Respondents Brief — United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer

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No. 05-1345

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED HAULERS ASSOCIATION, INC., e7 al,

Petitioners,

y.

ONEIDA-HERKIMER SOLID WASTE

MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ oF CERTIORARI TO THE

Unitep STATES Court OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

—

—-

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

ine

TO

Micuae J. CAHILL

Counsel of Record

GERMANO & CauHiLt, PC

4250 Veterans Memorial Highway

Suite 275

Holbrook, New York 11741

(631) 588-8778

Attorneys for Oneida Herkimer

Solid Waste Management Authority

(Additional Counsel Listed on Signature Page)

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sn ME ota seco at ediaes.oe eu haas

PERU nivihegueicuecadsaneebanss

Operation of the System ... d pupa weeok se kaka

EE ov No ecnunds Meee adeSin pu bhew eae

Flow Control and the Solid Waste Management Plan

ee oe eeaeeeeeeceweeeoemP OA CEO CACO eee szveaeesee¢eeosd 8 6 4

Il. The Oneida-Herkimer Laws Do Not

Discriminate Against Interstate Commerce,

And The Pike Balance Is The Appropriate Test

PGE. sacs bho Dacia Kanehabet Reis

A. There Is No Discrimination Here,

Therefore There Is No Commerce Clause

TE a oe Dae er ite a

B. The Public Purposes Served By Oneida-

Herkimer Distinguish This Case From

| SREP ESE pain oe ey ee

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12

17

Il. The

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Contents

1. The First Objective: Public

Assumption Of Environmental Risk

On Behalf Of The Community ....

2. The Public System In Oneida-

Herkimer Does Not Compete With

Private Sector Services ..........

3. The Market Participant Doctrine

Does Not Apply In This Action By

Appellant Haulers, And Any Indirect

Regulatory Effect On Non-Parties Is

Not Discrimination Against Interstate

CN bk ws hd ca ee kw eaear

4. Waste Reduction And Recycling Are

Unique Governmental Purposes

Consistent With National And State

into i sé Sicew ou buneene-

Oneida-Herkimer Laws Pass the

Balancing Test of Pike v. Bruce Church ....

A.

B.

Conclusion

The Laws Place No Cognizable Incidental

Burden On Interstate Commerce ......

The Counties’ Integrated System Of

Waste Management Provides Benefits

Possible Only Through Flow Control ...

Widespread Adoption Of Flow Control

Similar To Oneida-Herkimer’s Laws

Would Not Burden Interstate Commerce

Page

18

23

24

_ 26

30

30

36

39

iti

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. United States, 964 F.2d 252

a Re Ss Poe Ry pe 20-21

Ben Oehrleins & Son v. Hennepin County, 113 F.3d

Eee EG SUED ne kc de bkessuiceces othe 42

BF Goodrich v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1993)

bh ako o Cine eee ARTA ees bh Ken 20

Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State

Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) ........... 31

C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383

SOR 5 Fads Va Sie kee OU Ma eka ease sees passim

California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction

Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905) .............. 10, 29, 43

Chem. Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334

PETE pre eee tae Pre Pree ay ee 13,15

City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617

ge SC er eee re 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 41

CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S.

i if UT ET EP SEROTEC ET Eee TG ere 32, 33, 34

Exxon v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) ......... 11, 34

Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp.,

893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1996) .............. 21

iv

Cited Authorities

Page

Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan, 504 U.S.

BEE. 0 keV ACHONA aoe be Rae cb oe 14, 15,41.

Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905) ....... 10, 43

Gen. Motors v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) ....... 13

Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392

ee a Pre rey eee es Pre 1]

Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d

pg ERI pea i mr i My DASeoe re 42

Houlton Citizens’ Coalition v. Town of Houlton, 175

Due ee Cee ae, RE ok Hee okies tA Oh haw eos 42

HP Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949)

Vimy hod Kaen ERE NEC Ok a cbOd ues ERE ene 42, 43

Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794

SN ccs ia kb oA oda Wk om eb dee ae eo 24

Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) ....... 13

Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993)

Se ides RE AEE 6 TU AD LAER We 12

Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) ........... 13

Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890) ........ 11

Nat'l Paint & Coatings Association v. Chicago, 45

ety ye fe | rrr arr aera 36

Cited Authorities

Page

Nat’l Solid Waste Management Assoc. v. Pine Belt

Regional Solid Waste Auth., 389 F.3d 491 (Sth Cir.

NN ak ELE a Ria reek REA SEEKER DS cake 36

New York State Trawlers Assoc. v. Jorling, 16 F.3d

Me ek ee er ere 36

Old Bridge Chem., Inc. v. New Jersey Dep t of Envitl.

Protection, 965 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1992) ...... 36

Oregon Waste Sys. v. Oregon Dept. of Envtl. Quality,

SIL U.S. 93 (1994) 2... cc cee ee 9, 12, 13, 15, 19, 29

Pacific Northwest Venison Producers v. Smitch,-20

F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1994) ................... 36

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)

PPE PTET Oe eee CTO ee Pe Bre te 20

Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970) .......

peat ee doe CEST REA EM OKA hen ees ore 9, 10, 29, 30, 31

Pike. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York

State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) ....... 26

Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) ............ 18

Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995)

Kab eeOR EE KES hae Oka hue ae eee eae 12

vi

Cited Authorities

Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) ......

St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Warwick Dyeing

Corp., 26 F.3d 1195 (1st Cir. 1994) ...........

U.S.A. Recycling v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272

SE CUE 1. kins wd okie bie bo NAA S Daw Aelon ees

United States v. Best Foods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) ...

United States v. Cello-Foil Products, Inc. 100 F.3d

i Cs Oe ewe hi ehhedbekhete

United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &

Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) ...

USA Recycling v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272

SE CEE Bbc Aba CA aOR vend ncdneeay

V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Dept of Public Safety, 131

Wien POE CE Gs EOOED ka awk dos casaeraces

West Lynn Creamery Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186

SE hel ak Cre Kaine acea eke seuss doeees

21

42

36

29

29

vii

Cited Authorities

3 Page

Statutes:

Herkimer Local Law §2(c) ...............-...- 3

Sasa Ms A GUE URED ccc awied coe deeaceaecs 35

N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §27-0106(1) .......... 27

N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §27-0107(1)(a) ........ 28

N.Y. Envil. Conserv. Law §§27-1301-27-2403 .... 21

N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§2049-aa-2049-yy ........ 4

N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §2049-ee(4) .............. 35

N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law $2099-O0(7) 2... ccccccccess 1,24

N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §2049-tt(3) ............00- 4

N.Y. Solid Waste Management Act of 1988, c. 70,

codified as amended in scattered sections Article

27 of N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law .............. 5

Cepia Lae GING) oo wc ccc ccc ctccccccens 3

Se ee Noack ce ens caeiciees 18, 20, 28

Fe een EE 0602 civ acne achivgs deceves’ 27

en ED vic cévcubcrasencteceuns 28

ee Rs LOND, bck Kad vs nweee ce evens 4, 18, 20

Ge an TEED obs Kdncedvadewecetecturs 20

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The respondents created a public waste management

system supported by the flow control laws at issue here, in

response to public demand, prompted by a failed system of

public and private waste management in the 1980’s. The laws

favor the pub'ic system and the citizens of the counties, but

do not favor or disfavor any private entity on the basis of

their location within or outside of the counties or the State

of New York. This case will determine whether such an

exercise of the police power is consistent with the Commerce

Clause of the Constitution.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management

Authority (the “Authority”) operates an integrated solid waste

management system as a public monopoly in the Counties

of Oneida and Herkimer, in the Mohawk River Valley, in

New York. The system consists of three transfer stations, a

recycling facility, a compost facility, a household hazardous

waste facility, a stump grinding facility and, as of October

2006, a landfill for non-recyclable waste.' The objectives of

the system are to foster waste reduction, maximize reuse and

recycling of waste materials, reduce the toxicity of non-

recyclable waste and safely dispose of non-recyclable waste,

in accordance with New York State solid waste management

policy and the region’s Local Solid Waste Management Plan

(the “Plan”). The Authority does not provide service for waste

originating outside of the Counties. JA 121a-24a; N.Y. Pub.

Auth. Law §2049-ee(7) (McKinney 2006).

1. The Authority’s long-planned solid waste landfill was

completed and began receiving waste on October 24, 2006. The

Authority’s transport and disposal contract with Waste Management

of New York, operative since 1998, will terminate on December 31,

2006.

2

OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM

The system provides disposal and recycling services, but

does not provide waste collection service. Waste collection

is provided by the region’s constituent cities, towns and

villages,” and by private sector waste haulers by arrangement

with consumers and municipalities. The system operates as

a monopoly because the flow control laws under challenge

here require all haulers and generators in the Counties to

deliver waste and recyclables left at curbside to the

appropriate Authority facility. (“Generators” of waste are

simply all of the citizens, businesses and institutions that

produce it.)

The courts below found that the flow control laws are

not protectionist, do not discriminate against interstate

commerce and are even-handed regulation. It is not disputed

that all haulers and generators of waste, whether based locally

or outside of the counties or the state, are equally subject to

the laws. All pay the same system charge for the disposal of

non-recyclable waste, and all are permitted to deliver

recyclables and household hazardous wastes free of charge.

