Petition for Writ of Certiorari — CPV Md., LLC v. PPL Energyplus, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 356 (2015) (No. 14-623)

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Supreme Court, U.S.

14-623 | wim

: OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

CPV MARYLAND, LLC,

Petitioner,

Vv.

PPL ENERGYPLUS, LLC, et al.

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CLIFTON S. ELGARTEN

Counsel of Record

LARRY F. EISENSTAT

RICHARD LEHFELDT

JENNIFER N. WATERS

CROWELL & MORING LLP

1001 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 624-2500

celgarten@crowell.com

Counsel for Petitioner

@November 26, 2014

ee

Baso-Epes Prams Co.. Inc. - (202) 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. $§824 et

seq., States retain authority over electricity and

capacity purchases by local utilities. They cannot,

however, impose the rates for those purchases; only

the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)

can regulate interstate wholesale rates. Seeking a

new power plant, Maryland conducted a competitive

procurement and directed its local utilities to enter

into long-term contracts with the successful bidder,

providing the stable revenue needed to induce the

developer's investment and support the costs of

construction. Under those contracts, if the developer’s

accepted bid price exceeds what the developer earns by

selling the plant’s capacity in the FERC-supervised

auction, the utility pays the difference to the

developer; if auction revenue exceeds the bid price, the

developer rebates the difference to the utility. The

payment or rebate is passed on to retail ratepayers.

1. Where, as a result of a state-directed procure-

ment, the contract price to build and operate a power

plant is the developer’s bid price, and may result in

payments beyond what the developer earns selling the

plant’s capacity in the FERC-supervised auction, is

the program “field preempted” as a State’s attempt to

set interstate wholesale rates?

2. Is a state-directed contract to support construc-

tion of a power plant “conflict preempted” because

its long-term pricing structure provides incentives

different from the incentives provided by prices

generated in the FERC-supervised yearly capacity

auction?

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner in this Court is CPV Maryland, LLC

(CPV), Intervenor-Appellant below and Intervenor-

Defendant in the district court. The Chairman and

Commissioners of the Maryland Public Service

Commission (Commission) were sued in their official

capacities and were Defendants-Appellants below.

Harold Williams, Lawrence Brenner, and Kelly

Speakes-Backman were named Defendants-Appellants

below and remain Commissioners. W. Kevin Hughes

was also a named Defendant-Appellant below as a

Commissioner; he is now Chairman. Douglas R.M.

Nazarian was also a named Defendant-Appellant below

as Chairman; he is no longer a member of the

Commission. Anne E. Hoskins, who was not a member

of the Commission at the time this litigation

commenced, is now a Commissioner.

Respondents, Plaintiffs-Appellees in the court

below, are: PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, PPL Brunner

Island, LLC, PPL Holtwood, LLC; PPL Martins Creek,

LLC, PPL Montour, LLC, PPL Susquehanna, LLC,

Lower Mount Bethel Energy, LLC, PPL New Jersey

Solar, LLC, PPL New Jersey Biogas, LLC, PPL

Renewable Energy, LLC, PSEG Power, LLC, and

Essential Power, LLC.

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Petitioner CPV Maryland, LLC does not issue stock

and so no publicly held company owns 10% or more of

any stock.

CPV Maryland, LLC is 25% owned by wholly-owned

subsidiaries of Competitive Power Ventures Holdings,

LLC (CPV Holdings). The ownership structure,

including affiliates, is: CPV Maryland, LLC is 25%

owned by CPV Maryland Holding Company, LLC.

CPV Maryland Holding Company, LLC is wholly

owned by CPV Maryland Holding Company II, LLC.

CPV Maryland Holding Company II, LLC is 99%

owned by CPV Power Development, Inc. and 1%

owned by CPV Maryland Investment, LLC. CPV

Maryland Investment, LLC is wholly owned by CPV

Power Development, Inc. CPV Power Development,

Inc. is wholly owned by CPV Holdings. CPV Holdings

is 88.55% owned by Warburg Pincus Private Equity

IX, L.P.

CPV Maryland, LLC is also 50% owned by wholly

owned subsidiaries of the Marubeni Corporation. The

ownership structure, including affiliates, is as follows:

CPV Maryland, LLC is 50% owned by MC St. Charles

LLC. MC St Charles LLC is wholly owned by

Marubeni Power America, Inc. Marubeni Power

America, Inc. is wholly owned by AXIA Power

Holdings B.V. AXIA Power Holdings B.V. is wholly

owned by the Marubeni Corporation.

iv

CPV Maryland, LLC is also 25% owned by wholly

owned subsidiaries of the Toyota Tsusho Corporation.

The ownership structure, including affiliates, is as

follows: CPV Maryland, LLC is 25% owned by Toyota

Tsusho St. Charles, LLC. Toyota Tsusho St. Charles,

LLC is wholly owned by Toyota Tsusho Power USA,

Inc. Toyota Tsusho Power USA, Inc. is wholly owned

by the Toyota Tsusho Corporation.

Vv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .................cccccccsseeees

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGG..................

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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PRO-

ey BOE bccccccnscencnpnessesnscsecessaneosens

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY..................

A. The FPA Preserves the States’ Power To

B.

C.

D.

E.

Support Power Plant Construction. ..........

Maryland’s Initiative Supported

Necessary Power Plant Construction ......

FERC Can Influence Power Plant

Development Only Indirectly Through

Its Market and Rate Supervision.............

FERC Approved CPV’s Sale Of Capacity

eee

REASONS TO GRANT THE PETITION ...........

I.

THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS

WITH THIS COURTS PRECEDENTS

AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE FPA...

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

A. The Decision Disregards The Standards

For Finding FPA Preemption................... 19

B. The Fourth Circuit Decision Conflicts

With The Premises On Which FERC

Initiated Use Of A Forward Market To

Influence New Construction..................... 21

C. The Fourth Circuit Has Fundamentally

Altered the FPA’s Division of State-

II ccictrnnncennsennenmeeoninmmennn 24

1. The Fourth’ Circuits ‘field

preemption” theory improperly finds

that these contracts contained rates

A ictonicesnnnnsevnennneinees 24

(a) The contracts do not contain rates

subject to FERC review ................. 24

(b) Maryland set no rates .................... 27

2. Maryland’s initiative does not conflict

with any federal policy ........................ 29

.

Il. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION

DEPRIVES STATES—AND FERC—OF

AUTHORITY NEEDED TO SUPPORT

THE NATION’S ELECTRIC INFRA-

IIE nececnsencsssicensssnenmnenmmssnmnsemmnessones 36

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

APPENDIX Page

Appendix A—Court of Appeals Opinion (Jun.

aT Nin sendineseneinniehiiebpunésnnanabinnaiibaemapeititaetinies la

Appendix B—Court of Appeals Judgment

Sirs Tl ITE hiiicnesdunitanteenteiotnsnninnnnteiimienuess 26a

Appendix C—Order Denying Petitions for

Rehearing and Rehearing en banc (Jun. 30,

Sita locscinnsumnsenetsemnsennsemnintunienneeimunsnanniieenienn 30a

Appendix D—District Court Opinion (Sept.

aI nsinsnciamnesenmemprmennnienimaipiantio 34a

Appendix E—District Court Judgment Order

es Ss erenecensesesetesinemnnetmenmennesneenies 162a

Appendix F—Supremacy Clauzse..................... 165a

Appendix G—Federal Power Act..................... 166a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page(s)

Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall,

TEE 20

Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC,

372 F.3d 395 (D.C. Cir. 2004)................... 25

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Ill.

Commerce Comm’n,

2014 IL App (1st) 130544 (2014).............. 33

Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC,

569 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 2009).................. passim

Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC,

753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014)................... 24

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,

es Ge benieercncevecsscscnecenssnaseesens 20

Mississippi Power & Light Co. v.

Mississippi ex rel. Moore,

GT TBs Be Ci eceecccceeccccceseccesecccccceseees 25, 26

Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v.

Public Util. Dist. No. 1,

Ee 13, 27

N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC,

744 F.3d 74 (3d Cir. 2014).................. 16, 23, 29

Nantahala Power & Light Co. v.

Thornburg,

476 U.S. 963 (1986)............ccccccccscssssecseeees 25, 26

New England Power Generators Ass’n, Inc.

v. FERC,

757 F.3d 283 (D.C. Cir. 2014)............. 14, 23, 24

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

New York v. FERC,

I a i 9, 28

NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils.

Comm'n,

Msi cicridecitsicicddhaneniinnsennaas 13, 26

Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp.

Comm’n of Kan..,

Se es Ge Ci scccsscccsccsecescccssccsseses 8, 20, 21

PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon,

766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014) .........000.000... passim

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.

Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,

- 5 Eon 8, 20

In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,

I 13

In re Review of Proposed Town of New

Shoreham Project,

25 A.3d 482 (R.I. 2011) oo. ecceceeceeees 33

FERC ORDERS

Allegheny Energy Supply Co.,

108 FERC 961,082 (2004)... 28

Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n,

132 FERC 461,047 (2010), clarified, 133

FERC 461,059 (2010), reh’g denied, 134

FERC 61,044 (2011).....c...cccccccssvesssssees 5, 11, 28

Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,

134 FERC 961,044 (2011).............000000... 10, 28

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Commonwealth Atl. Ltd. P’ship,

51 FERC 961,368 (1990).............0. eee 11

CPV Shore, L.L.C., CPV Maryland, L.L.C.,

148 FERC 961,096 (2014).............0..0000000.. 27, 35

Doswell Ltd. P’ship,

50 FERC 961,251 (1990)...............cccecceeeeee 11

Midwest Power Sys., Inc.,

78 FERC 461,067 (1997)...................cccc008 11, 28

N.Y. Mercantile Exch..,

74 FERC 461,311 (1996).....................00 25

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,

115 FERC 461,079 (2006)....................00... 22

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,

117 FERC 461,331 (2006).................0.0..... 22

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C..,

135 FERC 961,022 (2011).............0..000.... 22

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C..,

137 FERC 961,145 (2011)...................... 6, 22

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,

143 FERC 961,090 (2013)..................:cc0 16

Revised Pub. Util. Filing Requirements,

97 FERC 961,317 (2001)................cceeee00 25

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

| kT 8, 9, 20

innit aninatiigtinidaal 8, 9, 20

BP es SUD ccncccnnensvineronsnnsesssnmnemsessssens 8,

xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

ETE Te aa a aE Pee 8, 13, 25

I 1

ET Ir ee 1

I iia teens 1

Conn. Pub. Act 13-303, Section 6 (2013) ..... 32

Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C.

ITI sinisrsccninsnnineneisscsitiiiiiainiiiiensnnimnnenen 9

EPA, Carbon Pollution Emission Guide-

lines for Existing Stationary Sources:

Electric Utility Generating Units,

Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (Jun.

ESERIES ORR ces 32

Federal Power Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C.

a IITTIT siscorscedetcliicedtinlediiinaitnieiadinineninennieiee . 2,8

2012 Mass. Legis. Serv., ch. 209, §35.......... 33

Nev. Rev. Stat. §704.7316 ................cccccceeeee 33

eal arian 10, 28

Order No. 84815, No. 9214

8 ee 11

Resolution E-4471, Pub. Utils. Comm’n of

& < f S 33

MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITIES

xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

American Public Power Association, Power

Plants Are Not Built on Spec—2014

I ccna inl isleleaiiemeatiarinnicinin

American Public Power Association, Power

Plants Are Not Built on Spec: An Analysis

of New Electric Generation Projects

Constructed in 2011 (2012)..................0000

“Calpine Executes Contracts for Sutter

Energy Center With California Utilities,”

Pg EC Oeeron

Jeff Beattie, “New York Regulators Throw

Lifeline to Exelon’s Struggling Ginna

Nuke,” HIS Energy Daily (Nov. 17,

Onur Aydin, Frank Graves, and Metin

Celebi, Coal Plant Retirements: Feedback

Effects on Wholesale Electricity Prices,

The Brattle Group (Nov. 2013).................

PJM, Coal Capacity at Risk for Retirement

in PJM: Potential Impacts of the Finalized

EPA Cross State Air Pollution Rule and

Proposed National Emissions Standards

for Hazardous Air Pollutants (2011)........

U.S. Energy Information Administration,

Annual Energy Outlook 2014 (Apr. 2014)..

Page(s)

10

33

33

32

31, 32

31

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CPV Maryland, LLC (CPV) respectfully seeks a writ

of certiorari to review the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in this

case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit is reported at 753 F.3d 467

(4th Cir. 2014) and reprinted at App.la. The Fourth

Circuit order denying rehearing is reprinted at

App.30a. The district court’s opinion is reported at

974 F. Supp. 2d 790 (D. Md. 2013) and reprinted at

App.34a.

JURISDICTION

This case was filed in the district court under 28

U.S.C. §1331, raising constitutional challenges to

Maryland’s program supporting construction of a new

power plant. The district court issued final judgment

on October 24, 2013. That judgment was appealed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291. The Fourth Circuit

affirmed on June 2, 2014. Timely motions for

rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied. On

September 15, 2014, the Chief Justice granted an

extension of time to and including November 27, 2014

to file this Petition. This Petition is being filed within

the time allowed. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Supremacy Clause is set forth at App.165a.

Relevant provisions of the Federal Power Act are

reprinted beginning at App.166a.

2

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The Fourth Circuit’s decision holding that the

Federal Power Act (FPA) of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§824 et

seq., preempts Maryland’s directed procurement of a

power plant needed by that State misconceives, and

crucially alters, the division of state and federal

responsibility under the FPA. It directly undermines

the States’ ability to direct and supervise electricity

and capacity purchases by local utilities, and thus

to meet their citizens’ long-term electricity needs

through traditional means: long-term ratepayer com-

mitments to power plant developers that provide the

reliable revenue stream needed to support the capital

investment required to build a power plant.

Given the enormous up-front investment required

to build a power plant, those commitments are critical.

In 2013, less than 3% of new power plant construction

proceeded without revenue-stabilizing, long-term com-

mitments to power plant developers in place. Those

commitments are typically in the form of long-term

contracts between the developer and local utilities, or

reflect construction by vertically-integrated utilities

that both generate electricity and sell to consumers,

with the assurance that they will recover their costs

through retail rates.

Under the FPA, States have sole authority to

regulate and directly support power plant con-

struction, and to pass the construction costs on to

retail customers. The Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission (FERC) is expressly denied authority

over power plant construction (or retirement).

Therefore, the vitality of the Nation’s energy infra-

structure ultimately depends on targeted state support

for new power plants, most usually—until this and the

3

similar Third Circuit case that followed it said no'—

through long-term contracts providing the revenue

stream necessary for power plant development. The

Fourth Circuit’s decision undermines the States’

ability to support that infrastructure development.

Maryland needed a new natural gas electric power

plant to be built in a particular region. It determined

that in the current “economic climate,” existing

markets had not attracted the necessary investment

capital to build the plant. Maryland then conducted

a procurement, offering the successful bidder long-

term contracts with the State’s local utilities,

providing the stable revenue needed to support power

plant construction.

To induce the bids and the capital investment of

nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars needed to

build a new power plant, the Maryland Public Service

Commission (MPSC) offered the successful bidder

a financial arrangement called a “contract for

differences.” Under these contracts, the bidder agreed

to develop and operate the plant, selling its capacity in

the federally-supervised interstate auction, according

to the rules of the auction. The local utilities

would pay the developer the difference between the

déveloper’s auction sales revenue and its bid price to

build and operate the plant. If the developer’s auction

sales revenue exceeded the bid price, the developer

would rebate the difference to the utilities. The local

titilities would, in turn, recover their costs from (or

rebate surpluses to) their retail customers.

1 PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir.

2014). Separate petitions for certiorari are being filed addressing

that case, which raises the same issue.

4

Maryland’s program is an exercise of traditional

powers. To ensure reliable electricity supply,

Maryland directed local electric utilities to enter into

long-term contracts at prices set by competitive

procurement. It promised the utilities that they would

recover their costs from retail customers. It did all this

to spur construction of needed generation resources

available to the State.

In barring Maryland’s program based on “field

preemption,” the Fourth Circuit misconstrued the

FPA in two ways: by equating a developer’s price bid

in a competitive procurement with a price “set” by the

State, and by deeming a supplemental payment to be

a rate subject to FERC review in the first place.

The FPA assigns FERC authority over interstate

wholesale sales of electricity and interstate transmis-

sion. Congress expressly preserved state authority

over electric generation, intrastate transmission, and

electric sales and rates other than wholesale sales.

States retain broad authority over local utilities.

States have long exercised their authority over local

“utility buy-side” decisions to support power plant

development, directing their utilities to buy power (or

approving proposals to buy power) through long-term

contracts that ensure reliable, economical electricity

for their citizens.

Until the decision below—and the Third Circuit

decision that followed it—not only the existence of

state authority to direct such long-term contracts,

but the limits of the States’ authority to direct

their utilities to enter into contracts, were clearly

demarcated and well understood. States could

mandate and oversee competitive procurements for

local utilities, and direct them to enter into contracts

at market prices established by those procurements.

5

What States could not do was set the price at which

utilities buy, or developers sell, energy or capacity.

State price-setting would usurp FERC’s exclusive

authority.2 The Fourth Circuit’s field preemption

theory improperly equates a competitive price, offered

by a developer, with a price impermissibly imposed by

the State. It thereby nullifies the States’ power to

direct local utilities to enter into contracts that meet

their citizens’ needs.

