Respondents Brief — Massachusetts v. EPA

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No. 05-1120 OFFICE

OCT 2 4 2006

CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT

PAUL D. CLEMENT bs

- Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

SUE ELLEN WOOLDRIDGE

Assistant Attorney General

GREGORY G. GARRE

THOMAS G. HUNGAR

Deputy Solicitors General

ROGER R. MARTELLA, JR. MALCOLM L. STEWART

Acting General Counsel Assistant to the Solicitor

CaRoL S. HOLMES General

Attorney JON M. LIPSHULTZ

Environmental Protection Attorney

Agency De —

ae | ’ epee partment of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20460 Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether petitioners have carried their burden of

establishing standing to sue in this case.

2. Whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

reasonably determined that it lacks authority under the Clean

Air Act (CAA) to regulate greenhouse gas emissions for the

purpose of addressing global climate change.

3. Whether, assuming that EPA is authorized by the

CAA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions for the purpose of

addressing global climate change, the agency reasonably

exercised its discretion in declining to initiate a rulemaking to

consider regulation of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse

gas emissions from new motor vehicles.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CE ic cpt secsnedanchaesdunnsauesensahacaidas 1

NEED. i. ip neeccdevenedésocdsedvedecenss 7

I 6 66006 6 ns None nedn bess ancedseccineiconicess 9

I. _ Petitioners lack Article II] standing ............... 10

A. Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the

regulation they seek is likely to affect climatic

or environmental conditions in Massachusetts ... 13

B. Petitioners’ predictions concerning the possible

indirect effects of EPA regulation are too

speculative to establish causation and

EEE svelcncnesdnvetecdesestscndouns 14

C. Petitioners’ accounts of previous regulatory

undertakings are insufficient to establish

EE sd indbseddanddnckeudedstebasandcdedssiee 18

II. EPAreasonably concluded that the CAA does not

authorize it to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases

to address concerns about global climate change .... . 20

A. Key provisions of the CAA cannot coherently

be applied to greenhouse gas emissions ......... 23

B. Various federal statutes reflect Congress’s

intent to obtain additional information before

undertaking any regulation of greenhouse gas

GEE 0 cc ctddunbbodbdndapeesenddecesnes 26

C. Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions within

the United States would have potentially vast

economic and political consequences ............ 31

D. EPA’s interpretation of the CAA’s text is

EE 0 cis dibhe Cl eu Lidedadasnedns audeveek 33

(III)

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued: Page

IT.

EPA reasonably exercised its discretion in

determining that, even if it possessed statutory

authority in this sphere, it would decline to exercise

that authority at the present time ................. 35

A. Federal agencies have broad discretion to

decline to initiate rulemakings, even when the

governing law would authorize regulation ....... 36

B. Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA does not impose

any timetable for determining whether

greenhouse gas emissions from new motor

vehicles would meet the statutory

endangerment standard ..............0000005- 39

C. EPA’s denial of the rulemaking petition in this

case reflects a reasonable exercise of agency

COUT 0:0. 0'00600600066000080s0eurnnnee 45

COUN ook dv dddacccadccansceacesnedseeeenee 50

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458

GES. GRP. TGED cocccdsscoccoccdcssubeesscnenoens 36

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) 2.0.6... .e cee eeees 17

American Horse Prot. Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1

GA. Cie. TERED oo cccccccoccdovcsvicceaeceseaunnn 38

American Lung Ass'n v. Reilly, 962 F.2d 258 (2d Cir.

BED ccvceccececchdecesunsbessanessuneaean 48

ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989) .......... 17

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) .....--2- eee eee 1]

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ..... 22

Cases—Continued: Page

Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) .............. 12

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 8. Ct. 1854

en ek eadeheeeabeseneesececees 10,19 |

Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803

Aine GnceesKeeensebesetcececcocecs 33

Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) ............. ce eeees 43, 47

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529

EE oudheccccdccnccccescucecceces passim

General Motors Corp. v. National Highway Traffic

Safety Admin., 898 F.2d 165 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ........ 37

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) .......... 37, 38, 45

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ont. v. EPA, 912

ae SG CE, BEUED cccccccccccccccces 43, 44, 48

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555

EE SE ee 11, 16, 17, 20

Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc. v.

FERC, 388 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 2004) .... 2.0.2.2... 37

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ima. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (19838)... 2... ccc cece ee ees 38, 39

NRDC v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1989) ........ 44

Ni.DC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) .......... 37

National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. DOE,

851 F.2d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ........... cc cece eee 37

National Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X

Internet Servs., 125 S.Ct. 2688 (2005) .............. 23

National Mining Ass'n v. United States Dep't of the

Interior, 70 F.3d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ... 2.2.2.2... 37

New York Pub. Interest Research Group v.

Whitman, 321 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2008) .............. 43

VI

Cases—Continued: Page

Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206

ED btdenssendedanevecnndesawscenéedusodanene 21

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) .......... 43

Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895 (D.C. Cir. 200%) ..11, 12

Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.

PEED Hadendasaccsccncansddecckacosente 11, 16,17

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83

EE. scteosadeancensseokioniindanemmdengietl 20

Timpinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ......... 37

United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532

i s.¢ckdcedusakdbdensscnawenniacdens 35

Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457

GED. sdsadecedstennsnsednsdnnneseedudennasende 21

WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ..... 37

Constitution, treaties, statutes and rules:

U.S. Const.:

Art. II, § 3, Cl. 4 (Take Care Clause) ............ 39

i a 7, 8, 10, 11512, 19

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change, opened for

signature, Mar. 16, 1998, 37 1.L.M.32 ........... 30

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the

Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No.

100-10, 1622 U.N.T.S. 29 ...........cecceeeeeess 30

Clear Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.: |

42 U.S.C. 7403(g) (§ 108(g)) 2.2.0.2... 20 5- 26, 27, 35

42 U.S.C. 7403(g)(1) (§ 103(g)(1)) .........- 26, 34, 35

Vil

Statutes and rules—Continued: Page

ee SGD cateccccccccccicsescuces 27

SE EE cccdacnsudacvsncccusdicnccndd 23

iccchenncdddbaccnctecnseee 42

es CED cevccevccoecccoscecosaceses 23

Ses HED 6 occeseccecccescecsccceeses 42

Ss ED hevenecnccudéckcccccccsenus 43

Gs HEED ceccddcetuceedconseccesceeeess 42

Ss HEED oc csvccuccvccccecsssecss 42

I cc ints cactiiadaedndepiinantd 42

42 U.S.C. 7412(a)(1) (§ 112(a)(1)) (1988) .......... 44

es CREED 0 cecdcececdcoveceonsascases 42

Se MED on cdcosecdececccceccccunnsas 42

Gee CEN EN EES ecccccccccccocccacceseses 48

42 U.S.C. 7415(a) (§ 115(a)) .. 2... eee eee eee ee 43

Sa CED Sacocecccdcesuccovcsevancs 29

42 U.S.C. 7450-7459 (1988) ... 0... cece cece ee eee 29

42 U.S.C. 7453 (1988)... 00. .cccccecceceeeeeee: 2g

Ss SEED ce cnceceSccccccccceesvessn 29

Se HEED 6 ces ccnsucncscesonsccceoes 30

Ss CE ED vo ccccbesbeuncecceseneccces 30

EE ED Set duunceandeeecdinecenss 23

42 U.S.C. 7521-7590 (2000 & Supp. ITI 2003) ....... 2

Ge ee: CGE waescdcsccocnccocsnses 33, 34

SD pstudedoccdesspestencusedeues 20

42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1) ($ 202(a)(1)) ... 2.2.2... passim

SP MED vdacateddicdadcussossécvacsees 42

Ss SE noc dnicccccivecccccdedeuseuecsis 42

Vill

Statutes and rules—Continued: - Page

Se TT tn acihccnebeesdcadeneéaneres 42

Se SNEED dncdcoencsctssssundceves 2, 20

42 U.S.C. 7602(g) (§ 302(g)) ............... 2, 33, 34

ED eciicecsudeswidécbdanduscdénnbes 2

ED ocdccnccceccseséuescecios 5, 11

Pe SD decvacusenencsateessiccees 26

42 U.S.C. 766la(i) (§ 502(1)) ................046. 43

ee SED vib odadctvcucteQianeséudads 43

Ss CED Kcesdecscccdvececeddiccuse 30

42 U.S.C. 767la(e) (§ 602(e)) ................. 26, 27

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No.

101-549, § 821, 104 Stat. 2699 (42 U.S.C. 7651k

BD dk conldidantncaaedbsdadeedeweendenseed 26, 27

Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486,

$§ 1601-1609, 106 Stat. 2999-3008 ates USC.

SEE condondccsecdescosevedésescescces 28

§ 1604, 106 Stat. 3002 (42 U.S.C. 13384) ........ 28

Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 49 U.S.C.

REE udasatoddceesacssicaseoaueaunns 4,24

SP ED avcccadenesoesecdvchedeess 25

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.

. PPO oc decncescecaccesccedoussscvcceecens 21

Global Change Research Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.

101-106, Tit. 1, 104 Stat. 3096 (15 U.S.C. 2921-

PEED ecccnsdchecsoscsaconvsvsccececoueceuescs 28

15 UBC. TIBMANE) 2... cccccccccscccccccces 28

SP ED voccccccccccceseseeescoensa 28

SPEED Scccccccecconscocsvenesoncee 28

IX

Statutes and rules—Continued: Page

Global Climate Change Prevention Act of 1990,

Pub. L. No. 101-624, §§ 2401-2412, 104 Stat.

4058-4062 (7 U.S.C. 6701 et seg.) 2.0... e eee eens 28

§ 2403(a)(1), 104 Stat. 4059 (7 U.S.C.

GED cavccccsccceccncssvovoceneses 28

Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.

100-224, §§ 1101-1106, 101 Stat. 1407-1409 (15

EF TETIE LER COT POE 27, 49

§ 1103(b), 101 Stat. 1408 ...............+-4-.28

© REDS, BER BNE. BERD oc ccccccccccccccccces 49

§ 1104(3), 101 Stat. 1409 ................. 28, 49

National Climate Program Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C.

BEEOEEED. cedccdvasccecccasccasadectecscecte 27

PPRMED acdcocudstcusasccccocses 27

PRED cpdndcdeddcceddcsccdesesucene 12

D.C. Cir. R. (July 2006):

DT i<cbuituctieviibaetenaseanekenebee ll

ES ne oe een penmare 1]

Miscellaneous: :

Climate Change Fact Sheet (May 18, 2005)

< http://www. state.gov/g/oes/ris/fs/46741.htm> ...... 4

Council on Environmental Quality: Addressing

Global Climate Change (visited Oct. 24, 2006)

<http:// www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/global-change.

SE cauubedhesunscudnecgdducnciendsceducevéeed i)

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page

EPA:

Climate Change: U.S. Climate Policy (visited Oct.

24, 2006) <http://www.epa.gov/climatechange> ...9

Climate Change-U.S. Policy: International

Cooperation (visited Oct. 24, 2006)

<http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/policy/

internationalcooperation.htm> ................. 48

53 Fed. Reg. 30,566 (1988) ............ ccc cece eee eees 29

57 Fed. Reg. 33,754 (1902) ............ccscececsccees 29

71 Fed. Reg. (2006):

iG cedéuddesecocosasiccussgueccotnddvcdess 25

DT wu desnecnnsesedesasanah caedeseonnssiens 24

Interview with Debra Saunders of San Francisco

Chronicle (Oct. 11, 2006) <http://www.state.

gov/secretary/rm/73913.htm> .........6. cece ewes 31

News Release (July 11, 2006) <http://www.

whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2006/07/2006071 1-

SE. cddddnsdadedastenesesd SEPT EET ec cccccecces i)

S. Rep. No. 228, 101st Cong., lst Sess. (1989) .......... 30

U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change,

Kyoto Protocol (visited Oct. 24, 2006) <http://

unfecc.int/essential_background/kyoto_

protocol/items/2830.htm> ............6 cece ees 30, 31

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 05-1120

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

; ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT

STATE MENT

This case involves a challenge to an administrative

decision of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). EPA

denied a rulemaking petition seeking regulation, pursuant to

Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA or Act), 42 U.S.C.

