Reply Brief — National Ass'n v. Defenders of Wildlife
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13 pop Nos. 06-340 & 06-549 |
3n The
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
¢
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF HOME BUILDERS, et a/.,
Petitioners,
VS.
DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, et ai.,
Respondents.
+
UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Petitioners,
VS.
DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, et ai.,
Respondents.
.
On Writs Of Certiorari To The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit
.
STATE OF ARIZONA’S REPLY BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
»
TERRY GODDARD
Arizona Attorney General
MARY O’GRADY
Solicitor General
PAULA S. BICKETT
Counsel of Record
Chief Counsel, Civil Appeals
JAMES T. SKARDON
Assistant Attorney General
1275 West Washington —
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
(602) 542-3333
Counsel for State of Arizona
Il.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Court Should Not Remand This Case to
the EPA Because Its Approval of Arizona’s Pol-
lution Permitting Program, Which Was Based
on Arizona’s Compliance with the Require-
ments of the Clean Water Act, Was Legally
I ceccccansninsinmnsnsonatanmnaisizatanenictidinaiomine -
Section 7(a2) Does Not Apply to EPA’s Deci-
sion to Transfer Pollution Permitting Author-
SP Bp I cccccscccerecenesensimntiiniiiinatnionnnnen
A. Because the Language of Section 7(a)(2) Is
Susceptible to Different Interpretations,
the Court Should Look to Its Legislative
History to Determine Congress’s Intent .....
B. This Court’s Decision in TVA v. Hill Does
Not Support Respondents’ Construction of
I elie
a
1
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
; Page
CASES
Am. Textile Mfrs. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981)............ 2
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371
EERE ce co ee ome oe ee 4
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)........ steseecsceserssesacsoceseresesesessssorere 5, 8,9
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
| ____. SREIIESEE Caeser ene mNeLE eee op hho: 2, 3,4
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729
Ear cctshtdasdoiiteincibiiintaiaaiaioads sevesseeeecessecevenseesesesencessceecerensenevees 2
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Re 8 ee 1
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117
I, SO ancient 5
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 15S (1978).......ccccscoccccccsccceseceeees 8,9, 10
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Endangered Species Act, § 7(a)(1),
I elite 7,8,9
Endangered Species Act, § 7(a)(2),
ee le Oe ED Sccrctictencscictinenieeiinnndiiesintientntesinainenaiann passim
Clean Water Act, § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)......... passim
a 5
KS SE ener eC ne meee eno 3
5 ES ATR ORE eC een eee ee en 3
a 3
Pe Be cortiticnesregtcrennncssnnnnnsnenimaivieeniiannmincn 9
ARGUMENT
I. The Court Should Not Remand This Case to the
EPA Because Its Approval of Arizona’s Pollu-
tion Permitting Program, Which Was Based on
Arizona’s Compliance with the Requirements
of the Clean Water Act, Was Legally Correct.
Respondents argue that the Court must remand this
case to EPA without addressing the statutory construction
questions because EPA’s decision was based on “inconsis-
tent interpretations of Section 7(a)(2)” of the Endangered
Species Act. (Brief for Respondents Defenders of Wildlife,
et al. [Def. Br.] at 22.) But Respondents fail to acknowl-
edge or even address Arizona’s argument that this Court
should affirm EPA’s decision based on the correct interpre-
tation of the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species
Act even if its interpretation is different from EPA’s
interpretation of the relevant statutes. Because EPA’s
interpretation of Section 7(a)(2), by Respondents’ own
terms, is an interpretation of a federal statute, this Court
should determine the correct interpretation of Section
7(a)(2) instead of remanding.
To support their argument that the Court must
remand to the EPA under “fundamental principles of
administrative and appellate review,” Respondents do not
cite to any cases in which this Court has remanded a
question concerning the appropriate interpretation of a
federal statute to the administrative agency. (Def. Br. at
25.) Instead, Respondents rely on decisions that reiterate
the non-controversial principle that the Court will remand
to the administrative agency when the agency has not
provided an adequate explanation for a decision that it
alone is authorized to make. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983)
- 2
(Because the Secretary of Transportation was required to
issue motor vehicle safety standards and had rescinded
crash protection requirements in its safety standards
without offering any explanation, the Court vacated the
rescission and remanded to the agency.); Florida Power &
Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985) (In determin-
ing whether the court of appeals had original subject
matter jurisdiction over the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion’s orders denying citizen petitions to modify, suspend,
or revoke the license of a nuclear reactor, the Court reiter-
ated that the agency record should enable the reviewing
court to evaluate the basis for the agency decision.);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 419 (1971), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977) (Court reversed the lower
courts’ ruling upholding the Secretary of Transportation’s
authorization of the expenditure of federal funds for the
construction of an expressway through a public park
because the record on review did not contain factual
findings to support the Secretary’s legally required deter-
mination that there was no feasible and prudent alterna-
tive route.); and Am. Textile Mfrs. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 539-40 (1981) (Court vacated and remanded the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA's)
promulgation of a wage guarantee requirement because
OSHA failed to make the necessary determination or
statement of reasons that the wage requirement was
related to the achievement of health and safety goals.).
