Petitioners Brief — Sturgeon v. Masica, 136 S. Ct. 27 (2015) (No. 14-1209)

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No. 14-1209

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

JOHN STURGEON,

Petitioner,

BERT FROST, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

AS ALASKA REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, et ai,

Respondents.

On Writ oF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED States Court

or APPEALS FOR THE Ninta Circuit

PETITIONER’S OPENING BRIEF

WruuiaM S. Consovoy

J. MICHAEL CONNOLLY

MATTHEW T. FINDLEY

Counsel of Record

Consovoy McCartuy Eva R. GARDNER

Park PLLC ASHBURN & Mason, P.C.

3033 Wilson Boulevard 1227 W. Ninth Avenue

Suite 700 Suite 200

Arlington, VA 22201 Anchorage, AK 99501

(907) 276-4331

MICHAEL H. Park mtf@anchorlaw.com

Consovoy McCartTuy

Park PLLC Douc.Las Pore

Three Columbus Circle Pope & Katcuer

15" Floor 421 W. First Avenue

New York, NY 10019 Suite 220

Anchorage, AK 99501

Attorneys for Petitioner

Date: November 16, 2015

COUNSEL PRESS

(800) 274-8321 + (B00) 359-6859

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Section 103(c) of the Alaska National

Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 prohibits the

National Park Service from exercising regulatory control

over State, Native Corporation, and private Alaska land

physically located within the boundaries of the National

Park System.

12

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Petitioner in this case is John Sturgeon.

Respondents are Bert Frost, in his official capacity as

Alaska Regional Director of the National Park Service;

Greg Dudgeon, in his official capacity as Superintendent

of the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve; Andee

Sears, in her official capacity as a Special Agent for the

National Park Service; Sally Jewell, in her official capacity

as Secretary of the Interior; Jonathan Jarvis, in his official

capacity as Director of the National Park Service; the

National Park Service; and the United States Department

of the Interior.

wt

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ..............-.ceee0e: i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ............... ii

- gE em mn rE iii

TABLE OF APPENDICES ...................... vi

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ............. vii

i ee adeewen 1

I ead 1

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................... 1

A. The Allocation of Lands to the

State of Alaska and Alaska Natives........... 1

B. The Alaska National Interest

Lands Conservation Act of 1980.............. 4

Te CS c cdecictccceescessvcess 10

wv

Table of Contents

Page

Th SEIN dc ticneneedeséscececedes 16

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT...................- 17

Ek ccnddeeedsdedcdesds deneenensenen 21

I ANILCA Prohibits NPS from

Regulating Nonfederal Lands Within

Alaska CSUs as Though They Were Part

of the National Park System. ............... 21

A. Section 103(c) of ANILCA limits

NPS’s general regulatory control to

“public lands” within Alaska CSUs....... 22

B. Congress intended for Section 103(c) to

prevent NPS from regulating nonpublic

landsin Alaska CSUsas though they were

part of the National Park System. ....... 28

C. NPS’s construction of Section 103) is

vb cc cscvecocctéiocccccecsd 30

II. NPS’s Alternative Arguments Are Beyond

the Question Presented and Provide No

Basis for Affirming the Judgment Below. .... . 33

A. Submerged lands were “conveyed” to

SS. geccdsvccdsssseseus 33

Vv

Table of Contents

Page

B. State navigable waters are not

EE cbncicencdeneewedenceawe 35

1. Ownership of submerged lands

includes control of the waters

flowing above them................. 35

2. Nofederalreserved water rights for

subsistence justify NPS extending

its jurisdiction to state submerged

lands and navigable waters. ......... 38

UU Se ccencccsdvesecepsoevdsccoossese 39

vt

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — 16 U.S.C. § 3108 ................. la

APPENDIX B — 36 C.F.R. § 1.2 ..............28.. 4a

APPENDIX C — 36 C.FLR. § 2.17 ............2005. 6a

vit

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

CASES

Alaska v. Ahtna,

891 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989).............

Alaska v. Babbitt,

72 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1995) ..............

Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov.,

See I PE 6 ccc csecccccecescess

Alaska v. United States,

201 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2000).............

Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, Alaska,

GD UAD. GE Gen occ ccccccsccccccess

BedRoc Lid., LLC v. United States,

Ge Ws BOW Gs eee ccccccccccccscess

Bulova Watch Co. v. United States,

365 U.S. 753 (1961)......... pencececeses

Cappaert v. United States,

Ge Ws SEES ovescccccesesccccnes

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

Ge Gn Ee so wcrc cccccccccceces

vitt

Cited Authorities

Page

Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,

ERT eae ere 31

City of Angoon v. Marsh,

oe fl re 4

Deal v. United States,

Ne ccs seek eh wobnakeneneeen 26

Dep't of Natural Res. v. Alaska Riverways, Inc.,

232 P.3d 1203 (Alaska 2010) ..................4- 2

Idaho v. United States,

ge Sa i ie 34

Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois,

es ance binansnenened 2, 36, 37

Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.

Implement Workers of Am., UAW v.

Johnson Controls, Inc.,

cee ccc ace Lacie cuanedatawe 28

James v. State,

950 P.2d 1130 (Alaska 1997) ................00. 34

Katie John v. United States,

720 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2013). ...............000- 38

Koniag, Inc. v. Koncor Forest Res.,

39 F.3d 991 (Oth Cir. 1994)... 2... ccc ccccccccces 4

1x

Cited Authorities

Nken v. Holder,

556 U.S. 418 (2009). ..............208.

Paroline v. United States,

EE Gs SUED oc ccc vcccccceseecs

Sturgeon v. Masica,

768 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2014)............

Totemoff v. State,

905 P.2d 954 (Alaska 1995).............

Trustees for Alaska v. State,

736 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1987) .............

Tyonek Native Corp. v.

Sec’y of the Interior,

836 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1988) ...........

United States v. Alaska,

Be Ss CS odd eccccsescceceseues

United States v. Brown,

36 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1994).............

United States v. California,

GP Ee ccesccccccceccesees

United States v. Gonzales,

Se PE ps sec cesccevccceseses

x

Cited Authorities

Page

Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ.,

EE nici candeskanetsuneceseswac 21

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

OP NE FP ev cb snsiccccecccsccevedesens 11, 17

| OPPO T ETT CTT CT TCC CTT Tee 1]

Pee NS So deen teeNdvescccdsccessccend 5, 6

EE obi. decdnddceteratencedenenecad 5

ee rb idnuxctedckdedssonctiedhewsedsaes 5

PP I Sa 6 ndakedsscnsdesnavensdsadent 5

SP MU one veddspucdsctcsnsddcesesacacese 5

SE Shes eves ntdeveddeunccceesnsecks 5

ee Es nidcotevesdvebccidedetavecssed 5

Ss EES a ocevccctectncewisecesuseced 5, 30

Be ES oc ccecenasccescestceteesssecent 5

SP ER occcucnctccesesésevantsssvenens 27

EE nds ccdeccnie’ 6dbseeneecne passim

xt

Cited Authorities

Page

BP UREGe Be soc eccccceccccceccccccccccccesecd 30

i dvcddewessdavecheestosens 37-38

I cicdevectcnccodecesisdecsewsscunse 5

ap iakcdenntimeecstuedeandankes 5

EN Scb-deddcrceensevpccuseccstssecs 1

Ss hve cercsssccccevesescecsi 2, 18, 36

na bteredccdscccenessedcceuccees 3

EE bh oncetnndes tetescetadevadenases 3

Cekeedcncevecsdschhcanstudeceevacs 3

Se iktcntvedcsccccneksseeesenucesncas 3

ck cepeneneusewesdsneseas cy 4

ee I oo iba ccccsscccoscsscqnnses 4

ee I sb veccccesesecccccccosess 10

ii cncddbncccdctenvtsscepeonruns 25

Pe CAs FE occ cbccdececcvccccociesesoseda 1]

xt

Cited Authorities

Page

OO TLE, 8 ENE oc cccccccescccsseseseceenant 22

BB CRG, GTP 0c cccccccccesevevecesouanaun 22

Act of Dec. 19, 2014, Pub. L. 113-287,

EP ee, SUNG ov vcccccsseccecosvensecoun 11

Alaska Admin. Code tit. 11, § 20.990(7)............. 14

Alaska Admin. Code tit. 11, § 20.990(18) ............ 14

Alaska Const. art. VITE, $3 .....ccccccccccccsccees 37

Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation

Act, Pub. L. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) .... passim

Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,

Pub. L. 92-903, 85 Stat. 688 (1971).......... passim

Aleaica Stat. § SB.GG.IBGE).. 2. cccccvcccccccccccese 37

Alaska Stat. § 38.05.126(b)..............ceeee eens 37

Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. 85-508,

We PEED 6 cc ccccccccoecsoesesess passim

REGULATIONS

SOG Fe BRR cov ccccvvcsesacseséseseass 13, 21

SE CFR. GSTAD oc ccccccsccccccccseceess 12, 13, 16

rrit

Cited Authorities

Page

EE 35

Cee eee os ne co ccuasineseseces 35

i ae nc eccusecestescecett 35

Cee 32

ee lana eaccccgesetetese 35

Applicability of Reguiations to Non-Federal Lands

and Waters Under U.S. Legislative Jurisdiction,

52 Fed. Reg. 35,238 (Sept. 18, 1987) ............. 12

General Provisions and Non-Federal Oil and Gas

Rights, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,572 (Oct. 26, 2015)........ 31