As shown below, the supplemental payments under

the contracts for differences at issue were actually not

rates subject to FERC’s jurisdiction at all because they

did not govern a sale of capacity or electricity. But

even if one were to accept the premise that they were

subject to FERC jurisdiction, that would not mean

preemption. It would simply invite FERC’s review

of those rates at FERC’s initiative or at the behest

of anyone complaining about them. Rates or contracts

subject to FERC’s review cannot usurp FERC’s

jurisdiction. Indeed, by judicially declaring the

contracts invalid, nominally to protect FERC’s

authority, the Fourth Circuit’s decision paradoxically

prevented FERC from exercising any authority it

might have to review those contracts. What Maryland

did not do is set a wholesale rate at which energy or

capacity is purchased. If the purchase price is not

imposed by the State, but by the market, as a

developer’s competitive offer, it does not usurp FERC’s

rate-review authority, and is not “field preempted.”

The Fourth Circuit’s contrary field preemption ruling

* See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 132 FERC 961,047, P 69 (2010),

clarified, 133 FERC 961,059 (2010), reh’g denied, 134 FERC

761,044 (2011).

6

misses this basic point, eviscerating boundaries within

which States and FERC have operated for decades.

The Fourth Circuit’s conflict preemption holding

is arguably even broader and equally wrong. FERC

determined that state-supported generators that

complied with FERC’s revised rules could sell capacity

in the FERC-supervised auction without harming the

auction, notwithstanding any “subsidy.” Moreover,

FERC explained that its auction rule changes were not

intended to interfere with state support for new

capacity. Thus, there was no basis to find actual

conflict between federal and state law.

Instead, the Fourth Circuit posited a policy-minded

conflict, holding that by providing incentives for power

plant development, Maryland “disrupted” incentives

provided by the FERC-supervised auction’s “price

signals.” But FERC’s auction rules and auction prices

do not apply outside the auction. There is no evidence

that Congress or FERC intended auction rates and

rules to be the only source of incentives to invest in

new power plants, and it is unlikely that they would

do so, displacing States from their primary role in

developing the Nation’s energy infrastructure.

Because prices affect investment, FERC has a

limited role in stimulating investment as an “incident”

to its market and rate supervision.‘ But markets are

imperfect. States look farther into the future than

a three year forward auction. They can support

fuel source diversity for environmental or reliability

5 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 137 FERC 961,145, P 89

(2011), aff'd, N.J. Bd. Of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 95 (3d

Cir. 2014) (“NJBPU”).

* See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477,

484 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (CDPUC”).

7

reasons—to which markets may be indifferent.

They have offered developers long-term support

for electricity infrastructure development when

investment capital is not otherwise forthcoming.®

That authority necessarily resides with States because

FERC itself cannot sponsor new power plants.

Government-directed procurements like Maryland’s

spur investment when markets are not otherwise

attracting needed investment capital.

The Fourth Circuit’s rulings equating a pro-

curement with a rate set by the State, and questioning

the States’ authority to incentivize power plant

construction, undermine a tool widely used by States

to stimulate construction and other energy initiatives.

Directions to local utilities to buy electricity or

capacity stimulate power plant construction and

support other energy initiatives. All such contracts

“set rates,” and provide incentives different from

auction incentives. The particular mechanism used

here is especially useful. New Jersey used a nearly

identical approach to support three power plants

needed by that State.* That approach is well-suited to

its purpose. A “guarantee” measured by the difference

between what the developer bids to build a plant, and

what it earns selling its capacity, effectively limits

ratepayer contributions to the project.

A quarter century ago, the Court directed courts

considering “field preemption” under the FPA’s sister

statute to “take seriously the lines Congress drew in

5 The Fourth Circuit’s backup theory, that 20-year contracts

conflict with the three year lock-in for auction prices, is equally

ill-conceived. FERC’s auction purchase rules do not set policy

outside the auction. See infra at 31-32.

® See Solomon, 766 F.3d at 248-49.

8

creating a dual regulatory system,” and avoid

“extravagant” interpretations of federal energy

regulatory jurisdiction at the States’ expense. Nw.

Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan.,

489 U.S. 493, 512-13 (1989). The Court also

admonished that the inevitable interaction between

state and federal initiatives should not be mistaken for

preemptive conflict. Jd. at 517-18. The Fourth

Circuit’s decision ignored the Court’s directions. The

Court should grant certiorari to address the important

questions presented and restore the States’ power to

support needed energy infrastructure development.

STATEMENT

A. The FPA Preserves the States’ Power

To Support Power Plant Construction

The “[n)eed for new power facilities, their economic

feasibility, and rates and services, are areas that have

been characteristically governed by the States.” Pac.

Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation &

Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983). The FPA

preserves each State’s authority to ensure reliable

electricity supply for its citizens by supporting power

plant construction, transmission line approval, or

through development of new technologies. It also

preserves the States’ authority to set retail rates to

support those initiatives.

With the FPA, 16 U.S.C. §§824 et seg., Congress

vested exclusive regulatory authority over the “sale

of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce”

in what eventually became FERC. 16 U.S.C. §824(a),

(bX1). FERC also has authority over practices

“affecting,” or “in connection with,” rates. 16 U.S.C.

§§824d, 824e. But FERC’s authority extends “only” tc

matters “not subject to regulation by the States.” Jd.

9

§824(a). Moreover, FERC “shall not have jurisdiction,

except as specifically provided . . . , over facilities used

for the generation of electric energy.” 16 U.S.C.

§824(b\(1).

While the federal role has changed over time,

‘States retain significant control over local matters,”

including “utility generation and resource portfolios”

and “utility buy-side . . . decisions,” i.e., where the

utility purchases power to meet its needs rather than

construct its own facilities. New York v. FERC, 535

U.S. 1, 24 (2002). In 2005, when Congress expanded

FERC jurisdiction over transmission and reliability

standards, see 16 U.S.C. §§8240 et seq., it again

denied FERC the authority “to order the construction

of additional generation . . . capacity,” 16 U.S.C.

§8240(i(2), confirming that “[nJothing in this section

shall be construed to preempt any authority of any

State to take action to ensure the safety, adequacy,

and reliability of electric service within that State

....” Id. $8240(iX3).

State support for power plant construction through

supervision of local utilities and state-approved

charges on retail ratepayers is, of course, nothing new.

Under the classic regulatory model, with vertically-

integrated utilities which both generate electricity and

sell electricity to retail ratepayers, States ensured

needed new power plant construction by allowing local

utilities to recover prudently incurred costs from retail

ratepayers. Many States continue to have vertically-

integrated utilities. Others, like Maryland, have

partially restructured their electric power sector

by requiring their local utilities to buy some or all of

their generation requirements from the interstate

markets, again with the costs of those purchases borne

ultimately by retail ratepayers.

10

Even in restructured states, state regulators retain

regulatory control over purchasing decisions by their

local utilities, and the rates they charge their

customers. States use that authority to direct those

utilities to enter into long-term contracts to purchase

power (or to approve such contracts). Those contracts

assure reliable electricity supplies for state citizens.

And they assure developers of the long-term revenue

stream needed to finance projects costing hundreds of

millions of dollars.

Almost all (more than 97%) of new power plant

construction rests on long-term commitments, under-

written by ratepayers. Those commitments typically

take the form of long-term contracts between the

developer and the regulated local utility (64%), or

construction by the local utility that owns the power

plant and sells to retail consumers (29.6%). Only 2.4%

of recent new generation capacity was built “on spec,”

i.e., relying solely on short-term open market sales.’

State authority to direct local utilities to buy power

or capacity from prospective developers poses no

conflict with federal law or policy. See 18 C.F.R.

§35.27 (recognizing States’ authority to “establish .. .

[clompetitive procedures for the acquisition of electric

energy . .. purchased at wholesale”). This includes the

authority to “dictate the generation resources from

which utilities may procure electric energy.” Cal. Pub.

’ These figures are for 2013. See American Public Power

Association, Power Plants Are Not Built on Spec—2014 Update

at 1-2 and Table 1 (2014) ("2014 APPA Study”), http

goo.git62QuS. Similar figures are available for 2011. See

American Public Power Association, Power Plants Are Not Buiit

on Spec: An Analysis of New Electric Generation Projects

Constructed in 2011 at 5-6 and Table 2 (2012) (“2012 APPA

Study”), http://goo.gl/WCboHw.

11

Utils. Comm’n, 134 FERC 461,044, P 30 & n.62

(2011). If the resulting contracts are subject to FERC

jurisdiction, FERC may review them.

What States may not do is set the price (rather than

have the price set competitively) at which electricity or

capacity is sold at wholesale. Only FERC can

determine whether prices subject to its jurisdiction are

just and reasonable. Compare Midwest Power Sys.,

Inc., 78 FERC $61,067, 61,248 (1997); Cal. Pub. Utils.

Comm'n, 132 FERC 461,047, P 69 (2010) (California

statute “preempted to the extent that the [State] is

setting wholesale rates”), with Doswell Ltd. P’ship, 50

FERC 61,251, 61,756-57 (1990) (approving state-

certified agreement, with prices set by competition);

Commonwealth Atl. Ltd. P’ship, 51 FERC 961,368

(1990).

B. Maryland’s Initiative Supported

Necessary Power Plant Construction

In April 2012, the Maryland Public Service

Commission (MPSC) determined that “long-term

demand for electricity . . . compels us to order new

generation in the amount of 650 to 700 MWs... in

Maryland by 2015.” Order No. 84815, No. 9214 at 29

(MPSC Apr. 12, 2012). It explained that market forces

had not “provided sufficient certainty for prospective

generation suppliers to secure financing in the current

economic climate.” Id. at 22.

It offered the successful bidder, agreeing to build the

plant in the desired locale, contracts with Maryland’s

local utilities. CPV offered a plant with the required

capacity and technology and was selected as providing

“the best price.” The 20-year contracts were in the

form of contracts for differences, a hedge. The party

that would ordinarily bear the risk of yearly price

12

fluctuations in capacity revenue (i.e., the developer)

trades that variable revenue for a defined revenue

stream, at its offer price. The counterparty — a local

utility — takes on the risk of fluctuating prices. The

Fourth Circuit deemed these contracts a “guarantee[]”

or “subsidy.” App.18a, 23a.

CPV thus agreed to build a power plant of specified

capacity in Maryland’s desired locale, using

designated natural gas technology, and to sell its

capacity in the federally-supervised capacity auction.®

In consideration, CPV would receive its offer price,

over 20 years. If CPV’s revenues were below the

contract price, Maryland’s local utilities would pay

CPV the difference, and pass any cost on to their

ratepayers. If CPV realized sales revenues above its

yearly contract price, CPV would rebate the difference

to local utilities, which would pass the savings on to

the retail ratepayers.

® As a definitional matter, “capacity” is used in two related

ways. Capacity is the quantity of electricity that a given resource

can produce or make available. But because electricity demand

fluctuates (and electricity cannot be stored), the ability to provide

electricity on demand is itself sold in interstate markets. As the

D.C. Circuit explained:

“Capacity” is not electricity itself but the ability to produce

it when necessary. It amounts to a kind of call option that

electricity transmitters purchase from parties—generally,

generators—who can either produce more or consume less

when required. The penultimate and most proximate buyers

of capacity (before the consumers who ultimately shoulder

the costs in their utility bills) are .. the public utilities that

deliver electricity to end users.

See CDPUC, 569 F.3d at 479.

13

C. FERC Can Influence Power Plant

Development Only Indirectly Through

Its Market and Rate Supervision

Under the FPA, FERC regulates interstate whole-

sale energy markets and has exclusive authority to

determine whether rates are “just and reasonable.” 16

U.S.C. §824d(a). FERC may also choose to regulate

other matters “affecting” or “in connection with”

rates. 16 U.S.C. §§824d, 824e. FERC has encouraged

formation of “regional transmission organizations,”

which coordinate generators, transmission resources

and wholesale purchasers. PJM Interconnection,

L.L.C. (PJM), spanning most of thirteen states,

including Maryland, is the largest of these entities.

Capacity is frequently bought and sold through

bilateral contracts. See NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me.

Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, 171 (2010) (“The

[FPA] allows .. . sellers and buyers [to] agree on rates

by contract.”).° Non-auction sales are subject to

FERC’s review for “justness and reasonableness,”

whether the result of state-directed procurements or

not. Where the price is competitively set by a seller

without market power, FERC’s review is limited

because market-based rates are presumed valid. See

Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Public Util. Dist.

No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 547-48 (2008).

As a supplement to the many other markets and

methods for selling capacity, FERC has encouraged

regional transmission organizations to operate

® Long-term contracts are central to the provision of reliable

electric supply; the FPA is “premised” on them. In re Permian

Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 822 (1968). They are a “key

factor fostering stability in the electricity market, to the longrun

benefit of consumers.” NRG, 558 U.S. at 174.

14

forward markets for capacity sales. See, e.g., Conn.

Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477,

484 (D.C. Cir. 2009) “CDPUC”). A forward market

functions as a clearing house for purchases and sales,

and can also generate “price signals” that may prompt

investment in new plants (or retirement of old ones).

See New England Power Generators Ass’n, Inc. v.

FERC, 757 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

The D.C. Circuit approved FERC’s development of

organized forward capacity markets. See CDPUC,

569 F.3d at 484-85. FERC premised that approval by

explaining that it was merely exercising its authority

over wholesale prices and markets, which could

incidentally spur power plant construction. Such

incidental effects, the court said, would not displace or

invade the States’ primary authority over power plant

construction. Id.

PJM’s auction, the Reliability Pricing Model (RPM),

operates in conjunction with, and in no way displaces,

the many other methods of buying and selling capacity

in the region. PJM surveys the region to predict how

much capacity will be needed three years hence.

Almost all generators must offer their capacity—

including capacity that is already the subject of other

contracts, at prices different than the auction price—

for one year, three years in the future. Offers to sell

are stacked, lowest to highest. The clearing price is

the highest price PJM must accept to acquire the

capacity to meet projected demand. Offers above that

price are rejected. Accepted offers are paid the

clearing price, no matter what the actual offer was.

PJM buys the accepted capacity at the clearing price

and resells it to auction purchasers. App.9a-10a.

Almost all capacity is offered into this auction at

“zero"—meaning that offerors are “price takers,”

15

selling at whatever clearing price the auction

produces. That is because a power plant requires

enormous up-front capital investment. Once those

costs are sunk, the cost of supplying capacity is small,

so a rational offeror wants to be paid something,

rather than nothing, and will offer at a price certain to

clear. Moreover, utilities that have already bought

capacity under long-term contracts are required to

participate in the auction, and will likewise offer that

contracted capacity into the auction at zero.

Given the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit, it bears

emphasis that the auction clearing price controls

auction sales, but does not set a price for the plethora

of transactions outside the auction. It is a “residual”

pricing model only. Much capacity offered into the

auction is already subject to long-term bilateral

contracts, under which local utilities (with the

concurrence or at the direction of the State) buy

capacity at negotiated or competitively bid prices,

different from the auction price. FERC requires the

owner of that capacity to offer it into the auction. In

other words, the local utility buys capacity, long-term,

and resells it at auction. The result is multiple prices

for capacity, even for capacity later sold through the

auction.

The net economic effect of state-directed bilateral

capacity purchase agreements is, of course, the same

as that of the contracts for differences at issue here:

The local utility and its ratepayers absorb the

difference between the long-term price at which it

contracted, and whatever the yearly auction price

turns out to be.

16

D. FERC Approved CPV’s Sale Of Capacity

In the Auction

New gas-fired generators are barred from entering

the auction as price-takers, and are instead required

to clear their first (but not subsequent) auction with

a minimum offer price reflecting costs. Until the

2012 auction, however, FERC had exempted state-

supported generators from minimum offer price rules,

allowing them to bid zero so that state-sponsored

projects would receive the clearing price for their

capacity. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74,

79, 86 (3d Cir. 2014) (“NJBPU”).

In response to Maryland’s and New Jersey’s similar

programs, FERC subjected state-supported generators

to minimum offer price rules (to which they had

formerly been exempted), but held that “even if

discriminatory subsidies are being received, if the

resource is needed at the [minimum offer price] then

it ... should be permitted to participate in the auction

regardless of whether it also receives a subsidy.” Id.

at 98, 111 (FERC “permit[ted] states to develop

whatever capacity resources they wish, and to use

those resources to any extent that they wish, while

approving rules that prevent the state’s choices from

adversely affecting wholesale capacity rates.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

CPV offered its capacity in the 2012 auction under

these rules. Its offer cleared, meaning that its capacity

will be sold, and FERC approved the clearing price.

See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 143 FERC 961,090,

P 143 (2013).

E. The Decisions Below

Respondents include incumbent generators claiming

that competition from the successful bidders would

17

affect their prices in the auction. They brought this

case in the United States District Court for the

District of Maryland against members of Maryland’s

Public Service Commission. Respondents also brought

a parallel case challenging New Jersey's similar

program. See PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 766

F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014). Petitioner CPV intervened.

Respondents asserted that the Maryland initiative

was “field preempted,” “conflict preempted,” and

violated the Commerce Clause. The district court held

for Respondents on “field preemption,” App.129a,

declined to resolve the conflict preemption claim,

App.37a n.5, and rejected the Commerce Clause claim,

App.37a.

