Opposition Brief — Massachusetts v. EPA
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No. 05-1120
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL..
Petitioners.
Y.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET
Al...
Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT UTILITY AIR
REGULATORY GROUP IN OPPOSITION
NORMAN W. FICHTHORN
(Counsel of Record)
LUCINDA MINTON LANGWORTHY
ALLISON D. Wood
HUNTON & WiLtiAMs LLP
1900 K Street. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 955-1500
Counsel for Respondent
ILSON-EPES PRINTING
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
The Utility. Air Regulatory Group (“UARG”) ts a not-for-
profit association of individual electric generating companies
and national trade associations that participate collectively in
administrative proceedings under the Clean Air Act, and in
litigation arising from those proceedings, that affect electric
generators. .UARG has no outstanding shares or debt
securities in the hands of the public and has no parent
company. No publicly held company has a 10% or greater
ownership interest in UARG.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ee i Fe i accrcccticcnencscssesintinscsccnnsavosivieddngiiotains 1V
STATEMENT OF THE CASE........c:cccscsssssscscsescssessssensesssesssee l
TET casiaiesdbslstpscincaninicneincenjesiitensdiciningsiesaieanidnananasiuniiiahaunmnedes 4
I. THE LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED ARE
UNREMARKABLE AND DO NOT
WARRANT REVIEW BY THIS COURT .........000.0.0..2. 4
A. — The Court of Appeals’ Decision Is Fully
Consistent with Established Principles
of Administrative Law Governing
Review of Denials of Rulemaking
PE iiinidaticibnianenlauisstatenseld sheapehaneniigiedceteséariabiciniie 5
B. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Is Fully
Consistent with the Clean Air Act and
Case Law Construing That Act ................cesesceeeeeees 9
II. CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT HAVE
ACTED TO ADDRESS GLOBAL CLIMATE
TUITE ssecseisiediisastniihceadetademaiabentabdsenbtenbisantediiteediitadaiialdeiigeeinigten 14
TIT vitscicctccistsiierinsinsisiviicinpinnaienageiansiiiaseiliianahaninitibiaaatliii 19
il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC,
oe LF of . ; 7, RR an rn 7,14
American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Lyng,
74 PB BL oe - , een ware 5, 7,8
Cellnet Communications, Inc. v. FCC,
eB a ees re 5
Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA,
rae as Gale SPE ciceiscieseicntcvessnesonnsiiveninsin 13
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,
P08 Fe 6 Se Ce TOD nscasscntenicsccecasiincesee 9,10, 13
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) ................. ssalbniatuaipenaeiennvianeibiecegiaie l
Massachusetts v. EPA,
rk gh eT sill i. passim
NRDC v. SEC,
606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) oe 6, 7, 8, 14
Timpinaro v. SEC,
es Gs HOD vesineciencintncemsasmicstineseesdntnsse 5
WWHT, Inc. v. FCC,
656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ..............ccccccseesees passim
STATUTES
es A I ciccintsliacinsbcinstisbiidpuismaiiicipascad daiadhees ceadiuabaiiacaidinios 8
DOO 6 UN I nasa cicincesschececssaceseccninnste 15,17
Le La LS a ae TR 15
Se es ee Pe icnscnesisinhidecnicmisssiinecaeciveteischeien 15
iV
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000)......c.cecccseccseessseesseesseeen 1,2,9
42 U.S.C. § 1336266) (2ODO) ......o.-scvscceseces!taesccvsernsenpessones 16
42 USC. 6 150C III. cicero 16
42 UBL. 6 199D6 CII ocosicciecsccsruene 16
49 U.S.C. §§ 32901-32919 (2000) ...ccccccsecsseesssecsneessesenneee 2
Re A 1), ee ee: 15
Pub. L. No. 100-204 (1987)......cc-ccesccecccssesseesseessscssecesueeen 17
Pub. L. No. 101-549 (1990).....ccccccessssscssscssescsecsssessueeseeeen 15
Pub. L. No. 101-606 (1990).........c.ccccsccesssocccseecsesssecsseceenes 15
Pub. L. No. 101-624 (1990).....ccccccsssecsseesseessescscsseenees 14, 15
Pub. L. No. 102-486 (1992).....ccscccesscescsssessesssucssseeeeees 15, 16
Pet B.. Bl: BOUB0 CODD scinssinsssseosscessetsbnceslenaslunenaien 16
FEDERAL REGISTER
Control of Emissions from New Highway
Vehicles and Engines, Notice of denial of petition
for rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922 (Sept. 8,
SO irisnviisnnnislignnnpigiviegiaiade passim
Guidelines for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas
Reporting, 71 Fed. Reg. 20784 (Apr. 21, 2006)............... 16
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
149 Cong. Rec. $13598 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 2003)............ 16
151 Cong. Rec. $6892 (daily ed. June 21, 2005)............. 16
H.R. Rep. No. 102-474 (1992)........cccccccccscesrorecsesereess 16, 17
FRG. POD. FS — FSD CFG Fe tics ssccsiscesscnscsesscsreonenetasmeniasainiian 15
5. ave. 9G, 308” Camas CIO F A. sicicccsctcccemdcnns 17
MISCELLANEOUS
Charter for the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean
Development and Climate (Jan. 2006) ...............0... 18
