Petitioners Brief — Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corporation

Supreme Court brief2007

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LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

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136 Cong. Rec. $16904 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) ......... 15

136 Cong. Rec. $16914 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990)... 15

136 Cong. Rec. $3383 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1990) ...0......00..... 15

136 Cong. Rec. $3720 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1990)..........0000.... 15

136 Cong. Rec. $3723 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1990).........0.......... 15

Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany .

S. 1630, Rep. 101-952, 2d Sess. 344-345 (1990)............... 15

ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS

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39 Fed. Reg. 42510 (Dec. 5, 1974).........cccceccsrrocssscessesesenseses 5

40 Fed. Reg. 58416 (Dec. 16, 1975)...................ssccscccsssssssesesees

41 Fed. Reg. 56767 (Dec. 30, 1976)........0...0.060. chsbatdialed 8,28

43 Fed. Reg. 26380 (June 19, 1978) 0......c... cee ccssseeseseseeees 9

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44 Fed. Reg. 51924 (Sept. 5, 1979) .............:....cccccsesessveees 9,31

45 Fed. Reg. 52676 (Aug. 7, 1980) .......... cece eeeeeeees passim

46 Fed. Reg. 36695 (July 15, 1981)...........ccecceseeeeesseeeseeees 11

“47 Fed. Reg. 6017 (Feb. 10. 1982) cccccsscccssssssssssssssssssssssseee 21

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53 Fed. Reg. 5860 (Feb. 26, 1988) ..................ceccccesssesseceeees 47

56 Fed. Reg. 27630 (June 14, 1991)... eeeeseseeseeeeereeeees 16

57 Fed. Reg. 32314 (July 21, 1992)............ ec ceseseeeee passim

61 Fed. Reg. 38250 (July 23, 1996)...........ccceeeeeees 17,19,49

67 Fed. Reg. 80186 (Dec. 31, 2002) 0.00... ceeeeeeeeeeees passim

70 Fed. Reg. 61081 (Oct. 20, 2005)............ccececcsossrcsersssorores 23

71 Fed. Rem. 9066 (Feb. 27, ZOGG) ........ccrrerceccrsccccnevssssseseres 21

OTHER MATERIALS

Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,”

gO BR, RIESE ee 27

General Accounting Office, Air Pollution Emissions

from Older Electric-Generating Units,

gS _, SIRES r at ron, mame aeee 21

Jonathan Levy and Jack Spengler, Health Benefits of

Emissions Reductions from Older Power Plants,

9 Risk in Perspective, Vol. 2 (2001) ...............cscesessssseeeees 21

XIV

Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Stationary Source Air

SP St Tr i

XV

OPINIONS BELOW

The district court’s opinion (Pet. App. 22a) is reported at

278 F. Supp. 2d 619, and its order granting final judgment

(Pet. App. 85a) is unreported. The court of appeals’ opinion

(Pet. App. 1a) is reported at 411 F.3d 539. ,

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals denied rehearing en banc on August

30, 2005. This Court granted certiorari on May 15, 2006 (126

S. Ct. 2019). Jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act (Act or CAA), 42

U.S.C. 7401 ef seg., and of Title 40 of the Code of Federal

Regulations are reproduced in an addendum to this brief.

STATEMENT

This case arises from an extensive “Plant Modernization

Program” by which respondent Duke Energy Corporation

(Duke) undertook to refurbish coal-burning power plants.

Because of age and physical deterioration, these plants could

operate only sporadically (and in some cases had been shut

down for years) and, without modernization, they were due to

be retired and replaced. The United States brought an

enforcement action alleging that Duke’s projects triggered the

Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)

provisions, which apply when a source undergoes a

“modification,” i.¢., “[a]ny physical change” that “increases

the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source.” 42

U.S.C. 7411(a)(4), 7479¢(2\(C). The United States maintained

that, under regulations promulgated by the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) in 1980 and 1992 defining PSD

modifications as physical changes that increase “actual”

emissions, measured in “tons per year,” a modernization that

enables a source to operate more of the time - and emit more

pollution — requires a PSD permit.

The Fourth Circuit held that the enforcement suit could not

proceed, reasoning that Congress had required EPA to adopt a

regulatory test for PSD “modifications” identical to one the

agency uses in regulations implementing the distinct New

Source Performance Standards (NSPS) program. Under that

NSPS standard, a modification cannot occur unless there is an

increase in a source’s maximum hourly emissions rate. Like

other tests of emissions capacity or potential, that test

excludes consideration of how much of the time (and how

intensively) a source in fact operates. It thus exempts from

PSD coverage the comprehensive overhaul of an old source —

a source that, due to age and physical decay, was inoperative

most or all of the time — even when the modernization

project’s result is to “increase[] the amount of any air

pollutant emitted by such source” by hundreds or thousands

of tons per year.

In imposing that result, the Fourth Circuit starkly violated

Section 307 of the Act. That provision vests the D.C. Circuit

with exclusive jurisdiction to review challenges to nationally

applicable CAA regulations, and, in strong terms, disables

courts in enforcement actions from deciding issues that could

have been presented to the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b),

(e). The rationale the Fourth Circuit offered for finding the

jurisdictional bar inapplicable — that the court was merely

“interpreting” rather than invalidating EPA’s regulations —

does not withstand a moment’s scrutiny. Even if courts were

free to substitute their reading of a regulation for that of the

agency, the court of appeals here did not actually “construe”

the PSD regulations, whose language and preamble the court

deemed “irrelevant” to the case because of what it saw as a

peremptory statutory command. In fact, the PSD regulations

manifestly cannot be “interpreted” to be the same as the

NSPS regulations, or to impose an hourly rate test.

It would be hard to imagine a more serious affront to the

exclusive review role Congress assigned to the D.C. Circuit.

The 1980 regulations the Fourth Circuit found contrary to

statute were, in relevant part, adopted to conform to the D.C.

Circuit's decision in Alabama Power v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323

(1979), which construed the Act’s PSD provisions to mandate

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that EPA evaluate whether the program applies to physical

changes by looking at their effects on “actual emissions,” and

held the PSD statute to require distinctive regulatory elements

that the D.C. Circuit had held unlawful for NSPS. And the

Fourth Circuit’s decision was issued even as numerous

parties, including Duke, were challenging the same

regulations in the D.C. Circuit. In a decision rendered nine

days after the Fourth Circuit’s, New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3

(D.C. Cir. 2005), the D.C. Circuit not only reyected (on merits

and waiver grounds) the very statutory challenges Duke

successfully pressed in the instant case, but also held, based in

part on distinctive statutory requirements of the PSD

program, that EPA must measure PSD modifications by

increases in a source’s “actual” emissions, not “potential” or

“allowable” emissions.

Even if Congress had not been so clear in forbidding courts

in enforcement actions from deciding broad statutory

questions assigned to the D.C. Circuit, the interpretation

imposed by the court below could not stand. EPA’s

regulatory test for PSD modifications — tailored to the D.C.

Circuit’s construction of the Act in Alabama Power, and

upheld in full in New York - is easily a permissible reading of

the statute, one carefully calibrated to the distinctive textual

requirements and programmatic purposes of the Act’s PSD

provisions. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit did not identify the

slightest inconsistency between EPA’s regulatory test and the

language of the statutory definition it implements.

Instead, relying on Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452

U.S. 247 (1981), the court of appeals invoked what it

perceived as a congressional “mandate” on EPA to adopt

identical regulatory definitions of source “modification” for

the NSPS and PSD programs. But this Court has never — in

Rowan or any other case — endorsed any such rigid

presumption. To the contrary, the Court has consistently

emphasized the need to interpret each term of a complex

regulatory statute like the CAA in light of the specific

statutory context in which it functions. As the D.C. Circuit

3

has held, EPA’s regulations not only may but must give effect

to the PSD provisions’ distinctive and explicit targeting of the

actual “tons per year” of pollution emitted by major emitting

sources. The test urged by Duke and imposed by the court

below (without consideration of its patent lack of fit with the

PSD provisions of the Act) would exempt plant renovation

projects that undeniably increase the amount of air pollutants

emitted by a source by thousands of tons a year. That test is

inconsistent with the plain text, intricate mechanics, and

fundamental objectives of the statutory PSD program, and

with D.C. Circuit holdings in jurisdictionally proper Section

307(b) rulemaking reviews.

A. Statutory And Regulatory Background

1. The 1970 Act. Congress enacted the Clean Air Act

Amendments of 1970 “to protect and enhance the quality of

the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health

and welfare and the productive capacity of its population.” 42

U.S.C. 7401(b). The CAA directs EPA to establish National

Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for air pollutants at

a level requisite to protect public health and the welfare, id.

7409, and authorizes States to establish state implementation

plans (SIPs) containing measures sufficient to achieve and

maintain the NAAQS. /d. 7410. See General Motors Corp.

v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 533 (1990); Union Elec. Co. v.

EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249-50 (1976). EPA has promulgated

NAAQS for various pollutants, including sulfur dioxide,

nitrogen dioxide, and particulates. 40 C.F.R. pt. 50.

The 1970 Act also established the NSPS program, which

directs EPA to prescribe uniform, national, technology-based

performance standards for various categories of equipment.

42 U.S.C. 7411. The NSPS apply to newly constructed

sources and to those that undergo “modification.” 42 U.S.C.

741 1(ay(2), (4). Believing that the controls required in the

1970 legislation would suffice to attain the NAAQS,

Congress fixed 1975 as the deadline for meeting those

standards. 42 U.S.C. 7410(b), (e), (f) (1970). That year

4

passed, however, with air quality in much of the country still

not meeting them. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 95-127 at 55 (1977);

123 Cong. Rec. 18022 (June 8, 1977) (“record to date” under

NSPS had been “disappointing”) (Sen. Muskie).

2. The 1977 Amendments and the PSD Program.

Responding to these widely recognized failures, Congress

enacted the 1977 CAA Amendments, a “lengthy, detailed,

technical, complex and comprehensive response to a major

social issue.” Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 848

(1984). Among their major innovations were two new

programs, collectively referred to as New Source Review

(NSR): the Nonattainment program (NNSR), codified in Part

D of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7501-7515, which applies to areas

failing to meet the NAAQS, and the PSD program, codified in

Part C, id. 7470-7492, which applies in areas where air

quality satisfies those standards.

“Before 1977, no CAA provision specifically addressed

potential air quality deterioration in areas where pollutant

levels were lower than the NAAQS.” Alaska Dept. of Env'l

Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 471 (2004).' The PSD

program’s purposes include guarding against harms to public

health and welfare anticipated to occur notwithstanding

NAAQS attainment, protecting air quality in National Parks,

and preventing large sources from harming air quality in

downwind States. 42 U.S.C. 7470. Congress also established

the program to insure “that economic growth will occur in a

manner consistent with the preservation of existing clean air

resources,” and “that any decision to permit increased air

pollution * * * is made only after careful evaluation of all the

consequences” and based upon “informed public

participation.” /d. 7470(3), (5).

EPA established an administrative PSD program in 1974. 39 Fed. Reg.

42510 (Dec. 5, 1974). The statutory PSD program enacted in 1977

“follow|ed] the outline” of that program, but is “more claborate and in

many ways more stringent.” 48 Fed. Reg. 52676, 52679 (Aug. 7, 1980).

The PSD provisions require permitting prior to

construction or modification of “major emitting facilities,”

large factories and power plants “that emit, or have the

potential to emit” 100 or 250 “tons per year” of a pollutant

(depending on source type). 42 U.S.C. 7475(a), 74791). The

permit process requires a “complete” assessment of baseline

air quality in the locality and a prediction of the proposed

project’s effect on local air quality. /d. 7475(a), (e). An

applicant must show that emissions will not “cause” or

“contribute to” an exceedance of any applicable PSD

“increment.” /d. 7473, 7475(a)(3), (d). A “central feature” of

the PSD program, Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 374,

increments are caps on increases in pollutant concentrations,

the most stringent applicable in “class I” areas like National

Parks. A source must employ the “best available pollution

control technology” (BACT), identified “case-by-case” in

light of local environmental and economic factors, id.

7475(a), 7479(3), and must comply with NSPS and other

CAA requirements. /d. 7475(a)(3).

The NSR programs added in 1977 represented a significant

departure from the 1970 Act’s approach. Whereas NSPS sets

categorical, national performance requirements for classes of

equipment irrespective of size or location, NSR applies only -

to the nation’s largest pollution sources and demands site-

specific review, prior to construction activity, of projected

effects on local air quality. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 850 &

n.24 (NNSR): Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 346-51 (PSD).

Congress partially “grandfathered” sources built before

August 7, 1977, from NSR requirements. See 42 U.S.C.

7475(a). It was widely believed, and asserted before

Congress, that many existing plants had limited useful lives

and would be shut down within a relatively short time. See,

e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-1175 at 159 (“electric utility industry”

provided testimony that “it is imprudent to backfit FGD |a

control technology] into existing ‘plants, especially older units

facing retirement within 10-15 years”); S. Rep. No. 95-127 at

128 (1977) (“There are in the United States approximately

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200 old coal-fired power plants over 20 years of age. * * *

Most will be totally phased out of operation in the next 5 to

20 years.”’) (additional views of Sen. Baker).

Congress provided, however, that NSR would apply to any

“modification” of an existing source. For PSD purposes,

“(t]he term ‘construction,’ when used in connection with any

source or facility, includes the modification (as defined in

section 7411(a) of this title) of any source or facility.” 42

U.S.C. 7479(2)(C).? Similarly, under the NNSR program,

“(t]he terms ‘modification’ and ‘modified’ mean the same as

the term ‘modification’ as used in section 7411(a)(4).” /d.

7501(4). Thus, existing sources are subject to NSR when

they undergo “any physical change in, or change in the

method of operation of, a stationary source which increases

the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source or

which results in the emission of any air pollutant not

previously emitted.” /d. 7411(a)(4) (CAA Section 111(a)(4)).

The PSD provisions contain a single, partial exemption for

“modifications or expansions” where emissions are less than

“50 tons per year.” /d. 7475(b).

3. Judicial Review of CAA Rulemakings. Intended to

promote “even and consistent national application” of EPA’s

implementing regulations and protect “the integrity of the

time sequences provided throughout the Act,” S. Rep. No. 91-

1196 at 40-41 (1970), Section 307(b) of the Act describes the

exclusive means of judicial review of CAA regulations and

other EPA actions. See Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446

U.S. 578 (1980); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434

U.S. 275 (1978). Section 307(b\(1) provides that specified

actions, including “any * * * nationally applicable regulations

promulgated, or final actions taken, by the Administrator

* The PSD provisions as enacted in August 1977 failed to specify that the

term “construction” included modifications. Congress corrected that

oversight in the Clean Air Act Technical and Conforming Amendments,

enacted November 16. 1977, Pub. L. 95-190, § 14(a)(54), 91 Stat. 1402.

See New York, 413 F.3d at 13; Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 401 0.49.

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under” the Act may be challenged “only” in the D.C. Circuit,

by petition for review filed “within sixty days” of the

promulgation or other final action, except that petitions

“based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day” are

considered timely if filed within 60 days of when those

grounds arose. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)\(1). Section 307(b)(2)

provides that “[a]ction of the Administrator with respect to

which review could have been obtained [by such petition for

review] shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or

criminal proceedings for enforcement.” /d. 7607(b)(2).° This

prohibition applies “whether or not review was actually

sought.” Harrison, 446 U.S. at 605.

In 1977, Congress added Section 307(d)’s detailed

requirements for CAA _ rulemakings, see 42 U.S.C.

7607(d)(1 (J) (PSD), and its prescription that only objections

raised in the statutory public comment process or by petition

for reconsideration are subject to judicial review, id.

7607(d)(7)B). See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d

1032, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The 1977 amendments also

added Section 307(e), stating that “[njothing in [the CAA]

shall be construed to authorize judicial review” of EPA

regulations or orders under the CAA, “except as provided in

this section.” 42 U.S.C. 7607(e).

4. Alabama Power and the 1980 Regulations. EPA

issued initial regulations implementing the 1977 PSD

provisions in 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 26380 (June 19, 1978).

3

In 1977, Congress reaffirmed the importance of having the validity of

national actions definitively settled by a court expert in administrative law

and the CAA’s complexities. It rejected a recommendation from the

Administrative Conference “to permit the validity of regulations to be

challenged in defense to an enforcement proceeding,” 41 Fed. Reg.

56767, 56768 (Dec. 30, 1976), and amended Section 307(b) to expand the

categories of actions subject to exclusive review. See Pub. L. 95-95 §$§

303, 305, 91 Stat. 685, 772, 776-77 (1977); H.R. Rep. No. 95-294 at 322

(1977) (“reaffirm[ing]” “intent to strictly limit Section 307 challenges”).