JA 282a-85a.

The local laws are not enforced beyond the borders of

Oneida and Herkimer Counties. There was no evidence

presented below that these laws interfere in any way with

the regulatory systems of any other state, or any other county

within New York State. From 1991 through 2006, the

Authority arranged for the disposal of non-recyclable waste

delivered to the Authority’s transfer stations at landfills

located in Pennsylvania (1991-97) and western New York

(1998-2006). Contracts with these facilities were procured

2. The more densely populated areas of the Counties, including

the cities of Utica, Rome and their surrounding suburbs, are scrved

by municipal collection with public employees or private contractors.

Persons in other communities are served by private haulers or self-

haul to Authority facilities.

3

through public competitive bidding pursuant to standards

established by the Authority. JA 358a-59a.

The courts below found that the Authority’s bidding

process was open to in-state and out-of-state bidders and did

not discriminate against any bidder on the basis of its location

in another state. Pet. App. 67a, 95a-6a. Because the laws

require that all waste in the region be delivered to the

Authority, all landfills other than the facility selected by the

Authority are unable to receive Oneida-Herkimer waste. As

of January 1, 2007, all non-recyclable non-hazardous waste

in the Counties will be disposed of at the Authority’s landfill

in Oneida County.

The laws require the waste generators of the Counties to

recycle, and direct that recyclable materials be separated at

curbside and delivered to the Authority’s recycling facility.

The laws allow generators to make direct arrangements with

buyers of recyclables, but if such arrangements are not made,

the recyclables are to be placed at curbside and delivered to

the Authority. See Oneida Local Law §2(d); Pet. App. 122a;

Herkimer Local Law §2(c); Pet. App. 135a. At the recycling

center, the Authority further sorts and separates the material

into 37 different commodities which are marketed to buyers

in interstate commerce. JA 123a, 420a-21a.

BACKGROUND

The public waste management system was created in

response to public demand prompted by the collapse of

traditional disposal methods in the 1980’s. Historically, waste

disposal in the region had been provided at local landfills

operated by towns, cities, villages and private landowners,

with minimal environmental safeguards. A 1969 planning

study conducted for Oneida and Herkimer Counties identified

44 operating dump sites, both public and private, all of which

posed varying degrees of threat to public health and the

environment. In the early 1980’s, health officials ordered the

4

closure of drinking water wells near several of these facilities.

Twelve of these sites were ultimately identified as inactive

hazardous waste disposal sites by State and Federal

authorities. One, the privately operated Ludlow landfill in

the Town of Paris, Oneida County, was named to the National

Priorities List (Superfund) pursuant to the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensatior, and Liability Act

of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seg. JA 450a-52a, 475a, 477a.

Clean-up and remediation costs at these sites totaled over

$74 million. In the case of the Ludlow landfill, regulatory

- action by the state to compel its closure led to wider litigation,

in which over 600 local businesses, municipalities (29 of

them) and other generators, were named as third-party

defendants in a cost recovery action. Of the 44 operating

dump sites in 1969, only one was operating at the time these

local laws were adopted in early 1990. JA 447a-52a.

The private sector provided no solutions. In 1986, only

the privately-operated Mohawk Valley landfill was available

to serve the City of Utica, and its operators doubled their

fees to the City on short notice. Mohawk Valley was itself

unlined, operating without a state permit, and under

regulatory pressure to close. In September 1986, local

haulers, including two of the plaintiffs in this case, called

upon the Counties to develop a new regional landfill as a

safeguard against the closure of Mohawk Valley, which

finally occurred in 1992. JA 447a-55a, 474a-80a, 41 4a-19a.

The “crisis” in solid waste management was apparent,

and in response to demand by all sectors of the community,

the Counties undertook to reform local disposal and establish

a public system capable of serving the needs of all citizens

in the region. At the request of the Counties, the New York

State legislature created the Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste

Management Authority in September 1988. N.Y. Pub. Auth.

Law §§2049-aa-2049-yy. Among the powers granted to the

Authority and the Counties, Section 2049-tt(3) of the Act

5

expressly authorizes the Counties, “in recognition of the

public policy of the state in the ... management of solid

waste” to “displace competition with regulation or monopoly

public control” and to require “that all solid waste . . . shall

be delivered to a specified solid waste management-resource

recovery facility.” > JA 417a-18a, 462a-65a.

In the same year that it created the Authority, the State

of New York adopted the Solid Waste Management Act of

1988.4 The 1988 Act established a hierarchy of waste

management methods for the state, providing first for waste

reduction, followed by re-use, recycling, recovery of energy,

and finally land disposal in order of priority. The Act als»

mandated the preparation of both a state-wide solid waste

management plan and a series of local plans to be adopted

by regional p!anning units and approved by the state’s

Department of Environmental Conservation. The Authority

was charged with preparing a solid waste management plan

for the Oneida-Herkimer region. JA 417a-18a.

The Authority began the planning process at its initial

meeting in the fall of 1988. By May 15, 1989, a Draft Local

Solid Waste Management Plan (the “Plan”), together with a

Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement (“DGEIS”)

were ready for public comment. The Authority conducted

public hearings and received comments on the Plan for the

next eight months. Four formal public hearings were

conducted in July and December 1989, and numerous

informal presentations were made to local governments, civic

organizations and industry groups, including the local waste

hauling industry. The Authority conducted 15 regular

meetings during this period, at which members of the public

were invited to comment on the Plan and the future of waste

3. See, generally, Br. of amicus curiae Rockiand County Solid

Waste Management Authority for a discussion of the role of public

service monopolies in our federal system.

4. N.Y. Solid Waste Management Act of 1988, c. 70, codified as

amended in scattered sections Article 27 of N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law.

6

management in the region. By December 1989, the Authority

had received over 10,000 letters and other written comments

on various aspects of the Plan. JA 146a-51a.

FLOW CONTROL AND THE SOLID WASTE

MANAGEMENT PLAN

The Plan calls for a comprehensive public system to

safely manage all of the waste generated in the two-County

region. The core concept of the Plan’s approach is an

“qntegrated system” in which different management methods

are brought to bear on different components of the waste

stream. The overall objective is to minimize the amount of

waste destined for land disposal by providing facilities and

incentives to separate and recycle as much waste as possible.

By agreements with the Counties, the Authority acquired

some of their existing facilities, and assumed the financial

obligation for the construction and operation of additional

facilities called for by the Plan. JA 465a.

The flow control laws were, and remain, the foundation

of the Plan and the integrated system. Prior to 1991, no

household recycling service was available anywhere in the

region. To institute a region-wide recycling program, the

Counties required the participation of homeowners to

separate recyclables from other wastes, and the assistance of

haulers to provide new collection arrangements to deliver

recyclables and non-recyclables to the appropriate facility.

The Plan did not call for public waste collection to displace

existing collection arrangements, or limit private transactions

in recyclable materials. It did require the participation of the

local hauling industry to conform their services to the new

approach. JA 43 1a-35a.

Since 1990, the public system in Oneida-Herkimer has

developed into one of the most successful in New York State.

As of 2003, the Oneida-Herkimer system had recycled over

370,000 tons of paper, containers and other materials,

7

composted 140,000 tons of green waste, and disposed or

recycled over 260,000 gallons of liquid hazardous waste.

These figures represent more than 1.5 years of regional waste

generation diverted from landfills, avoiding $27 million in

landfill disposal fees and generating over $14 million in

revenue for the public. Over the same period, the Authority

provided reliable disposal for 2.3 million tons of waste

through contracts procured by competitive bidding in

interstate commerce. In addition to the services provided by

the Authority’s facilities, the system aids local industry

through the provision of free waste audits, and also provides

extensive public education programs focusing on methods

to reduce waste generation and maximize recycling. JA 130a-

38a.

The integrated management system is supported by the

system charge levied on the non-recyclable fraction of the

waste stream. The Authority’s recycling, composting,

hazardous waste management and industrial waste audit

programs are not structured to generate revenue, but to

encourage the separation of recyclables, green wastes and

hazardous waste for proper disposal. As discussed in detail

in the expert report of Dr. Robert N. Stavins, the system

charge is intentionally structured to create a differential price

for the disposal of non-recyclable waste and recyclables, to

serve aS an economic incentive for recycling and waste

reduction. JA 374a-87a. At $78/ton, it represents the cost of

the entire range of Authority services provided to the

community. It is not comparable to the market cost for

disposal of a ton of waste at facilities that do not offer the

bundle of services provided by the Authority.

The system charge is a user fee, which provides

additional advantages as a method of financing the waste

system. It distributes the costs of the system to the community

on the basis of the amount of non-recyclable waste generated

by the user. Haulers who use Authority facilities do not absorb

8

the cost of the system because they pass the disposal charges

through to their customers in their bill for collection services.

JA 362a. The system charge is a fee for service, and is the

most equitable means of distributing the cost of the system

to the businesses and residents of the Counties. JA 391a.

Because the Authority is organized solely to provide waste

services, the system charge is not used to subsidize other

governmental programs, and has not served as a revenue

source for the Counties.