National Research Council, Climate Change
Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions
ERTS Se CREO ODEON ER 2, 3, 11, 12, 13
Transcript, President Bush Discusses Global —
Climate Change (June 11, 2001).............0..0000. 17, 18
United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change Homepage.................:::ccceseceeeeeseeees 17
White House Fact Sheet, Action on Climate
Change, Energy and Sustainable
Development (July 8, 2005) .0.............ceceeeeeeeeseereeeeeees 18
White House Fact Sheet, President Bush and the
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean
Development (July 27, 2005) .00...........cccceeeeeeeee 18,19
vl
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves review of the US.
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA” or
“Agency”) 2003 denial of a petition for rulemaking
asking the Agency to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles under section
202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (““CAA” or “Act”), 42
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000), to address global climate
change. The Petitioners based their request on their
argument that EPA had a “mandatory duty” under the
Act to regulate those emissions. Control of Emissions
from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, Notice of
denial of petition for rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922,
52923 (Sept. 8, 2003), A-59, A-60. After giving the
public an opportunity to comment on the rulemaking
petition and considering public comments, EPA denied
the petition. /d. at 52922-33, A-59 to A-93. The
Agency set forth three grounds for its denial of the
petition.
First, based on the Act's language and legislative
history, other statutes, congressional decisions, and
statutory interpretation principles underlying FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000), EPA determined it lacked authority under the
CAA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions for the
purpose of addressing global climate change. /d. at
52925-29, A-68 to A-79. The Agency said that “[i}n
light of Congress’ attention to the issue of global
climate change, and the absence of any direct or even
indirect indication that Congress intended to authorize
regulation under the CAA to address global climate
change, it is unreasonable to conclude that the CAA
provides the Agency with such authority.” 68 Fed.
Reg. at $2928, A-78.
Second, EPA determined that even if the CAA
authorized it to regulate greenhouse gas emissions to
Nw
address global climate change, granting the rulemaking
petition would impermissibly conflict with title V of
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”), 49
U.S.C. §$§ 32901-32919, which authorizes the U.S.
Department of Transportation to establish fuel
economy standards for motor vehicles. 68 Fed. Reg. at
52929, A-79 to A-80. EPA found that “[a]t present, the
only practical way to reduce tailpipe emissions of
[carbon dioxide (“CQ,”), the most prevalent
greenhouse gas] is to improve fuel economy.” /d., A-
79. EPA concluded that “any EPA effort to set CO)
tailpipe standards under the CAA would either abrogate
EPCA’s regime (if the standards were effectively more
stringent than the applicable [fuel economy] standard)
or be meaningless (if they were effectively less
stringent).” /d., A-80
Third, EPA determined that, assuming arguendo
that the CAA did provide EPA with authority to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions to address global
climate change, section 202(a) of the CAA -- the
provision at issue in the rulemaking petition -- gives
EPA’s Administrator discretion to determine “in his
judgment” whether, based on the facts before the
Agency, the emissions in question “may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). EPA observed that the
Administrator had never made a determination under
the CAA that greenhouse gas emissions endanger
public health or welfare and that the timing of any such
endangerment determination is within _ the
Administrator’s discretion. 68 Fed. Reg. at 58929, A-
80 to A-81. EPA thus determined that, contrary to
Petitioners’ argument, it had no mandatory duty to
undertake rulemaking. Moreover, FPA determined that
the scientific evidence before it in reviewing the
petition, including the National Research Council's
report, Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some
Key Questions (2001) (“NRC_ Report”), was
“extraordinarily complex and _ still evolving” and
reflected ‘“‘considerable uncertainty in current
understanding of how the climate system varies
naturally and reacts to emissions of greenhouse
gases.” 68 Fed. Reg. at 52930, A-83 (quoting NRC
Report). EPA also noted, for example, that, given the
global nature of atmospheric concentrations of COb, it
is “extremely difficult to evaluate” to what extent any
“effects in the U.S. would be related to anthropogenic
[CO] emissions in the U.S.” /d. at 52927, A-73.
