Petitioners Brief — RICHLIN SEC. SERVICE CO. v. Chertoff

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S1433

No.06°1717 . StrestistueTts

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

RICHLIN SECURITY SERVICE COMPANY,

Petitioner,

Vv.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF,

SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

PETITIONER'S BRIEF

BRIAN WOLFMAN

(Counsel of Record)

ScoTT L. NELSON

PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION

GROUP

1600 20th Street, NW

Washington, D.C. 20009

(202) 588-1000

January 2008 Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTION PRESENTED

Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5

U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), may

a prevailing party be awarded attorney fees for

paralegal services at the market rate for such services,

or does EAJA limit reimbursement for paralegal

services to cost only?

FT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED .................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................-. iv

ec oc i nus So ekcvb eves aaeeen 1

ee ed Nes ieee as hk ww Ree 1

PE ETT EEED son cscsccvnscveceecese 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................. 3

A. The Equal Access To Justice Act .......... 4

B. Proceedings On The Merits .............. 8

eb SE 2 cove we eee scckyetonw ay 8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................. 11

EE ASL oa dod bade adnan 14

A. Paralegal Services Are Compensable At

Market Rates Under This Court’s Decision In

Missouri v. Jenkins And The Text And

rk camer ebeebeeos 14

B. EAJA’s Adjustable Rate Cap Provides No

Basis For Compensating Paralegal Services

DP do cGienad se 0ba saab anne oe can 28

il

C. Paralegal Services Are Not “Other Expenses”

Under EAJA, But Even If They Are, They

Should Be Awarded At The Cost To The Client

Not The Cost To The Lawyer. ........... 36

EE csi sconce ew aeeskecnwed 43

ES ob 6 bivids rinses weneeseueaeonweee

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,

ee I os cds ci be ive bade balms 20

Aumiller v. University of Delaware,

455 F. Supp. 676 (D. Del. 1978).......... 22, 31

Blum v. Stenson,

PEE gc cc cece ccccees 16, 20, 22

Brady v. Washington County,

509 F. Supp. 538 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) ......... 31

Burchett v. Bower,

470 F. Supp. 1170 (D. Ariz. 1979) ........... 22

Cable Atlanta, Inc. v. Project, Inc.,

572 F. Supp. 1113 (N.D. Ga. 1983) .......... 32

Cameo Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Senn,

738 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1984) ............ 16, 28

Chee v. Schweiker,

563 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Ariz. 1983) ........... 32

In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation,

560 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Ga. 1980) ........ 22, 29

v

Citizens for Responsible Resource

Development v. Watt,

579 F. Supp. 431 (D. Ala. 1983)............. 32

City of Burlington v. Dague,

Pe er eT 17, 19

Coalition to Preserve Houston & Houston

Independent School District v. InterimBoard of

Trustees,

494 F. Supp. 738 (S.D. Tex. 1980) ........ 22, 31

Commissioner, INS v. Jean,

ED ic o's co. bed ieueeeueen 4, 34

David v. Sullivan,

777 F. Supp. 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) ............ 7

Dewalt v. Sullivan,

O68 P.O6 37 Ga Cle. 20GED ow wc ccc ccccceuns 6, 7

Dowdell v. City of Apopka, Fla.,

698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983) ............. 38

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Watt,

554 F. Supp. 36 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ............ 32

Employees of BMC Software, Inc. v.

Sec’y of Labor, __ F. Supp. 2d__,

2007 WL 2994605 (C.L.T. 2007) ............. 41

vi

Former Employees of BMC Software, Inc. v.

Sec’y of Labor,

2007 WL 4181696 (C.I.T. 2007) ............. 42

Francia v. White,

594 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1979) ........... 22, 31

Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,

491 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2007) ............... 35

Goldstein v. California,

i 30

Groves v. Heckler,

599 F. Supp. 830 (M.D. Pa. 1984) ........... 32

Harris v. Sullivan,

968 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1992) ................. 6

Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424 (1983) .......... 16, 17, 18, 20, 42

Hixon v. City of Golden Valley,

2007 WL 4373111 (D. Minn. 2007) .......... 35

Independent Federation of Flight Attendants

v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) ............ 10, 19

Information Sciences Corp. v. United States,

78 Fed. Cl. 673 (Fed. Cl. 2007) ............. 42

International Woodworkers of America v. Donovan,

792 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1985) ............... 39

vil

JA. Jones Construction Co. v. Southern Stress

Wire Corp., 575 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Ga. 1982) . 32

Jean v. Nelson,

863 F.2d 759 (1988), aff'd on other issue, Comm’,

INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990) ..... 10, 29, 39

Johnson v. Combs,

471 F. 2d 84 (5th Cir. 1972) ................ 18

Johnson v. Sullivan,

919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990) ................ 6

Kauffman v. Schweiker,

559 F. Supp. 372 (M.D. Pa. 1981) ........... 32

Keith v. Volpe,

501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980) ........... 22

Kelly v. Bowen,

862 F.2d 1333 (8th Cir. 1988) .............. 39

Kennedy v. Crittendon,

1980 WL 243 (M.D. Ga. 1980) .............. 31

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,

572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983),

affd in part, rev d in part on other grounds,

746 7.28 ODS. Gir. IBD 2... ccc ce cceecs: 35

Marek v. Chesny,

ee ee 17, 37

McPherson v. School District No. 186,

465 F. Supp. 749 (S.D. Ill. 1978) ............ 31

Meissner v. Richlin Sec. Serv. Co.,

1998 WL 228175 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ............ 8

Meyer v. Sullivan,

958 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1992) .............. 6

Mid-Hudson Legal Services v. G & U, Inc.,

465 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ..... 22, 29, 31

Miller v. Alamo,

983 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1993) ............... 29

Missouri v. Jenkins,

ED nig ccs céntcevcess passim

Moholland v. Schwetker,

546 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.H. 1982) ............ 32

Neely v. City of Grenada,

71 F.R.D. 484 (N.D. Miss. 1978) ......... 22, 31

New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey,

SE Givtdcuseventsetesess 18, 19

Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,

I, 6c adc etadsusseccees 18

Northcross v. Board of Education,

as 18, 19

ix

Northcross v. Board of Education,

611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979) ......... 22, 26, 38

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council

for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986) .... 17, 18, 19

Pennsylvania v. O'Neill,

431 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ........... 22

Pierce v. Underwood,

i oe oud ons kh 6, 7

Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff,

437 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .............. 8

Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Rooney,

18 F. App’x 843 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ............. 8

Sacco v. United States,

452 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ............. 19

Selzer v. Berkowitz,

477 F. Supp. 686 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) ........ 22, 31

Sherrill v. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc.,

441 F. Supp. 846 (W.D.N.C. 1977) .......... 22

Skehan v. Board of Trustees,

501 F. Supp. 1360 (M.D. Pa. 1980) ....... 22, 31

Sullivan v. Finkelstein,

ne deweue eben 27

Sullivan v. Hudson,

i a Oe em dws 19

Swicker v. William Armstrong & Sons, Inc.,

484 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ........ 22, 31

Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers'

Compensation Programs,

545 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1976) ........... 22, 29

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Morales,

RE a a Pe ae aera 17

Trustees of the Construction Industrial & Laborers

Health & Welfare Trust v. Redland Insurance

Co., 460 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 2006) .......... 38

United States v. Adkinson,

256 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (N.D. Fla. 2003), affd,

360 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2004) ............. 39

United States v. Enmons,

a i ies etd 28

: Visser v. Magnarelli,

i 542 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) .......... 32

Wallace v. Sec'y of HHS,

1983 WL 44228 (D. Mass. 1983) ............ 32

WATCH v. Harris,

535 F. Supp. 9 (D. Conn. 1981) ............. 32

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A ee ee ee ee ee ee ee et ee ee he NO ee ee ee

a eh. ee

ee Se

‘aes a ae

xl

West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,

|, rere Tre 23, 24, 38

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

We cd ned keeseeksc suds adcewneas 1,3

Fe re 5, 9, 14, 37, 40

RRM ere Pee 1 ee mc 12

5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A) ..... 5, 6, 7, 16, 21, 37, 43

DERI oc ccc cckvccecsuse 5, 14

lie oeusscadeee ens 5,9

ES OER ee Sere 1

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1M(A) .... 3, 5, 12, 14, 19, 37, 40

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) 3, 5, 6, 7, 14, 16, 21, 37, 43

es URE ovo av booccavbencdunes 5

8 errr 3, 9, 11, 15, 16, 20, 23

Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996) ........ 5

Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (1985) ......... 4,5

Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2321 (1980) ....... 4,5

Pe ee ae 2 ew ee eS ee

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Sat Pes

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EF Pe ee 7

a ce ok edd eee aeew ae hewn 7

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SI POE occ cescccsvccecce Ys

51 Fed. Reg. 16659 (May 6, 1986).............. 32

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

H.R. Rep. No. 99-120 (1985),

reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132 ...... 25, 27

S. Rep. No. 98-586,

98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) ............ 24, 26

H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418 (1980),

reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4991 ...... 4, 21

S. Rep. No. 96-253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) .. 21

MISCELLANEOUS

Laffey Matrix, available at

http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/dc/Divisions/

Civil_Division/Laffey_Matrix_7.html ........ 35

Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative

History in a System of Separated Powers,

53 Vand. L. Rev. 1457, 1522 (2000).......... 27

xii

U.S. Dep’t of Laber, Bureau of Labor Statistics,

Consumer Price Index, All Urban Consumers,

available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests

EE eaesvaeeeeee suse becenvaeepare

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit is reported at 472 F.3d 1370