General Regulations for Areas Administered by

the National Park Service,

48 Fed. Reg. 30,252 (June 30, 1983). .......... 11, 12

General Regulations for Areas Administered

by the National Park Service and National

Park System Units in Alaska,

61 Fed. Reg. 35,133 (July 5, 1996) ......... 13, 27, 30

National Park System Units in Alaska,

46 Fed. Reg. 31,836 (June 17, 2981) ........... 10, 11

Proclamation No. 4611,

43 Fed. Reg. 57,009 (Dec. 5, 1978) ................ 4

XIV

Cited Authorities

Page

Public Land Order 4582,

34 Fed. Reg. 1,025 (Jan. 23, 1969) ................ 3

Public Land Order 5653,

43 Fed. Reg. 59,756 (Dec. 21, 1978) ............... 4

Public Land Orders 5696-5711,

45 Fed. Reg. 9,562 (Feb. 12, 1980)................ 4

OTHER AUTHORITIES

125 Cong. Rec. 9,905 (1979) ........ cece cece eeee 7,8

125 Cong. Rec. 11,158 (1979). .............005: passim

125 Cong. Rec. 11,458 (1979) ........... cece eeees 9, 10

126 Cong. Rec. 21,891 (1980) ... 0... cece cccccees 9

126 Cong, Ree. 31,558 (ISB)... wc cccccccccccccccs 8

126 Cong. Rec. 30,496 (1980) .... 2... cece eee e ce eees 9

126 Cong. Rec. 30,498 (1980) ................... 10, 29

S. Rep. No. 96-413 (1979) ............cceeeeee 7, 28, 29

ee ED GED ccccccccccccccoucesceseed 9

H.R. 39, 96th Cong. (1980) ........... ccc e eee eens 9

xU

Cited Authorities

Page

H.R. Con. Res. 452, 96th Cong. (1980) ............... 9

Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed 2014) .............. 34

Richard M. Johannsen, Public Land Withdrawal

Policy and the Antiquities Act, 56 Wash. L.

DTT... cauaeeudccecedbecesdouseeces 4-5

i

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit is reported at 768 F.3d 1066 and is

reproduced in the Appendix to the Petition (“App.”) at

3a-34a. The Ninth Circuit’s order denying rehearing en

banc is unreported and is reproduced at App. la-2a. The

opinion of the United States District Court for the District

of Alaska is unreported and is reproduced at App. 35a-58a.

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit issued its decision on October 6, 2014. App. 3a.

A timely petition for rehearing en banc was denied on

December 16, 2014. App. la. The petition for a writ of

certiorari was timely filed on March 31, 2015, and granted

on October 1, 2015. This Court has jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant statutory and regulatory provisions are

reproduced in the appendix to this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The Allocation of Lands to the State of Alaska and

Alaska Natives

Upon entering the Union in 1959, Alaska received the

largest land grant in the history of the United States.

The Alaska Statehood Act of 1958 (“Statehood Act”)

2

authorized Alaska to select up to 102,550,000 acres—an

area the size of California—from the public lands of the

United States “which [we]re vacant, unappropriated, and

unreserved at the time of their selection.” Pub. L. 85-508,

§ 6(b), 72 Stat. 339, 340 (1958). This unprecedented grant

was driven by “fear that the territory was economically

immature” and that its small, dispersed population “would

be unable to support a state government.” Trustees for

Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 335 (Alaska 1987). The land

grant would act “as an endowment which would yield the

income that Alaska needed to meet the costs of statehood”

and thus “ensure the economic and social well-being of the

new state.” Jd. at 335-36.

The Statehood Act also made the Submerged Lands

Act of 1953, which grants “title to and ownership of the

lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries

of the respective States,” 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a), “applicable

to the State of Alaska” such that Alaska “shall have the

same rights as do existing States thereunder,” Pub. L.

85-508, § 6(m), 72 Stat. 343. Alaska therefore “holds

title to the beds of navigable waters ‘in trust for the

people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation

of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have

liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or

interference of private parties.” Dep’t of Natural Res.

v. Alaska Riverways, Inc., 232 P.3d 1203, 1211 (Alaska

2010) (quoting Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.

387, 452 (1892)).

In the decade following its admission to the Union,

Alaska began selecting lands from the public domain in

accordance with its rights under the Statehood Act. But

land disputes quickly arose when the State attempted

3

to select lands over which Alaska Natives had asserted

aboriginal title. Because the Statehood Act had not

extinguished their claims, Alaska Natives contended that

the State had no legal right to their land. As a result, the

Secretary of the Interior temporarily suspended transfer

of unreserved public lands to Alaska. See Public Land

Order 4582, 34 Fed. Reg. 1,025 (Jan. 23, 1969).

In 1971, Congress passed the Alaska Native Claims

Settlement Act (“ANCSA”) to resolve these disputes. Pub.

L. 92-903, 85 Stat. 688 (1971). Congress designed ANCSA

to settle Alaska Natives’ claims of aboriginal title “rapidly,

with certainty, in conformity with the real economic and

social needs of Natives, without litigation, with maximum

participation by Natives in decisions affecting their rights

and property.” 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b). At the same time,

Congress was intent on doing so “without establishing any

permanent racially defined institutions, rights, privileges,

or obligations” or “creating a reservation system or

lengthy wardship or trusteeship.” Jd. In short, Congress

sought to “end the sort of federal supervision over Indian

affairs that had previously marked federal Indian policy.”

Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov., 522 U.S. 520,

523-24 (1998).

To that end, Congress extinguished the aboriginal

land claims of Alaska Natives, appropriated $962.5 million

to fund various Native regional and village corporations,

and granted these corporations the right to select

approximately 40 million acres of land. See 43 U.S.C.

§§ 1603(b), 1605, 1607, 1610-15. “Congress contemplated

that land granted under ANCSA would be put primarily to

three uses—village expansion, subsistence, and capital for

economic development. Of these potential uses, Congress

4

clearly expected economic development would be the most

significant.” Koniag, Inc. v. Koncor Forest Res., 39 F.3d

991, 996 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted). Indeed,

Congress recognized that development of the land would

allow Alaska Natives to “achiev{e] financial independence

and self-sufficiency.” City of Angoon v. Marsh, 749 F.2d

1413, 1414 (9th Cir. 1984).

B. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation

Act of 1980

In addition to resolving the land claims of Native

Alaskans, ANCSA directed the Secretary of the Interior

to set aside up to 80 million acres of unreserved federal land

“which the Secretary deems are suitable for addition to or

creation as units of the National Park System[].” 43 U.S.C.

§ 1616(d)(2). The Secretary’s subsequent withdrawals,

however, never received congressional approval. See id.

§ 1616(d)(2)(D) (providing that the withdrawals would

expire unless Congress approved them within five years).

The Carter Administration (claiming authority under

the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,

43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784, and the Antiquities Act of 1906,

16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433) then started withdrawing land on

an ad hoc basis. By 1980, the Carter Administration had

unilaterally withdrawn over 100 million acres of federal

land. See Proclamation No. 4611, 43 Fed. Reg. 57,009 (Dec.

5, 1978); Public Land Order 5653, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,756

(Dec. 21, 1978); Public Land Orders 5696-5711, 45 Fed.

Reg. 9,562 (Feb. 12, 1980). Alaska, which was still in the

process of making its land selections under the Statehood

Act, was “outraged by President Carter’s expansive use

of the Antiquities Act,” and the “public outcry against

this massive land ‘lock-up’ was significant.” Richard M.

5

Johannsen, Public Land Withdrawal Policy and the

Antiquities Act, 56 Wash. L. Rev. 439, 455 (1981).

In response, Congress enacted the Alaska National

Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”), Pub. L. 96-

487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980). ANILCA rescinded the Carter

Administration’s land withdrawals, see 16 U.S.C. § 3209,

and made any future federal withdrawals in Alaska of

more than 5,000 acres subject to congressional approval

see id. § 3213(a). Congress thus developed its own polici

to finally “complete the allocation of federal lands in tie

State of Alaska.” Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell,

Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 549 (1987). In doing so, Congress

sought to balance two objectives: protecting “the national

interest in the scenic, natural, cultural and environmental

values on the public lands in Alaska” and, as it had done

with the Alaska Statehood Act and ANCSA, ensuring “the

economic and social needs of the State of Alaska and its

people.” 16 U.S.C. § 3101(d).

ANILCA placed more than 100 million acres into

conservation system units (“CSUs”) in Alaska, expanding

the National Park System by over 43 million acres and

creating numerous new National Monuments and Wildlife

Refuges. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431, 410hh, 668dd, 460mm, 539,

1274(a), 1132.1 The Yukon-Charley Rivers National

Preserve (“Yukon-Charley”) is one of these CSUs.

1. ANILCA defined a CSU as “any unit in Alaska of the

National Park System, National Wildlife Refuge System, National

Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems, National Trails System.

National Wilderness Preservation System, or a National Forest

Monument.” 16 U.S.C. § 3102(4). That definition included “existing

units, units established, designated, or expanded by or under the

provisions of this Act, additions to such units, and any such unit

established, designated, or expanded hereafter.” Id.

6

Congress identified the Yukon-Charley as “containing

approximately one million s~ven hundred and thirteen

thousand acres of public lands, as generally depicted on

map numbered YUCH-90,008, and dated October 1978.”

