Petition for Writ of Certiorari — CPV Md., LLC v. PPL Energyplus, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 356 (2015) (No. 14-623)
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Supreme Court, U.S.
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: OFFICE OF THE CLERK
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
CPV MARYLAND, LLC,
Petitioner,
Vv.
PPL ENERGYPLUS, LLC, et al.
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
CLIFTON S. ELGARTEN
Counsel of Record
LARRY F. EISENSTAT
RICHARD LEHFELDT
JENNIFER N. WATERS
CROWELL & MORING LLP
1001 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 624-2500
celgarten@crowell.com
Counsel for Petitioner
@November 26, 2014
ee
Baso-Epes Prams Co.. Inc. - (202) 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. $§824 et
seq., States retain authority over electricity and
capacity purchases by local utilities. They cannot,
however, impose the rates for those purchases; only
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
can regulate interstate wholesale rates. Seeking a
new power plant, Maryland conducted a competitive
procurement and directed its local utilities to enter
into long-term contracts with the successful bidder,
providing the stable revenue needed to induce the
developer's investment and support the costs of
construction. Under those contracts, if the developer’s
accepted bid price exceeds what the developer earns by
selling the plant’s capacity in the FERC-supervised
auction, the utility pays the difference to the
developer; if auction revenue exceeds the bid price, the
developer rebates the difference to the utility. The
payment or rebate is passed on to retail ratepayers.
1. Where, as a result of a state-directed procure-
ment, the contract price to build and operate a power
plant is the developer’s bid price, and may result in
payments beyond what the developer earns selling the
plant’s capacity in the FERC-supervised auction, is
the program “field preempted” as a State’s attempt to
set interstate wholesale rates?
2. Is a state-directed contract to support construc-
tion of a power plant “conflict preempted” because
its long-term pricing structure provides incentives
different from the incentives provided by prices
generated in the FERC-supervised yearly capacity
auction?
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner in this Court is CPV Maryland, LLC
(CPV), Intervenor-Appellant below and Intervenor-
Defendant in the district court. The Chairman and
Commissioners of the Maryland Public Service
Commission (Commission) were sued in their official
capacities and were Defendants-Appellants below.
Harold Williams, Lawrence Brenner, and Kelly
Speakes-Backman were named Defendants-Appellants
below and remain Commissioners. W. Kevin Hughes
was also a named Defendant-Appellant below as a
Commissioner; he is now Chairman. Douglas R.M.
Nazarian was also a named Defendant-Appellant below
as Chairman; he is no longer a member of the
Commission. Anne E. Hoskins, who was not a member
of the Commission at the time this litigation
commenced, is now a Commissioner.
Respondents, Plaintiffs-Appellees in the court
below, are: PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, PPL Brunner
Island, LLC, PPL Holtwood, LLC; PPL Martins Creek,
LLC, PPL Montour, LLC, PPL Susquehanna, LLC,
Lower Mount Bethel Energy, LLC, PPL New Jersey
Solar, LLC, PPL New Jersey Biogas, LLC, PPL
Renewable Energy, LLC, PSEG Power, LLC, and
Essential Power, LLC.
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
Petitioner CPV Maryland, LLC does not issue stock
and so no publicly held company owns 10% or more of
any stock.
CPV Maryland, LLC is 25% owned by wholly-owned
subsidiaries of Competitive Power Ventures Holdings,
LLC (CPV Holdings). The ownership structure,
including affiliates, is: CPV Maryland, LLC is 25%
owned by CPV Maryland Holding Company, LLC.
CPV Maryland Holding Company, LLC is wholly
owned by CPV Maryland Holding Company II, LLC.
CPV Maryland Holding Company II, LLC is 99%
owned by CPV Power Development, Inc. and 1%
owned by CPV Maryland Investment, LLC. CPV
Maryland Investment, LLC is wholly owned by CPV
Power Development, Inc. CPV Power Development,
Inc. is wholly owned by CPV Holdings. CPV Holdings
is 88.55% owned by Warburg Pincus Private Equity
IX, L.P.
CPV Maryland, LLC is also 50% owned by wholly
owned subsidiaries of the Marubeni Corporation. The
ownership structure, including affiliates, is as follows:
CPV Maryland, LLC is 50% owned by MC St. Charles
LLC. MC St Charles LLC is wholly owned by
Marubeni Power America, Inc. Marubeni Power
America, Inc. is wholly owned by AXIA Power
Holdings B.V. AXIA Power Holdings B.V. is wholly
owned by the Marubeni Corporation.
iv
CPV Maryland, LLC is also 25% owned by wholly
owned subsidiaries of the Toyota Tsusho Corporation.
The ownership structure, including affiliates, is as
follows: CPV Maryland, LLC is 25% owned by Toyota
Tsusho St. Charles, LLC. Toyota Tsusho St. Charles,
LLC is wholly owned by Toyota Tsusho Power USA,
Inc. Toyota Tsusho Power USA, Inc. is wholly owned
by the Toyota Tsusho Corporation.
Vv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .................cccccccsseeees
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGG..................
EET icictsnnscciennenniennsnienetietinintinmiensines
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PRO-
ey BOE bccccccnscencnpnessesnscsecessaneosens
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY..................
A. The FPA Preserves the States’ Power To
B.
C.
D.
E.
Support Power Plant Construction. ..........
Maryland’s Initiative Supported
Necessary Power Plant Construction ......
FERC Can Influence Power Plant
Development Only Indirectly Through
Its Market and Rate Supervision.............
FERC Approved CPV’s Sale Of Capacity
eee
REASONS TO GRANT THE PETITION ...........
I.
THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS
WITH THIS COURTS PRECEDENTS
AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE FPA...
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
A. The Decision Disregards The Standards
For Finding FPA Preemption................... 19
B. The Fourth Circuit Decision Conflicts
With The Premises On Which FERC
Initiated Use Of A Forward Market To
Influence New Construction..................... 21
C. The Fourth Circuit Has Fundamentally
Altered the FPA’s Division of State-
II ccictrnnncennsennenmeeoninmmennn 24
1. The Fourth’ Circuits ‘field
preemption” theory improperly finds
that these contracts contained rates
A ictonicesnnnnsevnennneinees 24
(a) The contracts do not contain rates
subject to FERC review ................. 24
(b) Maryland set no rates .................... 27
2. Maryland’s initiative does not conflict
with any federal policy ........................ 29
.
Il. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
DEPRIVES STATES—AND FERC—OF
AUTHORITY NEEDED TO SUPPORT
THE NATION’S ELECTRIC INFRA-
IIE nececnsencsssicensssnenmnenmmssnmnsemmnessones 36
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
APPENDIX Page
Appendix A—Court of Appeals Opinion (Jun.
aT Nin sendineseneinniehiiebpunésnnanabinnaiibaemapeititaetinies la
Appendix B—Court of Appeals Judgment
Sirs Tl ITE hiiicnesdunitanteenteiotnsnninnnnteiimienuess 26a
Appendix C—Order Denying Petitions for
Rehearing and Rehearing en banc (Jun. 30,
Sita locscinnsumnsenetsemnsennsemnintunienneeimunsnanniieenienn 30a
Appendix D—District Court Opinion (Sept.
aI nsinsnciamnesenmemprmennnienimaipiantio 34a
Appendix E—District Court Judgment Order
es Ss erenecensesesetesinemnnetmenmennesneenies 162a
Appendix F—Supremacy Clauzse..................... 165a
Appendix G—Federal Power Act..................... 166a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page(s)
Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall,
TEE 20
Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC,
372 F.3d 395 (D.C. Cir. 2004)................... 25
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Ill.
Commerce Comm’n,
2014 IL App (1st) 130544 (2014).............. 33
Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC,
569 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 2009).................. passim
Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC,
753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014)................... 24
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
es Ge benieercncevecsscscnecenssnaseesens 20
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v.
Mississippi ex rel. Moore,
GT TBs Be Ci eceecccceeccccceseccesecccccceseees 25, 26
Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v.
Public Util. Dist. No. 1,
Ee 13, 27
N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC,
744 F.3d 74 (3d Cir. 2014).................. 16, 23, 29
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v.
Thornburg,
476 U.S. 963 (1986)............ccccccccscssssecseeees 25, 26
New England Power Generators Ass’n, Inc.
v. FERC,
757 F.3d 283 (D.C. Cir. 2014)............. 14, 23, 24
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
New York v. FERC,
I a i 9, 28
NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n,
Msi cicridecitsicicddhaneniinnsennaas 13, 26
Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp.
Comm’n of Kan..,
Se es Ge Ci scccsscccsccsecescccssccsseses 8, 20, 21
PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon,
766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014) .........000.000... passim
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
- 5 Eon 8, 20
In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,
I 13
In re Review of Proposed Town of New
Shoreham Project,
25 A.3d 482 (R.I. 2011) oo. ecceceeceeees 33
FERC ORDERS
Allegheny Energy Supply Co.,
108 FERC 961,082 (2004)... 28
Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n,
132 FERC 461,047 (2010), clarified, 133
FERC 461,059 (2010), reh’g denied, 134
FERC 61,044 (2011).....c...cccccccssvesssssees 5, 11, 28
Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,
134 FERC 961,044 (2011).............000000... 10, 28
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Commonwealth Atl. Ltd. P’ship,
51 FERC 961,368 (1990).............0. eee 11
CPV Shore, L.L.C., CPV Maryland, L.L.C.,
148 FERC 961,096 (2014).............0..0000000.. 27, 35
Doswell Ltd. P’ship,
50 FERC 961,251 (1990)...............cccecceeeeee 11
Midwest Power Sys., Inc.,
78 FERC 461,067 (1997)...................cccc008 11, 28
N.Y. Mercantile Exch..,
74 FERC 461,311 (1996).....................00 25
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,
115 FERC 461,079 (2006)....................00... 22
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,
117 FERC 461,331 (2006).................0.0..... 22
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C..,
135 FERC 961,022 (2011).............0..000.... 22
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C..,
137 FERC 961,145 (2011)...................... 6, 22
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,
143 FERC 961,090 (2013)..................:cc0 16
Revised Pub. Util. Filing Requirements,
97 FERC 961,317 (2001)................cceeee00 25
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
| kT 8, 9, 20
innit aninatiigtinidaal 8, 9, 20
BP es SUD ccncccnnensvineronsnnsesssnmnemsessssens 8,
xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
ETE Te aa a aE Pee 8, 13, 25
I 1
ET Ir ee 1
I iia teens 1
Conn. Pub. Act 13-303, Section 6 (2013) ..... 32
Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C.
ITI sinisrsccninsnnineneisscsitiiiiiainiiiiensnnimnnenen 9
EPA, Carbon Pollution Emission Guide-
lines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units,
Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (Jun.
ESERIES ORR ces 32
Federal Power Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C.
a IITTIT siscorscedetcliicedtinlediiinaitnieiadinineninennieiee . 2,8
2012 Mass. Legis. Serv., ch. 209, §35.......... 33
Nev. Rev. Stat. §704.7316 ................cccccceeeee 33
eal arian 10, 28
Order No. 84815, No. 9214
8 ee 11
Resolution E-4471, Pub. Utils. Comm’n of
& < f S 33
MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITIES
xii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
American Public Power Association, Power
Plants Are Not Built on Spec—2014
I ccna inl isleleaiiemeatiarinnicinin
American Public Power Association, Power
Plants Are Not Built on Spec: An Analysis
of New Electric Generation Projects
Constructed in 2011 (2012)..................0000
“Calpine Executes Contracts for Sutter
Energy Center With California Utilities,”
Pg EC Oeeron
Jeff Beattie, “New York Regulators Throw
Lifeline to Exelon’s Struggling Ginna
Nuke,” HIS Energy Daily (Nov. 17,
Onur Aydin, Frank Graves, and Metin
Celebi, Coal Plant Retirements: Feedback
Effects on Wholesale Electricity Prices,
The Brattle Group (Nov. 2013).................
PJM, Coal Capacity at Risk for Retirement
in PJM: Potential Impacts of the Finalized
EPA Cross State Air Pollution Rule and
Proposed National Emissions Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants (2011)........
U.S. Energy Information Administration,
Annual Energy Outlook 2014 (Apr. 2014)..
Page(s)
10
33
33
32
31, 32
31
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
CPV Maryland, LLC (CPV) respectfully seeks a writ
of certiorari to review the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in this
case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit is reported at 753 F.3d 467
(4th Cir. 2014) and reprinted at App.la. The Fourth
Circuit order denying rehearing is reprinted at
App.30a. The district court’s opinion is reported at
974 F. Supp. 2d 790 (D. Md. 2013) and reprinted at
App.34a.
JURISDICTION
This case was filed in the district court under 28
U.S.C. §1331, raising constitutional challenges to
Maryland’s program supporting construction of a new
power plant. The district court issued final judgment
on October 24, 2013. That judgment was appealed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed on June 2, 2014. Timely motions for
rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied. On
September 15, 2014, the Chief Justice granted an
extension of time to and including November 27, 2014
to file this Petition. This Petition is being filed within
the time allowed. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Supremacy Clause is set forth at App.165a.
Relevant provisions of the Federal Power Act are
reprinted beginning at App.166a.
2
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The Fourth Circuit’s decision holding that the
Federal Power Act (FPA) of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§824 et
seq., preempts Maryland’s directed procurement of a
power plant needed by that State misconceives, and
crucially alters, the division of state and federal
responsibility under the FPA. It directly undermines
the States’ ability to direct and supervise electricity
and capacity purchases by local utilities, and thus
to meet their citizens’ long-term electricity needs
through traditional means: long-term ratepayer com-
mitments to power plant developers that provide the
reliable revenue stream needed to support the capital
investment required to build a power plant.
Given the enormous up-front investment required
to build a power plant, those commitments are critical.
In 2013, less than 3% of new power plant construction
proceeded without revenue-stabilizing, long-term com-
mitments to power plant developers in place. Those
commitments are typically in the form of long-term
contracts between the developer and local utilities, or
reflect construction by vertically-integrated utilities
that both generate electricity and sell to consumers,
with the assurance that they will recover their costs
through retail rates.
Under the FPA, States have sole authority to
regulate and directly support power plant con-
struction, and to pass the construction costs on to
retail customers. The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) is expressly denied authority
over power plant construction (or retirement).
Therefore, the vitality of the Nation’s energy infra-
structure ultimately depends on targeted state support
for new power plants, most usually—until this and the
3
similar Third Circuit case that followed it said no'—
through long-term contracts providing the revenue
stream necessary for power plant development. The
Fourth Circuit’s decision undermines the States’
ability to support that infrastructure development.
Maryland needed a new natural gas electric power
plant to be built in a particular region. It determined
that in the current “economic climate,” existing
markets had not attracted the necessary investment
capital to build the plant. Maryland then conducted
a procurement, offering the successful bidder long-
term contracts with the State’s local utilities,
providing the stable revenue needed to support power
plant construction.
To induce the bids and the capital investment of
nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars needed to
build a new power plant, the Maryland Public Service
Commission (MPSC) offered the successful bidder
a financial arrangement called a “contract for
differences.” Under these contracts, the bidder agreed
to develop and operate the plant, selling its capacity in
the federally-supervised interstate auction, according
to the rules of the auction. The local utilities
would pay the developer the difference between the
déveloper’s auction sales revenue and its bid price to
build and operate the plant. If the developer’s auction
sales revenue exceeded the bid price, the developer
would rebate the difference to the utilities. The local
titilities would, in turn, recover their costs from (or
rebate surpluses to) their retail customers.
1 PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir.
2014). Separate petitions for certiorari are being filed addressing
that case, which raises the same issue.
4
Maryland’s program is an exercise of traditional
powers. To ensure reliable electricity supply,
Maryland directed local electric utilities to enter into
long-term contracts at prices set by competitive
procurement. It promised the utilities that they would
recover their costs from retail customers. It did all this
to spur construction of needed generation resources
available to the State.
In barring Maryland’s program based on “field
preemption,” the Fourth Circuit misconstrued the
FPA in two ways: by equating a developer’s price bid
in a competitive procurement with a price “set” by the
State, and by deeming a supplemental payment to be
a rate subject to FERC review in the first place.
The FPA assigns FERC authority over interstate
wholesale sales of electricity and interstate transmis-
sion. Congress expressly preserved state authority
over electric generation, intrastate transmission, and
electric sales and rates other than wholesale sales.
States retain broad authority over local utilities.
States have long exercised their authority over local
“utility buy-side” decisions to support power plant
development, directing their utilities to buy power (or
approving proposals to buy power) through long-term
contracts that ensure reliable, economical electricity
for their citizens.
Until the decision below—and the Third Circuit
decision that followed it—not only the existence of
state authority to direct such long-term contracts,
but the limits of the States’ authority to direct
their utilities to enter into contracts, were clearly
demarcated and well understood. States could
mandate and oversee competitive procurements for
local utilities, and direct them to enter into contracts
at market prices established by those procurements.
5
What States could not do was set the price at which
utilities buy, or developers sell, energy or capacity.