There is no dispute that the flow control laws operate

without differential impact on private disposal service

providers, transporters, haulers and buyers of recyclable

materials, regardless of their out-of-state or in-state location.

The cost of the services provided through the public system

is borne entirely by the residents and businesses of the

Counties. On review of the record below, the Magistrate

Judge, the District Court and the Second Circuit Court of

Appeals, each concluded that the laws i) do not discriminate

against interstate commerce; and ii) do not place any

incidental burdens on interstate commerce that outweigh the

substantial public benefits the laws provide as an integral

part of the public sclid waste management system established

for the region.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The decision below should be affirmed. The Oneida-

Herkimer flow control ordinances neither discriminate

against interstate commerce nor place any incidental burden

upon interstate commerce. The ordinances require all haulers

and waste generators in the two Counties to deliver waste

and recyclables to the Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste

Management Authority — a public system in which the local

government has assumed responsibility for waste

management.

9

Under the dormant Commerce Clause, discrimination

“means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state

economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the

latter.” Oregon Waste Systems v. Dep 1. of Envtl. Quality, 511

U.S. 93, 99 (1994). There is no discrimination here.

Petitioners concede that in-state and out-of-state waste

haulers, processors and transporters are treated alike. The

flow control ordinances direct all collections to the publicly-

owned facilities, thus they do not favor local private business

interests over out-of-state private interests.

The Counties’ flow control ordinances are not

condemned by C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511

U.S. 383 (1994). Clarkstown required all waste to be

processed at a designated private facility, “depriving

competitors, including out of state firms, of access to a local

market. . . .” Jd. at 386. Thus, Clarkstown used its regulatory

power to favor local enterprise. . . .” Jd. at 394. Here, no local

enterprise is favored.

Oneida-Herkimer mandates participation in a public

system in which local government has assumed responsibility

for waste management in order to protect public health and

preserve natural resources. Assuming arguendo that such a

non-discriminatory scenario has some incidental effect on

interstate commerce, the Oneida-Herkimer ordinances pass

the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) balancing

test: “Where [a] statute regulates even handedly to effectuate

a legitimate public interest, and its effects on interstate

commierce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the

burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in

relation to the putative local benefits.” /d. at 142.

The local benefits here are substantial. The flow control

laws serve three public purposes that would not be served

by private enterprise. First, the laws place the power to make

disposal decisions in public hands, allowing the Authority

to assume the risks and responsibilities that would otherwise

10

be carried by the Counties’ residents and businesses under

modern environmental law. Second, the laws allow the

Authority to pursue policies designed to reduce waste and

maximize recycling within the Counties in accord with

national and state policy. Third, the laws allow the Authority

to manage waste through an integrated system of programs

and facilities designed to match specific components of the

waste stream to the methods that suit them best.

The management of public waste disposal has historical

roots. See Br. of amicus curiae Madison County, New York.

For over 100 years, municipalities have performed their

traditional duty to control solid waste from the time it is

placed on the curb. See, e.g., Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S.

325 (1905); Cal Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works,

199 U.S. 306 (1905). Oneida-Herkimer’s laws place the

responsibility for waste management with government, not

private haulers, allowing the Authority to pursue important

policy objectives of waste reduction, recycling and ensuing

“the proper disposal of hazardous wastes thereby reducing

the counties’ exposure to costly environmental tort suits.”

United Haulers il, Pet. App. 20a.

The discriminatory Ciarkstown ordinances in Carbone

relied on the private market to manage local waste; the town’s

goal was only monetary. Oneida-Herkimer has assumed

governmental responsibility to manage local waste; their goal

is to protect public interests by preserving and protecting

the public health and environment and ensuring compliance

with laws designed to achieve those goals.

The Second Circuit doubted that the Oneida-Herkimer

ordinances imposed “a differential burden triggering the need

for Pike analysis.” Pet. App. 16a. It declined to resolve the

question because “we find it readily apparent that even if we

were to endorse the Plaintiffs’ claim that the Counties’

ordinances burden interstate commerce by preventing the

Counties’ wastes from being processed by non-local facilities,

11

the resulting burden would be substantially outweighed by

the ordinances’ local benefits.” Pet. App. 16a. The Petitioners

concede that there is no differential impact on any cognizable

out-of-state economic interest. No further inquiry is necessary

because government regulation that does not differentiate

between commerce in one state and another does not burden

interstate commerce. The Commerce Clause does not protect

“the particular structure or methods of operation in-a retail

market.” Exxon v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978).

Therefore, the claim that the Commerce Clause gives

commercial haulers the right to take waste to the disposal

facility of their choice is not cognizable. Since all waste

collectors are treated alike, Oneida-Herkimer’s flow control

laws are not unconstitutional.

The decision below should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT

1. The Oneida-Herkimer Laws Do Not Discriminate

Against Interstate Commerce, And The Pike Balance

Is The Appropriate Test For Review

C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383

(1994) did not establish a new constitutional rule and did

not sweep away traditional constitutional distinctions

between government service and private sector services,

either in the limited field of waste disposal, or in any broader

sense. Carbone was grounded in established precedent, both

under the Court’s relatively recent line of “waste cases”

commencing with City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437

U.S. 617 (1978) and the older established line of “processing

cases” commencing with Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313

(1890). Because it was so firmly grounded, no new rule of

law can be inferred from the application of established law

to the facts presented in the case. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United

Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 496 (1968) (case does not

announce new rule unless it indicates “that the issue involved

12

was novel, that innovative principles were necessary to resolve

it, or that the issue had been settled in prior cases in a manner

contrary to the view held by [the Court]).”*

The question presented here is not how Carbone might have

been decided if the Clarkstown facility were unambiguously

owned and operated by the town, but how the laws of Oneida

and Herkimer Counties impact interstate commerce, and how

and to what extent they provide benefits to the public. The court

_ Of appeals in United Haulers | applied established precedent to

the facts presented, and properly found that the flow control

laws serve non-protectionist purposes and do not discriminate

against interstate commerce.

A. There Is No Discrimination Here, Therefore There

Is No Commerce Clause Violation

Dormant Commerce Clause analysis is two-pronged: first

a determination as to whether the challenged law discriminates

against interstate commerce, and if not, whether the law places

any incidental burdens on interstate commerce that outweigh

the putative local benefits of the law. City of Philadelphia v.

New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).

In Oregon Waste Sys. v. Dept of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93

(1994), the Court defined “discrimination” against interstate

commerce: “As we use the term here, discrimination simply

means differential treatment of in-state and out-of state economic

interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”

Id. at 99. When a law is found to discriminate against interstate

commerce, a rule of virtual per se invalidity applies, and the

burden then falls on the government to demonstrate under strict

scrutiny that the local interest sought to be protected cannot be

adequately served by alternative means with a lesser impact on

5. See, also, Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749,

761 (1995) Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment, citing Keene Corp.

v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 215 (1993) {case does not announce

new rule where claims are resolved “under well-settled law”).

13

interstate commerce. /d. at 99, citing Chem. Waste

Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. at 340-41; Maine v. Taylor,

477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). A discriminatory purpose can

manifest itself on the face of the regulation, or in its practical

effect. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 626

(1978); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).

Each prong of the Commerce Clause analysis requires

comparison of the effects of the challenged law on both in-

state and out-of state interests. This comparison in turn

requires a preliminary identification of the interests to be

compared, in order to determine that they are “similarly

situated,” so as not to compare “apples to oranges.”

Conceptually, of course, any notion of discrimination

assumes a comparison of substantially similar

entities. Although this central assumption has more

often than not itself remained dormant in this Court’s

opinions on state discrimination subject to review

under the dormant Commerce Clause, when the

allegedly competing entities provide different

products, as here, there is a threshold question

whether the companies are indeed similarly situated

for constitutional purposes.

Gen. Motors v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298-99 (1997).

Thus, whenever the Court has found that a local

regulation discriminates against interstate commerce, it has

also found that some entity situated out-of-state is burdened

in a different way than a similar entity located within the

state. Where a differential burden is involved, the difference

must be explained by some justification other than the injured

party’s state of origin. Specific differential treatment of in-

state and out-of state interests has been found in each of this

Court’s recent waste cases, including C&A Carbone v. Town

of Clarkstown.

14

In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the State of New

Jersey banned all out-of-state waste from its public and private

landfills. Suit was brought by private landfill operators within

New Jersey who served out-of-state municipalities. The Court

found that New Jersey’s purpose — to conserve both public

and private landfill space within the state — was effected

through a discriminatory mechanism. New Jersey targeted out-

of-state waste for no reason other than its place of origin.

Consequently, the state’s residents continued to have New Jersey

capacity available, but the burden of the regulation fell upon

the residents of other states, who did not. The Court pointed

out that the state could have acted to “slow the flow of a// waste

into the State’s remaining landfills, even though commerce

might be incidentally affected.” /d. at 626. Thus, a general

reduction in the commerce in waste (which is the object and

effect of the Oneida-Herkimer regulations), would not have

constituted discrimination for the Philadelphia court. Moreover,

while the regulation extended to both public and private landfills,

the Court pointedly expressed no opinion about “New Jersey’s

power, consistent with the Commerce Clause, to restrict to State

residents access to state-owned resources,” 437 U.S. at 627 n.6,

recognizing the ability of public systems (such as Oneida-

Herkimer) to limit service to their own region.

In Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan, 504 U.S.

353 (1992), the court struck a Michigan statute that prohibited

private landfills from accepting waste generated outside of

Michigan. Again, the state was autempting to conserve

Michigan’s private landfill capacity for Michigan residents, but

did so without identifying any reason why out-of-state waste

should be treated differently than local waste. Again, the burden

of the regulation fell upon the residents of other states. The

court expressly stated that “the case did not raise any question

conceming policies that municipalities may pursue with respect

to publicly owned facilities.” /d. at 358-59.

15

City of Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot each represented

attempts by states to preserve local disposal capacity by direct

bans of out-of-state waste. Chem. Waste Management v. Hunt,

504 U.S. 334 (1992) and Oregon Waste Sys. v. Oregon Dept.

of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) represented attempts

by states to slow the flow of waste into private facilities in

Alabama and Oregon. The method adopted in each case was

an assessment of fees on out-of-state waste at rates different

from the fees assessed on in-state waste. In these cases the

burden of the assessed fees fell disproportionately upon the

shippers of out-of-state waste (and indirectly upon out-of-

state generators) without an acceptable justification that

out-of-state waste posed greater problems for the state than

in-state waste. The differential treatment of out-of-state waste

could not be justified for any reason other than the origin of

the waste. Significantly, in Chem. Waste Management the

differential fee was struck down, but Alabama regulations

reducing the total intake of hazardous waste into the subject

facility — without differentiating between in-state and out-

of-state sources — were allowed to stand. /d. at 342-46.

In Carbone, two flaws in the Clarkstown scheme were

identified. The first was the application of Clarkstown’s

ordinance to the Carbone processing facility, which was

engaged in accepting New Jersey waste for ultimate disposal

in Indiana. This had the effect of burdening residents of New

Jersey with higher costs than they would otherwise have paid.

Carbone, 511 U.S. at 388-89. As in Philadelphia, Fort

Gratiot, Oregon Waste and Chem. Waste Management, the

burden of the regulation was shifted to people outside of the

state.

The second flaw in the Clarkstown scheme was the

direction of Clarkstown’s waste to a “single local proprietor,”

Carbone at 392, which in Clarkstown’s case, was the

privately operated transfer station designated in the

ordinance. The court found this aspect of the arrangement

16

unconstitutional because the town denied access to the local

waste market to both Carbone and other “rival businesses”

of the Clarkstown facility. Jd. at 394. The burden on interstate

commerce due to the designation of a single local proprietor

was to favor that particular proprietor and disfavor all others,

including competing facilities located out-of-state.

Neither of the flaws identified in the Clarkstown scheme

are present here. In Oneida-Herkimer, the laws do not apply

to waste generated outside of the Counties, and there is no

burden shifted to the residents or waste generators in other

states. As the courts below found, the entire financial burden

of the Oneida-Herkimer system, as implemented by the local

laws, falls on the residents and waste generators of the

Counties.° There is no interference with any regulatory regime

in any other state, or in any other county within New York

State, that would either increase the costs or limit the disposal

options of any person outside of Oneida and Herkimer

Counties.

Petitioners argue that the unconstitutional favoritism to

the “single local proprietor” in Carbone should be equally

unconstitutional whether the favored entity is a privately-

operated facility or an unambiguously public facility. This

reading assumes that the Court adopted the proposition that

there is no difference between public and private facilities

that handle solid waste, and that there is, or should be, no

constitutional distinction between the public sector and the

private sector for Commerce Clause purposes. This is not

6. As noted in the expert report of Dr. Robert Stavins and

confirmed in depositions of the plaintiffs, the practice of the waste

collection industry is to pass disposal costs, as well as other operating

costs, through to the consumers of collection services. While Dr.

Stavins recognized the possibility that some cost of compliance with

the laws might not be passed through, or might be borne by residents

of neighboring counties, there was no evidence presented that any

such costs would be of a non-trivial nature, or would extend to other

states. JA 360a-63a.

17

stated in the decision,’ and the Court should not adopt such

a proposition now.

B. The Public Purposes Served By Oneida-Herkimer

Distinguish This Case From Carbone

An examination of the different purposes of the

Clarkstown and Oneida-Herkimer laws reveals the

constitutional distinction. Clarkstown’s arrangement with its

operator was not public management. ‘lize Oneida-Herkimer

system is publicly managed.

The Oneida-Herkimer laws serve three public objectives

that were not served by Clarkstown’s ordinance. First, the

purpose of the Oneida-Herkimer laws is to place the power

to choose how the public’s waste is to be managed in the

hands of local government, and to take that decision-making

power out of the hands of private haulers and processors.

Second, the laws allow the Authority to pursue policy

objectives of waste reduction and recycling, which are

antithetical to private sector waste interests, and uniquely

governmental. Third, the laws allow the Authority to employ

methods of waste management, including a variety of

technical, administrative and economic tools, which are

7. The language of the majority opinion in Carbone, which the

court of appeals in United Haulers | described as “elusive” (Pet. App.

45a), does not resolve the issue. The majority characterized the town’s

purpose in adopting the law as a means to finance “its new facility”

id. at 387, and “its project” id. at 394, in the sense that the town’s right

to possess the facility would come about with the exercise of a right to

purchase the facility for $1 after the end of five years. Jd. at 387. The

majority refers to the designated transfer station as a “town-sponsored

facility” id. at 393, as a “favored local operator” id. at 389, a “favored

operator” id. at 391, as “the preferred processing facility,” a “single

local proprietor” and “local business” id. at 392, but never describes it

as a public facility. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion describes it

as the “town-authorized facility” id. at 402. The dissent characterizes it

as “a single processor” which is “essentially an agent of the municipal

government.” /d. at 416.

18

uniquely effective and also uniquely governmental. All three

are non-protectionist, non-discriminatory public purposes.

1. The First Objective: Public Assumption Of

Environmental Risk On Behalf Of The

Community

The Counties, and communities across the nation, were

facing a failed waste management system in the 1970’s and

1980’s. The Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §6901, et seq., and

the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and

Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §9601, et seq.,

changing the paradigm for environmental responsibility, and

making generators of waste liable for the costs associated with

improper disposal. Oneida and Herkimer Counties recognized

this new paradigm, and acting in their role “as guardian[s] and

trustee[s] for [their] people” Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438

(1980), the Counties established a new public disposal system

to interpose local government between their citizens and the

environmental liabilities associated with waste generation and

disposal.

Petitioners argue that the public disposal system in

Oneida-Herkimer burdens interstate commerce by denying

the private sector the ability to offer low cost disposal to

Oneida-Herkimer waste generators. Pet. Br. 11. The argument

essentially rests on a single assertion: “When in-state

generators hire commercial haulers to remove their waste,

the waste enters interstate commerce.” /d. at 49. Because

the laws deny the haulers the ability to seek out the lowest

cost disposal available in the market place, the argument runs,

the “economic viability” of out-of-state facilities is

threatened. /d. at 16-17. Neither argument has merit.

First, as Petitioners concede, the alleged threat to the

economic viability of out-of-state facilities is fully shared

by all in-state facilities. There is no differential treatment of

19

either, and hence no discrimination against interstate

commerce. See Oregon Waste Sys., supra.

Second, the premise is simply wrong. Oneida-Herkimer

generators have not hired commercial haulers to dispose of

their waste; they have only hired them to collect it. In the

absence of flow control, commercial haulers would seek low-

cost disposal options without consulting their customers. To

gain control of disposal, generators in Oneida-Herkimer

elected legislators to make disposal decisions on their behalf.

Here, the generators’ message to their haulers is: take the

waste to the public system.

This first primary objective of the laws — that regional

waste must go to public, not private, facilities for processing

and disposal — is the foundation for the court of appeals’

finding, in United Haulers |, that the laws do not serve a

protectionist purpose and do not discriminate against

interstate commerce. “Not only are such regulations ‘less

likely to be protectionist’ [when they direct waste to public

facilities] they are less likely to give rise to retaliation and

jealousy from neighboring states.” Pet. App. 48a.

The public system at work in Oneida and Herkimer

Counties is distinguishable from the hasty arrangement made

by Clarkstown with its private transfer station operator. The

key difference is Oneida-Herkimer’s affirmative assumption

of responsibility for disposal of the public’s waste, reflected

in its comprehensive plan for programs and facilities, its

direct receipt of waste and recyclables, its receipt of the fees

paid by the public, and its presence as a party in all of the

subsequent transactions with vendors, transporters, disposers,

and buyers of recycled materials, with the attendant risk and

legal liability that accompanies the provision of service.

Clarkstown avoided taking responsibility for disposal of its

citizens’ waste.

20

In Oneida-Herkimer, the necessity for the assumption of

governmental responsibility for waste disposal was prompted

- by the sweeping changes in American environmental law and

policy since 1976. With the adoption of the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.

§6901, et seg., and the Comprehensive Environmental Response

Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.