(2006), and is reproduced in the appendix to the

petition for a writ of certiorari at 1a. The opinion of the

Department of Transportation Board of Contract

Appeals is reported at 2005 WL 1635099 (2005), and is

reproduced at Pet. App. 25a. The Federal Circuit’s

supplemental opinion issued in response to petitioner's

petition for rehearing is reported at 482 F.3d 1358

(2007), and is reproduced at Pet. App. 54a. The Federal

Circuit’s unreported order denying rehearing and

rehearing en banc is reproduced at Pet. App. 57a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit was entered on December 26,

2006. Pet. App. 1a. Petitioner filed a timely petition for

rehearing en banc on January 8, 2007, which the

Federal Circuit treated as a petition for panel

rehearing and rehearing en banc and denied on April

3, 2007. Pet. App. 57a. The petition for a writ of

certiorari was filed on June 25, 2007, and was granted

on November 13, 2007. This Court has jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTE INVOLVED

The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) authorizes

an award of fees and other expenses to certain parties

who prevail against the United States in court or in

adversary administrative proceedings.

5 U.S.C. § 504, the portion of EAJA that applies to

adversary administrative proceedings, provides in

relevant part:

2

(a)(1) An agency that conducts an adversary

adjudication shall award, to a prevailing party

other than the United States, fees and other

expenses incurred by that party in connection

with that proceeding, unless the adjudicative

officer of the agency finds that the position of

the agency was substantially justified or that

special circumstances make an award unjust.

Whether or not the position of the agency was

substantially justified shall be determined on

the basis of the administrative record, as a

whole, which is made in the adversary

adjudication for which fees and other expenses

are sought.

* «*

(b)(1) For the purposes of this section —

(A) “fees and other expenses” includes the

reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the

reasonable cost of any study, analysis,

engineering report, test, or project which is

found by the agency to be necessary for the

preparation of the party’s case, and reasonable

attorney or agent fees. (The amount of fees

awarded under this section shall be based upon

prevailing market rates for the kind and quality

of the services furnished, except that (i) no

expert witness shall be compensated at a rate in

excess of the highest rate of compensation for

expert witnesses paid by the agency involved,

and (ii) attorney or agent fees shall not be

awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the

agency determines by regulation that an

3

increase in the cost of living or a special factor,

such as the limited availability of qualified

attorneys or agents for the proceedings involved,

justifies a higher fee.)'

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Equal Access to Justice Act provides that

certain parties that prevail against the federal

government in court and adversary administrative

proceedings are entitled to an award of fees and other

expenses. Petitioner Richlin Security Service Company,

a sole proprietorship, prevailed in administrative and

judicial proceedings against the federal government

and was awarded attorney fees and other expenses

under EAJA by the Department of Transportation

Board of Contract Appeals (the Board). The question

presented is whether such an award may include

compensation for paralegal services at rates that

chents generally pay for paralegal services in the

relevant legal market, as this Court held was

appropriate under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in Missouri v.

Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284-89 (1989), or whether, as

the Federal Circuit held, those services may only be

‘The nearly identical portions of EAJA applicable to recovery

of fees and other expenses incurred in court proceedings are

codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A). Petitioner's fee

application at issue here sought recovery for fees incurred in

adversary proceedings before the Department of Transportation's

Board of Contract Appeals and, thus, was filed under 5 U.S.C. §

504. In general, citations in this brief to provisions of section 504

are accompanied by citations to the corresponding provisions of

section 2412(d). The relevant portions of section 2412(d) are

contained in an addendum to this brief.

4

compensated at the cost to the attorney, regardless of

how the marketplace values them.

A. The Equal Access To Justice Act

EAJA was first enacted in 1980 for a three-year

period beginning on October 1, 1981 based on

Congress’s express finding that individuals, small

businesses, and non-profit organizations “may be

deterred from seeking review of, or defending against,

unreasonable governmental action because of the

expense involved in securing the vindication of their

rights in civil actions and in administrative

proceedings.” Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 202(a), 94 Stat.

2321, 2325 (1980); see also id. at §§ 202(b), (c)(1), 94

Stat. at 2325 (noting government’s “greater resources”

and that EAJA’s purpose was “to diminish the

deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending

against, governmental action.”); Comm'r, INS v. Jean,

496 U.S. 154, 163 (1990) (“The specific purpose of the

EAJA is to eliminate for the average person the

financial disincentive to challenge unreasonable

governmental actions.”). In addition, Congress wanted

to “encouragle] private parties to vindicate their rights

and [thereby to] ‘curb[] excessive regulation and the

unreasonable exercise of Government authority.” Jd. at

164-65 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 12 (1980),

reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4991). In 1985,

Congress reenacted EAJA and made it permanent.

Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (1985).

EAJA provides that “fees and other expenses” shall

be awarded to eligible parties who have prevailed in

adversary administrative proceedings or in court

against the federal government, unless the agency

adjudicator or court finds that the position of the

5

United States “was substantially justified or that

special circumstances make an award unjust.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 504(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). An individual is

eligible for fees if his or her net worth does not exceed

$2 million, while a business is eligible if its net worth

does not exceed $7 million and it had 500 or fewer

employees when the action was commenced. 5 U.S.C.

§ 504(b)(1)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). Certain

charitable organizations and cooperatives are eligible

regardless of size or net worth. /d: 5 U.S.C.

§ 504(b)(1)(B).”

“Fees and other expenses” are defined to include

“reasonable attorney or agent fees.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 504(b)(1)(A); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)

(defining “fees and other expenses” to include

“reasonable attorney fees”). EAJA does not leave the

amount of fees to the broad discretion of the court or

agency adjudicator, but states that the amount of fees

“shall be based upon prevailing market rates,” subject

to a dollar-per-hour cap on attorney fees that may be

adjusted in certain circumstances. 5 U.S.C.

§ 504(b)(1)(A)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). At the time

of EAJA's enactment, the adjustable cap was $75 per

hour.’

*Originally, the net-worth limits for individuals and businesses

were $1 million and $5 million, respectively. See Pub. L. No. 96-

481, §§ 203(a)(1), 204(a), 94 Stat. at 2326, 2328. The current limits

were set in 1985. Pub. L. No. 99-80, §§ 1, 2, 99 Stat. at 185.

‘In 1996, Congress raised the cap to $125 per hour, effective

March 29, 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-121, §§ 231-233, 110 Stat. 847,

862-64 (1996). The 1996 hike from $75 per hour to $125 per hour

(continued...)

6

As noted above, the cap is not absolute, but may be

adjusted upward on two bases. First, any court, or an

administrative tribunal authorized by regulation to do

so, may award fees above the statutory cap if “an

increase in the cost of living ... justifies a higher fee.”

5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).

Courts and authorized administrative tribunals

generally award cost-of-living adjustments as a matter

or course when market rates exceed the unadjusted

statutory cap. See, e.g., Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d

1029, 1033-35 (11th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Sullivan,

919 F.2d 503, 504-05 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing cases); see

also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 571-72 (1988)

(suggesting that cost-of-living increases are automatic

by referring repeatedly to fee cap as “$75 per hour

(adjusted for inflation)”). The cap is adjusted upward

by measuring the increase in the cost of living between

the date of enactment of the statutory cap and the date

the relevant legal services were rendered, typically by

using the Bureau of Labor Statistics “all-items” index,

a general measure of inflation. See, e.g., Dewalt v.

Sullivan, 963 F.2d 27, 29-30 (3d Cir. 1992); Johnson,

919 F.2d at 504. Courts have held that the fee cap may

not be adjusted based on inflation in the cost of legal

services, see, e.g., Harris v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 263 (2d

(continued)

reflected the increase in the cost of living between EAJA's original

October 1, 1981, effective date and the hike’s March 1996 effective

date. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,

Consumer Price Index, All Urban Consumers, available at

ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (showing 66.7%

cost-of-living increase from October 1981 through March 1996).

7

Cir. 1992); Dewalt, 963 F.2d at 29-30, and, thus, the

fee cap, even when adjusted for inflation, has failed to

keep up in recent years with the hyper-inflation in the

legal services market. The current inflation-adjusted

cap is approximately $168 per hour.

Second, courts and futhorized administrative

tribunals may award fees above the cap — whether

inflation-adjusted or not — based on the presence of

any “special factor,” one of which is mentioned in the

statute: “the limited availability of qualified attorneys

for the proceedings involved.” 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A); 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). This Court has held that this

statutory formulation refers to “attorneys having some

distinctive knowledge or specialized skill needful for

the litigation in question — as opposed to an

extraordinary level of the general lawyerly knowledge

and ability useful in all litigation.” Pierce, 487 U.S. at

572. The Court cited patent law and foreign law as

examples of distinctive knowledge that would justify

an award above the cap, jd. and, although this basis

for enhancement has been allowed only rarely post-

Pierce, the lower courts have identified other examples.

