Reply Brief — Massachusetts v. EPA

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TO (27) PILED

NOV 15 2006

No. 05-1120 ; ninroe

In the Supreme Court of the United Stategn EE HE Cea

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL., Petitioners

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL., Respondents

--—

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

REPLY

THOMAS F. REILLY

Attorney General of Massachusetts

LISA HEINZERLING

Special Assistant Attorney General

600 New Jersey Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

JAMES R. MILKEY*

WILLIAM L. PARDEE

CAROL LANCU

Assistant Attorneys General

1 Ashburton Place, 18" Floor

Boston, MA 02108

(617) 727-2200

“Counsel of Record

- Attorneys for Petitioners

(Additional Counsel Listed on Signature Page)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ee ID ectsinicsitsinsitesnrsinpinaniicsnmnstanusinimcenpinieiitien i

Argument

I. Petitioners have standing .........0....c.c.csccsssesescscsssseseseee 1

A. Petitioners have demonstrated injury in fact ... 2

B. Petitioners have demonstrated that their

injury is fairly traceable to EPA’s decision ....... 6

C. Petitioners have demonstrated

SOI enstctecicttnniicenennpncinmennmemmnmmns 10

IJ. The Clean Air Act authorizes regulation of

greenhouse gases from motor vehicles ...............0. 13

Ill. EPA may not decline to issue emission

standards for motor vehicles based on policy

considerations not reflected within section

202(a)(1) of the Clean Aiir Act ........cccccccseseeseseeseensees 18

A. EPA's decision must be reversed if it reflects a

misinterpretation of the Clean Air Act .............. 19

B. EPA committed plain legal error in

declining to issue emission standards for

motor vehicles based on policy

considerations not reflected within section

202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act ......ccccceceeeeeees 23

SD csercenctciniprintincinitnernpdrmniinanneninmaennannien 27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) ......cscccscssecsseeerseseeeseees 7

Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.

ED crccicrinsctasantverentcnntentininiondeasnneninieeimanamaen 20, 21

Ass’‘n. of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397

SS: SUT sictnegnipntacenninnuecesianeiainatpentaninepeinanninimaninne 9

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater

ee 14

i

Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401 (1905) ............ 12

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438

CD BO GD cecepeeseesemnnsnesenmemensennnennneemenans 11

Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328 (7th Cir.

TIPE conenesssesinmivaennsnanpiimetantaebenannenninumimtmnnmmanniats 4

Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (1976)..........cccceeceeenees 26

FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S. 463

ane sratnesianenenspttehennecninitatsinmnaionepeeetemmmiitnes 20

FEC o. Altins, S24 US. 11 (1996) .......r.cccscscssesssccesesessees 2,12

Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services (TOC),

SP A NT GID cxnpsensecnentscernnnmmneonappimmanatanienen 2,9

General Motors Corp. v. NHTSA, 898 F.2d 165 (D.C.

GR, TERED enssnasevenseresvsivipsoestunpiipennestsansarcsqenianmepuentnenmmnians 21

Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91

EERUWURD econssssneresintencasersossnnnneenenniacapennanemdutinuenstncegnenseaentiins 5

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) ......ccscescsesseresees 19, 20

In re United Steelworkers of America v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass‘n,

FED Fe BERT GAL, COP, TED) nccscrocseccocsscencceccceges 22

Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ.

FORE Se PR IOUED ercetesecentecnstenentenetenimmnenoennes 7

Japan Whaling Ass‘n v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S.

Ie inks dcmiinnentontipitrininccmecseovepetscntwnniines 21

Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) .......cssssseseeeeseeserees 11

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) . 2, 4,5, 7

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) ......cecccecseesseresesrenenees 3

Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ..........00. «8

Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc. v.

FERC, 388 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 2004) .......ccsseseseeeseeseees 21

Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d

Se ice GENE ecnenenisvepnecenesmsenteivtennenimteenerenbscinenanin 4

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

BD, Gin, GED GE BONED ceretnspescencnnnnntrensecseen 20, 24

NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) ..... 20

Natural Res. Def. Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046

(D.C. Cir. 1979)

Natural Res. Def. Council v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974

INL TEES cssrcnasinienaisiapivcnsmapinieinnmescaiiismeneiiiaaesmnnes 9

New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. 1 (1799) ....cccccccceeeserseseeees 2

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1

GRUNT D cassepssersienintessentequessaneenenanibtegensaiminamncmenpeeaien 12

Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union v.

Zegeer, 768 F.2d 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ..........cceceeceees 22

Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004) ............ 10

Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546 (5th

RAs FIP ovincncconcvsiosncnsneiseneseucabnemameneasetetnaierdinemmnamenmnies 9

Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) ...cccccssssesesesererees 3

Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26

SE cote eprineseqneeninianeenrescinenpincttinininesainitmeieminmeinnen 6,7

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990)... 3,4

Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986) ....... 20

Statutes:

Sa a taes SED cicescniocncspenceseinpiniinessisabsistintinibniaginiiitsies 22

ee ede tate serennicntenerencntentinsenennasnenipenetantapenmnentintion 22

Be Ae BND crereteinsesnerentscsnnsccasenecsnnesencssensnszenetnen 22

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706 ............ 19, 21

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.:

Title I, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.:

BRDU, GE UA, FERGIE) cccececeserccscccseccrsscrescssescencse 14

§ 108(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2).......scsccceerserreeseersees 17

§ 111(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. 7411(b)(1)(A) «2... cceceeeseees 8

D BERD, Go UA. PERT) ccccsccccesccnesecsevesennesenssseses 16

§ 112(f)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. 7412(f)(2)(A)........cceeeeee 25

Title II, 42 U.S.C. 7521 et seq.:

§ 202(a)(1),

42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1) ...8, 12, 13, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27

§ 209(c4), 422 U.S.C. 7545 (C)(1) ...secsecereeesereseseeeneerees 8

§ 213(a,(1), 42 U.S.C. 7547(a)(1).....ccsecccesseseeserenerseees 8 -

Titie III, 42 U.S.C. 7601 et seq.:

§ 302(g), 42 U.S.C. 7602(g) ....sessesecsrersereseesensees 13,17

ill

§ 302(h), 42 U.S.C. 7602(h) «0... ccsseseeseseeeee 13, 15, 17

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No.

91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1676 ........:cccscsesesessseseenssenesenees 16

Federal Register:

Ss TE TF COO ccsicrscisctsicccnsceninsentistesimememantensies 6

Se Ee, CR: SH ID ccorcesnceynnvsncennnsesetinentnsennensancssonense 15

GP FR, CAN, BFGF CIPD cccncsesncsnsrsessncestesccenesenesconeesesnncese 8

SP NP TED srvnenenecenscenerescenessensenvenanmsetennnens 15

70 Fed. Reg. (2005):

1D, BI a esnsctcinenstnsennsjnassenntqntesnesonsacnasassesouensensepeneseenetente 8

OA TEPID. poctecenssesouncsnseananneccnensensemstesveneassscsensinssensanenwienne 9

70 BO, CN TOE GD ccccccescsonncencsccsscnstetonensnseccsensonenes 16

Miscellaneous:

116 Cong. Rec. (1970):

ETE cecristrccensmensttnntentepestnessnceenqumnesialineneaseeineneines 15

OD. TIO cenccssscenscescases eosseseseesssssessoveecszencecece ssonsconscssesseese 15

