Amicus Curiae Brief — United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.

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No. 06-562

A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER

V.

ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORPORATION, RESPONDENT

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE FORMER ADMINISTRATOR

CAROL M. BROWNER, FORMER ASSISTANT

ADMINISTRATORS DON R. CLAY, TIMOTHY FIELDS,

JR., STEVEN A. HERMAN, MARIANNE LAMONT

HORINKO, ELLIOTT P. LAWS, AND DR. J. WINSTON

PORTER, AND FORMER GENERAL COUNSELS

JONATHAN Z. CANNON AND JEAN C. NELSON OF THE

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

JOEL M. GROSS

Counsel of Record

JOSEPH S. KAKESH*

ARNOLD & PORTER LLP

555 Twelfth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 942-5000

* Admitted only in Maryland Attorneys for Amici Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE. ...............ccccccccceeeeeeeees l

BUREIGARY GP ABIUIITIIND ceccescescccsscesccssccsssccsescccessosenses 2

I. Interpreting Section 107 Contrary to

its Express Language to Preclude Claims

by Potentially Responsible Parties Would

Discourage and Delay the Cleanup of

IIE HII crsctipticniccsisinccetissininiebinicinisinsnneapnsnanamnctioniens 5

A. The Importance of Encouraging Private

Party Cleanups ...............--s-cesssssesosssssesesesceseeoees 5

B. Affirming the Court of Appeals

Decision will Get More Sites Cleaned

Up, and Cleaned Up Faster ...............ccseeceeeseeees 9

C. The Solicitor General’s Brief is

Inconsistent With EPA’s Policies

I Seciniineiiaiencthianensnritntncnemsicanesiinsnnisit 12

D. Petitioner’s Position Would

Discourage Compliance with

Administrative Cleanup Orders ................05 14

Il. Petitioner’s Position Would Allow Many

Federal PRPS to Escape Liability ...................0.......002. 15

III. Petitioner’s Position Would Result

in Increased litigation and

Transaction Costs

SEETHER EEE EHH HEE

il

IV. Providing for a Broad Right

of Recovery Under Section

107(a)(4)(b) Would Contribute to

The Overall Fairness of the

SENT icesihtincesencseiciisitinniinlaniiiiagubciicandiiaidiiniaa 19

STE TTDIT TT siceecsiissasinseridnisetcniseieiaeitaiiisuieiaeieeabintileiidadtenesaigies 21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc.,

608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 1985)... 19, 20

Comm 'r v. Engle,

a aiiicicersieccnntccitniniicianibninatinnniiani 21

Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc.,

a ee CN cerittitaciicciontitsinidtinieniatnadaeiitineitedninnnds 4

Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc.,

a kites icesdcelscnitiisinniinsdnindennineiniennens 4

Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,

UA, STi dchcslinihdteiniantasdechietipeieivinsnnicaniadaiidbiitaleianendionaii 21

Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, |

ee iiciisteciidinnnintininiepiedinininnscnnvaunees 6

Morrison Enter. v. McShares, Inc.,

GR Fleet lk ee 10

STATUTES

a IED ciscdiincienniipasenncnensnidtmmmmennntiionse 10

Be se te I sa scncctscssecistenitneanianapneinsnncescsinitipandenien 16

Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356

TUTE ixsanipsecsietunsnsadendieiiapincentescsidiiniadansiseieinandbienenninanenn 7

iV

RULES

BEI Ss Se incitnitineeciiciicniiaininiadsanenieemmmne

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

53 Fed. Reg. 51,394 (Dec. 21, 1988) ............ceeseeees

55 Fed. Reg. 8666 (Mar. 8, 1990) 00.00... ccc eeceeeceeees

4, FES 1 i; ; See eeEENT

131 Cong. Rec. H4652 (1985)... eeeeeeeeeeeeenees

ct alee I entenicticscisinininstanitcimnaeninnsininniiiiiiin

es I, Bes De GR Parcs cccnccccvinicnassnesnncsssnnsens

| eee

MISCELLANEOUS

United States Environmental Protection Agency,

Interim Guidance on Orphan Share

Compensation for Settlers of Remedial

Design/ Remedial Action and Non-Time-Critical

ee I isi csiecseiieninciianednniiinnt

Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Finance and

Hazardous Materials, (Feb. 4, 1998) (statement

Fe I PR, FO Dice ccenscecncsesnvsiemnanenintonenseaneones

wep 2

iat 8

Vv

Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,

Trade and Hazardous Materials of

the S. Comm. on Commerce (July 18, 1995)

(statement of Steven Herman).....................:00ceeeeeeeeees

EPA, Guidance on Settlements with Prospective

Purchasers of Contaminated Property (May 24,

1995), available at

http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/html-

SE INIIIE ccsicssossaconiecaseacisincontntiadibaniianameniinndenienciis )

EPA, Documentation of Reason(s) for

Not Issuing CERCLA § 106 UAOs to

All Identified PRPs (Aug. 2, 1996)...00.0... eee

Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on

Finance and Hazardous Materials

(May 12, 1999) (statement of Carol Browner) ..........