CPV and the Maryland defendants appealed. The

Fourth Circuit affirmed. On “field preemption,” it held

that the contract payments “effectively supplant[]” a

wholesale rate, invading FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction

over rates. App.17a.

The panel also found conflict preemption. It held

that “Maryland’s initiative disrupts [FERC’s] scheme

by substituting the state’s preferred incentive

structure for that approved by FERC.” App.23a. The

Fourth Circuit did not identify the source of its belief

that the FERC-supervised auction was an exclusive

source of incentives, displacing the States.

The Fourth Circuit panel also held that Maryland’s

20-year subsidy conflicted with FERC’s “policy choice”

to allow prices for sales within the auction to be locked

in for only three years. The Fourth Circuit did not

explain why an internal auction sales rule would apply

to transactions outside of the auction, or why its

reasoning would not similarly prohibit the many

18

existing long-term contracts with locked-in capacity

prices.

REASONS TO GRANT THE PETITION

The Fourth Circuit’s rulings (and those of the Third

Circuit, addressing New Jersey's similar program)

dangerously restructure the federal-state division of

authority under the FPA — dangerously because they

displace the only governmental authorities, the

States, authorized to directly support new power plant

construction. The decision disregards this Court’s

stringent standards for finding preemption within the

framework of interlocking federal-state electricity

regulation. It finds improper state rate-setting where

the State set no rate. And it hobbles the States

in structuring incentives for new power plant

construction, as well as for clean and renewable

energy initiatives.

As reflected in earlier decisions of the D.C. and

Third Circuits, FERC’s supervision of markets and

rates gives FERC some incidental ability to influence

power plant construction. But that incidental power

leaves intact the States’ primary authority: over power

plant construction, over capacity and electricity “buy-

side” decisions by state utilities, and over ratepayer

charges to support those activities. In finding

preemption based on a State’s support of new plant

construction through long-term, ratepayer-backed

contracts with the State’s local utilities, and in

granting primacy to the federally-supervised capacity

auction as a source of incentives, the decision below

turns the FPA’s division of responsibility upside down.

It contradicts the basic premises upon which FERC

initiated the capacity auctions.

19

Though the Fourth Circuit declared its ruling

“limited,” it is not. The broad theory of improper

state rate-setting underlying the finding of “field

preemption,” and the equally broad notion of “conflict

preemption” based on the idea that the federally-

supervised auction displaces state-created incentives

for power plant construction, strike at the core of the

States’ ability to support power plant construction

through long-term contracts and rate-payer support.

The legal premises of the decision are decidedly wrong,

and the restructuring of state-federal authority

dramatic.

Moreover, the practical future effects of the court’s

ruling, and the disabling threat they pose to the

States’ ability to support energy infrastructure, are, as

shown below, even more pronounced. By curbing the

use of state-directed contracts, at competitively

determined prices, to encourage power plant

construction and other energy initiatives, the decision

will hobble the States’ ability to assure the creation of

reliable energy supplies to meet their citizens’ — and,

thus, the Nation’s — energy infrastructure needs.

Those needs cannot be directly addressed by FERC

under the FPA; Congress left those matters to the

States. For the reasons described below, the Court

should grant certiorari to address the important

questions presented.

lL THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS

WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS AND

THE STRUCTURE OF THE FPA

A. The Decision Disregards The Standards

For Finding FPA Preemption

All “pre-emption cases . . . start with the assumption

that the historic police powers of the States were not

20

to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that

was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).

The “[nleed for new power facilities, their economic

feasibility, and rates and services, are areas that have

been characteristically governed by the States.” Pac.

Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 205."° The FPA expressly

preserves state authority, and forecloses FERC

authority, over such matters.

FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over interstate

sales and rates. 16 U.S.C. §824(a)-(b). FERC has

jurisdiction over matters affecting or in connection

with rates as well. FERC is denied “jurisdiction,

except as specifically provided in this subchapter .. .

over facilities used for the generation of electric

energy.” 16 U.S.C. §824(b)(1).

The resulting system of “interlocking” state-federal

responsibility impacts preemption standards. With

respect to field preemption, this Court cautioned, in

the context of the FPA’s sister statute, the Natural

Gas Act, against “an extravagant ... mode of

interpretation” of FERC’s authority that would

undermine powers reserved to the States."' Nw. Cent.,

The Fourth Circuit’s theory that this presumption can be

disregarded because the FPA provides for federal regulation of

interstate rates, App.20a, is a non sequitur. Maryland, here,

exercised traditional powers over power plant construction,

utility procurement decisions, and retail rates. The decision

1! While Northwest Central interpreted the Natural Gas Act

(“NGA”), the same principles apply under the FPA: Because

the relevant provisions of the FPA and the Natural Gas Act

are “in all material respects substantially identical,” there is

an “established practice of citing interchangeably decisions

interpreting the pertinent sections of the two statutes.” Ark. La.

21

489 U.S. at 512-13. State programs are not field

preempted merely because they affect matters within

FERC’s jurisdiction, as they inevitably do. Field

preemption is found only where the State enters the

federal sphere, as by setting rates for or regulating

interstate transactions, id., which Maryland did not do

here.

Courts must be equally circumspect in judging

conflict preemption, analyzing “sensitively” so as to

preserve the States’ role. Jd. at 515. The general

approach, anticipated by Congress, is one of federal

accommodation, not preemption. Jd. at 517-18.

Conflict preemption is found only when interference

with FERC’s regulation is “so extensive and

disruptive” that “federal accommodation must give

way to federal pre-emption.” Id.

Even on these basic points, the Fourth Circuit held

to the contrary. It found that the mere fact that FERC

had to consider accommodation and changed the

auction rules in response to Maryland’s initiative

(albeit only by subjecting state-subsidized entities to

the rules to which other new generators are subject)

supported “conflict preemption.” App.24a.

B. The Fourth Circuit Decision Conflicts

With The Premises On Which FERC

Initiated Use Of A Forward Market To

Influence New Construction

The Fourth Circuit’s preemption findings are

inconsistent with the premises upon which FERC

developed the forward capacity auctions.

Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 n.7 (1981) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

22

FERC encouraged development of forward capacity

auctions in some regions in part to improve the ability

of “the market” to generate cogent price signals to

potential investors. But there is simply no conflict

between improving market mechanisms to better

“signal” future needs, and preserving the States’

authority to support new power plant construction

through specific competitive procurements for bilat-

eral contracts when existing markets alone are not

filling the need. FERC acknowledged from the outset

that a forward capacity auction will not always be

“sufficient to provide appropriate incentives for

efficient investment decisions—whether new entry or

a retirement decision is at stake.” FERC explicitly

acknowledged the continuing role of long-term bi-

lateral capacity contracts in providing incentives to

build new power plants. 18 Most recently, in approving

auction rule changes in response to Maryland’s (and

New Jersey's) program, FERC disclaimed any desire

to “interfere with states or localities that, for policy

reasons, seek to provide assistance for new capacity

entry if they believe such expenditures are appro-

priate for their state.”™

This makes perfect sense under the FPA. States

look farther into the future than a three year forward

“ PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC %61,331, P 77

(2006).

“ In response to an objection that the auction was an

“intrusion into state jurisdiction over generation,” FERC

explained that there was no intrusion because utilities may

continue to “create an incentive for the construction of new

capacity by entering into long-term bilateral agreements.. .”

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 115 FERC $61,079, P 172 (2006).

% 137 FERC at PP 3, 89; PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 135

FERC 461,022, P 141 (2011).

23

market. They can assess economic conditions and

encourage investment when capital is tight. They

can consider the benefits of a diverse fuel mix, and

environmental or renewable energy objectives about

which an auction “market” is indifferent. States

necessarily fill those roles because FERC itself is

denied the power to order the creation of new

generation capacity.

In CDPUC, the D.C. Circuit evaluated the nascent

auction being implemented in New England, conclud-

ing that it was an appropriate incident to FERC’s

market and rate regulation. 569 F.3d at 484-85; see

also Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d

216, 222 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing FERC as

having “incidentally incentivized construction of more

generation facilities, which are subject to State

control”). It did so on the explicit understanding that

such an auction left intact the States’ “right to forbid

new entrants from providing new capacity, to require

retirement of existing generators, to limit new con-

struction to more expensive, environmentally friendly

units, or to take any other action in their role as

regulators of generation facilities without direct

interference from [FERC].” CDPUC, 569 F.3d at 481.

Thus, until the Fourth Circuit’s decision here, the

respective spheres of authority were well defined. On

the one hand, FERC could supervise the auction to

ensure that it operates as intended, including how

state-subsidized entities could participate in the

auction. See NJBPU, 744 F.3d 74 (approving rules for

state-subsidized generators); New England Power

Generators, 757 F.3d at 290-91 (approving rules for a

New England auction). On the other hand,

[S]tates remain free to subsidize the

construction of new generators, and load

24

serving entities to build or contract for any

self-supply they believe is necessary.

Id. at 291. States could continue to direct their local

utilities to enter into contracts serving the State’s

energy sufficiency and reliability objectives. The

only limit beyond that was that States could not set

the prices (or review prices) for interstate power

purchases. The Fourth Circuit here turned this

framework upside down, holding that FERC’s auction

has, in fact, displaced the States’ powers to support

new power plant construction because that would

“disrupt” the FERC-supervised auction.

C. The Fourth Circuit Has Fundamentally

Altered the FPA’s Division of State-

Federal Authority

The Fourth Circuit’s rulings reflect basic misun-

derstandings about the FPA regulatory framework

established by FERC and the FPA itself.

1. The Fourth Circuit’s “field

preemption” theory improperly

finds that these contracts contained

rates set by the State

The Fourth Circuit’s field preemption ruling was

wrong for two reasons. First, the contract payments

the Fourth Circuit found objectionable are not “rates”

subject to FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction. Second, and

more important, whether or not subject to FERC’s

jurisdiction, they were not “set” by Maryland, and

therefore, do not invade FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction.

a. The contracts do not contain rates

subject to FERC review

Maryland’s local utilities do not purchase electricity

or capacity from CPV under the contracts at issue. Yet

25

FERC’s rate-review jurisdiction is “limited to

contracts [] which directly govern[] the rate in a

jurisdictional sale—providing for the rate in whole or

in part, or specifying or embodying it, or setting forth

rules by which it is to be calculated.”” Financial

payments separate from such sales are not rates

subject to FERC’s review.’* Thus, the contracts do not

fall within FERC’s jurisdiction (and FERC has not

asserted jurisdiction)—though, as shown below, it

would make no difference for preemption purposes if

they did because the prices were not set by the State.’’

The Fourth Circuit acknowledged as much but held

that Maryland’s program “effectively supplants” the

auction rate and therefore “intrudes on FERC’s

jurisdiction.” App.17a. The Fourth Circuit invoked

this Court’s “filed rate” cases, Mississippi Power &

Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S.

354 (1988) and Nantahala Power & Light Co. v.

Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986). See App.18a.

But the Fourth Circuit misunderstood those cases.

First, the FPA’s filed rate doctrine does not con-

template a single uniform rate at which electricity or

capacity must be bought and sold at any one time. To

the contrary, under the FPA, parties buy and sell at

5 Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 403

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

© See Revised Pub. Util. Filing Requirements, 97 FERC

461,317, *4-5 (2001); N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 74 FERC {7 61,311,

61,986-87 (1996) (FERC has no jurisdiction over a futures

contract that can be settled financially, unless the contract goes

to delivery).

FERC might choose to assert jurisdiction because the

contracts “affect,” or are “in connection with,” interstate rates.

See 16 U.S.C. §§824d, 824e.

26

prices of their choosing.” The auction only establishes

a rate for capacity sold in the auction. Capacity,

including capacity resold in the auction, is routinely

sold at prices different from auction prices. That there

is a difference between what CPV will receive under

its long-term contract, on the one hand, and what it

will receive for capacity in the yearly auction, on the

other, is immaterial for preemption purposes.

Second, the basis for finding preemption in the “filed

rate” cases was the fact that an electric utility had

bought or was already committed to buy energy on

terms subject to FERC’s jurisdiction—and the State

then second-guessed those terms by preventing its

electric utility from recovering the resulting costs.

Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 970; Mississippi Power &

Light, 487 U.S. at 372. In each case, the State

substituted its judgment for FERC’s, resulting in

unrecoverable payments by the utilities, “trapped

costs.” There is no analogous trapped cost or second-

guessing of a FERC-jurisdictional purchase here. To

the contrary, the State’s input here was prospective,

as part of its control over utility buy-side decisions. It

does not “stand[] to reason” (as the Fourth Circuit put

it, App.18a), that the “filed rate” doctrine applies

equally to payments that exceed the auction price

based on a State’s buy-side direction. Neither FERC

nor any court has ever so held. Indeed, it is no surprise

that the prices to support new construction, in a

NRG, 558 U.S. at 167 (“a rate set by a freely negotiated

wholesale-energy contract meets the statutory just and

reasonable requirement”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

27

particular locale, over a long-term,”’ are different from

one-year auction prices.

The economic effect of States directing local utilities

to enter into long-term capacity purchase contracts is

precisely the same as the contracts for differences

here. The utility buys capacity over a long-term at a

fixed price. It must then offer that capacity in the

auction, and obtain whatever price the auction

provides. The utility receives (or pays) the difference

between its contract price and the auction price. The

payment of that difference is what the Fourth Circuit

deemed preempted here.

b. Maryland set no rates

Contracts and rates subject to FERC’s review

jurisdiction do not usurp FERC jurisdiction. Rather,

they submit to that jurisdiction, and are not

preempted. Indeed, by holding these contracts invalid,

the Fourth Circuit (on its theory that the contracts

invade FERC’s jurisdiction) paradoxically prevented

FERC from reviewing these contracts.”

The more important point for preemption, however,

is that whether or not these contracts are reviewable

by FERC, they are not preempted. That is because the

prices set forth in the contracts were not set by, or

reviewed by, Maryland, but by CPV, as offeror, in a

competitive procurement. In other words, the issue

® It would be “perverse” to expect such contracts to mimic

single year prices. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 547-48, 551

(“parties enter into wholesale-power contracts .. . to hedge

against the volatility that market imperfections produce”).

* FERC so held. CPV Shore, L.L.C., CPV Maryland, L.L.C.,

148 FERC 761,096, PP 28-31 (2014) (ruling that it could not

review the contracts because the court declared them invalid).

28

whether these contracts contain a FERC-jurisdictional

rate determines whether the contracts are subject to

FERC review. But it does not determine whether the

State has purported to exercise a power — to set or

determine rates for interstate sales — reserved to

FERC by the FPA. Here, the State simply exercised

its authority to direct its utilities’ buy-side decisions.

The Fourth Circuit missed this distinction.

It is well established that States retain authority

over “resource planning and utility buy-side

decisions.” See New York, 535 U.S. at 24. States may

thus direct utilities to buy capacity or energy under

long-term agreements. See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. §35.27

(FERC recognizing States’ authority to “establish . . .

[clompetitive procedures for the acquisition of electric

energy”); see also Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 134 FERC

at P 30 & n.62 (States may “dictate the generation

resources from which utilities may procure electric

energy.”).

A State crosses the line into exclusive FERC

territory not by directing its utilities to enter into

contracts reviewable by FERC, but only if it purports

to mandate the price at which capacity is purchased,

rather than allow it to be established by negotiation,

or, as here, by competitive bid. The State exercises the

kind of governmental power over rates reserved to

FERC by the FPA only if it sets or reviews the rate for

reasonableness. FERC’s cases reflect this basic

distinction. Compare Allegheny Energy Supply Co.,

108 FERC 761,082, PP 15, 20, 21 (2004) (approving a

state procurement where competitively bid prices

“were binding. Winning bidders received the actual

price in their offers .. . .”), with Cal. Pub. Utils.

Comm'n, 132 FERC at P 64 (state-imposed rate is

preempted); Midwest, 78 FERC at 61,246, 61,248

29

(state-directed procurement “preempted to. . . the

extent [the State] set[s} rates for the wholesale sales

of electric energy”).

By conducting a procurement, without setting a

price, Maryland did not usurp any power reserved to

FERC. The Fourth Circuit — like the Third, whose

decision followed — missed this basic point. In so

doing, these two Circuits have eviscerated a clear line

between permissible procurements and impermissible

state rate-review, hobbling the States’ ability to

support needed power plant construction and other

energy initiatives in the process.

2. Maryland’s initiative does not

conflict with any federal policy

The Fourth Circuit’s “conflict preemption” theory is

also untenable. There was no actual conflict between

Maryland’s program and the auction. FERC may

make rules that protect the auction. FERC here

changed the auction’s rules (which had exempted

state-supported generators from minimum offer

price requirements) to address Maryland’s (and New

Jersey's similar) subsidy. See NJBPU, 744 F.3d 74.

With those changes, FERC concluded that auction

sales by state-supported generators are “competitive”

and “economic,” “regardless of whether [the generator]

also receives a subsidy.” Jd. at 91-92, 97, 110 (internal

quotation marks omitted). The Third Circuit affirmed

FERC’s revisions as “preventling] the state’s choices

from adversely affecting wholesale capacity rates.” Id.

at 98.

