Reply — Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014) (No. 14-47)
Supreme Court brief2014
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 14-47
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP,
Petitioner,
Vv.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
F. WILLIAM BROWNELL
(Counsel of Record)
HENRY V. NICKEL
LEE B. ZEUGIN
LAUREN E. FREEMAN
ELIZABETH L. HORNER
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP
2200 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20037
(202) 955-1500
bbrownell@hunton.com
October 29, 2014 Counsel for Petitioner
VALSON-EPES PrunTnG Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 ~ WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 29.6, Petitioner hereby incorpo-
rates by reference the disclosure statement filed with
the petition for a writ of certiorari on July 14, 2014.
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
II.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Extraordinary Costs of EPA's
Efforts to Transform an Essential
Industry Make This Case Worthy of
ee Se BN siiectcdenncanesenesieninnsen
Certiorari Is Needed to Address EPA’s
Interpretation of the “Appropriate and
Necessary” Decisional Standard in 42
U.S.C. §7412(m) to Eliminate the
Distinction Between “Residual Risk”
Regulation Under §7412(f), (m), and
(n) and Categorical HAP Regulation
Under §7412(c) and (d), and to
Obliterate the Distinction’ that
Congress Drew Between §7412
Regulation of EGUs and §7412
Regulation of Other Sources. ...................
CONCLUSION
eeeeeteeere
CCT SSR ee eee eee ee eee
SESH SESS SESE ESTES EE HEHEHE EHS HEHEHE EER HORE HR HH ee
SHEESH SSS ESE STE ESSE SETHE SEH ESET HEHEHE HEHEHE Pee eee
shies 1
inaesaiel 5
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases:
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208
EI cnsnenscsiiisacscsciunmaiihentemnabigaebianbchaemetaaneonaass 12, 13
EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134
Be ls ee Ge rriecnceneidenebsiniintniniicsichniesmenianinin 2
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)................000.000 11
Sierra Club v. Ga. Power Co., 180 F.3d 1309
Se ts II eninsictecictnianaeienenieummpnnntenmatinnsoeiiniia 5
Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011) .............. 13
UARG v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014)........................ 1
Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) ............. 5
Statutes:
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, et seq.
ee Ss Oe Pi iictinictnnnisnsiiisnniuniinhinniisiuaitaitienaiasddeniis 3
Pe Oe I eictinsanninctteanentaensavinsesemsncetioiéite 10
Ae ee Ge I Hitcinicitehintschasiecinlichiceebcsicassaisioaiitsdebiiiieih 2,4
ee se I ihe cihnidisisdlcncdeenniiasinesadenantnele 6, 8, 9, 11
Ae Tees OF PR Sittttindercciitinnicctiicncsinsenitiiicinniaiuitindiin 10
i 6, 7, 8, 11
ee I act cciersinedesiccihitinnsntiemsinintincnnteiigh 6
ices cecaccrciaransdel 6
42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(3) ........ sanlaicpivconsins dtiniaiiontabeinibiaebaltaaieeh 6
iV
GB UEG.C. © FOI onecececcecvscerenscecenvevemsevesiwce 6, 7
eB FI acestcinsceseiittrreccitcerscscrecens 6, 8,9
GE UGG: © TORII oisnseiccccnccecnecerectcsosee: 7,9, 11
ST, 6 PI vrssstcssisnitccininctertesveoces 7,9, 11
Oe UT, BT vse nicnitsscceiceencs 6, 8, 9, 11
TE, 6 PI nisin iiss i)
GB UID. © FORBID 3aencsesecsesccsccecccscecccceces 6, 8, 9, 11
SURG, 5 I iis )
