Amicus Curiae Brief — Woodford v. Ngo

a . Supreme Vou. vs. |

-) y we e

es LE. :

No. 05-416 | FEB 2- 2006 |

In The

Supreme Court of the Anited States

Sd

JEANNE S. WOODFORD, WARDEN, A.P. KANE,

Petitioners,

v.

VIET MIKE NGO,

Respondent.

¢

On Writ Of Certiorari To The

United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

S

BRIEF FOR THE JEROME N. FRANK LEGAL

SERVICES ORGANIZATION OF THE YALE

LAW SCHOOL AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

S

GIOVANNA SHAY

JEROME N. FRANK LEGAL

SERVICES ORGANIZATION

YALE LAW SCHOOL

P.O. Box 209090

New Haven, CT 06520-9090

203-432-4800

Counsel of Record for

Amicus Curiae

Oo

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ey ne Se TIT occnites-cncncsdiisnesacenacbsescoiscckensiies ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE......0000.... eee 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .......00000... ee. 1

EE sitncieleipciideainuteipabiainincitiitedocldnpiceniasivivaiebeiinationts 4

I. A procedural default rule would significantly

restrict the enforcement of civil rights statutes

in prisons, jails, and juvenile facilities.............. 6

A. Correctional grievance procedures nation-

wide are marked by successive short dead-

ri icsicetiiisiinsidsdivecicieaaniibsnitdeannditlindeicianapiniinanais 6

B. A procedural default rule would discour-

age reporting of institutional problems,

would eliminate remedies for meritorious

claims, and would be difficult to adminis-

I iscnicnnsn ciceiniasiatacpiglnibciaaehihtiaseaidiiiatsiaiadbbesibineties alae 13

C. The most vulnerable inmates will be least

able to comply with procedural deadlines

EST EE Ree ete ne Dees RENO ona Pe 16

II]. Exhaustion under CRIPA as amended by the

PLRA cannot be analogized to habeas exhaus-

tion or administrative appeals .......................... 22

A. This Court should not. engraft a habeas-

style procedural] default rule onto the civil

RAE AE AE ea ne eae ear re eo 22

B. Acivil rights action under Section 1983 is

not analogous to judicial review of federal

i i cdiestetcicivestincndpceniuiessnduccntins 26

ET inadntaiitiaintcngtinedicandidisateaindatbindbeiiinatndibigit 28

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Alexander S. v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373 (4th Cir. 1997)......... 12

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).................66.. 26

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)..................sscceeeeeeeeees 27

Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985)..............0.cc.c00 27

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) ..........0.0.00008. 14

Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999)...............cececceeee 27

Doe v. Cook County Juvenile Detention Center, 1999

WL 1069244 (N.D. Ml. Nov. 22, 1999).........0000 ee. 13

Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000)...................... 23

Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991)... eee 16

Garcia v. Village of Mount Prospect, 360 F.3d 630

NN Siac hicsictasicainiacinchdntettitiarpslinisdelaaasidertecnagerite sheendasiebi 26

Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670 (2d Cir. 2004)... 4

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) ......... cette eens 25

James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341 (1984)..............c eee. 16

Johnson v. California, 125 S.Ct. 1141 (2005) ................... 26

Lawrence v. Goord, 304 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2002)............... 15

Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002)............. ec ceeeseeeeeeeeeeeeees 16

Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999) ......... eee eeeeeeee 12

Minix v. Pazera, 2005 WL 1799538 (N.D. Ind. July

SN, SD sciipiinenecapienbaidaipnis siisinipeuniteiioniiaiiimndectnd passim

Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980)................0.04. 5

il

TABLE OF AUTHORIT:ES — Continued

Page

Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Services City of N.Y., 436

SS I etd ied iia asin ci scadcntenidbesnctinndnidiineniats 4

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) ......... eee 4, 24

Moore v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and

Corrections, 2002 WL 1791996 (E.D. La. Aug. 5,

ak lh aiinitata ani nec acid nests iatl a heen cach dnlinelenashclteninatlngnie’ 13

Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004)........5.........0084. 25

Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).................. 5

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002)..........0.0--. wees 2, 14, 15

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)....................00. 25

Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2002) .........000.0.... 15

Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720 (6th Cir. 2003) ............... 2

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) .........:::ccccccceeeeeeeeeeees 25

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) ..............ccceceeeeeee 23

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S.Ct. 1242 (2005) .......0..0. 25

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)..........0..0.0...cccceeeeeees 14

STATUTES

ee NS ini seniish pilin Louhiinacdiieshsciidiiees tie agulaieliniiee passim

Ce es Oe EE ccc cnccctinesesessntoncentnsemmeninticvnnsi 21

Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 556

SEI TEUIET III. sciteesitiitnladhlcaesstoadeissdiiguinhcebaisbittindndetaedininacadites 4, 27

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (20085)..........000000000c0 23

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act

(CRIPA), as amended by the PLRA, 42 U.S.C.

BF Bell incscnccseitsbicadatiibenidesientsaniaanieannns 1, 4, 5, 26

Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appro-

priations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504

(a)(15), 110 Stat. 1321, 1355 (1996) 00. 21

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-1(2)(c) (2005)......... 0c eeeeeeeeees 27

Texas Code Ann. § 2001.226 (2005)...............ccecceeeeeeeeees 27

RULES

ON GOR, GE: TID wccecnicsecvccsnnssnccisecdosrnsineatietipalbiieddiaiadaanias 1

BA: GIG. BE -SIPIN stcceninssetittnclisecsscensintsteaiaeabinsiastaiieesiaiiiaies 1

REGULATIONS AND POLICIES

Alaska Dept. of Corrections Policy Index No.

808.03, effective May 23, 2002...................... cee 7,9, 11

Arizona Dept. of Corrections Dept. Order 800,

ING TIE Gi TH te ceccstrciccesscnseccntcicbaniibaiamakianns 7,8,9

Arkansas Dept. of Corrections Admin. Dir. 04-01,

I HU. Bi, Bi iccviciaivsnterttvesitantinciinaiiadasanen 7, 9,12

California Dept. of Corrections, tit. 15, Calif. Code

OE Tate, Fe OD ccc svsnintccssintiiniepiiiiniiuitiinmmabbaiiaain 7

Clark County Sheriff’s Office, Inmate Handbook,

available at http//Awww.co.clark. wa.us/sheriff/custody/

handbook.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2006) ..................... 12

Colorado Dept. of Corrections, Reg. No. 850-04,

GE TD, Ti Te socccoccccncsciovctdcevenneninecienaniaianaacaaiines 11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Connecticut Dept. of Correction, Admin. Dir. 9.6,

GEUAEIVS BEae. GB, BOSD ...cccccccccvesccsececccsseccsssescoees 7, 9, 10, 11

Delaware Bureau of Prisons Proc. No. 4.4, revised

aii li cciididienddcmnienncient 7, 8, 10, 11

District of Columbia Dept. of Corrections, D.O.

4030.1D, effective May 4, 1992 ............0000.00.. 7,9, 10, 11

Rules of the Florida Dept. of Corrections, Ch. 33-

I a ss cea cnssccnnengeeee 7

Georgia Dept. of Corrections Standard Operating

Procedures (SOP) IIB05-0001, effective June 1,

EET SEER eee ee eee ee aa 7, 8, 10, 12

Glenn County Jail Handbook, available at http://

www.countyofglenn.net/Jail (last visited Jan. 24,

a a cstnednontslodonne 12

Hawaii Dept. of Corrections, Policy No. 493.12.03,

I I I cad irs ccricecnsccnibancacdohdnesen 7, 10,11

Idaho Dept. of Corrections Dir. No. 316.02.01.001,

EESTI S EP SCI EDO aI 7,10

Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 20 Ill. Adm. Code

EI ae 8

Indiana Dept. of Correction, Policy No. 00-02-301,

I I Ohi BI cndecncsencsnoscensnsancavssMosendnasconesey passim

lowa Dept. of Corrections, Policy No. IN-V-46,

revised Jan. 2005........ SEE ESE eS 8

Kansas Dept. of Corrections, Article 15 — Grievance

Procedure for Inmates, § 44-15-101 ........000.c. 8, 11

Kansas Dept. of Corrections, Article 15 — Grievance

Procedure for Inmates, § 44-15-102 ............cccccceceeeeeeeees 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Kentucky Dept. of Corrections Policy No. 14.6,

OO ie 7,10, 11

Louisiana, La. Admin. Code, tit. 22 pt. I, § 325.......... 10, 11

Maine Dept. of Corrections, Policy and Procedures

| EA Or eee 8, 10

Maryland Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional

Services (Division of Correction), Directive No.

185-101, effective Apr. 1, 1998 .............cc.ccccssesssssssrresees 10

Maryland Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional

Services (Division of Pretrial Detention and

Services), Dir. No. 180-1, issued Nov. 30, 2000............. 11

Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 103 CMR

GD I Tk BIE crccedcictcciccoceckcseieccesetinnnss 7,10

Michigan Dept. of Corrections Policy No. 03.02.130

effective Dec. 19, 20038 ...................:cccceeeeeeeee 2, 7, 8, 10, 12

Minnesota Dept. of Corrections Policy No. 303.100,

hs Boe intinitesictcnnstascmmianinnsncvitinamessenesiniin 8

Missouri Dept. of Corrections Institutional Services -

Policy and Procedure Manual, Procedure No.

IS8-2.1, effective Jan. 15, 1992.00.00... 7, 8, 10, 12

Montana State Prison Policy No. 3.3.3, effective

GE Bh Fil actsicinsaiictntsaniciiabasianeneasieeannini 7,9, 10, 11

Nebraska Dept. of Correctional Services, Policy No.

217.02, referencing Nebraska Admin. Code, tit.

es is Bh IE Sicienicrecesicibnncasennensiibcinecintetaletpetiaiiinns 8, 9, 10

Nevada Dept. of Corrections Admin. Reg. 740.02,

I ili 7, 8,10, 11

New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections, Statement

eR FD ER renee see eer 8

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -— Continued

Page

New Jersey Dept. of Corrections IMM.RRP.003,

EE, Bis TE cccrecaniitscnctinnnctnintsininvsinnsccennienene 10

New Mexico Corrections Dept., CD-150500, revised

FNRI AI ene are ee eA Te 9

New Mexico Corrections Dept., CD-150501, revised

PR ESAT U eC Oe ore ea 8, 10

New York Dept. of Correctional Services, N.Y. Comp.