State price-setting would usurp FERC’s exclusive
authority.2 The Fourth Circuit’s field preemption
theory improperly equates a competitive price, offered
by a developer, with a price impermissibly imposed by
the State. It thereby nullifies the States’ power to
direct local utilities to enter into contracts that meet
their citizens’ needs.
As shown below, the supplemental payments under
the contracts for differences at issue were actually not
rates subject to FERC’s jurisdiction at all because they
did not govern a sale of capacity or electricity. But
even if one were to accept the premise that they were
subject to FERC jurisdiction, that would not mean
preemption. It would simply invite FERC’s review
of those rates at FERC’s initiative or at the behest
of anyone complaining about them. Rates or contracts
subject to FERC’s review cannot usurp FERC’s
jurisdiction. Indeed, by judicially declaring the
contracts invalid, nominally to protect FERC’s
authority, the Fourth Circuit’s decision paradoxically
prevented FERC from exercising any authority it
might have to review those contracts. What Maryland
did not do is set a wholesale rate at which energy or
capacity is purchased. If the purchase price is not
imposed by the State, but by the market, as a
developer’s competitive offer, it does not usurp FERC’s
rate-review authority, and is not “field preempted.”
The Fourth Circuit’s contrary field preemption ruling
* See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 132 FERC 961,047, P 69 (2010),
clarified, 133 FERC 961,059 (2010), reh’g denied, 134 FERC
761,044 (2011).
6
misses this basic point, eviscerating boundaries within
which States and FERC have operated for decades.
The Fourth Circuit’s conflict preemption holding
is arguably even broader and equally wrong. FERC
determined that state-supported generators that
complied with FERC’s revised rules could sell capacity
in the FERC-supervised auction without harming the
auction, notwithstanding any “subsidy.” Moreover,
FERC explained that its auction rule changes were not
intended to interfere with state support for new
capacity. Thus, there was no basis to find actual
conflict between federal and state law.
Instead, the Fourth Circuit posited a policy-minded
conflict, holding that by providing incentives for power
plant development, Maryland “disrupted” incentives
provided by the FERC-supervised auction’s “price
signals.” But FERC’s auction rules and auction prices
do not apply outside the auction. There is no evidence
that Congress or FERC intended auction rates and
rules to be the only source of incentives to invest in
new power plants, and it is unlikely that they would
do so, displacing States from their primary role in
developing the Nation’s energy infrastructure.
Because prices affect investment, FERC has a
limited role in stimulating investment as an “incident”
to its market and rate supervision.‘ But markets are
imperfect. States look farther into the future than
a three year forward auction. They can support
fuel source diversity for environmental or reliability
5 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 137 FERC 961,145, P 89
(2011), aff'd, N.J. Bd. Of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 95 (3d
Cir. 2014) (“NJBPU”).
* See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477,
484 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (CDPUC”).
7
reasons—to which markets may be indifferent.
They have offered developers long-term support
for electricity infrastructure development when
investment capital is not otherwise forthcoming.®
That authority necessarily resides with States because
FERC itself cannot sponsor new power plants.
Government-directed procurements like Maryland’s
spur investment when markets are not otherwise
attracting needed investment capital.
The Fourth Circuit’s rulings equating a pro-
curement with a rate set by the State, and questioning
the States’ authority to incentivize power plant
construction, undermine a tool widely used by States
to stimulate construction and other energy initiatives.
Directions to local utilities to buy electricity or
capacity stimulate power plant construction and
support other energy initiatives. All such contracts
“set rates,” and provide incentives different from
auction incentives. The particular mechanism used
here is especially useful. New Jersey used a nearly
identical approach to support three power plants
needed by that State.* That approach is well-suited to
its purpose. A “guarantee” measured by the difference
between what the developer bids to build a plant, and
what it earns selling its capacity, effectively limits
ratepayer contributions to the project.
A quarter century ago, the Court directed courts
considering “field preemption” under the FPA’s sister
statute to “take seriously the lines Congress drew in
5 The Fourth Circuit’s backup theory, that 20-year contracts
conflict with the three year lock-in for auction prices, is equally
ill-conceived. FERC’s auction purchase rules do not set policy
outside the auction. See infra at 31-32.
® See Solomon, 766 F.3d at 248-49.
8
creating a dual regulatory system,” and avoid
“extravagant” interpretations of federal energy
regulatory jurisdiction at the States’ expense. Nw.
Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan.,
489 U.S. 493, 512-13 (1989). The Court also
admonished that the inevitable interaction between
state and federal initiatives should not be mistaken for
preemptive conflict. Jd. at 517-18. The Fourth
Circuit’s decision ignored the Court’s directions. The
Court should grant certiorari to address the important
questions presented and restore the States’ power to
support needed energy infrastructure development.
STATEMENT
A. The FPA Preserves the States’ Power
To Support Power Plant Construction
The “[n)eed for new power facilities, their economic
feasibility, and rates and services, are areas that have
been characteristically governed by the States.” Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation &
Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983). The FPA
preserves each State’s authority to ensure reliable
electricity supply for its citizens by supporting power
plant construction, transmission line approval, or
through development of new technologies. It also
preserves the States’ authority to set retail rates to
support those initiatives.
With the FPA, 16 U.S.C. §§824 et seg., Congress
vested exclusive regulatory authority over the “sale
of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce”
in what eventually became FERC. 16 U.S.C. §824(a),
(bX1). FERC also has authority over practices
“affecting,” or “in connection with,” rates. 16 U.S.C.
§§824d, 824e. But FERC’s authority extends “only” tc
matters “not subject to regulation by the States.” Jd.
9
§824(a). Moreover, FERC “shall not have jurisdiction,
except as specifically provided . . . , over facilities used
for the generation of electric energy.” 16 U.S.C.
§824(b\(1).
While the federal role has changed over time,
‘States retain significant control over local matters,”
including “utility generation and resource portfolios”
and “utility buy-side . . . decisions,” i.e., where the
utility purchases power to meet its needs rather than
construct its own facilities. New York v. FERC, 535
U.S. 1, 24 (2002). In 2005, when Congress expanded
FERC jurisdiction over transmission and reliability
standards, see 16 U.S.C. §§8240 et seq., it again
denied FERC the authority “to order the construction
of additional generation . . . capacity,” 16 U.S.C.
§8240(i(2), confirming that “[nJothing in this section
shall be construed to preempt any authority of any
State to take action to ensure the safety, adequacy,
and reliability of electric service within that State
....” Id. $8240(iX3).
State support for power plant construction through
supervision of local utilities and state-approved
charges on retail ratepayers is, of course, nothing new.
Under the classic regulatory model, with vertically-
integrated utilities which both generate electricity and
sell electricity to retail ratepayers, States ensured
needed new power plant construction by allowing local
utilities to recover prudently incurred costs from retail
ratepayers. Many States continue to have vertically-
integrated utilities. Others, like Maryland, have
partially restructured their electric power sector
by requiring their local utilities to buy some or all of
their generation requirements from the interstate
markets, again with the costs of those purchases borne
ultimately by retail ratepayers.
10
Even in restructured states, state regulators retain
regulatory control over purchasing decisions by their
local utilities, and the rates they charge their
customers. States use that authority to direct those
utilities to enter into long-term contracts to purchase
power (or to approve such contracts). Those contracts
assure reliable electricity supplies for state citizens.
And they assure developers of the long-term revenue
stream needed to finance projects costing hundreds of
millions of dollars.
Almost all (more than 97%) of new power plant
construction rests on long-term commitments, under-
written by ratepayers. Those commitments typically
take the form of long-term contracts between the
developer and the regulated local utility (64%), or
construction by the local utility that owns the power
plant and sells to retail consumers (29.6%). Only 2.4%
of recent new generation capacity was built “on spec,”
i.e., relying solely on short-term open market sales.’
State authority to direct local utilities to buy power
or capacity from prospective developers poses no
conflict with federal law or policy. See 18 C.F.R.
§35.27 (recognizing States’ authority to “establish .. .
[clompetitive procedures for the acquisition of electric
energy . .. purchased at wholesale”). This includes the
authority to “dictate the generation resources from
which utilities may procure electric energy.” Cal. Pub.
’ These figures are for 2013. See American Public Power
Association, Power Plants Are Not Built on Spec—2014 Update
at 1-2 and Table 1 (2014) ("2014 APPA Study”), http
goo.git62QuS. Similar figures are available for 2011. See
American Public Power Association, Power Plants Are Not Buiit
on Spec: An Analysis of New Electric Generation Projects
Constructed in 2011 at 5-6 and Table 2 (2012) (“2012 APPA
Study”), http://goo.gl/WCboHw.
11
Utils. Comm’n, 134 FERC 461,044, P 30 & n.62
(2011). If the resulting contracts are subject to FERC
jurisdiction, FERC may review them.
What States may not do is set the price (rather than
have the price set competitively) at which electricity or
capacity is sold at wholesale. Only FERC can
determine whether prices subject to its jurisdiction are
just and reasonable. Compare Midwest Power Sys.,
Inc., 78 FERC $61,067, 61,248 (1997); Cal. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n, 132 FERC 461,047, P 69 (2010) (California
statute “preempted to the extent that the [State] is
setting wholesale rates”), with Doswell Ltd. P’ship, 50
FERC 61,251, 61,756-57 (1990) (approving state-
certified agreement, with prices set by competition);
Commonwealth Atl. Ltd. P’ship, 51 FERC 961,368
(1990).
B. Maryland’s Initiative Supported
Necessary Power Plant Construction
In April 2012, the Maryland Public Service
Commission (MPSC) determined that “long-term
demand for electricity . . . compels us to order new
generation in the amount of 650 to 700 MWs... in
Maryland by 2015.” Order No. 84815, No. 9214 at 29
(MPSC Apr. 12, 2012). It explained that market forces
had not “provided sufficient certainty for prospective
generation suppliers to secure financing in the current
economic climate.” Id. at 22.
It offered the successful bidder, agreeing to build the
plant in the desired locale, contracts with Maryland’s
local utilities. CPV offered a plant with the required
capacity and technology and was selected as providing
“the best price.” The 20-year contracts were in the
form of contracts for differences, a hedge. The party
that would ordinarily bear the risk of yearly price
12
fluctuations in capacity revenue (i.e., the developer)
trades that variable revenue for a defined revenue
stream, at its offer price. The counterparty — a local
utility — takes on the risk of fluctuating prices. The
Fourth Circuit deemed these contracts a “guarantee[]”
or “subsidy.” App.18a, 23a.
CPV thus agreed to build a power plant of specified
capacity in Maryland’s desired locale, using
designated natural gas technology, and to sell its
capacity in the federally-supervised capacity auction.®
In consideration, CPV would receive its offer price,
over 20 years. If CPV’s revenues were below the
contract price, Maryland’s local utilities would pay
CPV the difference, and pass any cost on to their
ratepayers. If CPV realized sales revenues above its
yearly contract price, CPV would rebate the difference
to local utilities, which would pass the savings on to
the retail ratepayers.
® As a definitional matter, “capacity” is used in two related
ways. Capacity is the quantity of electricity that a given resource
can produce or make available. But because electricity demand
fluctuates (and electricity cannot be stored), the ability to provide
electricity on demand is itself sold in interstate markets. As the
D.C. Circuit explained:
“Capacity” is not electricity itself but the ability to produce
it when necessary. It amounts to a kind of call option that
electricity transmitters purchase from parties—generally,
generators—who can either produce more or consume less
when required. The penultimate and most proximate buyers
of capacity (before the consumers who ultimately shoulder
the costs in their utility bills) are .. the public utilities that
deliver electricity to end users.
See CDPUC, 569 F.3d at 479.
13
C. FERC Can Influence Power Plant
Development Only Indirectly Through
Its Market and Rate Supervision
Under the FPA, FERC regulates interstate whole-
sale energy markets and has exclusive authority to
determine whether rates are “just and reasonable.” 16
U.S.C. §824d(a). FERC may also choose to regulate
other matters “affecting” or “in connection with”
rates. 16 U.S.C. §§824d, 824e. FERC has encouraged
formation of “regional transmission organizations,”
which coordinate generators, transmission resources
and wholesale purchasers. PJM Interconnection,
L.L.C. (PJM), spanning most of thirteen states,
including Maryland, is the largest of these entities.
Capacity is frequently bought and sold through
bilateral contracts. See NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me.
Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, 171 (2010) (“The
[FPA] allows .. . sellers and buyers [to] agree on rates
by contract.”).° Non-auction sales are subject to
FERC’s review for “justness and reasonableness,”
whether the result of state-directed procurements or
not. Where the price is competitively set by a seller
without market power, FERC’s review is limited
because market-based rates are presumed valid. See
Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Public Util. Dist.
No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 547-48 (2008).
As a supplement to the many other markets and
methods for selling capacity, FERC has encouraged
regional transmission organizations to operate
® Long-term contracts are central to the provision of reliable
electric supply; the FPA is “premised” on them. In re Permian
Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 822 (1968). They are a “key
factor fostering stability in the electricity market, to the longrun
benefit of consumers.” NRG, 558 U.S. at 174.
14
forward markets for capacity sales. See, e.g., Conn.
Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477,
484 (D.C. Cir. 2009) “CDPUC”). A forward market
functions as a clearing house for purchases and sales,
and can also generate “price signals” that may prompt
investment in new plants (or retirement of old ones).
See New England Power Generators Ass’n, Inc. v.
FERC, 757 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
The D.C. Circuit approved FERC’s development of
organized forward capacity markets. See CDPUC,
569 F.3d at 484-85. FERC premised that approval by
explaining that it was merely exercising its authority
over wholesale prices and markets, which could
incidentally spur power plant construction. Such
incidental effects, the court said, would not displace or
invade the States’ primary authority over power plant
construction. Id.
PJM’s auction, the Reliability Pricing Model (RPM),
operates in conjunction with, and in no way displaces,
the many other methods of buying and selling capacity
in the region. PJM surveys the region to predict how
much capacity will be needed three years hence.
Almost all generators must offer their capacity—
including capacity that is already the subject of other
contracts, at prices different than the auction price—
for one year, three years in the future. Offers to sell
are stacked, lowest to highest. The clearing price is
the highest price PJM must accept to acquire the
capacity to meet projected demand. Offers above that
price are rejected. Accepted offers are paid the
clearing price, no matter what the actual offer was.
PJM buys the accepted capacity at the clearing price
and resells it to auction purchasers. App.9a-10a.
Almost all capacity is offered into this auction at
“zero"—meaning that offerors are “price takers,”
15
selling at whatever clearing price the auction
produces. That is because a power plant requires
enormous up-front capital investment. Once those
costs are sunk, the cost of supplying capacity is small,
so a rational offeror wants to be paid something,
rather than nothing, and will offer at a price certain to
clear. Moreover, utilities that have already bought
capacity under long-term contracts are required to
participate in the auction, and will likewise offer that
contracted capacity into the auction at zero.
Given the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit, it bears
emphasis that the auction clearing price controls
auction sales, but does not set a price for the plethora
of transactions outside the auction. It is a “residual”
pricing model only. Much capacity offered into the
auction is already subject to long-term bilateral
contracts, under which local utilities (with the
concurrence or at the direction of the State) buy
capacity at negotiated or competitively bid prices,
different from the auction price. FERC requires the
owner of that capacity to offer it into the auction. In
other words, the local utility buys capacity, long-term,
and resells it at auction. The result is multiple prices
for capacity, even for capacity later sold through the
auction.
The net economic effect of state-directed bilateral
capacity purchase agreements is, of course, the same
as that of the contracts for differences at issue here:
The local utility and its ratepayers absorb the
difference between the long-term price at which it
contracted, and whatever the yearly auction price
turns out to be.
16
D. FERC Approved CPV’s Sale Of Capacity
In the Auction
New gas-fired generators are barred from entering
the auction as price-takers, and are instead required
to clear their first (but not subsequent) auction with
a minimum offer price reflecting costs. Until the
2012 auction, however, FERC had exempted state-
supported generators from minimum offer price rules,
allowing them to bid zero so that state-sponsored
projects would receive the clearing price for their
capacity. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74,
79, 86 (3d Cir. 2014) (“NJBPU”).
In response to Maryland’s and New Jersey’s similar
programs, FERC subjected state-supported generators
to minimum offer price rules (to which they had
formerly been exempted), but held that “even if
discriminatory subsidies are being received, if the
resource is needed at the [minimum offer price] then
it ... should be permitted to participate in the auction
regardless of whether it also receives a subsidy.” Id.
at 98, 111 (FERC “permit[ted] states to develop
whatever capacity resources they wish, and to use
those resources to any extent that they wish, while
approving rules that prevent the state’s choices from
adversely affecting wholesale capacity rates.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
CPV offered its capacity in the 2012 auction under
these rules. Its offer cleared, meaning that its capacity
will be sold, and FERC approved the clearing price.
See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 143 FERC 961,090,
P 143 (2013).
E. The Decisions Below
Respondents include incumbent generators claiming
that competition from the successful bidders would
17
affect their prices in the auction. They brought this
case in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland against members of Maryland’s
Public Service Commission. Respondents also brought
a parallel case challenging New Jersey's similar
program. See PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 766
F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014). Petitioner CPV intervened.
