Amicus Curiae Brief — Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corporation
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4 OF) FILED
(2) SEP 15 2006
7 OF THE CLERK
No.05-848 | SORE BGS OR
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, ef ai.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
BRIEF OF THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF BOILERMAKERS, IRON SHIP BUILDERS,
BLACKSMITHS, FORGERS AND HELPERS,
AFL-CIO, AND THE ELECTRIC RELIABILITY
COORDINATING COUNCIL
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
Scott H. SEGAL*
JASON B. HUTT
BRACEWELL & GIULIANI LLP
2000 K Street, N.W., Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 828-5845
*Counsel of Record September 15, 2006
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT..............:::::cccesceseseeeeees 3
SUTPIUUTE scissesiscoacicshtapncsitpasinnaibectinbuisaasseniipiiniibeiinuinpuciatastis 5
I. A “Modification” Test Triggered by
Activity that Increases a Facility’s
Hourly Emissions Rate Is Consistent
with Environmental Protection ..................... 5
II. The Historical NSR Test Results in
Significant Distributional Benefits
Over the EPA Enforcement Test................... 8
III. § The Historical NSR Test Avoids
Unacceptable Compromises Between
Environmental and Occupational
I incsccnetetedntanpiarinindainisincssvinnitieies 12
TATA liatnieinssheisissehiistieaiiantiiplidaciacinhinteiipnapibiapdptenbaptiibinel 15
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm.,
GS4 UB. SF CEGBS) .nccccecceccesescescssceccccssevcseccscscessooes
FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.,
SI la
Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n,
SED Spain Ee GREED censsnsesinsccescesenenennscssnvsoneeetaneeneces
NLRB v. Brown,
ie
Volkswagenwerk v. FMC,
EGER Se DI Fee
Statutes
OR I i i
RR I i iii citation
Other Authorities
A. Denny Ellerman, Paul L. Joskow & David
Harrison, Jr., Emissions Trading in the U.S.:
Experience, Lessons, and Considerations for
Greenhouse Gases (Pew Center on Global
Climate Change, May 2003) ............:scssesssereeceeees
Air Quality and Strategies Division, EPA, Latest
Findings on National Air Quality (2003) (No.
RIEDEL
Page
Bernard L. Weinstein, Ph.D. & Terry L. Clower,
Ph.D., The EPA's Reinterpretation of New Source
Review Rules: Implications for Economic
Development in Rural America (May 2002).............
Byron Swift, Allowance Trading and SO? Hot Spots —
Good News from the Acid Rain Program, 31
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 954 (May 12, 2000)...
Byron Swift, Command Without Control: Why Cap-
and-Trade Should Replace Rate Standards for
Regional Pollutants, 31 Envt'l L. Rep. (Envt'l
ee eee
Clean Air Markets Division, EPA, 1999 Compliance
Report: Acid Rain Program (2000) (No. EPA-
Clean Power Act: Hearings on S. 556 Before S.
Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works, 107th Cong. 757
(2002) (statement of J. Thomas Mullen, President
Congressional Budget Office, Shifting the Cost
Burden of a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Program
I ae he a A
Curtis Carlson, et al., Sulfur Dioxide Control By
Electric Utilities: What are the Gains from
Trade?, 108 J. of Pol. Econ. No. 6, 1292 (2000).....
Howard Gruenspecht & Robert Stavins, Op-Editorial,
A Level Playing Field on Pollution at Power
Plants, Boston Globe, Jan. 26, 2002, at A1S...........
Illinois Clean Coal Institute, Facts About Coal (2003)..
Page
iv
Letter from Bill Cunningham, President, Unions for
Jobs and the Environment, to Congressmen Joe
Barton and John Dingell (Oct. 5, 2005) .........ccceeeeeseeeees
Modification of New Source Review, Unions for Jobs
and the Environment Newsletter, Apr.-June 2002,
New Source Review Policy, Regulations and
Enforcement Activities: Joint Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works and the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107" Cong. (statement
of Ande Abbott, Director, Legislative
Department, International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers) (July 16, 2002)............:sccssssrereeeereeeeeeeeees
Steve Cook, Black Mayors, Native American Group
Call for Quick Action on New Source Review,
BNA Daily Env't Report No. 93, at A-2 (May 14,
DIED viceceveernnconesissnscianitiassiniieniiininiaigiienatnaantennnnmmnttiiiie
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, ef ail.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION,
Respondent.