1 SEINE’ ntessnscsenpsscsmasseensoneseneqneesnesetutecescnessesepenseaneseetie 15

Brief of Respondent, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93

GPO GIPPRIP ED cxcocesonssicecevesssrsnsssnnncsanssanstenssenstetvineseeeusseesees 3

Consumer Product Safety Commission, Carbon

Monoxide Questions and Answers, CPSC Document

#466, available at

http:/ /cpsc.gov/CPSCPUB/PUBS/ 466.htm1 ........... 16

Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Cin deb

Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83 .. inn wae

HARRISON’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL M EDICINE

Kasper et al., eds., 16th ed. 2005 .......s.scsscssessesessersseseeees 16

STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE:

TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993) ........... 16

iv

ARGUMENT

A common theme runs_ throughout respondents’

arguments on standing, statutory authority, and agency

discretion: a judicially restrained approach to this case,

respondents suggest, implies a ruling in their favor. This is not

so. On standing, respondents ask this Court to make factual

judgments by recasting them as legal determinations; these

determinations would do violence to this Court's Article III

jurisprudence. On statutory authority, respondents encourage

the Court to focus not on the statutory text at issue here, but

instead on the political and economic consequences of a ruling

in petitioners’ favor. Making interpretive principles turn, not

on statutory text, but on the Court’s own view of the political

and economic ramifications of a case is the very antithesis of

judicial restraint. Last, on agency discretion, respondents ask

for a new and lenient interpretive rule for cases involving

agencies’ refusals to issue rules. But nothing in the

background principles of administrative law that respondents

invoke allows an agency to turn its back on a statute that the

agency does not, for its own policy reasons, want to follow.

I. Petitioners have standing.

In the court of appeals, petitioners submitted forty-three

detailed affidavits establishing their standing. No party

responded to, let alone refuted, those declarations. By a vote of

2-1, the court declined to dismiss the petition for review on

grounds of standing. This Court declined to take up the issue

in granting review. Nonetheless, respondents make standing a

centerpiece of their briefs. Accepting their arguments would

rework and distort the role of standing. Respondents’

arguments should be rejected.

2

A. Petitioners have demonstrated injury in fact.

In their affidavits, petitioners described in detail how

emissions of greenhouse gases have already caused and are

causing States, cities, and individuals injuries that

unquestionably satisfy the “injury in fact” requirement of

Article III.! That is no doubt why EPA has not contested injury

in fact in these proceedings.

Rising temperatures have injured petitioners in the

following specific and concrete ways: coastal States have lost

and are losing land to rising sea levels (D.C. Cir. Jt. App. 666;

Stdg. App. 179, 194, 196, 208, 212, 216, 217, 234, 266, 304-305);

ground-level ozone (smog) is exacerbated by rising

temperatures, leading to adverse health effects and costly

efforts on the part of States to address the problem (Stdg. App.

3-5, 68); glaciers are melting, causing distinct injuries to

particular individuals (JA 190; Stdg. App. 182, 190, 212). These

injuries span a broad range, from the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts losing coastal land (Stdg. App. 196) to Frank

Keim no longer being able to hike on the Alaskan glaciers he

used to enjoy (Stdg. App. 190). The former injury, the loss of

sovereign territory, has been a cognizable Article III injury

since the founding of the republic (see New York v. Connecticut,

4 US. 1, 4 (1799)); the latter is exactly the kind of injury held

sufficient to support federal jurisdiction in Friends of the Earth

v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services (TOC), 528 U.S. 167 (2000).

Petitioners’ injuries are not “’some day’ injuries, as

respondents contend (Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG)

Br. 13, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564

n.2 (1992)); they are injuries in the here and now. Nor do

petitioners’ declarations describe mere “generalized

grievances” (Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (AAM)

' Petitioners’ declarations are collected in a “standing appendix”

which has been lodged with the Court as part of the appeals court

record (“Stdg. App.”). For convenience, additional copies of this

document have also been lodged with the Clerk.

3

Br. 12); they attest to harms being visited—right now —upon

particular individuals and particuiar States. The fact that the

interests asserted here “are shared by the many rather than the

few does not make them less deserving of legal protection

through the judicial process.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.

727, 734 (1972); see also FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998).

Industry respondents assert that petitioners’ case fess on

the “central allegation” that substantial harm will not occur

until the year 2100. AAM Br. 9-10; see also UARG Br. 12 & n4.

This characterization is incorrect; it ignores petitioners’

detailed statements of current harm.

The record is also filled with evidence of continuing harm.

See, e.g., JA 229, 233-235; Stdg. App. 5-6, 43-48, 170-174, 175-

180, 234-236. Each of the injuries described above is not only

continuing, but will worsen with rising concentrations of

greenhouse gases. Stdg. App. 182, 207-209, 211, 213-219, 234-

236. Because each of these injuries is present today and will

only become more grave, respondents’ arguments that these

injuries do not satisfy Article III are wrong.

Respondents ask this Court to hold that temporal distance

alone warrants denial of standing. Respondent UARG

suggests, based on McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), that

standing cannot exist where an injury will not occur for five

years. UARG Br. 13. If this were true, no one would have

standing to object to illegal exposure to carcinogens, as most

cancers have latency periods far longer than the five-year

interval involved in McConnell. Instead, McConnell stands only

for the common-sense rule that temporal distance can vitiate

standing where the passage of time aggravates, as opposed to

reduces, uncertainty about injury; this is, indeed, the way the

case was argued to the Court. Brief of Respondent FEC at 129-

30, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (No. 02-1676).

Nor does Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990), relied

upon by the automobile manufacturers (AAM Br. 10-11), hold

that temporal distance alone undoes standing. Whitmore held

that the plaintiff had no standing to object to the execution of a

fellow inmate, where the plaintiff's claim of injury assumed

4

that he would be granted habeas relief; that he would be

retried, convicted, and sentenced to death; and that a

comparison of his crime (which involved stabbing his victim

10 times, cutting her throat, and carving an “X” on the side of

her face) to his fellow inmate’s would show that his capital

sentence was arbitrary given the comparative mildness of his

crime. 495 U.S. at 156-157. To recall the facts of Whitmore is to

refute respondents’ extravagant reading of it; it was not

temporal distance, but an implausible chain of causation,

which led to the denial of standing there. That situation is

precisely the opposite of what is present here, namely, one in

which the magnitude and certainty of injury only increase as

time passes.

Here, the continuing harms petitioners describe are the

result of physics and chemistry, not the unpredictable

workings of the electoral or criminal system. “The injury is of

course probabilistic, but even a small probability of injury is

sufficient to create a case or controversy —to take a suit out of

the category of the hypothetical ... .” Elk Grove Village v.

Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.). Nothing in

the record refutes petitioners’ claims of continuing harm. To

say, as amici Robert H. Bork, et al. do, that Massachusetts’

claim of injury based on the loss of its land to the rising seas is

“entirely speculative’ unless one knows more about

economics (Bork Br. 12 & n. 9), is like saying that “a

homeowner whose house is destroyed by arson has not been

injured by the arsonist, if the house was adequately insured.”

Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361, 1367

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.).

Respondents refer dismissively to petitioners’ “reams of

untested declarations,” calling them “speculative.” AAM Br. 8-

9. While petitioners do bear the burden of proof on standing,

the factual questions underlying standing are addressed in the

same manner as other factual issues in litigation. Lujan, 504

US. at 561. Thus respondents were required to meet

petitioners’ proof with evidence, not adjectives. Nothing in the

record refutes the conclusion, supported in petitioners’

\

5

affidavits, that emissions of greenhouse gases have harmed

and will continue to harm petitioners.?

