Amicus Curiae Brief — Gonzales v. Carhart
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: MAY 2 2 2006
Ne. GS-50 OFFICE OF THE CLERK
In The
Supreme Court of the Anited States
¢
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General,
Petitioner,
V.
LEROY CARHART, et al.,
Respondents.
¢
On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Eighth Circuit
*
BRIEF OF GIANNA JESSEN, ZACHARY
KLOPFENSTEIN (BY AND THROUGH HIS
PARENTS, TERRY AND JILL KLOPFENSTEIN),
AND THE CENTER FOR MORAL CLARITY AS
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
S
KELLY SHACKELFORD
Counsel of Record
HIRAM S. SASSER III
JONATHAN M. SAENZ
LIBERTY LEGAL INSTITUTE
903 East 18th Street, Suite 230 -
Plano, Texas 75074
(972) 423-3131
(972) 423-6570 (FAX)
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Re Ce BAF EE ssccsicctvtencccsccscevinccsnsssincsiessee iii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE...............ccccscssssessessenees 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...0000.00.......:ccccccecesssseeeeeees
PITT cletieniicieciiatteapiiacinaaiietebiinisitninitienasinasiacatintiaptaialimavictuibion 5
I. Congress deserves deference when it makes
II.
public policy decisions, especially when such
decisions are at the margins of constitutional
RD i iciticcicniitiscitceanisvnitniadainindnilathitima situs
A. Partial-Birth Abortion lies beyond the
IO iccewiicchtes diitericiatntsinbciandiiniiniguinittinateiniiaiit
B. This Court defers to Congress in its policy
I CUD sicctcséninctsieedntipiniiesieintinimbenviaideiniiiin
C. From the foundation of this Nation, it has
been clear that the Court should show
great deference to the public policy deci-
ee nce tetdiistintinncsinesebaninnatanbeiees
Congress should be free to consider a broad
array of evidence when acting as a policy-
maker, including the experiences of those in-
timately familiar with late-term and partial-
EN a ctniciiisiseitaseivichiminsptateinctigeininteitiiiniisese
A. Congress may consider evidence that psy-
chological harm to women occurs as a re-
a A i iicatiitechsiihiisibeiatentcecitlerisiaitenniiins
B. Congressional consideration may include
such factors as Post Traumatic Stress Dis-
order, the diffusion of responsibility and
how partial-birth abortion is merely a ve-
neer to provide moral distance for the doc-
SF I and chticasicendsiccitnbaannsetinshidstnsniiin
11
15
16
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS - “~ ontinued
Page
C. It is within the legislative ken of Congress
to consider the survival of children of late-
term or partial-birth abortions in deter-
mining their life claim outweighs the lib-
erty interest of the mother at the outer
most fringes of that interest...................:06 20
CAI ctrstencccsrecserserepsecesenepininnsnnenonvnenentensnoneneens 25
ili
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Akron v. Akron Cir. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S.
I ctaise talib ctrsntsisnctinchstcpctstdedpebcnibsobiinibeidiintiiatiiidinieiticineisaiioes 6
Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392 (3rd Cir.
Scie eit thai etched ncgtinnapetitcndigidiiiele 15
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) .0.........cccccceeeeeeeeeeees 15
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)................ 13, 14
FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting,
Se Fe ED abetted pastopecitcninscnticietibnnbcntndiencidarsonsite 10
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) ...............000. 10
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)............0.....0000 10
McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846 (5th Cir. 2004)................. 16
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994).... 5, 20
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3rd
FRR IRR SE RAY I ROR anreA MALE EME AD! RAPES WEN 15
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ............ccceceeceeeeeees 5, 16, 20
Stenberg v. Carhart, 520 U.S. 914 (2000)...........0....... 6, 7,9
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997)
a eeiniaie 10, 11, 16
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144
CD sinianeaninnen RET HO RSS OF TEESE DEE aw SPIRE ERO 24
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649
a ccthccecechuasliihtediet had dice titliakaeiieileic ten baenieadhninthiin balchiaiiclocsnd 10
lv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
HISTORICAL SOURCES
THE FEDERALIST (Benjamin Warner ed., 1818)............
THOMAS JEFFERSON, 15 WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., Thomas
Jefferson Memorial Association 1904) .....................
