Reply Brief — National Ass'n v. Defenders of Wildlife

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13 pop Nos. 06-340 & 06-549 |

3n The

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

¢

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

OF HOME BUILDERS, et a/.,

Petitioners,

VS.

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, et ai.,

Respondents.

+

UNITED STATES

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Petitioners,

VS.

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, et ai.,

Respondents.

.

On Writs Of Certiorari To The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

.

STATE OF ARIZONA’S REPLY BRIEF

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

»

TERRY GODDARD

Arizona Attorney General

MARY O’GRADY

Solicitor General

PAULA S. BICKETT

Counsel of Record

Chief Counsel, Civil Appeals

JAMES T. SKARDON

Assistant Attorney General

1275 West Washington —

Phoenix, Arizona 85007

(602) 542-3333

Counsel for State of Arizona

Il.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Court Should Not Remand This Case to

the EPA Because Its Approval of Arizona’s Pol-

lution Permitting Program, Which Was Based

on Arizona’s Compliance with the Require-

ments of the Clean Water Act, Was Legally

I ceccccansninsinmnsnsonatanmnaisizatanenictidinaiomine -

Section 7(a2) Does Not Apply to EPA’s Deci-

sion to Transfer Pollution Permitting Author-

SP Bp I cccccscccerecenesensimntiiniiiinatnionnnnen

A. Because the Language of Section 7(a)(2) Is

Susceptible to Different Interpretations,

the Court Should Look to Its Legislative

History to Determine Congress’s Intent .....

B. This Court’s Decision in TVA v. Hill Does

Not Support Respondents’ Construction of

I elie

a

1

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

; Page

CASES

Am. Textile Mfrs. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981)............ 2

Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371

EERE ce co ee ome oe ee 4

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

467 U.S. 837 (1984)........ steseecsceserssesacsoceseresesesessssorere 5, 8,9

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401

| ____. SREIIESEE Caeser ene mNeLE eee op hho: 2, 3,4

Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729

Ear cctshtdasdoiiteincibiiintaiaaiaioads sevesseeeecessecevenseesesesencessceecerensenevees 2

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Re 8 ee 1

Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117

I, SO ancient 5

TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 15S (1978).......ccccscoccccccsccceseceeees 8,9, 10

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Endangered Species Act, § 7(a)(1),

I elite 7,8,9

Endangered Species Act, § 7(a)(2),

ee le Oe ED Sccrctictencscictinenieeiinnndiiesintientntesinainenaiann passim

Clean Water Act, § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)......... passim

a 5

KS SE ener eC ne meee eno 3

5 ES ATR ORE eC een eee ee en 3

a 3

Pe Be cortiticnesregtcrennncssnnnnnsnenimaivieeniiannmincn 9

ARGUMENT

I. The Court Should Not Remand This Case to the

EPA Because Its Approval of Arizona’s Pollu-

tion Permitting Program, Which Was Based on

Arizona’s Compliance with the Requirements

of the Clean Water Act, Was Legally Correct.

Respondents argue that the Court must remand this

case to EPA without addressing the statutory construction

questions because EPA’s decision was based on “inconsis-

tent interpretations of Section 7(a)(2)” of the Endangered

Species Act. (Brief for Respondents Defenders of Wildlife,

et al. [Def. Br.] at 22.) But Respondents fail to acknowl-

edge or even address Arizona’s argument that this Court

should affirm EPA’s decision based on the correct interpre-

tation of the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species

Act even if its interpretation is different from EPA’s

interpretation of the relevant statutes. Because EPA’s

interpretation of Section 7(a)(2), by Respondents’ own

terms, is an interpretation of a federal statute, this Court

should determine the correct interpretation of Section

7(a)(2) instead of remanding.

To support their argument that the Court must

remand to the EPA under “fundamental principles of

administrative and appellate review,” Respondents do not

cite to any cases in which this Court has remanded a

question concerning the appropriate interpretation of a

federal statute to the administrative agency. (Def. Br. at

25.) Instead, Respondents rely on decisions that reiterate

the non-controversial principle that the Court will remand

to the administrative agency when the agency has not

provided an adequate explanation for a decision that it

alone is authorized to make. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983)

- 2

(Because the Secretary of Transportation was required to

issue motor vehicle safety standards and had rescinded

crash protection requirements in its safety standards

without offering any explanation, the Court vacated the

rescission and remanded to the agency.); Florida Power &

Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985) (In determin-

ing whether the court of appeals had original subject

matter jurisdiction over the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-

sion’s orders denying citizen petitions to modify, suspend,

or revoke the license of a nuclear reactor, the Court reiter-

ated that the agency record should enable the reviewing

court to evaluate the basis for the agency decision.);

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.