If there were evidence in the record creating a genuine

factual controversy about petitioners’ declarations of current

and continuing harm, further factfinding would be necessary.*

Respondents do not ask for this result. They apparently would

have this Court rule, by judicial fiat, that climate change has

not harmed, is not harming, and will not harm petitioners.

Respondents’ preferred disposition of the case is thick with

irony: invoking a doctrine grounded in judicial restraint,

respondents in effect are asking this Court to make the very

scientific finding that they assert the accountable and expert

agency charged with environmental protection need not, and

indeed may not, make. Respondents’ position stands standing

on its head.

B. Petitioners have demonstrated that their injury is fairly

traceable to EPA’s decision.

US. motor vehicles are responsible for 23 percent of this

country’s carbon dioxide emissions and some 6 percent of the

entire world’s. Stdg. App. 232. U.S. motor vehicles and power

plants together are responsible for more than 60 percent of

U.S. emissions of carbon dioxide. Pet. Br. 39 n.28. EPA has

2 The 2001 report by the National Research Council entitled Climate

Change Science, on which EPA relied in emphasizing the

uncertainties surrounding climate change, confirms petitioners’

claims of harm. See Brief of Amici Curiae Climate Scientists David

Battisti et al.

3 In a proceeding like this one, in which a petition for review is filed

directly in the court of appeals, creating a procedure for resolving a

factual dispute could be tricky, as Judge Tatel observed below. Pet.

App. A30. Nevertheless, this Court has made clear that factual

questions underlying standing are to be decided like other factual

questions, even proceeding to trial if necessary. See, e.g., Lujan, 504

US. at 561, quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 US. 91,

115 n.31 (1979).

6

cited the conclusion it reached in this case in declining to

regulate greenhouse gases from power plants.‘ Ibid. Despite

these impressive percentages,5 EPA argues that respondents

have not shown that their injury is fairly traceable to EPA’s

decision because these emissions do not “materially affect the

overall extent of global climate change.” U.S. Br. 13-14. EPA is

wrong on both the facts and the law.

It is uncontested that emissions of greenhouse gases

contribute to the harms petitioners have described. Moreover,

greenhouse gases, once emitted, become distributed

throughout the earth’s lower atmosphere. A ton of carbon

dioxide emitted by an automobile has the same climate-

changing effect as a ton of carbon dioxide emitted by any

other source. If EPA regulated greenhouse gases, the carbon

dioxide emitted by motor vehicles would be reduced. The

harms suffered by petitioners are thus “fairly . . . trace[able]”

to EPA’s decision not to regulate greenhouse gases from motor

vehicles. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, quoting Simon v. E. Kentucky

Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976) (EKWRO). No

intervening act of a third party separates the greenhouse gas

* Conceding the link between its decision in this case and its refusal

to regulate greenhouse gases from power plants, EPA joined the

motion for a stay of a separate proceeding challenging its decision on

power plants because the Court granted review here. CO» Litigation

Group (CLG) Br. 30.

5 EPA tries to minimize the effect of controlling emissions under

section 202(a)(1) by noting that this provision applies only to new

motor vehicles. U.S. Br. 13-14. Any rule applied to new vehicles

would ultimately affect all vehicles: the U.S. automobile fleet turns

over every 10-15 years. 60 Fed. Reg. 12459, 12472 (1995).

* Redressability is even clearer when one considers the linkage

between EPA’s decision on motor vehicles and its decision not to

regulate greenhouse gas emissions from power plants (sources

which together comprise over 60 percent of U.S. carbon dioxide

emissions, Pet. Br. 39 n. 28)—a linkage the Solicitor General confirms

in his brief to this Court. U.S. Br. 32.

_—

7

emissions left unregulated by EPA’s decision and the harm

those emissions cause.

The Court's precedents make clear that its concern with

ensuring that asserted injuries are fairly traceable to

challenged actions is satisfied when the causal chain is as

direct as it is here. In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), the

Court worried that recognizing standing where plaintiffs’

injuries arose from “’the independent action of some third

party not before the court’” would “pave the way generally for

suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government

_violations of law, but the particular programs agencies

establish to carry out their legal obligations.” Id. at 757

(quoting EKWRO, 426 U.S. at 42), 759; see also DaimlerChrysler

Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1864 (2006). Here, in contrast,

petitioners challenge a “specifically identifiable Government

violation(] of law” that results directly in the emission of more

greenhouse gases than would be emitted if EPA had not

declined to regulate greenhouse gases.

Respondents seek to avoid the straightforward result

dictated by the Court's decisions by asking this Court to adopt

a new constitutional rule of causation: in the Solicitor

General's formulation, judicial review of EPA’s decision not to

regulate greenhouse gases from motor vehicles would be

available only if these emissions “materially affect the overall

extent of global climate change.” U.S. Br. 14. This standard has

no basis in Article III] and would undo the Clean Air Act's

causal framework.

“(Sjtanding is gauged by the specific common-law,

statutory or constitutional claims that a party presents.

‘Typically, . . . the standing inquiry requires careful judicial

examination of a complaint's allegations to ascertain whether

the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the

particular claims asserted.’” Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of

Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 US. 72, 77 (1991), quoting, with

emphasis added, Allen, 468 U.S. at 752; see also Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

8

judgment) (“Congress has the power to . . . articulate chains of

causation that will give rise to a case or controversy .. .”).

Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act directs the

Administrator of the EPA to regulate air pollutants emitted by

new motor vehicles when the Administrator determines that

they “cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may

reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or

welfare.” 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1) (emphasis added). The same

causal relationship triggers regulation under other provisions

of the Act. See, eg., 42 US.C. 7411(b)(1)(A); 7545(c)(1);

7547(a)(1). These provisions reflect Congress's insistence that

regulation proceed where > source contributes to, and is not

solely responsible for, endangerment of public health or

welfare—which is overwhelmingly the norm in pollution

cases.

EPA, too, has recognized that effective air pollution control

requires regulation of sources that, standing alone, cause a

portion of a large-scale harm. With respect to ozone pollution,

for example, the agency has observed:

Each source’s contribution is a small percentage of the

overall.problem; indeed, it is rare for emissions from even

the largest single sources to exceed one percent of the

inventory of ozone precursors even for a_ single

metropolitan area. . . . [A]ttaimment requires controls on

numerous sources across a broad area.

63 Fed. Reg. 57356, 57375 (1998). EPA concluded that upwind

States “contribute[d] significantly” to ozone nonattainment

problems in downwind States within the meaning of section

110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) of the Clean Air Act, even where their

contributions to ozone pollution in the downwind States were

on the order of one percent. Id. at 57391-93; see also Michigan v.

EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding EPA’s

approach).”

? EPA also used a one-percent threshold in identifying significant

contributions to nonattainment in its recent interstate air pollution

trading rule. 70 Fed. Reg. 25162, 25175 (2005). Likewise, in

9

Respondents seek to quietly overturn Congress's decision

to require control of sources that “contribute to” a pollution

problem. Respondents argue that, as a matter of constitutional

law, this Court cannot hear this case because regulation of U.S.

motor vehicles— which, again, account for an impressive 23

percent of this country’s carbon dioxide emissions and some 6

percent of the entire world’s (Stdg. App. 232)—will not

“materially affect the overall extent of global climate change.”

