Petitioners Brief — Sturgeon v. Masica, 136 S. Ct. 27 (2015) (No. 14-1209)
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No. 14-1209
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
JOHN STURGEON,
Petitioner,
BERT FROST, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS ALASKA REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, et ai,
Respondents.
On Writ oF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED States Court
or APPEALS FOR THE Ninta Circuit
PETITIONER’S OPENING BRIEF
WruuiaM S. Consovoy
J. MICHAEL CONNOLLY
MATTHEW T. FINDLEY
Counsel of Record
Consovoy McCartuy Eva R. GARDNER
Park PLLC ASHBURN & Mason, P.C.
3033 Wilson Boulevard 1227 W. Ninth Avenue
Suite 700 Suite 200
Arlington, VA 22201 Anchorage, AK 99501
(907) 276-4331
MICHAEL H. Park mtf@anchorlaw.com
Consovoy McCartTuy
Park PLLC Douc.Las Pore
Three Columbus Circle Pope & Katcuer
15" Floor 421 W. First Avenue
New York, NY 10019 Suite 220
Anchorage, AK 99501
Attorneys for Petitioner
Date: November 16, 2015
COUNSEL PRESS
(800) 274-8321 + (B00) 359-6859
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Section 103(c) of the Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 prohibits the
National Park Service from exercising regulatory control
over State, Native Corporation, and private Alaska land
physically located within the boundaries of the National
Park System.
12
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
Petitioner in this case is John Sturgeon.
Respondents are Bert Frost, in his official capacity as
Alaska Regional Director of the National Park Service;
Greg Dudgeon, in his official capacity as Superintendent
of the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve; Andee
Sears, in her official capacity as a Special Agent for the
National Park Service; Sally Jewell, in her official capacity
as Secretary of the Interior; Jonathan Jarvis, in his official
capacity as Director of the National Park Service; the
National Park Service; and the United States Department
of the Interior.
wt
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ..............-.ceee0e: i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ............... ii
- gE em mn rE iii
TABLE OF APPENDICES ...................... vi
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ............. vii
i ee adeewen 1
I ead 1
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................... 1
A. The Allocation of Lands to the
State of Alaska and Alaska Natives........... 1
B. The Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act of 1980.............. 4
Te CS c cdecictccceescessvcess 10
wv
Table of Contents
Page
Th SEIN dc ticneneedeséscececedes 16
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT...................- 17
Ek ccnddeeedsdedcdesds deneenensenen 21
I ANILCA Prohibits NPS from
Regulating Nonfederal Lands Within
Alaska CSUs as Though They Were Part
of the National Park System. ............... 21
A. Section 103(c) of ANILCA limits
NPS’s general regulatory control to
“public lands” within Alaska CSUs....... 22
B. Congress intended for Section 103(c) to
prevent NPS from regulating nonpublic
landsin Alaska CSUsas though they were
part of the National Park System. ....... 28
C. NPS’s construction of Section 103) is
vb cc cscvecocctéiocccccecsd 30
II. NPS’s Alternative Arguments Are Beyond
the Question Presented and Provide No
Basis for Affirming the Judgment Below. .... . 33
A. Submerged lands were “conveyed” to
SS. geccdsvccdsssseseus 33
Vv
Table of Contents
Page
B. State navigable waters are not
EE cbncicencdeneewedenceawe 35
1. Ownership of submerged lands
includes control of the waters
flowing above them................. 35
2. Nofederalreserved water rights for
subsistence justify NPS extending
its jurisdiction to state submerged
lands and navigable waters. ......... 38
UU Se ccencccsdvesecepsoevdsccoossese 39
vt
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — 16 U.S.C. § 3108 ................. la
APPENDIX B — 36 C.F.R. § 1.2 ..............28.. 4a
APPENDIX C — 36 C.FLR. § 2.17 ............2005. 6a
vit
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
CASES
Alaska v. Ahtna,
891 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989).............
Alaska v. Babbitt,
72 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1995) ..............
Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov.,
See I PE 6 ccc csecccccecescess
Alaska v. United States,
201 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2000).............
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, Alaska,
GD UAD. GE Gen occ ccccccsccccccess
BedRoc Lid., LLC v. United States,
Ge Ws BOW Gs eee ccccccccccccscess
Bulova Watch Co. v. United States,
365 U.S. 753 (1961)......... pencececeses
Cappaert v. United States,
Ge Ws SEES ovescccccesesccccnes
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
Ge Gn Ee so wcrc cccccccccceces
vitt
Cited Authorities
Page
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
ERT eae ere 31
City of Angoon v. Marsh,
oe fl re 4
Deal v. United States,
Ne ccs seek eh wobnakeneneeen 26
Dep't of Natural Res. v. Alaska Riverways, Inc.,
232 P.3d 1203 (Alaska 2010) ..................4- 2
Idaho v. United States,
ge Sa i ie 34
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois,
es ance binansnenened 2, 36, 37
Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.
Implement Workers of Am., UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc.,
cee ccc ace Lacie cuanedatawe 28
James v. State,
950 P.2d 1130 (Alaska 1997) ................00. 34
Katie John v. United States,
720 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2013). ...............000- 38
Koniag, Inc. v. Koncor Forest Res.,
39 F.3d 991 (Oth Cir. 1994)... 2... ccc ccccccccces 4
1x
Cited Authorities
Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418 (2009). ..............208.
Paroline v. United States,
EE Gs SUED oc ccc vcccccceseecs
Sturgeon v. Masica,
768 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2014)............
Totemoff v. State,
905 P.2d 954 (Alaska 1995).............
Trustees for Alaska v. State,
736 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1987) .............
Tyonek Native Corp. v.
Sec’y of the Interior,
836 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1988) ...........
United States v. Alaska,
Be Ss CS odd eccccsescceceseues
United States v. Brown,
36 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1994).............
United States v. California,
GP Ee ccesccccccceccesees
United States v. Gonzales,
Se PE ps sec cesccevccceseses
x
Cited Authorities
Page
Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ.,
EE nici candeskanetsuneceseswac 21
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
OP NE FP ev cb snsiccccecccsccevedesens 11, 17
| OPPO T ETT CTT CT TCC CTT Tee 1]
Pee NS So deen teeNdvescccdsccessccend 5, 6
EE obi. decdnddceteratencedenenecad 5
ee rb idnuxctedckdedssonctiedhewsedsaes 5
PP I Sa 6 ndakedsscnsdesnavensdsadent 5
SP MU one veddspucdsctcsnsddcesesacacese 5
SE Shes eves ntdeveddeunccceesnsecks 5
ee Es nidcotevesdvebccidedetavecssed 5
Ss EES a ocevccctectncewisecesuseced 5, 30
Be ES oc ccecenasccescestceteesssecent 5
SP ER occcucnctccesesésevantsssvenens 27
EE nds ccdeccnie’ 6dbseeneecne passim
xt
Cited Authorities
Page
BP UREGe Be soc eccccceccccceccccccccccccesecd 30
i dvcddewessdavecheestosens 37-38
I cicdevectcnccodecesisdecsewsscunse 5
ap iakcdenntimeecstuedeandankes 5
EN Scb-deddcrceensevpccuseccstssecs 1
Ss hve cercsssccccevesescecsi 2, 18, 36
na bteredccdscccenessedcceuccees 3
EE bh oncetnndes tetescetadevadenases 3
Cekeedcncevecsdschhcanstudeceevacs 3
Se iktcntvedcsccccneksseeesenucesncas 3
ck cepeneneusewesdsneseas cy 4
ee I oo iba ccccsscccoscsscqnnses 4
ee I sb veccccesesecccccccosess 10
ii cncddbncccdctenvtsscepeonruns 25
Pe CAs FE occ cbccdececcvccccociesesoseda 1]
xt
Cited Authorities
Page
OO TLE, 8 ENE oc cccccccescccsseseseceenant 22
BB CRG, GTP 0c cccccccccesevevecesouanaun 22
Act of Dec. 19, 2014, Pub. L. 113-287,
EP ee, SUNG ov vcccccsseccecosvensecoun 11
Alaska Admin. Code tit. 11, § 20.990(7)............. 14
Alaska Admin. Code tit. 11, § 20.990(18) ............ 14
Alaska Const. art. VITE, $3 .....ccccccccccccsccees 37
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation
Act, Pub. L. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) .... passim
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,
Pub. L. 92-903, 85 Stat. 688 (1971).......... passim
Aleaica Stat. § SB.GG.IBGE).. 2. cccccvcccccccccccese 37
Alaska Stat. § 38.05.126(b)..............ceeee eens 37
Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. 85-508,
We PEED 6 cc ccccccccoecsoesesess passim
REGULATIONS
SOG Fe BRR cov ccccvvcsesacseséseseass 13, 21
SE CFR. GSTAD oc ccccccsccccccccseceess 12, 13, 16
rrit
Cited Authorities
Page
EE 35
Cee eee os ne co ccuasineseseces 35
i ae nc eccusecestescecett 35
Cee 32
ee lana eaccccgesetetese 35
Applicability of Reguiations to Non-Federal Lands
and Waters Under U.S. Legislative Jurisdiction,
52 Fed. Reg. 35,238 (Sept. 18, 1987) ............. 12
General Provisions and Non-Federal Oil and Gas
Rights, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,572 (Oct. 26, 2015)........ 31
General Regulations for Areas Administered by
the National Park Service,
48 Fed. Reg. 30,252 (June 30, 1983). .......... 11, 12
General Regulations for Areas Administered
by the National Park Service and National
Park System Units in Alaska,
61 Fed. Reg. 35,133 (July 5, 1996) ......... 13, 27, 30
National Park System Units in Alaska,
46 Fed. Reg. 31,836 (June 17, 2981) ........... 10, 11
Proclamation No. 4611,
43 Fed. Reg. 57,009 (Dec. 5, 1978) ................ 4
XIV
Cited Authorities
Page
Public Land Order 4582,
34 Fed. Reg. 1,025 (Jan. 23, 1969) ................ 3
Public Land Order 5653,
43 Fed. Reg. 59,756 (Dec. 21, 1978) ............... 4
Public Land Orders 5696-5711,
45 Fed. Reg. 9,562 (Feb. 12, 1980)................ 4
OTHER AUTHORITIES
125 Cong. Rec. 9,905 (1979) ........ cece cece eeee 7,8
125 Cong. Rec. 11,158 (1979). .............005: passim
125 Cong. Rec. 11,458 (1979) ........... cece eeees 9, 10
126 Cong. Rec. 21,891 (1980) ... 0... cece cccccees 9
126 Cong, Ree. 31,558 (ISB)... wc cccccccccccccccs 8
126 Cong. Rec. 30,496 (1980) .... 2... cece eee e ce eees 9
126 Cong. Rec. 30,498 (1980) ................... 10, 29
S. Rep. No. 96-413 (1979) ............cceeeeee 7, 28, 29
ee ED GED ccccccccccccccoucesceseed 9
H.R. 39, 96th Cong. (1980) ........... ccc e eee eens 9
xU
Cited Authorities
Page
H.R. Con. Res. 452, 96th Cong. (1980) ............... 9
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed 2014) .............. 34
Richard M. Johannsen, Public Land Withdrawal
Policy and the Antiquities Act, 56 Wash. L.
