Reply Brief — U.S. Army Corp of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015) (No. 15-290)

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In the Supreme Court of

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,

PETITIONER

Vv.

HAWKES Co., INC., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR.

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20540-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@ usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

OFC Gi it 0

ee ee oo

7”

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. A jurisdictional determination is not “final agency

CORNED cccscenngesensssesmansinsrscnsmnesnnnennnmnemmenenipnnenimessnaanen 3

A. Ajurisdictional determination is an informa-

tional tool that assists landowners in assess-

ing their rights and obligations under

B. A jurisdictional determination is not “final

agency action” because it does not determine

legal rights or obligations, or impose legal

1. Agency action is not final unless it

determines legal rights or obligations,

or imposes legal consequences ......................+. 5

2. A jurisdictional determination does not

alter legal rights or impose legal con-

C. The asserted practical consequences of a

jurisdictional determination do not render

eB cctrerntncncecencesssestnensamnomensseses 16

II. Respondents have adequate alternative oppor-

tunities to obtain judicial resolution of CWA-

SI FR iccecccecncscnesecsccensensstscssnmssenssssessesssctsncerscen 20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)...............0000+- 8

Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632

eS hiccersemnencsnesennenencemansneseennnsemsensenemnmnaees 6, 15, 17

Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA,

aE 6

Aluminum Co. of Am. v. United States, 790 F.2d 938

Tis TANTEI TIIITTI etteinleertiandeensiaahedncennieniatininaniaipineiaainanatiniiianaianie 22

II

Cases—Continued: Page

American Fed’n of Gov't Emps., AFL-CIO v.

O'Connor, 747 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1984),

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985) ...........ccccesceeseeseeseeseeneees 16

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)............cccccceeceeeeeeeeee 5, 7

Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340

clandestine thle data nareiaeeatiieraemnaes 22

Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States,

TET A 8

Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994)..........ccccccceceeees 6, 7, 14

FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232

ree ceercannescasenonesnanencssnsnnstanaseemnnenenannesesesensemenete passim

Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992)... 5, 6, 7, 14

Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40

Eee ea ae 16

Golden & Zimmerman, LLC v. Domenech,

I tT sscrrnsencresenenmnsenneameanenenennesesesete 15

Holistic Candlers & Consumers Ass'n v. FDA,

664 F.3d 940 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 497

SE hiciestresiniveniicesattecntatanneeniennaninenemmaauictienntsnenesnmnsccnntencnacnen 15

Independent Equip. Dealers Ass'n v. EPA,

372 F.3d 420 (D.C. Cir. 2004)..........cscscccsecessesessseseees 6, 15, 16

Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871

ee iserncssnessenseneenenmnteenpusenensneseniennsrenatecenensenesmnmnananesente 8

New Jersey v. United States Nuclear Regulatory

Comm'n, 526 F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 2008)................-cceccceeseeeseeees 15

Port of Boston Marine Terminal Association v.

Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62

ee atcreentcccsnntnnaininaiananeninmnannamenatenamnedtenangpenemmens 9, 16

Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125

Sra hicirinesniecnstiesatineteceanentaiuitesiianiedanasatincnmenniedeisinimaneemenintenns 8

III

Cases—Continued: Page

Stillwater of Crown Point Homeowner's Ass'n v.

Kovich, 820 F Supp. 2d 859 (N.D. Ind. 2011).................. 13

Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158

Sra hceseniceaniieciihiechiatdehgia hentia iantaaiy 8

United States v. Cooper, 482 F3d 658 (4th Cir. 2007)........ 13

Statutes and regulations:

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.............. 2

Ee Le 1, 20, 22

ce 19

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. .........c.ccccscssecesesesenees 1

ETERS NEEL ee nC 3

SAAT an ree 3

rine ata linicia 3

a na TEED 11

ae en ED 11

8 EE a ee Ee eee 18

I i alealies 13

ee 13, 23

EEE ne: ee ER 11

eRe 3

ne ea ne 3

Ee TE 11

EE ee De 1]

ET a a nN ee ET 11

I i 3

33 C.F-.R.:

Pt. 320:

TE cc trnicrtieiaicientinibanecicariataianiianidaieal i]

ETS aR ne ae ea 21

Regulations—Continued: Page

Pt. 325:

ETE SE 21

TE ee TE TEC 21

Pt. 330:

I iii 18

EET ae a 18

EE SE ee ee ae ee 15

ities tantra naeacitatiatealinitniated 9, 10

TS ne eR 10

Si ish tirciernidassictainenseniianenneiaminmionadinannantentnennitianedies 15

Miscellaneous:

Administrative Authority to Construe § 404 of the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 43 Op. Att’y

irae acinar iri eren aaa tciatdcteearcrtas 12

Dep’t of the Army, Annual Report Fiscal Year 2011

of the Secretary of the Army on Civil Works

Activities (1 October 2010-30 September 2011),

http-//edm16021.contentdm.ocle.org/cdm/

compoundobject/collection/p16021coll6/id/1548/

RE SRESERRTERS Sear aneceoee are NoPE ee eA eT OID id a 21

Monsuadien of yon Between the Depart-

ment of the Army and the Environmental Protec-

tion Agency Concerning Federal Enforcement for

the Section 404 Program of the Clean Water Act

(1989), http:/Avwww.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/

civilworks/mous/enfimoa. pdf ...............c-eeseseeseseeseseesessesesees 11

Miscellaneous—-Continued: Page

Memorandum of Agreement: Exemptions Under

Section 404(f) of the Clean Water Act (1989),

https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/memorandum-

agreement-exemptions-under-section-404f-

i iccieerecteennntisctmiatennitiesanintinininemnemntnmans 12

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs:

Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 90-06 (Aug. 14,

SUITE cterscininnindghiinemmnsiiinamipitainenee 15

Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 05-02 (June 14,

il hicsecnninnsienisiniesiaseniniisuniamaiateiapiniinmanuninnnnimasease 12

Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 08-02 (June 26,

2008), http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/

2/doces/civilworks/RGLS/rgl08-02. pdf ................... 14

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 15-290

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,

PETITIONER

vz.

HAWKES Co., INC., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

During the four decades since Congress enacted

the Clean Water Act (CWA or Act), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et

seq., the United States Army Corps of Engineers

(Corps) has issued jurisdictional determinations on

request, in order to inform property owners of the

Corps’ view on whether and to what extent their prop-

erty falls within the CWA’s coverage. A jurisdictional

determination is not subject to immediate judicial

review because it is not “final agency action for which

there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5

U.S.C. 704. A jurisdictional determination does not

alter the range of legally available options, but simply

gives the landowner additional information to consider

in choosing among those alternatives.

Respondents primarily contend (Br. 16) that an af-

firmative jurisdictional determination (expressing the

Corps’ view that waters protected by the CWA are

(1)

2

present on the relevant tract) should be judicially

reviewable because it creates a strong practical disin-

centive to development of the property. But agency

statements of opinion regarding the legal status of

particular conduct often influence private parties’

decisions; indeed, they are useful for precisely that

reason. Non-binding agency recommendations to a

final decisionmaker outside the agency likewise can

have significant practical impacts. Absent any altera-

tion of legal rights and obligations, however, such

practical effects are insufficient to render agency

communications reviewable under the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.

Although the Corps’ longstanding practice of

providing jurisdictional determinations upon request

affords significant benefits to landowners, the CWA

neither mandates nor explicitly references that prac-

tice. If jurisdictional determinations are not subject

to immediate review, a landowner may challenge the

agency's coverage determination if it is denied a per-

mit, is granted a permit on terms that it finds objec-

tionable, or is subjected to an enfcrcement action. In

enacting the CWA without providing for standalone

jurisdictional determinations, Congress _ evidently

contemplated that those avenues of judicial review,

taken together, would provide an adequate means of

resolving disputes about the scope of CWA coverage.

3

I. A JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION IS NOT

“FINAL AGENCY ACTION”

A. A Jurisdictional Determination Is An Informational

Tool That Assists Landowners In Assessing Their

Rights And Obligations Under The CWA

1. The CWA requires that any discharges of pollu-

tants into the “waters of the United States” must be

authorized, either by the statute itself or by a permit.

33 U.S.C. 1362(7); see 33 U.S.C. 1251(a), 1311, 1344. A

potential discharger may seek a permit, which if

granted provides advance assurance that the dis-

charges are lawful; may discharge without a permit if

it is sufficiently confident that one is not required; or

may avoid both potential liability and the costs of the

permitting process by forgoing any discharges into

areas that are even arguably protected by the Act. 33

U.S.C. 1319, 1344(p). That choice is not different in

kind from the choices that regulated parties often face

when the line between lawful and unlawful conduct is

not wholly clear.

Judicial review of the Corps’ final permitting deci-

sion is available under the APA. Alternatively, a

landowner that discharges without a permit may ar-

gue in any subsequent enforcement proceeding that a

permit was unnecessary, either because the discharg-

es were not into CWA-protected waters or because

they were otherwise authorized by the statute. If the

Corps had never adopted its practice of issuing

standalone jurisdictional determinations upon re-

quest, those would clearly be the only available ave-

nues for judicial resolution of CWA-coverage disputes.

2. Respondents contend (Br. 16) that the affirma-

tive jurisdictional determination in this case had “an

inescapable coercive effect on Hawkes” by requiring

4

Hawkes to choose among the three options described

above. But respondents would have been compelled to

choose among the same three options if they had not

sought a jurisdictional determination, if they had

received a negative jurisdictional determination, or if

the Corps had never adopted the practice of issuing

jurisdictional determinations upon request. An af-

firmative or negative jurisdictional determination may

substantially affect the recipient landowner’s assess-

ment of the relative advantages and disadvantages of

the three options described above, but it does not

affect the actual legality or illegality of any pollutant

discharge.

Respondents seek to analogize a jurisdictional de-

termination to “a permit grant or permit denial, which

the Corps admits are reviewable under the APA.”

Resps. Br. 26. As our opening brief explains (at 39-

40), that analogy is inapt. The Corps’ issuance of a

CWA permit does not reflect the agency’s opinion that

the authorized discharges are already lawful; it causes

those discharges to be lawful. That is precisely the

operative legal effect that a jurisdictional determina-

tion lacks.

