Respondents Brief — RICHLIN SEC. SERVICE CO. v. Chertoff
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No. 06-1717
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In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
RICHLIN SECURITY SERVICE COMPANY, PETITIONER
Vv.
MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
PAUL D. CLEMENT
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JEFFREY S. BUCHOLTZ
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
GREGORY G. GARRE
Deputy Solicitor General
ANTHONY A. YANG
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
JEANNE E. DAVIDSON
REGINALD T. BLADES, JR.
MICHAEL JAY SINGER
MICHAEL E. ROBINSON
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether, under the Equal Access to Justice Act,
5 U.S.C. 504 and 28 U.S.C. 2412, paralegal services are
“attorney fees” compensable at market rates or “other
expenses” compensable at the rate of cost to the attor-
ney.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
i i i oe eri eee way ]
ee . cncuecttbapedededseeseckinss 6
Argument:
1. The EAJA reimburses paralegal charges at the
I ee ad ele ci ic esnrccnce 10
A. The plain language and the structure of the
EAJA demonstrate that the paralegal costs
are “other expenses” reimbursed at cost, not
“attorney fees” reimbursed at prevailing
EE on hdd eWaN cheb ddaskbtbseeoseccess 10
B. The legislative history and purpose of the
EAJA confirms Congress’s intent to reimburse
paralegal time at cost as an out-of-pocket
BE o.oo cov ienncanskoswhskendanedsccccsss 26
C. Principles of sovereign immunity require
that the term “attorney fees” be narrowly
construed to exclude paralegal expenses ........ 36
Il. The EAJA compensates “other expenses” at
the cost to the attorney, not at market rates
SE L.davicucdkcasGheadbdneieische<cks 39
SEE 46 i usadhederecucendskssdubaubuthecedsenees 44
NS 66a 045 640660s Senses enabeadcketheteseavates la
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
American Acad. of Pediatrics v. Heckler,
580 F. Supp. 436 (D.D.C.), vacated in part,
594 F. Supp. 69 (D.D.C. 1984) ............... ee eee 29
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006) ......... 5, 7, 17, 21, 27
(III)
Cases—Continued: Page
Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129 (1991) ............0... 37
Ashton v. Pierce, 580 F. Supp. 440 (D.D.C. 1984) ...... 28
Aston v. Secretary of HHS, 808 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1986) ... 41
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States,
i es eda cr eee es ceusebue 24
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) .............. 37
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) ....... 60. c cece eee 4
Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383 (1994) ......... 0.006. 39
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412
ED Wikis eeda essudneerebbedaigngseberecdess 25
City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992) ....... 24
Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990) .... 32, 34
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.
EE ick ba ee he ce dan isnbstenetaeneweusceses 19
Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S.
dies chica sh a nbnegPaeeeeebebedseneees 36
Fanning, Phillips & Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717
a od ce eee ees ecbavaways 1]
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) ....... 24, 25
Former Employees of BMC Software, Inc. v. United
States Sec’y of Labor, No. 04-00229, 2007 WL
4181696 (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 28, 2007) ............. 43
Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1979) ........ 33
General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S.
athe ie iicheneckekseksenseeeecsees 24
Glick v. United States Civil Serv. Comm’n,
567 F. Supp. 1483 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd, 799 F.2d
gta cades 29
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) ............ 20
Cases—Continued: Page
Independent Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes,
SEED kencendcviesacdsencnesniuns 24, 25
Information Scis. Corp. v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. :
PED x. vn nccenbarxesteesseconendueesentasens 43
International Woodworkers of Am. v. Donovan,
792 F.2d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 1986) .................. 42
Jones v. Armstrong Cork Co., 630 F.2d 324 (5th Cir.
SUED koctkdesvewsverss batudusbanseeabeweshenent 33
Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46 (1st Cir.
SOUEE . 6-000 6000s innnseeeueeensshendessuus anne 33
Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996) .............eeeeeee 36
Lane v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 294 F.3d 1001
GED ove catcecandcecedctaveiieesscckiues 11
Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986) ...... 36
Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991) ............ 31
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989) ........ passim
Northcross v. Board of Educ. of the Memphis City
Schs., 611 F.2d 642 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 911 (1980), overruled in relevant part by
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989) ..... 29, 30, 33
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council
for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987) ............2005. 23
Photo Data, Inc. v. Sawyer, 533 F. Supp. 348 (D.D.C.
TED se nccnctscsavadcebapsdeuasenssdangeuntian 29
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988) ........ passim
Precision Concrete v. NLRB, 362 F.3d 847, 854 (D.C.
CEE 0 o.080-+cenrensheecuepweebdsseseeneuieet 42
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) ......... 26
Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522 (1987) ....... 34
VI
Cases——Continued: Page
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983) ....... 37
Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 126 8. Ct. 1869
cin sa weeee ste seceue os 40
Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1998) .............. 25
Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 (1989) ...........45. 25
Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 545 F.2d
EE 33
United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973) ......... 32
United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969) .............. 36
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 585 (1980) ......... 36
United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992) ... 36
United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995) ........ 36
United States Department of Energy v. Ohio,
EE ee 38
West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83
I Ede Ke euciueehihsesbesees 19, 21, 26, 37
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) .......... 39
Statutes and rules:
Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183:
eck iché eebeeesebessaceceeese 15
EE ee ee 15
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tit. VI1, 42 U.S.C. 2000e
TE BAhaddeGdeedesebendesdsoccecédeceesceces 25
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C.
gE SERS POPr ety PTTTeT TTT TTT TT ee passim
Vil
Statutes and rules—Continued: Page
Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. 96-481, Tit. II,
94 Stat. 2325:
IEEE cn cccccoccccnseseusens 32
sii sce caveceudkienens 15, 28
§ 204(c), 20B, 94 Stat. MBZO .... 2... cece ceees 15, 28
i itd osenebnwdeewnseewde 15, 28
Equal Access to Justice Act:
a A ee oe 2,7, 11
DUS.C.504(a)1) 0.0... eee eee eee 2, 6, 11, 21, 35
EE pict cncageddkccetesess 12, 13, 22
5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A) (1988) ........ 6... eee eee 32
DO IED sce ccccccccoscoccccs passim
DU SEUUNIIED cccccccccccccccscces 18, 22
ET eee nc iccsnnsackasdnadecendans 2
ED nn ne cncnisnassekdnewinnde 2
28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(A) .........-...4.. 2, 11, 14, 29
28 U.S.C. 2412(GMZMAME) 2... ec ce eee cees 18
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.
PEE. ca rcnacadhccesneseccccccccecouesoose: 17
SPR SUID ovctecccccssccceceees 17
Service Contract Act of 1965, 41 U.S.C. 351 et seg. ...... 1
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, Tit. II,
PEE nevedauccddcceecesscccoes 15
SPREE Onc o50nseucesédcandeecdsneesencasaas 24
EE dnexdvetesnnédesnectavackensannan 19, 21
INGE ne nceecaccessdsucnecscusoscesssetedee 33
Vill
Rules—Continued: Page
i ek le 19
TE a he Dene BO Per. lpg 39
Miscellaneous:
Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers (1989) ........... 16
Altman Weil, Inc.:
New Survey Provides Snapshot of Law Firm
Economics Across U.S. (Aug. 2, 2007)
<http://www.altmanweil.com/index.cfm/
Fa/r.resource_detail/oid/87716caa-56df-4ad9-
b375-9e9366ba6d60/resource/New_Survey_
Provides Snapshot_of_Law_Firm_
Economics Across US.cfm> ................. 16
Paralegal Compensation Survey Shows Solid
Increases (May 22, 2007) <http://www.
altmanweil.com/index.cfm/fa/r.resource_
detail/oid/3f87 107 1-6be8-44dd-a469-
532a7a4ab0fb/resources/Paralegal_
Compensation_Survey_Shows_Solid_
EY dda deue cee keddausdecessiucest 16
DT ddduddneveséadedmbebaceleaseadataes 15, 16
The 2003 Survey of Law Firm Economics (2003) .... 15
Award of Attorneys’ Fees Against the Federal
Government: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) ................. 15, 27, 28
46 Fed. Reg. (1981): |
PEE Ghbnbevededcoudhedeausentedeusacacepaset 31
IX
Miscellaneous—Continued: Page
ED tchidecenkionnnceensonaawawewene 31
i swiedteanaeiekaeneveriebhenes eneseuns 31
DP cal cvedegndenst eddedeaswosuiudtcdsurenh 31
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) .. 28
H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
EE abuse teeridedadracébcpensigsecececs passim
H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) ........ 32
S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979) ....... 15, 27
S. Rep. No. 586, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) ...... passim
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
EE ink dt etdiedanbeeesundeneséesees 13
The Random House Dictionary of the English
EY END kcccecascucsccccescccacs: 13
Webster's Third New International Dictionary
BED CecSe ccc cccesserseviccedsssvecessevescess 12
Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
No. 06-1717
RICHLIN SECURITY SERVICE COMPANY , PETITIONER
v.
MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
STATEMENT
1. Petitioner contracted with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service in 1990 and 1991 to provide guard
services for detainees at the Los Angeles International
Airport. Pet. App. 2a. In 1995, the Department of La-
bor determined that the contracts had misclassified peti-
tioner’s employees for purposes of the wage classifica-
tion scheme of the Service Contract Act of 1965, 41
U.S.C. 351 et seq., resulting in underpayment of peti-
tioner’s employees. Pet. App. 2a-3a. The Department of
Labor further found that employees were entitled to
back wages from petitioner. /bid. Petitioner then filed
a claim against the government for the increased costs
associated with the parties’ misclassification of peti-
tioner’s employees and, after its claim was denied, pur-
(1)
2
sued an administrative appeal to the Department of
Transportation Board of Contract Appeals (Board) with-
out representation by legal counsel. /d. at 26a, 32a.
After the Board determined that petitioner was enti-
tled to compensation from the government, petitioner
retained legal counsel in 1998 to represent petitioner
before the Board in further proceedings to quantify the
amount of compensation owed. Pet. App. 27a, 33a-34a.
A series of appeals to the Board and to the Federal Cir-
cuit ensued. Petitioner ultimately secured partial suc-
cess on its $1.57 million claim when the Board awarded
petitioner approximately $700,000 in compensation. /d.
at 3a, 26a, 44a. The court of appeals affirmed. /d. at 3a.