THOMAS JEFFERSON, LETTER TO ABIGAIL ADAMS
(September 11, 1804), reprinted in 4 MEMOIR,
CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES, FROM THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Thomas Jefferson
Randolph ed., Gray and Bowen 1830).................:00-
RUuFuS KING, RUFUS KING’S RECORD OF THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONVENTION (June 4, 1787), reprinted
in THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 (Max Farrand ed., Yale University Press
BIPEDD sccoccvceseseynnecccesenasssuscnuvcotoveesdutecebienbaisteobbanianniepets
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, INAUGURAL ADDRESS (March 4,
1861), reprinted in 4 A COMPILATION OF THE MEs-
SAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897
(James D. Richardson ed., Published by Author-
ity Of Congress 1899)............cccccessccrscscccssssessssesseeees
JAMES MADISON, 2 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
(Henry D. Gilpin ed., Langtree & O’Sullivan
BED ccsececesnizsnsanistndnmmiviactnndpaniifanveyionngiciaipaiieeniaee
JAMES WILSON, JAMES WILSON AT THE PENNSYL
VANIA RATIFICATION DEBATES (December 1, 1787),
reprinted in, 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION (Jonathan Elliot ed., Printed for
TN TI occ necicscnstiidociibiarldchedtateacandinaiietieloskonss
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
THE DEBATES ANID PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND
SESSION OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS (John
C. Rives ed., Congressional Globe Office 1862) .......
STUDIES
C. A. Barnard, The Long-Term Psychosocial Effects
of Abortion (Institute for Pregnancy Loss, 1990).....
W. Franz & D. Reardon, Differential Impact of
Abortion on Adolescents and Adults, 27(105) Ado-
EE ee ean
M. Gissler, et al., Suicides After Pregnancy in
Finland: 1987-94: Register Linkage Study 313
(British Medical J.) 1431 (1996)............cccccccccceeeeeeee 7
B. Lask, J. Lydon, et al., Pregnancy Decision
Making as a Significant Life Event: A Commit-
ment Approach, 71(1) J. Personality and Soc.
Psychology 141 (1996) .................::ccccceees Ea
B. Major & C. Cozzarelli, Psychosocial Predictors of
Adjustment to Abortion, 48(3) J. Soc. Issues, 121-
42 (1992)............ Nini saeheebdishicnapehnddnepinensnntanateense
W. B. Miller, An Empirical Study of the Psychologi-
cal Antecedents and Consequences of Induced
Abortion, 48(3) J. Soc. Issues 67 (1992) .............00.
W. B. Miller, Testing a Model of the Psychological
Consequences of Abortion, The New Civil War: The
Psychology, Culture, and Politics of Abortion,
(Linda J. Beckman & S. Maria Harvey eds., 1998)...
— 17
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, The
Emotional Effects of Induced Abortion, available
at http://www.plannedparenthood.com/pp2/portal/
files/portal/medicalinfo/abortion/fact-010600-emoteff.
xml#1097838269784::2874363106508449296............... 17
H. Sderberg, et al., Emotional Distress Following
Induced Abortion: A Study of Incidence and De-
terminants Among Abortees in Malm Sweden, 79
Eur. J. Obstet. Gynecol. Reprod. Biol. 173 (1998) ........ 17
H. P. Vaughan, Canonical Variates of Post-Abortion
Syndrome (Institute for Pregnancy Loss, 1990)........... 17
PUBLICATIONS
Dexter Duggan, California Abortionist Testifies in
His Own Defense, LIFE ADVOCATE, May/June
Sree ciciescltchieneeihitis crip ceilenanlaiataidatideda nisin aiiiatintetiaiitaa ted 22
Susan Fraker and Janet Huck, The Trial of Dr.
Waddill, NEWSWEEK, April 3, 1978........................:cc000 22
Neal Hall, Jury Will Hear Malpractice Lawsuit
Over Girl Born After Failed Abortion: A Judge
Has Ruled That The Case of a Baby Born Brain-
Damaged And Left to Die Is Not Too Complex For
Jurors, VANCOUVER SUN, April 29, 1998 ..................0 23
David Kocieniewski, Ana’s Plight; Mom Says She'll
Be Honest With Baby Maimed In Abortion, NEws-
, ND Tis Bi ivictcicteiteinencensegsinintinascetnecscesnanion 23
Jeffrey Perlman, Waddill Trial Has Heavy Impact,
Los ANGELES TIMES, May 15, 1978 .......................cc00000 22
The Ordeal of a Divided Jury, TIME, May 22, 1978.......... 22
Vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -— Continued
OTHER SOURCES
Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection
and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L.
ls Se Gee aeitntcceapibncianiitunnningninisnisisnaiaatiniciinacsen
Davip A. GROSSMAN, LT. COL., ON KILLING: THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING TO KILL IN
WAR AND Society, (Bay Back Books 1995)..............
LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, (Irving
Dillard ed., 3d ed. 1960) (“The Spirit of Liberty,”
speech at an “I Am an American Day” ceremony,
Central Park, New York City, May 21, 1944)...........
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hear-
ing on H.R. 1833 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 18 (Nov. 17, 1995)...............