7521(a)(1), of emissions of carbon dioxide and three other so-

called “greenhouse gases” from new motor vehicles. EPA con-

cluded that it lacked authority to undertake such regulation

under the CAA. See Pet. App. A59-A80. EPA further deter-

mined that it would decline as a matter of discretion to exercise

any such authority that it might possess. See id. at A80-A87.

The court of appeals denied petitions for review that challenged

EPA’s decision. See id. at Al-A58.

1. Title I of the CAA focuses on stationary sources of air

pollution, such as power plants. Title I] of the Act establishes

(1)

2

a framework for federal control of pollution from motor vehicles

and other mobile sources. See 42 U.S.C. 7521-7590 (2000 &

Supp. II] 2003). Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C.

7521(a)(1), directs EPA to “prescribe * * * standards applica-

ble to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes

of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in

[EPA’s] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which

may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or

welfare.”

Section 302 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7602, sets forth general

definitions applicable to the CAA as a whole. The Act defines

the term “air pollutant” to mean “any air pollution agent or

combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical,

biological, [or] radioactive * * * substance or matter which is

emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air|,]” including

any precursors to the formation of such air pollutant. 42 U.S.C.

7602(g). References in the CAA to “effects on welfare” include

“effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade materials,

animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, and damage

to * * * property, and hazards to transportation, as well as

effects on economic values and on personal comfort and well-

being.” 42 U.S.C. 7602(h).

2. On October 20, 1999, the International Center for Tech-

nology Assessment (ICTA) and several other parties filed a

rulemaking petition asking EPA to regulate emissions of car-

bon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons

from new motor vehicles. J.A. 5-45. The petition alleged that

emissions of those “greenhouse gases” from motor vehicles

contributed to global climate change, satisfied the criteria for

regulation under Section 202(a)(1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.

7521(a)(1), and could feasibly be regulated by EPA. See J.A.

16-41. After soliciting and considering approximately 50,000

public comments, see Pet. App. A63, EPA denied the rule-

making petition, see id. at A59-A93.

3

a. EPA concluded that it lacked statutory authority to reg-

ulate the greenhouse gases at issue to address global climate

change. Pet. App. A67, A68-A79.' EPA explained that this

Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120 (2000), “cautions agencies against using broadly

worded statutory authority to regulate in areas raising unusu-

ally significaut economic and political issues when Congress has

specifically addressed those areas in other statutes.” Pet. App.

A68. EPA noted that the only provisions of the Act that specifi-

cally mention carbon dioxide or “global warming” are expressly

nonregulatory in nature. Jd. at A70-A71. It further explained

that Congress had addressed another global atmospheric is-

sue—stratospheric ozone depletion—by adding to the CAA a

distinct set of provisions specifically tailored to that issue and

its international dimensions. /d. at A71-A72. EPA noted in

that regard that global climate change presents problems fun-

damentally different from those that the National Ambient Air

Quality Standards—a central CAA mechanism for controlling

pervasive air pollutants—were intended to or are capable of

solving. Jd. at A72-A73. EPA also observed that Congress had

specifically addressed the subject of global climate change in

legislation enacted outside the CAA framework, id. at A74, and

had “declined to adopt other legislative proposals * * * to

require [greenhouse gas] emissions reductions from stationary

and mobile sources,” id. at A74-A75.

' Indenying ICTA’s petition for rulemaking, EPA adopted the legal opinion

of the agency's then-Genera] Counsel, Robert E. Fabricant, “as the position of

the Agency for purposes of deciding this petition and for all other relevant

purposes under the CAA.” Pet. App. A69. In that opinion, General Counsel

Fabricant acknowledged that his legal conclusion reflected a departure from

the position taken by two prior EPA general counsels in 1998 and 1999. See

J.A. 120-123. Those general counsels had concluded that EPA possessed

authority under the CAA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, while

emphasizing that the agency had no current intention of exercising that

authority. See J.A. 54, 61-62, 71, 77, 79, 91, 98, 106, 108, 122-123.

4

EPA concluded that “the term ‘air pollution’ as used in the

regulatory provisions [of the Act] cannot be interpreted to en-

compass global climate change,” and that “[carbon dioxide] and

other [greenhouse gases] are not ‘agents’ of air pollution and do

not satisfy the CAA section 302(g) definition of ‘air pollutant’

for purposes of those provisions.” Pet. App. A78. EPA also

determined, however; that;“|e]ven if [greenhouse gases] were

air pollutants generally subject to regulation under the CAA,

Congress has not authorized the Agency to regulate [carbon

dioxide] emissions from motor vehicles to the extent such stan-

dards would effectively regulate the fuel economy of passenger

ears and light duty trucks.” /d. at A79. EPA explained that at

present, “the only practical way to reduce tailpipe emissions of

{carbon dioxide] is to improve fuel economy.” /bid. The agency

further concluded that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act

(EPCA), 49 U.S.C. 32901-32919, which is administered by the

Department of Transportation, was intended to serve as “the

only statutory vehicle for regulating the fuel economy of cars

and light duty trucks,” and that EPCA therefore precluded any

EPA regulation of carbon dioxide emissions that would effec-

tively regulate the fuel economy of vehicles subject to EPCA.

Pet. App. A72; see id: at A87 (explaining impracticality of other

suggested methods of controlling carbon dioxide emissions).

b. EPA alternatively determined that it would deny the

petition for rulemaking even if the CAA authorized it to regu-

late greenhouse gas emissions in order to address global cli-

mate change. EPA noted that “the CAA provision authorizing

regulation of motor vehicle emissions does not impose a manda-

tory duty on the Administrator to exercise her judgment,” but

instead confers “discretionary authority.” Pet. App. A80. EPA

also observed that no EPA Administrator had yet made a find-

ing that the standard for regulation under Section 202(a)(1) of

the CAA (i.e., that air-pollutant emissions “cause, or contribute

to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endan-

5

ger public health or welfare,” 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1)) had been

satisfied with respect to carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gas

emissions. Pet. App. A81.

Based in large part on a report issued it in 2001 by the Na-

tional Academies’ National Research Council (NRC), EPA iden-

tified numerous areas of scientific uncertainty as to the mecha-

nisms of global climate change, its potential effects on human

health and the environment, and effective responses. Pet. App.

A82-A84. The agency also expressed the concern that regula-

tion of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles would

“result in an inefficient, piecemeal approach to addressing the

climate change issue” because “|t]he U.S. motor vehicle fleet is

one of many sources of |greenhouse gas] emissions.” /d. at

A85. EPA further observed that “[{uJnilateral EPA regulaiion

of motor vehicle [greenhouse gas] emissions could also weaken

U.S. efforts to persuade key developing countries to reduce the

[greenhouse gas] intensity of their economies.” Jd. at A86. The

agency concluded that, “[ujntil more is understood about the

causes, extent and significance of climate change and the poten-

tial options for addressing it, EPA believes it is inappropriate

to regulate [greenhouse gas] emissions from motor vehicles.”

Ibid.

3. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1), numerous petitions for

review of EPA’s denial of the rulemaking petition were filed in

the District of Columbia Circuit. On July 15, 2005, the court of

appeals denied those petitions. Pet. App. A1-A58.

a. Judge Randolph, who announced the judgment of the

court, declined to adopt EPA’s position that petitioners lack

standing to bring this case. Judge Randolph viewed the decla-

rations submitted by petitioners to establish standing as suffi-

cient to survive a motion for summary judgment, Pet. App. A8,

but he observed that the record also contained evidence “con-

tradict[ing]| petitioners’ claim that greenhouse gas emissions

from new motor vehicles have caused or will cause a significant

6

change in the global climate,” id. at A9. In Judge Randolph's

view, it was not a sensible course of action either “to refer the

standing issues to a special master for a factual determination”

or “to remand to EPA for a factual determination of causation

and redressability.” /bid. Judge Randolph concluded that, in

light of the “factual overlap of the standing issues with EPA’s

justifications for not regulating greenhouse gases,” it was ap-

propriate “to proceed to the merits with respect to EPA’s alter-

native decision not to regulate.” /bid.

On the merits, Judge Randolph assumed, arguendo, that

EPA possessed statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas

emissions from new motor vehicles, but held that EPA: had

properly declined to exercise that authority. Pet. App. A10-

Al5. Judge Randolph noted the substantial scientific uncer-

tainties in the current understanding of climate change. /d. at

Al2. He also emphasized that, because Section 202(a)(1) “di-

rects the Administrator to regulate emissions that ‘in his judg-

ment’ ‘may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health

or welfare,” it “gives the Administrator considerable discre-

tion” to take into account “policy judgments” as well as “scien-

tific evidence” in determining whether regulation of particular

emissions is advisable. Jd. at Al3. Noting the array of policy

concerns identified by EPA in its denial of the petition for

rulemaking, see id. at Al3-A14, Judge Randolph concluded that

“the EPA Administrator properly exercised his discretion un-

der § 202(a)(1) [42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1)] in denying the petition for

rulemaking,” id. at A15.

b. Judge Sentelle concluded that the petitions for review

should be dismissed because petitioners lacked standing. Pet.

App. Al6-A20. In his view, the impacts from global warming

alleged by petitioners were too generalized to establish stand-

ing. Jd. at Al7-A18. To ensure that a majority of the panel

could agree on a disposition of the case, however, Judge

Sentelle accepted as law of the case the views of Judges

7

Randolph and Tate! that the court had jurisdiction to reach the

merits. See id. at A19-A20. Because the judgment advocated

by Judge Randolph (7.e., that the petitions for review be denied)

was “closest to that which [Judge Sentelle] would issue,” Judge

Sentelle joined in that disposition. Jd. at A20.

c. Judge Tatel dissented. Pet. App. A21-A58. He con-

cluded that at least one petitioner, the Commonwealth of Mas-

sachusetts, had established standing to sue. /d. at A27-A31.

On the merits, Judge Tatel would have held that EPA pos-

sessed statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emis-

sions from motor vehicles in order to address global climate

change. /d. at A31-A42. Judge Tatel further concluded that

the policy considerations identified by EPA did not justify the

agency’s refusal to initiate a rulemaking, and that the petition

for review therefore should be granted. See id. at A44-A58.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The court of appeals properly denied petitioners’ request to

compel EPA to undertake regulation of greenhouse gas emis-

sions from new motor vehicles at this time.

1. As a threshold matter, the petition for review is not suit-

able for judicial resolution because petitioners lack Article ITI

standing. Petitioners have failed to carry their burden of estab-

lishing that they will be harmed by the specific agency action

they challenge—EPA’s decision not to regulate greenhouse gas

emissions from new motor vehicles within the United States,

which involves only a tiny fraction of global greenhouse gas

emissions—or that their anticipated injuries would be materi-

ally alleviated by the judicial ruling they seek. Moreover, peti-

tioners’ theory of causation and redressability depends on pre-

dictions by their declarants that EPA regulation will set in

motion an elaborate sequence of events involving independent

choices by non-federal actors, including foreign governments.

8

Those predictions are far too speculative to establish Article II]

standing.

II. In any event, even if petitioners had established stand-

ing, EPA properly denied the petition for rulemaking. EPA

reasonably concluded that it lacks authority to regulate green-

house gas emissions from new motor vehicles in order to ad-

dress global climate change. EPA recognized that key provi-

sions of the CAA cannot coherently be applied to greenhouse

gas emissions; that more recent laws reflect Congress’s intent

to assimilate more information as a predicate to legislation or

international agreements to address global climate change; and

that regulation of greenhouse gas emissions would have ex-

traordinary economic and political ramifications. Under FDA

v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000),

those considerations amply support the agency’s determination

that the CAA’s general provisions do not vest EPA with regula-

tory authority in this area.