402, 419 (1971), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v.

Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977) (Court reversed the lower

courts’ ruling upholding the Secretary of Transportation’s

authorization of the expenditure of federal funds for the

construction of an expressway through a public park

because the record on review did not contain factual

findings to support the Secretary’s legally required deter-

mination that there was no feasible and prudent alterna-

tive route.); and Am. Textile Mfrs. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.

490, 539-40 (1981) (Court vacated and remanded the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA's)

promulgation of a wage guarantee requirement because

OSHA failed to make the necessary determination or

statement of reasons that the wage requirement was

related to the achievement of health and safety goals.).

Here, EPA made the factual findings and determina-

tions that were necessary for it to conclude that Arizona’s

pollution permitting (NPDES) program met the require-

ments of Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act. (J.A. 237.)

Respondents acknowledge that they never claimed that

3

Arizona’s program did not meet the requirements of

Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act. (Def. Br. at 19 n.8.)’

Because Respondents do not challenge EPA’s factual

findings or statement of its reasons that Arizona met the

requirements of the Clean Water Act, the Court need not

remand to EPA for clarification.

Respondents also argue that EPA’s post hoc clarifica-

tions of its interpretation of Section 7(a)(2) cannot justify

its approval of the Arizona pollution permitting program

under the Clean Water Act. (Def. Br. at 24-25.) But EPA’s

clarification of its interpretation of a federal statute is not

the kind of post hoc explanation that requires a remand.

In Volpe, the Court reversed the district court’s sum-

mary judgment rejecting petitioners’ claim that the Secre-

tary of the Department of Transportation violated federal

statutes when it authorized the expenditure of federal

funds to construct an expressway through a public park

without finding if there was a “feasible and prudent”

alternative route. 401 U.S. at 405 & n.4 (quoting 49 U.S.C.

§ 1653(f) and 23 U.S.C. § 138). The Court found that the

district court erred in relying on factual affidavits that the

government respondents submitted in that court to sup-

port the Secretary's decision because the affidavits were

“post hoc” rationalizations and did not constitute the whole

’ Respondents point out that EPA has discretion under the Clean

Water Act to “establish water quality standards that provide ‘for the

protection and propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife.’” (Def. Br. at 7

{quoting 40 C.F.R. § 131.2].) However, EPA and the Fish & Wildlife

Service (FWS) concluded that Arizona’s Water Quality Standards would

provide adequate protection to aquatic species and that oversight of the

Arizona program would ensure that Arizona continued to meet Clean

Water Act requirements, including those for the protection of fish,

shellfish, and wildlife. (NAHB Pet. App. 615-16.)

4

record compiled by the agency. Jd. at 419. In contrast, EPA’s

clarification of its interpretation of Section 7(a\2) after the

court of appeals issued its decision below is not EPA's at-

tempt to provide factual findings or a statement of its rea-

sons for approving Arizona’s pollution permitting program —

it is the agency's interpretation of a federal statute, which is

readily subject to review by this Court.

Similarly, in Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United

States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962), the Court rejected

“appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency

action” because it was an attempt to justify a decision that

only the Interstate Commerce Commission was authorized

to make, and the Commission had made no findings to

support its decision. Unlike the situation in Burlington,

EPA is not attempting to justify its approval of Arizona’s

pollution permitting program based on factual findings

that are not part of the administrative record. Rather, it

clarified its interpretation of Section 7(a)(2), which is a

legal interpretation that this Court may review.

Respondents also argue that it is unfair to affirm

EPA’s decision based on its clarified interpretation of

Section 7(a)(2) because they have “been severely preju-

diced” by EPA’s shifting, inconsistent positions concerning

its Section 7(a)(2) responsibilities. (Def. Br. at 28.) How-

ever, after the court of appeals allowed Arizona and

Petitioner National Association of Home Builders to

intervene below, they squarely raised and briefed the legal

issue of whether EPA was required to approve Arizona’s

application to administer the NPDES program because

Arizona met the criteria for approval under Section 402(b)

of the Clean Water Act. (Brief of Intervenor State of

Arizona at 1, Nos. 03-71439 & 03-72894 (9th Cir. 2003));

Intervenors-Respondents Home Builders’ Answering Brief

5

at 34, Nos. 03-71439 & 03-72894 (9th Cir. 2003)). And,

Respondents fully addressed the issue. (Petitioners’ Reply

Brief at 25-29.) Therefore, Respondents cannot legiti-

mately claim prejudice when they have béen given the

opportunity both in the court of appeals and this Court to

address this legal argument.