See also Harrison, 446 U.S. at 584-85, 590-91. Congress did accept a

recommendation to extend the time to seek review from 30 to 60 days.

8

Those regulations: (a) defined “modification” as a physical

change that increases a source’s “potential emission rate,” id.

at 26382; (b) adopted a qualified form of “netting” for

measuring intra-source emissions increases (i.e., subtracting

contemporaneous decreases in emissions from increases at the

source in determjning whether a modification has occurred),

and (c) restricted PSD applicability to changes that increased

a source’s potential emissions by at least 100 or 250 tons per

year (depending on source type), id.

On review under Section 307(b), the D.C. Circuit issued an

initial per curiam opinion, Alanama Power Co. v. Costle, 606

F.2d 1068 (1979), intended to guide ongoing EPA rulemaking

to correct identified flaws in the 1978 rules while the court

prepared its full opinion, id. at 1077. EPA published

proposed regulations that would have confined PSD-

triggering “modifications” to those physical changes which

increased a source’s “potential to emit” pollutants. 44 Fed.

Reg. 51924, 51948 (Sept. 5, 1979). Soon thereafter, the D.C.

Circuit issued its full decision, 636 F.2d 323 (1979), which

explored the PSD enactment in detail.

The court held that EPA’s exemption for projects that

increased emissions by less than 100 or 250 tons per year was

contrary to the Act’s “clear language,” explaining that:

Implementation of ilie statute’s definition of

“modification” will undoubtedly prove inconvenient

and costly to affected industries; but the clear language

of the statute unavoidably imposes these costs except

for de minimis increases. The statutory scheme intends

to “grandfather” existing industries; but the provisions

concerning modifications indicate that this is not to

constitute a perpetual immunity from all standards

under the PSD program. If these.plants increase

pollution, they will generally need a permit.

Id. at 400. The Alabama Power court ‘also held that the

distinctive purpose of the PSD provisions required that EPA

provide for netting (the “bubble concept”), because “Congress

intended to apply the permit process * * * only where

9

industrial changes might increase pollution in an area, not

where an existing plant changed its operations in ways that

produced no pollution increase.” /d. at 401. Acknowledging

that in ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978),

it had found EPA’s use of a bubble concept unlawful for the

NSPS program, the D.C. Circuit explained that the different

results reflected the “significantly different” regulations and

statutory programs at issue. While ASARCO had held the

bubble to be “contrary to the intent of the NSPS,” Alabama

Power explained, netting was “precisely suited” to PSD’s

focus on actual consequences for local air quality. 636 F.2d at

402, 406. Cf. ASARCO, 527 F.2d at 327, 329.

EPA then promulgated new and extensively revised PSD

regulations. 45 Fed. Reg. 52676 (Aug. 7, 1980). The 1980

regulations define a PSD “major modification” as “any

physical change in or change in the method of operation of a

major stationary source that wold result in a significant net

emissions increase of any pollutant subject to regulation

under the Act.” 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)(2)(i) (1987).* This

definition, like Section 111(a)(4) of the Act, requires two

basic determinations: (1) whether a project constitutes a

“physical change” (or “change in the method of operation”)

and (2) whether the change would result in an “increase” in

emissions. EPA exempted some activities from PSD

requirements at the first step, including certain everyday

activities that would otherwise fit within the broad statutory

language. Thus, the regulations define “physical change” and

“change in the method of operation” to exclude, among other

things, “routine maintenance, repair, and replacement,” and

an “increase in the hours or rate of operation.” 40 C.F.R.

* EPA promulgated separate sets of regulations, identical in relevant

respects, for incorporation in SIPs, 45 Fed. Reg. at 52729-35 (40 C.F.R.

51.24(b) (1980) (recodified in 1987 at 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b) (1987)), and

for areas without approved state plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52735-41 (40 C.F.R.

52.21(b) (1980)). Following the practice of the courts below, see Pet.

App. Sa, 36a, we cite to the regulations as recodified in 1987.

10

51.166(b)(2)(iii) (a), ().°

As to the second step, the regulations define a “net

emissions increase” as “any increase in actual emissions from

a particular physical change or change in method of

operation,” together with “[a]ny other [contemporaneous]

increases and decreases in actual emissions at the source.” 40

C.F.R. 51.166(b)(3)(i)(a), (6).° Determining whether there

has been an increase requires a source-wide assessment of the

“extent that the new level of actual emissions exceeds the old

level.” Jd. 51.166(b)(3)(v). The regulations specify that

“actual emissions as of a particular date shall equal the

average rate, in tons per year, at which the unit actually

emitted the pollutant” during a preceding two-year or other

period representative of normal source operation, and that

“actual emissions” “shall be calculated using the unit’s actual

operating hours, production rates, and types of materials

processed, stored, or combusted during the selected time

period.” /d. 51.166(b)(21)(i), (11). They provide that for a unit

which “has not begun normal operations on the particular

date, actual emissions shall equal the potential to emit of the

unit on that date.” /d. 51.166(b)(21 ){iv).’

“Following the lead” of the D.C. Circuit’s construction of

the PSD provisions in Alabama Power, and the “language” of

the statutory definition, EPA announced that it had “shifted

the focus of its regulatory definitions from ‘potential to emit’

“

* The regulations also specify pollutant-specific, annual thresholds below

which increases are not deemed “significant,” and are therefore PSD-

exempt. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)\23)(i) (40 “tpy” (tons per year)

thresholds for nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide).

® EPA’s regulations for the NNSR program use the same test for

“modifications.” See, e.g., 46 Fed. Reg. 36695, 36697 (July 15, 1981).

” The regulations provide that the potential to emit ascribed to a unit can

be reduced upon the applicant’s agreement to a permit limitation. 40

C.F.R. 51.166(b,4). See Puerto Rican Cement Co. v. EPA, 889 F.2d 292,

297 (1* Cir. 1989). The D.C. Circuit has addressed the potential to emit

concept in a number of cases. See, e.g., Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. EPA, 59

F.3d 1351, 1361-65 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

11

to ‘actual emissions.’” 45 Fed. Reg. at 52700 (discussing 636

F.2d at 400-01). Adoption of an actual emissions test avoided

practical “problems” created by the 1979 proposal’s

“potential to emit” standard. 45 Fed. Reg. at 52700. Because

“an existing source’s potential emissions could give a figure

considerably higher than what it is actually emitting,” that test

would yield “paper” reduction credits even as the actual

emissions increased — “especially” if, prior to the change, the

source “operated only a small part of the time.” /d. EPA

decided to avoid such “‘paper offset[s],”” which “could

permit actual air quality to deteriorate seriously, while the

change which increased actual emissions avoided NSR.” /d.

5. The CMA Litigation. Pursuant to Section 307(b),

many partics — including respondent Duke’s corporate

predecessor — filed petitions for review challenging various

aspects of the 1980 PSD regulations in the D.C. Circuit.

Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. EPA, Nos. 79-1112, et al.

See New York, 413 F.3d at 14-15. Certain petitioners —

including General Motors and other major industrial firms -

attacked EPA’s use of an “actual emissions” test in place of

the capacity-based test used in the 1978 PSD regulations and

the 1979 proposal. Their brief raised as its first issue whether

EPA exceeded its “statutory authority” by providing “that a

modification subject to review under Parts C and D of the

Clean Air Act would occur whenever actual emissions from a

source increased as a result of an alteration to that source,

even where the source’s capacity to emit remains constant.”

Br. of Industry Pet’rs on Actual Emissions Definition of Net

Increase at 1, No. 79-1112, ef al. (dated Feb. 12, 1981;

docketed Feb. 17, 1981).

The CMA _ proceedings were stayed for settlement

discussions, which resulted in a 1982 agreement between

EPA and certain petitioners — including Duke — under which

EPA undertook to propose new regulations, with petitioners

reserving the night to reopen their judicial challenge in the

event those proposals were not adopted. See Settlement

Agreement, D.C. Cir. Case No. 79-1112 (Feb. 22, 1982). The

12

regulatory changes, set forth in “Exhibit B” to the Agreement,

see 61 Fed. Reg. 38250, 38268-69 (July 23, 1996), would

have amended the emissions “increase” test “[b]y adding a

new subparagraph (b)(2)(v)” to the 1980 PSD regulations

providing that a modification “shall not be deemed to occur if

one of the following occurs: (a) there is no significant net

increase in the source's potential to emit (as calculated in

terms of pounds of pollutant emitted per hour) or (b) there is

no significant net increase in the source’s actual emissions.”

Id. at 38269 (emphasis added). Exhibit B also called for EPA

to propose “deleting” all 11 instances in which “actual”

preceded “emissions” in EPA’s regulatory definition of

“significant net emissions increase.” See id. & n.28. EPA

published proposed regulations based on the Exhibit B

language in 1996, but identified several ways in which such

changes could impair the efficacy of the PSD program, 61

Fed. Reg. at 38269-70, and reached a final decision not to

adopt the changes in 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 80186, 80204-06

(Dec. 31, 2002), leading Duke and other petitioners in CMA

to reopen their challenges to the 1980 rules.

6. Application of the 1980 Regulations. In Puerto Rican

Cement Co. v. EPA, 889 F.2d 292 (1" Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.),

the First Circuit sustained an EPA determination that the PSD

requirements applied to an upgrade project that increased

“overall emissions” by enabling a facility to be used more

intensively, even though the change did not increase its

hourly emissions rate. /d. at 293, 297. After upholding EPA’s

application of its regulations to the project, id. at 297-98, the

court, pointing to Section 307(b) and CMA, rejected as

“obviously too late” a claim that the regulations were contrary

to the Act. /d. at 299.

EPA addressed the 1980 regulations’ application to the

refurbishment of an old power plant in response to an

applicability determination requested by the Wisconsin

Electric Power Company (“WEPCo”). EPA rejected the

utility’s contention that only increases in the source’s

maximum emissions “rate” triggered PSD review, explaining

13

that “actual emissions are the product of” a source’s

emissions rate, the production rate, and hours of operation,

and that “an increase in any one of these three specified

factors, if attributable to a physical or operational change, can

trigger an emissions increase for PSD purposes[.]” JA 294.

Reviewing that determination in Wisconsin Electric Power

Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901 ( 7" Cir. 1990), the Seventh Circuit

observed that the PSD and NSPS regulations measured

emissions increases in “a fundamentally distinct manner” -

the NSPS rules are “concerned primarily with increases in

emissions rates, expressed in kilograms per hour,” whereas

the PSD rules are “concerned with changes in fotal annual

emissions, expressed in tons per year,” id. at 913, 915

(emphasis original). Recognizing that the emissions increase

caused by WEPCo’s renovations “would come not from an

increase in emission rate, but rather from increases in

production rate or hours of operation,” id. at 916, the court

rejected the utility’s claim that its project was PSD-exempt

under the regulatory language providing that increases in

“hours of operation” or “production rate” do not themselves

constitute a “physical change,” explaining that the exemption

“was provided to allow facilities to take advantage of

fluctuating market conditions, not construction’ or

modification activity.” /d. at 916 n.11.

The court in WEPCo set aside EPA’s application of the

“actual to potential” test set forth in the 1980 reguiations for

sources that “have not begun normal operations,” to calculate

post-change annual emissions by assuming round-the-clock

operation. While agreeing that EPA “cannot reasonably rely

on a utility’s own unenforceable estimates of its annual

emissions,” the court found that the record permitted a “‘more

realistic assessment’” of post-change emissions and remanded

to EPA for such an assessment. 893 F.2d at 917 (quoting

Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 379): see also New York, 413

F.3d at 15. On remand, EPA estimated WEPCo’s future

annual emissions “based on all the available facts in the

record,” including how much the unit was likely to be used

14

after the improvements and at what production and emissions

rates — a test referred to as the “actual-to-projected-actual”

test — and found that, by that measure, a significant net

emissions increase would occur for one pollutant but not for

others. JA 68; see 57 Fed. Reg. at 32317 & n.10.

When Congress comprehensively amended the CAA in

1990, see Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990), it

debated, but declined to adopt, proposals to amend the Act’s

PSD provisions to exclude modernization projects like the

one at issue in WEPCo, including calls to enact a

modification test that would only be triggered by increases in

a source's “potential capacity” to emit.” However, Congress

did amend the NNSR provisions, which, like the PSD

provisions, incorporate Section 111(a)’s definition of

“modification.” 42 U.S.C. 7501(4). The 1990 revisions to the

NNSR provisions — enacted in response to continuing failure

to attain health-based air quality standards in many areas —

reaffirmed NSR’s focus on actual quantities of pollutants

being released and their impacts on local air quality.

Congress in 1990 ratcheted down the statutory thresholds,

* An amendment offered by Senator McClure would have exempted any

physical change to an “existing utility unit or source” from NSR unless it

“increase|d] the maximum potential capacity of the unit or source to emit

criteria air pollutants under its physical and operational design.” Amt. No.

1404, Sec. 709(g), 136 Cong Rec. $3428 (daily ed. March 28, 1990). See

also, e.g., 136 Cong. Rec. $16904 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990); 136 Cong.

Rec. $16914 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990); 136 Cong. Rec. $3383-84 (daily

ed.M-» 28, 1990): 136 Cong. Rec. $3720 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1990). The

Conference Committee stated that failure to include such provisions in the

final version of the bill was “not intended to affect or prejudice in any way

the issues or resolution of the WEPCO matter.” Joint Explanatory

Statement to Accompany S. 1630, Rep. 101-952, 2d Sess. 344-345 (1990).

Senator Mitchell observed while in 1970 “it was assumed that electric

utility units had an average lifetime of 30 years,” many utilitics “are now

choosing to extend the life of their plants,.” thereby “cxacerbat[ing]”

pollution problems. 136 Cong. Rec. $16904 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). See

136 Cong. Rec. $3723-25 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1990) (Sen. Chafee); 36

Cong. Rec. $3383-84 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1990) (Sen. Baucus).

15

expressed in tonnages of annual emissions, for applying

NNSR, based on the severity of an area’s pollution. NNSR in

“serious” ozone nonattainment areas, for example, was

expanded to apply to any source “that emits, or has the

potential to emit, at least 50 tons per year.” 42 U.S.C.

751 la(c); H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, at 234 (1990) (“regulation

of smaller sources is essential for attainment in heavily

polluted areas”). The 1990 amendments directed that owners

of a modified source “shall assure that the total tonnage of

increased emissions of the air pollutant * * * shall be offset

by an equal or greater reduction * * * in the actual emissions

of such air pollutant.” /d. 7503(c)(1) (emphasis added).

7. The 1992, 1996 and 2002 Rulemakings. After the

WEPCo decision, EPA adopted regulations that, among other

things, addressed the means of calculating post-change

emissions for PSD modifications. 57 Fed. Reg. 32314 (July

21, 1992). The 1992 regulations left in place the 1980

regulations’ measure of emissions in terms of “actual”

emissions measured in “tons per year,” and the express

requirements that the pre-change baseline take account of the

source’s hours of operation and production rates. The 1992

PSD regulations added to that test a provision allowing

electric utilities to measure post-change emissions using

“representative annual emissions” — defined as “the average

rate, in tons per year, at which the source is projected to emit

a pollutant for the two-year period after a physical change * *

* considering the effect any such change will have on

increasing or decreasing the hourly rate and on projected

capacity utilization,” 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)(32) (1993) — so

long as the owner or operator then submits annual emissions

data for five years following resumption of regular operations

to verify its projection. 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)(21)(v) (1993).°

” The agency explained that its “extensive experience with electric

utilities, and the generally similar nature of operations within this source

category, provide EPA an adequate basis on which to predict future actual

emissions from such units in most cases.” 56 Fed. Reg. 27630, 27631

16

Having formally proposed the regulatory changes in the

CMA Exhibit B in 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 38250 (July 23,

1996),'° EPA rejected them in a 2002 NSR rulemaking. EPA

reiterated concerns it expressed in 1996 about the effects of

such a change on the PSD program, and noted comments

from States and others that the proposal would frustrate SIP

administration, lead to overconsumption of PSD increments

and to nonattainment backsliding, and “virtually eliminate

NSR in most modification cases.” 67 Fed. Reg. at 80205.

EPA declined to adopt Exhibit B, concluding it “could lead to

unreviewed increases in emissions that would be detrimental

to air quality” and “make it difficult to implement the

statutory requirements for state-of-the-art controls.” /d.

Duke and other utility petitioners moved to reopen the D.C.

