Respondents Brief — Massachusetts v. EPA
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No. 05-1120 OFFICE
OCT 2 4 2006
CLERK
In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
Vv.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT
PAUL D. CLEMENT bs
- Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
SUE ELLEN WOOLDRIDGE
Assistant Attorney General
GREGORY G. GARRE
THOMAS G. HUNGAR
Deputy Solicitors General
ROGER R. MARTELLA, JR. MALCOLM L. STEWART
Acting General Counsel Assistant to the Solicitor
CaRoL S. HOLMES General
Attorney JON M. LIPSHULTZ
Environmental Protection Attorney
Agency De —
ae | ’ epee partment of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20460 Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether petitioners have carried their burden of
establishing standing to sue in this case.
2. Whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
reasonably determined that it lacks authority under the Clean
Air Act (CAA) to regulate greenhouse gas emissions for the
purpose of addressing global climate change.
3. Whether, assuming that EPA is authorized by the
CAA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions for the purpose of
addressing global climate change, the agency reasonably
exercised its discretion in declining to initiate a rulemaking to
consider regulation of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gas emissions from new motor vehicles.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CE ic cpt secsnedanchaesdunnsauesensahacaidas 1
NEED. i. ip neeccdevenedésocdsedvedecenss 7
I 6 66006 6 ns None nedn bess ancedseccineiconicess 9
I. _ Petitioners lack Article II] standing ............... 10
A. Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the
regulation they seek is likely to affect climatic
or environmental conditions in Massachusetts ... 13
B. Petitioners’ predictions concerning the possible
indirect effects of EPA regulation are too
speculative to establish causation and
EEE svelcncnesdnvetecdesestscndouns 14
C. Petitioners’ accounts of previous regulatory
undertakings are insufficient to establish
EE sd indbseddanddnckeudedstebasandcdedssiee 18
II. EPAreasonably concluded that the CAA does not
authorize it to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases
to address concerns about global climate change .... . 20
A. Key provisions of the CAA cannot coherently
be applied to greenhouse gas emissions ......... 23
B. Various federal statutes reflect Congress’s
intent to obtain additional information before
undertaking any regulation of greenhouse gas
GEE 0 cc ctddunbbodbdndapeesenddecesnes 26
C. Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions within
the United States would have potentially vast
economic and political consequences ............ 31
D. EPA’s interpretation of the CAA’s text is
EE 0 cis dibhe Cl eu Lidedadasnedns audeveek 33
(III)
IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued: Page
IT.
EPA reasonably exercised its discretion in
determining that, even if it possessed statutory
authority in this sphere, it would decline to exercise
that authority at the present time ................. 35
A. Federal agencies have broad discretion to
decline to initiate rulemakings, even when the
governing law would authorize regulation ....... 36
B. Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA does not impose
any timetable for determining whether
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles would meet the statutory
endangerment standard ..............0000005- 39
C. EPA’s denial of the rulemaking petition in this
case reflects a reasonable exercise of agency
COUT 0:0. 0'00600600066000080s0eurnnnee 45
COUN ook dv dddacccadccansceacesnedseeeenee 50
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458
GES. GRP. TGED cocccdsscoccoccdcssubeesscnenoens 36
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) 2.0.6... .e cee eeees 17
American Horse Prot. Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1
GA. Cie. TERED oo cccccccoccdovcsvicceaeceseaunnn 38
American Lung Ass'n v. Reilly, 962 F.2d 258 (2d Cir.
BED ccvceccececchdecesunsbessanessuneaean 48
ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989) .......... 17
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) .....--2- eee eee 1]
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ..... 22
Cases—Continued: Page
Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) .............. 12
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 8. Ct. 1854
en ek eadeheeeabeseneesececees 10,19 |
Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803
Aine GnceesKeeensebesetcececcocecs 33
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) ............. ce eeees 43, 47
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
EE oudheccccdccnccccescucecceces passim
General Motors Corp. v. National Highway Traffic
Safety Admin., 898 F.2d 165 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ........ 37
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) .......... 37, 38, 45
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ont. v. EPA, 912
ae SG CE, BEUED cccccccccccccccces 43, 44, 48
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
EE SE ee 11, 16, 17, 20
Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc. v.
FERC, 388 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 2004) .... 2.0.2.2... 37
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ima. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (19838)... 2... ccc cece ee ees 38, 39
NRDC v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1989) ........ 44
Ni.DC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) .......... 37
National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. DOE,
851 F.2d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ........... cc cece eee 37
National Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 125 S.Ct. 2688 (2005) .............. 23
National Mining Ass'n v. United States Dep't of the
Interior, 70 F.3d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ... 2.2.2.2... 37
New York Pub. Interest Research Group v.
Whitman, 321 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2008) .............. 43
VI
Cases—Continued: Page
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206
ED btdenssendedanevecnndesawscenéedusodanene 21
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) .......... 43
Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895 (D.C. Cir. 200%) ..11, 12
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
PEED Hadendasaccsccncansddecckacosente 11, 16,17
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83
EE. scteosadeancensseokioniindanemmdengietl 20
Timpinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ......... 37
United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532
i s.¢ckdcedusakdbdensscnawenniacdens 35
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457
GED. sdsadecedstennsnsednsdnnneseedudennasende 21
WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ..... 37
Constitution, treaties, statutes and rules:
U.S. Const.:
Art. II, § 3, Cl. 4 (Take Care Clause) ............ 39
i a 7, 8, 10, 11512, 19
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, opened for
signature, Mar. 16, 1998, 37 1.L.M.32 ........... 30
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No.
100-10, 1622 U.N.T.S. 29 ...........cecceeeeeess 30
Clear Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.: |
42 U.S.C. 7403(g) (§ 108(g)) 2.2.0.2... 20 5- 26, 27, 35
42 U.S.C. 7403(g)(1) (§ 103(g)(1)) .........- 26, 34, 35
Vil
Statutes and rules—Continued: Page
ee SGD cateccccccccccicsescuces 27
SE EE cccdacnsudacvsncccusdicnccndd 23
iccchenncdddbaccnctecnseee 42
es CED cevccevccoecccoscecosaceses 23
Ses HED 6 occeseccecccescecsccceeses 42
Ss ED hevenecnccudéckcccccccsenus 43
Gs HEED ceccddcetuceedconseccesceeeess 42
Ss HEED oc csvccuccvccccecsssecss 42
I cc ints cactiiadaedndepiinantd 42
42 U.S.C. 7412(a)(1) (§ 112(a)(1)) (1988) .......... 44
es CREED 0 cecdcececdcoveceonsascases 42
Se MED on cdcosecdececccceccccunnsas 42
Gee CEN EN EES ecccccccccccocccacceseses 48
42 U.S.C. 7415(a) (§ 115(a)) .. 2... eee eee eee ee 43
Sa CED Sacocecccdcesuccovcsevancs 29
42 U.S.C. 7450-7459 (1988) ... 0... cece cece ee eee 29
42 U.S.C. 7453 (1988)... 00. .cccccecceceeeeeee: 2g
Ss SEED ce cnceceSccccccccceesvessn 29
Se HEED 6 ces ccnsucncscesonsccceoes 30
Ss CE ED vo ccccbesbeuncecceseneccces 30
EE ED Set duunceandeeecdinecenss 23
42 U.S.C. 7521-7590 (2000 & Supp. ITI 2003) ....... 2
Ge ee: CGE waescdcsccocnccocsnses 33, 34
SD pstudedoccdesspestencusedeues 20
42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1) ($ 202(a)(1)) ... 2.2.2... passim
SP MED vdacateddicdadcussossécvacsees 42
Ss SE noc dnicccccivecccccdedeuseuecsis 42
Vill
Statutes and rules—Continued: - Page
Se TT tn acihccnebeesdcadeneéaneres 42
Se SNEED dncdcoencsctssssundceves 2, 20
42 U.S.C. 7602(g) (§ 302(g)) ............... 2, 33, 34
ED eciicecsudeswidécbdanduscdénnbes 2
ED ocdccnccceccseséuescecios 5, 11
Pe SD decvacusenencsateessiccees 26
42 U.S.C. 766la(i) (§ 502(1)) ................046. 43
ee SED vib odadctvcucteQianeséudads 43
Ss CED Kcesdecscccdvececeddiccuse 30
42 U.S.C. 767la(e) (§ 602(e)) ................. 26, 27
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-549, § 821, 104 Stat. 2699 (42 U.S.C. 7651k
BD dk conldidantncaaedbsdadeedeweendenseed 26, 27
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486,
$§ 1601-1609, 106 Stat. 2999-3008 ates USC.
SEE condondccsecdescosevedésescescces 28
§ 1604, 106 Stat. 3002 (42 U.S.C. 13384) ........ 28
Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 49 U.S.C.
REE udasatoddceesacssicaseoaueaunns 4,24
SP ED avcccadenesoesecdvchedeess 25
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.
. PPO oc decncescecaccesccedoussscvcceecens 21
Global Change Research Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-106, Tit. 1, 104 Stat. 3096 (15 U.S.C. 2921-
PEED ecccnsdchecsoscsaconvsvsccececoueceuescs 28
15 UBC. TIBMANE) 2... cccccccccscccccccces 28
SP ED voccccccccccceseseeescoensa 28
SPEED Scccccccecconscocsvenesoncee 28
IX
Statutes and rules—Continued: Page
Global Climate Change Prevention Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-624, §§ 2401-2412, 104 Stat.
4058-4062 (7 U.S.C. 6701 et seg.) 2.0... e eee eens 28
§ 2403(a)(1), 104 Stat. 4059 (7 U.S.C.
GED cavccccsccceccncssvovoceneses 28
Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-224, §§ 1101-1106, 101 Stat. 1407-1409 (15
EF TETIE LER COT POE 27, 49
§ 1103(b), 101 Stat. 1408 ...............+-4-.28
© REDS, BER BNE. BERD oc ccccccccccccccccces 49
§ 1104(3), 101 Stat. 1409 ................. 28, 49
National Climate Program Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C.
BEEOEEED. cedccdvasccecccasccasadectecscecte 27
PPRMED acdcocudstcusasccccocses 27
PRED cpdndcdeddcceddcsccdesesucene 12
D.C. Cir. R. (July 2006):
DT i<cbuituctieviibaetenaseanekenebee ll
ES ne oe een penmare 1]
Miscellaneous: :
Climate Change Fact Sheet (May 18, 2005)
< http://www. state.gov/g/oes/ris/fs/46741.htm> ...... 4
Council on Environmental Quality: Addressing
Global Climate Change (visited Oct. 24, 2006)
<http:// www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/global-change.
SE cauubedhesunscudnecgdducnciendsceducevéeed i)
Miscellaneous—Continued: Page
EPA:
Climate Change: U.S. Climate Policy (visited Oct.
24, 2006) <http://www.epa.gov/climatechange> ...9
Climate Change-U.S. Policy: International
Cooperation (visited Oct. 24, 2006)
<http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/policy/
internationalcooperation.htm> ................. 48
53 Fed. Reg. 30,566 (1988) ............ ccc cece eee eees 29
57 Fed. Reg. 33,754 (1902) ............ccscececsccees 29
71 Fed. Reg. (2006):
iG cedéuddesecocosasiccussgueccotnddvcdess 25
DT wu desnecnnsesedesasanah caedeseonnssiens 24
Interview with Debra Saunders of San Francisco
Chronicle (Oct. 11, 2006) <http://www.state.
gov/secretary/rm/73913.htm> .........6. cece ewes 31
News Release (July 11, 2006) <http://www.
whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2006/07/2006071 1-
SE. cddddnsdadedastenesesd SEPT EET ec cccccecces i)
S. Rep. No. 228, 101st Cong., lst Sess. (1989) .......... 30
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Kyoto Protocol (visited Oct. 24, 2006) <http://
unfecc.int/essential_background/kyoto_
protocol/items/2830.htm> ............6 cece ees 30, 31
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 05-1120
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
; ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT
STATE MENT
This case involves a challenge to an administrative
decision of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). EPA
denied a rulemaking petition seeking regulation, pursuant to
Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA or Act), 42 U.S.C.