Here, EPA made the factual findings and determina-
tions that were necessary for it to conclude that Arizona’s
pollution permitting (NPDES) program met the require-
ments of Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act. (J.A. 237.)
Respondents acknowledge that they never claimed that
3
Arizona’s program did not meet the requirements of
Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act. (Def. Br. at 19 n.8.)’
Because Respondents do not challenge EPA’s factual
findings or statement of its reasons that Arizona met the
requirements of the Clean Water Act, the Court need not
remand to EPA for clarification.
Respondents also argue that EPA’s post hoc clarifica-
tions of its interpretation of Section 7(a)(2) cannot justify
its approval of the Arizona pollution permitting program
under the Clean Water Act. (Def. Br. at 24-25.) But EPA’s
clarification of its interpretation of a federal statute is not
the kind of post hoc explanation that requires a remand.
In Volpe, the Court reversed the district court’s sum-
mary judgment rejecting petitioners’ claim that the Secre-
tary of the Department of Transportation violated federal
statutes when it authorized the expenditure of federal
funds to construct an expressway through a public park
without finding if there was a “feasible and prudent”
alternative route. 401 U.S. at 405 & n.4 (quoting 49 U.S.C.
§ 1653(f) and 23 U.S.C. § 138). The Court found that the
district court erred in relying on factual affidavits that the
government respondents submitted in that court to sup-
port the Secretary's decision because the affidavits were
“post hoc” rationalizations and did not constitute the whole
’ Respondents point out that EPA has discretion under the Clean
Water Act to “establish water quality standards that provide ‘for the
protection and propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife.’” (Def. Br. at 7
{quoting 40 C.F.R. § 131.2].) However, EPA and the Fish & Wildlife
Service (FWS) concluded that Arizona’s Water Quality Standards would
provide adequate protection to aquatic species and that oversight of the
Arizona program would ensure that Arizona continued to meet Clean
Water Act requirements, including those for the protection of fish,
shellfish, and wildlife. (NAHB Pet. App. 615-16.)
4
record compiled by the agency. Jd. at 419. In contrast, EPA’s
clarification of its interpretation of Section 7(a\2) after the
court of appeals issued its decision below is not EPA's at-
tempt to provide factual findings or a statement of its rea-
sons for approving Arizona’s pollution permitting program —
it is the agency's interpretation of a federal statute, which is
readily subject to review by this Court.
Similarly, in Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962), the Court rejected
“appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency
action” because it was an attempt to justify a decision that
only the Interstate Commerce Commission was authorized
to make, and the Commission had made no findings to
support its decision. Unlike the situation in Burlington,
EPA is not attempting to justify its approval of Arizona’s
pollution permitting program based on factual findings
that are not part of the administrative record. Rather, it
clarified its interpretation of Section 7(a)(2), which is a
legal interpretation that this Court may review.
Respondents also argue that it is unfair to affirm
EPA’s decision based on its clarified interpretation of
Section 7(a)(2) because they have “been severely preju-
diced” by EPA’s shifting, inconsistent positions concerning
its Section 7(a)(2) responsibilities. (Def. Br. at 28.) How-
ever, after the court of appeals allowed Arizona and
Petitioner National Association of Home Builders to
intervene below, they squarely raised and briefed the legal
issue of whether EPA was required to approve Arizona’s
application to administer the NPDES program because
Arizona met the criteria for approval under Section 402(b)
of the Clean Water Act. (Brief of Intervenor State of
Arizona at 1, Nos. 03-71439 & 03-72894 (9th Cir. 2003));
Intervenors-Respondents Home Builders’ Answering Brief
5
at 34, Nos. 03-71439 & 03-72894 (9th Cir. 2003)). And,
Respondents fully addressed the issue. (Petitioners’ Reply
Brief at 25-29.) Therefore, Respondents cannot legiti-
mately claim prejudice when they have béen given the
opportunity both in the court of appeals and this Court to
address this legal argument.