BRIEF OF THE
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
BOILERMAKERS, IRON SHIP BUILDERS,
BLACKSMITHS, FORGERS AND HELPERS,
AFL-CIO, AND THE ELECTRIC RELIABILITY
COORDINATING COUNCIL
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE!’
The International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron
Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO
(commonly referred to as “the Boilermakers Union") is a
Pursuant to Rule 37.6 of the Rules of this Court,
counsel hereby certifies that the brief submitted on behalf of amici curiae
Boilermakers Union and ERCC was not authored in whole or in part by
counsel for a party, and no person or entity other than the amici and their
staffs \:ave made a monetary contribution to the preparation of this brief.
The parties have granted consent for the filing of amicus curiae briefs.
2
diverse union representing over 70,000 workers throughout
the United States and Canada in construction, repair,
maintenance, manufacturing, professional emergency
medical services, and related industries.
The Boilermakers Union is the principal union
responsible for the installation, maintenance, and repair of
industrial boilers, as well as the installation of the pollution
control equipment utilized to achieve the emissions
reductions that are the goals of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401 et seq. ("the Act"). As a result, the Boilermakers
Union has a dual concer: first and foremost, to have safe
and productive workplaces for boiler operations; and second,
to ensure the sensible implementation of clean air standards
that foster the market for Boilermaker services while
protecting health, safety and the environment.
Boilermakers have been active participants in the
policy making process regarding emissions control, power-
plant maintenance, and related topics. Representatives from
Boilermaker locals have testified at U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") field hearings on the new source
review ("NSR") enforcement program, and the Union's
Government Affairs Office has submitted Congressional
testimony and authored letters on clean-air topics including
NSR.
The Electric Reliability Coordinating Council
("ERCC") is coalition of electric power-generating
companies established in 2001 and dedicated to
commonsense strategies for implementation and enforcement
of the Act. ERCC has been particularly active in the public
policy discourse regarding the NSR program. As a general
proposition, ERCC has taken the position that the U.S.
Department of Justice and EPA were not correct when they
brought various NSR enforcement cases in 1999, specifically
misstating the basis upon which construction activities may
3
trigger an NSR evaluation at existing facilities. In addition,
ERCC has also supported clarification of the NSR program
through the rulemaking and legislative processes, and has
sought to explain the policy issues relevant to such
clarification to the interested public.
Collectively, the members of ERCC generate
electricity for millions of consumers in most regions of the
United States. ERCC members have an obligation to
provide reliable electrical service to these consumers and
believe that the NSR program should not and need not force
choice between reliable and efficient power production and
environmental protection.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It is the intention of this brief to place the question of
the alleged need for NSR evaluation for construction and
maintenance activities at existing facilities in a broader
public policy context.
Whether an agency’s reading of a regulation is
inconsistent with a statutory mandate or would frustrate the
congressional policy underlying a statute are properly within
the province of a court addressing the agency’s enforcement
of the regulation. Therefore, administrative (including
enforcement) decisions that are inconsistent with a statutory
mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying
a statute should not be upheld. See, e.g., NLRB v. Brown,
380 U.S. 278, 291-92 (1965); see also, FEC v. Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1981)
(noting that “administrative constructions of the statute,
whether reached by adjudication or by rulemaking” must be
rejected to the extent that such actions "frustrate the policy
that Congress sought to implement" (citations omitted));
FMC vy. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1973);
Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968).
4
While the present amici do not contend that policy
objectives should substitute for sound legal reasoning in the
enforcement arena, we do believe that the policy arguments
create an important lens through which the purposes and
objectives of proper enforcement initiatives can be usefully
viewed. Further, the policy context propagated by amici
allied with petitioners tends to misapprehend the alleged
environmental § consequences, § understate _—potential
environmental benefits, and ignore entirely other proven
benefits to cautious application of NSR to construction and
maintenance activities at existing facilities, such approach
supported by EPA’s clear and contemporaneous explanation
of the meaning of the 1980 regulation at issue here.
The first section of this brief will place the NSR
program and the legal standards arising there-under in the
proper environmental policy context. The Boilermakers
Union and ERCC will demonstrate that emissions are
currently declining and will continue to decline; that NSR is
not the basis of these declines; that an overbroad application
of NSR will hamper the highly successful market approaches
developed under the Act; and that such application can
actually delay or prevent technological improvements
needed for additional clean-air progress.
