Opposition Brief — Massachusetts v. EPA

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No. 05-1120

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL..

Petitioners.

Y.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET

Al...

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT UTILITY AIR

REGULATORY GROUP IN OPPOSITION

NORMAN W. FICHTHORN

(Counsel of Record)

LUCINDA MINTON LANGWORTHY

ALLISON D. Wood

HUNTON & WiLtiAMs LLP

1900 K Street. N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 955-1500

Counsel for Respondent

ILSON-EPES PRINTING

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

The Utility. Air Regulatory Group (“UARG”) ts a not-for-

profit association of individual electric generating companies

and national trade associations that participate collectively in

administrative proceedings under the Clean Air Act, and in

litigation arising from those proceedings, that affect electric

generators. .UARG has no outstanding shares or debt

securities in the hands of the public and has no parent

company. No publicly held company has a 10% or greater

ownership interest in UARG.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ee i Fe i accrcccticcnencscssesintinscsccnnsavosivieddngiiotains 1V

STATEMENT OF THE CASE........c:cccscsssssscscsescssessssensesssesssee l

TET casiaiesdbslstpscincaninicneincenjesiitensdiciningsiesaieanidnananasiuniiiahaunmnedes 4

I. THE LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED ARE

UNREMARKABLE AND DO NOT

WARRANT REVIEW BY THIS COURT .........000.0.0..2. 4

A. — The Court of Appeals’ Decision Is Fully

Consistent with Established Principles

of Administrative Law Governing

Review of Denials of Rulemaking

PE iiinidaticibnianenlauisstatenseld sheapehaneniigiedceteséariabiciniie 5

B. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Is Fully

Consistent with the Clean Air Act and

Case Law Construing That Act ................cesesceeeeeees 9

II. CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT HAVE

ACTED TO ADDRESS GLOBAL CLIMATE

TUITE ssecseisiediisastniihceadetademaiabentabdsenbtenbisantediiteediitadaiialdeiigeeinigten 14

TIT vitscicctccistsiierinsinsisiviicinpinnaienageiansiiiaseiliianahaninitibiaaatliii 19

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Action for Children’s Television v. FCC,

oe LF of . ; 7, RR an rn 7,14

American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Lyng,

74 PB BL oe - , een ware 5, 7,8

Cellnet Communications, Inc. v. FCC,

eB a ees re 5

Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA,

rae as Gale SPE ciceiscieseicntcvessnesonnsiiveninsin 13

Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,

P08 Fe 6 Se Ce TOD nscasscntenicsccecasiincesee 9,10, 13

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120 (2000) ................. ssalbniatuaipenaeiennvianeibiecegiaie l

Massachusetts v. EPA,

rk gh eT sill i. passim

NRDC v. SEC,

606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) oe 6, 7, 8, 14

Timpinaro v. SEC,

es Gs HOD vesineciencintncemsasmicstineseesdntnsse 5

WWHT, Inc. v. FCC,

656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ..............ccccccseesees passim

STATUTES

es A I ciccintsliacinsbcinstisbiidpuismaiiicipascad daiadhees ceadiuabaiiacaidinios 8

DOO 6 UN I nasa cicincesschececssaceseccninnste 15,17

Le La LS a ae TR 15

Se es ee Pe icnscnesisinhidecnicmisssiinecaeciveteischeien 15

iV

42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000)......c.cecccseccseessseesseesseeen 1,2,9