§9601, et seq., broad new responsibilities and liabilities were

created for generators of solid and hazardous wastes, including

municipalities, small businesses and individuals. RCRA

provided for the systematic identification of toxic and hazardous

substances by federal and state officials, together with new

methods for their management. CERCLA provided harsh new

liabilities for the improper disposal of wastes, including strict,

joint and several liability for investigation, clean-up and

remediation costs.

“The remedy that Congress felt it needed in CERCLA is

sweeping: everyone who is potentially responsible for

hazardous-waste contamination may be forced to contribute to

the cost of clean-up.” Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S.

1, 21 (1989) (emphasis in original); United States v. Best Foods,

524 U.S. 51, 56(1998). These liabilities extend to whole classes

of transporters and “arrangers,” * who could be ordinary citizens

and small businesses whose wastes find their way to

contaminated sites. CERCLA liability has been held to attach

not only to hazardous wastes regulated “cradle to grave” under

RCRA, but to ordinary municipal solid wastes that contain

hazardous substances, even in trace amounts.’ Generators are

8. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(3) provides that “persons who

have arranged for disposal ..., or arranged with a transporter for

transport and disposal” are liable for those hazardous substances

they owned or possessed.”

9. See St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Warwick Dyeing

Corp., 26 F.3d 1195 (1st Cir. 1994); BF Goodrich v. Murtha, 958

F.2d°1192, 1202 (2d Cir. 1993); Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. United

(Cont'd)

21

equally responsible, with transporters and the owners of

contaminated sites, for the environmental injuries caused by

improper disposal. Generators do not escape this liability

when they hire commercial haulers. To the contrary, CERCLA

prompts generators to take greater control over the decisions

involved in waste disposal.

These laws were applied in Oneida and Herkimer

Counties with the designation of several local landfills as

inactive hazardous waste sites under New York Law,’ and

the commencement of CERCLA litigation involving

hundreds of local defendants to remediate a National

Priorities List (Superfund) site in Oneida County. JA 447a-

52a, 472a-78a. As these environmental threats were

identified, the community recognized that waste disposal

decisions were too important to be made by their trash

haulers. They called for a new public agency to assume

responsibility.

Petitioners and their amici characterize the Counties’

environmental concerns as “misguided,” Pet. Br. 19 and

“flawed,” NSWMA Br. 23, pointing out that “If a commercial

hauler were to pick up waste from a business or residence

and then bring it to a processing or disposal facility

unconnected with the Counties, respondents never would

come into possession of the waste and would not have any

liability for it.” Pet. Br. 19. This observation is true, but it

entirely misses the point of the Counties’ system and laws.

The Counties and the Authority are taking possession of the

region’s waste in order to reduce the exposure of their

(Cont'd) "

States, 964 F.2d 252, 260-61 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Cello-

Foil Products, Inc., 100 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir- 1996); United States v.

Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th

Cir. 1986); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893

F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990).

10. N.Y. Envti. Conserv. Law §§ 27-1301-27-2403.

-

22

residents and businesses to environmental liability. The

public placed the disposal choice in the hands of their

government precisely because they believed they could better

avoid exposure to liability through a public system than by

leaving the decisions with commercial haulers.

Clarkstown, in contrast, did not take possession of its

citizens’ waste. Instead, it commanded its citizens to deal

with a private entity for waste service, and promised only

that if the operator did not receive sufficient revenue through

the transactions forced by the law, the town would make up

any shortfall. Carbone at 387. The operator, in turn, enjoyed

a private monopoly for five years, allowing the town to sit

on the sidelines until the passage of time would allow it to

claim the operator’s facility. If the operator were to deliver

Clarkstown waste to an environmentally-unsafe facility, the

residents of Clarkstown could be exposed to liabilities as

“arrangers” under CERCLA because their transaction with

the operator sent the waste on its way. But the town would

avoid exposure to those liabilities because it avoided taking

possession of the waste. Pet. Br. 19.

The Court recognized in Carbone that Clarkstown

“elected to use the open market to earn revenues for its

project” when it granted the private facility an exclusive right

to receive local waste in exchange for the deferred receipt of

a transfer facility, id. at 394. Unlike the fees charged by the

Authority for its services, the citizens’ fees in Clarkstown

went to the operator, Because the Clarkstown arrangement

relied on the private operator to manage local waste, it was

properly prohibited from employing “discriminatory

regulation to give that project an advantage over rival

businesses from out-of-state.” Jd. at 394.

The assumption of the responsibility and potential

liabilities associated with waste management is a traditional

governmental function. The process undertaken by the

Counties and the Authority to establish a public system, and -

23

then to craft a Plan stating its objectives and management

methods, was an exercise of democracy, taken after months

of public hearings and discussion. As a result of this process,

the Authority and the Counties identified the essential

facilities necessary to provide the beginnings of an integrated

system, and then issued over $55 million in public bonds to

begin construction. Pet. App. 27a. Clarkstown made no

capital investment in waste management.

2. The Public System In Oneida-Herkimer Does

Not Corapete With Private Sector Services

Another flaw in Petitioners’ argument is the false notion

that the Counties’ system competes with services offered by

the private sector. The role of the Authority in Oneida-

Herkimer is not comparable to the roles played by the “rival”

private processing facilities in Clarkstown.

The Clarkstown ordinance was enforced against the

Carbone processing facility, directing it to deliver waste

generated in New Jersey to the Clarkstown facility after it

had been received and processed by Carbone. The Oneida-

Herkimer laws would not have this effect. The laws are

applicable solely to haulers and generators within the

Counties, and do not regulate private processing facilities,

landfills or other disposal facilities. If the Carbone facility

were located within Oneida or Herkimer Counties, the laws

would not prevent its operation, or its acceptance of waste

from other states or local sources. The Oneida-Herkimer laws

would prevent local haulers and generators from delivering

to it, but it would not be subject to prosecution for accepting

local waste. No hauler in Oneida-Herkimer is prevented from

collecting waste outside of the Counties and delivering it

anywhere, including a private facility located within the

Counties.

The Authority provides disposal service only to the

citizens of Oneida and Herkimer Counties, to whom it owes

24

a governmental responsibility."' In fulfilling its governmental

responsibility within the Counties, the Authority does not

compete with private disposal services located in other states

or elsewhere in New York. Any competition between the

Authority and the private sector could only occur if the

Authority were to offer service to persons to whom it does

not have a governmental responsibility, such as residents of

other jurisdictions. But because the Authority does not accept

waste from areas outside of the Counties, it does not compete

with other disposal service providers in those markets either.

3. The Market Participant Doctrine Does Not

Apply In This Action By Appellant Haulers,

And Any Indirect Regulatory Effect On

Non-Parties Is Not Discrimination Against

Interstate Commerce

The Counties and the Authority do not raise the market

participant doctrine as a defense against the claims of the

haulers. The doctrine applies to non-regulatory activities that

“fall outside of the scope of activity governed by the dormant

Commerce Clause.” Pet. App. lla-12a. As to the appellant

haulers, the market participant doctrine is simply not an issue

in this case, because the Counties and the Authority do not

claim that the haulers are not regulated by the flow control

laws.

In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794

(1984), the Court found that the restraints of the dormant

Commerce Clause do not apply to the actions of states when

they act as participants in commercial markets, and not as

regulators of those markets. In South Central Timber v.

Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984), the Court made clear that the

market participant doctrine allows a state to impose burdens

on commerce in the markets in which it participates, but not

11. The Authority is obligated to provide services to the citizens

of the Counties, and precluded from accepting waste generated

elsewhere. See N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 2049-ee(7) (McKinney 2006).

25

in “downstream” markets where it exercises government

power as a regulator. /d. at 95.

The Petitioners argue here, as they argued below, that

because the Authority is a participant in the disposal

marketplace, it cannot use its regulatory power to favor its

own facilities at the expense of interstate commerce. App.

Br. 33-37. This is not a correct statement of the doctrine.

The market participant cases do not prohibit regulations that

favor public facilities. They prohibit municipalities from

regulating and also claiming immunity from commerce

clause scrutiny as market participants.

These laws unquestionably regulate the conduct of the

haulers in directing them to deliver to public facilities. The

establishment of a public disposal system is also the act of a

sovereign. The Counties do not claim any exemption from

the strictures of the Commerce Clause in adopting and

enforcing the local laws that place disposal power in.

government hands. The Counties regulate the hauers, but

do not discriminate or otherwise burden interstate commerce.

Had this case been brought by a private landfill, the

Authority might rely upon the market participant doctrine to

defend its right to choose other landfills for disposal of

Oneida-Herkimer waste from 1991-2006, or to cease trading

with all private landfills after 2007. As the court of appeals

found in United Haulers ll, the Authority does indeed

participate in the marketplace “as any other economic actor

would when, after having employed its regulatory powers to

compel delivery of the waste . . . to its processing facilities,

it contracts with private parties to deliver its processed wastes

to landfill sites that meet its requirements.”'? But because

the Authority does not employ any uniquely governmental

12. See Br. of amicus curiae National Association of Counties

at 19-22 for a response to petitioner’s reliance on the market

participant doctrine.

