep’t of the Army, Annual Re-
port Fiscal Year 2011 of the Secretary of the Army on Civil Works
Activities (1 October 2010-30 September 2011), at 45-1, http://edm
16021.contentdm.oclic.org/edm/compoundobject/collection/p16021 collé/
id/1548/rec/1.
22
mediate judicial review of a standalone jurisdictional
determination, when a successful permit application
could obviate the need for judicial intervention, would
consume significant agency and judicial resources
without definitively resolving the CWaA-coverage
issue. See Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 242; see also
p. 19, supra. Contrary to respondents’ argument (Br.
43), the fact that the permit process may involve is-
sues (such as mitigation and timing) that are “irrele-
vant to the jurisdictional question” does not render it
inadequate. Regulated parties often must wait to
obtain review of an interlocutory agency order until
the conclusion of administrative proceedings that
address additional issues unrelated to that order. See
Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 241; Aluminum Co. of Am.
v. United States, 790 F.2d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(Sealia, J.).
Finally, respondents argue (Br. 46, 50-53) that re-
quiring a landowner to seek a permit “undermines the
presumption of reviewability.” Jd. at 50 (capitalization
altered). But the “presumption favoring judicial re-
view of administrative action” governs resolution of
the question whether ‘a particular statutory scheme
precludes review of agency action that satisfies Sec-
tion 704’s criteria. Block v. Community Nutrition
Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984). The disputed issue
here, by contrast, is whether a jurisdictional determi-
nation falls within Section 704 to begin with, ze.,
whether it is “final agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy in a court.” In Sackett, for
example, the Court first determined that the compli-
ance order was “final agency action” and that no other
adequate judicial remedy existed, without applying
any presumption in favor of review. 132 S. Ct. at
23
1371-1372. The Court then applied the presumption in
considering whether the CWA precluded judicial re-
view of the order. /d. at 1372-1373.
B. A recipient of an affirmative jurisdictional de-
termination who elects to proceed with discharges
may also obtain judicial review of the CWA-coverage
issue if the government institutes an administrative
penalty proceeding or judicial enforcement action, or
if an aggrieved private plaintiff commences a citizen
suit. Respondents argue (Br. 53-56) that those ave-
nues for review are inadequate because the landowner
may face steadily accruing statutory penalties if the
court ultimately concludes that a CWA violation has
occurred. See 33 U.S.C. 1319(d); Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at
1370. But a person who discharges without a permit
would run that risk even if it had not received a juris-
dictional determination, or if the Corps had never
adopted the practice of furnishing such determina-
tions upon request.
C. The adequacy of existing remedies is particu-
larly clear when the two mechanisms described above
are considered in tandem. By invoking the permitting
process, a landowner can obtain judicial review of
CWaA-coverage issues without engaging in potentially
unlawful discharges, and thus without subjecting itself
to possible penalties if its view of CWA (non-)coverage
is ultimately rejected. Alternatively, a landowner that
wishes to avoid the administrative requirements of the
permitting process can discharge without a permit
and argue in any enforcement action that its discharg-
es did not violate the Act. Respondents claim an enti-
tlement to a third judicial-review mechanism that
combines the most attractive (to the landowner) fea-
tures of the two existing avenues, by allowing pre-
24
discharge review without prior recourse to the permit-
ting process. Respondent identifies no sound basis for
concluding, however, that the existing modes of re-
view, taken together, are less than “adequate.”
* * * * >
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in our
opening brief, the judgment of the court of appeals
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted.
DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR.
Solicitor General
MARCH 2016
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