Respondents Brief — Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.

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A “4 ;"Siipreme Count.US. |

by FILED |

No. 05-1074 OCT 2 3 2006 |

ere nen

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

LILLY M. LEDBETTER,

Petitioner,

Vv.

THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY,

Respondent.

—_— -—

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

JAY ST. CLAIR GLEN D. NAGER

BRADLEY ARANT ROSE & (Counsel of Record)

WHITE LLP MICHAEL A. CARVIN

One Federal Place SHAY DVORETZKY

1819 Fifth Avenue North JONES Day

Birmingham, AL 35203 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.

(205) 521-8000 Washington, DC 20001

(202) 879-3939

Counsel for Respondent

A RTS ANTS

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Respondent makes the following corporate disclosure

statement pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6:

The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company has no parent

company. No publicly held company owns 10% or more of

The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company’s stock.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| Page

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ....csssssssvseeeeee

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...ccccece.cecececoscoccoesconcecccceseesessor iv

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE. cssssssssescossossosesee

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ....ssssssscccscssssscessesseseeres 8

eS EERO FET ee ew Ie 1

{. LEDBETTER DOES NOT HAVE A TIMELY

INTENTIONAL PAY DISCRIMINATION CLAIM

FOR ACTIONS TAKEN OUTSIDE THE CHARGE-

A. Section 706(e) Bars A Private Plaintiff From

Bringing An Intentional Discrimination Claim

Concerning The Lingering Effects Of

Decisions Occurring Outside Of The Charge-

ER ETS LEIS TE Tih ee 13

B. Ledbetter’s Intentional Pay Discrimination

' Claim Is Time-Barred Because She

Challenges The Present Effects Of Salary

Decisions Occurring Outside Of The Charge-

a eiicisitetibitciesiatinmieeltpilaiieitieteigeertetetsapini 20

Il. BAZEMORE v. FRIDAY DOES NOT AUTHORIZE

AN INTENTIONAL PAY DISCRIMINATION

CLAIM BY A PRIVATE PARTY CONCERNING

ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION OCCURRING

OUTSIDE OF THE CHARGE-FILING PERIOD........ 24

A. Bazemore Involved Allegations By The

United States Of Present Intentional *

Discrimination; And This Court Merely

Rejected The Employer's Defense That The

Claim Was Barred Because The Alleged

Discrimination Began Before Title VII's

OS TI sissiccnicccistisstcnitiansnnpeidteatatistaiaiadiididiedadianaas 25

B. Ledbetter Misconstrues Snippets of Language

in Justice Brennan’s Bazemore Concurrence.......... 29

Ul. LEDBETTER’S REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARE

PR Te Be Oceccaviinisrvinaiiasensiiaiadiaiiaanieaiiiiiebieets 35

_ A. Ledbetter’s Empirical And Policy Arguments

Wrongly Ask The Court To Rewrite Section

PRED vcswscscncsnesnicisiaitiicicanimsinsiailiiicataiacdisunieiuiaiimimades tall 36

B. Ledbetter’s Argument For Acquiescence In

Allegedly Consistent Positions Of Most

Courts Of Appeals And The EEOC Is

PD cisniniinsssoncndsbanisieiiciniiiainetiiniseiamemenaiaaa 40

C. Ledbetter’s Inapt Analogies Concern Claims

About Present Violations of Law...........ccceeeeeeeees 43

D. Ledbetter’s Reliance On The Legislative

History Of Statutory Provisions Other Than

Section 706(e) Is Without Merit... eee 47

CA Ai cccvinnsisscrenin’ ievconesoinnsinsisinisesmnnmsiniiaanhiah 49

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

American Federation of State, County & Municipal

Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir.

eect elinancnamnlindnantncnonnsetns 12

Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d

ERO Cee 4]

Bartelt v. Berlitz School of Languages of America,

Inc., 698 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1983).........:cccccecsceereeeseeees 41!

Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust

Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of California, Inc., 522 U.S.

Ts las tated tiinettehetedat tcecineeretapenangnenreenensnannesensenten 46

Bazemore v. Friday, 75\ F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1984)....... 25, 26

Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) ..............00 passim

Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 ¥.2d 711 (7th

TIT coniinsecqnaiiddhiicdeesibebuttiapenenmadanannseetnarimiiemsesmestmeies 14

Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336

EE 4\

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742

EE Ea en 13

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.

By Ge ty Gt BI CIID orccccciccncccosnosonnssersesoosscencooes 38

Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001)............. 4]

Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981) ......ccccccccceceeereeees 22

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).....cccccccecccceceseeseeeeeees 41

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412

| SSE SSE SE een a a 38

City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)........ 47

County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161

ERLE SS ee 12, 35

Dasgupta v. University of Wisconsin Board of

Regents, 121 F.3d 1138 (7th Cir. 1997) oo ccccccceecceeeees 40

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(Continued)

Page

Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250

Ip a sindeiinsnenceisnhitenesiebaeniniedenpumteecadeaneaiaateasneiapaminiaiitenel passim

Farmingdale Iron Works, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 98

SEITE hsnedinpiessasdisiainaduntenantiniediaminiendenisenpuitienmatinapesisniiiels 45

Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S.

ee i eniiacticiiasisiisiiceintiuaniitanileabiapisidaiaaitiiiaiadal eisai 40

Forsyth v. Federation Employment & Guidance

Service, 409 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2005) .0......cceceeceeseeeeeeeees 4]

General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)........ 43

General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. NLRB, 476 F.2d

YE CS ener aes eee 44

Gibbs v. Pierce County Law Enforcement Support

Agency, 785 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1986) ..0..... eee 4]

Goodwin v. General Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005

ON ea 41

Hall v. Ledex, Inc., 669 F.2d 397 (6th Cir. 1982)............... 4]

Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S.

I a ciiietitiniiiciindisascniniesticliiitiniapitaatinaliiacaass 27, 30, 32, 37

Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) .....¢.cccccce0ese0ees 47

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United

RL RR ae 43,47

International Union of Electrical, Radio &

Machinery Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429

Rs ED cciviinrniinceiccitntiteiinndiiatiniicitnintmmuiniaiembennianl 13

Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997) occ. ccceceee. 46

Knight v. City of Columbus, 19 F.3d 579 (11th Cir.

PUTT niccusaiinnitajtieniatbeicapiatiiinemnieanaasipimetidabeennessintmntunlian 46

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of

PO BS BS ee 35

Lorance vy. A T &T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(Continued)

Page

Machinists Local Lodge No. 1424 v. NLRB, 362 U.S.

ie AT nninisscecisiinenisiniiainieniatiguainiiateanimniaiabinenismdvehde 17,44

Melville Confections, Inc. v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 689

TER: SITET icsticcsseeetiaiesiensinheiniinipsliniasiiatnuniadeaaicasemingmemenl 45

Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57

Tre sisceiicinthteinnasichadeiebbiltatdpnieiscsnadiduiiaaibadiniiniatonsiiieininiinnavaieigi 24

Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 __

STITT cscicisslaniteetpinpinidnaaratdantintieiaeidinaainadasitineindeaniniaiits 14, 39, 43

NLRB v. F_H. McGraw & Co., 206 F.2d 635 (6th Cir.

DI ccc cecnsstnenessenesssennesenensseseassumnenqenmnsnntntmestminaseenestnenses 45

Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977)........ccc00 12

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536

Be ee I ccccinsinectntsrciciintsihanieaninediniindensinenaidaanaiins passim

News Printing Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 210 (1956)........ccccceeeees 44

Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S.

Be Cae Uicicdnepsanticeshiperiiniminciairanthisisidaipisindsaisiiatindsaptabianhia 27

Palmer v. Board of Education of Community Unit

School District 201-U, 46 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 1995).......47

Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,

Fee es I eiertinedatinigtnhinnentitincieiseticisibiniates 21, 31

Pollis v. New School for Social Research, 132 F.3d

Be I IIT creciccniinsinsnriscidnieiteitlarddandntetmsnienitzennnniteedin 45

Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 492

hs STII cxcnninsdneiierdatonsentetshiititmmnnewssanindasinianes 43,47

Saint Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

Ein irienciigussncainiashitinsiegtnasteiiasennianlidhiptpeematenannieasiniaienees 35

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) oes 42

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.

United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S.

ai UIT intincennderctneeuniinesiaseinneiiunntninibeibidsieiiebidmesiciimiindaeiaitttaines 48

United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553

a i scicniaceenrenantiandsenmimananasiiiniaidiniiiibiapiasaetiiiiianieenceaniai passim

Vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(Continued)

Page

United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192

(ESE ere eae Ae ea ea TO TE 48

United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793 (Sth Cir.

STTrceciteciiieicleciieiatidapailatain bia in iahaleadcitaeacell 47

United States v. Carlson, 235 F.3d 466 (9th Cir.

SELES Meo ewe a ae ee PAE es Ne Tee ee EST 47

Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642

IIT retinas ind iaiaiidiaria achat inne hl iainaiiadialia dials 37

Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir.

ETERS CE Sart aca AO Re eee ee a 14

Wintner v. Cisneros, No. APL 01962705, 1996 WL

poe RE Ee eee 42

Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385

SESS MESS SEER tec eRe aA 38

Statutes & Regulations

Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) 0.0.0... ecceeeeeeeeeee 5, 39, 45

dF LEE fT odd > ~ . Sn 39

Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.

SNS an iD icinschcisenadiledieaiaieeinhainnitehaeiniaiitgsdicinlaaiaaataininaiiaiiied 5

Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29

Seis I Sen sinecccniinsieseneminscinelniasietenneiiaednidintanetecsiiianne 46

ts ie et icoernnicasietesdscteciciitiisimineduatintuicnimmniaseniiibiantiing 38

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000-17 oo... ceeeeeeeeteees 5

Se irs Se icnitccviciinicnnianineniiiinnenininnniininiis 34

er i Ae I ctentatecornitintnccnensenenstanimnnmantnisionnian 34

er Oe ED cttcrcnsanivesnnrasinstinnininsinmiets passim

Se CRE. © FO recrcetncasetcreeninnsecnenseescstinien 36, 39

ee, Be ee ccrctceninntiniicnenccncassncnsiabimasimnaianiiins 37

ROCF BR, & CGE 6 Ge ccccencescossccscnmnscsessensessessseneqnanesta 23

vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(Continued)

Page

Legislative & Agency Matcrials

Civil Rights Act—Report from the Senate Labor &

Human Resources Committee, 8. Rep. No. 101-

Pee vicsnerniliivedtscimmeiniuiianinmeniianpeniinantiianionsbapeencets 48

137 Cong. Rec. $15472-01 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991)......... 48

Other Authorities

31 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 79.14

ETE. SIIITTIIIIT irsitepincinincaniciensiieiiahaphahtgariaesiaadeslaaiiabanabieatetins 46

27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 148 (2d ed. 2006)... 39

EEOC Compliance Manual § 2-IV.C.2 (July 27,

Tati icestidehittinsedtidanesitnipatied tn intabaaadepenisieniitininepiaiaepemmenetiie 42

EEOC Compliance Manual § 2-1V.C ........cccecceeeeeeseeeneees 42

Br. for the Federal Petitioners, Bazemore v. Friday,

I Cais IE ncetnnsnsicndinsnccunpnsttrtiegpnenimennenennsiniiniees 26

Br. of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae Supporting

Petitioners, Bazemore v. Friday, 1986 WL 728218........ 26

Reply Br. for the Federal Petitioners, Bazemore v.

Peta, TGS WE, Tae cescccvaserccessccenssscncsnssssensseieeseseese 26

Br. of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae, Cardenas v.

Massey (3d Cir. 2001), 2000 WL 33988483 .................. 4?