In light of the scientific uncertainty on these
critical issues, EPA found no basis for making an
endangerment determination and regulating motor
vehicles’ greenhouse gas emissions under section
202(a) of the CAA. /d. at 52931, A-86 (declining to
regulate “[u]ntil more is understood about the causes,
extent and significance of climate change”). EPA
concluded that “establishing [greenhouse gas] emission
standards for U.S. motor vehicles at this time would
require EPA to make scientific and technical judgments
without the benefit of the studies being developed to
reduce uncertainties and advance technologies.” /d.,
A-85. Accordingly, EPA denied the rulemaking
petition because it determined that, even if it had
authority under the CAA to undertake rulemaking, it
had neither an obligation nor a sound basis to do so.
Petitioners sought review of EPA’s denial by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. Without reaching the issue whether the CAA
provides EPA with authority to regulate for global
climate change purposes, Massachusetts v. EPA, 415
F.3d 50, 56 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005), A-10 & n.l, a
pancl of the D.C. Circuit held, in an opinion by Judge
-Randolph, that assuming arguendo that EPA has such
authority, the Agency properly exercised its discretion
in denying the rulemaking petition. /d. at 58, A-15; see
4
also id. at 61, A-20 (Sentelle, J., concurring in the
judgment). Judge Tatel dissented, believing that EPA
had “misinterpreted the scope of its statutory authority”
and had provided a legally inadequate explanation for
the petition denial. /d. at 82, A-58 (Tatel, J.,
dissenting).
Some of the Petitioners filed a petition. for
rehearing and rehearing en banc. Both the panel and
the full court denied that petition. A-94 to A-95; A-98.
ARGUMENT
I. THE LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED ARE
UNREMARKABLE AND DO NOT
WARRANT REVIEW BY THIS COURT.
The leg: issues presented by this case do not
merit this Court’s review. This case involves EPA’s
denial of a petition for rulemaking under the CAA, a
denial that the Court of Appeals properly found was a
reasonable exercise of EPA’s very broad discretion and
that it therefore declined to disturb based on well-
established principles of administrative law. Although
the factual matters considered by EPA revolve around
interesting public policy questions concerning global
climate change, the legal doctrines governing this case
are well-settled and were properly applied below.
Petitioners believe that global climate change is
“the most pressing environmental problem of our
time,” Pet. Br. at 22, and that “[t]here can be no
reasonable debate about the exceptional importance of
[that] problem,” id. at 23. Plainly, global climate
change presents our nation’s elected decision makers
with important questions of public policy. This case,
however, does not present those public policy
questions. As the dissenting opinion below noted,
although this case arose “in the context of a highly
controversial question -- global warming -- it actually
presents a quite traditional legal issue: has the
Environmental Protection Agency complied with the
Clean Air Act?” Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 82, A-58
(Tatel, J., dissenting).
For the reasons discussed below, the issues
presented by this case and the Court of Appeals’
resolution of those issues do not warrant review by this
Court.
A. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Is Fully
Consistent with Established Principles of
Administrative Law Governing Review of -
Denials of Rulemaking Petitions.
As Petitioners acknowledge, the D.C. Circuit is
“the premier intermediate court” on administrative law
matters. Pet. at 4. That court’s case law consistently
reflects the long-established administrative law
principle that a federal agency’s decision -- based on
the facts and given the circumstances before it -- to
decline a request to institute rulemaking proceedings is
given a high degree of deference. Such a decision
should be overturned “only in the rarest and most
compelling of circumstances.” WWHT, Inc. v. FCC,
656 F.2d 807, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Timpinaro
v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same);
American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1,
4-6 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (denials of rulemaking petitions
entitled to “high end” of range of deference). Indeed,
“an agency's refusal to initiate a rulemaking 1s
evaluated with deference so broad as to make the
process akin to non-reviewability.” Cellnet
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1106, 1111
(D.C. Cir. 1992). In rejecting challenges to EPA’s
denial of the rulemaking petition here, the D.C. Circuit
applied settled administrative law precedents.