US. Br. 13-14; see also UARG Br. 14-15 (petitioners must show

new motor vehicles “caused” global climate change). The

Solicitor General does not define “materially affect.” However,

he must have in mind a standard stricter than the statutory

“contributes to” standard; as noted, EPA has in the past found

that sources “contribute significantly to”—not. merely

“contribute to” —a pollution problem when their contributions

are on the order of one percent. By erecting a causal standard

for standing that is stricter than the causal standard prescribed

by the underlying statute, respondents would “raise the

standing hurdle higher than the necessary showing for success

on the merits... .” Laidlaw, 528 US. at 181. Yet “[t]he question

of standing is different” from “the merits.” Ass’n of Data

Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).

The Solicitor General also cites no authority for the idea

that a “material” effect is required for standing. There is none.

In Laidlaw, for example, plaintiffs were not required to

demonstrate that defendants’ mercury discharges into the

North Tyger River were responsible for some preordained

percentage of plaintiffs’ harm. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 182-184; see

also, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980

(4th Cir. 1992) (standing established if defendant “contributes

to the pollution” that affects the plaintiff); Sierra Club v. Cedar

Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 558 (5th Cir. 1996) (defendant's

regulating mercury emissions from U.S. power plants, EPA noted

that these emissions accounted for approximately one percent of the

total global pool of mercury emissions. 70 Fed. Reg. 15994, 16028

(2005}.

10

contribution to pollution suffices for traceability). Multiple

causation is pervasive in the law (see, e.g., Olympic Airways v.

Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 653 (2004)), and different statutory and

common-law frameworks deal with it in different ways. The

Court should reject respondents’ invitation to create a new

constitutional rule for such cases.

In any event, petitioners’ declarations satisfy any sensible

construction of the Solicitor General’s new standard. Seen in

its most favorable light, the Solicitor General’s standard might

be viewed as an effort to avoid federal jurisdiction over

decisions with truly de minimis effects. As noted, U.S. motor

vehicles are responsible for approximately 23 percent of this

country’s carbon dioxide emissions and 6 percent of the entire

world’s. Stdg. App. 232. In 1999, the U.S. transportation sector

emitted almost half a billion metric tons of carbon dioxide

(Stdg. App. 219); the emissions from this sector come mainly

from automobiles (Stdg. App. 220). Half a billion metric tons

of carbon dioxide cannot plausibly be viewed as de minimis.

C. Petitioners have demonstrated redressability.

Reversal of EPA’s decision declining to regulate

greenhouse gases from motor vehicles would make possible

significant controls on sources responsible for some 60 percent

of this country’s carbon dioxide emissions—23 percent from

motor vehicles and the rest from the power plants left

unregulated by the same legal conclusion EPA reached here.

Pet. Br. 39 n.28. Lower greenhouse gas emissions mean

reduced harms from climate change. Stdg. App. 232-236.

Petitioners’ injuries are thus redressable by judicial action.

Here, too, respondents provide no factual rebuttal to

petitioners’ claims; instead, they offer a new constitutional

8 EPA does briefly speculate about the possibility that other nations

will “free ride” on any effort by the U.S. to reduce its greenhouse gas

emissions (U.S. Br. 19), thus, presumably, somehow rendering US.

regulatory efforts nugatory. But just as standing cannot be .

established based on speculation or conjecture, it also cannot be

11

test for redressability. Here, too, their argument should be

rejected.

EPA asserts that petitioners’ injury must be “materially

alleviated” by a ruling in their favor. U.S. Br. 7; see also AAM

Br. at 16 (lawsuit must lead to “significant reduction” in

greenhouse gas concentrations). The government does not

define what it means or cite any judicial precedent for its

suggested standard. Congress has chosen to re_juire regulation

of mobile sources when they “contribute to” air pollution that

endangers public health or welfare. As already discussed, the

government's standard of materiality appears to be stricter

than the Clean Air Act's causal standard. This Court should

reject respondents’ implicit invitation to smother the standard

Congress chose with a stricter constitutional test.

In addition, there is no support in this Court's precedents

for respondents’ new constitutional test. On the contrary, this

Court has held that “a plaintiff satisfies the redressability

requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will

relieve a discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a

favorable decision will relieve his every injury.” Larson v.

Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n. 15 (1982) (emphasis in original).

Acceptance of respondents’ test would have far-reaching

consequences. Incomplete redressability abounds in legal

cases. Creditors often receive just pennies on the dollar in

bankruptcy proceedings; plaintiffs in “pure” comparative fault

regimes have received as little as one percent of their total

damages; damage caps—such as the $75,000 cap of the

Warsaw Convention—can limit plaintiffs’ redress to a small

fraction of their total harm. On respondents’ theory, federal

jurisdiction would not exist in these cases because the redress

>

¢—

denied on this basis. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study

Group, 438 U.S. 59, 78 (1978) (“Nothing in our prior cases requires a

party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction to negate the kind of

speculative and hypothetical possibilities suggested in order to

demonstrate the likely effectiveness of judicial relief.”).

12

available is too small in proportion to the total harm.’ And, on

respondents’ theory, even if Congress passed legislation

saying, explicitly and precisely, that “EPA must regulate

greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles,” no one would

have standing to challenge a failure by EPA to comply with

this legislative directive.

Oddly — given their otherwise dite representations of the

consequences of a ruling in favor of petitioners — respondents’

arguments on redressability amount to a complaint that

Congress did not go far enough in section 202 of the Clean Air -

Act. Congress’s incremental, source-by-source approach to

pollution control becomes, on respondents’ theory, a basis for

rejecting judicial review altogether. But this Court has

“frequently said that the legislative authority, exerted’ within

its proper field, need not embrace all the evils within its reach.

The Constitution does not forbid ‘cautious advance, step by

step,’ in dealing with the evils which are exhibited ii activities

within the range of legislative power.” NLRB v. Jones &

Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46 (1937), quoting Carroll v.

Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401, 411 (1905). Respondents’

_theory of redressability is in tension with this fundamental

principle of judicial deference to legislative choices.

II. The Clean Air Act authorizes regulation of greenhouse

gases from motor vehicles.

Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act directs the EPA to

regulate “air pollutant(s]” from motor vehicles when, in the

° Another of respondents’ arguments would unsettle much of

administrative law. Industry respondents assert that petitioners

cannot show redressability because EPA might decide, on remand,

not to regulate greenhouse gases. UARG Br. 19-20; AAM Br. 16-17.

Scores of administrative law cases concern agency decisions in which

the agencies enjoy some discretion. This Court has made clear that

an injury caused by an agency decision is redressable by a judicial

remand to the agency, even if the complainant might lose on

remand. See, e.g., Akins, 524 U.S. at 25.

13

Administrator’s judgment, they “cause, or contribute to, air

pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger

public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1). The Act defines

“welfare” to include effects on “climate” and “weather.” 42

U.S.C. 7602(h). Physical or chemical matter that is emitted into

the ambient air is an “air pollutant” under the Act. 42 U.S.C.

7602(g). Greenhouse gases are physical and chemical matter

emitted into the ambient air by motor vehicles. EPA thus has

authority over these gases under section 202(a)(1) of the Act.

In concluding that it lacked authority to regulate

greenhouse gases emitted by motor vehicles, EPA relied on

unenacted legislation; legislation that was enacted subsequent

to, and is fully compatible with, the provisions at issue here;

and the supposed incompatibility of regulation of greenhouse

gas emissions under section 202 with the Clean Air Act's

programs addressing air quality standards and stratospheric

ozone depletion and with the Energy Policy and Conservation

Act's fuel efficiency program. Pet. App. A68-A80. Petitioners

have rebutted each of these arguments. Pet. Br. 20-32.