III. EPA also reasonably declined to exercise any regula-

tory authority that it might possess in this sphere. Under back-

ground principles of administrative law, an agency’s decision

not to initiate a rulemaking may be based on a wide range of

discretionary factors and is reviewed under a highly deferential

standard. Contrary to petitioners’ contention, Section 202(a)(1)

of the CAA does not divest EPA of that customary discretion.

To the contrary, that Section must be read in light of that well-

established background of discretion. Section 202(a)(1) states

that EPA must undertake rulemaking if the agency renders a

judgment that a pollutant meets the statutory endangerment

standard, but it does not impose any deadline by which EPA

must make such a determination with respect to particular pol-

lutants. EPA identified a variety of sound reasons—including

the “[sJubstantial scientific uncertainties” (Pet. App. A84) that

surround this issue, while major federal studies are being

conducted—for declining to determine at this time whether the

9

greenhouse gases at issue meet the endangerment standard.

There is no basis on the present administrative record for this

Court to overturn that considered agency judgment.

ARGUMENT

Global climate change is one of the most important and

widely debated scientific, economic, and political issues of our

time. While the science of global climate change is evolving and

remains subject to substantial debate and uncertainties, the

United States has established a multifaceted approach to study-

ing and addressing that complex and important issue. As part

of that effort, the United States has allocated more than 29

billion dollars during the years 2001-2006—more than any other

nation—for scientific research into global climate change and

for climate-related programs; has committed to significantly

reducing the greenhouse gas intensity of the American econ-

omy over the next decade; has entered into extensive partner-

ships with private industries designed to reduce greenhouse

gas emissions; has entered into multilateral and bilateral agree-

ments with other nations to seek a cooperative international

approach to addressing global climate change; and has become

the largest funder of activities under the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change.” As ongoing scien-

tific studies provide additional information about the problem

and potential solutions, the United States stands ready to take

further measures and to work with the rest of the world to ad-

dress the phenomenon of climate change.

* See generally Pet. App. A88-A92; <http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/>

(visited Oct. 24, 2006); <http//www.state.gov/g/oes/ris/fs/46741.htm>

(visited Oct. <4, 2006); <http://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/global-change.html >

(visited Oct. 24, 2006); <http//www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/

20060711-7.html> (visited Oct. 24, 2006).

10

This case, however, does not concern the adequacy of those

broader efforts. Rather, the case presents more modest issues

concerning the standing of petitioners to seek relief in federal

court and the legality of EPA’s decision not to initiate a

rulemaking with respect to greenhouse gas emissions from new

motor vehicles at this time. Under established principles of

federal jurisdiction, statutory interpretation, and administra-

tive law, petitioners’ challenge to that_agency decision fails,

both because petitioners lack Article I1] standing and, alterna-

tively, because EPA’s denial of the rulemaking petition was

lawful. Rejection of petitioners’ challenge will in no way fore-

close additional steps by the United States government to ad-

dress global climate change or subsequent litigation concerning

those efforts. Nor will it prevent Congress from acting to clar-

ify its intent with respect to EPA’s role in this area. It will

simply block the efforts of these would-be litigants to enlist the

courts to force EPA to undertake immediate regulation of

greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles.

I. PETITIONERS LACK ARTICLE III STANDING

All parties invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts

must “earry the burden of establishing their standing under

Article III” of the Constitution. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.

Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1860-1861 (2006). That bedrock require-

ment is designed to “ensur[e] that the Federal Judiciary re-

spects the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in

a democratic society.” Jd. at 1860 (internal quotation marks

omitted). When a plaintiff fails to demonstrate standing to

bring an action, “the courts have no business deciding it, or

expounding the law in the course of doing so.” /d. at 1861.

Those considerations are particularly apt in this case, where

petitioners seek a judicial order directing EPA to regulate in a

sphere of great economic and political significance.

- 11

To establish standing, a plaintiff must show not only “injury

in fact,” but also that there is “a causal connection between the |

injury and the conduct complained of,” so that the plaintiff's

injury is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the

defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action

of some third party not before the court.” Lujan v. Defenders

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Simon v. Eastern

Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). The plain- |

tiff also must show that it is “‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘spec-

ulative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable deci-

sion.’” Jd. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43). In cases

like this one, where a special jurisdictional provision authorizes

direct review of federal agency action by a court of appeals, the

petitioner may be required to submit declarations setting forth

specific facts that establish all three elements of Article III

standing.”

Judge Tatel concluded, in dissent, that petitioners’ declara-

tions established Article II] standing at least with respect to

the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. See Pet. App. A27-A31.

In his view, petitioners adequately demonstrated injury in fact

* A petition for review in the District of Columbia Circuit is the exclusive

avenue for seeking judicial review of EPA decisions like the one at issue here.

See 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). Under that Circuit's precedent, standing issues are

typically decided on the basis of declarations supplied by the parties in the

court of appeals. See generally Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F 3d 895, 898-901

(D.C. Cir. 2002); Pet. App. A8-A9; see also D.C. Cir. R. 15(e(2), 28(a)(7) ( July

2006). The standard of review for such issues is akin to that applicable at the

summary-judgment stage in a district court proceeding. See Sierra Club, 292

F.3d at 899. As this Court has explained, “each element of Article III standing

must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff

bears the burden of proof, ie., with the manner and degree of evidence

required at the successive stages of the litigation,” and “a plaintiff must set

forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts to survive a motion for

summary judgment.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167-168 (1997) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted).

12

through declarations predicting that greenhouse gas emissions

will lead to global warming, which in turn will cause rising sea

levels, which in turn will “lead both to permanent loss of coastal

land and to more frequent and severe storm surge flooding

events along the coast.” /d. at A27 (internal quotation marks

omitted).‘ But even assuming that the available science sup-

ports such cataclysmic predictions, that is not enough. In order

to establish causation and redressability, petitioners must fur-

ther demonstrate that their anticipated injury is tom material

extent attributable to the specific agency action they complain

of—i.e., EPA’s decision not to regulate greenhouse gas emis-

sions from new motor vehicles within the United States—and

that a judicial decision requiring EPA to undertake such regu-

lation is likely to have the ultimate effect of significantly allevi-

ating that harm. Petitioners have failed to make those show-

ings.

* Petitioners also assert (Br. 6 n.5) standing on the ground that the EPA

decision at issue here “threatens to have ripple effects on California's and other

States’ sovereign power to enforce State laws” because it may be invoked as a

ground for holding state regulation of greenhouse gas emissions to be

preempted. As petitioners’ amici acknowledge (see Arizona Amici Br. 8 n.1),

however, that argument was presented in the court of appeals only through a

post-briefing letter submitted by California pursuant to Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 28(j). Consistent with applicable circuit precedent, see

Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 900-901 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that a

petitioner seeking direct court of appeals review of federal agency action must

present al] materials necessary to establish standing no later than in its

opening brief), the court of appeals did not address that theory. Because that

alternative standing theory was not presented in bricfing to the court of

appeals and that court did not pass upon it, the argument is not properly before

this Court. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 597-598 (2005). In any

event, the States’ concern, although it might provide a motivation for a State

to file an amicus brief, is far too speculative to support a claim of standing.

13

A. Petitioners Have Failed To Demonstrate That The Regu-

lation They Seek Is Likely To Affect Climatic Or Environ-

mental Conditions In Massachusetts

Global climate change is, by definition, a global phenome-

non. The greenhouse gases at issue here are “fairly consistent

in concentration, everywhere along the surface of the earth.”

Pet. App. A73. The vast majority—as much as 80 percent—of

all greenhouse gas emissions emanate from countries other

than the United States. See J.A. 238. For that reason, reduc-

ing greenhouse gas emissions within the United States is un-

likely, as a general matter, to have a significant long-term im-

pact on climatic conditions in this country without reductions of

greenhouse gas emissions in other parts of the world. More-

over, even within the United States, petitioners’ own declara-

tion indicates that nearly 70% of United States greenhouse gas

emissions are from non-transportation sources and thus would

not be affected by the rulemaking petitioners request. See

ibid. One of petitioners’ declarations states that, during the

1990s, “the U.S. transportation sector (mainly automobiles) was

responsible for about 7% of global fossil fuel emissions.” /bid.

Even that 7% figure substantially overstates the potential

impact of the regulation that petitioners advocate. Because

EPA’s regulatory authority under 42 U.S.C. 7521(a) is limited

to new motor vehicles, only a very small fraction (significantly

less than 7%) of worldwide greenhouse gas emissions could

potentially be affected by the rulemaking that petitioners have

asked EPA to initiate. And even with respect to new vehicles,

petitioners recognize (Br. 19-20) that EPA could not mandate

a total cessation of greenhouse gas emissions. The requested

EPA rulemaking would therefore result in, at most, a tiny per-

centage reduction in worldwide greenhouse gas emissions.

Nothing in the record suggests that so small a fraction of

worldwide greenhouse gas emissions could materially affect the

14

overall extent of global climate change. Petitioners’ declara-

tions therefore do not establish that the regulatory action they

seek, standing alone, would have any material impact on clima-

tic or environmental conditions within Massachusetts.

B. Petitioners’ Predictions Concerning The Possible Indirect

Effects Of EPA Regulation Are Too Speculative To Estab-

lish Causation And Redressability

Petitioners do not appear to dispute the foregoing analysis.

The declarations they submitted in the court of appeals con-

tained no discussion of the direct effects on global climatic con-

ditions (or conditions in Massachusetts) of reductions in green-

house gas emissions from new motor vehicles in the United

States. Rather, those declarations predict that the requested

rulemaking would set in motion an elaborate chain of events,

including (i) investment in improved technology; (ii) develop-

ment of technological innovations by private industry; (iii) emis-

sions regulation by foreign governments; (iv) meaningful global

reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases; (v) a significant

climatic response to such emissions reductions decades in the

future; and (vi) consequent alleviation in Massachusetts of its

alleged injury (e.g., coastal land loss).

For example, the declaration of Michael P. Walsh forecasts

that “establishing emissions standards for pollutants that con-

tribute to global warming would lead to investment in develop-

ing improved technologies to reduce those emissions from mo-

tor vehicles, and that successful technologies would gradually

be mandated by other countries around the world.” J.A. 244.

The declaration of Michael C. McCracken similarly predicts

that, “[(i]f the U.S. takes steps to reduce motor vehicle emis-

sions, other countries are very likely to take similar actions

regarding their own motor vehicles using technology developed

in response to the U.S. program, thereby multiplying the total

emission reduction benefit of the U.S. action.” J.A. 239. Peti-

15

tioners’ theory of causation and redressability thus depends on

projections that (a) EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emis-

sions from new motor vehicles within the United States will

spur technological advances by private industry, and (b) foreign

governments, including foreign governments in developing

countries that face added economic dilemmas, will mandate use

of the resulting technology, thereby reducing greenhouse gas

emissions worldwide.°

Given the highly speculative nature of those projections,

petitioners cannot establish causation and redressability under

ordinary standing principles. Because of the nature of their

challenge, however, petitioners face a heightened burden in

establishing the requisite causation and redressability. In De-

fenders of Wildlife, the Court explained that, in a suit “chal-

lenging the legality of government action or inaction,” the

showing needed to establish standing

depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself

an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he is,

there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction

has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or

* In its “Summary of Opinions” section, the McCracken Declaration states

that “{ajchievable reductions in emissions of (carbon dioxide] and other

greenhouse gases from U.S. motor. vehicles would significantly reduce the

build-up in atmospheric concentrations of these gases and delay and moderate

many of the adverse impacts of global warming.” J.A. 225-226. In light of the

more detailed analysis set forth in subsequent paragraphs of the declaration,

however, that statement is not naturally read as an assertion that emissions

reductions from new United States motor vehicles, in and of themselves, would

materially ameliorate global climate change. Rather, the declaration as a whole

sets forth the view that such reductions would ultimately lead to the desired

effects by spurring technological innovation and by inducing foreign govern-

ments to impose comparable limits. If the quoted sentence wes intended as an

assertion that EPA motor vehicle regulation by itself would materially impact

worldwide climatic conditions, it is unsupported by specific facts and is far too

conclusory and farfetched to establish causation and redressability.