Letter from Christine Todd Whitman, EPA, to

Sen. Jeffords, Chairman S. Comm on Env’t and

. h,. Lo. 8k aan ee

Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and

Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on Energy

and Commerce (Feb. 10, 1994) (statement of

Elliott P. Laws, Ass’t Administrator).....................008

Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water

Resources and Environment of the H. Comm. on

Transp. (April 10, 1997) (statement of Steven

Herman, Ass’t Admimistrator)............cccccccceeeecseeeeeeeees

vi

Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on

Administrative Law and Governmental Relations

of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 51

EES ASE a 19-20

Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Finance and

Hazardous Materials (Mar. 5, 1998) (statement of

TT en 20

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

Amici Curiae are nine former senior officials of the

United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).

They each had substantial responsibility for administering

the Superfund program established by the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act

(“CERCLA”).’ Each amicus has a longstanding professional

expertise relevant to the question presented in this case and

to the ramifications to the Superfund program of how the

Court decides that question. -Each has a strong personal

interest in this Court's resolution of the important legal issue

raised in this case, and in the efficient, effective and fair

administration of the Superfund program so as to protect

public health and the environment throughout the United

States.

The amici include a former EPA Administrator who

had overall responsibility for all EPA programs and devoted

substantial attention to the Superfund program; two former

General Counsels who had responsibility for counseling the

Agency and its leadership on legal issues under CERCLA;

and a former Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and

Compliance Assurance who had responsibility for enforcing

CERCLA, which enforcement was a central element of the

Superfund program. The amici also consist of the last five

persons (other than the present office holder) to have served

as the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Solid Waste

and Emergency Response (“OSWER”)—-the office charged

with primary responsibility for implementing the Superfund

' The parties’ written consents to the filing of this brief are being

submitted to the Clerk of this Court. Pursuant to S.Ct. R. 37.6, amici

state that this brief was not authored, in whole or in part, by counsel for a

party, and that no monetary contribution to the preparation or submission

of this brief was made by any person or entity other than amici or their

counsel.

2

program. Collectively, these five amici led OSWER for

almost twenty years, and through four Administrations.

Amici are concerned that the position advanced by

the Solicitor General on behalf of the United States in this

case will substantially weaken the Superfund program and

will undermine crucial policies which have been lynchpins

of the program throughout its existence—encouraging

expeditious private party cleanups of contaminated sites;

applying CERCLA’s “polluter pays” principle equally to

federal agencies when they are polluters; reducing the

litigation and transaction costs of the Superfund program;

and enforcing CERCLA in a fair and equitable manner.

Amici have devoted large amounts of their time and energy

to achieving these goals, and a ruling in favor of Petitioner

will undermine that which amici have worked so hard to

accomplish.

A further description of the backgrounds of the

individual amici is set forth in an Appendix to this brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In June 1996, EPA issued a guidance document to

implement a series of reforms that then Administrator

Browner (one of the amici) had recently announced. In that

guidance document, EPA summarized three goals underlying

several of these reforms: “to provide greater fairness, reduce

litigation and transaction costs, and promote private party

cleanup of Superfund sites.” United States Environmental

Protection Agency, Interim Guidance on Orphan Share

Compensation for Settlers of Remedial Design/ Remedial

Action and Non-Time-Critical Removals (June 3, 1996), at

1. None of these three objectives were new. They all had

been articulated for years in CERCLA’s legislative history,

in Administration statements on the _ statute’s

3

implementation, and in judicial holdings on its interpretation.

But the formulation in the 1996 guidance document is useful

because each of the three purposes recognized there as

integral elements of CERCLA enforcement policy would be

substantially undermined if Petitioner’s counter-textual

interpretation of Section 107(aX4)(B) of CERCLA were

accepted by this Court: private party cleanups would be

discouraged and delayed, litigation and transaction costs

would increase, and unfairness would result.

The overarching objective of CERCLA is to facilitate

the prompt cleanup of contaminated sites around the United

States at which there have been releases of hazardous

substances, so as to protect human health and the

environment. Because the number of sites in need of

cleanup far exceeds the number of sites EPA has had the

resources to address, private party cleanups undertaken

without EPA involvement are critical to our national effort to

cleanup hazardous sites.

In enacting CERCLA in 1980, Congress recognized

_ that a statute intended to provide (as its name connotes) for

“comprehensive environmental response” could not rely

solely on government to effectuate that response. So from

day one, CERCLA has encouraged private party cleanups

by, among other things, providing for the recovery of

response costs not just by federal, state and tribal

governments, but, as indicated in Section 107(a)(4)(B), by

“any other person.” Private parties were encouraged to

undertake cleanup through the carrot of being able to recover

those costs, in whole or in part, from other parties who are

liable under CERCLA.

