Respondents Brief — Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.
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A “4 ;"Siipreme Count.US. |
by FILED |
No. 05-1074 OCT 2 3 2006 |
ere nen
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
LILLY M. LEDBETTER,
Petitioner,
Vv.
THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY,
Respondent.
—_— -—
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
JAY ST. CLAIR GLEN D. NAGER
BRADLEY ARANT ROSE & (Counsel of Record)
WHITE LLP MICHAEL A. CARVIN
One Federal Place SHAY DVORETZKY
1819 Fifth Avenue North JONES Day
Birmingham, AL 35203 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
(205) 521-8000 Washington, DC 20001
(202) 879-3939
Counsel for Respondent
A RTS ANTS
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Respondent makes the following corporate disclosure
statement pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6:
The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company has no parent
company. No publicly held company owns 10% or more of
The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company’s stock.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
| Page
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ....csssssssvseeeeee
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...ccccece.cecececoscoccoesconcecccceseesessor iv
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE. cssssssssescossossosesee
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ....ssssssscccscssssscessesseseeres 8
eS EERO FET ee ew Ie 1
{. LEDBETTER DOES NOT HAVE A TIMELY
INTENTIONAL PAY DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
FOR ACTIONS TAKEN OUTSIDE THE CHARGE-
A. Section 706(e) Bars A Private Plaintiff From
Bringing An Intentional Discrimination Claim
Concerning The Lingering Effects Of
Decisions Occurring Outside Of The Charge-
ER ETS LEIS TE Tih ee 13
B. Ledbetter’s Intentional Pay Discrimination
' Claim Is Time-Barred Because She
Challenges The Present Effects Of Salary
Decisions Occurring Outside Of The Charge-
a eiicisitetibitciesiatinmieeltpilaiieitieteigeertetetsapini 20
Il. BAZEMORE v. FRIDAY DOES NOT AUTHORIZE
AN INTENTIONAL PAY DISCRIMINATION
CLAIM BY A PRIVATE PARTY CONCERNING
ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION OCCURRING
OUTSIDE OF THE CHARGE-FILING PERIOD........ 24
A. Bazemore Involved Allegations By The
United States Of Present Intentional *
Discrimination; And This Court Merely
Rejected The Employer's Defense That The
Claim Was Barred Because The Alleged
Discrimination Began Before Title VII's
OS TI sissiccnicccistisstcnitiansnnpeidteatatistaiaiadiididiedadianaas 25
B. Ledbetter Misconstrues Snippets of Language
in Justice Brennan’s Bazemore Concurrence.......... 29
Ul. LEDBETTER’S REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARE
PR Te Be Oceccaviinisrvinaiiasensiiaiadiaiiaanieaiiiiiebieets 35
_ A. Ledbetter’s Empirical And Policy Arguments
Wrongly Ask The Court To Rewrite Section
PRED vcswscscncsnesnicisiaitiicicanimsinsiailiiicataiacdisunieiuiaiimimades tall 36
B. Ledbetter’s Argument For Acquiescence In
Allegedly Consistent Positions Of Most
Courts Of Appeals And The EEOC Is
PD cisniniinsssoncndsbanisieiiciniiiainetiiniseiamemenaiaaa 40
C. Ledbetter’s Inapt Analogies Concern Claims
About Present Violations of Law...........ccceeeeeeeees 43
D. Ledbetter’s Reliance On The Legislative
History Of Statutory Provisions Other Than
Section 706(e) Is Without Merit... eee 47
CA Ai cccvinnsisscrenin’ ievconesoinnsinsisinisesmnnmsiniiaanhiah 49
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
American Federation of State, County & Municipal
Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir.
eect elinancnamnlindnantncnonnsetns 12
Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d
ERO Cee 4]
Bartelt v. Berlitz School of Languages of America,
Inc., 698 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1983).........:cccccecsceereeeseeees 41!
Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust
Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of California, Inc., 522 U.S.
Ts las tated tiinettehetedat tcecineeretapenangnenreenensnannesensenten 46
Bazemore v. Friday, 75\ F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1984)....... 25, 26
Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) ..............00 passim
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 ¥.2d 711 (7th
TIT coniinsecqnaiiddhiicdeesibebuttiapenenmadanannseetnarimiiemsesmestmeies 14
Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336
EE 4\
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
EE Ea en 13
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
By Ge ty Gt BI CIID orccccciccncccosnosonnssersesoosscencooes 38
Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001)............. 4]
Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981) ......ccccccccceceeereeees 22
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).....cccccccecccceceseeseeeeeees 41
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412
| SSE SSE SE een a a 38
City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)........ 47
County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161
ERLE SS ee 12, 35
Dasgupta v. University of Wisconsin Board of
Regents, 121 F.3d 1138 (7th Cir. 1997) oo ccccccceecceeeees 40
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
Page
Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250
Ip a sindeiinsnenceisnhitenesiebaeniniedenpumteecadeaneaiaateasneiapaminiaiitenel passim
Farmingdale Iron Works, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 98
SEITE hsnedinpiessasdisiainaduntenantiniediaminiendenisenpuitienmatinapesisniiiels 45
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S.
ee i eniiacticiiasisiisiiceintiuaniitanileabiapisidaiaaitiiiaiadal eisai 40
Forsyth v. Federation Employment & Guidance
Service, 409 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2005) .0......cceceeceeseeeeeeeees 4]
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)........ 43
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. NLRB, 476 F.2d
YE CS ener aes eee 44
Gibbs v. Pierce County Law Enforcement Support
Agency, 785 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1986) ..0..... eee 4]
Goodwin v. General Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005
ON ea 41
Hall v. Ledex, Inc., 669 F.2d 397 (6th Cir. 1982)............... 4]
Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S.
I a ciiietitiniiiciindisascniniesticliiitiniapitaatinaliiacaass 27, 30, 32, 37
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) .....¢.cccccce0ese0ees 47
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
RL RR ae 43,47
International Union of Electrical, Radio &
Machinery Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429
Rs ED cciviinrniinceiccitntiteiinndiiatiniicitnintmmuiniaiembennianl 13
Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997) occ. ccceceee. 46
Knight v. City of Columbus, 19 F.3d 579 (11th Cir.
PUTT niccusaiinnitajtieniatbeicapiatiiinemnieanaasipimetidabeennessintmntunlian 46
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of
PO BS BS ee 35
Lorance vy. A T &T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
Page
Machinists Local Lodge No. 1424 v. NLRB, 362 U.S.
ie AT nninisscecisiinenisiniiainieniatiguainiiateanimniaiabinenismdvehde 17,44
Melville Confections, Inc. v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 689
TER: SITET icsticcsseeetiaiesiensinheiniinipsliniasiiatnuniadeaaicasemingmemenl 45
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
Tre sisceiicinthteinnasichadeiebbiltatdpnieiscsnadiduiiaaibadiniiniatonsiiieininiinnavaieigi 24
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 __
STITT cscicisslaniteetpinpinidnaaratdantintieiaeidinaainadasitineindeaniniaiits 14, 39, 43
NLRB v. F_H. McGraw & Co., 206 F.2d 635 (6th Cir.
DI ccc cecnsstnenessenesssennesenensseseassumnenqenmnsnntntmestminaseenestnenses 45
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977)........ccc00 12
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536
Be ee I ccccinsinectntsrciciintsihanieaninediniindensinenaidaanaiins passim
News Printing Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 210 (1956)........ccccceeeees 44
Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S.
Be Cae Uicicdnepsanticeshiperiiniminciairanthisisidaipisindsaisiiatindsaptabianhia 27
Palmer v. Board of Education of Community Unit
School District 201-U, 46 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 1995).......47
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,
Fee es I eiertinedatinigtnhinnentitincieiseticisibiniates 21, 31
Pollis v. New School for Social Research, 132 F.3d
Be I IIT creciccniinsinsnriscidnieiteitlarddandntetmsnienitzennnniteedin 45
Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 492
hs STII cxcnninsdneiierdatonsentetshiititmmnnewssanindasinianes 43,47
Saint Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502
Ein irienciigussncainiashitinsiegtnasteiiasennianlidhiptpeematenannieasiniaienees 35
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) oes 42
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S.
ai UIT intincennderctneeuniinesiaseinneiiunntninibeibidsieiiebidmesiciimiindaeiaitttaines 48
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553
a i scicniaceenrenantiandsenmimananasiiiniaidiniiiibiapiasaetiiiiianieenceaniai passim
Vil
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
Page
United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192
(ESE ere eae Ae ea ea TO TE 48
United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793 (Sth Cir.
STTrceciteciiieicleciieiatidapailatain bia in iahaleadcitaeacell 47
United States v. Carlson, 235 F.3d 466 (9th Cir.
SELES Meo ewe a ae ee PAE es Ne Tee ee EST 47
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
IIT retinas ind iaiaiidiaria achat inne hl iainaiiadialia dials 37
Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir.
ETERS CE Sart aca AO Re eee ee a 14
Wintner v. Cisneros, No. APL 01962705, 1996 WL
poe RE Ee eee 42
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385
SESS MESS SEER tec eRe aA 38
Statutes & Regulations
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) 0.0.0... ecceeeeeeeeeee 5, 39, 45
dF LEE fT odd > ~ . Sn 39
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
SNS an iD icinschcisenadiledieaiaieeinhainnitehaeiniaiitgsdicinlaaiaaataininaiiaiiied 5
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29
Seis I Sen sinecccniinsieseneminscinelniasietenneiiaednidintanetecsiiianne 46
ts ie et icoernnicasietesdscteciciitiisimineduatintuicnimmniaseniiibiantiing 38
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000-17 oo... ceeeeeeeeteees 5
Se irs Se icnitccviciinicnnianineniiiinnenininnniininiis 34
er i Ae I ctentatecornitintnccnensenenstanimnnmantnisionnian 34
er Oe ED cttcrcnsanivesnnrasinstinnininsinmiets passim
Se CRE. © FO recrcetncasetcreeninnsecnenseescstinien 36, 39
ee, Be ee ccrctceninntiniicnenccncassncnsiabimasimnaianiiins 37
ROCF BR, & CGE 6 Ge ccccencescossccscnmnscsessensessessseneqnanesta 23
vill
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Continued)
Page
Legislative & Agency Matcrials
Civil Rights Act—Report from the Senate Labor &
Human Resources Committee, 8. Rep. No. 101-
Pee vicsnerniliivedtscimmeiniuiianinmeniianpeniinantiianionsbapeencets 48
137 Cong. Rec. $15472-01 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991)......... 48
Other Authorities
31 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 79.14
ETE. SIIITTIIIIT irsitepincinincaniciensiieiiahaphahtgariaesiaadeslaaiiabanabieatetins 46
27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 148 (2d ed. 2006)... 39
EEOC Compliance Manual § 2-IV.C.2 (July 27,
Tati icestidehittinsedtidanesitnipatied tn intabaaadepenisieniitininepiaiaepemmenetiie 42
EEOC Compliance Manual § 2-1V.C ........cccecceeeeeeseeeneees 42
Br. for the Federal Petitioners, Bazemore v. Friday,
I Cais IE ncetnnsnsicndinsnccunpnsttrtiegpnenimennenennsiniiniees 26
Br. of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Bazemore v. Friday, 1986 WL 728218........ 26
Reply Br. for the Federal Petitioners, Bazemore v.
Peta, TGS WE, Tae cescccvaserccessccenssscncsnssssensseieeseseese 26
Br. of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae, Cardenas v.
Massey (3d Cir. 2001), 2000 WL 33988483 .................. 4?