Codes R. & Regs., tit. 7, § 701.7 (2005)................... 10, 11

North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention Policy No. YD/DC 8.0 ............ 13

North Carolina Dept. of Corrections, Rules and

Policies Inmate Booklet (Mar. 2002) ................cccceeeseeseees 8

North Dakota Dept. of Corrections Policies and

Procedures Manual, effective May 5, 2005......8, 9, 10, 11

Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-9-31.................ccccccccsssssserrecceeeees 8

Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, OP-090124, effective

es Bes Bh etinedie tiniitndshieniniiadceniiniiinnicnninbiapinsitenninnsseed 8,9

Oregon Admin. Rules 291-109-0100 et s€q........ccccccceceece0e0es 8

Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, Policy No. DC-

ADM 804, effective Jan. 3, 2005.............0.00000ccceec eee ee 10

Rhode Island Code of Reg. 06.070.002, effective

es Sk ET teicicetctansticteltaciinccicieniesenenitennssbieiaichbiabeintndiiarl 2,7, 10, 11

South Carolina Dept. of Corrections Policy No. GA-

OR GS ee 8, 10, 12

South Dakota Dept. of Corrections Policy No.

1.3.E.2, effective Aug. 3, 2005 ..................c:ccccceseees 7, 8, 10

Tennessee Dept. of Corrections Index No. 501.01,

IY Wiis MI iilintinashtsierncteniodiiesssitetentincntninbdetideinines 7, 10,12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -— Continued

Page

Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Offender Orien-

tation Handbook (Nov. 2004).................ccccceceeseeeeeesseeeeeess 8

United States Bureau of Prisons Directive 1330.13,

es Bi a sainstisticnseessccnitteresiantiniilelineincdiciniaiieee 7, 22

Utah Dept. of Corrections Institutional Operations

Division Manual, FDr02/03.03, dated July 1, 2003 ....passim

Virginia Dept. of Corrections Procedure No. DOP

eR EE SE riiidhisinisidnindntpncicnprecmibapiivanionginiiiiin 8, 11,12

Washington Dept. of Corrections, No. DOC 550.100,

TE IGG ig SUED ctcecnninnstcanscsciciiiencesintctinttnasnienennenss 8

West Virginia Division of Corrections, W.Va. Code

sic hinciiabthinicisiitscinsistianietedbioaniatics 11, 12

Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, Wisconsin Admin.

Code § DOC 310.09 et seg. (2005)............cccccceteeeteeeeeees 11

Wyoming Dept. of Corrections, Admin. Reg. No.

2.501, revised Dec. 11, 1998 0.0.0.0... cece 8, 9,11

REPORTS AND FINDINGS

ALLEN J. BECK AND LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, U.S.

DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT IN STATE PRISONS

PAULA M. DitrTon, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU

OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH AND

TREATMENT OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS (1999)....... 21

CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DeEpr. oF JUSTICE,

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, EDUCATION AND

CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS (Jan. 2003) ...................... 20

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Letter Of Bradley J. Schlozman, Acting Assistant

Attorney General, to Mitch Daniels, now Gover-

nor of the State of Indiana (Sept. 9, 2005), avail-

able at http/Awww.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/split_

indiana_southbend_juv_findlet_9-9-05.pdf (last vis-

hs SA TUE nicseieciesiaiicasteinbdistialideniindngnedndiimhieninaediseen 3, 19

U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION OFFICE OF EDUCATION AND

RESEARCH, LITERACY BEHIND PRISON WALLS:

PROFILES OF THE ADULT PRISON POPULATION

FROM THE NATIONAL ADULT LITERACY SURVEY

AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, PSYCHIATRIC

SERVICES IN JAILS AND PRISONS (2d ed. 2000) ............... 21

1

INTEREST OF THE JEROME N. FRANK LEGAL

SERVICES ORGANIZATION OF THE YALE LAW

SCHOOL AS AMICUS CURIAE

At the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization

of the Yale Law School (LSO), law students supervised by

law school clinical faculty provide free representation to

indigent people in need of legal aid.’ Since 1970, LSO

students have provided legal assistance to incarcerated

people, first through a Prison Clinic, and now through

both the Prison Clinic and the Complex Federal Litigation

Clinic (CFL). Yale students have represented inmates in

federal and state courts and before administrative agen-

cies, in a range of proceedings including habeas and civil

rights actions, and involving a wide variety of issues. In

recent years, LSO has litigated a number of cases involv-

ing Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) exhaustion. This

case will determine the viability of at least one current

LSO client’s case, and it will affect the remedies available

to many other inmates seeking help from LSO.

S

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The government urges this Court to engraft a judicially

created procedural default rule onto the exhaustion re-

quirement of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons

* The parties have consented to the filing of this amicus brief and

consent letters have been filed with the Clerk. Sup. Ct. R. 37(3).

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37(6), amicus states that no counsel

for any party authored any part of this brief. No person or entity other

than the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization of the Yale Law

Schoo] (LSO) made any monetary contribution to the preparation or

submission of this brief.

2

Act (CRIPA), as amended by the PLRA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a). The government’s gloss is not required by the

statute and is inconsistent with the structure and purpose

of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the other civil rights statutes. The

simple exhaustion requirement that Congress mandated

in § 1997e(a) is intended to provide, as this Court has

stated, “time and opportunity [for corrections officials] to

address complaints internally before allowing the initia-

tion of a federal case.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524

(2002). Congress did not intend to require federal courts to

stand idle in the face of constitutional violations because

an inmate missed a grievance deadline. See Thomas uv.

Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 733 (6th Cir. 2003).

A procedural default rule will severely impair federal

courts’ ability to remedy constitutional abuses in prisons,

because correctional grievance procedures are marked by

numerous levels of review and short deadlines, inviting

procedural errors by unrepresented inmates. Amicus LSO

has surveyed correctional policies nationwide, and the

Appendix to this brief includes a chart describing griev-

ance policies promulgated by the United States Bureau of

Prisons, state correctional systems, and jails. Many of

these policies include numerous levels of review, with

deadlines as short as two to five days.’

* See, eg., Indiana Dept. of Correction, Policy No. 00-02-

3OL(XVIIIMA) and (C) (May 1, 2000) (allowing forty-eight hours for

informal complaint and an additional two working days for the filing of a

formal grievance); Michigan Dept. of Corrections Policy No. 03.02.130(R)

and (X) (Dec. 19, 2003) (requiring attempt at informal resolution within

two business days, followed by the filing of a grievance within five

business days); Rhode Island Code of Reg. 06.070.002 (10) (Jan. 7, 1980)

(requiring grievances to be filed within three days).

3

Grafting a procedural default rule onto the civil rights

statutes will exact the greatest toll on the most vulnerable

inmates and detainees. Under such a regime, the least

sophisticated inmates and those most in danger or most

easily intimidated will suffer disproportionately: juveniles,

first-time offenders, the mentally ill, victims of sexual

assault who do not immediately come forward, the illiter-

ate or marginally literate, those who do not speak English,

and those who fear retaliation or further abuse by line

staff.

In Minix v. Pazera, 2005 WL 1799538 at *1 (N.D. Ind.

July 27, 2005), a district court dismissed on summary

judgment claims arising from repeated beatings and a

sexual assault that a child had suffered in an Indiana

juvenile facility. The court based its decision on the child’s

failure to comply with the Indiana grievance process,

which includes a two-business-day filing deadline, despite

what the court termed the juvenile’s mother’s “heroic”

attempts to alert state officials to the abuse. Jd. at *2, 4, 7.

Less than two months after the district court issued its

decision in Minix, the United States Department of Justice

(DOJ) Civil Rights Division found that the Indiana juve-

nile facility at issue in Minix had violated children’s

constitutional rights by failing to protect them from harm,

and that its “dysfunctional” grievance system had contrib-

uted to the unconstitutional conditions.’ Minix confirms

that a procedural default rule will result in dismissal of

* Letter of Bradley J. Schlozman, Acting Assistant Attorney

General, to Mitch Daniels, now Governor of the State of Indiana 2, 3, and 7

(Sept. 9, 2005), available at http:/Avww.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/

split_indiana_southbend_juv_findlet_9-9-05.pdf (last visited Jan. 24,

2006).

4

meritorious constitutional claims, and accord undue

deference to grievance systems that lie wholly within the

control of the defendants.

Both Petitioner and the United States claim that the

federal-state comity concerns animating the habeas

procedural default rule also apply to PLRA exhaustion,

Brief of Petitioner, Woodford v. Ngo (No. 05-416) (Pet. Br.)

at 28-30; Brief of the United States, Woodford v. Ngo (No.

05-416) (U.S. Br.) at 13-15, and the United States argues

that rules governing judicial review of federal agencies’

decisions should govern civil rights actions, U.S. Br. at 10-

12. However, neither federal habeas review of state court

criminal convictions nor judicial review of agency decisions

presents a true analogy for exhaustion in the context of

federal civil rights actions. Civil rights suits are original

actions, designed to vindicate federal rights when state

and local officials are unable or unwilling to do so. See

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961), overruled on

other grounds, Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Services, 436 US.

658 (1978). The minimal process provided by many inmate

grievance systems cannot be compared with state court

criminal proceedings, or agency actions under the Admin-

istrative Procedure Act (APA), see 5 U.S.C. § 556 (2005), et

seq. See Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 678 (2d Cir. 2004).

¢

ARGUMENT

Neither the text nor the legislative history of CRIPA

as amended by the PLRA requires a procedural default

rule. The amicus brief filed by a number of states ac-

knowledges candidly that, “(t]he language of § 1997e(a)

does not specifically address the issue.” Brief of the State

5

of New York et al. as Amici Curiae at 2, Woodford v. Ngo

(No. 05-416) (N.Y. Br.). Another amicus brief filed in

support of Respondent examines the legislative history of

CRIPA as amended by the PLRA, and demonstrates that

Congress did not intend to adopt a procedural default rule.

Brief of A.C.L.U. National Prison Project as Amicus

Curiae, Woodford v. Ngo (No. 05-416). This Court has been

rightly reluctant to invent exhaustion rules for civil rights

litigation without explicit Congressional guidance. See

Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 508 (1982) (“A

judicially imposed exhaustion requirement would be

inconsistent with Congress’ decision to adopt § 1997e and

would usurp policy judgments that Congress has reserved

for itself.”); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 816 n.19

(1980) (“[W]e do not believe that a court should read in a

time limitation provision that Congress has not seen fit to

include ... at least when dealing with a statutory scheme

in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers[,] initiate

the process.”) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted).

Recognizing the absence of a Congressional mandate

for a procedural default rule, the government relies on

policy arguments about the need for timely investigations

of inmates’ complaints, N.Y. Br. at 3, and analogizes to

other areas of the law, such as habeas and administrative

law, Pet. Br. at 26-30, U.S. Br. at 10-15. These arguments

provide slim justification for a draconian rule that would

allow jailers to determine whether federal courts can

review constitutional claims, eviscerating the civil rights

statutes and depriving the most vulnerable inmates of

access to a federal forum.