See, e.g., David v. Sullivan, 777 F. Supp. 212, 219-21

(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (Medicare law).

‘As noted, administrative tribunals must be authorized by

regulation to adjust the cap. Some tribunals have been authorized

to exceed the cap, see, e.g., 5 C.F.R. §§ 2430.4, .5 (Federal Labor

Relations Authority); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2704.107, .201(b) (Federal Mine

Safety and Health Review Commission); some, including the

tribunal below, have not. See Pet. App. 38a.

8

B. Proceedings On The Merits

The merits of this litigation can be summarized

briefly. Mistakes in contracts between petitioner

Richlin Security Service Company and what was then

the Immigration and Naturalization Service (and is

now part of the Department of Homeland Security)

resulted in the substantial underpayment of Richlin’s

employees. See Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 437

F.3d 1296, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The underpayments

were of such magnitude to a small business like Richlin

that, before it won this litigation, Richlin had been

unable to pay its employees what it owed them. /d. at

1298 (citing Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Rooney, 18 F.

App’x 843, 844-45 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). In lengthy

proceedings before both the Board and the Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the government

contended that Richlin was required by law to suffer

the consequences of the contractual mistakes. The

Federal Circuit rejected that position as inconsistent

with the terms of the contract and controlling case law,

see Meissner v. Richlin Sec. Serv. Co., 1998 WL

228175, *4 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and, on remand from a

later appeal, the Board eventually awarded Richlin the

amount of the additional wages, payroll taxes, and

workers’ compensation premiums that Richlin was

required to pay as a result of the mistakes. Pet. App.

3a.

C. Fee Proceedings

After prevailing on the merits, Richlin sought an

award of fees and other expenses under EAJA for the

time spent over nearly nine years by its lawyers and

paralegals before the Board. The Board found that

Richlin met EAJA’s size and net-worth limitations, 5

9

U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B), that it was a prevailing party,

see id. § 504(a)(1), and that the government’s position

on the merits was not “substantially justified.” See id.

The Board awarded Richlin approximately $50,000 for

work done by the company’s lawyers. See Pet. App. 5a.

The Board did not, however, award Richlin fees at

the $50 to $95 per hour market rates for paralegal

services charged to Richlin over the course of the

proceedings. It noted that EAJA does not “expressly

provide for the reimbursement of paralegal services at

the market rate,” id. at 6a, and thus held that

paralegal services are reimbursable only at the

attorney's cost, even where, as is the case here,

paralegal time is billed to the client at hourly market

rates in the relevant legal market and not at the

attorney's cost as an out-of-pocket expense. The Board

took judicial notice of paralegal salaries in the

Washington, D.C. area “as reflected on the internet”

and awarded Richlin $35 per hour as the “reasonable

cost to the [law] firm.” Jd. (quoting Board decision). The

Board awarded approximately $10,600, representing

roughly 300 hours of compensable paralegal time. See

id.

A divided panel] of the Federal Circuit affirmed. The

panel majority acknowledged this Court’s ruling in

Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284-89 (1989), that,

under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of

1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, paralegal services are a

component of “attorney’s fees” compensable at market

rates, as long as those services are separately billed in

the relevant market. The majority further

acknowledged the Court’s repeated admonition that

“fee-shifting statutes’ similar language is a ‘strong

10

indication’ that they are to be interpreted alike.” Pet.

App. 13a (quoting /ndependent Federation of Flight

Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n.2 (1989)). The

majority nevertheless distinguished EAJA from section

1988, largely on the ground that the former

contemplates an award of “expenses,” which

purportedly includes the cost to law firms of

paralegals, while the latter does not. Pet. App. 15a,

19a. The court of appeals also relied on EAJA’s per-

hour rate cap for attorney fees as justification for

limiting recovery for paralegal services, noting that “it

seemled] unlikely” that Congress would have capped

paralegal and attorney services at the same level. Pet.

App. 16a. In so holding, the court of appeals

acknowledged that its ruling was at odds with an

Eleventh Circuit decision, Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d

759, 778 (1988), aff'd on other issue, Commr, INS v.

Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990), which held that fees for

paralegal services are compensable at market rates

under EAJA.

Senior Circuit Judge Plager dissented on the

ground that “the panel’s position is at variance with

established Supreme Court law,” Pet. App. 20a-21a,

relying on this Court’s statement in Jenkins that a

“reasonable attorney’s fee’ cannot have been meant to

compensate only work performed personally by

members of the bar,” but was also intended to

compensate the work of “others whose labor

contributes to the work product for which an attorney

bills her client.” /d. at 21a (quoting Jenkins, 491 U.S.

at 285).

Richlin petitioned for rehearing en banc, explaining

that, in addition to the acknowledged conflict with the

1l

Eleventh Circuit, the Federal Circuit’s ruling had

opened a conflict with decisions of three other circuits.

The petition also noted that a Senate committee report

that the panel majority had relied on did not, in fact,

support its ruling, and that, in any event, the report

was not genuine legislative history because it had

accompanied a 1984 version of EAJA that was vetoed

by President Reagan, not the 1985 version that was

actually enacted.

The panel responded to the rehearing petition in a

supplemental opinion. See Pet. App. 54a. With respect

to the purported legislative history, the court of

appeals acknowledged its earlier reliance on a

committee report that accompanied vetoed legislation,

but held that because the President’s veto related to

issues other than the compensability of paralegal

services, the “earlier legislative history” drafted by a

different Congress in 1984 was “pertinent to the 1985

enactment on the issue presented here.” /d. at 56a n.2.

Senior Judge Plager dissented again “on the basis of

his dissent from the original panel opinion.” /d. In an

order accompanying its supplemental opinion, the

Federal Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en

banc. Pet. App. 57a.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A. Fees incurred for paralegal services are

compensable at market rates under EAJA. In Missouri

v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285, the Court held, first, that

paralegal services are “attorney’s fees” under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988 because that term logically includes charges not

only for the work of members of the bar, but also for

other law firm personnel whose services contribute to

the lawver’s work product. Jenkins also held that

12

paralegal services are compensable at market rates

under section 1988 if they are billed separately on that

basis in the relevant legal community, and that

separate paralegal billing encourages efficient delivery

of legal services. On the second question addressed in

Jenkins —- how to value paralegal services if they are

statutory attorney fees — EAJA provides its own

answer because all compensable fees, including

attorney fees, must be awarded at “prevailing market

rates.” 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

Thus, under EAJA, if paralegal services are “attorney

fees,” as they were held to be in Jenkins, they are

indisputably compensable at market rates.

Jenkins's determination that section 1988 fees

include paralegal services applies to EAJA. “Attornev’s

fees” under section 1988 and “attorney fees” under

EAJA are nearly identical terms, and, ordinarily,

Congress’s use of the same or similar terms should be

accorded the same meaning statute to statute. The

Court has applied that principle of statutory

construction with special force to federal fee-shifting

statutes in light of their generally similar purposes,

and it should be applied here. At the time of EAJA’s

enactment, courts already had interpreted section 1988

and other fee-shifting statutes to require that fees,

including fees incurred for paralegal services, be

awarded at market rates. If anything, the Congress

that enacted EAJA, and expressly required that fees be

awarded at “prevailing market rates,” would have been

more likely than the Congress that enacted section

1988, and required only that fees be “reasonable,” to

have provided compensation for paralegal services in

a manner that mimics the market.

13

B. The Federal Circuit erred in maintaining that

Jenkins is inapplicable here in light of EAJA’s

adjustable dollar-per-hour cap on attorney rates. The

Federal Circuit stated that if fees for paralegal services

were “attorney fees,” in light of the cap, law firm

charges for paralegal services would be fully

recoverable while charges for attorney services would

not, leading to the supposed overuse of paralegals and

undermining /Jenkins’s efficiency rationale. The

Federal Circuit’s view is misguided for a host of

reasons, not least of which is that it conflicts with

reality. When EAJA was enacted and reenacted in

pies pn eineian owuln avopuvuvesy a= vie bere vale Valilape

points from which to assess Congress’s intent and,

thus, the Federal Circuit's “overuse” argument

market rates for most or all lawyers practicing in most

locations were at or below the EAJA cap. Therefore.

Congress would not have expected market-rate

recovery for paralegal services to result in “overuse” of

paralegals in comparison to the higher-priced lawyers

for whom they work. In any event, limiting

reir bursement for paralegal services to the law firm's

cost, as the Federal Circuit held EAJA requires, would

improperly drive up the cost of litigation for clients

the people that EAJA was intended to benefit.

C. The Federal Circuit's holding that paralegal!

services are compensable at the cost of those services

to the /awyer is doubly wrong. Treating paralegal!

services as an item awardable at cost is at odds with

the judicial understanding of EAJA, under which cost

based awards generally are for out-of-pocket expenses

charged by third-party vendors. These expenses

include items such as travel costs and long-distance

14

phone calls, not the work of in-firm personnel (which is

billed separately by the firm at market rates or

recovered as overhead through the attorneys’ rates).