16 U.S.C. § 410hh(10). ANILCA established the Yukon-

Charley as a “unit{] of the National Park System ... [to] be

administered by the Secretary under the laws governing

the administration of such lands and under the provisions

of this Act.” Id. § 410hh.

Because Congress sought to include an entire

ecosystem within a given CSU, each one encompassed

a massive amount of land—not all of which belonged

to the federal government. ANILCA delineated new

CSU boundaries that encompassed roughly 28 percent

of all land in Alaska. Native Corporations and the State

owned much of the nonfederal land contained within

these CSUs. As of this year, Native Corporations alone

own approximately 18 million acres within CSUs, which

amount to approximately 40 percent of their total ANCSA

land selections. See Brief of Ahtna, Inc. et al. as Amici

Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5 & Ex. 1 (Apr. 29, 2015).

The disposition of these nonfederal lands within the

new or expanded CSUs received significant congressional

attention. There was.no question as to Congress’s intent:

State, Native Corporation, and private lands were not

“public lands,” were not part of any CSU, and would not

be subject to federal regulation as if they were part of a

CSU. As the Senate committee charged with drafting

responsibility explained, “[t]hose private lands, and those

public lands owned by the State of Alaska ... are not to

be construed as subject to the management regulations

which may be adopted to manage and administer any

7

national conservation system unit which is adjacent to,

or surrounds, the private or non-Federal public lands.”

S. Rep. No. 96-413, at 303 (1979). Rather, only “Federal

laws and regulations of general applicability to both

private and public lands, such as the Clean Air Act,

the Water Pollution Control Act, U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers wetlands regulations, and other Federal

statutes and regulations of general applicability would be

applicable to private or non-F ederal public land inholdings

within conservations system units.” Jd. These generally-

applicable statutes and regulations thus were “unaffected

by the passage of this bill.” Jd.

Congress was especially concerned that ANILCA not

disturb the land rights granted to Alaska Natives under

ANCSA. Applying federal conservation regulations to

Native Corporation lands would imperil ANCSA’s goal of

ensuring financial independence and self-sufficiency for

Alaska Natives. As Arizona Congressman Morris Udall,

one of ANILCA’s primary sponsors, put it: ANILCA was

a “direct out-growth of [ANCSA],” and, as a consequence,

it was “important to recall the relationship between the

conservation system units ... and the lands which the

Native peoples of Alaska have received and will receive

pursuant to the [ANCSA] in return for the extinguishment

of their claims based on aboriginal title.” 125 Cong. Rec.

9,905 (1979) (statement of Rep. Udall).

Congressman Udall explained that ANILCA was to

have no effect on these lands:

We recognize that there are certain lands which

have been selected by Native Corporations and

which are within the exterior boundaries of

8

some of the conservation system units .... I want

to make clear that inclusion of these Native

lands within the boundaries of conservation

system units is not intended to affect any rights

which the Corporations may have under this

act, [ANCSA], or any other law, or to restrict

use of such lands by the owning Corporations

nor to subject the Native lands to regulations

applicable to the public lands within the specific

conservation system unit.

Id.; see also 125 Cong. Rec. 21,882 (1980) (statement of

Sen. Stevens) (“The fact that Native lands lie within the

boundaries of conservation system units is not intended

to affect any rights which the [Native] corporations have

under this act, [ANCSA], or any other law.... The Native

organizations have been given repeated assurances that

including their lands within conservation units will not

affect the implementation of [ANCSA].”); 125 Cong. Rec.

11,158 (1979) (statement of Rep. Seiberling) (recognizing

that nothing in ANILCA “alters in any way the ability

of the State or Natives to do what it will with ... lands”

within the boundaries of CSUs).

Congress understood, though, that it should do more

than make its intent known in legislative documents and

floor statements. It thus added Section 103(¢), which states:

Only those lands within the boundaries of any

conservation system unit which are public

lands (as such term is defined in this Act)

shall be deemed to be included as a portion of

such unit. No lands which, before, on, or after

December 2, 1980, are conveyed to the State, to

9

any Native Corporation, or to any private party

shall be subject to the regulations applicable

solely to public lands within such units. If the

State, a Native Corporation, or other owner

desires to convey any such lands, the Secretary

may acquire such lands in accordance with

applicable law (including this Act), and any

such lands shall become part of the unit, and

be administered accordingly.

16 U.S.C. § 3103(€).?

Congress added Section 103(c) to “make clear beyond

any doubt that any State, Native, or private lands, which

may lie within the outer boundaries of the conservation

system unit are not parts of that unit and are not subject

to regulations which are applied to public lands, which,

in fact, are part of the unit.” 125 Cong. Rec. 11,158 (1979)

(statement of Rep. Seiberling). Only an express statutory

prohibition would guarantee that some “sharp lawyer”

would not use “catch words” to circumvent Congress’s

intention that “the fact that [land] is within the boundaries

drawn on the map for that conservation unit does not in

2. This provision was originally located in Section 810(c)

of H.R. 3651, the “Udall-Anderson” bill that eventually became

ANILCA. See H.R. 39, 96th Cong. (1979). After the House

version of ANILCA passed, 125 Cong. Rec. 11,458-59 (1979), it

was replaced with the Senate’s version, which did not include

Section 810(c), 126 Cong. Rec. 21,891 (1980); H.R. 39, 96th Cong.

‘(1980). This provision was included in the final version of ANILCA

through a concurrent resolution that reinstated the original

Section 810(c) amendment language to its new location at Section

103(c). 126 Cong. Rec. 30,495-500 (1980); see H.R. Con. Res. 452,

96th Cong. (1980).

10

any way change the status of that State, native or private

land or make it subject to any of the laws or regulations

that pertain to U.S. public lands.” Jd. In sum, Congress

added Section 103(c) to establish “that only public lands

(and not State or private lands) are to be subject to the

conservation unit regulations applying to public lands.”

126 Cong. Rec. 30,498 (1980) (statement of Rep. Udall).

C. Regulatory History

In the wake of ANILCA’s passage, NPS adopted

regulations to govern “public uses of National Park

System units in Alaska, including units established by

[ANILCA)].” National Park System Units in Alaska, 46

Fed. Reg. 31,836, 31,836 (June 17, 1981). These NPS

regulations addressed, inter alia, public access, camping

and picnicking, carrying of firearms, and preservation

of natural features. See id. at 31,854-64 (citing 36 C.F.R.

Part 13). These Alaska-specific regulations complemented

NPS’s nationwide regulations and, in some cases,

superseded “otherwise applicable regulatory provisions

of 36 CFR Parts 1-9,” which NPS found “generally

inappropriate in the unique Alaska setting.” Jd. at 31,836.

NPS recognized “Sections 103(c) and 906(0) of

ANILCA generally restrict the applicability of [NPS]

regulations to federally-owned lands within park area

boundaries.” /d. at 31,843.° “Consistent with the statute

3. Section 906(0) provides, in relevant part, that “any land

withdrawn pursuant to [ANCSA] and within the boundaries

of any [CSU] ... shall be added to such unit and administered

accordingly” unless it is conveyed to a Native Corporation or the

State; and that “[uJntil conveyed, all Federal lands within the

boundaries of a [CSU] ... shall be administered in accordance

with the laws applicable to such unit.” 43 U.S.C. § 1635(0)(1)-(2).

11

and the explanatory legislative history,” then, NPS

“restrict[ed] the applicability of these regulations to

‘federally owned’ lands ... within park area boundaries.”

Id. (citing 126 Cong. Rec. 11,115 (1980) and 126 Cong. Rec.

15,130-31 (1980)). In other words, NPS made clear that

“[t]hese regulations would not apply to activities occurring

on State lands. Similarly, these regulations would not

apply to activities occurring on Native or any other non-

federally owned land interests located inside park area

boundaries.” Jd.

Two years later, NPS engaged in a “comprehensive

review of [its] general regulations” applicable nationwide

in an effort to “simplify” them and “ease the burden of [its]

regulations on the public.” General Regulations for Areas

Administered by the National Park Service, 48 Fed. Reg.

30,252, 30,252 (June 30, 1983). Under the National Park

Service Organic Act, the Secretary of the Interior had the

authority to “make and publish such rules and regulations

as he may deem necessary ur proper for the use and

management of the parks, monuments, and reservations

under the jurisdiction of the National Park Services,” 16

U.S.C. § 3, and to “[p}romulgate and enforce regulations

concerning boating and other activities on or relating to

waters located within areas of the National Park System,

including waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United

States,” id. § 1a-2(h).‘* Acting under those authorities, NPS

revised many of its general regulations governing public

use and recreational activities in areas it administers.

48 Fed. Reg. at 30,252. As part of this overhaul, NPS

4. 16 U.S.C. § 3 and 16 U.S.C. § la-2(h) were later repealed

and recodified by the Act of Dec. 19, 2014, Pub. L. 113-287, § 7,

128 Stat. 3094, 3273 (2014). See 54 U.S.C. § 100751.

12

prohibited “(t]he operation or use of hovercraft” in park

areas. Id. at 30,286 (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 2.17(e)).