Circuit CMA proceedings, which were consolidated with

challenges to the 1992 and 2002 PSD regulations.

8. D.C. Circuit Proceedings. On June 24, 2005, the D.C.

Circuit upheld the 1980 PSD modification regulations against

(June 14, 1991) (proposed rule). EPA distinguished the different tests

used under NSPS and PSD, 57 Fed. Reg. at 32316, and discussed the test

under 1980 PSD regulations in detail, id. at 32316-18.

'° In the 1996 notice, EPA explained that the effect of the Exhibit B

language would be to “eliminate a source's level of operations as a factor

when determining whether a proposed change will result in an increase,”

and that if “[p]Jast and future levels of utilization of the source are

completely disregarded * * * an existing source could make any change

so long as the change docs not significantly increase the source's hourly

potential emissions rate.” 61 Fed. Reg. at 38269. Such an approach

would allow a source to avoid PSD for physical changes that allow it to

operate “at much higher levels (e.g., more hours per day or weck) than it

had in the past,” with the result that “actual emissions (measured in tpy

[tons per year]) could more than double due to the increase in utilization

even though hourly potential emissions remain the same” — a “particular

concer” in the case of “older sources,” of which the impact had “never

been assessed.” /d. EPA also determined that Exhibit B’s rejection of an

actual emissions test might “conflict” with the 1990 Amendments’ NNSR

provisions, under which “offsetting emissions reductions .* * * must be

calculated in terms of actual emissions.” /d. at 38269 n. 31 (emphasis

added) (citing 42 U.S.C. 7503(c)). See supra, pp. 15-16.

17

the revived challenges of a utility industry coalition that

included Duke. New York, 413 F.3d 3. The court rejected

petitioners’ argument that Congress, by incorporating into the

PSD program the statutory definition of “modification” set

out in the 1970 Act’s NSPS provisions, intended to impose

for the statutory PSD program a “modification” definition set

forth in EPA’s pre-1977 NSPS regulations, which gauged

modifications by increases in hourly emissions rate. 413 F.

3d at 19-20; see also id. at 18 (noting that the industry

petitioners “challenge the 1980 rule’s definition of

modification in the NSR context to the extent that it differs

from the NSPS definition”). The D.C. Circuit explained that

it “ha[d] (naturally) required indications in the statutory

language or history to infer that Congress intended to

incorporate into a statute a preexisting regulatory definition,”

and that, in the case of the 1977 PSD enactment, it found

none. /d. at 20. The court also observed that when the PSD

provisions were enacted in 1977, EPA’s NSPS regulations

contained two different and “possibly inconsistent” regulatory

definitions for “modification,” id. at 19,'' and that the

regulatory definitions for NSPS and EPA’s’ 1974

administrative PSD program “already differed” at that point.

413 F.2d at 12. Noting that industry had made “no attack at

all on the reasonableness of EPA’s definition of modification

for NSR (apart from its divergence from one of the 1975

NSPS definitions)” the court “reject{[ed] this portion of

industry's challenge to the 1980 and the 2002 rules.” /d. at 20.

The New York court returned to the _ statutory

“modification” definition in striking down portions of EPA’s

2002 regulations exempting certain projects from NSR “even

if the change increases the source’s net actual emissions.”

'' NSPS regulations in place in 1977 contained one provision (in place

with minor changes since 1971, see 36 Fed. Reg. 24876, 24877 (Dec. 23,

1971)), with language tracking the statutory definition, 40 C.F.R. 60.2(h)

(1976), and another prescribing an hourly rate standard, id. 60.14(b). See

40 Fed. Reg. 58416, 58416-17 (Dec. 16, 1975).

18

413 F.3d at 38. Examining the text of the definition and other

PSD provisions, the court held that the “plain language of the

CAA indicates that Congress intended to apply NSR to

changes that increase actual emissions instead of potential or

allowable emissions.” /d. at 40.

B. Factual Background and Proceedings Bei» v

1. Duke’s Plant Modernization Program. This case

concerns significant rehabilitation projects at eight of Duke’s

plants in the Carolinas. See Pet..App. 26a-28a. The units

began service between 1940 and 1975, and had, by the 1980s,

become so debilitated that a number were removed from

Duke’s installed generating capacity because “they no longer

[could] provide reliable service.” State ex. rel. Utilities

Comm. v. Eddleman, 358 S.E.2d 339, 348 (N.C. 1987).

Duke’s CEO testified to South Carolina utility officials about

the “geriatric condition” of Duke units, JA 201, stating they

were “no longer reliable because of their age and condition,”

and that “[h]istorically, units of this age and condition would

be retired and scrapped.” Pet. App. 28a; JA 204; see

Eddleman, 358 S.E.2d at 349 (“*Ordinarily, plants of this age

and condition are retired and replaced by new capacity.””)

(quoting and upholding N.C. Utilities Commission finding

regarding the Duke plants).

In 1985, Duke embarked on what it called its “Plant

Modernization Program” (PMP), aimed at “refurbish[ing]”

projects it had taken off line, JA 224, so they could “operate

safely, reliably, and cost effectively for an additional 20

years.” Pet. App. 28a; see JA 232. Duke’s project manager

described the modernization of one of the facilities, Unit 4 of

the Buck Steam Station, as equivalent to taking a 1932 Ford

and “rebuild[ing] it completely” so that it could run “from

here [North Carolina] to Denver every day.” U.S. Summ. J.

Ex. 24 at 25 (Milton Starnes Dep. 25:16).'? Duke’s PMP

'* Duke's prescribed “major rehabilitation” for its plants included, for

example, replacement of “[m]ajor portions of the boiler water walls of the

boiler superheater and of the drum circulation system” at Buck 4, as well

19

strategy was to “[cJapitalize all expenditures” of PMP, JA

230, with “rehabilitation and upgrading” projects completed

over a number of years to make “the extended operating life

of the rehabilitated units a cost-effective alternative to the

addition of new capacity.” JA 232.

Duke’s target for PMP projects was improving a unit's

availability for service to a range of 80-85%. JA 230. But no

such heavy utilization was needed to yield a significant

increase in emissions. Duke's expert testified that the Buck 4

unit, which did not operate at all for 10 years prior to and

during the PMP, would need to operate for only 151 hours —

less than seven days — to increase sulfur dioxide emissions by

40 tons per year, the threshold for a significant increase under

the PSD regulations,'’ while the United States’ expert

projected that Buck 4’s post project emissions would increase

by 873.2 tons per year. '*

2. District Court Proceedings. In December 2000, the

United States filed an enforcement action against Duke

pursuant to Sections 113(b) and 167 of the CAA, charging

that Duke had violated the Act by engaging in 29

as manufacture and installation of new generator coils and replacement of

condenser tubes (JA 206-07); for Buck 3, complete “rewinding” of a

“condemned” generator rotor “too dangerous to operate under

circumstances” as well as “major replacements of the boiler” (JA 206);

and, for Allen 2, “modifications and upgrading” of the boiler, replacement

of a precipitator, replacement feed water heaters, and a “completely

rewound” generator stator with “new copper coils, insulation, and the

works” (JA 206). Duke was “counting on total rchabilitation, or there was

no way” its older units could make it into the 21" Century. JA 210.

' US. Ex. 96 (Ex. FCG-5 to Expert Report of Frank C. Graves).

'* JA 445 (Comparison Test 2). Buck 4 resumed commercial operations

on January 1, | 995, CA4 JA at 790, without having undergone NSR and

without any PSD pollution controls. EPA's online Unit Emissions Report

for Buck 4 reports that. in 2003, Buck 4 operated 5,132 hours and emitted

1,095 tons of SO. See http://cfpub.cpa.gov zdmindex.cfm (quick reports,

unit level emissions report, acid rain database. facility name “Buck,” Unit

ID “7") (last visited July 15, 2006). Unlike the parties in Puerto Rican

Cement and WEPCo, Duke never sought an applicability determination.

20

“modifications” without obtaining PSD permits required

under the Act and the applicable state implementation plans. '°

Petitioners intervened as plaintiffs. Plaintiffs submitted that

Duke’s extensive refurbishments resulted in large increases in

emissions and constituted modifications under the governing

PSD regulations.'° Among other defenses, Duke countered

that a PSD “increase” could not occur absent an inerease in

hourly emissions rate. Pet. App. 58a-59a.

The district court sided with Duke, and concluded that the

“PSD statutory definition [of modification] incorporated not

only the NSPS statutory definition of modification, but also

the regulations implementing the NSPS program,” Pet. App.

35a, see id. 67a, and, further, that Duke's post-PMP emissions

had to be calculated by “assuming the same pre-project”

hours of operation, meaning that “only if the project increases

the hourly rate of emissions will there be an annual emissions

increase.” /d. 59a-60a. Although the PSD regulations require

comparison of annual, rather than hourly emissions, the court

reasoned that consistency could be achieved by “annualizing”

the hourly rates -- i.e., assuming that the plant would operate

the same pre-project number of hours, even for changes

'S This is one of a number of NSR enforcement cases involving major

renovation projects at older coal-fired power plants. See, e.g., United

States v. Cinergy, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (S.D. Ind. 2005), appeal pending

(7 Cir. No. 06-1224); United States v. East Kentucky Power Co-op., Civ.

No. 04-34 (E.D. Ky.) (filed 2004); United States v. American Elec. Power

Serv. Corp., Civ. No. C2-05-360 (S.D. Ohio) (filed 2005). Because those

sources account for a large share of emissions of pollutants such as sulfur

dioxide (SO,) and nitrogen oxides (NOx), see, e.g., General Accounting

Office, Air Pollution Emissions from Older Electric-Generating Units,

No. GAO 02-709, 2-3, 20-21 (2002); Jonathan Levy and Jack Spengler,

Health Benefits of Emissions Reductions from Older Power Plants, 9 RISK

IN PERSPECTIVE | (2001), and because BACT typically reduces emissions

dramatically, sec 71 Fed. Reg. 9866, 9871 (Feb. 27, 2006), NSR

enforcement carries substantial bencfits for air quality and public health.

'© In 1982, EPA approved North and South Carolina's incorporation of the

1980 PSD regulations into their respective SIPs, 47 Fed. Reg. 7836 (Feb.

23, 1982) (NC); 47 Fed. Reg. 6017 (Feb. 10, 1982) (SC).

21

whose very purpose was to support increased operations. The

court found support for an hourly rate test in the regulatory

language providing that increases in “hours of operation”

would not count as “physical changes” or changes in a

source’s “method of operation.” /d. 58a-59a. Plaintiffs

stipulated that Duke’s refurbishments would not cause a PSD-

triggering “net emissions increase” under the district court’s

hourly rate test, and based on that stipulation, the district

court entered final judgment for Duke. Pet. App. 87a.

3. Fourth Circuit Proceedings. On June 15, 2005, the

Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment for Duke. It did not

adopt the district court’s regulatory ratification theory.

Instead it reasoned that “because Congress mandated that the

PSD definition of ‘modification’ be identical to the NSPS

definition of ‘modification, the EPA cannot interpret

‘modification’ under the PSD inconsistently with the way it

interprets the term under the NSPS.” Pet. App. | 1a (footnote

omitted). The panel relied on Rowan, 452 U.S. 247, a case it

had ordered the parties to brief afier oral argument. Pet. App.

lla-12a n.4, 21a. The Fourth Circuit read Rowan to teach

that “when Congress itself provided ‘substantially identical’

statutory definitions of a term in different statutes, the agency

charged with enforcing the statutes could not interpret the

statutory definitions ‘differently.”” /d. (quoting 452 U.S. at

257); see Pet. App. 14a (concluding that Congress “intended

the statutory definitions of ‘modification’ in the PSD and

NSPS provisions to be interpreted identically”). Finding that

Congress had in this way “directly spoken to the precise

question at issue,”” Pet. App. | la n.3 (quoting Chevron), the

court declared that “the language and various interpretations

of the PSD regulations, on which the district court partially

based its holding and which the parties exhaustively discuss,

are largely irrelevant to the proper analysis of this case.” /d.

In a footnote, the Fourth Circuit addressed its power to

resolve the case on these grounds, stating that while Section

307(b) barred it from passing on the “validity” of the PSD

regulations, the district court had shown that the regulations

22

“can be interpreted consistently with pre-existing principles -

the NSPS regulations,” and that “the statute” required the

PSD rules to be so construed. Pet. App. 15a n.7.

4. Rehearing Petitions in New York and this Case.

D.C. Circuit’s New York decision was handed down nine ba

after the decision in this case. In upholding the 1980 PSD

regulations, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged the Fourth

Circuit’s decision, but held that the petitioners had waived the

argument that EPA “must use identical regulatory definitions

of modification across the NSPS and NSR programs.” 413

F.3d at 20. The Utilities Air Regulatory Group (UARG), of

which Duke is a member, and which was represented in New

York by Duke’s Fourth Circuit counsel, sought panel and en

banc rehearing in New York, arguing that “[t}he statutory

construction argument addressed and resolved by the Fourth

Circuit in Duke Energy was the same one [UARG] presented

in this case: the proper interpretation of CAA § 169(2)(C),

the provision of the Act defining ‘construction’ for purposes

of PSD.” Pet. for Reh., D.C. Cir. No. 02-1387 at 13 (Aug. 8,

2005). The D.C. Circuit denied rehearing on December 9,

2005. 431 F.3d 801. No party petitioned for certiorari.

Petitioners and the United States sought rehearing in the

Fourth Circuit, pointing both to the D.C. Circuit’s ruling

upholding the 1980 regulations and to its reading of the PSD

provisions to require an actual emissions test for PSD. Those

petitions were denied on August 30, 2005.'’ This Court

granted certiorari on May 15, 2006.

'? EPA then issued a notice proposing to amend its regulations to

establish, for Electric Generating Units, a “uniform emissions test

nationally under the NSPS and NSR programs[.|” 70 Fed. Reg. 61081,

61083 (Oct. 20, 2005). While it “disagreed” with the Duke decision, and

noted “differences” between NSPS and PSD precluding an identical

modification test for both, EPA considered the need for changes

“apparent” duc to the Fourth Circuit’s ruling. /d. at 61081, 61083 & n.3.

23

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In deciding this case based on a statutory “mandate” that

EPA use identical regulatory tests for NSPS and PSD

modifications, the Fourth Circuit exceeded express statutory

limits upon its authority. Section 307(b) of the Act, in the

clearest possible terms, provides that review of national CAA

regulations be obtained only in the D.C. Circuit, by petition

for review filed within 60 days, and that matters reviewable in

this manner “shall not” be subject to judicial review in

enforcement proceedings such as this one.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision is the paradigm of the broad,

facial, nationally significant ruling that Congress assigned to

the D.C. Circuit — exclusively. The court of appeals nowhere

found, and in the circumstances could not have found, that the

regulations promulgated in 1980 and 1992 lulled prospective

litigants into believing that EPA had adopted PSD regulations

identical to the NSPS regulations, or that EPA had adopted a

“maximum hourly rate” test for PSD. The PSD rules on their

face differ markedly from the NSPS rules in numerous

significant respects, including their measurement of increases

by “actual emissions” in “tons per year,” and their provisions

for “netting.” EPA’s 1980 preamble explained that these

features of the rules represented a significant departure from

the prior, potential emissions-focused test and had been

tailored to the distinct requirements of the PSD program, as

elucidated by the D.C. Circuit in Alabama Power. The CMA

litigation and “Exhibit B” — which sought to strip the “actual”

emissions language from the regulations and insert new

hourly rate language — show that regulated parties understood

that EPA had adopted a new, PSD-specific approach to

determining modifications. Review of any statutory challenge

like that sustained by the Fourth Circuit plainly “could have

been obtained” in the D.C. Circuit, and was barred in this

enforcement case. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(2), (d)(7)(B), (e).

The Fourth Circuit’s insistence that it was merely engaged

in “interpretation” of the 1980 PSD regulations — significantly

24

undercut by its statement that their language was “irrelevant,”

and its failure to examine the regulatory text or accompanying

Federal Register preamble at all — rings hollow. Whatever

room the PSD regulations may leave for interpretation on

other points, on the point relevant here — whether their

definition of modification mirrors the NSPS regulations, and

imposes an hourly rate test - the regulations are

unambiguous, and they cannot be so “interpreted.”

The court of appeals’ extrajurisdictional foray

compromised the interests in regulatory stability, orderly

administration, and uniformity that Section 307(b) was

enacted to protect. The court held the PSD regulations

defective on a ground that was not presented to EPA in its

NSR rulemakings and that was waived in the Section 307(b)

review proceeding in the D.C. Circuit. Its ruling conflicts

with D.C. Circuit rulings on both the validity of specific PSD

regulations and on the meaning of the statutory provisions

that are pivotal to multiple mayor CAA programs.