6

I A PROCEDURAL DEFAULT RULE WOULD

SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRICT THE ENFORCE-

MENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES IN PRIS-

ONS, JAILS, AND JUVENILE FACILITIES.

A. Correctional grievance procedures na-

tion-wide are marked by successive short

deadlines.

A procedural default rule would drastically impair

federal courts’ ability to remedy many types of constitu-

tional violations. Inmate grievance procedures are charac-

terized by numerous levels of review, each with its own

deadline. Many of these deadlines are quite short. The

government states that “[mjost jurisdictions require the

filing of administrative claims within 14 to 30 days of the

action being challenged.” U.S. Br. at 29. This is not the

whole story. To better understand the nature of inmate

grievance procedures, amicus LSO has compiled a collec-

tion of state and local jurisdictions’ grievance procedures.

The chart in the Appendix to this brief summarizes our

findings.

More than a dozen of the department of corrections

policies summarized in the chart provide for periods

shorter than fourteen days for the filing of the first official

* Amicus compiled these policies by searching electronic databases

and the internet and by canvassing attorneys and advocates. Because

inmate grievance policies sometimes are not published in a readily

available form, and because in some jurisdictions they are revised

frequently, the policies set out in the chart should be considered

illustrative only. Amicus does not represent that they are the most

current. The second column of the chart states the source of information

on which we relied in preparing the chart, including an effective date

(when available). The policies and other materials that we relied on in

compiling the chart are available on our web site at http://www.law.

yale.edu/Woodford.

grievance — between two and ten days counted in some

jurisdictions from the date of the incident and in others

from the response to an informal complaint.’ More than

thirty of the departments of corrections that we surveyed

require a prisoner to at least attempt informal resolution —

talking with a staff member or submitting a request form

- before filing a grievance. Some of these policies set

* See Arizona Dept. of Corrections Dept. Order 802.09, 1.1.2 (Mar.

3, 2000) (ten days); Arkansas Dept. of Corrections Admin. Dir. 04-

O1(IVXE\7) (Feb. 1, 2004) (three working days); Georgia Dept. of

_Corrections Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) I1B05-0001(V1\(C\(2)

(June 1, 2004) (five business days); Indiana Dept. of Corrections Policy

No. 00-02-301 XVIII (C) (May 1, 2000) (two working days); Kentucky

Dept. of Corrections Policy No. 14.6 I] (J)(2) (Jan. 4, 2005) (five working

days); Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 103 CMR 491.08(4) (Jan. 5,

2001) (ten working days); Michigan Dept. of Corrections Policy

03.02.130 (X) (Dec. 19, 2003) (five business days); Missouri Dept. of

Corrections Institutional Services Policy and Procedure Manual,

Procedure No. IS8-2.1 III(I3) (Jan. 15, 1992) (five working days);

Montana State Prison Policy No. 3.3.3 V (F)(1) (Apr. 1, 1997) (three

working days); Nevada Dept. of Corrections Admin. Reg. 740.02, § 1.5.1

(Jan. 5, 2004) (five days); Rhode Island Code of Regulations

06.070.002(E)(10) (Jan. 7, 1980) (three days); South Dakota Dept. of

Corrections, Policy No. 1.3.E.2, Formal Resolution (A) (Aug. 3, 2005)

(five working days); Tennessee Dept. of Corrections Index No. 501.01 VI

(C)\(1) (May 1, 2004) (seven calendar days); Utah Dept. of Corrections

Institutional Operations Division Manual, FDr02/03.03(C) (July 1,

2003) (five working days).

* See United States Bureau of Prisons Directive 1330.13, § 542.13

(Aug. 13, 2002); Alaska Dept. of Corrections Policy Index No. 808.03

(B\(1) (May 23, 2002); Arizona Dept. of Corrections Dept. Order 802.01,

1.1.3 (Mar. 3, 2000); Arkansas Admin. Dir. 04-01 (IV(E)(1) (Feb. 1,

2004); California Dept. of Corrections, tit. 15, Calif. Code of Reg.

§ 3084.2(b) (2004); Connecticut Dept. of Correction, Admin. Dir. 9.6 (9)

(Mar. 5, 2003), Delaware Bureau of Prisons Proc. No. 4.4 at 5 (May 15,

1998); District of Columbia Dept. of Corrections D.O. 4030.1D VII (F\\1)

(May 4, 1992); Rules of the Florida Dept. of Corrections, Ch. 33-

103.005(1) (Oct. 9, 2005); Georgia Dept. of Corrections, SOP Ref. No.

11B05-0001 V1(B\(1) (June 1, 2004); Hawaii Dept. of Corrections, Policy

No. 493.12.03(4.0 10b) (Apr. 3, 1992); Idaho Dept. of Corrections Dir.

(Continued on following page)

8

out deadlines for initiating the informal resolution process

that are quite short - as short as two days. See, e.g.,

Indiana Dept. of Correction, Policy No. 00-02-301 XVIII

(A) (May 1, 2000) (forty-eight hours); Michigan Dept. of

Corrections Policy No. 03.02.130 (R) (Dec. 19, 2003) (two

business days).’ A number of policies require a prisoner

No. 316.02.01.001, 05.02.01 (Sept. 16, 2004); Illinois Dept. of Correc-

tions, 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 504.810(a) (2005); Indiana Dept. of Correc-

tions, Policy No. 001-02-301, XIV (May 1, 2000); lowa Dept. of

Corrections, Policy No. IN-V-46 V(A) (Jan. 2005); Kansas Dept. of

Corrections, Article 15 — Grievance Procedure for Inmates, § 44-15-

101(b); Maine Dept. of Corrections, Policy and Procedures Manual

subsection 29.1 VI(B)(1); Michigan Dept. of Corrections Policy No.

03.02.130(x) (Dec. 19, 2003); Minnesota Dept. of Corrections Policy No.

303.100(A)(1XaX2) (May 1, 2005); Missouri Dept. of Corrections, Institu-

tional Services Policy and Procedure Manual Procedure No. IS 8-2.1

IIl(H\(1) (Jan. 15, 1992); Montana State Prison Policy No. 3.3.3 V(E)

(Apr. 1, 1997); Nebraska Dept. of Correctional Services, Policy No.

217.02, referencing Nebraska Admin. Code, tit. 68, ch. 2, § 003.02;

Nevada Dept. of Corrections, Admin. Reg. 740, § 1.4.1.1 (Jan. 5, 2004);

New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections, Statement No. 1.16 IV (A)(1)

(Oct. 1, 2002); New Mexico Corrections Dept., CD-150501(A\1) (June

22, 2005); North Carolina Dept. of Corrections, Rules and Policies

Inmate Booklet, § 20(6)(a) (Mar. 2002); North Dakota Dept. of Correc-

tions Policies and Procedures Manual, Inmate Rights, VI(H)(1) (May 5,

2005); Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-9(J)(1)-31; Oklahoma Dept. of Correc-

tions, OP-090124 IV(A) (Oct. 11, 2005); Oregon Admin. Rules 291-109-

0140(1\(a); South Carolina Dept. of Corrections Policy No. GA-01.12

(13.1) (Nov. 1, 2004); South Dakota Dept. of Corrections, Policy No.

1.3.E.2, Informa] Resolution (Aug. 3, 2005); Texas Dept. of Criminal

Justice, Offender Orientation Handbook VI(B) (Nov. 2004); Utah Dept.

of Corrections, Institutional Operations Division Manual, FDr02/

03.03(A) (July 1, 2003); Virginia Dept. of Corrections Procedure No.

DOP 866-7.13 (Nov. 20, 1998); Washington Dept. of Corrections, No.

DOC 550.100 (Mar. 1, 2005); Wyoming Dept. of Corrections, Admin.

Reg. No. 2.501, Appendix A (C)(1)(a) (Dec. 11, 1998).

” See also Arizona Dept. of Corrections, Dept. Order 802.08 (Mar. 3,

2000) (ten working days); Delaware Bureau of Prisons, Proc. No. 4.4

(May 15, 1998) (seven calendar days); Georgia Dept. of Corrections,

SOP Ref. No. 11B05-0001] (VIX BX5) (June 1, 2004) (ten calendar days);

(Continued on following page)

9

to attempt informal resolution within the time for filing

the first official grievance. See, e.g., Connecticut Dept. of

Correction, Admin. Dir. 9.6 (9) (Mar. 5, 2003); District of

Columbia Dept. of Corrections, D.O. 4030.1D VII (F)(1)

and (3) (May 4, 1992). Some policies allow prison officials a

number of days in which to respond to the informal com-

plaint before the prisoner may go on to file the formal one.

See, e.g., Connecticut Dept. of Correction, Admin. Dir. 9.6

(9), (10(G) (Mar. 5, 2003) (requiring informal resolution

and permitting staff fifteen days to respond to informal

request, but requiring that formal grievance be filed

within thirty days of incident).

All of the department of corrections policies that we

reviewed required an inmate to pursue at least one level of

review of the initial response to a formal grievance in

order to complete administrative exhaustion. Many

mandate two or more levels of review. Of the corrections

department policies that we collected, a significant num-

ber required an administrative appeal in fewer than

fourteen days; deadlines were as short as three to five

days in many instances.” The Alaska and Indiana policies

Montana State Prison Policy No. MSP 3.3.3 V (EX1) (Apr. 1, 1997) (five

working days); Nebraska Department of Correctional Services, Policy

No. 217.02, referencing Nebraska Admin. Code, tit. 68, ch. 2, § 004.01

(three calendar days); New Mexico Corrections Dept., CD-150500 (June

22, 2005) (five calendar days); North Dakota Dept. of Corrections

Policies and Procedures Manual, Inmate Rights VI (H) (May 5, 2005)

(five calendar days); Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, OP-090124 IV(A)

and (B) (Oct. 11, 2005) (three days for attempt at verbal resolution,

seven days for written attempt at resolution); Utah Dept. of Correc-

tions, Institutional Operations Division Manual, FDr02/03.03 (July 1,

2003) (seven working days); Wyoming Dept. of Corrections, Admin. Reg.

No. 2.501, Appendix A(C\1) (Dec. 11, 1998) (seven calendar days).

* See Alaska Dept. of Corrections, Index No. 808.03 (B)(4) (May 23,

2002) (two working days); Arizona Dept. of Corrections, Dept. Order

802.09, 1.3 (Mar. 3, 2000) (ten calendar days); Arkansas Dept. of

(Continued on following page)

10

Corrections, Admin. Dir. 04-01 IV (G) (Feb. 1, 2004) (five working days);

Colorado Dept. of Corrections, Reg. No. 850-04 IV (DX 1c) (Dec. 15,

2005) (five calendar days); Connecticut Dept. of Correction, Admin. Dir.