At the same time, NPS sought to clarify the extent of

its jurisdiction over nonfederal lands. See id. at 30,260-

61. In an amended version of 36 C.F.R. § 1.2(b), NPS

announced that “(t]he regulations contained in Parts 1

through 7 of this chapter are not applicable on privately

owned lands and water (including Indian lands and waters

owned individually or tribally) within the boundaries of

a park area, except as may be provided by regulations

relating specifically to privately owned lands and waters

under the legislative jurisdiction of the United States.” Jd.

at 30,275. “Legislative jurisdiction,” in turn, was defined

as “lands and waters under the exclusive or concurrent

jurisdiction of the United States.” Jd. at 30,276 (quoting

36 C.F.R. § 1.4).

In 1988, NPS revised Section 1.2(b) to confirm that

the ban on federal regulation in the absence of legislative

jurisdiction extended to all “non-federally owned lands

and waters” and not just “privately owned lands and

water.” Applicability of Regulations to Non-Federal Lands

and Waters Under U.S. Legislative Jurisdiction, 52 Fed.

Reg. 35,238, 35,239 (Sept. 18, 1987).

NPS abruptly reversed course in 1996. Referencing

its inability to prosecute an individual who had taken a

seal from Alaskan waters for a ceremonial potlatch,® the

5. Inthat case, United States v. Brown, 36 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir.

1994), the United States ceased prosecution and sought dismissal

because it recognized that it neither “own{ed] the submerged land”

nor had “legislative jurisdiction” over such lands. See Brief of the

United States at 5-6, United States v. Brown, No. 94-30019, 1994

WL 16122537 (9th Cir. May 17, 1994).

13

agency purported to clarify “the applicability of those NPS

regulations that apply in all National Park System areas

to waters subject to federal jurisdiction located within

park boundaries, including navigable waters.” General

Regulations for Areas Administered by the National

Park Service and National Park System Units in Alaska,

61 Fed. Reg. 35,133, 35,133 (July 5, 1996). Abandoning

its earlier view, NPS announced “that NPS regulations

otherwise applicable within the boundaries of a National

Park System unit apply on and within waters subject to

the jurisdiction of the United States located within that

unit, including navigable waters and areas within their

at 35,136 (quoting 36 C.FR. § 1.2(a)(3)).

NPS therefore claimed power to enforce both its

general] regulations, which included the ban on hovercraft

in 36 C.F.R. § 2.17(e), and its Alaska-specific regulations

in 36 C.F.R. Part 13 over all State-owned navigable

waters within the boundaries of the CSUs that ANILCA

created or expanded. NPS rejected comments that

Section 103(c) of ANILCA “should be interpreted as

superseding NPS authority to regulate (non-federal]

waters within park boundaries.” /d. at 35,135. According

to NPS, Section 103(c) “was characterized by Congress as

a minor technical provision” and interpreting it to allow

NPS regulation of nonfederal navigable waters within

CSUs would be “consistent with [ANILCA’s] underlying

protective purposes.” Jd.

14

D. Factual Background

Petitioner John Sturgeon is a lifelong Alaskan. Prior

to this dispute, he had hunted moose annually since 1971

on the Yukon River downstream from Eagle, Alaska, and

its tributary, the Nation River. App. 8a. In 1990, in order

to access waters of the Nation River inaccessible by other

watercraft, Mr. Sturgeon purchased a small personal

hovercraft and registered it with the State of Alaska.

App. 8a. A hovercraft is a motorized vessel that utilizes a

low-pressure air cushion produced by downward-directed

fans. See Alaska Admin. Code tit. 11, §§ 20.990(7), (18). A

hovercraft can travel over water and exposed gravel bars,

which are common in Alaska. Alaska law permits the use

of hovercraft on State-owned lands and waters.

From 1990 through 2007, Mr. Sturgeon used his

hovercraft to access moose-hunting grounds on the Nation

River, including those waters of the Nation River upriver

from the Yukon-Charley boundary. App. 8a. Because

the Nation River is navigable, Alaska holds title to its

submerged lands. See Alaska v. United States, 201 F.3d

1154 (9th Cir. 2000).

In September 2007, during his annual moose-hunting

trip, Mr. Sturgeon entered the Nation River from the

Yukon River on his hovercraft. Approximately two miles

upriver, Mr. Sturgeon stopped on a gravel bar located

below the river’s mean high-water mark to make repairs.

Shortly thereafter, three armed NPS rangers approached

him. App. 8a. The NPS rangers told Mr. Sturgeon that he

was committing a federal crime by operating his State-

registered hovercraft within the Yukon-Charley. App.

8a. Mr. Sturgeon explained to the NPS rangers that he

15

was operating his hovercraft on a State-owned navigable

river. App. 8a. The NPS rangers said that Mr. Sturgeon

was incorrect and insisted that he remove the hovercraft

from the Yukon-Charley. App. 8a.

Mr. Sturgeon later met with NPS Special Agent Sears

in Anchorage, Alaska, to discuss NPS’s threat of criminal]

citation. App. 9a. Special Agent Sears acknowledged that

the State of Alaska owned the submerged lands within

the banks of the Yukon and Nation Rivers, but reaffirmed

NP%S’s position that it would be a federal crime for Mr.

Sturgeon to use his hovercraft on navigable waters within

CSUs. App. 9a. She warned Mr. Sturgeon that NPS would

criminally charge him if he again operated his hovercraft

within the Yukon-Charley. App. 9a. Because of these

warnings, Mr. Sturgeon did not use his hovercraft within

the Yukon-Charley in subsequent hunting seasons. He

thus was unable to hunt areas of the Nation River that

he had previously accessed with his hovercraft. App. 9a.

In October 2010, Mr. Sturgeon sent a letter to then-

Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar, requesting that he

initiate a rulemaking to repeal or amend NPS regulations

so that NPS could no longer restrict access on State

navigable waters located within the boundaries of CSUs.

App. 9a. He received no response. On June 26, 2011, Mr.

Sturgeon wrote to the NPS Alaska District Regional

Chief Ranger, copying Special Agent Sears, requesting

written confirmation that he would be cited if he again

operated his hovercraft within the remote regions of the

Yukon-Charley. D. Ct. Doc. No. 1-2, at 1-2 (Sept. 14, 2011).

He received no response.

16

E. Proceedings Below

On September 14, 2011, Mr. Sturgeon filed a complaint

against Sue Masica—the Alaska Regional Director of

NPS at the time—and additional federal defendants in

the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska under

the Administrative Procedure Act. The complaint sought,

among other things, a declaratory judgment that ANILCA

prohibits NPS from enforcing its regulations, including

its ban on hovercraft in 36 C.F.R. § 2.17(e), on nonfederal

lands in Alaska. Mr. Sturgeon also sought to enjoin the

defendants from interfering with the operation of his

hovercraft on navigable waters within the Yukon-Charley.

The State of Alaska intervened to join the challenge.®

The district court granted summary judgment to the

defendants. App. 35a-58a. The court recognized that the

State had acquired title to the bed of the Nation River

under the Statehood Act and the Submerged Lands

Act. App. 55a. Nevertheless, the district court held that

NPS could ban hovercraft on these waters because, in

its view, Section 103(c) prohibited application of only

Alaska-specific regulations. App. 56a. Because NPS’s

nationwide regulations, including the ban on hovercraft,

“were enacted by the Department of the Interior pursuant

to its general authority to adopt regulations for all NPS

administered lands and waters,” they were not “adopted

‘solely’ to address entry upon or use of various equipment

on public lands within ANILCA-created conservation

units such as Yukon-Charley.” App. 56a.

6. On appeal, NPS claimed that the State had no standing to

bring its action. The Ninth Circuit agreed and ordered the district

court to dismiss the State’s complaint. App. 14a-20a.

17

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Like the district court,

the Ninth Circuit concluded that ANILCA did not prevent

NPS from imposing its generally applicable regulations

on nonfederal lands within CSUs. ANILCA’s limitation

on NPS authority to impose “regulations applicable solely

to public lands within such units” applied only to Alaska-

specific regulations. App. 25a-26a. In the court’s view,

ANILCA did not supersede the general authority that

Congress, in 1976, vested in the Secretary of the Interior

to “[p]romulgate and enforce regulations concerning

boating and other activities on or relating to waters located

with areas of the National Park System, including waters

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” App. 25a

(quoting 16 U.S.C. § la-2(h)). The Ninth Circuit concluded,

therefore, that because the “hovercraft ban ... applies

to all federal-owned lands and waters administered by

NPS nationwide”—and not only on federal lands within

Alaska—it may be enforced on Alaskan land owned by

the State, Native Corporations, and individuals. App. 26a.

On October 1, 2015, this Court granted Mr. Sturgeon’s

petition for certiorari.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case involves a straightforward question of

statutory interpretation. ANILCA mandates that any

nonfederal land within its CSU boundaries is not included

in the CSUs and is exempt from regulations enacted to

manage the CSUs.

Specifically, in Section 103(c), Congress provided

that only “public lands” within the boundaries of CSUs

“shall be deemed to be included as a portion of such

18

unit,” and that no lands owned by “the State, [a] Native

Corporation, or [a] private party shall be subject to the

regulations applicable solely to public lands within such

units.” 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c). Congress further stated

that to “become part of the unit and [be] administered

accordingly,” nonfederal land must first be conveyed to

the United States. /d.

ANILCA defines “public lands” to mean “land situated

in Alaska which, after December 2, 1980, are Federal

lands,” id. § 3102(8), and “federal lands” to mean “lands

the title to which is in the United States after December 2,

1980,” id. § 3102(2). Lands belonging to Alaska and Native

Corporations are expressly excluded from the definition

of “public lands.” Jd. § 3102(8).