Having ventured into territory prohibited to it by Section

307(b), the Fourth Circuit seriously misapprehended the

substance of the Act. EPA’s regulatory standard for PSD

modifications adheres to the text of the statutory modification

definition — which broadly embraces “any physical change”

that “increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted” by a

source ~ and to the D.C. Circuit’s pathmarking construction

of the PSD provisions in Alahama Power. As the D.C.

Circuit has held, the Act unambiguously rules out an

approach under which actual emissions increases resulting

from a physical change are disregarded.

This Court’s Rowan decision does not support the Fourth

Circuit's reading of the Act. That case did not espouse the

“effectively irrebuttable” presumption the court below took

from it, but rested on a thoroughly conventional review of

statutory text, purposes and history, which led to a conclusion

that Congress had specifically intended the IRS to implement

the particular statutes at issue through parallel regulatory

standards. Here, there is no indication that Congress intended

25

or expected EPA to devise a uniform definition of

“modification” without regard to the particulars of the

different programs in which it must operate. This Court has

directed that common statutory terms be read in context, and

the Act’s PSD provisions provide explicit support for EPA’s

definition of PSD emissions in terms of actual “tons per

year.” The D.C. Circuit, relying on the modification definition

and other provisions of the PSD program, has held that EPA

not only may but must measure PSD increases to capture

actual increases in emissions, and must include in its PSD

rules elements statutorily forbidden for NSPS.

The Fourth Circuit’s mistaken conversion of the

presumption of uniform usage into a peremptory iron law led

it to impose on EPA a test for PSD modifications that would

violate the PSD statute. By immunizing modernization

projects that greatly “increase the amount” of pollution

actually “emitted” by sources, the court’s maximum hourly

rate test would defeat the basic aim of the PSD enactment to

assess and limit adverse impacts on local air quality.

ARGUMENT

I. SECTION 307(b) OF THE ACT PRECLUDED THE

FOURTH CIRCUIT FROM REVIEWING THE

STATUTORY VALIDITY OF EPA’S REGULATORY

TEST FOR PSD MODIFICATIONS

The Fourth Circuit’s theory that the PSD provisions’ cross-

reference to the Section I111(a)(4) definition of

“modification” required that EPA’s regulations on NSPS

modifications and PSD modifications be identical involves

precisely the kind of matter the Act reserves to the D.C.

Circuit exclusively and that “shall not be” reached by a court

in an enforcement action. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(2).

A. The Fourth Circuit Plainly Violated Section 307(b).

Congress could not have been more explicit that statutory

challenges to EPA _ regulations may be adjudicated

exclusively in the D.C. Circuit on timely petition for review.

26

Section 307(b) provides that EPA regulations and other

actions of national effect are reviewable “only” in that court,

by petition filed within 60 days, and that actions reviewable

by such a petition “shall not be subject to judicial review” in

enforcement actions. See also 42 U.S.C. 7607(e). An

exercise of Congress’s recognized powei to “prescribe the

procedures and conditions under which, and the courts in

which, judicial review of administrative orders may be had,”

the statute “is written in simple words of plain meaning and

leaves no room to doubt the congressional purpose and

intent.” City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S.

320, 335-36 (1958) (discussing Federal Power Act’s review

provision, 16 U.S.C. 825b)).'* “[T]here is little room for

doubt regarding congressional intent where, as here, the

relevant statute speaks not only to the existence and nature of

pre-enforcement review but also to the non-existence of

enforcement-cum-review.” United States v. Ethyl Corp., 761

F.2d 1153, 1157 (5" Cir. 1985). In short, Section 307(b)

means “exactly what it says.” Harrison, 446 U.S. at 589.

Section 307 reflects Congress’s considered — and

reconsidered — judgment that limitations on the timing, scope,

and forum for judicial review are of central importance to the

” eas implementation of this uncommonly complex statute. See

Alabama Power, 606 F.2d at 1075. In 1977, after reviewing

proposals to narrow Section 307’s limitations, Congress

instead expanded the grant of exclusive jurisdiction (while

also enlarging the time for review and adding detailed

requirements for EPA rulemaking). See supra, p. 8 & n.3.

Congress deliberately called upon the D.C. Circuit’s special

expertise in superintending the administration of complex

'’ See F.C.C. v. ITT World Comme'ns, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 468 (1984)

(discussing exclusive D.C. Circuit review of certain FCC orders, see 47

U.S.C. 402(a)); E. 1. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112,

136-137 (1977) (discussing Section 50%b) of Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.

1369(b)); NLRB v. Cheney Cal. Lumber Co., 327 U.S. 385, 388 (1946).

27

regulatory statutes,'’ and promoted stability and uniformity

by giving that court’s decisions a definitive role in overseeing

CAA implementation. See City of Tacoma, 357 U.S. at 336

(referring to “statutory finality” created by Federal Power

Act’s exclusive review provision); Lubrizol Corp. v. Train,

547 F.2d 310, 317 (6" Cir. 1975) (in Section 307(b),

“Congress established a single, national forum whose

decisions would be uniform and final, save for review by the

Supreme Court”). Implementing the Act is an iterative

process, in which both the D.C. Circuit and the EPA must

construe the Act in light of D.C. Circuit precedent, subject to

this Court’s review. See Davton Power & Light Co. v. EPA,

§20 F.2d 703, 708 (6" Cir. 1975) (EPA regulations were

“promulgated in response to” ruling of D.C. Circuit, which

was “[c]learly * * * in the best position to determine whether

the regulations are consistent with its order”).*? Section

" See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L.

REV. 1267, 1310 (1975) (noting D.C. Circuit’s “special importance for

administrative law” in light of CAA’s and other exclusive review

provisions); O ‘Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 535 (1933) (The

“courts of the District” are “in closer contact with, and more immediately

open to the influences of, the legislative department, and exercise a more

extensive jurisdiction in cases affecting the operations of the general

government and its various departments” than other federal courts). In

opposing the 1976 Administrative Conference proposal, later rejected by

Congress, to limit the scope of exclusive review, EPA General Counsel

G. William Frick emphasized the D.C. Circuit's “obvious expertise in

administrative law matters,” its “sensitivity to Congressional mandates,”

and its “thorough{] familiar[itv]” with the CAA, a “very complex statute

— and with its equally complex legislative history.” 41 Fed. Reg. at

56769. See Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 859

(D.C. Cir. 1979) (reviewing. pursuant to Section 307, challenges of

“baroque complexity” to “highly complex” PSD rules promulgated by

EPA “besieged on all side by vocal private and public interest groups”).

* Because agencies must adhere to precedent grounded on unambiguous

statutory commands, National Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X

Internet Servs. 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2700 (2005): Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843

n.9, Section 307(b) protects EPA from the quandary presented (as here) by

conflicting judicial readings of those commands.

28

307(b) ensures that a court reviewing complex decisions of

national significance will have before it the rulemaking

record upon which to evaluate the agency’s actions. See 42

U.S.C. 7607(d)(7)(A) (defining “record for judicial review”);

Lubrizol Corp., 547 F.2d at 316; cf. Florida Power & Light

Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744-45 (1985) (discussing

reasons for initial court of appeals review under Hobbs Act).

By barring other courts from deciding matters that “could

have been” resolved in the D.C. Circuit, the Act gives parties

of all stripes reason to present their inevitably conflicting

theories about the Act’s meaning in the same time and place.

And by barring review of such matters in enforcement

actions, the Act expresses Congress’s strong preference that

regulations restricting the emission of harmful pollutants into

the air should be followed — or promptly challenged — but not

disobeyed in hopes that the local court in which enforcement

proceeds will invalidate them. See S. Rep. No. 91-1196 at 38

(the issue before courts in public or citizen enforcement

actions is the “factual one of whether there had been

compliance”); Hawaiian Elec. Co. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1440,

1447 (9" Cir. 1984) (challenge to 1980 PSD modification

regulations barred by Section 307(b), a “valid mechanism to

prevent continual piecemeal attacks on the same EPA

action”); see also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S.

305, 323 n2 (1982) (discussing Clean Water Act

enforcement). The effect of a D.C. Circuit ruling that CAA

regulations are flawed is a remand to EPA, see Florida

Power & Light Co., 470 U.S. at 744, rather than, as here, a

disruptive intercircuit conflict over the validity of national

regulations and over the meaning of the Act.

Section 307’s multiple prohibitions against entertaining in

other fora challenges that could have been brought by petition

in the D.C. Circuit squarely applied here. Any claim that the

“plain language of the Clean Air Act” mandated that EPA

adopt “identical[]” modification regulations for the NSPS and

the NSR programs (Pet. App. 14a), was a “facial” challenge

to the regulations, a pure question of law that fell in the very

29

heartland of the D.C. Circuit’s exclusive review authority.

See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass ‘ns, 531 U.S. 457, 479

(2001) (pointing to the “special judicial-review provision of

the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)” in holding that Court,

reviewing a D.C. Circuit decision, could address issue that

was “purely one of statutory interpretation”). Nothing about

the Fourth Circuit’s abstract statutory theory depended on

EPA’s application of its regulations to particular

circumstances. Cf. Puerto Rican Cement, 889 F.2d at 296-98.

EPA’s adoption in 1980 — as in a// generations of its PSD and

NNSR regulations ~ of a test for modifications that differs in

explicit and decisive ways from the agency’s NSPS

modification test constituted “[a]ction of the Administrator

with respect to which review could have been obtained under

paragraph (1)” of Section 307(b), 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(2).7"

Nor could anyone have believed, in 1980, that EPA had

established PSD regulations that were identical to its NSPS

regulations. The marked difference between the modification

tests — “hourly rate” for NSPS and “actual, annual” for NSR —

has been a staple of judicial and academic descriptions of the

NSPS and PSD regulatory regimes.” The PSD regulations’

*' See H.R. Rep. No. 95-294 at 322 (“{U]Jnless a petitioner can show that

the basis for his challenge did not cxist or was not reasonably to be

anticipated before the expiration of 60 days, the court of appeals is

without jurisdiction to consider a petition filed later than 60 days after the

publication of the promulgated rule.”).

2 See New York 1, 413 F.3d at 18 (“While the NSPS regulatory definition

of modification allegedly focuses on the hourly rate of emissions, the NSR

definition focuses on net emissions increases measured in tons per year’);

WEPCo, 893 F.2d at 913, 915 (contrasting NSPS and PSD regulations);

United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 875 (S.D. Ohio

2003) (rejecting claim that PSD regulation provides for “hourly emissions

rate test” and finding it “abundantly clear” that it “focuses on ... total

annual emissions” whereas NSPS regulation “focuses on the maximum

potential hourly emissions”); United States vy. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 245

F. Supp. 2d 994, 998 (S.D. Ind. 2003). See also 57 Fed. Reg. at 32316

(“Emissions increases for NSPS purposes are determined by changes in

the hourly emissions rates at maximum physical capacity.” whercas “the

30

“actual emissions” metric and their references to “tons per

year,” 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)(1)(i)(a), (21)(ii), (23)(i), nowhere

appear in the NSPS regulations, which measure emissions

increases by changes in hourly rates, in “kg/hr.” /d. 60.14(b).

The 1980 PSD regulations specifically require that a source's

pre-change emissions be “calculated using the unit’s actual

operating hours,” 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)(21)(ii), while the

NSPS regulations contain no such provision. The NSPS

regulations contain elaborate procedures, absent from the

PSD regulations, for calculating hourly emission rates. 40

C.F.R. 60.14(b) (1), (2) (discussing emissions factors,

material balances and testing procedures). See also 40 Fed.

Reg. at 58420 (Appendix C). The equally elaborate netting

provisions in the PSD regulations, e.g., id. 51.166(b)(3) -

linked to the statute’s distinctive focus on large sources’

effects on local air quality, see Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at

401 — are absent from the NSPS regulations, as are the PSD

“significance” thresholds, measured in “tons per year.” 40

C.F.R. 51.166(b)(23)(i). These and other differences provided

vivid notice to prospective litigants that EPA, in 1980, did not

espouse the view that its PSD and NSPS modification

regulations had to be, or were, the same. The only avenue for

a claim that EPA had thereby violated “the plain language of

the Clean Air Act,” Pet. App. 14a, was a petition for review in

the D.C. Circuit.

The 1980 preamble provided equally vivid notice.

Highlighting the significance of its new emissions increase

test for PSD, EPA announced that it had “shifted the focus of

its regulatory definitions from ‘potential to emit’ to ‘actual

emissions.”” 45 Fed. Reg. at 52700; see New York, 413 F.3d

at 14 (discussing this shift). Explaining this departure from

NSR regulations examine total emissions to the atmosphere * * *

determined by changes in annual emissions as expressed in tons per ycar

(tpy).”); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., STATIONARY SOURCE AIR POLLUTION LAW

170 (2005)) (“Unlike NSPS, which are based on a change in the hourly

rate of emissions, PSD applicability is triggered by significant changes in

total annual emissions, expressed in tpy.” ).

31

the 1979 proposed regulations, under which PSD would have

been triggered by increases in “a unit’s potential to emit the

pollutant,” 44 Fed. Reg. at 51948, EPA pointed to Alabama

Power’s mandate to address “actual” impacts on air quality.

45 Fed. Reg. at 52700. EPA also explained that the shift to an

actual emissions test was also necessary to prevent

malfunction and misuse of the netting mechanism. /d.; see

also id. at 52713 (increased emissions “due to increased hours

of operation or capacity utilization” occurring afier the

baseline period count against increment).

That EPA had adopted a new modification standard

specially tailored to the PSD provisions was not lost on the

agency’s readership. The General Motors petitioners in CMA

complained vociferously that under the new regulations PSD

would apply to projects that “result in a significant increase in

actual emissions, even though the source’s net capacity to

emit remains constant or declines.” Br. at 5-6 (D.C. Cir. No.

79-1112) (emphasis in original). And Exhibit B to the CMA

settlement proposed to “delet[e]” the word “actual” from the

1980 regulations, and to substitute a test that would have

exempted all physical changes from PSD review in the

absence of a net increase in “PTE [potential to emit] (as

calculated in terms of pounds of pollutant emitted per hour).”

67 Fed. Reg. at 80205 (quoting Exhibit B).**

B. The Fourth Circuit’s “Interpretation” of the 1980

PSD Regulations Contravened Section 307(b) and

Is Foreclosed By the Regulatory Text.

In response to objections that EPA’s regulations were

subject to exclusive review in the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth

Circuit stated it was merely addressing an “interpretation” of

EPA’s 1980 PSD regulations, which in its view could be

“interpreted consistently with pre-existing principles,” namely

** The considerations just summarized utterly banish from this case the

kind of fair notice concerns that might be raised by some applications of

Section 307(b\2). See ddamo Wrecking, 434 U.S. at 283 n.2.

32

“the NSPS regulations.” Pet. App. 15a n.7..* The court of

appeals did not itself explain how such an interpretation could

be accomplished, instead pointing to the distnct court’s

opinion, and insisting that a “choice of this interpretation — as

required under the statute — over the EPA’s interpretation is

not an invalidation of those regulations.” /d.*

But the Fourth Circuit’s own opinion makes plain that the

court strayed far into forbidden D.C. Circuit terrain. Indeed,

the court confided that, because its ruling was based upon the

statute under the first prong of Chevron, “the language and

various interpretations of the PSD regulations” were “largely

irrelevant to the proper analysis of this case.” Pet. App. lla

n.3. The court went on wholly to ignore the central tools for

** No genuine question is presented here of Section 307(b)(2)'s effect on

the authority of courts in enforcement actions to review agencies’

interpretations of their own regulations, since the Fourth Circuit's ruling

was by any measure a clearly forbidden, facial, statutory invalidation of

national CAA regulations. By its terms, Section 307(b)(2) does not turn

on “invalidation” versus “interpretation” of regulations, but instead on

whether judicial review “could have been obtained” under Section

307(b\(1), which authorizes review of some agency interpretations of their

own regulations. See Harrison, 446 U.S. at 586-94 (Section 307(b)(1)

provides for court of appeals review of NSPS applicability determination);

Puerto Rican Cement, 889 F.2d at 296-98, 299 (reviewing EPA's

application of PSD regulations to the petitioner's facility).