Respondents also argue that the Court should remand
to give the public the opportunity to comment on EPA’s
clarification of Section 7(a)(2)’s application to approvals of
state NPDES programs. (Def. Br. at 28-29.) Although the
public has the right to comment on an agency’s promulga-
tion, modification, or repeal of a rule (see 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(5)), “there is no barrier to an agency altering its
initial interpretation [of a statute] to adopt another
reasonable interpretation - even one that represents a
new policy response generated by a different administra-
tion.” Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117
~ F.8d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984)).
Because EPA has not changed its interpretation of its
rules, there is no need to remand for public comment.
Finally, Respondents argue that the Court should
remand because they would have challenged EPA’s deci-
sion to partially fund Arizona’s NPDES program if they
had known that EPA would take the position that Section
7(a)(2) did not apply to its decision to approve the pro-
gram. (Def. Br. at 30.) This argument has no merit.
First, Respondents cannot blame their failure to raise
-all relevant issues below on EPA. As noted above, Arizona
and National Association of Home Builders put Respon-
dents on notice of their interpretation of Section 7(a)(2).
Moreover, FWS’s Biological Opinion put Respondents on
6
notice that FWS believed that the Clean Water Act
granted States the right to administer NPDES programs
even if such approval would result in a loss of conservation
benefits. (NAHB Pet. App. 114.)’
Second, once EPA determined that it would approve
Arizona’s program because it met Section 402(b)’s require-
ments, its additional decision to provide funding would not
require consultation under Section 7(a)(2). Such consultation
is triggered by the requirement that EPA “insure” that “any
action” that it “fund{s]” is “not likely to jeopardize” any
endangered or threatened species or adversely modify critical
habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Although increased construc-
tion may affect terrestrial upland species, the action funded
-~ the Arizona NPDES program - is not likely to jeopardize
any endangered or threatened species or adversely modify
critical habitat. (See NAHB Br. at 45-46 and the Brief of
Amici Curiae High Production Homebuilders in Support of
Petitioners for an in-depth discussion of when agency action
triggers Section 7 consultation.)
In sum, the Court should not remand this matter to
EPA because any inconsistencies in EPA’s decisionmaking
involve the interpretation of federal statutes and are
therefore appropriate for this Court’s review. And, this
Court’s guidance on this important question is necessary
to resolve the conflict between the circuit courts.
* In its Biological Opinion, the FWS stated: “Further, loss of any
conservation benefit is not caused by EPA's decision to approve the
State of Arizona’s program. Rather, the absence of the section 7 process
that exists with respect to Federal NPDES permits reflects Congress’
decision to grant States the right to administer these programs under
state law provided the State’s program meets the requirements of
402(b) of the Clean Water Act.” Jd.
7
II. Section 7(a)(2) Does Not Apply to EPA’s Deci-
sion to Transfer Pollution Permitting Authority
to Arizona,
Respondents selectively focus on language, legislative
history, and decisional authority that seemingly supports
their argument that Section 7(a)(2) applies to EPA’s
decision to transfer pollution permitting authority to
Arizona under Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act. But
Respondents simply ignore statutory language, legislative
history, and decisional authority that show that Congress
intended the transfer provisions of Section 402(b) to be
mandatory and did not intend to expand agencies’ authori-
ties when it enacted the Endangered Species Act. Respon-
dents’ construction of Section 7(a)(2) is wrong because it is
contrary to Congress’s intent.
A. Because the Language of Section 7(a)(2) Is
Susceptible to Different Interpretations,
the Court Should Look to Its Legislative
History to Determine Congress’s Intent.
Respondents argue that the plain language of Section
7(a)(2) and its relationship to Section 7(a)(1) show that it
applies to nondiscretionary agency actions. (Def. Br. at 34-
35.) But Respondents ignore Section 7(a)’s legislative
history that is contrary to their argument. Because the
language of Section 7(a)(2) is susceptible to different
interpretations, the Court should examine its legislative
history to ascertain Congress’s intent and defer to the
reasonable interpretation of the agency responsible for
enforcing the statute.