DTT... cauaeeudccecedbecesdouseeces 4-5
i
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit is reported at 768 F.3d 1066 and is
reproduced in the Appendix to the Petition (“App.”) at
3a-34a. The Ninth Circuit’s order denying rehearing en
banc is unreported and is reproduced at App. la-2a. The
opinion of the United States District Court for the District
of Alaska is unreported and is reproduced at App. 35a-58a.
JURISDICTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit issued its decision on October 6, 2014. App. 3a.
A timely petition for rehearing en banc was denied on
December 16, 2014. App. la. The petition for a writ of
certiorari was timely filed on March 31, 2015, and granted
on October 1, 2015. This Court has jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The relevant statutory and regulatory provisions are
reproduced in the appendix to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Allocation of Lands to the State of Alaska and
Alaska Natives
Upon entering the Union in 1959, Alaska received the
largest land grant in the history of the United States.
The Alaska Statehood Act of 1958 (“Statehood Act”)
2
authorized Alaska to select up to 102,550,000 acres—an
area the size of California—from the public lands of the
United States “which [we]re vacant, unappropriated, and
unreserved at the time of their selection.” Pub. L. 85-508,
§ 6(b), 72 Stat. 339, 340 (1958). This unprecedented grant
was driven by “fear that the territory was economically
immature” and that its small, dispersed population “would
be unable to support a state government.” Trustees for
Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 335 (Alaska 1987). The land
grant would act “as an endowment which would yield the
income that Alaska needed to meet the costs of statehood”
and thus “ensure the economic and social well-being of the
new state.” Jd. at 335-36.
The Statehood Act also made the Submerged Lands
Act of 1953, which grants “title to and ownership of the
lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries
of the respective States,” 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a), “applicable
to the State of Alaska” such that Alaska “shall have the
same rights as do existing States thereunder,” Pub. L.
85-508, § 6(m), 72 Stat. 343. Alaska therefore “holds
title to the beds of navigable waters ‘in trust for the
people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation
of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have
liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties.” Dep’t of Natural Res.
v. Alaska Riverways, Inc., 232 P.3d 1203, 1211 (Alaska
2010) (quoting Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 452 (1892)).
In the decade following its admission to the Union,
Alaska began selecting lands from the public domain in
accordance with its rights under the Statehood Act. But
land disputes quickly arose when the State attempted
3
to select lands over which Alaska Natives had asserted
aboriginal title. Because the Statehood Act had not
extinguished their claims, Alaska Natives contended that
the State had no legal right to their land. As a result, the
Secretary of the Interior temporarily suspended transfer
of unreserved public lands to Alaska. See Public Land
Order 4582, 34 Fed. Reg. 1,025 (Jan. 23, 1969).
In 1971, Congress passed the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (“ANCSA”) to resolve these disputes. Pub.
L. 92-903, 85 Stat. 688 (1971). Congress designed ANCSA
to settle Alaska Natives’ claims of aboriginal title “rapidly,
with certainty, in conformity with the real economic and
social needs of Natives, without litigation, with maximum
participation by Natives in decisions affecting their rights
and property.” 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b). At the same time,
Congress was intent on doing so “without establishing any
permanent racially defined institutions, rights, privileges,
or obligations” or “creating a reservation system or
lengthy wardship or trusteeship.” Jd. In short, Congress
sought to “end the sort of federal supervision over Indian
affairs that had previously marked federal Indian policy.”
Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov., 522 U.S. 520,
523-24 (1998).
To that end, Congress extinguished the aboriginal
land claims of Alaska Natives, appropriated $962.5 million
to fund various Native regional and village corporations,
and granted these corporations the right to select
approximately 40 million acres of land. See 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1603(b), 1605, 1607, 1610-15. “Congress contemplated
that land granted under ANCSA would be put primarily to
three uses—village expansion, subsistence, and capital for
economic development. Of these potential uses, Congress
4
clearly expected economic development would be the most
significant.” Koniag, Inc. v. Koncor Forest Res., 39 F.3d
991, 996 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted). Indeed,
Congress recognized that development of the land would
allow Alaska Natives to “achiev{e] financial independence
and self-sufficiency.” City of Angoon v. Marsh, 749 F.2d
1413, 1414 (9th Cir. 1984).
B. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation
Act of 1980
In addition to resolving the land claims of Native
Alaskans, ANCSA directed the Secretary of the Interior
to set aside up to 80 million acres of unreserved federal land
“which the Secretary deems are suitable for addition to or
creation as units of the National Park System[].” 43 U.S.C.
§ 1616(d)(2). The Secretary’s subsequent withdrawals,
however, never received congressional approval. See id.
§ 1616(d)(2)(D) (providing that the withdrawals would
expire unless Congress approved them within five years).
The Carter Administration (claiming authority under
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784, and the Antiquities Act of 1906,
16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433) then started withdrawing land on
an ad hoc basis. By 1980, the Carter Administration had
unilaterally withdrawn over 100 million acres of federal
land. See Proclamation No. 4611, 43 Fed. Reg. 57,009 (Dec.
5, 1978); Public Land Order 5653, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,756
(Dec. 21, 1978); Public Land Orders 5696-5711, 45 Fed.
Reg. 9,562 (Feb. 12, 1980). Alaska, which was still in the
process of making its land selections under the Statehood
Act, was “outraged by President Carter’s expansive use
of the Antiquities Act,” and the “public outcry against
this massive land ‘lock-up’ was significant.” Richard M.
5
Johannsen, Public Land Withdrawal Policy and the
Antiquities Act, 56 Wash. L. Rev. 439, 455 (1981).
In response, Congress enacted the Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”), Pub. L. 96-
487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980). ANILCA rescinded the Carter
Administration’s land withdrawals, see 16 U.S.C. § 3209,
and made any future federal withdrawals in Alaska of
more than 5,000 acres subject to congressional approval
see id. § 3213(a). Congress thus developed its own polici
to finally “complete the allocation of federal lands in tie
State of Alaska.” Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell,
Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 549 (1987). In doing so, Congress
sought to balance two objectives: protecting “the national
interest in the scenic, natural, cultural and environmental
values on the public lands in Alaska” and, as it had done
with the Alaska Statehood Act and ANCSA, ensuring “the
economic and social needs of the State of Alaska and its
people.” 16 U.S.C. § 3101(d).
ANILCA placed more than 100 million acres into
conservation system units (“CSUs”) in Alaska, expanding
the National Park System by over 43 million acres and
creating numerous new National Monuments and Wildlife
Refuges. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431, 410hh, 668dd, 460mm, 539,
1274(a), 1132.1 The Yukon-Charley Rivers National
Preserve (“Yukon-Charley”) is one of these CSUs.
1. ANILCA defined a CSU as “any unit in Alaska of the
National Park System, National Wildlife Refuge System, National
Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems, National Trails System.
National Wilderness Preservation System, or a National Forest
Monument.” 16 U.S.C. § 3102(4). That definition included “existing
units, units established, designated, or expanded by or under the
provisions of this Act, additions to such units, and any such unit
established, designated, or expanded hereafter.” Id.
6
Congress identified the Yukon-Charley as “containing
approximately one million s~ven hundred and thirteen
thousand acres of public lands, as generally depicted on
map numbered YUCH-90,008, and dated October 1978.”