** There was an odd mismatch between the court of appeals’ reading of

what “the statute” required — identity between NSPS and PSD

modification regulations mandated by the common statutory definitions —

and its rather casual endorsement of the district court's analysis, which

had relied on provisions of the PSD regulations, relating to netting and

“significance” thresholds, (Pet. App. 64a-65a & n.22) that are entirely

absent from the NSPS regulations and thereby violate the Fourth Circuit's

reading of the CAA’s “mandate.” See also id. at 64a (district court’s

insistence that its interpretation did not make the PSD and NSPS tests

“indistinguishable”). The Fourth Circuit left unexplained, as well. how the

1992 amendment to the PSD regulations test for emissions increases,

unaddressed by the district court and unchallenged by Duke or any other

utility despite its patent difference from the NSPS increase test. New York,

413 F.3d at 17, could be “interpreted” to conform its statutory theory.

33

interpreting regulations, such as the regulatory text,

Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587-88 (2000),

and the rulemaking preamble. Even when regulatory text

permits alternative readings, a court has no warrant to

overturn an agency’s interpretation merely because the court

concludes the text “can be interpreted” differently.°° A

species of “interpretation” that deems regulatory language

and the agency’s contemporaneous Federal Register

explanation “irrelevant” would, among other defects, nullify

the explicit restrictions imposed by Congress in Section

307(b), and open the door to all manner of congressionally

prohibited collateral attacks. The Fourth Circuit's actions

consisted of a statutory invalidation of national EPA rules, a

paradigmatic violation of Section 307(b) and (e).

In any event, the court was entirely wrong in concluding

that the PSD modification regulations “can be interpreted” to

be identical to, or the functional equivalent of, the NSPS

regulations. As we have just explained, the PSD regulations

nowhere provide for, and cannot accommodate, the maximum

hourly rate test imposed by the courts below. They were

deliberately crafted to capture net increases in “actual

emissions,” measured in “tons per year,” whether or not there

is an increase in maximum hourly emissions rates or other

measure of capacity to emit, and the two sets of regulations

differ in numerous other obvious and fundamental ways.

Section 307(b) barred the Fourth Circuit from doing what

Duke and the other CM4 challengers unsuccessfully tned to

do: “delete” the PSD regulations’ reliance on “actual”

emissions, and amend the regulation to add a “potential to

emit” test under which no PSD “modification” could be found

absent an increase in hourly emissions rates. Supra, p. 12-13.

*° An agency's interpretation merits “substantial deference,” Thomas

Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994), and “control{s]”

unless “plainly erroncous or inconsistent with the regulation."” Auer v.

Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citations omitted). See Puerto Rican

Cement, 889 F.2d at 297.

34

The basis for the Fourth Circuit’s alternative

“interpretation” of the PSD regulations was the district court’s

opinion, which relied (Pet. App. 59a-60a) on the provision

stating that “[a] physical change or change in the method of

operation shall not include” an “increase in the hours of

operation or in the production rate * * *” 40 C.F.R.

51.166(b)(2)(111)().*” The court understood this provision to

mean that even when a plant undergoes an extensive physical

change — a “modernization” — the very purpose of which is to

allow it to operate dramatically more hours, regulators must

pretend that hours of operation and production rates will

remain unchanged. See Pet. App. 58a-59a (“in calculating

post project emissions levels the hours and conditions of

operation must be held constant”).*

This reading is manifestly wrong. By providing that an

*’ The court of appeals (Pet. App. 1Sa n.7) also cited statements by

Edward Reich, Director of EPA’s Division of Stationary Source

Enforcement, in which Reich stated that increased hours of operation

would not suffice to trigger PSD. JA 28, 35. Reich's statements on the

increased hours exemption do not address situations where a physical

change enables increased hours of operation, and, to the extent they are

construed to exempt the resulting emissions from the definition of

emissions “increase” (rather than “change”™), are flatly inconsistent with

the text of and preamble to the 1980 regulations, and with EPA’s

application of them since Reich's statements, see. e.g., JA 294; 57 Fed.

Reg. at 32328. In Puerto Rican Cement, the court properly rejected a

similar reliance on the “deviant” reading of the PSD regulations in by an

EPA official, observing that the statements were inconsistent with “EPA

materials written both before, and after,” and that “[nJo large agency can

guarantee that all its administrators will react similarly, or interpret

regulations identically, throughout the United States.” 889 F.2d at 298-99.

** The district court claimed to fit an hourly rate test into the PSD rules by

“annualizing” it (e.g., Pet. App. 64a), a step the court considered

necessary to conform to the regulations’ numerous references to annual

emissions. The regulations, however, make no mention of annualization

of hourly rates, and the “net emissions increase” definition encompasses

annual emissions preciscly because it references “actual emissions,”

which are defined by “tons per year” of emissions. 40 C.F.R.

$1.166(b 31), (b)(21).

35

increase in hours or production rates does not constitute a

“physical change or change in the method of operation,” what

the regulations plainly mean is that a modification will not be

found in the absence of a physical change. The fact that an

increase in operating hours does not alone suffice to meet the

first prong of the two-part modification test in no way

suggests that increases in actual emissions caused by a

physical change should be ignored. See Ohio Edison, 276 F.

Supp. 2d at 876 (exemption “clearly” limited to “an increase

in hours of operation unaccompanied by physical construction

to the unit itself’). The question of what counts as an

increase is addressed by the second prong of the modification

test, defining a “significant emissions increase,” which, far

from ignoring hours or production rates, requires

consideration of both. 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)(21)(11).

Properly understood, the regulations ensure that prosaic

business decisions that might appear to fall within the

statute’s broad references to “any physical change” or “any *

* * change in the method of operation” do not trigger PSD

requirements. As EPA explained in 1980, the exemption

derived from the agency’s decision that the regulatory

definition of modification “should focus on changes in ‘actual

emissions,”” and that:

While EPA has concluded that as a general rule Congress

intended any significant net increase in such emissions to

undergo PSD or nonattainment review, it is also

convinced that Congress could not have intended a

company to have to get an NSR permit before it could

lawfully change hours or rate of operation. Plainly, such

a requirement would severely and unduly hamper the

ability of any company to take advantage of favorable

market conditions. The emphasis of the relevant statutory

provisions on ‘construction’ strongly supports EPA’s

interpretation of Congress’ intent. See, e.g., section

165(a), 42 U.S.C. 7475.

45 Fed. Reg. at 52704. EPA’s rationale, like the regulatory

text, demonstrates that the exemption was not meant as an

36

instruction to engage in the counterfactual exercise in

measurement engaged in by the district court.

Because “modification” is a dual test under the statute -

requiring a “physical change” and an “increase” in the

amount of pollutant emitted by a source — the PSD regulations

broadly allow a facility to increase its hours of operation or

production rates in response to business needs without

triggering PSD. But, under PSD, if a dilapidated source is

physically rebuilt to expand operations, the additional

pollution that results from the expanded use of the facility is

considered in determining whether PSD applies, because both

of the statutory criteria are satisfied. See 57 Fed. Reg. at

32328 (“[A]n increase in emissions attributable to an increase

in hours of operation or production rate which is the result of

a construction-related activity is not excluded from [PSD and

NNSR] review.”) (citing WEPCo, 893 F.2d at 916 n.11, and

Puerto Rican Cement, 889 F.2d at 298).

C. The Ruling Below Produced the Very Disarray

Section 307(b) was Enacted to Prevent.

The Fourth Circuit’s ruling struck a serious and wholly

gratuitous blow to a complex body of case law and agency

regulations that emerged from 25 years of rulemaking and

judicial review under CAA Section 307(b) and (d). The EPA

regulations the Fourth Circuit found wanting were themselves

enacted in large part to conform to a D.C. Circuit decision

(Alabama Power) that had construed the PSD provisions of

the Act not only to permit but to require a distinctive

regulatory test for modification — a test that reflects statutory

imperatives peculiar to the NSR programs and that make it

fundamentally different from the NSPS regime. Without the

benefit of the administrative record on which Congress

commanded that EPA’s national policy decisions be

reviewed, 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(2)-(7), the court struck down

EPA’s regulatory test on statutory grounds that had not even

been presented to the agency in any of the various PSD

rulemakings, id. 7607(d)(7)(B), or presented to the D.C.

37

Circuit in the CMA/New York proceeding.

The Fourth Circuit's broad statutory ruling produced just

the sort of “inconsistent adjudications,” Ethyl Corp., 761 F.2d

at 1156, Section 307(b) was enacted to prevent, and its

decision was at odds with decisions of the very court

Congress assigned exclusive authority to make determinations

of this kind. Alabama Power and New York are utterly

inconsistent with the “mandate” the Fourth Circuit discerned

from the Act. See also New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880, 889

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (New York I/) (in Section 307(b) challenge

to 2003 NSR rules, stating that “|t]o the extent industry

intervenors [including Duke] rely on the NSPS regime to

reargue their position that ‘modifications’ require an increase

in maximum emissions rates, that issue was resolved in New

York I, 413 F.3d at 19-20, 40”). If other courts can be

persuaded (as they are being importuned) to brush aside

Section 307(b), the Fourth Circuit's ruling will continue to

invite collateral attacks on every generation of EPA’s PSD

and NNSR modification regulations (all of which differ in

important ways from the agency’s NSPS regulations). When

it enacted and expanded Section 307(b), Congress sought to

ward off just that result, recognizing that regulatory stability

and national uniformity are particularly important in the CAA

context, not least for States that incorporate regulations in

their SIPs. See Train v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 421

U.S. 60, 87 (1975) (noting States’ “reliance” on EPA’s CAA

implementing regulations).

Il. EPA’S DEFINITION OF PSD MODIFICATIONS BY

REFERENCE TO INCREASES IN ACTUAL, ANNUAL

EMISSIONS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE ACT

The Fourth Circuit’s ruling would warrant reversal even if

there were no Section 307(b). EPA’s decision to assess PSD

“modifications” in terms of physical changes’ net effect on a

source’s actual, annual emissions is entirely consistent with

the Act and reasonable. The court below condemned it only

by erroneous reliance on an exceptionally rigid presumption

38

that is unsupported by this Court’s decisions. The court

thereby imposed a test for PSD modifications that is itself

contrary to the plain text and basic purposes of the statute —

and to the decisions of the court of appeals with express

authority to determine the validity of CAA regulations.

A. The Statutory Text Supports EPA’s Approach.

An agency’s construction of a statute it administers must be

upheld if it is consistent with the “unambiguously expressed

intent of Congress,” and — to the extent the statute is

ambiguous — “based on a permissible construction of the

statute.” Chevron,467 U.S. at 842-43. See 42 U.S.C.

7607(d)(9) (statutory standard of review of CAA regulations,

including PSD regulations, id., 7607(d)(1)(J)).

The plain language of the Act strongly supports the

agency's approach. In promulgating the 1980 rules, EPA

properly emphasized that plain text: “any physical change in,

or change in the method of operation of, a stationary source

which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by

such source or which results in the emissions of any air

pollutant not previously emitted” - observing that “the

underlined words in the definition appear to refer to what the

source is actually emitting at a particular time.” 45 Fed. Reg.

at 52700 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 7411(a), underlining added by

EPA). EPA noted that Alabama Power had described the

PSD provisions in terms that “like the section 111(a)(4)

definition, suggest changes in actual emissions,” and that the

agency's regulatory definition was “consistent with the [D.C.

Circuit’s] view of section 111(a)(4).” /d. (citing 636 F.2d at

400-01).

EPA’s definition of PSD modifications in terms of actual

emissions is supported by statutory language defining “major

emitting facilit[ies]” subject to PSD as sources “which emit,

or which have the potential to emit,” pollutants in specified

annual amounts. 42 U.S.C. 7479(1) (emphasis added). This

“juxtaposition * * * indicates that when Congress enacted the

NSR program in 1977, it was conscious of the distinction

39

between actual and potential emissions.” New York, 413 F.3d

at 39 (citing Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 353, which, based

on this same text, concluded that “[p]lainly, the pollutants that

sources ‘emit’ is a reference to some measure of actual

emissions”). “If Congress had intended for ‘increases’ in

emissions to be measured in terms of potential or allowable

emissions, it would have added a reference to ‘potential to

emit’ or ‘emission limitations.*” Mew York, 413 F.3d at 40.

Thus, “the plain language of the CAA indicates that Congress

intended to apply NSR to changes that increase actual

emissions instead of potential or allowable emissions.” /d. *”

EPA’s decision to measure emissions increases in annual

terms — in “tons per year” — is also firmly rooted in the text,

which measures emissions for PSD coverage and exemption

purposes in “tons per year.” 42 U.S.C. 7475(b), 7479(1). See

also id. 7602(j), (x) (NNSR source definition in terms of “tons

per year” of emissions). In the 1990 amendments, Congress

continued the NSR programs’ reliance on actual, annual

emissions. Congress enacted mgorous new NNSR thresholds

based on actual annual emissions of pollutants, calibrated to

the severity of the given area’s pollution levels. See, ¢.g., 42

U.S.C. 751la(c) (major source thresholds for serious ozone

areas of “50 tons per year”); 751 1a(d) (for severe areas, “25

tons per year”); 75lla(e) (for extreme area, “10 tons per

year”). The NSR provisions, in short, are plainly “concerned

with increases in total annual emissions.” WEPCo, 893 F.2d

at 904 (emphasis added).

The PSD program protects local air quality largely through

the increment mechanism (wholly absent from NSPS), and

the “emphatic goal of the PSD provisions is to prevent those

thresholds from being exceeded|.]” Alabama Power, 636 F.2d

at 362. Increments are set by reference to a “baseline

*’ See also 42 U.S.C. 7475(b) (exempting “an expansion or modification

of a major emitting facility which is in existence on August 7, 1977" with

“less than fifty tons per year” of “al/owable” emissions from certain PSD

obligations) (emphasis added); 4lahuma Power, 636 F.2d at 400 n.47.

40

concentration,” 42 U.S.C. 7473, 7479(4), which “include[s]

all emissions actually being made by major facilities.”

Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 376 (emphasis added). EPA’s

definition of “significant net emissions increase” was meant

to “establish as close a correspondence as possible” between

PSD permitting requirements and activities that in fact

“consumed increment.” 45 Fed. Reg. at 52701. See also id.

at 52721 (“both baseline concentrations and increment

consumption should be based on actual air quality impacts’’);

id. at 52714 (increased pollution from existing sources not

“grandfather[ed]” into baseline, but instead counted against

increment). This choice was surely reasonable, if not

statutorily mandated: Under the PSD statute, “all emissions

are considered” in calculating increment consumption,

Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 381 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-

564 at 151 (1977). Exempting changes that significantly

increase actual, annual emissions would frustrate States’

ability to track and allocate increment in ways that reflect

their policy choices regarding new development. See S. Rep.

No. 95-127, pt. 98 at 31 (1977)."'

Moreover, EPA’s focus on actual emissions ensures that

netting credits are conferred only for contemporaneous

“decreases” in emissions that produce real air quality benefits.

A test turning on capacity to emit would convert netting,

designed to provide flexibility for projects whose overall

effect is benign, into a program of exemptions for projects

that in fact harm air quality. See 45 Fed. Reg. at 52700; 61

Fed. Reg. at 38269. That result would be especially perverse

given that Alabama Power held netting to be statutorily

* As explained in Alabama Power, Congress rejected proposals to make

the baseline turn on “plant capacity in existence.” See 636 F.2d at 380-81.

"A test exempting such projects from PSD review and BACT controls

would allow “modernized” projects to consume increment otherwise

available to other sources, see 45 Fed. Reg. at 52720, potentially barring a

“major new source with state-of-the-art emissions controls” from locating

in the area. 61 Fed. Reg. at 38270.

4]

required for PSD, even though statutorily prohibited for

NSPS, see ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 327-29, precisely because of

the PSD provisions’ distinctive focus on projects’ actual

effects on local air quality. 636 F.2d at 401.

EPA’s use of actual emissions has the virtue of “coherence”

and “consistency with” the PSD provisions’ “primary

purpose.” See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346

(1997). That purpose is reflected both in broad statutory

aspirations, 42 U.S.C. 7470, and in the elaborate mechanics of

the program. On every page, the statutory text confirms what

Alabama Power emphasized: The PSD program is focused

on assessing and limiting actual “effects” and “impacts” on

air quality in the vicinity of the source.”

B. Congress’s Use of the Same Statutory Definition of

“Modification” for NSPS and the NSR Programs

Provided No Basis to Invalidate the PSD Rules.

The Fourth Circuit found EPA’s PSD regulations contrary

to the Act only by using a decidedly nontraditional “tool[] of -

statutory construction,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11, ie.,

what it called an “effectively irrebuttable” presumption

derived from Rowan. Pet. App. 17a. This conclusion was

seriously misguided in multiple respects.