In the absence of a concrete conflict, the Fourth

Circuit discerned a conflict in the notion that

“Maryland’s initiative disrupts this scheme by

substituting the state’s preferred incentive structure

30

for that approved by FERC.” App.23a. But that

“disruption” rests on the false premise that auction

“price signals” were to be an exclusive source of

“incentives” for constructing power plants. There is no

evidence that FERC, let alone Congress, had that

intention.

There is nothing incompatible about FERC, on

the one hand, organizing an auction to allow the

“market” to more effectively encourage investment,

and States retaining their historic authority to

support infrastructure development through long-

term contracts when economic conditions are not

otherwise attracting the necessary investment capital.

A preference for market solutions is not inconsistent

with States retaining power to support energy

initiatives through procurements.

The Fourth Circuit also cited an auction rule that

allows new generators in certain situations to lock in

a price that auction purchasers must pay for a three

year period—even if later auction prices are lower.

The Fourth Circuit found in this rule a FERC “policy”

against state subsidies extending more than three

years. But, in fact, FERC was simply making a rule

about auction sales for auction purchasers. Such a

rule says nothing at all about the duration of subsidies

or contracts outside the auction, which impose no

added cost on auction purchasers at all.

Il. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION DE-

PRIVES STATES—AND FERC—OF AU-

THORITY NEEDED TO SUPPORT THE

NATION’S ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE

The Fourth Circuit’s decision nullifies Maryland’s

program for a much needed power plant. New Jersey’s

similar initiative was nullified on a similar and

31

equally doubtful basis. See Solomon, 766 F.3d 241.

But the importance of these decisions extends far

beyond these vital power plants. As described above,

the assurance of stable long-term revenue has always

been necessary to attract capital to build new power

plants, and it continues to be necessary. Thus,

virtually all power plant construction—more than 97%

—is supported by long-term ratepayer commitments.

In States without vertically-integrated utilities (where

ratepayer commitment to offset prudently incurred

costs follows routinely), new power plants will not

be built—nor other energy initiatives pursued—

without the revenue assurances provided by long-term

contracts.”

State authority to support needed infrastructure

development by directing the purchasing decisions of

its utilities is more critical than ever. A substantial

portion of the Nation’s coal-fired power supply is being

retired. Environmental regulations and economic

factors favoring natural gas over coal are driving the

change.” The Department of Energy projects that 50

GW of the Nation’s existing 310 GW of coal-fired

generating capacity will be retired by 2020. PJM

estimates retirements of between 11 and 25 GW in the

*1 In 2013, only 2.4 percent of new capacity was built solely for

open sales into interstate markets. 2014 APPA Study at 1-2 and

Table 1. And the vast majority of even that small proportion

received some type of subsidy. Id. at 2.

™ See PJM, Coal Capacity at Risk for Retirement in PJM:

Potential Impacts of the Finalized EPA Cross State Air Pollution

Rule and Proposed National Emissions Standards for Hazardous

Air Pollutants at 10-15 (2011) ("2011 PJM Study”).

® U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy

Outlook 2014 at IF-34 (Apr. 2014).

32

region,“ and independent analyses indicate up to 21

GW of retirements by 2018. Even more closures

are likely in light of the Environmental Protection

Agency's June 2014 proposed regulation calling on

States to take the lead in reducing carbon dioxide

emissions from power plants.”

The long-term contract mechanism to support

infrastructure development used here by Maryland

(and by New Jersey, see Solomon, 766 F.3d at 248-49)

—a contract for differences—is especially important

because it is ideally suited to its purpose of providing

ratepayer support for power plant construction.

Ratepayers pay only what is needed to support the

intended result (whether a new natural gas-fired

power plant or a wind farm), net of what the developer

earns anyway by selling its capacity in the interstate

market. New Jersey, for example, subsidizes renew-

able energy generation by measuring the difference

between the bid price, and the price earned through

sales.

Other States have used similar mechanisms to

encourage renewable energy production and carry out

other facets of electric resource planning. Connecticut,

for example, used this mechanism to support renewa-

ble power projects.”” And States similarly direct their

local utilities to negotiate cost-based contracts with

* See 2011 PJM Study at 27-28.

* Onur Aydin, Frank Graves, and Metin Celebi, Coal Plant

Retirements: Feedback Effects on Wholesale Electricity Prices, The

Brattle Group (Nov. 2013).

* EPA, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing

Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, Proposed

Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (Jun. 18, 2014).

™’ Conn. Pub. Act 13-303, Section 6 (2013).

33

economically distressed power plants where loss of the

power plant’s capacity could negatively impact reliable

electric supplies for the State.“ Thus, the decision

below has immediate implications for a range of

initiatives already in place, beyond support for new,

traditional fuel power plants.

Long-term contracts are pirticularly effective in

supporting development of new technology and fuel

diversity. Massachusetts established a program

under which it ordered its utilities to enter into long-

term contracts with renewable power developers.”

Illinois sought to promote clean coal technology, and

so used its procurement power to require its utilities

to enter into long-term power purchase agreements

with a firm building the world’s first zero emission

coal-fired power plant.” Nevada,” Rhode Island,”

and other States also rely on state-run procurements

to secure the long-term contracts necessary to cover

the enormous costs of power plant development.

While the Fourth Circuit protectively pronounced

its ruling “narrow,” it sweeps broadly. The Fourth

% See Jeff Beattie, “New York Regulators Throw Lifeline to

Exelon’s Struggling Ginna Nuke,” HIS Energy Daily (Nov. 17,

2014); see also Resolution E-4471, Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal.

(Mar. 22, 2012) (state-directed procurement to support continued

operations at a natural gas-fired power plant); “Calpine Executes

Contracts for Sutter Energy Center With California Utilities,”

Reuters (May 7, 2012), http://goo.gi/tPq07o0. (same).

%® 2012 Mass. Legis. Serv., ch. 209, §35.

*® See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n,

2014 IL App (1st) 130544 (2014).

3! Nev. Rev. Stat. §704.7316.

33 In re Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25

A.3d 482 (R.1. 2011).

34

Circuit’s field preemption theory rests on the

erroneous premise that by directing a local utility's

buy-side decision through a competitive procurement,

a State is thereby setting a rate different from the

auction rate, and thus invading FERC’s exclusive rate-

review authority. That holding bars States from

employing one of their traditional, and certainly most

effective, toole—the offer of long-term, ratepayer-

supported contracts—to encourage investment in new

power plants or to support other energy initiatives.

Moreover, there is nothing unusual—or preempted—

about the fact that such long-term contracts produce

prices different from auction prices. Almost all

capacity, including capacity already subject to

bilateral contracts at prices different from auction

prices (whether state-directed or not), must be bid into

its capacity auction. All such contracts, particularly

long-term agreements, create a price for capacity sold

in the yearly auction that is not the auction price. Cf.

App.19a. The economic effect of long-term capacity

purchase agreements on the parties, and on the

auction, is the same as the contracts for differences at

issue here.

The Fourth Circuit’s conflict preemption ruling is

arguably even more expansive. According to the

Fourth Circuit, Maryland disrupted the federal

regulatory framework “by substituting the state’s

preferred incentive structure for that approved by

FERC.” App.23a. Under this theory, any special

state incentive to encourage new generation—or reject

new construction—would contradict the “incentive

structure” of the auction market. In addition, by

capping generators’ compensgation at the auction price,

the ruling seemingly forecloses the States’ ability to

35

opt for more expensive options, such as solar, wind,

nuclear, or clean coal.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision thus strips the States

of basic tools that they need and use to support

investment in energy infrastructure.“ And because

FERC itself lacks authority in this field, stripping

the States of such powers dangerously leaves no

government with the authority to intervene directly to

ensure that the Nation’s urgent need for adequate

supplies of electricity are met.

Finally, while resting on the notion that preemption

was necessary here to protect FERC’s authority, the

Fourth Circuit’s rulings actually diminished that

authority. By invalidating these contracts as

preempted, the Fourth Circuit prevented FERC from

reviewing them to determine whether they are just

and reasonable.* And while finding that Maryland’s

program conflicts in some way with the FERC-

supervised auction, the appellate court effectively

overrode FERC’s determination that Petitioner could

sell its capacity in the auction without any harm to

that auction.

% The Fourth Circuit’s alternative conflict preemption ruling

is equally broad. It equates FERC’s many decisions about how

the auction should operate with an “explicit policy choice” that

preempts state actions outside the auction. App.24a.

™ See CPV Shore, 148 FERC at PP 28-31 (FERC ruling that it

could not review the contracts because the court declared them

invalid).

APPENDIX

36

CONCLUSION

The petition should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

CLIFTON S. ELGARTEN

Counsel of Record

LARRY F. EISENSTAT

RICHARD LEHFELDT

JENNIFER N. WATERS

CROWELL & MORING LLP

1001 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, DC 20004

Counsel for Petitioner

November 26, 2014

la

APPENDIX A

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-2419

PPL ENERGYPLUS, LLC; PPL BRUNNER ISLAND, LLC;

PPL HOLTwoop, LLC; PPL MARTINS CREEK, LLC;

PPL Montour, LLC; PPL SUSQUEHANNA, LLC;

LOWER MOUNT BETHEL ENERGY, LLC; PPL

NEW JERSEY SOLAR, LLC; PPL NEw JERSEY BIOGAS,

LLC; PPL RENEWABLE ENERGY, LLC; PSEG POWER

LLC; ESSENTIAL POWER, LLC,

Plaintiffs Appellees,

Vv.

DOUGLAS R.M. NAZARIAN; HAROLD WILLIAMS;

LAWRENCE BRENNER; KELLY SPEAKES-BACKMAN;

KEVIN HUGHES,

Defendants - Appellants,

and

CPV MARYLAND, LLC,

Defendant.

AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL

RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION; NRG

ENERGY INC.; MARYLAND OFFICE OF PEOPLE’S

COUNSEL; CONNECTICUT PUBLIC UTILITIES

REGULATORY AUTHORITY; CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT

OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;

2a

GEORGE JEPSEN, Attorney General for the State of

Connecticut; CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF CONSUMER

COUNSEL; NEW ENGLAND CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSIONERS, INC.; MAINE PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSION; RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSION; VERMONT PUBLIC SERVICE

BOARD; VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE;

CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION; PUBLIC

SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

(NYPSC); PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; DELAWARE PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION; NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC

UTILITIES; NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF RATE COUNSEL;

MARYLAND ENERGY ADMINISTRATION; AMERICAN WIND

ENERGY ASSOCIATION; THE MID-ATLANTIC

RENEWABLE ENERGY COALITION,

Amici Supporting Appellants,

PJM POWER PROVIDERS GROUP; ELECTRIC POWER

SUPPLY ASSOCIATION; EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,

Amici Supporting Appellees.

No. 13-2424

PPL ENERGYPLUuUS, LLC; PPL BRUNNER ISLAND, LLC;

PPL HOLTwoop, LLC; PPL MARTINS CREEK, LLC;

PPL MONTOUR, LLC; PPL SUSQUEHANNA, LLC;

LOWER MOUNT BETHEL ENERGY, LLC;

PPL NEW JERSEY SOLAR, LLC; PPL NEW JERSEY

BroGas, LLC; PPL RENEWABLE ENERGY, LLC; PSEG

POWER LLC; ESSENTIAL POWER, LLC,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

CPV MARYLAND, LLC,

Defendant - Appellant,

3a

and

DOUGLAS R.M. NAZARIAN; HAROLD WILLIAMS;

LAWRENCE BRENNER; KELLY SPEAKES-BACKMAN;

KEVIN HUGHES,

Defendants.

AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL

RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION;

NRG ENERGY INC.; MARYLAND OFFICE OF PEOPLE’S

COUNSEL; CONNECTICUT PUBLIC UTILITIES

REGULATORY AUTHORITY; CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT

OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;

GEORGE JEPSEN, Attorney General for the State of

Connecticut; CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF CONSUMER

COUNSEL; NEW ENGLAND CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSIONERS, INC.; MAINE PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSION; RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSION; VERMONT PUBLIC SERVICE

BOARD; VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE;

CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION; PUBLIC

SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

(NYPSC); PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; DELAWARE PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION; NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC

UTILITIES; NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF RATE COUNSEL;

MARYLAND ENERGY ADMINISTRATION; AMERICAN

WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION; THE MID-ATLANTIC

RENEWABLE ENERGY COALITION,

Amici Supporting Appellant,

PJM POWER PROVIDERS GROUP; ELECTRIC POWER

SUPPLY ASSOCIATION; EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,

Amici Supporting Appellees.

4a

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis,

Senior District Judge. (1:12-cv-01286-MJG)

Argued: May 13, 2014 Decided: June 2, 2014

Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit

Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote

the opinion, in which Judge Keenan and Judge Diaz

joined.

ARGUED: Scott H. Strauss, SPIEGEL &

MCDIARMID, LLP, Washington, D.C.; Clifton Scott

Elgarten, CROWELL & MORING LLP, Washington,

D.C., for Appellants. Paul D. Clement, BANCROFT,

PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF:

H. Robert Erwin, Ransom E. Davis, Baltimore,

Maryland; Peter J. Hopkins, Jeffrey A. Schwarz,

SPIEGEL & MCDIARMID LLP, Washington, D.C., for

Appellants Douglas R.M. Nazarian, Harold Williams,

Lawrence Brenner, Kelly Speakes-Backman, and

Kevin Hughes. Larry F. Eisenstat, Richard Lehfeldt,

Jennifer N. Waters, CROWELL & MORING LLP,

Washington, D.C., for Appellant CPV Maryland, LLC.

Erin E. Murphy, Candice Chiu, BANCROFT PLLC,

Washington, D.C., for Amici. Jesse A. Dillon, PPL

SERVICES CORP., Allentown, Pennsylvania, David

L. Meyer, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP,

Washington, D.C., for Appellees PPL EnergyPlus,

5a

LLC, PPL Brunner Island, LLC, PPL Holtwood, LLC,

PPL Martins Creek, LLC, PPL Montour, LLC, PPL

Susquehanna, LLC, Lower Mount Bethel Energy,

LLC, PPL New Jersey Solar, LLC, PPL New Jersey

Biogas, LLC, and PPL Renewable Energy, LLC.

Tamara Linde, Vice President Regulatory, Vaughn

L. McKoy, General State Regulatory Counsel,

PSEG SERVICES CORP., Newark, New Jersey;

Shannen W. Coffin, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP,

Washington, D.C., for Appellee PSEG Power, LLC.

David Musselman, ESSENTIAL POWER, LLC,

Princeton, New Jersey, for Appellee Essential Power,

LLC. Susan N. Kelly, Senior Vice President of Policy

Analysis and General Counsel, Delia D. Patterson,

Assistant General Counsel, AMERICAN PUBLIC

POWER ASSOCIATION, Washington, D.C.; Jay A.

Morrison, Vice President, Regulatory Issues, Pamela

M. Silberstein, Associate Director, Power Supply

Issues, NATIONAL RURAL ELECTRIC COOPER-

ATIVE ASSOCIATION, Arlington, Virginia, for Amici

American Public Power Association and National

Rural Electric Cooperative Association. Abraham

Silverman, Cortney Madea, NRG ENERGY, INC.,

Princeton, New Jersey; Jeffrey A. Lamken, Martin V

Totaro, Washington, D.C., Kaitlin R. O’Donnell,

MOLOLAMKEN LLP, New York, New York, for

Amicus NRG Energy Inc. Paula M. Carmody, William

F. Fields, MARYLAND OFFICE OF PEOPLE’S

COUNSEL, Baltimore, Maryland, for Amicus

Maryland Office of People’s Counsel. Randall L. Speck,

Jeffrey A. Fuisz, Kimberly B. Frank, Susanna Y. Chu,

KAYE SCHOLER LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici.

Clare E. Kindall, Assistant Attorney General,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, New

Britain, Connecticut, for Amicus Connecticut Public

Utilities Regulatory Authority. Robert D. Snook,

6a

Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL, New Britain, Connecticut,

for Amicus Connecticut Department of Energy and

Environmental Protection. John S. Wright, Assistant

Attorney General, Michael C. Wertheimer, Assistant

Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL, New Britain, Connecticut, for Amicus

George Jepsen, Attorney General for the State of

Connecticut. Elin Swanson Katz, Joseph A. Rosenthal,

CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF CONSUMER COUN-

SEL, New Britain, Connecticut, for Amicus

Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel. Sarah

Hofmann, Executive Director, NEW ENGLAND

CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMIS-

SIONERS, INC., Montpelier, Vermont, for Amicus

New England Conference of Public Utilities

Commissioners, Inc. Lisa Fink, STATE OF MAINE

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, Augusta,

Maine, for Amicus Maine Public Utilities Commission.

Amy K. D’Alessandro, RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSION, Warwick, Rhode Island,

for Amicus Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission.

June Tierney, General Counsel, VERMONT PUBLIC

SERVICE BOARD, Montpelier, Vermont, for Amicus

Vermont Public Service Board. Edward McNamara,

Regional Policy Director, VERMONT DEPARTMENT

OF PUBLIC SERVICE, Montpelier, Vermont, for

Amicus Vermont Department of Public Service. Frank

Lindh, Candace Morey, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSION, ' San _ Francisco,

California, for Amicus California Public Utilities

Commission.Kimberly A. Harriman, Acting General

Counsel, Jonathan D. Feinberg, Solicitor, Alan

Michaels, Assistant Counsel, PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,

Albany, New York, for Amicus Public Service

7a

Commission of the State of New York. Richard A.