Even if it were appropriate under EAJA to

reimburse paralegal expenses at “cost,” reimbursement

should be based on the cost incurred by the c/ent, not

the /awyer. It is clients (not lawyers) whose interests

EAJA seeks to protect, and basing the client’s

reimbursement for paralegal services on what it costs

the lawyer to employ the paralegal leaves the client

with a loss that bears no rational relationship to the

costs faced by the client or EAJA’s purposes. After all,

EAJA provides an award of fees and other expenses to

the “prevailing party,” 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1); 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d)(1)(A), not that party’s lawyer. Awarding

paralegal expenses based on the cost incurred by the

chent would avoid that irrationality; and because doing

so reflects market reality, it also underscores why

paralegal services are “attorney fees” under EAJA that

should be awarded at “prevailing market rates.”

ARGUMENT

A. Paralegal Services Are Compensable At Market

Rates Under This Court’s Decision In Missour7 v.

Jenkins And The Text And Structure Of EAJA.

The reasoning of this Court’s decisions, together

with the statutory text, demonstrate that “attorney

fees” under EAJA includes paralegal services.

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit’s decision must be

reversed because the “amount of fees awarded under”

EK AJA “shall be based upon prevailing market rates for

the kind and quality of the services furnished.” 5

U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A) Gi); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).

15

1. In Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, the Court

considered whether and on what basis fees incurred for

paralegal services are awardable as “attorney's fees”

under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of

1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Court first held that, in

using the term “attorney’s fee,” Congress must have

meant to compensate not only the work of members of

the bar, but the work of others, including paralegals,

whose services contribute to the lawyer’s work product.

Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285. As the Court put it:

Id.

Clearly, a “reasonable attorney’s fee” cannot

have been meant to compensate only work

pertormed personally by members of the bar.

Rather, the term must refer to a reasonable fee

for the work product of an attorney. Thus, the

fee must take into account the work not only of

attorneys, but also of secretaries, messengers,

librarians, janitors, and others whose labor

contributes to the work product for which an

attorney bills her client; and it must also take

account of other expenses and profit. The parties

have suggested no reason why the work of

paralegals should not be similarly compensated,

nor can we think of any. We thus take as our

starting point the self-evident proposition that

the “reasonable attorney’s fee” provided for by

statute should compensate the work of

paralegals, as well as that of attorneys.

The Court then turned to what it termed the “more

difficult” question of how paralegal services should be

“valuated.” J/d. Relying on its prior fee-shifting

precedents holding that attorney fees are to be

16

compensated at “market rate,” see id. at 285-86 (citing,

e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 & n.11 (1984);

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 447 (1983)), the

Court explained that

the prevailing ‘market rate’ for attorney time is

not independent of the manner in which

paralegal time is accounted for. Thus, if the

prevailing practice in a given community were

to bill paralegal time separately at market rates,

fees awarded the attorney at market rates for

attorney time would not be fully compensatory

if the court refused to compensate hours billed

by paralegals or did so only at “cost.”

Id. at 286-87 (footnote omitted). Moreover, the Court

explained, “encouraging the use of lower cost

paralegals rather than attorneys wherever possible, ...

‘encourages cost-effective delivery of legal services.”

Id. at 288 (quoting Cameo\ Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v.

Senn, 738 F.2d 836, 846 (7th Cir. 1984)).

2. Under EAJA, we are not faced with what

Jenkins called the “more difficult” question; if

paralegal services are “attorney fees” under EAJA,

they are necessarily compensable at “prevailing market

rates.” See 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A); accord 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(2)(A). In other words, if Jenkins’ holding that

“attorney's fees” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 includes

paralegal services — what Jenkins called a “self-

evident proposition,” 491 U.S. at 285 — applies to

EAJA, the decision below must be reversed.

Jenkins applies with full force to EAJA. To begin

with, the statutory term “attorney fees” used in EAJA

is nearly identical to the term “attorney’s fee”

17

construed in Jenkins. And, under ordinary principles

of statutory construction, the Court generally accords

the same meaning it has given Congress’s use of a term

in one statute to Congress’s use of the same or a

similar term in another statute. See, e.g., Trans World

Airlines, Inc. v. Morales, 504 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1992).

That principle of construction applies with special

potency to federal fee-shifting statutes, such as section

1988 and EAJA, for two reasons. First, “there are over

100 separate [federal] statutes providing for the award

of attorney’s fees.” Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley

Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 562

\4v0U/) see aisu Marek V. Unesny, 4/3 U.S. 1, 43 (1985)

(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Congress has enacted well

over 100 fee-shifting statutes.”). It makes no sense,

absent compelling circumstances to the contrary, to

ascribe to Congress an unexpressed intent to define the

same or similar terms differently. Rational legislators

would not create disparate definitions for dozens of the

same or similar statutory terms in dozens of statutes

because doing so would cause chaos for litigants,

lawyers, and courts trying to discern their meaning.

Thus, in the case of federal fee-shifting statutes,

according the same meaning to the same or similar

statutory texts marries fidelity to congressional intent

with the practical needs of the bar, the judiciary, and

the members of the public that fee-shifting statutes are

intended to benefit. For that reason, whether the issue

is the parameters of a “reasonable” fee, see City of

Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992), who is

a “prevailing party,” see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 &

n.7, or, as here, what is encompassed by the term

“attorney fees,” courts generally should resolve the

18

issue consistently across the range of federal fee-

shifting statutes.

Second, this principle of statutory construction is

especially applicable in the fee-shifting context in light

of the common purposes of most, if not all, federal fee-

shifting provisions, including section 1988 and EAJA.

Those provisions are intended to encourage vindication

of federal rights by reducing the cost of challenging

unlawful conduct and, in turn, inducing future

compliance with federal law. See supra at 4 (discussing

these dual purposes of EAJA); Delaware Valley

Citizens’ Council, 478 U.S. at 559-60 (same with

respect to section 1988); Hens/ey, 461 U.S. at 429

(same); see also, e.g., New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v.

Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980) (same purposes of fee-

shifting provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964).

The Court made this point in Northcross v. Board

of Education, 412 U.S. 427 (1973) (per curiam), where

it gave the fee-shifting provision of one civil rights

statute the same meaning it had earlier given to the

fee-shifting provision of another civil rights statute.

The Court noted that the “similarity of language” in

the two provisions “is, of course, a strong indication

that the two statutes should be interpreted pari

passu.” Id. at 428. It then went on to explain that “the

two provisions share the same raison détre” — to

vindicate federal rights and to encourage individuals to

seek judicial relief.” /d. (quoting Johnson v. Combs, 471

F. 2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1972), relying on Newman v.

Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402

(1968)); see also Delaware County Citizens’ Council,

478 U.S. at 560 (“Given the common purpose of §

~«., & as wh so. sent: so Se

19

304(d) lof the Clean Air Act] and § 1988 to promote

citizen enforcement of important federal policies, we

find no reason not to interpret both provisions

governing attorney’s fees in the same manner.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the Court has accorded

uniform application to the same or similar terms in fee-

shifting statutes more frequently, more consistently,

and more forcefully than in any other context of which

we are aware. In light of the “similar” language of

“many ... federal fee-shifting statutes,” the Court has

noted that “our case law construing what is a

‘reasonable’ fee applies uniformly to all of them.”

VaxyUue, DVD U.D. al O0Z, see also, e.g., ZIpes, 491 U.S.

at 754 n.2 (“We have stated in the past that fee-

shifting statutes’ similar language is a ‘strong

indication’ that they are to be interpreted alike.”)

(quoting Northcross, 412 U.S. at 428); Pet. App. 13a

n.7 (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear

that the various federal attorney’s fees statutes should

be construed to reach a uniform result.”) (quoting Sacco

v. United States, 452 F.3d 1305, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).

And, in an EAJA case, Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S.

877, 888-90 (1989), the Court interpreted the term

“civil action” under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) to include

fees incurred in certain administrative proceedings, in

significant part because of this Court’s construction of

similar terms in Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council, 478

U.S. at 558, and New York Gas Light, 447 U.S. at 60.

Indeed, this principle of statutory construction is so

powerful with respect to fee-shifting statutes that, in

Hensley, the Court applied it prospectively, holding, in

a section 1988 case, that “[t]he standards set forth in

this opinion are generally applicable in all cases in

20

which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a

‘prevailing party.” 461 U.S. at 433 n.7.

3. EAJA’s textual demand for market-based fees,

which makes explicit a policy that is only implicit in

section 1988, provides strong confirmation that the two

statutes should be treated similarly with regard to the

compensability of paralegal services. In 1976, Congress

enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to overrule Alyveska Pipeline

Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975),

which held that courts in civil rights cases generally

did not have the power to award fees to the prevailing

party absent statutory authorization. Thereafter, in a

series of decisions, the Court made clear that a

“reasonable attorney’s fee” under section 1988 was one

based on how the private market valued legal services,

and the standard for the award of attorney fees became

one of commercial reasonableness. Thus, in Hensley,

461 U.S. at 433, the Court, adopting the primary

billing method in commercial law firms, held that the

starting point for fee calculation is the product of a

reasonable number of hours spent on the litigation and

the lawyer’s reasonable hourly rate. Similarly, B/um v.