2. In 2003, petitioner applied to the Board under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA or Act), 5 U.S.C.
504, for an award of attorney fees and other expenses.
Pet. App. 29a. The EAJA authorizes an agency to award
“fees and other expenses” to a “prevailing party” in ad-
versary administrative proceedings in cases in which the
position of the United States is not “substantially justi-
fied” and no special circumstances would make an award
unjust. 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1).'
The statute defines “fees and other expenses” to in-
clude “the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engi-
neering report, test, or project which is found by the
agency to be necessary for the preparation of the party’s
case” as well as “reasonable expenses of expert wit-
nesses” and “reasonable attorney or agent fees.”
5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A). The statute further provides:
' A separate provision of the EAJA provides for recovery of “fees
and other expenses” from the United States hy a prevailing party ina
civil action in court. 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A); see also 28 U.S.C.
2412(d)(2)(A) (defining “fees and other expenses”). Section 2412 is not
at issue in this case.
3
The amount of fees awarded under this section shall
be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind
and quality of the services furnished, except that
(i) no expert witness shall be compensated at a rate
in excess of the highest rate of compensation for ex-
pert witnesses paid by the agency involved, and
(ii) attorney or agent fees shall not be awarded in
excess of $125 per hour unless the agency deter-
mines by regulation that an increase in the cost of
living or a special factor, such as the limited avail-
ability of qualified attorneys or agents for the pro-
ceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.
Ibid. Because the Department of Transportation (like
most agencies) has not promulgated regulations autho-
rizing the Board to increase the statute’s $125-per-hour
ceiling on “attorney or agent fees,” reimbursement for
such fees by the Board is limited to $125 per hour.
Petitioner’s EAJA application, as amended, sought
reimbursement for $51,794 in attorney fees for work on
the underlying proceedings before the Board and
$14,225 in attorney fees for time spent preparing peti-
tioner’s EAJA application based on the statute’s maxi-
mum rate of $125 per hour. Pet. App. 5a, 29a; ef. C.A.
App. 30, 91, 169 (listing hourly rate of petitioner’s pri-
mary counsel as $325 to $400 per hour). Petitioner addi-
tionally sought reimbursement for paralegals used by
petitioner’s attorney. The amended EAJA application
sought reimbursement at an $80 hourly paralegal rate
beginning in 1998, which increased to $95 in 2002 and
$135 in 2004. Jd. at 41, 156, 211; cf. Pet. App. 33a
(amended application eliminated EAJA claim for work
before June 1998). Petitioner thus sought reimburse-
ment, generally at these rates, for 523.8 hours of para-
4
legal time on the underlying cases and 68.2 hours of
paralegal time preparing the EAJA application, totaling
$51,901 in paralegal charges. /d. at 5a.’
3. The Board awarded petitioner $43,312 in attorney
fees for the underlying cases and $7,125 in fees for the
preparation of the EAJA petition. Pet. App. 47a, 52a.
With regard to reimbursement for paralega! expenses,
the Board ruled that, under the EAJA, such expenses
are recoverable at the cost to the firm, not at the rate
billed to the client. Finding no evidence in the record
concerning the cost of paralegal services to the firm,*
the Board, rather than denying paralegal expenses en-
tirely, took judicial notice of paralegal salaries in the
Washington, D.C. area and found that $35 per hour was
a reasonable cost to petitioner’s Washington-based firm.
* As the court of appeals noted, it appears that petitioner reduced its
fee request to $95 per hour for periods in which petitioner’s EAJA
application asserted a $135 hourly rate. Pet. App. 5a; see Reply to
Respondent’s Answer to Richlin’s Am. Application for Attorney’s Fees
& Expenses 5 (stating that petitioner “reduced any of its paralegal
costs claimed in excess of $95 per hour to $95 per hour”).
* Petitioner similarly did not submit affidavits or other evidence that
its requested rates were consistent with prevailing charges in the rele-
vant legal market. The time records submitted by petitioner were gen-
erated in connection with petitioner’s EAJA claim (and not submitted
as contemporaneous bills to petitioner), see Appellant’s Application for
Attorney’s Fees & Expenses 20, and, while petitioner asserted in a legal
brief that $400 (for counsel) and $135 (for paralegals) reflected “market
rates” because its counsel uses these hourly rates and “(c]lients pay
* * * without objection,” Reply to Respondent’s Answer to Richlin’s
Am. Application for Attorney’s Fees & Expenses 4, the Board found
that petitioner failed to prove that its requested paralegal rate reflected
a prevailing market rate. Pet. App. 42a n.4; cf. Blum v. Stenson, 465
U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984). The court of appeals had no occasion to revisit
that aspect of the Board's ruling.
5
Id. at 42a-43a. The Board accordingly awarded peti-
tioner $10,587 for paralegal expenses. /d. at 52a.
4. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. la-24a.
Relying on the text, structure, purpose, and history of
the EAJA, the court of appeals ruled that paralegal
costs are not compensable as “fees,” but rather consti-
tute other “expenses” that are recoverable only at the
cost to the attorney. /d. at 7a-19a.
In particular, the court explained that the EAJA al-
lows for the recovery of “expenses” beyond just “fees,”
but allows the recovery of such expenses only to the ex-
tent of their underlying cost. Given that additional cate-
gory and, in light of the strict construction that must be
given to the EAJA’s limited waiver of sovereign immu-
nity, the court determined that Congress intended
paralegal costs to be recoverable as “expenses” reim-
bursed at cost to the attorney, and not “fees.” Pet. App.
6a, 15a. That construction, the court explained, was bol-
, Stered by the fact that Congress had gone out of its way
to place a cap on attorney fees, but had not separately
capped paralegal costs. /d. at 16a. In light of that statu-
tory feature, the court found it “unlikely that Congress
would have set the maximum fee for paralegal services
as high as $75 per hour (the equivalent, of about $185 in
today’s dollars)—a level that likely exceeded the then-
current billing rate for paralegal services—given the
overall desire to cap allowable fees below market rates.”
Id. at 16a-17a (footnote omitted) (citing Arlington Cent.
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2460
(2006)). Indeed, the court noted, the legislative history
underlying the EAJA’s 1985 reenactment specifically
addressed the question of paralegal costs and states that
paralegal charges reflect a “type of expense[]” under the
6
EAJA that is “billed at cost.” Jd. at 19a; see id. at 56a
n.2.
The court of appeals recognized that Missouri v.
Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989), had construed a “reason-
able attorney’s fee” under the Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 1988, to include
compensation for the work of paralegals, and that simi-
lar fee-shifting statutes using similar language are nor-
mally construed in the same manner. Pet. App. 9a-11a,
13a. However, the court concluded that the “differences
in the surrounding language, structure, and purpose” of
the EAJA required that the Act be interpreted differ-
ently from Section 1988. Jd. at 13a-15a.
Senior Judge Plager dissented. Pet. App. 20a-24a.
He reasoned that the interpretation of the EAJA should
be guided by this Court’s interpretation of Section 1988,
and thus concluded that paralegal services should be
recoverable as “attorney fees.” Jd. at 20a-21la.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The court of appeals correctly held that paralegal
expenses are reimbursed at cost under the EAJA as
“other expenses” and are not “attorney fees” reimburs-
able at prevailing market rates.
I. A. The EAJA provides that federal agencies shall
award “fees and other expenses” to prevailing parties in
adversary administrative adjudications when the posi-
tion of the United States is not substantially justified
and no special circumstances would make the award un-
just. 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1). “Fees,” in turn, are categorized
as attorney, agent, and expert witness fees, the reim-
bursement of which is limited to prevailing market rates
subject to a statutory ceiling for each category of fees.
5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A). The language, structure, and leg-
7
islative history of the EA.JA demonstrate that paralegal
expenses are “other expenses” reimbursable at cost, and
not “attorney fees.”
The most natural reading of “attorney fees” in
5 U.S.C. 504 is one that provides compensation for an
attorney’s time spent representing a party in litigation.
In common parlance, “attorney fees” do not mean “para-
legal” expenses. That resolution is bolstered by the sur-
rounding text. The EAJA’s broader category of “other
expenses” naturally captures costs that are associated
with an attorney’s representation of a party, but are not
themselves “attorney fees.” Thus, while expenses for
paralegal assistance are not readily embraced by the
phrase “attorney fees,” they fall comfortably into the
EAJA’s second and related category of reimbursable
“other expenses.”
Other provisions of the EAJA confirm that “attorney
fees” do not include paralegal expenses. While the
EAJA requires that attorney fees be calculated based on
prevailing market rates, Congress also imposed a statu-
tory ceiling on the amount of “attorney fees” that may
be awarded. Congress set the cap based on the billing
rates of attorneys and not the rates of paralegals, which
were dramatically lower. And when Congress set the
cap at $75 and later increased it to $125 the ceiling
capped “attorney fees” at a level below that of many
attorneys nationwide. Congress’s decision to use attor-
neys’ charged rates subject to caps and its failure to
impose any analogous caps on paralegals’ rates strongly
suggests Congress thought paralegal charges would be
treated as expenses (subject to the “cap” of their actual
cost). Cf. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2006).
8
Compensating paralegal expenses as “attorney fees”
would result in EAJA awards for paralegal time that are
disproportionately high relative to the fees that can be
recovered for ordinary attorney work (because paralegal
rates are generally much lower than those of attorneys)
and, indeed, would permit attorneys to recover paralegal
expenses that are near or equal to the awards given for
the time of even extraordinarily experienced attorneys.
To the extent that litigation against the government is
informed by the availability of EAJA fees, that anomaly
could “distort the normal allocation of work” by encour-
aging attorneys to shift work to paralegals (where they
can recover the full amount of, or at least a greater pro-
portion of, their normal hourly rates) and thus “result in
a less efficient performance of legal services.” Pet. App.
18a.
