Respondents Brief — RICHLIN SEC. SERVICE CO. v. Chertoff

Supreme Court brief2008

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

SIISS

|

No. 06-1717

———S—————_ =

.

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

RICHLIN SECURITY SERVICE COMPANY, PETITIONER

Vv.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY OF

HOMELAND SECURITY

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

PAUL D. CLEMENT

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

JEFFREY S. BUCHOLTZ

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

GREGORY G. GARRE

Deputy Solicitor General

ANTHONY A. YANG

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

JEANNE E. DAVIDSON

REGINALD T. BLADES, JR.

MICHAEL JAY SINGER

MICHAEL E. ROBINSON

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, under the Equal Access to Justice Act,

5 U.S.C. 504 and 28 U.S.C. 2412, paralegal services are

“attorney fees” compensable at market rates or “other

expenses” compensable at the rate of cost to the attor-

ney.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

i i i oe eri eee way ]

ee . cncuecttbapedededseeseckinss 6

Argument:

1. The EAJA reimburses paralegal charges at the

I ee ad ele ci ic esnrccnce 10

A. The plain language and the structure of the

EAJA demonstrate that the paralegal costs

are “other expenses” reimbursed at cost, not

“attorney fees” reimbursed at prevailing

EE on hdd eWaN cheb ddaskbtbseeoseccess 10

B. The legislative history and purpose of the

EAJA confirms Congress’s intent to reimburse

paralegal time at cost as an out-of-pocket

BE o.oo cov ienncanskoswhskendanedsccccsss 26

C. Principles of sovereign immunity require

that the term “attorney fees” be narrowly

construed to exclude paralegal expenses ........ 36

Il. The EAJA compensates “other expenses” at

the cost to the attorney, not at market rates

SE L.davicucdkcasGheadbdneieische<cks 39

SEE 46 i usadhederecucendskssdubaubuthecedsenees 44

NS 66a 045 640660s Senses enabeadcketheteseavates la

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Acad. of Pediatrics v. Heckler,

580 F. Supp. 436 (D.D.C.), vacated in part,

594 F. Supp. 69 (D.D.C. 1984) ............... ee eee 29

Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.

Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006) ......... 5, 7, 17, 21, 27

(III)

Cases—Continued: Page

Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129 (1991) ............0... 37

Ashton v. Pierce, 580 F. Supp. 440 (D.D.C. 1984) ...... 28

Aston v. Secretary of HHS, 808 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1986) ... 41

Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States,

i es eda cr eee es ceusebue 24

Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) .............. 37

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) ....... 60. c cece eee 4

Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383 (1994) ......... 0.006. 39

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412

ED Wikis eeda essudneerebbedaigngseberecdess 25

City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992) ....... 24

Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990) .... 32, 34

Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.

EE ick ba ee he ce dan isnbstenetaeneweusceses 19

Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S.

dies chica sh a nbnegPaeeeeebebedseneees 36

Fanning, Phillips & Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717

a od ce eee ees ecbavaways 1]

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) ....... 24, 25

Former Employees of BMC Software, Inc. v. United

States Sec’y of Labor, No. 04-00229, 2007 WL

4181696 (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 28, 2007) ............. 43

Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1979) ........ 33

General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S.

athe ie iicheneckekseksenseeeecsees 24

Glick v. United States Civil Serv. Comm’n,

567 F. Supp. 1483 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd, 799 F.2d

gta cades 29

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) ............ 20

Cases—Continued: Page

Independent Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes,

SEED kencendcviesacdsencnesniuns 24, 25

Information Scis. Corp. v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. :

PED x. vn nccenbarxesteesseconendueesentasens 43

International Woodworkers of Am. v. Donovan,

792 F.2d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 1986) .................. 42

Jones v. Armstrong Cork Co., 630 F.2d 324 (5th Cir.

SUED koctkdesvewsverss batudusbanseeabeweshenent 33

Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46 (1st Cir.

SOUEE . 6-000 6000s innnseeeueeensshendessuus anne 33

Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996) .............eeeeeee 36

Lane v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 294 F.3d 1001

GED ove catcecandcecedctaveiieesscckiues 11

Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986) ...... 36

Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991) ............ 31

Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989) ........ passim

Northcross v. Board of Educ. of the Memphis City

Schs., 611 F.2d 642 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,

447 U.S. 911 (1980), overruled in relevant part by

Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989) ..... 29, 30, 33

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council

for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987) ............2005. 23

Photo Data, Inc. v. Sawyer, 533 F. Supp. 348 (D.D.C.

TED se nccnctscsavadcebapsdeuasenssdangeuntian 29

Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988) ........ passim

Precision Concrete v. NLRB, 362 F.3d 847, 854 (D.C.

CEE 0 o.080-+cenrensheecuepweebdsseseeneuieet 42

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) ......... 26

Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522 (1987) ....... 34

VI

Cases——Continued: Page

Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983) ....... 37

Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 126 8. Ct. 1869

cin sa weeee ste seceue os 40

Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1998) .............. 25

Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 (1989) ...........45. 25

Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 545 F.2d

EE 33

United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973) ......... 32

United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969) .............. 36

United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 585 (1980) ......... 36

United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992) ... 36

United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995) ........ 36

United States Department of Energy v. Ohio,

EE ee 38

West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83

I Ede Ke euciueehihsesbesees 19, 21, 26, 37

Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) .......... 39

Statutes and rules:

Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183:

eck iché eebeeesebessaceceeese 15

EE ee ee 15

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tit. VI1, 42 U.S.C. 2000e

TE BAhaddeGdeedesebendesdsoccecédeceesceces 25

Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C.

gE SERS POPr ety PTTTeT TTT TTT TT ee passim

Vil

Statutes and rules—Continued: Page

Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. 96-481, Tit. II,

94 Stat. 2325:

IEEE cn cccccoccccnseseusens 32

sii sce caveceudkienens 15, 28

§ 204(c), 20B, 94 Stat. MBZO .... 2... cece ceees 15, 28

i itd osenebnwdeewnseewde 15, 28

Equal Access to Justice Act:

a A ee oe 2,7, 11

DUS.C.504(a)1) 0.0... eee eee eee 2, 6, 11, 21, 35

EE pict cncageddkccetesess 12, 13, 22

5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A) (1988) ........ 6... eee eee 32

DO IED sce ccccccccoscoccccs passim

DU SEUUNIIED cccccccccccccccscces 18, 22

ET eee nc iccsnnsackasdnadecendans 2

ED nn ne cncnisnassekdnewinnde 2

28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(A) .........-...4.. 2, 11, 14, 29

28 U.S.C. 2412(GMZMAME) 2... ec ce eee cees 18

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.

PEE. ca rcnacadhccesneseccccccccecouesoose: 17

SPR SUID ovctecccccssccceceees 17

Service Contract Act of 1965, 41 U.S.C. 351 et seg. ...... 1

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness

Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, Tit. II,

PEE nevedauccddcceecesscccoes 15

SPREE Onc o50nseucesédcandeecdsneesencasaas 24

EE dnexdvetesnnédesnectavackensannan 19, 21

INGE ne nceecaccessdsucnecscusoscesssetedee 33

Vill

Rules—Continued: Page

i ek le 19

TE a he Dene BO Per. lpg 39

Miscellaneous:

Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers (1989) ........... 16

Altman Weil, Inc.:

New Survey Provides Snapshot of Law Firm

Economics Across U.S. (Aug. 2, 2007)

<http://www.altmanweil.com/index.cfm/

Fa/r.resource_detail/oid/87716caa-56df-4ad9-

b375-9e9366ba6d60/resource/New_Survey_

Provides Snapshot_of_Law_Firm_

Economics Across US.cfm> ................. 16

Paralegal Compensation Survey Shows Solid

Increases (May 22, 2007) <http://www.

altmanweil.com/index.cfm/fa/r.resource_

detail/oid/3f87 107 1-6be8-44dd-a469-

532a7a4ab0fb/resources/Paralegal_

Compensation_Survey_Shows_Solid_

EY dda deue cee keddausdecessiucest 16

DT ddduddneveséadedmbebaceleaseadataes 15, 16

The 2003 Survey of Law Firm Economics (2003) .... 15

Award of Attorneys’ Fees Against the Federal

Government: Hearings Before the Subcomm.

on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of

Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,

96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) ................. 15, 27, 28

46 Fed. Reg. (1981): |

PEE Ghbnbevededcoudhedeausentedeusacacepaset 31

IX

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page

ED tchidecenkionnnceensonaawawewene 31

i swiedteanaeiekaeneveriebhenes eneseuns 31

DP cal cvedegndenst eddedeaswosuiudtcdsurenh 31

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) .. 28

H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.

EE abuse teeridedadracébcpensigsecececs passim

H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) ........ 32

S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979) ....... 15, 27

S. Rep. No. 586, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) ...... passim

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English

EE ink dt etdiedanbeeesundeneséesees 13

The Random House Dictionary of the English

EY END kcccecascucsccccescccacs: 13

Webster's Third New International Dictionary

BED CecSe ccc cccesserseviccedsssvecessevescess 12

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 06-1717

RICHLIN SECURITY SERVICE COMPANY , PETITIONER

v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY OF

HOMELAND SECURITY

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

STATEMENT

1. Petitioner contracted with the Immigration and

Naturalization Service in 1990 and 1991 to provide guard

services for detainees at the Los Angeles International

Airport. Pet. App. 2a. In 1995, the Department of La-

bor determined that the contracts had misclassified peti-

tioner’s employees for purposes of the wage classifica-

tion scheme of the Service Contract Act of 1965, 41

U.S.C. 351 et seq., resulting in underpayment of peti-

tioner’s employees. Pet. App. 2a-3a. The Department of

Labor further found that employees were entitled to

back wages from petitioner. /bid. Petitioner then filed

a claim against the government for the increased costs

associated with the parties’ misclassification of peti-

tioner’s employees and, after its claim was denied, pur-

(1)

2

sued an administrative appeal to the Department of

Transportation Board of Contract Appeals (Board) with-

out representation by legal counsel. /d. at 26a, 32a.

After the Board determined that petitioner was enti-

tled to compensation from the government, petitioner

retained legal counsel in 1998 to represent petitioner

before the Board in further proceedings to quantify the

amount of compensation owed. Pet. App. 27a, 33a-34a.