7521(a)(1), of emissions of carbon dioxide and three other so-
called “greenhouse gases” from new motor vehicles. EPA con-
cluded that it lacked authority to undertake such regulation
under the CAA. See Pet. App. A59-A80. EPA further deter-
mined that it would decline as a matter of discretion to exercise
any such authority that it might possess. See id. at A80-A87.
The court of appeals denied petitions for review that challenged
EPA’s decision. See id. at Al-A58.
1. Title I of the CAA focuses on stationary sources of air
pollution, such as power plants. Title I] of the Act establishes
(1)
2
a framework for federal control of pollution from motor vehicles
and other mobile sources. See 42 U.S.C. 7521-7590 (2000 &
Supp. II] 2003). Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C.
7521(a)(1), directs EPA to “prescribe * * * standards applica-
ble to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes
of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in
[EPA’s] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare.”
Section 302 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7602, sets forth general
definitions applicable to the CAA as a whole. The Act defines
the term “air pollutant” to mean “any air pollution agent or
combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical,
biological, [or] radioactive * * * substance or matter which is
emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air|,]” including
any precursors to the formation of such air pollutant. 42 U.S.C.
7602(g). References in the CAA to “effects on welfare” include
“effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade materials,
animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, and damage
to * * * property, and hazards to transportation, as well as
effects on economic values and on personal comfort and well-
being.” 42 U.S.C. 7602(h).
2. On October 20, 1999, the International Center for Tech-
nology Assessment (ICTA) and several other parties filed a
rulemaking petition asking EPA to regulate emissions of car-
bon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons
from new motor vehicles. J.A. 5-45. The petition alleged that
emissions of those “greenhouse gases” from motor vehicles
contributed to global climate change, satisfied the criteria for
regulation under Section 202(a)(1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
7521(a)(1), and could feasibly be regulated by EPA. See J.A.
16-41. After soliciting and considering approximately 50,000
public comments, see Pet. App. A63, EPA denied the rule-
making petition, see id. at A59-A93.
3
a. EPA concluded that it lacked statutory authority to reg-
ulate the greenhouse gases at issue to address global climate
change. Pet. App. A67, A68-A79.' EPA explained that this
Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000), “cautions agencies against using broadly
worded statutory authority to regulate in areas raising unusu-
ally significaut economic and political issues when Congress has
specifically addressed those areas in other statutes.” Pet. App.
A68. EPA noted that the only provisions of the Act that specifi-
cally mention carbon dioxide or “global warming” are expressly
nonregulatory in nature. Jd. at A70-A71. It further explained
that Congress had addressed another global atmospheric is-
sue—stratospheric ozone depletion—by adding to the CAA a
distinct set of provisions specifically tailored to that issue and
its international dimensions. /d. at A71-A72. EPA noted in
that regard that global climate change presents problems fun-
damentally different from those that the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards—a central CAA mechanism for controlling
pervasive air pollutants—were intended to or are capable of
solving. Jd. at A72-A73. EPA also observed that Congress had
specifically addressed the subject of global climate change in
legislation enacted outside the CAA framework, id. at A74, and
had “declined to adopt other legislative proposals * * * to
require [greenhouse gas] emissions reductions from stationary
and mobile sources,” id. at A74-A75.
' Indenying ICTA’s petition for rulemaking, EPA adopted the legal opinion
of the agency's then-Genera] Counsel, Robert E. Fabricant, “as the position of
the Agency for purposes of deciding this petition and for all other relevant
purposes under the CAA.” Pet. App. A69. In that opinion, General Counsel
Fabricant acknowledged that his legal conclusion reflected a departure from
the position taken by two prior EPA general counsels in 1998 and 1999. See
J.A. 120-123. Those general counsels had concluded that EPA possessed
authority under the CAA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, while
emphasizing that the agency had no current intention of exercising that
authority. See J.A. 54, 61-62, 71, 77, 79, 91, 98, 106, 108, 122-123.
4
EPA concluded that “the term ‘air pollution’ as used in the
regulatory provisions [of the Act] cannot be interpreted to en-
compass global climate change,” and that “[carbon dioxide] and
other [greenhouse gases] are not ‘agents’ of air pollution and do
not satisfy the CAA section 302(g) definition of ‘air pollutant’
for purposes of those provisions.” Pet. App. A78. EPA also
determined, however; that;“|e]ven if [greenhouse gases] were
air pollutants generally subject to regulation under the CAA,
Congress has not authorized the Agency to regulate [carbon
dioxide] emissions from motor vehicles to the extent such stan-
dards would effectively regulate the fuel economy of passenger
ears and light duty trucks.” /d. at A79. EPA explained that at
present, “the only practical way to reduce tailpipe emissions of
{carbon dioxide] is to improve fuel economy.” /bid. The agency
further concluded that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA), 49 U.S.C. 32901-32919, which is administered by the
Department of Transportation, was intended to serve as “the
only statutory vehicle for regulating the fuel economy of cars
and light duty trucks,” and that EPCA therefore precluded any
EPA regulation of carbon dioxide emissions that would effec-
tively regulate the fuel economy of vehicles subject to EPCA.
Pet. App. A72; see id: at A87 (explaining impracticality of other
suggested methods of controlling carbon dioxide emissions).
b. EPA alternatively determined that it would deny the
petition for rulemaking even if the CAA authorized it to regu-
late greenhouse gas emissions in order to address global cli-
mate change. EPA noted that “the CAA provision authorizing
regulation of motor vehicle emissions does not impose a manda-
tory duty on the Administrator to exercise her judgment,” but
instead confers “discretionary authority.” Pet. App. A80. EPA
also observed that no EPA Administrator had yet made a find-
ing that the standard for regulation under Section 202(a)(1) of
the CAA (i.e., that air-pollutant emissions “cause, or contribute
to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endan-
5
ger public health or welfare,” 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1)) had been
satisfied with respect to carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gas
emissions. Pet. App. A81.
Based in large part on a report issued it in 2001 by the Na-
tional Academies’ National Research Council (NRC), EPA iden-
tified numerous areas of scientific uncertainty as to the mecha-
nisms of global climate change, its potential effects on human
health and the environment, and effective responses. Pet. App.
A82-A84. The agency also expressed the concern that regula-
tion of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles would
“result in an inefficient, piecemeal approach to addressing the
climate change issue” because “|t]he U.S. motor vehicle fleet is
one of many sources of |greenhouse gas] emissions.” /d. at
A85. EPA further observed that “[{uJnilateral EPA regulaiion
of motor vehicle [greenhouse gas] emissions could also weaken
U.S. efforts to persuade key developing countries to reduce the
[greenhouse gas] intensity of their economies.” Jd. at A86. The
agency concluded that, “[ujntil more is understood about the
causes, extent and significance of climate change and the poten-
tial options for addressing it, EPA believes it is inappropriate
to regulate [greenhouse gas] emissions from motor vehicles.”
Ibid.
3. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1), numerous petitions for
review of EPA’s denial of the rulemaking petition were filed in
the District of Columbia Circuit. On July 15, 2005, the court of
appeals denied those petitions. Pet. App. A1-A58.
a. Judge Randolph, who announced the judgment of the
court, declined to adopt EPA’s position that petitioners lack
standing to bring this case. Judge Randolph viewed the decla-
rations submitted by petitioners to establish standing as suffi-
cient to survive a motion for summary judgment, Pet. App. A8,
but he observed that the record also contained evidence “con-
tradict[ing]| petitioners’ claim that greenhouse gas emissions
from new motor vehicles have caused or will cause a significant
6
change in the global climate,” id. at A9. In Judge Randolph's
view, it was not a sensible course of action either “to refer the
standing issues to a special master for a factual determination”
or “to remand to EPA for a factual determination of causation
and redressability.” /bid. Judge Randolph concluded that, in
light of the “factual overlap of the standing issues with EPA’s
justifications for not regulating greenhouse gases,” it was ap-
propriate “to proceed to the merits with respect to EPA’s alter-
native decision not to regulate.” /bid.
On the merits, Judge Randolph assumed, arguendo, that
EPA possessed statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles, but held that EPA: had
properly declined to exercise that authority. Pet. App. A10-
Al5. Judge Randolph noted the substantial scientific uncer-
tainties in the current understanding of climate change. /d. at
Al2. He also emphasized that, because Section 202(a)(1) “di-
rects the Administrator to regulate emissions that ‘in his judg-
ment’ ‘may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare,” it “gives the Administrator considerable discre-
tion” to take into account “policy judgments” as well as “scien-
tific evidence” in determining whether regulation of particular
emissions is advisable. Jd. at Al3. Noting the array of policy
concerns identified by EPA in its denial of the petition for
rulemaking, see id. at Al3-A14, Judge Randolph concluded that
“the EPA Administrator properly exercised his discretion un-
der § 202(a)(1) [42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1)] in denying the petition for
rulemaking,” id. at A15.
b. Judge Sentelle concluded that the petitions for review
should be dismissed because petitioners lacked standing. Pet.
App. Al6-A20. In his view, the impacts from global warming
alleged by petitioners were too generalized to establish stand-
ing. Jd. at Al7-A18. To ensure that a majority of the panel
could agree on a disposition of the case, however, Judge
Sentelle accepted as law of the case the views of Judges
7
Randolph and Tate! that the court had jurisdiction to reach the
merits. See id. at A19-A20. Because the judgment advocated
by Judge Randolph (7.e., that the petitions for review be denied)
was “closest to that which [Judge Sentelle] would issue,” Judge
Sentelle joined in that disposition. Jd. at A20.
c. Judge Tatel dissented. Pet. App. A21-A58. He con-
cluded that at least one petitioner, the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts, had established standing to sue. /d. at A27-A31.
On the merits, Judge Tatel would have held that EPA pos-
sessed statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emis-
sions from motor vehicles in order to address global climate
change. /d. at A31-A42. Judge Tatel further concluded that
the policy considerations identified by EPA did not justify the
agency’s refusal to initiate a rulemaking, and that the petition
for review therefore should be granted. See id. at A44-A58.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court of appeals properly denied petitioners’ request to
compel EPA to undertake regulation of greenhouse gas emis-
sions from new motor vehicles at this time.
1. As a threshold matter, the petition for review is not suit-
able for judicial resolution because petitioners lack Article ITI
standing. Petitioners have failed to carry their burden of estab-
lishing that they will be harmed by the specific agency action
they challenge—EPA’s decision not to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles within the United States,
which involves only a tiny fraction of global greenhouse gas
emissions—or that their anticipated injuries would be materi-
ally alleviated by the judicial ruling they seek. Moreover, peti-
tioners’ theory of causation and redressability depends on pre-
dictions by their declarants that EPA regulation will set in
motion an elaborate sequence of events involving independent
choices by non-federal actors, including foreign governments.
8
Those predictions are far too speculative to establish Article II]
standing.
II. In any event, even if petitioners had established stand-
ing, EPA properly denied the petition for rulemaking. EPA
reasonably concluded that it lacks authority to regulate green-
house gas emissions from new motor vehicles in order to ad-
dress global climate change. EPA recognized that key provi-
sions of the CAA cannot coherently be applied to greenhouse
gas emissions; that more recent laws reflect Congress’s intent
to assimilate more information as a predicate to legislation or
international agreements to address global climate change; and
that regulation of greenhouse gas emissions would have ex-
traordinary economic and political ramifications. Under FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000),
those considerations amply support the agency’s determination
that the CAA’s general provisions do not vest EPA with regula-
tory authority in this area.