16 U.S.C. § 410hh(10). ANILCA established the Yukon-
Charley as a “unit{] of the National Park System ... [to] be
administered by the Secretary under the laws governing
the administration of such lands and under the provisions
of this Act.” Id. § 410hh.
Because Congress sought to include an entire
ecosystem within a given CSU, each one encompassed
a massive amount of land—not all of which belonged
to the federal government. ANILCA delineated new
CSU boundaries that encompassed roughly 28 percent
of all land in Alaska. Native Corporations and the State
owned much of the nonfederal land contained within
these CSUs. As of this year, Native Corporations alone
own approximately 18 million acres within CSUs, which
amount to approximately 40 percent of their total ANCSA
land selections. See Brief of Ahtna, Inc. et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5 & Ex. 1 (Apr. 29, 2015).
The disposition of these nonfederal lands within the
new or expanded CSUs received significant congressional
attention. There was.no question as to Congress’s intent:
State, Native Corporation, and private lands were not
“public lands,” were not part of any CSU, and would not
be subject to federal regulation as if they were part of a
CSU. As the Senate committee charged with drafting
responsibility explained, “[t]hose private lands, and those
public lands owned by the State of Alaska ... are not to
be construed as subject to the management regulations
which may be adopted to manage and administer any
7
national conservation system unit which is adjacent to,
or surrounds, the private or non-Federal public lands.”
S. Rep. No. 96-413, at 303 (1979). Rather, only “Federal
laws and regulations of general applicability to both
private and public lands, such as the Clean Air Act,
the Water Pollution Control Act, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers wetlands regulations, and other Federal
statutes and regulations of general applicability would be
applicable to private or non-F ederal public land inholdings
within conservations system units.” Jd. These generally-
applicable statutes and regulations thus were “unaffected
by the passage of this bill.” Jd.
Congress was especially concerned that ANILCA not
disturb the land rights granted to Alaska Natives under
ANCSA. Applying federal conservation regulations to
Native Corporation lands would imperil ANCSA’s goal of
ensuring financial independence and self-sufficiency for
Alaska Natives. As Arizona Congressman Morris Udall,
one of ANILCA’s primary sponsors, put it: ANILCA was
a “direct out-growth of [ANCSA],” and, as a consequence,
it was “important to recall the relationship between the
conservation system units ... and the lands which the
Native peoples of Alaska have received and will receive
pursuant to the [ANCSA] in return for the extinguishment
of their claims based on aboriginal title.” 125 Cong. Rec.
9,905 (1979) (statement of Rep. Udall).
Congressman Udall explained that ANILCA was to
have no effect on these lands:
We recognize that there are certain lands which
have been selected by Native Corporations and
which are within the exterior boundaries of
8
some of the conservation system units .... I want
to make clear that inclusion of these Native
lands within the boundaries of conservation
system units is not intended to affect any rights
which the Corporations may have under this
act, [ANCSA], or any other law, or to restrict
use of such lands by the owning Corporations
nor to subject the Native lands to regulations
applicable to the public lands within the specific
conservation system unit.
Id.; see also 125 Cong. Rec. 21,882 (1980) (statement of
Sen. Stevens) (“The fact that Native lands lie within the
boundaries of conservation system units is not intended
to affect any rights which the [Native] corporations have
under this act, [ANCSA], or any other law.... The Native
organizations have been given repeated assurances that
including their lands within conservation units will not
affect the implementation of [ANCSA].”); 125 Cong. Rec.
11,158 (1979) (statement of Rep. Seiberling) (recognizing
that nothing in ANILCA “alters in any way the ability
of the State or Natives to do what it will with ... lands”
within the boundaries of CSUs).
Congress understood, though, that it should do more
than make its intent known in legislative documents and
floor statements. It thus added Section 103(¢), which states:
Only those lands within the boundaries of any
conservation system unit which are public
lands (as such term is defined in this Act)
shall be deemed to be included as a portion of
such unit. No lands which, before, on, or after
December 2, 1980, are conveyed to the State, to
9
any Native Corporation, or to any private party
shall be subject to the regulations applicable
solely to public lands within such units. If the
State, a Native Corporation, or other owner
desires to convey any such lands, the Secretary
may acquire such lands in accordance with
applicable law (including this Act), and any
such lands shall become part of the unit, and
be administered accordingly.
16 U.S.C. § 3103(€).?
Congress added Section 103(c) to “make clear beyond
any doubt that any State, Native, or private lands, which
may lie within the outer boundaries of the conservation
system unit are not parts of that unit and are not subject
to regulations which are applied to public lands, which,
in fact, are part of the unit.” 125 Cong. Rec. 11,158 (1979)
(statement of Rep. Seiberling). Only an express statutory
prohibition would guarantee that some “sharp lawyer”
would not use “catch words” to circumvent Congress’s
intention that “the fact that [land] is within the boundaries
drawn on the map for that conservation unit does not in
2. This provision was originally located in Section 810(c)
of H.R. 3651, the “Udall-Anderson” bill that eventually became
ANILCA. See H.R. 39, 96th Cong. (1979). After the House
version of ANILCA passed, 125 Cong. Rec. 11,458-59 (1979), it
was replaced with the Senate’s version, which did not include
Section 810(c), 126 Cong. Rec. 21,891 (1980); H.R. 39, 96th Cong.
‘(1980). This provision was included in the final version of ANILCA
through a concurrent resolution that reinstated the original
Section 810(c) amendment language to its new location at Section
103(c). 126 Cong. Rec. 30,495-500 (1980); see H.R. Con. Res. 452,
96th Cong. (1980).
10
any way change the status of that State, native or private
land or make it subject to any of the laws or regulations
that pertain to U.S. public lands.” Jd. In sum, Congress
added Section 103(c) to establish “that only public lands
(and not State or private lands) are to be subject to the
conservation unit regulations applying to public lands.”
126 Cong. Rec. 30,498 (1980) (statement of Rep. Udall).
C. Regulatory History
In the wake of ANILCA’s passage, NPS adopted
regulations to govern “public uses of National Park
System units in Alaska, including units established by
[ANILCA)].” National Park System Units in Alaska, 46
Fed. Reg. 31,836, 31,836 (June 17, 1981). These NPS
regulations addressed, inter alia, public access, camping
and picnicking, carrying of firearms, and preservation
of natural features. See id. at 31,854-64 (citing 36 C.F.R.
Part 13). These Alaska-specific regulations complemented
NPS’s nationwide regulations and, in some cases,
superseded “otherwise applicable regulatory provisions
of 36 CFR Parts 1-9,” which NPS found “generally
inappropriate in the unique Alaska setting.” Jd. at 31,836.
NPS recognized “Sections 103(c) and 906(0) of
ANILCA generally restrict the applicability of [NPS]
regulations to federally-owned lands within park area
boundaries.” /d. at 31,843.° “Consistent with the statute
3. Section 906(0) provides, in relevant part, that “any land
withdrawn pursuant to [ANCSA] and within the boundaries
of any [CSU] ... shall be added to such unit and administered
accordingly” unless it is conveyed to a Native Corporation or the
State; and that “[uJntil conveyed, all Federal lands within the
boundaries of a [CSU] ... shall be administered in accordance
with the laws applicable to such unit.” 43 U.S.C. § 1635(0)(1)-(2).
11
and the explanatory legislative history,” then, NPS
“restrict[ed] the applicability of these regulations to
‘federally owned’ lands ... within park area boundaries.”
Id. (citing 126 Cong. Rec. 11,115 (1980) and 126 Cong. Rec.
15,130-31 (1980)). In other words, NPS made clear that
“[t]hese regulations would not apply to activities occurring
on State lands. Similarly, these regulations would not
apply to activities occurring on Native or any other non-
federally owned land interests located inside park area
boundaries.” Jd.
Two years later, NPS engaged in a “comprehensive
review of [its] general regulations” applicable nationwide
in an effort to “simplify” them and “ease the burden of [its]
regulations on the public.” General Regulations for Areas
Administered by the National Park Service, 48 Fed. Reg.
30,252, 30,252 (June 30, 1983). Under the National Park
Service Organic Act, the Secretary of the Interior had the
authority to “make and publish such rules and regulations
as he may deem necessary ur proper for the use and
management of the parks, monuments, and reservations
under the jurisdiction of the National Park Services,” 16
U.S.C. § 3, and to “[p}romulgate and enforce regulations
concerning boating and other activities on or relating to
waters located within areas of the National Park System,
including waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States,” id. § 1a-2(h).‘* Acting under those authorities, NPS
revised many of its general regulations governing public
use and recreational activities in areas it administers.
48 Fed. Reg. at 30,252. As part of this overhaul, NPS
4. 16 U.S.C. § 3 and 16 U.S.C. § la-2(h) were later repealed
and recodified by the Act of Dec. 19, 2014, Pub. L. 113-287, § 7,
128 Stat. 3094, 3273 (2014). See 54 U.S.C. § 100751.
12
prohibited “(t]he operation or use of hovercraft” in park
areas. Id. at 30,286 (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 2.17(e)).