Petitioner argues that parties who may themselves be

liable cannot utilize the cost recovery option of Section

107(a)(4)(B). If this position were adopted, it would

4

severely undermine CERCLA’s objectives by discouraging

private parties from undertaking prompt, high-quality

cleanups of contaminated sites. It would instead encourage

those parties to delay cleanup until the government files suit,

so that they do not lose their ability to seek cost sharing from

other parties who may be liable for cleanup costs at the same

site. This would lead to unnecessary litigation, which would

both divert scarce governmental resources from more

pressing needs and increase the cost of the Superfund

process for parties who have, until now, been willing to

undertake cleanups without litigation. And the result would

compromise the overall fairness of the CERCLA liability

scheme by penalizing those who undertake cleanups

voluntarily and rewarding those who do not.

Moreover, the position advanced by Petitioner would

mean, in combination with this Court’s ruling in Cooper

Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004),

that recipients of administrative cleanun orders under Section

106 of CERCLA—orders which are key elements of the

CERCLA enforcement program—could not comply with

those orders and then seek recovery of their costs from other

liable parties. In contrast, those order recipients who refused

to comply, and who provoked a lawsuit from the

government, would have a right to recover from other liable

parties. Such a result would create irrational incentives, and

would again undermine the Agency’s ability to encourage or

obtain private party cleanups.

Finally, just as CERCLA recognizes that government

cannot be the sole solution to the challenges that CERCLA

is intended to address, it also recognizes that private parties

are not the sole source of those problems. The government,

especially the federal government, has been a major source

of the problem, and under CERCLA, it needs to be subject to

the “polluter pays” principle just like private parties. But the

5

position advanced by the United States here will put the

federal government when it is a polluter in a far better

position than private parties would be in_ similar

circumstances. In other words, the position advanced by the

United States would result in allowing some federal agencies

that have contributed to contaminated sites to escape liability

for their conduct, and in so doing improperly places the

interests of those federal agencies ahead of the interests of

EPA in enforcing CERCLA fairly and equitably as to all

responsible parties, including federal agencies.

ARGUMENT

I. INTERPRETING SECTION 107 CONTRARY

TO ITS EXPRESS LANGUAGE TO PRECLUDE

CLAIMS BY POTENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE

PARTIES WOULD DISCOURAGE AND

DELAY THE CLEANUP OF CONTAMINATED

SITES

A. The Importance of Encouraging Private -

Party Cleanups

The leaders of EPA and of its Superfund program

have long recognized the importance of promoting prompt

and effective cleanup of sites by private parties. After all,

cleanup of contaminated sites is why CERCLA exists, and

there are far more contaminated sites in the United States

than EPA will ever have the resources to address. It has

been estimated that there may be over 450,000 contaminated

commercial and industrial sites across the United States.* In

contrast, in fiscal year 2006, EPA was able to conduct or

* EPA, The Facts Speak for Themselves: A Fundamentally Different

Superfund Program (Nov. 1996), available at

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/ whatisst/sf_fact4.pdf.

6

oversee cleanup construction projects (undertaken by EPA or

PRPs) at 414 sites. EPA, Superfund Nat’! Accomplishments

Summary Fiscal Year 2006 as of Dec. 2006, available at

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/process/numbers06.ht

m.

These 414 Sites will generally be those most in need

of cleanup. But it is clear that most of the contaminated sites

in the United States will not be cleaned up by EPA or under

EPA’s supervision. Encouraging private party cleanups

without EPA involvement is therefore essential to addressing

the national inventory of contaminated sites.

Congress emphasized the importance of encouraging

private party clean’p in the initial 1980 enactment of

CERCLA by clearly providing for recovery of response costs

by private parties under Section 107(a)(4)(B). The provision

for recovery of private party cleanup costs was recognized

by this Court in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S.

809, 816 (1994).

Congress also emphasized the goal of encouraging

private party cleanup when debating the 1986 SARA

amendments. For example, Representative Lent stated: “I

am especially proud of a key groundbreaking structural

reform that will encourage responsible parties to come

forward and take responsibility for cleaning up the toxic

waste sites they helped create.” 131 Cong. Rec. H4652

(1985). During Congressional hearings on the SARA

amendments, Assistant Attorney -General Habicht also

articulated the importance of encouraging private party

cleanups and encouraging persons to undertake cleanup

without an EPA enforcement lawsuit: “As the Government's

goals in this enforcement process become clear, we’re

confident that the reasonable parties around the country, who

have already demonstrated a recognition of what the rules

7

are and what the goals of the Government are, will come

forward and will become participants in the cleanup

process.” Reauthorization of Superfund: Hearings Before

the Subcomm. on Water Res. of the H. Comm. on Public

Works and Transp., 99th Cong. 549 (1985).

Congress recently reemphasized the goal of

encouraging private party cleanup when it passed the Small

Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization

Act. See Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002). These

amendments to CERCLA sought, among other things, to

stimulate voluntary cleanup programs at the state and local

level by providing grants to facilitate private party cleanup of

so called “brownfield” sites, contaminated properties with

the potential for productive reuse and development. /d. §

211. The Senate committee report accompanying this

legislation recognized the significance of voluntary cleanup

to the overall contaminated property problem, observing that

“(t]he vast majority of contaminated sites across the Nation

will not be cleaned up by the Superfund program.” S. Rep.

No. 107-2, at 15 (2001).

