Respondents Brief — Environmental Protection Agency v. Defenders of Wildlife

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i OFFICE OF "HE CLERK 1

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

°

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

OF HOME BUILDERS, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vs.

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, et a/.,

Respondents.

Sd

UNITED STATES

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Petitioners,

Vs.

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, ef a/.,

Respondents.

e

On Writs Of Certiorari To The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

Sd

OPENING BRIEF OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

@—

TERRY GODDARD

Arizona Attorney General

Mary O'GRADY

Solicitor General

PAULA BICKETT

Counsel of Record

Chief Counsel. Civil Appeals

JAMES T. SKAKDON

Assistant Attorney General

1275 West Washington

Phoenix, Arizona S5007

(602) 542-3333

Counsel for State of Arizona

ALP LAW BRIER PRENTING ¢

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Spe-

cies Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), which requires each

federal agency to insure that its actions do not jeopardize

the continued existence of any endangered or threatened

species or modify its critical habitat, impliedly repealed

the Environmental Protection Agency’s obligation to

transfer its pollution permitting authority to Arizona

under Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(b).

2. Whether the court of appeals correctly held that

the Environmental Protection Agency’s decision to transfer

- permitting authority to Arizona under the Clean Water Act

was arbitrary and capricious because it was based on

inconsistent interpretations of Section 7(a)(2) of the

Endangered Species Act; and if so, whether the court of

appeals should have remanded to the Environmental

Protection Agency for further proceedings without ruling

on the interpretation of Section 7(a)(2).

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The State of Arizona filed a brief in support of the

petition for writ of certiorari and was an intervenor in the

court of appeals.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) is a Petitioner in this Court and was a respondent

in the court of appeals. The National Association of Home

Builders, Southern Arizona Home Builders Association,

Home Builders Association of Central Arizona, Arizona

Chamber of Commerce, Arizona Mining Association,

Arizona Association of Industries, Greater Phoenix Cham-

ber of Commerce, and American Forest & Paper Associa-

tion (collectively referred to as Home Builders or NAHB)

are also Petitioners in this Court and were intervenors in

the court of appeals.

The following parties are Respondents in this Court

and were petitioners in the court of appeals: Defenders of

Wildlife, Center for Biological Diversity, and Craig Miller.

in

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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TITIES CII scisischsdapsslisnibenciodiianiehiianieshdeaigudabnciieiseainimdisiaindioaete 1

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a 1

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Ba | RI I acihccicacicicsiscsiiciliicttletebtbchntnsichaiineiase 3

es: PI MEIN i ainucinciscrtnsisisicntacetiilianbdticciimpeniaitinninnni 7

I I II sisitititcescntcienissniniinciiniininiiiteininatinanin 10

ITE scncidincacnccnnciianiniipeitichiighibaceiiicuidemiaiaaadgunianttains 11

I. The EPA’s Decision to Transfer Pollution

Permitting Authority to Arizona Was Legally

a

A. The EPA Must Transfer Permitting Au-

thority to a State Permitting Program that

Meets the Requirements of Section 402(b)

of the Clean Water Act. ........cscesssescsssseseseeses

B. Neither the Language nor the Purpose of

the Endangered Species Act Supports the

Majority Apparent Conclusion that the

Endangered Species Act Impliedly Re-

pealed Congress’s Mandate in Section

402(b) of the Clean Water Act ...............0000

1. Congress did not intend for the Endan-

gered Species Act to modify Section

402(b) of the Clean Water Act................

11

1]

13

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

2. Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Spe-

cies Act can be easily reconciled with

Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act.... 20

Il. Because the EPA Was Required to Approve

Arizona’s Pollution Permitting Program Under

the Clean Water Act, Its Approval Was Legally

Correct Regardless of Its Interpretation of Sec-

tion 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act........ 22

A. The Court of Appeals Should Have Upheld

the EPA’s Approval Because It Was Le-

ET GI cncnccgitesesouenticinttaeseninincenenenmeeeen 22

B. The Court Should Not Remand to the EPA

Because Remand Is Futile and Detrimen-

tal to the States’ Interests .00..........cccceeeee seen 24

REET AF ILE POTTER) ORE PE PS EE FT Pa 26

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Am. Forest and Paper Ass’n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291

(Bide Cle, BBD a ccressosesccccscesssssiniscssnsnsennianmiaain 12, 21

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ........ccecseseseseesseeeeees 20

Citizens for a Better Env’t v. EPA, 596 F.2d 720 (7th

CEe, FIFO nccccsecccsnscsccsicosonsssovesessinseennncninnianaianaale 13

Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541

CB, TE COD occccccscascccesesccscsessisureenssiotnamaaiiaman 10

EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control

Bd. , 49B US. BOO (IGF) ncccosccccccccrsesccsssscsonesnssdncssesssocene 12

Ground Zero Ctr. For Non-Violent Action v. U.S.

Dep't of the Navy, 383 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2004) .......... 21

Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir.

BIDE .ccccacscnctecssestesesssinsvonnesnasecsssesnnnimiiaiiaaa 21

Matsushita Elec. Indus’l Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516

OTB, BOF (GD nceccncnsscccsissncncsscnnnsstecsetcepsiiansneadsaaaanaa 14

Milk Transport v. ICC, 190 F. Supp. 350 (D. Minn.