Stenson, 465 U.S. at 895, held that the “reasonable

hourly rate” is to be calculated based on “prevailing

market rates in the relevant community.” And Jenkins,

491 U.S. at 285-87, as discussed above, held that

paralegal services, like services performed by lawyers

themselves, are compensable on the same basis on

which they are charged to paying clients in the

relevant legal community.

Under EAJA, however, the courts were not required

to construe a general concept such as reasonableness

in determining how fees should be calculated. EAJA is

21

specific on this point, providing that “[t]he amount of

fees awarded” “shall be based upon prevailing market

rates for the kind and quality of the services

furnished.” 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added);

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2MA) (same). To be sure, the

statutory provisions requiring a market-rate award do

not by themselves specify what types of services are

included in the term “attorney fees,” and, thus, do not

on their own definitively resolve the question

presented here. But they go a long way in that

direction. The statutory command that fees be awarded

based on “prevailing market rates” is strong evidence

VL WULIB LEDS 5 ALLLOELIL Liiae CUULLDS a41lU AUIS ave

agencies use a market-based approach when awarding

compensation under EAJA. And a market-based

approach should, as Jenkins explained, provide

compensation for paralegal services in the manner

dictated by the market. Put another way, if there is

any distinction to be drawn between EAJA and section

1988, the Congress that enacted fAJA, and explicitly

required use of “prevailing market rates,” would have

been more, not less, likely to have intended that

compensation for paralegal services track the market

than the Congress that enacted section 1988 and

required only that a fee be “reasonable.”

Moreover, in enacting EAJA and its requirement

that fees be based on “prevailing market rates,”

Congress was aware of existing fee-shifting legislation,

including section 1988 and fee-shifting provisions of

other federal civil rights laws. See H.R. Rep. No. 96-

1418, at 8(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4987:

S. Rep. No. 96-253, 96th, Cong., lst Sess. 4 (1979).

Under those statutes, courts generally awarded fees at

22

market rates. See generally Blum, 465 U.S. at 893-96

(discussing practice under statutes on which section

1988 was patterned). Indeed, under section 1988, in

the years leading up to EAJA’s enactment, courts that

considered whether and on what basis to award fees for

paralegal services generally awarded them on a

market-rate basis. See, e.g., Northcross v. Bd. of Educ.,

611 F.2d 624, 638 (6th Cir. 1979); Francia v. White,

594 F.2d 778, 781 (10th Cir. 1979); Skehan v. Bd. of

Trs., 501 F. Supp. 1360, 1370, 1374 (M.D. Pa. 1980);

Selzer v. Berkowitz, 477 F. Supp. 686, 690 & n.3

(E.D.N.Y. 1979).° Thus, the legal background against

which Congress enacted EAJA in 1980 was one in

which the market dictated compensability of attorney

fees, including paralegal services.

* Accord, e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403, 413-14 (C.D.

Cal. 1980); Coalition to Preserve Houston & Houston Indep. School

Dist. v. Interim Bd. of Trs., 494 F. Supp. 738, 745, 747 (S.D. Tex.

1980); Burchett v. Bower, 470 F. Supp. 1170, 1173 (D. Ariz. 1979);

Mid-Hudson Legal Servs. v. G & U, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 261, 274

nn.15-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Aumiller v. Univ. of Delaware, 455 F.

Supp. 676, 682 & n.13(D. Del. 1978); Neely v. City of Grenada, 77

F.R.D. 484, 487 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 431 F.

Supp. 700, 711 (E.D. Pa. 1977). In the years prior to EAJA’s

enactment, courts also awarded fees for paralegal services at

market rates under fee-shifting statutes other than section 1988.

See, e.g, Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Dir. Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs, 545 F.2d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 1976)

(Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act);

Swicker v. William Armstrong & Sons, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 762, 773

(E.D. Pa. 1980) (Title VID; Sherrill v. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 441

F. Supp. 846, 848-49 (W.D.N.C. 1977) (same); see also In re

Chicken Antitrust Litig., 560 F. Supp. 963, 972, 977-78 (N.D. Ga.

1980) (federal antitrust settlement).

23

4. The Court’s decision in West Virginia University

Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), strongly

supports the view that paralegal services are a part of

“attorney fees” under EAJA and, thus, compensable at

market rates. First, Casey makes clear that Jenkins

was not, as the Federal Circuit suggested, motivated

by an extratextual policy concern that if paralegal

services were not shoehorned into “attorney's fees,”

there would be no basis under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for

recovering them at all because section 1988 does not

refer to “expenses.” See Pet. App. 15a. To the contrary,

in holding that expert witness fees were not

nscangpwenmagtate muevesscy © cco Maiucs peuuul 1700,

Casey rejected the plaintiffs assertion that Jenkins

was an instance where the Court “permitted the] ...

perception of the ‘policy’ of the statute to overcome its

‘plain language.” Casey, 499 U.S. at 99. The Court

explained that Jenkins was not a freewheeling

exposition of section 1988's policy, but a

straightforward interpretation of the term “attorney’s

fees,” which, the Court held, included law clerk and

paralegal services because they “had traditionally been

included in calculation of the lawyers’ hourly rates.” Jd.

As explained in detail above, that textual reading of

the term “attorney’s fees” in section 1988 is equally, if

not more, applicable to EAJA.

Second, Casey explained that a number of fee-

shifting statutes expressly authorize an award of both

attorney’s fees and expert's fees, thus undermining the

claim that section 1988's reference to “attorney’s fees”

alone authorized an award of expert fees. The Court

contrasted that situation with the paralegal services

question decided in Jenkins on the ground that fee-

24

shifting statutes do not single-out paralegal services

for special treatment, and it took pains to point out

that EAJA is no exception:

We do not know of a single statute that shifts clerk

or paralegal fees separately; and even those, such

as the EAJA, which comprehensively define the

assessable “litigation costs” make no separate

mention of clerks or paralegals.

Id. at 99-100 (emphasis added). Thus, Casey

underscores that paralegal services are a part of

“attorney fees” compensable at “prevailing market

rates” under EAJA because, just like other fee-shifting

statutes, EAJA “makel[s] no separate mention of clerks

or paralegals.” /d°

5. The Federal Circuit shunned the follow-the-

market approach endorsed in Jenkins and in EAJA’s

plain text based in part on a Senate committee report

that cited as an example of an “expense” paralegal time

“billed at cost.” See Pet. App. 19a (quoting S. Rep. No.

98-586, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1984)). That reliance

was misplaced for several reasons.

*The Federal Circuit majority acknowledged that, in Casey,

the Court “reaffirmed its holding in Jenkins that paralegal

services are included in § 1988's definition of attorney’s fees.” Pet.

App. lla. The majority quoted virtually all of the Casey opinion

immediately before and after the blocked quotation reproduced

above, see id., but omitted the part most relevant to this case: the

sentence that identified EAJA as a statute that, like other fee-

shifting statutes, makes no separate mention of paralegal services

and thus incorporates those services within the term “attorney

fees.”

den mw ee tomd

25

First, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s

understanding of EAJA, the report’s reference to

paralegal services as an “expense” tells us nothing

about whether those services should be valued at

market rate or at the attorney’s cost, since all items

compensable under EAJA, including attorney fees, are

“expenses.” See infra at 36-38 (discussing the Federal

Circuit’s misreading of EAJA in this regard). And the

report’s reference to paralegal time “billed at cost”

reflects only that if paralegal time is billed at cost in

the marketplace, it should be compensated under

EAJA on that basis. See Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 288

fawr -eee

‘ 2 tureasneeg, aaa . 47VV poyuues ual Lue WUrkK OL

paralegals invariably be billed separately. If it is the

practice in the relevant market not to do so, or to bill

the work of paralegals only at cost, that is all that §

1988 requires.”). But if paralegal time is billed on an

above-cost hourly basis, then the market should control

there as well. The Senate report does not address that

scenario or purport to preclude that result.’

Moreover, the Federal Circuit relied on the

committee report selectively. Shortly before the line

quoted by the Federal Circuit, the report relied on an

interpretation of EAJA issued by the Administrative

Conference of the United States (ACUS) that would

“permit the award of ‘reasonable expenses of the

‘In addition, the Federal Circuit assumed that the committee

report’s reference to an expense award “at cost” meant the

attorney's cost rather than the c/ient’s cost. That assumption is

not correct because EAJA provides reimbursement for the

expenses incurred by the “prevailing party,” not the prevailing

party's lawyer. See infra Part C.

26

attorney ... as a separate item, if the attorney ...

ordinarily charges clients for such expenses.” S. Rep.

No. 98-586, at 14 (quoting ACUS interpretation)

(emphasis added). The committee thus endorsed

ACUS’s position that the market should control the

determination of what types of services are separately

compensable under EAJA. Given that market-based

approach, it is unlikely that the same committee

believed that the market should be disregarded in

valuing any of those services, including paralegal

services. Indeed, immediately after its reference to

ACUS’s views, the committee report cited with

approval the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Northcross v.

Board of Education, a section 1988 case that took a

market-based approach to the award of fees and

expenses generally and held that attorney fees for

paralegal services should be awarded at market rates.

See 611 F.2d at 638. In sum, the committee report

taken as a whole bolsters Richlin’s view that, under

EAJA, paralegal services should be compensated as the

market compensates them. In any case, the report

hardly provides unambiguous support for the Federal

Circuit’s ruling.