Poy Pol E . Raeaierenemeaners 5, 6, 8, 10, 11
42 U.S.C. § 7412(m)(1)(A) ......-.---.-200--00-+ 27.3.
Legislative History:
House Debate on the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990 Conference Report (Oct. 26,
1990) (statement of Rep. Michael Oxley), re-
printed in 1 A Legislative History of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, at 1417
Ota a BAA RT Ey nS © 0S eS a 5
Regulations:
re aici aictcceiteseteationies 10
Federal Register:
71 Fed. Reg. 76,603 (Dec. 21, 2006) .............-.2...2000000 fs)
76 Fed. Reg. 24,976 (May 3, 2011)................cseccseccseee 3
79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (June 18, 2014)....................... 2,4
Miscellaneous:
EPA, Integrated Risk Information System,
Methylmercury,
http:/Iwww.epa.gov/iris/subst/0073.htm (last
ss RE Pee 3
EPA, Study of Hazardous Air Pollutant Emis-
sions from Electric Utility Steam Generating
Units — Final Report to Congress, Vol. 1
(Feb. 1998), Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-
CREE Rite a ee ge Ie ER 2, 3,4
Harrison, David, Ph.D., et al., NERA Economic
Consulting, Potential Energy Impacts of the
EPA Proposed Clean Power Plan (Oct. 2014),
available at
U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-
14-672, EPA Regulations and Electricity:
Update on Agencies’ Monitoring Efforts and
Coal-Fueled Generating Unit Requirements
(Aug. 2014), available at
http:/Awww V u AQ-14-672............ 4
ARGUMENT
I. The Extraordinary Costs of EPA’s Efforts
to Transform an Essential Industry Make
This Case Worthy of This Court’s Atten-
tion.
In his dissent to the panel decision, Judge Ka-
vanaugh recognized the importance of this case to
American society. The costs of the Mercury and Air
Toxics Standards (“MATS”) Rule are immense:
The estimated cost of compliance with
EPA’s Final Rule is approximately $9.6
billion per year, by EPA’s own calcula-
tion.... To put it in perspective, that
amount would pay the annual health
insurance premiums of about two mil-
lion Americans.... Put simply, the Rule
is “among the most expensive rules that
EPA has ever promulgated.”
Pet. App. 82a (emphasis in original) (citation omit-
ted). And even though EPA’s $9.6 billion figure ap-
pears to be an underestimate,! these costs reflect on-
ly part of EPA’s broader effort to restructure the
American electric utility industry through revisionist
interpretations of established Clean Air Act pro-
grams. See, eg., UARG v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427,
2442, 2444 (2014) (remanding greenhouse gas “pre-
vention of significant deterioration” and Title V per-
1 EPA’s modeled retirements have proven to be more than an
order of magnitude below reality. Utility Air Regulatory Group
(“UARG”) Pet. 34.
2
mitting requirements); EPA v. EME Homer City
Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014) (rejecting
EPA’s statutory interpretation underlying its region-
al interstate transport program and remanding the
case for “as applied” challenges); see also 79 Fed.
Reg. 34,830 (June 18, 2014) (proposing environmen-
tal dispatch, renewable portfolio, and demand-side
management standards for electric utility steam
generating unit (“EGU”) greenhouse gas emissions
pursuant to Clean Air Act §111(d), 42 U.S.C.
§7411(d)). Indeed, EPA estimates that its proposed
§7411(d) standards for EGU greenhouse gas emis-
sions alone will impose more than $65 billion in annu-
al costs on the electric utility industry above and be-
yond the $9.6 billion in annual costs imposed by the
MATS Rule. UARG Pet. 36 (describing costs of the
proposed rule).
There is no dispute about the magnitude of the
costs imposed by the MATS program—they are
EPA’s own estimates. And while, as Judge Ka-
vanaugh said, “the benefits of this Rule are disput-
ed,” Pet. App. 83a, the federal respondents’ brief con-
firms that any residual risk associated with EGU
hazardous air pollutant (“HAP”) emissions is
dwarfed by the regulatory costs. As EPA concedes,
the quantified benefits of reducing HAP emissions
under the MATS Rule would amount to only about
$4 to $6 million each year. EPA Opp. 12 n.6, 28.2
2 Even without the MATS Rule, mercury emissions from power
plants fell from 50 tons in 1994-1995 to 29 tons in 2010 as a
result of other regulatory programs. Compare EPA, Study of
HAP Emissions from EGUs—Final Report to Congress, Vol. 1,
3
And while EPA projected that the additional controls
required to produce that $4 to $6 million HAP bene-
fit would also result in substantial “co-benefits” by
reducing fine particulate matter (“PMg>5”), a conven-
tional pollutant already regulated under the Nation-
al Ambient Air Quality Standard (“NAAQS”) pro-
gram, 42 U.S.C. § 7409, “EPA made clear...that the
RIA [projecting these co-benefits for non-HAPs]
played no role in its finding that regulating [HAP
emissions from] power plants was ‘appropriate and
necessary under Section 7412(n)(1)(A).” Jd. at 12
(emphasis added).