Page
1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE’
On April 5, 1977, a pregnant 17 year old young woman
sought a saline abortion at seven months pregnant. The
saline abortion procedure involves injecting saline solution
into the amniotic fluid. During this abortion procedure,
the saline solution burns the fetus and causes it to be
delivered dead. This young woman, Tina, was informed by
the staff at the abortion clinic that it was in her best
interest to obtain an abortion because her mom was
already on welfare. Tina and the doctor who injected her
abdomen with saline never looked each other in the eye
and the doctor only said one word during the entire
procedure: “saline.” It was a command to the nurse to
hand him the saline solution he injected into Tina.
Tina and the other women injected with the solution
were required to drink heavy amounts of water and walk
around, waiting for their baby to die so that their bodies
could discharge it. Tina waited in the clinic overnight.
However, something “abnormal” happened. In the early
hours of April 6, Tina went into labor. Tina was sur-
rounded by a room full of women who had delivered limp,
lifeless babies. Tina, unassisted by any nurse or other
worker at the abortion clinic, gave birth to a living baby
girl, amicus Gianna. Other women were crying, the nurses
were shocked.
* The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Their letters
of consent have been filed with the Clerk of this Court. Pursuant to this
Court’s Rule 37.6, none of the counsel for the parties have authored this
brief in whole or in part and no one other than amici or its counsel
contributed money or services to the preparation and submission of this
brief.
2
Gianna was born that morning before the abortionist’s
scheduled shift. Since the abortionist was not available,
Gianna was sent to a hospital, escaping an almost sure
death at the hands of the abortionist. She did not com-
pletely escape injury from the saline abortion attempt and
remained in the hospital for three months. She was later
placed with a foster family who specialized in high-risk
children.
Due to lack of oxygen supply to her during the abor-
tion, Gianna has been forced to live with cerebral palsy.
Although doctors never believed she would be able to sit
up or walk, she has exceeded all probabilities. She can now
walk and run. In April of 2006, she ran in the London
marathon. In 1996 and 2000, Gianna testified before
Congress concerning her survival of a late-term abortion.
Amicus Zachary, represented by and through his
adoptive parents, Terry and Jill Klopfenstein, is also a
miracle baby grown up. Zachary is nine-years-old. Zach-
ary’s biological mother was addicted to and was using
crack cocaine during her pregnancy. When Zachary was in
his biological mother’s womb, he was diagnosed with
hydrocephalus and minimal cortex. Zachary had an
abnormal amount of fluid in his head and little chance of
survival. He was a baby of severe abnormalities — one that
would easily fall within a “health exception.” Zachary was
born on the evening of February 28, 1997 at 39 weeks
gestation. With Zachary’s head likely visible, his skull was
punctured and the fluid was drained.’ The doctor assumed
* The procedure Zachary endured is called cephalocentesis. It is not
a partial-birth abortion. It is a medical procedure that is done to shrink
the oversized head of a baby with hydrocephalus and is usually fatal.
Zachary, however, is in a unique position to demonstrate that life, even
(Continued on following page)
3
Zachary would die as a result. Zachary’ heart rate was
around 100, but he had little respiration and was ashy in
color.
The doctors placed “comfort care only” orders for
Zachary, which means no one was to assist in reviving
him, no oxygen, no respiratory assistance, just allow him
to die. The doctors did not even aspirate him after delivery,
which is a standard practice for all newborns. Zachary
refused to die. He survived that Friday night. He survived
Saturday. He survived Sunday. Zachary refused to die and
was given no help to live. Finally, on Monday, a neurosur-
geon was called. Zachary needed surgery right away, but
first a blood clot caused by the procedure needed to be
drained.’ Zachary was finally cared for and lives today
with mental and physical handicaps caused by his mis-
treatment, yet he has overcome many of the significant
handicaps that plagued him since birth.
Amicus Center for Moral Clarity, Inc. (“CMC”) is a
501(cX3) tax-exempt non-profit corporation dedicated to
advancing the non-partisan causes of racial and gender
equality, the eradication of poverty, and raising the stan-
dard of moral excellence for this nation. It is a Christ-
centered organization founded by Senior Pastor Rod
Parsley of World Harvest Church that is dedicated to
giving a voice to the values central to the faith.
life determined unworthy by some medical professionals, is precious
and worthy of a chance.
* If Zachary had been deemed worthy of salvation, a caesarean
section would have been an easy alternative that would not have put
Zachary’s life at risk.
4
This is the first time CMC has appeared as amicus
before any court. The reason for CMC’s appearance is its
concern regarding post-abortion counseling services and
the significant impact partial-birth abortion is having on
the psychological well being of women that terminate their
pregnancies in such a manner. The emotional scarring
associated with such a terrible procedure leaves life-long
wounds. With partial-birth abortion on the fringes of the
wide spectrum of legal abortions, CMC feels it must
participate on behalf of women everywhere.
