Respondents Brief — United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer
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No. 05-1345
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
UNITED HAULERS ASSOCIATION, INC., e7 al,
Petitioners,
y.
ONEIDA-HERKIMER SOLID WASTE
MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ oF CERTIORARI TO THE
Unitep STATES Court OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
—
—-
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS
ine
TO
Micuae J. CAHILL
Counsel of Record
GERMANO & CauHiLt, PC
4250 Veterans Memorial Highway
Suite 275
Holbrook, New York 11741
(631) 588-8778
Attorneys for Oneida Herkimer
Solid Waste Management Authority
(Additional Counsel Listed on Signature Page)
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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PERU nivihegueicuecadsaneebanss
Operation of the System ... d pupa weeok se kaka
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Flow Control and the Solid Waste Management Plan
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Il. The Oneida-Herkimer Laws Do Not
Discriminate Against Interstate Commerce,
And The Pike Balance Is The Appropriate Test
PGE. sacs bho Dacia Kanehabet Reis
A. There Is No Discrimination Here,
Therefore There Is No Commerce Clause
TE a oe Dae er ite a
B. The Public Purposes Served By Oneida-
Herkimer Distinguish This Case From
| SREP ESE pain oe ey ee
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ll
12
17
Il. The
il
Contents
1. The First Objective: Public
Assumption Of Environmental Risk
On Behalf Of The Community ....
2. The Public System In Oneida-
Herkimer Does Not Compete With
Private Sector Services ..........
3. The Market Participant Doctrine
Does Not Apply In This Action By
Appellant Haulers, And Any Indirect
Regulatory Effect On Non-Parties Is
Not Discrimination Against Interstate
CN bk ws hd ca ee kw eaear
4. Waste Reduction And Recycling Are
Unique Governmental Purposes
Consistent With National And State
into i sé Sicew ou buneene-
Oneida-Herkimer Laws Pass the
Balancing Test of Pike v. Bruce Church ....
A.
B.
Conclusion
The Laws Place No Cognizable Incidental
Burden On Interstate Commerce ......
The Counties’ Integrated System Of
Waste Management Provides Benefits
Possible Only Through Flow Control ...
Widespread Adoption Of Flow Control
Similar To Oneida-Herkimer’s Laws
Would Not Burden Interstate Commerce
Page
18
23
24
_ 26
30
30
36
39
iti
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases:
Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. United States, 964 F.2d 252
a Re Ss Poe Ry pe 20-21
Ben Oehrleins & Son v. Hennepin County, 113 F.3d
Eee EG SUED ne kc de bkessuiceces othe 42
BF Goodrich v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1993)
bh ako o Cine eee ARTA ees bh Ken 20
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) ........... 31
C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383
SOR 5 Fads Va Sie kee OU Ma eka ease sees passim
California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction
Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905) .............. 10, 29, 43
Chem. Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334
PETE pre eee tae Pre Pree ay ee 13,15
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
ge SC er eee re 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 41
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S.
i if UT ET EP SEROTEC ET Eee TG ere 32, 33, 34
Exxon v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) ......... 11, 34
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp.,
893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1996) .............. 21
iv
Cited Authorities
Page
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan, 504 U.S.
BEE. 0 keV ACHONA aoe be Rae cb oe 14, 15,41.
Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905) ....... 10, 43
Gen. Motors v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) ....... 13
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392
ee a Pre rey eee es Pre 1]
Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d
pg ERI pea i mr i My DASeoe re 42
Houlton Citizens’ Coalition v. Town of Houlton, 175
Due ee Cee ae, RE ok Hee okies tA Oh haw eos 42
HP Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949)
Vimy hod Kaen ERE NEC Ok a cbOd ues ERE ene 42, 43
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794
SN ccs ia kb oA oda Wk om eb dee ae eo 24
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) ....... 13
Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993)
Se ides RE AEE 6 TU AD LAER We 12
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) ........... 13
Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890) ........ 11
Nat'l Paint & Coatings Association v. Chicago, 45
ety ye fe | rrr arr aera 36
Cited Authorities
Page
Nat’l Solid Waste Management Assoc. v. Pine Belt
Regional Solid Waste Auth., 389 F.3d 491 (Sth Cir.
NN ak ELE a Ria reek REA SEEKER DS cake 36
New York State Trawlers Assoc. v. Jorling, 16 F.3d
Me ek ee er ere 36
Old Bridge Chem., Inc. v. New Jersey Dep t of Envitl.
Protection, 965 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1992) ...... 36
Oregon Waste Sys. v. Oregon Dept. of Envtl. Quality,
SIL U.S. 93 (1994) 2... cc cee ee 9, 12, 13, 15, 19, 29
Pacific Northwest Venison Producers v. Smitch,-20
F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1994) ................... 36
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)
PPE PTET Oe eee CTO ee Pe Bre te 20
Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970) .......
peat ee doe CEST REA EM OKA hen ees ore 9, 10, 29, 30, 31
Pike. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York
State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) ....... 26
Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) ............ 18
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995)
Kab eeOR EE KES hae Oka hue ae eee eae 12
vi
Cited Authorities
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) ......
St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Warwick Dyeing
Corp., 26 F.3d 1195 (1st Cir. 1994) ...........
U.S.A. Recycling v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272
SE CUE 1. kins wd okie bie bo NAA S Daw Aelon ees
United States v. Best Foods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) ...
United States v. Cello-Foil Products, Inc. 100 F.3d
i Cs Oe ewe hi ehhedbekhete
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) ...
USA Recycling v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272
SE CEE Bbc Aba CA aOR vend ncdneeay
V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Dept of Public Safety, 131
Wien POE CE Gs EOOED ka awk dos casaeraces
West Lynn Creamery Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186
SE hel ak Cre Kaine acea eke seuss doeees
21
42
36
29
29
vii
Cited Authorities
3 Page
Statutes:
Herkimer Local Law §2(c) ...............-...- 3
Sasa Ms A GUE URED ccc awied coe deeaceaecs 35
N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §27-0106(1) .......... 27
N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §27-0107(1)(a) ........ 28
N.Y. Envil. Conserv. Law §§27-1301-27-2403 .... 21
N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§2049-aa-2049-yy ........ 4
N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §2049-ee(4) .............. 35
N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law $2099-O0(7) 2... ccccccccess 1,24
N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §2049-tt(3) ............00- 4
N.Y. Solid Waste Management Act of 1988, c. 70,
codified as amended in scattered sections Article
27 of N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law .............. 5
Cepia Lae GING) oo wc ccc ccc ctccccccens 3
Se ee Noack ce ens caeiciees 18, 20, 28
Fe een EE 0602 civ acne achivgs deceves’ 27
en ED vic cévcubcrasencteceuns 28
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The respondents created a public waste management
system supported by the flow control laws at issue here, in
response to public demand, prompted by a failed system of
public and private waste management in the 1980’s. The laws
favor the pub'ic system and the citizens of the counties, but
do not favor or disfavor any private entity on the basis of
their location within or outside of the counties or the State
of New York. This case will determine whether such an
exercise of the police power is consistent with the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management
Authority (the “Authority”) operates an integrated solid waste
management system as a public monopoly in the Counties
of Oneida and Herkimer, in the Mohawk River Valley, in
New York. The system consists of three transfer stations, a
recycling facility, a compost facility, a household hazardous
waste facility, a stump grinding facility and, as of October
2006, a landfill for non-recyclable waste.' The objectives of
the system are to foster waste reduction, maximize reuse and
recycling of waste materials, reduce the toxicity of non-
recyclable waste and safely dispose of non-recyclable waste,
in accordance with New York State solid waste management
policy and the region’s Local Solid Waste Management Plan
(the “Plan”). The Authority does not provide service for waste
originating outside of the Counties. JA 121a-24a; N.Y. Pub.
Auth. Law §2049-ee(7) (McKinney 2006).
1. The Authority’s long-planned solid waste landfill was
completed and began receiving waste on October 24, 2006. The
Authority’s transport and disposal contract with Waste Management
of New York, operative since 1998, will terminate on December 31,
2006.
2
OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM
The system provides disposal and recycling services, but
does not provide waste collection service. Waste collection
is provided by the region’s constituent cities, towns and
villages,” and by private sector waste haulers by arrangement
with consumers and municipalities. The system operates as
a monopoly because the flow control laws under challenge
here require all haulers and generators in the Counties to
deliver waste and recyclables left at curbside to the
appropriate Authority facility. (“Generators” of waste are
simply all of the citizens, businesses and institutions that
produce it.)
The courts below found that the flow control laws are
not protectionist, do not discriminate against interstate
commerce and are even-handed regulation. It is not disputed
that all haulers and generators of waste, whether based locally
or outside of the counties or the state, are equally subject to
the laws. All pay the same system charge for the disposal of
non-recyclable waste, and all are permitted to deliver
recyclables and household hazardous wastes free of charge.
JA 282a-85a.