At the same time, NPS sought to clarify the extent of
its jurisdiction over nonfederal lands. See id. at 30,260-
61. In an amended version of 36 C.F.R. § 1.2(b), NPS
announced that “(t]he regulations contained in Parts 1
through 7 of this chapter are not applicable on privately
owned lands and water (including Indian lands and waters
owned individually or tribally) within the boundaries of
a park area, except as may be provided by regulations
relating specifically to privately owned lands and waters
under the legislative jurisdiction of the United States.” Jd.
at 30,275. “Legislative jurisdiction,” in turn, was defined
as “lands and waters under the exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction of the United States.” Jd. at 30,276 (quoting
36 C.F.R. § 1.4).
In 1988, NPS revised Section 1.2(b) to confirm that
the ban on federal regulation in the absence of legislative
jurisdiction extended to all “non-federally owned lands
and waters” and not just “privately owned lands and
water.” Applicability of Regulations to Non-Federal Lands
and Waters Under U.S. Legislative Jurisdiction, 52 Fed.
Reg. 35,238, 35,239 (Sept. 18, 1987).
NPS abruptly reversed course in 1996. Referencing
its inability to prosecute an individual who had taken a
seal from Alaskan waters for a ceremonial potlatch,® the
5. Inthat case, United States v. Brown, 36 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir.
1994), the United States ceased prosecution and sought dismissal
because it recognized that it neither “own{ed] the submerged land”
nor had “legislative jurisdiction” over such lands. See Brief of the
United States at 5-6, United States v. Brown, No. 94-30019, 1994
WL 16122537 (9th Cir. May 17, 1994).
13
agency purported to clarify “the applicability of those NPS
regulations that apply in all National Park System areas
to waters subject to federal jurisdiction located within
park boundaries, including navigable waters.” General
Regulations for Areas Administered by the National
Park Service and National Park System Units in Alaska,
61 Fed. Reg. 35,133, 35,133 (July 5, 1996). Abandoning
its earlier view, NPS announced “that NPS regulations
otherwise applicable within the boundaries of a National
Park System unit apply on and within waters subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States located within that
unit, including navigable waters and areas within their
at 35,136 (quoting 36 C.FR. § 1.2(a)(3)).
NPS therefore claimed power to enforce both its
general] regulations, which included the ban on hovercraft
in 36 C.F.R. § 2.17(e), and its Alaska-specific regulations
in 36 C.F.R. Part 13 over all State-owned navigable
waters within the boundaries of the CSUs that ANILCA
created or expanded. NPS rejected comments that
Section 103(c) of ANILCA “should be interpreted as
superseding NPS authority to regulate (non-federal]
waters within park boundaries.” /d. at 35,135. According
to NPS, Section 103(c) “was characterized by Congress as
a minor technical provision” and interpreting it to allow
NPS regulation of nonfederal navigable waters within
CSUs would be “consistent with [ANILCA’s] underlying
protective purposes.” Jd.
14
D. Factual Background
Petitioner John Sturgeon is a lifelong Alaskan. Prior
to this dispute, he had hunted moose annually since 1971
on the Yukon River downstream from Eagle, Alaska, and
its tributary, the Nation River. App. 8a. In 1990, in order
to access waters of the Nation River inaccessible by other
watercraft, Mr. Sturgeon purchased a small personal
hovercraft and registered it with the State of Alaska.
App. 8a. A hovercraft is a motorized vessel that utilizes a
low-pressure air cushion produced by downward-directed
fans. See Alaska Admin. Code tit. 11, §§ 20.990(7), (18). A
hovercraft can travel over water and exposed gravel bars,
which are common in Alaska. Alaska law permits the use
of hovercraft on State-owned lands and waters.
From 1990 through 2007, Mr. Sturgeon used his
hovercraft to access moose-hunting grounds on the Nation
River, including those waters of the Nation River upriver
from the Yukon-Charley boundary. App. 8a. Because
the Nation River is navigable, Alaska holds title to its
submerged lands. See Alaska v. United States, 201 F.3d
1154 (9th Cir. 2000).
In September 2007, during his annual moose-hunting
trip, Mr. Sturgeon entered the Nation River from the
Yukon River on his hovercraft. Approximately two miles
upriver, Mr. Sturgeon stopped on a gravel bar located
below the river’s mean high-water mark to make repairs.
Shortly thereafter, three armed NPS rangers approached
him. App. 8a. The NPS rangers told Mr. Sturgeon that he
was committing a federal crime by operating his State-
registered hovercraft within the Yukon-Charley. App.
8a. Mr. Sturgeon explained to the NPS rangers that he
15
was operating his hovercraft on a State-owned navigable
river. App. 8a. The NPS rangers said that Mr. Sturgeon
was incorrect and insisted that he remove the hovercraft
from the Yukon-Charley. App. 8a.
Mr. Sturgeon later met with NPS Special Agent Sears
in Anchorage, Alaska, to discuss NPS’s threat of criminal]
citation. App. 9a. Special Agent Sears acknowledged that
the State of Alaska owned the submerged lands within
the banks of the Yukon and Nation Rivers, but reaffirmed
NP%S’s position that it would be a federal crime for Mr.
Sturgeon to use his hovercraft on navigable waters within
CSUs. App. 9a. She warned Mr. Sturgeon that NPS would
criminally charge him if he again operated his hovercraft
within the Yukon-Charley. App. 9a. Because of these
warnings, Mr. Sturgeon did not use his hovercraft within
the Yukon-Charley in subsequent hunting seasons. He
thus was unable to hunt areas of the Nation River that
he had previously accessed with his hovercraft. App. 9a.
In October 2010, Mr. Sturgeon sent a letter to then-
Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar, requesting that he
initiate a rulemaking to repeal or amend NPS regulations
so that NPS could no longer restrict access on State
navigable waters located within the boundaries of CSUs.
App. 9a. He received no response. On June 26, 2011, Mr.
Sturgeon wrote to the NPS Alaska District Regional
Chief Ranger, copying Special Agent Sears, requesting
written confirmation that he would be cited if he again
operated his hovercraft within the remote regions of the
Yukon-Charley. D. Ct. Doc. No. 1-2, at 1-2 (Sept. 14, 2011).
He received no response.
16
E. Proceedings Below
On September 14, 2011, Mr. Sturgeon filed a complaint
against Sue Masica—the Alaska Regional Director of
NPS at the time—and additional federal defendants in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska under
the Administrative Procedure Act. The complaint sought,
among other things, a declaratory judgment that ANILCA
prohibits NPS from enforcing its regulations, including
its ban on hovercraft in 36 C.F.R. § 2.17(e), on nonfederal
lands in Alaska. Mr. Sturgeon also sought to enjoin the
defendants from interfering with the operation of his
hovercraft on navigable waters within the Yukon-Charley.
The State of Alaska intervened to join the challenge.®
The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants. App. 35a-58a. The court recognized that the
State had acquired title to the bed of the Nation River
under the Statehood Act and the Submerged Lands
Act. App. 55a. Nevertheless, the district court held that
NPS could ban hovercraft on these waters because, in
its view, Section 103(c) prohibited application of only
Alaska-specific regulations. App. 56a. Because NPS’s
nationwide regulations, including the ban on hovercraft,
“were enacted by the Department of the Interior pursuant
to its general authority to adopt regulations for all NPS
administered lands and waters,” they were not “adopted
‘solely’ to address entry upon or use of various equipment
on public lands within ANILCA-created conservation
units such as Yukon-Charley.” App. 56a.
6. On appeal, NPS claimed that the State had no standing to
bring its action. The Ninth Circuit agreed and ordered the district
court to dismiss the State’s complaint. App. 14a-20a.
17
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Like the district court,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that ANILCA did not prevent
NPS from imposing its generally applicable regulations
on nonfederal lands within CSUs. ANILCA’s limitation
on NPS authority to impose “regulations applicable solely
to public lands within such units” applied only to Alaska-
specific regulations. App. 25a-26a. In the court’s view,
ANILCA did not supersede the general authority that
Congress, in 1976, vested in the Secretary of the Interior
to “[p]romulgate and enforce regulations concerning
boating and other activities on or relating to waters located
with areas of the National Park System, including waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” App. 25a
(quoting 16 U.S.C. § la-2(h)). The Ninth Circuit concluded,
therefore, that because the “hovercraft ban ... applies
to all federal-owned lands and waters administered by
NPS nationwide”—and not only on federal lands within
Alaska—it may be enforced on Alaskan land owned by
the State, Native Corporations, and individuals. App. 26a.
On October 1, 2015, this Court granted Mr. Sturgeon’s
petition for certiorari.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case involves a straightforward question of
statutory interpretation. ANILCA mandates that any
nonfederal land within its CSU boundaries is not included
in the CSUs and is exempt from regulations enacted to
manage the CSUs.
Specifically, in Section 103(c), Congress provided
that only “public lands” within the boundaries of CSUs
“shall be deemed to be included as a portion of such
18
unit,” and that no lands owned by “the State, [a] Native
Corporation, or [a] private party shall be subject to the
regulations applicable solely to public lands within such
units.” 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c). Congress further stated
that to “become part of the unit and [be] administered
accordingly,” nonfederal land must first be conveyed to
the United States. /d.
ANILCA defines “public lands” to mean “land situated
in Alaska which, after December 2, 1980, are Federal
lands,” id. § 3102(8), and “federal lands” to mean “lands
the title to which is in the United States after December 2,
1980,” id. § 3102(2). Lands belonging to Alaska and Native
Corporations are expressly excluded from the definition
of “public lands.” Jd. § 3102(8).