Respondents’ submissions on these points add nothing to

EPA's original arguments; we refer the Court to our opening

brief on these issues.

Respondents also now attempt to bolster their extra-

‘textual analysis of the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act

with arguments based on the language of these provisions;

these arguments are unpersuasive. EPA’s argument from text

amounts to this: “air pollution agents” must have

“imdependent meaning” beyond the items listed in section

302(g)'s “including” clause, and that independent meaning

constrains interpretation of the phrase “any chemical, physical

. substance or matter.” Only those chemical or physical

substances that are also “air pollution agents” are covered by

- the Act. U.S. Br. 34. EPA has, however, provided no

interpretation of the phrase “air pollution agent” beyond

saying that this term does not include greenhouse gases under

14

the Act’s “regulatory provisions.”!° Pet. App. A78. This

circular reasoning lies behind the Solicitor General's otherwise

mysterious reference to “cognizable ‘pollution.”” U.S. Br. 33

(emphasis added). The government's position appears to be

that although greenhouse gases may indeed constitute

“pollution,” they are not—for the extra-textual reasons noted

above — cognizable pollution under the Act. Nothing in the Act

supports a distinction between “cognizable” and “non-

cognizable” pollution.

Contrary to the Solicitor General’s suggestion, petitioners’

interpretation gives independent meaning to the phrase “air

pollution agent” (Pet. Br. 14), and thus does not render this

term “superfluous.” U.S. Br. 34; see also UARG Br. 45; AAM Br.

23; CLG Br. 7.

Moreover, although petitioners have focused on the text

following the “including” clause of section 302(g) because it so

clearly captures the emissions at issue in this case, it is also

beyond dispute that these emissions fall within the phrase “air

pollution agents,” even if one looks only at that language and

ignores the language of the “including” clause.\' This is true for

several reasons.

First, focusing on carbon dioxide: carbon dioxide is

specifically named as an “air pollutant” in section 103(g) of the

Act. 42 U.S.C. 7403(g). EPA asks the Court to ignore this

10 The government's inattention to the statutory text is pointedly

illustrated by its invention of hypothetical statutory text as a reason

why this statutory text—the relevant provisions of the Clean Air

Act—should be read in a particular way. U.S. Br. 34.

1! Respondents’ brusque treatment of the “including” clause, which

helps define what the term “air pollution agents” means, ignores the

teaching of this Court's decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of

Cmtys. for a Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 697 n.10 (1995) (“Congress

explicitly defined the operative term” (there, “take”; here, “air

pollution agent”), “thereby obviating the need for us to probe its

meaning as we must probe the meaning of the undefined subsidiary

term” (there, “harm”; here, “any physical, chemical . . . substance or

matter”)).

15

unambiguous textual inclusion of carbon dioxide in a list of

“air pollutants” based on its theory that the Act draws a bright

line between “regulatory” and “nonregulatory” provisions.

U.S. Br. 34-35. EPA’s rigid distinction between “regulatory”

and “nonregulatory” provisions has no support in the text or

structure of the Act. Pet. Br. 16-17.

In addition, EPA itself has acknowledged that carbon

_ dioxide exacerbates ozone pollution by exacerbating the

conditions that create this pollution. See 66 Fed. Reg. 18245,

18246 (2001). Thus carbon dioxide is an “agent” of ozone “air

pollution.” Carbon dioxide helps to bring about air pollution

in the form of ozone; this is precisely what an “agent” — of “air

pollution” — does.

As for the other substances at issue here (methane, nitrous

oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons), to the extent respondents

address them at all, they appear to agree that these substances

are “air pollution agents” insofar as they cause effects other

than climate change. CLG Br. 3 n.2 (acknowledging that

methane is an air pollutant with respect to some of its effects);

UARG Br. 45 n.18 (appearing to concede that EPA could

regulate methane due to its “explosive characteristics” and

other features). EPA agrees as well. 61 Fed. Reg. 9905, 9906

(1996) (methane contributes to landfill gas pollution). Yet

nothing in the language of the Act supports treating a

chemical substance as a pollutant for one purpose, but not for

another, depending on the exact effects being targeted.

Respondents’ approach would, moreover, forbid EPA from

regulating pollutants based on effects specifically singled out

by Congress as among the important components of human

welfare.'2 42 U.S.C. 7602(h) (defining “welfare” to include

12 During debate on the 1970 Amendments, which added the terms

“climate” and “weather” to the definition of “welfare,” Senator

Boggs introduced into the record a White House Report stating that:

“Air pollution alters climate and may produce global changes in

temperature. . . . [T]he addition of particulates and carbon dioxide in

the atmosphere could have dramatic and long-term effects on world

16

“weather” and “climate”); Pet. Br. 15-16. There is no sense in

respondents’ approach.

Industry respondents, focusing solely on carbon dioxide,

argue that this chemical is not an “air pollution agent” for

several different reasons. They say that the Clean Air Act only

applies to substances that make the air “dirty.” UARG Br. 46;

AAM Br. 23. This is not a word used in the Act. It is also hard

to know what respondents mean by “dirty.” For example,

carbon monoxide is colorless and odorless (this is why carbon

monoxide detectors are needed);'° it is not “dirty” in the usual

sense of the term. Yet carbon monoxide has been regulated

under section 202 of the Act for decades, see Pub. L. No. 91-

604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1690 (1970), and respondents do not

question the appropriateness of this regulation.

Respondents also assert that carbon dioxide is not an “air

pollution agent” because it is “essential to life.” AAM Br. 20.

Yet chromium and selenium, for example, are essential

nutrients, see HARRISON’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE

401 (Table 60-2), 410 (Kasper et al., eds., 16th ed. 2005), and

chromium and selenium compounds are nonetheless

regulated as hazardous air pollutants under the Act. 42 U.S.C.

7412(b)(1). EPA has, moreover, just announced a proposed

rule that would control the use of carbon dioxide as a

substitute for ozone-depleting substances because carbon

dioxide is deadly at certain concentrations. 71 Fed. Reg. 55140,

55143 (2006). Many substances have benign, or even

beneficent, consequences at lower concentrations and malign

consequences at higher concentrations. See STEPHEN BREYER,

BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK

REGULATION 9 (1993) (“Drinking a bottle of pure iodine is

climate.” 116 Cong. Rec. 32907, 32914, 32917. This evidences an

affirmative awareness of the problem of global climate change at the

time “ongress added the words “climate” and “weather” to the

definition of “ welfare.”

%3 Consumer Product Safety Commission, Carbon Monoxide

Questions and Answers, CPSC Document #466, available at

http:/ / www.cpsc.gov /CPSCPUB/ PUBS/ 466. html.

17

deadly; placing a drop of diluted iodine on a cut is helpful.”).

Respondents’ categorical treatment of carbon dioxide as

“essential to life” ignores this basic scientific principle.

Respondents also argue that greenhouse gases do not

belong in the category of “air pollution agents” because they

exert their effects through their presence in the upper

atmosphere, rather than in the “ambient air” as EPA has

defined it. CLG Br. 10-11; UARG Br. 47-48. This is not a line

drawn by Congress; it is one of respondents’ invention.

Section 302(g) requires only that, to be an air pollutant,

substance or matter be “emitted into or otherwise enter[]} the

ambient air.” 42 U.S.C. 7602(g).'* There is no question that

motor vehicles emit greenhouse gases into the very zone

described by respondents. And, as a matter of scientific fact,

greenhouse gases contribute to climate change at all altitudes,

from the ground upwards.