Amici share a common objective: to bring to the
Court’s attention the survivor’s perspective of a late-term
or partial-birth abortion and the valid reasons why delib-
erative bodies, not courts, should set this difficult public
policy. With so much argument on both sides regarding
this critical issue, it is easy for the Court to lose sight of
the true life interests at stake in a partial-birth abortion.
With partial-birth abortion lying on the outer markers, it
is perfectly within the purview of Congress to make the
tough public policy decision to choose to favor the life of
the almost born, such as the lives of amici Gianna and
Zachary, over the low water mark of the liberty interest of
a woman to end the young life she carries.
¢
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The American system of government is dependent
upon the proper role of its branches. The Legislative body
is the policy-making body, making difficult policy decisions
for the country after extensive deliberation, debate, and
analysis in representing the people. As the Founders of
this country and centuries of American jurisprudence
5
attest, the Legislature is in a much better position to serve
this role than the Courts. In fact, when a court oversteps
into policymaking, it directly restricts the liberty and
freedom of The People, substituting its moral and policy
beliefs for those of The People and their representative
body — Congress.
Partial-birth abortion is a deep public policy issue
involving many complex issues of life and death, medicine,
psychology, societal impacts, and increased callousness,
among many other concerns. Congress can properly and .
fully consider such concerns, in public and through the
exchange of ideas. It is their role.
The lives of people like amici are exactly the kinds of
evidence Congress can and should be able to consider.
+
ARGUMENT
I. Congress deserves deference when it makes
public policy decisions, especially when such
decisions are at the margins of constitutional
jurisprudence.
This case does not present an issue that challenges
Roe or Casey.* Instead, this is a case regarding a public
policy decision bevond the margins of the judicially crafted
right to an abortion that involves a substantial number of
factors and competing interests and extensive public
debate. The very purpose of Congress is to make such
* Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
510 U.S. 1309 (1994).
6
public policy decisions, and Congress is best equipped to
do so.
“The members of the Legislative department ...
are numerous. They are distributed and dwell
among the people at large. Their connections of
blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance embrace
a great proportion of the most influential part of
the society . . . they are more immediately the con-
fidential guardians of their rights and liberties.”
THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 275 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Benjamin Warner ed., 1818). Congress investigates,
debates, and deliberates on public policy issues and is in a
far superior position to formulate public policy decisions.
See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 968 (2000) (“Irre-
spective of the difficulty of the task, legislatures, with
their superior fact finding capabilities, are certainly better
able to make the necessary judgments than are courts.”)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 456 n. 4 (1983) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting)). It would be improper to presume other-
wise. As Luther Martin, one of the delegates to the Consti-
tutional Convention attested: “[a] knowledge of mankind
and of legislative affairs cannot be presumed to belong in a
higher degree to the Judges than to the Legislature.”
A. Partial-Birth Abortion lies beyond the mar-
gins.
Partial-birth abortion is a “gruesome procedure.”
Carhart, 530 U.S. at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring). It is a
* JAMES MADISON, 2 THE Papers OF JAMES MADISON 1166 (Henry
D. Gilpin, ed., Langtree & O’Sullivan 1840) (Luther Martin, during the
debates of Saturday, July 21, 1787).
7
procedure that “millions find hard to distinguish from
infanticide and that the Court hesitates even to describe.”
Id. at 982 (Thomas, J., dissenting). It is a procedure that
“many decent and civilized people find so abhorrent as to
be among the most serious crimes against human life...”
Id. at 979 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). It is a procedure that
“is so horrible that the most clinical description of it
evokes a shudder of revulsion.” Jd. at 953 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). It is a procedure that is “subject to the most
severe moral condemnation, condemnation reserved for
the most repulsive human conduct.” Jd. at 963 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
As described in Carhart:
“la]t this point, the right-handed surgeon slides
the fingers of the left hand along the back of the
fetus and hooks the shoulders of the fetus with
the index and ring fingers (palm down). The sur-
geon takes a pair of blunt curved Metzenbaum
scissors in the right hand. He carefully advances
the tip, curved down, along the spine and under
his middle finger until he feels it contact the base
of the skull under the tip of his middle finger.
The surgeon then forces the scissors into the base
of the skull or into the foramen magnum. Having
safely entered the skull, he spreads the scissors
to enlarge the opening. The surgeon removes the
scissors and introduces a catheter into this hole
and evacuates the skull contents ... In cases in
which the physician inadvertently dilates the
woman to too great a degree, the physician will
have to hold the fetus inside the woman so that
he can perform the procedure.”