There is no dispute that Alaska’s navigable waters are
not “public lands.” Through the Statehood Act, Alaska
received “title to and ownership of the lands beneath
navigable waters within [its] boundaries.” 43 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a). The Submerged Lands Act establishes that this
title includes control of the waters and resources above.
See infra at 33-35. Because Alaska’s navigable waters are
not “public lands,” NPS may not regulate them pursuant
to its general authority to manage national parks. Section
103(¢c) of ANILCA, a specific statutory provision, is
controlling. For Mr. Sturgeon, that means that NPS had
no authority to threaten him with a criminal citation for
using his hovercraft on the Nation River, a State-owned
navigable river in Alaska.
The Ninth Circuit found otherwise by distorting the
plain meaning of Section 103(c). Focusing on the word
“solely,” the Ninth Circuit read Section 103(c) to mean that
19
nonfederal land within CSUs was exempt from only “CSU-
specific regulations.” App. 24a (emphasis in original).
But nothing in ANILCA suggests a distinction
between NPS regulations applicable nationwide and
those applicable only in Alaska CSUs. Instead, Section
103(c) distinguishes between NPS’s authority to manage
“public lands within such units” and its lack of authority
to manage nonpublic (7.e., nonfederal) lands within such
units. Had Congress intended otherwise, it would not have
expressly required that these lands be conveyed to NPS
before they could be administered as part of the National
Park System. Congress used the word “solely” to ensure
that nonfederal lands in Alaska CSUs remained subject
to laws applicable to both public and private lands (such
as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act).
ANILCA’s legislative history confirms this plain
reading. Congress passed ANILCA to provide for the
conservation of Alaskan lands while also preserving the
unique interests of the State and Native Corporations in
their respective lands. In the Statehood Act, Congress
provided the State of Alaska with a historic land grant
to ensure the economic prosperity of its people. And in
ANCSA, Congress provided significant funds and land
grants to Alaska Natives so they could achieve financial
independence and self-sufficiency. In light of the economic
purposes of these acts, Congress wanted to ensure that
ANILCA did not undermine these objectives by saddling
State and Native Corporation lands with burdensome
federal regulations. Congress thus passed Section 103(c)
to “make clear beyond any doubt that any State, Native, or
private lands, which may lie within the outer boundaries of
the conservation system unit are not parts of that unit and
20
are not subject to regulations which are applied to public
lands, which, in fact, are part of the unit.” 125 Cong. Rec.
11,158 (1979) (statement of Rep. Seiberling).
Even if ANILCA were ambiguous, which it is not,
NPS’s construction of Section 103(c) would be unreasonable
and entitled to no deference. Under NPS’s interpretation,
the agency could easily evade Section 103(c)’s limitation
on federal control simply by promulgating a nationwide
regulation applicable to nonpublic lands. Paradoxically,
this interpretation would mean that shov’d this new
regulation be more restrictive than NPS’s Alaska-specific
rules, public lands within CSUs would continue to receive
the benefit of the relaxed Alaska-specific regulations,
but nonpublic lands would not. This nonsensical outcome
squarely contradicts ANILCA, which repeatedly
recognizes the unique nature of Alaskan lands.
Finally, NPS’s alternative arguments based on
navigable waters are not before the Court and cannot
salvage the agency’s regulations in any event. NPS may
argue that submerged lands were never “conveyed” to the
State of Alaska. But the transfer of title from the United
States to Alaska under the Statehood and Submerged
Lands Acts is a “conveyance” under any commonly
understood definition of the term. Nor are Alaskan
navigable waters “public lands,” as NPS may argue. It is
settled law that the State’s ownership of submerged lands
includes control of the waters flowing above them.
In short, because the State’s navigable waters are
not “public lands,” ANILCA makes clear that NPS may
not regulate them as though they were part of a CSU.
NPS thus had no power to threaten Mr. Sturgeon with
21
a criminal citation for using his hovercraft on the Nation
River. This Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit’s
decision.
ARGUMENT
I. ANILCA Prohibits NPS from Regulating
Nonfederal Lands Within Alaska CSUs as Though
They Were Part of the National Park System.
This Court reviews a federal agency’s construction of a
statute that it administers under the framework set forth
in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). “If a court, employing
traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that
Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue,
that intention is the law and must be given effect.” /d. at
843 n.9. “Only if ‘Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue’ should a court consider ‘whether
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.” Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of
Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 107 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
NPS’s construction of Section 103(c) cannot survive
Chevron review. First, Congress spoke directly and
clearly by specifying in ANILCA that nonfederal lands
within a CSU are not part of the CSU and not subject to
regulation as though they were. As a consequence, N PS’s
enforcement of 36 C.F.R. § 1.2(a)(3) exceeded its statutory
authority. Second, the legislative history confirms that
Congress intended for Section 103(c) to prevent NPS
from regulating nonpublic land in Alaska CSUs as though
they were part of the National Park System. Third, even
22
if there were any ambiguity, NPS’s interpretation of
Section 103(c) would still be unreasonable and depend on
an impermissible construction of ANILCA.
A. Section 103(c) of ANILCA limits NPS’s general
regulatory control to “public lands” within
Alaska CSUs.
The question presented here is whether Section
103(c) of ANILCA limits NPS’s general authority to
regulate nonfederal lands located within Alaska CSUs.’
As explained below, it plainly does.
The Court’s “inquiry begins with the statutory text,
and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.” BedRoc
Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004). The
text of Section 103(c) is straightforward. It provides:
Only those lands within the boundaries of any
conservation system unit which are public
lands (as such term is defined in this Act)
shall be deemed to be included as a portion of
7. NPS’s regulatory authority derives from two statutory
sources, neither of which permits application of the hovercraft
regulation to nonpublic lands within Alaska CSUs. First, the
Secretary of the Interior may “prescribe such regulations as
the Secretary considers necessary or proper for the use and
management of System units.” 54 U.S.C. § 100751(a). Second,
the Secretary may “prescribe regulations under subsection (a)
concerning boating and other activities on or relating to water
located within System units, including water subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.” Jd. § 100751(b). But it is “familiar
law that a specific statute controls over a general one.” Bulova
Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961).
23
such unit. No lands which, before, on, or after
December 2, 1980, are conveyed to the State, to
any Native Corporation, or to any private party
shall be subject to the regulations applicable
solely to public lands within such units. If the
State, a Native Corporation, or other owner
desires to convey any such lands, the Secretary
may acquire such lands in accordance with
applicable law (including this Act), and any
such lands shall become part of the unit, and
be administered accordingly.
16 U.S.C. § 31030).
The Court need look no further than the provision’s
first sentence to resolve this dispute. State, Alaska Native,
and private property holdings located within CSUs are
not “public lands” as ANILCA defines that term. The
preceding statutory section, Section 102, defines “lands”
to mean “land, waters, and interests therein.” 16 U.S.C.
§ 3102(1). And it defines “public lands” to mean “land
situated in Alaska which, after December 2, 1980, are
Federal lands,” excluding from its ambit lands belonging
to the “State of Alaska,” “a Native Corporation,” or “lands
referred to in Section 19(b) of [ANCSA].” Jd. § 3102(8).
Because the navigable waterway at issue is not public
land as ANILCA defines that term, it is not “a portion”
of the CSU within which it is located. In other words, the
State-owned river upon which Mr. Sturgeon was using his
hovercraft is not part of the National Park System. NPS
may not manage it as though it were.
Congress wisely understood that the nonpublic status
of these lands might not prevent NPS from trying to
24
regulate them. Section 103(c)’s second sentence therefore
provides that nonpublic lands shall not be “subject to the
regulations applicable solely to public lands within such
units.” In other words, regulations (including NPS boating
regulations) that apply to the federal portions of CSUs do
not, and cannot, apply to State, Native Corporation, and
private lands within CSU boundaries.
Lastly, Section 103(c)’s third sentence sets forth the
only way such nonpublic land may become subject to NPS
management. As the statute explains, “the State, a Native
Corporation, or other owner” must “convey” the land,
which “the Secretary may acquire ... in accordance with
applicable law.” Only after the nonpublic land is conveyed
to the United States “shall [it] become part of the unit,
and be administered accordingly.”
When read together, Sections 102 and 103(c) evince
a clear intent to protect State, Native Corporation, and
private land from being managed as part of the National
Park System. Every statutory reference to nonfederal
land is phrased in protective or exclusionary terms. Such
land is excluded from the definition of “public lands” in
Section 102(3); it is excluded from the CSUs in the first
sentence of Section 103(c); it is fenced off from NPS
regulation in the second sentence of Section 103(¢); and
Section 103(c)’s third sentence ensures that it may be
administered by NPS only after it has been conveyed to
the federal government.
Section 103(c) has a mirror image in Section 906(0),
which confirms its plain meaning. Section 906(0)(1),
located in ANILCA’s chapter addressing ANCSA and the
Statehood Act, provides that ANCSA land withdrawals
25
are included in a CSU “and administered accordingly”
unless they were conveyed to a Native Corporation prior
to ANILCA’s enactment, or unless they are subsequently
conveyed to the State. 43 U.S.C. § 1635(0)(1). Section
906(0)(2) then provides that “Federal lands within the
boundaries of a conservation system unit ... shall be
administered in accordance with the laws applicable to
such unit” only “until conveyed” out of federal ownership.