Finally, the Federal Circuit majority’s reliance on

the committee report fails for a more fundamental

reason: The report is not “legislative history” at all.

The Senate report was prepared for a 1984 version of

EAJA passed by the 98th Congress but vetoed by the

President. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, pt. 1, at 6 (1985),

reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 134. Thus, the

court of appeals erred in its original opinion in stating

that “Congress acted to make EAJA permanent in

1984.” Pet. App. 19a. In fact, as that court later

27

acknowledged in its supplemental opinion, /d. at 56a

n.2, EAJA was made permanent not by the 98th

Congress in 1984, but by the 99th Congress in 1985,

and “{nlo Senate Report was submitted with thlat)

legislation.” 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132. The House

committee report that accompanied the bill that was

actually enacted in 1985 makes no mention of the

treatment of paralegal services. See id. at 132-57.

To the extent that legislative history serves as

legitimate evidence of congressional intent, it does so

only because it is presumed to have been ratified by

Congress and the President when the relevant

legislation was enacted. See Jonathan R. Siegel, 7he

Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated

Powers, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1457, 1522 (2000); cf

Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631-32 (1990)

(Scalia, J., concurring). That did not occur with respect

to the 1984 report cited by the Federal Circuit. That

court’s assertion that the Senate report is “pertinent”

nonetheless because the President’s veto reflected

concern about a topic other than paralega! services and

the enacted 1985 legislation was otherwise “nearly,

identical” to the failed 1984 legislation, see Pet. App

56a n.2, sidesteps the problem: The Federal Circuit s

defense of the 1984 report does not attempt to explain

how a committee report produced to accompany

legislation voted on by one Congress could have been

ratified by another Congress that did not produce that

report, did not enact the legislation accompanying that

report, and never referred to the relevant issue in its

own legislative history.

In its opposition to certiorari, the government

claimed reliance on the 1984 committee report was

28

justified even though it accompanied vetoed legislation

because this Court endorsed that kind of reliance in a

footnote in United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 404

n.14 (1973). See Cert. Opp. 8 n.4. If anything, the

Enmons footnote underscores that the 1984 report is

not a legitimate basis for giving meaning to the 1985

legislation. Over a four-justice dissent, the footnote

permitted reliance on floor statements accompanying

unenacted legislation only because those statements

were repeatedly endorsed in the legislative history

accompanying the legislation that was actually

enacted. As explained above, the legislative history

that accompanied the enacted version of EAJA did not

mention paralegal services, let alone endorse the

snippet of faux legislative history on which the Federal

Circuit relied.

* * *

For all of the reasons addressed above, paralegal

services are “attorney fees” that must be awarded at

“prevailing market rates” under EAJA.

B. EAJA’s Adjustable Rate Cap Provides No Basis For

Compensating Paralegal Services At Cost.

As explained above, our view that paralegal

services are compensable under EAJA at market rates

comports with Jenkins and EAJA’s text, structure, and

purpose. Moreover, as this Court put it in Jenkins,

“encouraging the use of lower cost paralegals rather

than attorneys wherever possible, ... ‘encourages

cost-effective delivery of legal services.” 491 U.S. at

288 (quoting Cameo, 738 F.2d at 846); Pet. App. 23a

(relying on market forces “encourages cost-effective

delivery of legal services.”) (Plager, J., dissenting); see

29

also Miller v. Alamo, 983 F.2d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 1993)

(“Work done by paralegals is compensable if it is work

that would have been done by an attorney. If such

hours were not compensable, then attorneys may be

compelled to perform the duties that could otherwise

be fulfilled by paralegals, thereby increasing the

overall cost of legal services.”); Jean, 863 F.2d at 778

(same).*

The Federal Circuit, however, maintained that this

rationale does not apply here in light of EAJA’s

adjustable cap on hourly rates. Pet. App. 18a. In its

view, if paralegal services were compensable at market

rates, there would be an undue incentive to use

paralegal services (recovery for which would be largely

or entirely uncapped), rather than lawyer services

(recovery for which would be limited by the fee cap).

See id. Thus, the Federal Circuit maintained,

paralegals would be “overused,” inducing “less efficient

performance of legal services.” /d. This argument is

insufficient to overcome Jenkins, EAJA’s text, and the

“The efficiency rationale for use of paralegals was well

understood at the time of EAJA’s enactment. See, e.g., Todd

Shipyards, 545 F.2d at 1182 (“Paralegals can do some of the work

that the attorney would have to do anyway and can do it at

substantially less cost per hour, resulting in less total cost billed

to the employer [client]. Therefore, paralegal time at paralegal

rates can reasonably be counted along with the attorney’s time as

‘attorney fees.”); Jn re Chicken, 560 F. Supp. at 977 (“The advent

and widespread use of the paraprofessional has meant that the

cost of effective legal counsel has been reduced and its availability

enhanced without impairing the quality or delivery of legal

services.”); Mid-Hudson, 465 F. Supp. at 274 n.16 (“The use of

paralegals saves lawyer’s time and consequently money. It should

be encouraged, not the reverse.”).

30

other evidence of congressional intent discussed in Part

A above. Moreover, for the reasons that follow, the

argument fails on its own terms.

1. The Federal Circuit’s position appears to be

based on that court’s mistaken belief that, as a general

proposition, Congress sought in EAJA to compensate

parties for their litigation expenses on a below-market-

rate basis. Pet. App. 16a-17a (“It seems unlikely that

Congress would have set the fee for paralegals as high

as $75 per hour ... [,] given the overall desire to cap

allowable fees below market rates.”). The Federal

Circuit erred because it looked at EAJA from today’s

perspective — where lawyers’ hourly rates at large

commercial law firms in major metropolitan areas are

generally above the EAJA cap — not from the vantage

point of EAJA’s original enactment in 1980 or its

reenactment in 1985. As this Court has put it,

however, “[t]o interpret accurately” Congress’s intent,

a court should not read statutes “as if they were

written today, for to do so would inevitably distort

their intended meaning.” Goldstein v. California, 412

U.S. 546, 564 (1973).

EAJA was not conceived as a statute under which

most legal work performed by most lawyers would be

compensable at below-market rates. To the contrary,

EAJA was conceived as a market-rate statute, as its

text expressly indicates, albeit one under which some

of the costs of legal services were capped (unless the

statutory criteria for lifting the cap were met). In 1980,

the circumstances in which the hourly-rate ceiling

would be below a lawyer’s reasonable hourly market

were relatively rare. Indeed, in the years leading up to

EAJA’s enactment, lawyers’ market rates were often

31

below $75 per hour, sometimes well below.’ Generally,

fee rates exceeded $75 per hour only for relatively

senior lawyers in large metropolitan law firms."

Indeed, even in the period between EAJA’s initial

enactment in 1980 and its reenactment in 1985, the

unadjusted $75 per hour rate cap proved sufficient to

* See, e.g., Francia, 594 F.2d at 781 ($32 per hour “and up”);

Skehan, 501 F. Supp. at 1368-69 ($50-$70 per hour for seven

attorneys in practice in Washington, D.C., and $80 per hour for

one attorney who graduated law school in 1957 and had practiced

for ‘seven years at the Office of the Solicitor General); Swicker, 484

t Cupp. ae ree fu (A 9OU UCLIDIUL CILiLy Ald UISCUSSINg Wide range

of cases in which hourly rates almost invariably were below $75

per hour, referring to 1977 study finding that “mean hourly rate

awarded in Title VII cases was $40,” and awarding fees of $60 per

hour for work of two attorneys and $40 per hour for

another); Kennedy v. Crittendon, 1980 WL 243, *4 (M.D. Ga. 1980)

($30 to $60 per hour); Brady v. Washington County, 509 F. Supp.

538, 543 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (plaintiffs witness testified in fee

proceeding “that the customary charge for legal services in civil

matters in the area. . . is $50-an-hour.”); Mid-Hudson, 465 F.

Supp. at 270 (awards ranging from $50 to $80 per hour); Aumiller,

455 F. Supp. at 682 ($25 to $75 per hour); McPherson v. School

Dist. No. 186, 465 F. Supp. 749, 760 (S.D. Ill. 1978) (awarding $25

to $60 per hour and noting that the “current average hourly rate

in Springfield for complex federal litigation is $50 per hour for

experienced attorneys comparable in ability to” the senior lawyer

in the case); Nee/y, 77 F.R.D. at 486 (“prevailing hourly rate” of

$35 to $45 per hour).

- See, e.g.,Coalition to Preserve Houston, 494 F. Supp. at 747

($30 to $75 per hour for three attorneys and $85 to $100 per hour

for the senior lawyer); Selzer, 477 F. Supp. at 688, 690-91 (court

awarded “normal billing rates of approximately $125 per hour for

partners’ time and between $27.25 to $65 per hour for associates’

time” at major New York law firm, noting that fee resulted in an

average rate of about $60 per hour).

32

replicate the market for most or all legal work in most

cases.’

This point is driven home by the model rules issued

by the Administrative Conference of the United States

shortly after EAJA’s reenactment in 1985. The rules

provided that, in determining the compensable market

rate, the adjudicator should consider various factors,

including the customary fees for similar services and

prevailing market rates in the community. 51 Fed.