9.6(16) (Mar. 5, 2003) (five calendar days); Delaware Bureau of Prisons,

Pro. No. 4.4, IGP Resolution Levels: Appeals (May 15, 1998) (three

days); District of Columbia Dept. of Corrections, D.O. 4030.1D VII(G\3)

(May 4, 1992) (five days); Georgia Dept. of Corrections, SOP II BO5-

0001 (VIXD\2\(1) (June 1, 2004) (five business days); Hawaii Dept. of

Public Safety, Policy No. 493.12.03, 4.15 (a) and (f) (Apr. 3, 1992) (five

days); Idaho Dept. of Correction, Dir. No. 316.02.01.001, 05.03.00 (Sept.

16, 2004) (ten days); Indiana Dept. of Correction, Policy No. 00-02-301

XVIII (C) (May 1, 2000) (two business days); Kansas Dept. of Correc-

tions, Article 15 — Grievance Procedure for Inmates, § 44-15-102(b) and

(c1) (three days); Kentucky Dept. of Corrections, Policy No. 14.6 II

(JX2Xj) and (3c) (Jan. 4, 2005) (three working days); Louisiana, La.

Admin. Code, tit. 22 pt. I, § 325(G)(2)(a) (five days); Maine Dept. of

Corrections, Policy and Procedures Manual subsection 29.1I[V(D)(1) and

(E)(1) (ten days); Maryland Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional

Services (Division of Correction), Directive No. 185-101 I1I(G)(1) (Apr. 1,

1993) (ten calendar days); Massachusetts Dept. of Correction 103 CMR

491.12(1) (Jan. 5, 2001) (ten working days); Michigan Dept. of Correc-

tions Policy Directive No. 03.02.130 (DD) and (HH) (Dec. 19, 2003) (five

business days and ten business days); Missouri Dept. of Corrections

Institutional Services Policy and Procedure Manual III(K) (January 15,

1992) (five working days and ten working days); Montana State Prison

Policies and Procedures, Policy No. 3.3.3 V(1)(1)(a) (Apr. 1, 1997) (three

working days); Nebraska Department of Correctional Services, Policy

No. 217.02, referencing Nebraska Admin. Code, tit. 68, ch. 2, § 004.05

(ten days); Nevada Dept. of Corrections, Admin. Reg. 740.02, 1.3.4 (Jan.

5, 2004) (five days); New Jersey Dept. of Corrections IMM.RRP.003

IV(H) (Aug. 1, 2003) (ten working days); New Mexico Corrections Dept.,

CD-150501(D)\(1) (June 22, 2005) (seven days); New York State Dept. of

Correctional Services, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs., tit. 7, § 701.7(b)(1)

(2005) (four working days); North Dakota Dept. of Corrections Policies

and Procedures Manual, Inmate Rights, VI (1)(3)a) (May 5, 2005) (five

days); Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, Policy No. DC-ADM 804

VI(CK 1b) (Jan. 3, 2005) (ten working days); Rhode Island Code of

Rules 06 070 002 (C)(1), (D)(1), and (E)(2) (Jan. 7, 1980) (three working

days); South Carolina Dept. of Corrections Policy No. GA-01.12(13.5)

(Nov. 1, 2004) (five calendar days); South Dakota Dept. of Corrections,

Policy No. 1.3.E.2, Appeals to the Secretary of Corrections (B) (Aug. 3,

2005) (10 days). Tennessee Dept. of Corrections, Index No. 501.01 VI

(Continued on following page)

11

that we reviewed allow only two working days for certain

appeals.” The Delaware and Kansas policies that we

obtained permit three calendar days for appeals.” Several

departments of corrections permit only three working days

for certain appeals.’ The New York State Department of

Correctional Services policy permits only four working

days for appeals. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs., tit. 7,

§ 701.7 (2005). Ten of the policies that we collected (includ-

ing the policy of the Connecticut Department of Correc-

tion) allow five calendar days to appeal.” An additional six

(C\(2) and (3) (May 1, 2004) (five days); Utah Dept. of Corrections,

Policy Manual, FDr02/03.031(C) (July 1, 2003) (five working days);

Virginia Dept. o* Corrections, Pro. No. DOP 866-7.16(5) (Nov. 20, 1998)

(five days); West Virginia Division of Corrections, W.Va. Code of State

Rules § 90-9-3.1.10, 3.2.1 (five working days); Wisconsin Dept. of

Corrections, Wisconsin Admin. Code § DOC 310.13(1) (2005) (ten days);

Wyoming Dept. of Corrections, Admin. Reg. No. 2.501, Appendix A(G)2)

(Dec. 11, 1998) (ten days).

* Alaska Dept. of Corrections Index No. 808.03 (B)(4) (May 23,

2002); Indiana Dept. of Correction, Policy No. 00-02-301 XVIII (E), (G),

and (I) (May 1, 2000).

* Delaware Bureau of Prisons Policy, No. 4.4, IGP Resolution

Levels: Appeals (May 15, 1998); Kansas Dept. of Corrections, Art. 15,

Policy No. 44-15-102 (c)(1).

“ Kentucky Dept. of Corrections Policy No. 14.6 II (J)(2Xj) and

(3Xc) (Jan. 4, 2005); Maryland-Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional

Services (Division of Pretrial Detention and Services), Dir. No. 180-1 V

(C1) (Nev. 30, 2000); Montana State Prison Policy No. 3.3.3 V(I)(1)(a)

and (K)(1) (Apr. 1, 1997); Rhode Island Dept. of Corrections, R.I. Code

R. 06.070.002 (CX 1), (D1), and (E(2) (Jan. 7, 1980).

" See Colorado Dept. of Corrections Admin. Reg. 850-04 IV

(DX 1c) (Dec. 15, 2005); Connecticut Dept. of Correction, Admin. Dir.

9.6 (16) (Mar. 5, 2003); District of Columbia Dept. of Corrections, D.O.

4030.1D VII (GX3) and (4) (Apr. 4, 1992); Hawaii Dept. of Public Safety,

Policy No. 493.12.03(15)aXF) (Apr. 3, 1992); Louisiana, La. Admin.

Code, tit. 22, pt. I, § 325(G)(2Ka); Nevada Dept. of Corrections, Admin.

Reg. 740.02, § 1.6.1 (Jan. 5, 2004); North Dakota Dept. of Corrections

Policies and Procedures Manual, Inmate Rights, VI (I1)(2a) and (3a)

(Continued on following page)

12

state corrections policies permit five working days to

appeal.”

The PLRA applies not only to state corrections agen-

cies, but also to local jails and detention centers. As a

practical matter, the smaller and more local the facility,

the more difficult it is to obtain a copy of its grievance

policy. However, we have included in our chart two county

sheriffs’ policies covering jails, and the deadlines in these

policies are also quite short. The policy in the Glenn

County (California) Jail provides five working days for the

formal grievance and five working days for the appeal.”

The Clark County (Washington) Sheriff’s Office permits

seven calendar days for the grievance and forty-eight

hours for the appeal.”

Case law to date concludes that PLRA exhaustion

requirements apply to juvenile facilities, which sometimes

(May 5, 2005); South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, Policy No. GA-

01.12(13.5) (Nov. 1, 2004); Tennessee Dept. of Corrections, Index No.

501.01 VI (C2) and (3) (May 1, 2004); Virginia Dept. of Corrections,

Proc. No. DOP 866-7.16(5) (Nov. 20, 1998).

* See Arkansas Dept. of Correction, Admin. Dir. 04-01 IV (G) (Feb.

1, 2004); Georgia Dept. of Corrections, SOP Ref. No. I1B05-0001 VI

(D)\(2) (June 1, 2004); Michigan Dept. of Corrections, No. 03.02.130 (DD)

(Dec. 19, 2003); Missouri Dept. of Corrections Institutional Services

Policy and Procedure Manual, Procedure No. IS8-2.1 III(K) (Jan. 15,

1992); Utah Dept. of Corrections, Institutional Operations Division

Manual, FDr02/03.04(B) (July 1, 2003); and West Virginia Division of

Corrections, W. Va. Code St. R. § 90-9-3 (2005).

“ See Glenn County Jail Handbook, available at http://www.

countyofglenn.net/Jail (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).

* See Clark County Sheriff’s Office, Inmate Handbook, available

at http://www.co.clark.wa.us/sheriff/custody/handbook.pdf (last visited

Jan. 24, 2006).

* See Alexander S. v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373, 1385 (4th Cir. 1997),

abrogated on other grounds, Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999);

(Continued on following page)

13

provide as few as one to two days for filing grievances. See,

e.g., North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention Policy No. YD/DC 8.0 (providing

that grievances must be appealed to Facility Director

within twenty-four hours); Minix v. Pazera, 2005 WL

1799538 at *3-4 (N.D. Ind. July 27, 2005) (discussing two-

business-day deadline in Indiana juvenile facility).

B. A procedural default rule would discourage

reporting of institutional problems, would

eliminate remedies for meritorious claims,

and would be difficult to administer.

A number of states have filed an amicus brief arguing

that grievance deadlines are “essential to the operation of

prison grievance procedures” because they “facilitate

prompt investigation and resolution of grievances, allow

for swift remedial responses, and ensure that prison

officials receive timely information about prisoner com-

plaints before inmate dissatisfaction leads to unrest.” N.Y.

Br. at 3. While prompt complaints are preferable, there are

reasons why an inmate might legitimately delay filing a

grievance: fear of retaliation, injury, or, particularly in the

case of sexual assault victims, trauma or embarrassment.

A procedural! default rule would discourage inmates from

filing complaints if the deadline has passed. By contrast, a

simple exhaustion rule encourages inmates to report

problems, and allows prison officials to determine whether

they will seek to remedy them, or decline to do so on the

Minix v. Pazera, 2005 WL 1799538 (N.D. Ind. July 27, 2005); Moore v.

Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections, 2002 WL 1791996

(E.D. La. Aug. 5, 2002); Doe v. Cook County Juvenile Detention Center,

1999 WL 1069244 (N_D. Ill. Nov. 22, 1999).

14

grounds that the information is too stale. The statutes of

limitations on civil rights actions ensure that federal

officials will not be haled into court to answer ancient

claims. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985)

(concluding that § 1983 actions must be brought within

state statutes of limitations for tort actions based on

personal injuries).

In some situations, it would defy belief that prison

officials would not want to learn about serious problems —

for example a beating or sexual assault — even if it were

brought to their attention after the deadline for filing a

grievance. Indeed, this is another way in which prison

grievance deadlines differ from state court procedural

rules. State court rules and the habeas doctrine of proce-

dural default are designed to ensure finality and to end

second-guessing of state court judgments; they are essen-

tially retrospective. See Coleman v. Thompson, 5(@1 US.