III. EPA also reasonably declined to exercise any regula-
tory authority that it might possess in this sphere. Under back-
ground principles of administrative law, an agency’s decision
not to initiate a rulemaking may be based on a wide range of
discretionary factors and is reviewed under a highly deferential
standard. Contrary to petitioners’ contention, Section 202(a)(1)
of the CAA does not divest EPA of that customary discretion.
To the contrary, that Section must be read in light of that well-
established background of discretion. Section 202(a)(1) states
that EPA must undertake rulemaking if the agency renders a
judgment that a pollutant meets the statutory endangerment
standard, but it does not impose any deadline by which EPA
must make such a determination with respect to particular pol-
lutants. EPA identified a variety of sound reasons—including
the “[sJubstantial scientific uncertainties” (Pet. App. A84) that
surround this issue, while major federal studies are being
conducted—for declining to determine at this time whether the
9
greenhouse gases at issue meet the endangerment standard.
There is no basis on the present administrative record for this
Court to overturn that considered agency judgment.
ARGUMENT
Global climate change is one of the most important and
widely debated scientific, economic, and political issues of our
time. While the science of global climate change is evolving and
remains subject to substantial debate and uncertainties, the
United States has established a multifaceted approach to study-
ing and addressing that complex and important issue. As part
of that effort, the United States has allocated more than 29
billion dollars during the years 2001-2006—more than any other
nation—for scientific research into global climate change and
for climate-related programs; has committed to significantly
reducing the greenhouse gas intensity of the American econ-
omy over the next decade; has entered into extensive partner-
ships with private industries designed to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions; has entered into multilateral and bilateral agree-
ments with other nations to seek a cooperative international
approach to addressing global climate change; and has become
the largest funder of activities under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change.” As ongoing scien-
tific studies provide additional information about the problem
and potential solutions, the United States stands ready to take
further measures and to work with the rest of the world to ad-
dress the phenomenon of climate change.
* See generally Pet. App. A88-A92; <http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/>
(visited Oct. 24, 2006); <http//www.state.gov/g/oes/ris/fs/46741.htm>
(visited Oct. <4, 2006); <http://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/global-change.html >
(visited Oct. 24, 2006); <http//www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/
20060711-7.html> (visited Oct. 24, 2006).
10
This case, however, does not concern the adequacy of those
broader efforts. Rather, the case presents more modest issues
concerning the standing of petitioners to seek relief in federal
court and the legality of EPA’s decision not to initiate a
rulemaking with respect to greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles at this time. Under established principles of
federal jurisdiction, statutory interpretation, and administra-
tive law, petitioners’ challenge to that_agency decision fails,
both because petitioners lack Article I1] standing and, alterna-
tively, because EPA’s denial of the rulemaking petition was
lawful. Rejection of petitioners’ challenge will in no way fore-
close additional steps by the United States government to ad-
dress global climate change or subsequent litigation concerning
those efforts. Nor will it prevent Congress from acting to clar-
ify its intent with respect to EPA’s role in this area. It will
simply block the efforts of these would-be litigants to enlist the
courts to force EPA to undertake immediate regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles.
I. PETITIONERS LACK ARTICLE III STANDING
All parties invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts
must “earry the burden of establishing their standing under
Article III” of the Constitution. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1860-1861 (2006). That bedrock require-
ment is designed to “ensur[e] that the Federal Judiciary re-
spects the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in
a democratic society.” Jd. at 1860 (internal quotation marks
omitted). When a plaintiff fails to demonstrate standing to
bring an action, “the courts have no business deciding it, or
expounding the law in the course of doing so.” /d. at 1861.
Those considerations are particularly apt in this case, where
petitioners seek a judicial order directing EPA to regulate in a
sphere of great economic and political significance.
- 11
To establish standing, a plaintiff must show not only “injury
in fact,” but also that there is “a causal connection between the |
injury and the conduct complained of,” so that the plaintiff's
injury is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action
of some third party not before the court.” Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Simon v. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). The plain- |
tiff also must show that it is “‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘spec-
ulative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable deci-
sion.’” Jd. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43). In cases
like this one, where a special jurisdictional provision authorizes
direct review of federal agency action by a court of appeals, the
petitioner may be required to submit declarations setting forth
specific facts that establish all three elements of Article III
standing.”
Judge Tatel concluded, in dissent, that petitioners’ declara-
tions established Article II] standing at least with respect to
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. See Pet. App. A27-A31.
In his view, petitioners adequately demonstrated injury in fact
* A petition for review in the District of Columbia Circuit is the exclusive
avenue for seeking judicial review of EPA decisions like the one at issue here.
See 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). Under that Circuit's precedent, standing issues are
typically decided on the basis of declarations supplied by the parties in the
court of appeals. See generally Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F 3d 895, 898-901
(D.C. Cir. 2002); Pet. App. A8-A9; see also D.C. Cir. R. 15(e(2), 28(a)(7) ( July
2006). The standard of review for such issues is akin to that applicable at the
summary-judgment stage in a district court proceeding. See Sierra Club, 292
F.3d at 899. As this Court has explained, “each element of Article III standing
must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof, ie., with the manner and degree of evidence
required at the successive stages of the litigation,” and “a plaintiff must set
forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts to survive a motion for
summary judgment.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167-168 (1997) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
12
through declarations predicting that greenhouse gas emissions
will lead to global warming, which in turn will cause rising sea
levels, which in turn will “lead both to permanent loss of coastal
land and to more frequent and severe storm surge flooding
events along the coast.” /d. at A27 (internal quotation marks
omitted).‘ But even assuming that the available science sup-
ports such cataclysmic predictions, that is not enough. In order
to establish causation and redressability, petitioners must fur-
ther demonstrate that their anticipated injury is tom material
extent attributable to the specific agency action they complain
of—i.e., EPA’s decision not to regulate greenhouse gas emis-
sions from new motor vehicles within the United States—and
that a judicial decision requiring EPA to undertake such regu-
lation is likely to have the ultimate effect of significantly allevi-
ating that harm. Petitioners have failed to make those show-
ings.
* Petitioners also assert (Br. 6 n.5) standing on the ground that the EPA
decision at issue here “threatens to have ripple effects on California's and other
States’ sovereign power to enforce State laws” because it may be invoked as a
ground for holding state regulation of greenhouse gas emissions to be
preempted. As petitioners’ amici acknowledge (see Arizona Amici Br. 8 n.1),
however, that argument was presented in the court of appeals only through a
post-briefing letter submitted by California pursuant to Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 28(j). Consistent with applicable circuit precedent, see
Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 900-901 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that a
petitioner seeking direct court of appeals review of federal agency action must
present al] materials necessary to establish standing no later than in its
opening brief), the court of appeals did not address that theory. Because that
alternative standing theory was not presented in bricfing to the court of
appeals and that court did not pass upon it, the argument is not properly before
this Court. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 597-598 (2005). In any
event, the States’ concern, although it might provide a motivation for a State
to file an amicus brief, is far too speculative to support a claim of standing.
13
A. Petitioners Have Failed To Demonstrate That The Regu-
lation They Seek Is Likely To Affect Climatic Or Environ-
mental Conditions In Massachusetts
Global climate change is, by definition, a global phenome-
non. The greenhouse gases at issue here are “fairly consistent
in concentration, everywhere along the surface of the earth.”
Pet. App. A73. The vast majority—as much as 80 percent—of
all greenhouse gas emissions emanate from countries other
than the United States. See J.A. 238. For that reason, reduc-
ing greenhouse gas emissions within the United States is un-
likely, as a general matter, to have a significant long-term im-
pact on climatic conditions in this country without reductions of
greenhouse gas emissions in other parts of the world. More-
over, even within the United States, petitioners’ own declara-
tion indicates that nearly 70% of United States greenhouse gas
emissions are from non-transportation sources and thus would
not be affected by the rulemaking petitioners request. See
ibid. One of petitioners’ declarations states that, during the
1990s, “the U.S. transportation sector (mainly automobiles) was
responsible for about 7% of global fossil fuel emissions.” /bid.
Even that 7% figure substantially overstates the potential
impact of the regulation that petitioners advocate. Because
EPA’s regulatory authority under 42 U.S.C. 7521(a) is limited
to new motor vehicles, only a very small fraction (significantly
less than 7%) of worldwide greenhouse gas emissions could
potentially be affected by the rulemaking that petitioners have
asked EPA to initiate. And even with respect to new vehicles,
petitioners recognize (Br. 19-20) that EPA could not mandate
a total cessation of greenhouse gas emissions. The requested
EPA rulemaking would therefore result in, at most, a tiny per-
centage reduction in worldwide greenhouse gas emissions.
Nothing in the record suggests that so small a fraction of
worldwide greenhouse gas emissions could materially affect the
14
overall extent of global climate change. Petitioners’ declara-
tions therefore do not establish that the regulatory action they
seek, standing alone, would have any material impact on clima-
tic or environmental conditions within Massachusetts.
B. Petitioners’ Predictions Concerning The Possible Indirect
Effects Of EPA Regulation Are Too Speculative To Estab-
lish Causation And Redressability
Petitioners do not appear to dispute the foregoing analysis.
The declarations they submitted in the court of appeals con-
tained no discussion of the direct effects on global climatic con-
ditions (or conditions in Massachusetts) of reductions in green-
house gas emissions from new motor vehicles in the United
States. Rather, those declarations predict that the requested
rulemaking would set in motion an elaborate chain of events,
including (i) investment in improved technology; (ii) develop-
ment of technological innovations by private industry; (iii) emis-
sions regulation by foreign governments; (iv) meaningful global
reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases; (v) a significant
climatic response to such emissions reductions decades in the
future; and (vi) consequent alleviation in Massachusetts of its
alleged injury (e.g., coastal land loss).
For example, the declaration of Michael P. Walsh forecasts
that “establishing emissions standards for pollutants that con-
tribute to global warming would lead to investment in develop-
ing improved technologies to reduce those emissions from mo-
tor vehicles, and that successful technologies would gradually
be mandated by other countries around the world.” J.A. 244.
The declaration of Michael C. McCracken similarly predicts
that, “[(i]f the U.S. takes steps to reduce motor vehicle emis-
sions, other countries are very likely to take similar actions
regarding their own motor vehicles using technology developed
in response to the U.S. program, thereby multiplying the total
emission reduction benefit of the U.S. action.” J.A. 239. Peti-
15
tioners’ theory of causation and redressability thus depends on
projections that (a) EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emis-
sions from new motor vehicles within the United States will
spur technological advances by private industry, and (b) foreign
governments, including foreign governments in developing
countries that face added economic dilemmas, will mandate use
of the resulting technology, thereby reducing greenhouse gas
emissions worldwide.°
Given the highly speculative nature of those projections,
petitioners cannot establish causation and redressability under
ordinary standing principles. Because of the nature of their
challenge, however, petitioners face a heightened burden in
establishing the requisite causation and redressability. In De-
fenders of Wildlife, the Court explained that, in a suit “chal-
lenging the legality of government action or inaction,” the
showing needed to establish standing
depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself
an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he is,
there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction
has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or
* In its “Summary of Opinions” section, the McCracken Declaration states
that “{ajchievable reductions in emissions of (carbon dioxide] and other
greenhouse gases from U.S. motor. vehicles would significantly reduce the
build-up in atmospheric concentrations of these gases and delay and moderate
many of the adverse impacts of global warming.” J.A. 225-226. In light of the
more detailed analysis set forth in subsequent paragraphs of the declaration,
however, that statement is not naturally read as an assertion that emissions
reductions from new United States motor vehicles, in and of themselves, would
materially ameliorate global climate change. Rather, the declaration as a whole
sets forth the view that such reductions would ultimately lead to the desired
effects by spurring technological innovation and by inducing foreign govern-
ments to impose comparable limits. If the quoted sentence wes intended as an
assertion that EPA motor vehicle regulation by itself would materially impact
worldwide climatic conditions, it is unsupported by specific facts and is far too
conclusory and farfetched to establish causation and redressability.