3. Respondents and their amici suggest that ac-

ceptance of the government’s position would have

disruptive effects on large numbers of landowners

whose activities are potentially subject to the CWA.

Until the decision below, however, no court had held

that a standalone jurisdictional determination is re-

viewable final agency action. Holding that jurisdic-

tional determinations are not immediately reviewable

therefore would not impose any new disability on

landowners, but would simply reaffirm that they may

5

obtain judicial review of CWA-coverage questions only

through the mechanisms they have previously utilized.

B. A Jurisdictional Determination Is Not “Final Agency

Action” Because It Does Not Determine Legal Rights

Or Obligations, Or Impose Legal Consequences

A jurisdictional determination is not immediately

reviewable because it does not have an essential at-

tribute of “final agency action”: it does not determine

“rights or obligations” or impose “legal consequenc-

es.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-178 (1997)

(citations omitted). In resisting that conclusion, re-

spondents argue that the Court should discard or

dilute the well-established “legal consequences” re-

quirement. They also contend that a jurisdictional de-

termination has various legal consequences. Neither

argument has merit.

I. Agency action is not final unless it determines le-

gal rights or obligations, or imposes legal conse-

quences

a. This Court has long held that “two conditions”

“must be satisfied” before agency action is considered

final and reviewable: it “must mark the consumma-

tion of the agency’s decisionmaking process,” and it

“must be one by which rights or obligations have been

determined, or from which legal consequences will

flow.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177-178 (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted); see Gov’t Br. 25-26.

Respondents argue (Br. 18-20) that one of those “two

conditions” is enough, and that a jurisdictional deter-

mination should be considered “final agency action” if

it satisfies Bennett’s first prong. That contention

cannot be squared with Bennett, or with other deci-

sions before and after Bennett that have applied the

6

same two-pronged standard. See, e.g., Sackett v.

EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371-1372 (2012); Alaska Dep’t

of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 483

(2004); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 797

(1992); FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 234,

241 (1980).

Bennett’s requirement that the challenged action

must not only be the consummation of agency deci-

sionmaking, but also must actually alter the legal

obligations of regulated entities, serves a critical pur-

pose. Numerous agency actions—for instance, letters

stating an agency’s interpretation of a statutory pro-

vision or its view as to an entity’s obligation—may

represent the consummation of agency decisionmak-

ing with respect to particular issues. See, e.g., Air

Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 644 (6th Cir.

2004) (Sutton, J.). Subjecting every such communica-

tion to immediate judicial review, whether or not it

has any concrete legal effect, would enmesh the courts

in abstract, piecemeal disputes and disrupt agencies’

administrative processes. It would also “muzzle any

informal communications between agencies and their

regulated communities—communications that are

vital to the smooth operation of both government and

business.” /ndependent Equip. Dealers Ass'n v. EPA,

372 F.3d 420, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.).

The same principle applies when one agency pro-

vides a recommendation to another federal actor who

has final decision-making authority. See Franklin,

505 U.S. at 796-799; Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462,

468-471 (1994). Transmittal of the recommendation

may reflect the consummation of the recommending

agency’s work. But if the recipient is legally free to

accept or reject the recommendation, that communica-

7

tion is “not final and therefore not subject to review.”

Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798. The Court in Franklin and

Dalton reached that conclusion even though the con-

sequence was to preclude any non-constitutional re-

view at all, since the President (the official responsible

for making the final decision under both statutory

schemes) is not an “agency” for purposes of the APA.

See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800-801; Dalton, 511 U.S. at

470, 476-477. Here, by contrast, although respondents

contend that alternative avenues of review are inade-

quate, judicial review of CWA-coverage issues is un-

questionably available both in the permitting context

and in enforcement proceedings. See pp. 20-24, infra.

b. Respondents argue (Br. 20-22) that, under Ben-

nett’s second prong, an agency action need not impose

“independent” legal consequences. Although their

argument is somewhat cryptic, respondents appear to

contend that the agency action itself need not “alter

the legal regime” in order to be final. 520 U.S. at 178.

That is incorrect.

Quoting the APA’s exhaustive definition of “agency

action,” respondents assert (Br. 21) that the “lan-

guage of the APA does not require ‘agency action’ to

have ‘independent’ legal consequences.” Respondents

do not identify the specific language in the APA defi-

nition that they believe supports their argument. In

any event, this Court has squarely held that, in order

to constitute “final agency action” under the APA, a

particular action “must be one by which rights or

obligations have been determined,” or from which

“legal consequences will flow.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at

178 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court in Bennett distinguished Franklin and

Dalton on precisely that ground. See ibid. (“Unlike

8

the reports in Franklin and Dalton, which were pure-

ly advisory and in no way affected the legal rights of

the relevant actors, the Biological Opinion at issue

here has direct and appreciable legal consequences.”).

In accord with that formulation, the agency actions

this Court has held to be final have themselves altered

the pertinent legal regimes by determining parties’

rights or obligations. A published rule, for instance, is

final when it has the “status of law,” 2e., when it is

intended to impose binding legal obligations. See, e.g.,

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151-152 (1967);

Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S.