Respondents also argue that the Court should remand

to give the public the opportunity to comment on EPA’s

clarification of Section 7(a)(2)’s application to approvals of

state NPDES programs. (Def. Br. at 28-29.) Although the

public has the right to comment on an agency’s promulga-

tion, modification, or repeal of a rule (see 5 U.S.C.

§ 551(5)), “there is no barrier to an agency altering its

initial interpretation [of a statute] to adopt another

reasonable interpretation - even one that represents a

new policy response generated by a different administra-

tion.” Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117

~ F.8d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984)).

Because EPA has not changed its interpretation of its

rules, there is no need to remand for public comment.

Finally, Respondents argue that the Court should

remand because they would have challenged EPA’s deci-

sion to partially fund Arizona’s NPDES program if they

had known that EPA would take the position that Section

7(a)(2) did not apply to its decision to approve the pro-

gram. (Def. Br. at 30.) This argument has no merit.

First, Respondents cannot blame their failure to raise

-all relevant issues below on EPA. As noted above, Arizona

and National Association of Home Builders put Respon-

dents on notice of their interpretation of Section 7(a)(2).

Moreover, FWS’s Biological Opinion put Respondents on

6

notice that FWS believed that the Clean Water Act

granted States the right to administer NPDES programs

even if such approval would result in a loss of conservation

benefits. (NAHB Pet. App. 114.)’

Second, once EPA determined that it would approve

Arizona’s program because it met Section 402(b)’s require-

ments, its additional decision to provide funding would not

require consultation under Section 7(a)(2). Such consultation

is triggered by the requirement that EPA “insure” that “any

action” that it “fund{s]” is “not likely to jeopardize” any

endangered or threatened species or adversely modify critical

habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Although increased construc-

tion may affect terrestrial upland species, the action funded

-~ the Arizona NPDES program - is not likely to jeopardize

any endangered or threatened species or adversely modify

critical habitat. (See NAHB Br. at 45-46 and the Brief of

Amici Curiae High Production Homebuilders in Support of

Petitioners for an in-depth discussion of when agency action

triggers Section 7 consultation.)

In sum, the Court should not remand this matter to

EPA because any inconsistencies in EPA’s decisionmaking

involve the interpretation of federal statutes and are

therefore appropriate for this Court’s review. And, this

Court’s guidance on this important question is necessary

to resolve the conflict between the circuit courts.

* In its Biological Opinion, the FWS stated: “Further, loss of any

conservation benefit is not caused by EPA's decision to approve the

State of Arizona’s program. Rather, the absence of the section 7 process

that exists with respect to Federal NPDES permits reflects Congress’

decision to grant States the right to administer these programs under

state law provided the State’s program meets the requirements of

402(b) of the Clean Water Act.” Jd.

7

II. Section 7(a)(2) Does Not Apply to EPA’s Deci-

sion to Transfer Pollution Permitting Authority

to Arizona,

Respondents selectively focus on language, legislative

history, and decisional authority that seemingly supports

their argument that Section 7(a)(2) applies to EPA’s

decision to transfer pollution permitting authority to

Arizona under Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act. But

Respondents simply ignore statutory language, legislative

history, and decisional authority that show that Congress

intended the transfer provisions of Section 402(b) to be

mandatory and did not intend to expand agencies’ authori-

ties when it enacted the Endangered Species Act. Respon-

dents’ construction of Section 7(a)(2) is wrong because it is

contrary to Congress’s intent.

A. Because the Language of Section 7(a)(2) Is

Susceptible to Different Interpretations,

the Court Should Look to Its Legislative

History to Determine Congress’s Intent.

Respondents argue that the plain language of Section

7(a)(2) and its relationship to Section 7(a)(1) show that it

applies to nondiscretionary agency actions. (Def. Br. at 34-

35.) But Respondents ignore Section 7(a)’s legislative

history that is contrary to their argument. Because the

language of Section 7(a)(2) is susceptible to different

interpretations, the Court should examine its legislative

history to ascertain Congress’s intent and defer to the

reasonable interpretation of the agency responsible for

enforcing the statute.