16
requiring the action will redress it. When, however, as in
this case, a plaintiffs asserted injury arises from the govern-
ment’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation)
of someone else, much more is needed. In that cireum-
stance, causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the
response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the
government action or inaction—and perhaps on the re-
sponse of others as well. The existence of one or more of
the essential elements of standing depends on the unfet-
tered choices made by independent actors not before the
courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discre-
tion the courts cannot presume either to control or predict,
* * * and it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce
facts showing that those choices have been or will be made
in such manner as to produce causation and permit
redressability of injury.
504 U.S. at 561-562 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted); see Simon, 426 U.S. at 45.
Petitioners, of course, do not challenge EPA’s regulation of
their own conduct. They contend instead that EPA’s refusal to
regulate the manufacturers of new motor vehicles will cause
petitioners injury, and that EPA’s exercise of regulatory au-
thority would alleviate that harm. Under Defenders of Wildlife,
the elaborate chain of events that petitioners claim will ulti-
mately ameliorate the effects of climate change in Massachu-
setts falls far short of the “much more” (504 U.S. at 562) that is
needed to establish causation and redressability.
Depending on the stringency of the limits that the agency
imposed, EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from
new motor vehicles in the United States might ultimately lead
to technological improvements developed to facilitate compli-
ance with the new requirements. The nature of any such inno-
17
vations, however, is at this point a matter of pure conjecture.°
Petitioners’ forecasts concerning foreign governments’ likely
responses to EPA regulation are even more speculative. For-
eign sovereigns are paradigmatic “independent actors * * *
whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts
cannot presume either to control or to predict.” Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562 (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490
U.S. 605, 615 (1989) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)). As experience
demonstrates, foreign governments may respond “in different
ways” to global climate change, “depending on their percep-
tions of wise state [environmental] policy and myriad other cir-
cumstances.” ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 615 (opinion of Kennedy,
J.).
At least absent a treaty or similar binding arrangement
whereby a foreign government has committed to respond in
specific ways to particular United States actions, it is neither
° Aplaintiff cannot establish causation and redressability simply by showing
that particular government action would create a financial inducement to the
private conduct that the plaintiff desires. In Simon, the Court held that
indigent plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the decision of the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) to grant tax-exempt status to hospitals that refused to
serve indigents. See 426 U.S. at 32-33, 40-46. The Court found it “purely
speculative whether the denials of service specified in the complaint fairly can
be traced to [the IRS’s] ‘encouragement’ or instead result from decisions made
by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications.” /d. at 42-43. In Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), the Court reached a similar conclusion, holding
that plaintiffs who alleged an impairment of their ability to have their children
educated in a racially integrated setting lacked standing to challenge the IRS's
grant of tax exemptions for certain racially discriminatory private schools. See
id. at 756-761. The Court explained, inter alia, that it was “entirely speculative
* * * whether withdrawal of a tax exemption from any particular school would
lead the school to change its policies.” /d. at 758. Furthermore, with or without
greenhouse gas regulation, automobile manufacturers have significant legal
and economic incentives to improve fuel efficiency. Those incentives make it
particularly difficult for petitioners to show that regulation under the CAA
would be the cause of significant technological innovations.
18
feasible nor appropriate for a federal court to predict the likely
response of a foreign sovereign to EPA regulation in the do-
mestic sphere. Reliance on petitioners’ forecasts as a basis for
federal jurisdiction would be especially inappropriate here.
Those predictions are not based on analysis of the unique as-
pects of the issue of global climate change or of the likely future
behavior of foreign governments in this distinct context. More-
over, those forecasts are directly contrary to EPA’s expressed
concern_that “[ujnilateral EPA regulation of motor vehicle
[greenhouse gas] emissions could * * * weaken US. efforts
to persuade key developing countries to reduce the [greenhouse
gas] intensity of their economies,” Pet. App. A86 (emphasis
added), and they are inconsistent with the United States’ expe-
rience in addressing stratospheric ozone depletion, see id. at
A86 n.5."
C. Petitioners’ Accounts Of Previous Regulatory Undertak-
ings Are Insufficient To Establish Standing
The Walsh Declaration asserted that, because motor vehicle
emissions standards previously imposed in the United States
have led to technological improvements and to parallel emis-
sions limits imposed by foreign governments, EPA regulation
of greenhouse gas emissions would likely have the same result.
See J.A. 242-243. Petitioners’ description of prior regulatory
’ Stratospheric ozone depletion formerly presented a global phenomenon
similar to global climate change. The United States’ experience in addressing
that problem during the 1980s reinforces the concern that, when the harms
caused by emissions in one country are spread throughout the world, unilateral
regulatory action by the United States is unlikely to induce foreign govern-
ments to undertake comparable measures. As EPA explained, unilateral “U.S.
controls on substances that deplete stratospheric ozone were * * * more than
offset by emission increases in other countries. The U.S. did not impose
additional domestic controls on stratospheric ozone-depleting substances until
key developed and developing nations had committed to controlling their own
emissions.” Pet. App. A&6 n.5.
19
episodes is a wholly inadequate basis for concluding that Article
III’s requirements have been satisfied here. The plaintiffs in
Simon and Allen (see note 6, supra) surely could not have es-
tablished causation and redressability simply by identifying
prior instances in which economic actors had altered their be-
havior in response to changes in the tax laws.
Petitioners’ reliance on prior emissions regulation by for-
eign governments is particularly misconceived. The fact that
greenhouse gases are evenly concentrated throughout the
world creates a distinct obstacle to unilateral emissions regula-
tion by any single government, since the country that imposes
such limits may bear a substantial economic burden but will
receive only a small share of any resulting benefit. The prior
willingness of foreign sovereigns to follow the United States’
lead by mandating reductions in other types of emis-
sions—which lead to greater localized environmental hazards,
such as smog—therefore does not suggest that unilateral EPA
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions by new motor vehicles
in the United States would be likely to have the same result.
Indeed, the global nature of the phenomenon at issue provides
a classic situation in which countries—particularly developing
countries—may seek a “free ride” from expensive regulation
self-imposed by other nations. See note 7, supra.
Because petitioners lack Article II] standing to maintain
this action, this case should be remanded to the court of appeals
with instructions to dismiss the petition for review for lack of
jurisdiction, and this Court should refrain from “expounding”
(Cuno, 126 S. Ct. at 1861) on the case. Indeed, Lhe restraint
imposed by Article III’s standing requirement is particularly
appropriate in cases such as this, given the economic and politi-
cal sensitivity of the regulation that petitioners seek to force
20
EPA to undertake, and the significant scientific uncertainty
concerning global climate change."
Il. EPA REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT THE CAA DOES
‘NOT AUTHORIZE IT TO REGULATE EMISSIONS OF
GREENHOUSE GASES TO ADDRESS CONCERNS ABOUT
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
On the merits, petitioners argue (e.g., Br. 12) that, because
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases emitted from motor
vehicles are “substance[s] or matter which [are] emitted into or
otherwise enter[{] the ambient air,” 42 U.S.C. 7602(g), those
gases are encompassed by the CAA’s definition of “air pollut-
ant” and are therefore subject to EPA regulation. Petitioners
do not contend, however, that Congress specifically contem-
plated the application of the CAA to regulatory control of
greenhouse gas emissions to address glohal climate change,
either when Congress enacted the definition of “air pollutant,”
see ibid., or when it authorized EPA to regulate emissions from
new motor vehicles, see 42 U.S.C. 7521(a). Nor do they account
for more recent statutes that specifically address carbon diox-
ide emissions and global climate change, and indicate that EPA
lacks authority to regulate such matters under the general pro-
visions on which petitioners rely.
* Judge Randolph concluded that petitioners’ declarations were sufficient
to create genuine issues of fact as to each of the three elements of standing, see
Pet. App. A7-A8, and proceeded to the merits of petitioners’ claims, see id. at
A9. For the reasons stated above, however, as a matter of law, petitioners have
failed to “set forth * * * specific facts,” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561
(internal quotation marks omitted), that, if believed, would establish causation
and redressability. Because petitioners have failed to present evidence
sufficient to carry their burden at this stage of the litigation (see note 3, supra),
the court of appeals lacked authority to reach the merits of petitioners’ claims,
and the petitions for review should have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
_ See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 88, 93-102 (1998).
21
Standing alone, the enacting Congress’s failure specifi-
cally to contemplate the CAA’s application to greenhouse
gases does not mean that such applications are automatically
precluded. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey,
524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998). EPA responsibly recognized, how-
ever, that this Court’s recent decision in FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), “cautions
agencies against using broadly worded statutory authority to
regulate in areas raising unusually significant economic and
political issues when Congress has specifically addressed
those areas in other statutes.” Pet. App. A68. That principle
counsels against interpreting the CAA to encompass the in-
choate authority to regulate the type of emissions at issue
here. Indeed, as EPA observed, “[iJt is hard to imagine any
issue in the environmental area having greater ‘economic and
political significance’ than regulation of activities that might
lead to global climate change.” /d. at A76.
In Brown & Williamson, this Court held that the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) lacked authority under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C.
301 et seq., to regulate tobacco products. See 529 U.S. at 133-
161. The Court assumed, arguendo, that cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco are encompassed by the FDCA’s definition
of “drug delivery device[].” Jd. at 131-132. The Court recog-
nized, however, that reading the FDCA to cover tobacco
products was inconsistent with Congress’s actions concerning
tobacco in more recent statutes, see id. at 143, and it noted
that “the meaning of one statute may be affected by other
Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently
and more specifically to the topic at hand,” id. at 133. The
Court further explained that it “must be guided to a degree
by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is
likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and polit-
ical magnitude to an administrative agency.” /bid.; see Whit-
22
man v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)
(citing, inter alia, Brown & Williamson in explaining that
Congress “does not, one might say, hide elephants in
mouseholes”).
Based on analogous considerations, EPA reasonably de-
termined that it lacks authority to address the threat of
global climate change by regulating greenhouse gas emissions
from new motor vehicles. EPA explained that key provisions
of the CAA cannot cogently be applied to such emissions, and
that a broad range of legislation evidences Congress’s intent
to obtain additional information before regulating in this con-
troversial sphere. Pet. App. A70-A74, A79-A80. EPA also
observed that regulation of greenhouse gas emissions would
potentially have even greater economic and political implica-
tions than tobacco regulation. /d. at A76. EPA concluded
that the relevant provisions of law, taken as a whole, were
best construed not to authorize regulation under the CAA of
greenhouse gas emissions for the purpose of addressing
global climate change. That self-restrained determination is
reasonable and is entitled to deference under the principles
of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Petitioners make the extravagant claim that “EPA’s inter-
pretation deserves no deference.” Pet. Br. 9. But where, as
here, Congress has not directly spoken to an issue, neither
Chevron nor any other precedent of this Court precludes an
agency from exercising prudence or self-restraint in deter-
mining whether, or how, to regulate a problem of such enor-
mous economic and political magnitude as global climate
change. Acceptance of petitioners’ position would suggest
that agencies are subject to a presumptive duty to regulate
whenever a statute arguably authorizes regulation, even with
respect to issues as to which awaiting direct congressional
23
guidance or the results of ongoing studies would be most re-
sponsible and beneficial.”