BBG) ccccsccascccscessesesctccssssesontcnssocdeesonssenetionnesiasennnanal 23

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)... eee eseee nee ee 14

Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156

(DD.G. Che. Ba nceccexccsessonsssscncnenincsestesianimamammanan 12

N.C. Comm’n of Indian Affairs v. U.S. Dep't of ~

Labor, 725 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1984) ..........ccccceessessseeenees 23

Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat

Maint. Trust v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n,

O63 F.8d 27 (D.C. Cie. 29GB) nccirccccscescesccsccssosccscnssssncsasases 21

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497 (1936) ............. 14

Ry. Executives’ Ass’n v. ICC, 784 F.2d 959 (9th Cir.

EE 23

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943)............. 22, 23, 24

Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978)......... 13

Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502 (9th Cir. 1995)........ 21

Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gyne-

cologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) ....cccc.sescsssesscssessssneceseeeees 24

Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988)..............cccceeeeeees 14

TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).............cccccsssrcrrsesseees 14, 18

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-

205, § 7, 87 Stat. 884, 892 (1973)...........cecccessseseeeeenees 15

Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub.

L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3'752Z.........ccccccrcoscccscersesserees 15

Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1979, Pub.

L. No. 96-159, § 4, 93 Stat. 1226...............ccccsssssercceeseees 16

Endangered Species Act, § 7 ...........:cccccccseeseeeeeeeeeeees passim

Endangered Species Act, §7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C.

ainda sitirenansnemetiien 15, 16, 17

Endangered Species Act, §7(aX(2), 16 U.S.C.

I TTTTiistiiiericindihertiienieideensinagncummnnennaneanennannnenteets passim

Clean Water Act, § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)......... passim

I rin arene nmanennnennnennnnnnneteen 12

Et EEE TID ccccnnsncsnccsensceccensvenenennanammneutencones 7

vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

ts Ob ED sitiesittintictintnccemnnstepccmmpninasinaintinnninnsné 1

es ee cacianicieendeencccniecnenctrennnniinininnssinensasiiiaiioniinia 9, 20

et We ED iisinacistinteisaisiiciniencieaspiesnnemssidniantinnninindunnniiitii 20

68 Fed. Reg. 39087, 39089 (July 1, 2003)... cece eeeeees 5

Rs ee ee Oe eititnticcnccinripaininitnineniivisbininanininnaen 3

A.A.C. R18-9-A901 — R18-9-1015...... eee ee ee een 3

OTHER AUTHORITIES

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1804 at 18 (1978)......cccccecesseeeseees 16

1 2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit is reported at 420 F.3d 946 (9th Cir.

2005), and is reprinted at Petitioners National Association

of Home Builders’ Appendix (NAHB Pet. App.) at 1-68. The

denial of rehearing en banc and Judge Kozinski’s dissent

from that denial, which was joined by Judges O’Scannlain,

Kleinfeld, Tallman, Callahan, and Bea, is reported at 450

F.3d 394 (9th Cir. 2006), and is reprinted at NAHB Pet.

App. 134-158.

¢

JURISDICTION

Respondents petitioned the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to review EPA’s decision to

transfer its pollution permitting authority to Arizona under

33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1). The court of appeals issued its

judgment and opinion on August 22, 2005, and denied

rehearing en banc on June 8, 2006. Home Builders filed a

Petition for Writ of Certiorari on September 6, 2006. Ari-

zona filed its Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certio-

rari on September 26, 2006. After receiving extensions of

time from Justice Kennedy, EPA filed its Petition for Writ of

Certiorari on October 23, 2006. The Court granted Home

Builders’ and EPA’s Petitions for Certiorari on January 5,

2007, and has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254/1).

¢

“STATUTES INVOLVED .

Sectiea 7(a)-(b) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973

(ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)-(b), and Section 402(b) of the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act or

2

CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), are reproduced in EPA’s Pet.

App. 117a-124a. )

¢

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case concerns the State of Arizona’s efforts to

obtain authority to administer the surface water discharge

permitting program, known as the National Pollutant

Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), in Arizona under

Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).

The EPA transferred the NPDES program to Arizona after

determining that its program met the requirements of the

Clean Water Act. Arizona was the forty-fifth State to

obtain EPA approval of its permitting program.

Congress clearly intended the States to run the

pollution permitting programs upon demonstrating that

their programs met the Clean Water Act criteria. And, this

Court and others have recognized that approval of the

transfer of NPDES authority to a State is mandatory after

it demonstrates that it meets the criteria set forth in

Section 402(b). There is no dispute that Arizona met the

statutory criteria. Nevertheless, a majority of a panel of

the Ninth Circuit vacated the transfer of the program to

Arizona on the grounds that the EPA, the transferring

agency, failed to comply with the requirements of Section

7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536/a)(2).

In reaching its conclusion, the majority panel deter-

mined that the Endangered Species Act repealed the

mandating language of Section 402(b) by implication,

contrary to this Court’s rulings, and misread the legisla-

tive history of the Endangered Species Act. The majority's

views of the reach of the Endangered Species Act are not

only wrong as a matter of law, but radical in nature,

potentially imposing Endangered Species Act Section 7

requirements on every decision of the United States

government, even where other acts of Congress have, as

here, directed agency decisions under specified circum-

stances. Because the court of appeals evred on a question

of law, Arizona urges the Court to vacate the court of

appeals’ decision and order it to uphold EPA’s administra-

tive decision approving Arizona’s program under the Clean

Water Act.

A. Statement of Facts.

In 2001, the Arizona Legislature authorized and

directed the Arizona Department of Environmental Qual-

ity (ADEQ) to establish a state pollution permitting

program, known as the Arizona Pollutant Discharge

Elimination System (AZPDES), which was to be consistent

with the requirements of § 402(b) of the Clean Water Act.