The local laws are not enforced beyond the borders of
Oneida and Herkimer Counties. There was no evidence
presented below that these laws interfere in any way with
the regulatory systems of any other state, or any other county
within New York State. From 1991 through 2006, the
Authority arranged for the disposal of non-recyclable waste
delivered to the Authority’s transfer stations at landfills
located in Pennsylvania (1991-97) and western New York
(1998-2006). Contracts with these facilities were procured
2. The more densely populated areas of the Counties, including
the cities of Utica, Rome and their surrounding suburbs, are scrved
by municipal collection with public employees or private contractors.
Persons in other communities are served by private haulers or self-
haul to Authority facilities.
3
through public competitive bidding pursuant to standards
established by the Authority. JA 358a-59a.
The courts below found that the Authority’s bidding
process was open to in-state and out-of-state bidders and did
not discriminate against any bidder on the basis of its location
in another state. Pet. App. 67a, 95a-6a. Because the laws
require that all waste in the region be delivered to the
Authority, all landfills other than the facility selected by the
Authority are unable to receive Oneida-Herkimer waste. As
of January 1, 2007, all non-recyclable non-hazardous waste
in the Counties will be disposed of at the Authority’s landfill
in Oneida County.
The laws require the waste generators of the Counties to
recycle, and direct that recyclable materials be separated at
curbside and delivered to the Authority’s recycling facility.
The laws allow generators to make direct arrangements with
buyers of recyclables, but if such arrangements are not made,
the recyclables are to be placed at curbside and delivered to
the Authority. See Oneida Local Law §2(d); Pet. App. 122a;
Herkimer Local Law §2(c); Pet. App. 135a. At the recycling
center, the Authority further sorts and separates the material
into 37 different commodities which are marketed to buyers
in interstate commerce. JA 123a, 420a-21a.
BACKGROUND
The public waste management system was created in
response to public demand prompted by the collapse of
traditional disposal methods in the 1980’s. Historically, waste
disposal in the region had been provided at local landfills
operated by towns, cities, villages and private landowners,
with minimal environmental safeguards. A 1969 planning
study conducted for Oneida and Herkimer Counties identified
44 operating dump sites, both public and private, all of which
posed varying degrees of threat to public health and the
environment. In the early 1980’s, health officials ordered the
4
closure of drinking water wells near several of these facilities.
Twelve of these sites were ultimately identified as inactive
hazardous waste disposal sites by State and Federal
authorities. One, the privately operated Ludlow landfill in
the Town of Paris, Oneida County, was named to the National
Priorities List (Superfund) pursuant to the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensatior, and Liability Act
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seg. JA 450a-52a, 475a, 477a.
Clean-up and remediation costs at these sites totaled over
$74 million. In the case of the Ludlow landfill, regulatory
- action by the state to compel its closure led to wider litigation,
in which over 600 local businesses, municipalities (29 of
them) and other generators, were named as third-party
defendants in a cost recovery action. Of the 44 operating
dump sites in 1969, only one was operating at the time these
local laws were adopted in early 1990. JA 447a-52a.
The private sector provided no solutions. In 1986, only
the privately-operated Mohawk Valley landfill was available
to serve the City of Utica, and its operators doubled their
fees to the City on short notice. Mohawk Valley was itself
unlined, operating without a state permit, and under
regulatory pressure to close. In September 1986, local
haulers, including two of the plaintiffs in this case, called
upon the Counties to develop a new regional landfill as a
safeguard against the closure of Mohawk Valley, which
finally occurred in 1992. JA 447a-55a, 474a-80a, 41 4a-19a.
The “crisis” in solid waste management was apparent,
and in response to demand by all sectors of the community,
the Counties undertook to reform local disposal and establish
a public system capable of serving the needs of all citizens
in the region. At the request of the Counties, the New York
State legislature created the Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority in September 1988. N.Y. Pub. Auth.
Law §§2049-aa-2049-yy. Among the powers granted to the
Authority and the Counties, Section 2049-tt(3) of the Act
5
expressly authorizes the Counties, “in recognition of the
public policy of the state in the ... management of solid
waste” to “displace competition with regulation or monopoly
public control” and to require “that all solid waste . . . shall
be delivered to a specified solid waste management-resource
recovery facility.” > JA 417a-18a, 462a-65a.
In the same year that it created the Authority, the State
of New York adopted the Solid Waste Management Act of
1988.4 The 1988 Act established a hierarchy of waste
management methods for the state, providing first for waste
reduction, followed by re-use, recycling, recovery of energy,
and finally land disposal in order of priority. The Act als»
mandated the preparation of both a state-wide solid waste
management plan and a series of local plans to be adopted
by regional p!anning units and approved by the state’s
Department of Environmental Conservation. The Authority
was charged with preparing a solid waste management plan
for the Oneida-Herkimer region. JA 417a-18a.
The Authority began the planning process at its initial
meeting in the fall of 1988. By May 15, 1989, a Draft Local
Solid Waste Management Plan (the “Plan”), together with a
Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement (“DGEIS”)
were ready for public comment. The Authority conducted
public hearings and received comments on the Plan for the
next eight months. Four formal public hearings were
conducted in July and December 1989, and numerous
informal presentations were made to local governments, civic
organizations and industry groups, including the local waste
hauling industry. The Authority conducted 15 regular
meetings during this period, at which members of the public
were invited to comment on the Plan and the future of waste
3. See, generally, Br. of amicus curiae Rockiand County Solid
Waste Management Authority for a discussion of the role of public
service monopolies in our federal system.
4. N.Y. Solid Waste Management Act of 1988, c. 70, codified as
amended in scattered sections Article 27 of N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law.
6
management in the region. By December 1989, the Authority
had received over 10,000 letters and other written comments
on various aspects of the Plan. JA 146a-51a.
FLOW CONTROL AND THE SOLID WASTE
MANAGEMENT PLAN
The Plan calls for a comprehensive public system to
safely manage all of the waste generated in the two-County
region. The core concept of the Plan’s approach is an
“qntegrated system” in which different management methods
are brought to bear on different components of the waste
stream. The overall objective is to minimize the amount of
waste destined for land disposal by providing facilities and
incentives to separate and recycle as much waste as possible.
By agreements with the Counties, the Authority acquired
some of their existing facilities, and assumed the financial
obligation for the construction and operation of additional
facilities called for by the Plan. JA 465a.
The flow control laws were, and remain, the foundation
of the Plan and the integrated system. Prior to 1991, no
household recycling service was available anywhere in the
region. To institute a region-wide recycling program, the
Counties required the participation of homeowners to
separate recyclables from other wastes, and the assistance of
haulers to provide new collection arrangements to deliver
recyclables and non-recyclables to the appropriate facility.
The Plan did not call for public waste collection to displace
existing collection arrangements, or limit private transactions
in recyclable materials. It did require the participation of the
local hauling industry to conform their services to the new
approach. JA 43 1a-35a.
Since 1990, the public system in Oneida-Herkimer has
developed into one of the most successful in New York State.
As of 2003, the Oneida-Herkimer system had recycled over
370,000 tons of paper, containers and other materials,
7
composted 140,000 tons of green waste, and disposed or
recycled over 260,000 gallons of liquid hazardous waste.
These figures represent more than 1.5 years of regional waste
generation diverted from landfills, avoiding $27 million in
landfill disposal fees and generating over $14 million in
revenue for the public. Over the same period, the Authority
provided reliable disposal for 2.3 million tons of waste
through contracts procured by competitive bidding in
interstate commerce. In addition to the services provided by
the Authority’s facilities, the system aids local industry
through the provision of free waste audits, and also provides
extensive public education programs focusing on methods
to reduce waste generation and maximize recycling. JA 130a-
38a.
The integrated management system is supported by the
system charge levied on the non-recyclable fraction of the
waste stream. The Authority’s recycling, composting,
hazardous waste management and industrial waste audit
programs are not structured to generate revenue, but to
encourage the separation of recyclables, green wastes and
hazardous waste for proper disposal. As discussed in detail
in the expert report of Dr. Robert N. Stavins, the system
charge is intentionally structured to create a differential price
for the disposal of non-recyclable waste and recyclables, to
serve aS an economic incentive for recycling and waste
reduction. JA 374a-87a. At $78/ton, it represents the cost of
the entire range of Authority services provided to the
community. It is not comparable to the market cost for
disposal of a ton of waste at facilities that do not offer the
bundle of services provided by the Authority.
The system charge is a user fee, which provides
additional advantages as a method of financing the waste
system. It distributes the costs of the system to the community
on the basis of the amount of non-recyclable waste generated
by the user. Haulers who use Authority facilities do not absorb
8
the cost of the system because they pass the disposal charges
through to their customers in their bill for collection services.
JA 362a. The system charge is a fee for service, and is the
most equitable means of distributing the cost of the system
to the businesses and residents of the Counties. JA 391a.
Because the Authority is organized solely to provide waste
services, the system charge is not used to subsidize other
governmental programs, and has not served as a revenue
source for the Counties.
There is no dispute that the flow control laws operate
without differential impact on private disposal service
providers, transporters, haulers and buyers of recyclable
materials, regardless of their out-of-state or in-state location.