A. Key Provisions Of The CAA Cannot Coherently Be Ap-
plied To Greenhouse Gas Emissions
1.. In determining whether the CAA authorizes regulation
of greenhouse gases to address the threat of global climate
change, EPA appropriately considered whether a principal
CAA mechanism for controlling pervasive air pollutants—the
NAAQS system, see 42 U.S.C. 7408-7410—could feasibly be
used to address carbon dioxide emissions. See Pet. App. A72-
A74. As EPA explained, the NAAQS regime has traditionally
been directed at controlling pollutants at or near the surface
of the earth. Jd. at A72. “Concentrations of these substances
generally vary from place to place as a result of differences in
local or regional emissions and other factors (e.g., topogra-
phy).” /bid. Congress expected that there would be material
differences among the States in their efforts to meet the
NAAQS, and it therefore directed EPA to designate “attain-
ment” and “nonattainment” areas for particular pollutants,
with more stringent requirements generally applying to
nonattainment areas. See 42 U.S.C. 7407(d), 7501-7515.
* As petitioners observe (Br. 3), two prior EPA general counsels had
expressed the view that the agency was authorized to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions under the CAA. See note 1, supra. In denying ICTA’s petition for
rulemaking, however, EPA acknowledged those earlier statements, see Pet.
App. A68, expressly adopted the contrary position, td. at A69, and explained in
detail the bases for that decision, see id. at A68-A80. Under those circum-
stances, EPA's current interpretation of the relevant CAA provisions is
entitled to judicia! deference. See, e.g., National Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699-2700 (2005). Moreover, even
when EPA general counsels believed that the agency possessed the authority
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, EPA nevertheless declined to exercise
that authority. There is consequently an unbroken agency practice of declining
to regulate in this sphere. See pp. 44-45, in/fra. .
24
By contrast, carbon dioxide—the most pervasive anth-
ropogenic greenhouse gas—is well-mixed globally throughout
the atmosphere and persists there for roughly 50 to 200
years. Pet. App. A73. With respect to carbon dioxide emis-
sions, EPA would therefore have no practical basis for distin-
guishing between attainment and nonattainment areas. And
if EPA established a NAAQS for carbon dioxide that called
for a reduction from present concentrations, the entire Na-
tion would be subject to the stringent CAA limitations that
apply to nonattainment areas, even though the success of
state efforts to achieve the applicable standard would depend
on the willingness of foreign governments to undertake paral-
lel measures to reduce worldwide carbon dioxide emissions.
[bid.; see pp. 14-18, supra. “Such a situation would be incon-
sistent with a basic underlying premise of the CAA regime for
implementation of a NAAQS—that actions taken by individ-
ual states and by EPA can generally bring all areas of the
U.S. into attainment of a NAAQS.” /bid.
2. The petition for rulemaking in this case did not request
that EPA promulgate NAAQS for greenhouse gases, but in-
stead sought regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from
new motor vehicles. See J.A. 43. At present, however, the
only practical way of meaningfully reducing motor-vehicle
emissions of the greenhouse gases at issue here is by improv-
ing fuel economy. See Pet. App. A79, A&87; see also 71 Fed.
Reg. 17,654 (2006). Because the emissions limits that peti-
tioners advocate would function in practical effect as fuel-
economy regulations, EPA’s adoption of such limits would
subvert the implementation by the Department of Transpor-
tation (DOT) of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA), 49 U.S.C. 32901-32919. See Pet. App. A77, A79-A80.
In EPCA, “Congress has already created a detailed set of
mandatory standards governing the fuel economy of cars and
light duty trucks, and has authorized DOT—not EPA—to
25
implement those standards.” Pet. App. A79. EPCA offers
automakers substantial flexibility to choose appropriate
methods of meeting fleetwide standards, and it provides for
congressional oversight of standards promulgated by DOT
pursuant to the statute. See id. at A79-A80. The tension
between the EPCA and CAA regimes would be particularly
acute for “non-passenger” vehicles (which include light trucks
and SUVs), for which EPCA requires DOT to set fuel-econ-
omy standards at the “maximum feasible” level. 49 U.S.C.
32902(a); see, e.g., 71 Fed. Reg. 17,588 (2006). An EPA-im-
posed emissions limit that effectively required manufacturers
to satisfy fuel-economy standards above the level determined
by DOT to be the “maximum feasible” would directly clash
with DOT’s administration of EPCA. Based on the consider-
able evidence that Congress intended EPCA to be exclusive,
EPA reasonably concluded that, “[e}ven if [greenhouse gases]
were air pollutants generally subject to regulation under the
CAA, Congress has not authorized the Agency to regulate
[carbon dioxide] emissions from motor vehicles to the extent
such standards would effectively regulate the fuel economy of
passenger cars and light duty trucks.” Pet. App. A79.
Accordingly, greenhouse gas emissions “simply do not
fit,” Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143, within key aspects
of the regulatory regime established by the CAA. The physi-
cal characteristics of carbon dioxide preclude cogent applica-
tion of the NAAQS. And any attempt by EPA to mandate
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehi-
cles would subvert Congress's determination that the EPCA
fuel-economy standards should be exclusive.
26
B. Various Federal Statutes Reflect Congress’s Intent To
‘Obtain Additional Information Before Undertaking Any
Regulation Of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
The Court in Brown & Williamson observed that “the
meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, partic-
ularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more
specifically to the topic at hand.” 529 U.S. at 133. A variety
of statutory provisions, both within the CAA and in other
legislation, have addressed the subjects of carbon dioxide
emissions and global climate change, as well as the analogous
issue of stratospheric ozone depletion. Most of those provi-
sions were enacted far more recently, and are therefore more
probative of the current meaning of the statutory scheme,
than the general CAA provisions on which petitioners rely.
Taken together, those intervening enactments strongly indi-
cate that EPA lacks authority under the CAA in its current
form to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in order to ad-
dress global climate change. See Pet. App. A69-A72.
1. Three provisions added to the CAA in 1990 specifically
refer to carbon dioxide or global warming. Section 103(g)(1)
of the Act refers to carbon dioxide in calling for the develon-
ment of pollution prevention “strategies and technologies.”
See 42 U.S.C. 7403(g)(1). Section 602(e) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
7671a(e), directs EPA to determine and publish the “global
warming potential” of each of several listed substances. And
Section 821 of the CAA Amendments of 1990, see Pub. L. No.
101-549, 104 Stat. 2699 (42 U.S.C. 7651k note), directs EPA to
obtain and make available information concerning carbon
dioxide emissions by certain regulated utilities.
In enacting those provisions, however, Congress ex-
pressly declined to authorize EPA to impose emissions limits.
In five separate places, Section 103(g) of the CAA states that
the “strategies and technologies” developed by EPA are to be
27
“nonregulatory.” See 42 U.S.C. 7403(g), 7403(g)(1)-(4). See-
tion 103(g) further provides that “[nJothing in this subsection
shall be construed to authorize the imposition on any person
of air pollution control requirements.” 42 U.S.C. 7403(g).
Section 602(e) similarly states that the requirement to iden-
tify the global warming potential of various substances “shall
not be construed to be the basis of any additional regulation
under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. 767la(e). And Section 821 of
the CAA Amendments of 1990, like Section 602(e) of the CAA,
is directed solely at information-gathering.
Since these are the only CAA provisions that specifically
address either carbon dioxide emissions or global warming,
and since they provide only for information collection or other
nonregulatory action, they strongly suggest a congressional
understanding that EPA lacks authority under the Act to
- regulate greenhouse gas emissions for the purpose of ad-
dressing global climate change. At a minimum, those provi-
sions reflect acon ressional preference that any general au-
thority EPA might possess in this area not be exercised in a
regulatory manner. Congress’s current preference for non-
regulatory measures is wholly understandable and prudent in
light of the significant complexity and uncertainty surround-
ing this issue and the enormous potential economic and politi-
cal consequences of regulating in this area.
2. Congress has enacted several statutory provisions out-
side the CAA that mandate research and inter-agency coordi-
nation to inform future legislative efforts and negotiations
with foreign governments to address the subject of global
climate change. See Pet. App. A74-A75."" As EPA explained,
The National Climate Program Act, 15 U.S.C. 2901 et seq., called for, inter
alia, “basic and applied research to improve the understanding of climate
processes, natura! and man induced, and the social, economic, and political
implications of climate change.” 15 U.S.C. 2904(d)(2). The Global Climate
Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, §§ 1101-1106, 101 Stat. 1407-1409
28
[with these statutes, Congress sought to develop a foun-
dation for considering whether future legislative action on
global climate change was warranted and, if so, what that
action should be. From federal agencies, it sought recom-
mendations for national policy and further advances in
scientific understanding and possible technological re-
sponses. It did not authorize any federal agency to take
any regulatory action in response to those recommenda-
tions and advances.
Id. at A74. EPA reasonably viewed that pattern of “consis-
tent congressional action to learn more about the global cli-
(15 U.S.C. 2901 note), directed EPA to “develop|] and propos|e] to Congress
a coordinated national policy on global climate change,” § 1103(b), 101 Stat.
1408, and directed EPA and the Department of State to “jointly” report to
Congress on their strategy for achieving “international cooperation to limit
global climate change,” § 1104(3), 101 Stat. 1409. The Global Change Research
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-606, Tit. I, 104 Stat. 3096 (15 U.S.C. 2921-2938),
contained a congressional finding that “human-induced changes, in conjunction
with natural fluctuations, may lead to significant global warming and thus alter
world climate patterns and increase global sea levels.” 15 U.S.C. 2931(a)(2).
The Act established various mechanisms, including the creation of a Committee
on Earth and Environmental Sciences (see 15 U.S.C. 2932), to “provide for
development and coordination of acomprehensive and integrated United States
research program which will assist the Nation and the world to understand,
assess, predict, and respond to human-induced and natural processes of global
change.” 15 U.S.C. 2931(b). The Global Climate Change Prevention Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, §§ 2401-2412, 104 Stat. 4058-4062 (7 U.S.C. 6701 et
seq.), directed the Department of Agriculture to “study the effects of global
climate change on agriculture and forestry.” § 2403(a)(1), 104 Stat. 4059
(7 U.S.C, 6702(a)1)). The Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486,
§§ 1601-1609, 106 Stat. 2999-3008 (42 U.S.C. 13381-13388), directed the
Secretary of Energy to compile, analyze, and report various categories of
information pertaining to global climate change. See, e.g., § 1604, 106 Stat. 3002
(42 U.S.C. 13384) (directing the Secretary to “transmit a report to Congress
containing a comparative assessment of alternative policy mechanisms for
reducing the generation of greenhouse gases”).
29
mate change issue before specifically authorizing regulation
to address it” as strong evidence that the CAA did not al-
ready authorize regulatory activity in this area. Jd. at A75.""
3. The method by which Congress addressed the phenom-
enon of stratospheric ozone depletion is also illuminating.
See Pet. App. A71-A72. “Like global climate change, the
causes and effects of stratospheric ozone depletion are global
in nature. Anthropogenic substances that deplete strato-
spheric ozone are emitted around the world and are very
long-lived; their depleting effects and the consequences of
those effects occur on a global scale.” /bid.; see generally 53
Fed. Reg. 30,566 (1988); 57 Fed. Reg. 33,754 (1992). As EPA
explained, “Congress specifically addressed the problem in a
separate portion of the [CAA] * * * that recognized the
global nature of the problem and called for negotiation of
international agreements to ensure wor!d-wide participation
in research and any control of stratospheric ozone-depleting
substances.” Pet. App. A72."
'' EPA further observed that “Congress declined to adopt other legislative
proposals, contemporaneous with the bills to amend the CAA in 1989 and 19990,
to require [greenhouse gas] emissions reductions from stationary and mobile
sources.” Pet. App. A74-A75. Subsequent to the 1990 amendments to the CAA,
a number of additional bills that would have mandated EPA regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions have been introduced but not enacted. See Gov't
CA. Br. 52-53 & n.22. Of course, Congress may direct EPA to undertake
regulation of greenhouse gases at any time that it sees fit. Absent such explicit
congressional action, however, it would be anomalous for the courts to direct
EPA to take that significant regulatory step, especially against the backdrop
of the actions that Congress has taken in this realm.