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989), does not
compel a different conclusion. That case involved the
construction of a different fee-shifting statute (Section
1988) with materially different language. Except for a
narrow category of court “costs,” Section 1988 autho-
rizes reimbursement of prevailing civil rights plaintiffs
only for “attorney’s fees” and, the Court held in Jenkins,
the term “attorney’s fees” must therefore include com-
pensation for the work of those paid by attorneys to con-
tribute to the attorneys’ work product. In the EAJA,
however, Congress provided for reimbursement of a
second statutory category—“other expenses”—in addi-
tion to “attorney fees.” That second category fundamen-
tally changes the analysis. In Jenkins, the Court’s task
was to define the term “attorney’s fees,” and paralegal
expenses were either encompassed in that term or unre-
coverable. Here, by contrast, paralegal expenses can be
recovered, and the Court’s task is to decide which statu-
9
tory category encompasses paralegal expenses. More-
over, Section 1988 was designed to provide a “fully com-
pensatory” fee to prevailing civil rights plaintiffs; by
contrast, the EAJA’s fee caps specifically preclude such
a recovery.
Nor does the canon of construction that similar
words should normally be construed similarly suggest
that Jenkins should be extended to the EAJA context.
That canon readily yields where, as here, it is reasonable
to conclude from variations in statutory text and context
that the words were intended to embrace different
meanings. This Court has therefore construed “virtually
identical” language in fee-shifting statutes differently
when the policy considerations and legislative history
underlying the statutes pointed to different outcomes.
B. The EAJA’s legislative history underscores that
Congress intended the term “attorney fees” and the cap
on such fees to apply “only to the compensation of law-
yers” themselves and not to other costs connected with
their representation of parties. H.R. Rep. No. 1418,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1980). Congress made that in-
tent plain in the process of reenacting the EAJA in 1985.
For example, the Senate Report on reenactment ex-
plained that attorneys’ out-of-pocket expenses should be
compensated under EAJA as other expenses and that
“paralegal time” should be reimbursed in that manner
“at cost.” S. Rep. No. 586, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15
(1984). This Court has twice relied on the very same
report as accurately reflecting congressional intent sur-
rounding the reenactment of the EAJA, and it addresses
conclusively the question presented here.
C. If there were any doubt as to the proper construc-
tion of “attorney fees,” the canon of construction that
the scope of waivers of sovereign immunity should be
10
narrowly construed in favor of the sovereign compels
the conclusion that paralegal expenses are not a type of
“attorney fees” under the EAJA. Nothing in the
EAJA’s text requires a contrary result, particularly be-
cause the EAJA’s provision of “other expenses” aptly
captures paralegal expenses necessary for the prepara-
tion of a party’s case.
Ii. The Court should reject petitioner’s alternative
argument that even if paralegal time is not compensated
as “attorney fees” and are “other expenses” under the
EAJA, “other expenses” should be reimbursed at the
market rate paid by the client, not at the cost of the at-
torney. To begin with, this contention is not fairly in-
cluded in the question presented, was not pressed or
passed upon below, and therefore is not properly before
the Court. In any event, the argument fails. The EAJA
specifically provides that attorney, agent, and expert
witness “fees” are to be awarded at prevailing market
rates, but makes no similar provision for “other ex-
penses.” To the contrary, in discussing the recovery
available for such “other expenses,” Congress focused
on reimbursement for their “reasonable cost.” 5 U.S.C.
504(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
ARGUMENT
I. THE EAJA REIMBURSES PARALEGAL CHARGES AT
THE COST TO THE ATTORNEY.
A. The Plain Language And The Structure Of The EAJA
Demonstrate That The Paralegal Costs Are “Other Ex-
penses” Reimbursed At Cost, Not “Attorney Fees” Reim-
bursed At Prevailing Market Rates
The EAJA provides that federal agencies shall award
“fees and other expenses” to prevailing parties in adver-
ll
sary administrative adjudications when the position of
the United States is not substantially justified and no
special circumstances would make an award unjust.
5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1). The statute’s definition of “fees and
other expenses” distinguishes between two categories of
expenses: (1) those that qualify as attorney, agent, or
expert witness “fees” and are reimbursed at “prevailing
market rates” subject to a statutory cap; and (2) other,
non-“fee” expenses which are reimbursed at “cost.” 5
U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A). As the court of appeals correctly
concluded, the text, structure, and legislative history all
point to the conclusion that paralegal expenses fall into
the latter category and thus may be reimbursed at cost,
not market rates.
1. The bare language of 5 U.S.C. 504 strongly favors
the conclusion that paralegal expenses are reimbursable
as a non-fee “expense,” rather than an “attorney fee.”
By authorizing awards of “fees and other expenses,” the
statute identifies two types of compensable “expenses”:
(1) fees and (2) other, non-fee expenses. Section 504
further permits reimbursement of three types of fees for
professionals that a party may retain to litigate a case:
the “reasonable expenses [including fees] of expert wit-
nesses” and “reasonable attorney or agent fees.”
5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A).* An application for an EAJA
* Inthe EAJA context, an “agent” is a specialized non-attorney prac-
titioner authorized to represevit clients before an administrative agency
with the special permission of the tribunal. See Lane v. United States
Dep't of Agric., 294 F.3d 1001, 1003 (8th Cir. 2002); Fanning, Phillips
& Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717, 721-722 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also H.R.
Rep. No. 1418, supra, at 14 (“An ‘agent fee’ may be awarded for the
services of a non-attorney where an agency permits such agents to
represent parties who come before it.”). Consequently, the EAJA does
not authorize the payment of “agent fees” in court proceedings, where
only attorneys may normally serve as legal representatives. See 28
12
award must therefore include an “itemized statement
from any attorney, agent, or expert witness represent-
ing or appearing on behalf of the party stating the actual
time expended and the rate at which fees and other ex-
penses were computed.” 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(2).
Petitioner contends that paralegal expenses qualify
as an “attorney fee” under the EAJA, but the Act’s stat-
utory language points decisively in the opposite direc-
tion. The words “attorney fees” do not, on their own,
suggest that the term embraces paralegal expenses. A
paralegal is not an “attorney,” and, indeed, may not
practice law. And while paralegals may assist attorneys
who provide legal services, Congress’s use of the word
“attorney” rather than a more general word such as “lit-
igation” to modify “fees” suggests that separate charges
for paralegals do not constitute “attorney fees.” It is
also noteworthy that Congress provided that the profes-
sionals whose fees may be reimbursed must submit an
itemized list of their expenses and their fees, 5 U.S.C.
504(a)(2), but Congress made no provision for paralegals
to submit itemized reports of expenses and fees. That
suggests that paralegal services are an expense to be
listed on attorneys’ itemized statements, not a fee.
At the same time, reimbursement for paralegal work
fits comfortably into the EAJA’s more general category
of “other expenses” that may be compensated in addi-
tion to attorney, agent, or expert fees. The term “ex-
penses” is commonly used to refer to “an item of outlay
incurred in the operation of a business enterprise” or
“the charges that are incurred by an employee in con-
nection with the performance of his duties.” Webster’s
U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(A). Petitioner does not contend that paralegal
expenses qualify as “agent fees” or “expert witness fees.” Cf. Pet. App.
7a, 9a.
13
Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language 800 (1986); see The Random House Dictio-
nary of the English Language 680 (2d ed. 1987)
(“charges incurred during a business arrangement”);
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Lan- .
guage 462 (1976) (“[c]harges incurred while performing
one’s job”). That definition fits well in the EAJA context
where an “attorney, agent, or expert witness represent-
ing or appearing in behalf of [a] party,” 5 U.S.C.
504(a)(2), will incur such business charges in connection
with the provision of professional litigation-related ser-
vices. Where a paralegal provides assistance to an at-
torney by performing tasks necessary to prepare a
party’s case, the attorney’s payment of such paralegal
costs are closely analogous to the “cost of any study,
analysis,” or “project” that the EAJA identifies as
“other expenses” reimbursable when “necessary for
the preparation of the party’s case.” See 5 U.S.C.
504()(1)(A).
2. Other provisions within the EAJA confirm that
paralegal charges ancillary to an attorney’s provision of
legal services are “other expenses” and not “attorney
fees.” In particular, the Act’s detailed provisions that
“define and limit” the reasonable amount of “fees” that
may be compensated with federal funds, Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572 n.3 (1988), both demon-
strate that paralegal expenses are not reimbursed as
“fees” and reflect Congress’s intent to limit the amount
of profit imbedded in the fees of attorney, agents, and
experts that the government will compensate under the
Act.
Two independent statutory restrictions limit the
amount of a reasonable fee awarded under the EAJA.
First, Congress specified that the “amount of fees * * *
14
shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind
and quality of the services furnished.” 5 U.S.C.
504(b)(1)(A). Second, Congress further imposed statu-
tory caps limiting the maximum hourly rate reimburs-
able under the Act, reflecting the judgment that, “what-
ever the local or national market might be,” the reason-
able amount of “public reimbursement” for professional
services should not exceed the cap (unless a statutory
exception is satisfied). See Underwood, 487 U.S. at 572.
EAJA fee awards in agency proceedings are thus
capped, for expert witness fees, at the “highest rate of
compensation for expert witnesses paid by the agency
involved” and, for “attorney or agent fees,” at “$125 per
hour unless the agency determines by regulation that an
increase in the cost of living or a special factor * * *
justifies a higher fee.” 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A).°
As the court of appeals recognized, it would be anom-
alous to construe paralegal expenses as a type of “attor-
ney fee” because doing so would provide disproportion-
ately high reimbursement for paralegals (whose hourly
charges are generally much lower than the fees charged
by attorneys) when the EAJA restricts the hourly rate
for attorney time to below prevailing rates in many legal
markets. See Pet. App. 16a-17a & n.11. Congress rec-
ognized when it originally enacted the EAJA in 1980
that the statute’s “attorney fee” ceiling (then at $75 per
hour) would often reimburse less than the prevailing
° The EAJA imposes similar statutory ceilings with respect to fees
associated with civil actions in court. Expert witness fees are limited to
“the highest rate of compensation paid for expert witnesses by the
United States” and “attorney fees” are subject to the same $125-per-
hour cap “unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of
living or a special factor * * * justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C.
2412(d)(2)(A).