Respondents asserted that the Maryland initiative
was “field preempted,” “conflict preempted,” and
violated the Commerce Clause. The district court held
for Respondents on “field preemption,” App.129a,
declined to resolve the conflict preemption claim,
App.37a n.5, and rejected the Commerce Clause claim,
App.37a.
CPV and the Maryland defendants appealed. The
Fourth Circuit affirmed. On “field preemption,” it held
that the contract payments “effectively supplant[]” a
wholesale rate, invading FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction
over rates. App.17a.
The panel also found conflict preemption. It held
that “Maryland’s initiative disrupts [FERC’s] scheme
by substituting the state’s preferred incentive
structure for that approved by FERC.” App.23a. The
Fourth Circuit did not identify the source of its belief
that the FERC-supervised auction was an exclusive
source of incentives, displacing the States.
The Fourth Circuit panel also held that Maryland’s
20-year subsidy conflicted with FERC’s “policy choice”
to allow prices for sales within the auction to be locked
in for only three years. The Fourth Circuit did not
explain why an internal auction sales rule would apply
to transactions outside of the auction, or why its
reasoning would not similarly prohibit the many
18
existing long-term contracts with locked-in capacity
prices.
REASONS TO GRANT THE PETITION
The Fourth Circuit’s rulings (and those of the Third
Circuit, addressing New Jersey's similar program)
dangerously restructure the federal-state division of
authority under the FPA — dangerously because they
displace the only governmental authorities, the
States, authorized to directly support new power plant
construction. The decision disregards this Court’s
stringent standards for finding preemption within the
framework of interlocking federal-state electricity
regulation. It finds improper state rate-setting where
the State set no rate. And it hobbles the States
in structuring incentives for new power plant
construction, as well as for clean and renewable
energy initiatives.
As reflected in earlier decisions of the D.C. and
Third Circuits, FERC’s supervision of markets and
rates gives FERC some incidental ability to influence
power plant construction. But that incidental power
leaves intact the States’ primary authority: over power
plant construction, over capacity and electricity “buy-
side” decisions by state utilities, and over ratepayer
charges to support those activities. In finding
preemption based on a State’s support of new plant
construction through long-term, ratepayer-backed
contracts with the State’s local utilities, and in
granting primacy to the federally-supervised capacity
auction as a source of incentives, the decision below
turns the FPA’s division of responsibility upside down.
It contradicts the basic premises upon which FERC
initiated the capacity auctions.
19
Though the Fourth Circuit declared its ruling
“limited,” it is not. The broad theory of improper
state rate-setting underlying the finding of “field
preemption,” and the equally broad notion of “conflict
preemption” based on the idea that the federally-
supervised auction displaces state-created incentives
for power plant construction, strike at the core of the
States’ ability to support power plant construction
through long-term contracts and rate-payer support.
The legal premises of the decision are decidedly wrong,
and the restructuring of state-federal authority
dramatic.
Moreover, the practical future effects of the court’s
ruling, and the disabling threat they pose to the
States’ ability to support energy infrastructure, are, as
shown below, even more pronounced. By curbing the
use of state-directed contracts, at competitively
determined prices, to encourage power plant
construction and other energy initiatives, the decision
will hobble the States’ ability to assure the creation of
reliable energy supplies to meet their citizens’ — and,
thus, the Nation’s — energy infrastructure needs.
Those needs cannot be directly addressed by FERC
under the FPA; Congress left those matters to the
States. For the reasons described below, the Court
should grant certiorari to address the important
questions presented.
lL THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS
WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS AND
THE STRUCTURE OF THE FPA
A. The Decision Disregards The Standards
For Finding FPA Preemption
All “pre-emption cases . . . start with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not
20
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
The “[nleed for new power facilities, their economic
feasibility, and rates and services, are areas that have
been characteristically governed by the States.” Pac.
Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 205."° The FPA expressly
preserves state authority, and forecloses FERC
authority, over such matters.
FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over interstate
sales and rates. 16 U.S.C. §824(a)-(b). FERC has
jurisdiction over matters affecting or in connection
with rates as well. FERC is denied “jurisdiction,
except as specifically provided in this subchapter .. .
over facilities used for the generation of electric
energy.” 16 U.S.C. §824(b)(1).
The resulting system of “interlocking” state-federal
responsibility impacts preemption standards. With
respect to field preemption, this Court cautioned, in
the context of the FPA’s sister statute, the Natural
Gas Act, against “an extravagant ... mode of
interpretation” of FERC’s authority that would
undermine powers reserved to the States."' Nw. Cent.,
The Fourth Circuit’s theory that this presumption can be
disregarded because the FPA provides for federal regulation of
interstate rates, App.20a, is a non sequitur. Maryland, here,
exercised traditional powers over power plant construction,
utility procurement decisions, and retail rates. The decision
1! While Northwest Central interpreted the Natural Gas Act
(“NGA”), the same principles apply under the FPA: Because
the relevant provisions of the FPA and the Natural Gas Act
are “in all material respects substantially identical,” there is
an “established practice of citing interchangeably decisions
interpreting the pertinent sections of the two statutes.” Ark. La.
21
489 U.S. at 512-13. State programs are not field
preempted merely because they affect matters within
FERC’s jurisdiction, as they inevitably do. Field
preemption is found only where the State enters the
federal sphere, as by setting rates for or regulating
interstate transactions, id., which Maryland did not do
here.
Courts must be equally circumspect in judging
conflict preemption, analyzing “sensitively” so as to
preserve the States’ role. Jd. at 515. The general
approach, anticipated by Congress, is one of federal
accommodation, not preemption. Jd. at 517-18.
Conflict preemption is found only when interference
with FERC’s regulation is “so extensive and
disruptive” that “federal accommodation must give
way to federal pre-emption.” Id.
Even on these basic points, the Fourth Circuit held
to the contrary. It found that the mere fact that FERC
had to consider accommodation and changed the
auction rules in response to Maryland’s initiative
(albeit only by subjecting state-subsidized entities to
the rules to which other new generators are subject)
supported “conflict preemption.” App.24a.
B. The Fourth Circuit Decision Conflicts
With The Premises On Which FERC
Initiated Use Of A Forward Market To
Influence New Construction
The Fourth Circuit’s preemption findings are
inconsistent with the premises upon which FERC
developed the forward capacity auctions.
Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 n.7 (1981) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
22
FERC encouraged development of forward capacity
auctions in some regions in part to improve the ability
of “the market” to generate cogent price signals to
potential investors. But there is simply no conflict
between improving market mechanisms to better
“signal” future needs, and preserving the States’
authority to support new power plant construction
through specific competitive procurements for bilat-
eral contracts when existing markets alone are not
filling the need. FERC acknowledged from the outset
that a forward capacity auction will not always be
“sufficient to provide appropriate incentives for
efficient investment decisions—whether new entry or
a retirement decision is at stake.” FERC explicitly
acknowledged the continuing role of long-term bi-
lateral capacity contracts in providing incentives to
build new power plants. 18 Most recently, in approving
auction rule changes in response to Maryland’s (and
New Jersey's) program, FERC disclaimed any desire
to “interfere with states or localities that, for policy
reasons, seek to provide assistance for new capacity
entry if they believe such expenditures are appro-
priate for their state.”™
This makes perfect sense under the FPA. States
look farther into the future than a three year forward
“ PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC %61,331, P 77
(2006).
“ In response to an objection that the auction was an
“intrusion into state jurisdiction over generation,” FERC
explained that there was no intrusion because utilities may
continue to “create an incentive for the construction of new
capacity by entering into long-term bilateral agreements.. .”
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 115 FERC $61,079, P 172 (2006).
% 137 FERC at PP 3, 89; PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 135
FERC 461,022, P 141 (2011).
23
market. They can assess economic conditions and
encourage investment when capital is tight. They
can consider the benefits of a diverse fuel mix, and
environmental or renewable energy objectives about
which an auction “market” is indifferent. States
necessarily fill those roles because FERC itself is
denied the power to order the creation of new
generation capacity.
In CDPUC, the D.C. Circuit evaluated the nascent
auction being implemented in New England, conclud-
ing that it was an appropriate incident to FERC’s
market and rate regulation. 569 F.3d at 484-85; see
also Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d
216, 222 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing FERC as
having “incidentally incentivized construction of more
generation facilities, which are subject to State
control”). It did so on the explicit understanding that
such an auction left intact the States’ “right to forbid
new entrants from providing new capacity, to require
retirement of existing generators, to limit new con-
struction to more expensive, environmentally friendly
units, or to take any other action in their role as
regulators of generation facilities without direct
interference from [FERC].” CDPUC, 569 F.3d at 481.
Thus, until the Fourth Circuit’s decision here, the
respective spheres of authority were well defined. On
the one hand, FERC could supervise the auction to
ensure that it operates as intended, including how
state-subsidized entities could participate in the
auction. See NJBPU, 744 F.3d 74 (approving rules for
state-subsidized generators); New England Power
Generators, 757 F.3d at 290-91 (approving rules for a
New England auction). On the other hand,
[S]tates remain free to subsidize the
construction of new generators, and load
24
serving entities to build or contract for any
self-supply they believe is necessary.
Id. at 291. States could continue to direct their local
utilities to enter into contracts serving the State’s
energy sufficiency and reliability objectives. The
only limit beyond that was that States could not set
the prices (or review prices) for interstate power
purchases. The Fourth Circuit here turned this
framework upside down, holding that FERC’s auction
has, in fact, displaced the States’ powers to support
new power plant construction because that would
“disrupt” the FERC-supervised auction.
C. The Fourth Circuit Has Fundamentally
Altered the FPA’s Division of State-
Federal Authority
The Fourth Circuit’s rulings reflect basic misun-
derstandings about the FPA regulatory framework
established by FERC and the FPA itself.
1. The Fourth Circuit’s “field
preemption” theory improperly
finds that these contracts contained
rates set by the State
The Fourth Circuit’s field preemption ruling was
wrong for two reasons. First, the contract payments
the Fourth Circuit found objectionable are not “rates”
subject to FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction. Second, and
more important, whether or not subject to FERC’s
jurisdiction, they were not “set” by Maryland, and
therefore, do not invade FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction.
a. The contracts do not contain rates
subject to FERC review
Maryland’s local utilities do not purchase electricity
or capacity from CPV under the contracts at issue. Yet
25
FERC’s rate-review jurisdiction is “limited to
contracts [] which directly govern[] the rate in a
jurisdictional sale—providing for the rate in whole or
in part, or specifying or embodying it, or setting forth
rules by which it is to be calculated.”” Financial
payments separate from such sales are not rates
subject to FERC’s review.’* Thus, the contracts do not
fall within FERC’s jurisdiction (and FERC has not
asserted jurisdiction)—though, as shown below, it
would make no difference for preemption purposes if
they did because the prices were not set by the State.’’
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged as much but held
that Maryland’s program “effectively supplants” the
auction rate and therefore “intrudes on FERC’s
jurisdiction.” App.17a. The Fourth Circuit invoked
this Court’s “filed rate” cases, Mississippi Power &
Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S.
354 (1988) and Nantahala Power & Light Co. v.
Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986). See App.18a.
But the Fourth Circuit misunderstood those cases.
First, the FPA’s filed rate doctrine does not con-
template a single uniform rate at which electricity or
capacity must be bought and sold at any one time. To
the contrary, under the FPA, parties buy and sell at
5 Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 403
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
© See Revised Pub. Util. Filing Requirements, 97 FERC
461,317, *4-5 (2001); N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 74 FERC {7 61,311,
61,986-87 (1996) (FERC has no jurisdiction over a futures
contract that can be settled financially, unless the contract goes
to delivery).
FERC might choose to assert jurisdiction because the
contracts “affect,” or are “in connection with,” interstate rates.
See 16 U.S.C. §§824d, 824e.
26
prices of their choosing.” The auction only establishes
a rate for capacity sold in the auction. Capacity,
including capacity resold in the auction, is routinely
sold at prices different from auction prices. That there
is a difference between what CPV will receive under
its long-term contract, on the one hand, and what it
will receive for capacity in the yearly auction, on the
other, is immaterial for preemption purposes.
Second, the basis for finding preemption in the “filed
rate” cases was the fact that an electric utility had
bought or was already committed to buy energy on
terms subject to FERC’s jurisdiction—and the State
then second-guessed those terms by preventing its
electric utility from recovering the resulting costs.
Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 970; Mississippi Power &
Light, 487 U.S. at 372. In each case, the State
substituted its judgment for FERC’s, resulting in
unrecoverable payments by the utilities, “trapped
costs.” There is no analogous trapped cost or second-
guessing of a FERC-jurisdictional purchase here. To
the contrary, the State’s input here was prospective,
as part of its control over utility buy-side decisions. It
does not “stand[] to reason” (as the Fourth Circuit put
it, App.18a), that the “filed rate” doctrine applies
equally to payments that exceed the auction price
based on a State’s buy-side direction. Neither FERC
nor any court has ever so held. Indeed, it is no surprise
that the prices to support new construction, in a
NRG, 558 U.S. at 167 (“a rate set by a freely negotiated
wholesale-energy contract meets the statutory just and
reasonable requirement”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27
particular locale, over a long-term,”’ are different from
one-year auction prices.
The economic effect of States directing local utilities
to enter into long-term capacity purchase contracts is
precisely the same as the contracts for differences
here. The utility buys capacity over a long-term at a
fixed price. It must then offer that capacity in the
auction, and obtain whatever price the auction
provides. The utility receives (or pays) the difference
between its contract price and the auction price. The
payment of that difference is what the Fourth Circuit
deemed preempted here.
b. Maryland set no rates
Contracts and rates subject to FERC’s review
jurisdiction do not usurp FERC jurisdiction. Rather,
they submit to that jurisdiction, and are not
preempted. Indeed, by holding these contracts invalid,
the Fourth Circuit (on its theory that the contracts
invade FERC’s jurisdiction) paradoxically prevented
FERC from reviewing these contracts.”
The more important point for preemption, however,
is that whether or not these contracts are reviewable
by FERC, they are not preempted. That is because the
prices set forth in the contracts were not set by, or
reviewed by, Maryland, but by CPV, as offeror, in a
competitive procurement. In other words, the issue
® It would be “perverse” to expect such contracts to mimic
single year prices. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 547-48, 551
(“parties enter into wholesale-power contracts .. . to hedge
against the volatility that market imperfections produce”).
* FERC so held. CPV Shore, L.L.C., CPV Maryland, L.L.C.,
148 FERC 761,096, PP 28-31 (2014) (ruling that it could not
review the contracts because the court declared them invalid).
28
whether these contracts contain a FERC-jurisdictional
rate determines whether the contracts are subject to
FERC review. But it does not determine whether the
State has purported to exercise a power — to set or
determine rates for interstate sales — reserved to
FERC by the FPA. Here, the State simply exercised
its authority to direct its utilities’ buy-side decisions.
The Fourth Circuit missed this distinction.
It is well established that States retain authority
over “resource planning and utility buy-side
decisions.” See New York, 535 U.S. at 24. States may
thus direct utilities to buy capacity or energy under
long-term agreements. See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. §35.27
(FERC recognizing States’ authority to “establish . . .
[clompetitive procedures for the acquisition of electric
energy”); see also Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 134 FERC
at P 30 & n.62 (States may “dictate the generation
resources from which utilities may procure electric
energy.”).
A State crosses the line into exclusive FERC
territory not by directing its utilities to enter into
contracts reviewable by FERC, but only if it purports
to mandate the price at which capacity is purchased,
rather than allow it to be established by negotiation,
or, as here, by competitive bid. The State exercises the
kind of governmental power over rates reserved to
FERC by the FPA only if it sets or reviews the rate for
reasonableness. FERC’s cases reflect this basic
distinction. Compare Allegheny Energy Supply Co.,
108 FERC 761,082, PP 15, 20, 21 (2004) (approving a
state procurement where competitively bid prices
“were binding. Winning bidders received the actual
price in their offers .. . .”), with Cal. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n, 132 FERC at P 64 (state-imposed rate is
preempted); Midwest, 78 FERC at 61,246, 61,248
29
(state-directed procurement “preempted to. . . the
extent [the State] set[s} rates for the wholesale sales
of electric energy”).
By conducting a procurement, without setting a
price, Maryland did not usurp any power reserved to
FERC. The Fourth Circuit — like the Third, whose
decision followed — missed this basic point. In so
doing, these two Circuits have eviscerated a clear line
between permissible procurements and impermissible
state rate-review, hobbling the States’ ability to
support needed power plant construction and other
energy initiatives in the process.
2. Maryland’s initiative does not
conflict with any federal policy
The Fourth Circuit’s “conflict preemption” theory is
also untenable. There was no actual conflict between
Maryland’s program and the auction. FERC may
make rules that protect the auction. FERC here
changed the auction’s rules (which had exempted
state-supported generators from minimum offer
price requirements) to address Maryland’s (and New
Jersey's similar) subsidy. See NJBPU, 744 F.3d 74.