Rowan itself does not announce, or employ, any such rigid

presumption. In that case, the Court considered the meaning

* See, e.g.. 42 U.S.C. 7470(5) (requiring “careful evaluation” of any

decision “to permit increased air pollution in any area”), 7472(a) &

7475(d) (heightened protection for specified Parks and wilderness areas):

7473 (increments); 7475S(a\2) (requiring hearing on “air quality impact of

such source”); 7475(a)(6) (requiring analysis of “any air quality impacts

projected for the areca as a result of growth associated with such a

facility”); 7475(a\ 7) (requiring monitoring “to determine the effect which

emissions from any such facility may have” on “air quality in any area

which may be affected”); 7475(e)(1) (pre-permitting analysis of “ambient

air quality at the proposed site”); 7475(e 3) B) (detailing requirements to

assess “the effect of emissions from a proposed facility”); 7479(3) (“case-

by-case,” source-specific BACT requirement, “taking into account energy,

environmental, and economic impacts”).

42

of the statutory term “wages” as used in federal revenue laws.

The relevant statutes set forth three definitions of that term —

identical definitions governing contributions to the Social

Security (FICA) and unemployment insurance (FUTA)

programs, and a similar definition in the income-tax

withholding statute. See 452 U.S. at 249 & n.2. Treasury

regulations provided that employees’ meals and lodging

furnished for the “convenience of the employer” were not

“wages” for purposes of the withholding statute, but were

“wages” under FICA and FUTA. The Court described the

question before it as whether the latter regulatory definitions

were consistent with the agency’s obligation to “‘implement

the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,’” 452

U.S. at 252 (citation omitted), adding that the regulations

were due “less deference” because promulgated under only a

general grant of rulemaking authority, id. at 253.

The Court found in the history of the three statutes “strong

evidence that Congress intended ‘wages’ to mean the same

thing under FICA, FUTA, and income tax withholding.” 452

U.S. at 255. That history revealed “congressional concern for

‘the interest of simplicity and ease of administration,’” id. at

255-56 (quoting S. Rep. No. 77-1631 at 165 (1942)), and an

intent “to coordinate the income-tax withholding system with

FICA and FUTA.” /d. at 257. “[OJne of the means Congress

chose” to pursue that end was “to base withholding upon the

same measure — ‘wages’ — as taxation under FICA and

FUTA,” a term with a meaning known to be “‘intentionally

narrow and precise.’ 452 U.S. at 255-56 (quoting Central

Illinois Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 31

(1978)). See also 452 U.S. at 254 (noting agency’s

“acknowledgment” that benefits at issue were not “income,”

and that Central Illinois had held “wages” to be a “narrower

concept” than “income”). The Court found it “extraordinary”

that “‘a Congress pursuing this interest” would have intended,

“without ever saying so, for identical definitions to be

interpreted differently.” /d. at 257. It noted, as well, that the

IRS had first adopted parallel regulations, only to later change

43

the FICA/FUTA rules “without explanation.” /d. at 259, 260.

Rowan itself never endorsed the extremely strong and

general “presumption” the court of appeals took from it. — In

reaching its decision in that case, the Court analyzed the text

and history of the relevant statutes and its own prior

construction of the term “wages,” found indications that

Congress had intended the agency to adopt identical

definition of “wages,” and highlighted Treasury’s wholesale

failure to explain its decisions. Nothing in Rowan suggests

that an inference created by Congress’s use of identical or

similar definitions is ever “irrebuttable” (Pet. App. 17a) by

reference to the particular statutory contexts in which the

terms are used. Nor has this Court ever cited Rowan as

establishing any such overbearing canon of construction. In

the 25 years since Rowan was decided, this Court has cited it

only once, in United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S.

16, 24 (1982), decided the same Term, and there only for the

proposition that Treasury regulations promulgated under

general rulemaking authority receive less than full deference.

This Court’s precedent, in fact, strongly refutes the Fourth

Circuit’s acontextual canon. The presumption of uniform

usage “is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such

variation in the connection in which the words are used as

reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed

in different parts of the act with different intent.’” General

Dynamics Land Svs., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595 (2004)

(citations omitted). Far from establishing any irrebuttable

presumption, this Court has always “recognize[ed] the

controlling significance of context,” Wachovia Bank, Nat'l

Assoc. v. Schmidt, 126 S. Ct. 941, 948-49 (2006), in

construing common statutory terms.”

* See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S.

200, 213 (2001); Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Lab.

Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 634 (1993); Erlenbaugh v. United

States, 409 U.S. 239, 245 (1972); Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 231

(1959); Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 86-87

(1934). Walter Wheeler Cook’s comparison of an over-rigid presumption

44

And contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s view, the fact that

terms here are found in the form of a shared statutory

definition does not deactivate that “controlling” principle.

Thus, in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 343 (1997),

this Court unanimously held that the term “employee” in Title

VII, a term governed by a sing/e definition covering that

entire statute, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(f), includes former employees

in some parts of the statute but not in others, depending upon

the “context” of the particular use. 519 U.S. at 343-44. See

id. at 343 (noting that term “may have a plain meaning in the

context of a particular section,” but not have “the same

meaning in all other sections and in all other contexts”). See

also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 845 (court of appeals erred by

imposing “static judicial definition” of term “source” as used

in NNSR, stripping EPA of ability to interpret term in a way

that made sense “in the context of this particular program’).

The Court in Robinson concluded that construing “employee”

to include former employees was warranted in the context of

Title VII's retaliation provisions, a construction “consisten|t]

with a primary purpose” of those provisions to maintain

access to statutory remedies. 519 U.S. at 346. Compare Pet.

App. 18a (Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that common definition

of “modification” created “mandate” that “the different

purposes of the NSPS and PSD programs cannot override”).

In contrast to Rowan, there is every indication that

Congress did not mean to require EPA to adopt identical

regulatory definitions of “modification,” and component

terms like emissions “increase,” for the distinct, technical,

and complex NSPS, PSD, and NNSR programs. ** EPA must,

of uniform usage to “‘original sin’” has “become a staple of [this Court's]

opinions.” General Dynamics Land Svs., 540 U.S. at 596 n.8 (citations

omitted). Sce also Nat Mining Assn, 59 F.3d at

1358 (upholding EPA’s differing interpretation, in Section 307(d) CAA

rulemaking, of “very similar” definitions of major source, and noting that

“[{d]ifferent [CAA] programs have different objectives and structure”).

* Nor, as the D.C. Circuit explained, is there is any evidence Congress

intended to import any specific NSPS regulation as a_ statutory

45

under each program, give effect to the two-step concept of

“modification” set forth in 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(4) — requiring a

“physical [or operational] change” that “increases the amount

of any air pollutant emitted.” (And there is surely no

inconsistency between the PSD regulations and that statutory

language). By fitting the general definition to the particulars

of the respective programs, EPA has properly interpreted the

constituents of the definition, including “increase” and

“amount emitted” — themselves undefined by Congress — to

effectuate differences in coverage, operation, and purpose

between NSPS, enacted in 1970, and the two NSR programs

enacted seven years later. NSPS and NSR_ differ

fundamentally, and EPA was surely not precluded from

taking account of their differences in crafting its respective

modification regulations.

NSPS sets identical operational requirements for new and

modified sources within a source category, without regard to

site-specific factors, and with no threshold based on source

size or emissions levels. Congress adopted an entirely

different approach in the 1977 amendments. PSD is

pervasively concerned with protecting local air quality, a

purpose that necessitates, as Alabama Power explains, a focus

on actual pollution “amounts” — as well as netting to allow

sources to make physical changes without PSD review when

their overall effect will be to leave air quality in the vicinity

unharmed. See Northern Plains Resource Council v. EPA,

645 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9" Cir. 1981) (contrasting “equipment

oriented” NSPS with “site oriented” PSD program). Instead

of generic, national technology-based standards, the PSD

provisions require modeling of local pollutant levels, specific

requirement for PSD. See New York, 413 F.3d at 18-20; cf. 42 U.S.C.

7478(b) (expressly providing for certain projects commenced before 1977

amendments’ effective date to be governed by 1974 PSD regulations).

* Recognizing the relevant similarities between the two NSR programs,

EPA has chosen to adopt NNSR_ modification regulations “largely

identical” to its PSD regulations. Sce 57 Fed. Reg. at 32316 n.7.

46

determinations of the probable impacts of the proposed

project’s emissions on local air quality, and pollution controls

imposed in a “case-by-case” manner.

The word “source” in the common modification definition

has a different referent under PSD than under NSPS.

Compare 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(3) (NSPS “stationary source’)

with id. 7479(1) (PSD “major emitting facility”). That

difference reflects the disparate mechanics and purposes of

the respective programs. Unlike the NSPS definition, the

PSD definition (like other PSD provisions) measures

emissions in “tons per year,” id., draws the distinction

between what a source “emits” and its emissions “capacity,”

see New York, 413 F.3d at 39-40; Alabama Power, 636 F.2d

at 353, and evinces Congress's intent that PSD, unlike NSPS,

be restricted to facilities “which, due to their size, are

financially able to bear the substantial regulatory costs

imposed by the PSD provisions and which, as a group, are

primarily responsible for emission of the deleterious

pollutants that befoul our nation’s air.” /d.; see id. at 400

n.46; compare 53 Fed. Reg. 5860 (Feb. 26, 1988) (adopting

NSPS for residential wood stoves). It is both feasible and

important to measure increases in actual emissions from the

large sources that count as “major emitting facilities,” and

PSD’s dominant emphasis on the specific, local air quality

impacts of these large sources fully justified EPA’s decision

to predicate PSD applicability and increment consumption on

actual, annual emissions. See 45 Fed. Reg. at 52701.

Whereas in Rowan the agency could offer no reason for its

different regulations on “wages,” here EPA extensively

explained the basis for its PSD regulations. That the Fourth

Circuit disregarded EPA’s rationale, along with the text of the

regulations, illustrates just how far it strayed from any proper

approach to judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(7), (9).

Congress’s use of the same broadly worded, and general,

definition of modification under multiple CAA programs

cannot be understood as a mandate that EPA construe these

terms without regard to the “different contexts” in which

47

these undefined terms must function throughout this

“technical and complex” statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-

64; see id. at 845.*°

In another stark contrast to Rowan, 452 U.S. at 254, 263

(citing Central Illinois), EPA’s PSD regulations were crafted

to conform to precedent from the court empowered by

Congress to review national CAA regulations. Alabama

Power, 636 F.2d at 353, 399-402 & n. 46: see also New York,

413 F.3d at 39-40. And the D.C. Circuit has instructed EPA

to do what principles of administrative law would ordinarily

require — define a PSD “modification” in a manner faithful to

the text of the statutory definition and to the textual

requirements and programmatic ends of the other PSD

provisions with which it must function. The Fourth Circuit’s

ruling, remarkably, forbids EPA from doing so, imposing

instead a mandate of obliviousness to context. The

Congresses that enacted these elaborate programs surely did

not intend that result.*’

*© Congress's refusal to alter the PSD modification provisions in 1990,

after EPA had operated for a decade under diverging regulatory

definitions for NSPS and NSR, and after WEPCo, see supra, n. 8, further

undermines the Fourth Circuit's conclusion. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at

863-864; cf. Nat'l Mining Ass'n, 59 F 3d at 1363 (Congress's choices “in

1990” should be construed “against a backdrop of over a decade of

skirmishing between the agency and affected companies” when these

issues were “very much in the forefront”).

*’ The court of appeals’ rationale would apply to the NNSR program,

which like PSD incorporates the Section 11 1(a)(4) definition, see 42

U.S.C. 7501(4). It would condemn every itcration of EPA’s modification

regulations under that major CAA program, see, e.g. 40 C.F.R.

51.16S(aX vif A). (ayvil) (2005), applicable in areas failing to mean the

health-based NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. 7502(c\5). And it would do so

despite unambiguous statutory text measuring NNSR emissions in actual,

annual terms. See supra, pp. 15-16, 40. See also 42 U.S.C. 742% 23)

(modification definition for solid waste incinerators, added in 1990,

phrased very similarly to Section | 11(a\4) definition).

48

C. The Emissions Increase Test Imposed by the

Fourth Circuit Violates the Statute.

The effect of the court of appeals’ “identical regulations”

mandate was to require that EPA use a maximum hourly rate

test for PSD — at least until such time as EPA amends its

NSPS regulations. See Pet. App. 18a.** But that test would

violate the plain text and fundamental objectives of the Act’s

PSD provisions and contravene the D.C. Circuit’s unappealed

decisions in Alabama Power and New York.

The “plain language of the CAA” requires that EPA “apply

NSR to changes that increase actual emissions instead of

potential or allowable emissions.” New York, 413 F.3d at 40.

See also Alahama Power, 636 F.2d at 353, 400-01. A

maximum hourly rate test violates that command. The

“amount” of pollutant “emitted” by a source is not merely a

function of its maximum hourly rates, but also of how much

the plant is in use. See JA 294. Yet the regulatory test

improperly imposed by the courts below simply pretends that

increases in actual emissions from expanded use do not exist.

See Pet. App. 58a-59a; cf. 61 Fed. Reg. at 38269 (effect of

Exhibit B proposal “to eliminate a source’s level of

operations as a factor when determining whether a proposed

change will result in an increase” and to “completely

disregard] |” utilization). Such an approach is at odds with an

entire PSD enactment concerned with changes in actual local

air quality, not in engineering potentials or regulatory

allowances. See 45 Fed. Reg. at 52700 (potential emissions

** The Fourth Circuit never explained why, even assuming the common

statutory definitions mandated regulatory identity between NSPS and the

PSD, it was the PSD regulations that should be condemned, even though

those regulations hew to the plain language of the modification definition,

fit with PSD-specific provisions of the Act, and were crafted to conform

to a decision of the court empowered by Congress to review CAA

regulations. See also New York, 413 F.3d at 19 (stating that NSPS hourly

rate regulation was “possibly inconsistent” with another NSPS regulation

that tracked the statutory definition of modification) (comparing 40 C.F.R.

60.2(h) (1976) with 40 C_F.R. 60.14(a) (1976)).

49

test “could permit actual air quality to deteriorate seriously”);

61 Fed. Reg. at 38268-70 (detailing adverse “environmental

consequences” of Exhibit B proposal); 67 Fed. Reg. at 80205

(Exhibit B approach “detrimental to air quality”).

Nor does such an approach to PSD “modifications” fare

well as a matter of “ordinary or natural meaning.” S.D.

Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envt'l Protection, 126 S. Ct.

1843, 1847 (2006) (citation omitted). A major overhaul that

enables an old plant to operate, say, ten times as many hours

as it could in its prior condition — with a correspondingly

large increase in quantities of pollution actually released into

the local airshed that is PSD’s concern — is, manifestly, a

“physical change” that “increases the amount of any air

pollutant emitted” by the source. “Were it not for the

hundreds of pages of briefing” submitted in the D.C. Circuit

and elsewhere trying to impose on PSD accounting

methodologie calculated to disregard actual emissions, “one

would have thought it fairly clear that this text does not

permit” such an approach. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at

465. See New York I, 443 F.3d at 889.

Ignoring increases in emissions from the expanded

operations of “modernized” sources is inconsistent with the

limits Congress placed on the grandfathering benefit

conferred on existing sources in 1977. As the D.C. Circuit

observed in Alabama Power, by extending the Act’s PSD

requirements to “modifications,” Congress denied these

sources a “perpetual immunity from all standards under the

PSD program.” 636 F.2d at 400.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

50

JEFFREY M. GLEASON

J. BLANDING HOLMAN, IV

CALEB JAFFE

Southern Environmental

Law Center

200 W. Franklin Suite 330

Chapel Hill, N.C. 27516

(434) 967-1450

VICKIE PATTON

Environmental Defense

2334 North Broadway

Boulder, Colorado 80304

(303) 447-7215

SEAN H. DONAHUE

Counsel of Record

2000 L St., NW

Suite 808

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 466-2234

DAVID T. GOLDBERG

99 Hudson St., 8th Floor

New York, N.Y. 10013

(212) 334-8813

Counsel for Petitioners

JULY 2006

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ADDENDUM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Clean Air Act, ch 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955),

as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments

of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, and by

the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L.

95-95, 91 Stat. 685, and by the Clean Air Act

Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, 104 Stat.