26

power to regulate those with whom it does business, “the

outcome of its bidding process is simply not a concern of

the Commerce Clause.” Pet. App. 12a.

The flow control laws do not apply to landfills or other

disposal facilities, and no out-of-state landfill or other

disposal facility is a party to this case. But even if the Court

were to consider the operation of the public disposal system

as a kind of “downstream” regulation of-private landfills,

such an effect does not violate the Commerce Clause. As the

courts below found, nothing in the Authority’s procurement

policies operated to favor in-state entities over out-of-state

entities in the selection of landfills for regional waste during

the 1991-2006 period. In using its new public landfill from

2007 forward, the Authority is withdrawing from the

commercial market altogether, which denies waste to in-state

and out-of-state landfills alike. Moreover, the removal of

regional waste from both intrastate and interstate commerce

is at most an “indirect” effect on interstate commerce,

reviewable under the balancing test of Pike. Brown-Forman

Distiliers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.

573, 579 (1986).

4. Waste Reduction And Recycling Are Unique

Governmental Purposes Consistent With

National And State Policies

The second governmental objective served by the laws

is the pursuit of established state and federal solid waste

policy. The objective of the Counties’ Final Local Solid Waste

Management Plan “is to provide for maximum levels of waste

reduction and recycling, coupled with the development of

environmentally and economically sound programs and

facilities for the remainder of the waste stream.” JA 144a.

This objective is in accord with the statutory policy of the

State of New York, which establishes four state-wide

management priorities:

27

First, to reduce the amount of solid waste

generated;

Second, to reuse material for the purpose for

which it was originally intended or to recycle

material that cannot be reused;

Third, to recover, in an environmentally-

acceptable manner, energy from solid waste that

cannot be economically and technically reused and

recycled; and

Fourth, to dispose of solid waste that is not being

reused, recycled or from which energy is not being

recovered, by land burial or other methods

approved by the department.

N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §27-0106(1) (McKinney 2006).

National policy in waste management has the same

priorities. RCRA provides:

The objectives of this chapter are to promote

protection of health and the environment and to

conserve valuable material and energy resources

by providing technical and financial assistance to

state and local governments and interstate

agencies for the development of solid waste

management plans (including resource recovery

and resource conservation systems) which will

promote improved solid waste management

techniques (including new more effective

organizational arrangements), new and improved

methods of collection, separation, and recovery

of solid waste, and the environmentally safe

disposal of non-recoverable residues. . . .

42 U.S.C. § 6902(a).

28

of ordinary citizens, and in the customs and

waste industry.

RCRA expected that “the collection and di

waste should continue to be primarily the functywn of state,

regional and local agencies . . .” 42 U.S.©. §6 4). It is

not necessary for states and local governments \t® secure

special authorization from Congress to provide solid’ waste

services to their citizens. Congress expected state local

agencies to exercise their sovereign powers.'’ The Commerce

Clause requires those powers to be exercised in a non-

protectionist, non-discriminatory manner. This Court has long

recognized that government regulation “for the purpose of

protecting the health of its citizens-and not simply the health

of its economy-is at the core of its police power.” Sporhase

v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982). The Oneida-Herkimer

laws, like the waste policies of the state and federal

governments, were adopted to protect health and the

environment. They are not protectionist.

The citizens of Oneida-Herkimer endorsed these non-

protectionist policies through their participation in the

extensive process undertaken by the Authority to identify

the elements of the public system and prepare the Local Solid

Waste Management Plan.'* The people contributed to the

creation of a waste system that would require them to pay

“more than twice as much as they had paid for waste disposal

13. See Br. of amicus curiae Onondaga County Resource

Recovery Agency, ct al., for discussion of the. police power and

RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §6901, et seq.

14. Clarkstown, unlike Oncida-Herkimer, was not a designated

planning unit under New York law. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §27-

0107(1 (a).

29

services prior to the adoption of the flow control laws.”

Pet. App. 48a. The planning process shows that there are “major

in-state interests adversely affected” by the laws, which this

Court has recognized are “a powerful safeguard against

legislative abuse” and indicative of non-discriminatory purposes.

West Lynn Creamery Inc. v. Healy, 5i2 U.S. 186, 200 (1994).

Oneida-Herkimer’s objectives — to shield their citizens

from environmental liability and to focus their waste policies

on the reduction and recycling of local waste — are uniquely

governmental, flowing from the sovereign power of the State

of New York, and protected by the 10° Amendment to the

Constitution. As this Court remarked in California Reduction

Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905), “it

may be taken as firmly established that the States possess,

because they have never surrendered, the power ... to

prescribe such regulations as may be reasonably necessary

and appropriate for the protection of the public health and

comfort.” /d. at 318. See Br. of amicus curiae State of New

York, et al.

Because these objectives are not protectionist, and in

the absence of any evidence of “differential treatment of in-

state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the

former and burdens the latter,” Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S.

at 99, the court of appeals correctly found that the laws do

not discriminate against interstate commerce, and that the

Pike balancing test was the proper standard to-employ in

assessing any incidental burdens that the laws placed upon

interstate commerce.

30

II. The Oneida-Herkimer Laws Pass The Balancing Test

Of Pike v. Bruce Church

A. The Laws Place No Cognizable Incidental Burden

On Interstate Commerce

No evidence of differential treatment to any specific out-

of-state interest was offered by Petitioners in United Haulers

I, but the court of appeals remanded the matter anyway for

“discovery and further argument by the parties, which will

undoubtedly assist the district court in this fact intensive

determination.” Pet. App. 52a. Detailed examination of the

effects of the laws on the various in-state and out-of-state

entities followed in the district court. The entities examined

included generators of wastes, haulers such as the plaintiffs,

transporters, processors, landfills and other service providers,

together with the regulatory interests of governmental

agencies in other states. There was no evidence that any of

these classes of interests were treated differently by the laws

due to their in-state or out-of-state character. Pet. App. 66a-

67a. The Petitioners conceded in discovery that they did not

even contend that there is any greater burden placed upon an

out-of-state entity by the laws than on a similarly situated -

in-state entity. JA 350a. The record in the courts below

confirms this undisputed fact. Pet. App. 89a-100a, 66a-68a.

Examination of the patterns of commerce in waste after

creation of the Authority’s system also revealed no

discriminatory effects on interstate interests. From an

economic perspective, the report of Dr. Stavins established

that the Authority’s early decision to construct the first major

transfer station in the region actually lowered the cost of

transporting non-recyclable waste from Oneida-Herkimer

into interstate commerce, commenced such shipments earlier

than would otherwise have occurred, and sent greater

tonnages into interstate commerce than-would otherwise have

occurred. JA 363a-69a. For recyclable materials, the laws’

source separation requirements have facilitated a high level

31

of recycling and have sent several hundred thousand tons of

recyclables to markets, many of them in interstate commerce.

JA 359a.

_ Despite the absence of any differential impact on out-

of-state interests, or indeed, because of this lack of evidence,

Petitioners argue that an even-handed regulation cannot, by

definition, have any materially-different impact on an out-

of-state interest compared to an in-state interest. According

to their argument, if any differential impact is present, no

matter how slight, the regulation discriminates against

interstate commerce and the rule of “per se” invalidity should

apply. Pet. Br. 46-47. Therefore, Petitioners claim, the court

of appeals misconstrued the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce

Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Their argument is baseless.

This Court has never demanded that state and local

regulation display afaultlessly perfect balance of in-state and

out-of-state burdens. The court has always recognized that

regulations can be “even-handed” and still have different

effects on out-of-state and in-state commerce. “When a

statute has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and

regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether the

State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden on

interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.”

Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor

Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986). Indeed, the Court has always

recognized that there is “no clear line” between a

discriminatory and an incidental burden on interstate

commerce. Carbone, O’Connor, J., concurring at 402. “In

either situation, the critical consideration is the overall effect

of the statute on both local and interstate activity.” Brown-

Forman, 476 U.S. at 579.

Here, the overall effect of the flow control laws on both

local and interstate activity is to reduce the commerce in

disposal services for non-recyclable waste, and to increase

the commerce in recyclable materials. The Report and

-

32

Recommendation of the Magistrate and the Decision of the

District Court each held that no incidental burden on

interstate commerce was established because Petitioners

could not show any qualitative or quantitative difference in

the treatment of in-state and out-of-state interests under the

laws. Because no incidental burden was shown, it was

unnecessary to engage in a balance of non-existent burdens

against the obvious benefits the laws provided to the public.

Pet. App. 66a-73a, 95a-99a.

In Uniied Haulers Il, the court of appeals considered

the Petitioners’ argument that the burden on commerce

consisted of the withholding, or “hoarding,” of waste from

intrastate and interstate markets, even without a showing of

differential impacts. Pet. App. 13a. The court of appeals

declined to decide whether such a withholding constitutes a

cognizable burden, but held that if that effect was a burden,

it was slight in comparison with the substantial benefits

afforded by the laws. Pet. App. 16a.

_In substance, the Petitioners’ ar,ument on the

“withholding” or “hoarding” of waste is that because the laws

have the effect of reducing the amount of waste in commerce

(both intrastate and interstate), there is a burden created,

characterized as an “export barrier” that the dormant

Commerce Clause should prohibit. This Court’s dormant

Commerce Clause jurisprudence requires rejection of this

theory for two reasons.