That same Senate committee report referred with

approval to existing EPA policy for reaching Memoranda of

Agreement (“MOA”) with states on voluntary cleanup

programs. /d. In 1997 guidance on drafting MOA with

states, EPA clearly indicated its belief that the availability of

contribution under CERCLA was an important component of

voluntary cleanup programs. See Notice of Availability of

Final Draft Guidance for Developing Superfund Memoranda

of Agreement (MOA) Language Concerning State Voluntary

Cleanup Programs, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,495 (Sept. 9, 1997).

That guidance reflected EPA’s position that a private party

taking action under a state voluntary cleanup program can

bring a claim against other liable parties as long as cleanup

complied with the National Contingency Plan (“NCP”): “The

8

MOA should make clear to any private party that recovery of

response costs under CERCLA will require that the cleanup

action meet the requirements outlined in the National

Contingency Plan.” Jd. at 47,499.

As this EPA guidance indicates, a broad right of

recovery from other liable parties is essential for

encouraging safe and effective private party cleanups. This

concept was not new in 1997. The necessity of a broad right

of recovery was emphasized when President Reagan

transmitted his administration’s proposed Superfund

amendment bill, a precursor to SARA, to Congress in 1985.

In the explanatory material accompanying the bill, it was

acknowledged that “[p]rivate parties may be more willing to

assume the financial responsibility for cleanup if they are

assured that they can seek contribution from other”

responsible parties. H.R. Doc. No. 99-32, at 73 (1985).

The encouragement of private party cleanups has

been one of the great successes of the Superfund program.

When reporting on the status of Superfund in 1998, then

Acting Assistant Administrator Timothy Fields, Jr. (one of

the am’ci) stated that “responsible parties are performing or

funding approximately 75% of Superfund long-term

cleanups, saving taxpayers more than $12 billion to date.”

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous

Materials, (Feb. 4, 1998) (statement of Timothy Fields, Jr.),

available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/congress/

test0204.htm. Similarly, then Assistant Administrator

Steven A. Herman (another of the amici) emphasized that

“responsible parties play a vital, and in our view,

irreplaceable role in cleaning up the nation’s Superfund

sites.” Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade

and Hazardous Materials of the S$. Comm. on Commerce

(July 18, 1995) (statement of Steven A. Herman).

9

B. Affirming the Court of Appeals Decision

will Get More Sites Cleaned Up, and

Cleaned Up Faster

There are many reasons that a private party would

undertake a voluntary cleanup of a contaminated site: the

party knows it is liable for some part of the contamination

and desires to promptly reduce risks to human health or the

environment; the party desires to conduct the cleanup before

the situation is exacerbated by contaminant migration or the

passage of time; the party desires to avoid liabilities to third

parties who may be affected by migrating contamination; or

the party wants to take advantage of incentives available for

participation in a State voluntary cleanup program. All of

these reasons support CERCLA’s ultimate goal of achieving

prompt cleanup. Yet in all of these situations, the party

undertaking cleanup would, in Petitioner’s view, have no

ability to recover its costs from other liable parties under

CERCLA.

—

The inevitable result of adopting Petitioner’s position

would be that fewer parties would undertake voluntary

cleanups. The party considering such a cleanup may have

been only a small contributor to the problems at the site, or

may have had only technical liability as the present site

owner without having contributed to the contamination at

all.’ Yet despite the fact that there may be other clearly

liable and viable parties from whom the cleanup costs could

be sought, under Petitioner’s view the party actually doing

the cleanup has no ability to sue those other parties. The

* Present owners of contaminated sites are often liable for those sites

even if their actions did not contribute to the contamination in any way.

While there are defenses to liability available for some owners of

contaminated property, those defenses are not always viable, even for

owners who have done nothing to contribute to the contamination.

10

entire cost of the cleanup will fall on the party who

voluntarily remediates the site, and the other parties can

escape responsibility altogether. In such a situation,

whatever incentives there may be for a private party to

undertake cleanup will have to be weighed against the

disincentive of losing any ability to get other liable parties to

share in the cleanup costs. And in that balance, the big loser

is likely to be prompt cleanups. In a world where “no good

deed goes unpunished,” there will be fewer good deeds,

which translates here to fewer voluntary cleanups. If

Petitioner prevails, the net effect will be that there will be

more contaminated sites in the United States than if

Respondent prevails.

Such a result would also have a devastating effect on

the formal voluntary cleanup programs that many states have

adopted with encouragement from EPA. EPA has long

made it clear that parties participating in such programs

should be able to seek recovery of costs from other liable

parties under CERCLA. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8792-93

(Mar. 8, 1990) (“EPA believes that it is important to

encourage private parties to perform voluntary cleanups of

sites, and to remove unnecessary obstacles to their ability to

recover their costs from the parties that are liable for the

contamination.”). If it tums out that EPA was wrong in

holding out the hope of cost recovery for those who do

voluntary cleanups, the cleanup programs will be sorely

damaged.

