Reply — Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014) (No. 14-47)

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No. 14-47

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP,

Petitioner,

Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

F. WILLIAM BROWNELL

(Counsel of Record)

HENRY V. NICKEL

LEE B. ZEUGIN

LAUREN E. FREEMAN

ELIZABETH L. HORNER

HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP

2200 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20037

(202) 955-1500

bbrownell@hunton.com

October 29, 2014 Counsel for Petitioner

VALSON-EPES PrunTnG Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 ~ WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002

RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Rule 29.6, Petitioner hereby incorpo-

rates by reference the disclosure statement filed with

the petition for a writ of certiorari on July 14, 2014.

RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

II.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Extraordinary Costs of EPA's

Efforts to Transform an Essential

Industry Make This Case Worthy of

ee Se BN siiectcdenncanesenesieninnsen

Certiorari Is Needed to Address EPA’s

Interpretation of the “Appropriate and

Necessary” Decisional Standard in 42

U.S.C. §7412(m) to Eliminate the

Distinction Between “Residual Risk”

Regulation Under §7412(f), (m), and

(n) and Categorical HAP Regulation

Under §7412(c) and (d), and to

Obliterate the Distinction’ that

Congress Drew Between §7412

Regulation of EGUs and §7412

Regulation of Other Sources. ...................

CONCLUSION

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208

EI cnsnenscsiiisacscsciunmaiihentemnabigaebianbchaemetaaneonaass 12, 13

EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134

Be ls ee Ge rriecnceneidenebsiniintniniicsichniesmenianinin 2

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)................000.000 11

Sierra Club v. Ga. Power Co., 180 F.3d 1309

Se ts II eninsictecictnianaeienenieummpnnntenmatinnsoeiiniia 5

Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011) .............. 13

UARG v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014)........................ 1

Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) ............. 5

Statutes:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, et seq.

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Pe Oe I eictinsanninctteanentaensavinsesemsncetioiéite 10

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i 6, 7, 8, 11

ee I act cciersinedesiccihitinnsntiemsinintincnnteiigh 6

ices cecaccrciaransdel 6

42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(3) ........ sanlaicpivconsins dtiniaiiontabeinibiaebaltaaieeh 6

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Poy Pol E . Raeaierenemeaners 5, 6, 8, 10, 11

42 U.S.C. § 7412(m)(1)(A) ......-.---.-200--00-+ 27.3.

Legislative History:

House Debate on the Clean Air Act Amend-

ments of 1990 Conference Report (Oct. 26,

1990) (statement of Rep. Michael Oxley), re-

printed in 1 A Legislative History of the

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, at 1417

Ota a BAA RT Ey nS © 0S eS a 5

Regulations:

re aici aictcceiteseteationies 10

Federal Register:

71 Fed. Reg. 76,603 (Dec. 21, 2006) .............-.2...2000000 fs)

76 Fed. Reg. 24,976 (May 3, 2011)................cseccseccseee 3

79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (June 18, 2014)....................... 2,4

Miscellaneous:

EPA, Integrated Risk Information System,

Methylmercury,

http:/Iwww.epa.gov/iris/subst/0073.htm (last

ss RE Pee 3

EPA, Study of Hazardous Air Pollutant Emis-

sions from Electric Utility Steam Generating

Units — Final Report to Congress, Vol. 1

(Feb. 1998), Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-

CREE Rite a ee ge Ie ER 2, 3,4

Harrison, David, Ph.D., et al., NERA Economic

Consulting, Potential Energy Impacts of the

EPA Proposed Clean Power Plan (Oct. 2014),

available at

U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-

14-672, EPA Regulations and Electricity:

Update on Agencies’ Monitoring Efforts and

Coal-Fueled Generating Unit Requirements

(Aug. 2014), available at

http:/Awww V u AQ-14-672............ 4

ARGUMENT

I. The Extraordinary Costs of EPA’s Efforts

to Transform an Essential Industry Make

This Case Worthy of This Court’s Atten-

tion.