42 U.S.C. § 1336266) (2ODO) ......o.-scvscceseces!taesccvsernsenpessones 16

42 USC. 6 150C III. cicero 16

42 UBL. 6 199D6 CII ocosicciecsccsruene 16

49 U.S.C. §§ 32901-32919 (2000) ...ccccccsecsseesssecsneessesenneee 2

Re A 1), ee ee: 15

Pub. L. No. 100-204 (1987)......cc-ccesccecccssesseesseessscssecesueeen 17

Pub. L. No. 101-549 (1990).....ccccccessssscssscssescsecsssessueeseeeen 15

Pub. L. No. 101-606 (1990).........c.ccccsccesssocccseecsesssecsseceenes 15

Pub. L. No. 101-624 (1990).....ccccccsssecsseesseessescscsseenees 14, 15

Pub. L. No. 102-486 (1992).....ccscccesscescsssessesssucssseeeeees 15, 16

Pet B.. Bl: BOUB0 CODD scinssinsssseosscessetsbnceslenaslunenaien 16

FEDERAL REGISTER

Control of Emissions from New Highway

Vehicles and Engines, Notice of denial of petition

for rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922 (Sept. 8,

SO irisnviisnnnislignnnpigiviegiaiade passim

Guidelines for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas

Reporting, 71 Fed. Reg. 20784 (Apr. 21, 2006)............... 16

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

149 Cong. Rec. $13598 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 2003)............ 16

151 Cong. Rec. $6892 (daily ed. June 21, 2005)............. 16

H.R. Rep. No. 102-474 (1992)........cccccccccscesrorecsesereess 16, 17

FRG. POD. FS — FSD CFG Fe tics ssccsiscesscnscsesscsreonenetasmeniasainiian 15

5. ave. 9G, 308” Camas CIO F A. sicicccsctcccemdcnns 17

MISCELLANEOUS

Charter for the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean

Development and Climate (Jan. 2006) ...............0... 18

National Research Council, Climate Change

Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions

ERTS Se CREO ODEON ER 2, 3, 11, 12, 13

Transcript, President Bush Discusses Global —

Climate Change (June 11, 2001).............0..0000. 17, 18

United Nations Framework Convention on

Climate Change Homepage.................:::ccceseceeeeeseeees 17

White House Fact Sheet, Action on Climate

Change, Energy and Sustainable

Development (July 8, 2005) .0.............ceceeeeeeeeseereeeeeees 18

White House Fact Sheet, President Bush and the

Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean

Development (July 27, 2005) .00...........cccceeeeeeeee 18,19

vl

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves review of the US.

Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA” or

“Agency”) 2003 denial of a petition for rulemaking

asking the Agency to regulate greenhouse gas

emissions from new motor vehicles under section

202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (““CAA” or “Act”), 42

U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000), to address global climate

change. The Petitioners based their request on their

argument that EPA had a “mandatory duty” under the

Act to regulate those emissions. Control of Emissions

from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, Notice of

denial of petition for rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922,

52923 (Sept. 8, 2003), A-59, A-60. After giving the

public an opportunity to comment on the rulemaking

petition and considering public comments, EPA denied

the petition. /d. at 52922-33, A-59 to A-93. The

Agency set forth three grounds for its denial of the

petition.

First, based on the Act's language and legislative

history, other statutes, congressional decisions, and

statutory interpretation principles underlying FDA v.

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120

(2000), EPA determined it lacked authority under the

CAA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions for the

purpose of addressing global climate change. /d. at

52925-29, A-68 to A-79. The Agency said that “[i}n

light of Congress’ attention to the issue of global

climate change, and the absence of any direct or even

indirect indication that Congress intended to authorize

regulation under the CAA to address global climate

change, it is unreasonable to conclude that the CAA

provides the Agency with such authority.” 68 Fed.

Reg. at $2928, A-78.

Second, EPA determined that even if the CAA

authorized it to regulate greenhouse gas emissions to

Nw

address global climate change, granting the rulemaking

petition would impermissibly conflict with title V of

the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”), 49

U.S.C. §$§ 32901-32919, which authorizes the U.S.

Department of Transportation to establish fuel

economy standards for motor vehicles. 68 Fed. Reg. at

52929, A-79 to A-80. EPA found that “[a]t present, the

only practical way to reduce tailpipe emissions of

[carbon dioxide (“CQ,”), the most prevalent

greenhouse gas] is to improve fuel economy.” /d., A-

79. EPA concluded that “any EPA effort to set CO)

tailpipe standards under the CAA would either abrogate

EPCA’s regime (if the standards were effectively more

stringent than the applicable [fuel economy] standard)

or be meaningless (if they were effectively less

stringent).” /d., A-80

Third, EPA determined that, assuming arguendo

that the CAA did provide EPA with authority to

regulate greenhouse gas emissions to address global

climate change, section 202(a) of the CAA -- the

provision at issue in the rulemaking petition -- gives

EPA’s Administrator discretion to determine “in his

judgment” whether, based on the facts before the

Agency, the emissions in question “may reasonably be

anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42

U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). EPA observed that the

Administrator had never made a determination under

the CAA that greenhouse gas emissions endanger

public health or welfare and that the timing of any such

endangerment determination is within _ the

Administrator’s discretion. 68 Fed. Reg. at 58929, A-

80 to A-81. EPA thus determined that, contrary to

Petitioners’ argument, it had no mandatory duty to

undertake rulemaking. Moreover, FPA determined that

the scientific evidence before it in reviewing the

petition, including the National Research Council's

report, Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some

Key Questions (2001) (“NRC_ Report”), was

“extraordinarily complex and _ still evolving” and

reflected ‘“‘considerable uncertainty in current

understanding of how the climate system varies

naturally and reacts to emissions of greenhouse

gases.” 68 Fed. Reg. at 52930, A-83 (quoting NRC

Report). EPA also noted, for example, that, given the

global nature of atmospheric concentrations of COb, it

is “extremely difficult to evaluate” to what extent any

“effects in the U.S. would be related to anthropogenic

[CO] emissions in the U.S.” /d. at 52927, A-73.