2399 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 ef seq.):

42 U.S.C. 7411 (excerpted)............

42 U.S.C. 7412 (excerpted) ............

3k oe err er ares

Se Corr oy ee eee

42 U.S.C. 7473 (excerpted) ............

42 U.S.C. 7475 (excerpted) ............

ER A eS SRE ey ete =

Page

42 U.S.C. 7501 (excerpted) ................. 14a

42 U.S.C. 7502 (excerpted)... 2... ccc ceees 14a

42 U.S.C. 7607 (excerpted)... 0... cccneess 1Sa

Code of Federal Regulations:

40 C.F.R. 51.166 (1987) (excerpted) ......... 22a

40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)(21) (1993) (excerpted)... . 33a

40 C.F.R. 60.2, 60.14 (1976)(excerpted). ..... 35a

40 C.F.R. 60.14 (1987) (excerpted) ........... 40a

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42 U.S.C. § 7411 [Section 111]

Standards of performance for new stationary sources

(a) Definitions. For purposes of this section:

(1) The term “standard of performance” means a standard

for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of

emission limitation achievable through the application of

the best system of emission reduction which (taking into

account the cost of achieving such reduction and any

nonair quality health and environmental impact and

energy requirements) the Administrator determines has

been adequately demonstrated.

(2) The term “new source” means any stationary source,

the construction or modification of which is commenced

after the publication of regulations (or, if earlier, proposed

regulations) prescribing a standard of performance under

this section which will be applicable to such source.

(3) The term “stationary source” means any building,

structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit

any air pollutant. Nothing in subchapter II of this chapter

relating to nonroad engines shall be construed to apply to

Stationary internal combustion engines.

(4) The term “modification” means any physical change

in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary

source which increases the amount of any air pollutant

emitted by such source or which results in the emission of

any air pollutant not previously emitted.

(5) The term “owner or operator” means any person who

owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises a stationary

source.

2a

(6) The term “existing source” means any stationary

source other than a new source.

*k KE &

(b) List of categories of stationary sources; standards of

performance; information on pollution control techniques;

sources owned or operated by United States; particular

systems; revised standards.

(1) (A) The Administrator shall, within 90 days after

December 31, 1970, publish (and from time to time

thereafter shall revise) a list of categories of stationary

sources. He shall include a category of sources in such list

if in his judgment in causes, or contributes significantly

to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to

endanger public health or welfare.

*e KK *

(2) The Administrator may distinguish among classes,

types, and sizes within categories of new sources for the

- purpose of establishing such standards.

(3) The Administrator shall, from time to time, issue

information on pollution control techniques for categories

of new sources and air pollutants subject to the provisions

of this section.

* * kk *

(d) Standards of performance for existing sources; remaining

useful life of source.

(1) The Administrator shall prescribe regulations which

shall establish a procedure similar to that provided by

section 7410 of this title under which each State shall

3a

submit to the Administrator a plan which (A) establishes

standards of performance for any existing source for any

air pollutant (i) for which air quality criteria have not been

issued or which is not included on a list published under

section 7408(a) of this title or emitted from a source

category which is regulated under section 7412 of this

title but (ii) to which a standard of performance under this

section would apply if such existing source were a new

source, and (B) provides for the implementation and

enforcement of such standards of performance.

Regulations of the Administrator under t! | paragraph

shall permit the State in applying a standard of

performance to any particular source under a plan

submitted under this paragraph to take into consideration,

among other factors, the remaining useful life of the

existing source to which such standard applies.

(2) The Administrator shall have the same authority—

(A) to prescribe a plan for a State in cases where the State

fails to submit a satisfactory plan as he would have under

section 7410(c) of this title in the case of failure to submit

an implementation plan, and

(B) to enforce the provisions of such plan in cases where

the State fails to enforce them as he would have under

sections 7413 and 7414 of this title with respect to an

implementation plan.

In promulgating a standard of performance under a plan

prescribed under this paragraph, the Administrator shall

take into consideration, among other factors, remaining

useful lives of the sources in the category of sources to

which such standard applies.

**£* * *

4a

42 U.S.C. § 7412 [Section 112]

** kK *

(a)(5) The term “modification” means any physical change in,

or change in the method of operation of, a major source which

increases the actual emissions of any hazardous air pollutant

emitted by such source by more than a de minimis amount or

which results in the emission of any hazardous air pollutant

not previously emitted by more than a de minimis amount.

*** * *

42 U.S.C. § 7471 [Section 161]

Plan requirements

In accordance with the policy of section 7401(b)(1) of this

title, each applicable implementation plan shall contain

emission limitations and such other measures as may be

necessary, as determined under regulations promulgated

under this part, to prevent significant deterioration of air

quality in each region (or portion thereof) designated pursuant

to section 7407 of this title as attainment or unclassifiable.

42 U.S.C. § 7472 [Section 162]

Initial classifications

(a) Areas designated as class I

Upon the enactment of this part, all—

(1) international parks,

(2) national wilderness areas which exceed 5,000

Sa

acres in size,

(3) national memorial parks which exceed 5,000 acres

in size, and

(4) national parks which exceed six thousand acres in

size,

and which are in existence on August 7, 1977, shall be class |

areas and may not be redesignated. All areas which were

redesignated as class I under regulations promulgated before

August 7, 1977, shall be class I areas which may be

redesignated as provided in this part. The extent of the areas

designated as Class I under this section shall conform to any

changes in the boundaries of such areas which have occurred

subsequent to August 7, 1977, or which may occur

subsequent to November 15, 1990.

(b) Areas designated as class II

All areas in such State designated pursuant to section 7407(d)

of this title as attainment or unclassifiable which are not

established as class I under subsection (a) of this section shall

be class II areas unless redesignated under section 7474 of

this title.

42 U.S.C. § 7473 [Section 163]

Increments and ceilings

(a) Sulfur dioxide and particulate matter; requirement that

maximum allowable increases and maximum allowable

concentrations not be exceeded.

In the case of sulfur oxide and particulate matter, each

applicable implementation plan shall contain measures

assuring that maximum allowable increases over baseline

6a

concentrations of, and maximum allowable concentrations of,

such pollutant shall not be exceeded. In the case of any

maximum allowable increase (except an allowable increase

specified under section 7475(d)(2)(C)(iv) of this title) for a

pollutant based on concentrations permitted under national

ambient air quality standards for any period other than an

annual period, such regulations shall permit such maximum

allowable increase to be exceeded during one such period per

year.

*e ee *

42 U.S.C. § 7475 [Section 165]

Preconstruction requirements

(a) Major emitting facilities on which construction is

commenced. No major emitting facility on which construction

is commenced after August 7, 1977, may be constructed in

any area to which this part applies unless—

(1) a permit has been issued for such proposed facility in

accordance with this part setting forth emission

limitations for such facility which conform to the

requirements of this part;

(2) the proposed permit has been subject to a review in

accordance with this section, the required analysis has

been conducted in accordance with regulations

promulgated by the Administrator, and a public hearing

has been held with opportunity for interested persons

including representatives of the Administrator to appear

and submit written or oral presentations on the air quality

impact of such source, alternatives thereto, control

technology requirements, and other appropriate

considerations;

7a

(3) the owner or operator of such facility demonstrates, as

required pursuant to section 7410(j) of this title, that

emissions from construction or operation of such facility

will not cause, or contribute to, air pollution in excess of

any (A) maximum allowable increase or maximum

allowable concentration for any pollutant in any area to

which this part applies more than one time per year, (B)

national ambient air quality standard in any air quality

control region, or (C) any other applicable emission

standard or standard of performance under this Act;

(4) the proposed facility is subject to the best available

control technology for cach pollutant subject to regulation

under this Act emitted from, or which results from, such

facility;

(5) the provisions of subsection (d) of this section with

respect to protection of class ] areas have been complied

with for such facility;

(6) there has been an analysis of any air quality impacts

projected for the area as a result of growth associated with

such facility;

(7) the person who owns or operates, or proposes to own

or operate, a major emitting facility for which a permit is

required under this part agrees to conduct such monitoring

as may be necessary to determine the effect which

emissions from any such facility may have, or is having,

on air quality in any area which may be affected by

emissions from such source; and

(8) in the case of a source which proposes to construct in a

class III area, emissions from which would cause or

contribute to exceeding the maximum allowable

increments applicable in a class Il area and where no

standard under section 7411 of this title has been

8a

promulgated subsequent to August 7, 1977, for such

source category, the Administrator has approved the

determination of best available technology as set forth in

the permit.

(b) Exception. The demonstration pertaining to maximum

allowable increases required under subsection (a)(3) of this

section shall not apply to maximum allowable increases for

class II areas in the case of an expansion or modification of a

major emitting facility which is in existence on August 7,

1977 whose allowable emissions of air pollutants, after

compliance with subsection (a)(4) of this section, will be less

than fifty tons per year and for which the owner or operator of

such facility demonstrates that emissions of particulate matter

and sulfur oxides will not cause or contribute to ambient air

quality levels in excess of the national secondary ambient air

quality standard for either of such pollutants.

**x* ee * *

(e) Analysis; continuous air quality monitoring data;

regulations; model adjustments.

(1) The review provided for in subsection (a) of this

section shall be preceded by an analysis in accordance

with regulations of the Administrator, promulgated under

this subsection, which may be conducted by the State (or

any general purpose unit of local government) or by the

major emitting facility applying for such permit, of the

ambient air quality at the proposed site and in areas which

may be affected by emissions from such facility for each

pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter which

will be emitted from such facility.

(2) Effective one year after August 7, 1977, the analysis

required by this subsection shall include continuous air

quality monitoring data gathered for purposes of

9a

determining whether emissions from such facility will

exceed the maximum allowable increases or the

maximum allowable concentration permitted under this

part. Such data shall be gathered over a period of one

calendar year preceding the date of application for a

permit under this part unless the State, in accordance with

regulations promulgated by the Administrator, determines

that a complete and adequate analysis for such purposes

may be accomplished in a shorter period. The results of

such analysis shall be available at the time of the public

hearing on the application for such permit.

(3) The Administrator shall within six months after

August 7, 1977 promulgate regulations respecting the

analysis required under this subsection which

regulations—

(A) shall not require the use of any automatic or

uniform buffer zone or zones,

(B) shall require an analysis of the ambient air quality,

climate and meteorology, terrain, soils and vegetation,

and visibility at the site of the proposed major emitting

facility and in the area potentially affected by the

emissions from such facility for each pollutant regulated

under this chapter which will be emitted from, or which

results from the construction or operation of, such

facility, the size and nature of the proposed facility, the

degree of continuous emission reduction which could be

achieved by such facility, and such other factors as may

be relevant in determining the effect of emissions from a

proposed facility on any air quality control region,

(C) shall require the results of such analysis shall be

available at the time of the public hearing on the

application for such permit, and

10a

(D) shall specify with reasonable particularity each air

quality model or 1.0dels to be used under specified sets

of conditions for purposes of this part.

Any model or models designated under such regulations may

be adjusted upon a determination, after notice and opportunity

for public hearing, by the Administrator that such adjustment

is necessary to take into account unique terrain or

meteorological characteristics of an area potentially affected

by emissions from a source applying for a permit required

under this part.

42 U.S.C. § 7479 [Section 169}

Definitions

For purposes of this part—

(1) The term “major emitting facility” means any of the

following stationary sources of air pollutants which emit, or

have the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more

of any air pollutant from the following types of stationary

sources: fossil-fuel fired steam electric plants of more than

two hundred and fifty million British thermal units per hour

heat input, coal cleaning plants (thermal dryers), kraft pulp

mills, Portland Cement plants, primary zinc smelters, iron and

steel mill plants, primary aluminum ore reduction plants,

primary copper smelters, municipal incinerators capable of

charging more than fifty tons of refuse per day, hydrofluoric,

sulfuric, and nitric acid plants, petroleum refineries, lime

plants, phosphate rock processing plants, coke oven batteries,

sulfur recovery plants, carbon black plants (furnace process),

primary lead smelters, fuel conversion plants, sintering plants,

secondary metal production facilities, chemical process

plants, fossil-fuel boilers of more than two hundred and fifty

million British thermal units per hour heat input, petroleum

storage and transfer facilities with a capacity exceeding three

hundred thousand barrels, taconite ore processing facilities,

glass fiber processing plants, charcoal production facilities.

Such term also includes any other source with the potential to

emit two hundred and fifty tons per year or more of any air

pollutant. This term shall not include new or modified

facilities which are nonprofit health or education institutions

which have been exempted by the State.

(2) (A) The term “commenced” as applied to construction of

a major emitting facility means that the owner or operator

has obtained all necessary preconstruction approvals or

permits required by Federal, State, or local air pollution

emissions and air quality laws or regulations and either has

(i) begun, or caused to begin, a continuous program of

physical on-site construction of the facility or (ii) entered

into binding agreements or contractual obligations, which

cannot be canceled or modified without substantial loss to

the owner or operator, to undertake a program of

construction of the facility to be completed within a

reasonable time.

(B) The term “necessary preconstruction approvals or

permits” means those permits or approvals, required by the

permitting authority as a precondition to undertaking any

activity under clauses (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (A) of this

paragraph.

(C) The term “construction” when used in connection with

any source or facility, includes the modification (as defined

in section 741 1(a) of this title) of any source or facility.

(3) The term “best available control technology” means an

emission limitation based on the maximum degree of

reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this

Act emitted from or which results from any major emitting

facility, which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case

l2a

basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and

economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable

for such facility through application of production processes

and available methods, systems, and techniques, including

fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel

combustion techniques for control of each such pollutant. In

no event shall application of “best available control

technology” result in emissions of any pollutants which will

exceed the emissions allowed by any applicable standard

established pursuant to section 7411 or 7412 of this title.

Emissions from any source utilizing clean fuels, or any other

means, to comply with this paragraph shall not be allowed to

increase above levels that would have been required under

this paragraph as it existed prior to November 15, 1990.

(4) The term “baseline concentration” means, with respect to

a pollutant, the ambient concentration levels which exist at

the time of the first application for a permit in an area subject

to this part, based on air quality data available in the

Environmental Protection Agency or a State air pollution

control agency and on such monitoring data as the permit

applicant is required to submit. Such ambient concentration

levels shall take into account all projected emissions in, or

which may affect, such area from any major emitting facility

on which construction commenced prior to January 6, 1975,

but which has not begun operation by the date of the baseline

air quality concentration determination. Emissions of sulfur

oxides and particulate matter from any major emitting facility

on which construction commenced after January 6, 1975,

shall not be included in the baseline and shall be counted

against the maximum allowable increases in pollutant

concentrations established under this part.

13a

42 U.S.C. § 7501 [Section 171]

Definitions

For the purposes of this part—

*“*e#* *

(2) Nonattainment area. The term “nonattainment area”

means, for any air pollutant, an area which is designated

“nonattainment” with respect to that pollutant within the

meaning of section 7407(d) of this title.

‘seek *

(4) The terms “modifications” and “modified” mean the same

as the term “modification” as used in section 7411(a)(4) of

this title.

42 U.S.C. § 7502 [Section 172]

Nonattainment plan provisions in general

x**e# kk *

(c) Nonattainment plan provisions. The plan provisions

(including plan items) required to be submitted under this part

shall comply with each of the following:

(1) In general. Such plan provisions shall provide for the

implementation of all reasonably available control

measures as expeditiously as practicable (including such

reductions in emissions from existing sources in the area

as may be obtained through the adoption, at a minimum,

of reasonably available control technology) and shall

provide for attainment of the national primary ambient air

l4a

quality standards.

**x* ke * *

(3) Inventory. Such plan provisions shall include a

comprehensive, accurate, current inventory of actual

emissions from all sources of the relevant pollutant or

pollutants in such area, including such periodic revisions

as the Administrator may determine necessary to assure

that the requirements of this part are met.

**ke eK *

42 U.S.C. § 7607 [Section 307]

Administrative proceedings and judicial review

**e ek *

(b) Judicial review.