In his dissent to the panel decision, Judge Ka-

vanaugh recognized the importance of this case to

American society. The costs of the Mercury and Air

Toxics Standards (“MATS”) Rule are immense:

The estimated cost of compliance with

EPA’s Final Rule is approximately $9.6

billion per year, by EPA’s own calcula-

tion.... To put it in perspective, that

amount would pay the annual health

insurance premiums of about two mil-

lion Americans.... Put simply, the Rule

is “among the most expensive rules that

EPA has ever promulgated.”

Pet. App. 82a (emphasis in original) (citation omit-

ted). And even though EPA’s $9.6 billion figure ap-

pears to be an underestimate,! these costs reflect on-

ly part of EPA’s broader effort to restructure the

American electric utility industry through revisionist

interpretations of established Clean Air Act pro-

grams. See, eg., UARG v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427,

2442, 2444 (2014) (remanding greenhouse gas “pre-

vention of significant deterioration” and Title V per-

1 EPA’s modeled retirements have proven to be more than an

order of magnitude below reality. Utility Air Regulatory Group

(“UARG”) Pet. 34.

2

mitting requirements); EPA v. EME Homer City

Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014) (rejecting

EPA’s statutory interpretation underlying its region-

al interstate transport program and remanding the

case for “as applied” challenges); see also 79 Fed.

Reg. 34,830 (June 18, 2014) (proposing environmen-

tal dispatch, renewable portfolio, and demand-side

management standards for electric utility steam

generating unit (“EGU”) greenhouse gas emissions

pursuant to Clean Air Act §111(d), 42 U.S.C.

§7411(d)). Indeed, EPA estimates that its proposed

§7411(d) standards for EGU greenhouse gas emis-

sions alone will impose more than $65 billion in annu-

al costs on the electric utility industry above and be-

yond the $9.6 billion in annual costs imposed by the

MATS Rule. UARG Pet. 36 (describing costs of the

proposed rule).

There is no dispute about the magnitude of the

costs imposed by the MATS program—they are

EPA’s own estimates. And while, as Judge Ka-

vanaugh said, “the benefits of this Rule are disput-

ed,” Pet. App. 83a, the federal respondents’ brief con-

firms that any residual risk associated with EGU

hazardous air pollutant (“HAP”) emissions is

dwarfed by the regulatory costs. As EPA concedes,

the quantified benefits of reducing HAP emissions

under the MATS Rule would amount to only about

$4 to $6 million each year. EPA Opp. 12 n.6, 28.2

2 Even without the MATS Rule, mercury emissions from power

plants fell from 50 tons in 1994-1995 to 29 tons in 2010 as a

result of other regulatory programs. Compare EPA, Study of

HAP Emissions from EGUs—Final Report to Congress, Vol. 1,

3

And while EPA projected that the additional controls

required to produce that $4 to $6 million HAP bene-

fit would also result in substantial “co-benefits” by

reducing fine particulate matter (“PMg>5”), a conven-

tional pollutant already regulated under the Nation-

al Ambient Air Quality Standard (“NAAQS”) pro-

gram, 42 U.S.C. § 7409, “EPA made clear...that the

RIA [projecting these co-benefits for non-HAPs]

played no role in its finding that regulating [HAP

emissions from] power plants was ‘appropriate and

necessary under Section 7412(n)(1)(A).” Jd. at 12

(emphasis added).

at 7-8 (Feb. 1998), Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-

3052 (hereinafter “Utility Study”) with 76 Fed. Reg. 24,976,

25,002 (May 3, 2011) (proposed MATS Rule). This decrease

raises questions about the need for a $9.6 billion program to

address residual mercury risk.