Beverly, Richard S. Herskovitz, PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Washington, D.C., for Amicus Public Service Commis-

sion of the District of Columbia. Kathleen Makowski,

Deputy Attorney General, DELAWARE PUBLIC

SERVICE COMMISSION, Dover, Delaware, for

Amicus Delaware Public Service Commission. John

Jay Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, Richard F.

Engel, Deputy Attorney General, Lisa J. Morelli,

Deputy Attorney General, Alex Moreau, Deputy

Attorney General, Jennifer S. Hsia, Deputy Attorney

General, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF LAW

AND PUBLIC SAFETY, Trenton, New Jersey, for

Amicus New Jersey Board of Public Utilities. Stefanie

A. Brand, Director, NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF

RATE COUNSEL, Trenton, New Jersey, for Amicus

New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel. Douglas F.

Gansler, Attorney General, Brent A. Bolea, Assistant

Attorney General, Steven M. Talson, Assistant

Attorney General, MARYLAND ENERGY ADMIN-

ISTRATION, Annapolis, Maryland, for Amicus

Maryland Energy Administration. Gene Grace,

AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION,

Washington, D.C., for Amici American Wind Energy

Association and The Mid-Atlantic Renewable Energy

Coalition. Glen Thomas, PJM POWER PROVIDERS

GROUP, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania; John Lee

Shepherd, Jr., Karis Anne Gong, SKADDEN, ARPS,

SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, Washington, D.C.,

for Amicus PJM Power Providers Group. David G.

Tewksbury, Stephanie S. Lim, Ashley C. Parrish,

KING & SPALDING LLP, Washington, D.C., for

Amicus The Electric Power Supply Association.

Edward H. Comer, Vice President, General Counsel

and Corporate Secretary, Henri D. Bartholomot,

8a

Associate General Counsel, Regulatory and Litigation,

EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, Washington, D.C..,

for Amicus Edison Electric Institute.

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

At issue is a Maryland program to subsidize the

participation of a new power plant in the federal

wholesale energy market. Appellees are energy firms

that compete with this new plant in interstate

commerce. They contend that the Maryland scheme is

preempted under the Federal Power Act’s authorizing

provisions, which grant exclusive authority over

interstate rates to the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission. The district court agreed. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

A.

For much of the 20th century, the energy market

was dominated by vertically integrated firms that

produced, transmitted, and delivered power to end-use

customers. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002);

PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d

790, 798 (D. Md. 2013) (opinion below). These firms

were subject to extensive local regulation, though

state power in this respect was limited by the

strictures of the dormant Commerce Clause. See Pub.

Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S.

83, 89 (1927).

The Federal Power Act (FPA), passed in 1935, was

designed in part to fill the regulatory gap created by

the dormant Commerce Clause and cover the then-

nascent field of interstate electricity sales. It vests the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with

9a

authority over the “transmission of electric energy

in interstate commerce” and the “sale of electric

energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” 16

U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). Federal regulation has become

increasingly prominent as the energy market has

shifted away from local monopolies to a system of

interstate competition. See New York, 535 U.S. at 7.

Rather than ensuring the reasonableness of

interstate transactions by directly setting rates, FERC

has chosen instead to achieve its regulatory aims

indirectly by protecting “the integrity of the interstate

energy markets.” N..J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744

F.3d 74, 81 (3d Cir. 2014). To this end, FERC has

authorized the creation of “regional transmission

organizations” to oversee certain multistate markets.

PJM Interconnection, LLC (PJM), superintended by

FERC, administers a large regional market that (as

relevant here) includes Maryland and the District of

Columbia.

PJM operates both energy and capacity markets.

The energy market is essentially a real-time market

that enables PJM to buy and sell electricity to

distributors for delivery within the next hour or 24

hours.

The capacity market is a forward-looking market,

which gives buyers the option to purchase electricity

in the future. In the capacity market, PJM sets a quota

based on how much capacity it predicts will be needed

three years hence and then relies on a Reliability

Pricing Model (RPM) to determine the appropriate

price per unit. Auction participants bid to sell capacity

for a single year, three years in the future. PJM stacks

the bids from lowest to highest and, starting at the

bottom, accepts bids until it has acquired sufficient

capacity to satisfy its quota.

10a

The highest-priced bid that PJM must accept to

meet this quota establishes the market-clearing price.

Every generator who bids at or below this level “clears”

the market and is paid the clearing price, regardless

of the price at which it actually bid. Existing

generators are permitted to bid at zero as “price-

takers,” meaning they agree to sell at whatever the

clearing price turns out to be.

Both the capacity and energy markets are designed

to efficiently allocate supply and demand, a function

which has the collateral benefit of incentivizing the

construction of new power plants when necessary.

Clearing prices occasionally differ based on geo-

graphical subdivisions designed by FERC to stimulate

new construction by signaling that certain regions are

prone to supply shortages. Such price signals are not

the sole mechanism for incentivizing generation,

however. PJM’s new entry price adjustment (NEPA)

guarantees certain new producers a fixed price for

three years to “support .. . the new entrant until

sufficient load growth [i.e., increased demand} would

be expected to” do so. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 128

FERC 4 61,157, at J 101 (2009).

In 2006, FERC instituted a requirement (the

minimum offer price rule, or MOPR) that new

generators in certain circumstances bid at or above a

specified price, fixed according to the agency’s estima-

tion of a generic energy project’s cost. This rule was

designed to prevent the manipulation of clearing

prices through the exercise of buyer market power.

The MOPR originally exempted certain state-

supported generators, however, and permitted them to

bid at zero.

Following a complaint lodged by several

competitors, FERC eliminated the exemption for

lla

state-sanctioned plants. The new rule required such

plants to bid initially at the agency-specified minimum

price unless they could demonstrate that their actual

costs were lower than this default price. FERC held

that this adjustment was necessary to protect the

integrity of its markets against below-cost bids by

subsidized plants that might artificially suppress

clearing prices. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 137

FERC 4 61,145, at { 96 (2011).

As these features suggest, the federal markets are

the product of a finely-wrought scheme that attempts

to achieve a variety of different aims. FERC rules

encourage the construction of new plants and sustain

existing ones. They seek to preclude state distortion of

wholesale prices while preserving general state

authority over generation sources. They satisfy short-

term demand and ensure sufficient long-term supply.

In short, the federal scheme is carefully calibrated to

protect a host of competing interests. It represents a

comprehensive program of regulation that is quite

sensitive to external tampering. .

B.

In 1999, Maryland decided to abandon the vertical

integration model and throw in its lot with the federal

interstate markets. Deregulation was accomplished by

the Electric Customer Choice and Competition Act,

Md. Code Ann., Pub. Utils. § 7-501, et seg., which

divested utilities of their generation resources,

effectively compelling Maryland energy firms to

participate in the federal wholesale markets. See PPL

EnergyPlus, LLC, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 815. The state

believed that these markets would ultimately produce

more efficient and cost-effective service than

traditional monopolies, thus providing state residents

the benefit of lower prices. See In the Matter of

12a

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company’s Proposal,

Order No. 81423, at 36 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, May

2007). Maryland’s decision to participate in the federal

scheme and enjoy its benefits was necessarily

accompanied by a relinquishment of the regulatory

autonomy the state had formerly enjoyed with respect

to traditional utility monopolies.

Maryland soon became concerned, though, that the

RPM was failing to adequately incentivize new

generation. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, 974 F. Supp. 2d at

795. To solve this perceived problem, the Maryland

Public Service Commission (MPSC) solicited proposals

for the construction of a new power plant. The plant

was to be located in the “SWMAAC zone,” an area

comprising part of Maryland and all of D.C., which the

state believed was at heightened risk for reliability

problems. In order to attract offers, the MPSC offered

the successful bidder a fixed, twenty-year revenue

stream secured by contracts for differences (CfDs) that

the state would compel one or more of its local electric

distribution companies (EDCs) to enter. Maryland’s

plan was ultimately formalized in the Generation

Order, issued by MPSC in 2012.

Intervenor-appellant Commercial Power Ventures

Maryland, LLC (CPV) submitted the winning bid and

was awarded the promised CfDs. The CfDs required

CPV to build a plant and sell its energy and capacity

on the federal interstate wholesale markets. If CPV

successfully cleared the market, it would be eligible for

payments from the EDCs amounting to the difference

between CPV’s revenue requirements per unit of

energy and capacity sold (set forth in its winning bid)

and its actual sales receipts. These costs would in turn

be passed on to the EDCs’ retail ratepayers. If CPV’s

receipts exceeded its approved revenue requirements,

13a

it would be obligated to pay the difference to the EDCs.

The CfDs did not require CPV to actually sell any

energy or capacity to the EDCs.

Plaintiffs-appellees are existing power plants in

competition with CPV who allege that the Genera-

tion Order is unconstitutional and has resulted in the

suppression of PJM prices, a reduction in their

revenue from the PJM market, and a distortion of the

price signals that market participants rely on in

determining whether to construct new capacity. After

a six-day bench trial, the district court found the

Generation Order field preempted. It reasoned that

the CfD payments had the effect of setting the

ultimate price that CPV receives for its sales in the

PJM auction, thus intruding on FERC’s exclusive

authority to set interstate wholesale rates. It did not

reach appellees’ conflict preemption claim and rejected

their dormant Commerce Clause claim. This appeal

followed.

IT.

Plaintiffs argue that the Generation Order and the

resulting CfDs are preempted by federal law under the

Supremacy Clause. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. They

ground this contention in two alternative theories:

field preemption and conflict preemption. We address

each in turn.’

1 As a threshold matter, appellants assert that we lack

jurisdiction under the filed rate doctrine. See Appellants’ Br. at

9. This claim is meritless, however, given that a judgment in

plaintiffs’ favor would require this court neither “to invalidate a

filed rate nor to assume a rate would be charged other than the

rate adopted by the federal agency in question.” Pub. Util. Dist.

No. 1 v. IDACORP Inc., 379 F.3d 641, 650 (9th Cir. 2004)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

l4a

A.

Preemption of all varieties is ultimately a question

of congressional intent. Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v.

State Corp. Comm’n, 489 U.S. 493, 509 (1989). Here,

the district court found the Generation Order invalid

under the doctrine of field preemption, which applies

when “Congress has legislated comprehensively to

occupy an entire field of regulation, leaving no room

for the States to supplement federal law.” Id. Actual

conflict between a challenged state enactment and

relevant federal law is unnecessary to a finding of field

preemption; instead, it is the mere fact of intrusion

that offends the Supremacy Clause. See N. Natural

Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 372 U.S. 84, 97-98

(1963). “If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a

given field, any state law falling within that field is

pre-empted.” Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.

238, 248 (1984).

Statutory text and structure provide the most

reliable guideposts in this inquiry. See Medtronic, Inc.

v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996) (“Congress’ intent, of

course, primarily is discerned from the language of the

pre-emption statute and the statutory framework

surrounding it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The FPA’s “declaration of policy” states:

It is declared that the business of

transmitting and selling electric energy for

ultimate distribution to the public is affected

with a public interest, and that Federal

regulation of matters relating to generation to

the extent provided in this subchapter and

subchapter III of this chapter and of that part

of such business which consists of the

transmission of electric energy in interstate

commerce and the sale of such energy at

15a

wholesale in interstate commerce is

necessary in the public interest, such Federal

regulation, however, to extend only to those

matters which are not subject to regulation by

the States.

16 U.S.C. § 824(a); see also id. at § 824(b).

The breadth of this grant of authority is confirmed

by the FPA’s similarly capacious substantive and

remedial provisions. For example, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)

states that:

All rates and charges made, demanded, or

received by any public utility for or in

connection with the transmission or sale of

electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of

the Commission, and all rules and

regulations affecting or pertaining to such

rates or charges shall be just and reasonable,

and any such rate or charge that is not just

and reasonable is hereby declared to be

unlawful.

A wealth of case law confirms FERC’s exclusive

power to regulate wholesale sales of energy in

interstate commerce, including the justness and

reasonableness of the rates charged. “The [FPA] long

has been recognized as a comprehensive scheme of

federal regulation of all wholesales of [energy] in

interstate commerce,” Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline

Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988) (internal quotation

marks omitted), and “FERC’s jurisdiction over

interstate wholesale rates is exclusive,” Appalachian

Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 812 F.2d 898, 902

(4th Cir. 1987); see also New England Power Co. v.

16a

New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 340 (1982).? In this

area, “if FERC has jurisdiction over a subject, the

States cannot have jurisdiction over the same subject.”

Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore,

487 U.S. 354, 377 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the

judgment).

Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected

the proposition that the “scope of [FERC’s] jurisdiction

... is to be determined by a case-by-case analysis of

the impact of state regulation upon the national

interest.” Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg,

476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986) (quoting FPC v. S. Cal.

Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964)) (internal quota-

tion marks omitted). Instead, “Congress meant to

draw a bright line easily ascertained, between state

and federal jurisdiction ... . This was done in the

[FPA] by making [FERC] jurisdiction plenary and

extending it to all wholesale sales in interstate

commerce except those which Congress has made

explicitly subject to regulation by the States.” Jd.

(quoting S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. at 215-16)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The federal scheme thus “leaves no room either for

direct state regulation of the prices of interstate

wholesales of [energy], or for state regulations which

would indirectly achieve the same result.” N. Natural

Gas Co., 372 U.S. at 91 (citation omitted). “Even where

state regulation operates within its own field, it may

? Schneidewind dealt with the Natural Gas Act rather than the

FPA. However, because “the relevant provisions of the two

statutes are in al) material respects substantially identical,” the

Supreme Court has adopted an “established practice of citing

interchangeably decisions interpreting the pertinent sections of

the two statutes.” Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 578 n.7

(1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).

17a

not intrude indirectly on areas of exclusive federal

authority.” Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC, 900 F.2d 269,

274 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks

omitted). As a result, states are barred from relying on

mere formal distinctions in “an attempt” to evade

preemption and “regulate matters within FERC’s

exclusive jurisdiction.” Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 308.

B.

Applying these principles, we conclude that the

Generation Order is field preempted because it

functionally sets the rate that CPV receives for its

sales in the PJM auction.

The CfD payments, which are conditioned on CPV

clearing the federal market, plainly qualify as

compensation for interstate sales at wholesale, not

simply for CPV’s construction of a plant. Furthermore,

the Order ensures—through a system of rebates and

subsidies calculated on the basis of the PJM market

rate—that CPV receives a fixed sum for every unit of

capacity and energy that it clears (up to a certain

ceiling). The scheme thus effectively supplants the

rate generated by the auction with an alternative rate

preferred by the state. See Appalachian Power Co., 812

F.2d at 904 (holding that the agreement at issue did

not “set a rate per se,” but that it nevertheless

“sufficiently resemble[d] a filed rate to come within the

realm of exclusive federal jurisdiction”). The Order

thus compromises the integrity of the federal scheme

and intrudes on FERC’s jurisdiction.

Maryland and CPV argue that the Generation Order

does not actually set a rate because it does not directly

affect the terms of any transaction in the federal

market. Relevantly, appellants contend, the Order

does not fix the rate that PJM pays to CPV for its sales

18a

in the auction; instead, it merely fixes the rate that

CPV receives for such sales. On the basis of this

asymmetry, appellants contend that the CfD

payments represent a separate supply-side subsidy

implemented entirely outside the federal market.

We cannot accept this argument. The case of

Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel.

Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988), is illustrative. There,

FERC ordered a utility to purchase a specified

percentage of a particular generator’s output. Jd. at

363. The utility petitioned Mississippi to approve an

increase in its retail rates to cover the costs imposed

by the order, but the state insisted that it retained the

authority to determine whether the purchases were

prudent before acceding to the request. Jd. at 365-67.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument, ruling

that the state was required to treat the utility’s

FERC-mandated payments as “reasonably incurred

operating expenses for the purpose of setting” the

utility's retail rates. Id. at 370; see also Nantahala

Power & Light Co., 476 U.S. 953 (rejecting a similar

state effort to bar a utility from passing FERC-

mandated wholesale rates through to consumers).

Mississippi's prudence review was preempted because

it denied full effect to the rates set by FERC, even

though it did not seek to tamper with the actual terms

of an interstate transaction.

As the district court recognized, see PPL Energy-

Plus, LLC, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 831, the principles

articulated in Mississippi Power & Light Co. apply

with equal force to this dispute. If states are required

to give full effect to FE2C-mandated wholesale rates

on the demand side of the equation, it stands to reason

that they are also required to do so on the supply side.

Here, the contract price guaranteed by the Generation

19a

Order supersedes the PJM rates that CPV would

otherwise earn—rates established through a FERC-

approved market mechanism. The Order ensures that

CPV receives a fixed price for every unit of energy and

capacity it sells in the PJM auction, regardless of the

market price. The fact that it does not formally upset

the terms of a federal transaction is no defense, since

the functional results are precisely the same. As in the

above-mentioned cases, Maryland has “eroded the

effect of the FERC determination and undermined

FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction.” Appalachian Power

Co., 812 F.2d at 904.