The second section of this brief will review
distributional impacts that can arise from improper
imposition of NSR on construction and maintenance
activities at existing facilities. By restricting energy supply
and undermining reliability, the petitioners’ view of the law
could wreak havoc on reliable supplies of electricity and
industrial manufacturing and could result in harm to those in
society least able to afford it: those living in poverty; the
elderly and those on fixed incomes; majority-minority
communities; and those living in rural areas seeking to
diversify their economic base.
5
The last section of the brief will describe the
unacceptable choice created by petitioners’ interpretation in
the area of occupational safety. No interpretation of the Act
should place environmental and safety obligations at odds
with one another, particularly when a commonsense, long-
held interpretation avoids this Hobson's Choice altogether.
ARGUMENT >
1. A “Modification” Test Triggered by Activity that
Increases a Facility’s Hourly Emissions Rate Is
Consistent with Environmental Protection
As a primary matter, and contrary to the views
expressed by amici allied with petitioners, criteria air
emissions for stationary sources have been on a continual
decline over the past two decades. As the EPA Air Trends
report states in its executive summary: "Since 1970,
aggregate emissions of the six principal pollutants have been
cut 48 percent. During that same time, U.S. gross domestic
product increased 164 percent, energy consumption
increased 42 percent, and vehicle miles traveled increased
155 percent." Air Quality and Strategies Division, EPA,
Latest Findings on National Air Quality 1 (2003) (No. EPA-
454/K-03-001).
Under Phase I of the Title [V program alone, utilities
reduced SO, emissions by eight million tons — nearly 50%
below their 1990 emissions level and 30% below the Phase I
cap. ' Clean Air Markets Division, EPA, 1999 Compliance
Report: Acid Rain Program 2 and 5 (2000) (No. EPA-430-
R-00-007). The environmental benefits of these reductions
were catalyzed by the banking and trading mechanisms
provided by the flexible cap-and-trade program — 75% of the
total allowances created were banked and 30 of the 51 firms
6
used intra-firm averaging.” The success of cap-and-trade
programs is not surprising -— the programs integrate
environmental decision-making into the financial reality that
fuels companies.”
The NSR program hardly explains this positive and
continuing trend in emissions reductions. Contrary to the
statements of some, the NSR program is not the centerpiece
of the Clean Air Act. Rather, it is a narrowly tailored
program designed principally to address new sources (as the
name implies), which includes modifications of existing
sources, a relatively rare occurrence.
The lion’s share of emissions reductions are related
to implementation of the national ambient air quality
standards as reflected in state implementation plans and,
ultimately, in the permit conditions applicable at individual
plants. The NSR program does not set or alter these
standards.
. Byron Swift, Command Without Control: Why Cap-
and-Trade Should Replace Rate Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31
Envt'l L. Rep. (Envt'l Law Inst.) 10,330, 10,331 (2001) (citing
Environmental Law Institute, Analysis of EPA 1995-1999 Compliance
Reports). See also, Curtis Carlson, et al., Sulfur Dioxide Control By
Electric Utilities: What are the Gains from Trade?, 108 J. of Pol. Econ.
No. 6 1292, 1320 (2000) (concluding that "[t}he flexibility of the trading
program has encouraged utilities to capitalize on advantageous trends,
such as changing fuel prices and technological innovation that might
have been delayed or discourage by traditional! regulatory approaches.").
See also, Byron Swift, Allowance Trading and SO; Hot
Spots - Good News from the Acid Rain Program, 3\ Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 19, at 957 (May 12, 2000) (concluding that "[t]hese data confirm a
general prediction about cap and trade programs, that they will tend to
create incentives for the dirtiest plants to clean up the most, as the per-ton
cost of emissions reductions may be expected to be the least.... These
data show that, if anything, trading may be expected to cool hot spots and
not create them.").
7
The environmental and energy benefits of adhering to
the historical meaning of the regulations providing that the
NSR program is triggered only by “modification” activity
(i.e., activity that increases a facility’s hourly emission rate)
that is “major” can be summarized as follows. Investments
in pollution prevention and in maintenance are facilitated
when the powerful disincentives created by inflexible NSR
enforcement strategies are removed. As experts from
Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and
from the think-tank Resources for the Future have written,
"Research has demonstrated that the New Source Review
process drives up costs tremendously (not just for the
electricity companies, but for their customers and
shareholders, that is, for all of us) and has resulted in worse
environmental quality than would have occurred if firms had
not faced this disincentive to invest in new, cleaner
technologies." Howard Gruenspecht & Robert Stavins, Op-
Editorial, A Level Playing Field on Pollution at Power
Plants, Boston Globe, Jan. 26, 2002, at A15.