(1) A petition for review of action of the Administrator in

promulgating any national primary or secondary ambient

air quality standard, any emission standard or requirement

under section 7412 of this title, any standard of

performance or requirement under section 7411 of this

title, any standard under section 7521 of this title (other

than a standard required to be prescribed under section

7521(b)(1) of this title), any determination under section

7521(b)(5) of this title, any control or prohibition under

section 7545 of this title, any standard under section 7571

of this title, any rule issued under section 7413, 7419, or

under section 7420 of this title, or any other nationally

applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken,

by the Administrator under this Act may be filed only in

the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia. A petition for review of the Administrator's

1Sa

action in approving or promulgating any implementation

plan under secticn 7410 of this title or section 7411(d) of

this title, any order under section 7411(j) of this title,

under section 7412 of this title, under section 7419 of this

title, or under section 7420 of this title, or his action under

section 1857c-10(c)(2)(A), (B), or (C) of this title (as in

effect before August 7, 1977) or under regulations

thereunder, or revising regulations for enhanced

monitoring and compliance certification programs under

section 7414(a)(3) of this titlet, or any other final action of

the Administrator under this Act (including any denial or

disapproval by the Administrator under subchapter I of

this chapter) which is locally or regionally applicable may

be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the

appropriate circuit. Notwithstanding the preceding

sentence a petition for review of any action referred to in

such sentence may be filed only in the United States Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia if such action is

based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect

and if in taking such action the Administrator finds and

publishes that such action is based on such a

determination. Any petition for review under this

subsection shall be filed within sixty days from the date

notice of such promulgation, approval, or action appears

in the Federal Register, except that if such petition is

based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day,

then any petition for review under this subsection shall be

filed within sixty days after such grounds arise. The filing

of a petition for reconsideration by the Administrator of

any otherwise final rule or action shall not affect the

finality of such rule or action for purposes of judicial

review nor extend the time within which a petition for

judicial review of such rule or action under this section

may be filed, and shall not postpone the effectiveness of

such rule or action.

l6a

(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which

review could have been obtained under paragraph (1)

shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal

proceedings for enforcement. Where a final decision by

the Administrator defers performance of any

nondiscretionary statutory action to a later time, any

person may challenge the deferral pursuant to paragraph

(1).

(c) Additional evidence. In any judicial proceeding in which

review is sought of a determination under this Act required to

be made on the record after notice and opportunity for

hearing, if any party applies to the court for leave to adduce

additional evidence, and shows to the satisfaction of the court

that such additional evidence is material and that there were

reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in

the proceeding before the Administrator, the court may order

such additional evidence (and evidence in rebuttal thereof) to

be taken before the Administrator, in such manner and upon

such terms and conditions as to the court may deem proper.

The Administrator may modify his findings as to the facts, or

make new findings, by reason of the additional evidence so

taken and he shall file such modified or new findings, and his

recommendation, if any, for the modification or setting aside

of his original determination, with the return of such

additional evidence.

(d) Rulemaking.

*e# Ee * *

(2) Not later than the date of proposal of any action to

which this subsection applies, the Administrator shall

establish a rulemaking docket for such action (hereinafter

in this subsection referred to as a “rule”’). Whenever a rule

applies only within a particular State, a second (identical)

17a

docket shall be simultaneously established in the

appropriate regional office of the Environmental

Protection Agency.

(3) In the case of any rule to which this subsection

applies, notice of propgsed rulemaking shall be published

in the Federal Register, as provided under section 553(b)

of title 5, shall be accompanied by a statement of its basis

and purpose and shall specify the period available for

public comment (hereinafter referred to as the “comment

period”). The notice of proposed rulemaking shall also

state the docket number, the location or locations of the

docket, and the times it will be open to public inspection.

The statement of basis and purpose shall include a

summary of—

(A) the factual data on which the proposed rule is based;

(B) the methodology used in obtaining the data and in

analyzing the data; and

(C) the major legal interpretations and _ policy

considerations underlying the proposed rule.

The statement shall also set forth or summarize and provide a

reference to any pertinent findings, recommendations, and

comments by the Scientific Review Committee established

under section 7409(d) of this title and the National Academy

of Sciences, and, if the proposal differs in any important

respect from any of these recommendations, an explanation of

the reasons for such differences. All data, information, and

documents referred to in this paragraph on which the

proposed rule relies si.all be included in the docket on the

date of publication of the proposed rule.

18a

*_** * *

(5) In promulgating a rule to which this subsection applies

(i) the Administrator shall allow any person to submit

written comments, data, or documentary information; (11)

the Administrator shall give interested persons an

opportunity for the oral presentation of data, views, or

arguments, in addition to an opportunity to make written

submissions; (iii) a transcript shall be kept of any oral

presentation; and (iv) the Administrator shall keep the

record of such proceeding open for thirty days after

completion of the proceeding to provide an opportunity

for submission of rebuttal and supplementary information.

(6) (A) The promulgated rule shall be accompanied by (1)

a statement of basis and purpose like that referred to in

paragraph (3) with respect to a proposed rule and (11) an

explanation of the reasons for any major changes in the

promulgated rule from the proposed rule.

(B) The promulgated rule shall also be accompanied by

a response to each of the significant comments,

criticisms, and new data submitted in written or oral

presentations during the comment period.

(C) The promulgated rule may not be based (in part or

whole) on any information or data which has not been

placed in the docket as of the date of such promulgation.

(7) (A) The record for judicial review shall consist

exclusively of the material referred to in paragraph (3),

clause (i) of paragraph (4)(B), and subparagraphs (A)

and (B) of paragraph (6).

19a

(B) Only an objection to a rule or procedure which was

raised with reasonable specificity during the period for

public comment (including any public hearing) may be

raised during judicial review. If the person raising an

objection can demonstrate to the Administrator that it

was impracticable to raise such objection within such

time or if the grounds for such objection arose after the

period for public comment (but within the time

specified for judicial review) and if such objection is of

central relevance to the outcome of the rule, the

Administrator shall convene a _ proceeding for

reconsideration of the rule and provide the same

procedural rights as would have been afforded had the

information been available at the time the rule was

proposed. If the Administrator refuses to convene such a

proceeding, such person may seek review of such

refusal in the United States court of appeals for the

appropriate circuit (as provided in subsection (b)). Such

reconsideration shall not postpone the effectiveness of

the rule. The effectiveness of the rule may be stayed

during such_ reconsideration, however, by the

Administrator or the court for a period not to exceed

three months.

(8) The sole forum for challenging procedural

determinations made by the Administrator under this

subsection shall be in the United States court of appeals

for the appropriate circuit (as provided in subsection (b))

at the time of the substantive review of the rule. No

interlocutory appeals shall be permitted with respect to

such procedural determinations. In reviewing alleged

procedural errors, the court may invalidate the rule only if

the errors were so serious and related to matters of such

central relevance to the rule that there is a substantial

likelihood that the rule would have been significantly

changed if such errors had not been made.

20a

(9) In the case of review of any action of the

Administrator to which this subsection applies, the court

may reverse any such action found to be—

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law;

(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege,

or inimunity;

(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or

limitations, or short of statutory right; or

(D) without observance of procedure required by law,

if (i) such failure to observe such procedure is

arbitrary or capricious, (ii) the requirement of

paragraph (7)(B) has been met, and (iii) the condition

of the last sentence of paragraph (8) is met.

(10) Each statutory deadline for promulgation of rules to

which this subsection applies which requires

promulgation less than six months after dat. of proposal

may be extended to not more than six months after date

of proposal by the Administrator upon a determination

that such extension is necessary to afford the public, and

the agency, adequate opportunity to carry out the

purposes of this subsection.

(11) The requirements of this subsection shall take

effect with respect to any rule the proposal of which

occurs after August 7, 1977.

(e) Other methods of judicial review not authorized. Nothing

in this Act shall be construed to authorize judicial review of

regulations or orders of the Administrator under this Act,

except as provided in this section.

2la

40 C.F.R. § 51.166 (1987)

TITLE 40 — Protection of Environment

CHAPTER I — Environmental Protection Agency

SUBCHAPTER C —Air Programs

Part 51—Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and

Submittal of Implementation Plans

Subpart I—Review of New Sources and Modifications

§ 51.166 Prevention of significant deterioration

of air quality.

(a) (1) Plan requirements. In accordance with the policy

of section 101(b)(1) of the act and the purposes of section

160 of the Act, each applicable State implementation plan

Shall contain emission limitations and such other

measures as may be necessary to prevent significant

deterioration of air quality.

(2) Plan Revisions. If a State Implementation Plan

revision would result in increased air quality deterioration

over any baseline concentration, the plan revision shall

include a demonstration that it will not cause or contribute -

to a violation of the applicable increment(s). If a plan

revision proposing less restrictive requirements was

submitted after August 7, 1977 but on or before any

applicable baseline date and was pending action by the

Administrator on that date, no such demonstration is

necessary with respect to the area for which a baseline

date would be established before final action is taken on

the plan revision. Instead, the assessment described in

paragraph (a)(4) of this section, shall review the expected

impact to the applicable increment(s).

(3) Required plan revision. If the State or the

22a

Administrator determines that a plan is substantially

inadequate to prevent significant deterioration or that an

applicable increment is being violated, the plan shall be

revised to correct the inadequacy or the violation. The

plan shall be revised within 60 days of such a finding by a

State or within 60 days following notification by the

Administrator, or by such later date as prescribed by the

Administrator after consultation with the State.

(4) Plan assessment. The State shall review the adequacy

of a plan on a periodic basis and within 60 days of such

time as information becomes available that an applicable

increment is being violated.

(5) Public participation. Any State action taken under this

paragraph shall be subject to the opportunity for public

hearing in accordance with procedures equivalent to those

established in § 51.102.

** *&* *

(b) Definitions. All state plans shall use the following

definitions for the purposes of this section. Deviations from

the following wording will be approved only if the state

specifically demonstrates that the submitted definition is more

stringent, or at least as stringent, in all respects as the

corresponding definitions below:

(1)(1) “Major stationary source” means:

(a) Any of the following stationary sources of air

pollutants which emits, or has the potential to emit,

100 tons per year or more of any pollutant subject to

regulation under the Act: Fossil fuel-fired steam

electric plants of more than 250 million British

thermal units per hour heat input, coal cleaning

plants (with thermal dryers), kraft pulp mills,

23a

portland cement plants, primary zinc smelters, iron

and steel mill plants, primary aluminum ore

reduction plants, primary copper smelters, municipal

incinerators capable of charging more than 250 tons

of refuse per day, lnydrofluoric, sulfuric, and nitric

acid plants, petroleum refineries, lime plants,

phosphate rock processing plants, coke oven

batteries, sulfur recovery plants, carbon black plants

(furnace process), primary lead smelters, fuel

conversion plants, sintering plants, secondary metal

production plants, chemical process plants, fossil

fuel boilers (or combinations thereof) totaling more

than 250 million British thermal units per hour heat

input, petroleum storage and transfer units with a

total storage capacity exceeding 300,000 barrels,

taconite ore processing plants, glass fiber processing

plants, and charcoal production plants;

(b) Notwithstanding the stationary source size

specified in paragraph (b)(1)(i)(a) of this section,

any stationary source which emits, or has the

potential to emit, 250 tons per year or more of any

air pollutant subject to regulation under the Act; or

(c) Any physical change that would occur at a

stationary source not otherwise qualifying under

paragraph (b)(1) of this section, as a major

Stationary source if the change would constitute a

major stationary source by itself.

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(2)(i) “Major modification” means any physical

change in or change in the method of operation of a

major stationary source that would result in a

significant net emissions increase of any pollutant

subject to regulation under the Act.

24a

(ii) Any net emissions increase that is significant for

volatile organic compounds shall be considered

significant for ozone.

(iii) A physical change or change in the method of

operation shall not include:

(a) Routine maintenance, repair, and

replacement;

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(f) An increase in the hours of operation or in the

production rate, unless such change would be

prohibited under any federally enforceable

permit condition which was established after

January 6, 1975, pursuant to 40 CFR 52.21 or

under regulations approved pursuant to 40 CFR

Subpart I or § 51.166.

(g) Any change in ownership at a stationary

source.

(3)(i) “Net emissions increase” means the amount by

which the sum of the following exceeds zero:

(a) Any increase in actual emissions from a

particular physical change or change in the

method of operation at a stationary source; and

(b) Any other increases and decreases in actual

emissions at the source’ that are

contemporaneous with the particular change

and are otherwise creditable. a

(ii) An increase or decrease in actual emissions is

25a

contemporaneous with the increase from the

particular change only if it occurs within a

reasonable period (to be specified by the state)

before the date that the increase from the particular

change occurs.

(iii) An increase or decrease in actual emissions is

creditable only if the reviewing authority has not

relied on it in issuing a permit for the source under

regulations approved pursuant to this section,

which permit is in effect when the increase in

actual emissions from the particular change

occurs.

(iv) An increase or decrease in actual emissions of

sulfur dioxide or particulate matter which occurs

before the applicable baseline date is creditable

only if it is required to be considered in calculating

the amount of maximum allowable increases

remaining available.

(v) An increase in actual emissions is creditable

only to the extent that the new level of actual

emissions exceeds the old level.

(vi) A decrease in actual emissions is creditable

only to the extent that:

(a) The old level of actual emissions or the old

level of allowable emissions, whichever is

lower, exceeds the new level of actual

emissions;

(b) It is federally enforceable at and after the

time that actual construction on the particular

change begins; and

26a

(c) It has approximately the same qualitative

significance for public health and welfare as

that attributed to the increase from the

particular change.

*“* ke *

(8) “Construction” means any physical change or change

in the method of operation (including fabrication,

erection, installation, demolition, or modification of an

emissions unit) which would result in a change in actual

emissions.

***# * *

(13)(i) “Baseline concentration” means that ambient

concentration level which exists in the baseline area at the

time of the applicable baseline date. A_ baseline

concentration is determined for each pollutant for which a

baseline date is established and shall include:

(a) The actual emissions representative of sources in

existence on the applicable baseline date, except as

provided in paragraph (b)(13)(ii> of this section;

*e# &£* *

27a

(21) (i) “Actual emissions” means the actual rate of

emissions of a pollutant from an emissions unit, as

determined in accordance with paragraphs

(b)(21)(ii) through (iv) of this section.

(ii) In general, actual emissions as of a particular

date shall equal the average rate, in tons per year,

at which the unit actually emitted the pollutant

during a two-year period which precedes the

particular date and which is representative of

normal source operation. The reviewing authority

may allow the use of a different time period upon

a determination that it is more representative of

normal source operation. Actual emissions shall be

calculated using the unit's actual operating hours,

production rates, and types of materials processed,

stored, or combusted during the selected time

period.

(iii) The reviewing authority may presume that

source-specific allowable emissions for the unit

are equivalent to the actual emissions of the unit.

(iv) For any emissions unit which has not begun

normal operations on the particular date, actual

emissions shall equal the potential to emit of the

unit on that date.

*~** * *

(23)(1) “Significant” means, in reference to a net

emissions increase or the potential of a source to emit

any of the following pollutants, a rate of emissions

that would equal or exceed any of the following rates:

Pollutant and Emissions Rate

Carbon monoxide: 100 tons per year (tpy)

Nitrogen oxides: 40 tpy

Sulfur dioxide: 40 tpy

Particulate matter: 25 tpy of particulate matter emissions.

15 tpy of PMjo emissions.

Ozone: 40 tpy of volatile organic compounds

Lead. 0.6 tpy

Asbestos: 0.007 tpy

Beryllium: 0.0004 tpy

Mercury: 0.1 tpy

Vinyl chloride: | tpy

Fluorides: 3 tpy

Sulfuric acid mist: 7 tpy

Hydrogen sulfide (H2S): 10 tpy

Total reduced sulfur (including H2S): 10 tpy

Reduced sulfur compounds (including H2S): 10 tpy

*** * *

(c) Ambient air increments. The plan shall contain emission

limitations and such other measures as may be necessary to

assure that in areas designated as Class I, II, or IL], increases

in pollutant concentration over the base-line concentration

shall be limited to the following:

29a

Maximum allowable increase (micrograms per cubic

Pollutant meter)

CLASS I

Particulate matter:

TSP, annual geometric mean 5

= TSP, 24-hr maximum 10

Sulfur dioxide:

Annual arithmetic mean 2

24-hr maximum 5

3-hr maximum 25

CLASS Il

Particulate matter:

TSP, annual geometric mean 19

TSP, 24-hr maximum 37

Sulfur dioxide:

Annual arithmetic mean 20

24-hr maximum 9]

3-hr maximum 512

CLASS Ill

Particulate matter:

TSP, annual geometric mean 37

TSP, 24-hr maximum 75

Sulfur dioxide:

Annual arithmetic mean 40

24-hr maximum 182

3-hr maximum 700

For any period other than an annual period, the applicable

30a

maximum allowable increase may be exceeded during one

such period per year at any one location.

(d) Ambient air ceilings. The plan shall provide that no

concentration of a pollutant shall exceed:

(1) The concentration permitted under the national

secondary ambient air quality standard, or

(2) The concentration permitted under the national

primary ambient air quality standard, whichever

concentration is lowest for the pollutant for a period of

exposure.

x*kKK *

(i) Review of major stationary sources and = major

modifications — source applicability and exemptions.

**** *

(7) The plan may provide that requirements equivalent

to those contained in p

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Petitioners Brief — Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corporation · 549 U.S. 561 | Frix