Not only is the potential availability of cost sharing

an important incentive for private parties to conduct

cleanups, it is also a powerful incentive for them to conduct

good and thorough cleanups. CERCLA provides that a

private party can only recover response costs that are

“consistent with the national contingency plan.” 42 U.S.C. §

9607(a)(4)(B); see also Morrison Enter. v. McShares, Inc.,

11

302 F.3d 1127, 1135-36 (10th Cir. 2002). The NCP is part

of CERCLA's implementing regulations, and it contains

detailed requirements for how cleanups are to be conducted.

See 40 C.F.R. part 300. A party that knows it will have to

demonstrate compliance with the NCP to recover its costs

from other liable parties has a strong incentive to conform to

the NCP, which helps ensure that the cleanup is fully

protective of human health and the environment. A party

that knows it cannot recover its costs under CERCLA will

not have the same incentive to comply with the NCP.

In 1988, EPA recognized this incentive and proposed

revisions to the NCP that were intended to make it easier for

a private party undertaking cleanup to know how to comply

with the NCP. EPA stated “that providing a list of

requirements to be complied with in order to be consistent

with the NCP will enhance the probability of a successful

cost recovery action, thus providing an incentive to other

persons to undertake response actions.” 53 Fed. Reg.

51,394, 51,462 (Dec. 21, 1988). In 1990, EPA amended the

NCP, adding a new Subpart H to describe how private

parties seeking to undertake cleanups should document their

costs so that they could recover them from other liable

parties. EPA stated that “it is important to encourage private

parties to perform voluntary cleanups of sites, and to remove

unnecessary obstacles to their ability to recover their costs

from the parties that are liable for the contamination.” 55

Fed. Reg. 8666, 8792-93 (Mar. 8, 1990) .*

* The provisions added by EPA to the NCP make abundantly clear that

in EPA’s view, Section 107(a)(4)(B) can be utilized by persons who

themselves have CERCLA liability. This can be seen in two ways.

First, 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c) provides:

12

C. The Solicitor General’s Brief is

Inconsistent With EPA’s Policies and

Judgment

The United States’ brief disparages the importance of

voluntary cleanups not done pursuant to settlements with the

FN 4 continued from previous page

(1) Responsible parties shall be liable for all response costs incurred by

the United States government or a state or an Indian tribe not inconsistent

with the NCP.

2) Responsible parties shall be liable for necessary costs of response

actions to releases of hazardous substances incurred by any other person

consistent with the NCP.

Petitioner argues that the phrase “any other person” in Section

107(a)(4)(B) means any person not listed as liable in that section. But

the phrase “any other person” in Section 300.700(c)(2) must mean any

person other than the United States, a state or a tribe, because the

CERCLA liable parties are not enumerated in the regulation (as they are

in the statute). Even more compelling is that Section 300.700(c)(3)

provides that:

For the purpose of cost recovery under section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA:

(ii) Any response action carried out in compliance with the terms of an

order issued by EPA pursuant to section 106 of CERCLA, or a consent

decree entered into pursuant to section 122 of CERCLA, will be

considered “consistent with the NCP.”

Clearly, a party that receives a Section 106 Order or enters into a consent

decree with EPA would be presumed to be liable under Section 107. But

the NCP makes clear that such parties can still sue under Section

107(a)(4)(B).

13

government. It asserts that “there is little evidence that, in

enacting CERCLA and SARA, Congress intended to

promote unsupervised cleanups at the expense of

government-supervised cleanups pursuant to settlement.”

U.S. Brief at 39. The United States’ brief further asserts that

all a party seeking to do a voluntary cleanup and preserve its

right to cost sharing from other parties needs to do is enter

into a settlement with EPA. It argues: “Moreover, to the

extent that a property owner . . . wishes to recover some of

its costs from other PRPs, the property owner need only

enter into a settlement with the federal or state government.”

Id. at 43.

These statements are at odds with the practical

realities of how CERCLA is administered. Certainly

settlements with PRPs are important tools, and preferable to

contentious litigation. That is beyond dispute. But the

process of negotiating and administering settlements is a

complex and costly one. Each settlement that EPA enters

into requires assembling and analyzing available data and

other information, and determining the nature of the remedial

work that should be implemented. And once it enters into

such a settlement, EPA has an obligation to make sure that

the settlement terms are complied with. All of this requires

resources, and, were settlements the only gateway for parties

wishing to undertake cleanups to be able to obtain cost

recovery from other parties, far more resources than EPA

and the Superfund program have. For example,-parties

considering acquiring contaminated properties have often

sought to enter into settlements with EPA, called Prospective

Purchaser Agreements. But EPA’s guidance for such

agreements has limited their availability to cases where “an

EPA action at the facility has been taken, is ongoing or Is

anticipated to be undertaken by the Agency.” EPA,

Guidance on Settlements with Prospective Purchasers of

Contaminated Property (May 24, 1995), available at

14

http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/html-doc/purchase.htm.