16

requiring the action will redress it. When, however, as in

this case, a plaintiffs asserted injury arises from the govern-

ment’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation)

of someone else, much more is needed. In that cireum-

stance, causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the

response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the

government action or inaction—and perhaps on the re-

sponse of others as well. The existence of one or more of

the essential elements of standing depends on the unfet-

tered choices made by independent actors not before the

courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discre-

tion the courts cannot presume either to control or predict,

* * * and it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce

facts showing that those choices have been or will be made

in such manner as to produce causation and permit

redressability of injury.

504 U.S. at 561-562 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted); see Simon, 426 U.S. at 45.

Petitioners, of course, do not challenge EPA’s regulation of

their own conduct. They contend instead that EPA’s refusal to

regulate the manufacturers of new motor vehicles will cause

petitioners injury, and that EPA’s exercise of regulatory au-

thority would alleviate that harm. Under Defenders of Wildlife,

the elaborate chain of events that petitioners claim will ulti-

mately ameliorate the effects of climate change in Massachu-

setts falls far short of the “much more” (504 U.S. at 562) that is

needed to establish causation and redressability.

Depending on the stringency of the limits that the agency

imposed, EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from

new motor vehicles in the United States might ultimately lead

to technological improvements developed to facilitate compli-

ance with the new requirements. The nature of any such inno-

17

vations, however, is at this point a matter of pure conjecture.°

Petitioners’ forecasts concerning foreign governments’ likely

responses to EPA regulation are even more speculative. For-

eign sovereigns are paradigmatic “independent actors * * *

whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts

cannot presume either to control or to predict.” Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562 (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490

U.S. 605, 615 (1989) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)). As experience

demonstrates, foreign governments may respond “in different

ways” to global climate change, “depending on their percep-

tions of wise state [environmental] policy and myriad other cir-

cumstances.” ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 615 (opinion of Kennedy,

J.).

At least absent a treaty or similar binding arrangement

whereby a foreign government has committed to respond in

specific ways to particular United States actions, it is neither

° Aplaintiff cannot establish causation and redressability simply by showing

that particular government action would create a financial inducement to the

private conduct that the plaintiff desires. In Simon, the Court held that

indigent plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the decision of the Internal

Revenue Service (IRS) to grant tax-exempt status to hospitals that refused to

serve indigents. See 426 U.S. at 32-33, 40-46. The Court found it “purely

speculative whether the denials of service specified in the complaint fairly can

be traced to [the IRS’s] ‘encouragement’ or instead result from decisions made

by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications.” /d. at 42-43. In Allen

v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), the Court reached a similar conclusion, holding

that plaintiffs who alleged an impairment of their ability to have their children

educated in a racially integrated setting lacked standing to challenge the IRS's

grant of tax exemptions for certain racially discriminatory private schools. See

id. at 756-761. The Court explained, inter alia, that it was “entirely speculative

* * * whether withdrawal of a tax exemption from any particular school would

lead the school to change its policies.” /d. at 758. Furthermore, with or without

greenhouse gas regulation, automobile manufacturers have significant legal

and economic incentives to improve fuel efficiency. Those incentives make it

particularly difficult for petitioners to show that regulation under the CAA

would be the cause of significant technological innovations.

18

feasible nor appropriate for a federal court to predict the likely

response of a foreign sovereign to EPA regulation in the do-

mestic sphere. Reliance on petitioners’ forecasts as a basis for

federal jurisdiction would be especially inappropriate here.

Those predictions are not based on analysis of the unique as-

pects of the issue of global climate change or of the likely future

behavior of foreign governments in this distinct context. More-

over, those forecasts are directly contrary to EPA’s expressed

concern_that “[ujnilateral EPA regulation of motor vehicle

[greenhouse gas] emissions could * * * weaken US. efforts

to persuade key developing countries to reduce the [greenhouse

gas] intensity of their economies,” Pet. App. A86 (emphasis

added), and they are inconsistent with the United States’ expe-

rience in addressing stratospheric ozone depletion, see id. at

A86 n.5."

C. Petitioners’ Accounts Of Previous Regulatory Undertak-

ings Are Insufficient To Establish Standing

The Walsh Declaration asserted that, because motor vehicle

emissions standards previously imposed in the United States

have led to technological improvements and to parallel emis-

sions limits imposed by foreign governments, EPA regulation

of greenhouse gas emissions would likely have the same result.

See J.A. 242-243. Petitioners’ description of prior regulatory

’ Stratospheric ozone depletion formerly presented a global phenomenon

similar to global climate change. The United States’ experience in addressing

that problem during the 1980s reinforces the concern that, when the harms

caused by emissions in one country are spread throughout the world, unilateral

regulatory action by the United States is unlikely to induce foreign govern-

ments to undertake comparable measures. As EPA explained, unilateral “U.S.

controls on substances that deplete stratospheric ozone were * * * more than

offset by emission increases in other countries. The U.S. did not impose

additional domestic controls on stratospheric ozone-depleting substances until

key developed and developing nations had committed to controlling their own

emissions.” Pet. App. A&6 n.5.

19

episodes is a wholly inadequate basis for concluding that Article

III’s requirements have been satisfied here. The plaintiffs in

Simon and Allen (see note 6, supra) surely could not have es-

tablished causation and redressability simply by identifying

prior instances in which economic actors had altered their be-

havior in response to changes in the tax laws.

Petitioners’ reliance on prior emissions regulation by for-

eign governments is particularly misconceived. The fact that

greenhouse gases are evenly concentrated throughout the

world creates a distinct obstacle to unilateral emissions regula-

tion by any single government, since the country that imposes

such limits may bear a substantial economic burden but will

receive only a small share of any resulting benefit. The prior

willingness of foreign sovereigns to follow the United States’

lead by mandating reductions in other types of emis-

sions—which lead to greater localized environmental hazards,

such as smog—therefore does not suggest that unilateral EPA

regulation of greenhouse gas emissions by new motor vehicles

in the United States would be likely to have the same result.

Indeed, the global nature of the phenomenon at issue provides

a classic situation in which countries—particularly developing

countries—may seek a “free ride” from expensive regulation

self-imposed by other nations. See note 7, supra.

Because petitioners lack Article II] standing to maintain

this action, this case should be remanded to the court of appeals

with instructions to dismiss the petition for review for lack of

jurisdiction, and this Court should refrain from “expounding”

(Cuno, 126 S. Ct. at 1861) on the case. Indeed, Lhe restraint

imposed by Article III’s standing requirement is particularly

appropriate in cases such as this, given the economic and politi-

cal sensitivity of the regulation that petitioners seek to force

20

EPA to undertake, and the significant scientific uncertainty

concerning global climate change."

Il. EPA REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT THE CAA DOES

‘NOT AUTHORIZE IT TO REGULATE EMISSIONS OF

GREENHOUSE GASES TO ADDRESS CONCERNS ABOUT

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

On the merits, petitioners argue (e.g., Br. 12) that, because

carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases emitted from motor

vehicles are “substance[s] or matter which [are] emitted into or

otherwise enter[{] the ambient air,” 42 U.S.C. 7602(g), those

gases are encompassed by the CAA’s definition of “air pollut-

ant” and are therefore subject to EPA regulation. Petitioners

do not contend, however, that Congress specifically contem-

plated the application of the CAA to regulatory control of

greenhouse gas emissions to address glohal climate change,

either when Congress enacted the definition of “air pollutant,”

see ibid., or when it authorized EPA to regulate emissions from

new motor vehicles, see 42 U.S.C. 7521(a). Nor do they account

for more recent statutes that specifically address carbon diox-

ide emissions and global climate change, and indicate that EPA

lacks authority to regulate such matters under the general pro-

visions on which petitioners rely.

* Judge Randolph concluded that petitioners’ declarations were sufficient

to create genuine issues of fact as to each of the three elements of standing, see

Pet. App. A7-A8, and proceeded to the merits of petitioners’ claims, see id. at

A9. For the reasons stated above, however, as a matter of law, petitioners have

failed to “set forth * * * specific facts,” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561

(internal quotation marks omitted), that, if believed, would establish causation

and redressability. Because petitioners have failed to present evidence

sufficient to carry their burden at this stage of the litigation (see note 3, supra),

the court of appeals lacked authority to reach the merits of petitioners’ claims,

and the petitions for review should have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

_ See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 88, 93-102 (1998).

21

Standing alone, the enacting Congress’s failure specifi-

cally to contemplate the CAA’s application to greenhouse

gases does not mean that such applications are automatically

precluded. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey,

524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998). EPA responsibly recognized, how-

ever, that this Court’s recent decision in FDA v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), “cautions

agencies against using broadly worded statutory authority to

regulate in areas raising unusually significant economic and

political issues when Congress has specifically addressed

those areas in other statutes.” Pet. App. A68. That principle

counsels against interpreting the CAA to encompass the in-

choate authority to regulate the type of emissions at issue

here. Indeed, as EPA observed, “[iJt is hard to imagine any

issue in the environmental area having greater ‘economic and

political significance’ than regulation of activities that might

lead to global climate change.” /d. at A76.

In Brown & Williamson, this Court held that the Food

and Drug Administration (FDA) lacked authority under the

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C.

301 et seq., to regulate tobacco products. See 529 U.S. at 133-

161. The Court assumed, arguendo, that cigarettes and

smokeless tobacco are encompassed by the FDCA’s definition

of “drug delivery device[].” Jd. at 131-132. The Court recog-

nized, however, that reading the FDCA to cover tobacco

products was inconsistent with Congress’s actions concerning

tobacco in more recent statutes, see id. at 143, and it noted

that “the meaning of one statute may be affected by other

Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently

and more specifically to the topic at hand,” id. at 133. The

Court further explained that it “must be guided to a degree

by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is

likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and polit-

ical magnitude to an administrative agency.” /bid.; see Whit-

22

man v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)

(citing, inter alia, Brown & Williamson in explaining that

Congress “does not, one might say, hide elephants in

mouseholes”).

Based on analogous considerations, EPA reasonably de-

termined that it lacks authority to address the threat of

global climate change by regulating greenhouse gas emissions

from new motor vehicles. EPA explained that key provisions

of the CAA cannot cogently be applied to such emissions, and

that a broad range of legislation evidences Congress’s intent

to obtain additional information before regulating in this con-

troversial sphere. Pet. App. A70-A74, A79-A80. EPA also

observed that regulation of greenhouse gas emissions would

potentially have even greater economic and political implica-

tions than tobacco regulation. /d. at A76. EPA concluded

that the relevant provisions of law, taken as a whole, were

best construed not to authorize regulation under the CAA of

greenhouse gas emissions for the purpose of addressing

global climate change. That self-restrained determination is

reasonable and is entitled to deference under the principles

of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

Petitioners make the extravagant claim that “EPA’s inter-

pretation deserves no deference.” Pet. Br. 9. But where, as

here, Congress has not directly spoken to an issue, neither

Chevron nor any other precedent of this Court precludes an

agency from exercising prudence or self-restraint in deter-

mining whether, or how, to regulate a problem of such enor-

mous economic and political magnitude as global climate

change. Acceptance of petitioners’ position would suggest

that agencies are subject to a presumptive duty to regulate

whenever a statute arguably authorizes regulation, even with

respect to issues as to which awaiting direct congressional

23

guidance or the results of ongoing studies would be most re-

sponsible and beneficial.”