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COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE

Lilly Ledbetter worked for The Goodyear Tire & Rubber

Company for 19 years, first as a Supervisor and subsequently

as an Area Manager. Ledbetter began her employment at the

same salary as male Supervisors. During the ensuing 19

years, several different managers made discrete annual

decisions regarding what merit increase Ledbetter should

receive in her salary. In some years, the increases that

Ledbetter received were greater than those awarded to male

- co-workers. In other years, they were less. In still other

years, Ledbetter was on layoff, or was about to be laid off,

and thus was not eligible for an increase. In this lawsuit,

Ledbetter seeks to challenge the collective effect of those 19

years of salary determinations, particularly focusing on

alleged discrimination occurring in the 1980’s and early

1990’s. Each of the alleged acts occurred well before

Ledbetter filed a charge with the EEOC in 1998 alleging

intentional pay discrimination. Applying Title VII's text and

this Court’s cases construing that text, the court below

correctly held that Ledbetter could not pursue such a stale

claim.

|. Ledbetter was hired on February 5, 1979 as a

Supervisor Trainee at Goodyear’s tire assembly plant in

Gadsden, Alabama. Pet. App. 5a. Shortly thereafter, she

became a Supervisor. Ledbetter was paid the same salary,

$16,760.52, as the other Supervisors at the Gadsden plant.

J.A. 39, 151-52. Moreover, in 1980 and 1981, Ledbetter

received the same lockstep pay increases, based on cost-of-

living adjustments, as the other Supervisors (15.59% in 1980

and 9.25% in 1981). J.A. 224; Tr. 125-28.

a. In 1982, Goodyear implemented a merit-based

compensation program. Pet. App. 4a; J.A. 114-42. Under

the “Pay. for Performance” program, each “Business Center

Manager” within a plant became responsible for determining

annual merit increases for the salaried empleyees under his

or her supervision. Pet. App. 4a-Sa; J.A. 120-21. In doing

2

so, the Business Center Manager was required to take cach

employee’s existing salary at the time as a given starting

point; the manager was to focus only on appropriate salary

increases. J.A. 69-70, 87-88, 120-21; Tr. 256-57. In that

regard, the manager was also to take into account each

employee's performance ranking for the year; where the

employee’s existing salary stood within the salary range for

his or her position; and the amount and timing of the

employee's most recent increase. Pet. App. 4a-5a; J.A. 120-

21, 174-77. Each employee’s annual incréase could not

exceed a specified maximum percentage, and the total

amount of increases awarded in each Business Center could

not exceed a set budget. Pet. App. 4a-5a, 48a; J.A. 87-88,

120-21.

b. Between 1982 and 1985 (when her title changed

to Area Manager), Ledbetter received annual salary increases

of 7.65%, 6.39%, 5.34%, and 7.19%. J.A. 224. For fifteen

months beginning in 1986 and extending into 1987,

Ledbetter was on layoff, and, as a result, she was not eligible

for pay increases in 1986, 1987, or 1988. Pet. App. 5a; J.A.

167: Tr. 39, 128-31. Upon being recalled, Ledbetter’s salary

was less than the salaries of Area Managers who had not

been laid off and had been eligible for increases during those

years. J.A. 167, 195. In 1989, Ledbetter received a 5.99%

increase. J.A. 224. But she was included in another layoff

later in 1989; as a result, she was ineligible for a pay increase

in 1990. Pet. App. 5a; J.A. 224. In 1991 and 1992, she

received pay increases of 8.86% and 6.65%, respectively.

J.A. 224. Ledbetter conceded at trial that Mike Nunn, her

supervisor between 1990 and 1992, did not discriminate

against her in determining her pay increases in those years.

Tr. 132-33.

c. Between 1993 and 1996, Mike Tucker evaluated

Ledbetter. In 1993, Tucker ranked Ledbetter third out of the

four Area Managers and fifth out of the six salaried

employees whom he supervised. Pet. App. Sa-6a; J.A. 174.

Jimmy Todd, who was ranked last, received no pay increase

3

for the year, while Ledbetter received a 5.28% increase, the

largest percentage increase awarded to any Area Manager

under Tucker’s supervision. Pet. App. Sa-6a; J.A. 174.

In 1994, Tucker ranked Ledbetter last among the four

Area Managers and last among the six salaried employees

whom he supervised. Pet. App. 6a; J.A. 175. She

nevertheless received a 5% pay increase. Pet. App. 6a; J.A.

175.

In 1995, Tucker awarded Ledbetter the maximum

“individual performance award”—4%—available under the

compensation guidelines for that year. Pet. App. 6a; Tr. 348.

Tucker awarded Ledbetter an additional increase of 3.85% in

1995 as a “top performance award” in order to raise her

salary. Pet. App. 6a; Tr. 348, 363.

In 1996, Tucker ranked Ledbetter 23rd out of 24 salaried

employees, and 15th out of 16 Area Managers. Pet. App. 7a;

J.A. 176-77; Tr. 344. Tucker ranked Jimmy Todd 24th, and

both he and the 22nd-ranked employee received no raises.

Pet. App. 7a; J.A. 176-77. Because Ledbetter’s 1995 raise

became effective on December |, 1995, she was not eligible

for another increase in 1996. Pet. App. 7a; Tr. 141, 344.

The cumulative amount of pay increases that Ledbetter

received between 1993 and 1996 was higher than the

increases for three of the four male Area Managers working

for Tucker. J.A. 193.

d. Because the Gadsden plant was experiencing

declining production, Goodyear slated Ledbetter and Jimmy

Todd—the two lowest-performing Area Managers in 1995—

for layoff at the end of 1996. Pet. App. 7a, 49a. However,

because other Area Managers went out on extended medical

leaves, Ledbetter’s layoff never took effect. Pet. App. 7a.

But, having been slated for layoff, she did not receive a pay

increase in 1997. Pet. App. 8a & n.4, 9a: Tr. 296-97, 318.

Throughout 1997, Ledbetter’s new manager, Jerry Jones,

expressed concerns to Ledbetter about her performance. Pet.

4

App. 8a. He eventually suggested that she apply for a non-

supervisory Technology Engineer position. Pet. App. 8a.

Ledbetter did so, but continued working as an Area Manager

through the end of 1997. Pet. App. 8a.

In late 1997, Kelly Owen replaced Jones as the Business

Center Manager responsible for evaluating Ledbetter. Pet.

App. 8a. In his evaluation of Ledbetter’s 1997 performance,

Owen ranked Ledbetter 23rd out of 24 salaried employees,

and 15th out of 16 Area Managers. Pet. App. 9a; J.A. 189-

92. Dean Nance, a man, was ranked last; the two people

ranked directly above Ledbetter were also men. Pet. App.

9a; J.A. 189-92. These four employees—the lowest-rated

employees under Owen’s supervision—did not receive merit

increases in 1998. Pet. App. 9a; J.A. 189-92.

e. In August 1998, Goodyear offefed an early

retirement option. Pet. App. 9a. Ledbetter took early

retirement effective November |, 1998.-Pet. App. 9a.

2. Ledbetter did not file an EEOC charge challenging

the cumulative effect of these 19 years of salary

determinations until July 21, 1998. Pet. App. 9a; J.A. 147-

50. The record shows that she had previous experience with

the EEOC charge process. The record also shows that she

was aware, by no later than 1992, of a disparity between her

pay and that of Gertain male Supervisors/Area Managers.

a. Specifically, in 1982, Ledbetter had filed a

charge with the EEOC alleging that Mike Maudsley, a

former department foreman who was deceased by the time of

trial in this case, had sexually harassed her. J.A. 103-09.

Ledbetter and Goodyear resolved these allegations without

litigation. J.A. 42-43.

b. With regard to her pay, Ledbetter testified that

“(dlifferent people that [she] worked for along the way had

always told [her] that [her] pay was extremely low.” J.A.

233 (emphasis added). She recalled that her manager told

her in 1992 that her pay was lower than that of other Area

Managers, and that by 1994 or 1995, she had learned the

5

amount of the difference. J.A. 230-33. In 1995, Ledbetter

told Mike Tucker that she “needed to earn an increase in

pay” because she “wanted to get in line with where [her]

peers were, because ... at that time [she] knew definitely

that they were all making a thousand [dollars} at least more

per month... .” J.A. 231-32; see also J.A. 236-37, 239-40.

c. On March 25, 1998, Ledbetter filed a

questionnaire with the EEOC alleging that she had been

forced into the Technology Engineer position. J.A. 143-46.

On July 21, 1998, she filed a formal charge in which she

further alleged that she was being paid a discriminatorily low

salary. J.A. 147-50.

3. After receiving a right-to-sue letter, Ledbetter filed

suit, asserting multiple claims of intentional age

discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation, in

violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; the

Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §206(d); and the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34.

JA. 13-21.

a. A magistrate judge recommended that summary

judgment be granted to Goodyear on all but one of

Ledbetter’s claims—a claim relating to a_ three-day

suspension that she recetved in 1998 for a manufacturing

error. With respect to Ledbetter’s intentional pay

discrimination claim under Title VII, the magistrate judge

found that, because “plaintiff's performance was ranked at or

near the bottom of Area Managers,” Ledbetter had not “cast

sufficient doubt on | Goodyear’ s] proffered

nondiscriminatory reason{]” for paying her less than other

Area Managers. Pet. App. 67a (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). With respect to Ledbetter’s Equal

Pay Act claim, the magistrate judge concluded that Ledbetter

had not “established a prima facie case with respect to Area

Managers outside the Business Center in which she worked,”

who were not appropriate comparators. Pet. App. 73a. As

the magistrate judge explained, “[eJach of the defendant's

6

Business Centers had a particular purpose, and made

different products,” so that “varied” and “specialized skill{s]

w{ere] required ...to supervise employees in the different

business centers.” Pet. App. 72a-73a. The magistrate judge

further concluded that “the disparity between [Ledbetter’s]

pay and that of her comparators” in her own Business Center

was “based on factors other than sex,” namely, Ledbetter’s

“weak” performance. Pet. App. 73a, 74a.

b. Finding “credibility” disputes in the testimony of

Mike Tucker concerning his recommendations about

Ledbetter’s salary increases between 1992 and 1995, the

district court denied summary judgment on Ledbetter’s

intentional pay discrimination claim. D. Ct. Dkt. #33 (Mem.

Op.), at 1-2; D. Ct. Dkt. #34 (order). The district court also

denied summary judgment on _ Ledbetter’s _ transfer,

retaliation, and discipline claims. D. Ct. Dkt. #33 (Mem.

Op.), at 2-3; D. Ct. Dkt. #34 (order). But the district court

entered summary judgment on all remaining claims,

including Ledbetter’s Equal Pay Act claim. D. Ct. Dkt. #33

(Mem. Op.), at 3; D. Ct. Dkt. #34 (order).

c. At trial, at the close of the evidence, the district

court granted judgment as a matter of law on Ledbetter’s

- claims of disparate discipline and retaliatory refusal to rehire,

but not on Ledbetter’s disparate pay and involuntary transfer -

claims. Pet. App. 10a; J.A. 98; Tr. 382, 384. A jury then

found for Goodyear on the transfer claim but returned a

verdict for Ledbetter on the pay claim. Pet. App. 10a-1 1a.

The jury awarded Ledbetter $223,776 in back pay, $4,662 in

damages for mental anguish, and $3,285,979 in punitive

damages. Pet. App. | la.

d. In post-trial motions, Goodyear renewed its

argument made at trial that Ledbetter’s pay claim was time-

barred as to all pay decisions made prior to September 26,

1997 (six months prior to the filing of Ledbetter’s EEOC

questionnaire). Goodyear also argued that no reasonable

jury could have concluded that the one pay decision made —

7

within the charge-filing period. by Kelly Owen, was

intentionally discriminatory. The district court rejected both

arguments, stating that:

The jury could reasonably have found that Terry

Amberson is an appropriate comparator. Apparently, both

he and the Plaintiff were paid the same salary on April |,

1979, and again on April 16, 1979. The jury could

reasonably have concluded that but for the gender

discrimination, their salaries would have been the same up

to November 1, 1998.

Pet. App. 4la (internal citation omitted). The court did,

however, remit the total award to $360,000, including

$300,000 in compensatory and punitive damages and

$60,000 in backpay, plus attorneys’ fees and costs. Pet. App.

lla, 38a-39a. The district court held that Ledbetter was

entitled to two years of backpay “[b]ecause of the continuing

nature of the disparate salary payments... .” Pet. App. 41a.

4. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. That court concluded

that a pay claim is “clear|ly]... governed by that part” of

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101

(2002), that “address[es] claims alleging ‘discrete acts of

discrimination.”” Pet. App. 17a. It further concluded that

Ledbetter could “state a timely cause of action for disparate

pay only to the extent that the ‘discrete acts of

discrimination’ of which she complains occurred within the

limitations period... .” Pet App. 19a.

The Eleventh Circuit noted that “a series of pre-Morgan

cases,” applying this Court’s decision in Bazemore v. Friday,

478 U.S. 385 (1986), had held that “an employee's pay

[claim] was not time-barred so long as the plaintiff received

within the limitations period at least one paycheck

implementing the pay rate the employee challenged as

unlawful.” Pet. App. 20a. But the court found that, even

“[a]ssuming that these cases survive Morgan .. . they do not

speak to how far back in time the plaintiff may reach in

looking for the intentionally discriminatory act that is the

8

central, requisite element of every successful disparate

treatment claim.” Pet. App. 22a-23a. The court noted that,

“[ulnless there is a claim that the person—or, more likely

today, the computer—who actually issued the paychecks in

question did so with intent to discriminate, the operative act

of discrimination will always be... the act of making the

underlying decision about what the plaintiff should be paid.”

Pet. App. 23a. The court further found that allowing a

plaintiff to “question every decision made contributing to his

or her” present salary level would entirely nullify Title VII's

charge-filing requirement. Pet. App. 23a. For these reasons,

the court held that “an employee looking to establish that his

or her pay level was unlawfully depressed may look no

further into the past than the last affirmative decision directly

affecting the employee’s pay immediately preceding the start

of the limitations period.” Pet. App. 24a.

The Eleventh Circuit next held that Ledbetter had not

provided legally sufficient evidence that either the “one raise

decision that was made within the limitations period”—i.e.,

Kelly Owen’s decision that she not receive a raise in 1998—

or the preceding decision that she not receive a raise in 1997

was motivated by Ledbetter’s sex. Pet. App. 27a-3la. With

regard to the former, the court noted that Ledbetter had been

ranked 23rd out of 24 employees in Tire Assembly, and 15th

out of 16 Area Managers, based on her performance; that the

men ranked at the bottom with Ledbetter also had been

denied raises; and that there was “no evidence that Owen

purposefully underrated Ledbetter’s performance for 1997.”

Pet. App. 3la. With regard to the 1997 decision, the court

found that the “uncontradicted evidence . . . established that

Ledbetter’s impending layoff was the reason for her being

denied a raise... .” Pet. App. 32a. .

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Ledbetter lost her Equal Pay Act claim in the district

court; she did not assert a Title VII disparate impact claim;

and the Eleventh Circuit found !egally insufficient evidence

9

of intentional pay discrimination during the Title VII charge-

filing period. The only question left is whether Ledbetter

can nonetheless pursue a claim that her present salary is the

result of allegedly intentionally discriminatory decisions

occurring outside of Title VII's charge-filing period. She

cannot.

I. Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

5(e)(1), requires that “[a] charge under this section shall be

filed within [180] days after the alleged unlawful

employment practice occurred.” This charge-filing

requirement, which this Court has described as a

compromise essential to the enactment of Title VII as a

whole, protects courts and defendants against stale claims

and promotes conciliation rather than litigation.

To honor both the text and the purposes of section 706(e),

this Court has repeatedly stressed the need to identify the

precise “unlawful employment practice” at issue and to

determine when that practice “occurred.” In doing so, the

Court has repeatedly held that section 706(c) bars a private

plaintiff from bringing an intentional discrimination claim

challenging discriminatory conduct occurring outside of the

charge-filing period, even if that past conduct continues to

have adverse effects into the charge-filing period. See. e.g.,

Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 111-13

(2002); Lorance v. A T & T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 905-

08 (1989): Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258

(1980); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558

(1977).

Under that case law, Ledbetter’s intentional pay

discrimination claim is time-barred. There is no evidence

that Goodyear issued paychecks during the | 80-day period in

a discriminatory manner or with a discriminatory intent.

Moreover, the court below held that Ledbetter did not have

legally sufficient evidence that the single salary decision

made during the charge-filing period was discriminatory —a

holding that is not before this Court. Ledbetter complains

10

that allegedly discriminatory decisions made by different

managers extending back over 19 years have lingering

effects within the charge-filing period. But that is precisely

the kind of stale claim that section 706(e) and this Court’s

cases establish is untimely. There is no basis for applying a

different charge-filing rule to discrete acts of intentional pay

discrimination than to other kinds of discrete acts. Indeed,

allowing Ledbetter to bring such an untimely intentional

discrimination claim would completely defeat the interests in

repose and conciliation that underlie section 706(e).

ll. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986), is not to

the contrary. Bazemore involved a claim by the United

States that concerned allegations of present intentional

discrimination in pay. This Court held that the employer

could not defend against those allegations of present

discrimination on the ground that the discrimination had

begun prior to the effective date of Title VII. There was no

claim, much less a holding, that a present interitional pay

discrimination claim by a private plaintiff may rest wholly

on allegedly discriminatory decisions made outside of

section 706(e)'s charge-filing period. Indeed, section 706(e)

was not even in issue in Bazemore because claims brought

by the United States are not subject to that provision.

Ill. Ledbetter’s remaining arguments are also in error.

The policy concerns that she raises provide no legal basis to

rewrite the statutory charge-filing requirement. The

argument that this Court should acquiesce in the position of

some courts of appeals and the EEOC is unfounded: The

lower courts and the EEOC have not had a consistent

position, and this Court should enforce the statute as enacted,

not as misconstrued by some lower courts and the EEOC.

Moreover, while Ledbetter contends that numerous

analogous contexts demonstrate that her claim should be

considered timely, the only relevant analogy that she

identifies—cases under the National Labor Relations Act-—

confirms that her claim is time-barred. Finally, Ledbetter’s

reliance on the legislative history of statutory provisions

other than section 706(e) is meritless. :

ARGUMENT

As it comes to this Court, this case turns on section

706(e)’s requirement that a plaintiff raising an intentional

discrimination claim under Title VII must file a timely

administrative charge. Specifically, to have a timely claim,

Ledbetter had to allege and prove that, during the 180-day

limitations period preceding the charge filing, Goodyear

intentionally discriminated against her because of her gender

in setting her salary and/or in issuing her paychecks.

Ledbetter sought to satisfy this burden by showing that

Goodyear’s facially neutral pay actions during the limitations

period gave present effect to allegedly discriminatory salary

decisions made outside of the charge-filing period. The

Eleventh Circuit correctly rejected this claim.

In considering the issue, it is useful to note three

preliminary points: First, there is no question in this case

about wheter Goodyear actually intentionally discriminated

on the basis of gender in setting Ledbetter’s salary and/or in

issuing her paychecks during the charge-filing period. The

Eleventh Circuit held that there was not legally sufficient

evidence to support such an intentional discrimination claim,

and Ledbetter did not seek or obtain certiorari review of that

holding. Second, contrary to Ledbetter’s misstatement (Pet.

Br. at 15), there is no question here whether Goodycar paid

Ledbetter less money for equal work on the basis of her sex.

The district court granted summary judgment against

Ledbetter on her claim under the Equal Pay Act, and she did

not appeal that ruling (much less seek and obtain certiorari

with respect to it). Finally, there is no claim here that

Goodyear’s facially neutral “Pay for Performance”

compensation program—including its provision, for both

men and women, that the prior year’s existing salary is taken

as a given and is subject only to a maximum annual merit

increase-—has an unlawful disparate impact on women.

12

There is serious doubt whether such a disparate impact claim

is cognizable under Title VII. See, e.g., County of Wash. v.

Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 (1981); Nashville Gas Co. v.

Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 139-42 (1977); Am. Fed’n of State,

County, & Mun. Employees v. Wash., 770 F.2d 1401, 1405-

06 (9th Cir. 1985). But, equally important, Ledbetter never

asserted any disparate impact claim in the district court—

instead asserting only intentional discrimination claims on

which she could obtain a jury trial and request an award of

compensatory and punitive damages.

Rather, the only question presented here is whether

Ledbetter has a cognizable intentional discrimination claim

for a disparity in pay during the limitations period that she

claims “is the result of intentionally discriminatory pay

decisions that occurred outside the limitations-period”—i.e.,

a claim of alleged discrimination that Ledbetter was aware of

by no later than 1992 and that she has never claimed should

be the subject of equitable tolling or estoppel. Pet. at i; Pet.

App. 19a n.16. Section 706(e) and this Court’s cases make it

clear that no such claim is cognizable.

I. LEDBETTER DOES NOT HAVE A TIMELY

INTENTIONAL PAY DISCRIMINATION CLAIM

FOR ACTIONS TAKEN OUTSIDE THE

CHARGE-FILING PERIOD.

As the court below recognized, Title VII requires

allegedly aggrieved employees like Ledbetter to assert their

intentional discrimination claims within the 180-day charge-

filing period or lose them. Moreover, as the court below also

recognized, Tithe VII°’s charge-filing requirement does not

allow an aggrieved employee to revive an intentional

discrimination claim for which no timely charge was filed

merely by arguing that an unlawful action outside the

charge-filing period continues to have adverse effects in later

time periods. But that is all that Ledbetter is arguing in this

Court. Accordingly, her arguments should be rejected, and

the judgment below should be affirmed.

13

A. Section 706(c) Bars A Private Plaintiff From

Bringing An Intentional Discrimination Claim

Concerning The Lingering Effects Of Decisions

Occurring Outside Of The Charge-Filing Period.

Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1),

provides that “[a] charge under this section. shall be filed

within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged

unlawful employment practice occurred” (or within 300 days

in a state that has an agency with the authority to grant or

seek relief with respect to the unlawful employment

practice). Under this provision, it is “mandatory” that a

plaintiff file a charge within the requisite days after the

“unlawful employment practice” “occurred,” or “lose the

ability to recover for it.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109-10.

1. The Court has long recognized that section 706(e)

“reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the

interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed

by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.”

Ricks, 449 U.S. at 260 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 706(e) “protect{s] employers from the burden of

defending claims arising from employment decisions that are

long past.” /d. at 256-57. Indeed, the Court has held that an

employer is “entitled to treat [a] past [discriminatory] act as

lawful after [the employee] failed to file a charge of

discrimination” within the prescribed period. Evans, 431

U.S. at 558.

In so holding, the Court has recognized that, as an

administrative filing requirement, section 706(e) not only

“assures prompt notification to the employer of a charge of

an alleged violation of Title VII,” Jnt’l Union of Elec., Radio

& Mach. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229,

240 n.14 (1976), but also “promote{s] conciliation rather

than litigation in the Title VII context,” Burlington Indus.,

Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). Section 706(e)

“bring|s] to bear,” as promptly as possible. “the voluntary

compliance and conciliation functions of the EEOC.” Bowe

14

v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969),

and thereby “promoi[es]...dispute resolution through

accommodation rather than litigation....” Weise v.

Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 412 (2d Cir. 1975) (citing

Henry J. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 78

(1973)).

The Court has stated that “[b]y choosing what are

obviously quite short deadlines [in Title VII], Congress

clearly intended to encourage the prompt processing of all

charges of employment discrimination.” Mohasco Corp. v.

Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980). Indeed, the Court has

recognized that section 706(e) and its prompt filing

requirement were a critical part of the legislative

“compromise” leading to the enactment of Title VII, id. at

826, and has admonished lower courts to “strict{ly] adher[e]”

to it. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 108.