722, 747 (1991). By contrast, prison grievance procedures,

at least in part, function as a management tool: they bring

issues to the attention of prison officials who are responsi-

ble for remedying constitutional violations on an on-going

basis. See N.Y. Br. at 1, 3; Porter, 534 U.S. at 525. A

procedural default rule would change the nature of prison

grievance systems, transforming their deadlines into “safe

harbor” provisions for rights abusers, and reducing the

incentive for prison officials to remedy rights violations

after the passage of the grievance deadline.

Maintaining a simple exhaustion rule does not mean,

as the government claims, that inmates will be allowed to

let prison grievance deadlines lapse and proceed directly to

federal court. See Pet. Br. at 15; N.Y. Br. at 10. A mechanism

already exists to force exhaustion: dismissal without preju-

dice. A court confronted with a prisoner’s unexhausted claim

15

should dismiss it, to allow the prisoner to attempt to

exhaust his tardy claim before returning to federal court.

See, e.g., Lawrence v. Goord, 304 F.3d 198, 199-200 (2d Cir.

2002) (reinstating judgment of district court dismissing

inmate’s claim without prejudice to refiling after exhaus-

tion). If the grievance deadline for a dismissed claim has

passed, prison and jail authorities have a choice: they may

choose to avail themselves of the opportunity to address

the prisoner’s claim and potentially forestall litigation.

Alternatively, officials can choose to enforce their filing

deadline, and, after the prisoner attempts to exhaust, he

can return to federal court, having satisfied the purposes

of the exhaustion requirement, to provide “time and

opportunity ... to address complaints internally” before

suit, Porter, 534 U.S. at 525.

The government has framed the question presented in

this case as encompassing not only alleged procedural

defaults based on late complaints, but also other types of

procedural defects. This raises the specter of requiring pro

se inmates to file what is in effect a draft § 1983 com-

plaint, with no opportunity to correct mistakes that they

learn of later, within only a few days or weeks of an

incident — an event that may have left the inmate physi-

cally injured or incapacitated, fearful of retaliation, or

confined to a segregation unit with even less access to

legal advice and information than is usually available in

the institution. See, e.g., Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646,

649 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[G]rievances must contain the sort of

information that the administrative system requires.

Some states (Illinois is an example) require fact-pleading

in litigation, and these might be expected to require

factual detail in administrative grievances too.”).

16

A procedural default rule based on grievance policies

also would be difficult to administer because prison and

jail grievance policies are much more malleable and

informal than the state court rules of criminal procedure

that are scrutinized in the habeas procedural default

cases. Cf. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1991)

(Georgia Supreme Court’s retroactive application of a rule

that barred consideration of a Batson claim did not consti-

tute “firmly established and regularly followed state

practice” that could constitute adequate and independent

state ground for decision); James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S.

341, 346-49 (1984) (Kentucky’s distinction between “ad-

monitions” and “instructions” was not “the sort of firmly

established and regularly followed state practice that can

prevent implementation of federal constitutional rights”).

Grievance policies are not always published, and some-

times must be requested directly from the defendants. Nor

is there as well-developed a body of decisional law inter-

preting prison grievance systems as there is construing

state rules of criminal procedure. See Lee v. Kemna, 534

U.S. 362, 387 (2002) (declining to apply procedural default

rule when no published Missouri decision directed “un-

modified application” of state rules governing requests for

continuances). As a result, a procedural default rule would

be difficult to apply, and would hand correctional officials

the power to terminate civil rights challenges.

C. The most vulnerable inmates will be least

able to comply with procedural deadlines

and rules.

The most vulnerable inmates would be the most affected

hy a strict procedural default rule. Unlike judicial review

of an agency determination, or federal habeas review of a

17 -

state court criminal conviction, the genesis of a civil rights

action is a constitutional violation, not a prior legal pro-

ceeding. A prisoner who has been abused may fear or

mistrust prison authorities, or simply believe that a

grievance will not help. In the days or weeks after a

serious incident, a prisoner may be injured, withdrawn, or

frightened.

Some of the inmates subject to the PLRA are chil-

dren.” In Minix v. Pazera, 2005 WL 1799538 (N.D. Ind.

July 27, 2005), a district court in the Northern District of

Indiana granted summary judgment to the defendants in a

civil rights case brought by a young man, S.Z., and his

mother, Cathy Minix, for injuries that he suffered while in

custody at Indiana juvenile facilities, including South

Bend Juvenile Facility.” Id. at *7. The Minix court based

its decision on S.Z.’s failure to properly exhaust Indiana

grievance procedures, which allow only two business days

in which to file a grievance. Id. at *3.

While S.Z. was incarcerated in Indiana state juvenile

facilities in 2002 and 2003, he was “jumped and beaten”

repeatedly by other inmates, sustaining injuries including

bruising, a black eye, a bloody nose, and a split lip. Jd. at

*1-2. No staff took action to investigate or protect him. /d.

at *1. During one of these beatings, S.Z. suffered a “sei-

zure-like” reaction; although staff were called to help him,

" Courts have applied the PLRA exhaustion requirement to

juvenile facilities. See supra, n.16.

* The Minix court granted defendants’ motion for partial summary

judgment, dismissed the federal claims without prejudice, and remanded

the case to St. Joseph Superior Court “where an Indiana court may

address claims brought under Indiana law against Indiana employees.”

Id. at *7.

18

no efforts were made to protect him, and he was beaten

again the next day. Jd. One of these beatings occurred in a

day room which was monitored by four cameras. Id. at *2.

At one point in his incarceration, S.Z. was raped, and he

also saw another detainee being raped. Jd. Presumably

affected by these events, S.Z. was placed on suicide watch

and sometimes did not eat. Jd. at *1. In January 2003, S.Z.

was beaten with padlock-laden socks. Jd. at *2. This time,

the staff gave him medical care and took pictures of his

injuries. Jd. Because he did not want to be viewed as a

“snitch,” S.Z. did not report these beatings. Jd. Staff at the

facility allegedly encouraged such beatings and arranged

for juveniles to fight, sometimes even handcuffing a

juvenile so that others could beat him. Jd.

S.Z.’s mother, however, was aware of his injuries and

made what the district court describes as “heroic efforts”

to protect her son. Jd. at *2, 7. Before S.Z. was beaten with

padlocks, his mother told staff at the facility about the

bruises on his body and the threats that had been made

against him. /d. at *2. After the padlock beating, she wrote

to an Indiana state Magistrate Judge and a Juvenile

Judge, one of whom notified the Governor about her

concerns. Jd. In March 2003, Mrs. Minix attempted to

attend a prearrarged meeting with the Superintendent of

one of the facilities, but was prevented from doing so by

staff. Id. at *2, 4. She was never given any information

about filing a grievance. Jd. at *2. She contacted the

Deputy Department of Correction (DOC) Commissioner,

and, ultimately, the Governor. Id. at *4. Finally, in May

2003, S.Z. was “unexpectedly released on order from the

Governor’s office.” Id. at *2.

Despite Mrs. Minix’s repeated attempts to notify state

authorities of the abuse of her son, the district court

19

concluded in a written opinion dated July 27, 2005, that

S.Z.’s failure to comply with the Indiana grievance process,

which includes a two-business-day deadline, meant that

S.Z. could not proceed with his federal claims. Jd. at *2-7.

The court said that Mrs. Minix’s attempts to alert state

officials to the abuse of her son were insufficient, in part

because they “did not issue within anything near the

prescribed time.” Jd. at *4. The court wrote, “her commu-

nications didn’t comply with the general time constraints

built into the grievance process, which allow investigation

and corrective action while evidence and memories are

still available.” Jd.

In September 2005, less than two months after the

district court’s decision in §S.Z.’s case, the Civil Rights

Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) reported the

results of an investigation that it had conducted into

juvenile facilities in Indiana, including the South Bend

Juvenile Correctional Facility, one of the facilities where

S.Z. was assaulted. The DOJ concluded that, “certain

deficiencies at South Bend violate the constitutional and

federal statutory rights of the youth residents,” and that

“South Bend fails to adequately protect the juveniles in its

care from harm.”” It also concluded that, “[thle dysfunc-

tional grievance system at South Bend contributes to the

State’s failure to ensure a reasonably safe environment.””

—

ah

* Letter of Bradley J. Schlozman, Acting Assistant Attorney

General, to Mitch Daniels, now Governor of the State of Indiana 2, 3

(Sept. 9, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/

split_indiana_southbend_juv_findlet_9-9-05.pdf (last visited Jan. 24,

2006).

* Id. at 7.

20

Minix illustrates the situation that will confront

juveniles under a strict procedural default regime. Chil-

dren subject to unconstitutional abuse will! not be able to

seek protection or redress in federal court because of their

inability to challenge their abusers within the few days or

weeks allowed by the grievance system. Although an

executive agency ultimately investigated the facility at

issue in Minix, the individual plaintiff in that case did not

get relief in a timely fashion. Moreover, the DOJ does not

possess sufficient resources to investigate every facility

where constitutional abuses are alleged.

Many adult inmates also will have trouble complying

with short grievance deadlines. One of the greatest obsta-

cles to compliance is illiteracy or poor literacy. Not surpris-

ingly, incarcerated people report lower levels of educational

attainment than the general population: forty percent of

state prison inmates, twenty-seven percent of federal

inmates, and forty-seven percent of inmates in local jails

have failed to complete high school or its equivalent,

compared with only about eighteen percent of the general

population. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOw, U.S. DEPT. OF

JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, EDUCATION AND

CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 2 (Jan. 2003). The National

Adult Literacy Survey (NALS), conducted in 1992 by the

United States Department of Education, concluded that

the vast majority of inmates — seven out of ten — operate at

the lowest two levels of literacy on a five-level scale. U.S.

DEPT. OF EDUCATION OFFICE OF EDUCATION AND RESEARCH,

LITERACY BEHIND PRISON WALLS: PROFILES OF THE ADULT

PRISON POPULATION FROM THE NATIONAL ADULT LITERACY

SURVEY xviii (1994). Some inmates performing at the

lowest level “do not demonstrate the ability to perform

even ... fairly straightforward literacy tasks,” such as

21

finding a single fact in a short piece of text or entering

personal information on a form. Jd. at 17. A procedural

default rule will sweep many of these persons out of court

for failing to conform to procedures they are incapable of

understanding and following correctly. ’

—

Further, a significant percentage of inmates suffer

from mental illness: Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS)

surveys report that sixteen percent of state prison in-

mates, seven percent of federal inmates, and sixteen

percent of those in local jails “reported either a mental

condition or an overnight stay in a mental hospital.”

PAULA M. Ditton, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF

JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT OF

INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 1 (1999). Some estimates are

even higher. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,

PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES IN JAILS AND PRISONS xix (2d ed. 2000)

(estimating that about twenty percent of inmates in prisons

and jails have serious mental illnesses and that up to five

percent are actively psychotic). Another BJS report states

that one in ten inmates takes psychotropic medications, with

the figure increasing to nearly one in five in certain states.