15
market rate for the work of attorneys. The cap was
eliminated then restored in the legislative process, see
S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1979), as a com-
promise that addressed concerns about the fiscal impact
of the statute.® After the EAJA was repealed following
a three-year experimental period from October 1981 to
October 1984, see EAJA, Pub. L. No. 96-481, Tit. II,
§§ 203(c), 204(c), 208, 94 Stat. 2327, 2329, 2330, Congress
reenacted the EAJA in 1985 with several changes, but
Congress retained the pre-existing $75 hourly cap on
“attorney fees.” See Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
80, $§ 1, 6, 99 Stat. 183, 186. The $75 cap thus remained
below prevailing market rates for attorneys in much of
the country. See Altman Weil, Inc., The 2003 Survey of
Law Firm Economics 82 (2003) (comprehensive survey
showing that 1985 national median hourly rate for law
firm associates and partners was $82 and $128, respec-
tively). When Congress raised the cap to its current
$125 per hour ceiling in 1996, it continued that pattern.
See Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, Tit. IT, § 231(b)(1), 110
Stat. 863; Altman Weil, Inc., The 1996 Survey of Law
Firm Economics I1-3 (1996) (1996 Survey) (1996 na-
* In explaining the bill the Senate passed after the bill was reported
by the committee which he chaired, Senator DeConcini explained that
while attorney rates in some communities might be well below the $75
ceiling, the “going rate” for attorney fees in large cities was $75 per
hour “or more,” and that the bill’s level of reimbursement did not “make
the taxpayer whole” because it represented a compromise that ad-
dressed the cost concerns of the Administration. See Award of Attor-
neys’ Fees Against the Federal Government: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1980) (state-
ment of Sen. DeConcini); see also pp. 27-30, infra (discussing legislative
history).
16
tional average hourly rates for associates and partners
were $127 and $184, respectively).
Because paralegal rates were undoubtedly far below
the EAJA’s fee caps when Congress established and
revised them in 1980, 1985, and 1996, it would be anoma-
lous to read the Act as compensating paralegal expenses
as “attorney fees” subject to a cap that Congress estab-
lished for attorneys and agents alone. Cf. 1996 Survey
II-3 (1996 national average paralegal rate was $66 per
hour); ef. also H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
15 (1980) (“The ceiling on attorney fees relates only to
the compensation of lawyers and agents (e.g., accoun-
tants themselves).”) (emphasis added). Doing so would
mean that Congress intended to ensure that para-
legals—but not attorneys—could obtain all or at least a
greater portion of their rates under the EAJA.'
’ Data from comprehensive surveys of legal billing rates show that
the 2007 median billing rates nationwide for law firm partners and
associates were $305 and $200 per hour, respectively, and were much
higher in some localities. In Washington, D.C., for instance, the data
reflect median hourly rates of $455 and $295, respectively. See Altman
Weil, Inc., New Survey Provides Snapshot of Law Firm Economics
Across U.S. (Aug. 2, 2007) <http://www.altmanweil.com/index.cfm/fa/
r.resource_detail/oid/87716caa-56df-4ad9-b375-9e9366ba6d60/resource/
New_ Survey Provides Snapshot_of_Law_Firm_Economics_Across_
US.cfm>.
The data similarly show that billing rates for paralegal time have
increased in 2007 to a national median of $160 per hour. At the median
hours billed per paralegal in 2006 (1490 hours), a single paralegal would
generate $238,400 in law firm revenue at this rate, far outstripping the
$59,973 in median total cash compensation paid to paralegals nation-
wide. See Altman Weil, Inc., Paralegal Compensation Survey Shows
Solid Increases (May 22, 2007) <http:/Awww.altmanweil.com/index.cfm/
fa/r.resource_detail/oid/3f87 1071 -6be8-44dd-a469-532a7a4ab0fb/
resources/Paralegal Compensation_Survey_Shows_Solid_
Increases.cfm>; ef. Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 198 (1989)
17
This Court recently relied upon a similar statutory
anomaly in rejecting the argument that expert fees were
recoverable under the attorney’s fees provision of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20
U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The IDEA “contains detailed provi-
sions that are designed to ensure that [‘attorney’s fees’ |
awards are indeed reasonable,” but contains no similar
provisions geared to regulating the amount of fees for
experts. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2006) (Arlington) (citing
20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(8)(C)-(G)). Given Congress’s attention
to regulating the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees,
this Court concluded that the “absence of any compara-
ble provisions relating to expert fees strongly suggests
that recovery of expert fees is not authorized.” /bid.
The same reasoning applies here. Congress’s attention
to establishing a cap on “attorney fees” in the EAJA
based upon a maximum rate that is obviously geared to
the billing rates for attorneys and the absence of an
analogous cap specifically geared to paralegal rates
“strongly suggests” that Congress did not intend para-
legal expenses to be compensated as an “attorney fee.”
The anomalous results produced under petitioner's
construction of “attorney fee” are reinforced by this
Court’s decision in Pierce v. Underwood, supra. There,
the Court explained that the EAJA’s fee cap suggests
Congress determined that the cap represented “gener-
ally quite enough public reimbursement for lawyers’
fees, whatever the local or national market might be.”
487 U.S. at 572. Given that assessment, the “need to
preserve the intended effectiveness of the [$125] cap”
led the Court to read narrowly the Act’s authorization to
(discussing data from 1984 to 1986 indicating that law firms billed
paralegal time at a rate two to four times the cost of a paralegal).
18
exceed the cap when the “limited availability of qualified
attorneys or agents for the proceedings involved” justi-
fies a higher fee, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). See Under-
wood, 487 U.S. at 572-573; ef. 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A)(ii).
The Court thus held that “attorneys ‘qualified for the
proceedings’” did not permit an increase based on an
attorney’s “extraordinary leve! of the general lawyerly
knowledge and ability useful in all litigation” and was
limited to contexts where attorneys were qualified in
some “specialized sense” with “distinctive knowledge or
specialized skill needed for the litigation in question.”
Id. at 572. Given that an attorney with an “extraordi-
nary level of the general lawyerly knowledge and abil-
ity” can be reimbursed at a rate no greater than the
Act’s fee cap, it would be particularly incongruous to
interpret “attorney fees” as including paralegal ex-
penses that may be reimbursed at 2 rate up to the very
same cap.
Moreover, as the court of appeals explained (Pet.
App. 18a), to the extent that litigation against the gov-
ernment is influenced by the availability of EAJA fees,
allowing paralegal expenses to be recovered as “attor-
ney fees”—without a meaningful cap like the statute
sets for the fees of attorneys—would “create a perverse
incentive.” In particular, it could cause attorneys—
whose fees are capped at $125—to shift work to para-
legals—whose charges are generally lower and effec-
tively uncapped. As the court of appeals explained,
“treating paralegal fees as attorney’s fees would [thus]
distort the normal allocation of work and result in a less
efficient performance of legal services.” /bid. Treating
paralegal expenses as “other expenses” recoverable at
cost eliminates that “perverse incentive.”
19
3. In arguing that paralegal expenses are “attorney
fees” under the EAJA, petitioner principally relies not
on the statute’s text, but instead on this Court’s inter-
pretation of a different statute in Missowri v. Jenkins,
491 U.S. 274 (1989). Pet. Br. 14-24. Jenkins involved a
distinct statutory scheme reflecting materially different
statutory text with a different structure, purpose, and
history. Those differences illustrate Congress’s intent
to treat the reimbursement of paralegal expenses differ-
ently in the EAJA, and demonstrate that Jenkins’ rea-
soning and result should not be extended to this case.
a. The Court in Jenkins interpreted the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 1988,
which authorizes courts to award prevailing parties in
certain civil rights actions a “reasonable attorney’s fee
as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). Just two years
earlier, the Court had concluded that Congress “com-
prehensively addressed” the “kinds of expenses that a
federal court may tax as costs” under Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(d) by restricting the meaning of “costs” to the six
types of costs listed in 28 U.S.C. 1920. Crawford Fitting
Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 440-442 (1987);
see West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 87
& n.3 (1991) (Crawford Fitting’s reasoning applies to
“costs” under 42 U.S.C. 1988). Jenkins accordingly ad-
dressed the meaning of a “reasonable attorney’s fee” in
Section 1988 against a backdrop in which paralegal ser-
vices were not recoverable “costs” and could be recov-
ered under Section 1988, if at all, only as attorney’s fees.
The Court held that they could be recovered as such
fees. See Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285.
Thus, in Jenkins, the only statutory hook for award-
ing paralegal expenses was a provision for “attorney’s
fees,” so the choice was to reimburse paralegal expenses
20
as “attorney’s fees,” or nothing. In this context, the
Court concluded that the phrase “reasonable attorney’s
fee” could not have been meant by Congress “to compen-
sate only work performed personally by members of the
bar” and, instead, must have been intended to “refer to
a reasonable fee for the work product of an attorney.”
Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285. The Court explained that the
term therefore must include “the work not only of attor-
neys, but also of secretaries, messengers, librarians,
janitors, and others whose labor contributes to the work
product for which an attorney bills her client,” including
“the work of paralegals.” /bid.
Jenkins then addressed the appropriate method of
valuing the work of paralegals, guided largely by the
Court’s prior recognition that Section 1988 grants “the
successful civil rights plaintiff a ‘fully compensatory
fee.’” 491 U.S. at 286 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)). That requirement to “yield
the same level of compensation that would be available
from the market” led the Court to conclude that para-
legal expenses must be reimbursed under Section 1988
in the same manner that such expenses are billed to cli-
ents in the relevant legal market at prevailing market
rates. Jd. at 286-287. Otherwise, “if the prevailing prac-
tice in the community were to bill paralegal time sepa-
rately at market rates, fees awarded to the attorney at
market rates for attorney time would not be fully com-
pensatory if the court refused to compensate hours
billed by paralegals or did so only at ‘cost.’” Jd. at 287.
b. While petitioner contends (Br. 15-16) that
Jenkins’ holding that paralegal expenses are an element
of a “reasonable attorney’s fee” under Section 1988 “ap-
plies with full force to EAJA,” the reasoning underlying
Jenkins’ holding demonstrates the opposite to be true.
2]
First, the presence of additional statutory language
in the EAJA shows that the Act’s use of the term “attor-
ney fees” is more limited than that of its textual counter-
part (“attorney’s fees”) in Section 1988. Section 1988
authorizes awards of “attorney’s fees” as part of the
“costs,” but because the word “costs” is a recognized
term of art that consists of the items listed in 28 U.S.C.