2. To honor section 706(e)’s text and fulfill its statutory

purposes, the Court has repeatedly stressed the need both to

identify at the outset the specific “unlawful employment

practice” at issue and to determine when that practice

“occurred.” Jd. at 109-10; see also Lorance, 490 U.S. at

904; Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257-58. In doing so, the Court has

repeatedly held that section 706(e) bars a private plaintiff

_from pursuing an intentional discrimination claim based

wholly on conduct occurring outside of the charge-filing

period, even if the past conduct continues to have adverse

effects in the charge-filing period. See, e.g., Lorance, 490

U.S. at 905-08; Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257.

a. The Court first addressed this matter in United

Air Lines v. Evans. There, a female flight attendant claimed

that her pay and benefits were unlawfully depressed because

she had previously been forced to resign pursuant to an

illegal policy prohibiting flight attendants from being

married. See 431 U.S. at 554, 558. Specifically, Evans had

resigned in 1968, but was rehired in 1972 after the illegal

policy was abolished. See id. at 554-55. However, on

15

rehire, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, Evans’

employer did not credit her with seniority for prior service,

and thus her pay and benefits were adversely affected. See

id. at 555 & n.6. Evans claimed that the employer was

violating Title VII vy “giv{ing] present effect to the past

illegal act” and was unlawfully “perpetuat{ing] the

consequences of forbidden [past] discrimination.” /d. at 557.

In rejecting Evans’ claim, the Court began by stating that

“the critical question is whether any present violation exists.”

Id. at 558 (emphasis in original). The Court answered that

question in the negative on the ground that the employer’s

seniority system was “neutral in its operation.” /d. The

Court further noted that Evans did not allege that the

seniority system “discriminate|d] against former female

employees or that it treat{ed] former employees who were

discharged for a discriminatory reason any differently from

former employees who resigned or were discharged for a

non-discriminatory reason.” /d.

The Court recognized that the seniority policy had a

“continuing impact on [Evans’] pay and fringe benefits” and

gave “present effect to [the employer’s] past act of

discrimination.” /d. But the employer “was entitled to treat

that past act as lawful after [Evans] failed to file a charge of

discrimination within the [limitations period] allowed” by

section 706(e). /d. The Court said that the discriminatory

act in 1968, which was “not made the basis for a timely

charge,” was “merely an unfortunate event in history” that

had “no present legal consequences.” /d. (emphasis added).

b. The Court next addressed the issue in Delaware

State College v. Ricks. There, a black college professor was

denied tenure by Delaware State College. See 449 U.S. at

252. Following its “policy of not discharging immediately a

junior faculty member who does not receive tenure,” the

College communicated the tenure denial decision and offered

Ricks a “‘terminal’ contract to teach one additional year,”

which he accepted. /d. at 253. Ricks waited until more than

16

180 days after the denial of tenure, but shortly before his

one-year terminal contract expired, to file a Title VII charge.

See id. at 254. This Court held that Ricks’ claim was

untimely. See id. at 262.

The Court emphasized that determining the timeliness of

Ricks’ claim “requires... identify[ing] precisely the

‘unlawful employment practice’ of which he complains.” /d.

at 257 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)) (emphasis added).

The Court found that Ricks was claiming intentional

discrimination by the College in denying him tenure. See id.

at 257-58. The Court thus concluded that the alleged

intentional discrimination “occurred—and the filing

limitations period[{] therefore commenced—at the time the

tenure decision was’ made and communicated to Ricks,”

more than 180 days before his charge. /d. at 258.

The Court acknowledged that one of the “effects of the

denial of tenure—the eventual loss of a teaching position—

did not occur until later.” /d. (emphasis in original). But, to

the Court, Ricks’ termination was simply the “delayed” but

“inevitable[] consequence of the denial of tenure.” /d. at

257-58. Indeed, the Court noted that, for the limitations

period to have run from the date that his contract expired,

“Ricks would have had to allege and prove that the manner

in which his employment was terminated differed

discriminatorily from the manner in which the College

terminated other professors who also had been denied

tenure.” /d. at 258. The Court reiterated that “[i]t is simply

insufficient for Ricks to allege that his termination gives

present effect to [a] past illegal act and therefore perpetuates

the consequences of forbidden discrimination.” /d. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

c. The Court again spoke to the issue in Lorance v.

AT&T Technologies, Inc. In that case, the Court

considered “when the limitations period begins to run in a

lawsuit arising out of a seniority system not alleged to be

discriminatory on its face or as presently applied” that was

17

allegedly adopted for a discriminatory purpose outside of the

limitations period. 490 U.S. at 903. The plaintiffs in

Lorance did not allege that, within the limitations period, the

facially neutral seniority system “treat[ed] similarly situated

employees differently or that it [was] operated in an

intentionally discriminatory manner.” /d. at 905. Rather, the

plaintiffs were alleging that the seniority system had been

adopted for the discriminatory purpose of favoring male over

female employees. See id. Because that alleged

discriminatory act occurred “well outside the period of

limitations,” the Court ruled that the plaintiffs’ claims were

“time barred under § 706(e).” Jd. at 906.

The Court explained that its “cases have rejected” the

“alternative approaches” put forth by the plaintiffs. /d. The

Court noted that it had twice before rejected the theory that

an employer is “guilty of a continuing violation which

‘occurred,’ for purposes of § 706(e), not only when the”

seniority system was discriminatorily adopted, “but also

when each of the concrete effects” of that adoption “was

felt.” /d. And the Court pointed to other decisions holding

that section 703(h) of Title VII bars disparate impact claims

based on the continuing adverse effects of a seniority system.

See id. at 908-09.

The Lorance Court also rested its conclusion on its

decision in Machinists Local Lodge No. 1424 v. NLRB, 362

U.S. 411, 413-14 (1960). Although Machinists arose under

the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), the Lorance

Court found that the NLRA “was the model for Title VII's

remedial provisions” and has a similar charge-filing period.

490 U.S. at 909-10. The Lorance Court further found that

Machinists had “considered and rejected an approach to the

limitations period identical to that advanced” by the

plaintiffs in Lorance. Id. at 910. Specifically, the

Machinists Court had held that where “‘a complaint based

upon [an] earlier event is time-barred.”’” to “* permit the event

itself ‘to cloak with illegality that which was otherwise

lawful’ ‘in effect results in reviving a legally defunct unfair

18

labor practice,” and in essence nullifies the limitations

period altogether. /d at 911 (quoting Machinists, 362 U.S.

at 417).. The Court in Lorance found this reasoning

“squarely in point”: “Because the claimed invalidity of the

facially nondiscriminatory and neutrally applied . . . seniority

system” in Lorance was “wholly dependent on the alleged

illegality” of its adoption, “the date of that [adoption]

governs the limitations period.” /d.

d. The Court most recently reaffirmed this

reasoning—and its construction of section 706(e)—in

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan. The plaintiff

in Morgan alleged that he had been subject to discrete

discriminatory and retaliatory acts by his employer and had

experienced a racially hostile work environment. See 536

U.S. at 104. While some of the alleged discriminatory acts

occurred within the charge-filing period, others took place

prior to that period. See id. at 106. In determining which, if

any, of these claims had been timely asserted, the Court

reiterated that “[t]he critical questions” are “[w)hat

constitutes an ‘unlawful employment practice’ and when has

that practice ‘occurred’?” /d. at 110.

As to discrete acts, “such as termination, failure to

promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire,” the Court

ruled that each discrete “incident of discrimination...

constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment

practice” that “starts a new clock for filing charges alleging

that act.” /d at 113, 114. The Court held that each such act

‘occurred’ on the day that it “happened,” and that a

plaintiff “must file a charge within either 180 or 300 days of

the date of the act or lose the ability to recover for it.” /d. at

110. The Court rejected Morgan’s argument that the term

“practice” in section 706(e) “converts related discrete acts,”

including those occurring outside the limitations period,

“into a single unlawful practice for the purposes of timely

filing.” /d at 111. Rather, discussing Evans and Ricks, the

Court reaffirmed that “discrete acts that fall within the

statutory time period do not make timely acts that fall

19

outside the time period.” /d. at 112. The Court held that,

while the existence of discriminatory acts outside the

limitations period “does not bar employees from filing

charges about related discrete acts” within the charge-filing

period, the plaintiff must allege present acts that “are

independently discriminatory” and must file a “timely”

charge “addressing those acts.” /d. at 113 (emphasis added).

The “emphasis” is on whether any “present” and

“independently” actionable “violation existed.” /d. at 112-13

(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

In contrast, the Court found that “[h]ostile environment

claims” must be treated differently. /d at 115. The Court

determined that, because the “very nature” of a hostile

environment claim “involves repeated conduct” and “the

cumulative effect of individual acts,” the “‘unlawful

employment practice” cannot “be said to occur on any

particular day.” Jd. Rather, the Court found that, “in direct

contrast to” a discrete discriminatory act, “a single act of

harassment may not be actionable on its own,” id., and that

“{a] hostile work environment claim is,” by its nature,

“composed of a series of separate acts that co!lectively

constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.”” /d. at 117

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). Accordingly, the Court

concluded that~-“the entire time period of the hostile

environment may be considered by a court,” “[p]rovided that

an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing

period.” /d.

On this analysis, the Court determined that, while

Morgan’s hostile environment claim was timely, his claims

concerning “discrete discriminatory acts” occurring prior to

the charge-filing period were not. /d. at 114-15, 120-21.

Reaffirming that “strict adherence to the procedural

requirements specified by the legislature is the best

guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law,” the

Court held that those claims were “no longer actionable.” /d.

at 108, 115 (internal quotation marks omitted).

20

B. Ledbetter’s Intentional Pay Discrimination Claim

Is Time-Barred Because She Challenges The

Present Effects of Salary Decisions Occurring

Outside Of The Charge-Filing Period.

These cases confirm that the court below correctly held

that Ledbetter’s intentional pay discrimination claim is time-

barred. Ledbetter was entitled to pursue her claim of

intentional pay discrimination concerning acts occurring

during the 180-day charge-filing period. But she was not

entitled to base that claim on acts occurring outside of the

period.

First, as Ledbetter necessarily concedes (Pet. Br. at 13,

18, 22, 32), her intentional pay discrimination claim

challenges “discrete” acts within the meaning of Morgan.

Morgan itself referred to pay discrimination claims as

concerning discrete acts. See 536 U.s. at 111-12. Moreover,

as the court below explained (Pet. App. 17a-18a), a plaintiff

alleging intentional pay discrimination “must point to some

specific, conscious conduct that was tainted” by unlawful

discrimination. Whether a plaintiff challenges a “decision|]

setting the plaintiff's salary” or “the issuance of a confirming

paycheck” as “the operative act of discrimination,” that act

is, “‘like termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer,

or refusal to hire,’ ... discrete in time, easy to identify,

and—if done with the requisite intent—independently

actionable.” Pet. App. 18a (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at

i 14). Indeed, because the “‘unlawful employment practice’

can be said to occur on a particular day,” and “a single

discriminatory act is actionable on its own,” intentional pay

discrimination claims lack “those characteristics that led the

Court to devise a separate rule governing the timing of

hostile work environment claims.” Pet. App. 18a (emphasis

added). Rather, each discrete act of alleged pay

discrimination “starts a new clock for filing charges,” and a

plaintiff must file a charge within 180 days of that act “or

lose the ability to recover for it.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110,

113.

21

Second, though she characterizes the paychecks received

during and after the 180-day period as the product of

intentional discrimination, Ledbetter has no cognizable claim

that any intentional discrimination occurred during the

charge-filing period. The Eleventh -Circuit held that

Ledbetter did not have legally sufficient evidence that the

single salary decision made during the charge-filing period

was motivated by gender (Pet. App. 31a), and Ledbetter did

not seek or obtain certiorari on that question. Moreover,

Ledbetter offered no evidence that the paychecks received

during that period were themselves issued’ with”

discriminatory intent; on the contrary, Goodyear’s payroll

system mechanically implements the salary determinations

made pursuant to the merit-based compensation system, and

the resulting paychecks are simply the “inevitable[]

consequence[s]” of earlier pay decisions. Ricks, 449 U.S. at

257-58.

Ledbetter is thus left to complain that, by taking her

existing salary as the starting point for determining the salary

to pay her during the charge-filing period, Goodyear

perpetuated the effects of earlier salary decisions. But

Ledbetter offered no evidence that, during the charge-filing

period, Goodyear knowingly relied on those decisions

“because of,” as opposed to “‘in spite of,” their allegedly -

discriminatory purpose. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney,

442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). On the contrary, the facts are

undisputed that Goodyear had no discriminatory purpose:

under the “Pay for Performance” program, taking existing

salary as the starting point for present salary decisions was a

facially neutral practice applied to all men and women alike.