2001 Ariz. Sess. Laws, Ch. 357, §5 (codified at Arizona

Revised Statutes Annotated (A.R.S.) §§ 49-255 to -255.03).

Pursuant to this statutory authority, Arizona employees

drafted and promulgated the extensive regulations neces-

sary to obtain EPA approval of Arizona’s pollution permit-

ting program. See Arizona Administrative Code R18-9-

A901 though R18-9-1015.

In January, 2002, Arizona applied to EPA for transfer

of the NPDES program regarding Arizona waterways

(except those on Indian land). (NAHB Pet. App. 7.) EPA

consulted with the United States Fish & Wildlife Service

(Service) under § 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act

concerning the effect of EPA’s transfer of the NPDES

program and the Service sent EPA its Biological Opinion

4

on December 3, 2002. (NAHB Pet. App. 77.) The Service

concluded that EPA’s approval of the AZPDES program

was “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of

[listed] species, and is not likely to destroy or adversely

modify designated or proposed critical habitat.” (NAHB

Pet. App. 116.) The Service’s conclusion was based in part

on its analysis of causation:

Further, loss of any conservation benefit is not

caused by EPA’s decision to approve the State of

Arizona’s program. Rather, the absence of the

section 7 process that exists with respect to Fed-

eral NPDES permits reflects Congress’ decision

to grant States the right to administer these pro-

grams under state law provided the State’s pro-

gram meets the requirements of 402(b) of the

Clean Water Act.

(NAHB Pet. App. 114.)

On December 5, 2002, the EPA approved Arizona’s

application to administer the NPDES program pursuant to

Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act. (NAHB Pet. App.

69.) Arizona thus became the forty-fifth State to obtain

this authority. (NAHB Pet. App. 4.) The EPA found that

Arizona had met all the requirements of Section 402(b).

(J.A.pp. 237) This finding is not disputed by any party.

(Pet. App. 31 n.11.)

Arizona obtained the EPA’s approval of its AZPDES

program as the result of more than two years of effort.

(Ariz. App. 6.)' The State invested over one million dollars

in resources and staff time in creating the AZPDES

' This refers to the Appendix attached to the State of Arizona's

Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

5

program. (/d.) Arizona state employees developed new

state laws and rules, prepared the submission of the

Arizona program for approval, negotiated and drafted the

memoranda of agreement with EPA to implement the

program, and drafted the program guidance materials for

the regulated community. (/d.) Arizona’s resource com-

mitment to AZPDES, in terms of money and personnel

time, has increased substantially during the pendency of

this case.

Invalidation of the AZPDES program would seriously

disrupt the pollution permitting process in Arizona. If

Arizona’s authority to continue its program is vacated,

regulated facilities would not know where to send informa-

tion regarding their permits, how to send it, or what

government official to contact regarding permit issues.

(Ariz. App. 7.) Action on permit applications would be

substantially delayed pending a determination as to what

agency would take over their processing. (/d. at 8.)

Further, invalidation of the AZPDES program would

halt or delay Arizona business activities, including con-

struction projects that are proceeding under general

permits that have been issued in the AZPDES program.

For example, in 2003 the Arizona Department of Envi-

ronmental Quality (ADEQ) completed promulgation of the

AZPDES Construction General Permit. (/d.) As the Ninth

Circuit majority noted, ADEQ issues several thousand

storm-water-discharge construction permits annually.

(Pet. App. 49 n.22.) The EPA revised its National Con-

struction General Permit on July 1, 2003, but it does not

cover construction projects in Arizona outside of reserva-

tions. 68 Fed. Reg. 39087, 39089 (July 1, 2003). If Ari-

zona’s Construction General Permit is invalid, there will

be many new construction sites that would otherwise be

6

covered by the Arizona permit that will no longer be able

to legally discharge under any authority. (Ariz. App. 8.)

In addition, invalidation of the AZPDES program may

negatively affect Arizona’s environment and water quality.

(Id.) The ADEQ has implemented education and outreach

efforts to ensure that the regulated community under-

stands its responsibilities under the Clean Water Act and

Arizona law. (Jd.) Under the AZPDES program, there are

more inspections of and other site visits to discharging

facilities than there were when EPA was managing the

NPDES program in Arizona. (/d.) These benefits and

increased regulatory oversight would cease if the AZPDES

program is invalidated. (Jd.) -

Finally, since approval of AZPDES, ADEQ has pro-

vided the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (Service)

with significantly increased notice of proposed projects in

Arizona that may affect endangered species. (Ariz. App. 2-

3.) ADEQ requires every construction general permit

applicant to submit a Notice of Intent including a unique

geographic identifier. (Jd. at 3.) The Service has provided

ADEQ a geographic information system map that identi-

fies the areas in Arizona that are of critical habitat con-

cern. (Jd.) ADEQ’s “Smart Notice of Intent” computer

system matches the identified project area with the

established areas of concern provided by the Service. (/d.)

Upon receiving a general permit Notice of Intent in an area

of critical habitat concern, ADEQ informs developers that

they are not authorized to discharge for thirty-two business

days — thus, preventing the beginning of construction

during that time. (Jd.) ADEQ sends a copy of Notices of

Intent that affect critica) habitat areas to the Service. Ud.

at 4.) The Service thus has thirty-two days to assess the

impact on endangered species and contact the developer

concerning the impacts. (Jd.) Under the NPDES program in

Arizona, developers could automatically begin construction

within forty-eight hours of giving notice. (Jd. at 3.)’