Id. at 988-89 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted). Evidence presented to Congress at a hearing on
8
partial-birth abortion also described the scene. As Con-
gress heard from an eyewitness to partial-birth abortion:
“(t]he baby’s little fingers were clasping and un-
clasping, and his little feet were kicking. Then
the doctor stuck the scissors in the back of his
head, and the baby’s arms jerked out, like a star-
tle reaction, like a flinch, like a baby does when
he thinks he is going to fall. The doctor opened
up the scissors, stuck a high-powered suction
tube into the opening, and sucked the baby’s
brains out. Now the baby went completely limp
... Dr. Haskell delivered the baby’s head. He cut
the umbilical cord and delivered the placenta. He
threw that baby in a pan, along with the pla-
centa and the instruments he’d used. I saw the
baby move in the pan. I asked another nurse and
she said it was just ‘reflexes.’™
Of course, amicus Gianna Jessen had first-hand
experience with a late-term abortion. To this day, Ms.
Jessen bears the scar of that struggle in the form of her
cerebral palsy, but she lives ... beautifully. Baby Zachary
too was condemned to die. His medical condition was
severe; he would surely die or live a miserable life accord-
ing to the medical experts. Yet, both amici are alive today
to tell their stories and testify by their lives that this is not
a matter for courts but rather involves a deep public policy
debate that requires open deliberation and exchange of
ideas that is better suited for the legislature.
* Id. at 1007; The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hearing
on H.R. 1833 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 18
(Nov. 17, 1995) (statement of Brenda Pratt Shafer).
9
If a doctor’s hand slips accidentally, a baby doomed to
die through a puncture in the back of the skull is born
alive. What does the doctor legally do in this situation?
What does society expect of the doctor when he makes a
mistake and allows a little girl to slip through his fingers
and be accidentally delivered? Who in the room has the
power to save that child who is accidentally born? Will a
nurse step forward? Is the mother strapped to a table
responsible for saving the baby once it is born? Why
cannot the doctor go ahead with the procedure even if this
occurs? What is the difference between the head being
held by a doctor in the birth canal and a head that is fully
exposed? It is appropriate for Congress to address these
policy questions through its deliberative process, including
the exchange of ideas, in the open, and the analysis of the
moral and social implications, finding the best conclusion
and policy for this country.
B. This Court defers to Congress in its policy
making role.
It is proper for Congress to “take into account the
grave moral issues presented by a new abortion method.”
Carhart, 530 U.S. at 967 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy went on to cite several cases for the proposition
that the Court should give wide deference to legislative
bodies when they decide close issues involving medical
disagreement and uncertainty. Jd. at 970-72 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (collecting cases). Justice Kennedy’s point is
well taken. It is not proper for the Court to “tie the State’s
hands.” Congress should be “afforded the widest latitude”
and the Court “should be cautious not to rewrite legisla-
tion.” Jd. On the fringe of a constitutional right lies an
area where public policy interests are of substantially
10
increasing importance and the right at issue is accorded
less deference. There is no clearer example of such a public
policy threshold than partial-birth abortion.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the
best that can be said is that there is some medical ambigu-
ity or uncertainty surrounding partial-birth abortion. It is
within this “play in the joints” that Congress is accorded
the most deference. The proposition that Congress or a
legislative body is in a better position to make these close
calls than the Court is well-established American juris-
prudence. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360
n. 3 (1997) (“it is precisely where such [public policy]
disagreement exists that legislatures have been afforded
the widest latitude”); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354,
370 (1983) (“legislative options must be especially broad
and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation”).
Thus, the Court’s deference to Congress’ role as the
national policymaker is in some measure due to the
acknowledgement that Congress “is far better equipped
than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts
of data bearing upon legislative questions.” Turner II, 520
U.S. at 195 (internal quotations omitted).’
” “Though different in degree, the deference to Congress is in one
respect akin to deference owed to administrative agencies because of
their expertise. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting,
436 U.S. 775, 814 (1978) (“Complete factual support in the record for
the [FCC’s] judgment or prediction is not possible or required; ‘a
forecast of the direction in which future public interest lies necessarily
involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency’”);
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 674 (1972) (it was
“beyond the competence of the Court of Appeals itself to assess the
relative risk and benefits” of FCC policy, so long as that policy was
based on findings supported by evidence). This is not the sum of the
(Continued on following page)
11
A common justification for judicial deference to
the legislature is the latter’s unique expertise in
performing the factfinding function essential to
determinations of policy. To the extent that fact-
finding and fact evaluation informs a constitu-
tional inquiry as well, legislatures are often
considered superior to courts in educating them-
selves on and calculating the relative weight of
the necessary background data. Legislatures,
unlike courts, have substantial staff, funds, time
and procedures to devote to effective information
gathering and sorting. Additionally, deference
with regard to some legislative matters reduces
what would otherwise be an unmanageable bur-
den on limited judicial resources.
Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the
Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 578-79
(1994) (footnotes omitted).
C. From the foundation of this Nation, it has
been clear that the Court should show great
deference to the public policy decisions of
Congress.