Our conclusion that the Generation Order “seeks to

regulate a field that the [FPA] has occupied also is

supported by the imminent possibility of collision

between” the state and federal regimes. Schneidewind,

485 U.S. at 310. While the potential for collision

between the two schemes is discussed in detail in Part

D, a high probability of conflict tends to suggest that

Congress intended federal authority in a particular

field to be uniform and exclusive. See id. Even if

“collision between the state and federal regulation” in

this case is not “an inevitable consequence,” it is

sufficiently likely to warrant invalidating the Maryland

program “in order to assure the effectuation of the

comprehensive federal regulation ordained by

Congress.” N. Natural Gas Co., 372 U.S. at 92.

C.

Appellants argue that this court should apply a

robust version of the presumption against preemption

to save the Maryland scheme. See, e.g., Intervenor-

Appellant’s Br. at 14. As its name suggests, this

presumption militates against findings of federal

preemption, especially in areas of traditional state

authority. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331

20a

U.S. 218, 230 (1947). However, the presumption “is not

triggered when the State regulates in an area where

there has been a history of significant federal

presence.” United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108

(2000). The presumption “is almost certainly not

applicable here because the federal government

has long regulated wholesale electricity rates.”

IDACORP Inc., 379 F.3d at 648 n.7. Nevertheless,

even were we to apply the presumption, we would find

it overcome by the text and structure of the FPA,

which unambiguously apportions control over

wholesale rates to FERC.

Appellants emphasize the FPA’s decree that FERC

“shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically

provided in this subchapter and subchapter III of this

chapter, over facilities used for the generation of

electric energy.” 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). They contend

that the Generation Order falls on the state side of the

jurisdictional line, since it is designed to ensure that

Maryland enjoys an adequate supply of generation

capacity.

Although states plainly retain substantial latitude

in directly regulating generation facilities, they may

not exercise this authority in a way that impinges on

FERC’s exclusive power to specify wholesale rates. As

the Supreme Court noted in a similar context:

[T]he problem of this case is not as to the

existence or even the scope of a State’s power

to [regulate generation facilities]; the

problem is only whether the Constitution

sanctions the particular means chosen by [the

state] to exercise the conceded power if those

means threaten effectuation of the federal

regulatory scheme.

2la

N. Natural Gas Co., 372 U.S. at 93. Here, Maryland

has chosen to incentivize generation by setting

interstate wholesale rates. This particular choice of

means is impermissible. Wholesale energy prices

“fixed by FERC must be given binding effect by state

authorities” even “in areas subject to state

jurisdiction.” California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc.,

375 F.3d 831, 851 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Nonetheless, it is important to note the limited

scope of our holding, which is addressed to the specific

program at issue. We need not express an opinion on

other state efforts to encourage new generation, such

as direct subsidies or tax rebates, that may or may not

differ in important ways from the Maryland initiative.

It goes without saying that not “every state statute

that has some indirect effect” on wholesale rates is

preempted, Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 308, for “there

can be little if any regulation of production that might

not have at least an incremental effect on the costs of

purchasers in some market,” Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp..,

489 U.S. at 514. In this case, however, the effect of the

Generation Order on matters within FERC’s exclusive

jurisdiction is neither indirect nor incidental. Rather,

the Order strikes at the heart of the agency’s statutory

power to establish rates for the sale of electric energy

in interstate commerce, see 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a), by

adopting terms and prices set by Maryland, not those

sanctioned by FERC.

D.

Appellants’ position is further complicated by the

fact that the principles of field and conflict preemption

in this case are mutually reinforcing. As relevant here,

conflict preemption applies “where under the

circumstances of a particular case, the challenged

22a

state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment

and execution of the full purposes and objectives of

Congress.” Crosby v. Nat Foreign Trade Council, 530

U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted). “What is a sufficient obstacle is a

matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the

federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose

and intended effects.” Id. “A state law may pose an

obstacle to federal purposes by interfering with the

accomplishment of Congress’s actual objectives, or by

interfering with the methods that Congress selected

for meeting those legislative goals.” College Loan

Corp. v. SLM Corp., 396 F.3d 588, 596 (4th Cir. 2005)

(emphasis omitted).

In a system of “interlocking” jurisdiction, such as

that created by the FPA, “[iJt is inevitable that

jurisdictional tensions will arise’—even if each

sovereign formally remains within the confines of its

“assigned sphere.” Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp., 489 U.S.

at 506, 515 & n.12 (internal quotation marks and

alteration omitted). “Thus, conflict-pre-emption anal-

ysis must be applied sensitively in this area, so as to

prevent the diminution of the role Congress reserved

to the States while at the same time preserving the

federal role.” Id. at 515. Here, “the impact of state

regulation of production on matters within federal

control is so extensive and disruptive of’ the PJM

markets that preemption is appropriate. Jd. at 517-18.

As an initial matter, the Generation Order has the

potential to seriously distort the PJM auction’s price

signals, thus “interferling] with the method by which

the federal statute was designed to reach its goals.”

IDACORP Inc., 379 F.3d at 650. PJM’s price signals

are intended to promote a variety of objectives,

including incentivizing new generation sources.

23a

See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 132 FERC § 61,173, at

61,870 (2010); see also PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, 974 F.

Supp. 2d at 813. Market participants necessarily rely

on these signals in determining whether to construct

new capacity or expand existing resources. The signals

appear to be serving their purpose; according to

FERC, the evidence “suggests that RPM has in fact

succeeded in securing sufficient capacity to meet

reliability requirements for the PJM region.” PJM

Interconnection, LLC, 137 FERC J¥ 61,145, at 9 3

(2011).

Maryland’s initiative disrupts this scheme by

substituting the state’s preferred incentive structure

for that approved by FERC. See PPL EnergyPlus, LLC

v. Hanna, No. 11-745, 2013 WL 5603896, at *36

(D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2013) (describing the distorting

impact of a similar New Jersey program on the

business decisions of private participants in the PJM

auction). Two features of the Order render its likely

effect on federal markets particularly problematic.

First, as noted, the CfDs are structured to actually set

the price received at wholesale. They therefore directly

conflict with the auction rates approved by FERC.

Second, the duration of the subsidy—twenty years—is

substantial.

The Order is preempted for the further reason that

it conflicts with NEPA, which represents an exception

to PJM’s otherwise steadfast commitment to a uniform

market clearing price. In order to stimulate plant

construction, NEPA carves out a three-year period

during which certain new generators are eligible to

receive a fixed price for the capacity they sell in the

PJM markets. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 128

FERC { 61,157, at { 92 (2009). CPV petitioned FERC

to extend the NEPA period to ten years on the grounds

24a

that the three-year period was insufficient to achieve

its objective. Jd. at { 93. FERC rejected CPV’s request,

stating that “[b]oth new entry and retention of existing

efficient capacity are necessary to ensure reliability

and both should receive the same price so that the

price signals are not skewed in favor of new entry.” Jd.

at { 102.

The Generation Order represents an effort by the

state to directly override this explicit policy choice. As

a functional matter, the CfDs extend the NEPA period

for CPV to twenty years, a duration vastly exceeding

the current NEPA term and double the term that CPV

unsuccessfully requested FERC to institute. Maryland

has sought to achieve through the backdoor of its own

regulatory process what it could not achieve through

the front door of FERC proceedings. Circumventing

and displacing federal rules in this fashion is not

permissible.

Appellants assert that no conflict is present because

FERC explicitly accommodated—via the MOPR—the

participation of subsidized plants in its auction. See,

e.g., Intervenor-Appellant’s Reply Br. at 23. The fact

that FERC was forced to mitigate the Generation

Order’s distorting effects using the MOPR, however,

tends to confirm rather than refute the existence of a

conflict. Furthermore, FERC’s own comments on the

subject belie appellants’ claim that the agency has

affirmatively approved the Generation Order. See

PJM Interconnection, LLC, 137 FERC at 7 3 (“Our

intent is not to pass judgment on state and local

policies and objectives with regard to the development

of new capacity resources ... .”).

As was the case with our field preemption holding,

our conflict preemption ruling is narrow and focused

upon the program before us. Obviously, not every state

25a

regulation that incidentally affects federal markets is

preempted. Such an outcome “would thoroughly

undermine precisely the division of the regulatory

field that Congress went to so much trouble to

establish .. . , and would render Congress’ specific

grant of power to the States to regulate production

virtually meaningless.” Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp., 489

U.S. at 515. The Generation Order, however, is simply

a bridge too far. It presents a direct and transparent

impediment to the functioning of the PJM markets,

and is therefore preempted.®

ITI.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold the Generation

Order preempted under federal law and affirm the

judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED

* Our conclusion that the Generation Order is preempted

renders it unnecessary for us to reach plaintiffs’ dormant

Commerce Clause arguments, which were rejected by the district

court. See Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 311 (“Because we have

concluded that Act 144 is pre-empted by the NGA, we need not

decide whether, absent federal occupation of the field, Act 144

violates the Commerce Clause.”).

26a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[Filed June 2, 2014)

No. 13-2419 (L)

(1:12-cv-01286-MJG)

PPL ENERGYPLUS, LLC; PPL BRUNNER ISLAND, LLC;

PPL HOLTWoopD, LLC; PPL MARTINS CREEK, LLC;

PPL Montour, LLC; PPL SUSQUEHANNA, LLC;

LOWER MOUNT BETHEL ENERGY, LLC; PPL

NEW JERSEY SOLAR, LLC; PPL NEW JERSEY BIOGAS,

LLC; PPL RENEWABLE ENERGY, LLC; PSEG POWER

LLC; ESSENTIAL POWER, LLC,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

Vv.

DOUGLAS R.M. NAZARIAN; HAROLD WILLIAMS;

LAWRENCE BRENNER; KELLY SPEAKES-BACKMAN;

KEVIN HUGHES,

Defendants - Appellants,

and

CPV MARYLAND, LLC,

Defendant.

AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL

RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION; NRG

ENERGY INC.; MARYLAND OFFICE OF PEOPLE'S

COUNSEL; CONNECTICUT PUBLIC UTILITIES

REGULATORY AUTHORITY; CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT

27a

OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;

GEORGE JEPSEN, Attorney General for the State of

Connecticut; CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF CONSUMER

COUNSEL; NEW ENGLAND CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSIONERS, INC.; MAINE PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSION; RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSION; VERMONT PUBLIC SERVICE

BOARD; VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE;

CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION; PUBLIC

SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

(NYPSC); PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; DELAWARE PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION; NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC

UTILITIES; NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF RATE COUNSEL;

MARYLAND ENERGY ADMINISTRATION; AMERICAN WIND

ENERGY ASSOCIATION; THE MID-ATLANTIC

RENEWABLE ENERGY COALITION,

Amici Supporting Appellants,

PJM POWER PROVIDERS GROUP; ELECTRIC POWER

SUPPLY ASSOCIATION; EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,

Amici Supporting Appellees.

No. 13-2424

(1:12-cv-01286-MJG)

PPL ENERGYPLUS, LLC; PPL BRUNNER ISLAND, LLC;

PPL HOLTwoop, LLC; PPL MARTINS CREEK, LLC;

PPL Montour, LLC; PPL SUSQUEHANNA, LLC;

LOWER MOUNT BETHEL ENERGY, LLC;

PPL NEW JERSEY SOLAR, LLC; PPL NEW JERSEY

BioGAs, LLC; PPL RENEWABLE ENERGY, LLC; PSEG

POWER LLC; ESSENTIAL POWER, LLC,

Plaintiffs Appellees,

We

28a

CPV MARYLAND, LLC,

Defendant Appellant,

and

DOUGLAS R.M. NAZARIAN; HAROLD WILLIAMS;

LAWRENCE BRENNER; KELLY SPEAKES-BACKMAN;

KEVIN HUGHES,

Defendants.

AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL

RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION;

NRG ENERGY INC.; MARYLAND OFFICE OF PEOPLE’S

COUNSEL; CONNECTICUT PUBLIC UTILITIES

REGULATORY AUTHORITY; CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT

OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;

GEORGE JEPSEN, Attorney General for the State of

Connecticut; CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF CONSUMER

COUNSEL; NEW ENGLAND CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSIONERS, INC.; MAINE PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSION; RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSION; VERMONT PUBLIC SERVICE

BOARD; VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE;

CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION; PUBLIC

SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

(NYPSC); PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; DELAWARE PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION; NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC

UTILITIES; NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF RATE COUNSEL;

MARYLAND ENERGY ADMINISTRATION; AMERICAN

WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION; THE MID-ATLANTIC

RENEWABLE ENERGY COALITION,

Amici Supporting Appellant,

29a

PJM POWER PROVIDERS GROUP; ELECTRIC POWER

SUPPLY ASSOCIATION; EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,

Amici Supporting Appellees.

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the decision of this court, the

judgment of the district court is affirmed.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this

court’s mandate in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 41.

(s/ PATRICIA S. CONNOR, CLERK

30a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[Filed June 30, 2014]

No. 13-2419 (L)

(1:12-cv-01286-MJG)

PPL ENERGYPLUS, LLC; PPL BRUNNER ISLAND, LLC;

PPL HOLTWooD, LLC; PPL MARTINS CREEK, LLC;

PPL MontTouR, LLC; PPL SUSQUEHANNA, LLC;

LOWER MOUNT BETHEL ENERGY, LLC; PPL

NEW JERSEY SOLAR, LLC; PPL NEw JERSEY BIOGAS,

LLC; PPL RENEWABLE ENERGY, LLC; PSEG POWER

LLC; ESSENTIAL POWER, LLC,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

Vv.

DOUGLAS R.M. NAZARIAN; HAROLD WILLIAMS;

LAWRENCE BRENNER; KELLY SPEAKES-BACKMAN;

KEVIN HUGHES,

Defendants - Appellants,

and

CPV MARYLAND, LLC,

Defendant.

AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL

RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION; NRG

ENERGY INC.; MARYLAND OFFICE OF PEOPLE’S

COUNSEL; CONNECTICUT PUBLIC UTILITIES

REGULATORY AUTHORITY; CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT

3la

OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;

GEORGE JEPSEN, Attorney General for the State of

Connecticut; CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF CONSUMER

COUNSEL; NEW ENGLAND CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSIONERS, INC.; MAINE PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSION; RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSION; VERMONT PUBLIC SERVICE

BOARD; VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE;

CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION; PUBLIC

SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

(NYPSC); PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; DELAWARE PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION; NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC

UTILITIES; NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF RATE COUNSEL;

MARYLAND ENERGY ADMINISTRATION; AMERICAN WIND

ENERGY ASSOCIATION; THE MID-ATLANTIC

RENEWABLE ENERGY COALITION,

Amici Supporting Appellants,

PJM POWER PROVIDERS GROUP; ELECTRIC POWER

SUPPLY ASSOCIATION; EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,

Amici Supporting Appellees.

No. 13-2424

(1:12-cv-01286-MJG)

PPL ENERGYPLUS, LLC; PPL BRUNNER ISLAND, LLC;

PPL HoLtwoop, LLC; PPL MARTINS CREEK, LLC;

PPL Montour, LLC; PPL SUSQUEHANNA, LLC;

LOWER MOUNT BETHEL ENERGY, LLC;

PPL NEW JERSEY SOLAR, LLC; PPL NEW JERSEY

BioGcas, LLC; PPL RENEWABLE ENERGY, LLC; PSEG

POWER LLC; ESSENTIAL POWER, LLC,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

V.

32a

CPV MARYLAND, LLC,

Defendant Appellant,

and

DOUGLAS R.M. NAZARIAN; HAROLD WILLIAMS;

LAWRENCE BRENNER; KELLY SPEAKES-BACKMAN;

KEVIN HUGHES,

Defendants.

AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL

RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION;

NRG ENERGY INC.; MARYLAND OFFICE OF PEOPLE’S

COUNSEL; CONNECTICUT PUBLIC UTILITIES

REGULATORY AUTHORITY; CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT

OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;

GEORGE JEPSEN, Attorney General for the State of

Connecticut; CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF CONSUMER

COUNSEL; NEW ENGLAND CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSIONERS, INC.; MAINE PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSION; RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC

UTILITIES COMMISSION; VERMONT PUBLIC SERVICE

BOARD; VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE;

CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION; PUBLIC

SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

(NYPSC); PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; DELAWARE PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION; NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC

UTILITIES; NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF RATE COUNSEL;

MARYLAND ENERGY ADMINISTRATION; AMERICAN

WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION; THE MID-ATLANTIC

RENEWABLE ENERGY COALITION,

Amici Supporting Appellant,

33a

PJM POWER PROVIDERS GROUP; ELECTRIC POWER

SUPPLY ASSOCIATION; EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,

Amici Supporting Appellees.

ORDER

The court denies the petitions for rehearing and

rehearing en banc. No judge requested a poll under

Fed. R. App. P. 35 on the petitions for rehearing en

banc.

Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge

Wilkinson, Judge Keenan, and Judge Diaz.

For the Court

e/ Patricia S.C Cler}

34a

APPENDIX D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Civil Action No. MJG-12-1286

PPL ENERGYPLUS, LLC, et al.

Plaintiffs

vs.

DOUGLAS R. M. NAZARIAN, in his official capacity

as Chairman of the Maryland Public Service

Commission, et al.

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The Court has heard the evidence, reviewed the

exhibits, considered the materials submitted by the

parties, and had the benefit of the arguments of

counsel.