With those changes, FERC concluded that auction
sales by state-supported generators are “competitive”
and “economic,” “regardless of whether [the generator]
also receives a subsidy.” Jd. at 91-92, 97, 110 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Third Circuit affirmed
FERC’s revisions as “preventling] the state’s choices
from adversely affecting wholesale capacity rates.” Id.
at 98.
In the absence of a concrete conflict, the Fourth
Circuit discerned a conflict in the notion that
“Maryland’s initiative disrupts this scheme by
substituting the state’s preferred incentive structure
30
for that approved by FERC.” App.23a. But that
“disruption” rests on the false premise that auction
“price signals” were to be an exclusive source of
“incentives” for constructing power plants. There is no
evidence that FERC, let alone Congress, had that
intention.
There is nothing incompatible about FERC, on
the one hand, organizing an auction to allow the
“market” to more effectively encourage investment,
and States retaining their historic authority to
support infrastructure development through long-
term contracts when economic conditions are not
otherwise attracting the necessary investment capital.
A preference for market solutions is not inconsistent
with States retaining power to support energy
initiatives through procurements.
The Fourth Circuit also cited an auction rule that
allows new generators in certain situations to lock in
a price that auction purchasers must pay for a three
year period—even if later auction prices are lower.
The Fourth Circuit found in this rule a FERC “policy”
against state subsidies extending more than three
years. But, in fact, FERC was simply making a rule
about auction sales for auction purchasers. Such a
rule says nothing at all about the duration of subsidies
or contracts outside the auction, which impose no
added cost on auction purchasers at all.
Il. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION DE-
PRIVES STATES—AND FERC—OF AU-
THORITY NEEDED TO SUPPORT THE
NATION’S ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE
The Fourth Circuit’s decision nullifies Maryland’s
program for a much needed power plant. New Jersey’s
similar initiative was nullified on a similar and
31
equally doubtful basis. See Solomon, 766 F.3d 241.
But the importance of these decisions extends far
beyond these vital power plants. As described above,
the assurance of stable long-term revenue has always
been necessary to attract capital to build new power
plants, and it continues to be necessary. Thus,
virtually all power plant construction—more than 97%
—is supported by long-term ratepayer commitments.
In States without vertically-integrated utilities (where
ratepayer commitment to offset prudently incurred
costs follows routinely), new power plants will not
be built—nor other energy initiatives pursued—
without the revenue assurances provided by long-term
contracts.”
State authority to support needed infrastructure
development by directing the purchasing decisions of
its utilities is more critical than ever. A substantial
portion of the Nation’s coal-fired power supply is being
retired. Environmental regulations and economic
factors favoring natural gas over coal are driving the
change.” The Department of Energy projects that 50
GW of the Nation’s existing 310 GW of coal-fired
generating capacity will be retired by 2020. PJM
estimates retirements of between 11 and 25 GW in the
*1 In 2013, only 2.4 percent of new capacity was built solely for
open sales into interstate markets. 2014 APPA Study at 1-2 and
Table 1. And the vast majority of even that small proportion
received some type of subsidy. Id. at 2.
™ See PJM, Coal Capacity at Risk for Retirement in PJM:
Potential Impacts of the Finalized EPA Cross State Air Pollution
Rule and Proposed National Emissions Standards for Hazardous
Air Pollutants at 10-15 (2011) ("2011 PJM Study”).
® U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy
Outlook 2014 at IF-34 (Apr. 2014).
32
region,“ and independent analyses indicate up to 21
GW of retirements by 2018. Even more closures
are likely in light of the Environmental Protection
Agency's June 2014 proposed regulation calling on
States to take the lead in reducing carbon dioxide
emissions from power plants.”
The long-term contract mechanism to support
infrastructure development used here by Maryland
(and by New Jersey, see Solomon, 766 F.3d at 248-49)
—a contract for differences—is especially important
because it is ideally suited to its purpose of providing
ratepayer support for power plant construction.
Ratepayers pay only what is needed to support the
intended result (whether a new natural gas-fired
power plant or a wind farm), net of what the developer
earns anyway by selling its capacity in the interstate
market. New Jersey, for example, subsidizes renew-
able energy generation by measuring the difference
between the bid price, and the price earned through
sales.
Other States have used similar mechanisms to
encourage renewable energy production and carry out
other facets of electric resource planning. Connecticut,
for example, used this mechanism to support renewa-
ble power projects.”” And States similarly direct their
local utilities to negotiate cost-based contracts with
* See 2011 PJM Study at 27-28.
* Onur Aydin, Frank Graves, and Metin Celebi, Coal Plant
Retirements: Feedback Effects on Wholesale Electricity Prices, The
Brattle Group (Nov. 2013).
* EPA, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, Proposed
Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (Jun. 18, 2014).
™’ Conn. Pub. Act 13-303, Section 6 (2013).
33
economically distressed power plants where loss of the
power plant’s capacity could negatively impact reliable
electric supplies for the State.“ Thus, the decision
below has immediate implications for a range of
initiatives already in place, beyond support for new,
traditional fuel power plants.
Long-term contracts are pirticularly effective in
supporting development of new technology and fuel
diversity. Massachusetts established a program
under which it ordered its utilities to enter into long-
term contracts with renewable power developers.”
Illinois sought to promote clean coal technology, and
so used its procurement power to require its utilities
to enter into long-term power purchase agreements
with a firm building the world’s first zero emission
coal-fired power plant.” Nevada,” Rhode Island,”
and other States also rely on state-run procurements
to secure the long-term contracts necessary to cover
the enormous costs of power plant development.
While the Fourth Circuit protectively pronounced
its ruling “narrow,” it sweeps broadly. The Fourth
% See Jeff Beattie, “New York Regulators Throw Lifeline to
Exelon’s Struggling Ginna Nuke,” HIS Energy Daily (Nov. 17,
2014); see also Resolution E-4471, Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal.
(Mar. 22, 2012) (state-directed procurement to support continued
operations at a natural gas-fired power plant); “Calpine Executes
Contracts for Sutter Energy Center With California Utilities,”
Reuters (May 7, 2012), http://goo.gi/tPq07o0. (same).
%® 2012 Mass. Legis. Serv., ch. 209, §35.
*® See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n,
2014 IL App (1st) 130544 (2014).
3! Nev. Rev. Stat. §704.7316.
33 In re Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25
A.3d 482 (R.1. 2011).
34
Circuit’s field preemption theory rests on the
erroneous premise that by directing a local utility's
buy-side decision through a competitive procurement,
a State is thereby setting a rate different from the
auction rate, and thus invading FERC’s exclusive rate-
review authority. That holding bars States from
employing one of their traditional, and certainly most
effective, toole—the offer of long-term, ratepayer-
supported contracts—to encourage investment in new
power plants or to support other energy initiatives.
Moreover, there is nothing unusual—or preempted—
about the fact that such long-term contracts produce
prices different from auction prices. Almost all
capacity, including capacity already subject to
bilateral contracts at prices different from auction
prices (whether state-directed or not), must be bid into
its capacity auction. All such contracts, particularly
long-term agreements, create a price for capacity sold
in the yearly auction that is not the auction price. Cf.
App.19a. The economic effect of long-term capacity
purchase agreements on the parties, and on the
auction, is the same as the contracts for differences at
issue here.
The Fourth Circuit’s conflict preemption ruling is
arguably even more expansive. According to the
Fourth Circuit, Maryland disrupted the federal
regulatory framework “by substituting the state’s
preferred incentive structure for that approved by
FERC.” App.23a. Under this theory, any special
state incentive to encourage new generation—or reject
new construction—would contradict the “incentive
structure” of the auction market. In addition, by
capping generators’ compensgation at the auction price,
the ruling seemingly forecloses the States’ ability to
35
opt for more expensive options, such as solar, wind,
nuclear, or clean coal.
The Fourth Circuit’s decision thus strips the States
of basic tools that they need and use to support
investment in energy infrastructure.“ And because
FERC itself lacks authority in this field, stripping
the States of such powers dangerously leaves no
government with the authority to intervene directly to
ensure that the Nation’s urgent need for adequate
supplies of electricity are met.
Finally, while resting on the notion that preemption
was necessary here to protect FERC’s authority, the
Fourth Circuit’s rulings actually diminished that
authority. By invalidating these contracts as
preempted, the Fourth Circuit prevented FERC from
reviewing them to determine whether they are just
and reasonable.* And while finding that Maryland’s
program conflicts in some way with the FERC-
supervised auction, the appellate court effectively
overrode FERC’s determination that Petitioner could
sell its capacity in the auction without any harm to
that auction.
% The Fourth Circuit’s alternative conflict preemption ruling
is equally broad. It equates FERC’s many decisions about how
the auction should operate with an “explicit policy choice” that
preempts state actions outside the auction. App.24a.
™ See CPV Shore, 148 FERC at PP 28-31 (FERC ruling that it
could not review the contracts because the court declared them
invalid).
APPENDIX
36
CONCLUSION
The petition should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
CLIFTON S. ELGARTEN
Counsel of Record
LARRY F. EISENSTAT
RICHARD LEHFELDT
JENNIFER N. WATERS
CROWELL & MORING LLP
1001 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20004
Counsel for Petitioner
November 26, 2014
la
APPENDIX A
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2419
PPL ENERGYPLUS, LLC; PPL BRUNNER ISLAND, LLC;
PPL HOLTwoop, LLC; PPL MARTINS CREEK, LLC;
PPL Montour, LLC; PPL SUSQUEHANNA, LLC;
LOWER MOUNT BETHEL ENERGY, LLC; PPL
NEW JERSEY SOLAR, LLC; PPL NEw JERSEY BIOGAS,
LLC; PPL RENEWABLE ENERGY, LLC; PSEG POWER
LLC; ESSENTIAL POWER, LLC,
Plaintiffs Appellees,
Vv.
DOUGLAS R.M. NAZARIAN; HAROLD WILLIAMS;
LAWRENCE BRENNER; KELLY SPEAKES-BACKMAN;
KEVIN HUGHES,
Defendants - Appellants,
and
CPV MARYLAND, LLC,
Defendant.
AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL
RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION; NRG
ENERGY INC.; MARYLAND OFFICE OF PEOPLE’S
COUNSEL; CONNECTICUT PUBLIC UTILITIES
REGULATORY AUTHORITY; CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;
2a
GEORGE JEPSEN, Attorney General for the State of
Connecticut; CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF CONSUMER
COUNSEL; NEW ENGLAND CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSIONERS, INC.; MAINE PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION; RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION; VERMONT PUBLIC SERVICE
BOARD; VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE;
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION; PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
(NYPSC); PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; DELAWARE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION; NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES; NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF RATE COUNSEL;
MARYLAND ENERGY ADMINISTRATION; AMERICAN WIND
ENERGY ASSOCIATION; THE MID-ATLANTIC
RENEWABLE ENERGY COALITION,
Amici Supporting Appellants,
PJM POWER PROVIDERS GROUP; ELECTRIC POWER
SUPPLY ASSOCIATION; EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,
Amici Supporting Appellees.
No. 13-2424
PPL ENERGYPLUuUS, LLC; PPL BRUNNER ISLAND, LLC;
PPL HOLTwoop, LLC; PPL MARTINS CREEK, LLC;
PPL MONTOUR, LLC; PPL SUSQUEHANNA, LLC;
LOWER MOUNT BETHEL ENERGY, LLC;
PPL NEW JERSEY SOLAR, LLC; PPL NEW JERSEY
BroGas, LLC; PPL RENEWABLE ENERGY, LLC; PSEG
POWER LLC; ESSENTIAL POWER, LLC,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
CPV MARYLAND, LLC,
Defendant - Appellant,
3a
and
DOUGLAS R.M. NAZARIAN; HAROLD WILLIAMS;
LAWRENCE BRENNER; KELLY SPEAKES-BACKMAN;
KEVIN HUGHES,
Defendants.
AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL
RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION;
NRG ENERGY INC.; MARYLAND OFFICE OF PEOPLE’S
COUNSEL; CONNECTICUT PUBLIC UTILITIES
REGULATORY AUTHORITY; CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;
GEORGE JEPSEN, Attorney General for the State of
Connecticut; CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF CONSUMER
COUNSEL; NEW ENGLAND CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSIONERS, INC.; MAINE PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION; RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION; VERMONT PUBLIC SERVICE
BOARD; VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE;
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION; PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
(NYPSC); PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; DELAWARE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION; NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES; NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF RATE COUNSEL;
MARYLAND ENERGY ADMINISTRATION; AMERICAN
WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION; THE MID-ATLANTIC
RENEWABLE ENERGY COALITION,
Amici Supporting Appellant,
PJM POWER PROVIDERS GROUP; ELECTRIC POWER
SUPPLY ASSOCIATION; EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,
Amici Supporting Appellees.
4a
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis,
Senior District Judge. (1:12-cv-01286-MJG)
Argued: May 13, 2014 Decided: June 2, 2014
Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Keenan and Judge Diaz
joined.
ARGUED: Scott H. Strauss, SPIEGEL &
MCDIARMID, LLP, Washington, D.C.; Clifton Scott
Elgarten, CROWELL & MORING LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Appellants. Paul D. Clement, BANCROFT,
PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF:
H. Robert Erwin, Ransom E. Davis, Baltimore,
Maryland; Peter J. Hopkins, Jeffrey A. Schwarz,
SPIEGEL & MCDIARMID LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Appellants Douglas R.M. Nazarian, Harold Williams,
Lawrence Brenner, Kelly Speakes-Backman, and
Kevin Hughes. Larry F. Eisenstat, Richard Lehfeldt,
Jennifer N. Waters, CROWELL & MORING LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant CPV Maryland, LLC.
Erin E. Murphy, Candice Chiu, BANCROFT PLLC,
Washington, D.C., for Amici. Jesse A. Dillon, PPL
SERVICES CORP., Allentown, Pennsylvania, David
L. Meyer, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellees PPL EnergyPlus,
5a
LLC, PPL Brunner Island, LLC, PPL Holtwood, LLC,
PPL Martins Creek, LLC, PPL Montour, LLC, PPL
Susquehanna, LLC, Lower Mount Bethel Energy,
LLC, PPL New Jersey Solar, LLC, PPL New Jersey
Biogas, LLC, and PPL Renewable Energy, LLC.
Tamara Linde, Vice President Regulatory, Vaughn
L. McKoy, General State Regulatory Counsel,
PSEG SERVICES CORP., Newark, New Jersey;
Shannen W. Coffin, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee PSEG Power, LLC.
David Musselman, ESSENTIAL POWER, LLC,
Princeton, New Jersey, for Appellee Essential Power,
LLC. Susan N. Kelly, Senior Vice President of Policy
Analysis and General Counsel, Delia D. Patterson,
Assistant General Counsel, AMERICAN PUBLIC
POWER ASSOCIATION, Washington, D.C.; Jay A.
Morrison, Vice President, Regulatory Issues, Pamela
M. Silberstein, Associate Director, Power Supply
Issues, NATIONAL RURAL ELECTRIC COOPER-
ATIVE ASSOCIATION, Arlington, Virginia, for Amici
American Public Power Association and National
Rural Electric Cooperative Association. Abraham
Silverman, Cortney Madea, NRG ENERGY, INC.,
Princeton, New Jersey; Jeffrey A. Lamken, Martin V
Totaro, Washington, D.C., Kaitlin R. O’Donnell,
MOLOLAMKEN LLP, New York, New York, for
Amicus NRG Energy Inc. Paula M. Carmody, William
F. Fields, MARYLAND OFFICE OF PEOPLE’S
COUNSEL, Baltimore, Maryland, for Amicus
Maryland Office of People’s Counsel. Randall L. Speck,
Jeffrey A. Fuisz, Kimberly B. Frank, Susanna Y. Chu,
KAYE SCHOLER LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici.
Clare E. Kindall, Assistant Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, New
Britain, Connecticut, for Amicus Connecticut Public
Utilities Regulatory Authority. Robert D. Snook,
6a
Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, New Britain, Connecticut,
for Amicus Connecticut Department of Energy and
Environmental Protection. John S. Wright, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Wertheimer, Assistant
Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, New Britain, Connecticut, for Amicus
George Jepsen, Attorney General for the State of
Connecticut. Elin Swanson Katz, Joseph A. Rosenthal,
CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF CONSUMER COUN-
SEL, New Britain, Connecticut, for Amicus
Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel. Sarah
Hofmann, Executive Director, NEW ENGLAND
CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMIS-
SIONERS, INC., Montpelier, Vermont, for Amicus
New England Conference of Public Utilities
Commissioners, Inc. Lisa Fink, STATE OF MAINE
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, Augusta,
Maine, for Amicus Maine Public Utilities Commission.
Amy K. D’Alessandro, RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION, Warwick, Rhode Island,
for Amicus Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission.
June Tierney, General Counsel, VERMONT PUBLIC
SERVICE BOARD, Montpelier, Vermont, for Amicus
Vermont Public Service Board. Edward McNamara,
Regional Policy Director, VERMONT DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SERVICE, Montpelier, Vermont, for
Amicus Vermont Department of Public Service. Frank
Lindh, Candace Morey, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION, ' San _ Francisco,
California, for Amicus California Public Utilities
Commission.Kimberly A. Harriman, Acting General
Counsel, Jonathan D. Feinberg, Solicitor, Alan
Michaels, Assistant Counsel, PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
Albany, New York, for Amicus Public Service
7a
Commission of the State of New York. Richard A.