1920, see Casey, 499 U.S. at 87 & n.3, “attorney’s fees”
is the only term in Section 1988 that might authorize
compensation for expenses associated with preparing a
client’s case. Cf. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2460. Jenkins
thus concluded that “attorney’s fees” under that statute
must take into account the “work not only of attorneys”
but also the expense of those “whose labor contributes
to the work product for which an attorney bills her cli-
ent” (including paralegals) and “other expenses and
profit.” 491 U.S. at 285 (emphasis added).
The EAJA, in contrast, expressly authorizes the re-
imbursement of “[attorney] fees and other expenses,”
5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) (emphasis added),
thereby separating into two distinct components what
Section 1988 combines in the single term of “attorney’s
fees.” These other “expenses” include items that would
not be recoverable as traditional “costs.” Thus, the exis-
tence of the category of “other expenses” must inform
the meaning of “attorney fees.” If the term “attorney
fees” in the EAJA were given the same broad interpre-
tation as its Section 1988 counterpart, that interpreta-
tion would improperly strip meaning from (and perhaps
even render superfluous) Congress’s express provision
for “other expenses” under the Act.
Petitioner is wrong in arguing that this Court’s inter-
pretation in Jenkins that paralegal expenses are “attor-
ney’s fees” means that paralegal expenses must always
22
qualify as “attorney’s fees.” Of course, paralegal ex-
penses would not qualify as “attorney’s fees” in a statute
that separately addressed “paralegal expenses” as such.
And here, paralegal expenses do not qualify as “attorney
fees” because the EAJA—unlike Section 1988—provides
for reimbursement of a second category of “other ex-
penses” that is naturally read to encompass paralegal
expenses. Nothing in Jenkins precludes that construc-
tion.
Moreover, unlike Section 1988, the text of the EAJA
provides that “the amount of fees”—not other non-fee
expenses—are to be determined based on “prevailing
market rates,” 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A); establishes a cap
on the rate at which “attorney fees” may be reimbursed;
provides an exception from that ceiling on “attorney
fees” based on factors addressing attorneys, not para-
legals; and requires those categories of professionals
(attorneys, agents, and experts) whose fees are to be
reimbursed to submit itemized time. See 5 U.S.C.
504(a)(2) (requiring itemized statements of fees and ex-
penses from “any attorney, agent, or expert witness”
representing or appearing on behalf the fee applicant);
5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A)(ii) (authorizing exception to fee
cap based on “limited availability of qualified attor-
neys”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1418, supra, at 15 (“The
ceiling on attorney fees relates only to the compensation
of lawyers and agents (e.g., accountants themselves).”)
(emphasis added). It would be inconsistent with these
limiting aspects of the EAJA to compensate “other ex-
penses” for the work of paralegals using prevailing mar-
ket rates rather than cost since Congress expressly re-
served such treatment for the “amount of fees.” See
also S. Rep. No. 586, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1984)
(“paralegal time” is an expense reimbursed at “cost”
23
under the EAJA). Had Congress intended to treat
“other expenses” in the same manner, it presumably
would have enacted statutory text to that effect.
The EAJA’s fee cap further reflects a basic struc-
tural difference between the Act and Section 1988.
Whereas “Congress’s intent [was] to provide a ‘fully
compensatory fee’” to prevailing plaintiffs under Section
1988, Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 287, the EAJA is “fundamen-
tally” different because “it is not designed to reimburse
fees without limit” and, thus, often does not provide a
“fully compensat[ory]” award because prevailing market
rates for lawyers often exceed its $125-per-hour cap on
fees. See Underwood, 487 U.S. at 573 (emphasis
added).* The very existence of that cap, whose only
function is to limit “public reimbursement for lawyers’
fees” below prevailing market rates, id. at 572, illus-
trates a core distinction between the EAJA and fee-
shifting statutes similar to Section 1988. See id. at 573
(concluding that whether the contingent nature of an
attorney fee agreement may justify an increase in the
amount of a reasonable “attorney fee” was “quite differ-
ent” under the EAJA, which is a “fundamentally” differ-
ent “sort of statutory scheme” than statutes like Section
1988; distinguishing Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987)
(Delaware Valley I1)); ef. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S.
at 713 & n.1 (award of “reasonable attorney’s fee” under
* This is true even in cases, unlike the present case, where regula-
tions permit a cost-of-living adjustment to the EAJA’s $125-per-hour
ceiling. Assuming plaintiffs’ estimate (Br. 7) of an adjusted rate of
$168-per-hour to be correct, survey data indicate that the 2007 billing
rates of most attorneys far exceed that rate. See p. 16 n.7, supra (2007
median hourly rates nationwide for partners and associates were $305
and $200 and, in Washington, D.C., $455 and $295, respectively).
24
Clean Air Act “follow[s] the principles and case law”
developed under Section 1988).
c. The important statutory differences between the
EAJA and Section 1988 fatally undermine petitioner’s
argument that Jenkins’ interpretation of Section 1988
controls here. To be sure, this Court has often con-
strued similar text to have the same meaning in differ-
ent statutes and has applied that interpretive principle
to Section 1988 and “many other federal fee-shifting
statutes” which, like Section 1988, award prevailing par-
ties a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of costs. See,
e.g., City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562
(1992); Independent Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes,
491 U.S. 754, 758 & n.2 (1989). However, the “presump-
tion that identical words * * * are intended to have the
same meaning” is “not rigid and readily yields’—even
when the same word is used in separate places within a
single statute—“whenever there is such variation in the
connection in which the words are used as reasonably to
warrant the conclusion that they were employed * * *
with different intent.” General Dynamics Land Sys.,
Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595 (2004) (quoting Atlantic
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427,
433 (1932)).
This Court in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517,
522-524 (1994), thus rejected the contention that its “de-
cisions construing similar fee-shifting language” in other
statutes controlled the proper interpretation of the
Copyright Act even though the Copyright Act’s fee-
shifting provision used “virtually identical language.”
Fogerty declined to extend to the copyright context the
* The Copyright Act authorizes courts to award “a reasonable at-
torney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs” in civil actions
under the act. 17 U.S.C. 505.
25
holding in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434
U.S. 412 (1978), that prevailing plaintiffs under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S:C. 2000e et seq.,
should normally obtain an award of attorney’s fees but
prevailing defendants should not. While acknowledging
that “fee-shifting statutes’ similar language is a ‘strong
indication’ that they are to be interpreted alike,” the
Fogerty Court held that that “normal indication” did not
apply because Christiansburg’s reasoning relied on fac-
tors including policy considerations and Title VII’s legis-
lative history that did not apply to the Copyright Act.
510 U.S. at 523 (quoting Zipes, 491 U.S. at 758 n.2).”°
That conclusion applies with even greater force here.
As discussed, the pertinent text of the EAJA is not “vir-
tually identical” to Section 1988 and, instead, contains
material differences. In particular, the EAJA provides
another category of expenses—“other expenses”—that
are reimbursable, which is unavailable under the statute
at issue in Jenkins. Additionally, the broader context of
the EAJA’s attorney fees provisions illustrates that fee
awards under the Act, unlike Section 1988 and similar
statutes, are not driven by a policy of full compensation.
See pp. 14-16, 23, supra. Petitioner’s narrow focus on
the use of the term “attorney fees” in both the EAJA
Petitioner incorrectly suggests (Br. 19) that Sullivan v. Hudson,
490 U.S. 877 (1989), construed the EAJA’s use of the term “civil action”
based on the principle that similar terms in fee-shifting statutes are to
be construed alike. Hudson nowhere invoked or relied upon that
interpretive canon. Instead, the Court reviewed the reasoning in its
prior decisions that addressed whether other fee-shifting statutes
allowed a court to award attorney fees for administrative proceedings
that were related to the action before the court. and concluded that the
“principles we found persuasive” in those prior decisions also “were
controlling here.” /d. at 888-889, 892; cf. generally Shalala v. Schaefer,
509 U.S. 292, 298-300 & n.4 (1993) (limiting scope of Hudson’s holding).
26
and Section 1988 thus fails to account for the well-estab-
lished rule that.a statute’s use of such terms must be
interpreted not only by reference to the terms’ specific
text but also by “the specific context in which that lan-
guage is used, and the broader context of the statute as
a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341
(1997)."
B. The Legislative History And Purpose Of The EAJA Con-
firms Congress’s Intent To Reimburse Paralegal Time
At Cost As An Out-Of-Pocket Expense
The legislative history of the EAJA confirms that
paralegal expenses are not a category of “attorney fees”
reimbursed at prevailing market rates but rather are
a type of “other expenses” to be reimbursed only at the
out-of-pocket cost to attorneys. Congress expressed
its understanding in 1980 that “attorney fees” was lim-
ited to compensation for an attorney’s time alone and,
when Congress revisited the EAJA in 1984 to reenact
the statute, it clarified not only that the EAJA reim-
bursed reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by
attorneys but also that “paralegal time” should be
“billed at cost” as such an expense. To the extent the
" Petitioner's reliance (Br. 23-24) on Casey is unavailing. Casey
simply discussed this Court’s decision in Jenkins; it did not a. or the
meaning of that decision and therefore provides no basis for disregard-
ing the considerations discussed above as to why Jenkins is not
controlling. See Casey, 490 U.S. at 99-100. More fundamentally, Casey
indicates that this Court has not been willing to read the phrase
“attorney’s fees” broadly to sweep in non-“attorney” fees where, as
here, there are textual indications that Congress intended to treat
“separate elements of litigation cost” (id. at 88) separately when it
comes to awarding litigation fees and expenses. Likewise, the Court
cautioned against a reading of fee-shifting statutes (including the
EAJA) that would deprive meaning from the full statutory text of those
provisions. See id. at 89, 91.
27
Court determines it useful to consult the legislative his-
tory, that should end the matter. Cf. Arlington, 126
S. Ct. at 2466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1. a. The EAJA’s authorization to award “attorney
fees” subject to a statutory ceiling resulted from a com-
promise entered to facilitate the Act’s passage by limit-
ing the size of awards and, hence, the Act’s impact on
the federal fisc. Initial efforts to enact the EAJA were
derailed in the 95th Congress because of concerns re-
garding the Act’s “high projected costs to the United
States.” H.R. Rep. No. 1418, supra, at 6. Those con-
cerns persisted and led to a compromise in the 96th Con-
gress limiting the scope of recovery. In the Senate, pro-
ponents of a broader bill to reimburse attorney fees
more fully initially succeeded in amending the Senate
bill to eliminate the $75 per hour “attorney fee” cap, but
the cap was later restored by the Judiciary Committee
before that bill passed the Senate. See S. Rep. No. 253,
supra, at 8.
The Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee
explained that the bill’s $75 attorney fee cap did not
“make the taxpayer whole” and, while he would have
preferred authorizing more generous awards, the bill
reflected a necessary “compromise|[]” made in the “pro-
cess of attempting to grind out legislation.” See Award
of Attorneys’ Fees Against the Federal Government:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liber-
ties and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1980) (statement
of Sen. DeConcini). That compromise “tried to strike
some common ground” recognizing that “attorneys’ fees
per hour vary immensely” by locality and that the “go-
ing rate” for attorneys in large cities was $75 per hour
“or more.” Jbid.; see also ibid. (statement of Rep.
28
Kastenmeier) (bill appears to “strike a balance” and to
be an “accommodation to the feelings of the Government
* * * as to cost” to facilitate “passing the bill”); id. a:
33 (statement of Rep. Railsback) (bill “represent[s] a
compromise”).
The 1980 House Report on the Senate bill, which was
enacted as the EAJA, accordingly explained that the $75
“ceiling on attorney fees relates only to the compensa-
tion of lawyers or agents (e.g., accountants themselves)”
and does not apply to the “costs connected with their
representation of a particular interest in a proceeding.”
H.R. Rep. No. 1418, supra, at 15 (emphasis added); cf.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1980)
(EAJA’s text is identical to bill reported by House).
That understanding of “attorney fees” and the associ-
ated cap on reimbursement for attorney time indicates
that expenses for items such as paralegal time, if reim-
bursable at all under the EAJA, would have been under-
stood by Congress not as “attorney fees” but as “other
expenses” similar to the reimbursable “cost of any
study, analysis,” or “project” “necessary for the prepa-
ration of the party’s case,” 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A).
In the three-year period between the Act’s October
1981 effective date and its October 1984 repeal, see
EAJA, Pub. L. 96-481, Tit. II, §§ 203(c), 204(c), 208, 94
Stat. 2327, 2329, 2330, a “controversy [arose] over
whether the definition of ‘fees and other expenses’ was
intended to be exclusive or whether, in addition to the
costs of studies and analyses [expressly included in that
definition], courts and agencies may award reasonable
out-of-pocket expenses incurred in connection with a
case.” S. Rep. No. 586, supra, at 15 (emphasis added).
Compare, e.g., Ashton v. Pierce, 580 F. Supp. 440, 443 & n.4(D.D.C.
1984) (“compensation for * * * paralegal time” is “an expense
29
The Senate Report addressing the EAJA’s reenactment
thus explained that, while the bill reenacting the Act
retained the original 1980 “language” of the definition,
the Report provided congressional “clarification” that
the definition permits reimbursement of such out-of-
pocket expenses. /bid.
Significantly for present purposes, the Report stated
that “[e]xamples of the type of expenses that should or-
dinarily be compensable include paralegal time (billed at
cost).” S. Rep. No. 586, supra, at 15 (emphasis added).
In doing so, the Report expressly endorsed (1) an inter-
pretation of the EAJA reflected in 1981 Model Rules
implementing the Act and (2) the result reached by the
Sixth Circuit concerning out-of-pocket expenses in the
Section 1988 context in Northcross v. Board of Educ. of
the Memphis City Schs., 611 F.2d 624, 639 (6th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980), overruled in
relevant part by Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285
n.7 (1989). See S. Rep. No. 586, supra, at 15. Both the
Model Rules and the Sixth Circuit specifically treated
covering ‘study’ and ‘analysis’ within the meaning of [the EAJA],”
which is “reimbursed at actual salary cost for time expended”), and
American Acad. of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 580 F . Supp. 436, 440 (D.D.C.
1984) (paralegal expenses “may be reimbursed at actual salary cost to
the law firm as an expense of litigation” under the EAJA; following
Ashton), vacated in part, 594 F. Supp. 69 (D.D.C. 1984) (vacating
different portion of EAJA award), with Glick v. United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 567 F. Supp. 1483, 1487 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (rejecting
claim for paralegal expenses because such expenses are “part of the
lawyer's overhead, covered by the lawyer's fee rate” under the EAJA,
which “should not be assessed against a defendant at a ‘profit making’
rate”), aff'd, 799 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1986) (Table), and Photo Data, Inc.
v. Sawyer, 533 F . Supp. 348,353 (D.D.C. 1982) (limiting reimbursement
of expenses to the “reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering
report, test, or project”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)A)).
30
paralegal expenses as reimbursable at the out-of-pocket
cost to an attorney, not as part of an attorney fee.
b. Petitioner contends (Br. 24-28) that the Senate
Report’s statement that paralegal expenses are “billed
at cost” does not undermine petitioner’s view that such
expenses are “attorney fees” compensable at market
rates. That position rests on four contentions, each of
which is misplaced. First, petitioner states (Br. 25) that
“expenses” under the EAJA encompass “attorney fees”
and that the Report merely notes that paralegal costs
are “expenses.” But the statute clearly distinguishes
between things like studies and fees for attorneys,
agents, and experts. The Report specifically explains
that “out-of-pocket expenses” may be reimbursed like
“the cost of studies and analyses” and proceeds to iden-
tify “paralegal time” as one “such expense[]” reimburs-
able at “cost.” S. Rep. No. 586, supra, at 15 (emphasis
added).
Second, petitioner asserts (Br. 26) that the Report’s
approval of the result in Northcross aids petitioner’s
case because, in petitioner’s view, Northcross “held that
attorney fees for paralegal services should be awarded
at market rates,” not cost. That is incorrect. North-
cross concluded that paralegal expenses constitute “rea-
sonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attor-
ney,” which therefore would be reimbursed under 42
U.S.C. 1988 at the attorney’s cost for such assistance.
See Northcross, 611 F.2d at 639. Indeed, in Jenkins,
this Court itself concluded that Northcross “considered
paralegal work ‘out-of-pocket expense,’ recoverable only
at cost to the attorney.” 491 U.S. at 285 n.7.
Third, petitioner argues (Br. 25-26) the Report’s reli-
ance on a Model Rule issued by the Chairman of the Ad-
ministrative Conference of the United States is inconclu-
31
sive because the Rule permits expenses to be billed sep-
arately from an attorney fee under the EAJA if such
expenses are ordinarily billed to clients. Cf. 46 Fed.
Reg. 32,900, 32,913 (1981) (Model Rule 0.106(b)). The
Rule’s preamble, however, explains that the Rule is
based on the understanding that an “attorney’s out-of-
pocket expenses ordinarily chargeable to clients” should
be reimbursed separately and in addition to the
“charges for the attorney’s time” that would be subject
to the EAJA’s (then) $75-per-hour ceiling on attorney
fees. Id. at 32,904-32,905 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1418,
supra, at 15). The preamble accordingly explains that
“paralegal costs should be chargeable as expenses” in
that manner. /d. at 32,905. Indeed, the preamble high-
lights the out-of-pocket character of paralegal expenses
in stating that the Model Rule’s drafters decided against
listing paralegal time or other specific items as “com-
pensable expenses” because “practices with respect to
charging [clients} for paralegal time, as with respect to
other expenses such as duplicating, telephone charges,
and the like, vary” depending on locality and field of
practice. /bid.
Finally, petitioner claims (Br. 26-28) that the Senate
Report “is not ‘legislative history’ at all” because the bil!
it accompanied was vetoed by the President late in the
second session of the 98th Congress and the EAJA was
not reenacted until the next year in the following Con
gress. In at least two unanimous decisions, however.
this Court has cited the same report as accurately re-
flecting congressional intent underlying the EAJA's
reenactment in contexts where, as here, the post-veto
passage of the EAJA involved statutory language that
was not materially different from the text discussed in
the report. See, e.g., Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S.
Te
32
89, 96 (1991) (citing Report as demonstrating that Con-
gress “explicitly” adopted and ratified one side of circuit
split concerning the meaning of “final judgment”); Com-
missioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 159 & n.7 (1990)
(citing Report as reflecting Congress’s understanding of
the EAJA’s definiticn of “position of the United
States”). See also United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S.
396, 404-405 & n.14 (1973) (concluding that earlier legis-
lative history may be pertinent where it reflects an in-
terpretation of “the very language subsequently enacted
by Congress”).
In this case, the relevant statutory text of 5 U.S.C.
504(b)(1)(A) discussed in the 1984 Report is identical to
the statutory text reenacted by Congress in 1985. In
fact, the post-veto bill was merely a “revision” of the
legislation that the President vetoed in 1984 and, while
portions were changed to “address concerns which the
Administration raised in the President’s veto message,”
H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1985), the bill
at issue in the 1984 Senate Report reflected the defini-
tion of “fees and other expenses” enacted as law in 1985.
Compare 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A) (1988), with S. Rep. No.
586, supra, at 1-2 (text of bill reported by 1984 Report),
and EAJA, Pub. L. No. 96-481, Tit. II, § 203(a)(1), 94
Stat. 2326 (original definition retained upon reenact-
ment).
To the extent petitioner suggests (Br. 21-22) that
Congress likely intended paralegal expenses to be a
form of “attorney fees” reimbursed at prevailing market
rates because Congress enacted the EAJA in 1980
against a “legal background” in which courts “generally”
awarded paralegal expenses at market-rates, petitioner
is incorrect. Before 1980, the few precedential decisions
addressing the reimbursement of paralegal expenses
33
under other federal fee-shifting statutes had produced
decidedly uneven results."* More to the point, the Sen-
ate Report’s ratification of the outcome in Northcross—
in which the court held that paralegal expenses were
recoverable at cost—cuts decidedly against petitioner’s
position."
In short, to the extent there is any doubt from the
EAJA’s statutory text, the Act’s legislative history
strongly confirms that the Act reimburses “paralegal
time” as an “out-of-pocket expense[],” not an attorney
fee, and compensates that expense at “cost,” S. Rep. No.