B. Proceedings Below.

In April 2003, Respondents petitioned the court of

appeals to review EPA’s approval of the AZPDES program

under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(D), which allows “any inter-

ested person” to request the court of appeals to review

EPA’s determinations regarding state permitting pro-

grams. Respondents contended that EPA’s decision to

approve AZPDES was arbitrary and capricious because it

failed to follow § 7(aX2) of the Endangered Species Act.

(NAHB Pet. App. 13.) Arizona moved to intervene because

it had a significant protectable interest in the EPA’s

approval of the AZPDES program and intended to raise a

legal argument that EPA might not raise — that is, that

EPA could not deny the transfer based on §7 of the En-

dangered Species Act if the transfer met the requirements

of § 402(b) of the Clean Water Act. (State of Arizona’s

Motion to Intervene, May 2, 2003.) The court of appeals

allowed Arizona as well as Petitioners Home Builders to

intervene. (NAHB Pet. App. 13.)

Respondents also filed a lawsuit against the adminis-

trator of the EPA and other federal officers in the United

States district court in Arizona alleging, among other

* Although the Service opines in its Biological Opinion that

Arizona's process will not provide species conservation that is equiva-

lent to that required by § 7 of the Endangered Species Act (NAHB Pet.

App. 79), the Service does not address whether EPA received sufficient

notice of construction in an area of critical habitat concern to enable it

to protect listed species.

, 8

claims, that the Biological Opinion that supported EPA’s

decision to approve AZPDES violated the Endangered

Species Act. (/d.) The district_court ordered that the

challenge be severed from Respondents’ other claims and

transferred to the court of appeals because that court had

exclusive jurisdiction over the challenge. (NAHB Pet. App.

13.) The court of appeals consolidated the transferred

district court challenge with Respondents’ petition for

administrative review. (NAHB Pet. App. 13.)

A two-member majority of the court of appeals con-

cluded that EPA’s approval of Arizona’s transfer applica-

tion was arbitrary and capricious because it was based on

“legally contradictory positions regarding its section 7

obligations” (NAHB Pet. App. 23), and that therefore the

transfer decision must be remanded “to the agency for a

plausible explanation of its decision, based on a single,

coherent interpretation of the statute” (id. at 28). The

majority then decided the legal question that it had

purported to remand to EPA:

We hold that approving Arizona’s pollution per-

mitting transfer application was an agency ac-

tion “authorized” by the EPA, thus triggering

both section 7(a)(2)’s consultation requirement

and its mandate that agencies not affirmatively

take actions that are likely to jeopardize listed

species. The EPA may have complied with its ob-

ligations under the Clean Water Act, but compli-

ance with a “complementary” statute cannot

relieve the EPA of its independent obligations

under section 7(a)(2).... Section 7(a)(2) imposes

a duty on the EPA to “insure” its transfer deci-

sion is not likely to jeopardize protected species

or adversely modify their habitat, and this duty

exists alongside Clean Water Act provisions as

9

the agency’s “first priority.” [TVA v.] Hill, 437

U.S. [153,] 185 [(1978)).

(NAHB Pet. App. 47.) The majority then vacated the EPA’s

decision to approve Arizona’s pollution permitting applica-

tion. (NAHB Pet. App. 63.)

Judge Thompson dissented. (NAHB Pet. App. 64-68.)

He would have denied Respondents’ petition for review

because “EPA’s authority to grant or deny the State

of Arizona’s application to administer the pollution

permitting program was nondiscretionary.” (Jd. at 68.)

“(T)herefore its decision was not ‘agency action’ within the

meaning of section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.” (Jd.

at 66.)

The respondents EPA and the Service and intervenors

Arizona and Home Builders moved for rehearing en banc.

(NAHB Pet. App. 134). The court denied rehearing en

banc. (NAHB Pet. App. 135.) Judge Kozinski dissented

from the denial and five judges joined his dissent. (NAHB

Pet. App. 135-149.) Judge Kozinski disagreed with the

majority’s conclusion that EPA’s decisionmaking was

internally inconsistent and concluded that, even if there

was inconsistency, the majority should have remanded to

EPA for further clarification. (/d. at 138-39.) He also

determined that the majority got it “flatly wrong” when it

concluded that the Endangered Species Act required EPA

to take endangered species into account when making its

decision whether to transfer a permitting program under

§ 402(b) of the Clean Water Act. (Jd. at 141.) The majority's

interpretation “transformed the ESA into an overriding

mandate that trumps an agency's obligations under its

own governing statute,” which was contrary to the Ser-

vice’s regulation, 50 C.F.R. § 402.03, and this Court’s

10

decision in Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen,

541 U.S. 752 (2004). (Ud. at 141-44.)

The court stayed its mandate pending this Court’s

final disposition. (Court of Appeals Order of June 16,

2006.)

¢

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. In enacting the Clean Water Act, Congress in-

tended that the States would administer the pollution

permitting programs outlined in Section 402(b) of the Act

in accordance with Section 402(b) requirements. The

language of Section 402(b) is unambiguous: the EPA “shall

approve” a State’s application to administer the pollution

permitting programs unless the applying State does not

meet one of the requirements specified therein.

The pane] majority erred in determining that Section

7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act precluded the EPA

from approving Arizona’s permitting program even though

the program met all the requirements of the Clean Water

Act. Because Section 402(b) is mandatory, the majority in

effect determined that Congress impliedly repealed a

portion of the Clean Water Act. This conclusion is wrong

because Congress did not intend to alter Section 402(b)

when it enacted the Endangered Species Act, and the two

statutes can be easily reconciled.