3 While EPA says there may be other unquantified benefits as-

sociated with ite MATS Rule, EPA Opp. 12-13, EPA disavowed

any reliance on comparison of costs and benefits as a basis for

the Rule. /d. at 12. Examination of federal respondents’ brief

illustrates why EPA did not attempt to rely on such “unquanti-

fied” benefits. For example, while federal respondents aasert

that 7% of American women were exposed in 2000 to mercury

levela that exceeded a “health-protective level,” id. at 6, sub-

stantial reductions in mercury have occurred in recent years,

see supra note 2, and moreover, that “health-protective level”

included an order of magnitude safety factor. EPA, Integrated

Risk Information System, Methylmercury §1.A.3,

http-?//www.epa.goviiris/subst/0073.htm (last updated Aug. 9,

2012). And, contrary to the assertion of health and environ-

mental respondents, Am. Academy of Pediatrics Opp. 16 n.6,

EPA did study the acute effects of HCl emissions and found

that the highest level of exposure was a mere 0.7% of the level

of potential concern. Utility Study, supra note 2, Vol. 1, at 6-19

4

Beyond the MATS Rule’s own extraordinary

costs, the MATS program reflects but the initial step

in an EPA campaign to fundamentally change how

the electric utility industry generates electricity. Fif-

ty-four gigawatts (““GWs”) of coal-fired generation—

one sixth of the Nation’s coal-fired capacity—have

been, or will be, retired as a result of the Rule by

2016. UARG Pet. 34 (citing U.S. Energy Information

Administration analysis); see also U.S. Government

Accountability Office, GAO-14-672, EPA Regulations

and Electricity: Update on Agencies’ Monitoring Ef-

forts and Coal-Fueled Generating Unit Retirements,

at 17 (Aug. 2014), avatlable at

http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO- 14-672 (“About

three-quarters of the retirements we identified in our

analysis...are expected to occur by the end of 2015,

corresponding to the initial April 2015 MATS com-

pliance deadline....”)}. MATS-prompted retirements

mark only the initial wave, with dozens of additional

GWs of coal-fired EGU capacity projected to retire

once EPA’s §7411(d) performance standards are im-

posed. UARG Pet. 36 (citing 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,933);

see also David Harrison, Ph.D., et al., NERA Eco-

nomic Consulting, Potential Energy Impacts of the

EPA Proposed Clean Power Plan at S-6 to S-7 (Oct.

2014), available at

http://www .nera.com/publications/archive/2014/poten

tial-impacts-of-the-epa-clean-power-plan.html (pro-

jecting potentially over 100 GWs of additional re-

tirements through 2031).

Table 6-13; see also National Mining Association Reply in Sup-

port of Petition, Case No. 14-49.

5

Electricity is an essential commodity, and the

electric utility industry is critical to the public

health, the public welfare, and the productive capaci-

ty of the Nation’s population. UARG Pet. 34 (citing

Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 272 (1976)).4

The extraordinary impacts of this Rule on this essen-

tial industry—and EPA’s conclusion that “it is irrele-

vant how large the costs are or whether the benefits

outweigh the costs in determining whether it is ‘ap-

propriate’ to regulate electric utilities under the

MACT program,” Pet. App. 83a (emphasis in origi-

nal)—alone make this case worthy of certiorari. But

certiorari is also important to address a more fun-

damental issue: EPA’s ongoing effort to expand a fo-

cused delegation of Clean Air Act authority into a li-

cense to transform an essential industry.

II. Certiorari Is Needed to Address EPA’s In-

terpretation of the “Appropriate and

Necessary” Decisional Standard in 42

U.S.C. §7412(n) to Eliminate the Distinc-

tion Between “Residual Risk” Regulation

* See also House Debate on the Clean Air Act Amendments of

1990 Conference Report (Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Mi-

chael Oxley), reprinted in 1 A Legislative History of the Clean

Air Act Amendments of 1990, at 1417 (1993) (§7412(n) was

written to “protect[]...the public health while avoiding the im-

position of excessive and unnecessary costs on residential, in-

dustrial, and commercial consumers of electricity.”); Sierra

Club v. Ga. Power Co., 180 F.3d 1309, 1311 (11th Cir. 1999) (per

curiam) (‘The district court was correct in concluding that a

steady supply of electricity during the summer months, espe-

cially in the form of air conditioning to the elderly, hospitals

and day care centers, is critical.”).