586, supra, at 15, in the same manner that the Act
reimburses “other [non-fee] expenses” such as the
“cost of any study, analysis,” or “project * * * neces-
'’ Compare Northcross, 611 F.2d at 639, and Lamphere v. Brown
Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 48 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1979) (paralegal expense reim-
bursed at amount paid by attorney under Title VII when paralegals
were not regularly employed by the attorney), with Todd Shipyards
Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 545 F.2d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 1976) (interpret-
ing 33 U.S.C. 928).
'* Not only does petitioner misread Northcross, as discussed earlier,
petitioner’s description of the “legal background” in 1980 overreads
other decisions. See, e.g., Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778, 781-782 (10th
Cir. 1979) (holding that award totaling $400 for legal services was abuse
of discretion where record showed expenditure of 133.75 hours of
attorney and paralegal time; remanding for recalculation of award
without addressing how to compensate paralegal expenses); cf. Jones
v. Armstrong Cork Co., 630 F.2d 324, 325 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that
district courts had taken various positions concerning paralegal
expenses). Perhaps because of the “increasingly widespread custom of
separately billing for the services of paralegals” observed in the 1980s,
courts of appeals appear to have more frequently addressed the
question of reimbursing paralegal charges (in non-EA.JA contexts) after
the EAJA’s enactment. See Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 284 & n.7, 286 (citation
omitted) (noting circuit split under 42 U.S.C. 1988 based on Northcross
and cases decided after Northcross).
34
sary for the preparation of the party’s case,” 5 U.S.C.
504(b)(1)(A).
2. Petitioner suggests (Br. 34) that limiting reim-
bursement of paralegal expenses to cost as an “other
expense” would contravene the “central purpose of
EAJA” to eliminate financial disincentives to litigation
against the government. But the caps that Congress
enacted in the EAJA for attorney fees, among other pro-
visions, underscore that Congress did not pursue such a
purpose at all costs, and petitioner simply fails to ac-
count for the compromises that Congress struck to enact
the legislation.’ More generally, petitioner ignores the
fact that “no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs”
and that “[dJjeciding what competing values will or will
not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular ob-
jective is the very essence of legislative choice.” Rodri-
guez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-526 (1987) (per
curiam) (“(I)t frustrates rather than effectuates legisla-
tive intent simplistically to assume that whatever fur-
thers the statute's primary objective must be the law.”).
Indeed, this Court’s decision in Underwood, which con-
strued the EAJA’s attorney fee previsions narrowly in
order to “preserve the intended effectiveness” of the
EAJA’s ceiling on the reimbursement of attorney fees,
illustrates that the Act’s general goals cannot form a
proper basis for determining the amount of reimburse-
* Petitioner cites to language in Jean, 496 U.S. at 163, suggesting
that the EAJA was intended to “eliminate” not just diminish the fi-
nancial disincentive to challenge certain governmental actions. Jean,
however, only addresses the “narrow” question of eligibility for an
EAJA award “rather than the amount that may be appropriately
awarded,” and nothing in Jean suggests that EAJA awards should fully
compensate litigants. See id. at 156, 163.
35
ment awarded under the EAJA. See Underwood, 487
U.S. at 572-573.
Petitioner contends that the EAJA should be con-
strued to reimburse paralegal costs at market rates
rather than cost because doing so would encourage para-
legal use at lower rates and, thus, encourage the “cost-
effective delivery of legal services.” Br. 28-29 (quoting
Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 288). There are two problems with
this argument in the EAJA context. First, because the
“EAJA subsidy is not directed to a category of litigation
that can be identified in advance,” a “lawyer will rarely
be able to assess with any degree of certainty the likeli-
hood that the Government’s position will be deemed so
unreasonable as to produce an EAJA award,” Under-
wood, 487 U.S. at 573-574, and it therefore may be un-
likely that the availability of fees will substantially influ-
ence litigation against the government. Cf. 5 U.S.C.
504(a)(1) (authorizing EAJA awards to prevailing par-
ties only where the government’s position is not “sub-
stantially justified”). Second, to the extent that such
litigation zs influenced by the availability of EAJA fees,
petitioner has it wrong. As the court of appeals ex-
plained, treating paralegal fees as attorney fees could
“distort the normal allocation of work and result in a
less efficient performance of legal services” under the
EAJA, because of the fact that the Act’s cap is set gen-
erally to attorney rates (not paralegal expenses) and
paralegal rates are much lower than those of attorneys.
Pet. App. 18a. The inefficient delegation of attorney
tasks to paralegals could, at the very least, increase the
time it takes to complete such tasks, thereby increasing
the overall size of EAJA awards in a manner contrary to
Congress’s intent to limit awards under the EAJA’s fee
caps.
36
C. Principles Of Sovereign Immunity Require That The
Term “Attorney Fees” Be Narrowly Construed To Ex-
clude Paralegal Expenses
Because the EAJA’s statutory text, structure, and
relevant background confirm that paralegal expenses
are not “attorney fees” reimbursed at prevailing market
rates, this Court need not invoke sovereign immunity
principles to resolve this case. However, if the Act’s text
were ambiguous on this point, those principles would
require that the Act’s award of “attorney fees” be con-
strued narrowly to exclude paralegal time.
It is well settled that waivers of sovereign immunity
“cannot be implied but must be unequivocally ex-
pressed.” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538
(1980) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4
(1969)). Statutory text waiving that immunity must be
“specific and express,” King, 395 U.S. at 4, and not en-
larged beyond what the language plainly requires.
United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34
(1992); see Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 191-192 (1996).
A statutory waiver therefore “must be ‘construed
strictly in favor of the sovereign,’” Nordic Vill., 503
US. at 34 (citation omitted), by interpreting “ambigu-
ities in favor of immunity.” United States v. Williams,
514 U.S. 527, 531 (1995). Even when Congress has
waived sovereign immunity, that waiver itself must be
“strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the
sovereign.” Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.,
525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999) (citing Lane v. Pena, supra, and
Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986)).
Nothing in the EAJA’s text clearly and unambigu-
ously requires that “attorney fees” be construed to in-
clude paralegal expenses. The statutory text does not
directly address the work of paralegals and, even in less
37
complex statutory fee-shifting regimes such as Section
1988, this Court has suggested that the term “attorney’s
fees” standing alone is “genuinely ambiguous” with re-
spect to whether it includes paralegal costs. See Casey,
499 U.S. at 100; pp. 12-13, supra. Moreover, as noted,
the Act contains provisions that are distinct from and
more detailed than the average fee-shifting statute, and
those unique provisions indicate that “attorney fees” in
the EAJA context are limited to compensation for time
worked by attorneys alone. See pp. 13-18, supra. Those
provisions defining the amount of fees that may be
awarded and the EAJA’s broader authorization to award
non-fee “other expenses” thus indicate that paralegal
costs are best understood as “other expenses,” not as
“attorney fees.” Even assuming that this interpretation
were not compelled as a textual matter, the statute’s
silence regarding paralegal expenses at the very least
reflects ambiguity regarding whether such costs are
“attorney fees,” which are reimbursed at prevailing
market rates, or “other expenses” necessary for the
preparation of a party’s case, which are reimbursed at
cost. Cf. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002)
(Where a “statutory provision says nothing explicitly
about” an issue, “such silence * * * normally creates
ambiguity.”).
“Attorney fee” should thus be construed narrowly to
exclude paralegal expenses in light of any such ambigu-
ity. See Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 137-138 (1991)
_ (applying strict construction to the EAJA’s use of “ad-
versary adjudication” and rejecting view that “broad
purposes” of the EAJA can be invoked to overcome
strict construction); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463
U.S. 680, 685-686 (1983) (strictly construing the term
“appropriate” in fee-shifting statute waiving sovereign
38
immunity from fee award); see also United States De-
partment of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 626-627 (1992)
(construing statutory authorization to impose monetary
“sanctions” imposed as “civil penalties” against govern-
ment as excluding punitive penalties notwithstanding
Congress’s use of “a seemingly expansive phrase like
‘civil penalties arising under federal law’” and “unre-
solved tension” in the statutory scheme suggesting that
punitive sanctions may have been intended by Con-
gress). Application of sovereign immunity principles to
limit the recovery of paralegal expenses to actual costs
is particularly appropriate for two additional reasons.
First, the concerns about protecting the public fisc that
animate the strict construction rule are not just an ab-
straction in the EAJA context. Congress in enacting
and amending the EAJA specifically recognized the
need to limit the burden on the public fisc. It is quite
unrealistic to think Congress would have sub silentio
vastly increased the government’s exposure to charges
for paralegals above and beyond actual cost. Second,
application of the principles here will not leave peti-
tioner without a remedy or render paralegal expenses
unrecoverable. As discussed, Congress authorized
EAJA awards not only for “attorney fees” but also for
“other expenses” necessary for the preparation of a
party’s case, and paralegal expenses qualify as such
“other expenses.” Accordingly, this case (unlike Jen-
kins) concerns only the extent to which paralegal time is
reimbursed by the EAJA, not whether they are reim-
bursed at all.
39
Il. THE EAJA COMPENSATES “OTHER EXPENSES” AT
THE COST TO THE ATTORNEY, NOT AT MARKET
RATES CHARGED TO CLIENTS.
Petitioner argues in the alternative (Br. 36-43) that,
even if payments for paralegal time constitute “other
expenses” rather than “attorney fees,” the EAJA com-
pensates “other expenses” at market rates paid by the
client, not at the cost to the lawyer. That issue is not
fairly included in the question presented on which this
Court granted certiorari, was not pressed or passed
upon below, and, thus, is not properly before this Court.
See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535, 537
(1992) (questions “related” and “complementary” to
question presented are not “fairly included therein”);
S. Ct. R. 14.1(a); see also Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S.
383, 388-389 (1994)."° However, even assuming the issue
'© The question presented asked whether a prevailing party under the
EAJA may “be awarded attorney fees for paralegal services at the mar-
ket rate for such services, as four circuits have held, or does EAJA
limit reimbursement for paralegal services to cost only, as the Federal
Circuit panel majority below held.” Pet. i (emphases added). The
petition stated that the four circuit decisions referenced in its question
presented included “the Eleventh Circuit's * * * [holding] that EAJA
authorizes recovery of market-rate attorney fees for paralegal services”
and decisions from three other circuits that “refer|ed] to compensation
for paralegal services as ‘fees’” and thus “presumably rellied] on the
part of EAJA that ties the proper method of calculating ‘fees’ to ‘mar-
ket rates.’” Pet. 7-9 (emphases added). Those four rulings, the petition
argued, were “directly at odds with the Federal Circuit’s basic holding
that paralegal services are cost-based ‘expenses,’ not ‘fees.’” Pet. 9.