In light of the scientific uncertainty on these

critical issues, EPA found no basis for making an

endangerment determination and regulating motor

vehicles’ greenhouse gas emissions under section

202(a) of the CAA. /d. at 52931, A-86 (declining to

regulate “[u]ntil more is understood about the causes,

extent and significance of climate change”). EPA

concluded that “establishing [greenhouse gas] emission

standards for U.S. motor vehicles at this time would

require EPA to make scientific and technical judgments

without the benefit of the studies being developed to

reduce uncertainties and advance technologies.” /d.,

A-85. Accordingly, EPA denied the rulemaking

petition because it determined that, even if it had

authority under the CAA to undertake rulemaking, it

had neither an obligation nor a sound basis to do so.

Petitioners sought review of EPA’s denial by the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit. Without reaching the issue whether the CAA

provides EPA with authority to regulate for global

climate change purposes, Massachusetts v. EPA, 415

F.3d 50, 56 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005), A-10 & n.l, a

pancl of the D.C. Circuit held, in an opinion by Judge

-Randolph, that assuming arguendo that EPA has such

authority, the Agency properly exercised its discretion

in denying the rulemaking petition. /d. at 58, A-15; see

4

also id. at 61, A-20 (Sentelle, J., concurring in the

judgment). Judge Tatel dissented, believing that EPA

had “misinterpreted the scope of its statutory authority”

and had provided a legally inadequate explanation for

the petition denial. /d. at 82, A-58 (Tatel, J.,

dissenting).

Some of the Petitioners filed a petition. for

rehearing and rehearing en banc. Both the panel and

the full court denied that petition. A-94 to A-95; A-98.

ARGUMENT

I. THE LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED ARE

UNREMARKABLE AND DO NOT

WARRANT REVIEW BY THIS COURT.

The leg: issues presented by this case do not

merit this Court’s review. This case involves EPA’s

denial of a petition for rulemaking under the CAA, a

denial that the Court of Appeals properly found was a

reasonable exercise of EPA’s very broad discretion and

that it therefore declined to disturb based on well-

established principles of administrative law. Although

the factual matters considered by EPA revolve around

interesting public policy questions concerning global

climate change, the legal doctrines governing this case

are well-settled and were properly applied below.

Petitioners believe that global climate change is

“the most pressing environmental problem of our

time,” Pet. Br. at 22, and that “[t]here can be no

reasonable debate about the exceptional importance of

[that] problem,” id. at 23. Plainly, global climate

change presents our nation’s elected decision makers

with important questions of public policy. This case,

however, does not present those public policy

questions. As the dissenting opinion below noted,

although this case arose “in the context of a highly

controversial question -- global warming -- it actually

presents a quite traditional legal issue: has the

Environmental Protection Agency complied with the

Clean Air Act?” Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 82, A-58

(Tatel, J., dissenting).

For the reasons discussed below, the issues

presented by this case and the Court of Appeals’

resolution of those issues do not warrant review by this

Court.

A. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Is Fully

Consistent with Established Principles of

Administrative Law Governing Review of -

Denials of Rulemaking Petitions.

As Petitioners acknowledge, the D.C. Circuit is

“the premier intermediate court” on administrative law

matters. Pet. at 4. That court’s case law consistently

reflects the long-established administrative law

principle that a federal agency’s decision -- based on

the facts and given the circumstances before it -- to

decline a request to institute rulemaking proceedings is

given a high degree of deference. Such a decision

should be overturned “only in the rarest and most

compelling of circumstances.” WWHT, Inc. v. FCC,

656 F.2d 807, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Timpinaro

v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same);

American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1,

4-6 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (denials of rulemaking petitions

entitled to “high end” of range of deference). Indeed,

“an agency's refusal to initiate a rulemaking 1s

evaluated with deference so broad as to make the

process akin to non-reviewability.” Cellnet

Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1106, 1111

(D.C. Cir. 1992). In rejecting challenges to EPA’s

denial of the rulemaking petition here, the D.C. Circuit

applied settled administrative law precedents.