Id. § 1635(0)(2). Like Section 103(c), Section 906(0)
clearly distinguishes between management of federal
and nonfederal lands. Federal lands are part of the CSU
“and administered accordingly,” while nonfederal lands
within CSU boundaries are not deemed to be included in
the CSU and are not so administered.’ Thus, ANILCA
draws a sharp distinction between federal lands, which
are subject to NPS management, and nonfederal lands,
which are not.
Indeed, it was not until Mr. Sturgeon initiated this
litigation that NPS made the argument, which the Ninth
Circuit accepted, that Section 103(c) exempts “nonfederal
land” within Alaska CSUs only from Alaska “CSU-specific
regulations.” App. 24a. According to the Ninth Circuit,
the phrase “regulations applicable solely to public lands
within such units” distinguishes between Alaska-specific
NPS regulations and nationwide NPS regulations. App.
23a-24a. The Ninth Circuit thus upheld the extension of
8. Section 907(a) likewise makes clear that nonpublic lands
within CSUs are exempt from NPS regulations applying to public
lands. That provision states that nonpublic land becomes subject to
federal management only if the owner agrees in writing. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1636(a). By implication, no agreement would be necessary if
these nonpublic lands were already subject to federal management
regulations.
26
NPS’s hovercraft ban to State-owned land because it is
not one that “applifes] solely to public lands within [CSUs]”
in Alaska. 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c). This regulation “applies to
all federal-owned lands and waters administered by NPS
nationwide, as well as all navigable waters lying within
national parks.” App. 26a.
The Ninth Circuit’s construction of Section 103(c) is
untenable. The statute does not distinguish between NPS
regulations applicable nationwide and those applicable
in Alaska CSUs. As explained above, it distinguishes
between NPS’s authority to manage “public lands within
such units” and its lack of authority to manage nonpublic
(i.e., nonfederal) lands within such units. That is the point
of Section 103(¢)’s first sentence: nonfederal lands are not
“deemed to be included as a portion of such unit” even
if they are physically located “within the boundaries of
any conservation system unit.” And that is plainly the
context in which Section 103(c)’s second sentence uses
the phrase “within such units.” See Deal v. United States,
508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (“[T]he meaning of a word cannot
be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the
context in which it is used.”).
Nor does the word “solely” limit the application of
Section 103(c). The provision does not employ “solely” to
distinguish nationwide NPS regulations from Alaska CSU-
specific regulations. It distinguishes federal regulations
applicable to both public and private lands—such as those
enforcing the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act—from
regulations “applicable solely to public lands”—such as
NPS regulations restricting boating and other activities.
See infra at 29. Put differently, “solely” emphasizes
that nonfederal lands within CSU boundaries, although
27
physically inside CSUs, are not subject to regulations
(like the hovercraft ban challenged here) that apply only
to public lands. There is no textual support for the Ninth
Circuit’s conclusion that “solely” modifies “within such
units” instead of “public lands”—the phrase immediately
following it in Section 103(c).
In sum, Section 103(c) plainly expresses Congress’s
intent. It provides that only “public lands” are part of
CSUs; that NPS may not exert regulatory control over
State, Native Corporation, and private lands located within
those CSUs; and that those lands may be administered
as part of the National Park System only if they are
later conveyed to the federal government. Because there
is no other permissible interpretation, “that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.°
9. It bears noting that ANILCA’s CSUs are not delineated
in the statute by reference to legal descriptions. Rather, Section
103, entitled “Maps,” establishes which lands are—and which lands
are not—included in ANILCA’s new or expanded CSUs. 16 U.S.C.
§ 3103. Accordingly, NPS’s claim that Section 103(c) is “a minor
technical provision,” 61 Fed. Reg. at 35,135, and that Congress
would not have “buried” a provision this important in “the ‘maps’
section of ANILCA,” Brief in Opposition 18 (quoting App. 42a),
misses the mark. Section 103(c) is in the maps section because it is
part of an enactment that was redrawing maps to create millions of
acres of CSUs. The maps section was the “natural place to locate”
a provision setting forth the regulatory regime that would apply
to the territory being allocated in those maps. Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418, 431 (2009).
28
B. Congress intended for Section 103(c) to prevent
NPS from regulating nonpublic lands in
Alaska CSUs as though they were part of the
National Park System.
“Given the straightforward statutory command” of
Section 103(c), “there is no reason to resort to legislative
history.” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997).
But there can be no serious dispute that the statute’s
“legislative history confirms what [its] language ...
compels.” Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.
Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 205 (1991). Congress’s objective in
inserting Section 103(c) into ANILCA was to ensure that
nonfederal lands newly surrounded by or adjacent to CSUs
would not be subject to NPS oversight and regulation.
Section 103(c)’s House sponsor introduced it as an
amendment to “make clear beyond any doubt that any
State, Native, or private lands, which may lie within the
outer boundaries of the conservation system unit are not
parts of that unit and are not subject to regulations which
are applied to public lands, which, in fact, are part of the
unit.” 125 Cong. Rec. 11,158 (1979) (statement of Rep.
Seiberling); see also S. Rep. No. 96-413, at 303 (Nov. 14,
1979) (“Those private lands, and those public lands, owned
by the State of Alaska ... are not to be construed as subject
to the management regulations which may be adopted to
unit which is adjacent to, or surrounds, the private or non-
Federal public lands.”). The legislative record is replete
with evidence confirming Section 103(©)’s specific purpose.
See supra at 5-10. Congress passed it to make explicit
“that only public lands (and not State or private lands) are
29
to be subject to the conservation unit regulations applying
to public lands.” 126 Cong. Rec. 30,498 (1980) (statement
of Rep. Udall).
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit erred in stating that
“the legislative history confirms that ANILCA § 103(c) did
not purport to exempt nonfederal lands within CSUs from
generally applicable federal laws and regulations like the
hovercraft ban.” App. 28a. In fact, that is the provision’s
main purpose. As Section 103(c) made clear, “the fact that
(land) is within the boundaries drawn on the map for that
conservation unit does not in any way change the status
of that State, native, or private land or make it subject to
any of the laws or regulations that pertain to U.S. public
lands, so that those inholdings are clearly not controlled
by any of the public land laws of the United States.” 125
Cong. Rec. 11,158 (1979) (statement of Rep. Seiberling).
The legislative history also undermines the Ninth
Circuit’s contorted interpretation of “solely.” As is evident
from the provision’s text, the function of “solely” in Section
103(¢) is to ensure that “Federal laws and regulations of
general applicability to both private and public lands, such
as the Clean Air Act, the Water Pollution Control Act, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers wetland regulations and other
Federal statutes of general applicability [are) applicable
to private or non-Federal public land in holdings within
[CSUs], and to such lands adjacent to [CSUs], and thus
are unaffected by the passage of the bill.” S. Rep. No. 96-
413, at 303 (1979). In contrast, there is no indication from
ANILCA’s legislative history that Congress used “solely”
to signal a distinction between Alaska CSU-specific and
nationwide NPS regulations.
30
In its rulemaking, NPS further claimed that its
revised construction of Section 103(c) was “consistent with
[ANILCA’s] underlying protective purposes: to protect
objects of ecological, cultural, geological, historical,
prehistorical, and scientific interest.” 61 Fed. Reg. at
35,135. To be sure, conservation of Alaska’s natural
resources was one of ANILCA’s purposes. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 3101(b).
But that was not Congress’s only purpose. ANILCA
also “provides adequate opportunity for satisfaction of
the economic and social needs of the State of Alaska and
its people.” 16 U.S.C. § 3101(d). For example, ANILCA
protects mining operations, see 16 U.S.C. § 3170; promotes
oil and gas development, see id. § 3142; and supports
the Alaska timber industry, see id. § 539d. NPS ignores
the “balance” the law struck. /d. § 3101(d). ANILCA’s
massive expansion of the National Park System achieved
Congress’s conservationist goal, and its restriction on
NPS authority to regulate nonfederal lands achieved
its parallel interest in safeguarding Alaska’s social and
economic welfare. Petitioner’s construction of Section
103(c) is faithful to Congress’s careful balancing of both
goals. NPS’s is not.
C. NPS’s construction of Section 103(c) is
unreasonable. ;
Even if Section 103(¢) were ambiguous, which it is
not, the hovercraft ban still would not be “based on a
permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467
U.S. at 843. NPS’s construction of Section 103(c) is at
odds with the provision’s restrictive design. The parties
may disagree over whether Section 103(c), by its terms,
31
restricts NPS’s authority broadly or narrowly; but they
agree that the point of enacting this provision was to
restrict NPS authority. Yet under NPS’s construction,
any statutory limitation on its authority is easily evaded.
All NPS would need to do is promulgate a new regulation
making a previously Alaska-specific rule applicable to
nonpublic lands nationwide and the rule would no longer
be “applicable solely” to public lands. An interpretation
of Section 103(c) that renders its restriction on NPS’s
authority “pointless” is not reasonable. Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001).