407, 418 (1942).' The EPA compliance order at issue

in Sackett was final because it directed the recipient to

take particular actions and imposed penalties for

violating the compliance order itself. 132 S. Ct. at

1371-1372; see Gov't Br. 42-43. An agency order (such

as a CWA permit) that determines whether a party’s

activities are exempted from or subject to a statutory

prohibition is final because it “render[s] the prohibi-

tions of the statute inoperative” or operative. Roches-

ter Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 133

(1939). In that situation, as respondents point out (Br.

22), the regulated party’s obligations are set forth in

the statute rather than the agency’s order. But the

agency’s action nevertheless determines the actual

' Although a published rule having the force of law is “final

agency action” within the meaning of the APA, the susceptibility of

such a rule to pre-enforcement review depends on a separate

ripeness inquiry. See Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387

U.S. 158, 162-165 (1967) (holding that published agency regulation

was “final agency action” but was not ripe for judicial review); see

generally Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891

(1990); Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152.

9

legality of the party’s conduct by resolving whether

the party must conform to the statutory requirements.

In arguing that an agency action can be immediate-

ly reviewable even if it does not have independent

legal effect, respondents rely (Br. 21-22) on Port of

Boston Marine Terminal Association v. Rederiaktie-

bolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62 (1970). That deci-

sion is consistent with the Court’s other “final agency

action” precedents. The Federal Maritime Commis-

sion had authority to review the legality of filed tariffs

under the Shipping Act and to modify, prohibit, or

approve them. /d. at 65 & n.9. The Court held that an

order establishing that the tariff was legal and en-

forceable was final. /d. at 65-66, 71. As respondents

point out (Br. 22), the Court observed that the order

was not “coercive,” in that it did not affirmatively

direct any party to take any particular action. Port of

Boston, 400 U.S. at 71. But the order nonetheless

determined rights or obligations by establishing that

the tariff could be enforced.

2. A jurisdictional determination does not alter legal

rights or impose legal consequences

a. A jurisdictional determination does not affect a

landowner’s ability to obtain a permit, see Gov't Br.

27-29, and it does not opine on whether the landown-

er’s planned activities (of which the Corps may be

unaware) would require a permit or predict whether a

permit would be granted, see 33 C.F.R. 331.2. Re-

spondents are therefore incorrect in arguing (Br. 24)

that a jurisdictional determination “determines what

exemptions and permits apply” if the landowner wish-

es to discharge pollutants into waters on its lands.

Respondents rely (Br. 24-25) on a Corps regulation

that states that the “Corps has authorized its district

10

engineers to issue formal determinations concerning

the applicability of the [CWA] * * * and the applica-

bility of general permits or statutory exemptions.” 33

C.F.R. 320.1(a)(6). That language simply defines the

responsibilities of Corps district engineers to include

both sorts of determinations; it does not suggest that

the second determination is encompassed within the

first. Another Corps regulation unambiguously re-

futes respondents’ reading of Section 320.1(a)(6) by

stating that jurisdictional determinations “do not

include determinations that a particular activity re-

quires a [Corps] permit.” 33 C.F.R. 331.2.

Respondents are also incorrect in asserting (Br. 27)

that “the Corps is legally bound by the [jurisdictional

determination] during the permit process.” While the

Corps is unlikely as a practical matter to revisit

a recent jurisdictional determination during the per-

mitting process, the applicant may trigger a re-

assessment by presenting new information. See Gov’t

Br. 5. And even without new information, the appli-

cant may dispute the Corps’ regulatory jurisdiction

over a particular site in an administrative appeal of a

permit denial, even if it has previously (and unsuccess-

fully) pursued an administrative appeal from the

standalone jurisdictional determination. 33 C.F.R.

331.5(a)(2); Gov’t Br. 29 n.7. In either circumstance, if

the Corps is persuaded by the applicant’s showing, it

may reverse its earlier jurisdictional determination

and conclude that no permit is necessary because

CWA-protected waters are not present at the relevant

site.

b. A jurisdictional determination also does not al-

ter the recipient’s potential legal exposure to CWA

11

liability, or alter the range of enforcement mecha-

nisms the landowner might face. See Gov’t Br. 29-33.

Respondents argue (Br. 27-28) that a jurisdictional

determination gives rise to legal consequences be-

cause it is binding on the government? in subsequent

enforcement actions. That is incorrect. When the

Corps or EPA considers enforcement action after the

Corps has already issued a standalone jurisdictional

determination, the agencies will as a matter of prac-

tice “rely” (Resps. Br. 27) on that determination and

ordinarily will not revisit the determination absent

some reason for doing so. But no statutory or regula-

tory provision legally binds either the Corps or the

EPA to treat an existing jurisdictional determination

as controlling if the agency comes to believe it is in-

correct.”