at 7-8 (Feb. 1998), Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-
3052 (hereinafter “Utility Study”) with 76 Fed. Reg. 24,976,
25,002 (May 3, 2011) (proposed MATS Rule). This decrease
raises questions about the need for a $9.6 billion program to
address residual mercury risk.
3 While EPA says there may be other unquantified benefits as-
sociated with ite MATS Rule, EPA Opp. 12-13, EPA disavowed
any reliance on comparison of costs and benefits as a basis for
the Rule. /d. at 12. Examination of federal respondents’ brief
illustrates why EPA did not attempt to rely on such “unquanti-
fied” benefits. For example, while federal respondents aasert
that 7% of American women were exposed in 2000 to mercury
levela that exceeded a “health-protective level,” id. at 6, sub-
stantial reductions in mercury have occurred in recent years,
see supra note 2, and moreover, that “health-protective level”
included an order of magnitude safety factor. EPA, Integrated
Risk Information System, Methylmercury §1.A.3,
http-?//www.epa.goviiris/subst/0073.htm (last updated Aug. 9,
2012). And, contrary to the assertion of health and environ-
mental respondents, Am. Academy of Pediatrics Opp. 16 n.6,
EPA did study the acute effects of HCl emissions and found
that the highest level of exposure was a mere 0.7% of the level
of potential concern. Utility Study, supra note 2, Vol. 1, at 6-19
4
Beyond the MATS Rule’s own extraordinary
costs, the MATS program reflects but the initial step
in an EPA campaign to fundamentally change how
the electric utility industry generates electricity. Fif-
ty-four gigawatts (““GWs”) of coal-fired generation—
one sixth of the Nation’s coal-fired capacity—have
been, or will be, retired as a result of the Rule by
2016. UARG Pet. 34 (citing U.S. Energy Information
Administration analysis); see also U.S. Government
Accountability Office, GAO-14-672, EPA Regulations
and Electricity: Update on Agencies’ Monitoring Ef-
forts and Coal-Fueled Generating Unit Retirements,
at 17 (Aug. 2014), avatlable at
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO- 14-672 (“About
three-quarters of the retirements we identified in our
analysis...are expected to occur by the end of 2015,
corresponding to the initial April 2015 MATS com-
pliance deadline....”)}. MATS-prompted retirements
mark only the initial wave, with dozens of additional
GWs of coal-fired EGU capacity projected to retire
once EPA’s §7411(d) performance standards are im-
posed. UARG Pet. 36 (citing 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,933);
see also David Harrison, Ph.D., et al., NERA Eco-
nomic Consulting, Potential Energy Impacts of the
EPA Proposed Clean Power Plan at S-6 to S-7 (Oct.
2014), available at
http://www .nera.com/publications/archive/2014/poten
tial-impacts-of-the-epa-clean-power-plan.html (pro-
jecting potentially over 100 GWs of additional re-
tirements through 2031).
Table 6-13; see also National Mining Association Reply in Sup-
port of Petition, Case No. 14-49.
5
Electricity is an essential commodity, and the
electric utility industry is critical to the public
health, the public welfare, and the productive capaci-
ty of the Nation’s population. UARG Pet. 34 (citing
Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 272 (1976)).4
The extraordinary impacts of this Rule on this essen-
tial industry—and EPA’s conclusion that “it is irrele-
vant how large the costs are or whether the benefits
outweigh the costs in determining whether it is ‘ap-
propriate’ to regulate electric utilities under the
MACT program,” Pet. App. 83a (emphasis in origi-
nal)—alone make this case worthy of certiorari. But
certiorari is also important to address a more fun-
damental issue: EPA’s ongoing effort to expand a fo-
cused delegation of Clean Air Act authority into a li-
cense to transform an essential industry.