The cost of the services provided through the public system
is borne entirely by the residents and businesses of the
Counties. On review of the record below, the Magistrate
Judge, the District Court and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, each concluded that the laws i) do not discriminate
against interstate commerce; and ii) do not place any
incidental burdens on interstate commerce that outweigh the
substantial public benefits the laws provide as an integral
part of the public sclid waste management system established
for the region.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The decision below should be affirmed. The Oneida-
Herkimer flow control ordinances neither discriminate
against interstate commerce nor place any incidental burden
upon interstate commerce. The ordinances require all haulers
and waste generators in the two Counties to deliver waste
and recyclables to the Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority — a public system in which the local
government has assumed responsibility for waste
management.
9
Under the dormant Commerce Clause, discrimination
“means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the
latter.” Oregon Waste Systems v. Dep 1. of Envtl. Quality, 511
U.S. 93, 99 (1994). There is no discrimination here.
Petitioners concede that in-state and out-of-state waste
haulers, processors and transporters are treated alike. The
flow control ordinances direct all collections to the publicly-
owned facilities, thus they do not favor local private business
interests over out-of-state private interests.
The Counties’ flow control ordinances are not
condemned by C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511
U.S. 383 (1994). Clarkstown required all waste to be
processed at a designated private facility, “depriving
competitors, including out of state firms, of access to a local
market. . . .” Jd. at 386. Thus, Clarkstown used its regulatory
power to favor local enterprise. . . .” Jd. at 394. Here, no local
enterprise is favored.
Oneida-Herkimer mandates participation in a public
system in which local government has assumed responsibility
for waste management in order to protect public health and
preserve natural resources. Assuming arguendo that such a
non-discriminatory scenario has some incidental effect on
interstate commerce, the Oneida-Herkimer ordinances pass
the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) balancing
test: “Where [a] statute regulates even handedly to effectuate
a legitimate public interest, and its effects on interstate
commierce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.” /d. at 142.
The local benefits here are substantial. The flow control
laws serve three public purposes that would not be served
by private enterprise. First, the laws place the power to make
disposal decisions in public hands, allowing the Authority
to assume the risks and responsibilities that would otherwise
10
be carried by the Counties’ residents and businesses under
modern environmental law. Second, the laws allow the
Authority to pursue policies designed to reduce waste and
maximize recycling within the Counties in accord with
national and state policy. Third, the laws allow the Authority
to manage waste through an integrated system of programs
and facilities designed to match specific components of the
waste stream to the methods that suit them best.
The management of public waste disposal has historical
roots. See Br. of amicus curiae Madison County, New York.
For over 100 years, municipalities have performed their
traditional duty to control solid waste from the time it is
placed on the curb. See, e.g., Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S.
325 (1905); Cal Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works,
199 U.S. 306 (1905). Oneida-Herkimer’s laws place the
responsibility for waste management with government, not
private haulers, allowing the Authority to pursue important
policy objectives of waste reduction, recycling and ensuing
“the proper disposal of hazardous wastes thereby reducing
the counties’ exposure to costly environmental tort suits.”
United Haulers il, Pet. App. 20a.
The discriminatory Ciarkstown ordinances in Carbone
relied on the private market to manage local waste; the town’s
goal was only monetary. Oneida-Herkimer has assumed
governmental responsibility to manage local waste; their goal
is to protect public interests by preserving and protecting
the public health and environment and ensuring compliance
with laws designed to achieve those goals.
The Second Circuit doubted that the Oneida-Herkimer
ordinances imposed “a differential burden triggering the need
for Pike analysis.” Pet. App. 16a. It declined to resolve the
question because “we find it readily apparent that even if we
were to endorse the Plaintiffs’ claim that the Counties’
ordinances burden interstate commerce by preventing the
Counties’ wastes from being processed by non-local facilities,
11
the resulting burden would be substantially outweighed by
the ordinances’ local benefits.” Pet. App. 16a. The Petitioners
concede that there is no differential impact on any cognizable
out-of-state economic interest. No further inquiry is necessary
because government regulation that does not differentiate
between commerce in one state and another does not burden
interstate commerce. The Commerce Clause does not protect
“the particular structure or methods of operation in-a retail
market.” Exxon v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978).
Therefore, the claim that the Commerce Clause gives
commercial haulers the right to take waste to the disposal
facility of their choice is not cognizable. Since all waste
collectors are treated alike, Oneida-Herkimer’s flow control
laws are not unconstitutional.
The decision below should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
1. The Oneida-Herkimer Laws Do Not Discriminate
Against Interstate Commerce, And The Pike Balance
Is The Appropriate Test For Review
C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383
(1994) did not establish a new constitutional rule and did
not sweep away traditional constitutional distinctions
between government service and private sector services,
either in the limited field of waste disposal, or in any broader
sense. Carbone was grounded in established precedent, both
under the Court’s relatively recent line of “waste cases”
commencing with City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978) and the older established line of “processing
cases” commencing with Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313
(1890). Because it was so firmly grounded, no new rule of
law can be inferred from the application of established law
to the facts presented in the case. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 496 (1968) (case does not
announce new rule unless it indicates “that the issue involved
12
was novel, that innovative principles were necessary to resolve
it, or that the issue had been settled in prior cases in a manner
contrary to the view held by [the Court]).”*
The question presented here is not how Carbone might have
been decided if the Clarkstown facility were unambiguously
owned and operated by the town, but how the laws of Oneida
and Herkimer Counties impact interstate commerce, and how
and to what extent they provide benefits to the public. The court
_ Of appeals in United Haulers | applied established precedent to
the facts presented, and properly found that the flow control
laws serve non-protectionist purposes and do not discriminate
against interstate commerce.
A. There Is No Discrimination Here, Therefore There
Is No Commerce Clause Violation
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis is two-pronged: first
a determination as to whether the challenged law discriminates
against interstate commerce, and if not, whether the law places
any incidental burdens on interstate commerce that outweigh
the putative local benefits of the law. City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
In Oregon Waste Sys. v. Dept of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93
(1994), the Court defined “discrimination” against interstate
commerce: “As we use the term here, discrimination simply
means differential treatment of in-state and out-of state economic
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”
Id. at 99. When a law is found to discriminate against interstate
commerce, a rule of virtual per se invalidity applies, and the
burden then falls on the government to demonstrate under strict
scrutiny that the local interest sought to be protected cannot be
adequately served by alternative means with a lesser impact on
5. See, also, Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749,
761 (1995) Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment, citing Keene Corp.
v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 215 (1993) {case does not announce
new rule where claims are resolved “under well-settled law”).
13
interstate commerce. /d. at 99, citing Chem. Waste
Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. at 340-41; Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). A discriminatory purpose can
manifest itself on the face of the regulation, or in its practical
effect. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 626
(1978); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
Each prong of the Commerce Clause analysis requires
comparison of the effects of the challenged law on both in-
state and out-of state interests. This comparison in turn
requires a preliminary identification of the interests to be
compared, in order to determine that they are “similarly
situated,” so as not to compare “apples to oranges.”
Conceptually, of course, any notion of discrimination
assumes a comparison of substantially similar
entities. Although this central assumption has more
often than not itself remained dormant in this Court’s
opinions on state discrimination subject to review
under the dormant Commerce Clause, when the
allegedly competing entities provide different
products, as here, there is a threshold question
whether the companies are indeed similarly situated
for constitutional purposes.
Gen. Motors v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298-99 (1997).
Thus, whenever the Court has found that a local
regulation discriminates against interstate commerce, it has
also found that some entity situated out-of-state is burdened
in a different way than a similar entity located within the
state. Where a differential burden is involved, the difference
must be explained by some justification other than the injured
party’s state of origin. Specific differential treatment of in-
state and out-of state interests has been found in each of this
Court’s recent waste cases, including C&A Carbone v. Town
of Clarkstown.
14
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the State of New
Jersey banned all out-of-state waste from its public and private
landfills. Suit was brought by private landfill operators within
New Jersey who served out-of-state municipalities. The Court
found that New Jersey’s purpose — to conserve both public
and private landfill space within the state — was effected
through a discriminatory mechanism. New Jersey targeted out-
of-state waste for no reason other than its place of origin.
Consequently, the state’s residents continued to have New Jersey
capacity available, but the burden of the regulation fell upon
the residents of other states, who did not. The Court pointed
out that the state could have acted to “slow the flow of a// waste
into the State’s remaining landfills, even though commerce
might be incidentally affected.” /d. at 626. Thus, a general
reduction in the commerce in waste (which is the object and
effect of the Oneida-Herkimer regulations), would not have
constituted discrimination for the Philadelphia court. Moreover,
while the regulation extended to both public and private landfills,
the Court pointedly expressed no opinion about “New Jersey’s
power, consistent with the Commerce Clause, to restrict to State
residents access to state-owned resources,” 437 U.S. at 627 n.6,
recognizing the ability of public systems (such as Oneida-
Herkimer) to limit service to their own region.
In Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan, 504 U.S.