In 1977 Congress amended the CAA to add a new Part B, entitled “Ozone
Protection,” to Title I of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. 7450-7459 (1988). Those
provisions were principally focused on developing the information needed to
confirm the theory, understand the effects, and develop methods for control.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 7450, 7453, 7454 (1988). Congress also directed the
President to undertake to enter into international agreements for cooperative
research and regulations, and it provided EPA with specific regulatory
30 E
Thus, in addressing the global problem of stratospheric
ozone depletion, Congress avoided the possibility of piece-
meal regulation by enacting new legislation that was specifi- ~
cally directed at the issue and called for international cooper-
ation. That legislative approach provides persuasive evidence
of Congress’s intent with respect to the analogous issue of
global climate change. As EPA explained, “{i}n light of this
CAA treatment of stratospheric ozone depletion, it would be
anomalous to conclude that Congress intended EPA to ad-
dress global climate change under the CAA’s general regula-
tory provisions, with no provision recognizing the interna-
tional dimension of the issue and any solution, and no express
authorization to regulate.” Pet. App. A72.
4. The history of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened
for signature, Mar. 16, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 32, reinforces EPA’s
conclusion that Congress did not intend the agency to regu-
late greenhouse gas emissions under the CAA. The
Protocol was agreed to in 1997 and generally called for indus-
trialized countries to cut their combined emissions to five
percent below 1990 levels by 2008 to 2012. See U.N. Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol (visited
Oct. 24, 2006) <http://unfeec.int/essential_background/
authority to avoid reasonably anticipated harm to the stratosphere. 42 U.S.C.
7456, 7457 (1988). In 1989, after the discovery of a seasonal hole in the
stratospheric ozone layer over Antarctica in 1985, 29 nations (including the
United States) ratified the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29
(Montreal Protocol), which set limits on the production and consumption of
various substa. ves that contribute to ozone depletion. See generally S. Rep.
No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 383 (1989). In 1990, Congress enacted additional
CAA amendments that repealed Part B of Title I and replaced it with a new
Title V1 establishing a more comprehensive regulatory program, consistent
with the Montreal Protocol, to control substances that deplete stratospheric
ozone and their substitutes. See 42 U.S.C. 7671-7671q.
31
kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php> (Kyoto Website). Although
it was initially signed by the United States, the United States
subsequently made clear that it does not intend to become a
party, and the Protocol was never submitted to the Senate for
advice and consent to ratification. See Pet. App. A75. In-
deed, “the Senate in 1997 adopted by a 97-0 vote the Byrd-
Hagel Resolution,” which expressed the Senate’s opposition
to any international agreement “that would result in serious
harm to the economy of the U.S. or that would mandate new
commitments to limit or reduce U.S. [greenhouse gas] emis-
sions” unless the agreement imposed parallel limitations on
developing countries. /bid. “Congress also attached lan-
guage to appropriations bills that barred EPA from imple-
menting the Kyoto Protocol without Senate ratification.”
Ibid. Those legislative actions reflect the opposition of both
Houses of Congress to any unilateral action by EPA to regu-
late greenhouse gas emissions within the United States."
C. Regulation Of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Within The
United States Would Have Potentially Vast Economic
And Political Consequences
The Court in Brown & Williamson also recognized that,
if Congress intends to authorize an administrative agency to
resolve an issue of great economic and political significance,
“common sense” suggests that Congress will express that
intent with reasonable specificity. See 529 U.S. at 133, 100.
* Although the Kyoto Protocol was agreed to in 1997, it did not come into
effect among its foreign signatories until February 2005 (well after the EPA
decision at issue here), see Kyoto Website, and its efficacy remains the subject
of intense political and scientific debate. See, e.g., <http://www.state.gov/
secretary/rm/2006/73913.htm > (Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice states that
“the Kyoto targets are not being met” and that, “[e]ven if they were met, with-
out China and India covered by Kyoto you're not going to deal with greenhouse
gas emissions in an effective way.”).
32
That concern applies with particular force in the instant case.
As EPA explained,
[ijt is hard to imagine any issue in the environmental area
having greater “economic and political” significance than
regulation of activities that might lead to global climate
change. Virtually every sector of the U.S. economy is
either directly or indirectly a source of [greenhouse gas]
emissions, and the countries of the world are involved in
scientific, technical, and political-level discussions about
climate change.
Pet. App. A76; see id. at A76-A77 (explaining that
_anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions are the direct result
of the production of energy from fossil fuels—the power
source for nearly all modes of transportation and approxi-
mately 70 percent of the electricity in this country).
Although the petition for rulemaking in this case sought
the imposition of greenhouse gas emissions limits only with
respect to new motor vehicles, the thrust of petitioners’ argu-
ment is that greenhouse gases are literally encompassed by
the CAA definition of “air pollutant” and must therefore be so
regarded for purposes of all the Act’s provisions. See, e.g.,
Pet. Br. 12, 17. Moreover, given the global character of the
problem to be addressed and the pervasive use of fossil fuels
throughout the United States economy, Congress cannot rea-
sonably be thought to have intended that EPA would regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles but from
no other source—particularly when the establishment of fuel-
economy requirements for motor vehicles is entrusted to a
different federal agency (see pp. 24-25, supra). In assessing
Congress’s intent in light of the economic and political signifi-
cance of the decision it was called upon to make, EPA there-
fore appropriately considered the practical ramifications of
regulating greenhouse gas emissions generally.
33
D. EPA’s Interpretation Of The CAA’s Text Is Reasonable
Based on the considerations described above, EPA deter-
mined that “the CAA does not authorize regulation to address
concerns about global climate change.” Pet. App. A78. Ex-
amining the text of the statutory provisions upon which peti-
tioners relied, EPA further determined that “(greenhouse
gases], as such, are not air pollutants under the CAA’s regula-
tory provisions, including sections 108, 109, 111, 112 and 202,”
and that “the term ‘air pollution’ as used in the regulatory
provisions cannot be interpreted to encompass global climate
change.” /bid. EPA explained (ibid.) that the term “air pol-
lutant” is defined in Section 302(g) of the CAA to mean “any
air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including
any physical, chemical, biological, [or] radioactive * * *
substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters
the ambient air,” 42 U.S.C. 7602(g), and that greenhouse
gases are not “agents” of air pollution for regulatory pur-
poses because they do not cause cognizable “pollution” within
the scope of the Act’s regulatory provisions. Pet. App. A78.
Petitioners suggest (Br. 11) that EPA’s construction of
the CAA is suspect because the agency discussed other indi-
cia of congressional intent before parsing the language of
Sections 202 and 302(g). That is incorrect. EPA’s conclusion
as to the limits of its regulatory authority was firmly rooted
in the text of enacted laws, including laws that specifically
address global climate change and the analogous problem of
stratospheric ozone depletion. The agency’s approach was
thus consistent with the “fundamental canon of statutory
construction that the words of a statute must be read in their
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme.” Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of the Treasury, 489 U.S.
803, 809 (1989). Petitioners are wrong in suggesting (Br. 23)
that EPA should have disregarded the other statutory indicia
34
of congressional intent on the ground that those laws were
enacted after Sections 202 and 302(g) of the CAA. As the
Court observed in Brown & Williamson, “the meaning of one
statute may be affected by other Acts, particularly where
Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to
the topic at hand.” 529 U.S. at 133. In light of the Court’s
teaching in Brown & Williamson, it was hardly ultra vires for
EPA to consider such potentially relevant laws in construing
the CAA’s earlier-enacted regulatory provisions.
Petitioners are also wrong in contending (Br. 12) that
EPA’s interpretation “ignore[s] * * * the plain text” of Sec-
tion 302(g). In petitioner’s view, the st» utory phrase “any air
pollution agent or combination of such agents” is essentially
superfluous, because anything that could be viewed as falling
with the subsequent “including” phrase, standing alone, nec-
essarily qualifies as an “air pollutant.” But EPA reasonably
rejected that view, in favor of an interpretation that gives “air
pollution agent” independent meaning. Pet. App. A79 n.3.
There is no textual difficulty in that approach, under which
the “including” phrase merely illustrates the kinds of sub-
stances that can qualify as “air pollution agents” without also
mandating inclusion of substances that do not, in the agency’s
expert view, contribute to “air pollution.” The phrase “any
American automobile, including any truck or minivan,” would
not naturally be construed to encompass a foreign-manufac-
tured minivan, and the same principle governs here.
Petitioners further contend (Br. 16-17) that, because car-
bon dioxide is specifically identified as an “air pollutant” for
purposes of Section 103(g)(1) of the CAA (42 U.S.C.
7403(g)(1)), it is necessarily an “air pollutant” for purposes of
Section 202(a)(1) as well. That inference is unwarranted.
“Although [the Court] generally presume(s] that identical
words used in different parts of the same act are intended to
have the same meaning, * * * the presumption is not rigid,
35
and the meaning of the same words well may vary to meet the
purposes of the law.” United States v. Cleveland Indians
Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 213 (2001) (citations, brackets, and
internal quotation marks omitted). Section 103(g) of the CAA
uses the word “nonregulatory” five times, and it states that
“(njothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize
the imposition on any person of air pollution control require-
ments.” 42 U.S.C. 7403(g). Treating carbon dioxide as an
“air pollutant” under Section 103(g)(1) and other nonregu-
latory provisions but not under Section 202(a)(1) is consistent
with Congress’s overall strategy of assimilating information
about global climate change and possible responses thereto as
a predicate for future action.
lil. EPA REASONABLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN
DETERMINING THAT, EVEN IF IT POSSESSED STAT-
UTORY AUTHORITY IN THIS SPHERE, IT WOULD
DECLINE TO EXERCISE THAT AUTHORITY AT THE
PRESENT TIME
Even assuming that EPA possesses the statutory author-
ity to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles to address global climate change, the agency reason-
ably exercised its discretion in declining to do so at this time.
EPA identified a variety of sound and appropriate rea-
sons—including the complex and highly uncertain nature of
the scientific record, the agency’s desire to have the benefit
of ongoing research, and the iuadvisability of piecemeal regu-
lation to address an issue of global magnitude at a time when
the President and Congress are seeking to develop a compre-
hensive approach—in support of that conclusion. See Pet.
App. A80-A92. Petitioners acknowledge (Br. 10, 41) that the
“scientific uncertainty” surrounding global climate change is
relevant to EPA’s decision whether to regulate in this sphere.
Petitioners nevertheless contend (Br. 35-48) that, if EPA is
36
authorized to regul<te greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles, Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA requires that the
decision whether to exercise that authority must be based
solely on scientific evidence concerning the likelihood of en-
dangerment to the public health or welfare, and that EPA’s
consideration of additional factors was unlawful. For several
reasons, that argument lacks merit.
A. Federal Agencies Have Broad Discretion To Decline
To Initiate Rulemakings, Even When The Governing
Law Would Authorize Regulation
Under established principles of administrative law, an
Executive Branch agency generally “has considerable discre-
tion in responding to requests to institute proceedings or to
promulgate rules, even though it possesses the authority to do
so should it see fit. Administrative rule making does not ordi-
narily comprehend any rights in private parties to compel an
agency to institute such proceedings or promulgate rules.”
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 479
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted). As the District of Columbia Circuit has explained:
An agency’s discretionary decision not to regulate a given
activity is inevitably based, in large measure, on factors
not inherently susceptible to judicial resolution—e.g., in-
ternal management considerations as to budget and per-
sonnel; evaluations of its own competence; weighing of
competing policies within a broad statutory framework.
* * * Further, even if an agency considers a particular
problem worthy of regulation, it may determine for rea-
sons lying within its special expertise that the time for
action has not yet arrived. * * * The area may be one of
such rapid technological development that regulations
would be outdated by the time they could become effec-
tive, or the scientific state of the art may be such that
37
sufficient data are not yet available on which to premise
adequate regulations.
NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citations
omitted). Those considerations are directly applicable here.
Precisely because a federal agency’s decision not to com-
mence a rulemaking may be based on discretionary consider-
ations unrelated to the agency’s legal authority to act, the
District of Columbia Circuit has long recognized that a partic-
ularly deferential standard applies on judicial review of such
a decision.'* That court has described its role in reviewing
denials of rulemaking petitions as “limited to ensuring that
the agency has adequately explained the facts and policy con-
cerns it relied on, and that the facts have some basis in the
record.” National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v.
DOE, 851 F.2d 1424, 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
Thus, “[iJt is only in the rarest and most compelling of cir-
cumstances that thie] court has acted to overturn an agency
judgment not to institute rulemaking.” WWHT, Inc. v. FCC,
656 F.2d 807, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
This Court’s decision in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821
(1985), reinforces the appropriateness of a deferential stan-
dard in this sphere. Chaney held that an agency’s refusal to
commence an enforcement proceeding is not ordinarily sub-
" See, e.g., Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc. v. FERC, 388
F.3d 908, 910-911 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[W Je will overturn an agency’s decision not
to initiate a rulemaking only for compelling cause.”) (citation omitted);
National Mining Ass'n v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 70 F.3d 1345,
1352 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[A jn agency's refusal to initiate a rulemaking is evaluat-
ed with deference so broad as to make the process akin to nonreviewability.”)
(citation omitted); 7impinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating
that such challenges will be upheld “only in the rarest and most compelling of
circumstances”) (citations omitted); General Motors Corp. v. National High-
way Traffic Safety Admin. , 898 F 2d 165, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (judicial review
is “especially narrow” in such circumstances).
38
ject to judicial review at all. See id. at 828-835. The Court
observed that “an agency decision not to enforce often in-
volves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which
are peculiarly within its expertise,” including the agency’s
assessments concerning the manner in which its limited re-
sources can most effectively be allocated. /d. at 831. The
Court also noted that, “when an agency refuses to act it gen-
erally does not exercise its coercive power over an individual's
liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon
areas that courts often are called upon to protect.” /d. at 832.
Those observations are equally applicable to an agency’s deci-
sion not to commence a rulemaking. See American Horse
Protection Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
This Court’s decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , 463
U.S. 29 (1983), reinforces the conclusion that an agency’s re-
fusal to initiate rulemaking must be reviewed under a particu-
larly deferential standard. The Court in Motor Vehicle Man-
ufacturers specifically rejected the contention that “the re-
scission of an agency rule should be judged by the same stan-
dard a court would use to judge an agency’s refusal to pro-
mulgate a rule in the first place.” /d. at 41. The Court ex-
plained that “the revocation of an extant regulation is sub-
stantially different than a failure to act” because “[rJevocation
The Court in Chaney noted that the case did “not involve the question of
agency discretion not to invoke rulemaking proceedings,” 470 U.S. at 825 n.2,
and the Court accordingly did not address that question. In American Horse
Protection Ass'n, the District of Columbia Circuit determined that “Chaney
* * * does not appear to overrule (the court of appeals’] prior decisions
allowing review of agency refusals to institute rulemakings.” 812 F.2d at 4.
The court also explained, however, that “[rjeview under the ‘arbitrary and ca-
pricious’ tag line * * * encompasses a range of levels of deference to the
agency, * * * and Chaney surely reinforces our frequent statements that an
agency's refusal to institute rulemaking proceedings is at the high end of the
range.” /d. at 4-5 (citation omitted).
39
constitutes a reversal of the agency’s former views as to the
proper course.” /bid. The Court concluded that “an agency
changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply
a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be
required when an agency does not act in the first instance.”
Id. at 42. That statement logically implies that an agency's
refusal to initiate rulemaking should be reviewed under a
more deferential standard than would apply to an agency’s
alteration of its regulatory scheme.
B. Section 202(a)(1) Of The CAA Does Not Impose Any
Timetable For Determining Whether Greenhouse
Gas Emissions From New Motor Vehicles Would
Meet The Statutory Endangerment Standard
Under background principles of administrative law, agen-
cies are presumptively free to base decisions not to initiate
rulemaking on a broad range of discretionary factors. See pp.
36-39, supra. In unusual circumstances, however, Congress
sometimes limits that customary discretion by (for example)
requiring an agency to determine within a particular time
period whether specified conditions are satisfied, and to con-
duct a rulemaking if those conditions are met. In light of
general principles of administrative law and the Executive's
-general discretion under the Take Care Clause of the Consti-
tution, see Art. II, § 3, cl. 4, such limitations should be con-
strued narrowly. See pp. 39-45, infra. Petitioners contend
(e.g., Br. 35-36) that, under Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA (42
U.S.C. 7521(a)(1)), the only factor EPA could properly con-
sider in determining whether to grant their petition for
rulemaking was whether greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles meet the statutory standard for endangerment
of public health or welfare. That claim lacks merit.
1. Section 202(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:
40
The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and
from time to time revise) in accordance with the provi-
sions of this section, standards applicable to the emission
of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judg-
ment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may rea-
sonably be anticipated to endanger public health or wel-
fare.
42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1) (emphasis added). The use of “shall”
indicates that, if EPA “in [its] judgment” determines that
particular pollutant emissions from new motor vehicles cause
air pollution that “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare,” the agency must “prescribe * * *
standards.”
Petitioners, however, do not contend that EPA has made
a determination that the statutory endangerment standard is
satisfied, thereby triggering a mandatory duty to issue stan-
dards, and yet has nevertheless declined to regulate.”
With respect to the source of EPA’s purported obligation to prescribe
standards in this area, the petition for rulemaking alleged that the agency had
previously determined that the endangerment standard was satisfied. See J.A.
16, 18, 21, 35, 41. The principal theory of the rulemaking petition was that,
“Thlaving already made formal findings that the emission of | greenhouse gases]
from mobile sources poses actual or potential harmful effects [on] the public
health or welfare, the Administrator must exercise her authority to regulate
the emissions of [greenhouse gases] from new motor vehicles under
§ 202(a)(1).” J.A. 41 (footnote omitted). In denying the petition for rulemaking,
however, EPA explained that none of the materials cited in that petition
constituted a formal finding by the Administrator that greenhouse gas
emissions satisfy the endangerment standard. Pet. App. A81. EPA further
noted that, even “if the Administrator were to find that [greenhouse gases}, in
general, may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,”
it would not necessarily follow that greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles satisfy the endangerment standard set forth in Section 202(a)(1). See
ibid. In this Court, petitioners do not press the contention that the Administra-
41
Rather, petitioners’ argument (e.g., Br. 38) is that the agency
acted unlawfully by denying the rulemaking petition without
deciding whether greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.” Nothing in Section 202(a)(1), however,
requires EPA to make such a determination at any particular
time. To the contrary, the provision emphasizes the Adminis-
trator’s ability to exercise his “judgment,” which presumably
includes the judgment that this issue is not yet ripe for deter-
mination. Thus, absent a formal judgment by the Administra-
tor that greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles
can be expected to cause endangerment, the agency retained
its traditional flexibility to base its denial of the rulemaking
petition on a broad range of discretionary factors."’
Adherence to the plain terms of Section 202(a)(1) pro-
duces a sensible result. Use of the word “shall” in Section
202(a)(1) reflects a congressional judgment that, once EPA
has devoted the resources necessary to determine whether
tor has already made the sort of formal endangerment finding that would
trigger the duty to prescribe standards under Section 202(a)(1).
'? While arguing that EPA was required to resolve the question of endanger-
ment, petitioners do not specify when or how that duty to decide arose.
Petitioners recite the statutory endangerment standard and construe Section
202(a)(1) to require “that the Administrator ‘shall’ regulate air pollutants
satisfying this criterion.” Pet. Br. 36. That formulation suggests that EPA is
in breach of its statutory obligations whenever the agency has failed to
prescribe standards for particular motor-vehicie pollutant emissions that in
fact “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42
U.S.C. 7521(a)(1). In addition to imposing a duty of omniscience that no agency
could satisfy, that construction of Section 202(a)(1) would render the phrase “in
his judgment” superfluous. Alternatively, petitioners might contend that
EPA’s purported obligation to decide the endangerment question was
triggered by the filing of ICTA’s petition for rulemaking. But since nothing in
the CAA provides for the filing of a rulemaking petition in these circumstances,
it is diffieult to see how ICTA’s petition could narrow the regulatory options
previously available to the agency.
42
particular emissions cause air pollution that may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger the public health or welfare, and
has concluded that the statutory endangerment standard is
satisfied, the directive that EPA must prescribe standards is
an acceptable constraint on the agency’s usual rulemaking
discretion. But requiring the agency to conduct the neces-
sary inquiries and to determine whether the endangerment
standard is satisfied with respect to a potentially unbounded
range of pollutants, even when EPA has concluded for other
reasons that regulation of particular emissions is unwar-
ranted, would entail a much more severe intrusion on the
agency’s customary flexibility to set its own priorities. Ab-
sent a clear indication in the statutory text, this Court should
not infer that Congress intended to mandate so sharp a de-
parture from background principles of administrative law.
And, because Section 202(a)(1) is at a minimum ambiguous on
this issue, EPA’s reasonable interpretation of the statutory
language is entitled to deference under Chevron.
2. The statutory scheme as a whole reinforces the literal
interpretation of Section 202(a)(1). Some provisions of the
CAA specify deadlines by which EPA is to study analogous
“endangerment” questions. Others provide specific direc-
tion for presentation and consideration of petitions and other
types of submissions to the agency.” And while the Act di-
* See, e.g.,42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(1) (regarding initial list of criteria pollutants);
42 U.S.C. 7411(b)(1)(A) (regarding initial list of categories of stationary
sources); 42 U.S.C. 7547(a), 7548 (regarding studies of nonroad engines and
vehicle emissions and motor vehicle particulate matter emissions, respectively).
" See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 7407(d)(3) (process and timing for redesignation of air
quality control regions), 741k) (process and timing for EPA review of state
implementation plan submissions), 7411(g) (substantive and timing criteria for
applications by States for revision of new source performance standards and
EPA responses thereto), 7412(b)(3) and (4) (timing and other requirements
relating to petitions to modify the CAA list of hazardous pollutants and agency
responses thereto), 7585(b)(2) (six-month deadline to respond to any petition
—o
45
rects EPA to review and (as may be appropriate) revise exist-
ing NAAQS at five-year intervals, 42 U.S.C. 7409(d)(1), Sec-
tion 202(a)(1) simply directs EPA to revise mobile source
emission standards “from time to time.” 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1);
ef. American Lung Ass'n v. Reilly, 962 F.2d 258, 263 (2d Cir.
1992) (contrasting statutorily-prescribed “indefinite intervals,
such as ‘from time to time,’” with “bright-line deadlines” such
as “at five-year intervals”). The existence of other CAA pro-
visions that establish specific deadlines or require the agency
to respond to submissions from private parties highlights the
absence of any similar requirement in Section 202(a)(1). See,
¢.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
3. Consistent with the foregoing principles, the full Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit explained 30 years ago that the “ex-
press provision for administrative discretion via the ‘judg-
ment’ phrase [in Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA] is necessary”
precisely because Section 202(a)(1) requires EPA to initiate
rulemaking once it makes a determination of “endanger-
{ment]” to health or welfare. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,
20 n.37 (en bane), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). Other
court of appeals decisions have recognized that EPA pos-
sesses broad discretion to decide whether and when to make
analogous threshold regulatory determinations under simi-
larly structured provisions of the CAA.” The District of Co-
seeking a determination that criteria for revised standards for certain vehicles
have been met), 7661d(b)(2) (process relating to petitions objecting to state
CAA operating permits).