Reg. 16659, 16666 (May 6, 1986). This guidance would

have had little value if market rates for legal services

were generally expected to exceed the statutory fee cap.

"! See, e.g., Groves v. Heckler, 599 F. Supp. 830, 834 (M.D. Pa.

1984) ($65 per hour); Citizens for Responsible Resource Dev. v.

Watt, 579 F. Supp. 431, 449 (D. Ala. 1983) ($70 per hour); Cable

Atlanta, Inc. v. Project, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 (N.D. Ga.

1983) ($60 per hour for one lawyer and $75 per hour for another):

Wallace v. Sec’y of HHS, 1983 WL 44228, *2 (D. Mass. 1983) ($35

to $60 per hour); Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (D.

Ariz. 1983) (“$50 per hour is a reasonable rate in plaintiff's local

area for the type of legal services rendered in this case.”);

Kauffman v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 372, 377 (M.D. Pa. 1983)

($50 per hour); J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Southern Stress Wire

Corp., 575 F. Supp. 365, 370 (N.D. Ga. 1982) ($60 to $65 per hour

for one lawyer and $70 to $75 per hour for another); Envt/.

Defense Fund, Inc. v. Watt, 554 F. Supp. 36, 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)

(“The hourly rates requested for each individual appear to be

based on prevailing market rates and are at or within the 75

dollar-per-hour limit established by” EAJA.); Moholland v.

Schweiker, 546 F. Supp. 383, 387 (D.N.H. 1982) ($30 to $50 per

hour); Visser v. Magnarelli, 542 F. Supp. 1331, 1338 (N.D.N.Y.

1982) (awarding $75 per hour because “it represents the hourly

rate in this area normally charged for similar work by attorneys

of like skill”); WATCH v. Harris, 535 F. Supp. 9, 15-16 (D. Conn.

1981) (awarding fees at $45 to $50 per hour).

er ee.

33

We do not intend to suggest that the fee cap in 1980

or 1985 was at or above the prevailing market rates for

all lawyers in all markets; as noted earlier, it was not.

Rather, our point is only that EAJA was seen primarily

as a market-rate-based fee-shifting statute that would,

with its potential to adjust rates for increases in the

cost of living, provide market-rate compensation for

most, albeit not all, compensable legal work. EAJA’s

drafters could not have foreseen that inflation in legal

services would greatly outstrip inflation generally.

They would thus have had no reason to believe that the

EAJA fee cap would, as a general matter, promote the

“Uvcsusc UL iwKal persuuiuel ViLIeU AL relatively 10w

rates.

2. Even if we were to assume (incorrectly) that

EAJA’s drafters contemplated a world in which market

rates for lawyers generally exceeded EAJA’s cap, the

Federal Circuit’s concern about the fee cap would still

be misguided. That concern was necessarily premised

on the unstated proposition that EAJA will motivate

law firms to shunt work to paralegals incapable of

handling that work. But that proposition is implausible

because of the strong ethical and economic incentives

not to assign work in that manner. The requirement

that lawyers provide competent and zealous

representation would generally prohibit a lawyer from

demanding that a paralegal, say, write an appellate

brief, just as law firm partners generally cannot assign

the most complex and sensitive matters to a brand-new

lawyer, even if doing so would save clients money in

the short term. Nor would the market permit such

inappropriate use of paralegals. If a law firm were to

overuse paralegals in the manner contemplated by the

34

Federal Circuit, the client would not save in the end,

because the quality of legal services would suffer, and

the client would demand the proper use of law firm

personnel or take its business elsewhere. And, on the

other hand, if the EAJA rate cap induces law firms to

provide paralegals with additional work that they are

capable of handling, the client will save money, and

Jenkins’s efficiency rationale will be served in spades.

In addition, consider what would happen if the

Federal Circuit’s rule controlled. In cases subject to

EAJA, paralegal services would be recoverable only at

the cost of those services to law firms — and clients

would lose. In cases where fees were recoverable —

that is, where the client had prevailed and the

government’s position was held to be unreasonable —

EAJA would reimburse only the law firm’s cost in

employing the paralegal, even though the client would

have incurred fees at full market rate. That result

would run counter to a central purpose of EAJA: “to

eliminate for the average person the financial

disincentive to challenge unreasonable governmental

actions.” Jean, 496 U.S. at 163.

3. In any event, the Federal Circuit's concern about

the supposed overuse of paralegals proves far too

much. The Federal Circuit's concern, though

misguided, is, to be sure, premised on a basic truth

about the fee cap: EAJA provides less reimbursement,

as a percentage of the total fee incurred by the client,

the more the law firm uses higher-priced personnel

whose market rates exceed the fee cap. As noted, the

Federal Circuit claimed that if fees for paralegal

services are recoverable at market rates, law firms will

assign work to relatively low-priced paralegals whose

35

market-rate fees are likely to be fully recoverable

because they generally fall below the fee cap.

As explained earlier (at 30-33), in EAJA’s early

years, even in relatively rare instances where some

attorney rates in some locations exceeded the cap, the

rates of junior and mid-level lawyers did not, and,

thus, fees for their work were fully recoverable even if

fees for the work of their senior colleagues were not.

Today, however, largely because inflation in legal

services has outstripped increases in the cost of living

generally, the market rates for relatively junior

associates as well as their more senior colleagues often

exceed even tne intlation-adjusted KAJA cap. But even

when that occurs, the rates for junior associates and

senior partners frequently differ dramatically. See,

e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 491 F.3d 649,

660 (7th Cir. 2007) (rates ranging from $200 to $400

per hour); Hixon v. City of Golden Valley, 2007 WL

4373111 (D. Minn. 2007) (same); Laffey Matrix,

available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/de/Divisions/Ci

vil_Division/Laffey_Matrix_7.html (District of

Columbia fee rates ranging from $215 per hour for

lawyers with one to three years of experience to $425

per hour for lawyers with more than 20 years of

experience). Thus, if the Federal Circuit were correct

about the effect of the rate cap, in cases subject to

"The Laffey matrix serves as a benchmark for market-rate fee

shifting in federal litigation in the Washington, D.C. area and is

updated annually by the office of the U.S. Attorney for the District

of Columbia. It has its origins in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,

572 F. Supp. 354, 388 (D.D.C. 1983), afd in part, rev d in part on

other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

36

EAJA, junior Jawyers would be “overused” and

inefficiency supposedly would ensue. But no one would

suggest that the work of junior associates is not

compensable as “attorney fees” under EAJA and that

such work may only be reimbursed at the associates’

cost to their law firms.

To be sure, junior associates are lawyers and

paralegals are not. But the fact that junior lawyers,

just as surely as paralegals, would be “overused” under

the Federal Circuit’s view of EAJA demonstrates that

it is recent hyper-inflation in the market for legal

services generally, and nothing about the cost of

paralegal services in particular or the meaning of the

statutory term “attorney fees,” that is the true source

of the Federal Circuit’s concern.

* + *

For all of these reasons, EAJA’s fee cap is irrelevant

to the question presented and provides no basis for

ignoring Jenkins and EAJA’s requirement that

attorney fees be awarded at “prevailing market rates.”

C. Paralegal Services Are Not “Other Expenses”

Under EAJA, But Even If They Are, They Should

Be Awarded At The Cost To The Client Not The

Cost To The Lawyer.

1. The question in this case is whether paralegal

services are compensable under EAJA at market rates

or at the cost of those services to the lawyer, as the

government maintains. In taking the latter approach,

the Federal Circuit focused on the fact that EAJA

authorizes an award of “expenses,” claiming in

particular that EAJA draws a distinction between

“attorney fees,” billed at market rates, and “expenses,”

-~s -1e OOS

37

billed at cost. See, e.g., Pet. App. 19a (“[Wle hold that

paralegal services are not recoverable as fees, but are

only recoverable as expenses at the cost to the

attorney.”); id. at 55a-56a (“[Playments for paralegal

services under EAJA are not recoverable as ‘attorney's

fees’ but are recoverable as ‘expenses,’ allowable only

at cost.”). With that supposed statutory distinction in

mind, the court of appeals distinguished Jenkinson the

ground that, in contrast to EAJA’s reference to

“expenses,” section 1988 refers only to “attorney's fees”

and does not mention “expenses.” See id. at 15a.

The Federal Circuit seriously misread EAJA’s plain

LAL. GAA autnorizes an award ot “fees and other

expenses.” 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (emphasis added); see

also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (same). “Fees and other

expenses” are defined to include “reasonable attorney

... fees,” the amount of which “shall be based upon

prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of

services furnished ....” 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A); see also

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2(A) (same). Thus, a// awards

under EAJA are awards of “expenses,” including

awards of “attorney fees.” The Federal Circuit’s

dichotomy between “expenses” awarded at cost, on the

one hand, and “attorney fees” awarded at market rate,

on the other, is flatly at odds with the statute.