Accordingly, the petition sought certiorari based on that purported
conflict and a purported conflict with this Court’s decision in Jenkins,
which held that paralegal costs were “attorney’s fees” under 42 U.S.C.
1988. Pet. 13-22. Fairly read, the question presented thus asked this
Court to review only whether paralegal costs were “attorney fees”
reimbursed at market rates under one line of authority or, instead,
40
were properly presented, petitioner’s argument is un-
availing.
As noted, the EAJA both distinguishes between
“fees” and “other expenses” and specifically provides
that the “amount of fees” that may be reimbursed “shall
be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and
quality of the services furnished.” 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A)
(emphasis added); see pp. 11-14, supra. Congress’s spe-
cific choice to measure “fees” by market rates while pro-
viding no similar provision for “other expenses” strongly
indicates Congress’s intent to reimburse only the ex-
pense of such non-fee items, 7.¢., only their cost. Indeed,
in specifically identifying as other expenses the “reason-
able cost of any study [or] analysis * * * necessary
for the preparation of the party’s case,” 5 U.S.C.
504(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added), Congress manifested its
intent that non-fee “other expenses” be reimbursed at
“cost.” Not only does the interpretive principle of
ejusdem generis support this conclusion, the strict con-
struction owed to waivers of sovereign immunity re-
quires that “other expenses” be taken no further than
were other “expenses” reimbursed by cost under the decision below,
not whether such costs were other “expenses” that should be reim-
bursed at market rates.
In addition, petitioner never argued below that, if paralegal costs
were not “attorney fees,” they should nevertheless be compensated as
an “expense” at market rates. See, e.g., Pet. C.A. Reply Br. 5 (arguing
that “paralegal time billed at cost is an expense of the attorney” but
“paralegal time billed as fees at billing rates are not ‘expenses’ of the
attorney and may be allowed as fees”); id. at 6 (concluding that
“paralegal services should have been awarded as fees”). Petitioner’s
failure to make this argument below—and the related lack of any op-
portunity for the court of appeals to consider and pass upon the argu-
ment—s itself a persuasive reason for this Court not to address it. See
Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1869, 1877 n.2 (2006).
41
the reimbursement of “cost” reflected in the statutory
text.
Moreover, compensating paralegal services at mar-
ket rates would be inconsistent with the statutory ceil-
ing that Congress placed on the amount of attorney and
other professional “fees” that may be reimbursed under
the EAJA. While Congress clearly authorized further
compensation (i.e., “other expenses”) beyond “fees” to
cover the reasonable cost of items or services necessary
for such professionals to prepare a case, there is no evi-
dence that Congress intended to reimburse parties for
any additional profit collected by attorneys that may be
imbedded in the market rates tied to any “other ex-
penses” billed to their clients. Such a reading would
improperly undermine the “need to preserve the in-
tended effectiveness of the [$125] cap,” Underwood, 487
U.S. at 573, that plays a critical role in the Act’s fee re-
imbursement.
Nor is petitioner correct in asserting (Br. 39) that
courts have adopted a “market rate” approach to com-
pensating “other expenses.” While courts have re
While petitioner argues (Br. 37-38) that the court of appeals
improperly distinguished between “fees” and “expenses” because fees
are a type of “expense” under the EAJA, petitioner’s contention seizes
on semantics not substance. The Act clearly distinguishes between
“fees” and “other [non-fee] expenses” and, while the court of appeals
did not retain the word “other” in its discussion of that distinction, a fair
reading of the court’s decision in context makes plain that its use of the
term “expenses” refers to “other expenses” that do not qualify as
“fees.” See, e.g., Pet. App. 4a, 15a.
* While petitioner states (Br. 39) that courts “regularly” approve
expenses such as “transportation and other travel costs, postage, [and]
long[-}distance telephone charges,” the courts of appeals have divided
over whether such charges are properly reimbursable under the EAJA.
Compare Aston v. Secretary of HHS, 808 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986)
42
quired that expenses be of a type that are normally
billed separately to clients in order to be reimbursable
under the EAJA, see, e.g., International Woodworkers
of Am. v. Donovan, 792 F.2d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 1986),
that requirement simply ensures that the expenses are
not general overhead costs that are already accounted
for (in addition to profit) in the prevailing market rates
for attorney fees. Cf. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 287 n.8 (not-
ing that both “costs and profit margin” are imbedded in
amount of attorney’s fees billed to clients). Requiring
that such “other expenses” be of a type normally billed
to clients not only prevents over-reimbursing expenses,
it ensures that the profit margin in an attorney’s hourly
rate is not improperly extended beyond that contem-
plated by the EAJA’s attorney fee caps.
Petitioner’s distinction between expenses directly
paid by attorneys to third-party vendors and those paid
for similar products produced by a firm in-house does
not withstand scrutiny. While petitioner asserts (Br. 39)
that “other expenses” should be paid at “market rates—
that is, at the rate that the client is willing to pay in the
relevant market”—that reasoning would permit reim-
bursement for charges beyond those paid by attorneys
to third-party vendors if the practice in the relevant
legal market was to bill clients for the actual cost paid
by the firm plus a firm overhead charge. Petitioner’s
approach would likewise permit reimbursement of items
such as in-house photocopying at rates that would in-
(travel, postage, and telephone costs are reimbursable), and /nterna-
tional Woodworkers of Am. v. Donovan, 792 F 2d 762, 767 (9th Cir.
1986) (travel, air courier, postage, and telephone costs reimbursable),
with Precision Concrete v. NLRB, 362 F.3d 847, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(travel, taxis, courier and overnight delivery, facsimile and telephone
costs are not reimbursable).
43
clude profit margin in addition to cost. Nothing in the
EAJA’s text or history suggests Congress intended any
distinction between “other expenses” resulting from in-
house or external purchases or that such expenses
should be compensated at a profit-making rate for attor-
neys.
Petitioner’s final suggestion (Br. 40-42) that calculat-
ing the cost of paralegal services poses practical prob-
lems is overstated. Attorney’s fees calculations often
involve litigation over amounts of fees or costs included
in attorney’s fee requests, including when it comes to
determining the prevailing market rate. There is no
reason to believe that reasonable valuations of costs at-
tributable to paralegal expenses will prove inherently
more difficult, much less elusive."
Much of the difficulty that petitioner and its amici
suggest may be associated with calculating paralegal
costs stems from the degree of precision that they as-
sume is required to document such costs. Such preci-
sion, however, is artificial in the attorney-fee context
where reasonable approximations are generally ac-
cepted. Courts routinely estimate “reasonable” costs,
The two post-Richlin cases that petitioner cites do not suggest
otherwise. The prevailing party in one case requested a $35 hourly rate
based on the rate derived in this suit. That request was granted with-
out government opposition, and nothing in the court’s decision suggests
that the rate was insufficient. See Former Employees of BMC Soft-
ware, Inc. v. United States Sec’y of Labor, No. 04-00229, 2007 WL
4181696, at *3 & n.1 (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 28, 2007). The prevailing
party in the second case withdrew its request for paralegal expenses
rather than document the relevant paralegal costs, and the court’s
decision does not reflect the reason for that withdrawal. /nformation
Scis. Corp. v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 673 (2007). A law firm may
decline to disclose the cost it pays for its paralegals for any number of
reasons independent from the inability to determine that cost.
pen - - - —= — — re" - a sro aoe a
44
market rates, and the time “reasonably” expended on
litigation. Attorneys similarly routinely record and bill
their time in estimated six- or fifteen-minute intervals.
There is no reason why attorneys cannot also provide a
reasonable approximation of the costs of paralegal ser-
vices based on documentation of such costs.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be af-
firmed.
Respectfully submitted.
PAUL D. CLEMENT
Solicitor General
JEFFREY S. BUCHOLTZ
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
GREGORY G. GARRE
Deputy Solicitor General
ANTHONY A. YANG
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
JEANNE E. DAVIDSON
REGINALD T. BLADES, JR.
MICHAEL JAY SINGER
MICHAEL E. ROBINSON
Attorneys
FEBRUARY 2008
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
1. 5 U.S.C. 504 provides in relevant part:
Costs and fees of parties
(a)(1) An agency that conducts an adversary adjud-
ication shall award, to a prevailing party other than the
United States, fees and other expenses incurred by that
party in connection with that proceeding, unless the ad-
judicative officer of the agency finds that the position of
the agency was substantially justified or that special cir-
cumstances make an award unjust. Whether or not the
position of the agency was substantially justified shall be
determined on the basis of the administrative record, as
a whole, which is made in the adversary adjudication for
which fees and other expenses are sought.
(2) A party seeking an award of fees and other ex-
penses shall, within thirty days of a final disposition in
the adversary adjudication, submit to the agency an ap-
plication which shows that the party is a prevailing par-
ty and is eligible to receive an award under this section,
and the amount sought, including an itemized statement
from any attorney, agent, or expert witness represen-
ting or appearing in behalf of the party stating the ac-
tual time expended and the rate at which fees and other
expenses were computed. The party shall also allege
that the position of the agency was not substantially jus-
tified. When the United States appeals the underlying
merits of an adversary adjudication, no decision on an
application for fees and other expenses in connection
with that adversary adjudication shall be made under
this section until a final and unreviewable decision is
rendered by the court on the appeal or until the under-
(la)
2a
lying merits of the case have been finally determined
pursuant to the appeal.
xs kk kK *
(b)(1) For the purposes of this section—
(A) “fees and other expenses” includes the rea-
sonable expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable
cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test,
or project which is found by the agency to be neces-
sary for the preparation of the party’s case, and rea-
sonable attorney or agent fees (The amount of fees
awarded under this section shall be based upon pre-
vailing market rates for the kind and quality of the
services furnished, except that (i) no expert witness
shall be compensated at a rate in excess of the high-
est rate of compensation for expert witnesses paid by
the agency involved, and (ii) attorney or agent fees
shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour un-
less the agency determines by regulation that an in-
crease in the cost of living or a special factor, such as
the limited availability of qualified attorneys or ag-
ents for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher
fee.);
x* * ke *
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.