II. Because EPA was required to approve Arizona’s

permitting program once it determined that the program

met the requirements of the Clean Water Act, the majority

should have upheld EPA’s approval regardless of any

inconsistencies in EPA’s interpretation of the Endangered

11

Species Act. This Court should therefore vacate the court

of appeals decision and uphold EPA’s decision based on the

correct interpretation of Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered

Species Act.

¢

ARGUMENT

I. The EPA’s Decision to Transfer Pollution Per-

mitting A°-*hority to Arizona Was Legally Cor-

rect.

A. The EPA Must Transfer Permitting Author-

ity to a Staite Permitting Program that

Meets the Requirements of Section 402(b)

of the Clean Water Act.

The Ninth Circuit majority opinion ignored both the

clear statement of congressional intent in the Clean Water

Act, and its plain ianguage, in holding that Section 7 of

the Endangered Species Act expanded the requirements

that Arizona must meet to receive EPA approval of its

NPDES program.

In the Clean Water Act, Congress expressly stated its

intent that the respective States be responsible for run-

ning the Act’s several pollution control programs, includ-

ing the NPDES program at issue in this case:

It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, pre-

serve, and protect the primary responsibilities

and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and

eliminate pollution, to plan the development and

use ... of land and water resources, and to con-

sult with the Administrator in the exercise of his

authority under this chapter. /t ts the policy of

Congress that the States manage the construction

12

grant program under this chapter and implement

the permit programs under Sections 1342 and

1344 of this title.

33 U.S.C. §1251(b) (NAHB Pet. App. 160) (emphasis

added). Under Section 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), the EPA

administrator “shall approve” each state application to

administer the NPDES program “unless” she determines

that the applying State does not meet one of the nine

specified requirements set forth therein. (NAHB Pet. App.

165-67.)

This Court has recognized that EPA approval of a

state program is mandatory when a State, like Arizona,

demonstrates that it has met all nine criteria. EPA v.

Calif. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200,

208 (1976) (“The EPA may require modification or revision

of a submitted program but when a plan is in compliance

with the EPA guidelines ... and is supported by adequate

authority to achieve the ends of §§ 402(b)(1)-(9) .. . and to

administer the described program, the EPA shall approve

the program. ...”). And, before the majority opinion here,

the circuit courts consistently acknowledged that EPA

must approve a state program if it meets the requirements

of § 402(b). Am. Forest & Paper Ass’n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291,

297 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The language of § 402(b) is firm: It

provides that EPA “shall” approve submitted programs

unless they fail to meet one of the nine listed require-

ments.”); Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156,

173-174 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that “Congress repeatedly

articulated its expectation that the States would play a

major role in administering’ the NPDES program and

finding that it “commands the Administrator to approve

the state permit system once he determines that the

statutory requirements and administrative guidelines are

13

met”); Citizens for a Better Env't v. EPA, 596 F.2d 720, 722

(7th Cir. 1979) (“If the state program satisfies the statu-

tory requirements of section 402(b) ... and the guidelines

issued under section 304(i) ... , the Administrator must

approve the program.”); Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d

408, 410 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Under § 1342(b), a state may

submit to the EPA” and “li]f the state can demonstrate

that it will apply the effluent limitations and the amend-

ments’ other requirements in the permits it grants and

that it will monitor and enforce the terms of those per-

mits,” the EPA Administrator “must approve the pro-

posal.”).

The majority nevertheless concluded that the EPA has

the “authority” and “duty” “to deny a pollution permitting

transfer application that meets Clean Water Act standards

but would jeopardize protected species.” (NAHB Pet. App.

31.) This conclusion is contrary to the mandatory language

in § 402(b) and neither the language nor the purpose of the

Endangered Species Act gives the EPA the authority to

override this mandatory provision of the Clean Water Act.

B. Neither the Language nor the Purpose of

the Endangered Species Act Supports the

Majority’s Apparent Conclusion that the

Endangered Species Act Impliedly Re-

pealed Congress’s Mandate in Section

402(b) of the Clean Water Act.

Without explicitly acknowledging it, the majority

concluded that Congress, in passing the Endangered

Species Act, intended to alter the statutory scheme for

approving the transfer of NPDES authority to States.

Where before a State like Arizona had to satisfy only

the nine criteria expressly stated in Section 402(b), the

14

majority held that Congress added a tenth requirement —

compliance with Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species

Act. The Ninth Circuit thus held that the ESA repealed, by

implication, the provision of the Clean Water Act that the

Director of the EPA “shall” approve a state program upon

demonstration of its compliance with the Clean Water Act.

This Court has long followed “‘the cardinal rule ...

that repeals by implication are not favored.’” Morton v.

Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549-550 (1974) (quoting Posadas v.

Natl City Bank, 296 U.S> 497, 503 (1936)). “In practical

terms, this ‘cardinal rule’ means that ‘[iJn the absence of

some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the

only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is

when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.’”

TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978) (quoting Mancari,

417 U.S. at 550). Moreover, “a statute dealing with a

narrow, precise, and specific subject is not subsumed by a

later enacted statute covering a more generalized spec-

trum. ... unless the later statute expressly contradicts the

original act or unless such a construction is absolutely

necessary in order that the words of the later statute shall

have any meaning at all.” Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S.

535, 547-548 (1988) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). “The rarity with which [the Court has] discov-

ered implied repeals is due to the relatively stringent

standard for such findings. ...” Matsushita Elec. Indus’

Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 381 (1996).

1. Congress did not intend for the Endan-

gered Species Act to modify Section

402(b) of the Clean Water Act.