In NRDC vy. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir.
1979),' the D.C. Circuit held that in cases such as the
instant case, where an agency declines to grant a
request to regulate, the scope of judicial review is --
and must be -- extremely limited for several reasons:
An agency’s discretionary decision not to
regulate a given activity is inevitably
based, in large measure, on factors not
inherently susceptible to judicial resolution
-- e.g., internal management considerations
as to budget and personnel; evaluations of
its own competence; weighing of
competing policies within a broad statutory
framework. Further, even if an agency
considers a particular problem worthy of
regulation, it may determine for reasons
lying within its special expertise that the
time for action has not yet arrived. The
area may be one of such rapid
technological development that regulations
would be outdated by the time they could
become effective, or the scientific state of
the art may be such that sufficient data are
not yet available on which to premise
adequate regulations. The circumstances in
the regulated industry may be evolving in a
way that could vitiate the need for
regulation, or the agency may still be
developing the expertise necessary for
effective regulation.
' See WWHT, 656 F.2d at 816 (identifying NRDC v. SEC as the
D.C. Circuit’s “most comprehensive statement . . . as to the
availability and scope of review of an agency's decision to deny a
petition for rulemaking”).
Id. at 1046 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original);
see also WWHT, 656 F.2d at 817 (quoting NRDC, 606
F.2d at 1046).
An agency's denial of a petition for rulemaking
must be upheld “if it violates no law, 1s blessed with an
articulated justification that makes a ‘rational
connection between the facts found and the choice
made,’ and follows upon a ‘hard look’ by the agency at
the relevant issues.” Action for Children’s Television
v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Because
“(t]he agency’s determination is essentially a
legislative one, . . . the reviewing court should do no
more than assure itself that the agency acted ‘in a
manner calculated to negate the dangers of arbitrariness
and irrationality.” WWHT, 656 F.2d at 817 (quoting
Action for Children’s Television, 564 F.2d at 472 n.24).
As the D.C. Circuit noted, “there are very few
cases in which courts have forced agencies to institute
rulemaking proceedings on a particular issue after it
has declined to do so.” /d. at 818. On rare occasions,
courts do remand a denial of a rulemaking petition with
instructions to provide a reasoned explanation of the
denial. For example, in American Horse Protection,
the Secretary of Agriculture denied a petition seeking
rulemaking to reconsider regulations on the practice of
“soring” horses in light of new evidence regarding the
practice. ~ 812 F.2d at 1-3. The support for the
Secretary's denial of the petition consisted of two
conclusory sentences and limited _ statistical
information, jd. at 5 -- “insufficient,” the court held, “to
assure a revicwing court that the agency's refusal to act
was the product of reasoned decisionmaking,” id. at 6.
In sharp contrast, EPA’s denial of the rulemaking
petition here was reasoned. The record before EPA
and the D.C. Circuit enabled that court to “assure itself
that the agency considered the relevant factors, that it
explained the ‘facts and policy concerns’ relied on, and
that the facts have some basis in the record.” /d. at 5.
EPA provided a full explanation of its reasons for
denying the petition in twelve pages of the Federal
Register. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52922-33, A-59 to A-93; cf.
5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2000) (Administrative Procedure
Act requirement that an agency, in denying a petition
for rulemaking, give “a brief statement of the grounds
for denial”) (quoted in American Horse Protection, 812
F.2d at 4). One of the principal grounds EPA gave for
its denial was the continued existence of significant
scientific uncertainty reflected in the record before it.
Id. at 52930, A-82 to A-85; see also NRDC, 606 F.2d
1046 (“[E]ven if an agency considers a particular
problem worthy of regulation, it may determine for
reasons lying within its special expertise that the time
for action has not yet arrived. ... [T]he scientific state
of the art may be such that sufficient data are not yet
available on which to premise adequate regulations.”)
(citations omitted). EPA also discussed other policy
concerns that would be raised by granting the petition,
68 Fed. Reg. at 52929-31, A-82 to A-87, and steps the
President was taking to address globa! climate oo
issues, id. at 52931-33, A-87 to A-92.