” See New York Pub. Interest Research Group v. Whitman, 321 F.3d 316,
330-331 (2d Cir. 2003) (EPA has discretion whether or not to make the
threshold “determination” regarding deficiencies in state operating permit
_ programs under Section 502(i) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7661a(i)); /er Majesty the
Queen in Right of Ont. v. United States EPA, 912 F 2d 1525, 1533-1535 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (EPA has discretion to determine whether and when to make the
threshold finding under Section 115(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7415(a), as to the
existence of “reason to believe” that emissions from sources in the United
44
lumbia Circuit has held, in particular, that EPA may properly
defer making an endangerment determination while it waits
for additional scientific and technical studies to be completed.
See Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ont. v. EPA, 912 F.2d
1525, 1533-1534 (1990). EPA’s construction of Section
202(a)(1) is thus consistent not only with generally applicable
background principles of administrative law, but with appel-
late decisions applying those principles to the CAA.
4. As noted above (see notes 1 & 9, supra), EPA’s deter-
mination that it lacks authority to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions to address global climate change reflects a depar-
ture from the position taken by two prior EPA general coun-
sels. EPA’s discretionary decision not to exercise any author-
ity it might possess, however, is fully consistent with previous
agency pronouncements under prior Administrators. In 1999
and 2000, EPA informed Congress that, while it construed the
CAA to authorize regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, it
had no present intention of exercising that authority. See
J.A. 80, 91, 101, 106, 108. The agency stated that “[t}he use of
EPA’s legal authorities involves adherence to specified legal
and technical procedural steps, as well as discretion as to
when to initiate applying this additional authority.” J.A.
106 (emphasis added). The agency further explained that,
“{als EPA has no current plans to propose regulations for
{carbon dioxide}, EPA has not evaluated the strength of the
technical and legal basis for [endangerment] findings under
any particular provision of the Act.” J.A. 91. Those state-
ments (which were made after ICTA’s petition for rulemaking
had been filed with the agency) unambiguously reflect EPA’s
States are endangering health or welfare in another country); NRDC v.
Thomas, 885 F.2d 1067, 1073-1075 (2d Cir. 1989) (EPA has discretion in
exercising its “judgment” as to whether emissions of hazardous)air pollutants
“may reasonably be anticipated” to result in certain types of illnesses under
then-existing version of CAA Section 112(aX1), 42 U.S.C. 7412(a)(1) (1988)).
45
~
consistent position that it is under no legal obligation to de-
termine, on any particular timetable, whether greenhouse gas
emissions satisfy the endangerment standard.
¢. EPA’s Denial Of The Rulemaking Petition In This
Case Reflects A Reasonable Exercise Of Agency Dis-
cretion
Based on a variety of considerations, EPA concluded that,
even if the CAA authorized it to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles for the purpose of ad-
dressing global climate change, the agency would decline to
exercise that authority at the present time. Petitioners’ chal-
lenge to that discretionary decision is premised solely on
their contention that Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA required
the agency to determine, based on scientific evidence alone,
whether such emissions may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare. Because Section 202(a)(1)
imposes no such requirement, EPA’s denial of the rulemaking
petition in this case should be sustained. Even assuming that
EPA’s balancing of the relevant discretionary factors was
subject to judicial review at all, EPA’s denial of the
rulemaking petition was wholly rational and easily satisfies
the deferential standard of review that courts have applied to
agency refusals to undertake regulatory activity.”
1. It is undeniable that the “science of climate change is
extraordinarily complex and still evolving.” Pet. App. A83.
As the court of appeals recognized, EPA properly relied upon
an authoritative analysis by the National Research Council
(NRC) as supporting the agency’s view that any decision
whether to regulate in this area would be better made after
* Because EPA's exercise of discretion clearly satisfies such standard of
review, this Court need not resolve the question left open in Chaney as to
whether an agency’s decision not to invoke rulemaking in such circumstances
is subject to judicial review at all. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 825 n.2.
46
further research was conducted into critical areas of current
scientific uncertainty. See id. at All-A13, A83-A85. The
NRC concluded that “[g]reenhouse gases are accumulating in
Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing
surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures
to rise.” J.A. 151. As EPA highlighted, however, the NRC
further observed that “[tjhe understanding of the relation-
ships between weather/climate and human health is in its
infancy and therefore the health consequences of climate
change are poorly understood.” Pet. App. A84.
Consistent with the NRC report, EPA explained:
[P]redicting future climate change necessarily involves a
complex web of economic and physical factors including:
our ability to predict future global anthropogenic emis-
sions of [greenhouse gases] and aerosols; the fate of these
emissions once they enter the atmosphere (e.g., what per-
centage are absorbed by vegetation or taken up by the
oceans); the impact of those emissions that remain in the
atmosphere on the radiative properties of the atmo-
sphere; changes in critically important climate feedbacks
(e.g., changes in cloud cover and ocean circulation);
changes in temperature characteristics (e.g., average tem-
peratures, shifts in daytime and evening temperatures);
changes in other climatic parameters (e.g., shifts in pre-
cipitation, storms); and ultimately the impact of such
changes on human health and welfare (e.g., increases or
decreases in agricultural productivity, human health im-
pacts).
Pet. App. A&83-A8&4.
EPA then identified five specific areas of ongoing re-
search that would be necessary to reduce “the wide range of
uncertainty inherent in current model predictions.” Pet. App.
47
A84.” Those studies are ongoing and are expected to be com-
pleted in the next few years. EPA further explained that the
President’s comprehensive global climate change strategy is
based on a wide variety of policy tools to address climate
change through a “sustained effort, over many generations.”
Id. at A&85. Those measures include tax incentives, public-
private partnerships, and major technology research, devel-
opment, and deployment initiatives that would reduce the
economy’s reliance on fossil fuels, supported by the Presi-
dent’s 2003 budget request for $4.5 billion for programs re-
lated to global climate change. /d. at A88-A91. Because “es-
tablishing [greenhouse gas] emission standards for U.S. mo-
tor vehicles at this time would require EPA to make scientific
and technical judgments without the benefit of the studies
being developed to reduce uncertainties and advance technol-
ogies,” id. at A85, the agency reasonably concluded that,
“{uJntil more is understood about the causes, extent and sig-
nificance of climate change and the potential options for ad-
dressing it, * * * it is inappropriate to regulate [greenhouse
gas] emissions from motor vehicles,” id. at A86.”
™ Those areas of research were (1) “{tJhe future global use of fossil fuels and
future global emissions of methane”; (2) “[t }he fraction of fossil fuel carbon that
will remain in the atmosphere and contribute to radiative forcing versus
exchange with the oceans or with the land biosphere”; (3) “[t]he impacts (either
positive or negative) of climate change on regional and local systems”; (4) “(t]he
nature and causes of natural variability of climate and its interactions with
human-induced changes”; and (5) “[t/he direct and indirect effects of the
changing distribution of aerosols.” Pet. App. A84.
> As petitioners correctly explain (Br. 41-42), EPA's broad discretion under
Section 202 of the CAA includes the authority to regulate notwithstanding the
existence of some scientific uncertainty as to the likely effects of particular
categories of emissions. See Ethyl, 541 F 2d at 27-28. The fact that EPA may
regulate in the face of uncertainty, however, does not preclude the agency from
deferring regulation pending the acquisition of additional information.
48
2. EPA also properly took account of other legal and pol-
icy implications of any decision to undertake the requested
regulatory action. See Pet. App. Al3-Al4. EPA explained
that initiation of the proposed rulemaking would
result in an inefficient, piecemeal approach to addressing
the climate change issue. The U.S. motor vehicle fleet is
one of many sources of [greenhouse gas] emissions both
here and abroad, and different [greenhouse gas] emission
sources face different technologica! challenges in reducing
emissions. A sensible regulatory scheme would require
that all significant sources and sinks of [greenhouse gas]
emissions be considered in deciding how best to achieve
any needed emission reductions.
Id. at A85-A86. The agency also properly considered the
present dearth of practical mechanisms to address green-
house gas emissions from motor vehicles, particularly given
DOT’s statutory responsibility for establishing fuel-economy
standards. Pet. App. A86-A87; see Her Majesty the Queen,
912 F.2d at 1533-1534 (recognizing that consideration of avail-
able “remedial procedures” is appropriate in deciding
whether to make an endangerment finding under Section 115
of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7415).
3. EPA also expressed reservations about the foreign
policy implications of any unilateral attempt to set domestic
greenhouse gas emission standards at this time.” The agency
* Petitioners and their amici suggest that it was inappropriate for EPA to
consider the potential international implications of regulating greenhouse
gases. But EPA has direct familiarity with the Executive’s foreign policy
on global climate change. In addition, EPA is periodically involved in dis-
cussions with the Department of State on this issue, and the two agencies
have entered into multilateral and bilateral agreements with other countries
on matters relating to global climate change. See<http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/policy/internationalcooperation.html > (visited Oct. 24, 2006).
Moreover, Congress has specifically recognized EPA's familiarity with such
49
observed that unilateral regulation could “weaken U.S. ef-
forts to persuade key developing countries to reduce the
[greenhouse gas] intensity of their economies,” and that
“{ajny potential benefit of EPA regulation could be lost to the
extent other nations decided to let their emissions signifi-
cantly increase in view of U.S. emission reductions.” Pet.
App. A86. Those concerns were premised in part on EPA’s
experience with efforts to control the phenomenon of strato-
spheric ozone depletion. See id. at A86 n.5; note 7, supra.
Particularly given the complexity and global nature of the
climate change issue, it would be inappropriate for a court to
set aside the Executive Branch’s judgment as to the likely
effects of domestic regulation on its active efforts to encour-
age the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in foreign
countries—where the vast majority of worldwide greenhouse
gas emissions are produced.
4. Finally, the considerations that led EPA to conclude
that it lacks regulatory authority in this sphere further sup-
port the reasonableness of the agency’s decision not to exer-
cise any such power that it might possess. The agency ex-
plained that key CAA regulatory mechanisms are ill-suited to
greenhouse gas emissions (see pp. 23-25, supra); that current
congressional policy favors further study and assimilation of
data as a predicate for future legislation or international
agreements (see pp. 26-31, supra); and that the economic and
political significance of greenhouse gas regulation counsels
hesitation in the absence of clear congressional guidance (see
pp. 31-32, supra). Even if EPA is found to possess authority
international efforts. In the Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, for
instance, Congress directed EPA to submit, “jointly” with the Secretary of
State, an “assessment of United States efforts to gain international cooperation
in limiting global climate change,” and “a description of the strategy by which
the United States intends to seek further international cooperation to limit
global climate change.” § 1104(2) and (3), 101 Stat. 1409 (15 U.S.C. 2901 note).
50
under current law to regulate greenhouse gas emissions for
the purpose of addressing global climate change, those fac-
tors would be directly relevant to the agency’s discretionary
decision whether to exercise such authority. Considering
those factors and the others discussed above, there is no basis
for the Court to override EPA’s judgment and require the
‘agency to undertake regulation in this context.
In sum, this Court need not question the “seriousness”
(Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161) of the complex issues
surrounding global climate change. But, applying settled
principles of administrative law, the Court should defer to the
expert agency’s judgment that now is not the time to embark
on the regulatory path that petitioners desire.
CONCLUSION
The case should be remanded to the court of appeals with
instructions to dismiss the petitions for review for lack of
jurisdiction. In the alternative, the judgment of the court of
appeals should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
PAUL D. CLEMENT
Solicitor General
SUE ELLBN WOOLDRIDGE
Assistant Attorney General
GREGORY G. GARRE
THOMAS G. HUNGAR
— ay eee 9 sem J a Deputy Solicitors General
ey Sev onsa sate eat MALCOLM L. STEWART
CAROL S. HOLMES Assistant to the Solicitor
auerney om ” General
nsirenmentel Praetiee aaa aes
Attorney
OCTOBER 2006
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