When it promulgated the final MATS Rule, EPA

argued there was nothing in the “appropriate and

necessary” decisional standard that contemplated

regulating only those EGU HAP emissions posing 4

health hazard, or that required EPA to consider costs

in applying that decisional standard. Pet. App. 212a.

The panel majority upheld EPA’s view of congres-

sional intent. Pet. App. 25a-28a.

spondents now defend the panel majority based on

6

Under §7412(f), (m), and (n) and Categori-

cal HAP Regulation Under §7412(c) and

(d), and to Obliterate the Distinction that

Congress Drew Between §7412 Regula-

tion of EGUs and §7412 Regulation of

Other Sources.

the following premises:

“Section 7412(c) generally deprives the

EPA of any discretion to consider costs

when deciding whether to include a

source category on the list of those sub-

ject to regulation.” EPA Opp. 18.

“Those statutory directives [of 42 U.S.C.

§7412(c)(1), (2), and (3)] are mandatory

and do not authorize the EPA to consid-

er the compliance costs associated with

regulating either [major or ‘ar-

ea’]...source[s] when making the initial

listing decision.” Id.

“Section 7412(c)(9) does not authorize

the agency to consider costs” when

The federal re-

7

“delet{ing] any major or area source cat-

egory from the list.” Id.

e Section 7412(d)(2) “does require the

agency to consider costs when deciding

whether to set the proper level of per-

missible emissions beyond the minimum

level required by Section 7412(d)(3).”

Id. at 19-20 (second emphasis added).

What the federal respondents extract from these

provisions written for non-EGU sources is that

(i) “Congress made cost irrelevant to the initial list-

ing decision, id. at 20, and that (ii) “the agency was

required to establish emissions standards for all

listed” HAPs once it found that “it is ‘appropriate and

necessary to regulate power plants generally.” Id. at

16. In other words, the federal respondents believe

that EPA has discretion to transform the broad “ap-

propriate and necessary” decisional standard for

regulating specific EGU HAP emissions under

§7412(n)(1)(A) into the restrictive decisional criteria

established in §7412(c) for the initial “listing” of

source categories other than EGUs.5

5 See EPA Opp. 21 ([T]he agency in making th[e ‘appropriate

and necessary’ determination reasonably looked to the process

that Congress had established in listing other source catego-

ries.”); id. at 29 (‘Once listed...{[EGUs] are properly treated like

other listed source categories....”). But see Pet. App. 84a-85a

(‘the majority opinion...does not sufficiently account for the fact

that treating electric utilities differently from standard sources

was the intent of Section 112(n)(1)(A), as revealed by the statu-

tory text,” and if Congress had not “intended EPA to consider

8

In transforming EGU regulation under §7412(n)

into a command (or authorization) to regulate all

EGU HAP emissions under §7412(c) and (d), EPA

ignores the distinction between (i) a §7412 program

that calls for new categorical technology-based regu-

lation of HAPs, and (ii) the very different §7412 pro-

gram that calls for additional, or “residual,” “risk-

based” regulation of HAPs following implementation

of control technology and other reduction measures

at EGUs as a result of other programs in the Clean

Air Act. Sections 7412(c) and (d) form the “core”

§7412 program enacted to initiate regulation of HAP

emissions from a broad spectrum of source catego-

ries. In contrast, §7412(n), like §7412(f) and (m),

calls for risk-based regulation of emissions that re-

main after HAPs have been reduced under other con-

trol programs. This distinction makes all) the differ-

ence.