During the drafting and ratification of the Constitu-
tion, it is clear that this Nation’s Founders understood
matter, however. We owe Congress’ findings an additional measure of
deference out of respect for its authority to exercise the legislative
power. Even in the realm of First Amendment questions where Con-
gress must base its conclusions upon substantial evidence, deference
must be accorded to its findings as to the harm to be avoided and to the
remedial measures adopted for that end, lest we infringe on traditional
legislative authority to make predictive judgments when enacting
nationwide regulatory policy.” Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180,
196 (1997) (Turner IT).
12
that Congress is the supreme branch governing public
policy decisions, if for no other reason than Congress is
directly accountable to the people. As Thomas Jefferson
expounded in a letter to Judge Spencer Roane:
“our Constitution . . . intending to establish three
departments, co-ordinate and independent that
they might check and balance one another, it
has given — according to this opinion — to one of
them alone the right to prescribe rules for the
government of the others; and to that one, too,
which is unelected by and independent of the na-
tion .. . The Constitution, on this hypothesis, is a
mere thing of wax in the hands of the Judiciary
which they may twist and shape into any form
they please.”
Rufus King, signer of the Constitution, warned during the
Constitutional Convention, “the judges must interpret the
laws; they ought not be legislators.” Rurus KING, RUFUS
KING’s RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (June
4, 1787), reprinted in THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 at 108 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1911).° It is improper for the Court to in-
trude upon Congress’ sphere as a policymaker.
Thomas Jefferson earlier warned that “the opinion
which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are
* THOMAS JEFFERSON, 15 WRITINGS Or THOMAS JEFFERSON 215
(Albert Ellery Bergh ed., Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association 1904)
(Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane, Sept. 6, 1819).
* Alexander Hamilton explained in FEDERALIST NO. 81, “there is
not a syllable in the plan [Constitution] which directly empowers the
national courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the
Constitution.” THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 436 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Benjamin Warner ed., 1818).
13
and are not constitutional and what not, not only for
themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the
Legislature and Executive also in their spheres, would
make the Judiciary a despotic branch.” THOMAS JEFFER-
SON, LETTER TO ABIGAIL ADAMS (September 11, 1804),
reprinted in 4 MEMOIR, CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLA-
NIES, FROM THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON at 27
(Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., Gray and Bowen, 1830).
President Lincoln, two score and seventeen years later,
stated in his Inaugural Address in response to the Court’s
decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857),
“if the policy of the government upon vital ques-
tions affecting the whole people is to be irrevoca-
bly fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the
instant they are made ... the people will have
ceased to be their own rulers, having ... re-
signed their government into the hands of that
eminent tribunal.”
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, INAUGURAL ADDRESS (March 4, 1861),
reprinted in 4 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897 at 9 (James D.
Richardson ed., Published by Authority of Congress 1899).
All of this is not to say the Court is deprived of
judicial review. It quite certainly is not. It is undisputed,
as James Wilson, signer of the Constitution and early
Supreme Court justice, pointed out during the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution ratification debate, “when they [the
judges] consider its [a law’s] principles and find it to be
incompatible with the superior power of the Constitution,
it is their duty to pronounce it void.” JAMES WILSON,
JAMES WILSON AT THE PENNSYLVANIA RATIFICATION DE-
BATES (December 1, 1787), reprinted in, 2 DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
14
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION at 446 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
Printed for the Editor 1836).”°
Some may argue that for the Court to defer to Con-
gress in its policy making role subjects the minority to the
will or tyranny of the majority. Setting aside for a moment
that Congress, by its very design, has built in safeguards
against such a majority, not the least of which is the
pocket veto whereby one person may defeat legislation
supported by a majority, there is one major flaw with this
argument. The Fourteenth Amendment, which serves as
the constit:tional basis or reason for the abortion right,
was passed by the majority. It was the majority, as ex-
pressed through an act of Congress, who ignored the Dred
Scott decision and banned slavery in the territories. THE
DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE
THIRTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS 2618 (John C. Rives, ed.,
Congressional Globe Office 1862) (June 9, 1862). The
majority freed the slaves, the majority (of males) extended
voting rights to women, the majority passed the Civil
* Of course, James Wilson also “moved as an amendment ‘that the
Supreme National Judiciary should be associated with the Executive in
the revisionary power.’. .. The Judiciary ought to have an opportunity
of remonstrating against projected encroachments on the people ...
counteracting by the weight of their opinions the improper views of the
Legislature.” JAMES MADISON, 2 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 1161-
62 (Henry D. Gilpin, ed., Langtree & O’Sullivan 1840) (James Wilson
during the debates of Saturday, July 21, 1787). This proposal was voted
down on four separate occasions. Jd. at 791, 812, 1171, VOL. III at 1331
(debates of Monday, June 4, 1787; debates of Wednesday, June 6, 1787;
debates of Saturday, July 21, 1787; debates of Wednesday, August 15,
1787, respectively).