II. Certiorari Is Needed to Address EPA’s In-
terpretation of the “Appropriate and
Necessary” Decisional Standard in 42
U.S.C. §7412(n) to Eliminate the Distinc-
tion Between “Residual Risk” Regulation
* See also House Debate on the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 Conference Report (Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Mi-
chael Oxley), reprinted in 1 A Legislative History of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990, at 1417 (1993) (§7412(n) was
written to “protect[]...the public health while avoiding the im-
position of excessive and unnecessary costs on residential, in-
dustrial, and commercial consumers of electricity.”); Sierra
Club v. Ga. Power Co., 180 F.3d 1309, 1311 (11th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam) (‘The district court was correct in concluding that a
steady supply of electricity during the summer months, espe-
cially in the form of air conditioning to the elderly, hospitals
and day care centers, is critical.”).
When it promulgated the final MATS Rule, EPA
argued there was nothing in the “appropriate and
necessary” decisional standard that contemplated
regulating only those EGU HAP emissions posing 4
health hazard, or that required EPA to consider costs
in applying that decisional standard. Pet. App. 212a.
The panel majority upheld EPA’s view of congres-
sional intent. Pet. App. 25a-28a.
spondents now defend the panel majority based on
6
Under §7412(f), (m), and (n) and Categori-
cal HAP Regulation Under §7412(c) and
(d), and to Obliterate the Distinction that
Congress Drew Between §7412 Regula-
tion of EGUs and §7412 Regulation of
Other Sources.
the following premises:
“Section 7412(c) generally deprives the
EPA of any discretion to consider costs
when deciding whether to include a
source category on the list of those sub-
ject to regulation.” EPA Opp. 18.
“Those statutory directives [of 42 U.S.C.
§7412(c)(1), (2), and (3)] are mandatory
and do not authorize the EPA to consid-
er the compliance costs associated with
regulating either [major or ‘ar-
ea’]...source[s] when making the initial
listing decision.” Id.
“Section 7412(c)(9) does not authorize
the agency to consider costs” when
The federal re-
7
“delet{ing] any major or area source cat-
egory from the list.” Id.
e Section 7412(d)(2) “does require the
agency to consider costs when deciding
whether to set the proper level of per-
missible emissions beyond the minimum
level required by Section 7412(d)(3).”
Id. at 19-20 (second emphasis added).
What the federal respondents extract from these
provisions written for non-EGU sources is that
(i) “Congress made cost irrelevant to the initial list-
ing decision, id. at 20, and that (ii) “the agency was
required to establish emissions standards for all
listed” HAPs once it found that “it is ‘appropriate and
necessary to regulate power plants generally.” Id. at
16. In other words, the federal respondents believe
that EPA has discretion to transform the broad “ap-
propriate and necessary” decisional standard for
regulating specific EGU HAP emissions under
§7412(n)(1)(A) into the restrictive decisional criteria
established in §7412(c) for the initial “listing” of
source categories other than EGUs.5
5 See EPA Opp. 21 ([T]he agency in making th[e ‘appropriate
and necessary’ determination reasonably looked to the process
that Congress had established in listing other source catego-
ries.”); id. at 29 (‘Once listed...{[EGUs] are properly treated like
other listed source categories....”). But see Pet. App. 84a-85a
(‘the majority opinion...does not sufficiently account for the fact
that treating electric utilities differently from standard sources
was the intent of Section 112(n)(1)(A), as revealed by the statu-
tory text,” and if Congress had not “intended EPA to consider
8
In transforming EGU regulation under §7412(n)
into a command (or authorization) to regulate all
EGU HAP emissions under §7412(c) and (d), EPA
ignores the distinction between (i) a §7412 program
that calls for new categorical technology-based regu-
lation of HAPs, and (ii) the very different §7412 pro-
gram that calls for additional, or “residual,” “risk-
based” regulation of HAPs following implementation
of control technology and other reduction measures
at EGUs as a result of other programs in the Clean
Air Act. Sections 7412(c) and (d) form the “core”
§7412 program enacted to initiate regulation of HAP
emissions from a broad spectrum of source catego-
ries. In contrast, §7412(n), like §7412(f) and (m),
calls for risk-based regulation of emissions that re-
main after HAPs have been reduced under other con-
trol programs. This distinction makes all) the differ-
ence.