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COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE
Lilly Ledbetter worked for The Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company for 19 years, first as a Supervisor and subsequently
as an Area Manager. Ledbetter began her employment at the
same salary as male Supervisors. During the ensuing 19
years, several different managers made discrete annual
decisions regarding what merit increase Ledbetter should
receive in her salary. In some years, the increases that
Ledbetter received were greater than those awarded to male
- co-workers. In other years, they were less. In still other
years, Ledbetter was on layoff, or was about to be laid off,
and thus was not eligible for an increase. In this lawsuit,
Ledbetter seeks to challenge the collective effect of those 19
years of salary determinations, particularly focusing on
alleged discrimination occurring in the 1980’s and early
1990’s. Each of the alleged acts occurred well before
Ledbetter filed a charge with the EEOC in 1998 alleging
intentional pay discrimination. Applying Title VII's text and
this Court’s cases construing that text, the court below
correctly held that Ledbetter could not pursue such a stale
claim.
|. Ledbetter was hired on February 5, 1979 as a
Supervisor Trainee at Goodyear’s tire assembly plant in
Gadsden, Alabama. Pet. App. 5a. Shortly thereafter, she
became a Supervisor. Ledbetter was paid the same salary,
$16,760.52, as the other Supervisors at the Gadsden plant.
J.A. 39, 151-52. Moreover, in 1980 and 1981, Ledbetter
received the same lockstep pay increases, based on cost-of-
living adjustments, as the other Supervisors (15.59% in 1980
and 9.25% in 1981). J.A. 224; Tr. 125-28.
a. In 1982, Goodyear implemented a merit-based
compensation program. Pet. App. 4a; J.A. 114-42. Under
the “Pay. for Performance” program, each “Business Center
Manager” within a plant became responsible for determining
annual merit increases for the salaried empleyees under his
or her supervision. Pet. App. 4a-Sa; J.A. 120-21. In doing
2
so, the Business Center Manager was required to take cach
employee’s existing salary at the time as a given starting
point; the manager was to focus only on appropriate salary
increases. J.A. 69-70, 87-88, 120-21; Tr. 256-57. In that
regard, the manager was also to take into account each
employee's performance ranking for the year; where the
employee’s existing salary stood within the salary range for
his or her position; and the amount and timing of the
employee's most recent increase. Pet. App. 4a-5a; J.A. 120-
21, 174-77. Each employee’s annual incréase could not
exceed a specified maximum percentage, and the total
amount of increases awarded in each Business Center could
not exceed a set budget. Pet. App. 4a-5a, 48a; J.A. 87-88,
120-21.
b. Between 1982 and 1985 (when her title changed
to Area Manager), Ledbetter received annual salary increases
of 7.65%, 6.39%, 5.34%, and 7.19%. J.A. 224. For fifteen
months beginning in 1986 and extending into 1987,
Ledbetter was on layoff, and, as a result, she was not eligible
for pay increases in 1986, 1987, or 1988. Pet. App. 5a; J.A.
167: Tr. 39, 128-31. Upon being recalled, Ledbetter’s salary
was less than the salaries of Area Managers who had not
been laid off and had been eligible for increases during those
years. J.A. 167, 195. In 1989, Ledbetter received a 5.99%
increase. J.A. 224. But she was included in another layoff
later in 1989; as a result, she was ineligible for a pay increase
in 1990. Pet. App. 5a; J.A. 224. In 1991 and 1992, she
received pay increases of 8.86% and 6.65%, respectively.
J.A. 224. Ledbetter conceded at trial that Mike Nunn, her
supervisor between 1990 and 1992, did not discriminate
against her in determining her pay increases in those years.
Tr. 132-33.
c. Between 1993 and 1996, Mike Tucker evaluated
Ledbetter. In 1993, Tucker ranked Ledbetter third out of the
four Area Managers and fifth out of the six salaried
employees whom he supervised. Pet. App. Sa-6a; J.A. 174.
Jimmy Todd, who was ranked last, received no pay increase
3
for the year, while Ledbetter received a 5.28% increase, the
largest percentage increase awarded to any Area Manager
under Tucker’s supervision. Pet. App. Sa-6a; J.A. 174.
In 1994, Tucker ranked Ledbetter last among the four
Area Managers and last among the six salaried employees
whom he supervised. Pet. App. 6a; J.A. 175. She
nevertheless received a 5% pay increase. Pet. App. 6a; J.A.
175.
In 1995, Tucker awarded Ledbetter the maximum
“individual performance award”—4%—available under the
compensation guidelines for that year. Pet. App. 6a; Tr. 348.
Tucker awarded Ledbetter an additional increase of 3.85% in
1995 as a “top performance award” in order to raise her
salary. Pet. App. 6a; Tr. 348, 363.
In 1996, Tucker ranked Ledbetter 23rd out of 24 salaried
employees, and 15th out of 16 Area Managers. Pet. App. 7a;
J.A. 176-77; Tr. 344. Tucker ranked Jimmy Todd 24th, and
both he and the 22nd-ranked employee received no raises.
Pet. App. 7a; J.A. 176-77. Because Ledbetter’s 1995 raise
became effective on December |, 1995, she was not eligible
for another increase in 1996. Pet. App. 7a; Tr. 141, 344.
The cumulative amount of pay increases that Ledbetter
received between 1993 and 1996 was higher than the
increases for three of the four male Area Managers working
for Tucker. J.A. 193.
d. Because the Gadsden plant was experiencing
declining production, Goodyear slated Ledbetter and Jimmy
Todd—the two lowest-performing Area Managers in 1995—
for layoff at the end of 1996. Pet. App. 7a, 49a. However,
because other Area Managers went out on extended medical
leaves, Ledbetter’s layoff never took effect. Pet. App. 7a.
But, having been slated for layoff, she did not receive a pay
increase in 1997. Pet. App. 8a & n.4, 9a: Tr. 296-97, 318.
Throughout 1997, Ledbetter’s new manager, Jerry Jones,
expressed concerns to Ledbetter about her performance. Pet.
4
App. 8a. He eventually suggested that she apply for a non-
supervisory Technology Engineer position. Pet. App. 8a.
Ledbetter did so, but continued working as an Area Manager
through the end of 1997. Pet. App. 8a.
In late 1997, Kelly Owen replaced Jones as the Business
Center Manager responsible for evaluating Ledbetter. Pet.
App. 8a. In his evaluation of Ledbetter’s 1997 performance,
Owen ranked Ledbetter 23rd out of 24 salaried employees,
and 15th out of 16 Area Managers. Pet. App. 9a; J.A. 189-
92. Dean Nance, a man, was ranked last; the two people
ranked directly above Ledbetter were also men. Pet. App.
9a; J.A. 189-92. These four employees—the lowest-rated
employees under Owen’s supervision—did not receive merit
increases in 1998. Pet. App. 9a; J.A. 189-92.
e. In August 1998, Goodyear offefed an early
retirement option. Pet. App. 9a. Ledbetter took early
retirement effective November |, 1998.-Pet. App. 9a.
2. Ledbetter did not file an EEOC charge challenging
the cumulative effect of these 19 years of salary
determinations until July 21, 1998. Pet. App. 9a; J.A. 147-
50. The record shows that she had previous experience with
the EEOC charge process. The record also shows that she
was aware, by no later than 1992, of a disparity between her
pay and that of Gertain male Supervisors/Area Managers.
a. Specifically, in 1982, Ledbetter had filed a
charge with the EEOC alleging that Mike Maudsley, a
former department foreman who was deceased by the time of
trial in this case, had sexually harassed her. J.A. 103-09.
Ledbetter and Goodyear resolved these allegations without
litigation. J.A. 42-43.
b. With regard to her pay, Ledbetter testified that
“(dlifferent people that [she] worked for along the way had
always told [her] that [her] pay was extremely low.” J.A.
233 (emphasis added). She recalled that her manager told
her in 1992 that her pay was lower than that of other Area
Managers, and that by 1994 or 1995, she had learned the
5
amount of the difference. J.A. 230-33. In 1995, Ledbetter
told Mike Tucker that she “needed to earn an increase in
pay” because she “wanted to get in line with where [her]
peers were, because ... at that time [she] knew definitely
that they were all making a thousand [dollars} at least more
per month... .” J.A. 231-32; see also J.A. 236-37, 239-40.
c. On March 25, 1998, Ledbetter filed a
questionnaire with the EEOC alleging that she had been
forced into the Technology Engineer position. J.A. 143-46.
On July 21, 1998, she filed a formal charge in which she
further alleged that she was being paid a discriminatorily low
salary. J.A. 147-50.
3. After receiving a right-to-sue letter, Ledbetter filed
suit, asserting multiple claims of intentional age
discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation, in
violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; the
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §206(d); and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34.
JA. 13-21.
a. A magistrate judge recommended that summary
judgment be granted to Goodyear on all but one of
Ledbetter’s claims—a claim relating to a_ three-day
suspension that she recetved in 1998 for a manufacturing
error. With respect to Ledbetter’s intentional pay
discrimination claim under Title VII, the magistrate judge
found that, because “plaintiff's performance was ranked at or
near the bottom of Area Managers,” Ledbetter had not “cast
sufficient doubt on | Goodyear’ s] proffered
nondiscriminatory reason{]” for paying her less than other
Area Managers. Pet. App. 67a (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). With respect to Ledbetter’s Equal
Pay Act claim, the magistrate judge concluded that Ledbetter
had not “established a prima facie case with respect to Area
Managers outside the Business Center in which she worked,”
who were not appropriate comparators. Pet. App. 73a. As
the magistrate judge explained, “[eJach of the defendant's
6
Business Centers had a particular purpose, and made
different products,” so that “varied” and “specialized skill{s]
w{ere] required ...to supervise employees in the different
business centers.” Pet. App. 72a-73a. The magistrate judge
further concluded that “the disparity between [Ledbetter’s]
pay and that of her comparators” in her own Business Center
was “based on factors other than sex,” namely, Ledbetter’s
“weak” performance. Pet. App. 73a, 74a.
b. Finding “credibility” disputes in the testimony of
Mike Tucker concerning his recommendations about
Ledbetter’s salary increases between 1992 and 1995, the
district court denied summary judgment on Ledbetter’s
intentional pay discrimination claim. D. Ct. Dkt. #33 (Mem.
Op.), at 1-2; D. Ct. Dkt. #34 (order). The district court also
denied summary judgment on _ Ledbetter’s _ transfer,
retaliation, and discipline claims. D. Ct. Dkt. #33 (Mem.
Op.), at 2-3; D. Ct. Dkt. #34 (order). But the district court
entered summary judgment on all remaining claims,
including Ledbetter’s Equal Pay Act claim. D. Ct. Dkt. #33
(Mem. Op.), at 3; D. Ct. Dkt. #34 (order).
c. At trial, at the close of the evidence, the district
court granted judgment as a matter of law on Ledbetter’s
- claims of disparate discipline and retaliatory refusal to rehire,
but not on Ledbetter’s disparate pay and involuntary transfer -
claims. Pet. App. 10a; J.A. 98; Tr. 382, 384. A jury then
found for Goodyear on the transfer claim but returned a
verdict for Ledbetter on the pay claim. Pet. App. 10a-1 1a.
The jury awarded Ledbetter $223,776 in back pay, $4,662 in
damages for mental anguish, and $3,285,979 in punitive
damages. Pet. App. | la.
d. In post-trial motions, Goodyear renewed its
argument made at trial that Ledbetter’s pay claim was time-
barred as to all pay decisions made prior to September 26,
1997 (six months prior to the filing of Ledbetter’s EEOC
questionnaire). Goodyear also argued that no reasonable
jury could have concluded that the one pay decision made —
7
within the charge-filing period. by Kelly Owen, was
intentionally discriminatory. The district court rejected both
arguments, stating that:
The jury could reasonably have found that Terry
Amberson is an appropriate comparator. Apparently, both
he and the Plaintiff were paid the same salary on April |,
1979, and again on April 16, 1979. The jury could
reasonably have concluded that but for the gender
discrimination, their salaries would have been the same up
to November 1, 1998.
Pet. App. 4la (internal citation omitted). The court did,
however, remit the total award to $360,000, including
$300,000 in compensatory and punitive damages and
$60,000 in backpay, plus attorneys’ fees and costs. Pet. App.
lla, 38a-39a. The district court held that Ledbetter was
entitled to two years of backpay “[b]ecause of the continuing
nature of the disparate salary payments... .” Pet. App. 41a.
4. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. That court concluded
that a pay claim is “clear|ly]... governed by that part” of
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101
(2002), that “address[es] claims alleging ‘discrete acts of
discrimination.”” Pet. App. 17a. It further concluded that
Ledbetter could “state a timely cause of action for disparate
pay only to the extent that the ‘discrete acts of
discrimination’ of which she complains occurred within the
limitations period... .” Pet App. 19a.
The Eleventh Circuit noted that “a series of pre-Morgan
cases,” applying this Court’s decision in Bazemore v. Friday,
478 U.S. 385 (1986), had held that “an employee's pay
[claim] was not time-barred so long as the plaintiff received
within the limitations period at least one paycheck
implementing the pay rate the employee challenged as
unlawful.” Pet. App. 20a. But the court found that, even
“[a]ssuming that these cases survive Morgan .. . they do not
speak to how far back in time the plaintiff may reach in
looking for the intentionally discriminatory act that is the
8
central, requisite element of every successful disparate
treatment claim.” Pet. App. 22a-23a. The court noted that,
“[ulnless there is a claim that the person—or, more likely
today, the computer—who actually issued the paychecks in
question did so with intent to discriminate, the operative act
of discrimination will always be... the act of making the
underlying decision about what the plaintiff should be paid.”
Pet. App. 23a. The court further found that allowing a
plaintiff to “question every decision made contributing to his
or her” present salary level would entirely nullify Title VII's
charge-filing requirement. Pet. App. 23a. For these reasons,
the court held that “an employee looking to establish that his
or her pay level was unlawfully depressed may look no
further into the past than the last affirmative decision directly
affecting the employee’s pay immediately preceding the start
of the limitations period.” Pet. App. 24a.
The Eleventh Circuit next held that Ledbetter had not
provided legally sufficient evidence that either the “one raise
decision that was made within the limitations period”—i.e.,
Kelly Owen’s decision that she not receive a raise in 1998—
or the preceding decision that she not receive a raise in 1997
was motivated by Ledbetter’s sex. Pet. App. 27a-3la. With
regard to the former, the court noted that Ledbetter had been
ranked 23rd out of 24 employees in Tire Assembly, and 15th
out of 16 Area Managers, based on her performance; that the
men ranked at the bottom with Ledbetter also had been
denied raises; and that there was “no evidence that Owen
purposefully underrated Ledbetter’s performance for 1997.”
Pet. App. 3la. With regard to the 1997 decision, the court
found that the “uncontradicted evidence . . . established that
Ledbetter’s impending layoff was the reason for her being
denied a raise... .” Pet. App. 32a. .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Ledbetter lost her Equal Pay Act claim in the district
court; she did not assert a Title VII disparate impact claim;
and the Eleventh Circuit found !egally insufficient evidence
9
of intentional pay discrimination during the Title VII charge-
filing period. The only question left is whether Ledbetter
can nonetheless pursue a claim that her present salary is the
result of allegedly intentionally discriminatory decisions
occurring outside of Title VII's charge-filing period. She
cannot.
I. Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e)(1), requires that “[a] charge under this section shall be
filed within [180] days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred.” This charge-filing
requirement, which this Court has described as a
compromise essential to the enactment of Title VII as a
whole, protects courts and defendants against stale claims
and promotes conciliation rather than litigation.
To honor both the text and the purposes of section 706(e),
this Court has repeatedly stressed the need to identify the
precise “unlawful employment practice” at issue and to
determine when that practice “occurred.” In doing so, the
Court has repeatedly held that section 706(c) bars a private
plaintiff from bringing an intentional discrimination claim
challenging discriminatory conduct occurring outside of the
charge-filing period, even if that past conduct continues to
have adverse effects into the charge-filing period. See. e.g.,
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 111-13
(2002); Lorance v. A T & T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 905-
08 (1989): Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258
(1980); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558
(1977).
Under that case law, Ledbetter’s intentional pay
discrimination claim is time-barred. There is no evidence
that Goodyear issued paychecks during the | 80-day period in
a discriminatory manner or with a discriminatory intent.
Moreover, the court below held that Ledbetter did not have
legally sufficient evidence that the single salary decision
made during the charge-filing period was discriminatory —a
holding that is not before this Court. Ledbetter complains
10
that allegedly discriminatory decisions made by different
managers extending back over 19 years have lingering
effects within the charge-filing period. But that is precisely
the kind of stale claim that section 706(e) and this Court’s
cases establish is untimely. There is no basis for applying a
different charge-filing rule to discrete acts of intentional pay
discrimination than to other kinds of discrete acts. Indeed,
allowing Ledbetter to bring such an untimely intentional
discrimination claim would completely defeat the interests in
repose and conciliation that underlie section 706(e).
ll. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986), is not to
the contrary. Bazemore involved a claim by the United
States that concerned allegations of present intentional
discrimination in pay. This Court held that the employer
could not defend against those allegations of present
discrimination on the ground that the discrimination had
begun prior to the effective date of Title VII. There was no
claim, much less a holding, that a present interitional pay
discrimination claim by a private plaintiff may rest wholly
on allegedly discriminatory decisions made outside of
section 706(e)'s charge-filing period. Indeed, section 706(e)
was not even in issue in Bazemore because claims brought
by the United States are not subject to that provision.
Ill. Ledbetter’s remaining arguments are also in error.
The policy concerns that she raises provide no legal basis to
rewrite the statutory charge-filing requirement. The
argument that this Court should acquiesce in the position of
some courts of appeals and the EEOC is unfounded: The
lower courts and the EEOC have not had a consistent
position, and this Court should enforce the statute as enacted,
not as misconstrued by some lower courts and the EEOC.
Moreover, while Ledbetter contends that numerous
analogous contexts demonstrate that her claim should be
considered timely, the only relevant analogy that she
identifies—cases under the National Labor Relations Act-—
confirms that her claim is time-barred. Finally, Ledbetter’s
reliance on the legislative history of statutory provisions
other than section 706(e) is meritless. :
ARGUMENT
As it comes to this Court, this case turns on section
706(e)’s requirement that a plaintiff raising an intentional
discrimination claim under Title VII must file a timely
administrative charge. Specifically, to have a timely claim,
Ledbetter had to allege and prove that, during the 180-day
limitations period preceding the charge filing, Goodyear
intentionally discriminated against her because of her gender
in setting her salary and/or in issuing her paychecks.
Ledbetter sought to satisfy this burden by showing that
Goodyear’s facially neutral pay actions during the limitations
period gave present effect to allegedly discriminatory salary
decisions made outside of the charge-filing period. The
Eleventh Circuit correctly rejected this claim.
In considering the issue, it is useful to note three
preliminary points: First, there is no question in this case
about wheter Goodyear actually intentionally discriminated
on the basis of gender in setting Ledbetter’s salary and/or in
issuing her paychecks during the charge-filing period. The
Eleventh Circuit held that there was not legally sufficient
evidence to support such an intentional discrimination claim,
and Ledbetter did not seek or obtain certiorari review of that
holding. Second, contrary to Ledbetter’s misstatement (Pet.
Br. at 15), there is no question here whether Goodycar paid
Ledbetter less money for equal work on the basis of her sex.
The district court granted summary judgment against
Ledbetter on her claim under the Equal Pay Act, and she did
not appeal that ruling (much less seek and obtain certiorari
with respect to it). Finally, there is no claim here that
Goodyear’s facially neutral “Pay for Performance”
compensation program—including its provision, for both
men and women, that the prior year’s existing salary is taken
as a given and is subject only to a maximum annual merit
increase-—has an unlawful disparate impact on women.
12
There is serious doubt whether such a disparate impact claim
is cognizable under Title VII. See, e.g., County of Wash. v.
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 (1981); Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 139-42 (1977); Am. Fed’n of State,
County, & Mun. Employees v. Wash., 770 F.2d 1401, 1405-
06 (9th Cir. 1985). But, equally important, Ledbetter never
asserted any disparate impact claim in the district court—
instead asserting only intentional discrimination claims on
which she could obtain a jury trial and request an award of
compensatory and punitive damages.
Rather, the only question presented here is whether
Ledbetter has a cognizable intentional discrimination claim
for a disparity in pay during the limitations period that she
claims “is the result of intentionally discriminatory pay
decisions that occurred outside the limitations-period”—i.e.,
a claim of alleged discrimination that Ledbetter was aware of
by no later than 1992 and that she has never claimed should
be the subject of equitable tolling or estoppel. Pet. at i; Pet.
App. 19a n.16. Section 706(e) and this Court’s cases make it
clear that no such claim is cognizable.
I. LEDBETTER DOES NOT HAVE A TIMELY
INTENTIONAL PAY DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
FOR ACTIONS TAKEN OUTSIDE THE
CHARGE-FILING PERIOD.
As the court below recognized, Title VII requires
allegedly aggrieved employees like Ledbetter to assert their
intentional discrimination claims within the 180-day charge-
filing period or lose them. Moreover, as the court below also
recognized, Tithe VII°’s charge-filing requirement does not
allow an aggrieved employee to revive an intentional
discrimination claim for which no timely charge was filed
merely by arguing that an unlawful action outside the
charge-filing period continues to have adverse effects in later
time periods. But that is all that Ledbetter is arguing in this
Court. Accordingly, her arguments should be rejected, and
the judgment below should be affirmed.
13
A. Section 706(c) Bars A Private Plaintiff From
Bringing An Intentional Discrimination Claim
Concerning The Lingering Effects Of Decisions
Occurring Outside Of The Charge-Filing Period.
Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1),
provides that “[a] charge under this section. shall be filed
within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred” (or within 300 days
in a state that has an agency with the authority to grant or
seek relief with respect to the unlawful employment
practice). Under this provision, it is “mandatory” that a
plaintiff file a charge within the requisite days after the
“unlawful employment practice” “occurred,” or “lose the
ability to recover for it.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109-10.
1. The Court has long recognized that section 706(e)
“reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the
interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed
by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.”
Ricks, 449 U.S. at 260 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Section 706(e) “protect{s] employers from the burden of
defending claims arising from employment decisions that are
long past.” /d. at 256-57. Indeed, the Court has held that an
employer is “entitled to treat [a] past [discriminatory] act as
lawful after [the employee] failed to file a charge of
discrimination” within the prescribed period. Evans, 431
U.S. at 558.
In so holding, the Court has recognized that, as an
administrative filing requirement, section 706(e) not only
“assures prompt notification to the employer of a charge of
an alleged violation of Title VII,” Jnt’l Union of Elec., Radio
& Mach. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229,
240 n.14 (1976), but also “promote{s] conciliation rather
than litigation in the Title VII context,” Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). Section 706(e)
“bring|s] to bear,” as promptly as possible. “the voluntary
compliance and conciliation functions of the EEOC.” Bowe
14
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969),
and thereby “promoi[es]...dispute resolution through
accommodation rather than litigation....” Weise v.
Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 412 (2d Cir. 1975) (citing
Henry J. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 78
(1973)).
The Court has stated that “[b]y choosing what are
obviously quite short deadlines [in Title VII], Congress
clearly intended to encourage the prompt processing of all
charges of employment discrimination.” Mohasco Corp. v.
Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980). Indeed, the Court has
recognized that section 706(e) and its prompt filing
requirement were a critical part of the legislative
“compromise” leading to the enactment of Title VII, id. at
826, and has admonished lower courts to “strict{ly] adher[e]”
to it. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 108.