In opposing certiorari, NPS argued that this concern
is purely hypothetical unless “NPS dramatically shifts
its regulatory approach” and, therefore, “enforcement of
NPS rules on navigable waters within park boundaries
will not make NPS’s rules applicable on privately
held, state-held, or Native-held inholdings.” Brief in
Opposition 21-22. But just last month, NPS published a
notice of proposed rulemaking that would eliminate an
Alaska-specific exemption from certain nationwide oil
and gas rules, making the rules enforceable on State,
Native Corporation, and private inholdings. See General
Provisions and Non-Federal Oil and Gas Rights, 80 Fed.
Reg. 65,572, 65,573 (Oct. 26, 2015). Notably, the rulemaking
explained “that because these regulations are generally
applicable to NPS units nationwide and to non-federal
interests in those units, they are not ‘applicable solely to
public lands within [units established under ANILCA],’
and thus are not affected by section 103(c) of ANILCA.”
Id. (quoting Sturgeon v. Masica, 768 F.3d 1066, 1077-78
(9th Cir. 2014)). Accordingly, there is no need to debate
whether NPS will use its newly found power to impose
nationwide regulations on nonpublic land in Alaska CSUs.
It has already promised to do so.
32
An interpretation of Section 103(c) that leads to a
“nonsensical result” is likewise unreasonable. Paroline
v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1729 (2014). Because of
the uniqueness of Alaska’s wilderness, numerous Alaska-
specific rules differ from the nationwide rules governing
the National Park System. Alaska’s national parks, for
example, have special camping, hunting, fishing, trapping,
commercial activity, and motorized access rules. See 36
C.F.R. § 13.25 (camping); id. § 13.30 (weapons, traps,
and nets); id. § 13.40 (commercial fishing); id. § 13.176
(commercial use of cabins); id. § 13.182 (construction of
temporary facilities); id. § 13.1316 (commercial passenger
transport). According to NPS’s interpretation of Section
103(c), however, nonpublic lands located in Alaska CSUs
would never receive the benefit of these more relaxed,
Alaska-specific regulations (because they can never apply
to nonpublic land). Rather, these nonpublic lands would
have to comply with the nationwide rules that NPS itself
determined were not appropriately sensitive to Alaska’s
circumstances.
The text of Section 103(c) cannot require that if NPS
enacted an Alaska-specific rule permitting hovercraft,
then State, Alaska Native, and private lands within
those parks would, paradoxically, remain subject to the
more restrictive nationwide rule. That is the epitome of
an unreasonable construction of a federal statute. But it
would be the inevitable consequence of adopting NPS’s
and the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Section 103(c).
33
II. NPS’s Alternative Arguments Are Beyond the
Question Presented and Provide No Basis for
Affirming the Judgment Below.
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit decided
this case based on their reading of Section 103(c). The
question presented to this Court is thus limited to that
issue. At the certiorari stage, however, NPS raised
alternative arguments in an effort to sustain the extension
of its hovercraft ban to nonpublic lands. But there are good
reasons why the lower courts bypassed these arguments
in favor of an anti-textual construction of Section 103(c).
As explained below, they are all untenable.
A. Submerged lands were “conveyed” to the State
of Alaska.
NPS argued below that Section 103(c) does not apply
to submerged lands and navigable waters because they
were not “conveyed” to the State, but instead became State
land by operation of law. See App. 55a-56a Therefore, NPS
asserted, such lands and waters could be administered
as part of a CSU under Section 103(c), even though they
were not “public lands.” Jd. The Ninth Circuit “assum[ed]
(without deciding) that the waters of and land beneath the
Nation River were ‘conveyed to the State’ for purposes of
Section 103(c).” App. 26a. This assumption was correct.
The Alaska Statehood Act expressly incorporated the
Submerged Lands Act of 1953. Pub. L. 85-508, § 6(m),
72 Stat. 339, 343 (1958). “By applying the Submerged
Lands Act to Alaska through the Alaska Statehood Act,
Congress granted the State title to submerged lands.”
United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1997). This grant
34
of title to submerged lands at statehood is universally
described as a transfer of an interest in property from the
United States to the newly sovereign state. See Idaho v.
United States, 533 U.S. 263, 272 (2001) (“[TJhe default rule
is that title to land under navigable waters passes from
the United States to a newly admitted state.”); Alaska v.
Ahtna, 891 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1989) (considering
ownership of the lower thirty miles of the Gulkana River
and noting that, “[i]f navigable, title to the submerged
lands passed to Alaska at statehood”).
A transfer of title to submerged lands from the United
States to Alaska is a “conveyance” under any commonly
understood definition of the term. Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “conveyance” as “(t]he voluntary transfer of a right
or of property,” and “convey” as “[t]o transfer or deliver
(something, such as a right or property) to another, esp.
by deed or other writing; esp., to perform an act that
is intended to create one or more property interests,
regardless of whether the act is actually effective to create
those interests.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
Neither definition excludes transfers by operation of law.
Accord Tyonek Native Corp. v. Sec’y of the Interior, 836
F.2d 1237, 1241 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988) (referencing “lands
conveyed under the Alaska Statehood Act”).
Consistent with these principles, the Alaska Supreme
Court has described the transfer of submerged lands to
the states at statehood as a “conveyance.” James v. State,
950 P.2d 1130, 1138 (Alaska 1997) (“We conclude that the
tidelands and lands underlying the coastal waters of the
Tongass were conveyed to the State of Alaska at statehood
under the equal footing doctrine and the Submerged
Lands Act.”). Section 103(c)’s exemption for “lands ...
35
conveyed to the State” thus applies to submerged lands
and navigable waters.
B. State navigable waters are not “public lands.”
1. Ownership of submerged lands includes
control of the waters flowing above them.
NPS asserted below that navigable waters could
be “public lands” under ANILCA because Alaska does
not “own” water, only its submerged lands. Resp. C.A.
Br. 38-40. But this novel theory has no merit because
the definition of “lands” in Section 102(1) of ANILCA
includes “waters.” 16 U.S.C. § 3102(1). Thus, under
ANILCA, submerged lands include the waters above
them. NPS’s regulations similarly make no distinction
between ownership of “submerged lands” and ownership
of “waters.” See 36 C.F.R. §§ 34.4, 9.37, & 9.38 (purporting
to regulate “federally owned or controlled lands and
waters”); 36 C.F.R. § 13.1406 (regulating “state-owned
lands and waters”).
Furthermore, there is no legal support for
distinguishing between submerged lands and the waters
above. The Submerged Lands Act makes clear that it
inseparably grants ownership of submerged lands and
the right to manage and regulate the resources in the
waters above:
It is determined and declared to be in the
public interest that (1) title to and ownership
of the lands beneath navigable waters within
the boundaries of the respective States, and
the natural resources within such lands and
36
waters, and (2) the right and power to manage,
administer, lease, develop, and use the said
lands and natural resources all in accordance
with applicable State law be, and they are,
subject to the provisions hereof, recognized,
confirmed, established and vested in and
assigned to the respective States.
43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (emphasis added).
The Submerged Lands Act thus grants to the States
“title to and ownership of [] submerged lands and waters,”
including “the right and power to manage, administer,
lease, develop, and use them.” United States v. California,
436 U.S. 32, 40 (1978) (emphasis added) (citation and
quotation omitted); see also Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d
954, 964 (Alaska 1995) (“The Submerged Lands Act thus
gives Alaska ownership of, title to, and management power
over the following: lands beneath the navigable waters
of Alaska, the navigable waters themselves, and fish and
other marine life located in Alaska’s navigable waters.”
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
Permitting federal regulation of navigable waterways
independent of state ownership of the submerged lands
beneath would also subvert the public trust doctrine. As a
sovereign state, Alaska holds title to lands under navigable
waters in trust for the people of Alaska, so “that they may
enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry commerce over
them, and have the liberty of fishing therein.” Jllinois
Cent., 146 U.S. at 453. Accordingly, “title to the lands
10. Alaska’s constitution and law unequivocally recognize
the rights of all Alaskans to use and access water for purposes
37
under the navigable waters ... necessarily carries with
it control over the waters above them.” Jd. at 452. NPS’s
assertion that waters flowing over submerged lands may
constitute federal “public lands” under ANILCA cannot
be reconciled with this principle. There is no authority for
divorcing control of State-owned submerged lands “from
the waters above them.”
NPS’s argument also overlooks the fact that “public
lands” in ANILCA are defined not by what Alaska owns,
but by what the United States owns. ANILCA provides
that “public lands” are “lands the title to which is in
the United States.” 16 U.S.C. §§ 3102(1)-(3). NPS has at
no point demonstrated or even argued that the United
States holds “title” to the waters flowing over Alaska’s
submerged lands. For good reason: the notion of federal
“title” to water is incompatible with Alaska’s undisputed
ownership of submerged lands and control of the waters
flowing above. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1).
Finally, ANILCA itself bars NPS’s efforts to usurp
Alaska’s traditional control over navigable waters flowing
over its submerged lands. Section 1319 makes clear
that ANILCA does not “expand or diminish[{] Federal
or State jurisdiction, responsibility, interests, or rights
in water resources development or control.” 16 U.S.C.
consistent with the public trust. See, e.g., Alaska Const. art. VIII,
§ 3 (“Whether occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and
waters are reserved to the people for common use.”); Alaska
Stat. § 38.05.126(a) (“The people of the state have a constitutional
right to free access to and use of the navigable or public water of
the state.”); Alaska Stat. § 38.05.126(b) (“[TJhe state holds and
controls all navigable or public water in trust for the use of the
people of the state.”).