To begin, residual risk regulation by its very na-
ture requires a pollutant-specific evaluation. Under
such programs, only those remaining HAP emissions
that present an unacceptable risk can trigger regula-
tion. For example, §7412(f) is directed at residual
risks posed by “sources” in regulated “categories or
subcategories,” and calls for a study identifying any
risks posed by specific pollutants remaining after
the costs of regulating electric utilities” as a “threshold decision
in deciding whether to regulate electric utilities under the
MACT program to begin with,” Congress could have “automati-
cally regulated electric utilities under the MACT program, as it
did with other sources”) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
9
§7412(d) technology-based regulation. For any such
risks, EPA must establish standards protective of
public health and the environment. Costs must be
considered in setting these residual risk standards.®
Like §7412(f), §7412(m) also calls for a “report” that
identifies “whether the other provisions of this sec-
tion [§7412] are adequate to prevent serious adverse
effects to public health or widespread environmental
effects.” Id. §7412(m)(6). If regulation under those
“other provisions” is inadequate, “the Administrator
shall...promulgate...such further emission standards
or contro] measures as may be necessary and appro-
priate to prevent such effect.” (Emphasis added).
Again, a pollutant-specific risk-based evaluation re-
sulting in pollutant-specific standards is contemplat-
ed.’
6 In evaluating any “adverse environmental effect” under
§7412(f), the statute directs EPA to “takfe] into consideration
costs.” For health-based “ample margin of safety” review under
§7412(f), Congress explicitly endorsed, in §7412(f)(2)(B), a 1989
HAP rule in which EPA considered cost and a range of other
factors in evaluating whether there was an “ample margin of
safety.” See 71 Fed. Reg. 76,603, 76,608 (Dec. 21, 2006).
7 By comparison, §7412(d)(3) determines a standard’s minimum
level of stringency (or “floor”) without considering cost. Cf. Cal-
pine Opp. 12 (‘Congress explicitly eliminated any EPA discre-
tion in 112(d)(3)....”); id. at 18 (noting “EPA’s nearly exclusive
use of Floor Standards”). By contrast, to establish standards
more stringent than the “floor” under §7412(d)(2), EPA must
evaluate cost and other factors on a pollutant-by-pollutant ba-
sis. See id. at 18 n.17 (recognizing that a “beyond-the-floor”
standard was set only for mercury emissions from low-rank coal
units in the MATS Rule). In this sense, §7412(d)(2) standards,
10
Section 7412(n) speaks in similar terms, except
that the study focuses only on those “public health”
hazards resulting from those HAP “emissions by
electric utility steam generating units...[that remain]
after imposition” of other CAA requirements. (Em-
phasis added). In discussing risks posed by emission
“units,” not risks posed by “source categories,”
§7412(n) underscores that only those HAPs emitted
by those units posing health risks may be regulated.
As a result, an “appropriate and necessary” finding
that HAP emissions from certain EGUs threaten
health cannot justify regulation of HAP emissions
from EGUs that pose no public health hazard.
Finally, it would be “a strange and asymmetric
scheme,” EPA Opp. 21, to construe the statute, as
EPA does, to exclude consideration of costs under the
like residual risk standards, will be driven by individual pollu-
tant characteristics.
8 In the Clean Air Act, Congress interchangeably uses the term
“source,” “unit,” and “facility” to refer to individual structures
that emit a pollutant. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§7411(a), 7412(a).
In contrast, source “category” refers to all sources within a par-
ticular industrial grouping. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §52.21(b)(1)(iii).