First,.the Commerce Clause has never been construed

to prohibit fair, across-the-board regulation of commerce that

has the effect of reducing the amount of trade in a given

commodity. In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,

481 U.S. 69 (1987), the Court upheld Indiana regulations

governing takeovers of Indiana corporations, rejecting the

argument that the dormant Commerce Clause was violated

because the law tended to reduce the number of transactions

made.

33

Dynamics’ argument that the Act is unconstitutional

ultimately rests on its contention that the Act will

limit the number of successful tender offers. There

is little evidence that this will occur. But even if true,

this result would not substantially affect our

Commerce Clause analysis. We reiterate that this

Act does not prohibit any entity-resident or

nonresident-from offering to purchase, or from

purchasing, shares in Indiana corporations, or from

attempting thereby to gain control.

Id., 481 U.S. at 93.

Government frequently regulates with the intention of

reducing commerce in goods and services. Regulations

prohibiting certain forms of advertising for cigarettes are

unquestionably intended to reduce the nation’s consumption

of tobacco, but they are not unconstitutional. Regulations

banning the sale of lead in gasoline and paints undoubtedly

have an adverse effect on the nation’s commerce in lead, but

they. do not offend the Commerce Clause. These kinds of

regulations are valid because they regulate all commerce in

he commodity, and do not distinguish between commerce

itv one state and another.

The second reason that Petitioners’ argument must fail

is that it would use the Commerce Clause to shore up the old

structure of the waste markets, in order to protect the position

of Low-cost landfills in those markets.'* These low- cost

facilities compete with other disposal technologies that may

offer, for example, greater environmental protections at

higher cost. Their interests do not coincide with the kinds of

innovation in management that the Authority represents. The

15. See Pet. Br. 11 “The ordinances ... bar {] patronage of

out-of-state facilities that offer-those services at lower prices.

NSWMA Br. at 20. Sussex Br. at 9.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

34

landfills have allied themselves here with local haulers who

are responsive to the attractions of low-cost disposal. '®

This partnering of haulers with low-cost landfills enjoys

no special constitutional protection. The old structure of

waste markets relied almost exclusively on disposal by

haulers in dumps and landfills. RCRA was adopted to change

that structure by encouraging recycling and energy recovery

at the expense of land disposal. In Oneida-Herkimer from

1991-2006, the Authority supplanted the haulers as the

purchaser of landfill service, for a diminished amount of non-

recyclable waste, reduced by the Authority’s recycling and

reduction programs. While landfills, as a class of disposal

facilities, may receive less waste from local haulers than they

might otherwise receive due to the success of national, state

and local recycling policies, the Commerce Clause does not

protect them from changes in market conditions — even

where the changes are prompted by regulation.

This Court has made it clear that the Commerce Clause

does not protect “the particular structure or methods of

operation in a retail market.” Exxon v. Maryland, 437 U.S.,

at 127; CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S/

at 93. “The fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on

some interstate companies does not, by itself, establish a

claim of discrimination against interstate commerce.” Exxom,

437 U.S. at 126. These principles have special significatice

here because the protections Petitioners seek would block

government efforts to reduce the public’s exposure to

environmental liability, and frustrate national waste policies

that encourage innovative approaches to waste management.

16. In depositions, the haulers testified that their likely choice

of out-of-county disposal sites would be dictated solely by cost, and

that in-state, rather than out-of-state landfills would be preferable

due to the cost of transportation. JA 364a, n.12.

35

Finally, Petitioners’ concede that a public waste system

that includes public collection as well as disposal service is

constitutional. Pet. Br. 48-49. The Counties surely could

institute public collection and completely displace the private

hauling industry.'’ But such an action would be both wasteful

and unnecessary, as the Counties’ interest is in proper

disposal, not in putting the region’s commercial haulers out

of business. Moreover, it is hard to see why this broader waste

service monopoly would not offend the Commerce Clause

to a greater extent than the less intrusive regulation of flow

control. With public collection, the government would still

be able to direct local waste to its own facilities, the economic

interests of private disposal facilities would be equally

threatened, and any other burdens placed on interstate

commerce by a public disposal system would be unchanged.

The Petitioners’ interests and those of their amici are at

odds when it comes to collection. The Oneida-Herkimer laws

do not threaten the haulers’ livelihoods. Not every hauler in

Oneida and Herkimer Counties is willing to support Petitioners’

view that the Commerce Clause denies government the power

to control disposal of waste unless it also exercises its power to

collect. See Br. amicus curiae Mohawk Valley EDGE.

Because there is concededly no differential impact on any

out-of-state economic interest affected by the laws, and because

the particular low-cdst business arrangement advocated by the

haulers is not protected by the Commerce Clause, there is, in

17. The power to provide public waste collection services is

granted to New York’s county governments Section 119 of the New

York General Municipal Law. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law §119 (McKinney

2006). The Authority is granted the power to provide collection

services by New York Public Authorities Law Section 2049-ee(4).

N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §2049-ee(4). Where public collection is

instituted, municipalities may contract with private haulers to perform

the service, and direct them to specific disposal facilities pursuant

to the contracts: U.S.A. Recycling v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272

(2d Cir. 1995).

36

fact, no incidental burden placed upon interstate commerce by

these laws. Under these circumstances, several courts of appeals

are in agreement with the district court that logic does not require

any further inquiry, or comparison of the benefits of the flow

control laws to non-existent burdens."

Nevertheless, if one examines the benefits here, all doubt

is erased.

B. The Counties’ Integrated System Of Waste

Management Provides Benefits Possible Only

Through Flow Control

The third governmental purpose of the flow control laws

is integrated management. The laws divide the waste stream

into component parts and direct each component to a facility

best suited to recover useful commodities, or dispose of it in

the most environmentally-sound manner. The Authority

operates eight different facilities to receive, process and

dispose ofthe region’s waste, all of which operate in concert

to fulfill the Solid Waste Management Plan’s commitment

to the maximization of waste reduction and recycling. The

effectiveness of this integrated management system is no

longer challenged by the Petitioners. The particular benefits,

of each of the Authority’s recycling, composting, hazardovis

waste and landfill facilities and programs are set forth at

length in the Joint Appendix and need not be restated here.

JA 115a-39a, 353a-95a, 419a-3 La.

18. Nat'l Paint & Coatings Association v. Chicago, 45 F.3d

1124, 1132 (7th Cir. 1995) “No disparate treatment, no disparate

impact, no problem under the dormant commerce clause.” O/d Bridge

Chem., Inc. v. New Jersey Dept of Envtl. Protection, 965 F.2d 1287,

1295 (3rd Cir. 1992); Nat'l Solid Waste Management Assoc. v. Pine

Belt Regional Solid Waste Auth., 389 F.3d 491, 502 (Sth Cir. 2004):

Pacific Northwest Venison Producers v. Smitch, 20 F.3d 1008, 1015

(9th Cir. 1994); New York State Trawlers Assoc. v. Jorling, 16 F.3d

1303, 1308 (2nd Cir. 1994); V-/ Oil Co. v. Utah State Dep t of Public

Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1425 (10" Cir. 1997).

37

However, two particular benefits of the flow control laws

should be emphasized. First, the application of different

technologies to different components of the waste stream is

possible only through a system of regulation. The flow control

laws establish a uniform set of rules to govern the disposal

practices of all waste generators and haulers in the region,

defining the categories of waste that can be recycled,

composted or consigned to land disposal. Uniform

participation by generators provides a stable foundation to

the system, allowing the Authority to introduce new services

as technologies and markets develop. Regulation of haulers

ensures that the collection industry participates in the Solid

Waste Plan to the same extent that generators participate,

delivering to the same facilities and paying the same charges.

Private market forces could not produce this community-

wide participation or achieve the high levels of recycling

and environmental awareness obtained through integrated

management. Only government involvement and the

applicatien of the flow control laws makes it possible.

See Stavins, JA 374a-78a.

Second, the flow control laws make it possible for the

‘Authority to provide the integrated “bundle” of benefits

through the system charge on non-recyclable waste. This $78/

ton charge delivers not only landfill transportation and

disposal, but recycling, composting, household hazardous

waste disposal and all of the other program benefits provided

by the system. The system charge makes it possible for the

Authority to accept recyclables and household hazardous

wastes without charging a fee for those materials, and at the

same time, provide an incentive to businesses and individuals

to red'ice their generation of non-recyclable waste. As Dr.

Stavins pointed out, “Flow control makes possible financial

incentives for waste reduction and recycling that are

unachievable through other means.” JA 388a-92a.

38

Private markets could not provide these benefits. Only

government regulation makes it possible to provide a variety

of waste services that are not structured to generate revenue,

and at the same time distribute the cost of the entire system

according to the amount of non-recyclable waste an

individual user generates. JA 381la-82a, 388a-9 1a.