ALLEN J. BECK AND LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEPT. OF

JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH

TREATMENT IN STATE PRISONS 1, 4 (2001). By the time a

family member or advocate discovers that a mentally ill

person has been abused, it may be too late to file a grievance.

Most likely a prisoner in this situation will not have

ready access to legal advice. Few indigent inmates have

lawyers on retainer to advise them in civil matters,” and

* Particularly in the wake of the PLRA fee caps, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(d) (2005), and restrictions on Legal Services Corporation (LSC)

funding, Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of

(Continued on following page)

22

their access to legal advice and information in prison within

the stringent time limits of prison grievance procedures

generally will be limited.” This is especially true for prison-

ers seeking to challenge abusive conduct by jail or prison

staff, because such inmates may be injured, intimidated or

fearful, or confined to a segregation unit. Thus, even if a

prisoner has a meritorious claim —- even if a court will later

appoint counsel for the prisoner — the prisoner may not be

represented during the time for filing a grievance.

II. EXHAUSTION UNDER CRIPA AS AMENDED

BY THE PLRA CANNOT BE ANALOGIZED TO

HABEAS EXHAUSTION OR ADMINISTRATIVE

APPEALS.

A. This Court should not engraft a habeas-

style procedural default rule onto the civil

rights statutes.

Petitioner argues that, “[blecause the policy consid-

erations underlying federal-habeas exhaustion are analo-

gous to those underlying PLRA exhaustion, both the

rationale for and utility of a procedural-default mechanism

in federal habeas apply under the PLRA.” Pet. Br. at 12. In

1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504 (a)(15), 110 Stat. 1321, 1355 (1996),

many jurisdictions have few law offices and legal services organizations

willing and able to take inmates’ cases, let alone ones that are well-

versed in how to develop them.

* Even if the prisoner has a civil rights attorney, he may be

required to navigate the prison grievance proceeding pro se; many

grievance proceedings do not allow lawyers to file grievances on behalf

of their clients. See, e.g., United States Bureau of Prisons, Directive

1330.13, § 540.16 (Aug. 13, 2002) (noting that, although an inmate may

obtain assistance from outside sources, including attorneys, “no person

may submit a Request or Appeal on the inmate's behalf,” and seeking

outside assistance will not justify a filing delay).

23

fact, the federal-state comity issues in habeas corpus and

prisoners’ civil rights claims are quite different. Law

professors have submitted an amicus brief in support of

Respondent explaining that the habeas procedural default

rule is a creature of the adequate and independent state

ground doctrine, designed to force the primary litigation of

criminal defendants’ constitutional claims in state courts.

Brief of Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of

Respondent, Woodford v. Ngo (No. 05-416).

As this Court has said, habeas procedural default

rules are designed to make “the state trial on the merits

the ‘main event’... rather than a ‘tryout on the road’ for

what will later be the determinative federal habeas

hearing.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977). This

Court has extended the concept of “procedural default” in

the habeas context to later stages of the state court crimi-

nal process, including direct appeal and state post-

conviction proceedings, thereby ensuring the primacy of

the entire state court criminal system. See, e.g., Edwards

v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452-54 (2000).” Indeed, after

the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA), federal habeas courts are required to accord

considerable deference to state courts’ determination of

federal constitutional claims, granting relief only if the

state-court adjudication was “contrary to, or an unreason-

able application of, clearly established Federal law, as

* Petitioner cites language from Edwards in support of the notion

that exhaustion and procedural default are not analytically distinct.

Pet. Br. at 27-28. The Edwards Court's reference to the “inseparability

of the exhaustion rule and the procedural-default doctrine,” however,

only describes the importance of procedural default in the habeas

context; it does not conflate the two concepts. 529 U.S. 446, 452-53.

24

determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)

(2005).

These comity concerns are simply inapplicable to civil

rights suits under § 1983. The civil rights and habeas

statutes strike a different balance between federal and

state authority. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted specifically

to enable federal courts to vindicate federal civil rights

when state and local officials were unable or unwilling to

do so. Describing the debates preceding passage of § 1983

in 1871, this Court wrote in Monroe v. Pape: “It is abun-

dantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed

was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by

reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance, or

otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims

of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and

immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment

might be denied by state agencies.” 365 U.S. at 180.

Moreover, prison and jail grievance systems are in no

way the “main event” in civil rights litigation in the sense

that state court criminal proceedings, with their constitu-

tionally mandated protections, are the focus of federal

post-conviction litigation. Grievance proceedings primarily

serve a correctional management, not a “rights-protection”

purpose. Inmate grievance proceedings are not conducted

by judges, and they are not accompanied by significant

procedural protections. Often, no evidence is taken, and no

legal argument considered. Indeed, amicus is aware of no

situation in recent years in which a prison system has

afforded an LSO clinic client even an administrative

hearing in response to a grievance. No one would argue, for

example, that a federal court should defer to a prison griev-

ance officer’s determination of federal law. When a federal

court hears a § 1983 action, it does not deferentially review

25

the prison grievance proceeding; it hears the claim de

novo, perhaps after a full trial, with such evidentiary

illumination as the administrative record may provide.

The government cites Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475 (1973), for the proposition that the same comity

concerns that underlie habeas rules also restrain federal

courts’ review of state prison officials’ actions in a civil

rights case. U.S. Br. at 15; see Pet. Br. at 29. The actual

holding of Preiser is that actions implicating good time

credits challenge custody, “the core of habeas corpus,” and

thus must be brought in habeas so that they are subject to

state court exhaustion. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 491-92. Since

Preiser, this Court has reaffirmed repeatedly that the

comity concerns underlying its holding apply only where

the fact or duration of custody is at issue, and that habeas

exhaustion principles extend no further than those cases.

See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 1247-48 (2005);

Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754-55 (2004).

Petitioner also attempts to equate the deference that

federal courts accord prison officials in matters of prison

administration under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987),

with the federal-state comity concerns underlying habeas

procedural default rules. Pet. Br. at 29-30. However, the

Turner standard does not require federal courts to defer to

prison rules limiting courts’ ability to hear constitutional

claims. Turner recognizes that “courts must take cogni-

zance of the valid constitutional] claims of prison inmates,”

and that, “when a prison regulation or practice offends a

fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will

discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.” Jd. at

84. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). Indeed,

with respect to certain types of constitutional claims,

federal courts will abandon Turner deference for strict

26

scrutiny. Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1147-49

(2005). In the absence of a clear Congressional mandate,

this Court cannot allow prison and jail officials’ procedural

rules to limit federal courts’ ability to discharge their duty.

B. Acivil rights action under Section 1983 is

not analogous to judicial review of federal

agency decisions.

The United States argues that procedural default is

required by a “general rule of administrative procedure.”

U.S. Br. at 10. In support of this argument, however, the

government relies on cases involving federal judicial

review of federal agencies’ decisions, which stand for the

proposition that courts should not consider arguments

that were not first presented to the agency. Jd. at 10-11.

This principle cannot be transplanted to prison and jail

grievance procedures preceding the filing of a civil rights

action.

Exhaustion under CRIPA as amended by the PLRA is

in no way analogous to the scheme of federal administra-

tive law, which involves a unified system of statutes,

regulations, and agency procedures, with the overall

purpose of ensuring that agency procedure is implemented

correctly and consistently. In civil rights actions, federal

courts do not “review” the decisions reached in prison

grievance proceedings in the way that they review the

decisions of administrative law judges and agencies. An

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403. U.S.

388 (1971), is an original action in which discovery may be

conducted and evidence taken; it is not limited by the admin-

istrative record of the prison grievance proceeding. See

Garcia v. Village of Mount Prospect, 360 F.3d 630, 643-44

27

(7th Cir. 2004) (“Title VII and §§ 1981 and 1983 claims are

original actions independent of the administrative review

proceeding and are therefore plenary in scope.”).

Certainly, the government could not argue that a

federal district court should defer to a prison or jail griev-

ance system’s interpretation of a statute governing correc-

tional officers’ behavior. Contrast Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,

843-45 (1984). Nor would a federal district court defer to a

prison grievance ‘officer’s findings of fact regarding an

inmate’s constitutional claim of excessive force or inade-

quate medical care. Contrast Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S.

150, 160-63 (1999) (discussing the appropriate standard of

review for courts to apply to findings of fact made by the

Patent and Trademark Office).

As this Court has recognized, the administrative

procedures accorded inmates by their jailers often include

“few of the procedural safeguards contained in the Admin-

istrative Procedure Act [APA].” Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474

U.S. 193, 206 (1985) (recognizing that disciplinary pro-

ceedings provided no right to a lawyer, compulsory proc-

ess, confrontation of witnesses, or discovery, among other

safeguards). In the experience of amicus, exhaustion of

grievance procedures — even in the federal system — often

consists of little more than a prisoner filling out a form,

which is sometimes returned with a response written at

the bottom. The Indiana grievance policy reviewed by

amicus states candidly that, “(t]he grievance policy is not a

legal forum.” See Indiana Department of Correction, Policy

No. 00-02-5301 XIV (May 1, 2000). In fact, some states

specifically exempt correctional agencies from their state

administrative procedure acts. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann.

§ 63-46b-1(2)(c) (2005); Texas Code Ann. § 2001.226 (2005).

28

This case will in large part determine the continued

viability of § 1983 and other civil rights statutes as vehi-

cles for federal courts to review the treatment of inmates.

This Court should not accede to the government’s request

that it engraft a judicially-imposed procedural default rule

onto the civil rights statutes, but should instead require

what Congress intended and policy considerations man-

date — simple exhaustion.

¢

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, amicus Jerome N.