353 (1992), the court struck a Michigan statute that prohibited
private landfills from accepting waste generated outside of
Michigan. Again, the state was autempting to conserve
Michigan’s private landfill capacity for Michigan residents, but
did so without identifying any reason why out-of-state waste
should be treated differently than local waste. Again, the burden
of the regulation fell upon the residents of other states. The
court expressly stated that “the case did not raise any question
conceming policies that municipalities may pursue with respect
to publicly owned facilities.” /d. at 358-59.
15
City of Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot each represented
attempts by states to preserve local disposal capacity by direct
bans of out-of-state waste. Chem. Waste Management v. Hunt,
504 U.S. 334 (1992) and Oregon Waste Sys. v. Oregon Dept.
of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) represented attempts
by states to slow the flow of waste into private facilities in
Alabama and Oregon. The method adopted in each case was
an assessment of fees on out-of-state waste at rates different
from the fees assessed on in-state waste. In these cases the
burden of the assessed fees fell disproportionately upon the
shippers of out-of-state waste (and indirectly upon out-of-
state generators) without an acceptable justification that
out-of-state waste posed greater problems for the state than
in-state waste. The differential treatment of out-of-state waste
could not be justified for any reason other than the origin of
the waste. Significantly, in Chem. Waste Management the
differential fee was struck down, but Alabama regulations
reducing the total intake of hazardous waste into the subject
facility — without differentiating between in-state and out-
of-state sources — were allowed to stand. /d. at 342-46.
In Carbone, two flaws in the Clarkstown scheme were
identified. The first was the application of Clarkstown’s
ordinance to the Carbone processing facility, which was
engaged in accepting New Jersey waste for ultimate disposal
in Indiana. This had the effect of burdening residents of New
Jersey with higher costs than they would otherwise have paid.
Carbone, 511 U.S. at 388-89. As in Philadelphia, Fort
Gratiot, Oregon Waste and Chem. Waste Management, the
burden of the regulation was shifted to people outside of the
state.
The second flaw in the Clarkstown scheme was the
direction of Clarkstown’s waste to a “single local proprietor,”
Carbone at 392, which in Clarkstown’s case, was the
privately operated transfer station designated in the
ordinance. The court found this aspect of the arrangement
16
unconstitutional because the town denied access to the local
waste market to both Carbone and other “rival businesses”
of the Clarkstown facility. Jd. at 394. The burden on interstate
commerce due to the designation of a single local proprietor
was to favor that particular proprietor and disfavor all others,
including competing facilities located out-of-state.
Neither of the flaws identified in the Clarkstown scheme
are present here. In Oneida-Herkimer, the laws do not apply
to waste generated outside of the Counties, and there is no
burden shifted to the residents or waste generators in other
states. As the courts below found, the entire financial burden
of the Oneida-Herkimer system, as implemented by the local
laws, falls on the residents and waste generators of the
Counties.° There is no interference with any regulatory regime
in any other state, or in any other county within New York
State, that would either increase the costs or limit the disposal
options of any person outside of Oneida and Herkimer
Counties.
Petitioners argue that the unconstitutional favoritism to
the “single local proprietor” in Carbone should be equally
unconstitutional whether the favored entity is a privately-
operated facility or an unambiguously public facility. This
reading assumes that the Court adopted the proposition that
there is no difference between public and private facilities
that handle solid waste, and that there is, or should be, no
constitutional distinction between the public sector and the
private sector for Commerce Clause purposes. This is not
6. As noted in the expert report of Dr. Robert Stavins and
confirmed in depositions of the plaintiffs, the practice of the waste
collection industry is to pass disposal costs, as well as other operating
costs, through to the consumers of collection services. While Dr.
Stavins recognized the possibility that some cost of compliance with
the laws might not be passed through, or might be borne by residents
of neighboring counties, there was no evidence presented that any
such costs would be of a non-trivial nature, or would extend to other
states. JA 360a-63a.
17
stated in the decision,’ and the Court should not adopt such
a proposition now.
B. The Public Purposes Served By Oneida-Herkimer
Distinguish This Case From Carbone
An examination of the different purposes of the
Clarkstown and Oneida-Herkimer laws reveals the
constitutional distinction. Clarkstown’s arrangement with its
operator was not public management. ‘lize Oneida-Herkimer
system is publicly managed.
The Oneida-Herkimer laws serve three public objectives
that were not served by Clarkstown’s ordinance. First, the
purpose of the Oneida-Herkimer laws is to place the power
to choose how the public’s waste is to be managed in the
hands of local government, and to take that decision-making
power out of the hands of private haulers and processors.
Second, the laws allow the Authority to pursue policy
objectives of waste reduction and recycling, which are
antithetical to private sector waste interests, and uniquely
governmental. Third, the laws allow the Authority to employ
methods of waste management, including a variety of
technical, administrative and economic tools, which are
7. The language of the majority opinion in Carbone, which the
court of appeals in United Haulers | described as “elusive” (Pet. App.
45a), does not resolve the issue. The majority characterized the town’s
purpose in adopting the law as a means to finance “its new facility”
id. at 387, and “its project” id. at 394, in the sense that the town’s right
to possess the facility would come about with the exercise of a right to
purchase the facility for $1 after the end of five years. Jd. at 387. The
majority refers to the designated transfer station as a “town-sponsored
facility” id. at 393, as a “favored local operator” id. at 389, a “favored
operator” id. at 391, as “the preferred processing facility,” a “single
local proprietor” and “local business” id. at 392, but never describes it
as a public facility. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion describes it
as the “town-authorized facility” id. at 402. The dissent characterizes it
as “a single processor” which is “essentially an agent of the municipal
government.” /d. at 416.
18
uniquely effective and also uniquely governmental. All three
are non-protectionist, non-discriminatory public purposes.
1. The First Objective: Public Assumption Of
Environmental Risk On Behalf Of The
Community
The Counties, and communities across the nation, were
facing a failed waste management system in the 1970’s and
1980’s. The Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §6901, et seq., and
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §9601, et seq.,
changing the paradigm for environmental responsibility, and
making generators of waste liable for the costs associated with
improper disposal. Oneida and Herkimer Counties recognized
this new paradigm, and acting in their role “as guardian[s] and
trustee[s] for [their] people” Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438
(1980), the Counties established a new public disposal system
to interpose local government between their citizens and the
environmental liabilities associated with waste generation and
disposal.
Petitioners argue that the public disposal system in
Oneida-Herkimer burdens interstate commerce by denying
the private sector the ability to offer low cost disposal to
Oneida-Herkimer waste generators. Pet. Br. 11. The argument
essentially rests on a single assertion: “When in-state
generators hire commercial haulers to remove their waste,
the waste enters interstate commerce.” /d. at 49. Because
the laws deny the haulers the ability to seek out the lowest
cost disposal available in the market place, the argument runs,
the “economic viability” of out-of-state facilities is
threatened. /d. at 16-17. Neither argument has merit.
First, as Petitioners concede, the alleged threat to the
economic viability of out-of-state facilities is fully shared
by all in-state facilities. There is no differential treatment of
19
either, and hence no discrimination against interstate
commerce. See Oregon Waste Sys., supra.
Second, the premise is simply wrong. Oneida-Herkimer
generators have not hired commercial haulers to dispose of
their waste; they have only hired them to collect it. In the
absence of flow control, commercial haulers would seek low-
cost disposal options without consulting their customers. To
gain control of disposal, generators in Oneida-Herkimer
elected legislators to make disposal decisions on their behalf.
Here, the generators’ message to their haulers is: take the
waste to the public system.
This first primary objective of the laws — that regional
waste must go to public, not private, facilities for processing
and disposal — is the foundation for the court of appeals’
finding, in United Haulers |, that the laws do not serve a
protectionist purpose and do not discriminate against
interstate commerce. “Not only are such regulations ‘less
likely to be protectionist’ [when they direct waste to public
facilities] they are less likely to give rise to retaliation and
jealousy from neighboring states.” Pet. App. 48a.
The public system at work in Oneida and Herkimer
Counties is distinguishable from the hasty arrangement made
by Clarkstown with its private transfer station operator. The
key difference is Oneida-Herkimer’s affirmative assumption
of responsibility for disposal of the public’s waste, reflected
in its comprehensive plan for programs and facilities, its
direct receipt of waste and recyclables, its receipt of the fees
paid by the public, and its presence as a party in all of the
subsequent transactions with vendors, transporters, disposers,
and buyers of recycled materials, with the attendant risk and
legal liability that accompanies the provision of service.
Clarkstown avoided taking responsibility for disposal of its
citizens’ waste.
20
In Oneida-Herkimer, the necessity for the assumption of
governmental responsibility for waste disposal was prompted
- by the sweeping changes in American environmental law and
policy since 1976. With the adoption of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.
§6901, et seg., and the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
§9601, et seq., broad new responsibilities and liabilities were
created for generators of solid and hazardous wastes, including
municipalities, small businesses and individuals. RCRA
provided for the systematic identification of toxic and hazardous
substances by federal and state officials, together with new
methods for their management. CERCLA provided harsh new
liabilities for the improper disposal of wastes, including strict,
joint and several liability for investigation, clean-up and
remediation costs.