The Corps’ regulations do not limit its authority to

revisit its own jurisdictional determinations, and it

* The EPA or the Corps may institute a proceeding for adminis-

trative penalties, 33 U.S.C. 1319(g); the EPA may issue a compli-

ance order, 33 U.S.C. 131%a), or initiate a judicial enforcement

action, 33 U.S.C. 1319(b); and the Corps may issue an order requir-

ing compliance with a permit, 33 U.S.C. 1344(s)(1), or initiate a

civil action seeking compliance with a permit and a penalty, 33

U.S.C. 1344(s)(3) and (4). In general, the Corps has primary en-

forcement authority for violations of Corps-issued permits and

some unpermitted discharges, and the EPA handles more serious

unpermitted discharges. See Memorandum of Agreement Be-

tween the Department of the Army and the Environmental Protec-

tion Agency Concerning Federal Enforcement for the Section 404

Program of the Clean Water Act (1989), http://www.usace.army.

mil/Portals/2/docs/civitworks/mous/enfmoa.pdf. If respondents,

without requesting a permit, had commenced peat-mining opera-

tions on the relevant tract, the decision whether to initiate an ad-

ministrative enforcement action would have been entrusted to the

EPA.

12

will do so if new information warrants. Corps, Regu-

latory Guidance Letter No. 05-02, 1 1 (June 14, 2005).

And the EPA is not legally bound by Corps jurisdic-

tional determinations because the EPA has final au-

thority, as between the two agencies, to construe the

scope of the CWA’s coverage. See Administrative

Authority to Construe § 404 of the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 197, 202

(1979). The Corps’ issuance of a negative jurisdiction-

al determination therefore would not preclude the

EPA from instituting an enforcement action if it be-

lieved that CWA-protected waters were present at the

relevant site and that the landowner had discharged

pollutants into those waters.*

Respondents argue (Br. 28-29) that, in an enforce-

ment action for unauthorized discharges, the govern-

ment might introduce an affirmative jurisdictional

determination as evidence of the landowner’s know-

* The agencies have established separate practices governing the

division of authority in certain rare “special cases” not at issue

here, ie., determinations of jurisdiction made by the EPA in

limited circumstances “where significant issues or technical diffi-

culties are anticipated or exist.” Memorandum of Agreement:

Exemptions Under Section 404(f) of the Clean Water Act § III.A

(1989), https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/memorandum-agreement-

exemptions-under-section-404f-clean-water-act (MOA). The MOA

provides that “determinations * * * made pursuant to this MOA

or the 1980 Memorandum of Understanding on Geographic Juris-

diction of the Section 404 Program,” which also addressed, in

relevant part, “special case[]” determinations, “will be binding on

the Government and represent the Government’s position.” /d.

§ VI.A. That statement establishes that an EPA “special case[]”

determination will contro] within the government. The MOA does

not address mine-run Corps jurisdictional determinations of the

sort at issue here, or suggest that all jurisdictional determinations

are legally “binding” on the agencies.

13

ledge of the CWA’s applicability. But, to the extent

that the defendant’s knowledge of particular waters’

CWaA-protected status is relevant to any liability or

penalty issue arising under the Act, the defendant’s

receipt of an affirmative jurisdictional determination

would not conclusively establish that such knowledge

existed.‘ The defendant would remain free to argue

that, although he knew of the Corps’ view that par-

ticular waters were covered by the Act, he believed

that view to be wrong.

A jurisdictional determination also does not impose

legal consequences in citizen suits. Respondents con-

tend (Br. 27) that, in a citizen suit alleging that partic-

ular discharges violated the CWA, the plaintiff “can

rely on the [affirmative jurisdictional determination]

as prima facie evidence of a violation of the” CWA.

But while an affirmative jurisdictional determination

(like a private consultant’s report) might be intro-

duced as evidence in such a suit, it would not alter the

plaintiff’s burden of establishing each of the elements

of a CWA violation, including the presence of waters

of the United States. See Stillwater of Crown Point

Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Kovich, 820 F Supp. 2d 859,

899 (N.D. Ind. 2011). By the same token, the recipient

* The courts of appeals generally have recognized that, because

the status of particular waters as “waters of the United States” is a

“jurisdictional element” of a CWA violation, the defendant in a

criminal case need not be proved to have known the facts estab-

lishing CWA coverage in order to be found guilty of “knowingly

violat{ing]” the Act. 33 U.S.C. 1319(c)(2)(A); see, e.g., United

States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 665-668 (4th Cir. 2007) (Wilkinson,

J.). The court may consider the defendant’s knowledge of such

facts, and of the relevant waters’ CWA-protected status, in as-

sessing an appropriate penalty within the applicable statutory

range. See 33 U.S.C. 1319(c) and (d).

14

of a negative jurisdictional determination might intro-

duce it as evidence that any discharge did not occur

into waters of the United States, see Corps, Regulato-

ry Guidance Letter No. 08-02, 1 2.b(3) (June 26, 2008),

http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/

RGLS/rgl08-02.pdf (a negative jurisdictional determi-

nation “can be used and relied on by the recipient” in

defending against a citizen suit), but a negative juris-

dictional determination does not preclude the imposi-

tion of liability as a matter of law, and the court is not

required to give it any particular weight.

c. Respondents assert (Br. 25) that a jurisdictional

determination has the “earmarks of final agency ac-

tion” because it reflects a considered decision made

after a relatively formal, structured agency process.