A series of appeals to the Board and to the Federal Cir-

cuit ensued. Petitioner ultimately secured partial suc-

cess on its $1.57 million claim when the Board awarded

petitioner approximately $700,000 in compensation. /d.

at 3a, 26a, 44a. The court of appeals affirmed. /d. at 3a.

2. In 2003, petitioner applied to the Board under the

Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA or Act), 5 U.S.C.

504, for an award of attorney fees and other expenses.

Pet. App. 29a. The EAJA authorizes an agency to award

“fees and other expenses” to a “prevailing party” in ad-

versary administrative proceedings in cases in which the

position of the United States is not “substantially justi-

fied” and no special circumstances would make an award

unjust. 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1).'

The statute defines “fees and other expenses” to in-

clude “the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engi-

neering report, test, or project which is found by the

agency to be necessary for the preparation of the party’s

case” as well as “reasonable expenses of expert wit-

nesses” and “reasonable attorney or agent fees.”

5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A). The statute further provides:

' A separate provision of the EAJA provides for recovery of “fees

and other expenses” from the United States hy a prevailing party ina

civil action in court. 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A); see also 28 U.S.C.

2412(d)(2)(A) (defining “fees and other expenses”). Section 2412 is not

at issue in this case.

3

The amount of fees awarded under this section shall

be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind

and quality of the services furnished, except that

(i) no expert witness shall be compensated at a rate

in excess of the highest rate of compensation for ex-

pert witnesses paid by the agency involved, and

(ii) attorney or agent fees shall not be awarded in

excess of $125 per hour unless the agency deter-

mines by regulation that an increase in the cost of

living or a special factor, such as the limited avail-

ability of qualified attorneys or agents for the pro-

ceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.

Ibid. Because the Department of Transportation (like

most agencies) has not promulgated regulations autho-

rizing the Board to increase the statute’s $125-per-hour

ceiling on “attorney or agent fees,” reimbursement for

such fees by the Board is limited to $125 per hour.

Petitioner’s EAJA application, as amended, sought

reimbursement for $51,794 in attorney fees for work on

the underlying proceedings before the Board and

$14,225 in attorney fees for time spent preparing peti-

tioner’s EAJA application based on the statute’s maxi-

mum rate of $125 per hour. Pet. App. 5a, 29a; ef. C.A.

App. 30, 91, 169 (listing hourly rate of petitioner’s pri-

mary counsel as $325 to $400 per hour). Petitioner addi-

tionally sought reimbursement for paralegals used by

petitioner’s attorney. The amended EAJA application

sought reimbursement at an $80 hourly paralegal rate

beginning in 1998, which increased to $95 in 2002 and

$135 in 2004. Jd. at 41, 156, 211; cf. Pet. App. 33a

(amended application eliminated EAJA claim for work

before June 1998). Petitioner thus sought reimburse-

ment, generally at these rates, for 523.8 hours of para-

4

legal time on the underlying cases and 68.2 hours of

paralegal time preparing the EAJA application, totaling

$51,901 in paralegal charges. /d. at 5a.’

3. The Board awarded petitioner $43,312 in attorney

fees for the underlying cases and $7,125 in fees for the

preparation of the EAJA petition. Pet. App. 47a, 52a.

With regard to reimbursement for paralega! expenses,

the Board ruled that, under the EAJA, such expenses

are recoverable at the cost to the firm, not at the rate

billed to the client. Finding no evidence in the record

concerning the cost of paralegal services to the firm,*

the Board, rather than denying paralegal expenses en-

tirely, took judicial notice of paralegal salaries in the

Washington, D.C. area and found that $35 per hour was

a reasonable cost to petitioner’s Washington-based firm.

* As the court of appeals noted, it appears that petitioner reduced its

fee request to $95 per hour for periods in which petitioner’s EAJA

application asserted a $135 hourly rate. Pet. App. 5a; see Reply to

Respondent’s Answer to Richlin’s Am. Application for Attorney’s Fees

& Expenses 5 (stating that petitioner “reduced any of its paralegal

costs claimed in excess of $95 per hour to $95 per hour”).

* Petitioner similarly did not submit affidavits or other evidence that

its requested rates were consistent with prevailing charges in the rele-

vant legal market. The time records submitted by petitioner were gen-

erated in connection with petitioner’s EAJA claim (and not submitted

as contemporaneous bills to petitioner), see Appellant’s Application for

Attorney’s Fees & Expenses 20, and, while petitioner asserted in a legal

brief that $400 (for counsel) and $135 (for paralegals) reflected “market

rates” because its counsel uses these hourly rates and “(c]lients pay

* * * without objection,” Reply to Respondent’s Answer to Richlin’s

Am. Application for Attorney’s Fees & Expenses 4, the Board found

that petitioner failed to prove that its requested paralegal rate reflected

a prevailing market rate. Pet. App. 42a n.4; cf. Blum v. Stenson, 465

U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984). The court of appeals had no occasion to revisit

that aspect of the Board's ruling.

5

Id. at 42a-43a. The Board accordingly awarded peti-

tioner $10,587 for paralegal expenses. /d. at 52a.

4. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. la-24a.

Relying on the text, structure, purpose, and history of

the EAJA, the court of appeals ruled that paralegal

costs are not compensable as “fees,” but rather consti-

tute other “expenses” that are recoverable only at the

cost to the attorney. /d. at 7a-19a.

In particular, the court explained that the EAJA al-

lows for the recovery of “expenses” beyond just “fees,”

but allows the recovery of such expenses only to the ex-

tent of their underlying cost. Given that additional cate-

gory and, in light of the strict construction that must be

given to the EAJA’s limited waiver of sovereign immu-

nity, the court determined that Congress intended

paralegal costs to be recoverable as “expenses” reim-

bursed at cost to the attorney, and not “fees.” Pet. App.

6a, 15a. That construction, the court explained, was bol-

, Stered by the fact that Congress had gone out of its way

to place a cap on attorney fees, but had not separately

capped paralegal costs. /d. at 16a. In light of that statu-

tory feature, the court found it “unlikely that Congress

would have set the maximum fee for paralegal services

as high as $75 per hour (the equivalent, of about $185 in

today’s dollars)—a level that likely exceeded the then-

current billing rate for paralegal services—given the

overall desire to cap allowable fees below market rates.”

Id. at 16a-17a (footnote omitted) (citing Arlington Cent.

Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2460

(2006)). Indeed, the court noted, the legislative history

underlying the EAJA’s 1985 reenactment specifically

addressed the question of paralegal costs and states that

paralegal charges reflect a “type of expense[]” under the

6

EAJA that is “billed at cost.” Jd. at 19a; see id. at 56a

n.2.

The court of appeals recognized that Missouri v.

Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989), had construed a “reason-

able attorney’s fee” under the Civil Rights Attorney’s

Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 1988, to include

compensation for the work of paralegals, and that simi-

lar fee-shifting statutes using similar language are nor-

mally construed in the same manner. Pet. App. 9a-11a,

13a. However, the court concluded that the “differences

in the surrounding language, structure, and purpose” of

the EAJA required that the Act be interpreted differ-

ently from Section 1988. Jd. at 13a-15a.

Senior Judge Plager dissented. Pet. App. 20a-24a.

He reasoned that the interpretation of the EAJA should

be guided by this Court’s interpretation of Section 1988,

and thus concluded that paralegal services should be

recoverable as “attorney fees.” Jd. at 20a-21la.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The court of appeals correctly held that paralegal

expenses are reimbursed at cost under the EAJA as

“other expenses” and are not “attorney fees” reimburs-

able at prevailing market rates.

I. A. The EAJA provides that federal agencies shall

award “fees and other expenses” to prevailing parties in

adversary administrative adjudications when the posi-

tion of the United States is not substantially justified

and no special circumstances would make the award un-

just. 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1). “Fees,” in turn, are categorized

as attorney, agent, and expert witness fees, the reim-

bursement of which is limited to prevailing market rates

subject to a statutory ceiling for each category of fees.

5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A). The language, structure, and leg-

7

islative history of the EA.JA demonstrate that paralegal

expenses are “other expenses” reimbursable at cost, and

not “attorney fees.”

The most natural reading of “attorney fees” in

5 U.S.C. 504 is one that provides compensation for an

attorney’s time spent representing a party in litigation.

In common parlance, “attorney fees” do not mean “para-

legal” expenses. That resolution is bolstered by the sur-

rounding text. The EAJA’s broader category of “other

expenses” naturally captures costs that are associated

with an attorney’s representation of a party, but are not

themselves “attorney fees.” Thus, while expenses for

paralegal assistance are not readily embraced by the

phrase “attorney fees,” they fall comfortably into the

EAJA’s second and related category of reimbursable

“other expenses.”

Other provisions of the EAJA confirm that “attorney

fees” do not include paralegal expenses. While the

EAJA requires that attorney fees be calculated based on

prevailing market rates, Congress also imposed a statu-

tory ceiling on the amount of “attorney fees” that may

be awarded. Congress set the cap based on the billing

rates of attorneys and not the rates of paralegals, which

were dramatically lower. And when Congress set the

cap at $75 and later increased it to $125 the ceiling

capped “attorney fees” at a level below that of many

attorneys nationwide. Congress’s decision to use attor-

neys’ charged rates subject to caps and its failure to

impose any analogous caps on paralegals’ rates strongly

suggests Congress thought paralegal charges would be

treated as expenses (subject to the “cap” of their actual

cost). Cf. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.

Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2006).

8

Compensating paralegal expenses as “attorney fees”

would result in EAJA awards for paralegal time that are

disproportionately high relative to the fees that can be

recovered for ordinary attorney work (because paralegal

rates are generally much lower than those of attorneys)

and, indeed, would permit attorneys to recover paralegal

expenses that are near or equal to the awards given for

the time of even extraordinarily experienced attorneys.

To the extent that litigation against the government is

informed by the availability of EAJA fees, that anomaly

could “distort the normal allocation of work” by encour-

aging attorneys to shift work to paralegals (where they

can recover the full amount of, or at least a greater pro-

portion of, their normal hourly rates) and thus “result in

a less efficient performance of legal services.” Pet. App.

18a.

Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989), does not

compel a different conclusion. That case involved the

construction of a different fee-shifting statute (Section

1988) with materially different language. Except for a

narrow category of court “costs,” Section 1988 autho-

rizes reimbursement of prevailing civil rights plaintiffs

only for “attorney’s fees” and, the Court held in Jenkins,

the term “attorney’s fees” must therefore include com-

pensation for the work of those paid by attorneys to con-

tribute to the attorneys’ work product. In the EAJA,

however, Congress provided for reimbursement of a

second statutory category—“other expenses”—in addi-

tion to “attorney fees.” That second category fundamen-

tally changes the analysis. In Jenkins, the Court’s task

was to define the term “attorney’s fees,” and paralegal

expenses were either encompassed in that term or unre-

coverable. Here, by contrast, paralegal expenses can be

recovered, and the Court’s task is to decide which statu-

9

tory category encompasses paralegal expenses. More-

over, Section 1988 was designed to provide a “fully com-

pensatory” fee to prevailing civil rights plaintiffs; by

contrast, the EAJA’s fee caps specifically preclude such

a recovery.

Nor does the canon of construction that similar

words should normally be construed similarly suggest

that Jenkins should be extended to the EAJA context.

That canon readily yields where, as here, it is reasonable

to conclude from variations in statutory text and context

that the words were intended to embrace different

meanings. This Court has therefore construed “virtually

identical” language in fee-shifting statutes differently

when the policy considerations and legislative history

underlying the statutes pointed to different outcomes.

B. The EAJA’s legislative history underscores that

Congress intended the term “attorney fees” and the cap

on such fees to apply “only to the compensation of law-

yers” themselves and not to other costs connected with

their representation of parties. H.R. Rep. No. 1418,

96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1980). Congress made that in-

tent plain in the process of reenacting the EAJA in 1985.

For example, the Senate Report on reenactment ex-

plained that attorneys’ out-of-pocket expenses should be

compensated under EAJA as other expenses and that

“paralegal time” should be reimbursed in that manner

“at cost.” S. Rep. No. 586, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15

(1984). This Court has twice relied on the very same

report as accurately reflecting congressional intent sur-

rounding the reenactment of the EAJA, and it addresses

conclusively the question presented here.

C. If there were any doubt as to the proper construc-

tion of “attorney fees,” the canon of construction that

the scope of waivers of sovereign immunity should be

10

narrowly construed in favor of the sovereign compels

the conclusion that paralegal expenses are not a type of

“attorney fees” under the EAJA. Nothing in the

EAJA’s text requires a contrary result, particularly be-

cause the EAJA’s provision of “other expenses” aptly

captures paralegal expenses necessary for the prepara-

tion of a party’s case.

Ii. The Court should reject petitioner’s alternative

argument that even if paralegal time is not compensated

as “attorney fees” and are “other expenses” under the

EAJA, “other expenses” should be reimbursed at the

market rate paid by the client, not at the cost of the at-

torney. To begin with, this contention is not fairly in-

cluded in the question presented, was not pressed or

passed upon below, and therefore is not properly before

the Court. In any event, the argument fails. The EAJA

specifically provides that attorney, agent, and expert

witness “fees” are to be awarded at prevailing market

rates, but makes no similar provision for “other ex-

penses.” To the contrary, in discussing the recovery

available for such “other expenses,” Congress focused

on reimbursement for their “reasonable cost.” 5 U.S.C.

504(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).

ARGUMENT

I. THE EAJA REIMBURSES PARALEGAL CHARGES AT

THE COST TO THE ATTORNEY.

A. The Plain Language And The Structure Of The EAJA

Demonstrate That The Paralegal Costs Are “Other Ex-

penses” Reimbursed At Cost, Not “Attorney Fees” Reim-

bursed At Prevailing Market Rates

The EAJA provides that federal agencies shall award

“fees and other expenses” to prevailing parties in adver-

ll

sary administrative adjudications when the position of

the United States is not substantially justified and no

special circumstances would make an award unjust.

5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1). The statute’s definition of “fees and

other expenses” distinguishes between two categories of

expenses: (1) those that qualify as attorney, agent, or

expert witness “fees” and are reimbursed at “prevailing

market rates” subject to a statutory cap; and (2) other,

non-“fee” expenses which are reimbursed at “cost.” 5

U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A). As the court of appeals correctly

concluded, the text, structure, and legislative history all

point to the conclusion that paralegal expenses fall into

the latter category and thus may be reimbursed at cost,

not market rates.

1. The bare language of 5 U.S.C. 504 strongly favors

the conclusion that paralegal expenses are reimbursable

as a non-fee “expense,” rather than an “attorney fee.”

By authorizing awards of “fees and other expenses,” the

statute identifies two types of compensable “expenses”:

(1) fees and (2) other, non-fee expenses. Section 504

further permits reimbursement of three types of fees for

professionals that a party may retain to litigate a case:

the “reasonable expenses [including fees] of expert wit-

nesses” and “reasonable attorney or agent fees.”

5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A).* An application for an EAJA

* Inthe EAJA context, an “agent” is a specialized non-attorney prac-

titioner authorized to represevit clients before an administrative agency

with the special permission of the tribunal. See Lane v. United States

Dep't of Agric., 294 F.3d 1001, 1003 (8th Cir. 2002); Fanning, Phillips

& Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717, 721-722 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also H.R.

Rep. No. 1418, supra, at 14 (“An ‘agent fee’ may be awarded for the

services of a non-attorney where an agency permits such agents to

represent parties who come before it.”). Consequently, the EAJA does

not authorize the payment of “agent fees” in court proceedings, where

only attorneys may normally serve as legal representatives. See 28

12

award must therefore include an “itemized statement

from any attorney, agent, or expert witness represent-

ing or appearing on behalf of the party stating the actual

time expended and the rate at which fees and other ex-

penses were computed.” 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(2).

Petitioner contends that paralegal expenses qualify

as an “attorney fee” under the EAJA, but the Act’s stat-

utory language points decisively in the opposite direc-

tion. The words “attorney fees” do not, on their own,

suggest that the term embraces paralegal expenses. A

paralegal is not an “attorney,” and, indeed, may not

practice law. And while paralegals may assist attorneys

who provide legal services, Congress’s use of the word

“attorney” rather than a more general word such as “lit-

igation” to modify “fees” suggests that separate charges

for paralegals do not constitute “attorney fees.” It is

also noteworthy that Congress provided that the profes-

sionals whose fees may be reimbursed must submit an

itemized list of their expenses and their fees, 5 U.S.C.

504(a)(2), but Congress made no provision for paralegals

to submit itemized reports of expenses and fees. That

suggests that paralegal services are an expense to be

listed on attorneys’ itemized statements, not a fee.

At the same time, reimbursement for paralegal work

fits comfortably into the EAJA’s more general category

of “other expenses” that may be compensated in addi-

tion to attorney, agent, or expert fees. The term “ex-

penses” is commonly used to refer to “an item of outlay

incurred in the operation of a business enterprise” or

“the charges that are incurred by an employee in con-

nection with the performance of his duties.” Webster’s

U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(A). Petitioner does not contend that paralegal

expenses qualify as “agent fees” or “expert witness fees.” Cf. Pet. App.

7a, 9a.

13

Third New International Dictionary of the English

Language 800 (1986); see The Random House Dictio-

nary of the English Language 680 (2d ed. 1987)

(“charges incurred during a business arrangement”);

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Lan- .

guage 462 (1976) (“[c]harges incurred while performing

one’s job”). That definition fits well in the EAJA context

where an “attorney, agent, or expert witness represent-

ing or appearing in behalf of [a] party,” 5 U.S.C.

504(a)(2), will incur such business charges in connection

with the provision of professional litigation-related ser-

vices. Where a paralegal provides assistance to an at-

torney by performing tasks necessary to prepare a

party’s case, the attorney’s payment of such paralegal

costs are closely analogous to the “cost of any study,

analysis,” or “project” that the EAJA identifies as

“other expenses” reimbursable when “necessary for

the preparation of the party’s case.” See 5 U.S.C.

504()(1)(A).

2. Other provisions within the EAJA confirm that

paralegal charges ancillary to an attorney’s provision of

legal services are “other expenses” and not “attorney

fees.” In particular, the Act’s detailed provisions that

“define and limit” the reasonable amount of “fees” that

may be compensated with federal funds, Pierce v.

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572 n.3 (1988), both demon-

strate that paralegal expenses are not reimbursed as

“fees” and reflect Congress’s intent to limit the amount

of profit imbedded in the fees of attorney, agents, and

experts that the government will compensate under the

Act.

Two independent statutory restrictions limit the

amount of a reasonable fee awarded under the EAJA.

First, Congress specified that the “amount of fees * * *

14

shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind

and quality of the services furnished.” 5 U.S.C.

504(b)(1)(A). Second, Congress further imposed statu-

tory caps limiting the maximum hourly rate reimburs-

able under the Act, reflecting the judgment that, “what-

ever the local or national market might be,” the reason-

able amount of “public reimbursement” for professional

services should not exceed the cap (unless a statutory

exception is satisfied). See Underwood, 487 U.S. at 572.

EAJA fee awards in agency proceedings are thus

capped, for expert witness fees, at the “highest rate of

compensation for expert witnesses paid by the agency

involved” and, for “attorney or agent fees,” at “$125 per

hour unless the agency determines by regulation that an

increase in the cost of living or a special factor * * *

justifies a higher fee.” 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A).°

As the court of appeals recognized, it would be anom-

alous to construe paralegal expenses as a type of “attor-

ney fee” because doing so would provide disproportion-

ately high reimbursement for paralegals (whose hourly

charges are generally much lower than the fees charged

by attorneys) when the EAJA restricts the hourly rate

for attorney time to below prevailing rates in many legal

markets. See Pet. App. 16a-17a & n.11. Congress rec-

ognized when it originally enacted the EAJA in 1980

that the statute’s “attorney fee” ceiling (then at $75 per

hour) would often reimburse less than the prevailing

° The EAJA imposes similar statutory ceilings with respect to fees

associated with civil actions in court. Expert witness fees are limited to

“the highest rate of compensation paid for expert witnesses by the

United States” and “attorney fees” are subject to the same $125-per-

hour cap “unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of

living or a special factor * * * justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C.

2412(d)(2)(A).