“The remedy that Congress felt it needed in CERCLA is
sweeping: everyone who is potentially responsible for
hazardous-waste contamination may be forced to contribute to
the cost of clean-up.” Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S.
1, 21 (1989) (emphasis in original); United States v. Best Foods,
524 U.S. 51, 56(1998). These liabilities extend to whole classes
of transporters and “arrangers,” * who could be ordinary citizens
and small businesses whose wastes find their way to
contaminated sites. CERCLA liability has been held to attach
not only to hazardous wastes regulated “cradle to grave” under
RCRA, but to ordinary municipal solid wastes that contain
hazardous substances, even in trace amounts.’ Generators are
8. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(3) provides that “persons who
have arranged for disposal ..., or arranged with a transporter for
transport and disposal” are liable for those hazardous substances
they owned or possessed.”
9. See St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Warwick Dyeing
Corp., 26 F.3d 1195 (1st Cir. 1994); BF Goodrich v. Murtha, 958
F.2d°1192, 1202 (2d Cir. 1993); Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. United
(Cont'd)
21
equally responsible, with transporters and the owners of
contaminated sites, for the environmental injuries caused by
improper disposal. Generators do not escape this liability
when they hire commercial haulers. To the contrary, CERCLA
prompts generators to take greater control over the decisions
involved in waste disposal.
These laws were applied in Oneida and Herkimer
Counties with the designation of several local landfills as
inactive hazardous waste sites under New York Law,’ and
the commencement of CERCLA litigation involving
hundreds of local defendants to remediate a National
Priorities List (Superfund) site in Oneida County. JA 447a-
52a, 472a-78a. As these environmental threats were
identified, the community recognized that waste disposal
decisions were too important to be made by their trash
haulers. They called for a new public agency to assume
responsibility.
Petitioners and their amici characterize the Counties’
environmental concerns as “misguided,” Pet. Br. 19 and
“flawed,” NSWMA Br. 23, pointing out that “If a commercial
hauler were to pick up waste from a business or residence
and then bring it to a processing or disposal facility
unconnected with the Counties, respondents never would
come into possession of the waste and would not have any
liability for it.” Pet. Br. 19. This observation is true, but it
entirely misses the point of the Counties’ system and laws.
The Counties and the Authority are taking possession of the
region’s waste in order to reduce the exposure of their
(Cont'd) "
States, 964 F.2d 252, 260-61 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Cello-
Foil Products, Inc., 100 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir- 1996); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th
Cir. 1986); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893
F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990).
10. N.Y. Envti. Conserv. Law §§ 27-1301-27-2403.
-
22
residents and businesses to environmental liability. The
public placed the disposal choice in the hands of their
government precisely because they believed they could better
avoid exposure to liability through a public system than by
leaving the decisions with commercial haulers.
Clarkstown, in contrast, did not take possession of its
citizens’ waste. Instead, it commanded its citizens to deal
with a private entity for waste service, and promised only
that if the operator did not receive sufficient revenue through
the transactions forced by the law, the town would make up
any shortfall. Carbone at 387. The operator, in turn, enjoyed
a private monopoly for five years, allowing the town to sit
on the sidelines until the passage of time would allow it to
claim the operator’s facility. If the operator were to deliver
Clarkstown waste to an environmentally-unsafe facility, the
residents of Clarkstown could be exposed to liabilities as
“arrangers” under CERCLA because their transaction with
the operator sent the waste on its way. But the town would
avoid exposure to those liabilities because it avoided taking
possession of the waste. Pet. Br. 19.
The Court recognized in Carbone that Clarkstown
“elected to use the open market to earn revenues for its
project” when it granted the private facility an exclusive right
to receive local waste in exchange for the deferred receipt of
a transfer facility, id. at 394. Unlike the fees charged by the
Authority for its services, the citizens’ fees in Clarkstown
went to the operator, Because the Clarkstown arrangement
relied on the private operator to manage local waste, it was
properly prohibited from employing “discriminatory
regulation to give that project an advantage over rival
businesses from out-of-state.” Jd. at 394.
The assumption of the responsibility and potential
liabilities associated with waste management is a traditional
governmental function. The process undertaken by the
Counties and the Authority to establish a public system, and -
23
then to craft a Plan stating its objectives and management
methods, was an exercise of democracy, taken after months
of public hearings and discussion. As a result of this process,
the Authority and the Counties identified the essential
facilities necessary to provide the beginnings of an integrated
system, and then issued over $55 million in public bonds to
begin construction. Pet. App. 27a. Clarkstown made no
capital investment in waste management.
2. The Public System In Oneida-Herkimer Does
Not Corapete With Private Sector Services
Another flaw in Petitioners’ argument is the false notion
that the Counties’ system competes with services offered by
the private sector. The role of the Authority in Oneida-
Herkimer is not comparable to the roles played by the “rival”
private processing facilities in Clarkstown.
The Clarkstown ordinance was enforced against the
Carbone processing facility, directing it to deliver waste
generated in New Jersey to the Clarkstown facility after it
had been received and processed by Carbone. The Oneida-
Herkimer laws would not have this effect. The laws are
applicable solely to haulers and generators within the
Counties, and do not regulate private processing facilities,
landfills or other disposal facilities. If the Carbone facility
were located within Oneida or Herkimer Counties, the laws
would not prevent its operation, or its acceptance of waste
from other states or local sources. The Oneida-Herkimer laws
would prevent local haulers and generators from delivering
to it, but it would not be subject to prosecution for accepting
local waste. No hauler in Oneida-Herkimer is prevented from
collecting waste outside of the Counties and delivering it
anywhere, including a private facility located within the
Counties.
The Authority provides disposal service only to the
citizens of Oneida and Herkimer Counties, to whom it owes
24
a governmental responsibility."' In fulfilling its governmental
responsibility within the Counties, the Authority does not
compete with private disposal services located in other states
or elsewhere in New York. Any competition between the
Authority and the private sector could only occur if the
Authority were to offer service to persons to whom it does
not have a governmental responsibility, such as residents of
other jurisdictions. But because the Authority does not accept
waste from areas outside of the Counties, it does not compete
with other disposal service providers in those markets either.
3. The Market Participant Doctrine Does Not
Apply In This Action By Appellant Haulers,
And Any Indirect Regulatory Effect On
Non-Parties Is Not Discrimination Against
Interstate Commerce
The Counties and the Authority do not raise the market
participant doctrine as a defense against the claims of the
haulers. The doctrine applies to non-regulatory activities that
“fall outside of the scope of activity governed by the dormant
Commerce Clause.” Pet. App. lla-12a. As to the appellant
haulers, the market participant doctrine is simply not an issue
in this case, because the Counties and the Authority do not
claim that the haulers are not regulated by the flow control
laws.
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794
(1984), the Court found that the restraints of the dormant
Commerce Clause do not apply to the actions of states when
they act as participants in commercial markets, and not as
regulators of those markets. In South Central Timber v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984), the Court made clear that the
market participant doctrine allows a state to impose burdens
on commerce in the markets in which it participates, but not
11. The Authority is obligated to provide services to the citizens
of the Counties, and precluded from accepting waste generated
elsewhere. See N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 2049-ee(7) (McKinney 2006).
25
in “downstream” markets where it exercises government
power as a regulator. /d. at 95.
The Petitioners argue here, as they argued below, that
because the Authority is a participant in the disposal
marketplace, it cannot use its regulatory power to favor its
own facilities at the expense of interstate commerce. App.
Br. 33-37. This is not a correct statement of the doctrine.
The market participant cases do not prohibit regulations that
favor public facilities. They prohibit municipalities from
regulating and also claiming immunity from commerce
clause scrutiny as market participants.
These laws unquestionably regulate the conduct of the
haulers in directing them to deliver to public facilities. The
establishment of a public disposal system is also the act of a
sovereign. The Counties do not claim any exemption from
the strictures of the Commerce Clause in adopting and
enforcing the local laws that place disposal power in.
government hands. The Counties regulate the hauers, but
do not discriminate or otherwise burden interstate commerce.
Had this case been brought by a private landfill, the
Authority might rely upon the market participant doctrine to
defend its right to choose other landfills for disposal of
Oneida-Herkimer waste from 1991-2006, or to cease trading
with all private landfills after 2007. As the court of appeals
found in United Haulers ll, the Authority does indeed
participate in the marketplace “as any other economic actor
would when, after having employed its regulatory powers to
compel delivery of the waste . . . to its processing facilities,
it contracts with private parties to deliver its processed wastes
to landfill sites that meet its requirements.”'? But because
the Authority does not employ any uniquely governmental
12. See Br. of amicus curiae National Association of Counties
at 19-22 for a response to petitioner’s reliance on the market
participant doctrine.
26
power to regulate those with whom it does business, “the
outcome of its bidding process is simply not a concern of
the Commerce Clause.” Pet. App. 12a.