Congress expressed no intention to alter the Clean

Water Act NPDES approval scheme when it enacted the

15

Endangered Species Act of 1973. Instead, it clearly in-

tended for the requirements of the new Act, including

Section 7, to be limited to actions within federal agencies’

existing authorities. As originally enacted, Section 7

provided:

The Secretary [of the Interior! shall review other

programs administered by him and utilize such

programs in furtherance of the purposes of this

Act. All other Federal departments and agencies

shall, in consultation with and with the assis-

tance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in

furtherance of the purposes of this Act by carry-

ing out programs for the conservation of endan-

gered species and threatened species listed

pursuant to section 4 of this Act and by taking

such action necessary to insure that actions au-

thorized, funded, or carried out by them do not

jeopardize the continued existence of such en-

dangered species and threatened species or re-

sult in the destruction or modification of habitat

of such species which is determined by the Secre-

tary, after consultation as appropriate with the

affected States, to be critical.

Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 7,

87 Stat. 884, 892 (1973) (emphasis added) (NAHB Pet.

App. 483).

When Congress amended the Endangered Species Act

in 1978, it divided Section 7 into subsections. As amended,

subsection 7(a) contained, in two separate sentences,

substantially the same language currently found in sub-

sections (a)(1) and (a2) of the ESA. See Pub L. No. 95-

632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3752 (1978). The 1978 amendment did

not change Section 7’s substantive provisions:

16

The conferees adopted Senate language creating

a new section 7(a), which essentially restates sec-

tion 7 of existing law, and outlines the responsi-

bilities of the Secretary and other Federal

agencies for protecting endangered species....

The Conferees felt that the Senate provision by

retaining existing law, was preferable since regu-

lations governing section 7 are now familiar to

most Federal agencies and have received sub-

stantial judicial interpretation.

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1804 at 18 (NAHB Pet. App. 487).

Thus, far from expressing an intent to repeal existing

provisions of the Clean Water Act, Congress intended to

preserve the substance of §7’s original requirements.

Congress again amended subsection 7(a) and separated it

into 7(a)(1) and (a)(2) but again expressed no intent to

make a substantive change. See Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4, 93

Stat. 1226 (1979).

_ Despite this legislative history, the panel majority

concluded that Congress intended to give federal agencies

a substantive grant of authority when it enacted §7 in

1973 that impliedly repealed EPA’s mandatory obligations

under the Clean Water Act. (NAHB Pet. App. 38.) In

reaching this conclusion, the majority ignored the original

language of § 7 of the Endangered Species Act and failed

to acknowledge that the phrase “utilize their authorities”

clearly applied to the language that is now in § 7(a)(2).

The majority then bases its analysis of the meaning of § 7

in 1973 on the wrong language — that is, its analysis is

based on the current language of § 7 not the language that

was enacted in 1973.

Another aspect of the statute’s structure and his-

tory ... bolsters the conclusion that section 7 in-

cludes an affirmative grant of authority to attend

to protection of listed species with agencies’

17

authority when they take actions covered by sec-

tion 7(a)(2). Section 7(a)(1) of the Endangered

Species Act directs agencies to “utilize their au-

thorities in furtherance of the purposes of this

chapter by carrying out programs for the conser-

vation of [listed] species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1).

Section 7(a)(2), in contrast, does not refer to

agencies’ existing “authorities,” but instead di-

rects agencies that, when considering covered

“actions,” they are to proceed in a manner not

likely to jeopardize listed species.

The House Report indicates that this distinction

between the two sections was, as one would

expect, deliberate. The Report noted the re-

quirement of present section 7(a)(2) as imposing

a “further require|ment!” beyond that of section

7(a(1). See H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, at 14

(1973).... (emphasis added). The contrasting

language of the two sections indicates that the

“further requirement” imposed by section 7(a)(2)

turns on the distinction between using existing

authority to promote conservation of species and

conferring an additional, do-no-harm obligation —

and reciprocal authority — applicable when the

agency’s own actions could cause harm to endan-

gered species.

(NAHB Pet. App. 34-35.)

Of course, the House Report in 1973 did not support

the majority’ construction of §7 because the Report

commented on the original language in § 7, which required

agencies to act within their existing authorities. Similarly,

Representative Dingell’s comments about the 1973 Act, on

which the majority also relied (NAHB Pet. App. 35), are

instructive in interpreting the language of §7 as it was

originally enacted but do not support the majority’s con-

clusion that Congress intended agencies to act within their

18

existing authorities when “carrying out programs for the

conservation” of listed species but not when insuring that

their actions were not likely to jeopardize listed species.

The majority also relied on this Court’s opinion in TVA

v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), to support its expansive

interpretation of § 7(a)(2). (NAHB Pet. App. 32-35.) But

Hill construed the language of §7 as it was originally

enacted in 1973, 473 U.S. at 160, and addresses whether a

federal agency must comply with §7 when it is acting

within its existing authority, id. at 164 n.14. Therefore,

Hill does not support the majority’s analysis.

In sum, nothing in the language or legislative history

of the Endangered Species Act indicates that Congress

intended to repeal any portion of § 402(b) of the Clean

Water Act. Indeed, the majority acknowledges that Con-

gress chose not to impose the requirements of the Endan-

gered Species Act on the States. See NAHB Pet. App. 6

(“By its terms § 7(a)(2) applies only to ‘federal agencies’ not

to state governmental bodies. Accordingly EPA’s pollution

permitting decisions are subject to section 7(a)(2) but state

pollution permitting decisions are not.”).’ Yet under the

majority’s analysis, Arizona must enact or agree to provi-

sions similar to § 7 of the Endangered Species Act in order

to obtain EPA approval of its permitting program.