A. Key Provisions Of The CAA Cannot Coherently Be Ap-

plied To Greenhouse Gas Emissions

1.. In determining whether the CAA authorizes regulation

of greenhouse gases to address the threat of global climate

change, EPA appropriately considered whether a principal

CAA mechanism for controlling pervasive air pollutants—the

NAAQS system, see 42 U.S.C. 7408-7410—could feasibly be

used to address carbon dioxide emissions. See Pet. App. A72-

A74. As EPA explained, the NAAQS regime has traditionally

been directed at controlling pollutants at or near the surface

of the earth. Jd. at A72. “Concentrations of these substances

generally vary from place to place as a result of differences in

local or regional emissions and other factors (e.g., topogra-

phy).” /bid. Congress expected that there would be material

differences among the States in their efforts to meet the

NAAQS, and it therefore directed EPA to designate “attain-

ment” and “nonattainment” areas for particular pollutants,

with more stringent requirements generally applying to

nonattainment areas. See 42 U.S.C. 7407(d), 7501-7515.

* As petitioners observe (Br. 3), two prior EPA general counsels had

expressed the view that the agency was authorized to regulate greenhouse gas

emissions under the CAA. See note 1, supra. In denying ICTA’s petition for

rulemaking, however, EPA acknowledged those earlier statements, see Pet.

App. A68, expressly adopted the contrary position, td. at A69, and explained in

detail the bases for that decision, see id. at A68-A80. Under those circum-

stances, EPA's current interpretation of the relevant CAA provisions is

entitled to judicia! deference. See, e.g., National Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v.

Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699-2700 (2005). Moreover, even

when EPA general counsels believed that the agency possessed the authority

to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, EPA nevertheless declined to exercise

that authority. There is consequently an unbroken agency practice of declining

to regulate in this sphere. See pp. 44-45, in/fra. .

24

By contrast, carbon dioxide—the most pervasive anth-

ropogenic greenhouse gas—is well-mixed globally throughout

the atmosphere and persists there for roughly 50 to 200

years. Pet. App. A73. With respect to carbon dioxide emis-

sions, EPA would therefore have no practical basis for distin-

guishing between attainment and nonattainment areas. And

if EPA established a NAAQS for carbon dioxide that called

for a reduction from present concentrations, the entire Na-

tion would be subject to the stringent CAA limitations that

apply to nonattainment areas, even though the success of

state efforts to achieve the applicable standard would depend

on the willingness of foreign governments to undertake paral-

lel measures to reduce worldwide carbon dioxide emissions.

[bid.; see pp. 14-18, supra. “Such a situation would be incon-

sistent with a basic underlying premise of the CAA regime for

implementation of a NAAQS—that actions taken by individ-

ual states and by EPA can generally bring all areas of the

U.S. into attainment of a NAAQS.” /bid.

2. The petition for rulemaking in this case did not request

that EPA promulgate NAAQS for greenhouse gases, but in-

stead sought regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from

new motor vehicles. See J.A. 43. At present, however, the

only practical way of meaningfully reducing motor-vehicle

emissions of the greenhouse gases at issue here is by improv-

ing fuel economy. See Pet. App. A79, A&87; see also 71 Fed.

Reg. 17,654 (2006). Because the emissions limits that peti-

tioners advocate would function in practical effect as fuel-

economy regulations, EPA’s adoption of such limits would

subvert the implementation by the Department of Transpor-

tation (DOT) of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act

(EPCA), 49 U.S.C. 32901-32919. See Pet. App. A77, A79-A80.

In EPCA, “Congress has already created a detailed set of

mandatory standards governing the fuel economy of cars and

light duty trucks, and has authorized DOT—not EPA—to

25

implement those standards.” Pet. App. A79. EPCA offers

automakers substantial flexibility to choose appropriate

methods of meeting fleetwide standards, and it provides for

congressional oversight of standards promulgated by DOT

pursuant to the statute. See id. at A79-A80. The tension

between the EPCA and CAA regimes would be particularly

acute for “non-passenger” vehicles (which include light trucks

and SUVs), for which EPCA requires DOT to set fuel-econ-

omy standards at the “maximum feasible” level. 49 U.S.C.

32902(a); see, e.g., 71 Fed. Reg. 17,588 (2006). An EPA-im-

posed emissions limit that effectively required manufacturers

to satisfy fuel-economy standards above the level determined

by DOT to be the “maximum feasible” would directly clash

with DOT’s administration of EPCA. Based on the consider-

able evidence that Congress intended EPCA to be exclusive,

EPA reasonably concluded that, “[e}ven if [greenhouse gases]

were air pollutants generally subject to regulation under the

CAA, Congress has not authorized the Agency to regulate

[carbon dioxide] emissions from motor vehicles to the extent

such standards would effectively regulate the fuel economy of

passenger cars and light duty trucks.” Pet. App. A79.

Accordingly, greenhouse gas emissions “simply do not

fit,” Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143, within key aspects

of the regulatory regime established by the CAA. The physi-

cal characteristics of carbon dioxide preclude cogent applica-

tion of the NAAQS. And any attempt by EPA to mandate

reductions of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehi-

cles would subvert Congress's determination that the EPCA

fuel-economy standards should be exclusive.

26

B. Various Federal Statutes Reflect Congress’s Intent To

‘Obtain Additional Information Before Undertaking Any

Regulation Of Greenhouse Gas Emissions

The Court in Brown & Williamson observed that “the

meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, partic-

ularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more

specifically to the topic at hand.” 529 U.S. at 133. A variety

of statutory provisions, both within the CAA and in other

legislation, have addressed the subjects of carbon dioxide

emissions and global climate change, as well as the analogous

issue of stratospheric ozone depletion. Most of those provi-

sions were enacted far more recently, and are therefore more

probative of the current meaning of the statutory scheme,

than the general CAA provisions on which petitioners rely.

Taken together, those intervening enactments strongly indi-

cate that EPA lacks authority under the CAA in its current

form to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in order to ad-

dress global climate change. See Pet. App. A69-A72.

1. Three provisions added to the CAA in 1990 specifically

refer to carbon dioxide or global warming. Section 103(g)(1)

of the Act refers to carbon dioxide in calling for the develon-

ment of pollution prevention “strategies and technologies.”

See 42 U.S.C. 7403(g)(1). Section 602(e) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.

7671a(e), directs EPA to determine and publish the “global

warming potential” of each of several listed substances. And

Section 821 of the CAA Amendments of 1990, see Pub. L. No.

101-549, 104 Stat. 2699 (42 U.S.C. 7651k note), directs EPA to

obtain and make available information concerning carbon

dioxide emissions by certain regulated utilities.

In enacting those provisions, however, Congress ex-

pressly declined to authorize EPA to impose emissions limits.

In five separate places, Section 103(g) of the CAA states that

the “strategies and technologies” developed by EPA are to be

27

“nonregulatory.” See 42 U.S.C. 7403(g), 7403(g)(1)-(4). See-

tion 103(g) further provides that “[nJothing in this subsection

shall be construed to authorize the imposition on any person

of air pollution control requirements.” 42 U.S.C. 7403(g).

Section 602(e) similarly states that the requirement to iden-

tify the global warming potential of various substances “shall

not be construed to be the basis of any additional regulation

under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. 767la(e). And Section 821 of

the CAA Amendments of 1990, like Section 602(e) of the CAA,

is directed solely at information-gathering.

Since these are the only CAA provisions that specifically

address either carbon dioxide emissions or global warming,

and since they provide only for information collection or other

nonregulatory action, they strongly suggest a congressional

understanding that EPA lacks authority under the Act to

- regulate greenhouse gas emissions for the purpose of ad-

dressing global climate change. At a minimum, those provi-

sions reflect acon ressional preference that any general au-

thority EPA might possess in this area not be exercised in a

regulatory manner. Congress’s current preference for non-

regulatory measures is wholly understandable and prudent in

light of the significant complexity and uncertainty surround-

ing this issue and the enormous potential economic and politi-

cal consequences of regulating in this area.

2. Congress has enacted several statutory provisions out-

side the CAA that mandate research and inter-agency coordi-

nation to inform future legislative efforts and negotiations

with foreign governments to address the subject of global

climate change. See Pet. App. A74-A75."" As EPA explained,

The National Climate Program Act, 15 U.S.C. 2901 et seq., called for, inter

alia, “basic and applied research to improve the understanding of climate

processes, natura! and man induced, and the social, economic, and political

implications of climate change.” 15 U.S.C. 2904(d)(2). The Global Climate

Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, §§ 1101-1106, 101 Stat. 1407-1409

28

[with these statutes, Congress sought to develop a foun-

dation for considering whether future legislative action on

global climate change was warranted and, if so, what that

action should be. From federal agencies, it sought recom-

mendations for national policy and further advances in

scientific understanding and possible technological re-

sponses. It did not authorize any federal agency to take

any regulatory action in response to those recommenda-

tions and advances.

Id. at A74. EPA reasonably viewed that pattern of “consis-

tent congressional action to learn more about the global cli-

(15 U.S.C. 2901 note), directed EPA to “develop|] and propos|e] to Congress

a coordinated national policy on global climate change,” § 1103(b), 101 Stat.

1408, and directed EPA and the Department of State to “jointly” report to

Congress on their strategy for achieving “international cooperation to limit

global climate change,” § 1104(3), 101 Stat. 1409. The Global Change Research

Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-606, Tit. I, 104 Stat. 3096 (15 U.S.C. 2921-2938),

contained a congressional finding that “human-induced changes, in conjunction

with natural fluctuations, may lead to significant global warming and thus alter

world climate patterns and increase global sea levels.” 15 U.S.C. 2931(a)(2).

The Act established various mechanisms, including the creation of a Committee

on Earth and Environmental Sciences (see 15 U.S.C. 2932), to “provide for

development and coordination of acomprehensive and integrated United States

research program which will assist the Nation and the world to understand,

assess, predict, and respond to human-induced and natural processes of global

change.” 15 U.S.C. 2931(b). The Global Climate Change Prevention Act of

1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, §§ 2401-2412, 104 Stat. 4058-4062 (7 U.S.C. 6701 et

seq.), directed the Department of Agriculture to “study the effects of global

climate change on agriculture and forestry.” § 2403(a)(1), 104 Stat. 4059

(7 U.S.C, 6702(a)1)). The Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486,

§§ 1601-1609, 106 Stat. 2999-3008 (42 U.S.C. 13381-13388), directed the

Secretary of Energy to compile, analyze, and report various categories of

information pertaining to global climate change. See, e.g., § 1604, 106 Stat. 3002

(42 U.S.C. 13384) (directing the Secretary to “transmit a report to Congress

containing a comparative assessment of alternative policy mechanisms for

reducing the generation of greenhouse gases”).

29

mate change issue before specifically authorizing regulation

to address it” as strong evidence that the CAA did not al-

ready authorize regulatory activity in this area. Jd. at A75.""

3. The method by which Congress addressed the phenom-

enon of stratospheric ozone depletion is also illuminating.

See Pet. App. A71-A72. “Like global climate change, the

causes and effects of stratospheric ozone depletion are global

in nature. Anthropogenic substances that deplete strato-

spheric ozone are emitted around the world and are very

long-lived; their depleting effects and the consequences of

those effects occur on a global scale.” /bid.; see generally 53

Fed. Reg. 30,566 (1988); 57 Fed. Reg. 33,754 (1992). As EPA

explained, “Congress specifically addressed the problem in a

separate portion of the [CAA] * * * that recognized the

global nature of the problem and called for negotiation of

international agreements to ensure wor!d-wide participation

in research and any control of stratospheric ozone-depleting

substances.” Pet. App. A72."

'' EPA further observed that “Congress declined to adopt other legislative

proposals, contemporaneous with the bills to amend the CAA in 1989 and 19990,

to require [greenhouse gas] emissions reductions from stationary and mobile

sources.” Pet. App. A74-A75. Subsequent to the 1990 amendments to the CAA,

a number of additional bills that would have mandated EPA regulation of

greenhouse gas emissions have been introduced but not enacted. See Gov't

CA. Br. 52-53 & n.22. Of course, Congress may direct EPA to undertake

regulation of greenhouse gases at any time that it sees fit. Absent such explicit

congressional action, however, it would be anomalous for the courts to direct

EPA to take that significant regulatory step, especially against the backdrop

of the actions that Congress has taken in this realm.