Thus, nothing in the record before EPA or the
court below presented those “rarest and most
compelling of circumstances” necessary to overturn an
agency denial of a rulemaking petition. WWHT, 656
F.2d at 818. Indeed, Petitioners do not show in their
petition, and no basis exists for concluding, that EPA’s
decision was not “reasoned,” that EPA failed to
“explain{] the ‘facts and policy concerns’ [it] relied
on,” or that the facts lack “some basis in the record.”
American Horse Protection, 812 F.2d at 5 (citations
omitted). In sum, applying familiar and_ settled
principles of administrative law, the D.C. Circuit
properly declined to overturn EPA’s decision to deny
the request for rulemaking.
B. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Is Fully
Consistent with the Clean Air Act and Case
Law Construing That Act.
The D.C. Circuit’s decision is also fully consistent
with the plain language of the CAA and with case law
construing the Act. That court did not need to -- and
expressly did not -- address the ments of EPA’s first
and second bases for denying the rulemaking petition
(namely, that it lacked authority under the Act to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions to address global
climate change and that any regulation of such
emissions from new motor vehicles would conflict
impermissibly with EPCA). Massachusetts, 415 F.3d
at 56 & n.1, A-10 & n.1_ The Court of Appeals did not
need to address those two reasons because, as the court
found, the CAA’s plain language supports the third
reason EPA gave for denying the rulemaking petition:
that section 202 of the Act provides EPA with
discretion in making the expert “judgment” whether
motor. vehicle emissions “may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). Given the facts in the record
before the Agency when it made its decision on the
petition, mothing compelled EPA to exercise its
judgment by determining that the _ statutory
endangerment criterion was satisfied.
The D.C. Circuit properly found no basis to
disturb EPA’s denial of the petition because the court
owed deference to the Agency’s expert conclusion that
a sound basis for making an_ endangerment
determination did not exist in light of substantial
scientific uncertainty in the record. Massachusetts, 415
F.3d at 57, A-11 to A-13; Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d
1, 20 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Section
202(ay(|¥s “judgment” language is an “express
provision for administrative discretion.”). As the court
10
a
noted, an endangerment determination under the Act
“*is necessarily a question of policy that is to be based
on an assessment of risks and that should not be bound
by either the procedural or the substantive rigor proper
for questions of fact.’” Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 58,
A-15 (quoting Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 24). Petitioners
correctly observe that the mere existence of some
degree of scientific uncertainty need not paralyze
regulators under all circumstances; whatever authority
EPA might have to regulate is not necessarily
eliminated by the presence of any degree of uncertainty
in the science. Pet. Br. at 15 (citing Ethyl, 541 F.2d at
25). That does not mean, however, that EPA must
exercise any such authority even in the presence of
substantial scientific uncertainty.
The D.C. Circuit’s en banc decision in Ethyl
supports EPA’s denial of the rulemaking petition at
issue here, as the court pointed out below.
Massachusetis, 415 F.3d at 57, A-13 to A-14. Ethyl
did not involve the denial of a petition for rulemaking
in the face of scientific uncertainty -- the kind of
agency decision that, as discussed above, is subject to
an extraordinarily high degree of judicial deference.
Instead, Ethyl involved an industry challenge to an
EPA decision to regulate where there was “less than
certainty” about endangerment. Frhy/, 541 F.2d at 25.
in rejecting that challenge, the D.C. Circuit held that
although “certainty is the scientific ideal[,] to the extent
that even science can be certain of its truth[,] .. .
[a]waiting certainty will often allow for only reactive,
not preventive, regulation.” /d. Thus, as Ethy/ makes
clear, an agency is not always obligated to wait for
complete scientific certainty before undertaking
regulation. Fthy/ plainly does not stand for the
converse proposition Petitioners urge here: that EPA
has a duty to grant a petition to regulate despite
11
substantial scientific uncertainty that the Agency is
working to resolve.
In fact, Petitioners concede, as they must, that
under the statute, EPA properly considers “scientific
uncertainty” in exercising judgment to determine
whether the endangerment criterion is met in light of
the record before it. Pet. Br. at 14-15. Despite Judge
Tatel’s view in dissent that he “doubt/s] EPA could
credibly conclude that it needs more research to
determine whether [greenhouse gas]-caused global
warming ‘may reasonably be anticipated to endanger’
welfare,” Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 77, A-> to A-51
(Tatel, J., dissenting), the passage from the NRC
Report that Judge Tatel quotes at length -- the same
report on which EPA relied -- is replete with statements
reflecting considerable scientific uncertainty regarding
global climate change and its possible effects on both
public welfare and public health. For example:
e ‘“‘Changes in storm frequency and intensity are one
of the more uncertain elements of future climate
change prediction.”” /d. at 79, A-53 (Tatel, J.,
dissenting) (quoting NRC Report) (emphasis
added).