Considered authorities from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and National Economic Research
Associates, Inc. concluded that "a properly designed
[emissions trading] program provides a framework to meet
emissions reduction goals at the lowest possible cost . . . by
giving emissions sources the flexibility to find and apply the
lowest-cost methods for reducing pollution. ... In practice,
well-designed emissions trading programs also have
achieved environmental goals more quickly and with greater
confidence than more costly command-and-control
alternatives." A. Denny Ellerman, Paul L. Joskow & David
Harrison, Jr., Emissions Trading in the U.S.: Experience,
Lessons, and Considerations for Greenhouse Gases, at iii
(Pew Center on Global Climate Change, May 2003). The
NSR enforcement initiative, by interposing such "costly
command-and-control" requirements even as more effective
market-sensitive approaches are being pursued, frustrates
effective implementation of the Act.
Il. The Historical NSR Test Results in Significant
Distributional Benefits Over the EPA
Enforcement Test
Simply put, the litigation-focused approach reflected
in the 1999 EPA NSR enforcement initiative can create
unacceptable burdens on those in society least able to afford
it. First, if the environmentalist claims are taken at face
value, it is clear that an effort is being made to undermine the
future use of coal-fired power as an energy source in the
United States. While petitioners have focused their efforts in
the instant case on existing coal-fired facilities, allied
Organizations have displayed a disturbing reluctance to
support the siting or development of new coal-fired power
generation capacity, regardless of the technology utilized.
The problem with opposition to both old and new
coal-fired capacity is that coal represents over half of U.S.
electric generating capacity, and “more than 80 percent of
America’s known recoverable fossil fuel reserves." _ Illinois
Clean Coal Institute, Facts About Coal (2003) ("Coal
presently accounts for 55 percent of the electricity generated
in the United States. Approximate totals for other fuels:
nuclear, 21 percent; hydroelectric, 10 percent; natural gas, 9
percent; petroleum, 4 _ percent."), available at
Any interpretation of the Act designed to marginalize
or eliminate such a major portion of electric-generating
capacity does so with great economic impact to consumers
on fixed incomes or those living at or near the poverty level.
Viewed in the context of recent discussions on caps on
carbon emissions, the Congressional Budget Office recently
reflected upon these significant distributional impacts:
9
"The price increases resulting from a carbon cap
would be regressive--that is, they would place a relatively
greater burden on lower-income households than on higher-
income ones. Higher-income households would face larger
costs in dollar amounts, but those costs would make up a
smaller share of their average annual income. For example,
one study estimated that the price increases resulting from a
15 percent cut in carbon emissions would cost the average
household in the lowest one-fifth of the income distribution
about $560 a year, or 3.3 percent of its average income.
Households in the top one-fifth of the income distribution
would pay an additional $1,800 a year, or 1.7 percent of their
average income.” Congressional Budget Office, Shifting the
Cost Burden of a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Program, at ix
(July 2003).
Groups on the frontline of addressing the
distributional impacts of energy costs have likewise
commented on the relationship between inflexible Clean Air
policy and unacceptable results for those living in poverty.
Catholic Charities of Cleveland testified that, "conversion to
natural gas from coal would have a devastating effect on the
people of Ohio and our country, particularly the poor and the
elderly.” Clean Power Act: Hearings on S. 556 Before S.
Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works, 107th Cong. 757 (2002)
(statement of J. Thomas Mullen, President & CEO, Catholic
Charities Health and Human Services). The group attempted
to quantify the impact of such fuel conversion as follows:
"The overall impact on the economy in Northeast
Ohio would be overwhelming, and the needs that we address
at Catholic Charities in Ohio with the elderly and poor would
be well beyond our capacity and that of our current partners
in government and the private sector. In a recent study on
Public Opinion on Poverty, it was reported that one-quarter
of Americans report having problems paying for several
basic necessities. In this study, currently 23% have difficulty
10
in paying their utilities - that is, one out of four Americans."
Id.