In 1977 Congress amended the CAA to add a new Part B, entitled “Ozone

Protection,” to Title I of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. 7450-7459 (1988). Those

provisions were principally focused on developing the information needed to

confirm the theory, understand the effects, and develop methods for control.

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 7450, 7453, 7454 (1988). Congress also directed the

President to undertake to enter into international agreements for cooperative

research and regulations, and it provided EPA with specific regulatory

30 E

Thus, in addressing the global problem of stratospheric

ozone depletion, Congress avoided the possibility of piece-

meal regulation by enacting new legislation that was specifi- ~

cally directed at the issue and called for international cooper-

ation. That legislative approach provides persuasive evidence

of Congress’s intent with respect to the analogous issue of

global climate change. As EPA explained, “{i}n light of this

CAA treatment of stratospheric ozone depletion, it would be

anomalous to conclude that Congress intended EPA to ad-

dress global climate change under the CAA’s general regula-

tory provisions, with no provision recognizing the interna-

tional dimension of the issue and any solution, and no express

authorization to regulate.” Pet. App. A72.

4. The history of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Na-

tions Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened

for signature, Mar. 16, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 32, reinforces EPA’s

conclusion that Congress did not intend the agency to regu-

late greenhouse gas emissions under the CAA. The

Protocol was agreed to in 1997 and generally called for indus-

trialized countries to cut their combined emissions to five

percent below 1990 levels by 2008 to 2012. See U.N. Frame-

work Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol (visited

Oct. 24, 2006) <http://unfeec.int/essential_background/

authority to avoid reasonably anticipated harm to the stratosphere. 42 U.S.C.

7456, 7457 (1988). In 1989, after the discovery of a seasonal hole in the

stratospheric ozone layer over Antarctica in 1985, 29 nations (including the

United States) ratified the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the

Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29

(Montreal Protocol), which set limits on the production and consumption of

various substa. ves that contribute to ozone depletion. See generally S. Rep.

No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 383 (1989). In 1990, Congress enacted additional

CAA amendments that repealed Part B of Title I and replaced it with a new

Title V1 establishing a more comprehensive regulatory program, consistent

with the Montreal Protocol, to control substances that deplete stratospheric

ozone and their substitutes. See 42 U.S.C. 7671-7671q.

31

kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php> (Kyoto Website). Although

it was initially signed by the United States, the United States

subsequently made clear that it does not intend to become a

party, and the Protocol was never submitted to the Senate for

advice and consent to ratification. See Pet. App. A75. In-

deed, “the Senate in 1997 adopted by a 97-0 vote the Byrd-

Hagel Resolution,” which expressed the Senate’s opposition

to any international agreement “that would result in serious

harm to the economy of the U.S. or that would mandate new

commitments to limit or reduce U.S. [greenhouse gas] emis-

sions” unless the agreement imposed parallel limitations on

developing countries. /bid. “Congress also attached lan-

guage to appropriations bills that barred EPA from imple-

menting the Kyoto Protocol without Senate ratification.”

Ibid. Those legislative actions reflect the opposition of both

Houses of Congress to any unilateral action by EPA to regu-

late greenhouse gas emissions within the United States."

C. Regulation Of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Within The

United States Would Have Potentially Vast Economic

And Political Consequences

The Court in Brown & Williamson also recognized that,

if Congress intends to authorize an administrative agency to

resolve an issue of great economic and political significance,

“common sense” suggests that Congress will express that

intent with reasonable specificity. See 529 U.S. at 133, 100.

* Although the Kyoto Protocol was agreed to in 1997, it did not come into

effect among its foreign signatories until February 2005 (well after the EPA

decision at issue here), see Kyoto Website, and its efficacy remains the subject

of intense political and scientific debate. See, e.g., <http://www.state.gov/

secretary/rm/2006/73913.htm > (Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice states that

“the Kyoto targets are not being met” and that, “[e]ven if they were met, with-

out China and India covered by Kyoto you're not going to deal with greenhouse

gas emissions in an effective way.”).

32

That concern applies with particular force in the instant case.

As EPA explained,

[ijt is hard to imagine any issue in the environmental area

having greater “economic and political” significance than

regulation of activities that might lead to global climate

change. Virtually every sector of the U.S. economy is

either directly or indirectly a source of [greenhouse gas]

emissions, and the countries of the world are involved in

scientific, technical, and political-level discussions about

climate change.

Pet. App. A76; see id. at A76-A77 (explaining that

_anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions are the direct result

of the production of energy from fossil fuels—the power

source for nearly all modes of transportation and approxi-

mately 70 percent of the electricity in this country).

Although the petition for rulemaking in this case sought

the imposition of greenhouse gas emissions limits only with

respect to new motor vehicles, the thrust of petitioners’ argu-

ment is that greenhouse gases are literally encompassed by

the CAA definition of “air pollutant” and must therefore be so

regarded for purposes of all the Act’s provisions. See, e.g.,

Pet. Br. 12, 17. Moreover, given the global character of the

problem to be addressed and the pervasive use of fossil fuels

throughout the United States economy, Congress cannot rea-

sonably be thought to have intended that EPA would regulate

greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles but from

no other source—particularly when the establishment of fuel-

economy requirements for motor vehicles is entrusted to a

different federal agency (see pp. 24-25, supra). In assessing

Congress’s intent in light of the economic and political signifi-

cance of the decision it was called upon to make, EPA there-

fore appropriately considered the practical ramifications of

regulating greenhouse gas emissions generally.

33

D. EPA’s Interpretation Of The CAA’s Text Is Reasonable

Based on the considerations described above, EPA deter-

mined that “the CAA does not authorize regulation to address

concerns about global climate change.” Pet. App. A78. Ex-

amining the text of the statutory provisions upon which peti-

tioners relied, EPA further determined that “(greenhouse

gases], as such, are not air pollutants under the CAA’s regula-

tory provisions, including sections 108, 109, 111, 112 and 202,”

and that “the term ‘air pollution’ as used in the regulatory

provisions cannot be interpreted to encompass global climate

change.” /bid. EPA explained (ibid.) that the term “air pol-

lutant” is defined in Section 302(g) of the CAA to mean “any

air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including

any physical, chemical, biological, [or] radioactive * * *

substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters

the ambient air,” 42 U.S.C. 7602(g), and that greenhouse

gases are not “agents” of air pollution for regulatory pur-

poses because they do not cause cognizable “pollution” within

the scope of the Act’s regulatory provisions. Pet. App. A78.

Petitioners suggest (Br. 11) that EPA’s construction of

the CAA is suspect because the agency discussed other indi-

cia of congressional intent before parsing the language of

Sections 202 and 302(g). That is incorrect. EPA’s conclusion

as to the limits of its regulatory authority was firmly rooted

in the text of enacted laws, including laws that specifically

address global climate change and the analogous problem of

stratospheric ozone depletion. The agency’s approach was

thus consistent with the “fundamental canon of statutory

construction that the words of a statute must be read in their

context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory

scheme.” Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of the Treasury, 489 U.S.

803, 809 (1989). Petitioners are wrong in suggesting (Br. 23)

that EPA should have disregarded the other statutory indicia

34

of congressional intent on the ground that those laws were

enacted after Sections 202 and 302(g) of the CAA. As the

Court observed in Brown & Williamson, “the meaning of one

statute may be affected by other Acts, particularly where

Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to

the topic at hand.” 529 U.S. at 133. In light of the Court’s

teaching in Brown & Williamson, it was hardly ultra vires for

EPA to consider such potentially relevant laws in construing

the CAA’s earlier-enacted regulatory provisions.

Petitioners are also wrong in contending (Br. 12) that

EPA’s interpretation “ignore[s] * * * the plain text” of Sec-

tion 302(g). In petitioner’s view, the st» utory phrase “any air

pollution agent or combination of such agents” is essentially

superfluous, because anything that could be viewed as falling

with the subsequent “including” phrase, standing alone, nec-

essarily qualifies as an “air pollutant.” But EPA reasonably

rejected that view, in favor of an interpretation that gives “air

pollution agent” independent meaning. Pet. App. A79 n.3.

There is no textual difficulty in that approach, under which

the “including” phrase merely illustrates the kinds of sub-

stances that can qualify as “air pollution agents” without also

mandating inclusion of substances that do not, in the agency’s

expert view, contribute to “air pollution.” The phrase “any

American automobile, including any truck or minivan,” would

not naturally be construed to encompass a foreign-manufac-

tured minivan, and the same principle governs here.

Petitioners further contend (Br. 16-17) that, because car-

bon dioxide is specifically identified as an “air pollutant” for

purposes of Section 103(g)(1) of the CAA (42 U.S.C.

7403(g)(1)), it is necessarily an “air pollutant” for purposes of

Section 202(a)(1) as well. That inference is unwarranted.

“Although [the Court] generally presume(s] that identical

words used in different parts of the same act are intended to

have the same meaning, * * * the presumption is not rigid,

35

and the meaning of the same words well may vary to meet the

purposes of the law.” United States v. Cleveland Indians

Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 213 (2001) (citations, brackets, and

internal quotation marks omitted). Section 103(g) of the CAA

uses the word “nonregulatory” five times, and it states that

“(njothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize

the imposition on any person of air pollution control require-

ments.” 42 U.S.C. 7403(g). Treating carbon dioxide as an

“air pollutant” under Section 103(g)(1) and other nonregu-

latory provisions but not under Section 202(a)(1) is consistent

with Congress’s overall strategy of assimilating information

about global climate change and possible responses thereto as

a predicate for future action.

lil. EPA REASONABLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN

DETERMINING THAT, EVEN IF IT POSSESSED STAT-

UTORY AUTHORITY IN THIS SPHERE, IT WOULD

DECLINE TO EXERCISE THAT AUTHORITY AT THE

PRESENT TIME

Even assuming that EPA possesses the statutory author-

ity to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor

vehicles to address global climate change, the agency reason-

ably exercised its discretion in declining to do so at this time.

EPA identified a variety of sound and appropriate rea-

sons—including the complex and highly uncertain nature of

the scientific record, the agency’s desire to have the benefit

of ongoing research, and the iuadvisability of piecemeal regu-

lation to address an issue of global magnitude at a time when

the President and Congress are seeking to develop a compre-

hensive approach—in support of that conclusion. See Pet.

App. A80-A92. Petitioners acknowledge (Br. 10, 41) that the

“scientific uncertainty” surrounding global climate change is

relevant to EPA’s decision whether to regulate in this sphere.

Petitioners nevertheless contend (Br. 35-48) that, if EPA is

36

authorized to regul<te greenhouse gas emissions from new

motor vehicles, Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA requires that the

decision whether to exercise that authority must be based

solely on scientific evidence concerning the likelihood of en-

dangerment to the public health or welfare, and that EPA’s

consideration of additional factors was unlawful. For several

reasons, that argument lacks merit.

A. Federal Agencies Have Broad Discretion To Decline

To Initiate Rulemakings, Even When The Governing

Law Would Authorize Regulation

Under established principles of administrative law, an

Executive Branch agency generally “has considerable discre-

tion in responding to requests to institute proceedings or to

promulgate rules, even though it possesses the authority to do

so should it see fit. Administrative rule making does not ordi-

narily comprehend any rights in private parties to compel an

agency to institute such proceedings or promulgate rules.”

Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 479

(D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks

omitted). As the District of Columbia Circuit has explained:

An agency’s discretionary decision not to regulate a given

activity is inevitably based, in large measure, on factors

not inherently susceptible to judicial resolution—e.g., in-

ternal management considerations as to budget and per-

sonnel; evaluations of its own competence; weighing of

competing policies within a broad statutory framework.

* * * Further, even if an agency considers a particular

problem worthy of regulation, it may determine for rea-

sons lying within its special expertise that the time for

action has not yet arrived. * * * The area may be one of

such rapid technological development that regulations

would be outdated by the time they could become effec-

tive, or the scientific state of the art may be such that

37

sufficient data are not yet available on which to premise

adequate regulations.

NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citations

omitted). Those considerations are directly applicable here.