But the APA requires finality, not formality. In Dal-

ton, for example, the Court held that an official De-

partment of Defense report recommending base clo-

sures was not final, despite the extensive formal pro-

cedures it reflected, because it was not binding on the

President and accordingly had no operative legal

effect. 511 U.S. at 469-470; see Franklin, 505 U.S. at

797; Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 234, 241-243.

The procedural attributes on which respondents

rely—that a jurisdictional determination reflects an

“official” rather than “[(pjreliminary” view, reached

after careful scientific investigation, and that the

Corps’ regulations describe a jurisdictional deter-

mination as “final” (Br. 25)—reinforce the conclusion

that the jurisdictional determination represents the

consummation of agency decisionmaking and there-

fore satisfies Bennett’s first prong. They do not es-

tablish, however, that it has legal effect. See Gov’t Br.

33-35 & n.8. Respondents also observe (Br. 25) that a

15

jurisdictional determination is “valid” for five years.°

33 C.F.R. Pt. 331, App. C. But the relevant question

is not how long a jurisdictional determination remains

valid, but whether it has binding legal effect during

that period. For the reasons discussed above and in

the government’s opening brief, it does not. See pp. 9-

14, supra; see also Gov’t Br. 25-41.

d. A Corps jurisdictional determination thus is

analogous to agency communications that inform

regulated parties of the agency’s view of the legal

status of particular private conduct. Although this

Court has not had occasion to address the question,

the courts of appeals have repeatedly held that such

statements are not final agency action because they do

not effect legal consequences apart from those already

imposed by the statute. See, e.g., Golden & Zimmer-

man, LLC v. Domenech, 599 F.3d 426, 432-433 (4th

Cir. 2010); see also Holistic Candlers & Consumers

Ass’n v. FDA, 664 F.3d 940, 941-946 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 133 S. Ct. 497 (2012); New Jersey v. United

States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 526 F.3d 98, 102

(3d Cir. 2008); Independent Equip. Dealers Ass'n, 372

F.3d at 428; Air Brake Sys., 357 F.3d at 644. Those

decisions reflect the recognition that, while agency

guidance is likely to influence a regulated party’s

conduct, that effect on a party’s own assessment of its

® The five-year validity period reflects the Corps’ conclusion

that, once the agency has undertaken the investigation necessary

to make the jurisdictional determination, it generally will not be an

efficient use of resources to revisit the question whether waters of

the United States are present on a particular tract. Absent con-

trary evidence, the Corps therefore presumes that physical condi-

tions on the site are unlikely to change significantly during the

ensuing five years. See Corps, Regulatory Guidance Letter No.

90-06, 1 2 (Aug. 14, 1990).

16

options does not amount to a legal consequence. /n-

dependent Equip. Dealers Ass’n, 372 F.3d at 428. If

agency guidance were immediately reviewable, more-

over, agencies would hesitate to devote limited re-

sources to “giving * * * needed advice.” American

Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. O'Connor, 747 F.2d

748, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (R.B. Ginsburg, J.), cert.

denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985).

Respondents rely (Br. 33-35) on decisions involving

agency actions that, unlike jurisdictional determina-

tions, had operative legal effects. In Frozen Food

Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 41-45 (1956),

the Court held that an Interstate Commerce Commis-

sion (ICC) order identifying the commodities that the

ICC deemed to be exempted from regulation under

the Interstate Commerce Act was final because it

effectively functioned as a rule. The order was func-

tionally equivalent to an “administrative regulation[]”

interpreting the scope of the statutory exemption for

“agricultural commodities,” Standard Oil, 449

U.S. at 240 & n.8 (discussing Frozen Food Express),

and thus “set{] the standard” governing how “an im-

portant segment of the trucking” industry would be

permitted to do business. Frozen Food Express, 351

U.S. at 44. Similarly, the order at issue in Port of

Boston was final because it determined the extent to

which a tariff could go into effect. 400 U.S. at 65-66,

71. A jurisdictional determination has no comparable

legal effect.

C. The Asserted Practical Consequences Of A Jurisdic-

tional Determination Do Not Render It Final Agency

Action

Respondents argue (Br. 30-39) that a jurisdictional

determination’s likely practical effect on a landown-

17

er’s decisionmaking is sufficient to render the juris-

dictional determination immediately reviewable. That

argument lacks merit.

1. When an agency action does not alter the legal

regime, even significant practical consequences do not

render it reviewable. In Standard Oil, the Court held

that an FTC complaint finding “reason to believe”

that a party had violated the Federal Trade Commis-

sion Act was not final, even though it imposed the

“substantial” “burden” of defending against the agen-

cy proceeding—a burden that entailed significant

expense as well as reputational harm. 449 U.S. at 242;

see Air Brake Sys., 357 F.3d at 645 (“[A]dverse eco-

nomic effects accompany many forms of indisputably

non-final government action[,] * * * but that does

not make the agency’s action final.”). In Dalton and

Franklin, the Court held that the agency recommen-

dations at issue were non-reviewable because they

were not legally binding; the Court did not assess the

practical impact those recommendations were likely to

have on the President’s decisionmaking.