This requirement was intended to preserve EPA’s “limited

resources.” -

And disparaging the value of voluntary cleanups

undertaken without a settlement with the government is not

justified. As discussed above, the potential availability of a

cost recovery remedy and the corresponding requirement to

comply with the National Contingency Plan will incentivize

the quality and promptness of such cleanups. In other words,

the experience and judgment of EPA has been that it is

worthwhile and environmentally beneficial to encourage

voluntary cleanups done without settlements, and that

requiring settlements as a prerequisite to cost recovery in all

cases would be a waste of scarce governmental resources. It

is unfortunate that the Solicitor General would take a

position, in a case in which the United States is a party

because it is a PRP, that is at odds with EPA’s often repeated

judgment on these issues.”

D. Petitioner’s Position Would Discourage

Compliance with Administrative

Cleanup Orders

Section 106 of CERCLA allows EPA to issue orders

to liable parties to undertake cleanup. This is a powerful

tool, and one that EPA uses frequently. EPA guidance

encourages the use of such orders so that liable parties and

not EPA will undertake cleanup. EPA guidance also

encourages the issuance of such orders to a subset of all the

liable parties at a site, based on an assertion of joint and

* We note in this regard that the name of EPA’s General Counsel does

not appear on the Solicitor General's Brief here as it did, for example, on

the Solicitor General’s brief in Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy,

No. 05-848 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007).

15

several liability, so that enforcement of the order by EPA

will be manageable. See EPA, Documentation of Reason(s)

for Not Issuing CERCLA § 106 UAOs to All Identified

PRPs (Aug. 2, 1996), available at http://www.epa.gov/

compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/reason-

cer106-rpt.pdf. What happens, then, if there are 60 liable

parties at a site, EPA issues a cleanup order to 30 of those,

and only 10 of those agree to comply with the order and in

fact undertake the entire cleanup? Can those 10 sue the 20

non-compliers and the 30 non-recipients to require them to

share in the costs?

Under the Court’s decision in Cooper Industries, it is

unlikely that the administrative order would be considered a

civil action to give rise to a contribution claim under Section

113(f). Thus, the order recipients’ ability to recover from the

non-compliers or non-recipients will turn on whether they

have a claim under Section 107(a)(4)(B). EPA’s regulations

and guidance have assumed that the compliers would be able

to seek cost sharing from other liable parties. But if that is

incorrect, and the Section 107 remedy is not available, there

will be an incentive to order recipients to not comply with

the order until they are sued. Such a party would run the nisk

of sanctions for its failure to comply, but that threat may be

outweighed by the fear of losing any ability to pursue other

liable parties. Again, the position advocated by the Solicitor

General here would punish PRPs who do the nght thing

(comply with an order) and reward those who do not (and

disobey the order).

Il. PETITIONER’S POSITION WOULD ALLOW

MANY FEDERAL PRPS TO ESCAPE

LIABILITY

Another important objective of CERCLA is to ensure

that federal government PRPs are treated the same as private

16

PRPs, and are responsible for cleaning up the contamination

they created. This concept is explicitly set forth in the

statute itself. Section 120(a) provides:

Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the

United States (including the executive, legislative,

and judicial branches of government) shall be subject

to, and comply with, this chapter in the same manner

and to the same extent, both procedurally and

substantively, as any nongovernmental entity,

including liability under section 9607 of this title.

42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1).

EPA officials have often emphasized the importance

of applying CERCLA consistently to federal PRPs. For

example, Administrator Browner emphasized _ that

“Superfund is . . . dedicated to cleaning up our nation’s

hazardous waste sites, including those caused by the

Federal government, and protecting public health and the

environment for citizens no matter where they live in our

country.” Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Finance and

Hazardous Materials (May 12, 1999) (statement of Carol

Browner) (emphasis added), available at

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/congress/05-|2-

99 htm. Similarly, in 2001 Administrator Whitman

expressed EPA’s continued commitment “to a level playing

ficld between Federal agencies and departments and the

private sector. Americans rightfully expect their government

to abide by the same environmental laws and standards as

private business.” Letter from Christine Todd Whitman,

EPA, to Sen. Jeffords, Chairman S. Comm on Env’t and Pub.

Works (Oct. 4, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/

compliance/resources/policies/civil/federal/letterwhitman.pdf

17

But this goal of consistent treatment has been

difficult to obtain, because EPA has not been able to sue

other parts of the Executive Branch in court and has rarely

been able to even issue administrative orders to federal

PRPs. Thus, the ability to bring federal PRPs into the

process is often dependent on the ability of other PRPs to sue

federal PRPs. In light of Cooper Industries, private PRPs

have seized upon Section 107(a)(4)(B) as a possible method

for forcing federal PRPs into the process. If that method is

also foreclosed, the ability to hold federal agency PRPs

accountable will be severely diminished, and such PRPs may

become a special class with a new de facto sovereign

immunity of the type Congress had explicitly precluded in

Section 120.°

Iti. PETITIONER’S POSITION WOULD RESULT

IN INCREASED LITIGATION AND

TRANSACTION COSTS

One of the most prevalent criticisms of the Superfund

program over the years has been that it is perceived to be

“laden with transaction costs, particularly attorneys fees.”

Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and Hazardous

Materials of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Feb.