Beverly, Richard S. Herskovitz, PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Washington, D.C., for Amicus Public Service Commis-
sion of the District of Columbia. Kathleen Makowski,
Deputy Attorney General, DELAWARE PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION, Dover, Delaware, for
Amicus Delaware Public Service Commission. John
Jay Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, Richard F.
Engel, Deputy Attorney General, Lisa J. Morelli,
Deputy Attorney General, Alex Moreau, Deputy
Attorney General, Jennifer S. Hsia, Deputy Attorney
General, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF LAW
AND PUBLIC SAFETY, Trenton, New Jersey, for
Amicus New Jersey Board of Public Utilities. Stefanie
A. Brand, Director, NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF
RATE COUNSEL, Trenton, New Jersey, for Amicus
New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel. Douglas F.
Gansler, Attorney General, Brent A. Bolea, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven M. Talson, Assistant
Attorney General, MARYLAND ENERGY ADMIN-
ISTRATION, Annapolis, Maryland, for Amicus
Maryland Energy Administration. Gene Grace,
AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION,
Washington, D.C., for Amici American Wind Energy
Association and The Mid-Atlantic Renewable Energy
Coalition. Glen Thomas, PJM POWER PROVIDERS
GROUP, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania; John Lee
Shepherd, Jr., Karis Anne Gong, SKADDEN, ARPS,
SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, Washington, D.C.,
for Amicus PJM Power Providers Group. David G.
Tewksbury, Stephanie S. Lim, Ashley C. Parrish,
KING & SPALDING LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Amicus The Electric Power Supply Association.
Edward H. Comer, Vice President, General Counsel
and Corporate Secretary, Henri D. Bartholomot,
8a
Associate General Counsel, Regulatory and Litigation,
EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, Washington, D.C..,
for Amicus Edison Electric Institute.
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
At issue is a Maryland program to subsidize the
participation of a new power plant in the federal
wholesale energy market. Appellees are energy firms
that compete with this new plant in interstate
commerce. They contend that the Maryland scheme is
preempted under the Federal Power Act’s authorizing
provisions, which grant exclusive authority over
interstate rates to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission. The district court agreed. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
A.
For much of the 20th century, the energy market
was dominated by vertically integrated firms that
produced, transmitted, and delivered power to end-use
customers. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002);
PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d
790, 798 (D. Md. 2013) (opinion below). These firms
were subject to extensive local regulation, though
state power in this respect was limited by the
strictures of the dormant Commerce Clause. See Pub.
Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S.
83, 89 (1927).
The Federal Power Act (FPA), passed in 1935, was
designed in part to fill the regulatory gap created by
the dormant Commerce Clause and cover the then-
nascent field of interstate electricity sales. It vests the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with
9a
authority over the “transmission of electric energy
in interstate commerce” and the “sale of electric
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” 16
U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). Federal regulation has become
increasingly prominent as the energy market has
shifted away from local monopolies to a system of
interstate competition. See New York, 535 U.S. at 7.
Rather than ensuring the reasonableness of
interstate transactions by directly setting rates, FERC
has chosen instead to achieve its regulatory aims
indirectly by protecting “the integrity of the interstate
energy markets.” N..J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744
F.3d 74, 81 (3d Cir. 2014). To this end, FERC has
authorized the creation of “regional transmission
organizations” to oversee certain multistate markets.
PJM Interconnection, LLC (PJM), superintended by
FERC, administers a large regional market that (as
relevant here) includes Maryland and the District of
Columbia.
PJM operates both energy and capacity markets.
The energy market is essentially a real-time market
that enables PJM to buy and sell electricity to
distributors for delivery within the next hour or 24
hours.
The capacity market is a forward-looking market,
which gives buyers the option to purchase electricity
in the future. In the capacity market, PJM sets a quota
based on how much capacity it predicts will be needed
three years hence and then relies on a Reliability
Pricing Model (RPM) to determine the appropriate
price per unit. Auction participants bid to sell capacity
for a single year, three years in the future. PJM stacks
the bids from lowest to highest and, starting at the
bottom, accepts bids until it has acquired sufficient
capacity to satisfy its quota.
10a
The highest-priced bid that PJM must accept to
meet this quota establishes the market-clearing price.
Every generator who bids at or below this level “clears”
the market and is paid the clearing price, regardless
of the price at which it actually bid. Existing
generators are permitted to bid at zero as “price-
takers,” meaning they agree to sell at whatever the
clearing price turns out to be.
Both the capacity and energy markets are designed
to efficiently allocate supply and demand, a function
which has the collateral benefit of incentivizing the
construction of new power plants when necessary.
Clearing prices occasionally differ based on geo-
graphical subdivisions designed by FERC to stimulate
new construction by signaling that certain regions are
prone to supply shortages. Such price signals are not
the sole mechanism for incentivizing generation,
however. PJM’s new entry price adjustment (NEPA)
guarantees certain new producers a fixed price for
three years to “support .. . the new entrant until
sufficient load growth [i.e., increased demand} would
be expected to” do so. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 128
FERC 4 61,157, at J 101 (2009).
In 2006, FERC instituted a requirement (the
minimum offer price rule, or MOPR) that new
generators in certain circumstances bid at or above a
specified price, fixed according to the agency’s estima-
tion of a generic energy project’s cost. This rule was
designed to prevent the manipulation of clearing
prices through the exercise of buyer market power.
The MOPR originally exempted certain state-
supported generators, however, and permitted them to
bid at zero.
Following a complaint lodged by several
competitors, FERC eliminated the exemption for
lla
state-sanctioned plants. The new rule required such
plants to bid initially at the agency-specified minimum
price unless they could demonstrate that their actual
costs were lower than this default price. FERC held
that this adjustment was necessary to protect the
integrity of its markets against below-cost bids by
subsidized plants that might artificially suppress
clearing prices. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 137
FERC 4 61,145, at { 96 (2011).
As these features suggest, the federal markets are
the product of a finely-wrought scheme that attempts
to achieve a variety of different aims. FERC rules
encourage the construction of new plants and sustain
existing ones. They seek to preclude state distortion of
wholesale prices while preserving general state
authority over generation sources. They satisfy short-
term demand and ensure sufficient long-term supply.
In short, the federal scheme is carefully calibrated to
protect a host of competing interests. It represents a
comprehensive program of regulation that is quite
sensitive to external tampering. .
B.
In 1999, Maryland decided to abandon the vertical
integration model and throw in its lot with the federal
interstate markets. Deregulation was accomplished by
the Electric Customer Choice and Competition Act,
Md. Code Ann., Pub. Utils. § 7-501, et seg., which
divested utilities of their generation resources,
effectively compelling Maryland energy firms to
participate in the federal wholesale markets. See PPL
EnergyPlus, LLC, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 815. The state
believed that these markets would ultimately produce
more efficient and cost-effective service than
traditional monopolies, thus providing state residents
the benefit of lower prices. See In the Matter of
12a
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company’s Proposal,
Order No. 81423, at 36 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, May
2007). Maryland’s decision to participate in the federal
scheme and enjoy its benefits was necessarily
accompanied by a relinquishment of the regulatory
autonomy the state had formerly enjoyed with respect
to traditional utility monopolies.
Maryland soon became concerned, though, that the
RPM was failing to adequately incentivize new
generation. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, 974 F. Supp. 2d at
795. To solve this perceived problem, the Maryland
Public Service Commission (MPSC) solicited proposals
for the construction of a new power plant. The plant
was to be located in the “SWMAAC zone,” an area
comprising part of Maryland and all of D.C., which the
state believed was at heightened risk for reliability
problems. In order to attract offers, the MPSC offered
the successful bidder a fixed, twenty-year revenue
stream secured by contracts for differences (CfDs) that
the state would compel one or more of its local electric
distribution companies (EDCs) to enter. Maryland’s
plan was ultimately formalized in the Generation
Order, issued by MPSC in 2012.
Intervenor-appellant Commercial Power Ventures
Maryland, LLC (CPV) submitted the winning bid and
was awarded the promised CfDs. The CfDs required
CPV to build a plant and sell its energy and capacity
on the federal interstate wholesale markets. If CPV
successfully cleared the market, it would be eligible for
payments from the EDCs amounting to the difference
between CPV’s revenue requirements per unit of
energy and capacity sold (set forth in its winning bid)
and its actual sales receipts. These costs would in turn
be passed on to the EDCs’ retail ratepayers. If CPV’s
receipts exceeded its approved revenue requirements,
13a
it would be obligated to pay the difference to the EDCs.
The CfDs did not require CPV to actually sell any
energy or capacity to the EDCs.
Plaintiffs-appellees are existing power plants in
competition with CPV who allege that the Genera-
tion Order is unconstitutional and has resulted in the
suppression of PJM prices, a reduction in their
revenue from the PJM market, and a distortion of the
price signals that market participants rely on in
determining whether to construct new capacity. After
a six-day bench trial, the district court found the
Generation Order field preempted. It reasoned that
the CfD payments had the effect of setting the
ultimate price that CPV receives for its sales in the
PJM auction, thus intruding on FERC’s exclusive
authority to set interstate wholesale rates. It did not
reach appellees’ conflict preemption claim and rejected
their dormant Commerce Clause claim. This appeal
followed.
IT.
Plaintiffs argue that the Generation Order and the
resulting CfDs are preempted by federal law under the
Supremacy Clause. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. They
ground this contention in two alternative theories:
field preemption and conflict preemption. We address
each in turn.’
1 As a threshold matter, appellants assert that we lack
jurisdiction under the filed rate doctrine. See Appellants’ Br. at
9. This claim is meritless, however, given that a judgment in
plaintiffs’ favor would require this court neither “to invalidate a
filed rate nor to assume a rate would be charged other than the
rate adopted by the federal agency in question.” Pub. Util. Dist.
No. 1 v. IDACORP Inc., 379 F.3d 641, 650 (9th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
l4a
A.
Preemption of all varieties is ultimately a question
of congressional intent. Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v.
State Corp. Comm’n, 489 U.S. 493, 509 (1989). Here,
the district court found the Generation Order invalid
under the doctrine of field preemption, which applies
when “Congress has legislated comprehensively to
occupy an entire field of regulation, leaving no room
for the States to supplement federal law.” Id. Actual
conflict between a challenged state enactment and
relevant federal law is unnecessary to a finding of field
preemption; instead, it is the mere fact of intrusion
that offends the Supremacy Clause. See N. Natural
Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 372 U.S. 84, 97-98
(1963). “If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a
given field, any state law falling within that field is
pre-empted.” Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
238, 248 (1984).
Statutory text and structure provide the most
reliable guideposts in this inquiry. See Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996) (“Congress’ intent, of
course, primarily is discerned from the language of the
pre-emption statute and the statutory framework
surrounding it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The FPA’s “declaration of policy” states:
It is declared that the business of
transmitting and selling electric energy for
ultimate distribution to the public is affected
with a public interest, and that Federal
regulation of matters relating to generation to
the extent provided in this subchapter and
subchapter III of this chapter and of that part
of such business which consists of the
transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce and the sale of such energy at
15a
wholesale in interstate commerce is
necessary in the public interest, such Federal
regulation, however, to extend only to those
matters which are not subject to regulation by
the States.
16 U.S.C. § 824(a); see also id. at § 824(b).
The breadth of this grant of authority is confirmed
by the FPA’s similarly capacious substantive and
remedial provisions. For example, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)
states that:
All rates and charges made, demanded, or
received by any public utility for or in
connection with the transmission or sale of
electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission, and all rules and
regulations affecting or pertaining to such
rates or charges shall be just and reasonable,
and any such rate or charge that is not just
and reasonable is hereby declared to be
unlawful.
A wealth of case law confirms FERC’s exclusive
power to regulate wholesale sales of energy in
interstate commerce, including the justness and
reasonableness of the rates charged. “The [FPA] long
has been recognized as a comprehensive scheme of
federal regulation of all wholesales of [energy] in
interstate commerce,” Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline
Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988) (internal quotation
marks omitted), and “FERC’s jurisdiction over
interstate wholesale rates is exclusive,” Appalachian
Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 812 F.2d 898, 902
(4th Cir. 1987); see also New England Power Co. v.
16a
New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 340 (1982).? In this
area, “if FERC has jurisdiction over a subject, the
States cannot have jurisdiction over the same subject.”
Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore,
487 U.S. 354, 377 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected
the proposition that the “scope of [FERC’s] jurisdiction
... is to be determined by a case-by-case analysis of
the impact of state regulation upon the national
interest.” Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg,
476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986) (quoting FPC v. S. Cal.
Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). Instead, “Congress meant to
draw a bright line easily ascertained, between state
and federal jurisdiction ... . This was done in the
[FPA] by making [FERC] jurisdiction plenary and
extending it to all wholesale sales in interstate
commerce except those which Congress has made
explicitly subject to regulation by the States.” Jd.
(quoting S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. at 215-16)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The federal scheme thus “leaves no room either for
direct state regulation of the prices of interstate
wholesales of [energy], or for state regulations which
would indirectly achieve the same result.” N. Natural
Gas Co., 372 U.S. at 91 (citation omitted). “Even where
state regulation operates within its own field, it may
? Schneidewind dealt with the Natural Gas Act rather than the
FPA. However, because “the relevant provisions of the two
statutes are in al) material respects substantially identical,” the
Supreme Court has adopted an “established practice of citing
interchangeably decisions interpreting the pertinent sections of
the two statutes.” Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 578 n.7
(1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17a
not intrude indirectly on areas of exclusive federal
authority.” Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC, 900 F.2d 269,
274 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks
omitted). As a result, states are barred from relying on
mere formal distinctions in “an attempt” to evade
preemption and “regulate matters within FERC’s
exclusive jurisdiction.” Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 308.
B.
Applying these principles, we conclude that the
Generation Order is field preempted because it
functionally sets the rate that CPV receives for its
sales in the PJM auction.
The CfD payments, which are conditioned on CPV
clearing the federal market, plainly qualify as
compensation for interstate sales at wholesale, not
simply for CPV’s construction of a plant. Furthermore,
the Order ensures—through a system of rebates and
subsidies calculated on the basis of the PJM market
rate—that CPV receives a fixed sum for every unit of
capacity and energy that it clears (up to a certain
ceiling). The scheme thus effectively supplants the
rate generated by the auction with an alternative rate
preferred by the state. See Appalachian Power Co., 812
F.2d at 904 (holding that the agreement at issue did
not “set a rate per se,” but that it nevertheless
“sufficiently resemble[d] a filed rate to come within the
realm of exclusive federal jurisdiction”). The Order
thus compromises the integrity of the federal scheme
and intrudes on FERC’s jurisdiction.
Maryland and CPV argue that the Generation Order
does not actually set a rate because it does not directly
affect the terms of any transaction in the federal
market. Relevantly, appellants contend, the Order
does not fix the rate that PJM pays to CPV for its sales
18a
in the auction; instead, it merely fixes the rate that
CPV receives for such sales. On the basis of this
asymmetry, appellants contend that the CfD
payments represent a separate supply-side subsidy
implemented entirely outside the federal market.
We cannot accept this argument. The case of
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel.
Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988), is illustrative. There,
FERC ordered a utility to purchase a specified
percentage of a particular generator’s output. Jd. at
363. The utility petitioned Mississippi to approve an
increase in its retail rates to cover the costs imposed
by the order, but the state insisted that it retained the
authority to determine whether the purchases were
prudent before acceding to the request. Jd. at 365-67.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, ruling
that the state was required to treat the utility’s
FERC-mandated payments as “reasonably incurred
operating expenses for the purpose of setting” the
utility's retail rates. Id. at 370; see also Nantahala
Power & Light Co., 476 U.S. 953 (rejecting a similar
state effort to bar a utility from passing FERC-
mandated wholesale rates through to consumers).
Mississippi's prudence review was preempted because
it denied full effect to the rates set by FERC, even
though it did not seek to tamper with the actual terms
of an interstate transaction.
As the district court recognized, see PPL Energy-
Plus, LLC, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 831, the principles
articulated in Mississippi Power & Light Co. apply
with equal force to this dispute. If states are required
to give full effect to FE2C-mandated wholesale rates
on the demand side of the equation, it stands to reason
that they are also required to do so on the supply side.
Here, the contract price guaranteed by the Generation
19a
Order supersedes the PJM rates that CPV would
otherwise earn—rates established through a FERC-
approved market mechanism. The Order ensures that
CPV receives a fixed price for every unit of energy and
capacity it sells in the PJM auction, regardless of the
market price. The fact that it does not formally upset
the terms of a federal transaction is no defense, since
the functional results are precisely the same. As in the
above-mentioned cases, Maryland has “eroded the
effect of the FERC determination and undermined
FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction.” Appalachian Power
Co., 812 F.2d at 904.