Respondents’ arguments illustrate why it would be

unworkable to treat the practical incentives created

by agency action as a sufficient basis for immediate

judicial review. Respondents primarily contend (Br.

16) that immediate review is necessary because the

cost of seeking a permit would be prohibitive for them.

Even assuming that is an accurate description of their

particular circumstances (respondents have not sup-

ported those assertions with evidence), it is doubtless

not true for all or even most potential dischargers.

The vast majority of discharges fall within general

permits, and either can be undertaken without provid-

ing advance notice to the Corps (and therefore without

18

expending any resources on a permit request), 33

C.F.R. 330.1(e), or after completing the abbreviated,

relatively inexpensive general-permit verification

process, 33 C.F.R. 330.1(f). See Gov’t Br. 8 (more

than 54,000 general-permit verifications issued in

2015, compared with 3100 individual permits and 97

applications denied); id. at 47-48. The cost of obtain-

ing an individual permit varies widely based on the

circumstances, but it will sometimes be only slightly

greater than for a general-permit verification, and

even a substantial cost will sometimes be a small per-

centage of the applicant’s planned expenditures for

the project. See id. at 48. Generalized assertions that

permitting costs may exceed an undefined threshold

for an unknown number of potential dischargers pro-

vide no basis for holding that all jurisdictional deter-

minations are immediately reviewable.

Respondents suggest in the alternative (Br. 37)

that the finality analysis “should take into account the

facts of this case,” including the fact that respondents’

own proposed peat-mining activities would require an

individual permit. See id. at 38, 40. Under that ap-

proach, the same jurisdictional determination for the

same property might have been treated as non-final if

respondents had expressed a desire to undertake a

more modest project for which a general permit might

apply. Respondents cite no decision in which the

Court has analyzed finality in that manner. That

approach would also create an evident potential for

manipulation, particularly if (as respondents contend,

see id. at 38) the allegations in a plaintiff's complaint

must be taken as true in assessing the practical im-

pact of the challenged agency conduct.

19

2. In any event, immediate judicial review of a

Corps jurisdictional determination would not neces-

sarily provide the certainty respondents seek. A re-

viewing court’s determination that a jurisdictional

determination is “arbitrary [and] capricious,” 5 U.S.C.

706(2)(A)—i.e., that the Corps’ administrative record

did not support a reasonable belief that the property

contains waters of the United States—would not pre-

vent the Corps or the EPA from gathering additional

evidence of CWA coverage and initiating enforcement

action based on that evidence.® And if the court held

that the jurisdictional determination was not arbitrary

and capricious, the landowner could still argue, in a

subsequent civil enforcement action, that the agency

had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence

iaat the property in question contained waters of the

United States.

Allowing immediate judicial review of the Corps’

jurisdictional determinations therefore would spawn

piecemeal and potentially duplicative proceedings.

That prospect might deter the Corps from engaging in

an informational practice that is triggered by a land-

owner’s request and is intended to benefit landowners

as well as to promote compliance with the CWA.

* Respondents’ complaint appropriately recognized that, if judi-

cial review is available, it should be “based upon the administrative

record before the Corps at the time the Corps made its decision.”

J.A. 8. Although respondents requested “[{a) declaration that

[their] Property is not subject to the CWA,” J.A. 26, that relief

would be inappropriate even if respondents’ suit is allowed to go

forward and is ultimately successful. The only question properly

before a reviewing court would be whether the Corps’ administra-

tive record adequately supported its jurisdictional determination—

not whether the relevant tract actually contains waters protected

by the CWA.

20

Il. RESPONDENTS HAVE ADEQUATE ALTERNATIVE

OPPORTUNITIES TO OBTAIN JUDICIAL RESOLU-

TION OF CWA-COVERAGE ISSUES

Even if a jurisdictional determination were “final

agency action,” APA review would be unavailable be-

cause a person who disagrees with such a determina-

tion has “other adequate remed[ies) in a court.” 5

U.S.C. 704. The CWA authorizes the Corps and the

EPA to issue permits for discharges that would oth-

erwise violate the Act, and it provides for various

forms of enforcement actions against alleged violators.

Judicial review of CWA-coverage issues is available in

both those contexts. Respondents contend that im-

mediate judicial review of Corps jurisdictional deter-

minations is an essential supplement to those mecha-

nisms. Congress evidently did not share that view,

however, since the CWA does not expressly contem-

plate standalone jurisdictional determinations.

A. Respondents assert (Br. 39-44) that seeking a

permit is prohibitively costly. But cf. pp. 17-18, supra.

That concern provides no basis for second-guessing

Congress’s evident determination that the permitting

process affords an adequate avenue for obtaining pre-

discharge resolution of CWA-coverage issues. Re-

spondents also rely on unrepresentative cost figures,

see Gov't Br. 47-48, and overlook the fact that lower-

cost general permits account for the vast majority of

permit grants. And while respondents assert (Br. 40)

that they must commission studies costing $100,000 to

pursue their own permit application, it is unclear how

substantial those costs are in relation to respondents’

project as a whole, which contemplates peat-mining on

150 acres of high-value wetlands over a 20-year peri-

od. J.A. 27.