In NRDC vy. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir.

1979),' the D.C. Circuit held that in cases such as the

instant case, where an agency declines to grant a

request to regulate, the scope of judicial review is --

and must be -- extremely limited for several reasons:

An agency’s discretionary decision not to

regulate a given activity is inevitably

based, in large measure, on factors not

inherently susceptible to judicial resolution

-- e.g., internal management considerations

as to budget and personnel; evaluations of

its own competence; weighing of

competing policies within a broad statutory

framework. Further, even if an agency

considers a particular problem worthy of

regulation, it may determine for reasons

lying within its special expertise that the

time for action has not yet arrived. The

area may be one of such rapid

technological development that regulations

would be outdated by the time they could

become effective, or the scientific state of

the art may be such that sufficient data are

not yet available on which to premise

adequate regulations. The circumstances in

the regulated industry may be evolving in a

way that could vitiate the need for

regulation, or the agency may still be

developing the expertise necessary for

effective regulation.

' See WWHT, 656 F.2d at 816 (identifying NRDC v. SEC as the

D.C. Circuit’s “most comprehensive statement . . . as to the

availability and scope of review of an agency's decision to deny a

petition for rulemaking”).

Id. at 1046 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original);

see also WWHT, 656 F.2d at 817 (quoting NRDC, 606

F.2d at 1046).

An agency's denial of a petition for rulemaking

must be upheld “if it violates no law, 1s blessed with an

articulated justification that makes a ‘rational

connection between the facts found and the choice

made,’ and follows upon a ‘hard look’ by the agency at

the relevant issues.” Action for Children’s Television

v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Because

“(t]he agency’s determination is essentially a

legislative one, . . . the reviewing court should do no

more than assure itself that the agency acted ‘in a

manner calculated to negate the dangers of arbitrariness

and irrationality.” WWHT, 656 F.2d at 817 (quoting

Action for Children’s Television, 564 F.2d at 472 n.24).

As the D.C. Circuit noted, “there are very few

cases in which courts have forced agencies to institute

rulemaking proceedings on a particular issue after it

has declined to do so.” /d. at 818. On rare occasions,

courts do remand a denial of a rulemaking petition with

instructions to provide a reasoned explanation of the

denial. For example, in American Horse Protection,

the Secretary of Agriculture denied a petition seeking

rulemaking to reconsider regulations on the practice of

“soring” horses in light of new evidence regarding the

practice. ~ 812 F.2d at 1-3. The support for the

Secretary's denial of the petition consisted of two

conclusory sentences and limited _ statistical

information, jd. at 5 -- “insufficient,” the court held, “to

assure a revicwing court that the agency's refusal to act

was the product of reasoned decisionmaking,” id. at 6.

In sharp contrast, EPA’s denial of the rulemaking

petition here was reasoned. The record before EPA

and the D.C. Circuit enabled that court to “assure itself

that the agency considered the relevant factors, that it

explained the ‘facts and policy concerns’ relied on, and

that the facts have some basis in the record.” /d. at 5.

EPA provided a full explanation of its reasons for

denying the petition in twelve pages of the Federal

Register. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52922-33, A-59 to A-93; cf.

5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2000) (Administrative Procedure

Act requirement that an agency, in denying a petition

for rulemaking, give “a brief statement of the grounds

for denial”) (quoted in American Horse Protection, 812

F.2d at 4). One of the principal grounds EPA gave for

its denial was the continued existence of significant

scientific uncertainty reflected in the record before it.

Id. at 52930, A-82 to A-85; see also NRDC, 606 F.2d

1046 (“[E]ven if an agency considers a particular

problem worthy of regulation, it may determine for

reasons lying within its special expertise that the time

for action has not yet arrived. ... [T]he scientific state

of the art may be such that sufficient data are not yet

available on which to premise adequate regulations.”)

(citations omitted). EPA also discussed other policy

concerns that would be raised by granting the petition,

68 Fed. Reg. at 52929-31, A-82 to A-87, and steps the

President was taking to address globa! climate oo

issues, id. at 52931-33, A-87 to A-92.

Thus, nothing in the record before EPA or the

court below presented those “rarest and most

compelling of circumstances” necessary to overturn an

agency denial of a rulemaking petition. WWHT, 656

F.2d at 818. Indeed, Petitioners do not show in their

petition, and no basis exists for concluding, that EPA’s

decision was not “reasoned,” that EPA failed to

“explain{] the ‘facts and policy concerns’ [it] relied

on,” or that the facts lack “some basis in the record.”