Precisely because a federal agency’s decision not to com-

mence a rulemaking may be based on discretionary consider-

ations unrelated to the agency’s legal authority to act, the

District of Columbia Circuit has long recognized that a partic-

ularly deferential standard applies on judicial review of such

a decision.'* That court has described its role in reviewing

denials of rulemaking petitions as “limited to ensuring that

the agency has adequately explained the facts and policy con-

cerns it relied on, and that the facts have some basis in the

record.” National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v.

DOE, 851 F.2d 1424, 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).

Thus, “[iJt is only in the rarest and most compelling of cir-

cumstances that thie] court has acted to overturn an agency

judgment not to institute rulemaking.” WWHT, Inc. v. FCC,

656 F.2d 807, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

This Court’s decision in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821

(1985), reinforces the appropriateness of a deferential stan-

dard in this sphere. Chaney held that an agency’s refusal to

commence an enforcement proceeding is not ordinarily sub-

" See, e.g., Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc. v. FERC, 388

F.3d 908, 910-911 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[W Je will overturn an agency’s decision not

to initiate a rulemaking only for compelling cause.”) (citation omitted);

National Mining Ass'n v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 70 F.3d 1345,

1352 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[A jn agency's refusal to initiate a rulemaking is evaluat-

ed with deference so broad as to make the process akin to nonreviewability.”)

(citation omitted); 7impinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating

that such challenges will be upheld “only in the rarest and most compelling of

circumstances”) (citations omitted); General Motors Corp. v. National High-

way Traffic Safety Admin. , 898 F 2d 165, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (judicial review

is “especially narrow” in such circumstances).

38

ject to judicial review at all. See id. at 828-835. The Court

observed that “an agency decision not to enforce often in-

volves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which

are peculiarly within its expertise,” including the agency’s

assessments concerning the manner in which its limited re-

sources can most effectively be allocated. /d. at 831. The

Court also noted that, “when an agency refuses to act it gen-

erally does not exercise its coercive power over an individual's

liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon

areas that courts often are called upon to protect.” /d. at 832.

Those observations are equally applicable to an agency’s deci-

sion not to commence a rulemaking. See American Horse

Protection Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

This Court’s decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers

Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , 463

U.S. 29 (1983), reinforces the conclusion that an agency’s re-

fusal to initiate rulemaking must be reviewed under a particu-

larly deferential standard. The Court in Motor Vehicle Man-

ufacturers specifically rejected the contention that “the re-

scission of an agency rule should be judged by the same stan-

dard a court would use to judge an agency’s refusal to pro-

mulgate a rule in the first place.” /d. at 41. The Court ex-

plained that “the revocation of an extant regulation is sub-

stantially different than a failure to act” because “[rJevocation

The Court in Chaney noted that the case did “not involve the question of

agency discretion not to invoke rulemaking proceedings,” 470 U.S. at 825 n.2,

and the Court accordingly did not address that question. In American Horse

Protection Ass'n, the District of Columbia Circuit determined that “Chaney

* * * does not appear to overrule (the court of appeals’] prior decisions

allowing review of agency refusals to institute rulemakings.” 812 F.2d at 4.

The court also explained, however, that “[rjeview under the ‘arbitrary and ca-

pricious’ tag line * * * encompasses a range of levels of deference to the

agency, * * * and Chaney surely reinforces our frequent statements that an

agency's refusal to institute rulemaking proceedings is at the high end of the

range.” /d. at 4-5 (citation omitted).

39

constitutes a reversal of the agency’s former views as to the

proper course.” /bid. The Court concluded that “an agency

changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply

a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be

required when an agency does not act in the first instance.”

Id. at 42. That statement logically implies that an agency's

refusal to initiate rulemaking should be reviewed under a

more deferential standard than would apply to an agency’s

alteration of its regulatory scheme.

B. Section 202(a)(1) Of The CAA Does Not Impose Any

Timetable For Determining Whether Greenhouse

Gas Emissions From New Motor Vehicles Would

Meet The Statutory Endangerment Standard

Under background principles of administrative law, agen-

cies are presumptively free to base decisions not to initiate

rulemaking on a broad range of discretionary factors. See pp.

36-39, supra. In unusual circumstances, however, Congress

sometimes limits that customary discretion by (for example)

requiring an agency to determine within a particular time

period whether specified conditions are satisfied, and to con-

duct a rulemaking if those conditions are met. In light of

general principles of administrative law and the Executive's

-general discretion under the Take Care Clause of the Consti-

tution, see Art. II, § 3, cl. 4, such limitations should be con-

strued narrowly. See pp. 39-45, infra. Petitioners contend

(e.g., Br. 35-36) that, under Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA (42

U.S.C. 7521(a)(1)), the only factor EPA could properly con-

sider in determining whether to grant their petition for

rulemaking was whether greenhouse gas emissions from new

motor vehicles meet the statutory standard for endangerment

of public health or welfare. That claim lacks merit.

1. Section 202(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:

40

The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and

from time to time revise) in accordance with the provi-

sions of this section, standards applicable to the emission

of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor

vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judg-

ment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may rea-

sonably be anticipated to endanger public health or wel-

fare.

42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1) (emphasis added). The use of “shall”

indicates that, if EPA “in [its] judgment” determines that

particular pollutant emissions from new motor vehicles cause

air pollution that “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger

public health or welfare,” the agency must “prescribe * * *

standards.”

Petitioners, however, do not contend that EPA has made

a determination that the statutory endangerment standard is

satisfied, thereby triggering a mandatory duty to issue stan-

dards, and yet has nevertheless declined to regulate.”

With respect to the source of EPA’s purported obligation to prescribe

standards in this area, the petition for rulemaking alleged that the agency had

previously determined that the endangerment standard was satisfied. See J.A.

16, 18, 21, 35, 41. The principal theory of the rulemaking petition was that,

“Thlaving already made formal findings that the emission of | greenhouse gases]

from mobile sources poses actual or potential harmful effects [on] the public

health or welfare, the Administrator must exercise her authority to regulate

the emissions of [greenhouse gases] from new motor vehicles under

§ 202(a)(1).” J.A. 41 (footnote omitted). In denying the petition for rulemaking,

however, EPA explained that none of the materials cited in that petition

constituted a formal finding by the Administrator that greenhouse gas

emissions satisfy the endangerment standard. Pet. App. A81. EPA further

noted that, even “if the Administrator were to find that [greenhouse gases}, in

general, may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,”

it would not necessarily follow that greenhouse gas emissions from motor

vehicles satisfy the endangerment standard set forth in Section 202(a)(1). See

ibid. In this Court, petitioners do not press the contention that the Administra-

41

Rather, petitioners’ argument (e.g., Br. 38) is that the agency

acted unlawfully by denying the rulemaking petition without

deciding whether greenhouse gas emissions from new motor

vehicles “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public

health or welfare.” Nothing in Section 202(a)(1), however,

requires EPA to make such a determination at any particular

time. To the contrary, the provision emphasizes the Adminis-

trator’s ability to exercise his “judgment,” which presumably

includes the judgment that this issue is not yet ripe for deter-

mination. Thus, absent a formal judgment by the Administra-

tor that greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles

can be expected to cause endangerment, the agency retained

its traditional flexibility to base its denial of the rulemaking

petition on a broad range of discretionary factors."’

Adherence to the plain terms of Section 202(a)(1) pro-

duces a sensible result. Use of the word “shall” in Section

202(a)(1) reflects a congressional judgment that, once EPA

has devoted the resources necessary to determine whether

tor has already made the sort of formal endangerment finding that would

trigger the duty to prescribe standards under Section 202(a)(1).

'? While arguing that EPA was required to resolve the question of endanger-

ment, petitioners do not specify when or how that duty to decide arose.

Petitioners recite the statutory endangerment standard and construe Section

202(a)(1) to require “that the Administrator ‘shall’ regulate air pollutants

satisfying this criterion.” Pet. Br. 36. That formulation suggests that EPA is

in breach of its statutory obligations whenever the agency has failed to

prescribe standards for particular motor-vehicie pollutant emissions that in

fact “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42

U.S.C. 7521(a)(1). In addition to imposing a duty of omniscience that no agency

could satisfy, that construction of Section 202(a)(1) would render the phrase “in

his judgment” superfluous. Alternatively, petitioners might contend that

EPA’s purported obligation to decide the endangerment question was

triggered by the filing of ICTA’s petition for rulemaking. But since nothing in

the CAA provides for the filing of a rulemaking petition in these circumstances,

it is diffieult to see how ICTA’s petition could narrow the regulatory options

previously available to the agency.

42

particular emissions cause air pollution that may reasonably

be anticipated to endanger the public health or welfare, and

has concluded that the statutory endangerment standard is

satisfied, the directive that EPA must prescribe standards is

an acceptable constraint on the agency’s usual rulemaking

discretion. But requiring the agency to conduct the neces-

sary inquiries and to determine whether the endangerment

standard is satisfied with respect to a potentially unbounded

range of pollutants, even when EPA has concluded for other

reasons that regulation of particular emissions is unwar-

ranted, would entail a much more severe intrusion on the

agency’s customary flexibility to set its own priorities. Ab-

sent a clear indication in the statutory text, this Court should

not infer that Congress intended to mandate so sharp a de-

parture from background principles of administrative law.

And, because Section 202(a)(1) is at a minimum ambiguous on

this issue, EPA’s reasonable interpretation of the statutory

language is entitled to deference under Chevron.

2. The statutory scheme as a whole reinforces the literal

interpretation of Section 202(a)(1). Some provisions of the

CAA specify deadlines by which EPA is to study analogous

“endangerment” questions. Others provide specific direc-

tion for presentation and consideration of petitions and other

types of submissions to the agency.” And while the Act di-

* See, e.g.,42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(1) (regarding initial list of criteria pollutants);

42 U.S.C. 7411(b)(1)(A) (regarding initial list of categories of stationary

sources); 42 U.S.C. 7547(a), 7548 (regarding studies of nonroad engines and

vehicle emissions and motor vehicle particulate matter emissions, respectively).

" See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 7407(d)(3) (process and timing for redesignation of air

quality control regions), 741k) (process and timing for EPA review of state

implementation plan submissions), 7411(g) (substantive and timing criteria for

applications by States for revision of new source performance standards and

EPA responses thereto), 7412(b)(3) and (4) (timing and other requirements

relating to petitions to modify the CAA list of hazardous pollutants and agency

responses thereto), 7585(b)(2) (six-month deadline to respond to any petition

—o

45

rects EPA to review and (as may be appropriate) revise exist-

ing NAAQS at five-year intervals, 42 U.S.C. 7409(d)(1), Sec-

tion 202(a)(1) simply directs EPA to revise mobile source

emission standards “from time to time.” 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1);

ef. American Lung Ass'n v. Reilly, 962 F.2d 258, 263 (2d Cir.

1992) (contrasting statutorily-prescribed “indefinite intervals,

such as ‘from time to time,’” with “bright-line deadlines” such

as “at five-year intervals”). The existence of other CAA pro-

visions that establish specific deadlines or require the agency

to respond to submissions from private parties highlights the

absence of any similar requirement in Section 202(a)(1). See,

¢.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).

3. Consistent with the foregoing principles, the full Dis-

trict of Columbia Circuit explained 30 years ago that the “ex-

press provision for administrative discretion via the ‘judg-

ment’ phrase [in Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA] is necessary”

precisely because Section 202(a)(1) requires EPA to initiate

rulemaking once it makes a determination of “endanger-

{ment]” to health or welfare. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,

20 n.37 (en bane), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). Other

court of appeals decisions have recognized that EPA pos-

sesses broad discretion to decide whether and when to make

analogous threshold regulatory determinations under simi-

larly structured provisions of the CAA.” The District of Co-

seeking a determination that criteria for revised standards for certain vehicles

have been met), 7661d(b)(2) (process relating to petitions objecting to state

CAA operating permits).