To begin, residual risk regulation by its very na-

ture requires a pollutant-specific evaluation. Under

such programs, only those remaining HAP emissions

that present an unacceptable risk can trigger regula-

tion. For example, §7412(f) is directed at residual

risks posed by “sources” in regulated “categories or

subcategories,” and calls for a study identifying any

risks posed by specific pollutants remaining after

the costs of regulating electric utilities” as a “threshold decision

in deciding whether to regulate electric utilities under the

MACT program to begin with,” Congress could have “automati-

cally regulated electric utilities under the MACT program, as it

did with other sources”) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part) (emphasis added).

9

§7412(d) technology-based regulation. For any such

risks, EPA must establish standards protective of

public health and the environment. Costs must be

considered in setting these residual risk standards.®

Like §7412(f), §7412(m) also calls for a “report” that

identifies “whether the other provisions of this sec-

tion [§7412] are adequate to prevent serious adverse

effects to public health or widespread environmental

effects.” Id. §7412(m)(6). If regulation under those

“other provisions” is inadequate, “the Administrator

shall...promulgate...such further emission standards

or contro] measures as may be necessary and appro-

priate to prevent such effect.” (Emphasis added).

Again, a pollutant-specific risk-based evaluation re-

sulting in pollutant-specific standards is contemplat-

ed.’

6 In evaluating any “adverse environmental effect” under

§7412(f), the statute directs EPA to “takfe] into consideration

costs.” For health-based “ample margin of safety” review under

§7412(f), Congress explicitly endorsed, in §7412(f)(2)(B), a 1989

HAP rule in which EPA considered cost and a range of other

factors in evaluating whether there was an “ample margin of

safety.” See 71 Fed. Reg. 76,603, 76,608 (Dec. 21, 2006).

7 By comparison, §7412(d)(3) determines a standard’s minimum

level of stringency (or “floor”) without considering cost. Cf. Cal-

pine Opp. 12 (‘Congress explicitly eliminated any EPA discre-

tion in 112(d)(3)....”); id. at 18 (noting “EPA’s nearly exclusive

use of Floor Standards”). By contrast, to establish standards

more stringent than the “floor” under §7412(d)(2), EPA must

evaluate cost and other factors on a pollutant-by-pollutant ba-

sis. See id. at 18 n.17 (recognizing that a “beyond-the-floor”

standard was set only for mercury emissions from low-rank coal

units in the MATS Rule). In this sense, §7412(d)(2) standards,

10

Section 7412(n) speaks in similar terms, except

that the study focuses only on those “public health”

hazards resulting from those HAP “emissions by

electric utility steam generating units...[that remain]

after imposition” of other CAA requirements. (Em-

phasis added). In discussing risks posed by emission

“units,” not risks posed by “source categories,”

§7412(n) underscores that only those HAPs emitted

by those units posing health risks may be regulated.

As a result, an “appropriate and necessary” finding

that HAP emissions from certain EGUs threaten

health cannot justify regulation of HAP emissions

from EGUs that pose no public health hazard.

Finally, it would be “a strange and asymmetric

scheme,” EPA Opp. 21, to construe the statute, as

EPA does, to exclude consideration of costs under the

like residual risk standards, will be driven by individual pollu-

tant characteristics.

8 In the Clean Air Act, Congress interchangeably uses the term

“source,” “unit,” and “facility” to refer to individual structures

that emit a pollutant. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§7411(a), 7412(a).

In contrast, source “category” refers to all sources within a par-

ticular industrial grouping. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §52.21(b)(1)(iii).

Federal respondents attempt to refute the pollutant-specific

nature of §7412(n) regulation by asserting that “[u}nder the

plain terms of the statute, the required determination concerns

whether regulation of a particular source category ‘is appropri-

ate and necessary,’ not whether regulation of particular types of

emissions satisfies that standard.” EPA Opp. 30 (emphasis in

original). Because §7412(n) does not refer to “source category”

but to “electric utility steam generating units,” the statute

clearly requires EPA to show that a particular type of emissions

from particular EGUs pose a health hazard that is “appropriate

and necessary” to regulate.

li

broad “necessary” and “appropriate” language in

subsections (m) and (n), when pollutant-specific deci-

sional standards under other provisions (including

subsections (d)(2) and (f)) explicitly or implicitly re-

quire consideration of costs in requiring further regu-

lation. EPA’s interpretation frustrates any congres-

sional expectations that regulation of EGUs would be

based on consideration of all factors relevant to the

“appropriate and necessary” residual risk decisional

standard established by §7412(n)(1)(A), and not on

the cost-blind regulatory criteria governing § 7412(c)

and §7412(d)(3) decisions. Cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs.

Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,

42-43 (1983) (explaining that an agency must consid-

er the relevant factors when exercising its discretion

under the governing statute).

As to this, the panel majority did not take issue

with their dissenting colleague’s observation that the

“centrality of cost consideration to proper regulatory

decisionmaking” necessarily establishes “cost” as be-

ing among the “relevant factors” that a regulatory

agency must normally take into account. Pet. App.

78a. Instead, the panel majority excused EPA’s re-

fusal to consider the cost of EGU regulation under

§7412(n) solely on the basis of Congress’ having used

the word “cost” in some provisions of §7412 (i.e., pro-

visions that involve regulation of residual risks) and

not having used it in others (i.e., provisions that ap-

ply generally to the regulation of source categories

other than EGUs). Id. at 26a-27a. Again, such stat-

utory (mis)interpretation fails to take account of the

different approach that Congress intended that EPA

12

take in determining whether residual risks from

identified EGU HAP emissions were “appropriate

and necessary” to regulate.

In Entergy Corporation v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556

U.S. 208, 222 (2009), this Court cautioned against an

interpretative approach under which an inference

was drawn that “silence” with respect to the permis-

sibility of EPA’s considering a particular “relevant

factor[ ]” meant that EPA should forgo consideration,

where the statutory provision at issue was “silent not

only with respect to” that one factor “but with re-

spect to all potentially relevant factors.” “If silence

here implies prohibition,” the Court pointed out,

“then the EPA could not consider any factors in im-

plementing [the statutory provision] — an obvious

logical impossibility.” Jd.

That is the very error in interpretative logic that

both EPA and the panel majority have committed

here. According to EPA, Congress’ failure to have

employed the word “cost” in the “appropriate and

necessary” decisional standard of §7412(n)(1){A) in-

dicates that EPA was not to consider cost in deter-

mining that it was “appropriate and necessary” to

regulate EGU HAP emissions.*® At the same time,

nothing on the face of the plain language of

§ 7412(n)(1)(A) purports to identify any of the “rele-

vant factors” that should inform EPA's exercise of

discretion in determining whether it is “appropriate

® See, e.g., Pet. App. 212a (“Cost does not have te be read into

the definition of ‘appropriate....”); see also id. at 26a ([T]he

word ‘costs’ appears nowhere in subparagraph (A)” of

§7412(n)1).).

13

and necessary’ to regulate EGUs. As in Entergy

Corporation, EPA’s approach “surely proves too

much.” 556 U.S. at 222.

CONCLUSION

In this MATS rulemaking, EPA necessarily erred

in construing the “open-ended,” “ambiguous,” and

“inherently context-dependent” term “appropriate” as

allowing the Agency to forgo an indisputably rele-

vant factor: the extraordinary costs of transforming

how the electric utility industry generates electrici-

ty..°© Given the consequences of the MATS Rule, as

set forth in this reply and in UARG’s petition, grant-

ing certiorari here is plainly warranted.

Respectfully submitted,

F. WILLIAM BROWNELL

(Counsel of Record)

HENRY V. NICKEL

LEE B. ZEUGIN

LAUREN E. FREEMAN

ELIZABETH L. HORNER

HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP

2200 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20037

(202) 955-1500

bbrownell@hunton.com

October 29, 2014 Counsel for Petitioner

10 See Pet. App. 26a (quoting Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct.

1651, 1659 (2011)).

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