2. To honor section 706(e)’s text and fulfill its statutory
purposes, the Court has repeatedly stressed the need both to
identify at the outset the specific “unlawful employment
practice” at issue and to determine when that practice
“occurred.” Jd. at 109-10; see also Lorance, 490 U.S. at
904; Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257-58. In doing so, the Court has
repeatedly held that section 706(e) bars a private plaintiff
_from pursuing an intentional discrimination claim based
wholly on conduct occurring outside of the charge-filing
period, even if the past conduct continues to have adverse
effects in the charge-filing period. See, e.g., Lorance, 490
U.S. at 905-08; Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257.
a. The Court first addressed this matter in United
Air Lines v. Evans. There, a female flight attendant claimed
that her pay and benefits were unlawfully depressed because
she had previously been forced to resign pursuant to an
illegal policy prohibiting flight attendants from being
married. See 431 U.S. at 554, 558. Specifically, Evans had
resigned in 1968, but was rehired in 1972 after the illegal
policy was abolished. See id. at 554-55. However, on
15
rehire, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, Evans’
employer did not credit her with seniority for prior service,
and thus her pay and benefits were adversely affected. See
id. at 555 & n.6. Evans claimed that the employer was
violating Title VII vy “giv{ing] present effect to the past
illegal act” and was unlawfully “perpetuat{ing] the
consequences of forbidden [past] discrimination.” /d. at 557.
In rejecting Evans’ claim, the Court began by stating that
“the critical question is whether any present violation exists.”
Id. at 558 (emphasis in original). The Court answered that
question in the negative on the ground that the employer’s
seniority system was “neutral in its operation.” /d. The
Court further noted that Evans did not allege that the
seniority system “discriminate|d] against former female
employees or that it treat{ed] former employees who were
discharged for a discriminatory reason any differently from
former employees who resigned or were discharged for a
non-discriminatory reason.” /d.
The Court recognized that the seniority policy had a
“continuing impact on [Evans’] pay and fringe benefits” and
gave “present effect to [the employer’s] past act of
discrimination.” /d. But the employer “was entitled to treat
that past act as lawful after [Evans] failed to file a charge of
discrimination within the [limitations period] allowed” by
section 706(e). /d. The Court said that the discriminatory
act in 1968, which was “not made the basis for a timely
charge,” was “merely an unfortunate event in history” that
had “no present legal consequences.” /d. (emphasis added).
b. The Court next addressed the issue in Delaware
State College v. Ricks. There, a black college professor was
denied tenure by Delaware State College. See 449 U.S. at
252. Following its “policy of not discharging immediately a
junior faculty member who does not receive tenure,” the
College communicated the tenure denial decision and offered
Ricks a “‘terminal’ contract to teach one additional year,”
which he accepted. /d. at 253. Ricks waited until more than
16
180 days after the denial of tenure, but shortly before his
one-year terminal contract expired, to file a Title VII charge.
See id. at 254. This Court held that Ricks’ claim was
untimely. See id. at 262.
The Court emphasized that determining the timeliness of
Ricks’ claim “requires... identify[ing] precisely the
‘unlawful employment practice’ of which he complains.” /d.
at 257 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)) (emphasis added).
The Court found that Ricks was claiming intentional
discrimination by the College in denying him tenure. See id.
at 257-58. The Court thus concluded that the alleged
intentional discrimination “occurred—and the filing
limitations period[{] therefore commenced—at the time the
tenure decision was’ made and communicated to Ricks,”
more than 180 days before his charge. /d. at 258.
The Court acknowledged that one of the “effects of the
denial of tenure—the eventual loss of a teaching position—
did not occur until later.” /d. (emphasis in original). But, to
the Court, Ricks’ termination was simply the “delayed” but
“inevitable[] consequence of the denial of tenure.” /d. at
257-58. Indeed, the Court noted that, for the limitations
period to have run from the date that his contract expired,
“Ricks would have had to allege and prove that the manner
in which his employment was terminated differed
discriminatorily from the manner in which the College
terminated other professors who also had been denied
tenure.” /d. at 258. The Court reiterated that “[i]t is simply
insufficient for Ricks to allege that his termination gives
present effect to [a] past illegal act and therefore perpetuates
the consequences of forbidden discrimination.” /d. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
c. The Court again spoke to the issue in Lorance v.
AT&T Technologies, Inc. In that case, the Court
considered “when the limitations period begins to run in a
lawsuit arising out of a seniority system not alleged to be
discriminatory on its face or as presently applied” that was
17
allegedly adopted for a discriminatory purpose outside of the
limitations period. 490 U.S. at 903. The plaintiffs in
Lorance did not allege that, within the limitations period, the
facially neutral seniority system “treat[ed] similarly situated
employees differently or that it [was] operated in an
intentionally discriminatory manner.” /d. at 905. Rather, the
plaintiffs were alleging that the seniority system had been
adopted for the discriminatory purpose of favoring male over
female employees. See id. Because that alleged
discriminatory act occurred “well outside the period of
limitations,” the Court ruled that the plaintiffs’ claims were
“time barred under § 706(e).” Jd. at 906.
The Court explained that its “cases have rejected” the
“alternative approaches” put forth by the plaintiffs. /d. The
Court noted that it had twice before rejected the theory that
an employer is “guilty of a continuing violation which
‘occurred,’ for purposes of § 706(e), not only when the”
seniority system was discriminatorily adopted, “but also
when each of the concrete effects” of that adoption “was
felt.” /d. And the Court pointed to other decisions holding
that section 703(h) of Title VII bars disparate impact claims
based on the continuing adverse effects of a seniority system.
See id. at 908-09.
The Lorance Court also rested its conclusion on its
decision in Machinists Local Lodge No. 1424 v. NLRB, 362
U.S. 411, 413-14 (1960). Although Machinists arose under
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), the Lorance
Court found that the NLRA “was the model for Title VII's
remedial provisions” and has a similar charge-filing period.
490 U.S. at 909-10. The Lorance Court further found that
Machinists had “considered and rejected an approach to the
limitations period identical to that advanced” by the
plaintiffs in Lorance. Id. at 910. Specifically, the
Machinists Court had held that where “‘a complaint based
upon [an] earlier event is time-barred.”’” to “* permit the event
itself ‘to cloak with illegality that which was otherwise
lawful’ ‘in effect results in reviving a legally defunct unfair
18
labor practice,” and in essence nullifies the limitations
period altogether. /d at 911 (quoting Machinists, 362 U.S.
at 417).. The Court in Lorance found this reasoning
“squarely in point”: “Because the claimed invalidity of the
facially nondiscriminatory and neutrally applied . . . seniority
system” in Lorance was “wholly dependent on the alleged
illegality” of its adoption, “the date of that [adoption]
governs the limitations period.” /d.
d. The Court most recently reaffirmed this
reasoning—and its construction of section 706(e)—in
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan. The plaintiff
in Morgan alleged that he had been subject to discrete
discriminatory and retaliatory acts by his employer and had
experienced a racially hostile work environment. See 536
U.S. at 104. While some of the alleged discriminatory acts
occurred within the charge-filing period, others took place
prior to that period. See id. at 106. In determining which, if
any, of these claims had been timely asserted, the Court
reiterated that “[t]he critical questions” are “[w)hat
constitutes an ‘unlawful employment practice’ and when has
that practice ‘occurred’?” /d. at 110.
As to discrete acts, “such as termination, failure to
promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire,” the Court
ruled that each discrete “incident of discrimination...
constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment
practice” that “starts a new clock for filing charges alleging
that act.” /d at 113, 114. The Court held that each such act
‘occurred’ on the day that it “happened,” and that a
plaintiff “must file a charge within either 180 or 300 days of
the date of the act or lose the ability to recover for it.” /d. at
110. The Court rejected Morgan’s argument that the term
“practice” in section 706(e) “converts related discrete acts,”
including those occurring outside the limitations period,
“into a single unlawful practice for the purposes of timely
filing.” /d at 111. Rather, discussing Evans and Ricks, the
Court reaffirmed that “discrete acts that fall within the
statutory time period do not make timely acts that fall
19
outside the time period.” /d. at 112. The Court held that,
while the existence of discriminatory acts outside the
limitations period “does not bar employees from filing
charges about related discrete acts” within the charge-filing
period, the plaintiff must allege present acts that “are
independently discriminatory” and must file a “timely”
charge “addressing those acts.” /d. at 113 (emphasis added).
The “emphasis” is on whether any “present” and
“independently” actionable “violation existed.” /d. at 112-13
(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
In contrast, the Court found that “[h]ostile environment
claims” must be treated differently. /d at 115. The Court
determined that, because the “very nature” of a hostile
environment claim “involves repeated conduct” and “the
cumulative effect of individual acts,” the “‘unlawful
employment practice” cannot “be said to occur on any
particular day.” Jd. Rather, the Court found that, “in direct
contrast to” a discrete discriminatory act, “a single act of
harassment may not be actionable on its own,” id., and that
“{a] hostile work environment claim is,” by its nature,
“composed of a series of separate acts that co!lectively
constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.”” /d. at 117
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). Accordingly, the Court
concluded that~-“the entire time period of the hostile
environment may be considered by a court,” “[p]rovided that
an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing
period.” /d.
On this analysis, the Court determined that, while
Morgan’s hostile environment claim was timely, his claims
concerning “discrete discriminatory acts” occurring prior to
the charge-filing period were not. /d. at 114-15, 120-21.
Reaffirming that “strict adherence to the procedural
requirements specified by the legislature is the best
guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law,” the
Court held that those claims were “no longer actionable.” /d.
at 108, 115 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20
B. Ledbetter’s Intentional Pay Discrimination Claim
Is Time-Barred Because She Challenges The
Present Effects of Salary Decisions Occurring
Outside Of The Charge-Filing Period.
These cases confirm that the court below correctly held
that Ledbetter’s intentional pay discrimination claim is time-
barred. Ledbetter was entitled to pursue her claim of
intentional pay discrimination concerning acts occurring
during the 180-day charge-filing period. But she was not
entitled to base that claim on acts occurring outside of the
period.
First, as Ledbetter necessarily concedes (Pet. Br. at 13,
18, 22, 32), her intentional pay discrimination claim
challenges “discrete” acts within the meaning of Morgan.
Morgan itself referred to pay discrimination claims as
concerning discrete acts. See 536 U.s. at 111-12. Moreover,
as the court below explained (Pet. App. 17a-18a), a plaintiff
alleging intentional pay discrimination “must point to some
specific, conscious conduct that was tainted” by unlawful
discrimination. Whether a plaintiff challenges a “decision|]
setting the plaintiff's salary” or “the issuance of a confirming
paycheck” as “the operative act of discrimination,” that act
is, “‘like termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer,
or refusal to hire,’ ... discrete in time, easy to identify,
and—if done with the requisite intent—independently
actionable.” Pet. App. 18a (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at
i 14). Indeed, because the “‘unlawful employment practice’
can be said to occur on a particular day,” and “a single
discriminatory act is actionable on its own,” intentional pay
discrimination claims lack “those characteristics that led the
Court to devise a separate rule governing the timing of
hostile work environment claims.” Pet. App. 18a (emphasis
added). Rather, each discrete act of alleged pay
discrimination “starts a new clock for filing charges,” and a
plaintiff must file a charge within 180 days of that act “or
lose the ability to recover for it.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110,
113.
21
Second, though she characterizes the paychecks received
during and after the 180-day period as the product of
intentional discrimination, Ledbetter has no cognizable claim
that any intentional discrimination occurred during the
charge-filing period. The Eleventh -Circuit held that
Ledbetter did not have legally sufficient evidence that the
single salary decision made during the charge-filing period
was motivated by gender (Pet. App. 31a), and Ledbetter did
not seek or obtain certiorari on that question. Moreover,
Ledbetter offered no evidence that the paychecks received
during that period were themselves issued’ with”
discriminatory intent; on the contrary, Goodyear’s payroll
system mechanically implements the salary determinations
made pursuant to the merit-based compensation system, and
the resulting paychecks are simply the “inevitable[]
consequence[s]” of earlier pay decisions. Ricks, 449 U.S. at
257-58.
Ledbetter is thus left to complain that, by taking her
existing salary as the starting point for determining the salary
to pay her during the charge-filing period, Goodyear
perpetuated the effects of earlier salary decisions. But
Ledbetter offered no evidence that, during the charge-filing
period, Goodyear knowingly relied on those decisions
“because of,” as opposed to “‘in spite of,” their allegedly -
discriminatory purpose. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). On the contrary, the facts are
undisputed that Goodyear had no discriminatory purpose:
under the “Pay for Performance” program, taking existing
salary as the starting point for present salary decisions was a
facially neutral practice applied to all men and women alike.