15

market rate for the work of attorneys. The cap was

eliminated then restored in the legislative process, see

S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1979), as a com-

promise that addressed concerns about the fiscal impact

of the statute.® After the EAJA was repealed following

a three-year experimental period from October 1981 to

October 1984, see EAJA, Pub. L. No. 96-481, Tit. II,

§§ 203(c), 204(c), 208, 94 Stat. 2327, 2329, 2330, Congress

reenacted the EAJA in 1985 with several changes, but

Congress retained the pre-existing $75 hourly cap on

“attorney fees.” See Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-

80, $§ 1, 6, 99 Stat. 183, 186. The $75 cap thus remained

below prevailing market rates for attorneys in much of

the country. See Altman Weil, Inc., The 2003 Survey of

Law Firm Economics 82 (2003) (comprehensive survey

showing that 1985 national median hourly rate for law

firm associates and partners was $82 and $128, respec-

tively). When Congress raised the cap to its current

$125 per hour ceiling in 1996, it continued that pattern.

See Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness

Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, Tit. IT, § 231(b)(1), 110

Stat. 863; Altman Weil, Inc., The 1996 Survey of Law

Firm Economics I1-3 (1996) (1996 Survey) (1996 na-

* In explaining the bill the Senate passed after the bill was reported

by the committee which he chaired, Senator DeConcini explained that

while attorney rates in some communities might be well below the $75

ceiling, the “going rate” for attorney fees in large cities was $75 per

hour “or more,” and that the bill’s level of reimbursement did not “make

the taxpayer whole” because it represented a compromise that ad-

dressed the cost concerns of the Administration. See Award of Attor-

neys’ Fees Against the Federal Government: Hearings Before the

Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the

House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1980) (state-

ment of Sen. DeConcini); see also pp. 27-30, infra (discussing legislative

history).

16

tional average hourly rates for associates and partners

were $127 and $184, respectively).

Because paralegal rates were undoubtedly far below

the EAJA’s fee caps when Congress established and

revised them in 1980, 1985, and 1996, it would be anoma-

lous to read the Act as compensating paralegal expenses

as “attorney fees” subject to a cap that Congress estab-

lished for attorneys and agents alone. Cf. 1996 Survey

II-3 (1996 national average paralegal rate was $66 per

hour); ef. also H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.

15 (1980) (“The ceiling on attorney fees relates only to

the compensation of lawyers and agents (e.g., accoun-

tants themselves).”) (emphasis added). Doing so would

mean that Congress intended to ensure that para-

legals—but not attorneys—could obtain all or at least a

greater portion of their rates under the EAJA.'

’ Data from comprehensive surveys of legal billing rates show that

the 2007 median billing rates nationwide for law firm partners and

associates were $305 and $200 per hour, respectively, and were much

higher in some localities. In Washington, D.C., for instance, the data

reflect median hourly rates of $455 and $295, respectively. See Altman

Weil, Inc., New Survey Provides Snapshot of Law Firm Economics

Across U.S. (Aug. 2, 2007) <http://www.altmanweil.com/index.cfm/fa/

r.resource_detail/oid/87716caa-56df-4ad9-b375-9e9366ba6d60/resource/

New_ Survey Provides Snapshot_of_Law_Firm_Economics_Across_

US.cfm>.

The data similarly show that billing rates for paralegal time have

increased in 2007 to a national median of $160 per hour. At the median

hours billed per paralegal in 2006 (1490 hours), a single paralegal would

generate $238,400 in law firm revenue at this rate, far outstripping the

$59,973 in median total cash compensation paid to paralegals nation-

wide. See Altman Weil, Inc., Paralegal Compensation Survey Shows

Solid Increases (May 22, 2007) <http:/Awww.altmanweil.com/index.cfm/

fa/r.resource_detail/oid/3f87 1071 -6be8-44dd-a469-532a7a4ab0fb/

resources/Paralegal Compensation_Survey_Shows_Solid_

Increases.cfm>; ef. Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 198 (1989)

17

This Court recently relied upon a similar statutory

anomaly in rejecting the argument that expert fees were

recoverable under the attorney’s fees provision of the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20

U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The IDEA “contains detailed provi-

sions that are designed to ensure that [‘attorney’s fees’ |

awards are indeed reasonable,” but contains no similar

provisions geared to regulating the amount of fees for

experts. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.

Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2006) (Arlington) (citing

20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(8)(C)-(G)). Given Congress’s attention

to regulating the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees,

this Court concluded that the “absence of any compara-

ble provisions relating to expert fees strongly suggests

that recovery of expert fees is not authorized.” /bid.

The same reasoning applies here. Congress’s attention

to establishing a cap on “attorney fees” in the EAJA

based upon a maximum rate that is obviously geared to

the billing rates for attorneys and the absence of an

analogous cap specifically geared to paralegal rates

“strongly suggests” that Congress did not intend para-

legal expenses to be compensated as an “attorney fee.”

The anomalous results produced under petitioner's

construction of “attorney fee” are reinforced by this

Court’s decision in Pierce v. Underwood, supra. There,

the Court explained that the EAJA’s fee cap suggests

Congress determined that the cap represented “gener-

ally quite enough public reimbursement for lawyers’

fees, whatever the local or national market might be.”

487 U.S. at 572. Given that assessment, the “need to

preserve the intended effectiveness of the [$125] cap”

led the Court to read narrowly the Act’s authorization to

(discussing data from 1984 to 1986 indicating that law firms billed

paralegal time at a rate two to four times the cost of a paralegal).

18

exceed the cap when the “limited availability of qualified

attorneys or agents for the proceedings involved” justi-

fies a higher fee, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). See Under-

wood, 487 U.S. at 572-573; ef. 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A)(ii).

The Court thus held that “attorneys ‘qualified for the

proceedings’” did not permit an increase based on an

attorney’s “extraordinary leve! of the general lawyerly

knowledge and ability useful in all litigation” and was

limited to contexts where attorneys were qualified in

some “specialized sense” with “distinctive knowledge or

specialized skill needed for the litigation in question.”

Id. at 572. Given that an attorney with an “extraordi-

nary level of the general lawyerly knowledge and abil-

ity” can be reimbursed at a rate no greater than the

Act’s fee cap, it would be particularly incongruous to

interpret “attorney fees” as including paralegal ex-

penses that may be reimbursed at 2 rate up to the very

same cap.

Moreover, as the court of appeals explained (Pet.

App. 18a), to the extent that litigation against the gov-

ernment is influenced by the availability of EAJA fees,

allowing paralegal expenses to be recovered as “attor-

ney fees”—without a meaningful cap like the statute

sets for the fees of attorneys—would “create a perverse

incentive.” In particular, it could cause attorneys—

whose fees are capped at $125—to shift work to para-

legals—whose charges are generally lower and effec-

tively uncapped. As the court of appeals explained,

“treating paralegal fees as attorney’s fees would [thus]

distort the normal allocation of work and result in a less

efficient performance of legal services.” /bid. Treating

paralegal expenses as “other expenses” recoverable at

cost eliminates that “perverse incentive.”

19

3. In arguing that paralegal expenses are “attorney

fees” under the EAJA, petitioner principally relies not

on the statute’s text, but instead on this Court’s inter-

pretation of a different statute in Missowri v. Jenkins,

491 U.S. 274 (1989). Pet. Br. 14-24. Jenkins involved a

distinct statutory scheme reflecting materially different

statutory text with a different structure, purpose, and

history. Those differences illustrate Congress’s intent

to treat the reimbursement of paralegal expenses differ-

ently in the EAJA, and demonstrate that Jenkins’ rea-

soning and result should not be extended to this case.

a. The Court in Jenkins interpreted the Civil Rights

Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 1988,

which authorizes courts to award prevailing parties in

certain civil rights actions a “reasonable attorney’s fee

as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). Just two years

earlier, the Court had concluded that Congress “com-

prehensively addressed” the “kinds of expenses that a

federal court may tax as costs” under Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(d) by restricting the meaning of “costs” to the six

types of costs listed in 28 U.S.C. 1920. Crawford Fitting

Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 440-442 (1987);

see West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 87

& n.3 (1991) (Crawford Fitting’s reasoning applies to

“costs” under 42 U.S.C. 1988). Jenkins accordingly ad-

dressed the meaning of a “reasonable attorney’s fee” in

Section 1988 against a backdrop in which paralegal ser-

vices were not recoverable “costs” and could be recov-

ered under Section 1988, if at all, only as attorney’s fees.

The Court held that they could be recovered as such

fees. See Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285.

Thus, in Jenkins, the only statutory hook for award-

ing paralegal expenses was a provision for “attorney’s

fees,” so the choice was to reimburse paralegal expenses

20

as “attorney’s fees,” or nothing. In this context, the

Court concluded that the phrase “reasonable attorney’s

fee” could not have been meant by Congress “to compen-

sate only work performed personally by members of the

bar” and, instead, must have been intended to “refer to

a reasonable fee for the work product of an attorney.”

Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285. The Court explained that the

term therefore must include “the work not only of attor-

neys, but also of secretaries, messengers, librarians,

janitors, and others whose labor contributes to the work

product for which an attorney bills her client,” including

“the work of paralegals.” /bid.

Jenkins then addressed the appropriate method of

valuing the work of paralegals, guided largely by the

Court’s prior recognition that Section 1988 grants “the

successful civil rights plaintiff a ‘fully compensatory

fee.’” 491 U.S. at 286 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)). That requirement to “yield

the same level of compensation that would be available

from the market” led the Court to conclude that para-

legal expenses must be reimbursed under Section 1988

in the same manner that such expenses are billed to cli-

ents in the relevant legal market at prevailing market

rates. Jd. at 286-287. Otherwise, “if the prevailing prac-

tice in the community were to bill paralegal time sepa-

rately at market rates, fees awarded to the attorney at

market rates for attorney time would not be fully com-

pensatory if the court refused to compensate hours

billed by paralegals or did so only at ‘cost.’” Jd. at 287.

b. While petitioner contends (Br. 15-16) that

Jenkins’ holding that paralegal expenses are an element

of a “reasonable attorney’s fee” under Section 1988 “ap-

plies with full force to EAJA,” the reasoning underlying

Jenkins’ holding demonstrates the opposite to be true.

2]

First, the presence of additional statutory language

in the EAJA shows that the Act’s use of the term “attor-

ney fees” is more limited than that of its textual counter-

part (“attorney’s fees”) in Section 1988. Section 1988

authorizes awards of “attorney’s fees” as part of the

“costs,” but because the word “costs” is a recognized

term of art that consists of the items listed in 28 U.S.C.