The flow control laws do not apply to landfills or other
disposal facilities, and no out-of-state landfill or other
disposal facility is a party to this case. But even if the Court
were to consider the operation of the public disposal system
as a kind of “downstream” regulation of-private landfills,
such an effect does not violate the Commerce Clause. As the
courts below found, nothing in the Authority’s procurement
policies operated to favor in-state entities over out-of-state
entities in the selection of landfills for regional waste during
the 1991-2006 period. In using its new public landfill from
2007 forward, the Authority is withdrawing from the
commercial market altogether, which denies waste to in-state
and out-of-state landfills alike. Moreover, the removal of
regional waste from both intrastate and interstate commerce
is at most an “indirect” effect on interstate commerce,
reviewable under the balancing test of Pike. Brown-Forman
Distiliers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573, 579 (1986).
4. Waste Reduction And Recycling Are Unique
Governmental Purposes Consistent With
National And State Policies
The second governmental objective served by the laws
is the pursuit of established state and federal solid waste
policy. The objective of the Counties’ Final Local Solid Waste
Management Plan “is to provide for maximum levels of waste
reduction and recycling, coupled with the development of
environmentally and economically sound programs and
facilities for the remainder of the waste stream.” JA 144a.
This objective is in accord with the statutory policy of the
State of New York, which establishes four state-wide
management priorities:
27
First, to reduce the amount of solid waste
generated;
Second, to reuse material for the purpose for
which it was originally intended or to recycle
material that cannot be reused;
Third, to recover, in an environmentally-
acceptable manner, energy from solid waste that
cannot be economically and technically reused and
recycled; and
Fourth, to dispose of solid waste that is not being
reused, recycled or from which energy is not being
recovered, by land burial or other methods
approved by the department.
N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §27-0106(1) (McKinney 2006).
National policy in waste management has the same
priorities. RCRA provides:
The objectives of this chapter are to promote
protection of health and the environment and to
conserve valuable material and energy resources
by providing technical and financial assistance to
state and local governments and interstate
agencies for the development of solid waste
management plans (including resource recovery
and resource conservation systems) which will
promote improved solid waste management
techniques (including new more effective
organizational arrangements), new and improved
methods of collection, separation, and recovery
of solid waste, and the environmentally safe
disposal of non-recoverable residues. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 6902(a).
28
of ordinary citizens, and in the customs and
waste industry.
RCRA expected that “the collection and di
waste should continue to be primarily the functywn of state,
regional and local agencies . . .” 42 U.S.©. §6 4). It is
not necessary for states and local governments \t® secure
special authorization from Congress to provide solid’ waste
services to their citizens. Congress expected state local
agencies to exercise their sovereign powers.'’ The Commerce
Clause requires those powers to be exercised in a non-
protectionist, non-discriminatory manner. This Court has long
recognized that government regulation “for the purpose of
protecting the health of its citizens-and not simply the health
of its economy-is at the core of its police power.” Sporhase
v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982). The Oneida-Herkimer
laws, like the waste policies of the state and federal
governments, were adopted to protect health and the
environment. They are not protectionist.
The citizens of Oneida-Herkimer endorsed these non-
protectionist policies through their participation in the
extensive process undertaken by the Authority to identify
the elements of the public system and prepare the Local Solid
Waste Management Plan.'* The people contributed to the
creation of a waste system that would require them to pay
“more than twice as much as they had paid for waste disposal
13. See Br. of amicus curiae Onondaga County Resource
Recovery Agency, ct al., for discussion of the. police power and
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §6901, et seq.
14. Clarkstown, unlike Oncida-Herkimer, was not a designated
planning unit under New York law. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §27-
0107(1 (a).
29
services prior to the adoption of the flow control laws.”
Pet. App. 48a. The planning process shows that there are “major
in-state interests adversely affected” by the laws, which this
Court has recognized are “a powerful safeguard against
legislative abuse” and indicative of non-discriminatory purposes.
West Lynn Creamery Inc. v. Healy, 5i2 U.S. 186, 200 (1994).
Oneida-Herkimer’s objectives — to shield their citizens
from environmental liability and to focus their waste policies
on the reduction and recycling of local waste — are uniquely
governmental, flowing from the sovereign power of the State
of New York, and protected by the 10° Amendment to the
Constitution. As this Court remarked in California Reduction
Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905), “it
may be taken as firmly established that the States possess,
because they have never surrendered, the power ... to
prescribe such regulations as may be reasonably necessary
and appropriate for the protection of the public health and
comfort.” /d. at 318. See Br. of amicus curiae State of New
York, et al.
Because these objectives are not protectionist, and in
the absence of any evidence of “differential treatment of in-
state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the
former and burdens the latter,” Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S.
at 99, the court of appeals correctly found that the laws do
not discriminate against interstate commerce, and that the
Pike balancing test was the proper standard to-employ in
assessing any incidental burdens that the laws placed upon
interstate commerce.
30
II. The Oneida-Herkimer Laws Pass The Balancing Test
Of Pike v. Bruce Church
A. The Laws Place No Cognizable Incidental Burden
On Interstate Commerce
No evidence of differential treatment to any specific out-
of-state interest was offered by Petitioners in United Haulers
I, but the court of appeals remanded the matter anyway for
“discovery and further argument by the parties, which will
undoubtedly assist the district court in this fact intensive
determination.” Pet. App. 52a. Detailed examination of the
effects of the laws on the various in-state and out-of-state
entities followed in the district court. The entities examined
included generators of wastes, haulers such as the plaintiffs,
transporters, processors, landfills and other service providers,
together with the regulatory interests of governmental
agencies in other states. There was no evidence that any of
these classes of interests were treated differently by the laws
due to their in-state or out-of-state character. Pet. App. 66a-
67a. The Petitioners conceded in discovery that they did not
even contend that there is any greater burden placed upon an
out-of-state entity by the laws than on a similarly situated -
in-state entity. JA 350a. The record in the courts below
confirms this undisputed fact. Pet. App. 89a-100a, 66a-68a.
Examination of the patterns of commerce in waste after
creation of the Authority’s system also revealed no
discriminatory effects on interstate interests. From an
economic perspective, the report of Dr. Stavins established
that the Authority’s early decision to construct the first major
transfer station in the region actually lowered the cost of
transporting non-recyclable waste from Oneida-Herkimer
into interstate commerce, commenced such shipments earlier
than would otherwise have occurred, and sent greater
tonnages into interstate commerce than-would otherwise have
occurred. JA 363a-69a. For recyclable materials, the laws’
source separation requirements have facilitated a high level
31
of recycling and have sent several hundred thousand tons of
recyclables to markets, many of them in interstate commerce.
JA 359a.
_ Despite the absence of any differential impact on out-
of-state interests, or indeed, because of this lack of evidence,
Petitioners argue that an even-handed regulation cannot, by
definition, have any materially-different impact on an out-
of-state interest compared to an in-state interest. According
to their argument, if any differential impact is present, no
matter how slight, the regulation discriminates against
interstate commerce and the rule of “per se” invalidity should
apply. Pet. Br. 46-47. Therefore, Petitioners claim, the court
of appeals misconstrued the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce
Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Their argument is baseless.
This Court has never demanded that state and local
regulation display afaultlessly perfect balance of in-state and
out-of-state burdens. The court has always recognized that
regulations can be “even-handed” and still have different
effects on out-of-state and in-state commerce. “When a
statute has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and
regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether the
State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden on
interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.”
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986). Indeed, the Court has always
recognized that there is “no clear line” between a
discriminatory and an incidental burden on interstate
commerce. Carbone, O’Connor, J., concurring at 402. “In
either situation, the critical consideration is the overall effect
of the statute on both local and interstate activity.” Brown-
Forman, 476 U.S. at 579.
Here, the overall effect of the flow control laws on both
local and interstate activity is to reduce the commerce in
disposal services for non-recyclable waste, and to increase
the commerce in recyclable materials. The Report and
-
32
Recommendation of the Magistrate and the Decision of the
District Court each held that no incidental burden on
interstate commerce was established because Petitioners
could not show any qualitative or quantitative difference in
the treatment of in-state and out-of-state interests under the
laws. Because no incidental burden was shown, it was
unnecessary to engage in a balance of non-existent burdens
against the obvious benefits the laws provided to the public.
Pet. App. 66a-73a, 95a-99a.
In Uniied Haulers Il, the court of appeals considered
the Petitioners’ argument that the burden on commerce
consisted of the withholding, or “hoarding,” of waste from
intrastate and interstate markets, even without a showing of
differential impacts. Pet. App. 13a. The court of appeals
declined to decide whether such a withholding constitutes a
cognizable burden, but held that if that effect was a burden,
it was slight in comparison with the substantial benefits
afforded by the laws. Pet. App. 16a.
_In substance, the Petitioners’ ar,ument on the
“withholding” or “hoarding” of waste is that because the laws
have the effect of reducing the amount of waste in commerce
(both intrastate and interstate), there is a burden created,
characterized as an “export barrier” that the dormant
Commerce Clause should prohibit. This Court’s dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence requires rejection of this
theory for two reasons.