The profound distributional impacts of an inflexible
approach to NSR enforcement led the National Conference
of Black Mayors, the National Indian Business Association,
and three other African American groups to find that: "At the
same time, however, local facilities that provide our
communities with jobs and economic opportunity must be
able to perform routine maintenance and add process
improvements to keep their operations safe, reliable,
productive and, importantly, to improve energy efficiency,
decrease emissions and maintain competitive flexibility. In
our view, the current NSR program, as applied, has a
disparate impact on urban and minority communities by
placing at risk economic and energy security and
improvements in air quality." Steve Cook, Black Mayors,
Native American Group Call for Quick Action on New
Source Review, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 93, at A-2 (May
14, 2002).
Aside from adverse distributional impacts that
manifest along socio-economic grounds, the EPA's
enforcement approach to NSR results in adverse impacts
along geographical grounds as well. Rural areas, in
particular, are hard hit. The rural economy is increasingly
attempting to diversify its base. Relying exclusively on
agriculture is risky. In a real sense, the need to diversify the
rural economic base is dependent on the availability of
reliable and affordable electricity, a proposition made more
difficult by an inflexible approach to NSR. Experts at the
Center for Economic Development and Research at the
University of North Texas wrote:
"Against this backdrop, [EPA's] new interpretation of
the [NSR] rules will make a bad economic situation worse
for rural America. This is particularly the case for
11
communities that are attempting to diversify away from
commodities by attracting manufacturing enterprises,
business services, tourism, and other growth industries. To
the extent application of the NSR program to utilities and
manufacturers serving or located in non-metropolitan areas
inflates the cost of electric power or creates uncertainty
about the reliability of delivery, businesses and households
will be even less inclined to locate or expand in these
communities." Bernard L. Weinstein, Ph.D. & Terry L.
Clower, Ph.D., The EPA's Reinterpretation of New Source
Review Rules: Implications for Economic Development in
Rural America 1 (May (2002), available at
http://www.unt.edu/cedr/N SR.pdf
Unfortunately all the above-cited groups may have
severely underestimated the impact of EPA’s enforcement
interpretation of NSR. A basic unspoken premise of the
enforcement initiative is that EPA had never previously
interpreted NSR in the manner it seeks to in this and other
enforcement cases. As respondents and other amici have
cautioned, requiring NSR review and permitting for the
common repair and replacement of utility unit and
manufacturing components would mean minimum waiting
periods of 6 to 22 months every time a plant is forced to shut
down to repair or replace a component. See, e.g., Amicus
Curiae Brief of American Public Power Association in the
instant case. Moreover, electric utilities are particularly
susceptible to periods of coincident peak demand, since
demand is driven in large part by weather, and utilities are
forced to operate more of their generating units during such
peak demand periods. That means that the older and less
reliable units are required to run, and if a unit breaks down,
then its load must be picked up by another unit. Meanwhile,
neighboring utilities are doing exactly the same thing.
But EPA’s litigation position would make
contemporaneous repairs during and following peak periods
12
a thing of the past. It would disrupt all repair planning and
would eventually lead to idling large amounts of generation
to wait for state and federal agency approval to undertake the
types of repairs that have occurred forthwith for decades.
The nation has never experienced the effects of EPA’s
enforcement interpretation, because EPA had never sought to
reinterpret the 1980 rules in this manner. If EPA and
petitioners have their way, the best outcome will be
prolonged periods of idled manufacturing and electric
generation capacity and the associated inability to meet
citizen demand for basic necessities — electricity in the dark,
cooling in the heat, heat in the winter, and the like.
According to labor organizations, the impact on employment
in industries attempting to compete in an international
marketplace could create risk to tens of millions of jobs.‘
This does not and cannot reflect the balance between air
quality and economic vitality that Congress so carefully
considered when creating the NSR program.
Ill. The Historical NSR Test Avoids Unacceptable
Compromises Between Environmental and
Occupational Safety Goals
A test under which NSR is triggered only for
“modifications” that are “major” allows for common repair
and replacement activities by avoiding the simplistic notion
that a mere increase in hours of operation can trigger the
program. The Boilermakers Union, along with many labor
* Letter from Bill Cunningham, President, Unions for Jobs and
the Environment, to Congressmen Joe Barton and John Dingell (Oct. 5,
2005) ("Further, by reducing the useful economic life of boilers or by
inaccurately setting baselines, the existing NSR confusion undermines
the competitiveness of American job sites. The result is that some of the
almost 20 million manufacturing jobs at stake in heavy industry are
ere at shay oe — at
13
organizations,” has pointed out that these efforts can pay
tangible dividends in the form of enhanced workplace safety.