American Horse Protection, 812 F.2d at 5 (citations

omitted). In sum, applying familiar and_ settled

principles of administrative law, the D.C. Circuit

properly declined to overturn EPA’s decision to deny

the request for rulemaking.

B. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Is Fully

Consistent with the Clean Air Act and Case

Law Construing That Act.

The D.C. Circuit’s decision is also fully consistent

with the plain language of the CAA and with case law

construing the Act. That court did not need to -- and

expressly did not -- address the ments of EPA’s first

and second bases for denying the rulemaking petition

(namely, that it lacked authority under the Act to

regulate greenhouse gas emissions to address global

climate change and that any regulation of such

emissions from new motor vehicles would conflict

impermissibly with EPCA). Massachusetts, 415 F.3d

at 56 & n.1, A-10 & n.1_ The Court of Appeals did not

need to address those two reasons because, as the court

found, the CAA’s plain language supports the third

reason EPA gave for denying the rulemaking petition:

that section 202 of the Act provides EPA with

discretion in making the expert “judgment” whether

motor. vehicle emissions “may reasonably be

anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42

U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). Given the facts in the record

before the Agency when it made its decision on the

petition, mothing compelled EPA to exercise its

judgment by determining that the _ statutory

endangerment criterion was satisfied.

The D.C. Circuit properly found no basis to

disturb EPA’s denial of the petition because the court

owed deference to the Agency’s expert conclusion that

a sound basis for making an_ endangerment

determination did not exist in light of substantial

scientific uncertainty in the record. Massachusetts, 415

F.3d at 57, A-11 to A-13; Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d

1, 20 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Section

202(ay(|¥s “judgment” language is an “express

provision for administrative discretion.”). As the court

10

a

noted, an endangerment determination under the Act

“*is necessarily a question of policy that is to be based

on an assessment of risks and that should not be bound

by either the procedural or the substantive rigor proper

for questions of fact.’” Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 58,

A-15 (quoting Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 24). Petitioners

correctly observe that the mere existence of some

degree of scientific uncertainty need not paralyze

regulators under all circumstances; whatever authority

EPA might have to regulate is not necessarily

eliminated by the presence of any degree of uncertainty

in the science. Pet. Br. at 15 (citing Ethyl, 541 F.2d at

25). That does not mean, however, that EPA must

exercise any such authority even in the presence of

substantial scientific uncertainty.

The D.C. Circuit’s en banc decision in Ethyl

supports EPA’s denial of the rulemaking petition at

issue here, as the court pointed out below.

Massachusetis, 415 F.3d at 57, A-13 to A-14. Ethyl

did not involve the denial of a petition for rulemaking

in the face of scientific uncertainty -- the kind of

agency decision that, as discussed above, is subject to

an extraordinarily high degree of judicial deference.

Instead, Ethyl involved an industry challenge to an

EPA decision to regulate where there was “less than

certainty” about endangerment. Frhy/, 541 F.2d at 25.

in rejecting that challenge, the D.C. Circuit held that

although “certainty is the scientific ideal[,] to the extent

that even science can be certain of its truth[,] .. .

[a]waiting certainty will often allow for only reactive,

not preventive, regulation.” /d. Thus, as Ethy/ makes

clear, an agency is not always obligated to wait for

complete scientific certainty before undertaking

regulation. Fthy/ plainly does not stand for the

converse proposition Petitioners urge here: that EPA

has a duty to grant a petition to regulate despite

11

substantial scientific uncertainty that the Agency is

working to resolve.

In fact, Petitioners concede, as they must, that

under the statute, EPA properly considers “scientific

uncertainty” in exercising judgment to determine

whether the endangerment criterion is met in light of

the record before it. Pet. Br. at 14-15. Despite Judge

Tatel’s view in dissent that he “doubt/s] EPA could

credibly conclude that it needs more research to

determine whether [greenhouse gas]-caused global

warming ‘may reasonably be anticipated to endanger’

welfare,” Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 77, A-> to A-51

(Tatel, J., dissenting), the passage from the NRC

Report that Judge Tatel quotes at length -- the same

report on which EPA relied -- is replete with statements

reflecting considerable scientific uncertainty regarding

global climate change and its possible effects on both

public welfare and public health. For example:

e ‘“‘Changes in storm frequency and intensity are one

of the more uncertain elements of future climate

change prediction.”” /d. at 79, A-53 (Tatel, J.,

dissenting) (quoting NRC Report) (emphasis

added).