The haulers ask the Court to compel Oneida-Herkimer

to allow them to take non-recyclable waste to anywhere they

might find a lower price. This would require the Authority

to “unbundle” its package of benefits, and lose many of the

benefits altogether. For example, if haulers were allowed to

take waste out of the Counties, the Authority would not be

able to insist upon higher environmenial standards at private

landfills elsewhere, because, as the Court pointed out in

Carbone, a local government regulating private transactions

may not exercise its police power beyond its borders. /d. at

393. As discussed above, restoring the decision-making

power over disposal to the haulers would expose local

generators to liabilities arising from poor choices made by

the haulers.

Without flow control and the system charge, the

Authority would not be able to accept recyclables, green’

wastes and household hazardous wastes at no charge, and.

the substantial incentives for recycling and waste reduction

would be lost. From an administrative point of view, the

Authority’s ability to enforce the recycling provisions of the

laws would be lost, because there would be no means to

inspect loads of waste bound for private landfills for the

presence of recyclables. Most importantly, without the flow

control laws there would be no means to mandate the

participation of cither haulers or generators in the Covnties’

solid waste plan, and no possibility that the federal, state or

local waste reduction and recycling objectives could be met.

39

As the court of appeals observed in United Haulers Il,

the benefits of the system are intrinsically tied to the laws.

We agree with plaintiffs that some of these goals,

particularly those relating to revenue generation,

also might be achieved through other instruments

of municipal policy. However, nothing in the

record before us demonstrates, or even suggests,

that the Counties could address their liability

concerns or encourage recycling across the wide

range of waste products accepted by the

Authority’s recycling program in any other way,

let alone through an approach as straightforward

as the use of flow control.

Pet. App. 20a.

C. Widespread Adoption Of Flow Control Similar

To Oneida-Herkimer’s Laws Would Not Burden

Interstate Commerce

if other communities were to adopt flow contro! laws

similar to those of Oneida-Herkimer, Petitioners and their

amici curiae forecast doom to an interstate trade in waste

that is based upon low-cost disposal. But the size of the

private interstate market in waste is dwarfed by the far larger

intrastate market, and the public’s own investment in waste

infrastructure. According to Petitioners’ own figures, 60%

of all disposal facilities in the United States are publicly

owned, NSWMA Br. 7, and more than 90% of the nation’s

waste is disposed of before it crosses any state lines. JA 240a.

The interstate trade in waste services is unlikely to suffer

any injury at all if laws and public systems like Oneida-

Herki ner’s become the norm.

The potential effects of the adoption of similar flow

control laws and systems by other municipalities were the

subject of expert testimony examined by the courts below.

Dr. Stavins established that with the adoption of flow control

40

and the Authority’s construction of the first major transfer

station in the Oneida-Herkimer region, interstate shipment

of waste from the region occurred earlier, and involved larger

quantities of waste, than would have been the case if the

private sector had been free to act on its own. JA 360a-69a.

Moreover, Dr. Stavins also pointed out that the

widespread adoption of flow control, as implemented in

Oneida-Herkimer, would almost certainly increase the

interstate trade in waste. Municipalities do not find any

assistance from flow control in siting landfills or other

disposal facilities within their borders. With flow control,

densely populated municipalities would be far more likely

to build transfer facilities to assist in the export of waste,

and the transfer stations they build would facilitate greater

interstate shipment of waste at the expense of intrastate

shipment. JA 370a-72a, 393a, 408a-1 2a.

To the extent that a municipality would, like Oneida-

Herkimer, elect to send its waste to its own public landfill,

the effect on all private disposal facilities, whether in-state

or out-of-state, would be exactly the same. Local disposal,

as opposed to export, would have the benefit of reducing the

environmental impacts of shipping, particularly the impacts

borne by other communities that suffer from air pollution,

traffic and other burdens.'? Moreover, any reduction in the

volume of waste entering the market due to construction of

a new public landfill would tend to reduce prices in both the

intrastate and interstate disposal markets. JA 372a.

To the extent that municipalities would use flow cortrol

to establish integrated systems, as Oneida-Herkimer has,

using combinations of technologies to reduce the volu'ne of

waste, the result would be an incontrovertible 200d,

advancing the declared goals of Congress in RCRA. In this

regard, flow control would make it possible for communities

19. See Br. of amicus curiae Environmental Defense.

41

to select new and innovative technologies that provide greater

environmental benefits than technologies currently in use,

particularly where the community is prepared to shoulder a

higher short-term cost to gain long-term health and safety

benefits.”

For communities such as Sussex or Charles City

Counties in Virginia, nothing in these laws resembles the

waste import bans examined by this Court ia City of

Philadelphia v. New Jersey and Fort Gratiot v. Michigan.

Those cases struck down laws barring private landfills in

New Jersey and Michigan from accepting out-of-state waste.

The Oneida-Herkimer laws have no effect whatsoever on the

ability of private landfills to accept waste. As discussed

above, the Authority does not compete with private landfills

at all because it serves the citizens of the Counties, to whom

it owes a governmental responsibility. Moreover, as discussed

above, the difficulties inherent in siting new landfills makes

it more likely that communities adopting flow control will

build transfer stations as the Authority did in 1991.

Communities without space or means to build will still rely

on export to secure disposal capacity. If the landfills in Sussex

and Charles City see any decline in waste volume in the

future, that may come from the nation’s success in its policy

to reduce waste and increase recycling. But such a change in

the general commerce in waste would not affect landfills in

Sussex or Charles City to any greater degree than landfills

in New York.

Finally, neither the courts, the waste industry, nor local

governments have developed any settled expectations based

on Carbone. To the contrary, as Petitioners pointed out,

Pet. 25-28, courts have adopted conflicting interpretations

of the meaning of Carbone, and municipalities have

i —

20. See Br. of amicus curiae Arkansas Association of Regional

Solid Wzste Management Districts, ct al.

42

developed ad hoc arrangements to secure the benefits of flow

control found to be constitutional by different courts.”'

The public/private distinction articulated by the Second

Circuit has the virtue of simplicity: municipalities that

assume responsibility for the waste disposal needs of their

citizens must do so fairly, favoring no private interest above

any another.

The purposes underlying the Court’s dormant Commerce

Clause jurisprudence, as articulated by Justice Jackson in

HP Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), continue

to reflect a balance between safeguarding the movement of

interstate commerce and affording the states the power to

effectively address threats to public health and the

environment.

Our system, fostered by the commerce clause, is

that every farmer and every craftsman shall be

encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will

have free access to every market in the nation,

that no home embargoes will withhold his export,

and no foreign state will by customs duties or

regulations exclude them.

Id. at 539.

At the same time, Justice Jackson also recognized the

equally important power of the state “to protect its inhabitants

against perils to health or safety, fraudulent traders and

highway hazards, even by use of measures which bear

21. See USA Recycling v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 127°: (2d

Cir. 1995) for flow control valid under contracts; Harvey & Hurvey,

Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995) and H oulton

Citizens’ Coalition v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178 (Ast Cir. 1999)

for flow control valid where procurement is open to out-of-state

bidders; Ben Oehrleins & Son v. Hennepin County, 113 F.3d 1372

(8th Cir. 1997) for flow control valid when applied to in-state

disposal.

43

adversely on interstate commerce.” Jd. at 532. He saw the

distinction between the government’s lack of power to retard

interstate commerce and its responsibility to protect the

public as “deeply rooted in both our history and our law.”

Id. at 532.

Here, the Counties are exercising the power to provide

traditional sanitation service to the community. Waste

disposal service, like water, sewer, fire and police protection,

lies at the foundation of civilized society,” and is invaluable

to the commercial life of the nation. The Petitioners ask the

Court to erase the distinction between public and private

service in waste disposal which has been recognized for over

100 years. California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction

Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905); Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S.

325 (1905). To do so would eliminate the “deeply rooted

distinction” recognized by the Court in HP Hood and in every

subsequent Commerce Clause case.

22. See, generally, Br. of amicus curiae Madison County, New

York.

44

CONCLUSION

The flow control laws are an exercise of the police power -

for the protection of the general health and safety of the

people of Oneida and Herkimer Counties. They aid in the

provision of essential government service and are applied

evenhandedly to all private entities, regardless of their

location. There is no violation of the Commerce Clause and

the decision below should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Micuaet J. CAHILL

Counsel of Record

GeRMANO & CaHILL, PC

4250 Veterans Memorial Highway

Suite 275 .

Holbrook, New York 11741

(631) 588-8778

Jupy DraBick!

25723 NYS Rte 180

Dexter, NY 13634-4009

Peter M. RAyYHILL

KERNAN & KERNAN PC.

258 Genesee Street

Utica, NY 13502

Bruce S. Rocow

Bruce S. Rocow, P.A.

Broward Financial Centre

500 East Broward Blvd., Ste. 1930

Fort Lauderdale, Florida 3339 4

Attorneys for Oneida-Herkimer

Solid Waste Management Authority

45

RICHARD A. FRYE

Frye Fotey & CARBONE

2219 Genesee Street -

Utica, NY 13501

Attorneys for Oneida County NY

Tuomas E. KeLty

HorrIGAN, HorriGAN, LOMBARDO

& Ketty PC

49 East Main Street

Amsterdam, NY 12010

Attorneys for Herkimer County, NY

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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