Put another way, the term “expenses” cannot, as

the Federal Circuit contemplated, mean only those

items awardable at cost because that term includes

fees, which are awardable at market rates. Cf Marek,

473 U.S. at 9 (because section 1988 authorizes award

of “attorney's fees as part of the costs,” such fees are

“costs” under that section and Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 68). For that reason, the Federal Circuit's

38

reliance on the presence in EAJA of the term

“expenses” begs the questions — already answered in

Jenkins — whether the statutory term “attorney fees”

includes paralegal services, and whether fees for such

services may be awarded at market rates. (And as

previously discussed, under EAJA, once it is

determined that paralegal services are a component of

“attorney fees,” further reliance on Jenkins is

unnecessary because the statute says that “fees” are to

be awarded at “prevailing market rates.”)"®

2. The government apparently has recognized the

flaw in the Federal Circuit’s reasoning and now says

that the question presented is whether paralegal

services are compensable at market rate as fees, or as

“other expenses’ compensable at the rate of cost to the

attorney.” Cert. Opp. (D. But that new parsing of the

statute does not help the government. “Other

expenses” under EAJA generally refers to out-of-pocket

expenses for services provided by third parties outside

of the law firm. Those out-of-pocket expenses can

either be paid directly by the client or incurred in the

first instance by the lawyer on the client's behalf.

'’Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s reliance on the absence of an

express provision for the award of out-of-pocket “expenses” under

section 1988 as a basis for distinguishing Jenkins overlooks that

section 1988 has long been read to authorize recovery of out-of-

pocket expenses. See, e.g., Casey, 499 U.S. at 87 n.3 (noting that

courts have held that “reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred

by the attorney’ [are] included in § 1988 ‘attorney's fee’ award”)

(quoting Northcross, 611 F.2d at 639); T's. of the Constr. Indus. &

Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Redland Ins. Co., 460 F.3d

1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 2006); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, Fla., 698

F.2d 1181, 1190-91 (11th Cir. 1983).

39

Thus, courts have regularly approved

reimbursement for “other expenses,” such as

transportation and other travel costs, postage, long

distance telephone calls, and the like paid by the client

or the law firm to outside vendors to accomplish the

client’s objectives in the litigation."* In these situations,

to be sure, if the lawyer pays the bill to the outside

vendor, reimbursement is limited to the lawyer’s cost,

but only because such reimbursement is also the cost

to the client. Thus, these “other expenses” are in reality

charged at market rates — that is, at the rate that the

client is willing to pay for them in the relevant market,

whothor that in the Gimvuae uuae uue puuue COlpany

charges for long distance calls made on the client’s

behalf or that an airline charges for a flight taking the

lawyer to court. And, that is why, in deciding whether

“other expenses” are compensable under EAJA, the

courts have generally taken a follow-the-market

approach and allowed reimbursement of such expenses

when they are ordinarily billed separately to the client

in the relevant legal market rather than included in

the attorney’s overhead. See, e.g., Int Woodworkers,

792 F.2d at 767; Adkinson, 256 F.Supp.2d at 1319.

Awarding expenses at the lawyer’s cost — when it

is different from the client’s cost — runs headlong into

this market-based approach to expense recovery and is

'* See, e.g., Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988);

Int] Woodworkers of Am. v. Donovan, 792 F.2d 762,767 (9th Cir.

1985): Jean, 863 F.2d at 778; United States v. Adkinson, 256 F.

Supp. 2d 1297,1319 (N.D. Fla. 2003), afd, 360 F.3d 1257 (11th

Cir. 2004).

40

an irrational basis for reimbursing a party under a fee-

shifting statute. By definition, clients incur paralegal

expenses at market rutes. The Federal Circuit,

however, decided that those services should only be

reimbursed at their lawyers’ cost. But that was no

better than plucking a number out of the air. The cost

to the lawyer might be a third, or half, or two-thirds of

what the party actually incurred for the paralegal’s

time, and thus has no relation to the market rate or

any other sensible guidepost for the cl/ient’s expense

recovery.

Paralegal services are not generally purchased from

third-party vendors, but are performed by in-house law

firm personnel under the direction of attorneys, which

is one reason why it makes sense to view paralegal

services as a component of statutory “attorney fees.”

See Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285 (holding that term

“attorney's fees” was meant to compensate work of all

personnel “whose labor contributes to the work product

for which an attorney bills her client.”). But, for the

reasons stated above, if the Court rejects our position

that paralegal services are a component of EAJA

“attorney fees,” and agrees with the government that

paralegal services are “other expenses,” those services

should be reimbursed at the client's cost, not at the

lawyer's cost. After all, EAJA authorizes an award of

fees and other expenses “to the prevailing party,” 5

U.S.C. § 504(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), not that

party's lawyer, and so if paralegal services are to be

awarded at cost, that cost should be the party’s.

3. The irrationality of the Federal Circuit’s decision

to award paralegal expenses at the lawyer’s cost is

underscored by the practical problems it will cause

oe ees ee Ret ke

41

(and has already caused). As noted earlier, the award

to Richlin for paralegal services was based on the

Board of Contract Appeals’ informal Internet survey of

paralegal salaries. But that is not the proper way tv

assess “the attorney’s cost.” Pet. App. 19a. The

attorney’s cost for a paralegal would include not only

the paralegal’s salary, but the cost of employer

provided fringe benefits and a share of all overhead

allocable to the paralegal, including utilities, rent or

depreciation, and similar administrative costs. The cost

computation would be difficult, and it would differ

paralegal to paralegal, firm to firm, and, arguably,

ocasuu Ww scasulL. DispuLles WUUIU arise 45 LU WHeLNe!

this or that cost were properly included in overhead

These problems are not theoretical. The difficulties

of properly assessing the cost to the attorney may be

insurmountable, as illustrated by two EAJA cases

decided in the wake of the decision below. In Former

Employees of BMC Software, Inc. v. Sec'v of Labor, _

F. Supp. 2d ___, 2007 WL 2994605 (C.I.T. 2007), the

court noted that “[clalculating the amount of the award

for the paralegal-type work in this case is particularl)

difficult in light of ... Richlin ....” Id. at *38. It

explained that although “(plrior to Rich/in, KAJA

awards had included compensation for paralegal work

at market rates ..., [now they] are only recoverable as

expenses at the cost to the attorney.” Id. (emphasis in

original, internal quotation omitted). Because it was

“impossible to calculate the [paralegal] fee award in

this case” based on the prevailing partys fce

application that had been filed prior to the decision

below, the applicant was “accorded the opportunity to

provide information on the cost to the law firm of any

42

paralegals and other non-attorneys whose time is

reflected in the [fee] Application.” Jd.

But proving actual cost turned out to be too

difficult, and “(rlather than attempt to separately

determine the actual cost to the firm for the”

paralegals, the prevailing party had to settle for less —

the hourly rate that the Federal Circuit had allowed to

Richlin, based on paralegal salaries alone. Former

Employees of BMC Software, Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor,

2007 WL 4181696, *3 (C.L.T. 2007). That result had the

virtue of simplicity, but not common sense: The award

for paralegal services lacked any connection either to

what the party had incurred for paralegal services or

to an accurate assessment of the attorney’s cost.

Even worse, in /nformation Sciences Corp. v.

United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 673, 683 (Fed. Cl. 2007),

“liln light of the level of proof demanded by Rich/in,”

the prevailing plaintiff “withdrlew] aclaim for recovery

of paralegal fees,” thereby relinquishing $15,875 that

it had incurred for paralegal services in opposing

unreasonable government conduct — fees to which it

would have been entitled had the court based its award

on market rates.

* * *

There is a mechanism that avoids the complexity

and irrationality of compensating paralegal services at

the lawyer’s cost. It is called a market, which silently

and definitively values legal services. It avoids both the

arbitrary loss of deserved compensation, as has

occurred as a result of the decision below, and the

“second major litigation,” Hens/ey, 461 U.S. at 437,

that would ensue if litigants were required to ascertain

43

the value of legal services based on the artificial

criterion of the lawyer's cost. It is also the mechanism

chosen by Congress when it decided that attorney fees

under EAJA should be valued at “prevailing market

rates.” 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A); 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d)(2){A).

CONCLUSION

The decision below should be reversed and the case

remanded for the purpose of setting an award of

attorney fees for paralegal services at market rates.

Respectfully submitted,

Brian Wolfman

(Counsel of Record)

Scott L. Nelson

Public Citizen Litigation Group

1600 20th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20009

(202) 588-1000

January 2008 Counsel for Petitioner

ADDENDUM

28 U.S.C. § 2412

(d)(1)(A) Except as otherwise specifically provided

by statute, a court shall award to a preveiling party

other than the United States fees and other expenses,

in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to

subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil

action (other than cases sounding in tort), including

proceedings for judicial review of agency action,

brought by or against the United States in any court

having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds

that the position of the United States was substantially

justified or that special circumstances make an award

unjust.

* * *

(2) For the purposes of this subsection—

(A) “fees and other expenses” includes the

reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the

reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering

report, test, or project which is found by the court to be

necessary for the preparation of the party's case, and

reasonable attorney fees (The amount of fees awarded

under this subsection shall be based upon prevailing

market rates for the kind and quality of the services

furnished, except that (i) no expert witness shall be

compensated at a rate in excess of the highest rate of

compensation for expert witnesses paid by the United

States: and (ii) attorney fees shall not be awarded in

excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines

that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor,

such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys

for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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