Federal respondents attempt to refute the pollutant-specific
nature of §7412(n) regulation by asserting that “[u}nder the
plain terms of the statute, the required determination concerns
whether regulation of a particular source category ‘is appropri-
ate and necessary,’ not whether regulation of particular types of
emissions satisfies that standard.” EPA Opp. 30 (emphasis in
original). Because §7412(n) does not refer to “source category”
but to “electric utility steam generating units,” the statute
clearly requires EPA to show that a particular type of emissions
from particular EGUs pose a health hazard that is “appropriate
and necessary” to regulate.
li
broad “necessary” and “appropriate” language in
subsections (m) and (n), when pollutant-specific deci-
sional standards under other provisions (including
subsections (d)(2) and (f)) explicitly or implicitly re-
quire consideration of costs in requiring further regu-
lation. EPA’s interpretation frustrates any congres-
sional expectations that regulation of EGUs would be
based on consideration of all factors relevant to the
“appropriate and necessary” residual risk decisional
standard established by §7412(n)(1)(A), and not on
the cost-blind regulatory criteria governing § 7412(c)
and §7412(d)(3) decisions. Cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
42-43 (1983) (explaining that an agency must consid-
er the relevant factors when exercising its discretion
under the governing statute).
As to this, the panel majority did not take issue
with their dissenting colleague’s observation that the
“centrality of cost consideration to proper regulatory
decisionmaking” necessarily establishes “cost” as be-
ing among the “relevant factors” that a regulatory
agency must normally take into account. Pet. App.
78a. Instead, the panel majority excused EPA’s re-
fusal to consider the cost of EGU regulation under
§7412(n) solely on the basis of Congress’ having used
the word “cost” in some provisions of §7412 (i.e., pro-
visions that involve regulation of residual risks) and
not having used it in others (i.e., provisions that ap-
ply generally to the regulation of source categories
other than EGUs). Id. at 26a-27a. Again, such stat-
utory (mis)interpretation fails to take account of the
different approach that Congress intended that EPA
12
take in determining whether residual risks from
identified EGU HAP emissions were “appropriate
and necessary” to regulate.
In Entergy Corporation v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556
U.S. 208, 222 (2009), this Court cautioned against an
interpretative approach under which an inference
was drawn that “silence” with respect to the permis-
sibility of EPA’s considering a particular “relevant
factor[ ]” meant that EPA should forgo consideration,
where the statutory provision at issue was “silent not
only with respect to” that one factor “but with re-
spect to all potentially relevant factors.” “If silence
here implies prohibition,” the Court pointed out,
“then the EPA could not consider any factors in im-
plementing [the statutory provision] — an obvious
logical impossibility.” Jd.
That is the very error in interpretative logic that
both EPA and the panel majority have committed
here. According to EPA, Congress’ failure to have
employed the word “cost” in the “appropriate and
necessary” decisional standard of §7412(n)(1){A) in-
dicates that EPA was not to consider cost in deter-
mining that it was “appropriate and necessary” to
regulate EGU HAP emissions.*® At the same time,
nothing on the face of the plain language of
§ 7412(n)(1)(A) purports to identify any of the “rele-
vant factors” that should inform EPA's exercise of
discretion in determining whether it is “appropriate
® See, e.g., Pet. App. 212a (“Cost does not have te be read into
the definition of ‘appropriate....”); see also id. at 26a ([T]he
word ‘costs’ appears nowhere in subparagraph (A)” of
§7412(n)1).).
13
and necessary’ to regulate EGUs. As in Entergy
Corporation, EPA’s approach “surely proves too
much.” 556 U.S. at 222.
CONCLUSION
In this MATS rulemaking, EPA necessarily erred
in construing the “open-ended,” “ambiguous,” and
“inherently context-dependent” term “appropriate” as
allowing the Agency to forgo an indisputably rele-
vant factor: the extraordinary costs of transforming
how the electric utility industry generates electrici-
ty..°© Given the consequences of the MATS Rule, as
set forth in this reply and in UARG’s petition, grant-
ing certiorari here is plainly warranted.
Respectfully submitted,
F. WILLIAM BROWNELL
(Counsel of Record)
HENRY V. NICKEL
LEE B. ZEUGIN
LAUREN E. FREEMAN
ELIZABETH L. HORNER
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP
2200 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 955-1500
bbrownell@hunton.com
October 29, 2014 Counsel for Petitioner
10 See Pet. App. 26a (quoting Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct.
1651, 1659 (2011)).
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.