J.A. 69-70, 87-88, 120-21; Tr. 256-57, 344, 351. There is no

evidence that Goodyear discriminatorily administered that

facially neutral practice. And Ledbetter has never advanced

a claim that this facially neutral practice, used by almost all

private- and public-sector employers, was maintained with a

discriminatory purpose or had an unlawful disparate impact

on women. Rather, Ledbetter simply claims that her salary

22

during the charge-filing period reflected the lingering effects

of allegedly discriminatory decisions made outside of the

charge-filing period by various supervisors. This is precisely

the kind of stale “perpetuation” claim that Evans, Ricks,

Lorance, and Morgan hold is too late to bring. See Morgan,

536 U.S. at 112-13; Lorance, 490 U.S. at 906-07; Ricks, 449

U.S. at 258: Evans, 431 U.S. at 558; see also Chardon-.

Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 7-8 (1981) (per curiam).

There is no basis for applying a different charge-filing

rule to discrete acts of intentional pay discrimination than to

other discrete acts like hiring, promotion, assignment, and

termination. The statutory text draws no distinction between

pay claims and those other kinds of claims, and Morgan

itself mentions pay claims in describing the limitations rule

applicable to discrete acts of alleged discrimination. See

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 112-13. Moreover, a pay decision is no

more or less discrete, and no more or less continuous, than

an act of termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, -

or the like. With respect to all, a decision is made and is

then implemented; with respect to all, the employer can

generally change the decision at any time or leave it as

initially made. The employer reaffirms a pay decision no

more or less than any of the other kinds of decisions by

allowing it to take effect in subsequent time periods; an

employer continues to carry out, for example, a failure to

promote or denial of transfer by continuing to employ an

individual in one capacity rather than another at a specified

rate of pay and benefits. In fact, these other decisions are

defined, in whole or in part, by the pay associated with them.

There is no principled or manageable basis for applying

different charge-filing rules to these various kinds of discrete

employment decisions (or, to the extent that a decision is in

part defined by a pay change, two charge-filing rules to the

same decision).

Finally, to allow Ledbetter to bring such an untimely

intentional discrimination claim would completely defeat

section 706(e)’s twin goals of protecting defendants and

23

courts from the hazards of stale claims and of encouraging

prompt conciliation instead of delayed litigation. Ledbetter’s

late-filed claim is contrary to both statutory purposes.

Here, there was little information available at trial in

2003 about the determinations made regarding Ledbetter’s

salary between 1979 and 1992 and about her comparative

performance during that time. Yet most of the shortfall of

which Ledbetter complains arose during that time. J.A. 166,

195. Moreover, Mike Maudsley, who Ledbetter claimed at

trial was responsible for the alleged discrimination against

her in the 1980°s, was deceased by the time of trial.

Allowing Ledbetter to base a present liability claim on such

long-past acts—particularly when the record demonstrates

that she knew by no later than 1982 how to avail herself of

the EEOC charge-filing process, and that she knew by no

later than 1992 of a disparity between her salary and those of

some male Area Managers—would authorize precisely the

sort of litigation over stale claims that section 706(e) seeks to

prevent.

Moreover, permitting such stale claims would impose

wholly unfair risks and burdens on employers. In order to

avoid and/or defend against such claims, employers would

annually have to investigate all prior salary decisions and

attempt to determine whether or not they were based solely

on non-discriminatory factors. In many circumstances,

documents relevant to such investigations would no “longer

exist, as record retention laws have limited timeframes and

limited scope, see, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (2006): see also

Pet. Br. at 28 n.14, and as the burdens of keeping records for

long periods can be substantial. Moreover, documents rarely

tell the entire story, and yet relevant witnesses will often

have moved on, retired, or died, or simply will no longer

remember critical facts. Further, as former Justice Marshall

once noted, “acts that may constitute Title VII violations are

generally effected through the actions of individuals,” not

through “company[-]wide discriminatory policies violative

of Title VII,” and those individuals “often” may “take . . .

24

step|s]} even in defiance of company policy” prohibiting

discrimination. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.

57, 75 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). In short, past

intentional discrimination frequently .s unknown to the

current management of an employe: like Goodyear, and

often will be difficult if not impossible to uncover.

In sum, it would be extraordinarily improper to permit

Ledbetter’s stale intentional pay discrimination claim to go

forward. That claim could have previously been brought in a

timely manner. It was not. It is based on allegations that a

deceased prior manager or other such individual managers

may have acted some years earlier in a discriminatory

manner in defiance of company policy. This Court has

consistently construed section 706(e) to bar private plaintiffs

from bringing such untimely claims.

Il. BAZEMORE v. FRIDAY DOES NOT AUTHORIZE

AN INTENTIONAL PAY DISCRIMINATION

CLAIM BY A PRIVATE PARTY CONCERNING

ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION OCCURRING

OUTSIDE OF THE CHARGE-FILING PERIOD.

In arguing that she may bring an intentional pay

discrimination claim based on the effects of decisions made

outside of Section 706(e)’s charge-filing period, Ledbetter

and her amici rely almost exclusively on snippets of

language from this Court’s decision in Bazemore. But

Bazemore involved a claim by the United States that could

not previously have been brought; that was not subject to

section 706(e); and that concerned intentional discrimination

in pay that allegedly was continuing. Section 706(e) was not

in issue; and there was no claim, much less a holding, that a

present intentional pay discrimination claim by a private

party could rest entirely on actions taken outside of the

charge-filing period. Bazemore simply is not proper

authority- for the kind of untimely intentional pay

discrimination claim that Ledbetter seeks to pursue.

25 '

A. Bazemore Involved Allegations By The United

States Of Present Intentional Discrimination; And

This Court Merely Rejected The Employer’s

Defense That The Claim Was Barred Because The

Alleged Discrimination Began Before Title VII's

Effective Date.

At issue in Bazemore were the pay practices of the North

Carolina Agricultural Extension Service after 1972, when

Title VII first became applicable to public employers. The

case came to the Court on a reccrd showing that, until

August 1, 1965, when Title VII became effective for private

employers, the Extension Service had been “divided into two

branches: a white branch and a ‘Negro branch.’” Bazemore,

478 U.S. at 390. “The white branch employed no

blacks....” /d “The ‘Negro branch’ was composed

entirely of black personnel and served only black farmers,

homemakers, and youth.” /d The Extension Service openly

paid blacks less than whites who performed the same work

in these two branches. See id. While the Extension Service

“merged the two branches . . . into a single organization” on

August |, 1965, it did not, going forward, change its practice

of paying blacks at a lower rate than whites. /d at 390-91.

Rather, after 1965, the Extension Service made annual salary

adjustments “on a nondiscriminatory basis,” but maintained

the institutionally segregated base salaries created by the

facially discriminatory, pre-1965 salary practices. Bazemore

v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662, 666 (4th Cir. 1984).

The United States alleged that, in compensating black

employees after 1972, the Extension Service was, for

discriminatory purposes, knowingly and _ intentionally

continuing the institutionally segregated salaries that

previously had been established. See id. at 671. The district

court found that the weight of the evidence did not support

the United States’ claim. See id at 665-66, 671-72. A

Fourth Circuit panel affirmed, holding that the United States’

claim was barred because the alleged salary discrimination

had begun prior to the statute’s effective date, and further

26

holding that the United States’ evidence—and, in particular,

its regression analysis—was legally insufticient to establish

intentional pay discrimination after 1972. See id. at 670-74.

Judge Phillips wrote a vigorous dissent on both counts. See

id. at 689-96 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (describing evidence of

intentional discrimination after 1972, including “weighty”

testimonial “evidence of knowing, intentional continuation

of acknowledged discriminatory [salary] policies”).

In this Court, the United States again argued that,

although the Extension Service first decided “to pay black

employees less than whites for the same work... before

Title VI! became applicable to public employers,” the

Extension Service’s “compensation scheme remained

intentionally discriminatory” after 1972. Br. for the Federal

Petitioners, Bazemore v. Friday, 1985 WL 669751, at *20

n.18 (emphasis added). The United States argued that the

post-1972 salary practices violated Title VII not because

there was a mere continuation of the pre-1972 “disparity in

salaries,” id, but because the Extension Service “ha[d]

purposely continued [its] discriminatory system subsequent

to the enactment of Title VII.” Reply Br. for the Federal

Petitioners, Bazemore v. Friday, 1986 WL 728399, at *4-*5

(emphasis added). Indeed, the United States argued that,

“(rjather than simply failing to remedy the effect of a

discrete pre-Act discriminatory action, the [Service]

continu[ed| its intentional discrimination on the basis of

race.” /d at *5. The amicus briefs filed in Bazemore

reflected this same understanding of the facts and allegations

in the case. See, e.g., Br. of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae

Supporting Petitioners, Bazemore v. Friday, 1986 WL

728218, at *10 (arguing that the United States had “shown

that the employer . . . maintained [a] race-skewed differential

with discriminatory intent”) (emphasis added).

This Court reversed. both with regard to, whether the

origin of the salary disparities could serve as a defense to the

United States’ claim, and with regard to the evaluation of the

United States’ evidence of intentional discrimination in pay

27

after 1972. See Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 386-87. As the

United States did in its briefs, Justice Brennan’s concurring

opinion (joined by all members of the Court) stressed that

the “‘critical question’” is “*whether any present violation

exists."” /d. at 396 n.6 (quoting Evans, 431 U.S. at 558)

(emphasis in Bazemore). Justice Brennan distinguished

Evans and Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433

U.S. 299 (1977), on the ground that, in those cases, “the

employer was not engaged in discriminatory practices at the

time [of] suit.” 478 U.S. at 396 n.6. Justice Brennan stated

that, in Bazemore, in contrast, the United States had alleged

that the employer did “not from the date of the Act forward

‘ma[ke] all [of its] employment decisions in a wholly

nondiscriminatory way.’” /d. (quoting Hazelwood, 433 U.S.

at 309) (emphasis in original). And, finally, Justice Brennan

explained the errors that the court of appeals had committed

in evaluating whether the post-1972 salary decisions were

made because of, rather than in spite of, race. See id. at 397-

404.

In short, contrary to Ledbetter and her amici, the Court in

Bazemore had no occasion to hold that section 706(e) allows

a private plaintiff to bring an intentional pay discrimination

claim concerning present pay disparities that are merely the

result of pay decisions made outside of the charge-filing

period. The United States is not subject to section 706(e) or

any other statute of limitations under Title VII, see

Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361 (1977),

and section 706(e) thus was not even at issue in Bazemore.

Moreover, Bazemore did not involve a claim that previously

could have been but, as here, was not timely brought.

Indeed, there is an obvious difference between pre-Act

discrimination and discrimination against an employee

which occurs outside the charge-filing period. In the former

Situation, a finding that deliberate perpetuation of pre-Act

discrimination is permissible would “have the effect of

exempting from liability those employers “who were

historically the greatest offenders of the rights of blacks.”

°8

Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395. In contrast, discrimination prior

to the charge-filing period is in no way exempt from Title

VII’s reach because employees (and/or the Government) can

timely avail themselves of the statute’s protections.

In any event, in contrast to Ledbetter’s claim here, the

United States did not claim in Bazemore that unlawful pay

discrimination could be established wholly by reference to

allegedly discriminatory acts occurring outside of an

applicable limitations period—much less acts that could have

been, but were not, made the subject of a timely charge.

Rather, the United States asserted in Bazemore that the

challenged pay practices reflected ongoing intentional

discrimination by the Extension Service itself. That claim of

ongoing intentional pay discrimination by the Extension

Service post-1972 was the claim that the Court held could be

pursued (and was not barred simply because the alleged

discriminatory policy and practice had been initiated before

Title VII's effective date). Indeed, that was the claim with

respect to which the Court further held that the Fourth

Circuit had erred in evaluating the proof of the Extension

Service’s continuing discriminatory intent—proof that would

have been irrelevant if the post-1972 salary disparities were

themselves sufficient to establish a present claim. The claim

of present, continuing, intentional discrimination was key to

Bazemore. See id. (“A [pre-Act discriminatory] pattern or

practice ... became a violation upon Title VII's effective

date, and fo the extent an employer continued to engage in

that act or practice, it is liable under that statute.”) (emphasis

added). But Ledbetter has no such claim here.