First,.the Commerce Clause has never been construed
to prohibit fair, across-the-board regulation of commerce that
has the effect of reducing the amount of trade in a given
commodity. In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
481 U.S. 69 (1987), the Court upheld Indiana regulations
governing takeovers of Indiana corporations, rejecting the
argument that the dormant Commerce Clause was violated
because the law tended to reduce the number of transactions
made.
33
Dynamics’ argument that the Act is unconstitutional
ultimately rests on its contention that the Act will
limit the number of successful tender offers. There
is little evidence that this will occur. But even if true,
this result would not substantially affect our
Commerce Clause analysis. We reiterate that this
Act does not prohibit any entity-resident or
nonresident-from offering to purchase, or from
purchasing, shares in Indiana corporations, or from
attempting thereby to gain control.
Id., 481 U.S. at 93.
Government frequently regulates with the intention of
reducing commerce in goods and services. Regulations
prohibiting certain forms of advertising for cigarettes are
unquestionably intended to reduce the nation’s consumption
of tobacco, but they are not unconstitutional. Regulations
banning the sale of lead in gasoline and paints undoubtedly
have an adverse effect on the nation’s commerce in lead, but
they. do not offend the Commerce Clause. These kinds of
regulations are valid because they regulate all commerce in
he commodity, and do not distinguish between commerce
itv one state and another.
The second reason that Petitioners’ argument must fail
is that it would use the Commerce Clause to shore up the old
structure of the waste markets, in order to protect the position
of Low-cost landfills in those markets.'* These low- cost
facilities compete with other disposal technologies that may
offer, for example, greater environmental protections at
higher cost. Their interests do not coincide with the kinds of
innovation in management that the Authority represents. The
15. See Pet. Br. 11 “The ordinances ... bar {] patronage of
out-of-state facilities that offer-those services at lower prices.
NSWMA Br. at 20. Sussex Br. at 9.
BEST AVAILABLE COPY
34
landfills have allied themselves here with local haulers who
are responsive to the attractions of low-cost disposal. '®
This partnering of haulers with low-cost landfills enjoys
no special constitutional protection. The old structure of
waste markets relied almost exclusively on disposal by
haulers in dumps and landfills. RCRA was adopted to change
that structure by encouraging recycling and energy recovery
at the expense of land disposal. In Oneida-Herkimer from
1991-2006, the Authority supplanted the haulers as the
purchaser of landfill service, for a diminished amount of non-
recyclable waste, reduced by the Authority’s recycling and
reduction programs. While landfills, as a class of disposal
facilities, may receive less waste from local haulers than they
might otherwise receive due to the success of national, state
and local recycling policies, the Commerce Clause does not
protect them from changes in market conditions — even
where the changes are prompted by regulation.
This Court has made it clear that the Commerce Clause
does not protect “the particular structure or methods of
operation in a retail market.” Exxon v. Maryland, 437 U.S.,
at 127; CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S/
at 93. “The fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on
some interstate companies does not, by itself, establish a
claim of discrimination against interstate commerce.” Exxom,
437 U.S. at 126. These principles have special significatice
here because the protections Petitioners seek would block
government efforts to reduce the public’s exposure to
environmental liability, and frustrate national waste policies
that encourage innovative approaches to waste management.
16. In depositions, the haulers testified that their likely choice
of out-of-county disposal sites would be dictated solely by cost, and
that in-state, rather than out-of-state landfills would be preferable
due to the cost of transportation. JA 364a, n.12.
35
Finally, Petitioners’ concede that a public waste system
that includes public collection as well as disposal service is
constitutional. Pet. Br. 48-49. The Counties surely could
institute public collection and completely displace the private
hauling industry.'’ But such an action would be both wasteful
and unnecessary, as the Counties’ interest is in proper
disposal, not in putting the region’s commercial haulers out
of business. Moreover, it is hard to see why this broader waste
service monopoly would not offend the Commerce Clause
to a greater extent than the less intrusive regulation of flow
control. With public collection, the government would still
be able to direct local waste to its own facilities, the economic
interests of private disposal facilities would be equally
threatened, and any other burdens placed on interstate
commerce by a public disposal system would be unchanged.
The Petitioners’ interests and those of their amici are at
odds when it comes to collection. The Oneida-Herkimer laws
do not threaten the haulers’ livelihoods. Not every hauler in
Oneida and Herkimer Counties is willing to support Petitioners’
view that the Commerce Clause denies government the power
to control disposal of waste unless it also exercises its power to
collect. See Br. amicus curiae Mohawk Valley EDGE.
Because there is concededly no differential impact on any
out-of-state economic interest affected by the laws, and because
the particular low-cdst business arrangement advocated by the
haulers is not protected by the Commerce Clause, there is, in
17. The power to provide public waste collection services is
granted to New York’s county governments Section 119 of the New
York General Municipal Law. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law §119 (McKinney
2006). The Authority is granted the power to provide collection
services by New York Public Authorities Law Section 2049-ee(4).
N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §2049-ee(4). Where public collection is
instituted, municipalities may contract with private haulers to perform
the service, and direct them to specific disposal facilities pursuant
to the contracts: U.S.A. Recycling v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272
(2d Cir. 1995).
36
fact, no incidental burden placed upon interstate commerce by
these laws. Under these circumstances, several courts of appeals
are in agreement with the district court that logic does not require
any further inquiry, or comparison of the benefits of the flow
control laws to non-existent burdens."
Nevertheless, if one examines the benefits here, all doubt
is erased.
B. The Counties’ Integrated System Of Waste
Management Provides Benefits Possible Only
Through Flow Control
The third governmental purpose of the flow control laws
is integrated management. The laws divide the waste stream
into component parts and direct each component to a facility
best suited to recover useful commodities, or dispose of it in
the most environmentally-sound manner. The Authority
operates eight different facilities to receive, process and
dispose ofthe region’s waste, all of which operate in concert
to fulfill the Solid Waste Management Plan’s commitment
to the maximization of waste reduction and recycling. The
effectiveness of this integrated management system is no
longer challenged by the Petitioners. The particular benefits,
of each of the Authority’s recycling, composting, hazardovis
waste and landfill facilities and programs are set forth at
length in the Joint Appendix and need not be restated here.
JA 115a-39a, 353a-95a, 419a-3 La.
18. Nat'l Paint & Coatings Association v. Chicago, 45 F.3d
1124, 1132 (7th Cir. 1995) “No disparate treatment, no disparate
impact, no problem under the dormant commerce clause.” O/d Bridge
Chem., Inc. v. New Jersey Dept of Envtl. Protection, 965 F.2d 1287,
1295 (3rd Cir. 1992); Nat'l Solid Waste Management Assoc. v. Pine
Belt Regional Solid Waste Auth., 389 F.3d 491, 502 (Sth Cir. 2004):
Pacific Northwest Venison Producers v. Smitch, 20 F.3d 1008, 1015
(9th Cir. 1994); New York State Trawlers Assoc. v. Jorling, 16 F.3d
1303, 1308 (2nd Cir. 1994); V-/ Oil Co. v. Utah State Dep t of Public
Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1425 (10" Cir. 1997).
37
However, two particular benefits of the flow control laws
should be emphasized. First, the application of different
technologies to different components of the waste stream is
possible only through a system of regulation. The flow control
laws establish a uniform set of rules to govern the disposal
practices of all waste generators and haulers in the region,
defining the categories of waste that can be recycled,
composted or consigned to land disposal. Uniform
participation by generators provides a stable foundation to
the system, allowing the Authority to introduce new services
as technologies and markets develop. Regulation of haulers
ensures that the collection industry participates in the Solid
Waste Plan to the same extent that generators participate,
delivering to the same facilities and paying the same charges.
Private market forces could not produce this community-
wide participation or achieve the high levels of recycling
and environmental awareness obtained through integrated
management. Only government involvement and the
applicatien of the flow control laws makes it possible.
See Stavins, JA 374a-78a.
Second, the flow control laws make it possible for the
‘Authority to provide the integrated “bundle” of benefits
through the system charge on non-recyclable waste. This $78/
ton charge delivers not only landfill transportation and
disposal, but recycling, composting, household hazardous
waste disposal and all of the other program benefits provided
by the system. The system charge makes it possible for the
Authority to accept recyclables and household hazardous
wastes without charging a fee for those materials, and at the
same time, provide an incentive to businesses and individuals
to red'ice their generation of non-recyclable waste. As Dr.
Stavins pointed out, “Flow control makes possible financial
incentives for waste reduction and recycling that are
unachievable through other means.” JA 388a-92a.
38
Private markets could not provide these benefits. Only
government regulation makes it possible to provide a variety
of waste services that are not structured to generate revenue,
and at the same time distribute the cost of the entire system
according to the amount of non-recyclable waste an
individual user generates. JA 381la-82a, 388a-9 1a.