““(T}he response of insects and plant diseases to
warming is poorly understood. On the regional
scale and in the longer term, there is much more
uncertainty.” Id. at 78, A-52 (quoting NRC
Report) (emphasis added).
e ‘Health outcomes in response to climate change
are the subject of intense debate. . . . Climate
change is just one of the factors that influence the
frequency and transmission of infectious disease,
and hence the assessments. view such changes as
highly uncertain”” — Id., A-52 (quoting NRC
Report) (emphasis added).
12
ee
The understanding of the relationships between
weather/climate and human health is in its infancy
and therefore the health consequences of climate
change are poorly understood. The costs, benefits,
and availability of resources for adaptation are also
uncertain.’” Id. at 79, A-53 (quoting NRC Report)
(emphasis added).
The passage from the NRC Report that Judge
Tatel quotes also contains several other statements that
illustrate the existence of substantial uncertainty about
whether any basis existed for EPA to make an
endangerment judgment. For example:
“*A key conclusion from the National Assessment
[of Climate Change Impacts] is that U.S. society is
likely to be able to adapt to most of the climate
change impacts on human systems, but these
adaptations may come with substantial cost.’” /d.
at 78, A-SI (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting NRC
Report) (emphasis added).
e ‘“‘In the near term, agriculture and forestry are
likely to benefit from CO) fertilization effects and
the increased water efficiency of many plants at
higher atmospheric CO, concentrations.’” J/d., A-
51 (quoting NRC Report) (emphasis added).
e ‘(T]he combination of the geographic and climatic
breadth of the United States, possibly augmented
by advances in genetics, increases the nation’s
robustness to climate change.’” /d., A-52 (quoting
NRC Report).
e “(Mjuch of the United States appears to be
protected against many different adverse health
outcomes related to climate change by a strong
public health system, relatively high levels of
public awareness, and a high standard of living.””
13
Id. at 79, A-53 (quoting NRC Report) (emphasis
added).
e “‘At a national level, the direct economic impacts
[of global climate change] are /ikely to be modest
[while] on a regional basis the level and extent of
both beneficial and harmful impacts will grow.’”
Id., A-54 (quoting NRC Report) (emphasis added).
In short, given the evidence of scientific
uncertainty described in the NRC Report before the
Agency, EPA was well justified in denying the petition
for rulemaking.
EPA noted, in addition to uncertainty in the
scientific evidence, other policy reasons that provided
further support for its decision to deny the rulemaking
petition. 68 Fed. Reg. 52929-33, A-82 to A-92.
Petitioners claim that EPA may not consider policy
reasons under section 202 of the CAA at all and that
EPA’s consideration of these reasons in this case
impermissibly tainted the Agency’s decision. Pet. Br.
at 14-15. Again, applying settled principles, the D.C.
Circuit properly rejected Petitioners’ objection, holding
that “Congress does not require the Administrator to
exercise his discretion solely on the basis of his
assessment of scientific evidence.” Massachusetts, 415
F.3d at 58, A-13 (citing Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 20); see id.,
A-15 (“as we have held, a reviewing court ‘will uphold
agency conclusions based on policy judgments’ ‘when
an agency must resolve issues “on the frontiers of
scientific knowledge”’’”) (quoting L£nvironmental
Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 82 (D.C. Cir.
1978)), Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 26 (“the statute accords the
regulator flexibility to assess risks and make essentially
legislative policy judgments”); WW/HIT, 656 F.2d at 818
(“The agency’s determination is essentially a
legislative one, and the reviewing court should do no
more than assure itself that the agency acted ‘in a
14
manner calculated to negate the dangers of arbitrariness
and irrationality."”) (quoting Action for Children’s
Television, 564 F.2d at 472 n.24); NRDC, 606 F.2d at
1046 (“An agency’s discretionary decision not to
regulate a given activity is inevitably based, in large
measure, on factors not inherently susceptible to
judicial resolution. . . .”) (emphasis in original).
In sum, the legal issues in this case do not_
remotely present an important federal question that
merits this Court’s review. EPA’s denial of the
rulemaking petition, and the Court of Appeals’ decision
declining to overturn that denial, are supported by well-
settled principles of administrative law. Moreover, the
CAA’s plain language and case law interpreting that
language support EPA’s decision, as the Court of
Appeals correctly held.
II. CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT HAVE
ACTED TO ADDRESS GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE.
Petitioners’ melodramatic claim that failure to
grant certiorari here “would likely drastically limit our
ability to address the growing crisis” they say is posed
by global climate change, Pet. Br. at 26, is wholly
unfounded. As EPA’ explained in denying the
rulemaking petition, Congress and the President have
acted to address global climate change. Indeed,
Congress and the President have continued to act to
address the problem since EPA denied the petition for
rulemaking.
Congress has enacted several statutes addressing
global climate change and greenhouse gas emissions.
It has focused much of its legislative efforts with regard
40 global climate change on establishing programs of
research to reduce the © scientific uncertainty
surrounding global climate change issues. See, e¢.g.,
Food and Agriculture Act, Pub. L. No. 101-624, tt.
15
XXIV, § 2401, 104 Stat. 4058 (1990) (creating a
research program for global climate change agricultural
issues); Global Change Research Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
606, tit. I, §§ 102, 103, 106, 104 Stat. 3097-98, 3101
(1990) (establishing research programs and providing
for scientific assessments every four years of the
“current trends in global change”); Energy Security
Act, Pub. L. No. 96-294, tit. VII, § 711, 94 Stat. 611,
774-75 (1980) (calling for a study of the “projected
impact, on the level of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere, of fossil fuel combustion, coal-conversion
and related synthetic fuel activities”); National Climate
Program Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901, 2904
(directing the President to establish a “national climate
program,” including “appropriate . . . recommendations
for action”); see also 68 Fed. Reg. at 52927, A-74; S.
Rep. No. 95-740, at 13, 14 (1978), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1398, 1399 (legislative history of National Climate
Program Act of 1978) (research programs assist the
nation in “respond[ing] more effectively to climate-
induced problems”).
In 1992, Congress directed the Secretary of
Energy to conduct several assessments related to
greenhouse gases and report to Congress. Energy
Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1604, 106
Stat. 2776, 3002; see also 68 Fed. Reg. at 52927, A-735.
> Congress also addressed global climate change in the CAA
when it last enacted substantial amendments to the Act in 1990.
See 68 Fed. Reg. at 52926, A-70 to A-72. In those amendments,
Congress directed EPA “to develop, evaluate. and demonstrate
nonregulatory strategies and technologies for air pollution
prevention” that would address several substances. including CO).
42 US.C. § 7403(g). In an uncodified provision of the public law
that includes the 1990 Amendments to the CAA, Congress
required electric utilities to monitor and report annually their CO,
emissions. Pub. 1. No. 101-549, § 821(a), 104 Stat. 2399. 2699
(1990)
16
That statute directed the Executive Branch to develop a
National Energy Policy Plan “to achieve to the
maximum extent practicable and at lIeast-cost to the
Nation . . . the stabilization and eventual reduction in
the generation of greenhouse gases.” 42 U.S.C. §
13382(a), (g). Under the Act, the Department of
Energy must assess “alternative policy mechanisms for
reducing the generation of greenhouse gases.” /d. §
13384. In enacting this statute, Congress sought
analysis of “the important technical and policy issues
that will enable us to make wiser decisions on more
dramatic and possibly higher cost actions which should
be undertaken only in the context of concerted
international action.” H.R. Rep. No. 102-474, pt. 1, at
152 (1992), 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1953, 1975.’
Most recently, in the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
Congress established additional specific federal
policies to address global climate change, including
coordination of technology development strategies and
deployment of greenhouse gas reducing technologies in
the United States and in developing countries. Pub. L.
No. 109-58, tit. XVI, §§ 1610(b)(1), (c)(1), 1611, 119
Stat. 595, 1109."
* The Energy Policy Act of 1992 also provided for voluntary
reporung of greenhouse gas emissions and reductions pursuant to
Department of Energy guidelines. Pub. L. No. 102-486. §
1605(b). 106 Stat. 3002: see also Guidelines for Voluntary
Greenhouse Gas Reporting. 71 Fed. Reg. 20784 (Apr. 21, 2006).
* During debate on the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress
considered and rejected for a second time a legislative proposal to
impose binding limits on CO, emissions. Senators McCain and
Lieberman offered Amendment No. 826, known as the “Climate
Stewardship and Innovation Act.” which would have imposed
mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions. 151 Cong. Rec.