The EPA acknowledges that it stated that it was

required to consult under Section 7(a)(2) before approving

8

Arizona’s application to administer the NPDES program in

the administrative proceeding below. (EPA Br. at 45.) EPA

also acknowledges that its characterization of Section 7(a\2)

is “not consistent with the relevant federal agencies’ under-

standing of Section 7(a)(2) as reflected in the FWS/NMFS

regulations ... and in more recent agency pronouncements.”

(EPA Br. at 45.) That EPA’s history of interpreting Section

7(aX(2) reflects two different interpretations does not show a

disingenuous litigation strategy, as suggested by Respon-

dents; rather it shows that the language of Section 7(a)(2) is

susceptible to more than one interpretation.

Given the ambiguity in Section 7(a)(2)’s language, the

Court must ascertain if the interpretation of the agency

responsible for enforcing the statute is contrary to con-

gressional intent as determined by traditional rules of

statutory construction. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 & n.9.

Instead of recognizing this and addressing the portion of

Section 7(a)’s legislative history that is discussed in

Petitioners and Arizona’s briefs, Respondents ignore it.’

The legislative history of Section 7(a) shows that

Congress intended the phrase “utilize their authorities” to

modify both the requirement that is now contained in

Section 7(a)1) and the requirement that is now contained

in Section 7(a)(2) and that Congress intended no substan-

tive change when it later separated the requirements into

two subsections. (See Ariz. Br. at 14-16; EPA Br. at 29-34;

NAHB Br. at 35-37.) Thus, the legislative history does not

* Respondents argue that the 1978 amendments to Section 7(aX2)

support their interpretation of Section 7(a\(2) because Congress ratified

this Court’s interpretation of Section 7(a\(2) in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153

(1978). This argument fails because TVA v. Hill does not support

Respondents’ interpretation. See argument in Section II(B) infra.

9

support Respondents’ argument that the limitation in

Section 7(a)(1) that agencies “utilize their authorities”

indicates that Congress did not intend to similarly limit

the agencies’ responsibility under Section 7(a)(2). Instead,

the legislative history supports FWS’s regulation that

construes Section 7(a)(2) to apply only to discretionary

agency actions. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (“Section 7 and the

requirements of this Part apply to all actions in which

there is discretionary Federal involvement or control.”).

Respondents argue that the Court should not defer to

FWS’s interpretation of the scope of Section 7(a)(2), even

though it is the agency responsible for enforcing the Endan-

gered Species Act, because EPA did not rely on it in the

Ninth Circuit. (Def. Br. at 45.) However, Arizona relied on 50

C.F.R. § 402.03 in arguing that Section 7(a)(2) did not apply

to EPA’s approval of Arizona’s NPDES program because EPA

lacked discretion to deny approval if Arizona met the re-

quirements of Section 402(b). (Brief of Intervenor State of

Arizona at 14-16, Nos. 03-71439 & 03-72894 (9th Cir. 2003)).

And, the court of appeals addressed the argument. (NAHB

Pet. App. at 39-41.) Because the enforcing agencies’ regula-

tion, 50 C.F.R. § 402.03, is a reasonable interpretation of

Section 7(a)(2) that is consistent with Congress’s intent, the

Court should defer to it. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.

B. This Court’s Decision in TVA v. Hill Does

Not Support Respondents’ Construction of

Section 7(a)(2).

Respondents also argue that 7'VA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153

(1978), supports their expansive interpretation of Section

7(a)(2). (Def. Br. at 38-39.) But Respondents fail to address

the significant distinctions between this case and Hill.

Those distinctions are fatal to Respondents’ argument.

10

First, Hill involved TVA’s discretionary action. The

Court found that the lump-sum congressional appropria-

tions to TVA did not require TVA to complete the Tellico

Dam even though its completion would violate Section 7 of

the Endangered Species Act. 437 U.S. at 189-93. Second,

Hill construed the language of Section 7 as it was originally

enacted in 1973, id. at 160, and thus addresses whether a

federal agency must comply with Section 7 when it is acting

within its existing authority, id. at 164 n.14. Therefore, Hill

does not support Respondents’ argument.

.

CONCLUSION

This Court should vacate the judgment of the court of

appeals and uphold EPA’s approval of the Arizona’s pollu-

tion permitting program.

DATED: April 9, 2007

Respectfully submitted,

TERRY GODDARD

Attorney General of Arizona

Mary O’GRADY

Solicitor General

PAULA S. BICKETT

Counsel of Record

Chief Counsel, Civil Appeals

JAMES T. SKARDON

Assistant Attorney General

1275 West Washington

Phoenix, Arizona 85007

(602) 542-3333

Counsel for State of Arizona

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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