There is no dispute that Alaska’s navigable waters are

not “public lands.” Through the Statehood Act, Alaska

received “title to and ownership of the lands beneath

navigable waters within [its] boundaries.” 43 U.S.C.

§ 1311(a). The Submerged Lands Act establishes that this

title includes control of the waters and resources above.

See infra at 33-35. Because Alaska’s navigable waters are

not “public lands,” NPS may not regulate them pursuant

to its general authority to manage national parks. Section

103(¢c) of ANILCA, a specific statutory provision, is

controlling. For Mr. Sturgeon, that means that NPS had

no authority to threaten him with a criminal citation for

using his hovercraft on the Nation River, a State-owned

navigable river in Alaska.

The Ninth Circuit found otherwise by distorting the

plain meaning of Section 103(c). Focusing on the word

“solely,” the Ninth Circuit read Section 103(c) to mean that

19

nonfederal land within CSUs was exempt from only “CSU-

specific regulations.” App. 24a (emphasis in original).

But nothing in ANILCA suggests a distinction

between NPS regulations applicable nationwide and

those applicable only in Alaska CSUs. Instead, Section

103(c) distinguishes between NPS’s authority to manage

“public lands within such units” and its lack of authority

to manage nonpublic (7.e., nonfederal) lands within such

units. Had Congress intended otherwise, it would not have

expressly required that these lands be conveyed to NPS

before they could be administered as part of the National

Park System. Congress used the word “solely” to ensure

that nonfederal lands in Alaska CSUs remained subject

to laws applicable to both public and private lands (such

as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act).

ANILCA’s legislative history confirms this plain

reading. Congress passed ANILCA to provide for the

conservation of Alaskan lands while also preserving the

unique interests of the State and Native Corporations in

their respective lands. In the Statehood Act, Congress

provided the State of Alaska with a historic land grant

to ensure the economic prosperity of its people. And in

ANCSA, Congress provided significant funds and land

grants to Alaska Natives so they could achieve financial

independence and self-sufficiency. In light of the economic

purposes of these acts, Congress wanted to ensure that

ANILCA did not undermine these objectives by saddling

State and Native Corporation lands with burdensome

federal regulations. Congress thus passed Section 103(c)

to “make clear beyond any doubt that any State, Native, or

private lands, which may lie within the outer boundaries of

the conservation system unit are not parts of that unit and

20

are not subject to regulations which are applied to public

lands, which, in fact, are part of the unit.” 125 Cong. Rec.

11,158 (1979) (statement of Rep. Seiberling).

Even if ANILCA were ambiguous, which it is not,

NPS’s construction of Section 103(c) would be unreasonable

and entitled to no deference. Under NPS’s interpretation,

the agency could easily evade Section 103(c)’s limitation

on federal control simply by promulgating a nationwide

regulation applicable to nonpublic lands. Paradoxically,

this interpretation would mean that shov’d this new

regulation be more restrictive than NPS’s Alaska-specific

rules, public lands within CSUs would continue to receive

the benefit of the relaxed Alaska-specific regulations,

but nonpublic lands would not. This nonsensical outcome

squarely contradicts ANILCA, which repeatedly

recognizes the unique nature of Alaskan lands.

Finally, NPS’s alternative arguments based on

navigable waters are not before the Court and cannot

salvage the agency’s regulations in any event. NPS may

argue that submerged lands were never “conveyed” to the

State of Alaska. But the transfer of title from the United

States to Alaska under the Statehood and Submerged

Lands Acts is a “conveyance” under any commonly

understood definition of the term. Nor are Alaskan

navigable waters “public lands,” as NPS may argue. It is

settled law that the State’s ownership of submerged lands

includes control of the waters flowing above them.

In short, because the State’s navigable waters are

not “public lands,” ANILCA makes clear that NPS may

not regulate them as though they were part of a CSU.

NPS thus had no power to threaten Mr. Sturgeon with

21

a criminal citation for using his hovercraft on the Nation

River. This Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit’s

decision.

ARGUMENT

I. ANILCA Prohibits NPS from Regulating

Nonfederal Lands Within Alaska CSUs as Though

They Were Part of the National Park System.

This Court reviews a federal agency’s construction of a

statute that it administers under the framework set forth

in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). “If a court, employing

traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that

Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue,

that intention is the law and must be given effect.” /d. at

843 n.9. “Only if ‘Congress has not directly addressed the

precise question at issue’ should a court consider ‘whether

the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction

of the statute.” Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of

Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 107 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring)

(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).

NPS’s construction of Section 103(c) cannot survive

Chevron review. First, Congress spoke directly and

clearly by specifying in ANILCA that nonfederal lands

within a CSU are not part of the CSU and not subject to

regulation as though they were. As a consequence, N PS’s

enforcement of 36 C.F.R. § 1.2(a)(3) exceeded its statutory

authority. Second, the legislative history confirms that

Congress intended for Section 103(c) to prevent NPS

from regulating nonpublic land in Alaska CSUs as though

they were part of the National Park System. Third, even

22

if there were any ambiguity, NPS’s interpretation of

Section 103(c) would still be unreasonable and depend on

an impermissible construction of ANILCA.

A. Section 103(c) of ANILCA limits NPS’s general

regulatory control to “public lands” within

Alaska CSUs.

The question presented here is whether Section

103(c) of ANILCA limits NPS’s general authority to

regulate nonfederal lands located within Alaska CSUs.’

As explained below, it plainly does.

The Court’s “inquiry begins with the statutory text,

and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.” BedRoc

Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004). The

text of Section 103(c) is straightforward. It provides:

Only those lands within the boundaries of any

conservation system unit which are public

lands (as such term is defined in this Act)

shall be deemed to be included as a portion of

7. NPS’s regulatory authority derives from two statutory

sources, neither of which permits application of the hovercraft

regulation to nonpublic lands within Alaska CSUs. First, the

Secretary of the Interior may “prescribe such regulations as

the Secretary considers necessary or proper for the use and

management of System units.” 54 U.S.C. § 100751(a). Second,

the Secretary may “prescribe regulations under subsection (a)

concerning boating and other activities on or relating to water

located within System units, including water subject to the

jurisdiction of the United States.” Jd. § 100751(b). But it is “familiar

law that a specific statute controls over a general one.” Bulova

Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961).

23

such unit. No lands which, before, on, or after

December 2, 1980, are conveyed to the State, to

any Native Corporation, or to any private party

shall be subject to the regulations applicable

solely to public lands within such units. If the

State, a Native Corporation, or other owner

desires to convey any such lands, the Secretary

may acquire such lands in accordance with

applicable law (including this Act), and any

such lands shall become part of the unit, and

be administered accordingly.

16 U.S.C. § 31030).

The Court need look no further than the provision’s

first sentence to resolve this dispute. State, Alaska Native,

and private property holdings located within CSUs are

not “public lands” as ANILCA defines that term. The

preceding statutory section, Section 102, defines “lands”

to mean “land, waters, and interests therein.” 16 U.S.C.

§ 3102(1). And it defines “public lands” to mean “land

situated in Alaska which, after December 2, 1980, are

Federal lands,” excluding from its ambit lands belonging

to the “State of Alaska,” “a Native Corporation,” or “lands

referred to in Section 19(b) of [ANCSA].” Jd. § 3102(8).

Because the navigable waterway at issue is not public

land as ANILCA defines that term, it is not “a portion”

of the CSU within which it is located. In other words, the

State-owned river upon which Mr. Sturgeon was using his

hovercraft is not part of the National Park System. NPS

may not manage it as though it were.

Congress wisely understood that the nonpublic status

of these lands might not prevent NPS from trying to

24

regulate them. Section 103(c)’s second sentence therefore

provides that nonpublic lands shall not be “subject to the

regulations applicable solely to public lands within such

units.” In other words, regulations (including NPS boating

regulations) that apply to the federal portions of CSUs do

not, and cannot, apply to State, Native Corporation, and

private lands within CSU boundaries.

Lastly, Section 103(c)’s third sentence sets forth the

only way such nonpublic land may become subject to NPS

management. As the statute explains, “the State, a Native

Corporation, or other owner” must “convey” the land,

which “the Secretary may acquire ... in accordance with

applicable law.” Only after the nonpublic land is conveyed

to the United States “shall [it] become part of the unit,

and be administered accordingly.”

When read together, Sections 102 and 103(c) evince

a clear intent to protect State, Native Corporation, and

private land from being managed as part of the National

Park System. Every statutory reference to nonfederal

land is phrased in protective or exclusionary terms. Such

land is excluded from the definition of “public lands” in

Section 102(3); it is excluded from the CSUs in the first

sentence of Section 103(c); it is fenced off from NPS

regulation in the second sentence of Section 103(¢); and

Section 103(c)’s third sentence ensures that it may be

administered by NPS only after it has been conveyed to

the federal government.

Section 103(c) has a mirror image in Section 906(0),

which confirms its plain meaning. Section 906(0)(1),

located in ANILCA’s chapter addressing ANCSA and the

Statehood Act, provides that ANCSA land withdrawals

25

are included in a CSU “and administered accordingly”

unless they were conveyed to a Native Corporation prior

to ANILCA’s enactment, or unless they are subsequently

conveyed to the State. 43 U.S.C. § 1635(0)(1). Section

906(0)(2) then provides that “Federal lands within the

boundaries of a conservation system unit ... shall be

administered in accordance with the laws applicable to

such unit” only “until conveyed” out of federal ownership.