Respondents’ suggestion, moreover, that pollution control

can and does focus only on cleaning the air to make it

breathable (AAM Br. 21) ignores the fact that the Act's core

provisions all protect welfare‘as well as human health. Pet. Br.

15. “[E}ffects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade

materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate,

damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to

transportation,” 42 U.S.C. 7602(h) (defining “welfare”), all go

well beyond concerns with breathable air. And citation to a

1968 law review article on the nature of the air pollution

problem (AAM Br. 23-25) hardly helps this Court to

understand the nature of today’s most challenging air

pollution problems, quite apart from climate change. One of

the reasons why ozone, example, has posed such a difficult

problem is that it does cross airshed boundaries (cf, AAM Br.

25), yet mo one in this proceeding is suggesting that ozone

4 Cf 42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2) (for purposes of air quality standards

program, underlying scientific documents must describe effects on

public health or welfare due to “the presence of such pollutant in the

ambient air’). |

18

pollution is thus not the kind of “air pollution” the Clean Air

Act aims to address.

~ Whatever the outer limits of the term “air pollution

agents,” they are not close to being reached by including

carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and

hydrofluorocarbons within the ambit of this term. Not only do

these chemicals fit exactly within the “including” clause of the

definition of “air pollution agents”; they also easily qualify as

“air pollution agents” even without consideration of that

clause. Indeed, EPA has recognized as much in other

regulatory proceedings. Pet. Br. 33-34. Perhaps this is why

EPA makes no effort to define “air pollution agents” in this

case except to say that this term does not include greenhouse

gases when they are being regulated as greenhouse gases. And

it does not so much as mention the other proceedings in which

it has taken a different approach to these chemicals.

Interpretation for the nonce is not interpretation at all; it is

merely improvisation.

III. EPA may not decline to issue emission standards for

motor vehicles based on policy considerations not

reflected within section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act.

Four years after receiving a petition to regulate greenhouse

gases from motor vehicles, and in settlement of a lawsuit

charging EPA with unreasonably delay in answering the

petition, EPA issued a final decision declining to regulate

greenhouse gases. In the section of its decision relevant here,

entitled “Different Policy Approach,” EPA gave the reasons

why it would refuse to regulate greenhouse gases from motor

vehicles even if it had the authority to do so: it thought

regulation under section 202(a)(1) was “piecemeal and

inefficient”; it gestured toward the potential foreign policy

implications of pursuing regulation under the Clean Air Act; it

stated that technology might not be available to reduce all of

the greenhouse gas emissions the petition covered; and it

19

outlined uncertainties remaining in our understanding of

climate change. Pet. Br. 4-5, 39-44.

Nowhere did EPA assert that was declining to regulate

due to resource constraints, competing priorities, or an

inability to determine whether the statutory standard of

endangerment was met—factors that might counsel chariness

in judicial review. In arguing that EPA’s decision should be

reviewed under an especially forgiving standard of review,

respondents ignore the actual structure of EPA’s decision.

That decision must be reversed if it is inconsistent with the

Clean Air Act. It is.

A. EPA’s decision must be reversed if it reflects a

misinterpretation of the Clean Air Act.

A court reviewing an agency decision “shall . . . compel

agency action unlawfully withheld... .” 5 U.S.C. 706(1). EPA’s

decision not to regulate greenhouse gases from motor vehicles

should be overturned if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.

706(2)(A). Under this standard, as explained in Part IILB

below, petitioners win. It is understandable, therefore, that

respondents work very hard to convince this Court to apply a

different standard of review here.

Indeed, respondents’ briefs brim with hints that EPA’s

decision declining to regulate greenhouse gases from motor

vehicles might not be reviewable at all. U.S. Br. 38 & n.15, 45 &

n.21; AAM Br. 43, 44. Respondents argue that agency refusals

to issue rules are fundamentally different from agency

decisions to issue rules, and that this difference makes the

former “effectively nonreviewable.” AAM Br. 43. Respondents

stop short, however, of actually saying that EPA’s decision is

unreviewable, settling instead for a “more deferential

standard” than the one that would be applied to agency rules

or revocations of rules. U.S. Br. 39.

As support for a different standard of review for this case,

the Solicitor General cites this Court’s decisions in Heckler v.

20

Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), and Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). In Heckler, of

course, as the Solicitor General notes, the Court did not even

address rulemaking proceedings. U.S. Br. 38 n.15; 470 US. at

825 n.2. Moreover, the Court based its decision as much on an

analogy to prosecutorial decisions not to indict, and their

historical immunity from review, as on the concerns the

Solicitor General identifies. 470 U.S. at 832. Agency decisions

not to promulgate rules do not implicate the prosecutorial

discretion protected in Chaney. See Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v.

Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987). As for State Farm, the

Court's only reference to the actual standard of review that

might be applicable to refusals to promulgate rules was the

Court’s mention of what the petitioners in that case thought

that standard would be. 463 U.S. at 42. The case does not hold

that a different standard of review applies to refusals to

promulgate rules or, more particularly, that an agency that

refuses to issue a rule has more leeway in interpreting a statute

than an agency that issues a rule.

The Court's practice in reviewing agency decisions

confirms that there is no special rule of interpretation reserved

for agency refusals to promulgate rules. In Young uv.

Community Nutrition Institute, 476 U.S. 974 (1986), for example,

the Court reviewed the refusal of the Food and Drug

Administration (FDA) to promulgate a rule limiting aflatoxin

in food. FDA’s decision was challenged as a misinterpretation

of its governing statute. Using ordinary tools of statutory

interpretation, the Court investigated whether FDA had

legally erred in refusing to promulgate the rule. Id. at 979-984.

The Court upheld FDA’s decision, but it did so by applying an

ordinary standard of review to the case. To similar effect are

FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 465-466,

469-474 (1984) (reviewing denial of rulemaking petition based

on ordinary principles of statutory construction), and NAACP

v. Federal Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 664, 666-671 (1976)

(same).

21

In Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society,

478 U.S. 221 (1986), moreover, in a context strikingly similar to

the one presented here, the Court scrutinized the Secretary of

Commerce's refusal to certify that Japan’s whaling practices

“diminish[ed] the effectiveness” of the International

Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, using ordinary

tools of statutory construction. There, the Court made clear

that an agency may not refuse to make a finding contemplated

by a statute “for any reason not connected with the aims and .

.. goals” of the relevant law. Id. at 233.

Likewise, the D.C. Circuit—contrary to respondents’

suggestions (U.S. Br. 36-37; UARG Br. 26-29; AAM Br. 44)—

reviews refusals to promulgate rules under the same standard

it uses for informal agency rulemaking. This is not surprising,

since section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act

(APA) does not draw the distinction respondents cite. For this

reason, the very cases cited by respondents clearly hold that

agency refusals to promulgate rules are to be overturned if the

agency commits a “plain error of law.” Midwest Indep.

Transmission Sys. Oper., Inc. v. FERC, 388 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C.