J.A. 69-70, 87-88, 120-21; Tr. 256-57, 344, 351. There is no
evidence that Goodyear discriminatorily administered that
facially neutral practice. And Ledbetter has never advanced
a claim that this facially neutral practice, used by almost all
private- and public-sector employers, was maintained with a
discriminatory purpose or had an unlawful disparate impact
on women. Rather, Ledbetter simply claims that her salary
22
during the charge-filing period reflected the lingering effects
of allegedly discriminatory decisions made outside of the
charge-filing period by various supervisors. This is precisely
the kind of stale “perpetuation” claim that Evans, Ricks,
Lorance, and Morgan hold is too late to bring. See Morgan,
536 U.S. at 112-13; Lorance, 490 U.S. at 906-07; Ricks, 449
U.S. at 258: Evans, 431 U.S. at 558; see also Chardon-.
Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 7-8 (1981) (per curiam).
There is no basis for applying a different charge-filing
rule to discrete acts of intentional pay discrimination than to
other discrete acts like hiring, promotion, assignment, and
termination. The statutory text draws no distinction between
pay claims and those other kinds of claims, and Morgan
itself mentions pay claims in describing the limitations rule
applicable to discrete acts of alleged discrimination. See
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 112-13. Moreover, a pay decision is no
more or less discrete, and no more or less continuous, than
an act of termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, -
or the like. With respect to all, a decision is made and is
then implemented; with respect to all, the employer can
generally change the decision at any time or leave it as
initially made. The employer reaffirms a pay decision no
more or less than any of the other kinds of decisions by
allowing it to take effect in subsequent time periods; an
employer continues to carry out, for example, a failure to
promote or denial of transfer by continuing to employ an
individual in one capacity rather than another at a specified
rate of pay and benefits. In fact, these other decisions are
defined, in whole or in part, by the pay associated with them.
There is no principled or manageable basis for applying
different charge-filing rules to these various kinds of discrete
employment decisions (or, to the extent that a decision is in
part defined by a pay change, two charge-filing rules to the
same decision).
Finally, to allow Ledbetter to bring such an untimely
intentional discrimination claim would completely defeat
section 706(e)’s twin goals of protecting defendants and
23
courts from the hazards of stale claims and of encouraging
prompt conciliation instead of delayed litigation. Ledbetter’s
late-filed claim is contrary to both statutory purposes.
Here, there was little information available at trial in
2003 about the determinations made regarding Ledbetter’s
salary between 1979 and 1992 and about her comparative
performance during that time. Yet most of the shortfall of
which Ledbetter complains arose during that time. J.A. 166,
195. Moreover, Mike Maudsley, who Ledbetter claimed at
trial was responsible for the alleged discrimination against
her in the 1980°s, was deceased by the time of trial.
Allowing Ledbetter to base a present liability claim on such
long-past acts—particularly when the record demonstrates
that she knew by no later than 1982 how to avail herself of
the EEOC charge-filing process, and that she knew by no
later than 1992 of a disparity between her salary and those of
some male Area Managers—would authorize precisely the
sort of litigation over stale claims that section 706(e) seeks to
prevent.
Moreover, permitting such stale claims would impose
wholly unfair risks and burdens on employers. In order to
avoid and/or defend against such claims, employers would
annually have to investigate all prior salary decisions and
attempt to determine whether or not they were based solely
on non-discriminatory factors. In many circumstances,
documents relevant to such investigations would no “longer
exist, as record retention laws have limited timeframes and
limited scope, see, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (2006): see also
Pet. Br. at 28 n.14, and as the burdens of keeping records for
long periods can be substantial. Moreover, documents rarely
tell the entire story, and yet relevant witnesses will often
have moved on, retired, or died, or simply will no longer
remember critical facts. Further, as former Justice Marshall
once noted, “acts that may constitute Title VII violations are
generally effected through the actions of individuals,” not
through “company[-]wide discriminatory policies violative
of Title VII,” and those individuals “often” may “take . . .
24
step|s]} even in defiance of company policy” prohibiting
discrimination. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 75 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). In short, past
intentional discrimination frequently .s unknown to the
current management of an employe: like Goodyear, and
often will be difficult if not impossible to uncover.
In sum, it would be extraordinarily improper to permit
Ledbetter’s stale intentional pay discrimination claim to go
forward. That claim could have previously been brought in a
timely manner. It was not. It is based on allegations that a
deceased prior manager or other such individual managers
may have acted some years earlier in a discriminatory
manner in defiance of company policy. This Court has
consistently construed section 706(e) to bar private plaintiffs
from bringing such untimely claims.
Il. BAZEMORE v. FRIDAY DOES NOT AUTHORIZE
AN INTENTIONAL PAY DISCRIMINATION
CLAIM BY A PRIVATE PARTY CONCERNING
ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION OCCURRING
OUTSIDE OF THE CHARGE-FILING PERIOD.
In arguing that she may bring an intentional pay
discrimination claim based on the effects of decisions made
outside of Section 706(e)’s charge-filing period, Ledbetter
and her amici rely almost exclusively on snippets of
language from this Court’s decision in Bazemore. But
Bazemore involved a claim by the United States that could
not previously have been brought; that was not subject to
section 706(e); and that concerned intentional discrimination
in pay that allegedly was continuing. Section 706(e) was not
in issue; and there was no claim, much less a holding, that a
present intentional pay discrimination claim by a private
party could rest entirely on actions taken outside of the
charge-filing period. Bazemore simply is not proper
authority- for the kind of untimely intentional pay
discrimination claim that Ledbetter seeks to pursue.
25 '
A. Bazemore Involved Allegations By The United
States Of Present Intentional Discrimination; And
This Court Merely Rejected The Employer’s
Defense That The Claim Was Barred Because The
Alleged Discrimination Began Before Title VII's
Effective Date.
At issue in Bazemore were the pay practices of the North
Carolina Agricultural Extension Service after 1972, when
Title VII first became applicable to public employers. The
case came to the Court on a reccrd showing that, until
August 1, 1965, when Title VII became effective for private
employers, the Extension Service had been “divided into two
branches: a white branch and a ‘Negro branch.’” Bazemore,
478 U.S. at 390. “The white branch employed no
blacks....” /d “The ‘Negro branch’ was composed
entirely of black personnel and served only black farmers,
homemakers, and youth.” /d The Extension Service openly
paid blacks less than whites who performed the same work
in these two branches. See id. While the Extension Service
“merged the two branches . . . into a single organization” on
August |, 1965, it did not, going forward, change its practice
of paying blacks at a lower rate than whites. /d at 390-91.
Rather, after 1965, the Extension Service made annual salary
adjustments “on a nondiscriminatory basis,” but maintained
the institutionally segregated base salaries created by the
facially discriminatory, pre-1965 salary practices. Bazemore
v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662, 666 (4th Cir. 1984).
The United States alleged that, in compensating black
employees after 1972, the Extension Service was, for
discriminatory purposes, knowingly and _ intentionally
continuing the institutionally segregated salaries that
previously had been established. See id. at 671. The district
court found that the weight of the evidence did not support
the United States’ claim. See id at 665-66, 671-72. A
Fourth Circuit panel affirmed, holding that the United States’
claim was barred because the alleged salary discrimination
had begun prior to the statute’s effective date, and further
26
holding that the United States’ evidence—and, in particular,
its regression analysis—was legally insufticient to establish
intentional pay discrimination after 1972. See id. at 670-74.
Judge Phillips wrote a vigorous dissent on both counts. See
id. at 689-96 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (describing evidence of
intentional discrimination after 1972, including “weighty”
testimonial “evidence of knowing, intentional continuation
of acknowledged discriminatory [salary] policies”).
In this Court, the United States again argued that,
although the Extension Service first decided “to pay black
employees less than whites for the same work... before
Title VI! became applicable to public employers,” the
Extension Service’s “compensation scheme remained
intentionally discriminatory” after 1972. Br. for the Federal
Petitioners, Bazemore v. Friday, 1985 WL 669751, at *20
n.18 (emphasis added). The United States argued that the
post-1972 salary practices violated Title VII not because
there was a mere continuation of the pre-1972 “disparity in
salaries,” id, but because the Extension Service “ha[d]
purposely continued [its] discriminatory system subsequent
to the enactment of Title VII.” Reply Br. for the Federal
Petitioners, Bazemore v. Friday, 1986 WL 728399, at *4-*5
(emphasis added). Indeed, the United States argued that,
“(rjather than simply failing to remedy the effect of a
discrete pre-Act discriminatory action, the [Service]
continu[ed| its intentional discrimination on the basis of
race.” /d at *5. The amicus briefs filed in Bazemore
reflected this same understanding of the facts and allegations
in the case. See, e.g., Br. of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Bazemore v. Friday, 1986 WL
728218, at *10 (arguing that the United States had “shown
that the employer . . . maintained [a] race-skewed differential
with discriminatory intent”) (emphasis added).
This Court reversed. both with regard to, whether the
origin of the salary disparities could serve as a defense to the
United States’ claim, and with regard to the evaluation of the
United States’ evidence of intentional discrimination in pay
27
after 1972. See Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 386-87. As the
United States did in its briefs, Justice Brennan’s concurring
opinion (joined by all members of the Court) stressed that
the “‘critical question’” is “*whether any present violation
exists."” /d. at 396 n.6 (quoting Evans, 431 U.S. at 558)
(emphasis in Bazemore). Justice Brennan distinguished
Evans and Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433
U.S. 299 (1977), on the ground that, in those cases, “the
employer was not engaged in discriminatory practices at the
time [of] suit.” 478 U.S. at 396 n.6. Justice Brennan stated
that, in Bazemore, in contrast, the United States had alleged
that the employer did “not from the date of the Act forward
‘ma[ke] all [of its] employment decisions in a wholly
nondiscriminatory way.’” /d. (quoting Hazelwood, 433 U.S.
at 309) (emphasis in original). And, finally, Justice Brennan
explained the errors that the court of appeals had committed
in evaluating whether the post-1972 salary decisions were
made because of, rather than in spite of, race. See id. at 397-
404.
In short, contrary to Ledbetter and her amici, the Court in
Bazemore had no occasion to hold that section 706(e) allows
a private plaintiff to bring an intentional pay discrimination
claim concerning present pay disparities that are merely the
result of pay decisions made outside of the charge-filing
period. The United States is not subject to section 706(e) or
any other statute of limitations under Title VII, see
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361 (1977),
and section 706(e) thus was not even at issue in Bazemore.
Moreover, Bazemore did not involve a claim that previously
could have been but, as here, was not timely brought.
Indeed, there is an obvious difference between pre-Act
discrimination and discrimination against an employee
which occurs outside the charge-filing period. In the former
Situation, a finding that deliberate perpetuation of pre-Act
discrimination is permissible would “have the effect of
exempting from liability those employers “who were
historically the greatest offenders of the rights of blacks.”
°8
Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395. In contrast, discrimination prior
to the charge-filing period is in no way exempt from Title
VII’s reach because employees (and/or the Government) can
timely avail themselves of the statute’s protections.
In any event, in contrast to Ledbetter’s claim here, the
United States did not claim in Bazemore that unlawful pay
discrimination could be established wholly by reference to
allegedly discriminatory acts occurring outside of an
applicable limitations period—much less acts that could have
been, but were not, made the subject of a timely charge.