10, 1994) (statement of Elliott P. Laws, Ass’t

Administrator). Mr. Laws (one of the amici) noted that “any

change that increases the transaction costs resulting from

* In making this point, we in no way intenc to disparage the great efforts

that federal agencies have made to clean up properties they have owned

and operated or otherwise are responsible for. Amici worked closely and

cooperatively while at EPA with many federal agencies to address their

CERCLA cleanup obligations. Our point is that were the Court to adopt

the position urged by the Solicitor General. it would inject both an

unfairness and the perception of unfairness in the respective treatment of

federal and private PRPs, and that would adversely effect the overall

CERCLA program.

18

public and private litigation is equally unacceptable.”

Similarly, then Assistant Administrator Steven Herman

noted during testimony before Congress the importance to

EPA of “ensuring that [PRP] dollars are spent on the actual

cleanup costs and not extensive legal costs.” Hearings

Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources and Environment

of the H. Comm. on Transp. (April 10, 1997) (statement of

Steven Herman, Ass’t Administrator), available at

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/congress/clrtest.htm.

While some measure of litigation is unavoidable in a

program such as that created by CERCLA, which imposes a

broad and substantial liability scheme, EPA leaders have

long and consistently sought to adopt policies that reduce the

amount of litigation required to implement the Superfund

program, and with the reduction in litigation, the amount of

money being spent on things other than site cleanup. The

position advocated by the United States here would run

directly contrary to this important objective, in a number of

ways.

First, a party contemplating a voluntary cleanup will

be incentivized to wait until it has been sued by the

government before undertaking that cleanup, so it will be

able to seek a cost sharing from other liable parties under

Section 113(f). In contrast, if the Court affirms a broad right

of recovery under Section 107(a)(4)(B), a right that extends

to parties themselves liable, anyone can undertake a

voluntary cleanup and still seek cost sharing from other

parties.

Second, a party that receives a Section 106 cleanup

order would, if the United States prevails here, have an

incentive to delay compliance with that order until it is sued,

sO as to ensure a cost sharing remedy. But a broad Section

19

107(a)(4)(B) nght would encourage prompt compliance with

such orders without the need for litigation.

Third, were the Court to adopt the United States’

position here, it would result in still more litigation over

which types of agreements with the government qualify the

settler as a “person who has resolved its liability to the

United States or a State for some or all of the costs of such

action in an administratively or judicially approved

settlement” and therefore entitled to contribution under

Section 113(f)(3)(B). Following Cooper Industries, there

has already been much litigation over this issue, and that

litigation will continue if Petitioner prevails here. But if

Respondent prevails, and a broad and clear right of recovery

under Section 107(a)(4)(B) is established, the Section

1 13(f)(3)(B) issue will largely be moot, and there will not be

the need for case by case adjudications over whether a

settlement falls within the scope of Section 113(f)(3)(B).

IV. PROVIDING FOR'A BROAD RIGHT OF

RECOVERY UNDER SECTION 107(A)(4)(B)

WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE OVERALL

FAIRNESS OF THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM

Recognizing that the strict’ liability scheme

established by CERCLA can impose broad liability on

persons who did nothing that was wrong at the time they did

it, and that application of principles of joint and several

liability has the potential to impose disproportionate liability

on certain PRPs, the leaders of the Superfund program at

EPA have long and consistently sought to maximize the

fairness of the program consistent with the goal of prompt

site cleanups.

In Congressional testimony, Assistant Attorney

General Habicht elaborated on the centrality of contribution

20

rights to CERCLA’s fairness, stating very simply: “(t]he

fairness of a joint and several liability scheme depends upon

the clear availability of contribution.” Oversight Hearings

Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and

Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,

99th Cong. 51 (1985).

° Similarly, the cases interpreting CERCLA have long

recognized the importance of contribution to the fairness of a

joint and several liability scheme. For example, in Colorado

v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 1985), a case

that preceded the 1986 Amendments to CERCLA that added

Section 113(f), the district court found that there was a nght

to contribution under CERCLA and such a right was

essential to the fairness of the liability scheme created. The

court cited Dean Prosser’s statement that “contribution is an

integral component of joint and several liability.” /d. at 1490

(quoting Prosser, Law of Torts § 50 (4th ed. 1982)). The

court in ASARCO also cited this Court’s recognition of the

fairness of allowing contribution among parties who have

joint and several liability. /d. (citing Northwest Airlines, Inc.

v. Transport Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77,

86-87 (1981)).

Insuring that Superfund is implemented in fair

manner has, as discussed above, remained a priority of

EPA’s leadership in implementing the statute. For example,

in March 1998 Congressional testimony Administrator

Browner emphasized how “EPA has addressed concerns

about the fairness of Superfund.” Hearings Before the H.

Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous Materials (Mar. 5,

1998) (statement of Carol Browner), available at

http://www.epa.gov/ocir/hearings/testimony/105_1997_ 1998

/030598.htm.