This Court’s decision in Lorance confirms _ this

understanding of Bazemore. In Lorance, the Court held that

a claim of intentional discrimination in the adoption of a

seniority system was untimely when not filed within 180

days of the adoption of that system, even though the

resulting facially neutral seniority system was applied within

the charge-filing period. The Lorance Court distinguished

Bazemore on the ground that Bazemore did not involve a

29

claim merely concerning the present effects of past

intentional discrimination. See Lorance, 490 U.S. at 913 n.5.

Rather, consistent with the briefing and opinion in

Bazemore, the Lorance Court described Bazemore as a case

involving allegations of intentional discrimination that

occurred after the effective date of Title VIl—specifically,

what the Court in Lorance described as_ intentional

discrimination arising from the application of a “facially

discriminatory” pay policy that “discriminates each time it is

applied.” Jd. But, as the Question Presented here makes

clear, the claim in this case does not concern allegations of

facial discrimination, or any other kind of intentional

discrimination, within the limitations period. Thus, as

understood by this Court in Lorance, Bazemore cannot

properly be said to authorize Ledbetter’s claim.

In short, Bazemore held only that an employer could not

defend the continuation of racially segregated salaries for

discriminatory purposes by pointing out that the

discrimination began pre-Act. Bazemore does not support

Ledbetter’s - sweeping assertion that nondiscriminatory

implementation of a facially neutral system can somehow

constitute unlawful discrimination simply because there were

discriminatory departures from that neutral policy by

individual supervisors in the past. Any such rule would run

headlong into both Lorance’s interpretation of Bazemore and

the settled principle that acts within the charge-filing period

are not actionable simply because they perpetuate the effects

of prior discriminatory acts.

B. Ledbetter Misconstrues Snippets Of Language In

Justice Brennan’s Bazemore Concurrence.

In arguing to the contrary, Ledbetter and her amici seize

upon snippets of language in Justice Brennan’s concurring

opinion in Bazemore. They claim that this language supports

two broader, alternative understandings of Bazemore. But

the language that they seize upon cannot sustain the legal

rule that they seek to create.

30

1. Ledbetter initially argues (Pet. Br. 3, 20-22) that her

claim is timely presented because, under Justice Brennan’s

opinion in Bazemore, each “week’s paycheck that delivers

less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong

actionable under Title VII....’” Bazemore, 478 U.S. at

395. But that language has no proper application to

Ledbetter’s claim here.

As explained above, unlike this case, Bazemore involved

allegations of present intentional discrimination—to wit, the

alleged maintenance of institutionally segregated pay rates

for a discriminatory purpose. Moreover, in Bazemore, the

employer sought to defend against those allegations by

asserting that the discriminatory pay structure had been

created before the effective date of the statute. It was in this

context that Justice Brennan stated that “[e]ach week’s

paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly

situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII,

regardless of the fact that this pattern was begun prior to the

effective date of Title VII.” 478 U.S. at 395-96.

Contrary to Ledbetter and her amici, the “|eJach week’s

paycheck” language cannot properly be understood apart

from the context in which it was written. The emphasis in

the sentence itself is on an illegal “pattern” of intentional pay

discrimination begun before, and allegedly continued after,

the statute’s effective date. /d. at 395. The opinion goes on

to reiterate that, under Evans and Hazelwood, the **critical

question” is “*whether any present violation exists.’” /d. at

396 n.6 (quoting Evans, 431 U.S. at 558) (emphasis in

Bazemore). Thus, in Bazemore, the alleged maintenance of

institutionally segregated pay rates for a discriminatory

purpose afier 1972 constituted the requisite “present

violation” and, if proved, would render each paycheck issued

an intentionally discriminatory, independently actionable act

that violated Title VII (and that was not subject to a statute

of limitations when challenged by the United States). But

Justice Brennan did not suggest that, absent sufficient

evidence of present intentional discrimination, paychecks

31

delivering different amounts to black and white employees

would by themselves constitute a violation of Title VII; on

the contrary, the next part of Justice Brennan’s opinion

proceeds from the premise that legally sufficient evidence of

present intentional discrimination was required. See id. at

397-404. Thus, in distinguishing the sare “[e]ach week’s

paycheck” language, the Lorance Court stressed that the

limitations inquiry “focuses on the timing of the

discriminatory acts....” Lorance, 490 U.S. at 913 nS

(emphasis in original).

Here, there is no comparable argument that Goodyear

maintained institutionally segregated pay rates for a

discriminatory purpose within the charge-filing period. The

Eleventh Circuit found no evidence of intentional

discrimination in pay during the charge-filing period, in

either the salary rate decision or the issuance of paychecks.

Pet. App. 3la. Moreover, while Ledbetter complains that her

salary within the charge-filing period reflects the effects of

past, allegedly discriminatory decisions by individual

managers, Ledbetter has never adduced evidence that, during

the charge-filing period, Goodyear perpetuated the base rate

of her salary with the purpose of discriminating against her.

See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (question is whether defendant

made the challenged decision “at least in part ‘because of,’

not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon” women).

On the contrary, the use of existing salary as the base pay

rate is part of Goodyear’s facially neutral “Pay for

Performance” program, which is applied to all men and

women alike. J.A. 69-70, 87-88, 120-21; Tr. 256-57, 344,

351. In short, as the Question Presented presumes, there is

no present intentional discrimination at issue here, and the

lack of any present intentional discrimination renders the

“{eJach week’s paycheck” language wholly inapplicable.

2. Ledbetter alternatively argues that Bazemore

recognized an “‘obligation’” on the part of employers to

““eradicate salary disparities based on race’ or sex even if

the disparity arose outside the limitations period. Pet. Br. at

32

42 (quoting Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 397). Once again,

Ledbetter is improperly stripping the language of Justice

Brennan’s opinion from the context in which it was used.

As explained above, in Bazemore, the Extension Service

employed a facially discriminatory compensation system

before 1965, segregating blacks and whites into two separate

branches and paying blacks less than whites who performed

the same work. See Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 390. Although

the Extension Service combined the two branches in 1965, it

continued thereafter, allegedly for discriminatory purposes,

to pay blacks and whites completely different salaries for the

same work, and even continued doing so after Title VII

became effective for public employers in 1972. It was in this

context—of a prior facially discriminatory pay policy

creating institutionally segregated salaries that were

allegedly continued for discriminatory purposes—that

Justice Brennan made the statement that “the Extension

Service was under an obligation to eradicate salary

disparities based on race that began prior to the effective date

of Title VII... .” Jd. at 397.

Contrary to Ledbetter and her amici, the “obligation to

eradicate salary disparities based on race” language cannot

properly be applied without regard to whether the case

involves institutionally segregated salaries that arose from a

facially discriminatory pay structure and that were allegedly

continued for intentionally discriminatory purposes. In the

same breath in Bazemore, Justice Brennan reiterated that the

United Stafés Was “alleging that in continuing to pay blacks

less than similarly situated whites, respondents have not

from the date of the Act forward ‘made all [their]

employment decisions in a wholly nondiscriminatory way.””

id. at 396 n.6 (quoting Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 309)

(emphasis and~bracketsin Bazemore). Justice Brennan

further reiterated that the Court’s decision “in no sense gives

legal effect to the pre-1972 actions, but, consistent with

Evans and Hazelwood, focuses on the present salary

structure, which is illegal if it is a mere continuation of the

, 33

pre-1965 discriminatory pay structure.” Id. (emphasis

added). And Justice Brennan went on to evaluate the

evidence of the alleged continuing discriminatory purpose—

an evaluation that, again, was unnecessary if there was an

unqualified obligation to eliminate any disparities

attributable to past discrimination. See id. at 397-404. In

other words, Justice Brennan tied the “obligation to eradicate

salary disparities based on race” language to institutionally

Segregated salaries (arising from a_ prior facially

discriminatory pay structure) that allegedly were

purposefully continued, because of race, into the present,

actionable time period. Justice Brennan did not purport to be

establishing an untethered obligation to identify and correct

all present effects of past intentional discrimination by any

supervisor, whether known or unknown to the employer,

whether continued with discriminatory purpose or not, and

whether subject to section 706(e) or not.

Here, of course; Goodyear’s compensation system was

facially neutral. Pet. Br. at 5, 48. Ledbetter received the

same starting salary as male supervisors. J.A. 39, 151-52.

She was subject to the same salary adjustment rules as were

male employees—including the rule that each year’s salary

decision took existing salary as a given and only provided an

adjustment up to a maximum percentage increase. J.A. 69-

70, 87-88, 120-21; Tr. 256-57, 344, 351. Further, Ledbetter

received larger percentage salary adjustments in some years

than did male supervisors (Pet. App. Sa-6a; J.A. 174, 193);

and she admitted that at least one of her managers, Mike

Nunn, did not discriminate against her in her pay between

1990 and 1992 (Tr. 132-33). Thus, unlike in Bazemore,

where it was undisputed that the Extension Service facially

discriminated against all blacks in compensation until 1965,

and it was alleged that the Extension Service continued these

segregated compensation rates thereafter for intentionally

discriminatory purposes, here ‘here were no alleged “male”

and “female” pay rates for Goodyear to dismantle and

eradicate. Rather, here, Ledbetter is merely complaining that

34

individual managers sometimes adjusted her salary on a

discriminatory basis years before she filed her EEOC charge.

Justice Brennan’s “obligation to eradicate” language was

aimed at the Extension Service’s facially discriminatory pay

structure and the purposeful continuing use of the

institutionally segregated pay rates that arose from it; that

language was not aimed at the kinds of isolated and discrete

decisions by “multiple lower-level managers at different

points in time over a 19-year period that Ledbetter is

challenging, and Justice Brennan’s language cannot fairly be

read to contemplate the sweeping and burdensome duty on

employers that Ledbetter would impose.

Indeed, Ledbetter’s argument that Bazemore recognized a

continuing affirmative duty to eradicate the effects of all past

intentional pay discrimination—whether known or unknown

to the employer, whether continued for discriminatory

reasons or not, whether untimely under section 706(e) or

not—cannot be reconciled with the language and structure of

Title VII. Such a duty is contrary to section 706(e) and this

Court’s holding that it forecloses claims based on mcre

“perpetuatifon]” of effects. Evans, 431 U.S. at 557. Such a

duty would also wrongly transform section 703(a)(1)’s

prohibition on discrimination into a_ requirement of

affirmative conduct by employers, akin to the leave

requirements of the Family and Medical Leave Act, the

reasonable accommodation requirements of the Americans

with Disabilities Act, and other provisions of so-called

“minimum employment standards” statutes. Such a duty

would contravene section 703(j) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(j), which provides that nothing contained in Title

VII “shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant

preferential treatment to any... group...on account of” a

de facto imbalance in the employer’s work force. And such -

a duty would conflict with the Bennett Amendment set forth

in section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), which

makes the Equal Pay Act, not Title VII, the governing law

for claims about gender-related pay practices that are not

35

presently intentionally discriminatory. See Gunther, 452

U.S. at 170-71.

3. In sum, the language that Ledbetter and her amici

seize upon in Justice Brennan’s opinion in Bazemore need

not and should not be read as they suggest. While the

language has potentially broad implications when read in

isolation, the language is of much more limited significance

when read in the context of the facts, allegations, and

opinion to which it is tied. Moreover, the language—as

construed by Ledbetter and her amici—plainly goes beyond

the limited holding of Bazemore (concerning whether the

Extension Service could defend against the United States’

claim by showing that the challenged disparity had its origins

in pre-Act discrimination); and this Court has repeatedly said

that “[i]t is to the holdings of our cases, rather than their

dicta, that we must attend.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379 (1994). Indeed, the Court has

warned against “dissect{ing]” the language of its prior

opinions “as though they were the United States Code.” Sv.

Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993). That

warning is particularly apt here, since the broader

understandings of Justice Brennan’s language that Ledbetter

and her amici urge directly conflict with the Court’s

decisions in Evans, Ricks, Lorance, and Morgan—all of

which reject the notion that Title VII allows private plaintiffs

to base intentional discrimination claims on discrete acts

occurring outside of the charge-filing period. The Court

should decline Ledbetter’s invitation to create such a conflict

between its cases.

Ill. LEDBETTER’S REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARE

ALSO IN ERROR.

In addition to her erroneous construction of Bazemore,

Ledbetter offers four other arguments for construing Title

VII to allow her untimely claim. Each argument is flawed.

36

A. Ledbetter’s Empirical And Policy Arguments

Wrongly Ask The Court To Rewrite Section

706(e).

Ledbetter and her amici suggest that various empirical and

policy considerations should cause the Court to construe

section 706(c) to allow intentional pay discrimination claims

challenging effects of past decisions. They assert that

women are generally offered lower starting salaries than

men; that employees, fearing retaliation, may be |

“understandabl[{y]” “reluctan[t] -to rock the boat” by

promptly challenging pay decisions; and that employees may

lack the incentives or information to challenge intentional

pay discrimination until the “harm” from discrete salary

decisions has “accumulat[ed].” See Pet. Br. at 22-29; Br. of

Nat’! P’ship for Women & Families as Amicus Curiae In

Support of Petitioner at 3. On the basis of these assertions,

they further argue that alleged victims of discrimination

should not be denied a remedy and that the equitable

doctrine of laches and the two-year limit on backpay

imposed by section 706(g)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1),

“adequately protect|] employers’ interest in avoiding stale

claims.” Pet. Br. at 28. But these arguments provide no

legal basis for rewriting the statutory text that this Court has

already authoritatively construed to the contrary.

First, the record of this case provides little support for the

sweeping assertions that Ledbetter and her amici advance.

Ledbetter started at the same salary as other male

supervisors. J.A. 39, 151-52. In a number of years, she

received larger percentage raises than her male co-workers.

Pet. App. Sa-6a; J.A. 174, 193. While her absolute salary did

not grow over time to the same extent as those of some male

co-workers, she was on layoff early in her career when most

of them were not, and she received lower performance

evaluations in many years. Pet. App. Sa-7a, 9a; J.A. 174-77,

189-92. Moreover, while Ledbetter offered anecdotal

testimony that Goodyear hired few other women supervisors

at this plant and paid them less than it paid men, she did not

37

substantiate this speculation with supporting documents.

Nor did she offer any of the qualified labor market data or

appropriately controlled statistical studies that this Court has

held are necessary to draw a legitimate inference of

discrimination (particularly an inference of systemic

discrimination). See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v.

Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-58 (1989); Hazelwood, 433 U.S.

at 307-13. Furthermore, early in her career, Ledbetter filed a

charge of discrimination with the EEOC, J.A. 103-09—

showing that at least some employees are willing promptly to

assert their rights and that, when they do so, nonretaliatory

responses and amicable resolutions are possible. In addition,

although she waited until 1998 to file a charge alleging

intentional pay discrimination, Ledbetter was aware, by no

later than 1992, of a disparity between her salary and the

salaries of some male supervisors, and, by 1995, had learned

that this disparity was “a thousand [dollars] at least more per

month....” J.A. 231-32; see also J.A. 233, 236-37, 239-40.

Indeed, Ledbetter testified that “[d]ifferent people that [she]

worked for along the way had a/ways told [her] that [her]

pay was extremely low.” J.A. 233 (emphasis added). Thus,

by her own admissions, Ledbetter had notice of a substantial

wage disparity—providing plenty of financial incentive for a

claim—-years before she first brought her intentional pay

discrimination charge. Whatever the case may be more

generally with respect to the “legislative facts” asserted, the

record of this proceeding—i.e., the conventional basis for

drawing judicial inferences—paints a very different picture

than has been suggested.

Second, the law already contains numerous provisions that

address the concerns that Ledbetter and her amici raise. In

addition to the substantive requirements of the Equal Pay Act

and the prohibition on discrimination in compensation in

section 703(a)(1) of Title VIL, section 706(k) of Title VII, 42

U.S.C. § 2000c-5(k), allows a prevailing Title VII plaintiff to

recover reasonable attorneys’ fees. That provision was

intended to “make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means”

38

to obtain legal representation and “to bring a meritorious

[discrimination] suit” even if the potential recovery is small.

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 420

(1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, Title

VII allows compensatory and punitive damages awards both

as a further incentive for plaintiffs to bring meritorious cases

and as a deterrent to employers from violating the law. See

42 U.S.C. §198la. Moreover, Title VII's anti-retaliation

provision provides an employee with “broad protection”

from retaliation “because that individual ‘opposed any

practice’ made unlawful by Title VII or ‘made a charge, -

testified, assisted, or participated in’ a Title VII proceeding

or investigation.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.

White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2408, 2413 (2006) (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). And the “time period for filing a

charge [under section 706(e)] is subject to equitable

doctrines such as tolling or- estoppel” if appropriate

circumstances, such as a defendant’s concealment of the

basis for a plaintiffs cause of action, are established.

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113; see also Zipes v. Trans World

Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).

Third, at bottom, Ledbetter is asking this Court to rewrite

the statute so that it will favor a plaintiff's right to challenge

past acts of alleged discrimination over the interests served

by section 706(e). But this Court has repeatedly rejected the

argument that “strict adherence” to the requirements of

section 706(e) is “‘unfair’ or that ‘a less literal reading’” of

section 706(e) would better effectuate the purposes of Title

VII. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 108-09 (quoting Mohasco, 447

U.S. at 824-25).

It is true, of course, that strict adherence to section 706(e)

will bar some claims that otherwise might be meritorious.

But section 706(e) reflects Congress’s judgment “concerning

the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid

claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the

prosecution of stale ones.” Ricks, 449 U.S. at 259-60

(internal quotation marks omitted). Particularly where

39

“Congress carefully prescribed a series of deadlines,”

reflecting a “compromise” essential to the enactment of Title

VII as a whole, this Court “must respect” the choice

“embodied in [Congress’s] words,” and may not

“simply ... alter the balance struck by Congress... by

favoring one side or the other in matters of statutory

construction.” Mohasco, 447 U.S. at 825-26.

Furthermore, contrary to the impression that Ledbetter and

her amici seek to create, honoring the balance struck by

section 706(e) does not leave victims of intentional pay

discrimination claims without a remedy. They can bring

timely Title VI! claims. Moreover, the EEOC and the

United States can seek relief on their behalf, and are not

subject to section 706(e). Perhaps even more importantly,

women such as Ledbetter may bring claims under the Equal

Pay Act, which is subject to a longer limitations period, see

29 U.S.C. § 255, and which focuses on the question of equal

pay for “equal work,” id. § 206(d)(1), rather than on stale

questions of intent in past decisions in years gone by.

Finally, the defense of laches and the two-year limit on

backpay in section 706(g)(1) do not adequately protect

employers’ interest in avoiding stale claims. “|A]n employer

may raise a laches defense” “[i]n addition to other

[available] equitable defenses” and the protection against

stale claims afforded by a statute of limitations. Morgan,

536 U.S. at 121 (emphasis added). But “laches is not a

substitute for a statute of limitations,” 27A Am. Jur. 2d

’ Equity § 148 (2d ed. 2006) (emphasis added), particularly

not for the “carefully prescribed” one measured precisely “by

numbers of days” established in section 706(e). Mohasco,

447 U.S. at 825. Likewise, while the two-year backpay rule

provides some protection for employers in Title VII cases,

there are no comparable backpay limit rules in other

employment statutes that contain limitation periods like that

in section 706(e). Further, the two-year backpay limit is no

justification for allowing a liability award—that may include

compensatory and punitive damages—on a claim that section

40

706(e) defines as stale. As this Court has recognized, section

706(g) is not an appropriate basis for relaxing the charge-

filing requirement or expanding the scope of liability under

Title VII. See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.

Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 578-82 (1984); Evans, 431 U.S. at 558-

59.

B. Ledbetter’s Argument For Acquiescence In

- Allegedly Consistent Positions Of Most Courts Of

Appeals And The EEOC Is Meritless.

Ledbetter next suggests (Pet. Br. at 29-33) that this Court

should acquiesce in the positions of most courts of appeals

and the EEOC, which she claims have consistently allowed

plaintiffs to raise intentional pay discrimination claims based

on alleged acts of discrimination taking place outside of the

charge-filing period. This suggestion is meritless.

1. The courts of appeals simply have not consistently

adopted the position that Ledbetter advocates. Rather, as she

argued in her petition, “(t]he [c]ourts of [a]ppeals [a]re

[iJntractably [d]Jivided [o]ver the [q]Juestion [p]resented” in

this case, and “the proper treatment of disparate pay claims

under Morgan and Bazemore has generated considerable

conflict and confusion in [the] circuits... .” Pet. at 9, 13.

First, some courts—like the court below—have held that

an intentional pay discrimination claim is untimely if it

merely challenges the present effects of acts taken outside of

the charge-filing period. As Ledbetter admitted in her

petition (Pet. at 13-14), Dasgupta v. University of Wisconsin

Board of Regents, 121 F.3d 1138 (7th Cir. 1997), also held

that a plaintiff's pay claim was untimely because “[t}here

were no new violations during the limitations period, but

merely a refusal to rectify the consequences of time-barred

violations.” /d at 1140. “{A]n untimely Title VII suit,” the

court explained, “cannot be revived by pointing to effects

within the limitations period of unlawful acts that occurred

earlier.” Id.

41

Second, while some courts have adopted Ledbetter’s

position, these courts have disagreed regarding how far back

a plaintiff may reach in seeking damages. Some have held

that backpay is limited to the disparity in salary during the

limitations period. See, e.g., Forsyth v. Fed'n Employment

& Guidance Serv., 409 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2005). Others

have held that plaintiffs can recover up to two years of

backpay. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Gen. Motors Corp., 275 F.3d

1005, 1011 (10th Cir. 2002). And still others have allowed

recovery to the date of the earliest discrimination. See, e.g.,

Gibbs v. Pierce County Law Enforcement Support Agency,

785 F.2d 1396, 1398, 1400 (9th Cir. 1986).

Third, most of the courts adopting the position urged by

Ledbetter have reasoned that intentional pay discrimination

constitutes a “continuing violation,” so that as long as the

plaintiff receives one disparate paycheck during the

limitations period, a charge with respect to related

discriminatory acts outside the period is timely. See, e.g.,

Goodwin, 275 F.3d at 1009; Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d

251, 258 (3d Cir. 2001); Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned

Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 167-68 (8th Cir. 1995); Brinkley-Obu

v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 347 (4th Cir. 1994);

Bartelt v. Berlitz Sch. of Languages of Am., Inc., 698 F.2d

1003, 1004 (9th Cir. 1983); Hall v. Ledex, Inc., 669 F.2d

397, 398 (6th Cir. 1982). As the court below correctly noted,

however, Morgan rejected the “continuing violation” theory

on which these cases are based.

In sum, there is simply no consistent position of the courts

of appeals in which this Court can acquiesce.

2. Nor should this Court acquiesce in the EEOC’s

present view that an intentional pay discrimination claim is

timely as long as the plaintiff received a single disparate

paycheck within the limitations period. Ledbetter herself

does not argue, nor could she, that the EEOC’s view is

entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See

42

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110 n.6 (“[W]e have held that the

EEOC’s interpretive guidelines do not receive Chevron

deference.”). Nor is the EEOC’s interpretation “entitled to

respect” under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140

(1944).

The present version of the EEOC Compliance Manual,

citing Bazemore, provides that “[r]epeated occurrences of the

same discriminatory employment acffon, such as

discriminatory paychecks, can be challenged as long as one

discriminatory act occurred within the charge filing period.”