Rather, the United States asserted in Bazemore that the
challenged pay practices reflected ongoing intentional
discrimination by the Extension Service itself. That claim of
ongoing intentional pay discrimination by the Extension
Service post-1972 was the claim that the Court held could be
pursued (and was not barred simply because the alleged
discriminatory policy and practice had been initiated before
Title VII's effective date). Indeed, that was the claim with
respect to which the Court further held that the Fourth
Circuit had erred in evaluating the proof of the Extension
Service’s continuing discriminatory intent—proof that would
have been irrelevant if the post-1972 salary disparities were
themselves sufficient to establish a present claim. The claim
of present, continuing, intentional discrimination was key to
Bazemore. See id. (“A [pre-Act discriminatory] pattern or
practice ... became a violation upon Title VII's effective
date, and fo the extent an employer continued to engage in
that act or practice, it is liable under that statute.”) (emphasis
added). But Ledbetter has no such claim here.
This Court’s decision in Lorance confirms _ this
understanding of Bazemore. In Lorance, the Court held that
a claim of intentional discrimination in the adoption of a
seniority system was untimely when not filed within 180
days of the adoption of that system, even though the
resulting facially neutral seniority system was applied within
the charge-filing period. The Lorance Court distinguished
Bazemore on the ground that Bazemore did not involve a
29
claim merely concerning the present effects of past
intentional discrimination. See Lorance, 490 U.S. at 913 n.5.
Rather, consistent with the briefing and opinion in
Bazemore, the Lorance Court described Bazemore as a case
involving allegations of intentional discrimination that
occurred after the effective date of Title VIl—specifically,
what the Court in Lorance described as_ intentional
discrimination arising from the application of a “facially
discriminatory” pay policy that “discriminates each time it is
applied.” Jd. But, as the Question Presented here makes
clear, the claim in this case does not concern allegations of
facial discrimination, or any other kind of intentional
discrimination, within the limitations period. Thus, as
understood by this Court in Lorance, Bazemore cannot
properly be said to authorize Ledbetter’s claim.
In short, Bazemore held only that an employer could not
defend the continuation of racially segregated salaries for
discriminatory purposes by pointing out that the
discrimination began pre-Act. Bazemore does not support
Ledbetter’s - sweeping assertion that nondiscriminatory
implementation of a facially neutral system can somehow
constitute unlawful discrimination simply because there were
discriminatory departures from that neutral policy by
individual supervisors in the past. Any such rule would run
headlong into both Lorance’s interpretation of Bazemore and
the settled principle that acts within the charge-filing period
are not actionable simply because they perpetuate the effects
of prior discriminatory acts.
B. Ledbetter Misconstrues Snippets Of Language In
Justice Brennan’s Bazemore Concurrence.
In arguing to the contrary, Ledbetter and her amici seize
upon snippets of language in Justice Brennan’s concurring
opinion in Bazemore. They claim that this language supports
two broader, alternative understandings of Bazemore. But
the language that they seize upon cannot sustain the legal
rule that they seek to create.
30
1. Ledbetter initially argues (Pet. Br. 3, 20-22) that her
claim is timely presented because, under Justice Brennan’s
opinion in Bazemore, each “week’s paycheck that delivers
less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong
actionable under Title VII....’” Bazemore, 478 U.S. at
395. But that language has no proper application to
Ledbetter’s claim here.
As explained above, unlike this case, Bazemore involved
allegations of present intentional discrimination—to wit, the
alleged maintenance of institutionally segregated pay rates
for a discriminatory purpose. Moreover, in Bazemore, the
employer sought to defend against those allegations by
asserting that the discriminatory pay structure had been
created before the effective date of the statute. It was in this
context that Justice Brennan stated that “[e]ach week’s
paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly
situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII,
regardless of the fact that this pattern was begun prior to the
effective date of Title VII.” 478 U.S. at 395-96.
Contrary to Ledbetter and her amici, the “|eJach week’s
paycheck” language cannot properly be understood apart
from the context in which it was written. The emphasis in
the sentence itself is on an illegal “pattern” of intentional pay
discrimination begun before, and allegedly continued after,
the statute’s effective date. /d. at 395. The opinion goes on
to reiterate that, under Evans and Hazelwood, the **critical
question” is “*whether any present violation exists.’” /d. at
396 n.6 (quoting Evans, 431 U.S. at 558) (emphasis in
Bazemore). Thus, in Bazemore, the alleged maintenance of
institutionally segregated pay rates for a discriminatory
purpose afier 1972 constituted the requisite “present
violation” and, if proved, would render each paycheck issued
an intentionally discriminatory, independently actionable act
that violated Title VII (and that was not subject to a statute
of limitations when challenged by the United States). But
Justice Brennan did not suggest that, absent sufficient
evidence of present intentional discrimination, paychecks
31
delivering different amounts to black and white employees
would by themselves constitute a violation of Title VII; on
the contrary, the next part of Justice Brennan’s opinion
proceeds from the premise that legally sufficient evidence of
present intentional discrimination was required. See id. at
397-404. Thus, in distinguishing the sare “[e]ach week’s
paycheck” language, the Lorance Court stressed that the
limitations inquiry “focuses on the timing of the
discriminatory acts....” Lorance, 490 U.S. at 913 nS
(emphasis in original).
Here, there is no comparable argument that Goodyear
maintained institutionally segregated pay rates for a
discriminatory purpose within the charge-filing period. The
Eleventh Circuit found no evidence of intentional
discrimination in pay during the charge-filing period, in
either the salary rate decision or the issuance of paychecks.
Pet. App. 3la. Moreover, while Ledbetter complains that her
salary within the charge-filing period reflects the effects of
past, allegedly discriminatory decisions by individual
managers, Ledbetter has never adduced evidence that, during
the charge-filing period, Goodyear perpetuated the base rate
of her salary with the purpose of discriminating against her.
See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (question is whether defendant
made the challenged decision “at least in part ‘because of,’
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon” women).
On the contrary, the use of existing salary as the base pay
rate is part of Goodyear’s facially neutral “Pay for
Performance” program, which is applied to all men and
women alike. J.A. 69-70, 87-88, 120-21; Tr. 256-57, 344,
351. In short, as the Question Presented presumes, there is
no present intentional discrimination at issue here, and the
lack of any present intentional discrimination renders the
“{eJach week’s paycheck” language wholly inapplicable.
2. Ledbetter alternatively argues that Bazemore
recognized an “‘obligation’” on the part of employers to
““eradicate salary disparities based on race’ or sex even if
the disparity arose outside the limitations period. Pet. Br. at
32
42 (quoting Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 397). Once again,
Ledbetter is improperly stripping the language of Justice
Brennan’s opinion from the context in which it was used.
As explained above, in Bazemore, the Extension Service
employed a facially discriminatory compensation system
before 1965, segregating blacks and whites into two separate
branches and paying blacks less than whites who performed
the same work. See Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 390. Although
the Extension Service combined the two branches in 1965, it
continued thereafter, allegedly for discriminatory purposes,
to pay blacks and whites completely different salaries for the
same work, and even continued doing so after Title VII
became effective for public employers in 1972. It was in this
context—of a prior facially discriminatory pay policy
creating institutionally segregated salaries that were
allegedly continued for discriminatory purposes—that
Justice Brennan made the statement that “the Extension
Service was under an obligation to eradicate salary
disparities based on race that began prior to the effective date
of Title VII... .” Jd. at 397.
Contrary to Ledbetter and her amici, the “obligation to
eradicate salary disparities based on race” language cannot
properly be applied without regard to whether the case
involves institutionally segregated salaries that arose from a
facially discriminatory pay structure and that were allegedly
continued for intentionally discriminatory purposes. In the
same breath in Bazemore, Justice Brennan reiterated that the
United Stafés Was “alleging that in continuing to pay blacks
less than similarly situated whites, respondents have not
from the date of the Act forward ‘made all [their]
employment decisions in a wholly nondiscriminatory way.””
id. at 396 n.6 (quoting Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 309)
(emphasis and~bracketsin Bazemore). Justice Brennan
further reiterated that the Court’s decision “in no sense gives
legal effect to the pre-1972 actions, but, consistent with
Evans and Hazelwood, focuses on the present salary
structure, which is illegal if it is a mere continuation of the
, 33
pre-1965 discriminatory pay structure.” Id. (emphasis
added). And Justice Brennan went on to evaluate the
evidence of the alleged continuing discriminatory purpose—
an evaluation that, again, was unnecessary if there was an
unqualified obligation to eliminate any disparities
attributable to past discrimination. See id. at 397-404. In
other words, Justice Brennan tied the “obligation to eradicate
salary disparities based on race” language to institutionally
Segregated salaries (arising from a_ prior facially
discriminatory pay structure) that allegedly were
purposefully continued, because of race, into the present,
actionable time period. Justice Brennan did not purport to be
establishing an untethered obligation to identify and correct
all present effects of past intentional discrimination by any
supervisor, whether known or unknown to the employer,
whether continued with discriminatory purpose or not, and
whether subject to section 706(e) or not.
Here, of course; Goodyear’s compensation system was
facially neutral. Pet. Br. at 5, 48. Ledbetter received the
same starting salary as male supervisors. J.A. 39, 151-52.
She was subject to the same salary adjustment rules as were
male employees—including the rule that each year’s salary
decision took existing salary as a given and only provided an
adjustment up to a maximum percentage increase. J.A. 69-
70, 87-88, 120-21; Tr. 256-57, 344, 351. Further, Ledbetter
received larger percentage salary adjustments in some years
than did male supervisors (Pet. App. Sa-6a; J.A. 174, 193);
and she admitted that at least one of her managers, Mike
Nunn, did not discriminate against her in her pay between
1990 and 1992 (Tr. 132-33). Thus, unlike in Bazemore,
where it was undisputed that the Extension Service facially
discriminated against all blacks in compensation until 1965,
and it was alleged that the Extension Service continued these
segregated compensation rates thereafter for intentionally
discriminatory purposes, here ‘here were no alleged “male”
and “female” pay rates for Goodyear to dismantle and
eradicate. Rather, here, Ledbetter is merely complaining that
34
individual managers sometimes adjusted her salary on a
discriminatory basis years before she filed her EEOC charge.
Justice Brennan’s “obligation to eradicate” language was
aimed at the Extension Service’s facially discriminatory pay
structure and the purposeful continuing use of the
institutionally segregated pay rates that arose from it; that
language was not aimed at the kinds of isolated and discrete
decisions by “multiple lower-level managers at different
points in time over a 19-year period that Ledbetter is
challenging, and Justice Brennan’s language cannot fairly be
read to contemplate the sweeping and burdensome duty on
employers that Ledbetter would impose.
Indeed, Ledbetter’s argument that Bazemore recognized a
continuing affirmative duty to eradicate the effects of all past
intentional pay discrimination—whether known or unknown
to the employer, whether continued for discriminatory
reasons or not, whether untimely under section 706(e) or
not—cannot be reconciled with the language and structure of
Title VII. Such a duty is contrary to section 706(e) and this
Court’s holding that it forecloses claims based on mcre
“perpetuatifon]” of effects. Evans, 431 U.S. at 557. Such a
duty would also wrongly transform section 703(a)(1)’s
prohibition on discrimination into a_ requirement of
affirmative conduct by employers, akin to the leave
requirements of the Family and Medical Leave Act, the
reasonable accommodation requirements of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, and other provisions of so-called
“minimum employment standards” statutes. Such a duty
would contravene section 703(j) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(j), which provides that nothing contained in Title
VII “shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant
preferential treatment to any... group...on account of” a
de facto imbalance in the employer’s work force. And such -
a duty would conflict with the Bennett Amendment set forth
in section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), which
makes the Equal Pay Act, not Title VII, the governing law
for claims about gender-related pay practices that are not
35
presently intentionally discriminatory. See Gunther, 452
U.S. at 170-71.