The EPA acknowledges that it stated that it was
required to consult under Section 7(a)(2) before approving
8
Arizona’s application to administer the NPDES program in
the administrative proceeding below. (EPA Br. at 45.) EPA
also acknowledges that its characterization of Section 7(a\2)
is “not consistent with the relevant federal agencies’ under-
standing of Section 7(a)(2) as reflected in the FWS/NMFS
regulations ... and in more recent agency pronouncements.”
(EPA Br. at 45.) That EPA’s history of interpreting Section
7(aX(2) reflects two different interpretations does not show a
disingenuous litigation strategy, as suggested by Respon-
dents; rather it shows that the language of Section 7(a)(2) is
susceptible to more than one interpretation.
Given the ambiguity in Section 7(a)(2)’s language, the
Court must ascertain if the interpretation of the agency
responsible for enforcing the statute is contrary to con-
gressional intent as determined by traditional rules of
statutory construction. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 & n.9.
Instead of recognizing this and addressing the portion of
Section 7(a)’s legislative history that is discussed in
Petitioners and Arizona’s briefs, Respondents ignore it.’
The legislative history of Section 7(a) shows that
Congress intended the phrase “utilize their authorities” to
modify both the requirement that is now contained in
Section 7(a)1) and the requirement that is now contained
in Section 7(a)(2) and that Congress intended no substan-
tive change when it later separated the requirements into
two subsections. (See Ariz. Br. at 14-16; EPA Br. at 29-34;
NAHB Br. at 35-37.) Thus, the legislative history does not
* Respondents argue that the 1978 amendments to Section 7(aX2)
support their interpretation of Section 7(a\(2) because Congress ratified
this Court’s interpretation of Section 7(a\(2) in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978). This argument fails because TVA v. Hill does not support
Respondents’ interpretation. See argument in Section II(B) infra.
9
support Respondents’ argument that the limitation in
Section 7(a)(1) that agencies “utilize their authorities”
indicates that Congress did not intend to similarly limit
the agencies’ responsibility under Section 7(a)(2). Instead,
the legislative history supports FWS’s regulation that
construes Section 7(a)(2) to apply only to discretionary
agency actions. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (“Section 7 and the
requirements of this Part apply to all actions in which
there is discretionary Federal involvement or control.”).
Respondents argue that the Court should not defer to
FWS’s interpretation of the scope of Section 7(a)(2), even
though it is the agency responsible for enforcing the Endan-
gered Species Act, because EPA did not rely on it in the
Ninth Circuit. (Def. Br. at 45.) However, Arizona relied on 50
C.F.R. § 402.03 in arguing that Section 7(a)(2) did not apply
to EPA’s approval of Arizona’s NPDES program because EPA
lacked discretion to deny approval if Arizona met the re-
quirements of Section 402(b). (Brief of Intervenor State of
Arizona at 14-16, Nos. 03-71439 & 03-72894 (9th Cir. 2003)).
And, the court of appeals addressed the argument. (NAHB
Pet. App. at 39-41.) Because the enforcing agencies’ regula-
tion, 50 C.F.R. § 402.03, is a reasonable interpretation of
Section 7(a)(2) that is consistent with Congress’s intent, the
Court should defer to it. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
B. This Court’s Decision in TVA v. Hill Does
Not Support Respondents’ Construction of
Section 7(a)(2).
Respondents also argue that 7'VA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978), supports their expansive interpretation of Section
7(a)(2). (Def. Br. at 38-39.) But Respondents fail to address
the significant distinctions between this case and Hill.
Those distinctions are fatal to Respondents’ argument.
10
First, Hill involved TVA’s discretionary action. The
Court found that the lump-sum congressional appropria-
tions to TVA did not require TVA to complete the Tellico
Dam even though its completion would violate Section 7 of
the Endangered Species Act. 437 U.S. at 189-93. Second,
Hill construed the language of Section 7 as it was originally
enacted in 1973, id. at 160, and thus addresses whether a
federal agency must comply with Section 7 when it is acting
within its existing authority, id. at 164 n.14. Therefore, Hill
does not support Respondents’ argument.
.
CONCLUSION
This Court should vacate the judgment of the court of
appeals and uphold EPA’s approval of the Arizona’s pollu-
tion permitting program.
DATED: April 9, 2007
Respectfully submitted,
TERRY GODDARD
Attorney General of Arizona
Mary O’GRADY
Solicitor General
PAULA S. BICKETT
Counsel of Record
Chief Counsel, Civil Appeals
JAMES T. SKARDON
Assistant Attorney General
1275 West Washington
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
(602) 542-3333
Counsel for State of Arizona
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