Our conclusion that the Generation Order “seeks to
regulate a field that the [FPA] has occupied also is
supported by the imminent possibility of collision
between” the state and federal regimes. Schneidewind,
485 U.S. at 310. While the potential for collision
between the two schemes is discussed in detail in Part
D, a high probability of conflict tends to suggest that
Congress intended federal authority in a particular
field to be uniform and exclusive. See id. Even if
“collision between the state and federal regulation” in
this case is not “an inevitable consequence,” it is
sufficiently likely to warrant invalidating the Maryland
program “in order to assure the effectuation of the
comprehensive federal regulation ordained by
Congress.” N. Natural Gas Co., 372 U.S. at 92.
C.
Appellants argue that this court should apply a
robust version of the presumption against preemption
to save the Maryland scheme. See, e.g., Intervenor-
Appellant’s Br. at 14. As its name suggests, this
presumption militates against findings of federal
preemption, especially in areas of traditional state
authority. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
20a
U.S. 218, 230 (1947). However, the presumption “is not
triggered when the State regulates in an area where
there has been a history of significant federal
presence.” United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108
(2000). The presumption “is almost certainly not
applicable here because the federal government
has long regulated wholesale electricity rates.”
IDACORP Inc., 379 F.3d at 648 n.7. Nevertheless,
even were we to apply the presumption, we would find
it overcome by the text and structure of the FPA,
which unambiguously apportions control over
wholesale rates to FERC.
Appellants emphasize the FPA’s decree that FERC
“shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically
provided in this subchapter and subchapter III of this
chapter, over facilities used for the generation of
electric energy.” 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). They contend
that the Generation Order falls on the state side of the
jurisdictional line, since it is designed to ensure that
Maryland enjoys an adequate supply of generation
capacity.
Although states plainly retain substantial latitude
in directly regulating generation facilities, they may
not exercise this authority in a way that impinges on
FERC’s exclusive power to specify wholesale rates. As
the Supreme Court noted in a similar context:
[T]he problem of this case is not as to the
existence or even the scope of a State’s power
to [regulate generation facilities]; the
problem is only whether the Constitution
sanctions the particular means chosen by [the
state] to exercise the conceded power if those
means threaten effectuation of the federal
regulatory scheme.
2la
N. Natural Gas Co., 372 U.S. at 93. Here, Maryland
has chosen to incentivize generation by setting
interstate wholesale rates. This particular choice of
means is impermissible. Wholesale energy prices
“fixed by FERC must be given binding effect by state
authorities” even “in areas subject to state
jurisdiction.” California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc.,
375 F.3d 831, 851 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Nonetheless, it is important to note the limited
scope of our holding, which is addressed to the specific
program at issue. We need not express an opinion on
other state efforts to encourage new generation, such
as direct subsidies or tax rebates, that may or may not
differ in important ways from the Maryland initiative.
It goes without saying that not “every state statute
that has some indirect effect” on wholesale rates is
preempted, Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 308, for “there
can be little if any regulation of production that might
not have at least an incremental effect on the costs of
purchasers in some market,” Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp..,
489 U.S. at 514. In this case, however, the effect of the
Generation Order on matters within FERC’s exclusive
jurisdiction is neither indirect nor incidental. Rather,
the Order strikes at the heart of the agency’s statutory
power to establish rates for the sale of electric energy
in interstate commerce, see 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a), by
adopting terms and prices set by Maryland, not those
sanctioned by FERC.
D.
Appellants’ position is further complicated by the
fact that the principles of field and conflict preemption
in this case are mutually reinforcing. As relevant here,
conflict preemption applies “where under the
circumstances of a particular case, the challenged
22a
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.” Crosby v. Nat Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted). “What is a sufficient obstacle is a
matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the
federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose
and intended effects.” Id. “A state law may pose an
obstacle to federal purposes by interfering with the
accomplishment of Congress’s actual objectives, or by
interfering with the methods that Congress selected
for meeting those legislative goals.” College Loan
Corp. v. SLM Corp., 396 F.3d 588, 596 (4th Cir. 2005)
(emphasis omitted).
In a system of “interlocking” jurisdiction, such as
that created by the FPA, “[iJt is inevitable that
jurisdictional tensions will arise’—even if each
sovereign formally remains within the confines of its
“assigned sphere.” Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp., 489 U.S.
at 506, 515 & n.12 (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted). “Thus, conflict-pre-emption anal-
ysis must be applied sensitively in this area, so as to
prevent the diminution of the role Congress reserved
to the States while at the same time preserving the
federal role.” Id. at 515. Here, “the impact of state
regulation of production on matters within federal
control is so extensive and disruptive of’ the PJM
markets that preemption is appropriate. Jd. at 517-18.
As an initial matter, the Generation Order has the
potential to seriously distort the PJM auction’s price
signals, thus “interferling] with the method by which
the federal statute was designed to reach its goals.”
IDACORP Inc., 379 F.3d at 650. PJM’s price signals
are intended to promote a variety of objectives,
including incentivizing new generation sources.
23a
See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 132 FERC § 61,173, at
61,870 (2010); see also PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, 974 F.
Supp. 2d at 813. Market participants necessarily rely
on these signals in determining whether to construct
new capacity or expand existing resources. The signals
appear to be serving their purpose; according to
FERC, the evidence “suggests that RPM has in fact
succeeded in securing sufficient capacity to meet
reliability requirements for the PJM region.” PJM
Interconnection, LLC, 137 FERC J¥ 61,145, at 9 3
(2011).
Maryland’s initiative disrupts this scheme by
substituting the state’s preferred incentive structure
for that approved by FERC. See PPL EnergyPlus, LLC
v. Hanna, No. 11-745, 2013 WL 5603896, at *36
(D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2013) (describing the distorting
impact of a similar New Jersey program on the
business decisions of private participants in the PJM
auction). Two features of the Order render its likely
effect on federal markets particularly problematic.
First, as noted, the CfDs are structured to actually set
the price received at wholesale. They therefore directly
conflict with the auction rates approved by FERC.
Second, the duration of the subsidy—twenty years—is
substantial.
The Order is preempted for the further reason that
it conflicts with NEPA, which represents an exception
to PJM’s otherwise steadfast commitment to a uniform
market clearing price. In order to stimulate plant
construction, NEPA carves out a three-year period
during which certain new generators are eligible to
receive a fixed price for the capacity they sell in the
PJM markets. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 128
FERC { 61,157, at { 92 (2009). CPV petitioned FERC
to extend the NEPA period to ten years on the grounds
24a
that the three-year period was insufficient to achieve
its objective. Jd. at { 93. FERC rejected CPV’s request,
stating that “[b]oth new entry and retention of existing
efficient capacity are necessary to ensure reliability
and both should receive the same price so that the
price signals are not skewed in favor of new entry.” Jd.
at { 102.
The Generation Order represents an effort by the
state to directly override this explicit policy choice. As
a functional matter, the CfDs extend the NEPA period
for CPV to twenty years, a duration vastly exceeding
the current NEPA term and double the term that CPV
unsuccessfully requested FERC to institute. Maryland
has sought to achieve through the backdoor of its own
regulatory process what it could not achieve through
the front door of FERC proceedings. Circumventing
and displacing federal rules in this fashion is not
permissible.
Appellants assert that no conflict is present because
FERC explicitly accommodated—via the MOPR—the
participation of subsidized plants in its auction. See,
e.g., Intervenor-Appellant’s Reply Br. at 23. The fact
that FERC was forced to mitigate the Generation
Order’s distorting effects using the MOPR, however,
tends to confirm rather than refute the existence of a
conflict. Furthermore, FERC’s own comments on the
subject belie appellants’ claim that the agency has
affirmatively approved the Generation Order. See
PJM Interconnection, LLC, 137 FERC at 7 3 (“Our
intent is not to pass judgment on state and local
policies and objectives with regard to the development
of new capacity resources ... .”).
As was the case with our field preemption holding,
our conflict preemption ruling is narrow and focused
upon the program before us. Obviously, not every state
25a
regulation that incidentally affects federal markets is
preempted. Such an outcome “would thoroughly
undermine precisely the division of the regulatory
field that Congress went to so much trouble to
establish .. . , and would render Congress’ specific
grant of power to the States to regulate production
virtually meaningless.” Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp., 489
U.S. at 515. The Generation Order, however, is simply
a bridge too far. It presents a direct and transparent
impediment to the functioning of the PJM markets,
and is therefore preempted.®
ITI.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold the Generation
Order preempted under federal law and affirm the
judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED
* Our conclusion that the Generation Order is preempted
renders it unnecessary for us to reach plaintiffs’ dormant
Commerce Clause arguments, which were rejected by the district
court. See Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 311 (“Because we have
concluded that Act 144 is pre-empted by the NGA, we need not
decide whether, absent federal occupation of the field, Act 144
violates the Commerce Clause.”).
26a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[Filed June 2, 2014)
No. 13-2419 (L)
(1:12-cv-01286-MJG)
PPL ENERGYPLUS, LLC; PPL BRUNNER ISLAND, LLC;
PPL HOLTWoopD, LLC; PPL MARTINS CREEK, LLC;
PPL Montour, LLC; PPL SUSQUEHANNA, LLC;
LOWER MOUNT BETHEL ENERGY, LLC; PPL
NEW JERSEY SOLAR, LLC; PPL NEW JERSEY BIOGAS,
LLC; PPL RENEWABLE ENERGY, LLC; PSEG POWER
LLC; ESSENTIAL POWER, LLC,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
Vv.
DOUGLAS R.M. NAZARIAN; HAROLD WILLIAMS;
LAWRENCE BRENNER; KELLY SPEAKES-BACKMAN;
KEVIN HUGHES,
Defendants - Appellants,
and
CPV MARYLAND, LLC,
Defendant.
AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL
RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION; NRG
ENERGY INC.; MARYLAND OFFICE OF PEOPLE'S
COUNSEL; CONNECTICUT PUBLIC UTILITIES
REGULATORY AUTHORITY; CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT
27a
OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;
GEORGE JEPSEN, Attorney General for the State of
Connecticut; CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF CONSUMER
COUNSEL; NEW ENGLAND CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSIONERS, INC.; MAINE PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION; RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION; VERMONT PUBLIC SERVICE
BOARD; VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE;
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION; PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
(NYPSC); PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; DELAWARE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION; NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES; NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF RATE COUNSEL;
MARYLAND ENERGY ADMINISTRATION; AMERICAN WIND
ENERGY ASSOCIATION; THE MID-ATLANTIC
RENEWABLE ENERGY COALITION,
Amici Supporting Appellants,
PJM POWER PROVIDERS GROUP; ELECTRIC POWER
SUPPLY ASSOCIATION; EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,
Amici Supporting Appellees.
No. 13-2424
(1:12-cv-01286-MJG)
PPL ENERGYPLUS, LLC; PPL BRUNNER ISLAND, LLC;
PPL HOLTwoop, LLC; PPL MARTINS CREEK, LLC;
PPL Montour, LLC; PPL SUSQUEHANNA, LLC;
LOWER MOUNT BETHEL ENERGY, LLC;
PPL NEW JERSEY SOLAR, LLC; PPL NEW JERSEY
BioGAs, LLC; PPL RENEWABLE ENERGY, LLC; PSEG
POWER LLC; ESSENTIAL POWER, LLC,
Plaintiffs Appellees,
We
28a
CPV MARYLAND, LLC,
Defendant Appellant,
and
DOUGLAS R.M. NAZARIAN; HAROLD WILLIAMS;
LAWRENCE BRENNER; KELLY SPEAKES-BACKMAN;
KEVIN HUGHES,
Defendants.
AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL
RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION;
NRG ENERGY INC.; MARYLAND OFFICE OF PEOPLE’S
COUNSEL; CONNECTICUT PUBLIC UTILITIES
REGULATORY AUTHORITY; CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;
GEORGE JEPSEN, Attorney General for the State of
Connecticut; CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF CONSUMER
COUNSEL; NEW ENGLAND CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSIONERS, INC.; MAINE PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION; RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION; VERMONT PUBLIC SERVICE
BOARD; VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE;
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION; PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
(NYPSC); PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; DELAWARE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION; NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES; NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF RATE COUNSEL;
MARYLAND ENERGY ADMINISTRATION; AMERICAN
WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION; THE MID-ATLANTIC
RENEWABLE ENERGY COALITION,
Amici Supporting Appellant,
29a
PJM POWER PROVIDERS GROUP; ELECTRIC POWER
SUPPLY ASSOCIATION; EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,
Amici Supporting Appellees.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the decision of this court, the
judgment of the district court is affirmed.
This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this
court’s mandate in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 41.
(s/ PATRICIA S. CONNOR, CLERK
30a
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[Filed June 30, 2014]
No. 13-2419 (L)
(1:12-cv-01286-MJG)
PPL ENERGYPLUS, LLC; PPL BRUNNER ISLAND, LLC;
PPL HOLTWooD, LLC; PPL MARTINS CREEK, LLC;
PPL MontTouR, LLC; PPL SUSQUEHANNA, LLC;
LOWER MOUNT BETHEL ENERGY, LLC; PPL
NEW JERSEY SOLAR, LLC; PPL NEw JERSEY BIOGAS,
LLC; PPL RENEWABLE ENERGY, LLC; PSEG POWER
LLC; ESSENTIAL POWER, LLC,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
Vv.
DOUGLAS R.M. NAZARIAN; HAROLD WILLIAMS;
LAWRENCE BRENNER; KELLY SPEAKES-BACKMAN;
KEVIN HUGHES,
Defendants - Appellants,
and
CPV MARYLAND, LLC,
Defendant.
AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL
RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION; NRG
ENERGY INC.; MARYLAND OFFICE OF PEOPLE’S
COUNSEL; CONNECTICUT PUBLIC UTILITIES
REGULATORY AUTHORITY; CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT
3la
OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;
GEORGE JEPSEN, Attorney General for the State of
Connecticut; CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF CONSUMER
COUNSEL; NEW ENGLAND CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSIONERS, INC.; MAINE PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION; RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION; VERMONT PUBLIC SERVICE
BOARD; VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE;
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION; PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
(NYPSC); PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; DELAWARE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION; NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES; NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF RATE COUNSEL;
MARYLAND ENERGY ADMINISTRATION; AMERICAN WIND
ENERGY ASSOCIATION; THE MID-ATLANTIC
RENEWABLE ENERGY COALITION,
Amici Supporting Appellants,
PJM POWER PROVIDERS GROUP; ELECTRIC POWER
SUPPLY ASSOCIATION; EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,
Amici Supporting Appellees.
No. 13-2424
(1:12-cv-01286-MJG)
PPL ENERGYPLUS, LLC; PPL BRUNNER ISLAND, LLC;
PPL HoLtwoop, LLC; PPL MARTINS CREEK, LLC;
PPL Montour, LLC; PPL SUSQUEHANNA, LLC;
LOWER MOUNT BETHEL ENERGY, LLC;
PPL NEW JERSEY SOLAR, LLC; PPL NEW JERSEY
BioGcas, LLC; PPL RENEWABLE ENERGY, LLC; PSEG
POWER LLC; ESSENTIAL POWER, LLC,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
V.
32a
CPV MARYLAND, LLC,
Defendant Appellant,
and
DOUGLAS R.M. NAZARIAN; HAROLD WILLIAMS;
LAWRENCE BRENNER; KELLY SPEAKES-BACKMAN;
KEVIN HUGHES,
Defendants.
AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL
RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION;
NRG ENERGY INC.; MARYLAND OFFICE OF PEOPLE’S
COUNSEL; CONNECTICUT PUBLIC UTILITIES
REGULATORY AUTHORITY; CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;
GEORGE JEPSEN, Attorney General for the State of
Connecticut; CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF CONSUMER
COUNSEL; NEW ENGLAND CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSIONERS, INC.; MAINE PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION; RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION; VERMONT PUBLIC SERVICE
BOARD; VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE;
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION; PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
(NYPSC); PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; DELAWARE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION; NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES; NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF RATE COUNSEL;
MARYLAND ENERGY ADMINISTRATION; AMERICAN
WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION; THE MID-ATLANTIC
RENEWABLE ENERGY COALITION,
Amici Supporting Appellant,
33a
PJM POWER PROVIDERS GROUP; ELECTRIC POWER
SUPPLY ASSOCIATION; EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,
Amici Supporting Appellees.
ORDER
The court denies the petitions for rehearing and
rehearing en banc. No judge requested a poll under
Fed. R. App. P. 35 on the petitions for rehearing en
banc.
Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge
Wilkinson, Judge Keenan, and Judge Diaz.
For the Court
e/ Patricia S.C Cler}
34a
APPENDIX D
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Civil Action No. MJG-12-1286
PPL ENERGYPLUS, LLC, et al.
Plaintiffs
vs.
DOUGLAS R. M. NAZARIAN, in his official capacity
as Chairman of the Maryland Public Service
Commission, et al.
Defendants
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The Court has heard the evidence, reviewed the
exhibits, considered the materials submitted by the
parties, and had the benefit of the arguments of
counsel.