” See New York Pub. Interest Research Group v. Whitman, 321 F.3d 316,

330-331 (2d Cir. 2003) (EPA has discretion whether or not to make the

threshold “determination” regarding deficiencies in state operating permit

_ programs under Section 502(i) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7661a(i)); /er Majesty the

Queen in Right of Ont. v. United States EPA, 912 F 2d 1525, 1533-1535 (D.C.

Cir. 1990) (EPA has discretion to determine whether and when to make the

threshold finding under Section 115(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7415(a), as to the

existence of “reason to believe” that emissions from sources in the United

44

lumbia Circuit has held, in particular, that EPA may properly

defer making an endangerment determination while it waits

for additional scientific and technical studies to be completed.

See Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ont. v. EPA, 912 F.2d

1525, 1533-1534 (1990). EPA’s construction of Section

202(a)(1) is thus consistent not only with generally applicable

background principles of administrative law, but with appel-

late decisions applying those principles to the CAA.

4. As noted above (see notes 1 & 9, supra), EPA’s deter-

mination that it lacks authority to regulate greenhouse gas

emissions to address global climate change reflects a depar-

ture from the position taken by two prior EPA general coun-

sels. EPA’s discretionary decision not to exercise any author-

ity it might possess, however, is fully consistent with previous

agency pronouncements under prior Administrators. In 1999

and 2000, EPA informed Congress that, while it construed the

CAA to authorize regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, it

had no present intention of exercising that authority. See

J.A. 80, 91, 101, 106, 108. The agency stated that “[t}he use of

EPA’s legal authorities involves adherence to specified legal

and technical procedural steps, as well as discretion as to

when to initiate applying this additional authority.” J.A.

106 (emphasis added). The agency further explained that,

“{als EPA has no current plans to propose regulations for

{carbon dioxide}, EPA has not evaluated the strength of the

technical and legal basis for [endangerment] findings under

any particular provision of the Act.” J.A. 91. Those state-

ments (which were made after ICTA’s petition for rulemaking

had been filed with the agency) unambiguously reflect EPA’s

States are endangering health or welfare in another country); NRDC v.

Thomas, 885 F.2d 1067, 1073-1075 (2d Cir. 1989) (EPA has discretion in

exercising its “judgment” as to whether emissions of hazardous)air pollutants

“may reasonably be anticipated” to result in certain types of illnesses under

then-existing version of CAA Section 112(aX1), 42 U.S.C. 7412(a)(1) (1988)).

45

~

consistent position that it is under no legal obligation to de-

termine, on any particular timetable, whether greenhouse gas

emissions satisfy the endangerment standard.

¢. EPA’s Denial Of The Rulemaking Petition In This

Case Reflects A Reasonable Exercise Of Agency Dis-

cretion

Based on a variety of considerations, EPA concluded that,

even if the CAA authorized it to regulate greenhouse gas

emissions from new motor vehicles for the purpose of ad-

dressing global climate change, the agency would decline to

exercise that authority at the present time. Petitioners’ chal-

lenge to that discretionary decision is premised solely on

their contention that Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA required

the agency to determine, based on scientific evidence alone,

whether such emissions may reasonably be anticipated to

endanger public health or welfare. Because Section 202(a)(1)

imposes no such requirement, EPA’s denial of the rulemaking

petition in this case should be sustained. Even assuming that

EPA’s balancing of the relevant discretionary factors was

subject to judicial review at all, EPA’s denial of the

rulemaking petition was wholly rational and easily satisfies

the deferential standard of review that courts have applied to

agency refusals to undertake regulatory activity.”

1. It is undeniable that the “science of climate change is

extraordinarily complex and still evolving.” Pet. App. A83.

As the court of appeals recognized, EPA properly relied upon

an authoritative analysis by the National Research Council

(NRC) as supporting the agency’s view that any decision

whether to regulate in this area would be better made after

* Because EPA's exercise of discretion clearly satisfies such standard of

review, this Court need not resolve the question left open in Chaney as to

whether an agency’s decision not to invoke rulemaking in such circumstances

is subject to judicial review at all. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 825 n.2.

46

further research was conducted into critical areas of current

scientific uncertainty. See id. at All-A13, A83-A85. The

NRC concluded that “[g]reenhouse gases are accumulating in

Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing

surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures

to rise.” J.A. 151. As EPA highlighted, however, the NRC

further observed that “[tjhe understanding of the relation-

ships between weather/climate and human health is in its

infancy and therefore the health consequences of climate

change are poorly understood.” Pet. App. A84.

Consistent with the NRC report, EPA explained:

[P]redicting future climate change necessarily involves a

complex web of economic and physical factors including:

our ability to predict future global anthropogenic emis-

sions of [greenhouse gases] and aerosols; the fate of these

emissions once they enter the atmosphere (e.g., what per-

centage are absorbed by vegetation or taken up by the

oceans); the impact of those emissions that remain in the

atmosphere on the radiative properties of the atmo-

sphere; changes in critically important climate feedbacks

(e.g., changes in cloud cover and ocean circulation);

changes in temperature characteristics (e.g., average tem-

peratures, shifts in daytime and evening temperatures);

changes in other climatic parameters (e.g., shifts in pre-

cipitation, storms); and ultimately the impact of such

changes on human health and welfare (e.g., increases or

decreases in agricultural productivity, human health im-

pacts).

Pet. App. A&83-A8&4.

EPA then identified five specific areas of ongoing re-

search that would be necessary to reduce “the wide range of

uncertainty inherent in current model predictions.” Pet. App.

47

A84.” Those studies are ongoing and are expected to be com-

pleted in the next few years. EPA further explained that the

President’s comprehensive global climate change strategy is

based on a wide variety of policy tools to address climate

change through a “sustained effort, over many generations.”

Id. at A&85. Those measures include tax incentives, public-

private partnerships, and major technology research, devel-

opment, and deployment initiatives that would reduce the

economy’s reliance on fossil fuels, supported by the Presi-

dent’s 2003 budget request for $4.5 billion for programs re-

lated to global climate change. /d. at A88-A91. Because “es-

tablishing [greenhouse gas] emission standards for U.S. mo-

tor vehicles at this time would require EPA to make scientific

and technical judgments without the benefit of the studies

being developed to reduce uncertainties and advance technol-

ogies,” id. at A85, the agency reasonably concluded that,

“{uJntil more is understood about the causes, extent and sig-

nificance of climate change and the potential options for ad-

dressing it, * * * it is inappropriate to regulate [greenhouse

gas] emissions from motor vehicles,” id. at A86.”

™ Those areas of research were (1) “{tJhe future global use of fossil fuels and

future global emissions of methane”; (2) “[t }he fraction of fossil fuel carbon that

will remain in the atmosphere and contribute to radiative forcing versus

exchange with the oceans or with the land biosphere”; (3) “[t]he impacts (either

positive or negative) of climate change on regional and local systems”; (4) “(t]he

nature and causes of natural variability of climate and its interactions with

human-induced changes”; and (5) “[t/he direct and indirect effects of the

changing distribution of aerosols.” Pet. App. A84.

> As petitioners correctly explain (Br. 41-42), EPA's broad discretion under

Section 202 of the CAA includes the authority to regulate notwithstanding the

existence of some scientific uncertainty as to the likely effects of particular

categories of emissions. See Ethyl, 541 F 2d at 27-28. The fact that EPA may

regulate in the face of uncertainty, however, does not preclude the agency from

deferring regulation pending the acquisition of additional information.

48

2. EPA also properly took account of other legal and pol-

icy implications of any decision to undertake the requested

regulatory action. See Pet. App. Al3-Al4. EPA explained

that initiation of the proposed rulemaking would

result in an inefficient, piecemeal approach to addressing

the climate change issue. The U.S. motor vehicle fleet is

one of many sources of [greenhouse gas] emissions both

here and abroad, and different [greenhouse gas] emission

sources face different technologica! challenges in reducing

emissions. A sensible regulatory scheme would require

that all significant sources and sinks of [greenhouse gas]

emissions be considered in deciding how best to achieve

any needed emission reductions.

Id. at A85-A86. The agency also properly considered the

present dearth of practical mechanisms to address green-

house gas emissions from motor vehicles, particularly given

DOT’s statutory responsibility for establishing fuel-economy

standards. Pet. App. A86-A87; see Her Majesty the Queen,

912 F.2d at 1533-1534 (recognizing that consideration of avail-

able “remedial procedures” is appropriate in deciding

whether to make an endangerment finding under Section 115

of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7415).

3. EPA also expressed reservations about the foreign

policy implications of any unilateral attempt to set domestic

greenhouse gas emission standards at this time.” The agency

* Petitioners and their amici suggest that it was inappropriate for EPA to

consider the potential international implications of regulating greenhouse

gases. But EPA has direct familiarity with the Executive’s foreign policy

on global climate change. In addition, EPA is periodically involved in dis-

cussions with the Department of State on this issue, and the two agencies

have entered into multilateral and bilateral agreements with other countries

on matters relating to global climate change. See<http://www.epa.gov/

climatechange/policy/internationalcooperation.html > (visited Oct. 24, 2006).

Moreover, Congress has specifically recognized EPA's familiarity with such

49

observed that unilateral regulation could “weaken U.S. ef-

forts to persuade key developing countries to reduce the

[greenhouse gas] intensity of their economies,” and that

“{ajny potential benefit of EPA regulation could be lost to the

extent other nations decided to let their emissions signifi-

cantly increase in view of U.S. emission reductions.” Pet.

App. A86. Those concerns were premised in part on EPA’s

experience with efforts to control the phenomenon of strato-

spheric ozone depletion. See id. at A86 n.5; note 7, supra.

Particularly given the complexity and global nature of the

climate change issue, it would be inappropriate for a court to

set aside the Executive Branch’s judgment as to the likely

effects of domestic regulation on its active efforts to encour-

age the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in foreign

countries—where the vast majority of worldwide greenhouse

gas emissions are produced.

4. Finally, the considerations that led EPA to conclude

that it lacks regulatory authority in this sphere further sup-

port the reasonableness of the agency’s decision not to exer-

cise any such power that it might possess. The agency ex-

plained that key CAA regulatory mechanisms are ill-suited to

greenhouse gas emissions (see pp. 23-25, supra); that current

congressional policy favors further study and assimilation of

data as a predicate for future legislation or international

agreements (see pp. 26-31, supra); and that the economic and

political significance of greenhouse gas regulation counsels

hesitation in the absence of clear congressional guidance (see

pp. 31-32, supra). Even if EPA is found to possess authority

international efforts. In the Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, for

instance, Congress directed EPA to submit, “jointly” with the Secretary of

State, an “assessment of United States efforts to gain international cooperation

in limiting global climate change,” and “a description of the strategy by which

the United States intends to seek further international cooperation to limit

global climate change.” § 1104(2) and (3), 101 Stat. 1409 (15 U.S.C. 2901 note).

50

under current law to regulate greenhouse gas emissions for

the purpose of addressing global climate change, those fac-

tors would be directly relevant to the agency’s discretionary

decision whether to exercise such authority. Considering

those factors and the others discussed above, there is no basis

for the Court to override EPA’s judgment and require the

‘agency to undertake regulation in this context.

In sum, this Court need not question the “seriousness”

(Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161) of the complex issues

surrounding global climate change. But, applying settled

principles of administrative law, the Court should defer to the

expert agency’s judgment that now is not the time to embark

on the regulatory path that petitioners desire.

CONCLUSION

The case should be remanded to the court of appeals with

instructions to dismiss the petitions for review for lack of

jurisdiction. In the alternative, the judgment of the court of

appeals should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

PAUL D. CLEMENT

Solicitor General

SUE ELLBN WOOLDRIDGE

Assistant Attorney General

GREGORY G. GARRE

THOMAS G. HUNGAR

— ay eee 9 sem J a Deputy Solicitors General

ey Sev onsa sate eat MALCOLM L. STEWART

CAROL S. HOLMES Assistant to the Solicitor

auerney om ” General

nsirenmentel Praetiee aaa aes

Attorney

OCTOBER 2006

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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