38
§ 3207(2). It also provides that the statute does not affect
“in any way any law governing appropriation or use of,
or Federal right to, water on lands within the State of
Alaska.” Id. § 3207(1); see also id. § 3202. In this way,
ANILCA preserves federal rights to use Alaskan waters
while expressly refraining from attempting to alter the
preexisting balance between state and federal control
over those waters.
2. No federal reserved water rights for
subsistence justify NPS extending its
jurisdiction to state submerged lands and
navigable waters.
Alternatively, NPS claimed below that it had the
authority under the Ninth Circuit’s “Katie John” decisions
to regulate Alaskan navigable waters as “public lands”
because the United States had reserved water rights
in waters flowing through Alaska CSUs to further the
conservation purposes behind ANILCA. Resp. C.A. Br.
12-13, 36-38; see Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698, 704 (9th
Cir. 1995) (“Katie John I”); Katie John v. United States,
720 F.3d 1214, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Katie John IT”).
These decisions, however, held that waters with associated
federal reserved water rights were “public lands” only
for the limited purpose of giving effect to ANILCA’s
subsistence provisions in Title VIII. See Katie John I,
72 F.3d at 702 n.9; Katie John II, 720 F.3d at 1245. Any
reserved water rights held by the government related
to subsistence provide no authority for NPS, or any
other agency, to regulate beyond subsistence issues. See
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976) (“The
implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine, however,
reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill
the purpose of the reservation, no more.”).
39
The NPS hovercraft prohibition at issue here was
adopted for reasons wholly unrelated to subsistence. It is
part of NPS’s regulations promulgated under its general
authorities, not any category of federal subsistence
regulations promulgated under Title VIII of ANILCA.
And on its face, it does not purport to manage allocation
of, or access to, subsistence resources.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the decision of the Ninth
Circuit.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM 8S. Consovoy MATTHEW T. FINDLEY
J. MICHAEL CONNOLLY Counsel of Record
Consovoy McCartTuy Eva R. GARDNER
Park PLLC ASHBURN & Mason, P.C.
3033 Wilson Boulevard 1227 W. Ninth Avenue
Suite 700 Suite 200
Arlington, VA 22201 Anchorage, AK 99501
(907) 276-4331
MICHAEL H. ParK mtf@anchorlaw.com
Consovoy McCartTuy
Park PLLC DouGLas Pope
Three Columbus Circle Pore & KaTCHER
15* Floor 421 W. First Avenue
New York, NY 10019 Suite 220
Anchorage, AK 99501
Attorneys for Petitioner
Date: November 16, 2015
APPENDIX
la
APPENDIX A — 16 U.S.C. § 3103
16 U.S.C. § 3103
§ 3103. Maps
(a) Filing and availability for inspection; discrepancies;
coastal areas
The boundary maps described in this Act shall be on
file and available for public inspection in the office of the
Secretary or the Secretary of Agriculture with regard to
the National Forest System. In the event of discrepancies
between the acreages specified in this Act and those
depicted on such maps, the maps shall be controlling,
but the boundaries of areas added to the National Park,
Wildlife Refuge and National Forest Systems shall, in
coastal areas not extend seaward beyond the mean high
tide line to include lands owned by the State of Alaska
unless the State shall have concurred in such boundary
extension and such extension is accomplished under the
notice and reporting requirements of this Act.
(b) Changes in land management status; publication
in Federal Register; filing; clerical errors; boundary
features and adjustments
As soon as practicable after December 2, 1980, a map
and legal description of each change in land management
status effected by this Act, including the National
Wilderness Preservation System, shall be published in
the Federal Register and filed with the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate,
2a
Appendix A
and each such description shall have the same force and
effect as if included in this Act: Provided, however, That
correction of clerical and typographical errors in each
such legal description and map may be made. Each such
map and legal description shall be on file and available
for public inspection in the office of the Secretary.
Whenever possible boundaries shall follow hydrographic
divides or embrace other topographic or natural features.
Following reasonable notice in writing to the Congress
of his intention to do so the Secretary and the Secretary
of Agriculture may make minor adjustments in the
boundaries of the areas added to or established by this
Act as units of National Park, Wildlife Refuge, Wild and
Scenic Rivers, National Wilderness Preservation, and
National Forest Systems and as national conservation
areas and national recreation areas. For the purposes of
this subsection, a minor boundary adjustment shall not
increase or decrease the amount of land within any such
area by more than 23,000 acres.
(c) Lands included within unit; acquisition of land by
Secretary
Only those lands within the boundaries of any conservation
system unit which are public lands (as such term is defined
in this Act) shall be deemed to be included as a portion of
such unit. No lands which, before, on, or after December 2,
1980, are conveyed to the State, to any Native Corporation,
or to any private party shall be subject to the regulations
applicable solely to public lands within such units. If the
State, a Native Corporation, or other owner desires to
convey any such lands, the Secretary may acquire such
3a
Appendix A
lands in accordance with applicable law (including this
Act), and any such lands shall become part of the unit,
and be administered accordingly.
4a
APPENDIX B — 36 C.F.R. § 1.2
36 C.F.R. § 1.2
§ 1.2 Applicability and scope.
(a) The regulations contained in this chapter apply to all
persons entering, using, visiting, or otherwise within:
(1) The boundaries of federally owned lands and
waters administered by the National Park Service;
(2) The boundaries of lands and waters
administered by the National Park Service for public-
use purposes pursuant to the terms of a written
instrument;
(3) Waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States located within the boundaries of the National
Park System, including navigable waters and areas
within their ordinary reach (up to the mean high
water line in places subject to the ebb and flow of
the tide and up to the ordinary high water mark in
other places) and without regard to the ownership of
submerged lands, tidelands, or lowlands;
(4) Lands and waters in the environs of the District
of Columbia, policed with the approval or concurrence
of the head of the agency having jurisdiction or control
over such reservations, pursuant to the provisions of
the Act of March 17, 1948 (62 Stat. 81);
(5) Other lands and waters over which the United
States holds a less-than-fee interest, to the extent
5a
Appendiz B
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the National Park
Service administered interest and compatible with
the nonfederal interest.
(b) The regulations contained in parts 1 through 5, part 7,
and part 13 of this chapter do not apply on non-federally
owned lands and waters or on Indian tribal trust lands
located within National Park System boundaries, except
as provided in paragraph (a) or in regulations specifically
written to be applicable on such lands and waters.
(c) The regulations contained in part 7 and part 13 of this
chapter are special regulations prescribed for specific
park areas. Those regulations may amend, modify, relax
or make more stringent the regulations contained in parts
1 through 5 and part 12 of this chapter.
(d) The regulations contained in parts 2 through 5, part
7, and part 13 of this section shall not be construed
to prohibit administrative activities conducted by the
National Park Service, or its agents, in accordance with
approved general management and resource management
plans, or in emergency operations involving threats to life,
property, or park resources.
(e) The regulations in this chapter are intended to treat
a mobility-impaired person using a manual or motorized
wheelchair as a pedestrian, and are not intended to
restrict the activities of such a person beyond the degree
that the activities of a pedestrian are restricted by the
same regulations.
6a
APPENDIX C — 36 C.F.R. § 2.17
36 C.F.R. § 2.17
§ 2.17 Aircraft and air delivery.
(a) The following are prohibited:
(1) Operating or using aircraft on lands or waters
other than at locations designated pursuant to special
regulations.
(2) Where a water surface is designated pursuant
to paragraph (a)(1) of this section, operating or
using aircraft under power on the water within 500
feet of locations designated as swimming beaches,
boat docks, piers, or ramps, except as otherwise
designated.
(3) Delivering or retrieving a person or object
by parachute, helicopter, or other airborne means,
except in emergencies involving public safety or
serious property loss, or pursuant to the terms and
conditions of a permit.
(b) The provisions of this section, other than paragraph (c)
of this section, shall not be applicable to official business
of the Federal government, or emergency rescues in
accordance with the directions of the superintendent, or
to landings due to circumstances beyond the control of
the operator.
(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (c)(3) of this
section, the owners of a downed aircraft shall remove the
Ta
Appendix C
aircraft and all component parts thereof in accordance
with procedures established by the superintendent. In
establishing removal procedures, the superintendent
is authorized to: (i) Establish a reasonable date by
which aircraft removal operations must be complete; (ii)
determine times and means of access to and from the
downed aircraft; and (iii) specify the manner or method
of removal.
(2) Failure to comply with procedures and
conditions established under paragraph (c)(1) of this
section is prohibited.
(3) The superintendent may waive the
requirements of paragraph (c)(1) of this section or
prohibit the removal of downed aircraft, upon a
determination that: (i) The removal of downed aircraft
would constitute an unacceptable risk to human life;
(ii) the removal of a downed aircraft would result in
extensive resource damage; or (iii) the removal of a
downed aircraft is impracticable or impossible.
(d) The use of aircraft shall be in accordance with
regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration. Such
regulations are adopted as a part of these regulations.
(e) The operation or use of hovercraft is prohibited.
(f) Violation of the terms and conditions of a permit issued
in accordance with this section is prohibited and may
result in the suspension or revocation of the permit.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.