Frank Legal Services Organization (LSO) urges this Court

to affirm the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

GIOVANNA SHAY

Counsel of Record for Amicus

JEROME N. FRANK LEGAL

SERVICES ORGANIZATION

YALE LAW SCHOOL

P.O. Box 209090

New Haven, CT 06520-9090

203-432-4800 (phone)

203-432-1426 (fax)

giovanna.shay@yale.edu

' Agency or |Policy or Other Informal = /Time for First Second (Third

Jurisdiction Source’ _ Resolution (Filing First |Appeal ‘Appeal (Appeal

Required? Official

_ Grievance

United States Directive 1330.13 [Yes 20 days 20days |30days |N/A

Bureau of Prisons- | Rffective 8/13/02 ~

Alabama’ |

Alaska Department Index No. 808.03 [Yes 30 days 2days* |30days N/A

of Corrections = =»—Bffective 5/23/02 |

Arizona Department Yes 10 dayst 10days |l0days (|N/A

Department of Order 800 10 days*

Corrections Effective 3/3/00

Arkansas Admin. Yes 3 days*t 5days* |N/A N/A

Department of Directive 04-01 15 days

Effective 2/1/04

California Title 15 California | Yes 15 days* 15days* |15days* |N/A

Department of Code of Regulations

Corvettions §§ 3084.2(b), 3084.5,

3084 .6(c) (2004)

Glenn County, Glenn County Jail = No 5 days** 5days* N/A N/A

California Division | Handbook § II |

of the Sheriff

Colorado Depart- | Regulation No. 850-04 | Not 30 days 5 days 5days |N/A

ment of Corrections | Péfective 12/15/05

Connecticut Admin. Yes 30 days* Sdays (Sdays |N/A

Department of Directive 9.6

6

Correction Effective 3/5/03

Delaware Bureau Procedure No.4.4 —‘[ Yes’ Automatic’ 3days” |N/A N/A

of Prisons Revised 5/15/98 —|7 days

District of Columbia | D.O. 4030.1D Yes 15 days 5days |5days |N/A

Department of Effective 5/4/92

Corrections |

Florida Dept. of | Chapter 33-103 of the| Yes" \5dayst® |15days |N/A N/A

Corrections Rules of the Dept. of |

|Corrections |

| Effective 10/9/05 |

* indicates working or business days. Otherwise, “days” are calendar days.

+ indicates that first formal grievance deadline is measured ‘rom the response to an informal resolution attempt. Otherwise, days

for filing the first officia) grievance are counted from the day of the incident.

+ indicates that informal reso!ution is encouraged or preferred, but not mandated.

All appeal deadlines generally run from the date of the response at the preceding grievance level.

t ddy

| | Agency or Policy or Other _/|Informal Time for First Second (Third

Jurisdiction Source’ Resolution /|Fiting First |Appeal |Appeal (Appeal

Required? Oficial

Gr evance

Georgia Department |Standard Operating | Yes 5 days*t 5days* |N/A N/A

of Corrections Procedures Ref. No. | 10 days

IIB05-0001

Effective 6/1/04

Hawaii Department | Policy No. 493.12.03 | Yes 14 days 5days j|5days (|N/A

of Public Safety | pefective 4/9/92 |

Idaho Department Directive Ne Yes 15days 10days N/A N/A

of Correction 316.02.01.001 |

Revised 9/16/04

Illinois Department |20 Ill. Admin. Code Yes 60 days 30days |N/A N/A

of Corrections §§ 504.810, 504.850

Indiana Department |Admin. Procedure Yes 2 days*t 2days* |2days* |2days*

of Correction No. 00-02-301 48 hours

Effective 5/1/00

Iowa Department of | Policy No. IN-V-46 Yes 30 days l5days (|lidays |N/A

Corrections Revised January 2005

Kansas Department | 44-15-101 Yes 15 days*” 3days |N/A N/A

of Corrections 14-15-102

Kentucky Depart- | Policy No. 14.6 No“ 5 days* 3days* (|3days* |N/A

ment of Corrections | Pffective 1/4/05

Louisiana Depart- |La. Admin. Code, |Not 90 days* 5days (N/A N/A

ment of Public Safety | tit 22, pt. I, § 325

and Corrections

Maine Department | Policy and Procedures | Yes 15 days 10days l0days |N/A

of Corrections Manual Subsection 29.1

Maryland Depart- _| Directive No. 185-001 | Not 15 days 10 days |30days" |N/A

one of Public Safety | Pffective 2/1/01

Regulations

12.07.01.01 et seq.

Maryland Depart- Directive No..180-1 {No 30 days Not 3days* |3 days*

ment of Public Safety |)..1ed 11/30/00 specified”

and Correctional

Services, Division of

Pretrial Detention

and Services”

* indicates working or business days. Otherwise, “days” are calendar days.

+ indicates that first formal grievance deadline is measured from the response to an informal reso.ution attempt. Otherwise, days

for filing the first official grievance are counted from the day of the incident.

¢ indicates that informal resolution is encouraged or preferred, but not mandated.

All appeal deadlines generally run from the date of the response at the preceding grievance level

z ddy

Agency or Policy or Other Informal Time for First Second (Third

Jurisdiction Source’ Resolution (Filing First |Appeal Appeal Appeal

Required? Official

Grievance

Massachusetts 103 CMR Not 10 days* 10 days* | Automatic”) N/A

Department of 491.00

Correction Effective 1/5/01 |

UMass Correctional | Policy and Procedures | Not 10 days* 10 days* |Not N/A

Health (UMC) Manual specified”

ee No. 12

Correction Approved 4/5/04

Michigan Depart- /Policy Directive No. | Yes 5 days*t 5days* |10days* |N/A

ment of Corrections —03.02.130 2 days*

Effective 12/19/03

Minnesota Depart- | Policy No. 303.100 | Yes Not specified” |15 days* |N/A N/A

ment of Corrections p¢fective 5/1/05

Mississippi Depart- Inmate Handbook, | Not 30 days Not Not N/A

ment of Corrections Chapter VIII specified” | specified

Missouri Depart- —_Institutional Services Yes 5 days*t 5days* (|10days* |N/A

ment of Corrections Policy and Procedure 15 days

Manual Procedure

No. IS8-2.1

|

Effective 1/15/92

Montana State Policy No. 3.3.3 Yes 3 days*t 3days* (|3days* |N/A

Prison Policies and | pefective 4/1/97 5 days*

Procedures

Nebraska Depart- | No. 217.02 Yes l5dayst” |10days |N/A N/A

ment of Correctional Effective 12/19/85 3 days

Services

References tit. 68, ch. 2

Nebraska Admin. Code

| Nevada Department | Admin. Regulation 740| Yes” 5 dayst 5days |N/A N/A

jaf Corrections Effective 1/5/04 6 months”

|New Hampshire Statement No. 1.16 /Yes 30 dayst 30days |N/A N/A

Department of ——| Effective 10/01/02 [90 days

| Corrections

New Jersey Internal Management | Not Not specified |10days* |N/A N/A

Department of Procedure 7

Corrections IMM.RRpP.003

IMM.002.001

Revised 8/1/03 ‘|

* indicates working or business days. Otherwise, “days” are calendar days.

t indicates that first formal grievance deadline is measured from the response to an informal resolution attempt. Otherwise, days

for filing the first official grievance are counted from the day of the incident.

t indicates that informal resolution is encouraged or preferred, but not mandated.

All appeal deadlines generally run from the date of the response at the preceding grievance level

¢ ddy

Agency or Policy or Other Informal Time for First Second /Third

Jurisdiction Source’ Resolution /Filing First |Appeal {Appeal (Appeal

Required? | Official

Grievance

New Mexico CD-150500 and 150501 by 20 days” ‘Tdays (N/A N/A

-~wonareanes Revised 6/2205 | days |

Department

New York Depart- N.Y. Comp. Codes R. |Not” 14 days 4days* |4days* |N/A

ment of Correctional | and Regs. Tit. 7, |

Services § 701.7

2005

|

City of New York | Directive No. 3375R | Not specified” |Not specified | Not Not Not

Department of Effective 3/4/85 specified” |specified specified

Correction

North Carolina Rules and Policies Yes 1 year Not ~ |Not N/A 2

Department of Inmate Booklet specified” | specified 9

Convection March 2002 | "

North Carolina Policy No. Yes 24hours” (24hours |24hours N/A

Department of Juve- | YD/DC 8.0

nile Justice and De- ;

i Receiatinn Effective 11/19/04 |

North Dakota Policies and Proce- {Yes 15 days 5days” |5days (N/A

Department of dures Manual 5 days

Corrections Revised 5/5/05

Ohio Department of |Ohio Admin. Code _ Yes 14 dayst 14days |N/A iN/A

‘Corrections § 5120-9-31 14 days

Oklahoma Depart- |OP-090124 Yes 15 days” 15 days” |N/A NA

ment of Corrections |Effective 10/11/05 3 days”

Oregon Department 291-109-0100 et seq. |Yes™ 30 days l4days 14 days 'N/A

of Corrections

Pennsylvania Policy No. DC-ADM | Not 15 days* 10 days* |l5idays* |N/A

Department of 804 |

;

jveveriene ‘Effective 1/3/05

Rhode Island RI. Code R. 06070002 No 3 days ‘Sdays* 3days* |3 days*

Department of ; / |

a aitiadin Effective 1/7/80 i

South Carolina |GA-01.12 Yes 15 days 5days 30days” |N/A

Department of | Issued 11/1/04 |

Corrections | |

* indicates working or business days. Otherwise, “days” are calendar days.

+ indicates that first formal grievance deadline is measured from the response to an informal resolution attempt. Otherwise, days

for filing the first official grievance are counted from the day of the incident.

+ indicates that informal reso.ution is encouraged or preferred, but not mandated.

All appeal deadlines generally run from the date of the response at the preceding grievance level.

¢ ‘ddy

Agency or Policy or Other Informal Time for First Second Third

Jurisdiction Source’ Resolution (Filing First |Appeal |Appeal Appeal

Required? Official

Grievance

South Dakota Admin. Remedyfor [Yes 5*t 10 days” |N/A N/A

Department of Inmates Policy No. 30 days

Corrections 13.E.2 a -

| 8/22/05

‘Tennessee Depart- | Index No. 501.01 No 7 days” 5days |5days |N/A

|ment of Corrections | prractive 5/1/04

Texas Department |Offender Orientation | Yes 15 days l5days (N/A N/A

of Criminal Justice |Handbook

| November 2004

Utah Department of | Institutional Opera- | Yes 5 days*t 5days* (|N/A N/A

Corrections tions Division Manual |7 days*”

Revised 7/1/03 :

| Vermont Department | Directive 320.01 No" Not specified | Not N/A N/A

‘of Corrections 320.01.01, 320.01.02 specified

| Effective 9/1/00

\Virginia Depart- {Procedure No. DOP | Yes 30 days Sdays |5days |N/A

ment of Corrections |866 .

Effective 11/20/98

Washington Depart- |No. DOC 550.100 =| Yes Not specified | Not Not N/A

ment of Corrections | Effective 3/1/05 specified" | specified

Clark County Inmate Handbook _| Yes 7 days 48hours |48hours |N/A

Sheriff's Office,

Washington

West Virginia Divi- |W. Va. Code of State |No 15 days 5days* j|5days* |N/A

sion of Corrections | Rules § 90-9-3

Wisconsin Depart- | Wisconsin Admin. Code | Not “ 14 days 10days |N/A N/A

ment of Corrections |§ DOC 310.09 et seq.

Wyoming Depart- |Admin Reg. No. 2.501 | Yes 30 days 10days |N/A N/A

ment of Corrections | Revised 12/11/98 7 days

* indicates working or business days. Otherwise, “days” are calendar days.