15
Rights Act, the majority has, for the sake of the minority,
secured the rights and privileges we all now enjoy.”
Congress, not the Court, answers to the citizens of
this country. Congress painstakingly gathers information,
conducts hearings, investigates, debates, and deliberates.
There are committee votes, pocket vetoes and negotiations.
There are a whole host of obstacles to the enactment of
new legislation, bicameralism chief among these. All of
this process, the factual record developed through this
process, and the ever present public pressure associated
with elective office serve to craft public policy decisions .
that are entitled to great deference. In sum, “[wle should
not forget that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the
liberty and welfare of the people.” Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 726 (3rd Cir. 1991) (Alito, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
II. Congress should be free to consider a broad
array of evidence when acting as a policymaker,
including the experiences of those intimately
familiar with late-term and partial-birth abor-
tions.
Some would argue that amici Gianna Jessen and
Zachary were “constitutional non-persons” or “‘human
beings’ who are not ‘constitutional persons.’” Alexander v.
Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1409 (3rd Cir. 1997) (Alito, J.,
concurring). That “is unfortunate.” Jd. Partial-birth
abortion extends beyond an even broad interpretation of
" It was Congress who passed the 1875 Civil Rights Act (various
sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.) to protect African-Americans against
racial discrimination in places of public accommodation. It was the
Court who struck it down. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
16
the right created in Roe v. Wade. The difference, of course,
is that the baby is not an unseen, unborn creature. It is a
baby fully capable of life outside of her mother’s womb
whose life is ended in the process of delivery, with her body
completely exposed to the outside world, save her face.
That the people of this country should be concerned and
Congress should be allowed to properly legislate in this
fringe area is obvious.” Any civilized society would.
A. Congress may consider evidence that psy-
chological harm to women occurs as a re-
sult of abortion.
Amici do not stake a claim that it is scientific fact
women suffer Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a
result of having late-term or partial-birth abortions. It is
not necessary for post-abortion PTSD to be proven beyond
reasonable scientific doubt before Congress may rely upon
the evidence that does exist to conclude that at least
partial-birth abortion is so fringe and naturally repulsive
as to be a trigger of PTSD.
There are about a “thousand affidavits of women who
have had abortions and claim to have suffered long-term
emotional damage and impaired relationships from their
decision ... [and] [s]tudies by scientists ... suggest that
women may be affected emotionally and physically for
years afterward and may be more prone to engage in high-
risk, self-destructive conduct as a result of having had
abortions.” See McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 850-51 (5th
“ Congress serves at the pleasure of the voting populous. Our form
of government is predicated upon an enduring principle that all power,
all authority, is drawn from the well of the people at large.
17
Cir. 2004) (Jones, J., concurring) (citing affidavits and
several scientific studies). There are numerous studies
that demonstrate a link between abortion and psychologi-
cal trauma.” These studies and affidavits provide compel-
ling evidence that there is indeed a problem, the
magnitude of which is only beginning to unfold.“
" See C. A. Barnard, The Long-Term Psychosocial Effects of
Abortion (Institute for Pregnancy Loss, 1990); W. Franz & D. Reardon,
Differential Impact of Abortion on Adolescents and Adults, 27(105)
Adolescence 161-72 (1992); M. Gissler, et al., Suicides After Pregnancy
in Finland: 1987-94: Register Linkage Study, 313 British Medical J.
1431-34 (1996); B. Lask; J. Lydon, et al., Pregnancy Decision Making as
a Significant Life Event: A Commitment Approach, 71(1) J. Personality
and Soc. Psychology, 141-51 (1996); B. Major & C. Cozzarelli, Psychoso-
cial Predictors of Adjustment to Abortion, 48(3) J. Soc. Issues, 121-42
(1992); W. B. Miller, An Empirical Study of the Psychological Antece-
dents and Consequences of Induced Abortion, 48(3) J. Soc. Issues 67-93
(1992); W. B. Miller, Testing a Model of the Psychological Consequences
of Abortion, The New Civil War: The Psychology, Culture, and Politics of
Abortion, (Linda J. Beckman & S. Maria Harvey, eds., 1998); H.
Sderberg, et al., Emotional Distress Following Induced Abortion: A
Study of Incidence and Determinants Among Abortees in Malm Sweden,
79 Eur. J. Obstet. Gynecol. Reprod. Biol. 173-78 (1998); H. P. Vaughan,
Canonical Variates of Post-Abortion Syndrome (Institute for Pregnancy
Loss, 1990).
* There is evidence to the contrary, Planned Parenthood published
a report on its website that indicates there is a positive relationship
between abortion and the psychological well-being of women that have
abortions. According to Planned Parenthood, a woman is psychologi-
cally better off having had an abortion. See Planned Parenthood Federa-
tion of America, The Emotional Effects of Induced Abortion, available
at http//www.plannedparenthood.com/pp2/portal/files/portal/medicalinfo/
abortion/fact-0 10600-emoteff.xml# 1097838269784 ::2874363 106508449295
(last visited May 19, 2006). However, “t]he Constitution gives to
Congress the role of weighing conflicting evidence in the legislative
process.” Turner 1], 520 U.S. at 199.