EEOC Compliance Manual § 2-IV.C. But, as noted above,

Bazemore involved allegations of present intentional

discrimination, and does not establish the timeliness of a

claim based only on the effects of past discrimination.

Moreover, prior to 2001, the EEOC had justified its

position on a different ground—by reference to “continuing

violations” doctrine. Thus, the 2000 version of the EEOC

Compliance Manual discussed the timeliness of intentional

pay discrimination claims under the section entitled

“Continuing Violations,” and provided that, if “a charge

raises a continuing violation, all of the events forming part of

the continuing violation, including those that transpired

outside the filing period, are considered timely, and relief

may be obtained for all of the discriminatory events.” EEOC

Compliance Manual § 2-IV.C.2, at 5741 (July 27, 2000); see

also id. at 5743. Similarly, prior to 2001, the EEOC

reasoned in bricfs and administrative decisions that such

intentional pay discrimination claims were timely on a

“continuing violation” theory. See, e.g., Br. of the EEOC as

Amicus Curiae, Cardenas v. Massey (3d Cir. 2001), 2000

WL 33988483, at *13 n.10; Wintner v. Cisneros, No.

APL 01962705, 1996 WL 713995, at *1 (E.E.0.C. Dec. 5,

1996). The EEOC abandoned this view, and adopted its

present view, only in the wake of Morgan’s rejection of the

“continuing violation” theory.

43

In short, the EEOC’s present view rests on a

misconstruction of Bazemore, and its prior view was rejected

in Morgan. Considering the lack of “thoroughness,”

“validity,” or “consistency” in the EEOC’s pronouncements,

its views are not entitled to any respect at all. Gen. Elec. Co.

v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (internal quotation

marks ontitied).

3. In all events, this Court has stressed that “no

deference is due to. . . interpretations at odds with the plain

language of [a] statute itself.” Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v.

Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989); see also Mohasco, 447 U.S.

at 825. For that reason, this Court has not hesitated to reach

conclusions that are contrary to the unanimous positions of

the courts of appeals and the EEOC. See, e.g., Betts, 492

U.S. at 175 (rejecting the position of the EEOC and all five

courts of appeals that considered the question presented);

Int’! Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 346

n.28 (1977) (rejecting a position that “enjoyed wholesale

adoption in the Courts of Appeals” and by the EEOC);

Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145-46 (rejecting the position of the

EEOC and all six courts of appeals that addressed the

question presented). The language of section 706(e) and this

Court’s cases interpreting it make clear that the Court should

do so here as well.

C. Ledbetter’s Inapt Analogies Concern Claims

About Present Violations of Law.

Ledbetter also contends (Pet. Br. at 34-38, 42-46) that

numerous “analogous contexts” demonstrate that her

challenge to the present effects of alleged unlawful

discrimination outside the charge-filing period should be

considered timely. But the only relevant analogy that

Ledbetter identifies—cases under the NLRA—in fact

confirms that her claim is time-barred. Her remaining

analogies are inapposite.

1. As Ledbetter correctly argues, the NLRA “served

{as} a model for many of Title VII’s enforcement

44

provisions.” Pet. Br. at 36 (citing Lorance, 490 U.S. at 909).

But, as Lorance held, this Court’s principal NLRA

limitations case, Machinists, confirms that the limitations

period on an intentional discrimination claim begins to run

with the adoption of a discriminatory policy, and not with

each application of that policy. See Lorance, 490 U.S. at

911. Where a complaint based on events outside the

limitations period is time-barred, permitting those events “tc

cloak with illegality” conduct within the limitations period

that is “otherwise lawful” and did not independently violate

the law “in effect results in reviving a legally defunct” claim,

contrary to the limitations period set by Congress.

Machinists, 362 U.S. at 417.

Moreover, News Printing Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 210 (1956),

which is cited in Machinists, 362 U.S. at 421 n.13, confirms

that no different analysis applies in the context of a pay

claim. In News Printing Co., the complaint alleged that the

employer had violated the NLRA by refusing to grant wage

increases to employees because they had supported a union.

~ 116 N.L.R.B. at 210. However, the only evidence presented

“involved conduct occurring more than 6 months before the

filing of the [relevant] charge[]....” /d. at 211. The NLRB

explained that, “[w]hile evidence... concerning conduct

which occurred prior to the statutory 6-month period may be

utilized as background evidence to evaluate a Respondent's

subsequent conduct, it is well established that Section 10(b)

of the Act precludes... giving independent and controlling

weight to such evidence.” /d. at 212 (footnote omitted).

The NLRA cases upon which Ledbetter relies are not to

the contrary. Each case involved an independent violation of

the NLRA within the limitations period. See Gen. Motors

Acceptance Corp. v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 850, 853 (Ist Cir.

1973) (finding a present violation of the NLRA based not on

the employer’s decision outside the limitations period to stop

giving merit increases to its employees, but “upon a number

of acts committed within the limitations — period

which... indicate that [the employer] was attempting to

45

discredit the union”) (emphasis added); Me/ville Confections,

Inc. v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 1964) (explaining

that maintenance of a facially discriminatory profit-sharing

plan that excluded unionized employees from participation

“carried with it its own inherent evidence of intent” to

“discourage[] union membership” and constituted a complete

violation of the NLRA without reference to conduct outside

the limitations period) (internal quotation marks omitted);

NLRB vy. F.H. McGraw & Co., 206 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir.

1953) (noting, before Machinists was decided, that the

enforcement of a closed shop agreement, which on its face

violates the NLRA, constitutes independently actionable

conduct without reference to the circumstances of the

adoption of the agreement outside the limitations period);

Farmingdale Iron Works, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 98, 99 (1980)

(concluding that each failure to make contractually required

benefit fund payments within the limitations period

constituted an independent, “separate and distinct” violation

of the NLRA without the need to examine conduct outside

the limitations period).

2. Ledbetter’s other analogies are also flawed: In each

instance, the alleged unlawful act—as defined in each

pertinent area of law—occurs during the limitations period.

For example, under the Equal Pay Act, “[a] violation

occurs when an employer pays lower wages to an employee

of one gender than to substantially equivalent employees of

the opposite gender in similar circumstances”—without the

“need [to] prove that the pay disparity was motivated

by ...discriminatfion]....” Pollis v. New Sch. for Social

Research, 132 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing 29

U.S.C. § 206(d)). Thus, the mere payment of a disparate

wage constitutes an independent violation and starts a new

limitations period each time that it occurs.

So, too, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, “the source

of [an employee's] recovery is the failure to pay [the

employee} overtime, not the [employer’s] rationale for not

= =a 46

paying” overtime. Knight v. City of Columbus, 19 F.3d 579,

582 (11th Cir. 1994). Liability for a failure to pay overtime

within the limitations period does not depend on the original

“decision to classify overtime-eligible employees as

exempt,” which may have occurred outside the limitations

period. /d. Thus‘fe]ach-failure to pay overtime constitutes

a new” and complete “violation.” /d at 581 (emphasis

omitted).

Contract law governing other sorts of installment

obligations is to the same effect. “[A] cause of action in

contract accrues at the time of the breach or failure to do the

thing that is the subject of the agreement.” 31 Richard A.

Lord, Williston on Contracts § 79:14, at 316 (4th ed. 1990)

(internal citations omitted). If, under the contract, “money is

payable in installments,” each installment constitutes a

separate obligation, and each failure to pay constitutes a

separately actionable breach with its own limitations period.

/d. at 338. The same rule governs each separately actionable

failure of an-employer “to make each withdrawal liability

payment when duc” under the Multiemployer Pension Plan

Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1381(a). Bay Area Laundry

& Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal.,

Inc., 522 U.S. 192, 208 (1997).

Similarly, in antitrust law, each “unlawfully high priced

sale|]” constitutes a new violation because that sale from a

continuing restraint of trade is the “separate.” single act that

violates the Sherman Act. Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521

U.S. 179, 189 (1997). Accordingly, a plaintiff may recover

for present violations regardless of the plaintiff's knowledge

of other earlier violations that were not timely challenged

(though “the commission of a separate new overt act

generally does not permit the plaintiff to recover for the

injury caused by old overt acts outside the limitations

period”). /d.

Finally, Ledbetter’s reliance on myriad other criminal and

civil rights analogies is likewise inapposite. In some of the

-

47

cases that Ledbetter cites, the affirmative defense of the

statute of limitations was not even in issue. See, e.g., Hunter

v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); City of Los Angeles v.

Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). Others involved allegedly

discriminatory policies that were reenacted during “each

year[]” of the limitations period, and that, in any event, were

challenged by some plaintiffs within the limitations period of

the original enactment. Palmer v. Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. Unit

Sch. Dist. 201-U, 46 F.3d 682, 685, 686 (7th Cir. 1995); see

also Manhart, 435 U.S. at 715 (policy at issue discriminated

“[o]n its face”). Still others quite properly apply the rule

that, in appropriate circumstances, evidence of conduct

outside the limitations period may be used in conjunction

with other evidence to establish a present violation. See,

e.g., United States v. Carlson, 235 F.3d 466, 470 (9th Cir.

2000); United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 798 (Sth Cir:

1975). But such “prior” conduct can serve as no more than

“background evidence in support of a (timely claim.”

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113 (emphasis added).

D. Ledbetter’s Reliance On The Legislative History

Of Statutory Provisions Other Than Section 706(e)

Is Without Merit.

Ledbetter also argues that the legislative history of the

failed Civil Rights Act of 1990 and of the enacted Civil

Rights Act of 1991 supports the limitations rule that she

advocates. Ledbetter is wrong again.

Neither the failed 1990 legislative effort nor the 1991

statute amended the pertinent statutory language in section

706(e), which was first enacted in 1964. This Court has

cautioned repeatedly that “[t]he views of members of a later

Congress, concerning [a] different section|] of Title VII”

than the one at issue, “are entitled to little if any weight.”

Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 354.39; see also, e.g., Betts, 492

U.S. at 168 (noting that, where a subsequent amendment to a

statute did not modify the language of the provision at issue,

“the interpretation given by one Congress (or a committee or

48

Member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little assistance in

discerning the meaning of that statute”); United Air Lines,

Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200 n.7 (1977) (explaining

that “[l]egislative observations 10 years after passage of [a

statute] are in no sense” relevant). Indeed, the legislative

history of “failed legislative proposals” like the Civil Rights

Act of 1990 is “a particularly dangerous ground on which to

rest an interpretation of a prior statute.” Solid Waste Agency

of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engrs,

531 U.S. 159, 169-70 (2001) (internal citation and brackets

omitted).

In any event, neither piece of legislative history supports

Ledbetter’s position. The Senate Report for the Civil Rights

Act of 1990 merely approved “the result correctly reached in

Bazemore.” Civil Rights Act of 1990—Report from the

Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, S. Rep. No.

101-315, at 54 (1990). As described above, the result

reached in Bazemore—-to wit, that an employer cannot

justify post-Act discrimination by showing that the

discrimination began prior to the statute’s effective date—is

not at issue in this case. Moreover, the interpretive

memorandum of the sponsors of the Civil Rights Act of 1991

emphasized that “[{t]his legislation should not be interpreted

to affect the sound ruling|] of the Supreme Court” in Ricks.

137 Cong. Rec. $15472-01, S15485 (daily ed. Oct. 30,

1991). That decision—in which this Court reaffirmed that

“ijt is simply insufficient” for a plaintiff raising an

intentional discrimination claim to challenge the “‘present

effects] [of a] past illegal act’” that was not made the basis

for a timely charge, Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258 (internal citation

omitted)--demonstrates_ that, contrary to Ledbetter’s

contention, the intentional pay discrimination claim at issue

in this case is time-barred. :

49

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the court

below should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

JAY ST. CLAIR GLEN D. NAGER

BRADLEY ARANT ROSE & (Counsel of Record)

WHITE LLP MICHAEL A. CARVIN

One Federal Place SHAY DVORETZKY

1819 Fifth Avenue North JoNes Day

Birmingham, AL 35203 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.

(205) 521-8000 Washington, DC 20001

(202) 879-3939

October 23, 2006 Counsel for Respondent

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