The Court now issues this Memorandum of Decision
as its findings of fact and conclusions of law in
compliance with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Court finds the facts stated
herein based upon its evaluation of the evidence,
including the credibility of witnesses, and the
inferences that the Court has found reasonable to
draw from the evidence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1999, Maryland utilized a vertically
integrated model of electric energy regulation. A single
electric utility (such as BGE or Pepco) owned the
35a
facilities that produced and delivered electricity to the
users in its exclusive territory. Maryland electric
power users purchased electricity from the one utility
that served the territory in which they were located.
The Maryland Public Service Commission (“PSC”)
ultimately determined whether additional generation
resources were needed in Maryland and provided for
the financing of those resources through the approval
of rate increases.
In 1999, the Maryland General Assembly passed the
Electric Customer Choice and Competition Act (the
“1999 Act”), which restructured, or deregulated,
Maryland’s electric energy market. The 1999 Act
separated the Maryland “utilities’ generating assets
from their distribution and transmission functions” by
transferring ownership of those generation assets to
other companies that owned and operated the power
plants. P.391 (2007 PSC Interim Report) at 10.
The PSC is empowered by the State of Maryland
to assure “safe, adequate, reasonable, and proper
[electric] service.” Md. Code Ann., Pub. Util. § 5-
101(a). However, Maryland-based utilities, which now
no longer own generating facilities, must purchase
energy on federally regulated wholesale markets.
Thus, the utilities and, correspondingly, Maryland
ratepayers are directly affected by the wholesale
prices determined on the federally regulated whole-
sale markets.
In mid-2000, the PSC and others began to voice
concerns over the operations of Maryland’s electricity
markets, the post-restructuring consumer electricity
rates, and the existence of adequate generation
resources to serve the energy needs of Maryland
ratepayers. In 2007, the PSC filed a report with the
General Assembly, stating that the federally regulated
36a
wholesale markets had not responded to Maryland’s
needs and opining that those markets were unlikely to
respond in the immediate future to the state’s
“looming capacity shortage.” P.391 (2007 PSC Interim
Report) at 1. The PSC concluded that it should require
the Maryland utilities to enter into long-term
contracts to induce the construction of new electric
generation facilities in Maryland.
Ultimately, on April 12, 2012, the PSC issued the
Generation Order at issue,’ directing Baltimore Gas
and Electric Company (“BGE”), Potomac Electric
Power Company (“Pepco”), and Delmarva Power &
Light Company (“Delmarva”) to enter into a Contract
for Differences (“CfD”) with CPV Maryland, LLC
(“CPV”). In essence, the CfD provided that regardless
of the price set by the federally regulated wholesale
market, the Maryland utilities would assure that CPV
received a guaranteed price fixed by a contractual
formula.? The result was that CPV had a secure
income stream available to finance construction of a
generating facility in a designated area within
Maryland.*
' PSC Order No. 84815. See P.44.
? Ultimately, the utilities’ customers.
3 As discussed herein, there was a theoretical possibility (but a
practical impossibility) that the facility could be constructed in
the District of Columbia.
37a
Plaintiffs* present claims in three Counts:
Count! Violation of the Supremacy
Clause, U.S. Constitution, art. VI,
cl.2;
Count II Violation of the Commerce Clause,
U.S. Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl.3;
and
Count III Vic'ation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
As discussed at length herein, the Court holds that
Plaintiffs have established their claim that the
Generation Order violates the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution by virtue of field
preemption® but does not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause.®
and Essential Power, LLC.
The named Defendants are the Commissioners of the PSC,
sued in their official capacities, Douglas R. M. Nazarian, Harold
Williams, Lawrence Brenner, Kelly Speakes-Backman, and
Kevin Hughes. On January 8, 2013, after Plaintiffs filed the
instant suit, Douglas R. M. Nazarian was appointed to the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals.
® The establishment of Plaintiffs’ field preemption claim
renders moot the question of whether Plaintiffs also established
their Supremacy Clause conflict preemption claim.
* The Court also holds that even if not formally abandoned,
Plaintiffs’ 28 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is not viable.
38a
Il. BACKGROUND
A. Electric Power Grids In A Nutshell
As once said in reference to the Rule in Shelley’s
case, it is one thing to put the subject of electric power
grids in a nutshell, but impossible to keep it there.’
Nevertheless, even an oversimplified, incomplete, and
imprecise introduction may be useful to those totally
unfamiliar with electric power grids.
To start, think of a power grid as analogous to a
network of pipes utilized to transport water from
various pumping stations, which take water from
natural sources (lake, river, etc.), to reservoirs. The
water in the reservoirs is then, as demanded by a local
utility, transported by pipes in the grid to the local
utility for distribution to the utility’s customers.
However, for a closer analogy, think of the same grid
without any reservoirs. When an amount of water is
placed into the grid by a pumping station, an equal
amount must flow out of the grid to a local utility.
Thus, the grid operator must insure that, at all times,
the supply (water put into the grid by the pumping
stations) equals the demand (water sent out of the grid
to the local utilities). This balance is maintained by
affecting the supply through adjustments of the price
paid to pumping station suppliers, payments to local
utilities (or customers) to reduce their usage,
’ Professor Barton W. Leach wrote that when “Lord Thurlow
undertook to put the Rule in Shelley's Case in a nutshell,” Lord
Macnaghten said, “it is one thing to put a case like Shelley’s in a
nutshell and another thing to keep it there.” W. Barton Leach,
Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638, 638 n.al (1938)
(quoting Van Grutten v. Foxwell, [1897] A. C. 658, 671).
39a
adjustments to the price paid by the local utilities for
the water they demand, etc.
B. Federal Regulation of Electric Energy
1. The Federal Power Act and FERC
In 1927, the United States Supreme Court held that
the dormant Commerce Clause prohibited states from
regulating the rates for wholesale power sales between
utilities in different states. The Court reasoned that,
unlike the regulation of the rates charged to local
consumers, regulation of interstate rates places “a
direct burden upon interstate commerce, from which
the state is restrained by the force of the commerce
clause.” Pub. Utils. Comm’n of RI. v. Attleboro Steam
& Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89 (1927).*
In response to the Attleboro decision, Congress
enacted the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) in 1935, which
“closed the ‘Attleboro gap’ by authorizing federal
regulation of interstate, wholesale sales of elec-
tricity—the precise subject matter beyond the
jurisdiction of the States in Attleboro.” New York v.
F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 20 (2002). Specifically, the FPA
gave the Federal Power Commission, the predecessor
agency to FERC, jurisdiction over the regulation of
interstate wholesale sales of electricity and of
interstate transmissions of electric energy. See 16
U.S.C. § 824(a); New York, 535 U.S. at 20-21.
The FPA vested FERC with the responsibility for
setting the “rates and charges” of wholesale electric
energy and for ensuring that those rates are “just and
® See Quill Corp. v. N.D. By & Through Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298
(1992) (recognizing abrogation of Attleboro on other grounds).
* The “sale of electric energy at wholesale’ § means a sale of
electric energy to any person for resale.” 16 U.S.C. § 824(d).
40a
reasonable.” Id. § 824d(a); Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 539 U.S. 39, 47-48 (2003). In essence,
FERC exercises this authority through an intricate
regulatory framework whereby transactions for the
wholesale sale of electricity are filed with FERC (on
either an individual basis or, more often, under a
market-based rate tariff). FERC determines on its own
initiative, or in response to a request by some party,
whether such rates are “just and reasonable” and not
unduly preferential, discriminatory, or disadvanta-
geous to any party.’® See 16 U.S.C. § 824e; id. § 824d.
As to the physical facilities that generate electric
energy, the FPA gave FERC jurisdiction over all
facilities for [the] transmission or sale of electric
energy” in interstate commerce. Jd. § 824(b)\(1). But,
“except as specifically provided in this subchapter
and subchapter III of this chapter,” FERC has no
jurisdiction over facilities used for the generation of
electric energy or over facilities used in local
distribution or only for the transmission of electric
energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities for the
transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by
the transmitter.” Jd.
The witnesses generally agreed that FERC has
no authority or power to order directly the siting,
building, or construction of a generation facility
generally or in any particular location within a state.
Tr. Mar. 5 (PM) at 82:4-21 (Nazarian); Tr. Mar. 6 (AM)
at 44:1-21, 46:12-47:7 (Massey); Tr. Mar. 7 (AM) at
© For example, FERC regulations require utilities with
market-based rate authority to file an Electronic Quarterly
Report (“EQR”) every quarter summarizing the contractual terms
and conditions in agreements subject to the jurisdiction of FERC,
including agreements for the wholesale sales of capacity and
energy. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.10b.
4la
32:10-21 (Wodyka). As discussed infra, that authority
is retained by the states under the FPA.
The FPA created an exclusive area of federal
jurisdiction in the electric energy realm regarding the
regulation of interstate wholesale energy sales and
transmission, including the entities that engage in
such acts. The FPA also retained a sphere of state
jurisdiction with respect to interstate retail sales,
distribution of electric energy, and the construction of
local generation facilities. See New York, 535 U.S. at
22-23 (explaining the legislative history [of the FPA)
is replete with statements describing Congress’ intent
to preserve state jurisdiction over local facilities”).'' As
summarized by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit:
Jurisdiction over this sale and delivery of
electricity is split between the federal
government and the states on the basis of the
type of service being provided and the nature
of the energy sale . . . . Thus transmission
occurs pursuant to FERC-approved tariffs;
local distribution occurs under rates set by
state’s public service commission.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 452 F.3d
822, 824 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
4 Also recognizing the role of the states, the Energy Policy Act
of 2005, which gave FERC jurisdiction over reliability standards
for the bulk-power system, states “[njothing in this section shal!
be construed to preempt any authority of any State to take action
to ensure the safety, adequacy, and reliability of electric service
within that State, as long as such action is not inconsistent with
any reliability standard.” 16 U.S.C. § 8240(iX3).
42a
2. Development of Wholesale Energy Markets
a. Traditional Vertically Integrated Utilities
When Congress enacted the FPA, networks of high-
voltage, long-distance transmission lines which today
crisscross the United States” simply did not exist.” See
Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. F.E.R.C.,
225 F.3d 667, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff'd sub nom. New
York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1 (2002). The absence of this
infrastructure likely was a factor in the development
of the vertically integrated structure of electric
utilities that generally predominated in the United
States until the 1990’s. The term “vertically integrated
electric utilities” refers to “generation, transmission,
and distribution facilities [which are] owned by a
single entity and sold as part of a bundled service
(delivered electric energy) to wholesale and retail
customers.” Promoting Wholesale Competition Through
Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Ser-
vices by Public Utilities, Recovery of Stranded Costs
by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities;
Proposed Rulemaking and Supplemental Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,662, 17,668
(Apr. 7, 1995) (hereinafter Open Access). Under the
vertically integrated structure:
Most electric utilities built their own power
plants and transmission systems, entered
into interconnection and _ coordination
arrangements with neighboring utilities, and
entered into long-term contracts to make
wholesale requirements sales (bundled sales
of generation and transmission) to municipal,
cooperative, and other investor-owned utili-
ties (I0Us) connected to each utility’s
43a
transmission system. Each system covered
limited service areas.
Id.
A utility operating in the vertically integrated
structure typically generates electricity with power
plants it owns; transmits the electricity from those
power plants to its service territory, usually defined by
the state of location;’* and distributes that electricity
to end-use customers within its service territory
through local distribution networks, poles, and wires
that the utility owns and maintains. See Tr. Mar. 4
(AM) at 121:14-122:21 (Alessandrini); Tr. Mar. 4 (PM)
at 8:23-10:20 (Carretta); Tr. Mar. 6 (AM) at 11:8-20
(Massey).
Where utilities operated in a vertical integration
structure, states often controlled the fiscal feasibility
of a utility's plans to expand its existing generation
facilities or to construct new power plants through a
regulatory framework. Thus, state regulators could
decide whether to allow an increase in the retail rate
charged by the utility to end-use customers sufficient
to permit the utility to recover the cost of financing the
construction of new generation facilities or the
development of existing facilities. See Tr. Mar. 4 (AM)
at 121:14-122:25 (Alessandrini). If the state approved
an adequate increase in retail rates, then the utility
acquired a financial guarantee that assisted the utility
in raising capital for its generation projects. See id.
When most electric utilities were vertically
integrated one-stop shops with monopolies over
4 Typically, a utility was granted a franchise by the state
government to provide electric service to all consumers located
‘within a defined territory or service territory. See Tr. Mar. 5 (AM)
at 42:13-44:11 (Nazarian).
44a
designated service territories, the electric energy
industry operated predominately as a retail market
subject to state regulation without significant
intervention from the federal government. See Tr.
Mar. 4 (AM) at 121:14-122:26 (Alessandrini). In this
scenario, the “wholesale market” regulated by FERC
consisted primarily of transactions between vertically
integrated utilities whose service territories were
physically situated near each other. Tr. Mar. 6 (AM)
13:3-16 (Massey).
b. FERC’s Fostering of Wholesale Energy
Markets
In the 1970’s and 1980’s, significant “[t]echnological
improvements . . . made feasible the transmission of
electric power over long distances at high voltages.”
See Transmission Access, 225 F.3d at 681 (D.C. Cir.
2000).In response to, among other things, advance-
ments in technology, the wholesale electricity market
began to blossom producing, inter alia, independent
and non-utility owned power plants capable of
providing competitively priced generation to the
wholesale market. See id. With a burgeoning whole-
sale market came more federal legislation and
regulation. For instance, in 1978 Congress passed the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”),
which called for “a program to improve the wholesale
distribution of electric energy” and the reliability of
electric service.” 16 U.S.C. § 2601(2). However, the
traditional vertically integrated utilities that owned
transmission lines were inhibiting the development of
this wholesale electricity market by “denyling]
alternative producers access to their transmission
'S Such as the market was in those days.
45a
lines on competitive terms and _ conditions.”
Transmission Access, 225 F.3d at 682.
Congress and FERC took action during the 1990’s to
facilitate the development of wholesale power markets
by “opening up transmission services” and reducing
the ability of vertically integrated public utilities to
deny customers access to competitively priced electric
generation. See Open Access, 60 Fed. Reg. at 17,663-
64. “[I]n 1992, Congress enacted the Energy Policy
Act, which amended sections 211 and 212 of the FPA
to authorize FERC to order utilities to ‘wheel’ power—
i.e., transmit power for wholesale sellers of power over
the utilities’ transmission lines—on a case-by-case
basis.” Transmission Access, 225 F.3d at 682 (citing
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 721-
22, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j-k)
(giving non-utility generators the right to have FERC
order transmission-owning utilities to interconnect
and obtain access to the local utilities’ delivery
systems)).'* In 1996, FERC issued Order No. 888,
which “ordered the national deregulation of electricity
transmission services” and required all public utilities
that owned or controlled transmission facilities to
provide open access to their transmission lines on
the same basis on which they provide access to
themselves. See Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v.
4 Additionally, in 2005 Congress passed the Energy Policy Act
of 2005, which made FERC responsible for system reliability
standards for the bulk-power system. See Energy Policy Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1211(a), 119 Stat. 594, 941 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 8240); Mandatory Reliability Standards for the
Bulk-Power System, 72 Fed. Reg. 16,416 (Apr. 4, 2007). Prior to
enactment of the Energy Policy Act, the nation’s bulk-power
system depended on participants’ voluntary compliance with
industry standards.” Alcoa Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 564 F.3d 1342, 1344
(D.C. Cir. 2009).
46a
F.E.R.C., 616 F.3d 520, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In a further effort to facilitate the development of
competitive wholesale power markets and to “increase
the efficiency of the electric transmission systems,”
FERC “strongly encouraged the [electric power]
industry to organize itself into Regional Transmission
Organizations” (“RTOs”). See generally Delmarva
Power & Light Co., 106 FERC { 61,290, 62,080 (2004);
Tr. Mar. 6 (AM) at 48:7-11 (Massey). RTOs are
voluntarily formed independent entities that have
“consolidateled] control of all transmission services in
a particular region” and that provide a platform for
regional wholesale power markets. See Braintree Elec.
Light Dep’t v. F.E.R.C., 550 F.3d 6, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2008);
Tr. Mar. 6 (AM) 14:20-15:8, 48:3-11 (Massey); Tr. Mar.
6 (PM) at 5:6-6:1 (Wodyka). FERC explained that such
consolidation of control in particular regions was
needed because “traditional management of the
transmission grid” by vertically integrated electric
utilities was inadequate to support the efficient and
reliable operation that is needed for the continued
development of competitive electricity markets.”
Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg.
810, 811 (Jan. 6, 2000). According to FERC, despite
Order No. 888, opportunities still existed “for
transmission owners to unduly discriminate in the
operation of their transmission systems so as to favor
their own or their affiliates’ power marketing
activities,” which could in turn impede competitive
electricity markets. Jd. at 817.
In 2000, FERC issued Order No. 2000 requiring
“utilities that own, operate, or control interstate
transmission facilities either to file a proposal to
participate in an RTO or to describe their efforts
47a
toward joining one.” Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n uv.
F.E.R.C., 454 F.3d 278, 280 (D.C. Cir. 2006); 18 C.F.R.