+ indicates that first forma] gnevance deadline is measured from the response to an informal resolution attempt. Otherwise. days

for filing the first official grievance are counted from the day of the incident.

¢ indicates that informal resolution is encouraged or preferred, but not mandated.

All appeal deadlines generally run from the date of the response at the preceding grievance level.

’ Because prison and jail grievance policies sometimes are not published in a readily available form, and because in some jurisdic-

tions they may be revised frequently, these policies should be considered illustrative only. Amicus does not represent that these policies

are the most current. The policies and materials that we relied on in compiling the chart are available on the LSO web site at

www law. yale.edu/Woodford.

* According to the Alabama Department of Corrections (DOC), the Alabama DOC grievance procedure is currently under review.

See www.doc.state.al.us/adminregs asp, last checked 1/24/06.

* The policy states, “laln appellant must submit the appeal within 15 working days of the event or decision being appealed, or of

receiving an unacceptable lower level appeal decision.” Calif. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 3804.6(c) (2004).

* The Inmate Handbook states that grievances may be resolved at 5 levels - Food Manager, Correctional Officer, Correctional

Corporal, Jail Division Command, and Under-Sheriff. The Under-Sheriff level is also characterized as an appeal. Glenn County Jail

Handbook at 15-16, available at www.countyofglenn.net/Jail, last checked 1/24/06.

* The Connecticut Department of Correction policy applies both to jails and to prisons in Connecticut.

* An exception is provided for grievances regarding property, which must be filed within one year of discovery or three years of the

occurrence. Connecticut Dept. of Correction Admin. Dir. 9.6(10XG).

* Level 3 review is restricted to grievances which: 1) challenge department level policy; 2) are emergency and cannot be acted upon

at subordinate level; 3) challenge integrity of the grievance process; or 4) did not receive a timely Level 2 response. Connecticut Dept. of

Correction Admin. Dir. 9.6(17).

* The “Informa! Resolution” stage of the process is alse described as Level | of the process and requires the filing of a form within 7 -

calendar days of the incident. Delaware Bureau of Prisons Procedure No. 4.4, IGP Resolution Levels, revised 5/15/98.

* Grievances that are not resolved informally are automatically referred to the Resident Grievance Committee, which makes a

recommendation to the Warden (“Level II”). Delaware Bureau of Prisons Procedure No. 4.4, [GP Resolution Levels, revised 5/15/98.

" The Warden’s “cision may be appealed to the Bureau's Grievance Officer (“Level III”). Deiaware Bureau of Prisons Procedure

No. 4.4, IGP Resolution Levels, revised 5/15/98.

" Informal resolution must be attempted within a “reasonable time.” Rules of the Florida Dept. of Corrections, Ch. 33-

103.011(1)(a), effective 10/9/05.

™ Policy states that, “the specified time frame shall commence on the day following the date of the incident or response to the

grievance at the previous level.” Rules of the Florida Dept. of Corrections, Ch. 33-103.011, effective 10/9/05.

” Policy states that, “grievances shall be filed within 15 days from the date of the discovery of the event giving rise to the griev-

ance, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays.” Kansas Dept. of Corrections, Article 15 - Grievance Procedure for Inmates § 44-15-

101b. The first step of the grievance process is that the inmate must seek informal, documented resolution through unit team. If no

response within 10 days, may file grievance report directly with the warden; if unsatisfactory response to informal resolution, must file

grievance within 3 calendar days of response to informal resolution request. Kansas Dept. of Corrections, Article 15 - Grievance

Procedure for Inmates, § 44-15-102(aX2) and (b).

“ Informal resolution shall be attempted by staff after grievance is filed. If grievant is not satisfied with informal resolution, he

must make a written request to Grievance Committee within 5 days of notice. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections, Policy No. 14.6II

(JX1bx 1) and (8), effective January 4, 2005.

” First letter to warden must be written within 90 days of the incident, but the policy also states that a grievance may be screened

out if “initial request” is made more than 30 days from the event. Apparently, the policy was amended in September 2002 to lengthen

the deadline for filing a grievance from 30 to 90 days; however, one provision states that a grievance may still be rejected if “there has

been a time lapse of more than 30 days between the event and the initial request.” Compare La. Admin. Code, tit. 22, pt. 1, § 325 (A){2)

and (G)1XA), amended LR 28:1993 (September 2002), with (FX 1XaXx)

* Appeal to Inmate Grievance Office. The Inmate Grievance Office may dismiss a grievance or refer for a hearing before an

administrative law judge (ALJ). Code of Md. Regs. 12.07.01.07-08. The ALJ c’.n either deny relief, or, if the ALJ determines that the

prisoner's complaint is meritorious, submit a recommendation for relief to the Secretary. Code of Md. Regs. 12.07.01 10.

” This Maryland policy applies to pretrial detainees; the previous entry applies to sentenced prisoners.

" First appeal is to Inmate Grievance Procedure Committee, and deadline is not specified. Subsequent appeals to Warden and

Commissioner must be made within 3 working days. Maryland Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services Division of Pretrial

Detention and Services, Policy No. 180-1 V (BX1), (CXL), (DX1), issued November 30, 2000.

” Appeal to Superintendent must be made in 10 working days. Central office reviews denials of relief by the Superintendent

automatically. 103 CMR §§ 491.12(1) and 491.13.

” Appeal to UMCH Medical Director must be made in 10 business days. Timeframe for second appeal, to DOC Health Services

Division, is not specified. Univ. of Massachusetts Correctional Health, Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, Policy & Procedures Manual,

No. 12, Procedure 3(b) and 5/a), effective 4/5 .

” Inmate must have at least 40 days 1 atil release to file a grievance. Minnesota Dept. of Corrections Policy No. 303.100, Proce-

dures (A) 1), effective 5/1/05.

” Mississippi Department of Corrections Inmate Handbook refers to “Steps Two and Three” of the grievance procedure, but does

not specify timelines. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections Inmate Handbook, Chapter VIII.

9 ddy

* First formal grievance must be filed within 15 calendar days of response to request for informal resolution, or, if no response is

received, within 20 days of the incident. Nebraska Admin. Code, tit. 68, ch.2, § 004.02.

* This required first step is actually quite formal, requiring the inmate to submit a written “request slip,” detailing his allegations;

the complaint is not termed a “grievance,” however, until it is filed with the Warden. New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections Policy and

Procedure Directive No. 1.16 IV, reviewed 10/01/03.

* Informal resolution must be attempted within 6 months for personal property damage or loss, personal injury, medical claims,

other tort claims, or civil rights claims. For all other issues, it must be attempted within 10 calendar days. Nevada Dept. of Correc-

tions, Admin. Reg. 740, 1.4.1.1, effective 1/5/04.

* Policy states that formal grievance must be filed within 20 days of the date of the Inmate Informal Complaint. New Mexico

Corrections Dept., CD-150-501 (A\1), revised 6/22/05.

* Informal resolution is not a condition of filing a grievance, but policy states that an inmate's failure to attempt informal resolu-

tion may result in dismissal of grievance. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs., tit. 78 701.3(aX2005).

* Inmate files a grievance with committee. If it is not informally resolved, inmate may request a formal hearing. City of New York

Dept. of Correction, Classification No. 3375R III (B\(1) and (2), effective 3/4/85.

* Three appeals - to Warden, Central Office Review Committee, and the Board of Correction/Commissioner - are available.

However, policy specifies no deadlines. City of New York Dept. of Correction, Classification No. 3375R III (BX3)-(5), effective 3/4/85. >

* Two levels of appeal are provided - to Region Director/Institution Head and to Grievance Examiner/Secretary of Correction. 3

However, Inmate Rules and Policies Booklet specifies no deadlines for these appeals. North Carolina Dept. of Corrections Rules and

Policies § 20 (6) (March 2002)

" North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Policy No. YD/DC 8.0 does not specify a timeframe _

for the first official grievance to Human Services Coordinator. North Carolina Dept. of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,

Policy No. YD/DC 8.0, effective 11/19/04. However, the Nondisciplinary Grievance Report Form states, “If you have a complaint or

grievance, fill out this form and give it to the human services coordinator within 24-hours of the incident.”

" Policy states both “5 working days” and “5 days.” Compare North Dakota Dept. of Corrections Inmate Grievance Procedure VI

(1X1)g) with VI (1X2)(a) and (3)(a), revised 5/5/05.

” Inmate must speak with staff within 3 days of incident. If complaint not resolved, inmate must submit “Request to Staff”

within 7 calendar days of incident. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, OP-090124 IV (A) and (B), effective 10/11/05.

* Inmate must submit formal grievance within 15 calendar days of incident or date of the response to the “Request to Staff” form,

whichever is later. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, OP-090124 V(A\ 1), effective 10/11/05.

* Appeal allowed only if new evidence is uncovered or probable error. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, OP-090124 VII, effective

10/11/05.

* Inmate must attempt both verbal and written informal resolution. Oregon Admin. Rules 291-109-0140 (1Xa).

” First appeal is to Division Director of Operations. Some issues may then be appealed to. South Carolina Administrative Law

Judge Division (ALJ). South Carolina Dept. of Corrections Policy No. GA-01.12 (13.4)-(13.6), issued 11/1/04.

™ Warden's response may only be appealed to the Secretary of Corrections if complaint concerns a major disciplinary action - a

classification action, or a decision regarding the restoration of good time credits. South Dakota Dept. of Corrections Admin. Remedy for

Inmates, Policy No. 1.3.E.2, Appeals to the Secretary of Corrections (Aug. 22, 2005).

” There is an exception for Title VI complaints, which must be filed within 180 days of the occurrence of tne alleged discriminatory

act. Tennessee Dept. of Corrections, Admin. Policies & Procedures, Index No. 501.01 VI (CX 1), effective 5/1/04.

* “Level One” of the process is described as “Informal.” Utah Dept. of Corrections, Institutional Operations Division Manual,

FDr02/03.03(A), revised 7/1/03. The Manual also requires inmates to document reasonable attempts to resolve complaints informally.

Id. at FDr02/02.08(A)( 1).

“ Vermont Dept. of Corrections Procedure No 320.01.01(4)(1), effective 9/1/00, states, “[s)taff at all levels will make every effort to

resolve issues before they escalate to grievances. However, if the offender desires to formally grieve an issue, staff will provide the

offender with grievance form #1.”

“ The policy refers to two levels of appeal, but no timelines are specified. Washington Dept. of Corrections, No. DOC 550.100 IV,

effective 3/1/05.

" The policy states that prior to accepting a complaint, grievance officials may direct the inmate to attempt to resolve the issue.

Wis. Admin. Code § 310.09 (4) (2005).