Id. § 1635(0)(2). Like Section 103(c), Section 906(0)

clearly distinguishes between management of federal

and nonfederal lands. Federal lands are part of the CSU

“and administered accordingly,” while nonfederal lands

within CSU boundaries are not deemed to be included in

the CSU and are not so administered.’ Thus, ANILCA

draws a sharp distinction between federal lands, which

are subject to NPS management, and nonfederal lands,

which are not.

Indeed, it was not until Mr. Sturgeon initiated this

litigation that NPS made the argument, which the Ninth

Circuit accepted, that Section 103(c) exempts “nonfederal

land” within Alaska CSUs only from Alaska “CSU-specific

regulations.” App. 24a. According to the Ninth Circuit,

the phrase “regulations applicable solely to public lands

within such units” distinguishes between Alaska-specific

NPS regulations and nationwide NPS regulations. App.

23a-24a. The Ninth Circuit thus upheld the extension of

8. Section 907(a) likewise makes clear that nonpublic lands

within CSUs are exempt from NPS regulations applying to public

lands. That provision states that nonpublic land becomes subject to

federal management only if the owner agrees in writing. 43 U.S.C.

§ 1636(a). By implication, no agreement would be necessary if

these nonpublic lands were already subject to federal management

regulations.

26

NPS’s hovercraft ban to State-owned land because it is

not one that “applifes] solely to public lands within [CSUs]”

in Alaska. 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c). This regulation “applies to

all federal-owned lands and waters administered by NPS

nationwide, as well as all navigable waters lying within

national parks.” App. 26a.

The Ninth Circuit’s construction of Section 103(c) is

untenable. The statute does not distinguish between NPS

regulations applicable nationwide and those applicable

in Alaska CSUs. As explained above, it distinguishes

between NPS’s authority to manage “public lands within

such units” and its lack of authority to manage nonpublic

(i.e., nonfederal) lands within such units. That is the point

of Section 103(¢)’s first sentence: nonfederal lands are not

“deemed to be included as a portion of such unit” even

if they are physically located “within the boundaries of

any conservation system unit.” And that is plainly the

context in which Section 103(c)’s second sentence uses

the phrase “within such units.” See Deal v. United States,

508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (“[T]he meaning of a word cannot

be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the

context in which it is used.”).

Nor does the word “solely” limit the application of

Section 103(c). The provision does not employ “solely” to

distinguish nationwide NPS regulations from Alaska CSU-

specific regulations. It distinguishes federal regulations

applicable to both public and private lands—such as those

enforcing the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act—from

regulations “applicable solely to public lands”—such as

NPS regulations restricting boating and other activities.

See infra at 29. Put differently, “solely” emphasizes

that nonfederal lands within CSU boundaries, although

27

physically inside CSUs, are not subject to regulations

(like the hovercraft ban challenged here) that apply only

to public lands. There is no textual support for the Ninth

Circuit’s conclusion that “solely” modifies “within such

units” instead of “public lands”—the phrase immediately

following it in Section 103(c).

In sum, Section 103(c) plainly expresses Congress’s

intent. It provides that only “public lands” are part of

CSUs; that NPS may not exert regulatory control over

State, Native Corporation, and private lands located within

those CSUs; and that those lands may be administered

as part of the National Park System only if they are

later conveyed to the federal government. Because there

is no other permissible interpretation, “that is the end

of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must

give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of

Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.°

9. It bears noting that ANILCA’s CSUs are not delineated

in the statute by reference to legal descriptions. Rather, Section

103, entitled “Maps,” establishes which lands are—and which lands

are not—included in ANILCA’s new or expanded CSUs. 16 U.S.C.

§ 3103. Accordingly, NPS’s claim that Section 103(c) is “a minor

technical provision,” 61 Fed. Reg. at 35,135, and that Congress

would not have “buried” a provision this important in “the ‘maps’

section of ANILCA,” Brief in Opposition 18 (quoting App. 42a),

misses the mark. Section 103(c) is in the maps section because it is

part of an enactment that was redrawing maps to create millions of

acres of CSUs. The maps section was the “natural place to locate”

a provision setting forth the regulatory regime that would apply

to the territory being allocated in those maps. Nken v. Holder,

556 U.S. 418, 431 (2009).

28

B. Congress intended for Section 103(c) to prevent

NPS from regulating nonpublic lands in

Alaska CSUs as though they were part of the

National Park System.

“Given the straightforward statutory command” of

Section 103(c), “there is no reason to resort to legislative

history.” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997).

But there can be no serious dispute that the statute’s

“legislative history confirms what [its] language ...

compels.” Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.

Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. Johnson Controls,

Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 205 (1991). Congress’s objective in

inserting Section 103(c) into ANILCA was to ensure that

nonfederal lands newly surrounded by or adjacent to CSUs

would not be subject to NPS oversight and regulation.

Section 103(c)’s House sponsor introduced it as an

amendment to “make clear beyond any doubt that any

State, Native, or private lands, which may lie within the

outer boundaries of the conservation system unit are not

parts of that unit and are not subject to regulations which

are applied to public lands, which, in fact, are part of the

unit.” 125 Cong. Rec. 11,158 (1979) (statement of Rep.

Seiberling); see also S. Rep. No. 96-413, at 303 (Nov. 14,

1979) (“Those private lands, and those public lands, owned

by the State of Alaska ... are not to be construed as subject

to the management regulations which may be adopted to

unit which is adjacent to, or surrounds, the private or non-

Federal public lands.”). The legislative record is replete

with evidence confirming Section 103(©)’s specific purpose.

See supra at 5-10. Congress passed it to make explicit

“that only public lands (and not State or private lands) are

29

to be subject to the conservation unit regulations applying

to public lands.” 126 Cong. Rec. 30,498 (1980) (statement

of Rep. Udall).

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit erred in stating that

“the legislative history confirms that ANILCA § 103(c) did

not purport to exempt nonfederal lands within CSUs from

generally applicable federal laws and regulations like the

hovercraft ban.” App. 28a. In fact, that is the provision’s

main purpose. As Section 103(c) made clear, “the fact that

(land) is within the boundaries drawn on the map for that

conservation unit does not in any way change the status

of that State, native, or private land or make it subject to

any of the laws or regulations that pertain to U.S. public

lands, so that those inholdings are clearly not controlled

by any of the public land laws of the United States.” 125

Cong. Rec. 11,158 (1979) (statement of Rep. Seiberling).

The legislative history also undermines the Ninth

Circuit’s contorted interpretation of “solely.” As is evident

from the provision’s text, the function of “solely” in Section

103(¢) is to ensure that “Federal laws and regulations of

general applicability to both private and public lands, such

as the Clean Air Act, the Water Pollution Control Act, U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers wetland regulations and other

Federal statutes of general applicability [are) applicable

to private or non-Federal public land in holdings within

[CSUs], and to such lands adjacent to [CSUs], and thus

are unaffected by the passage of the bill.” S. Rep. No. 96-

413, at 303 (1979). In contrast, there is no indication from

ANILCA’s legislative history that Congress used “solely”

to signal a distinction between Alaska CSU-specific and

nationwide NPS regulations.

30

In its rulemaking, NPS further claimed that its

revised construction of Section 103(c) was “consistent with

[ANILCA’s] underlying protective purposes: to protect

objects of ecological, cultural, geological, historical,

prehistorical, and scientific interest.” 61 Fed. Reg. at

35,135. To be sure, conservation of Alaska’s natural

resources was one of ANILCA’s purposes. See 16 U.S.C.

§ 3101(b).

But that was not Congress’s only purpose. ANILCA

also “provides adequate opportunity for satisfaction of

the economic and social needs of the State of Alaska and

its people.” 16 U.S.C. § 3101(d). For example, ANILCA

protects mining operations, see 16 U.S.C. § 3170; promotes

oil and gas development, see id. § 3142; and supports

the Alaska timber industry, see id. § 539d. NPS ignores

the “balance” the law struck. /d. § 3101(d). ANILCA’s

massive expansion of the National Park System achieved

Congress’s conservationist goal, and its restriction on

NPS authority to regulate nonfederal lands achieved

its parallel interest in safeguarding Alaska’s social and

economic welfare. Petitioner’s construction of Section

103(c) is faithful to Congress’s careful balancing of both

goals. NPS’s is not.

C. NPS’s construction of Section 103(c) is

unreasonable. ;

Even if Section 103(¢) were ambiguous, which it is

not, the hovercraft ban still would not be “based on a

permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467

U.S. at 843. NPS’s construction of Section 103(c) is at

odds with the provision’s restrictive design. The parties

may disagree over whether Section 103(c), by its terms,

31

restricts NPS’s authority broadly or narrowly; but they

agree that the point of enacting this provision was to

restrict NPS authority. Yet under NPS’s construction,

any statutory limitation on its authority is easily evaded.

All NPS would need to do is promulgate a new regulation

making a previously Alaska-specific rule applicable to

nonpublic lands nationwide and the rule would no longer

be “applicable solely” to public lands. An interpretation

of Section 103(c) that renders its restriction on NPS’s

authority “pointless” is not reasonable. Circuit City

Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001).