““(T}he response of insects and plant diseases to

warming is poorly understood. On the regional

scale and in the longer term, there is much more

uncertainty.” Id. at 78, A-52 (quoting NRC

Report) (emphasis added).

e ‘Health outcomes in response to climate change

are the subject of intense debate. . . . Climate

change is just one of the factors that influence the

frequency and transmission of infectious disease,

and hence the assessments. view such changes as

highly uncertain”” — Id., A-52 (quoting NRC

Report) (emphasis added).

12

ee

The understanding of the relationships between

weather/climate and human health is in its infancy

and therefore the health consequences of climate

change are poorly understood. The costs, benefits,

and availability of resources for adaptation are also

uncertain.’” Id. at 79, A-53 (quoting NRC Report)

(emphasis added).

The passage from the NRC Report that Judge

Tatel quotes also contains several other statements that

illustrate the existence of substantial uncertainty about

whether any basis existed for EPA to make an

endangerment judgment. For example:

“*A key conclusion from the National Assessment

[of Climate Change Impacts] is that U.S. society is

likely to be able to adapt to most of the climate

change impacts on human systems, but these

adaptations may come with substantial cost.’” /d.

at 78, A-SI (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting NRC

Report) (emphasis added).

e ‘“‘In the near term, agriculture and forestry are

likely to benefit from CO) fertilization effects and

the increased water efficiency of many plants at

higher atmospheric CO, concentrations.’” J/d., A-

51 (quoting NRC Report) (emphasis added).

e ‘(T]he combination of the geographic and climatic

breadth of the United States, possibly augmented

by advances in genetics, increases the nation’s

robustness to climate change.’” /d., A-52 (quoting

NRC Report).

e “(Mjuch of the United States appears to be

protected against many different adverse health

outcomes related to climate change by a strong

public health system, relatively high levels of

public awareness, and a high standard of living.””

13

Id. at 79, A-53 (quoting NRC Report) (emphasis

added).

e “‘At a national level, the direct economic impacts

[of global climate change] are /ikely to be modest

[while] on a regional basis the level and extent of

both beneficial and harmful impacts will grow.’”

Id., A-54 (quoting NRC Report) (emphasis added).

In short, given the evidence of scientific

uncertainty described in the NRC Report before the

Agency, EPA was well justified in denying the petition

for rulemaking.

EPA noted, in addition to uncertainty in the

scientific evidence, other policy reasons that provided

further support for its decision to deny the rulemaking

petition. 68 Fed. Reg. 52929-33, A-82 to A-92.

Petitioners claim that EPA may not consider policy

reasons under section 202 of the CAA at all and that

EPA’s consideration of these reasons in this case

impermissibly tainted the Agency’s decision. Pet. Br.

at 14-15. Again, applying settled principles, the D.C.

Circuit properly rejected Petitioners’ objection, holding

that “Congress does not require the Administrator to

exercise his discretion solely on the basis of his

assessment of scientific evidence.” Massachusetts, 415

F.3d at 58, A-13 (citing Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 20); see id.,

A-15 (“as we have held, a reviewing court ‘will uphold

agency conclusions based on policy judgments’ ‘when

an agency must resolve issues “on the frontiers of

scientific knowledge”’’”) (quoting L£nvironmental

Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 82 (D.C. Cir.

1978)), Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 26 (“the statute accords the

regulator flexibility to assess risks and make essentially

legislative policy judgments”); WW/HIT, 656 F.2d at 818

(“The agency’s determination is essentially a

legislative one, and the reviewing court should do no

more than assure itself that the agency acted ‘in a

14

manner calculated to negate the dangers of arbitrariness

and irrationality."”) (quoting Action for Children’s

Television, 564 F.2d at 472 n.24); NRDC, 606 F.2d at

1046 (“An agency’s discretionary decision not to

regulate a given activity is inevitably based, in large

measure, on factors not inherently susceptible to

judicial resolution. . . .”) (emphasis in original).

In sum, the legal issues in this case do not_

remotely present an important federal question that

merits this Court’s review. EPA’s denial of the

rulemaking petition, and the Court of Appeals’ decision

declining to overturn that denial, are supported by well-

settled principles of administrative law. Moreover, the

CAA’s plain language and case law interpreting that

language support EPA’s decision, as the Court of

Appeals correctly held.

II. CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT HAVE

ACTED TO ADDRESS GLOBAL CLIMATE

CHANGE.

Petitioners’ melodramatic claim that failure to

grant certiorari here “would likely drastically limit our

ability to address the growing crisis” they say is posed

by global climate change, Pet. Br. at 26, is wholly

unfounded. As EPA’ explained in denying the

rulemaking petition, Congress and the President have

acted to address global climate change. Indeed,

Congress and the President have continued to act to

address the problem since EPA denied the petition for

rulemaking.

Congress has enacted several statutes addressing

global climate change and greenhouse gas emissions.

It has focused much of its legislative efforts with regard

40 global climate change on establishing programs of

research to reduce the © scientific uncertainty

surrounding global climate change issues. See, e¢.g.,

Food and Agriculture Act, Pub. L. No. 101-624, tt.

15

XXIV, § 2401, 104 Stat. 4058 (1990) (creating a

research program for global climate change agricultural

issues); Global Change Research Act, Pub. L. No. 101-

606, tit. I, §§ 102, 103, 106, 104 Stat. 3097-98, 3101

(1990) (establishing research programs and providing

for scientific assessments every four years of the

“current trends in global change”); Energy Security

Act, Pub. L. No. 96-294, tit. VII, § 711, 94 Stat. 611,

774-75 (1980) (calling for a study of the “projected

impact, on the level of carbon dioxide in the

atmosphere, of fossil fuel combustion, coal-conversion

and related synthetic fuel activities”); National Climate

Program Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901, 2904

(directing the President to establish a “national climate

program,” including “appropriate . . . recommendations

for action”); see also 68 Fed. Reg. at 52927, A-74; S.

Rep. No. 95-740, at 13, 14 (1978), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.

1398, 1399 (legislative history of National Climate

Program Act of 1978) (research programs assist the

nation in “respond[ing] more effectively to climate-

induced problems”).

In 1992, Congress directed the Secretary of

Energy to conduct several assessments related to

greenhouse gases and report to Congress. Energy

Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1604, 106

Stat. 2776, 3002; see also 68 Fed. Reg. at 52927, A-735.

> Congress also addressed global climate change in the CAA

when it last enacted substantial amendments to the Act in 1990.

See 68 Fed. Reg. at 52926, A-70 to A-72. In those amendments,

Congress directed EPA “to develop, evaluate. and demonstrate

nonregulatory strategies and technologies for air pollution

prevention” that would address several substances. including CO).

42 US.C. § 7403(g). In an uncodified provision of the public law

that includes the 1990 Amendments to the CAA, Congress

required electric utilities to monitor and report annually their CO,

emissions. Pub. 1. No. 101-549, § 821(a), 104 Stat. 2399. 2699

(1990)

16

That statute directed the Executive Branch to develop a

National Energy Policy Plan “to achieve to the

maximum extent practicable and at lIeast-cost to the

Nation . . . the stabilization and eventual reduction in

the generation of greenhouse gases.” 42 U.S.C. §

13382(a), (g). Under the Act, the Department of

Energy must assess “alternative policy mechanisms for

reducing the generation of greenhouse gases.” /d. §

13384. In enacting this statute, Congress sought

analysis of “the important technical and policy issues

that will enable us to make wiser decisions on more

dramatic and possibly higher cost actions which should

be undertaken only in the context of concerted

international action.” H.R. Rep. No. 102-474, pt. 1, at

152 (1992), 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1953, 1975.’

Most recently, in the Energy Policy Act of 2005,

Congress established additional specific federal

policies to address global climate change, including

coordination of technology development strategies and

deployment of greenhouse gas reducing technologies in

the United States and in developing countries. Pub. L.

No. 109-58, tit. XVI, §§ 1610(b)(1), (c)(1), 1611, 119

Stat. 595, 1109."

* The Energy Policy Act of 1992 also provided for voluntary

reporung of greenhouse gas emissions and reductions pursuant to

Department of Energy guidelines. Pub. L. No. 102-486. §

1605(b). 106 Stat. 3002: see also Guidelines for Voluntary

Greenhouse Gas Reporting. 71 Fed. Reg. 20784 (Apr. 21, 2006).

* During debate on the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress

considered and rejected for a second time a legislative proposal to

impose binding limits on CO, emissions. Senators McCain and

Lieberman offered Amendment No. 826, known as the “Climate

Stewardship and Innovation Act.” which would have imposed

mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions. 151 Cong. Rec.