The majority opinion found that the transfer of the

NPDES program to Arizona would harm endangered

species because Section 7 consultation would not be

* See also Brief of Amici Curiae States of Nebraska, et al., in Support

of the Petition for Wnt of Certiorari at 13 (analyzing the language and

legislative history of the Endangered Species Act and concluding that

States are encouraged tc work cooperatively with the federal government

but that such state programs are strictly voluntary).

19

required when Arizona was running the program. (NAHB

Pet. App. 6, 47.) Although Arizona took a number of

actions to increase its protection of endangered species,

including its innovative “Smart Notice of Intent” program

that provides early warning to the State and the Service

whenever a development is proposed near critical habitat,

the majority opinion makes it clear that Arizona’s volun-

tary efforts did not suffice under Section 7 to allow the

program transfer to proceed:

In the abstract, voluntary compliance by state

agencies willing to follow [Fish and Wildlife Ser-

vice] recommendations to the same extent as

would the EPA might substitute for section 7

coverage. The EPA, however, could not so con-

clude without first analyzing the likelihood that

all relevant Arizona agencies can and would live

up to the Game and Fish Department’s promises,

as well as considering the effectiveness of federal .

oversight if Arizona agencies fail to live up to any

such promises.

(NAHB Pet. App. 60.) Thus, the majority indicated that

EPA must withhold approval from a State unless it either

created a statutory program substantially similar to the

Endangered Species Act or agreed to consult with the Fish

and Wildlife Service or National Marine Fisheries Service

on all state NPDES permitting decisions. That the effect of

the majority’s opinion is to impose the Endangered Species

Act on the States under the guise of Clean Water Act

approval further reinforces the conclusion that the major-

ity erred in concluding that Congress impliedly repealed

the mandate in § 402‘b) of the Clean Water Act.

20

2. Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Spe-

cies Act can be easily reconciled with

Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act.

If the majority had deferred to the Service’s regulation

and other federal decisions interpreting § 7(a)(2) to apply

only to discretionary agency actions, it could have recon-

ciled § 402(5) with § 7(a)(2). It erred in making no attempt

to reconcile the provisions.

In 1986, the agencies responsible for enforcing the

Endangered Species Act, the Fish & Wildlife Service and

the National Marine Fisheries Service, promulgated a

regulation interpreting the scope of §7’s requirements:

“Section 7 and the requirements of this Part apply to all

actions in which there is discretionary Federal involve-

ment or control.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (emphasis added)

(NAHB Pet. App. 230); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (requir-

ing reinitiation of formal consultation “where discretion-

ary Federal involvement or control over the action has

been retained”) (NAHB Pet. App. 243). Under this regula-

tion, §7 did not apply to the EPA’s approval of Arizona’s

permitting program because it lacked discretion to with-

hold its approval after Arizona had met the requirements

of § 402(b).

Instead of finding the two statutes reconcilable by

deferring to the Service’s reasonable interpretation in

accordance with Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the majority

interpreted “discretionary” to be somehow consistent with

its interpretation of § 7(a)(2) as conferring additional

agency authority. (NAHB App. 40-42.) Contrary to the

majority’s assertion, this interpretation was not consistent

with its other decisions interpreting the Endangered

Species Act. As Judge Thompson noted in his dissent, the

Ninth Circuit has “consistently recognized that an agency

21

may have decisionmaking authority and yet not be em-

powered, either as an initial matter or in conjunction with

some continuing authority, to act to protect endangered

and threatened species.” NAHB Pet. App. 64-65 (Thomp-

son, J., dissenting) (citing Ground Zero Ctr. For Non-

Violent Action v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 383 F.3d 1082,

1092 (9th Cir. 2004); Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d

1068, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1996), and Sierra Club v. Babbitt,

65 F.3d 1502, 1508-10 (9th Cir. 1995)).

The majority could have also reconciled § 7(a)(2) with

§ 402(b) of the Clean Water Act by adopting other circuits’

interpretation of the scope of § Ta)(2). See Am. Forest &

Paper Ass’n, 137 F.3d at 297, 299 (finding that the lan-

guage of § 402(b) is non-discretionary and that § 7(a)(2) is

not a “font of new authority” but “a directive to agencies to

channel their existing authority in a particular direction”),

Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust

v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 962 F.2d 27, 34 (D.C.

Cir. 1992) (Section 7 “directs agencies to ‘utilize their

authorities’ to carry out the ESA's objectives; it does not

expand the powers conferred on an agency by its enabling

act.”) Instead, the majority rejected the analysis of those

decisions, acknowledging that there was an intercircuit

conflict on the question. (NAHB Pet. App. 44.)

The majority erred in failing to reconcile § 7(a)(2) with

§ 402(b) of the Clean Water Act. Because § 7(a)(2) applies

only to discretionary agency actions, it did not conflict

with EPA’s responsibility to approve Arizona’s permitting

program when it determined that the program met the

requirements of § 402(b) of the Clean Water Act. EPA thus

correctly approved Arizona's permitting program and this

Court should vacate the majority's decision to vacate that

approval.

22

II. Because the EPA Was Required to Approve

Arizona’s Pollution Permitting Program Under

the Clean Water Act, Its Approval Was Legally

Correct Regardless of Its Interpretation of Sec-

tion 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act.

A. The Court of Appeals Should Have Upheld

the EPA’s Approval! Because It Was Legally

Correct.

The majority determined that it “must review the

EPA’s actions based on the ‘grounds ... upon which the

record discloses that its action was based.’” (NAHB Pet.