In opposing certiorari, NPS argued that this concern

is purely hypothetical unless “NPS dramatically shifts

its regulatory approach” and, therefore, “enforcement of

NPS rules on navigable waters within park boundaries

will not make NPS’s rules applicable on privately

held, state-held, or Native-held inholdings.” Brief in

Opposition 21-22. But just last month, NPS published a

notice of proposed rulemaking that would eliminate an

Alaska-specific exemption from certain nationwide oil

and gas rules, making the rules enforceable on State,

Native Corporation, and private inholdings. See General

Provisions and Non-Federal Oil and Gas Rights, 80 Fed.

Reg. 65,572, 65,573 (Oct. 26, 2015). Notably, the rulemaking

explained “that because these regulations are generally

applicable to NPS units nationwide and to non-federal

interests in those units, they are not ‘applicable solely to

public lands within [units established under ANILCA],’

and thus are not affected by section 103(c) of ANILCA.”

Id. (quoting Sturgeon v. Masica, 768 F.3d 1066, 1077-78

(9th Cir. 2014)). Accordingly, there is no need to debate

whether NPS will use its newly found power to impose

nationwide regulations on nonpublic land in Alaska CSUs.

It has already promised to do so.

32

An interpretation of Section 103(c) that leads to a

“nonsensical result” is likewise unreasonable. Paroline

v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1729 (2014). Because of

the uniqueness of Alaska’s wilderness, numerous Alaska-

specific rules differ from the nationwide rules governing

the National Park System. Alaska’s national parks, for

example, have special camping, hunting, fishing, trapping,

commercial activity, and motorized access rules. See 36

C.F.R. § 13.25 (camping); id. § 13.30 (weapons, traps,

and nets); id. § 13.40 (commercial fishing); id. § 13.176

(commercial use of cabins); id. § 13.182 (construction of

temporary facilities); id. § 13.1316 (commercial passenger

transport). According to NPS’s interpretation of Section

103(c), however, nonpublic lands located in Alaska CSUs

would never receive the benefit of these more relaxed,

Alaska-specific regulations (because they can never apply

to nonpublic land). Rather, these nonpublic lands would

have to comply with the nationwide rules that NPS itself

determined were not appropriately sensitive to Alaska’s

circumstances.

The text of Section 103(c) cannot require that if NPS

enacted an Alaska-specific rule permitting hovercraft,

then State, Alaska Native, and private lands within

those parks would, paradoxically, remain subject to the

more restrictive nationwide rule. That is the epitome of

an unreasonable construction of a federal statute. But it

would be the inevitable consequence of adopting NPS’s

and the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Section 103(c).

33

II. NPS’s Alternative Arguments Are Beyond the

Question Presented and Provide No Basis for

Affirming the Judgment Below.

Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit decided

this case based on their reading of Section 103(c). The

question presented to this Court is thus limited to that

issue. At the certiorari stage, however, NPS raised

alternative arguments in an effort to sustain the extension

of its hovercraft ban to nonpublic lands. But there are good

reasons why the lower courts bypassed these arguments

in favor of an anti-textual construction of Section 103(c).

As explained below, they are all untenable.

A. Submerged lands were “conveyed” to the State

of Alaska.

NPS argued below that Section 103(c) does not apply

to submerged lands and navigable waters because they

were not “conveyed” to the State, but instead became State

land by operation of law. See App. 55a-56a Therefore, NPS

asserted, such lands and waters could be administered

as part of a CSU under Section 103(c), even though they

were not “public lands.” Jd. The Ninth Circuit “assum[ed]

(without deciding) that the waters of and land beneath the

Nation River were ‘conveyed to the State’ for purposes of

Section 103(c).” App. 26a. This assumption was correct.

The Alaska Statehood Act expressly incorporated the

Submerged Lands Act of 1953. Pub. L. 85-508, § 6(m),

72 Stat. 339, 343 (1958). “By applying the Submerged

Lands Act to Alaska through the Alaska Statehood Act,

Congress granted the State title to submerged lands.”

United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1997). This grant

34

of title to submerged lands at statehood is universally

described as a transfer of an interest in property from the

United States to the newly sovereign state. See Idaho v.

United States, 533 U.S. 263, 272 (2001) (“[TJhe default rule

is that title to land under navigable waters passes from

the United States to a newly admitted state.”); Alaska v.

Ahtna, 891 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1989) (considering

ownership of the lower thirty miles of the Gulkana River

and noting that, “[i]f navigable, title to the submerged

lands passed to Alaska at statehood”).

A transfer of title to submerged lands from the United

States to Alaska is a “conveyance” under any commonly

understood definition of the term. Black’s Law Dictionary

defines “conveyance” as “(t]he voluntary transfer of a right

or of property,” and “convey” as “[t]o transfer or deliver

(something, such as a right or property) to another, esp.

by deed or other writing; esp., to perform an act that

is intended to create one or more property interests,

regardless of whether the act is actually effective to create

those interests.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

Neither definition excludes transfers by operation of law.

Accord Tyonek Native Corp. v. Sec’y of the Interior, 836

F.2d 1237, 1241 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988) (referencing “lands

conveyed under the Alaska Statehood Act”).

Consistent with these principles, the Alaska Supreme

Court has described the transfer of submerged lands to

the states at statehood as a “conveyance.” James v. State,

950 P.2d 1130, 1138 (Alaska 1997) (“We conclude that the

tidelands and lands underlying the coastal waters of the

Tongass were conveyed to the State of Alaska at statehood

under the equal footing doctrine and the Submerged

Lands Act.”). Section 103(c)’s exemption for “lands ...

35

conveyed to the State” thus applies to submerged lands

and navigable waters.

B. State navigable waters are not “public lands.”

1. Ownership of submerged lands includes

control of the waters flowing above them.

NPS asserted below that navigable waters could

be “public lands” under ANILCA because Alaska does

not “own” water, only its submerged lands. Resp. C.A.

Br. 38-40. But this novel theory has no merit because

the definition of “lands” in Section 102(1) of ANILCA

includes “waters.” 16 U.S.C. § 3102(1). Thus, under

ANILCA, submerged lands include the waters above

them. NPS’s regulations similarly make no distinction

between ownership of “submerged lands” and ownership

of “waters.” See 36 C.F.R. §§ 34.4, 9.37, & 9.38 (purporting

to regulate “federally owned or controlled lands and

waters”); 36 C.F.R. § 13.1406 (regulating “state-owned

lands and waters”).

Furthermore, there is no legal support for

distinguishing between submerged lands and the waters

above. The Submerged Lands Act makes clear that it

inseparably grants ownership of submerged lands and

the right to manage and regulate the resources in the

waters above:

It is determined and declared to be in the

public interest that (1) title to and ownership

of the lands beneath navigable waters within

the boundaries of the respective States, and

the natural resources within such lands and

36

waters, and (2) the right and power to manage,

administer, lease, develop, and use the said

lands and natural resources all in accordance

with applicable State law be, and they are,

subject to the provisions hereof, recognized,

confirmed, established and vested in and

assigned to the respective States.

43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (emphasis added).

The Submerged Lands Act thus grants to the States

“title to and ownership of [] submerged lands and waters,”

including “the right and power to manage, administer,

lease, develop, and use them.” United States v. California,

436 U.S. 32, 40 (1978) (emphasis added) (citation and

quotation omitted); see also Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d

954, 964 (Alaska 1995) (“The Submerged Lands Act thus

gives Alaska ownership of, title to, and management power

over the following: lands beneath the navigable waters

of Alaska, the navigable waters themselves, and fish and

other marine life located in Alaska’s navigable waters.”

(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).

Permitting federal regulation of navigable waterways

independent of state ownership of the submerged lands

beneath would also subvert the public trust doctrine. As a

sovereign state, Alaska holds title to lands under navigable

waters in trust for the people of Alaska, so “that they may

enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry commerce over

them, and have the liberty of fishing therein.” Jllinois

Cent., 146 U.S. at 453. Accordingly, “title to the lands

10. Alaska’s constitution and law unequivocally recognize

the rights of all Alaskans to use and access water for purposes

37

under the navigable waters ... necessarily carries with

it control over the waters above them.” Jd. at 452. NPS’s

assertion that waters flowing over submerged lands may

constitute federal “public lands” under ANILCA cannot

be reconciled with this principle. There is no authority for

divorcing control of State-owned submerged lands “from

the waters above them.”

NPS’s argument also overlooks the fact that “public

lands” in ANILCA are defined not by what Alaska owns,

but by what the United States owns. ANILCA provides

that “public lands” are “lands the title to which is in

the United States.” 16 U.S.C. §§ 3102(1)-(3). NPS has at

no point demonstrated or even argued that the United

States holds “title” to the waters flowing over Alaska’s

submerged lands. For good reason: the notion of federal

“title” to water is incompatible with Alaska’s undisputed

ownership of submerged lands and control of the waters

flowing above. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1).

Finally, ANILCA itself bars NPS’s efforts to usurp

Alaska’s traditional control over navigable waters flowing

over its submerged lands. Section 1319 makes clear

that ANILCA does not “expand or diminish[{] Federal

or State jurisdiction, responsibility, interests, or rights

in water resources development or control.” 16 U.S.C.

consistent with the public trust. See, e.g., Alaska Const. art. VIII,

§ 3 (“Whether occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and

waters are reserved to the people for common use.”); Alaska

Stat. § 38.05.126(a) (“The people of the state have a constitutional

right to free access to and use of the navigable or public water of

the state.”); Alaska Stat. § 38.05.126(b) (“[TJhe state holds and

controls all navigable or public water in trust for the use of the

people of the state.”).