Boilers at industrial facilities or electric utilities are subject
to constant stress and pressure.
For their part, Boilermakers have historically
supported tough air pollution standards -- while at the same
time casting a wary eye for those policies that may impact on
safety or competitiveness in these workplaces. The
Boilermaker position was explained in Senate testimony:
"Boilermakers could not support the EPA’s 1999
recent interpretation of its authority under the [NSR]
program. NSR, correctly interpreted, as we believe the
Administration's clarification does, forces new sources or
those undergoing major modifications, to install new
technology...We support NSR in that context. But, when
NSR is applied to the routine maintenance policies and
schedules of existing facilities, very different results occur.
In those cases, facilities are discouraged from undertaking
routine actions for fear of huge penalties or long delays or
both. By applying NSR in that way, we are pretty sure that
Boilermakers won't have the opportunity to work on
maintenance projects that we know are extremely important
Other uniors agree with the need for clarification of the
NSR program. One coalition of some ten manufacturing unions, Unions
for Jobs and the Environment, has written that, "A number of industry
and labor groups have complained that changes in EPA rules in 1997
made the definition of routine maintenance unclear. Because of those
changes, what was previously regarded as routine maintenance now
requires an investment in pollution control equipment as if the facility
were newly built. Uncertainty about the rules can cause a delay of
maintenance, often affecting health and safety, or result in the closure of
the plant and the loss of jobs." Modification of New Source Review,
Unions for Jobs and the Environment Newsletter, Apr.-June 2002, at 2,
— at
14
to energy efficiency." New Source Review Policy,
Regulations and Enforcement Activities: Joint Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works and the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107" Cong. 25-26 (statement of
Ande Abbott, Director, Legislative Department, International
Brotherhood of Boilermakers) (also citing the experience of
the California and New York electricity crises, the
Boilermakers Union testified that NSR enforcement should
not be allowed "to play with the reliability of the power
grid.") [hereinafter, "Boilermakers Testimony".
Upon passage of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 ("OSH Act"), Congress declared its "purpose
and policy, through the exercise of its powers to regulate
commerce among the several States and with foreign nations
and to provide for the general welfare, to assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe
and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human
resources." 29 U.S.C. § 651(b); see Gade v. Nat'l Solid
Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 102 (1992) ("Our review of
[OSH Act] persuades us that Congress sought to promote
occupational safety and health while at the same time
avoiding...possibly counterproductive regulation."). Amicus
Boilermakers Union, in testimony before Congress,
explained that, "maintenance is necessary to maintain worker
safety. Electric generating facilities harness tremendous
forces: superheater tubes exposed to flue gases over 2000
degrees; boilers under deteriorating conditions; and parts
located in or around boilers subjected to both extreme heat
and pressure. Any EPA interpretation which creates
incentives to delay maintenance is simply unacceptable to
our workers." Boilermakers Testimony at 26. The
Boilermakers Union later testified that, "the threat of
litigation too often acts as a deterrent to capital investments
that create work and maintain safe facilities for our
members." Clear Skies Act of 2005: Hearing on S. 131
15
Before the S. Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works, 109" Cong.
(statement of Abraham Breehey, Legislative Representative,
Government Affairs Department, International Brotherhood
of Boilermakers) (Feb. 1, 2005), available at
http://epw.senate.gov/hearing statements.cfm?id=23 1305.
CONCLUSION
Proponents of the EPA interpretation, with its broad
application of NSR to construction and maintenance
activities at existing facilities, have often portrayed the issue
as a Manichean dispute between environmental right and
wrong. In reality, and unsurprisingly, the issues are more
complex. In fact, when viewed in proper context, the
historical test governing what is “construction” that triggers
NSR (as opposed to EPA's interpretation in the instant
enforcement case) is more consistent with effective Clean
Air Act emissions control, and better preserves electric
reliability, efficiency, affordability, and occupational safety.
Respectfully submitted,
Scott H. SEGAL*
JASON B. HUTT
BRACEWELL & GIULIANI LLP
2000 K Street, Suite 500
Washington, DC 20006-1872
Tel. (202) 828-5845
Fax (202) 857-2127
*Counsel of Record
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.