The Court now issues this Memorandum of Decision

as its findings of fact and conclusions of law in

compliance with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The Court finds the facts stated

herein based upon its evaluation of the evidence,

including the credibility of witnesses, and the

inferences that the Court has found reasonable to

draw from the evidence.

I. INTRODUCTION

Prior to 1999, Maryland utilized a vertically

integrated model of electric energy regulation. A single

electric utility (such as BGE or Pepco) owned the

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facilities that produced and delivered electricity to the

users in its exclusive territory. Maryland electric

power users purchased electricity from the one utility

that served the territory in which they were located.

The Maryland Public Service Commission (“PSC”)

ultimately determined whether additional generation

resources were needed in Maryland and provided for

the financing of those resources through the approval

of rate increases.

In 1999, the Maryland General Assembly passed the

Electric Customer Choice and Competition Act (the

“1999 Act”), which restructured, or deregulated,

Maryland’s electric energy market. The 1999 Act

separated the Maryland “utilities’ generating assets

from their distribution and transmission functions” by

transferring ownership of those generation assets to

other companies that owned and operated the power

plants. P.391 (2007 PSC Interim Report) at 10.

The PSC is empowered by the State of Maryland

to assure “safe, adequate, reasonable, and proper

[electric] service.” Md. Code Ann., Pub. Util. § 5-

101(a). However, Maryland-based utilities, which now

no longer own generating facilities, must purchase

energy on federally regulated wholesale markets.

Thus, the utilities and, correspondingly, Maryland

ratepayers are directly affected by the wholesale

prices determined on the federally regulated whole-

sale markets.

In mid-2000, the PSC and others began to voice

concerns over the operations of Maryland’s electricity

markets, the post-restructuring consumer electricity

rates, and the existence of adequate generation

resources to serve the energy needs of Maryland

ratepayers. In 2007, the PSC filed a report with the

General Assembly, stating that the federally regulated

36a

wholesale markets had not responded to Maryland’s

needs and opining that those markets were unlikely to

respond in the immediate future to the state’s

“looming capacity shortage.” P.391 (2007 PSC Interim

Report) at 1. The PSC concluded that it should require

the Maryland utilities to enter into long-term

contracts to induce the construction of new electric

generation facilities in Maryland.

Ultimately, on April 12, 2012, the PSC issued the

Generation Order at issue,’ directing Baltimore Gas

and Electric Company (“BGE”), Potomac Electric

Power Company (“Pepco”), and Delmarva Power &

Light Company (“Delmarva”) to enter into a Contract

for Differences (“CfD”) with CPV Maryland, LLC

(“CPV”). In essence, the CfD provided that regardless

of the price set by the federally regulated wholesale

market, the Maryland utilities would assure that CPV

received a guaranteed price fixed by a contractual

formula.? The result was that CPV had a secure

income stream available to finance construction of a

generating facility in a designated area within

Maryland.*

' PSC Order No. 84815. See P.44.

? Ultimately, the utilities’ customers.

3 As discussed herein, there was a theoretical possibility (but a

practical impossibility) that the facility could be constructed in

the District of Columbia.

37a

Plaintiffs* present claims in three Counts:

Count! Violation of the Supremacy

Clause, U.S. Constitution, art. VI,

cl.2;

Count II Violation of the Commerce Clause,

U.S. Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl.3;

and

Count III Vic'ation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

As discussed at length herein, the Court holds that

Plaintiffs have established their claim that the

Generation Order violates the Supremacy Clause of

the United States Constitution by virtue of field

preemption® but does not violate the dormant

Commerce Clause.®

and Essential Power, LLC.

The named Defendants are the Commissioners of the PSC,

sued in their official capacities, Douglas R. M. Nazarian, Harold

Williams, Lawrence Brenner, Kelly Speakes-Backman, and

Kevin Hughes. On January 8, 2013, after Plaintiffs filed the

instant suit, Douglas R. M. Nazarian was appointed to the

Maryland Court of Special Appeals.

® The establishment of Plaintiffs’ field preemption claim

renders moot the question of whether Plaintiffs also established

their Supremacy Clause conflict preemption claim.

* The Court also holds that even if not formally abandoned,

Plaintiffs’ 28 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is not viable.

38a

Il. BACKGROUND

A. Electric Power Grids In A Nutshell

As once said in reference to the Rule in Shelley’s

case, it is one thing to put the subject of electric power

grids in a nutshell, but impossible to keep it there.’

Nevertheless, even an oversimplified, incomplete, and

imprecise introduction may be useful to those totally

unfamiliar with electric power grids.

To start, think of a power grid as analogous to a

network of pipes utilized to transport water from

various pumping stations, which take water from

natural sources (lake, river, etc.), to reservoirs. The

water in the reservoirs is then, as demanded by a local

utility, transported by pipes in the grid to the local

utility for distribution to the utility’s customers.

However, for a closer analogy, think of the same grid

without any reservoirs. When an amount of water is

placed into the grid by a pumping station, an equal

amount must flow out of the grid to a local utility.

Thus, the grid operator must insure that, at all times,

the supply (water put into the grid by the pumping

stations) equals the demand (water sent out of the grid

to the local utilities). This balance is maintained by

affecting the supply through adjustments of the price

paid to pumping station suppliers, payments to local

utilities (or customers) to reduce their usage,

’ Professor Barton W. Leach wrote that when “Lord Thurlow

undertook to put the Rule in Shelley's Case in a nutshell,” Lord

Macnaghten said, “it is one thing to put a case like Shelley’s in a

nutshell and another thing to keep it there.” W. Barton Leach,

Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638, 638 n.al (1938)

(quoting Van Grutten v. Foxwell, [1897] A. C. 658, 671).

39a

adjustments to the price paid by the local utilities for

the water they demand, etc.

B. Federal Regulation of Electric Energy

1. The Federal Power Act and FERC

In 1927, the United States Supreme Court held that

the dormant Commerce Clause prohibited states from

regulating the rates for wholesale power sales between

utilities in different states. The Court reasoned that,

unlike the regulation of the rates charged to local

consumers, regulation of interstate rates places “a

direct burden upon interstate commerce, from which

the state is restrained by the force of the commerce

clause.” Pub. Utils. Comm’n of RI. v. Attleboro Steam

& Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89 (1927).*

In response to the Attleboro decision, Congress

enacted the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) in 1935, which

“closed the ‘Attleboro gap’ by authorizing federal

regulation of interstate, wholesale sales of elec-

tricity—the precise subject matter beyond the

jurisdiction of the States in Attleboro.” New York v.

F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 20 (2002). Specifically, the FPA

gave the Federal Power Commission, the predecessor

agency to FERC, jurisdiction over the regulation of

interstate wholesale sales of electricity and of

interstate transmissions of electric energy. See 16

U.S.C. § 824(a); New York, 535 U.S. at 20-21.

The FPA vested FERC with the responsibility for

setting the “rates and charges” of wholesale electric

energy and for ensuring that those rates are “just and

® See Quill Corp. v. N.D. By & Through Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298

(1992) (recognizing abrogation of Attleboro on other grounds).

* The “sale of electric energy at wholesale’ § means a sale of

electric energy to any person for resale.” 16 U.S.C. § 824(d).

40a

reasonable.” Id. § 824d(a); Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub.

Serv. Comm'n, 539 U.S. 39, 47-48 (2003). In essence,

FERC exercises this authority through an intricate

regulatory framework whereby transactions for the

wholesale sale of electricity are filed with FERC (on

either an individual basis or, more often, under a

market-based rate tariff). FERC determines on its own

initiative, or in response to a request by some party,

whether such rates are “just and reasonable” and not

unduly preferential, discriminatory, or disadvanta-

geous to any party.’® See 16 U.S.C. § 824e; id. § 824d.

As to the physical facilities that generate electric

energy, the FPA gave FERC jurisdiction over all

facilities for [the] transmission or sale of electric

energy” in interstate commerce. Jd. § 824(b)\(1). But,

“except as specifically provided in this subchapter

and subchapter III of this chapter,” FERC has no

jurisdiction over facilities used for the generation of

electric energy or over facilities used in local

distribution or only for the transmission of electric

energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities for the

transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by

the transmitter.” Jd.

The witnesses generally agreed that FERC has

no authority or power to order directly the siting,

building, or construction of a generation facility

generally or in any particular location within a state.

Tr. Mar. 5 (PM) at 82:4-21 (Nazarian); Tr. Mar. 6 (AM)

at 44:1-21, 46:12-47:7 (Massey); Tr. Mar. 7 (AM) at

© For example, FERC regulations require utilities with

market-based rate authority to file an Electronic Quarterly

Report (“EQR”) every quarter summarizing the contractual terms

and conditions in agreements subject to the jurisdiction of FERC,

including agreements for the wholesale sales of capacity and

energy. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.10b.

4la

32:10-21 (Wodyka). As discussed infra, that authority

is retained by the states under the FPA.

The FPA created an exclusive area of federal

jurisdiction in the electric energy realm regarding the

regulation of interstate wholesale energy sales and

transmission, including the entities that engage in

such acts. The FPA also retained a sphere of state

jurisdiction with respect to interstate retail sales,

distribution of electric energy, and the construction of

local generation facilities. See New York, 535 U.S. at

22-23 (explaining the legislative history [of the FPA)

is replete with statements describing Congress’ intent

to preserve state jurisdiction over local facilities”).'' As

summarized by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit:

Jurisdiction over this sale and delivery of

electricity is split between the federal

government and the states on the basis of the

type of service being provided and the nature

of the energy sale . . . . Thus transmission

occurs pursuant to FERC-approved tariffs;

local distribution occurs under rates set by

state’s public service commission.

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 452 F.3d

822, 824 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

4 Also recognizing the role of the states, the Energy Policy Act

of 2005, which gave FERC jurisdiction over reliability standards

for the bulk-power system, states “[njothing in this section shal!

be construed to preempt any authority of any State to take action

to ensure the safety, adequacy, and reliability of electric service

within that State, as long as such action is not inconsistent with

any reliability standard.” 16 U.S.C. § 8240(iX3).

42a

2. Development of Wholesale Energy Markets

a. Traditional Vertically Integrated Utilities

When Congress enacted the FPA, networks of high-

voltage, long-distance transmission lines which today

crisscross the United States” simply did not exist.” See

Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. F.E.R.C.,

225 F.3d 667, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff'd sub nom. New

York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1 (2002). The absence of this

infrastructure likely was a factor in the development

of the vertically integrated structure of electric

utilities that generally predominated in the United

States until the 1990’s. The term “vertically integrated

electric utilities” refers to “generation, transmission,

and distribution facilities [which are] owned by a

single entity and sold as part of a bundled service

(delivered electric energy) to wholesale and retail

customers.” Promoting Wholesale Competition Through

Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Ser-

vices by Public Utilities, Recovery of Stranded Costs

by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities;

Proposed Rulemaking and Supplemental Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,662, 17,668

(Apr. 7, 1995) (hereinafter Open Access). Under the

vertically integrated structure:

Most electric utilities built their own power

plants and transmission systems, entered

into interconnection and _ coordination

arrangements with neighboring utilities, and

entered into long-term contracts to make

wholesale requirements sales (bundled sales

of generation and transmission) to municipal,

cooperative, and other investor-owned utili-

ties (I0Us) connected to each utility’s

43a

transmission system. Each system covered

limited service areas.

Id.

A utility operating in the vertically integrated

structure typically generates electricity with power

plants it owns; transmits the electricity from those

power plants to its service territory, usually defined by

the state of location;’* and distributes that electricity

to end-use customers within its service territory

through local distribution networks, poles, and wires

that the utility owns and maintains. See Tr. Mar. 4

(AM) at 121:14-122:21 (Alessandrini); Tr. Mar. 4 (PM)

at 8:23-10:20 (Carretta); Tr. Mar. 6 (AM) at 11:8-20

(Massey).

Where utilities operated in a vertical integration

structure, states often controlled the fiscal feasibility

of a utility's plans to expand its existing generation

facilities or to construct new power plants through a

regulatory framework. Thus, state regulators could

decide whether to allow an increase in the retail rate

charged by the utility to end-use customers sufficient

to permit the utility to recover the cost of financing the

construction of new generation facilities or the

development of existing facilities. See Tr. Mar. 4 (AM)

at 121:14-122:25 (Alessandrini). If the state approved

an adequate increase in retail rates, then the utility

acquired a financial guarantee that assisted the utility

in raising capital for its generation projects. See id.

When most electric utilities were vertically

integrated one-stop shops with monopolies over

4 Typically, a utility was granted a franchise by the state

government to provide electric service to all consumers located

‘within a defined territory or service territory. See Tr. Mar. 5 (AM)

at 42:13-44:11 (Nazarian).

44a

designated service territories, the electric energy

industry operated predominately as a retail market

subject to state regulation without significant

intervention from the federal government. See Tr.

Mar. 4 (AM) at 121:14-122:26 (Alessandrini). In this

scenario, the “wholesale market” regulated by FERC

consisted primarily of transactions between vertically

integrated utilities whose service territories were

physically situated near each other. Tr. Mar. 6 (AM)

13:3-16 (Massey).

b. FERC’s Fostering of Wholesale Energy

Markets

In the 1970’s and 1980’s, significant “[t]echnological

improvements . . . made feasible the transmission of

electric power over long distances at high voltages.”

See Transmission Access, 225 F.3d at 681 (D.C. Cir.

2000).In response to, among other things, advance-

ments in technology, the wholesale electricity market

began to blossom producing, inter alia, independent

and non-utility owned power plants capable of

providing competitively priced generation to the

wholesale market. See id. With a burgeoning whole-

sale market came more federal legislation and

regulation. For instance, in 1978 Congress passed the

Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”),

which called for “a program to improve the wholesale

distribution of electric energy” and the reliability of

electric service.” 16 U.S.C. § 2601(2). However, the

traditional vertically integrated utilities that owned

transmission lines were inhibiting the development of

this wholesale electricity market by “denyling]

alternative producers access to their transmission

'S Such as the market was in those days.

45a

lines on competitive terms and _ conditions.”

Transmission Access, 225 F.3d at 682.

Congress and FERC took action during the 1990’s to

facilitate the development of wholesale power markets

by “opening up transmission services” and reducing

the ability of vertically integrated public utilities to

deny customers access to competitively priced electric

generation. See Open Access, 60 Fed. Reg. at 17,663-

64. “[I]n 1992, Congress enacted the Energy Policy

Act, which amended sections 211 and 212 of the FPA

to authorize FERC to order utilities to ‘wheel’ power—

i.e., transmit power for wholesale sellers of power over

the utilities’ transmission lines—on a case-by-case

basis.” Transmission Access, 225 F.3d at 682 (citing

Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 721-

22, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j-k)

(giving non-utility generators the right to have FERC

order transmission-owning utilities to interconnect

and obtain access to the local utilities’ delivery

systems)).'* In 1996, FERC issued Order No. 888,

which “ordered the national deregulation of electricity

transmission services” and required all public utilities

that owned or controlled transmission facilities to

provide open access to their transmission lines on

the same basis on which they provide access to

themselves. See Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v.

4 Additionally, in 2005 Congress passed the Energy Policy Act

of 2005, which made FERC responsible for system reliability

standards for the bulk-power system. See Energy Policy Act of

2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1211(a), 119 Stat. 594, 941 (codified

at 16 U.S.C. § 8240); Mandatory Reliability Standards for the

Bulk-Power System, 72 Fed. Reg. 16,416 (Apr. 4, 2007). Prior to

enactment of the Energy Policy Act, the nation’s bulk-power

system depended on participants’ voluntary compliance with

industry standards.” Alcoa Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 564 F.3d 1342, 1344

(D.C. Cir. 2009).

46a

F.E.R.C., 616 F.3d 520, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

In a further effort to facilitate the development of

competitive wholesale power markets and to “increase

the efficiency of the electric transmission systems,”

FERC “strongly encouraged the [electric power]

industry to organize itself into Regional Transmission

Organizations” (“RTOs”). See generally Delmarva

Power & Light Co., 106 FERC { 61,290, 62,080 (2004);

Tr. Mar. 6 (AM) at 48:7-11 (Massey). RTOs are

voluntarily formed independent entities that have

“consolidateled] control of all transmission services in

a particular region” and that provide a platform for

regional wholesale power markets. See Braintree Elec.

Light Dep’t v. F.E.R.C., 550 F.3d 6, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2008);

Tr. Mar. 6 (AM) 14:20-15:8, 48:3-11 (Massey); Tr. Mar.

6 (PM) at 5:6-6:1 (Wodyka). FERC explained that such

consolidation of control in particular regions was

needed because “traditional management of the

transmission grid” by vertically integrated electric

utilities was inadequate to support the efficient and

reliable operation that is needed for the continued

development of competitive electricity markets.”

Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg.

810, 811 (Jan. 6, 2000). According to FERC, despite

Order No. 888, opportunities still existed “for

transmission owners to unduly discriminate in the

operation of their transmission systems so as to favor

their own or their affiliates’ power marketing

activities,” which could in turn impede competitive

electricity markets. Jd. at 817.

In 2000, FERC issued Order No. 2000 requiring

“utilities that own, operate, or control interstate

transmission facilities either to file a proposal to

participate in an RTO or to describe their efforts

47a

toward joining one.” Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n uv.

F.E.R.C., 454 F.3d 278, 280 (D.C. Cir. 2006); 18 C.F.R.