21

Respondents suggest (Br. 46-47) that the Corps

will use its control over the duration of the permitting

process, and its requests for additional information

from the applicant, to “wear down the applicant” until

it abandons its permit request.’ In fact, the Corps

uses an iterative process of consultation and infor-

mation requests so that it may reach a resolution that

enables the applicant to implement its project con-

sistent with the CWA and other federal statutes. See

33 C.F.R. 320.4 (Corps balances benefits of the pro-

posed project and private ownership rights with public

interest in preserving waters of the United States);

Gov't Br. 47-49. That is why permits are rarely de-

nied. In addition, Corps regulations protect appli-

cants by establishing default deadlines and limiting

information requests to those “deem[ed] essential.”

33 C.F.R. 325.1(e); see 33 C.F.R. 325.2(d).

Respondents argue (Br. 41-44) that it is “[wJasteful

and [uJnnecessary” to require landowners to under-

take the permitting process even though it “has noth-

ing to do with the question of jurisdiction.” But im-

’ In 2011, the Corps issued approximately 3600 individual per-

mits, approved approximately 53,000 projects under general per-

mits, modified approximately 3100 existing permits, and deter-

mined for approximately 9900 applications that no permit was

required. The Corps denied approximately 134 permit applica-

tions, and approximately 9700 were withdrawn. Permit denials

were infrequent because “[mJost projects which might otherwise

have been denied a permit were modified or conditioned to meet

Corps requirements, scaled down to qualify for approval under

general permits, or withdrawn.” Dep’t of the Army, Annual Re-

port Fiscal Year 2011 of the Secretary of the Army on Civil Works

Activities (1 October 2010-30 September 2011), at 45-1, http://edm

16021.contentdm.oclic.org/edm/compoundobject/collection/p16021 collé/

id/1548/rec/1.

22

mediate judicial review of a standalone jurisdictional

determination, when a successful permit application

could obviate the need for judicial intervention, would

consume significant agency and judicial resources

without definitively resolving the CWaA-coverage

issue. See Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 242; see also

p. 19, supra. Contrary to respondents’ argument (Br.

43), the fact that the permit process may involve is-

sues (such as mitigation and timing) that are “irrele-

vant to the jurisdictional question” does not render it

inadequate. Regulated parties often must wait to

obtain review of an interlocutory agency order until

the conclusion of administrative proceedings that

address additional issues unrelated to that order. See

Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 241; Aluminum Co. of Am.

v. United States, 790 F.2d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1986)

(Sealia, J.).

Finally, respondents argue (Br. 46, 50-53) that re-

quiring a landowner to seek a permit “undermines the

presumption of reviewability.” Jd. at 50 (capitalization

altered). But the “presumption favoring judicial re-

view of administrative action” governs resolution of

the question whether ‘a particular statutory scheme

precludes review of agency action that satisfies Sec-

tion 704’s criteria. Block v. Community Nutrition

Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984). The disputed issue

here, by contrast, is whether a jurisdictional determi-

nation falls within Section 704 to begin with, ze.,

whether it is “final agency action for which there is no

other adequate remedy in a court.” In Sackett, for

example, the Court first determined that the compli-

ance order was “final agency action” and that no other

adequate judicial remedy existed, without applying

any presumption in favor of review. 132 S. Ct. at

23

1371-1372. The Court then applied the presumption in

considering whether the CWA precluded judicial re-

view of the order. /d. at 1372-1373.

B. A recipient of an affirmative jurisdictional de-

termination who elects to proceed with discharges

may also obtain judicial review of the CWA-coverage

issue if the government institutes an administrative

penalty proceeding or judicial enforcement action, or

if an aggrieved private plaintiff commences a citizen

suit. Respondents argue (Br. 53-56) that those ave-

nues for review are inadequate because the landowner

may face steadily accruing statutory penalties if the

court ultimately concludes that a CWA violation has

occurred. See 33 U.S.C. 1319(d); Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at

1370. But a person who discharges without a permit

would run that risk even if it had not received a juris-

dictional determination, or if the Corps had never

adopted the practice of furnishing such determina-

tions upon request.

C. The adequacy of existing remedies is particu-

larly clear when the two mechanisms described above

are considered in tandem. By invoking the permitting

process, a landowner can obtain judicial review of

CWaA-coverage issues without engaging in potentially

unlawful discharges, and thus without subjecting itself

to possible penalties if its view of CWA (non-)coverage

is ultimately rejected. Alternatively, a landowner that

wishes to avoid the administrative requirements of the

permitting process can discharge without a permit

and argue in any enforcement action that its discharg-

es did not violate the Act. Respondents claim an enti-

tlement to a third judicial-review mechanism that

combines the most attractive (to the landowner) fea-

tures of the two existing avenues, by allowing pre-

24

discharge review without prior recourse to the permit-

ting process. Respondent identifies no sound basis for

concluding, however, that the existing modes of re-

view, taken together, are less than “adequate.”

* * * * >

For the foregoing reasons and those stated in our

opening brief, the judgment of the court of appeals

should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR.

Solicitor General

MARCH 2016

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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