1920, see Casey, 499 U.S. at 87 & n.3, “attorney’s fees”

is the only term in Section 1988 that might authorize

compensation for expenses associated with preparing a

client’s case. Cf. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2460. Jenkins

thus concluded that “attorney’s fees” under that statute

must take into account the “work not only of attorneys”

but also the expense of those “whose labor contributes

to the work product for which an attorney bills her cli-

ent” (including paralegals) and “other expenses and

profit.” 491 U.S. at 285 (emphasis added).

The EAJA, in contrast, expressly authorizes the re-

imbursement of “[attorney] fees and other expenses,”

5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) (emphasis added),

thereby separating into two distinct components what

Section 1988 combines in the single term of “attorney’s

fees.” These other “expenses” include items that would

not be recoverable as traditional “costs.” Thus, the exis-

tence of the category of “other expenses” must inform

the meaning of “attorney fees.” If the term “attorney

fees” in the EAJA were given the same broad interpre-

tation as its Section 1988 counterpart, that interpreta-

tion would improperly strip meaning from (and perhaps

even render superfluous) Congress’s express provision

for “other expenses” under the Act.

Petitioner is wrong in arguing that this Court’s inter-

pretation in Jenkins that paralegal expenses are “attor-

ney’s fees” means that paralegal expenses must always

22

qualify as “attorney’s fees.” Of course, paralegal ex-

penses would not qualify as “attorney’s fees” in a statute

that separately addressed “paralegal expenses” as such.

And here, paralegal expenses do not qualify as “attorney

fees” because the EAJA—unlike Section 1988—provides

for reimbursement of a second category of “other ex-

penses” that is naturally read to encompass paralegal

expenses. Nothing in Jenkins precludes that construc-

tion.

Moreover, unlike Section 1988, the text of the EAJA

provides that “the amount of fees”—not other non-fee

expenses—are to be determined based on “prevailing

market rates,” 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A); establishes a cap

on the rate at which “attorney fees” may be reimbursed;

provides an exception from that ceiling on “attorney

fees” based on factors addressing attorneys, not para-

legals; and requires those categories of professionals

(attorneys, agents, and experts) whose fees are to be

reimbursed to submit itemized time. See 5 U.S.C.

504(a)(2) (requiring itemized statements of fees and ex-

penses from “any attorney, agent, or expert witness”

representing or appearing on behalf the fee applicant);

5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A)(ii) (authorizing exception to fee

cap based on “limited availability of qualified attor-

neys”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1418, supra, at 15 (“The

ceiling on attorney fees relates only to the compensation

of lawyers and agents (e.g., accountants themselves).”)

(emphasis added). It would be inconsistent with these

limiting aspects of the EAJA to compensate “other ex-

penses” for the work of paralegals using prevailing mar-

ket rates rather than cost since Congress expressly re-

served such treatment for the “amount of fees.” See

also S. Rep. No. 586, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1984)

(“paralegal time” is an expense reimbursed at “cost”

23

under the EAJA). Had Congress intended to treat

“other expenses” in the same manner, it presumably

would have enacted statutory text to that effect.

The EAJA’s fee cap further reflects a basic struc-

tural difference between the Act and Section 1988.

Whereas “Congress’s intent [was] to provide a ‘fully

compensatory fee’” to prevailing plaintiffs under Section

1988, Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 287, the EAJA is “fundamen-

tally” different because “it is not designed to reimburse

fees without limit” and, thus, often does not provide a

“fully compensat[ory]” award because prevailing market

rates for lawyers often exceed its $125-per-hour cap on

fees. See Underwood, 487 U.S. at 573 (emphasis

added).* The very existence of that cap, whose only

function is to limit “public reimbursement for lawyers’

fees” below prevailing market rates, id. at 572, illus-

trates a core distinction between the EAJA and fee-

shifting statutes similar to Section 1988. See id. at 573

(concluding that whether the contingent nature of an

attorney fee agreement may justify an increase in the

amount of a reasonable “attorney fee” was “quite differ-

ent” under the EAJA, which is a “fundamentally” differ-

ent “sort of statutory scheme” than statutes like Section

1988; distinguishing Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley

Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987)

(Delaware Valley I1)); ef. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S.

at 713 & n.1 (award of “reasonable attorney’s fee” under

* This is true even in cases, unlike the present case, where regula-

tions permit a cost-of-living adjustment to the EAJA’s $125-per-hour

ceiling. Assuming plaintiffs’ estimate (Br. 7) of an adjusted rate of

$168-per-hour to be correct, survey data indicate that the 2007 billing

rates of most attorneys far exceed that rate. See p. 16 n.7, supra (2007

median hourly rates nationwide for partners and associates were $305

and $200 and, in Washington, D.C., $455 and $295, respectively).

24

Clean Air Act “follow[s] the principles and case law”

developed under Section 1988).

c. The important statutory differences between the

EAJA and Section 1988 fatally undermine petitioner’s

argument that Jenkins’ interpretation of Section 1988

controls here. To be sure, this Court has often con-

strued similar text to have the same meaning in differ-

ent statutes and has applied that interpretive principle

to Section 1988 and “many other federal fee-shifting

statutes” which, like Section 1988, award prevailing par-

ties a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of costs. See,

e.g., City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562

(1992); Independent Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes,

491 U.S. 754, 758 & n.2 (1989). However, the “presump-

tion that identical words * * * are intended to have the

same meaning” is “not rigid and readily yields’—even

when the same word is used in separate places within a

single statute—“whenever there is such variation in the

connection in which the words are used as reasonably to

warrant the conclusion that they were employed * * *

with different intent.” General Dynamics Land Sys.,

Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595 (2004) (quoting Atlantic

Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427,

433 (1932)).

This Court in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517,

522-524 (1994), thus rejected the contention that its “de-

cisions construing similar fee-shifting language” in other

statutes controlled the proper interpretation of the

Copyright Act even though the Copyright Act’s fee-

shifting provision used “virtually identical language.”

Fogerty declined to extend to the copyright context the

* The Copyright Act authorizes courts to award “a reasonable at-

torney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs” in civil actions

under the act. 17 U.S.C. 505.

25

holding in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434

U.S. 412 (1978), that prevailing plaintiffs under Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S:C. 2000e et seq.,

should normally obtain an award of attorney’s fees but

prevailing defendants should not. While acknowledging

that “fee-shifting statutes’ similar language is a ‘strong

indication’ that they are to be interpreted alike,” the

Fogerty Court held that that “normal indication” did not

apply because Christiansburg’s reasoning relied on fac-

tors including policy considerations and Title VII’s legis-

lative history that did not apply to the Copyright Act.

510 U.S. at 523 (quoting Zipes, 491 U.S. at 758 n.2).”°

That conclusion applies with even greater force here.

As discussed, the pertinent text of the EAJA is not “vir-

tually identical” to Section 1988 and, instead, contains

material differences. In particular, the EAJA provides

another category of expenses—“other expenses”—that

are reimbursable, which is unavailable under the statute

at issue in Jenkins. Additionally, the broader context of

the EAJA’s attorney fees provisions illustrates that fee

awards under the Act, unlike Section 1988 and similar

statutes, are not driven by a policy of full compensation.

See pp. 14-16, 23, supra. Petitioner’s narrow focus on

the use of the term “attorney fees” in both the EAJA

Petitioner incorrectly suggests (Br. 19) that Sullivan v. Hudson,

490 U.S. 877 (1989), construed the EAJA’s use of the term “civil action”

based on the principle that similar terms in fee-shifting statutes are to

be construed alike. Hudson nowhere invoked or relied upon that

interpretive canon. Instead, the Court reviewed the reasoning in its

prior decisions that addressed whether other fee-shifting statutes

allowed a court to award attorney fees for administrative proceedings

that were related to the action before the court. and concluded that the

“principles we found persuasive” in those prior decisions also “were

controlling here.” /d. at 888-889, 892; cf. generally Shalala v. Schaefer,

509 U.S. 292, 298-300 & n.4 (1993) (limiting scope of Hudson’s holding).

26

and Section 1988 thus fails to account for the well-estab-

lished rule that.a statute’s use of such terms must be

interpreted not only by reference to the terms’ specific

text but also by “the specific context in which that lan-

guage is used, and the broader context of the statute as

a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341

(1997)."

B. The Legislative History And Purpose Of The EAJA Con-

firms Congress’s Intent To Reimburse Paralegal Time

At Cost As An Out-Of-Pocket Expense

The legislative history of the EAJA confirms that

paralegal expenses are not a category of “attorney fees”

reimbursed at prevailing market rates but rather are

a type of “other expenses” to be reimbursed only at the

out-of-pocket cost to attorneys. Congress expressed

its understanding in 1980 that “attorney fees” was lim-

ited to compensation for an attorney’s time alone and,

when Congress revisited the EAJA in 1984 to reenact

the statute, it clarified not only that the EAJA reim-

bursed reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by

attorneys but also that “paralegal time” should be

“billed at cost” as such an expense. To the extent the

" Petitioner's reliance (Br. 23-24) on Casey is unavailing. Casey

simply discussed this Court’s decision in Jenkins; it did not a. or the

meaning of that decision and therefore provides no basis for disregard-

ing the considerations discussed above as to why Jenkins is not

controlling. See Casey, 490 U.S. at 99-100. More fundamentally, Casey

indicates that this Court has not been willing to read the phrase

“attorney’s fees” broadly to sweep in non-“attorney” fees where, as

here, there are textual indications that Congress intended to treat

“separate elements of litigation cost” (id. at 88) separately when it

comes to awarding litigation fees and expenses. Likewise, the Court

cautioned against a reading of fee-shifting statutes (including the

EAJA) that would deprive meaning from the full statutory text of those

provisions. See id. at 89, 91.

27

Court determines it useful to consult the legislative his-

tory, that should end the matter. Cf. Arlington, 126

S. Ct. at 2466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

1. a. The EAJA’s authorization to award “attorney

fees” subject to a statutory ceiling resulted from a com-

promise entered to facilitate the Act’s passage by limit-

ing the size of awards and, hence, the Act’s impact on

the federal fisc. Initial efforts to enact the EAJA were

derailed in the 95th Congress because of concerns re-

garding the Act’s “high projected costs to the United

States.” H.R. Rep. No. 1418, supra, at 6. Those con-

cerns persisted and led to a compromise in the 96th Con-

gress limiting the scope of recovery. In the Senate, pro-

ponents of a broader bill to reimburse attorney fees

more fully initially succeeded in amending the Senate

bill to eliminate the $75 per hour “attorney fee” cap, but

the cap was later restored by the Judiciary Committee

before that bill passed the Senate. See S. Rep. No. 253,

supra, at 8.

The Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee

explained that the bill’s $75 attorney fee cap did not

“make the taxpayer whole” and, while he would have

preferred authorizing more generous awards, the bill

reflected a necessary “compromise|[]” made in the “pro-

cess of attempting to grind out legislation.” See Award

of Attorneys’ Fees Against the Federal Government:

Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liber-

ties and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on

the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1980) (statement

of Sen. DeConcini). That compromise “tried to strike

some common ground” recognizing that “attorneys’ fees

per hour vary immensely” by locality and that the “go-

ing rate” for attorneys in large cities was $75 per hour

“or more.” Jbid.; see also ibid. (statement of Rep.

28

Kastenmeier) (bill appears to “strike a balance” and to

be an “accommodation to the feelings of the Government

* * * as to cost” to facilitate “passing the bill”); id. a:

33 (statement of Rep. Railsback) (bill “represent[s] a

compromise”).

The 1980 House Report on the Senate bill, which was

enacted as the EAJA, accordingly explained that the $75

“ceiling on attorney fees relates only to the compensa-

tion of lawyers or agents (e.g., accountants themselves)”

and does not apply to the “costs connected with their

representation of a particular interest in a proceeding.”

H.R. Rep. No. 1418, supra, at 15 (emphasis added); cf.

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1980)

(EAJA’s text is identical to bill reported by House).

That understanding of “attorney fees” and the associ-

ated cap on reimbursement for attorney time indicates

that expenses for items such as paralegal time, if reim-

bursable at all under the EAJA, would have been under-

stood by Congress not as “attorney fees” but as “other

expenses” similar to the reimbursable “cost of any

study, analysis,” or “project” “necessary for the prepa-

ration of the party’s case,” 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A).

In the three-year period between the Act’s October

1981 effective date and its October 1984 repeal, see

EAJA, Pub. L. 96-481, Tit. II, §§ 203(c), 204(c), 208, 94

Stat. 2327, 2329, 2330, a “controversy [arose] over

whether the definition of ‘fees and other expenses’ was

intended to be exclusive or whether, in addition to the

costs of studies and analyses [expressly included in that

definition], courts and agencies may award reasonable

out-of-pocket expenses incurred in connection with a

case.” S. Rep. No. 586, supra, at 15 (emphasis added).

Compare, e.g., Ashton v. Pierce, 580 F. Supp. 440, 443 & n.4(D.D.C.

1984) (“compensation for * * * paralegal time” is “an expense

29

The Senate Report addressing the EAJA’s reenactment

thus explained that, while the bill reenacting the Act

retained the original 1980 “language” of the definition,

the Report provided congressional “clarification” that

the definition permits reimbursement of such out-of-

pocket expenses. /bid.

Significantly for present purposes, the Report stated

that “[e]xamples of the type of expenses that should or-

dinarily be compensable include paralegal time (billed at

cost).” S. Rep. No. 586, supra, at 15 (emphasis added).

In doing so, the Report expressly endorsed (1) an inter-

pretation of the EAJA reflected in 1981 Model Rules

implementing the Act and (2) the result reached by the

Sixth Circuit concerning out-of-pocket expenses in the

Section 1988 context in Northcross v. Board of Educ. of

the Memphis City Schs., 611 F.2d 624, 639 (6th Cir.

1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980), overruled in

relevant part by Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285

n.7 (1989). See S. Rep. No. 586, supra, at 15. Both the

Model Rules and the Sixth Circuit specifically treated

covering ‘study’ and ‘analysis’ within the meaning of [the EAJA],”

which is “reimbursed at actual salary cost for time expended”), and

American Acad. of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 580 F . Supp. 436, 440 (D.D.C.

1984) (paralegal expenses “may be reimbursed at actual salary cost to

the law firm as an expense of litigation” under the EAJA; following

Ashton), vacated in part, 594 F. Supp. 69 (D.D.C. 1984) (vacating

different portion of EAJA award), with Glick v. United States Civil

Serv. Comm'n, 567 F. Supp. 1483, 1487 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (rejecting

claim for paralegal expenses because such expenses are “part of the

lawyer's overhead, covered by the lawyer's fee rate” under the EAJA,

which “should not be assessed against a defendant at a ‘profit making’

rate”), aff'd, 799 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1986) (Table), and Photo Data, Inc.

v. Sawyer, 533 F . Supp. 348,353 (D.D.C. 1982) (limiting reimbursement

of expenses to the “reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering

report, test, or project”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)A)).

30

paralegal expenses as reimbursable at the out-of-pocket

cost to an attorney, not as part of an attorney fee.

b. Petitioner contends (Br. 24-28) that the Senate

Report’s statement that paralegal expenses are “billed

at cost” does not undermine petitioner’s view that such

expenses are “attorney fees” compensable at market

rates. That position rests on four contentions, each of

which is misplaced. First, petitioner states (Br. 25) that

“expenses” under the EAJA encompass “attorney fees”

and that the Report merely notes that paralegal costs

are “expenses.” But the statute clearly distinguishes

between things like studies and fees for attorneys,

agents, and experts. The Report specifically explains

that “out-of-pocket expenses” may be reimbursed like

“the cost of studies and analyses” and proceeds to iden-

tify “paralegal time” as one “such expense[]” reimburs-

able at “cost.” S. Rep. No. 586, supra, at 15 (emphasis

added).

Second, petitioner asserts (Br. 26) that the Report’s

approval of the result in Northcross aids petitioner’s

case because, in petitioner’s view, Northcross “held that

attorney fees for paralegal services should be awarded

at market rates,” not cost. That is incorrect. North-

cross concluded that paralegal expenses constitute “rea-

sonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attor-

ney,” which therefore would be reimbursed under 42

U.S.C. 1988 at the attorney’s cost for such assistance.

See Northcross, 611 F.2d at 639. Indeed, in Jenkins,

this Court itself concluded that Northcross “considered

paralegal work ‘out-of-pocket expense,’ recoverable only

at cost to the attorney.” 491 U.S. at 285 n.7.

Third, petitioner argues (Br. 25-26) the Report’s reli-

ance on a Model Rule issued by the Chairman of the Ad-

ministrative Conference of the United States is inconclu-

31

sive because the Rule permits expenses to be billed sep-

arately from an attorney fee under the EAJA if such

expenses are ordinarily billed to clients. Cf. 46 Fed.

Reg. 32,900, 32,913 (1981) (Model Rule 0.106(b)). The

Rule’s preamble, however, explains that the Rule is

based on the understanding that an “attorney’s out-of-

pocket expenses ordinarily chargeable to clients” should

be reimbursed separately and in addition to the

“charges for the attorney’s time” that would be subject

to the EAJA’s (then) $75-per-hour ceiling on attorney

fees. Id. at 32,904-32,905 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1418,

supra, at 15). The preamble accordingly explains that

“paralegal costs should be chargeable as expenses” in

that manner. /d. at 32,905. Indeed, the preamble high-

lights the out-of-pocket character of paralegal expenses

in stating that the Model Rule’s drafters decided against

listing paralegal time or other specific items as “com-

pensable expenses” because “practices with respect to

charging [clients} for paralegal time, as with respect to

other expenses such as duplicating, telephone charges,

and the like, vary” depending on locality and field of

practice. /bid.

Finally, petitioner claims (Br. 26-28) that the Senate

Report “is not ‘legislative history’ at all” because the bil!

it accompanied was vetoed by the President late in the

second session of the 98th Congress and the EAJA was

not reenacted until the next year in the following Con

gress. In at least two unanimous decisions, however.

this Court has cited the same report as accurately re-

flecting congressional intent underlying the EAJA's

reenactment in contexts where, as here, the post-veto

passage of the EAJA involved statutory language that

was not materially different from the text discussed in

the report. See, e.g., Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S.

Te

32

89, 96 (1991) (citing Report as demonstrating that Con-

gress “explicitly” adopted and ratified one side of circuit

split concerning the meaning of “final judgment”); Com-

missioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 159 & n.7 (1990)

(citing Report as reflecting Congress’s understanding of

the EAJA’s definiticn of “position of the United

States”). See also United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S.

396, 404-405 & n.14 (1973) (concluding that earlier legis-

lative history may be pertinent where it reflects an in-

terpretation of “the very language subsequently enacted

by Congress”).

In this case, the relevant statutory text of 5 U.S.C.

504(b)(1)(A) discussed in the 1984 Report is identical to

the statutory text reenacted by Congress in 1985. In

fact, the post-veto bill was merely a “revision” of the

legislation that the President vetoed in 1984 and, while

portions were changed to “address concerns which the

Administration raised in the President’s veto message,”

H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1985), the bill

at issue in the 1984 Senate Report reflected the defini-

tion of “fees and other expenses” enacted as law in 1985.

Compare 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A) (1988), with S. Rep. No.

586, supra, at 1-2 (text of bill reported by 1984 Report),

and EAJA, Pub. L. No. 96-481, Tit. II, § 203(a)(1), 94

Stat. 2326 (original definition retained upon reenact-

ment).

To the extent petitioner suggests (Br. 21-22) that

Congress likely intended paralegal expenses to be a

form of “attorney fees” reimbursed at prevailing market

rates because Congress enacted the EAJA in 1980

against a “legal background” in which courts “generally”

awarded paralegal expenses at market-rates, petitioner

is incorrect. Before 1980, the few precedential decisions

addressing the reimbursement of paralegal expenses

33

under other federal fee-shifting statutes had produced

decidedly uneven results."* More to the point, the Sen-

ate Report’s ratification of the outcome in Northcross—

in which the court held that paralegal expenses were

recoverable at cost—cuts decidedly against petitioner’s

position."

In short, to the extent there is any doubt from the

EAJA’s statutory text, the Act’s legislative history

strongly confirms that the Act reimburses “paralegal

time” as an “out-of-pocket expense[],” not an attorney

fee, and compensates that expense at “cost,” S. Rep. No.