21

Confirming a broad right of private party cost

recovery under Section 107(a)(4)(B) will enhance the overall

fairness of the Superfund program. It is fair that parties who

perform cleanups without the need for litigation, the type of

conduct that should be rewarded and not punished, have the

ability to obtain cost sharing from other liable parties who

refused or otherwise did not participate in the cleanup. And

it is fair that those parties who choose to comply with a

Section 106 Order issued by EPA have the ability to obtain

cost sharing from those parties who refuse to comply with

such orders or those parties who are not named in the order

by EPA. Conversely, telling parties who receive Section

106 orders that they must comply, but may not pursue those

who do not, would be manifestly unfair.

We do not mean to suggest that the courts can or

should rewrite clear statutory language to achieve the

programmatic and policy objectives we have discussed. But

where the statutory language is best read, as it is here, as

providing for a right that achieves those objectives, the

courts should hesitate to achieve a result that is at odds with

both the statutory language and the goals that the statute was

enacted to achieve. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Engle, 464 U.S.

206, 217 (1984) (“Our duty then is ‘to find that interpretation

which can most fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute,

in the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and

with the general purposes that Congress manifested.’’)

(citation omitted); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458

U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (“It is true that interpretations of a

statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided

if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative

purpose are available.”); Dickerson v. New Banner Institute,

Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 118 (1983) (“As in all cases of statutory

construction, our task is to interpret the words of the statute

in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve.”’) (citation

and quotation marks omitted). z

22

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, and by the other amici

supporting Respondent, the judgment of the court of appeals

should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Joel M. Gross

Counsel of Record

Joseph S. Kakesh*

ARNOLD & PORTER LLP

555 12" Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 942-5705

Counsel for Amici Curiae

April 5, 2007

*Joseph S. Kakesh is admitted only in Maryland. “He is

currently under the supervision of principals of the firm who

are members in good standing of the D.C. Bar, pending

approval of application for admission to the D.C. Bar.

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX

Description of Amici Curiae

Carol M. Browner was appointed by President Clinton to

be the Administrator of the United States Environmental

Protection Agency and was confirmed by the United

States Senate in January, 1993. She served in the position

for eight years, longer than any other EPA Administrator.

Prior to her appointment to EPA, Ms. Browner served as

Secretary of the Environment for the State of Florida.

Jonathan Z. Cannon served as the Acting General Counsel

of the United States Environmental Protection Agency

from 1995 to 1998 and as the Assistant Administrator for

Administration and Resource Management for the Agency

from 1993 to 1995. He was appointed to the latter

position by President Clinton and confirmed by the United

States Senate. Mr. Cannon also served as the Acting

Assistant Administrator of the Office of Solid Waste and

Emergency Response from March to November 1989 and

as the Acting Deputy Administrator of EPA from March

to May 1993.

Don R. Clay served as the Assistant Administrator for the

Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response of the

United States Environmental Protection Agency from

1989 to 1993. Mr. Clay was appointed to that position by

President George H.W. Bush and confirmed by the

United States Senate. Prior to that, Mr. Clay served as

Deputy Assistant Administrator of the Office of Air and

Radiation from 1986 to 1989, as Acting Assistant

Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances from

A-2

1985-86, and Director of the Office of Toxic Substances

from 1981 to 1985.

Timothy Fields, Jr. served as the Assistant Administrator

for the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response of

the United States Environmental Protection Agency from

~ 1999 to 2001. Mr. Fields was appointed to that position

by President Clinton and confirmed by the United States

Senate. Prior to that, Mr. Fields served as the Acting

Assistant Administrator for the Office of Solid Waste and

Emergency Response from 1997 to 1999, and the

Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of

Solid Waste and Emergency Response from 1994 to 1997.

During his thirty year career at EPA, Mr. Fields also

served as Director of the Superfund Revitalization Office;

as Deputy Director of the Office of Emergency and

Remedial Response; as Director of the Emergency

Response Division; and as and Deputy Director of the

Hazardous Site Control Division.

Steven A. Herman served as the Assistant Administrator

for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance of the United

States Environmental Protection Agency from 1993 to

2001. Mr. Herman was appointed to that position by

President Clinton and confirmed by the United States

Senate.

Marianne Lamont Horinko was named Acting Administrator

of the United States Environmental Protection Agency by

President George W. Bush on July 10, 2003, and served in

this position from July 14, 2003 until November 5, 2003.

She also served as Assistant Administrator for the Office of

Solid Waste and Emergency Response from October 2001 to

June 2004 (except for the time during which she was Acting ©

A-3

Administrator). Ms. Horinko was appointed to that position

by President George W. Bush and confirmed by the United

States Senate.

Elliott P. Laws served as the Assistant Administrator for the

Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response of the

United States Environmental Protection Agency from 1993

to 1997. Mr. Laws was appointed to that position by

President Clinton and confirmed by the United States Senate.

Jean C. Nelson served as General Counsel of the United

States Environmental Protection Agency from 1993 to 1995.

Ms. Nelson was appointed to that position by President

Clinton and confirmed by the United States Senate.

Dr. J. Winston Porter served as the Assistant Administrator

for Solid Waste and Emergency Response of the United

States Environmental Protection Agency from 1985 to 1989.

Dr. Porter was appointed to that position by President

Reagan and confirmed by the United States Senate.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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