38

§ 3207(2). It also provides that the statute does not affect

“in any way any law governing appropriation or use of,

or Federal right to, water on lands within the State of

Alaska.” Id. § 3207(1); see also id. § 3202. In this way,

ANILCA preserves federal rights to use Alaskan waters

while expressly refraining from attempting to alter the

preexisting balance between state and federal control

over those waters.

2. No federal reserved water rights for

subsistence justify NPS extending its

jurisdiction to state submerged lands and

navigable waters.

Alternatively, NPS claimed below that it had the

authority under the Ninth Circuit’s “Katie John” decisions

to regulate Alaskan navigable waters as “public lands”

because the United States had reserved water rights

in waters flowing through Alaska CSUs to further the

conservation purposes behind ANILCA. Resp. C.A. Br.

12-13, 36-38; see Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698, 704 (9th

Cir. 1995) (“Katie John I”); Katie John v. United States,

720 F.3d 1214, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Katie John IT”).

These decisions, however, held that waters with associated

federal reserved water rights were “public lands” only

for the limited purpose of giving effect to ANILCA’s

subsistence provisions in Title VIII. See Katie John I,

72 F.3d at 702 n.9; Katie John II, 720 F.3d at 1245. Any

reserved water rights held by the government related

to subsistence provide no authority for NPS, or any

other agency, to regulate beyond subsistence issues. See

Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976) (“The

implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine, however,

reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill

the purpose of the reservation, no more.”).

39

The NPS hovercraft prohibition at issue here was

adopted for reasons wholly unrelated to subsistence. It is

part of NPS’s regulations promulgated under its general

authorities, not any category of federal subsistence

regulations promulgated under Title VIII of ANILCA.

And on its face, it does not purport to manage allocation

of, or access to, subsistence resources.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully

requests that this Court reverse the decision of the Ninth

Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM 8S. Consovoy MATTHEW T. FINDLEY

J. MICHAEL CONNOLLY Counsel of Record

Consovoy McCartTuy Eva R. GARDNER

Park PLLC ASHBURN & Mason, P.C.

3033 Wilson Boulevard 1227 W. Ninth Avenue

Suite 700 Suite 200

Arlington, VA 22201 Anchorage, AK 99501

(907) 276-4331

MICHAEL H. ParK mtf@anchorlaw.com

Consovoy McCartTuy

Park PLLC DouGLas Pope

Three Columbus Circle Pore & KaTCHER

15* Floor 421 W. First Avenue

New York, NY 10019 Suite 220

Anchorage, AK 99501

Attorneys for Petitioner

Date: November 16, 2015

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX A — 16 U.S.C. § 3103

16 U.S.C. § 3103

§ 3103. Maps

(a) Filing and availability for inspection; discrepancies;

coastal areas

The boundary maps described in this Act shall be on

file and available for public inspection in the office of the

Secretary or the Secretary of Agriculture with regard to

the National Forest System. In the event of discrepancies

between the acreages specified in this Act and those

depicted on such maps, the maps shall be controlling,

but the boundaries of areas added to the National Park,

Wildlife Refuge and National Forest Systems shall, in

coastal areas not extend seaward beyond the mean high

tide line to include lands owned by the State of Alaska

unless the State shall have concurred in such boundary

extension and such extension is accomplished under the

notice and reporting requirements of this Act.

(b) Changes in land management status; publication

in Federal Register; filing; clerical errors; boundary

features and adjustments

As soon as practicable after December 2, 1980, a map

and legal description of each change in land management

status effected by this Act, including the National

Wilderness Preservation System, shall be published in

the Federal Register and filed with the Speaker of the

House of Representatives and the President of the Senate,

2a

Appendix A

and each such description shall have the same force and

effect as if included in this Act: Provided, however, That

correction of clerical and typographical errors in each

such legal description and map may be made. Each such

map and legal description shall be on file and available

for public inspection in the office of the Secretary.

Whenever possible boundaries shall follow hydrographic

divides or embrace other topographic or natural features.

Following reasonable notice in writing to the Congress

of his intention to do so the Secretary and the Secretary

of Agriculture may make minor adjustments in the

boundaries of the areas added to or established by this

Act as units of National Park, Wildlife Refuge, Wild and

Scenic Rivers, National Wilderness Preservation, and

National Forest Systems and as national conservation

areas and national recreation areas. For the purposes of

this subsection, a minor boundary adjustment shall not

increase or decrease the amount of land within any such

area by more than 23,000 acres.

(c) Lands included within unit; acquisition of land by

Secretary

Only those lands within the boundaries of any conservation

system unit which are public lands (as such term is defined

in this Act) shall be deemed to be included as a portion of

such unit. No lands which, before, on, or after December 2,

1980, are conveyed to the State, to any Native Corporation,

or to any private party shall be subject to the regulations

applicable solely to public lands within such units. If the

State, a Native Corporation, or other owner desires to

convey any such lands, the Secretary may acquire such

3a

Appendix A

lands in accordance with applicable law (including this

Act), and any such lands shall become part of the unit,

and be administered accordingly.

4a

APPENDIX B — 36 C.F.R. § 1.2

36 C.F.R. § 1.2

§ 1.2 Applicability and scope.

(a) The regulations contained in this chapter apply to all

persons entering, using, visiting, or otherwise within:

(1) The boundaries of federally owned lands and

waters administered by the National Park Service;

(2) The boundaries of lands and waters

administered by the National Park Service for public-

use purposes pursuant to the terms of a written

instrument;

(3) Waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United

States located within the boundaries of the National

Park System, including navigable waters and areas

within their ordinary reach (up to the mean high

water line in places subject to the ebb and flow of

the tide and up to the ordinary high water mark in

other places) and without regard to the ownership of

submerged lands, tidelands, or lowlands;

(4) Lands and waters in the environs of the District

of Columbia, policed with the approval or concurrence

of the head of the agency having jurisdiction or control

over such reservations, pursuant to the provisions of

the Act of March 17, 1948 (62 Stat. 81);

(5) Other lands and waters over which the United

States holds a less-than-fee interest, to the extent

5a

Appendiz B

necessary to fulfill the purpose of the National Park

Service administered interest and compatible with

the nonfederal interest.

(b) The regulations contained in parts 1 through 5, part 7,

and part 13 of this chapter do not apply on non-federally

owned lands and waters or on Indian tribal trust lands

located within National Park System boundaries, except

as provided in paragraph (a) or in regulations specifically

written to be applicable on such lands and waters.

(c) The regulations contained in part 7 and part 13 of this

chapter are special regulations prescribed for specific

park areas. Those regulations may amend, modify, relax

or make more stringent the regulations contained in parts

1 through 5 and part 12 of this chapter.

(d) The regulations contained in parts 2 through 5, part

7, and part 13 of this section shall not be construed

to prohibit administrative activities conducted by the

National Park Service, or its agents, in accordance with

approved general management and resource management

plans, or in emergency operations involving threats to life,

property, or park resources.

(e) The regulations in this chapter are intended to treat

a mobility-impaired person using a manual or motorized

wheelchair as a pedestrian, and are not intended to

restrict the activities of such a person beyond the degree

that the activities of a pedestrian are restricted by the

same regulations.

6a

APPENDIX C — 36 C.F.R. § 2.17

36 C.F.R. § 2.17

§ 2.17 Aircraft and air delivery.

(a) The following are prohibited:

(1) Operating or using aircraft on lands or waters

other than at locations designated pursuant to special

regulations.

(2) Where a water surface is designated pursuant

to paragraph (a)(1) of this section, operating or

using aircraft under power on the water within 500

feet of locations designated as swimming beaches,

boat docks, piers, or ramps, except as otherwise

designated.

(3) Delivering or retrieving a person or object

by parachute, helicopter, or other airborne means,

except in emergencies involving public safety or

serious property loss, or pursuant to the terms and

conditions of a permit.

(b) The provisions of this section, other than paragraph (c)

of this section, shall not be applicable to official business

of the Federal government, or emergency rescues in

accordance with the directions of the superintendent, or

to landings due to circumstances beyond the control of

the operator.

(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (c)(3) of this

section, the owners of a downed aircraft shall remove the

Ta

Appendix C

aircraft and all component parts thereof in accordance

with procedures established by the superintendent. In

establishing removal procedures, the superintendent

is authorized to: (i) Establish a reasonable date by

which aircraft removal operations must be complete; (ii)

determine times and means of access to and from the

downed aircraft; and (iii) specify the manner or method

of removal.

(2) Failure to comply with procedures and

conditions established under paragraph (c)(1) of this

section is prohibited.

(3) The superintendent may waive the

requirements of paragraph (c)(1) of this section or

prohibit the removal of downed aircraft, upon a

determination that: (i) The removal of downed aircraft

would constitute an unacceptable risk to human life;

(ii) the removal of a downed aircraft would result in

extensive resource damage; or (iii) the removal of a

downed aircraft is impracticable or impossible.

(d) The use of aircraft shall be in accordance with

regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration. Such

regulations are adopted as a part of these regulations.

(e) The operation or use of hovercraft is prohibited.

(f) Violation of the terms and conditions of a permit issued

in accordance with this section is prohibited and may

result in the suspension or revocation of the permit.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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