3. In sum, the language that Ledbetter and her amici
seize upon in Justice Brennan’s opinion in Bazemore need
not and should not be read as they suggest. While the
language has potentially broad implications when read in
isolation, the language is of much more limited significance
when read in the context of the facts, allegations, and
opinion to which it is tied. Moreover, the language—as
construed by Ledbetter and her amici—plainly goes beyond
the limited holding of Bazemore (concerning whether the
Extension Service could defend against the United States’
claim by showing that the challenged disparity had its origins
in pre-Act discrimination); and this Court has repeatedly said
that “[i]t is to the holdings of our cases, rather than their
dicta, that we must attend.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379 (1994). Indeed, the Court has
warned against “dissect{ing]” the language of its prior
opinions “as though they were the United States Code.” Sv.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993). That
warning is particularly apt here, since the broader
understandings of Justice Brennan’s language that Ledbetter
and her amici urge directly conflict with the Court’s
decisions in Evans, Ricks, Lorance, and Morgan—all of
which reject the notion that Title VII allows private plaintiffs
to base intentional discrimination claims on discrete acts
occurring outside of the charge-filing period. The Court
should decline Ledbetter’s invitation to create such a conflict
between its cases.
Ill. LEDBETTER’S REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARE
ALSO IN ERROR.
In addition to her erroneous construction of Bazemore,
Ledbetter offers four other arguments for construing Title
VII to allow her untimely claim. Each argument is flawed.
36
A. Ledbetter’s Empirical And Policy Arguments
Wrongly Ask The Court To Rewrite Section
706(e).
Ledbetter and her amici suggest that various empirical and
policy considerations should cause the Court to construe
section 706(c) to allow intentional pay discrimination claims
challenging effects of past decisions. They assert that
women are generally offered lower starting salaries than
men; that employees, fearing retaliation, may be |
“understandabl[{y]” “reluctan[t] -to rock the boat” by
promptly challenging pay decisions; and that employees may
lack the incentives or information to challenge intentional
pay discrimination until the “harm” from discrete salary
decisions has “accumulat[ed].” See Pet. Br. at 22-29; Br. of
Nat’! P’ship for Women & Families as Amicus Curiae In
Support of Petitioner at 3. On the basis of these assertions,
they further argue that alleged victims of discrimination
should not be denied a remedy and that the equitable
doctrine of laches and the two-year limit on backpay
imposed by section 706(g)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1),
“adequately protect|] employers’ interest in avoiding stale
claims.” Pet. Br. at 28. But these arguments provide no
legal basis for rewriting the statutory text that this Court has
already authoritatively construed to the contrary.
First, the record of this case provides little support for the
sweeping assertions that Ledbetter and her amici advance.
Ledbetter started at the same salary as other male
supervisors. J.A. 39, 151-52. In a number of years, she
received larger percentage raises than her male co-workers.
Pet. App. Sa-6a; J.A. 174, 193. While her absolute salary did
not grow over time to the same extent as those of some male
co-workers, she was on layoff early in her career when most
of them were not, and she received lower performance
evaluations in many years. Pet. App. Sa-7a, 9a; J.A. 174-77,
189-92. Moreover, while Ledbetter offered anecdotal
testimony that Goodyear hired few other women supervisors
at this plant and paid them less than it paid men, she did not
37
substantiate this speculation with supporting documents.
Nor did she offer any of the qualified labor market data or
appropriately controlled statistical studies that this Court has
held are necessary to draw a legitimate inference of
discrimination (particularly an inference of systemic
discrimination). See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-58 (1989); Hazelwood, 433 U.S.
at 307-13. Furthermore, early in her career, Ledbetter filed a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC, J.A. 103-09—
showing that at least some employees are willing promptly to
assert their rights and that, when they do so, nonretaliatory
responses and amicable resolutions are possible. In addition,
although she waited until 1998 to file a charge alleging
intentional pay discrimination, Ledbetter was aware, by no
later than 1992, of a disparity between her salary and the
salaries of some male supervisors, and, by 1995, had learned
that this disparity was “a thousand [dollars] at least more per
month....” J.A. 231-32; see also J.A. 233, 236-37, 239-40.
Indeed, Ledbetter testified that “[d]ifferent people that [she]
worked for along the way had a/ways told [her] that [her]
pay was extremely low.” J.A. 233 (emphasis added). Thus,
by her own admissions, Ledbetter had notice of a substantial
wage disparity—providing plenty of financial incentive for a
claim—-years before she first brought her intentional pay
discrimination charge. Whatever the case may be more
generally with respect to the “legislative facts” asserted, the
record of this proceeding—i.e., the conventional basis for
drawing judicial inferences—paints a very different picture
than has been suggested.
Second, the law already contains numerous provisions that
address the concerns that Ledbetter and her amici raise. In
addition to the substantive requirements of the Equal Pay Act
and the prohibition on discrimination in compensation in
section 703(a)(1) of Title VIL, section 706(k) of Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000c-5(k), allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to
recover reasonable attorneys’ fees. That provision was
intended to “make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means”
38
to obtain legal representation and “to bring a meritorious
[discrimination] suit” even if the potential recovery is small.
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 420
(1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, Title
VII allows compensatory and punitive damages awards both
as a further incentive for plaintiffs to bring meritorious cases
and as a deterrent to employers from violating the law. See
42 U.S.C. §198la. Moreover, Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision provides an employee with “broad protection”
from retaliation “because that individual ‘opposed any
practice’ made unlawful by Title VII or ‘made a charge, -
testified, assisted, or participated in’ a Title VII proceeding
or investigation.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2408, 2413 (2006) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). And the “time period for filing a
charge [under section 706(e)] is subject to equitable
doctrines such as tolling or- estoppel” if appropriate
circumstances, such as a defendant’s concealment of the
basis for a plaintiffs cause of action, are established.
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113; see also Zipes v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).
Third, at bottom, Ledbetter is asking this Court to rewrite
the statute so that it will favor a plaintiff's right to challenge
past acts of alleged discrimination over the interests served
by section 706(e). But this Court has repeatedly rejected the
argument that “strict adherence” to the requirements of
section 706(e) is “‘unfair’ or that ‘a less literal reading’” of
section 706(e) would better effectuate the purposes of Title
VII. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 108-09 (quoting Mohasco, 447
U.S. at 824-25).
It is true, of course, that strict adherence to section 706(e)
will bar some claims that otherwise might be meritorious.
But section 706(e) reflects Congress’s judgment “concerning
the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid
claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the
prosecution of stale ones.” Ricks, 449 U.S. at 259-60
(internal quotation marks omitted). Particularly where
39
“Congress carefully prescribed a series of deadlines,”
reflecting a “compromise” essential to the enactment of Title
VII as a whole, this Court “must respect” the choice
“embodied in [Congress’s] words,” and may not
“simply ... alter the balance struck by Congress... by
favoring one side or the other in matters of statutory
construction.” Mohasco, 447 U.S. at 825-26.
Furthermore, contrary to the impression that Ledbetter and
her amici seek to create, honoring the balance struck by
section 706(e) does not leave victims of intentional pay
discrimination claims without a remedy. They can bring
timely Title VI! claims. Moreover, the EEOC and the
United States can seek relief on their behalf, and are not
subject to section 706(e). Perhaps even more importantly,
women such as Ledbetter may bring claims under the Equal
Pay Act, which is subject to a longer limitations period, see
29 U.S.C. § 255, and which focuses on the question of equal
pay for “equal work,” id. § 206(d)(1), rather than on stale
questions of intent in past decisions in years gone by.
Finally, the defense of laches and the two-year limit on
backpay in section 706(g)(1) do not adequately protect
employers’ interest in avoiding stale claims. “|A]n employer
may raise a laches defense” “[i]n addition to other
[available] equitable defenses” and the protection against
stale claims afforded by a statute of limitations. Morgan,
536 U.S. at 121 (emphasis added). But “laches is not a
substitute for a statute of limitations,” 27A Am. Jur. 2d
’ Equity § 148 (2d ed. 2006) (emphasis added), particularly
not for the “carefully prescribed” one measured precisely “by
numbers of days” established in section 706(e). Mohasco,
447 U.S. at 825. Likewise, while the two-year backpay rule
provides some protection for employers in Title VII cases,
there are no comparable backpay limit rules in other
employment statutes that contain limitation periods like that
in section 706(e). Further, the two-year backpay limit is no
justification for allowing a liability award—that may include
compensatory and punitive damages—on a claim that section
40
706(e) defines as stale. As this Court has recognized, section
706(g) is not an appropriate basis for relaxing the charge-
filing requirement or expanding the scope of liability under
Title VII. See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 578-82 (1984); Evans, 431 U.S. at 558-
59.
B. Ledbetter’s Argument For Acquiescence In
- Allegedly Consistent Positions Of Most Courts Of
Appeals And The EEOC Is Meritless.
Ledbetter next suggests (Pet. Br. at 29-33) that this Court
should acquiesce in the positions of most courts of appeals
and the EEOC, which she claims have consistently allowed
plaintiffs to raise intentional pay discrimination claims based
on alleged acts of discrimination taking place outside of the
charge-filing period. This suggestion is meritless.
1. The courts of appeals simply have not consistently
adopted the position that Ledbetter advocates. Rather, as she
argued in her petition, “(t]he [c]ourts of [a]ppeals [a]re
[iJntractably [d]Jivided [o]ver the [q]Juestion [p]resented” in
this case, and “the proper treatment of disparate pay claims
under Morgan and Bazemore has generated considerable
conflict and confusion in [the] circuits... .” Pet. at 9, 13.
First, some courts—like the court below—have held that
an intentional pay discrimination claim is untimely if it
merely challenges the present effects of acts taken outside of
the charge-filing period. As Ledbetter admitted in her
petition (Pet. at 13-14), Dasgupta v. University of Wisconsin
Board of Regents, 121 F.3d 1138 (7th Cir. 1997), also held
that a plaintiff's pay claim was untimely because “[t}here
were no new violations during the limitations period, but
merely a refusal to rectify the consequences of time-barred
violations.” /d at 1140. “{A]n untimely Title VII suit,” the
court explained, “cannot be revived by pointing to effects
within the limitations period of unlawful acts that occurred
earlier.” Id.
41
Second, while some courts have adopted Ledbetter’s
position, these courts have disagreed regarding how far back
a plaintiff may reach in seeking damages. Some have held
that backpay is limited to the disparity in salary during the
limitations period. See, e.g., Forsyth v. Fed'n Employment
& Guidance Serv., 409 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2005). Others
have held that plaintiffs can recover up to two years of
backpay. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Gen. Motors Corp., 275 F.3d
1005, 1011 (10th Cir. 2002). And still others have allowed
recovery to the date of the earliest discrimination. See, e.g.,
Gibbs v. Pierce County Law Enforcement Support Agency,
785 F.2d 1396, 1398, 1400 (9th Cir. 1986).
Third, most of the courts adopting the position urged by
Ledbetter have reasoned that intentional pay discrimination
constitutes a “continuing violation,” so that as long as the
plaintiff receives one disparate paycheck during the
limitations period, a charge with respect to related
discriminatory acts outside the period is timely. See, e.g.,
Goodwin, 275 F.3d at 1009; Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d
251, 258 (3d Cir. 2001); Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned
Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 167-68 (8th Cir. 1995); Brinkley-Obu
v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 347 (4th Cir. 1994);
Bartelt v. Berlitz Sch. of Languages of Am., Inc., 698 F.2d
1003, 1004 (9th Cir. 1983); Hall v. Ledex, Inc., 669 F.2d
397, 398 (6th Cir. 1982). As the court below correctly noted,
however, Morgan rejected the “continuing violation” theory
on which these cases are based.
In sum, there is simply no consistent position of the courts
of appeals in which this Court can acquiesce.
2. Nor should this Court acquiesce in the EEOC’s
present view that an intentional pay discrimination claim is
timely as long as the plaintiff received a single disparate
paycheck within the limitations period. Ledbetter herself
does not argue, nor could she, that the EEOC’s view is
entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See
42
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110 n.6 (“[W]e have held that the
EEOC’s interpretive guidelines do not receive Chevron
deference.”). Nor is the EEOC’s interpretation “entitled to
respect” under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944).
The present version of the EEOC Compliance Manual,
citing Bazemore, provides that “[r]epeated occurrences of the
same discriminatory employment acffon, such as
discriminatory paychecks, can be challenged as long as one
discriminatory act occurred within the charge filing period.”