Cir. 2004); Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n, 812 F.2d at 5; see also General

Motors Corp. v. NHTSA, 898 F.2d 165, 169-170 (D.C. Cir. 1990)

(agency refusal to institute rulemaking guided by ordinary

principles of statutory construction). The D.C. Circuit has, in

fact, explicitly rejected the analogy to Chaney on which the

government relies, Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n, 812 F.2d at 4, and has

overturned agencies’ denials of rulemaking petitions where

the denials were grounded in an error of law. See, e.g., id. at 7

(overturning agency refusal to institute rulemaking where

agency head had proved “blind to the nature of his mandate

from Congress”). To be sure, the D.C. Circuit has been hesitant

to overturn agency refusals to regulate where those refusals

are grounded in “factors not inherently susceptible to judicial

resolution,” such as competing agency priorities, see Natural

Res. Def. Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979),

but those factors are not present in this case, where petitioners’

22

claim is that EPA’s decision rested on a misinterpretation of

the statute on which the decision was based.

Creating a more deferential interpretive standard in the

context of agency refusals to take action would not only be

inconsistent with existing precedent and the APA, it would

have far-reaching (and bad) effects. A substantial number of

regulatory regimes prohibit certain conduct or commercial

activity in the absence of an agency decision allowing it; food

additives (21 U.S.C. 348(a)(2)), new drugs (21 U.S.C. 355(a)),

and certain medical devices (21 U.S.C. 360e(a)), to name just a

few examples, may not be marketed without agency approval.

If agency decisions “to institute proceedings or to promulgate

rules” (U.S. Br. 36) were subject to the more forgiving standard

of review respondents seek, then agency actions that decline to

free up—rather than constrain—market behavior would be

subject to the same forgiving standard.

In this case, the agency explained its refusal to act by

noting that it preferred to take a different route from the one

laid out in section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act. Nothing in

the “background principles of administrative law” EPA

invokes (U.S. Br. 39) grants the agency the power to ignore

statutes it does not like.'5

15 The Solicitor General’s emphasis (U.S. Br. 39-43) on the lack of a

deadline for enacting standards, or for responding to petitions to

enact standards, under section 202(a)(1) is misplaced. If there were a

deadline for enacting standards under section 202(a)(1), perhaps

petitioners would not have had to wait four years for an answer

from EPA on the rulemaking petition. But once EPA answered that

petition, the lack of an initial deadline for an answer became

irrelevant. EPA answered the petition, and its answer may not

violate the Clean Air Act. Were the law otherwise, the many cases

recognizing that agencies may be held to account for “unreasonable

delay” in their decisionmaking, see, e.g., In re United Steelworkers of

America v. Rubber Manufacturers Ass'n, 783 F.2d 1117, 1120 (D.C. Cir.

1986) (per curiam); Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International

Union v. Zegeer, 768 F.2d 1480, 1487-1488 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsburg,

J.), would amount to empty gestures. On respondents’ theory, an

23

B. EPA committed a plain legal error in declining to issue

emission standards for motor vehicles based on policy

considerations not reflected within section 202(a)(1) of

the Clean Air Act.

Bad journalists bury the lede; bad interpreters bury the

text. The latter, unfortunately, is exactly what EPA did in

declining to regulate greenhouse gases and what it continues

to do in trying to justify that decision to this Court.'®

For the Court’s convenience, here is the pertinent text of

section 202(a)(1):

The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from

time to time revise) standards applicable to the emission of

any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor

vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his

judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may

reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or

welfare.

42 US.C. 7521(a)(1). In its brief treatment of this statutory

language, EPA concedes that this language means that once

the agency has made a finding that emissions from new motor

vehicles contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be

anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, EPA must

regulate those emissions. U.S. Br. 41-42. But section 202(a)(1)

places, in EPA’s view, absolutely no constraint on the agency's

decision whether to make such a determination in the first

place. U.S. Br. 40-41.

EPA believes that the phrase “in his judgment” justifies the

latter conclusion:

agency could simply respond to any judicia! directive to come to a

timely decision by saying that it disagreed with the policy approach

of the statute under which it operated.

16 Petitioners’ opening brief describes how EPA’s decision

concerning the scope of its discretion collides with section 202(a)(1).

Pet. Br. 35-48.

24

Nothing in Section 202(a)(1) . . . requires EPA to make [an

endangerment] determination at any particular time. To

the contrary, the provision emphasizes the Administrator's

ability to exercise his ‘judgment,’ which presumably

includes the judgment that this issue is not yet ripe for

determination. Thus, absent a formal judgment by the

Administrator that greenhouse gas emissions from new

motor vehicles can be expected to cause endangerment, the

agency retained its traditional flexibility to base its denial

of the rulemaking petition on a broad range of

discretionary factors.

U.S. Br. 41. EPA's interpretation and its presumption about the

scope of the Administrator's discretion should be rejected for

several reasons.

“In his judgment” modifies only the phrase “cause, or

contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be

anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C.

7521(a)(1). It does not modify the word “shall” or grant

wholesale discretion over the question whether to regulate

emissions from motor vehicles. But that is how EPA reads the

phrase. In EPA’s view, “in his judgment” smuggles even a

blatant disagreement with the policy of section 202(a)(1) into

section 202(a)(1) itself, as a “discretionary factor” the agency is

entitled to consider. Only thus can EPA argue that its

characterization of section 202(a)(1) as an “inefficient,

piecemeal” answer to the question before it helped to justify

its refusal to regulate under that provision. U.S. Br. 48. An

agency cannot, however, defend a decision based on its own

preference for a policy approach different from the one

Congress chose. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463

US. at 43 (agency may not rely “on factors which Congress

has not intended it to consider”).

Moreover, EPA’s interpretation ascribes a very strange

intent to Congress. According to EPA, Congress thought that

emissions that contribute to air pollution which may

reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare

are such a big problem that EPA must regulate them. But, at

25

the same time, Congress gave EPA absolute discretion as to

whether to make the determination on which regulation could

be based. On EPA’s theory, the agency could have right in

front of its eyes conclusive evidence that climate change (for -

example) is causing and will, for the indefinite- future,

continue to cause an environmental catastrophe, and so long

as it did not take a close look at that evidence, it would have

absolutely no obligation to do anything to mitigate the threat.

EPA’s interpretation does violence not only to the text of

section 202(a)(1) and to its basic sense, but also to an

animating theme of the Clean Air Act itself: that as scientific

knowledge advances, it should be pressed into service in

protecting the public from threats to its health and welfare. See

Amicus Brief of Former EPA Administrators Carol M.

Browner et al.

Acceptance of EPA’s position would also pay insufficient

respect to Congress's choice, in section 202, of technology-

based standards over the health-based standards found

elsewhere in the Act. See, e.g., 42 USC. 7412(f)(2)(A).

Technology-based standards demand much less intensive

examination of the precise health and environmental

consequences of pollution than health-based standards do. See,

e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based

Standards, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 94-97, 106. Requiring highly

specific areas of scientific uncertainty to be resolved before

regulating, as EPA has done, misapprehends the nature of the

regulatory instrument Congress chose in enacting section 202.

Finally, EPA’s interpretation gets the standard of scientific

proof embodied in section 202(a)(1) just backwards. EPA

interprets the phrase “in his judgment” to give the

Administrator complete control over the determination of

when the issue of + endangerment “is . . . ripe for

determination.” U.S. Br. 41. See also id. at 44 (“EPA may

properly defer making an endangerment determination while

it waits for additional scientific and technical studies to be

completed”); id. at 45 (referring to “agency’s view that any

decision whether to regulate in this area would be better made

26

after further research was conducted into critical areas of

current scientific uncertainty”). Congress, however, included

the phrase “may reasonably be anticipated” precisely in order

to make clear that EPA need not, and should not, wait for all

scientific uncertainties to be resolved before taking action

against an environmental threat. Pet. Br. 41-43.