586, supra, at 15, in the same manner that the Act

reimburses “other [non-fee] expenses” such as the

“cost of any study, analysis,” or “project * * * neces-

'’ Compare Northcross, 611 F.2d at 639, and Lamphere v. Brown

Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 48 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1979) (paralegal expense reim-

bursed at amount paid by attorney under Title VII when paralegals

were not regularly employed by the attorney), with Todd Shipyards

Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 545 F.2d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 1976) (interpret-

ing 33 U.S.C. 928).

'* Not only does petitioner misread Northcross, as discussed earlier,

petitioner’s description of the “legal background” in 1980 overreads

other decisions. See, e.g., Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778, 781-782 (10th

Cir. 1979) (holding that award totaling $400 for legal services was abuse

of discretion where record showed expenditure of 133.75 hours of

attorney and paralegal time; remanding for recalculation of award

without addressing how to compensate paralegal expenses); cf. Jones

v. Armstrong Cork Co., 630 F.2d 324, 325 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that

district courts had taken various positions concerning paralegal

expenses). Perhaps because of the “increasingly widespread custom of

separately billing for the services of paralegals” observed in the 1980s,

courts of appeals appear to have more frequently addressed the

question of reimbursing paralegal charges (in non-EA.JA contexts) after

the EAJA’s enactment. See Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 284 & n.7, 286 (citation

omitted) (noting circuit split under 42 U.S.C. 1988 based on Northcross

and cases decided after Northcross).

34

sary for the preparation of the party’s case,” 5 U.S.C.

504(b)(1)(A).

2. Petitioner suggests (Br. 34) that limiting reim-

bursement of paralegal expenses to cost as an “other

expense” would contravene the “central purpose of

EAJA” to eliminate financial disincentives to litigation

against the government. But the caps that Congress

enacted in the EAJA for attorney fees, among other pro-

visions, underscore that Congress did not pursue such a

purpose at all costs, and petitioner simply fails to ac-

count for the compromises that Congress struck to enact

the legislation.’ More generally, petitioner ignores the

fact that “no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs”

and that “[dJjeciding what competing values will or will

not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular ob-

jective is the very essence of legislative choice.” Rodri-

guez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-526 (1987) (per

curiam) (“(I)t frustrates rather than effectuates legisla-

tive intent simplistically to assume that whatever fur-

thers the statute's primary objective must be the law.”).

Indeed, this Court’s decision in Underwood, which con-

strued the EAJA’s attorney fee previsions narrowly in

order to “preserve the intended effectiveness” of the

EAJA’s ceiling on the reimbursement of attorney fees,

illustrates that the Act’s general goals cannot form a

proper basis for determining the amount of reimburse-

* Petitioner cites to language in Jean, 496 U.S. at 163, suggesting

that the EAJA was intended to “eliminate” not just diminish the fi-

nancial disincentive to challenge certain governmental actions. Jean,

however, only addresses the “narrow” question of eligibility for an

EAJA award “rather than the amount that may be appropriately

awarded,” and nothing in Jean suggests that EAJA awards should fully

compensate litigants. See id. at 156, 163.

35

ment awarded under the EAJA. See Underwood, 487

U.S. at 572-573.

Petitioner contends that the EAJA should be con-

strued to reimburse paralegal costs at market rates

rather than cost because doing so would encourage para-

legal use at lower rates and, thus, encourage the “cost-

effective delivery of legal services.” Br. 28-29 (quoting

Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 288). There are two problems with

this argument in the EAJA context. First, because the

“EAJA subsidy is not directed to a category of litigation

that can be identified in advance,” a “lawyer will rarely

be able to assess with any degree of certainty the likeli-

hood that the Government’s position will be deemed so

unreasonable as to produce an EAJA award,” Under-

wood, 487 U.S. at 573-574, and it therefore may be un-

likely that the availability of fees will substantially influ-

ence litigation against the government. Cf. 5 U.S.C.

504(a)(1) (authorizing EAJA awards to prevailing par-

ties only where the government’s position is not “sub-

stantially justified”). Second, to the extent that such

litigation zs influenced by the availability of EAJA fees,

petitioner has it wrong. As the court of appeals ex-

plained, treating paralegal fees as attorney fees could

“distort the normal allocation of work and result in a

less efficient performance of legal services” under the

EAJA, because of the fact that the Act’s cap is set gen-

erally to attorney rates (not paralegal expenses) and

paralegal rates are much lower than those of attorneys.

Pet. App. 18a. The inefficient delegation of attorney

tasks to paralegals could, at the very least, increase the

time it takes to complete such tasks, thereby increasing

the overall size of EAJA awards in a manner contrary to

Congress’s intent to limit awards under the EAJA’s fee

caps.

36

C. Principles Of Sovereign Immunity Require That The

Term “Attorney Fees” Be Narrowly Construed To Ex-

clude Paralegal Expenses

Because the EAJA’s statutory text, structure, and

relevant background confirm that paralegal expenses

are not “attorney fees” reimbursed at prevailing market

rates, this Court need not invoke sovereign immunity

principles to resolve this case. However, if the Act’s text

were ambiguous on this point, those principles would

require that the Act’s award of “attorney fees” be con-

strued narrowly to exclude paralegal time.

It is well settled that waivers of sovereign immunity

“cannot be implied but must be unequivocally ex-

pressed.” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538

(1980) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4

(1969)). Statutory text waiving that immunity must be

“specific and express,” King, 395 U.S. at 4, and not en-

larged beyond what the language plainly requires.

United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34

(1992); see Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 191-192 (1996).

A statutory waiver therefore “must be ‘construed

strictly in favor of the sovereign,’” Nordic Vill., 503

US. at 34 (citation omitted), by interpreting “ambigu-

ities in favor of immunity.” United States v. Williams,

514 U.S. 527, 531 (1995). Even when Congress has

waived sovereign immunity, that waiver itself must be

“strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the

sovereign.” Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.,

525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999) (citing Lane v. Pena, supra, and

Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986)).

Nothing in the EAJA’s text clearly and unambigu-

ously requires that “attorney fees” be construed to in-

clude paralegal expenses. The statutory text does not

directly address the work of paralegals and, even in less

37

complex statutory fee-shifting regimes such as Section

1988, this Court has suggested that the term “attorney’s

fees” standing alone is “genuinely ambiguous” with re-

spect to whether it includes paralegal costs. See Casey,

499 U.S. at 100; pp. 12-13, supra. Moreover, as noted,

the Act contains provisions that are distinct from and

more detailed than the average fee-shifting statute, and

those unique provisions indicate that “attorney fees” in

the EAJA context are limited to compensation for time

worked by attorneys alone. See pp. 13-18, supra. Those

provisions defining the amount of fees that may be

awarded and the EAJA’s broader authorization to award

non-fee “other expenses” thus indicate that paralegal

costs are best understood as “other expenses,” not as

“attorney fees.” Even assuming that this interpretation

were not compelled as a textual matter, the statute’s

silence regarding paralegal expenses at the very least

reflects ambiguity regarding whether such costs are

“attorney fees,” which are reimbursed at prevailing

market rates, or “other expenses” necessary for the

preparation of a party’s case, which are reimbursed at

cost. Cf. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002)

(Where a “statutory provision says nothing explicitly

about” an issue, “such silence * * * normally creates

ambiguity.”).

“Attorney fee” should thus be construed narrowly to

exclude paralegal expenses in light of any such ambigu-

ity. See Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 137-138 (1991)

_ (applying strict construction to the EAJA’s use of “ad-

versary adjudication” and rejecting view that “broad

purposes” of the EAJA can be invoked to overcome

strict construction); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463

U.S. 680, 685-686 (1983) (strictly construing the term

“appropriate” in fee-shifting statute waiving sovereign

38

immunity from fee award); see also United States De-

partment of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 626-627 (1992)

(construing statutory authorization to impose monetary

“sanctions” imposed as “civil penalties” against govern-

ment as excluding punitive penalties notwithstanding

Congress’s use of “a seemingly expansive phrase like

‘civil penalties arising under federal law’” and “unre-

solved tension” in the statutory scheme suggesting that

punitive sanctions may have been intended by Con-

gress). Application of sovereign immunity principles to

limit the recovery of paralegal expenses to actual costs

is particularly appropriate for two additional reasons.

First, the concerns about protecting the public fisc that

animate the strict construction rule are not just an ab-

straction in the EAJA context. Congress in enacting

and amending the EAJA specifically recognized the

need to limit the burden on the public fisc. It is quite

unrealistic to think Congress would have sub silentio

vastly increased the government’s exposure to charges

for paralegals above and beyond actual cost. Second,

application of the principles here will not leave peti-

tioner without a remedy or render paralegal expenses

unrecoverable. As discussed, Congress authorized

EAJA awards not only for “attorney fees” but also for

“other expenses” necessary for the preparation of a

party’s case, and paralegal expenses qualify as such

“other expenses.” Accordingly, this case (unlike Jen-

kins) concerns only the extent to which paralegal time is

reimbursed by the EAJA, not whether they are reim-

bursed at all.

39

Il. THE EAJA COMPENSATES “OTHER EXPENSES” AT

THE COST TO THE ATTORNEY, NOT AT MARKET

RATES CHARGED TO CLIENTS.

Petitioner argues in the alternative (Br. 36-43) that,

even if payments for paralegal time constitute “other

expenses” rather than “attorney fees,” the EAJA com-

pensates “other expenses” at market rates paid by the

client, not at the cost to the lawyer. That issue is not

fairly included in the question presented on which this

Court granted certiorari, was not pressed or passed

upon below, and, thus, is not properly before this Court.

See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535, 537

(1992) (questions “related” and “complementary” to

question presented are not “fairly included therein”);

S. Ct. R. 14.1(a); see also Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S.

383, 388-389 (1994)."° However, even assuming the issue

'© The question presented asked whether a prevailing party under the

EAJA may “be awarded attorney fees for paralegal services at the mar-

ket rate for such services, as four circuits have held, or does EAJA

limit reimbursement for paralegal services to cost only, as the Federal

Circuit panel majority below held.” Pet. i (emphases added). The

petition stated that the four circuit decisions referenced in its question

presented included “the Eleventh Circuit's * * * [holding] that EAJA

authorizes recovery of market-rate attorney fees for paralegal services”

and decisions from three other circuits that “refer|ed] to compensation

for paralegal services as ‘fees’” and thus “presumably rellied] on the

part of EAJA that ties the proper method of calculating ‘fees’ to ‘mar-

ket rates.’” Pet. 7-9 (emphases added). Those four rulings, the petition

argued, were “directly at odds with the Federal Circuit’s basic holding

that paralegal services are cost-based ‘expenses,’ not ‘fees.’” Pet. 9.