App. 25 (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87

(1943)). The majority then concluded that it must remand

to the EPA because EPA’s approval of Arizona’s pollution

permitting program was inconsistent with its original

belief that § 7 required consultation. (NAHB Pet. App. 28.)

EPA has persuasively demonstrated that its position

concerning §7 consultation was not inconsistent with its

decision to rely on the Service’s Biological Opinion. See

EPA’s Petition at 23-25. Moreover, the Chenery rule does

not apply here because Intervenors Arizona and Home

Builders correctly argued below that EPA was required to

approve Arizona's permitting program under the Clean

Water Act. Thus, the court of appeals should have upheld

the EPA’s approval.

In Chenery, the Court held that, when an agency’s

decision involves an exercise of judgment in an area that

Congress has entrusted to the agency, the reviewing court

could not uphold the agency’s decision based on grounds

that were different from those on which the agency relied.

318 U.S. at 94-95. The Court explicitly stated that this

principle did not apply when the administrative agency

made an erroneous determination of law. /d. at 88 ("|Wle

23

do not disturb the settled rule that, in reviewing the

decision of a lower court, it must be affirmed if the result

ss correct although the lower court relied upon a wrong

ground or gave a wrong reason.”) (internal quotations

omitted); id. at 94 (“But if the action is based upon a

determination of law as to which the reviewing authority

of the courts does come into play, an order may not stand if

the agency has misconceived the law.”).

The lower courts have consistently held that the rule

in Chenery does not apply to their review of an agency’s

interpretation of a federal statute. See Ry. Executives’

Ass’n v. ICC, 784 F.2d 959, 969 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Generally,

a reviewing court may only judge the propriety of an

agency decision on the grounds invoked by the agency, ...

the court is not so bound when, as here, the issue in

dispute is the interpretation of a federal statute.”); N.C.

Comm’n of Indian Affairs v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 725 F.2d

238, 240 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding no Chenery problem

because “the question of interpretation of a federal statute

+s not ‘a determination or judgment which an administra-

tive agency alone is authorized to make’”) (quoting Chen-

ery, 332 U.S. at 89); Milk Transport v. ICC, 190 F. Supp.

350, 355 (D. Minn. 1960) (Chenery does not apply to the

court’s interpretation of a federal statute).

In this case, the court of appeals granted Arizona's

and Home Builders’ motions to intervene under § 509(b) of

the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 8 136%b), and Rule 151d) of

the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Arizona re-

quested intervention to argue that “$ 7 of the Endangered

Species Act could not legally preclude the transfer of

NPDES authority to a state pursuant to 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(b).” (State of Arizona’s Motion to Intervene at 7.)

The parties briefed that legal issue and the majority

24

reached the issue in holding that EPA’s obligations under

the Clean Water Act could not “relieve the EPA of its

independent obligations under section 7(a)(2).” (NAHB

Pet. App. 47.) Because the legal argument that Arizona

raised was a sufficient basis for upholding EPA’s approval

of Arizona’s permitting program, the majority erred in

vacating the approval. This Court should review the EPA’s

decision because any inconsistencies in its decisionmaking

involve the interpretation of federal statutes. Because the

court of appeals misinterpreted these statutes, the Court

should vacate its decision.

B. The Court Should Not Remand to the EPA

Because Remand Is Futile and Detrimental

to the States’ Interests.

The EPA’s decision to approve Arizona’s program

should not be remanded for clarification because this

Court is free to, and should, review the court of appeals’

erroneous construction of federal statutes. Moreover, the

Court should not remand here because it would be futile.

See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecolo-

gists, 476 U.S. 747, 756 n.7 (1986), overruled on other

grounds by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833

(1992). ({T}he ruling in Chenery has not required courts to

remand in futility.”). To the extent that there was any

inconsistency in the EPA’s position on the applicability of

Section 7(a)(2) to its approval of state permitting programs

under the Clean Water Act, EPA has clarified its position

in connection with Alaska’s application for transfer of

NPDES permitting authority. (EPA Pet. App. 93a-102a.)

EPA's position is that the decision whether to approve the

transfer of NPDES permitting authority to a State is not

subject to the requirements of Section 7/a)(2) because

Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act requires that the

25

State’s application be granted if the Clean Water Act

criteria are satisfied. Jd. The Service and the National

Marine Fisheries Service have confirmed that their inter-

pretations of the relevant statutory provisions are consis-

tent with EPA’s. (EPA Pet. App. 103a-116a.) Thus, remand

would serve no purpose as EPA has clarified its position.

Remand is also inappropriate here because, until this

Court determines whether Section 7(aX2) applies to

transfers of NPDES permitting authority to a State, the

status of Arizona and Alaska’s permitting programs’ is

uncertain. This Court should address the question so that

States in the Ninth Circuit are not governed by rules that

are different from those applied in all other circuits.

7

‘ The State of Alaska has applied for transfer of NPDES permit-

ting authority and has not yet received EPA approval of its permitting

program. Brief of Amicus Curiae Alaska in Support of Petitions for Writ

of Certiorari at 1.

26

CONCLUSION

This Court should vacate the judgment of the court of

appeals and uphold EPA’s approval of the Arizona’s per-

mitting program.

DATED: February 20, 2007.

Respectfully submitted,

TERRY GODDARD

Attorney General of Arizona

Mary O’GRADY

Solicitor General

PAULA S. BICKETT

Counsel of Record

Chief Counsel, Civil Appeals

JAMES T. SKARDON

Assistant Attorney General

1275 West Washington

Phoenix, Arizona 85007

(602) 542-3333

Counsel for State of Arizona

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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