§ 35.34(a). FERC’s stated purpose entailed “promoting

efficiency and reliability in the operation and planning

of the electric transmission grid and ensuring non-

discrimination in the provision of electric transmission

services.” 18 C.F.R. § 35.34(a). FERC defined the

required functions of any formed RTO as including,

inter alia: (1) “employ[ing) a transmission pricing

system that will promote efficient use and expansion

of transmission and generation facilities” and

(2) “ensur[ing] the development and operation of

market mechanisms to manage transmission conges-

tion.” Id. § 35.34(k) (1)-(2). An RTO “manage[s] all the

accounting for the energy that’s put in and taken out

of the transmission system it oversees, “operate[s] all

the different pricing and biding mechanisms that

fall under those wholesale market structures,” and

operates and plans the regional transmission system

within its area. Tr. Mar. 5 (AM) at 126:20-127:18

(Nazarian).

To constitute an RTO, an entity has to satisfy

certain requirements and have its proposal approved

by FERC. A FERC-approved RTO operates pursuant

to tariffs filed with, and approved by, FERC. See Tr.

Mar. 5 (AM) at 126:22-127:6 (Nazarian). Presently,

“([RTOs] exist in about two-thirds of the country” and

are thus responsible for “about two-thirds of the load”

or power consumption in the United States. Tr. Mar. 6

(AM) at 19:21-20:16 (Massey). As relevant hereto, all

of Maryland is part of an RTO formed in 2002,

48a

operated and administered by PJM Interconnected,

LLC”.

C. PJM Interconnected, LLC (“PJM”)

After issuance of Order No. 2000, PJM organized

itself into an RTO, receiving full RTO status from

FERC in December 2002. Although PJM operates as

an RTO under the control of FERC, PJM is a private

entity with 750 members or stakeholders, including

“parties that own facilities, or buy or sell power in the

PJM region.” Tr. Mar. 6 (PM) at 11:16-12:3 (Wodyka);

see also P.606 (PSC Order No. 81423) at 42. PJM’s

members include “power generators, transmission

owners, distributors, marketers, and large consum-

ers.” P.606 (PSC Order No. 81423) at 42. States are not

members or stakeholders of PJM. See id.

The PJM area encompasses the District of Columbia

and all or parts of 13 states (collectively the “PJM

region”).'"° The PJM region, i.e., PJM’s geographic

footprint, consists of about 18 interconnected trans-

mission zones. A transmission zone is the area or

territory in which a particular utility, such as

Baltimore Gas & Electric (“BGE”), owns transmission

lines or resources. A transmission zone generally

mirrors the utilitys historical service territory,

discussed supra. See Pls.’ Dem. 16. The PJM region

‘© PJM (Pennsylvania, Jersey, Maryland) traces its origins

back to 1927 when three traditional utilities in Pennsylvania,

New Jersey, and Maryland formed a power pool. See Tr. Mar. 6

(PM) at 10:9-23, 17:3-9 (Wodyka).

'© As part of organizing into an RTO, the transmission

resources in the PJM region were unified through the voluntary

agreement of the owner-utilities of those resources. Logistically,

the owner-utilities “transferred operational control of their

transmission lines to the PJM Interconnection,” but still retained

equity ownership. Tr. Mar. 6 (AM) at 14:24-15:8 (Massey).

49a

has an aggregate population of approximately 60

million people, covers 214,000 square miles, and

includes 1,365 electric generators that are connected

to PJM’s regional transmission system. P.516 (PJM—

At a Glance) at 3; Pls.’ Dem. 16.

As an RTO:

PJM is responsible for the coordination and

operation of the electric power system across

the entire PJM footprint. They also then

design and administer competitive markets

to support the operations and activities

within the, again, PJM RTO region. And

finally they do .. . resource adequacy

planning to ensure that appropriate genera-

tion and transmission resources are available

to serve the load requirements across the

PJM region. And they do this in a way that

they try to ensure the safety and reliability of

all the activities that occur in the PJM

footprint.

Tr. Mar. 6 (PM) at 10:25-11:10 (Wodyka).

As a FERC-approved RTO, PJM carries out its

responsibilities under FERC’s jurisdiction and pursu-

ant to FERC-approved tariffs, including the Open

Access Transmission Tariff (the “PJM Tariff’), which

governs broadly how PJM operates the regional

transmission system in the PJM region. P.516 (PJM—

At a Glance) at 4. Additionally, PJM executes its

duties through agreements with other parties that are

filed with, and approved by, FERC, including the

Transmission Owners Agreement (“TOA”), the

Reliability Assurance Agreement (“RAA”), and the

50a

Operating Agreement.'’ Tr. Mar. 6 (PM) at 25:5-19

(Wodyka); P.516 (PJM—At a Glance) at 4.

1. PJM’s Operation of the Bulk-Power System

and Transmission Planning

One aspect of PJM’s duties as an RTO is the day-to-

day operation and maintenance of the bulk electric

power system to ensure reliability of electricity

delivery across the [PJM] region.” Tr. Mar. 4 (AM) at

37:20-38:16 (Alessandrini). Thus, PJM operates and

maintains a regional interconnected transmission

system and power grid that spans the PJM footprint,

enabling electric energy to be dispatched and delivered

to various points across the PJM region. See PJM

Interconnection, LLC, 132 FERC 4 61,173, 61,869-70

(2010); see also Tr. Mar. 5 (AM) at 127:7-18 (Nazarian).

PJM can be thought of as analogous to an “air traffic

controller[] of the power grid” because it “monitors and

coordinates . . . electric generators, . . . high-voltage

transmission lines, . . . substations,” and the flow of

electric energy therein on a day-to-day basis. P.516

(PJM—At a Glance) at 1.

PJM is responsible for planning for the regional

transmission system it oversees to ensure resource

adequacy and future system reliability. To that end,

PJM evaluates whether, and to what extent, new

transmission resources or improvements to existing

transmission resources are necessary to meet the

'l The RAA, which is “signed by all the load-serving entities

[‘LSEs’] in the PJM region,” contains provisions related to the

amount of capacity resources that must be procured by each LSE.

P.516 (PJM—At a Glance) at 4; see also Tr. Mar. 6 (PM) at 131:2-

132:10 (Wodyka). “The Operating Agreement must be signed by

organizations to become members of PJM.” P.516 (PJM—At a

Glance) at 4. It “establish[es] how PJM operates as a regional

transmission organization.” Jd.

5la

requirements of the load in the future.” Tr. Mar. 4

(AM) at 38:12-16 (Alessandrini). For example, “PJM

conducts a long-range Regional Transmission Expan-

sion Planning (RTEP) process that identifies what

changes and additional to the grid are needed to

ensure reliability and the successful operation of the

wholesale markets.” P.516 (PJM—At a Glance) at 2;

see also Tr. Mar. 6 (AM) at 20:21-24 (Massey). The

RTEP includes long-term planning studies that look

into the future as far as 15 years .. . to evaluate the

performance of the transmission as well as the

generation system that’s going to be able to reliably

serve load in the long run.” Tr. Mar. 6 (PM) at 22:10-

21 (Wodyka).

2. PJM-Administered Wholesale Electricity

Markets

In addition to managing the physical flow of electric

energy across the interstate transmission system

within the PJM region and planning for improvements

to ensure infrastructure reliability, PJM administers

three wholesale markets’’ in which electric energy

18 PJM does not “own” the transmission resources within the

PJM region. Instead, it manages and operates those resources

through an interconnected bulk-power system. See Tr. Mar. 6

(AM) at 15:5-8 (Massey). As a result of the TOA, a FERC-filed

agreement, the transmission resource owners who wish to be part

of the PJM region are obligated to perform certain transmission

projects identified by PJM in its RTEP. All utilities that own

transmission resources within the PJM region and wish to be

part of the RTO must enter into the TOA. See P.516 (PJM—At a

Glance) at 4.

' As explained supra, the FPA charges FERC with the

regulation of interstate wholesale sales of electricity. See 16

U.S.C. § 824(a). Pursuant to the FPA, FERC has the power to set

and regulate wholesale electric energy “rates and charges,”

subject to the requirement that such rates or charges shall be just

52a

products are sold by capacity resources to PJM and

then resold by PJM to Load Serving Entities (“LSEs””)

according to prices set in each of the respective

markets. Only two of these markets, the energy

market and the capacity market, are pertinent to the

instant case. The third wholesale market, the

ancillary services market,”' is not. Therefore, the term

“PJM Markets” as used herein refers to the energy and

capacity markets collectively and excludes the

ancillary services market.

The PJM Markets are run pursuant to FERC-

approved tariffs and are the mechanisms that PJM

uses to set or determine the price at which energy and

capacity are to be bought and sold within its territory.

Transactions on the PJM Markets are not the only

permissible FERC-regulated wholesale transactions.

Private parties can buy and sell wholesale energy,

capacity, and ancillary services outside the PJM

Markets and thus outside the prices set by PJM in

such markets. See OPC’s Post-Trial Br. [Document

140] at 21. For instance, subject to FERC rules, a

capacity resource, such as a generation facility, may

and reasonable.” Jd. § 824d(a); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss.

ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 373 (1988). It is pursuant to this

power that FERC authorizes PJM to run the PJM wholesale

markets, setting the price for wholesale electricity sales through

market-based auctions.

” “LSE” refers to an entity that serves an energy demand by

purchasing wholesale energy for purposes of resale to end-use

customers who are actually using and consuming that energy,

such as homes and businesses. Tr. Mar. 5 (AM) at 48:22-51:21

(Nazarian); Tr. Mar. 11 (AM) at 41:1-7 (Roach).

21 “Ancillary Service Markets are markets for so-called

reliability services that are necessary in realtime [sic] to keep the

system perfectly in balance.” Tr. Mar. 6 (AM) at 18:14-16

(Massey).

53a

sell energy and capacity directly to an LSE through a

bilateral contract at a price determined by the parties,

not set by PJM through its market-based mechanisms.

See Tr. Mar. 5 (AM) at 16:21-17:9 (Nazarian).

Irrespective of the transactional means used by an

LSE to procure energy for resale to end-use customers,

the costs incurred by the LSE for wholesale purchases

are passed on to end-use customers through the retail

rate charged by the LSE. See Miss. Power & Light Co.

v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 372 (1988) (“States

may not bar regulated utilities from passing through

to retail consumers FERC-mandated wholesale

rates.”). Thus, an increase in wholesale rates tends to

result in a corresponding increase in retail rates.

a. PJM Wholesale Energy Market

The PJM wholesale energy market is a market in

which wholesale electric energy generated by power

plants is bought and sold to meet present load demand

within the PJM region (the “PJM Energy Market”). In

the PJM Energy Market, generation resources” sell

energy to PJM that is generated and delivered into

PJM’s interconnected power grid by the generator.

LSEs then purchase that energy from PJM to deliver

and resell it to end-use customers, thereby satisfying

load or customer demand for electricity at any point

in time. Tr. Mar. 4 (AM) at 23:16-24, 37:20-38:6

(Alessandrini). Because generators sell their energy to

PJM, and LSEs purchase that energy from PJM and

receive delivery through PJM’s interstate grids and

transmission systems, there is no direct sale of energy

from a generator to a particular LSE. Thus, the PJM

= The term “generation resources” refers to resources or

facilities within PJM that generate electric energy such as power

plants.

54a

Energy Market is composed of two separate sub-

markets—day-ahead and real-time. In the day-ahead

sub-market, generation facilities bid into an energy

market for energy delivery in the next twenty-four

hours; in the real-time sub-market, generation

resources bid into a market for delivery in the next

hour. See Tr. Mar. 6 (AM) at 18:4-19:12 (Massey).

With respect to setting the price of energy in the

PJM Energy Market, PJM uses a system called

“Locational Marginal Pricing [(‘LMP’)], which is the

economic dispatch and price setting of energy.” Tr.

Mar. 4 (AM) at 24:22-24 (Alessandrini). The concept of

LMP is that it “reflects the value of the energy at the

specific location and time it is delivered” and “takes

into account the effect of actual operating conditions

on the transmission system in determining the price

of electricity at different locations in the PJM terri-

tory.” P.516 (PJM—At a Glance) at 11. LMP may

result in different prices for energy in different zones

or locations within the PJM region. These “[e]nergy

prices vary across the PJM footprint according to a

number of factors that differentiate energy prices at

different points within the system.” P.391 (2007 PSC

Interim Report) at 17; see also Tr. Mar. 4 (AM) at

114:11-25 (Alessandrini). LMP for energy is “volatile”

because it depends on the value of that energy, where

it’s produced, at the time it’s produced, and what the

weather and other conditions are.”” Tr. Mar. 5 (PM)

at 65:21-66:6 (Nazarian).

* FERC describes the LMP as:

a bid-based, security-constrained economic dispatch

and unit commitment model to determine real-time

and next-day LMP for electricity, which reflect the

value of energy at a specific location and time it is

delivered. If the lowest-priced electricity can reach all

55a

Concerning the prices received by power plants for

energy sold into the PJM Energy Market, generation

facilities across the PJM region have the ability to bid

electric energy into the PJM Energy Market at a bid

price. PJM, as the operator of the power grid,

dispatches that energy to meet load demand by taking

generation bids in ascending order of cost (i.e., begin-

ning with the lowest cost generation and ending with

the highest cost generation) “until the electric load is

satisfied.” P.391 (2007 PSC Interim Report) at 17. The

highest cost generation (that is, the cost at the point

at which the load demand is satisfied) “set/s} the

clearing price for all [generators] operating in the

zone,” and the resulting price is the LMP received by

those generation resources. Jd.

One factor that influences LMPs significantly

is the extent, or lack, of transmission

capability into a state or region [because

when transmission lines are ‘congested’ or

‘constrained,’ i.e., they cannot carry the lower

cost electricity to meet demand, PJM must

dispatch more expensive generation located

in the constrained zone, which increases

LMPs.

Id. That is, if lower cost generation cannot be

dispatched to serve load in a particular zone due to

limitations in transporting the energy, PJM “skips” it

and dispatches higher cost generation, which results

locations, prices differ at the approximately 8,000

pricing nodes on the transmission system by marginal!

losses only. When transmission congestion prevents

the free flow of energy, more expensive electricity is

ordered to meet that demand, and the LMP is higher

in congested areas.

PJM Interconnection, LLC, 132 FERC 1 61173, 61,870 (2010).

56a

in “congestion costs” and higher LMPs paid by the

purchasing LSE and corresponding increases in the

retail energy rates for the end-use customers served

by the LSE. See id. at 17-18; see also Tr. Mar. 4 (AM)

at 116:6-118:1 (Alessandrini); Tr. Mar. 8 (AM) at

93:20-94:19 (Willig). Thus, higher LMPs provide

higher revenues to generation facilities.

According to PJM, the LMP pricing model:

give[s] price signals that encourage new

generation sources to locate in areas where

they will receive higher prices. It signals

large new users tu locate where they can buy

lower-cost power. It also encourages the

construction of new transmission facilities in

areas where congestion is common, in order

to reduce the financial impact of congestion

on electricity prices.

P.516 (PJM—At a Glance) at 11; see also Tr. Mar. 8

(AM) at 94:16-19 (Willig) (“If the LMPs are different at

‘... two points, it means there’s . . . differential value

to resources located at those two points.”). The

Maryland Public Service Commission (“PSC”) has

opined that LMPs do not work as intended, in part

because they “have not yielded adequate new gener-

ation inside Maryland’s transmission constraints.”

P.391 (2007 PSC Interim Report) at 18-19. The PSC

noted that as a “result[,] Marylanders have paid and

will continue to pay higher prices than others in the

PJM region due to our higher LMPs, but no new

material generation has been built in recent years.” Jd.

at 19.

b. PJM Wholesale Capacity Market

PJM administers a wholesale capacity market (the

“PJM Capacity Market”), which is a forward market

57a

where a product called “capacity” is sold by a capacity

resource to PJM and then resold by PJM to LSEs.

Capacity resources include generators that will

increase the energy supply and users that will reduce

the energy demand. LSEs purchase capacity to meet

their capacity obligations under certain FERC-filed

agreements with PJM. As in the PJM Energy Market,

capacity resources sell capacity to PJM; there is no

direct sale of capacity from a capacity resource to a

particular LSE.

PJM sets the price for capacity bought and sold in

the PJM Capacity Market through application of

the Reliability Pricing Model (“RPM”). The RPM

establishes an annual Base Residual Auction (“BRA”)

through which PJM procures capacity from capacity

resources “for a particular ‘power year” three years

after the auction. That is, capacity bid in the 2012 BRA

will be made available for the 2015/2016 power year.

The BRA determines the market clearing price, which

is the price that PJM will pay for all capacity that

clears the BRA. P.391 (2007 PSC Interim Report) at

19. Generally speaking, increases in capacity prices

lead to increases in the retail rates paid by end-use

customers.

(i) “Capacity”

“Capacity,” as used herein to refer to a product,” is

a standby commitment made by a capacity resource to

either produce electric energy or to consume less

* Throughout the trial, witnesses referred to capacity as both

a product bought and sold in the PJM Capacity Market and, more

generally, as the mega-watt capability of existing resources, i.e.,

how much electric energy an existing generation facility

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — CPV Md., LLC v. PPL Energyplus, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 356 (2015) (No. 14-623) | Frix