§ 35.34(a). FERC’s stated purpose entailed “promoting
efficiency and reliability in the operation and planning
of the electric transmission grid and ensuring non-
discrimination in the provision of electric transmission
services.” 18 C.F.R. § 35.34(a). FERC defined the
required functions of any formed RTO as including,
inter alia: (1) “employ[ing) a transmission pricing
system that will promote efficient use and expansion
of transmission and generation facilities” and
(2) “ensur[ing] the development and operation of
market mechanisms to manage transmission conges-
tion.” Id. § 35.34(k) (1)-(2). An RTO “manage[s] all the
accounting for the energy that’s put in and taken out
of the transmission system it oversees, “operate[s] all
the different pricing and biding mechanisms that
fall under those wholesale market structures,” and
operates and plans the regional transmission system
within its area. Tr. Mar. 5 (AM) at 126:20-127:18
(Nazarian).
To constitute an RTO, an entity has to satisfy
certain requirements and have its proposal approved
by FERC. A FERC-approved RTO operates pursuant
to tariffs filed with, and approved by, FERC. See Tr.
Mar. 5 (AM) at 126:22-127:6 (Nazarian). Presently,
“([RTOs] exist in about two-thirds of the country” and
are thus responsible for “about two-thirds of the load”
or power consumption in the United States. Tr. Mar. 6
(AM) at 19:21-20:16 (Massey). As relevant hereto, all
of Maryland is part of an RTO formed in 2002,
48a
operated and administered by PJM Interconnected,
LLC”.
C. PJM Interconnected, LLC (“PJM”)
After issuance of Order No. 2000, PJM organized
itself into an RTO, receiving full RTO status from
FERC in December 2002. Although PJM operates as
an RTO under the control of FERC, PJM is a private
entity with 750 members or stakeholders, including
“parties that own facilities, or buy or sell power in the
PJM region.” Tr. Mar. 6 (PM) at 11:16-12:3 (Wodyka);
see also P.606 (PSC Order No. 81423) at 42. PJM’s
members include “power generators, transmission
owners, distributors, marketers, and large consum-
ers.” P.606 (PSC Order No. 81423) at 42. States are not
members or stakeholders of PJM. See id.
The PJM area encompasses the District of Columbia
and all or parts of 13 states (collectively the “PJM
region”).'"° The PJM region, i.e., PJM’s geographic
footprint, consists of about 18 interconnected trans-
mission zones. A transmission zone is the area or
territory in which a particular utility, such as
Baltimore Gas & Electric (“BGE”), owns transmission
lines or resources. A transmission zone generally
mirrors the utilitys historical service territory,
discussed supra. See Pls.’ Dem. 16. The PJM region
‘© PJM (Pennsylvania, Jersey, Maryland) traces its origins
back to 1927 when three traditional utilities in Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, and Maryland formed a power pool. See Tr. Mar. 6
(PM) at 10:9-23, 17:3-9 (Wodyka).
'© As part of organizing into an RTO, the transmission
resources in the PJM region were unified through the voluntary
agreement of the owner-utilities of those resources. Logistically,
the owner-utilities “transferred operational control of their
transmission lines to the PJM Interconnection,” but still retained
equity ownership. Tr. Mar. 6 (AM) at 14:24-15:8 (Massey).
49a
has an aggregate population of approximately 60
million people, covers 214,000 square miles, and
includes 1,365 electric generators that are connected
to PJM’s regional transmission system. P.516 (PJM—
At a Glance) at 3; Pls.’ Dem. 16.
As an RTO:
PJM is responsible for the coordination and
operation of the electric power system across
the entire PJM footprint. They also then
design and administer competitive markets
to support the operations and activities
within the, again, PJM RTO region. And
finally they do .. . resource adequacy
planning to ensure that appropriate genera-
tion and transmission resources are available
to serve the load requirements across the
PJM region. And they do this in a way that
they try to ensure the safety and reliability of
all the activities that occur in the PJM
footprint.
Tr. Mar. 6 (PM) at 10:25-11:10 (Wodyka).
As a FERC-approved RTO, PJM carries out its
responsibilities under FERC’s jurisdiction and pursu-
ant to FERC-approved tariffs, including the Open
Access Transmission Tariff (the “PJM Tariff’), which
governs broadly how PJM operates the regional
transmission system in the PJM region. P.516 (PJM—
At a Glance) at 4. Additionally, PJM executes its
duties through agreements with other parties that are
filed with, and approved by, FERC, including the
Transmission Owners Agreement (“TOA”), the
Reliability Assurance Agreement (“RAA”), and the
50a
Operating Agreement.'’ Tr. Mar. 6 (PM) at 25:5-19
(Wodyka); P.516 (PJM—At a Glance) at 4.
1. PJM’s Operation of the Bulk-Power System
and Transmission Planning
One aspect of PJM’s duties as an RTO is the day-to-
day operation and maintenance of the bulk electric
power system to ensure reliability of electricity
delivery across the [PJM] region.” Tr. Mar. 4 (AM) at
37:20-38:16 (Alessandrini). Thus, PJM operates and
maintains a regional interconnected transmission
system and power grid that spans the PJM footprint,
enabling electric energy to be dispatched and delivered
to various points across the PJM region. See PJM
Interconnection, LLC, 132 FERC 4 61,173, 61,869-70
(2010); see also Tr. Mar. 5 (AM) at 127:7-18 (Nazarian).
PJM can be thought of as analogous to an “air traffic
controller[] of the power grid” because it “monitors and
coordinates . . . electric generators, . . . high-voltage
transmission lines, . . . substations,” and the flow of
electric energy therein on a day-to-day basis. P.516
(PJM—At a Glance) at 1.
PJM is responsible for planning for the regional
transmission system it oversees to ensure resource
adequacy and future system reliability. To that end,
PJM evaluates whether, and to what extent, new
transmission resources or improvements to existing
transmission resources are necessary to meet the
'l The RAA, which is “signed by all the load-serving entities
[‘LSEs’] in the PJM region,” contains provisions related to the
amount of capacity resources that must be procured by each LSE.
P.516 (PJM—At a Glance) at 4; see also Tr. Mar. 6 (PM) at 131:2-
132:10 (Wodyka). “The Operating Agreement must be signed by
organizations to become members of PJM.” P.516 (PJM—At a
Glance) at 4. It “establish[es] how PJM operates as a regional
transmission organization.” Jd.
5la
requirements of the load in the future.” Tr. Mar. 4
(AM) at 38:12-16 (Alessandrini). For example, “PJM
conducts a long-range Regional Transmission Expan-
sion Planning (RTEP) process that identifies what
changes and additional to the grid are needed to
ensure reliability and the successful operation of the
wholesale markets.” P.516 (PJM—At a Glance) at 2;
see also Tr. Mar. 6 (AM) at 20:21-24 (Massey). The
RTEP includes long-term planning studies that look
into the future as far as 15 years .. . to evaluate the
performance of the transmission as well as the
generation system that’s going to be able to reliably
serve load in the long run.” Tr. Mar. 6 (PM) at 22:10-
21 (Wodyka).
2. PJM-Administered Wholesale Electricity
Markets
In addition to managing the physical flow of electric
energy across the interstate transmission system
within the PJM region and planning for improvements
to ensure infrastructure reliability, PJM administers
three wholesale markets’’ in which electric energy
18 PJM does not “own” the transmission resources within the
PJM region. Instead, it manages and operates those resources
through an interconnected bulk-power system. See Tr. Mar. 6
(AM) at 15:5-8 (Massey). As a result of the TOA, a FERC-filed
agreement, the transmission resource owners who wish to be part
of the PJM region are obligated to perform certain transmission
projects identified by PJM in its RTEP. All utilities that own
transmission resources within the PJM region and wish to be
part of the RTO must enter into the TOA. See P.516 (PJM—At a
Glance) at 4.
' As explained supra, the FPA charges FERC with the
regulation of interstate wholesale sales of electricity. See 16
U.S.C. § 824(a). Pursuant to the FPA, FERC has the power to set
and regulate wholesale electric energy “rates and charges,”
subject to the requirement that such rates or charges shall be just
52a
products are sold by capacity resources to PJM and
then resold by PJM to Load Serving Entities (“LSEs””)
according to prices set in each of the respective
markets. Only two of these markets, the energy
market and the capacity market, are pertinent to the
instant case. The third wholesale market, the
ancillary services market,”' is not. Therefore, the term
“PJM Markets” as used herein refers to the energy and
capacity markets collectively and excludes the
ancillary services market.
The PJM Markets are run pursuant to FERC-
approved tariffs and are the mechanisms that PJM
uses to set or determine the price at which energy and
capacity are to be bought and sold within its territory.
Transactions on the PJM Markets are not the only
permissible FERC-regulated wholesale transactions.
Private parties can buy and sell wholesale energy,
capacity, and ancillary services outside the PJM
Markets and thus outside the prices set by PJM in
such markets. See OPC’s Post-Trial Br. [Document
140] at 21. For instance, subject to FERC rules, a
capacity resource, such as a generation facility, may
and reasonable.” Jd. § 824d(a); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss.
ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 373 (1988). It is pursuant to this
power that FERC authorizes PJM to run the PJM wholesale
markets, setting the price for wholesale electricity sales through
market-based auctions.
” “LSE” refers to an entity that serves an energy demand by
purchasing wholesale energy for purposes of resale to end-use
customers who are actually using and consuming that energy,
such as homes and businesses. Tr. Mar. 5 (AM) at 48:22-51:21
(Nazarian); Tr. Mar. 11 (AM) at 41:1-7 (Roach).
21 “Ancillary Service Markets are markets for so-called
reliability services that are necessary in realtime [sic] to keep the
system perfectly in balance.” Tr. Mar. 6 (AM) at 18:14-16
(Massey).
53a
sell energy and capacity directly to an LSE through a
bilateral contract at a price determined by the parties,
not set by PJM through its market-based mechanisms.
See Tr. Mar. 5 (AM) at 16:21-17:9 (Nazarian).
Irrespective of the transactional means used by an
LSE to procure energy for resale to end-use customers,
the costs incurred by the LSE for wholesale purchases
are passed on to end-use customers through the retail
rate charged by the LSE. See Miss. Power & Light Co.
v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 372 (1988) (“States
may not bar regulated utilities from passing through
to retail consumers FERC-mandated wholesale
rates.”). Thus, an increase in wholesale rates tends to
result in a corresponding increase in retail rates.
a. PJM Wholesale Energy Market
The PJM wholesale energy market is a market in
which wholesale electric energy generated by power
plants is bought and sold to meet present load demand
within the PJM region (the “PJM Energy Market”). In
the PJM Energy Market, generation resources” sell
energy to PJM that is generated and delivered into
PJM’s interconnected power grid by the generator.
LSEs then purchase that energy from PJM to deliver
and resell it to end-use customers, thereby satisfying
load or customer demand for electricity at any point
in time. Tr. Mar. 4 (AM) at 23:16-24, 37:20-38:6
(Alessandrini). Because generators sell their energy to
PJM, and LSEs purchase that energy from PJM and
receive delivery through PJM’s interstate grids and
transmission systems, there is no direct sale of energy
from a generator to a particular LSE. Thus, the PJM
= The term “generation resources” refers to resources or
facilities within PJM that generate electric energy such as power
plants.
54a
Energy Market is composed of two separate sub-
markets—day-ahead and real-time. In the day-ahead
sub-market, generation facilities bid into an energy
market for energy delivery in the next twenty-four
hours; in the real-time sub-market, generation
resources bid into a market for delivery in the next
hour. See Tr. Mar. 6 (AM) at 18:4-19:12 (Massey).
With respect to setting the price of energy in the
PJM Energy Market, PJM uses a system called
“Locational Marginal Pricing [(‘LMP’)], which is the
economic dispatch and price setting of energy.” Tr.
Mar. 4 (AM) at 24:22-24 (Alessandrini). The concept of
LMP is that it “reflects the value of the energy at the
specific location and time it is delivered” and “takes
into account the effect of actual operating conditions
on the transmission system in determining the price
of electricity at different locations in the PJM terri-
tory.” P.516 (PJM—At a Glance) at 11. LMP may
result in different prices for energy in different zones
or locations within the PJM region. These “[e]nergy
prices vary across the PJM footprint according to a
number of factors that differentiate energy prices at
different points within the system.” P.391 (2007 PSC
Interim Report) at 17; see also Tr. Mar. 4 (AM) at
114:11-25 (Alessandrini). LMP for energy is “volatile”
because it depends on the value of that energy, where
it’s produced, at the time it’s produced, and what the
weather and other conditions are.”” Tr. Mar. 5 (PM)
at 65:21-66:6 (Nazarian).
* FERC describes the LMP as:
a bid-based, security-constrained economic dispatch
and unit commitment model to determine real-time
and next-day LMP for electricity, which reflect the
value of energy at a specific location and time it is
delivered. If the lowest-priced electricity can reach all
55a
Concerning the prices received by power plants for
energy sold into the PJM Energy Market, generation
facilities across the PJM region have the ability to bid
electric energy into the PJM Energy Market at a bid
price. PJM, as the operator of the power grid,
dispatches that energy to meet load demand by taking
generation bids in ascending order of cost (i.e., begin-
ning with the lowest cost generation and ending with
the highest cost generation) “until the electric load is
satisfied.” P.391 (2007 PSC Interim Report) at 17. The
highest cost generation (that is, the cost at the point
at which the load demand is satisfied) “set/s} the
clearing price for all [generators] operating in the
zone,” and the resulting price is the LMP received by
those generation resources. Jd.
One factor that influences LMPs significantly
is the extent, or lack, of transmission
capability into a state or region [because
when transmission lines are ‘congested’ or
‘constrained,’ i.e., they cannot carry the lower
cost electricity to meet demand, PJM must
dispatch more expensive generation located
in the constrained zone, which increases
LMPs.
Id. That is, if lower cost generation cannot be
dispatched to serve load in a particular zone due to
limitations in transporting the energy, PJM “skips” it
and dispatches higher cost generation, which results
locations, prices differ at the approximately 8,000
pricing nodes on the transmission system by marginal!
losses only. When transmission congestion prevents
the free flow of energy, more expensive electricity is
ordered to meet that demand, and the LMP is higher
in congested areas.
PJM Interconnection, LLC, 132 FERC 1 61173, 61,870 (2010).
56a
in “congestion costs” and higher LMPs paid by the
purchasing LSE and corresponding increases in the
retail energy rates for the end-use customers served
by the LSE. See id. at 17-18; see also Tr. Mar. 4 (AM)
at 116:6-118:1 (Alessandrini); Tr. Mar. 8 (AM) at
93:20-94:19 (Willig). Thus, higher LMPs provide
higher revenues to generation facilities.
According to PJM, the LMP pricing model:
give[s] price signals that encourage new
generation sources to locate in areas where
they will receive higher prices. It signals
large new users tu locate where they can buy
lower-cost power. It also encourages the
construction of new transmission facilities in
areas where congestion is common, in order
to reduce the financial impact of congestion
on electricity prices.
P.516 (PJM—At a Glance) at 11; see also Tr. Mar. 8
(AM) at 94:16-19 (Willig) (“If the LMPs are different at
‘... two points, it means there’s . . . differential value
to resources located at those two points.”). The
Maryland Public Service Commission (“PSC”) has
opined that LMPs do not work as intended, in part
because they “have not yielded adequate new gener-
ation inside Maryland’s transmission constraints.”
P.391 (2007 PSC Interim Report) at 18-19. The PSC
noted that as a “result[,] Marylanders have paid and
will continue to pay higher prices than others in the
PJM region due to our higher LMPs, but no new
material generation has been built in recent years.” Jd.
at 19.
b. PJM Wholesale Capacity Market
PJM administers a wholesale capacity market (the
“PJM Capacity Market”), which is a forward market
57a
where a product called “capacity” is sold by a capacity
resource to PJM and then resold by PJM to LSEs.
Capacity resources include generators that will
increase the energy supply and users that will reduce
the energy demand. LSEs purchase capacity to meet
their capacity obligations under certain FERC-filed
agreements with PJM. As in the PJM Energy Market,
capacity resources sell capacity to PJM; there is no
direct sale of capacity from a capacity resource to a
particular LSE.
PJM sets the price for capacity bought and sold in
the PJM Capacity Market through application of
the Reliability Pricing Model (“RPM”). The RPM
establishes an annual Base Residual Auction (“BRA”)
through which PJM procures capacity from capacity
resources “for a particular ‘power year” three years
after the auction. That is, capacity bid in the 2012 BRA
will be made available for the 2015/2016 power year.
The BRA determines the market clearing price, which
is the price that PJM will pay for all capacity that
clears the BRA. P.391 (2007 PSC Interim Report) at
19. Generally speaking, increases in capacity prices
lead to increases in the retail rates paid by end-use
customers.
(i) “Capacity”
“Capacity,” as used herein to refer to a product,” is
a standby commitment made by a capacity resource to
either produce electric energy or to consume less
* Throughout the trial, witnesses referred to capacity as both
a product bought and sold in the PJM Capacity Market and, more
generally, as the mega-watt capability of existing resources, i.e.,
how much electric energy an existing generation facility
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