$6892. 6894 (daily ed. June 21, 2005). The Senate rejected this

amendment by a vote of 38-60. Vote No. 148. June 22. 2005. The

Senate in 2003 rejected a similar amendment by a vote of 43-55.

Vote No. 420, 149 Cong. Rec. $13598 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 2003).

17

Congress and the President also have acted to

address global climate change in the international

arena. In 1987, in the Global Climate Protection Act,

Congress directed the Secretary of State to coordinate

U.S. negotiations concerning global climate change.

See 15 U.S.C. § 2901 note; H.R. Rep. No. 102-474, pt.

1, at 152 (1992), 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1975

(mandatory measures to reduce greenhouse gas

emissions should be undertaken “only in the context of

concerted international action”); see also 68 Fed. Reg.

at 52927, A-74. This Act also demonstrates the

emphasis Congress has placed on research programs,

stating that research “is crucial to the development of

an effective United States response” to global climate

change and declaring that U.S. policy is to “identify

technologies and activities to limit mankind’s adverse

effect on the global climate . . . and . . . work toward

multilateral agreements.” Pub. L. No. 100-204, tit. XI,

$§ 1102(3), 1103(a), 101 Stat. 1407, 1408 (1987)

(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2901 note).

Consistent with this directive, President George H.

W. Bush signed, and the Senate ratified, the United

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(“UNFCCC”), which established mechanisms for

international approaches to address global climate

change.” See UNFCCC Homepage, http://unfccc.int

* The United States is not a party to the UNFCCC’s Kyoto

Protocol because Congress and the President want developing

nations to participate in any international programs requiring

reductions in greenhouse gas emissions on the same basis as

developed nations (something the Kyoto Protocol does not

require) and because participation in the Protocol “would have a

negative economic impact” on the United States. Transcript.

President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change (June 11.

2001), —s http://www.whitchouse.gov/news’/releases 2001 06/2001

061 1-2.html (visited May 5, 2006): S. Res. 98. 105" Cong. (1997)

(Senate resolution, approved by a vote of 95-0, urging the

President not to sign any international agreement to reduce

18

(last visited May 5, 2006). President George W. Bush

has committed the United States “to work within the

United Nations framework and elsewhere to develop

with our friends and allies and nations throughout the

world an effective and science-based response to the

issue of global warming.” Transcript, President Bush

Discusses Global Climate Change, see also 68 Fed.

Reg. at 52931, A-86 (“Unavoidably, climate change

raises important foreign policy issues, and it is the

President's prerogative to address them.”’).

To that end, in July 2005, President Bush reached

an agreement with leaders of the other “G8” nations to

“speed the development and deployment of clean

energy technologies to . . . address[] climate change.”

White House Fact Sheet, Action on Climate Change,

Energy and Sustainable Development (July 8, 2005),

http://www.whitchouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/

20050708-2.html (last visited May 5, 2006). Later that

month, the President announced that the United States

was joining with two other developed nations (Japan

and Australia) and three developing nations (China,

India, and South Korea) in the Asia-Pacific Partnership

on Clean Development and Climate to “achieve

practical results” through programs “addressing the

long-term challenge of climate change.” White House

Fact Sheet, President Bush and the Asia-Pacific

Partnership on Clean Development (July 27, 2005),

greenhouse gas emissions that does not include developing

nations): see also 68 Fed. Reg. at 52927. A-75.

* The Asia-Pacific Partnership. which is consistent with

UNFCCC principles. “serve[s] as a framework for supporting . . .

international cooperation among the Partners to meet [their]

development, energy. environment, and climate change

objectives.” Charter for the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean

Development and Climate (Jan. 2006). http:’/www.dfat.gov.au’

environment climate ap6 charter.html (last visited May 5, 2006).

19

http://www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2005/07/

print/20050727-11.html (last visited May 5, 2006).

Thus, no basis exists for Petitioners’ suggestion

that, absent this Court’s grant of certiorari in this case,

global climate change concerns will be unaddressed.

The nation’s elected decision makers have acted, and

continue to act, in response to those concerns.

Notwithstanding Petitioners’ claims, this Court’s

review of the decision below is unnecessary and

unwarranted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of

certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

NORMAN W. FICHTHORN

(Counsel of Record)

LUCINDA MINTON LANGWORTHY

ALLISON D. Woop

HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP

1900 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 955-1500

Counsel for Respondent Utility Air

May 8, 2006 Regulatory Group

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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