Citing Ethyl Corporation v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976),

the Solicitor General argues that “[t]he fact that EPA may

regulate in the face of uncertainty . . . does not preclude the

agency from deferring regulation pending the acquisition of

additional information.” US. Br. 47 n.23 (emphasis in

original). This argument badly misconceives the decision in

Ethyl, which Congress ratified in amending the endangerment

standard of section 202(a)(1) in 1977. Pet. Br. 42 n.32. The court

in Ethyl concluded that the agency’s discretion was not only

enlarged by the endangerment standard then in existence

(because the standard permitted regulation in the face of

uncertainty), but was constrained by it as well:

A statute allowing for regulation in the face of danger is,

necessarily, a precautionary statute. Regulatory action may

be taken before the threatened harm occurs; indeed, the

very existence of such precautionary legislation would

seem to demand that regulatory action precede, and,

optimally, prevent, the perceived threat. ... We believe the

precautionary language of the Act indicates quite plainly

Congress’ intent that regulation should precede any

threatened, albeit unprecedented, disaster. . . . [T]he

statutes—and common sense—demand regulatory action

to prevent harm, even if the regulator is less than certain

that the harm is otherwise inevitable.

541 F.2d at 13 & n.18, 25. Under section 202(a)(1) as amended

to embody the Ethyl decision, the Administrator may not, as

happened here, just wave a hand in the direction of scientific

uncertainty in explaining a failure to act against a large-scale

risk. There is always uncertainty in environmental matters,

and, especially given the Clean Air Act’s promotion of

scientific research, there will always be “additional scientific

27

and technical studies” (U.S. Br. 44) awaiting completion.

Acceptance of EPA’s claim of the scope of its own discretion

under section 202(a)(1) would render the precautionary aspect

of that provision a nullity.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed,

with directions to remand the case to EPA for a statutorily-

based, non-arbitrary decision on the petition for rulemaking.

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS F. REILLY

Attorney General of Massachusetts

LISA HEINZERLING

Special Assistant Attorney General

600 New Jersey Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 662-9115

JAMES R. MILKEY*

WILLIAM L. PARDEE

CAROL IANCU

Assistant Attorneys General

1 Ashburton Place, 18% Floor

Boston, MA 02108

(617) 727-2200

*Counsel of Record

November 15, 2006

BILL LOCKYER

Attorney General of

California

MARC N. MELNICK

NICHOLAS STERN

Deputy Attorneys General

1515 Clay Street, 20th

Floor

P.O. Box 70550

Oakland, CA 94612

(510) 622-2133

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL

Attorney General of

Connecticut

KIMBERLY MASSICOTTE

MATTHEW LEVIN

Assistant Attorneys General

P.O. Box 120

55 Elm Street

Hartford, CT 06141-0120

(860) 808-5250

LISA MADIGAN

Attorney General of Illinois

MATTHEW J. DUNN

GERALD T. KARR

Assistant Attorneys General

188 West Randolph Street

20th Floor

Chicago, IL 60601

(312) 814-3369

G. STEVEN ROWE

Attorney General of Maine

GERALD D. REID

Assistant Attorney General

State House Station #6

Augusta, ME 04333-0006

(207) 626-8545

STUART RABNER

Attorney General of

New Jersey

STEFANIE A. BRAND

KEVIN P. AUERBACHER

LISA MORELLI

Deputy Attorneys General

Richard J. Hughes Justice

Complex

25 Market St., P.O. Box

093

Trenton, NJ 08625-0093

(609) 633-8713

PATRICIA A. MADRID

Attorney General of

New Mexico

STUART M. BLUESTONE

Deputy Attorney General

STEPHEN R. FERRIS

JUDITH ANN MOORE

Assistant Attorneys General

P.O. Drawer 1508

Sante Fe, NM 87504-1508

(505) 827-6010

ELIOT SPITZER

Attorney General

of New York

CAITLIN J. HALLIGAN

Solicitor General

J. JARED SNYDER

Assistant Attorneys General

120 Broadway

New York, NY 10271

(212) 416-8016

HARDY MYERS

Attorney General of Oregon

PHILIP SCHRADLE

Special Counsel to the

Attorney General

RICHARD WHITMAN

Assistant Attorney General

Oregon Dept. of Justice

1162 Court Street, N.E.

Salem, OR 97301

(503) 378-6002

PATRICK C. LYNCH

Attorney General

of Rhode Island

TRICIA K. JEDELE

Special Assistant Attorney

General

150 South Main Street

Providence, RI 02903

(401) 274-4400

WILLIAM H. SORRELL

Attorney General of

Vermont

KEVIN O. LESKE

Assistant Attorney General

109 State Street

Montpelier, VT 05609-1001

(802) 828-6902

ROB MCKENNA

Attorney General of

Washington

LESLIE R. SEFFERN

Assistant Attorney General

JAY D. GECK

Deputy Solicitor General

P.O. Box 40117

Olympia, WA 98504-0117

(360) 586-4613

ROBERT J. SPAGNOLETTI

Attorney General of the

District of Columbia

TODD S. KIM

Solicitor General

DONNA MURASKY

Senior Assistant Attorney

General

441 Fourth Street, N.W.

6th Floor South

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 724-6609

MALAETASI M. TOGAFAU

Attorney General

of American Samoa

P.O. Box 7

Pago Pago, American

Samoa 96799

011 (684) 633-4163

MICHAEL CARDOZO

Corporation Counsel

City of New York

SUSAN KATH

SCOTT PASTERNACK

TRACY TRIPLETT

Assistant Corporation

Counsel

100 Church Street

New York, NY 10007

(212) 676-8517

RALPH S. TYLER

City Solicitor

City of Baltimore

WILLIAM PHELAN, JR.

Principal Counsel

Baltimore City Dept. of

Law

100 Holliday Street

Baltimore, MD 21202

(410) 396-4094

JULIE TEEL

P.O. Box 7745

San Diego, CA 92167

(619) 224-3400

Counsel for Center for

Biological Diversity

JOSEPH MENDELSON III

660 Pennsylvania Ave. SE

Washington, DC 20003

(202) 547-9359

Counsel for International

Center for Technology

Assessment, Center for Food

Safety, Environmental

Advocates, and Greenpeace

SETH KAPLAN

62 Summer Street

Boston, MA 02110

(617) 850-1721

Counsel for Conservation

Law Foundation

JAMES B. TRIPP

257 Park Avenue South

17th Floor

New York, NY 10010

(212) 505-2100

Counsel for Environmental

Defense

BRIAN DUNKIEL

Shems Dunkiel Kassel &

Saunders PLLC

91 College Street

Burlington, Vermont

05401

(802) 860-1003

DANIELLE FUGERE

311 Calif. St., Ste. 510

San Francisco, CA 94104

(415) 544-0790

Counsel for Friends of the

Earth

JOHN M. STANTON

1200 18th Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 887-8800

Counsel for National

Environmental Trust

DAVID DONIGER

1200 New York Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 289-2403

Counsel for Natural

Resources Defense Council

DAVID BOOKBINDER

408 C Street, NE

Washington, DC 20002

(202) 548-4598

HOWARD Fox

1625 Massachusetts Ave.,

NW, Suite 702

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 667-4500

Counsel for Sierra Club

ALEXANDRA SCHULTE

1707 H St., N.W. Suite 600

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 223-6133 x 109

Counsel for Union of

Concerned Scientists

ALEX FIDIS

218 D Street, SE

Washington, DC 20003

(202) 546-9707

Counsel for U.S. Public

Interest Research Group

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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