The haulers ask the Court to compel Oneida-Herkimer
to allow them to take non-recyclable waste to anywhere they
might find a lower price. This would require the Authority
to “unbundle” its package of benefits, and lose many of the
benefits altogether. For example, if haulers were allowed to
take waste out of the Counties, the Authority would not be
able to insist upon higher environmenial standards at private
landfills elsewhere, because, as the Court pointed out in
Carbone, a local government regulating private transactions
may not exercise its police power beyond its borders. /d. at
393. As discussed above, restoring the decision-making
power over disposal to the haulers would expose local
generators to liabilities arising from poor choices made by
the haulers.
Without flow control and the system charge, the
Authority would not be able to accept recyclables, green’
wastes and household hazardous wastes at no charge, and.
the substantial incentives for recycling and waste reduction
would be lost. From an administrative point of view, the
Authority’s ability to enforce the recycling provisions of the
laws would be lost, because there would be no means to
inspect loads of waste bound for private landfills for the
presence of recyclables. Most importantly, without the flow
control laws there would be no means to mandate the
participation of cither haulers or generators in the Covnties’
solid waste plan, and no possibility that the federal, state or
local waste reduction and recycling objectives could be met.
39
As the court of appeals observed in United Haulers Il,
the benefits of the system are intrinsically tied to the laws.
We agree with plaintiffs that some of these goals,
particularly those relating to revenue generation,
also might be achieved through other instruments
of municipal policy. However, nothing in the
record before us demonstrates, or even suggests,
that the Counties could address their liability
concerns or encourage recycling across the wide
range of waste products accepted by the
Authority’s recycling program in any other way,
let alone through an approach as straightforward
as the use of flow control.
Pet. App. 20a.
C. Widespread Adoption Of Flow Control Similar
To Oneida-Herkimer’s Laws Would Not Burden
Interstate Commerce
if other communities were to adopt flow contro! laws
similar to those of Oneida-Herkimer, Petitioners and their
amici curiae forecast doom to an interstate trade in waste
that is based upon low-cost disposal. But the size of the
private interstate market in waste is dwarfed by the far larger
intrastate market, and the public’s own investment in waste
infrastructure. According to Petitioners’ own figures, 60%
of all disposal facilities in the United States are publicly
owned, NSWMA Br. 7, and more than 90% of the nation’s
waste is disposed of before it crosses any state lines. JA 240a.
The interstate trade in waste services is unlikely to suffer
any injury at all if laws and public systems like Oneida-
Herki ner’s become the norm.
The potential effects of the adoption of similar flow
control laws and systems by other municipalities were the
subject of expert testimony examined by the courts below.
Dr. Stavins established that with the adoption of flow control
40
and the Authority’s construction of the first major transfer
station in the Oneida-Herkimer region, interstate shipment
of waste from the region occurred earlier, and involved larger
quantities of waste, than would have been the case if the
private sector had been free to act on its own. JA 360a-69a.
Moreover, Dr. Stavins also pointed out that the
widespread adoption of flow control, as implemented in
Oneida-Herkimer, would almost certainly increase the
interstate trade in waste. Municipalities do not find any
assistance from flow control in siting landfills or other
disposal facilities within their borders. With flow control,
densely populated municipalities would be far more likely
to build transfer facilities to assist in the export of waste,
and the transfer stations they build would facilitate greater
interstate shipment of waste at the expense of intrastate
shipment. JA 370a-72a, 393a, 408a-1 2a.
To the extent that a municipality would, like Oneida-
Herkimer, elect to send its waste to its own public landfill,
the effect on all private disposal facilities, whether in-state
or out-of-state, would be exactly the same. Local disposal,
as opposed to export, would have the benefit of reducing the
environmental impacts of shipping, particularly the impacts
borne by other communities that suffer from air pollution,
traffic and other burdens.'? Moreover, any reduction in the
volume of waste entering the market due to construction of
a new public landfill would tend to reduce prices in both the
intrastate and interstate disposal markets. JA 372a.
To the extent that municipalities would use flow cortrol
to establish integrated systems, as Oneida-Herkimer has,
using combinations of technologies to reduce the volu'ne of
waste, the result would be an incontrovertible 200d,
advancing the declared goals of Congress in RCRA. In this
regard, flow control would make it possible for communities
19. See Br. of amicus curiae Environmental Defense.
41
to select new and innovative technologies that provide greater
environmental benefits than technologies currently in use,
particularly where the community is prepared to shoulder a
higher short-term cost to gain long-term health and safety
benefits.”
For communities such as Sussex or Charles City
Counties in Virginia, nothing in these laws resembles the
waste import bans examined by this Court ia City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey and Fort Gratiot v. Michigan.
Those cases struck down laws barring private landfills in
New Jersey and Michigan from accepting out-of-state waste.
The Oneida-Herkimer laws have no effect whatsoever on the
ability of private landfills to accept waste. As discussed
above, the Authority does not compete with private landfills
at all because it serves the citizens of the Counties, to whom
it owes a governmental responsibility. Moreover, as discussed
above, the difficulties inherent in siting new landfills makes
it more likely that communities adopting flow control will
build transfer stations as the Authority did in 1991.
Communities without space or means to build will still rely
on export to secure disposal capacity. If the landfills in Sussex
and Charles City see any decline in waste volume in the
future, that may come from the nation’s success in its policy
to reduce waste and increase recycling. But such a change in
the general commerce in waste would not affect landfills in
Sussex or Charles City to any greater degree than landfills
in New York.
Finally, neither the courts, the waste industry, nor local
governments have developed any settled expectations based
on Carbone. To the contrary, as Petitioners pointed out,
Pet. 25-28, courts have adopted conflicting interpretations
of the meaning of Carbone, and municipalities have
i —
20. See Br. of amicus curiae Arkansas Association of Regional
Solid Wzste Management Districts, ct al.
42
developed ad hoc arrangements to secure the benefits of flow
control found to be constitutional by different courts.”'
The public/private distinction articulated by the Second
Circuit has the virtue of simplicity: municipalities that
assume responsibility for the waste disposal needs of their
citizens must do so fairly, favoring no private interest above
any another.
The purposes underlying the Court’s dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, as articulated by Justice Jackson in
HP Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), continue
to reflect a balance between safeguarding the movement of
interstate commerce and affording the states the power to
effectively address threats to public health and the
environment.
Our system, fostered by the commerce clause, is
that every farmer and every craftsman shall be
encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will
have free access to every market in the nation,
that no home embargoes will withhold his export,
and no foreign state will by customs duties or
regulations exclude them.
Id. at 539.
At the same time, Justice Jackson also recognized the
equally important power of the state “to protect its inhabitants
against perils to health or safety, fraudulent traders and
highway hazards, even by use of measures which bear
21. See USA Recycling v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 127°: (2d
Cir. 1995) for flow control valid under contracts; Harvey & Hurvey,
Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995) and H oulton
Citizens’ Coalition v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178 (Ast Cir. 1999)
for flow control valid where procurement is open to out-of-state
bidders; Ben Oehrleins & Son v. Hennepin County, 113 F.3d 1372
(8th Cir. 1997) for flow control valid when applied to in-state
disposal.
43
adversely on interstate commerce.” Jd. at 532. He saw the
distinction between the government’s lack of power to retard
interstate commerce and its responsibility to protect the
public as “deeply rooted in both our history and our law.”
Id. at 532.
Here, the Counties are exercising the power to provide
traditional sanitation service to the community. Waste
disposal service, like water, sewer, fire and police protection,
lies at the foundation of civilized society,” and is invaluable
to the commercial life of the nation. The Petitioners ask the
Court to erase the distinction between public and private
service in waste disposal which has been recognized for over
100 years. California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction
Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905); Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S.
325 (1905). To do so would eliminate the “deeply rooted
distinction” recognized by the Court in HP Hood and in every
subsequent Commerce Clause case.
22. See, generally, Br. of amicus curiae Madison County, New
York.
44
CONCLUSION
The flow control laws are an exercise of the police power -
for the protection of the general health and safety of the
people of Oneida and Herkimer Counties. They aid in the
provision of essential government service and are applied
evenhandedly to all private entities, regardless of their
location. There is no violation of the Commerce Clause and
the decision below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Micuaet J. CAHILL
Counsel of Record
GeRMANO & CaHILL, PC
4250 Veterans Memorial Highway
Suite 275 .
Holbrook, New York 11741
(631) 588-8778
Jupy DraBick!
25723 NYS Rte 180
Dexter, NY 13634-4009
Peter M. RAyYHILL
KERNAN & KERNAN PC.
258 Genesee Street
Utica, NY 13502
Bruce S. Rocow
Bruce S. Rocow, P.A.
Broward Financial Centre
500 East Broward Blvd., Ste. 1930
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 3339 4
Attorneys for Oneida-Herkimer
Solid Waste Management Authority
45
RICHARD A. FRYE
Frye Fotey & CARBONE
2219 Genesee Street -
Utica, NY 13501
Attorneys for Oneida County NY
Tuomas E. KeLty
HorrIGAN, HorriGAN, LOMBARDO
& Ketty PC
49 East Main Street
Amsterdam, NY 12010
Attorneys for Herkimer County, NY
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