EEOC Compliance Manual § 2-IV.C. But, as noted above,
Bazemore involved allegations of present intentional
discrimination, and does not establish the timeliness of a
claim based only on the effects of past discrimination.
Moreover, prior to 2001, the EEOC had justified its
position on a different ground—by reference to “continuing
violations” doctrine. Thus, the 2000 version of the EEOC
Compliance Manual discussed the timeliness of intentional
pay discrimination claims under the section entitled
“Continuing Violations,” and provided that, if “a charge
raises a continuing violation, all of the events forming part of
the continuing violation, including those that transpired
outside the filing period, are considered timely, and relief
may be obtained for all of the discriminatory events.” EEOC
Compliance Manual § 2-IV.C.2, at 5741 (July 27, 2000); see
also id. at 5743. Similarly, prior to 2001, the EEOC
reasoned in bricfs and administrative decisions that such
intentional pay discrimination claims were timely on a
“continuing violation” theory. See, e.g., Br. of the EEOC as
Amicus Curiae, Cardenas v. Massey (3d Cir. 2001), 2000
WL 33988483, at *13 n.10; Wintner v. Cisneros, No.
APL 01962705, 1996 WL 713995, at *1 (E.E.0.C. Dec. 5,
1996). The EEOC abandoned this view, and adopted its
present view, only in the wake of Morgan’s rejection of the
“continuing violation” theory.
43
In short, the EEOC’s present view rests on a
misconstruction of Bazemore, and its prior view was rejected
in Morgan. Considering the lack of “thoroughness,”
“validity,” or “consistency” in the EEOC’s pronouncements,
its views are not entitled to any respect at all. Gen. Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (internal quotation
marks ontitied).
3. In all events, this Court has stressed that “no
deference is due to. . . interpretations at odds with the plain
language of [a] statute itself.” Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v.
Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989); see also Mohasco, 447 U.S.
at 825. For that reason, this Court has not hesitated to reach
conclusions that are contrary to the unanimous positions of
the courts of appeals and the EEOC. See, e.g., Betts, 492
U.S. at 175 (rejecting the position of the EEOC and all five
courts of appeals that considered the question presented);
Int’! Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 346
n.28 (1977) (rejecting a position that “enjoyed wholesale
adoption in the Courts of Appeals” and by the EEOC);
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145-46 (rejecting the position of the
EEOC and all six courts of appeals that addressed the
question presented). The language of section 706(e) and this
Court’s cases interpreting it make clear that the Court should
do so here as well.
C. Ledbetter’s Inapt Analogies Concern Claims
About Present Violations of Law.
Ledbetter also contends (Pet. Br. at 34-38, 42-46) that
numerous “analogous contexts” demonstrate that her
challenge to the present effects of alleged unlawful
discrimination outside the charge-filing period should be
considered timely. But the only relevant analogy that
Ledbetter identifies—cases under the NLRA—in fact
confirms that her claim is time-barred. Her remaining
analogies are inapposite.
1. As Ledbetter correctly argues, the NLRA “served
{as} a model for many of Title VII’s enforcement
44
provisions.” Pet. Br. at 36 (citing Lorance, 490 U.S. at 909).
But, as Lorance held, this Court’s principal NLRA
limitations case, Machinists, confirms that the limitations
period on an intentional discrimination claim begins to run
with the adoption of a discriminatory policy, and not with
each application of that policy. See Lorance, 490 U.S. at
911. Where a complaint based on events outside the
limitations period is time-barred, permitting those events “tc
cloak with illegality” conduct within the limitations period
that is “otherwise lawful” and did not independently violate
the law “in effect results in reviving a legally defunct” claim,
contrary to the limitations period set by Congress.
Machinists, 362 U.S. at 417.
Moreover, News Printing Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 210 (1956),
which is cited in Machinists, 362 U.S. at 421 n.13, confirms
that no different analysis applies in the context of a pay
claim. In News Printing Co., the complaint alleged that the
employer had violated the NLRA by refusing to grant wage
increases to employees because they had supported a union.
~ 116 N.L.R.B. at 210. However, the only evidence presented
“involved conduct occurring more than 6 months before the
filing of the [relevant] charge[]....” /d. at 211. The NLRB
explained that, “[w]hile evidence... concerning conduct
which occurred prior to the statutory 6-month period may be
utilized as background evidence to evaluate a Respondent's
subsequent conduct, it is well established that Section 10(b)
of the Act precludes... giving independent and controlling
weight to such evidence.” /d. at 212 (footnote omitted).
The NLRA cases upon which Ledbetter relies are not to
the contrary. Each case involved an independent violation of
the NLRA within the limitations period. See Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 850, 853 (Ist Cir.
1973) (finding a present violation of the NLRA based not on
the employer’s decision outside the limitations period to stop
giving merit increases to its employees, but “upon a number
of acts committed within the limitations — period
which... indicate that [the employer] was attempting to
45
discredit the union”) (emphasis added); Me/ville Confections,
Inc. v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 1964) (explaining
that maintenance of a facially discriminatory profit-sharing
plan that excluded unionized employees from participation
“carried with it its own inherent evidence of intent” to
“discourage[] union membership” and constituted a complete
violation of the NLRA without reference to conduct outside
the limitations period) (internal quotation marks omitted);
NLRB vy. F.H. McGraw & Co., 206 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir.
1953) (noting, before Machinists was decided, that the
enforcement of a closed shop agreement, which on its face
violates the NLRA, constitutes independently actionable
conduct without reference to the circumstances of the
adoption of the agreement outside the limitations period);
Farmingdale Iron Works, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 98, 99 (1980)
(concluding that each failure to make contractually required
benefit fund payments within the limitations period
constituted an independent, “separate and distinct” violation
of the NLRA without the need to examine conduct outside
the limitations period).
2. Ledbetter’s other analogies are also flawed: In each
instance, the alleged unlawful act—as defined in each
pertinent area of law—occurs during the limitations period.
For example, under the Equal Pay Act, “[a] violation
occurs when an employer pays lower wages to an employee
of one gender than to substantially equivalent employees of
the opposite gender in similar circumstances”—without the
“need [to] prove that the pay disparity was motivated
by ...discriminatfion]....” Pollis v. New Sch. for Social
Research, 132 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing 29
U.S.C. § 206(d)). Thus, the mere payment of a disparate
wage constitutes an independent violation and starts a new
limitations period each time that it occurs.
So, too, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, “the source
of [an employee's] recovery is the failure to pay [the
employee} overtime, not the [employer’s] rationale for not
= =a 46
paying” overtime. Knight v. City of Columbus, 19 F.3d 579,
582 (11th Cir. 1994). Liability for a failure to pay overtime
within the limitations period does not depend on the original
“decision to classify overtime-eligible employees as
exempt,” which may have occurred outside the limitations
period. /d. Thus‘fe]ach-failure to pay overtime constitutes
a new” and complete “violation.” /d at 581 (emphasis
omitted).
Contract law governing other sorts of installment
obligations is to the same effect. “[A] cause of action in
contract accrues at the time of the breach or failure to do the
thing that is the subject of the agreement.” 31 Richard A.
Lord, Williston on Contracts § 79:14, at 316 (4th ed. 1990)
(internal citations omitted). If, under the contract, “money is
payable in installments,” each installment constitutes a
separate obligation, and each failure to pay constitutes a
separately actionable breach with its own limitations period.
/d. at 338. The same rule governs each separately actionable
failure of an-employer “to make each withdrawal liability
payment when duc” under the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1381(a). Bay Area Laundry
& Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal.,
Inc., 522 U.S. 192, 208 (1997).
Similarly, in antitrust law, each “unlawfully high priced
sale|]” constitutes a new violation because that sale from a
continuing restraint of trade is the “separate.” single act that
violates the Sherman Act. Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521
U.S. 179, 189 (1997). Accordingly, a plaintiff may recover
for present violations regardless of the plaintiff's knowledge
of other earlier violations that were not timely challenged
(though “the commission of a separate new overt act
generally does not permit the plaintiff to recover for the
injury caused by old overt acts outside the limitations
period”). /d.
Finally, Ledbetter’s reliance on myriad other criminal and
civil rights analogies is likewise inapposite. In some of the
-
47
cases that Ledbetter cites, the affirmative defense of the
statute of limitations was not even in issue. See, e.g., Hunter
v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); City of Los Angeles v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). Others involved allegedly
discriminatory policies that were reenacted during “each
year[]” of the limitations period, and that, in any event, were
challenged by some plaintiffs within the limitations period of
the original enactment. Palmer v. Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. Unit
Sch. Dist. 201-U, 46 F.3d 682, 685, 686 (7th Cir. 1995); see
also Manhart, 435 U.S. at 715 (policy at issue discriminated
“[o]n its face”). Still others quite properly apply the rule
that, in appropriate circumstances, evidence of conduct
outside the limitations period may be used in conjunction
with other evidence to establish a present violation. See,
e.g., United States v. Carlson, 235 F.3d 466, 470 (9th Cir.
2000); United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 798 (Sth Cir:
1975). But such “prior” conduct can serve as no more than
“background evidence in support of a (timely claim.”
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113 (emphasis added).
D. Ledbetter’s Reliance On The Legislative History
Of Statutory Provisions Other Than Section 706(e)
Is Without Merit.
Ledbetter also argues that the legislative history of the
failed Civil Rights Act of 1990 and of the enacted Civil
Rights Act of 1991 supports the limitations rule that she
advocates. Ledbetter is wrong again.
Neither the failed 1990 legislative effort nor the 1991
statute amended the pertinent statutory language in section
706(e), which was first enacted in 1964. This Court has
cautioned repeatedly that “[t]he views of members of a later
Congress, concerning [a] different section|] of Title VII”
than the one at issue, “are entitled to little if any weight.”
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 354.39; see also, e.g., Betts, 492
U.S. at 168 (noting that, where a subsequent amendment to a
statute did not modify the language of the provision at issue,
“the interpretation given by one Congress (or a committee or
48
Member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little assistance in
discerning the meaning of that statute”); United Air Lines,
Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200 n.7 (1977) (explaining
that “[l]egislative observations 10 years after passage of [a
statute] are in no sense” relevant). Indeed, the legislative
history of “failed legislative proposals” like the Civil Rights
Act of 1990 is “a particularly dangerous ground on which to
rest an interpretation of a prior statute.” Solid Waste Agency
of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engrs,
531 U.S. 159, 169-70 (2001) (internal citation and brackets
omitted).
In any event, neither piece of legislative history supports
Ledbetter’s position. The Senate Report for the Civil Rights
Act of 1990 merely approved “the result correctly reached in
Bazemore.” Civil Rights Act of 1990—Report from the
Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, S. Rep. No.
101-315, at 54 (1990). As described above, the result
reached in Bazemore—-to wit, that an employer cannot
justify post-Act discrimination by showing that the
discrimination began prior to the statute’s effective date—is
not at issue in this case. Moreover, the interpretive
memorandum of the sponsors of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
emphasized that “[{t]his legislation should not be interpreted
to affect the sound ruling|] of the Supreme Court” in Ricks.
137 Cong. Rec. $15472-01, S15485 (daily ed. Oct. 30,
1991). That decision—in which this Court reaffirmed that
“ijt is simply insufficient” for a plaintiff raising an
intentional discrimination claim to challenge the “‘present
effects] [of a] past illegal act’” that was not made the basis
for a timely charge, Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258 (internal citation
omitted)--demonstrates_ that, contrary to Ledbetter’s
contention, the intentional pay discrimination claim at issue
in this case is time-barred. :
49
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the court
below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
JAY ST. CLAIR GLEN D. NAGER
BRADLEY ARANT ROSE & (Counsel of Record)
WHITE LLP MICHAEL A. CARVIN
One Federal Place SHAY DVORETZKY
1819 Fifth Avenue North JoNes Day
Birmingham, AL 35203 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
(205) 521-8000 Washington, DC 20001
(202) 879-3939
October 23, 2006 Counsel for Respondent
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