Accordingly, the petition sought certiorari based on that purported

conflict and a purported conflict with this Court’s decision in Jenkins,

which held that paralegal costs were “attorney’s fees” under 42 U.S.C.

1988. Pet. 13-22. Fairly read, the question presented thus asked this

Court to review only whether paralegal costs were “attorney fees”

reimbursed at market rates under one line of authority or, instead,

40

were properly presented, petitioner’s argument is un-

availing.

As noted, the EAJA both distinguishes between

“fees” and “other expenses” and specifically provides

that the “amount of fees” that may be reimbursed “shall

be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and

quality of the services furnished.” 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A)

(emphasis added); see pp. 11-14, supra. Congress’s spe-

cific choice to measure “fees” by market rates while pro-

viding no similar provision for “other expenses” strongly

indicates Congress’s intent to reimburse only the ex-

pense of such non-fee items, 7.¢., only their cost. Indeed,

in specifically identifying as other expenses the “reason-

able cost of any study [or] analysis * * * necessary

for the preparation of the party’s case,” 5 U.S.C.

504(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added), Congress manifested its

intent that non-fee “other expenses” be reimbursed at

“cost.” Not only does the interpretive principle of

ejusdem generis support this conclusion, the strict con-

struction owed to waivers of sovereign immunity re-

quires that “other expenses” be taken no further than

were other “expenses” reimbursed by cost under the decision below,

not whether such costs were other “expenses” that should be reim-

bursed at market rates.

In addition, petitioner never argued below that, if paralegal costs

were not “attorney fees,” they should nevertheless be compensated as

an “expense” at market rates. See, e.g., Pet. C.A. Reply Br. 5 (arguing

that “paralegal time billed at cost is an expense of the attorney” but

“paralegal time billed as fees at billing rates are not ‘expenses’ of the

attorney and may be allowed as fees”); id. at 6 (concluding that

“paralegal services should have been awarded as fees”). Petitioner’s

failure to make this argument below—and the related lack of any op-

portunity for the court of appeals to consider and pass upon the argu-

ment—s itself a persuasive reason for this Court not to address it. See

Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1869, 1877 n.2 (2006).

41

the reimbursement of “cost” reflected in the statutory

text.

Moreover, compensating paralegal services at mar-

ket rates would be inconsistent with the statutory ceil-

ing that Congress placed on the amount of attorney and

other professional “fees” that may be reimbursed under

the EAJA. While Congress clearly authorized further

compensation (i.e., “other expenses”) beyond “fees” to

cover the reasonable cost of items or services necessary

for such professionals to prepare a case, there is no evi-

dence that Congress intended to reimburse parties for

any additional profit collected by attorneys that may be

imbedded in the market rates tied to any “other ex-

penses” billed to their clients. Such a reading would

improperly undermine the “need to preserve the in-

tended effectiveness of the [$125] cap,” Underwood, 487

U.S. at 573, that plays a critical role in the Act’s fee re-

imbursement.

Nor is petitioner correct in asserting (Br. 39) that

courts have adopted a “market rate” approach to com-

pensating “other expenses.” While courts have re

While petitioner argues (Br. 37-38) that the court of appeals

improperly distinguished between “fees” and “expenses” because fees

are a type of “expense” under the EAJA, petitioner’s contention seizes

on semantics not substance. The Act clearly distinguishes between

“fees” and “other [non-fee] expenses” and, while the court of appeals

did not retain the word “other” in its discussion of that distinction, a fair

reading of the court’s decision in context makes plain that its use of the

term “expenses” refers to “other expenses” that do not qualify as

“fees.” See, e.g., Pet. App. 4a, 15a.

* While petitioner states (Br. 39) that courts “regularly” approve

expenses such as “transportation and other travel costs, postage, [and]

long[-}distance telephone charges,” the courts of appeals have divided

over whether such charges are properly reimbursable under the EAJA.

Compare Aston v. Secretary of HHS, 808 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986)

42

quired that expenses be of a type that are normally

billed separately to clients in order to be reimbursable

under the EAJA, see, e.g., International Woodworkers

of Am. v. Donovan, 792 F.2d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 1986),

that requirement simply ensures that the expenses are

not general overhead costs that are already accounted

for (in addition to profit) in the prevailing market rates

for attorney fees. Cf. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 287 n.8 (not-

ing that both “costs and profit margin” are imbedded in

amount of attorney’s fees billed to clients). Requiring

that such “other expenses” be of a type normally billed

to clients not only prevents over-reimbursing expenses,

it ensures that the profit margin in an attorney’s hourly

rate is not improperly extended beyond that contem-

plated by the EAJA’s attorney fee caps.

Petitioner’s distinction between expenses directly

paid by attorneys to third-party vendors and those paid

for similar products produced by a firm in-house does

not withstand scrutiny. While petitioner asserts (Br. 39)

that “other expenses” should be paid at “market rates—

that is, at the rate that the client is willing to pay in the

relevant market”—that reasoning would permit reim-

bursement for charges beyond those paid by attorneys

to third-party vendors if the practice in the relevant

legal market was to bill clients for the actual cost paid

by the firm plus a firm overhead charge. Petitioner’s

approach would likewise permit reimbursement of items

such as in-house photocopying at rates that would in-

(travel, postage, and telephone costs are reimbursable), and /nterna-

tional Woodworkers of Am. v. Donovan, 792 F 2d 762, 767 (9th Cir.

1986) (travel, air courier, postage, and telephone costs reimbursable),

with Precision Concrete v. NLRB, 362 F.3d 847, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

(travel, taxis, courier and overnight delivery, facsimile and telephone

costs are not reimbursable).

43

clude profit margin in addition to cost. Nothing in the

EAJA’s text or history suggests Congress intended any

distinction between “other expenses” resulting from in-

house or external purchases or that such expenses

should be compensated at a profit-making rate for attor-

neys.

Petitioner’s final suggestion (Br. 40-42) that calculat-

ing the cost of paralegal services poses practical prob-

lems is overstated. Attorney’s fees calculations often

involve litigation over amounts of fees or costs included

in attorney’s fee requests, including when it comes to

determining the prevailing market rate. There is no

reason to believe that reasonable valuations of costs at-

tributable to paralegal expenses will prove inherently

more difficult, much less elusive."

Much of the difficulty that petitioner and its amici

suggest may be associated with calculating paralegal

costs stems from the degree of precision that they as-

sume is required to document such costs. Such preci-

sion, however, is artificial in the attorney-fee context

where reasonable approximations are generally ac-

cepted. Courts routinely estimate “reasonable” costs,

The two post-Richlin cases that petitioner cites do not suggest

otherwise. The prevailing party in one case requested a $35 hourly rate

based on the rate derived in this suit. That request was granted with-

out government opposition, and nothing in the court’s decision suggests

that the rate was insufficient. See Former Employees of BMC Soft-

ware, Inc. v. United States Sec’y of Labor, No. 04-00229, 2007 WL

4181696, at *3 & n.1 (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 28, 2007). The prevailing

party in the second case withdrew its request for paralegal expenses

rather than document the relevant paralegal costs, and the court’s

decision does not reflect the reason for that withdrawal. /nformation

Scis. Corp. v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 673 (2007). A law firm may

decline to disclose the cost it pays for its paralegals for any number of

reasons independent from the inability to determine that cost.

pen - - - —= — — re" - a sro aoe a

44

market rates, and the time “reasonably” expended on

litigation. Attorneys similarly routinely record and bill

their time in estimated six- or fifteen-minute intervals.

There is no reason why attorneys cannot also provide a

reasonable approximation of the costs of paralegal ser-

vices based on documentation of such costs.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be af-

firmed.

Respectfully submitted.

PAUL D. CLEMENT

Solicitor General

JEFFREY S. BUCHOLTZ

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

GREGORY G. GARRE

Deputy Solicitor General

ANTHONY A. YANG

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

JEANNE E. DAVIDSON

REGINALD T. BLADES, JR.

MICHAEL JAY SINGER

MICHAEL E. ROBINSON

Attorneys

FEBRUARY 2008

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

1. 5 U.S.C. 504 provides in relevant part:

Costs and fees of parties

(a)(1) An agency that conducts an adversary adjud-

ication shall award, to a prevailing party other than the

United States, fees and other expenses incurred by that

party in connection with that proceeding, unless the ad-

judicative officer of the agency finds that the position of

the agency was substantially justified or that special cir-

cumstances make an award unjust. Whether or not the

position of the agency was substantially justified shall be

determined on the basis of the administrative record, as

a whole, which is made in the adversary adjudication for

which fees and other expenses are sought.

(2) A party seeking an award of fees and other ex-

penses shall, within thirty days of a final disposition in

the adversary adjudication, submit to the agency an ap-

plication which shows that the party is a prevailing par-

ty and is eligible to receive an award under this section,

and the amount sought, including an itemized statement

from any attorney, agent, or expert witness represen-

ting or appearing in behalf of the party stating the ac-

tual time expended and the rate at which fees and other

expenses were computed. The party shall also allege

that the position of the agency was not substantially jus-

tified. When the United States appeals the underlying

merits of an adversary adjudication, no decision on an

application for fees and other expenses in connection

with that adversary adjudication shall be made under

this section until a final and unreviewable decision is

rendered by the court on the appeal or until the under-

(la)

2a

lying merits of the case have been finally determined

pursuant to the appeal.

xs kk kK *

(b)(1) For the purposes of this section—

(A) “fees and other expenses” includes the rea-

sonable expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable

cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test,

or project which is found by the agency to be neces-

sary for the preparation of the party’s case, and rea-

sonable attorney or agent fees (The amount of fees

awarded under this section shall be based upon pre-

vailing market rates for the kind and quality of the

services furnished, except that (i) no expert witness

shall be compensated at a rate in excess of the high-

est rate of compensation for expert witnesses paid by

the agency involved, and (ii) attorney or agent fees

shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour un-

less the agency determines by regulation that an in-

crease in the cost of living or a special factor, such as

the limited availability of qualified attorneys or ag-

ents for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher

fee.);

x* * ke *

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Respondents Brief — RICHLIN SEC. SERVICE CO. v. Chertoff · 553 U.S. 571 | Frix