$6892. 6894 (daily ed. June 21, 2005). The Senate rejected this
amendment by a vote of 38-60. Vote No. 148. June 22. 2005. The
Senate in 2003 rejected a similar amendment by a vote of 43-55.
Vote No. 420, 149 Cong. Rec. $13598 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 2003).
17
Congress and the President also have acted to
address global climate change in the international
arena. In 1987, in the Global Climate Protection Act,
Congress directed the Secretary of State to coordinate
U.S. negotiations concerning global climate change.
See 15 U.S.C. § 2901 note; H.R. Rep. No. 102-474, pt.
1, at 152 (1992), 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1975
(mandatory measures to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions should be undertaken “only in the context of
concerted international action”); see also 68 Fed. Reg.
at 52927, A-74. This Act also demonstrates the
emphasis Congress has placed on research programs,
stating that research “is crucial to the development of
an effective United States response” to global climate
change and declaring that U.S. policy is to “identify
technologies and activities to limit mankind’s adverse
effect on the global climate . . . and . . . work toward
multilateral agreements.” Pub. L. No. 100-204, tit. XI,
$§ 1102(3), 1103(a), 101 Stat. 1407, 1408 (1987)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2901 note).
Consistent with this directive, President George H.
W. Bush signed, and the Senate ratified, the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”), which established mechanisms for
international approaches to address global climate
change.” See UNFCCC Homepage, http://unfccc.int
* The United States is not a party to the UNFCCC’s Kyoto
Protocol because Congress and the President want developing
nations to participate in any international programs requiring
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions on the same basis as
developed nations (something the Kyoto Protocol does not
require) and because participation in the Protocol “would have a
negative economic impact” on the United States. Transcript.
President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change (June 11.
2001), —s http://www.whitchouse.gov/news’/releases 2001 06/2001
061 1-2.html (visited May 5, 2006): S. Res. 98. 105" Cong. (1997)
(Senate resolution, approved by a vote of 95-0, urging the
President not to sign any international agreement to reduce
18
(last visited May 5, 2006). President George W. Bush
has committed the United States “to work within the
United Nations framework and elsewhere to develop
with our friends and allies and nations throughout the
world an effective and science-based response to the
issue of global warming.” Transcript, President Bush
Discusses Global Climate Change, see also 68 Fed.
Reg. at 52931, A-86 (“Unavoidably, climate change
raises important foreign policy issues, and it is the
President's prerogative to address them.”’).
To that end, in July 2005, President Bush reached
an agreement with leaders of the other “G8” nations to
“speed the development and deployment of clean
energy technologies to . . . address[] climate change.”
White House Fact Sheet, Action on Climate Change,
Energy and Sustainable Development (July 8, 2005),
http://www.whitchouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/
20050708-2.html (last visited May 5, 2006). Later that
month, the President announced that the United States
was joining with two other developed nations (Japan
and Australia) and three developing nations (China,
India, and South Korea) in the Asia-Pacific Partnership
on Clean Development and Climate to “achieve
practical results” through programs “addressing the
long-term challenge of climate change.” White House
Fact Sheet, President Bush and the Asia-Pacific
Partnership on Clean Development (July 27, 2005),
greenhouse gas emissions that does not include developing
nations): see also 68 Fed. Reg. at 52927. A-75.
* The Asia-Pacific Partnership. which is consistent with
UNFCCC principles. “serve[s] as a framework for supporting . . .
international cooperation among the Partners to meet [their]
development, energy. environment, and climate change
objectives.” Charter for the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean
Development and Climate (Jan. 2006). http:’/www.dfat.gov.au’
environment climate ap6 charter.html (last visited May 5, 2006).
19
http://www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2005/07/
print/20050727-11.html (last visited May 5, 2006).
Thus, no basis exists for Petitioners’ suggestion
that, absent this Court’s grant of certiorari in this case,
global climate change concerns will be unaddressed.
The nation’s elected decision makers have acted, and
continue to act, in response to those concerns.
Notwithstanding Petitioners’ claims, this Court’s
review of the decision below is unnecessary and
unwarranted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of
certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
NORMAN W. FICHTHORN
(Counsel of Record)
LUCINDA MINTON LANGWORTHY
ALLISON D. Woop
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP
1900 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 955-1500
Counsel for Respondent Utility Air
May 8, 2006 Regulatory Group
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.