18
B. Congressional consideration may include
such factors as Post Traumatic Stress Dis-
order, the diffusion of responsibility and
how partial-birth abortion is merely a ve-
neer to provide moral distance for the doc-
tor and mother.
The book, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF
LEARNING TO KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY,” is a leading study
on how advanced militaries have learned to train their
soldiers to kill the enemy as it collects historical studies
regarding the ability of soldiers to kill fellow human
beings. According to Lt. Col. Grossman, the author and
former psychology professor at the United States Military
Academy at West Point, there are a few factors that enable
a human being to overcome her psychological protective
mechanism that causes a revolting shudder at the very
_ thought of killing another human being. Two of the factors
are emotional and physical distance between the killer and
victim.
Physical distance is understood easily. According to
Grossman, it is far easier to kill when one cannot see what
one is killing. That is why bomber pilots are much less
predicated toward PTSD than infantrymen who must on
occasion look into the whites of the enemy’s eyes. In the
aboriion context, it is easy to see why partial-birth abor-
tion is beyond the margins. A baby entirely in the womb is
physically removed from the realities of existence. Sure,
their images are available on ultrasound and technology
continues to close the physical distance that separates the
* Davip A. GROSSMAN, LT. CoL., ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
Cost OF LEARNING To KILL IN WaR AND Society (Bay Back Books
1995).
19
unborn from the visible world. However, the unborn
remain largely unseen, and completely so with the naked
eye. In partial-birth abortion, the baby’s body is visible to
all witnesses. The witnesses see the hands clasping, the
legs kicking, the intimate struggle for life. Physical dis-
tance is closed, and the taking of life becomes more appar-
ent. This is a natural psychological condition of a civilized
society. It is within the purview of Congress to make policy
decisions to restrict a procedure that is so utterly outside
the bounds of natural human behavior and which causes
damage to those nearby, including an increased callous-
ness toward life.
Emotional distance has cultural and moral compo-
nents. According to Grossman, part of the training of a
soldier involves dehumanizing the enemy to make killing
the enemy easier. As Grossman states, the goal of cultural
distance is to make the enemy “inferior forms of life.” Jd.
at 160. Cultural distance in the abortion context comes
when a baby is referred to as a “fetus” or “tissue” that does
not experience pain. The “fetus” becomes an inferior form
of life. It cannot talk or sustain its own life detached from
its mother. This cultural distance is greatly shortened
when the baby is capable of sustaining its own life.
Moral distance involves seeing a larger picture or
higher reason for the carnage. In the case of abortion in
general, the right of a woman to attain autonomy and self-
determination serve to create that moral justification. But
for partial-birth abortion, that moral distance is greatly
shortened because, as the lives of amici demonstrate, the
children have a self-determination claim as well. They are
capable of sustaining their own lives at the time of their
late-term abortions, as amici so aptly proved. Therefore,
Congress is in the best position to understand the will of
20
the people, balance considerations, and respond with hard
policy decisions when physical and emotional distance is
shortened by the aberration of partial-birth abortion.
This explains why the head must not come out of the
birthing canal, why our society will not tolerate the mur-
der of a baby that is delivered. We can see her face, she
makes noises and we can look into her eyes. Even if the
doctor must artificially hide the head in the canal because
it may easily slip out, he dare not allow that to happen.
Then our culture will not stand for the killing of the baby.
The psychological veneer of hiding the baby’s face is the
only difference between a partial-birth abortion and killing
the baby. Such a close and artificial distinction takes
partial-birth abortion outside of the normal abortion
framework envisioned in Roe and Casey where physical
and emotional distances are much greater. Congress is in
the superior position to identify this distinction, balance
the equities and medical evidence, and treat partial-birth
abortion as something completely different than pre-
viability abortion.
C. It is within the legislative ken of Congress
to consider the survival of children of late-
term or partial-birth abortions in deter-
mining their life claim outweighs the lib-
erty interest of the mother at the outer
most fringes of that interest.
As amici Gianna and Zachary can directly attest, the
baby who suffers during a partial-birth abortion is a living,
breathing citizen. Zachary, no doubt who presents an
extreme situation in which he was declared certain to die
anyway or else live a worthless life. Zachary did not get a
voice in this decision. Indeed, Zachary’s voice could not be
21
heard. Certainly Congress and the American people have
the ability to speak for Zachary. Certainly Congress may
speak for his unspoken desire to live. And it is indeed
obvious from the medical records that Zachary spoke of his
desire to live upon delivery. He spoke not through words,
but through his actions. He refused to die. He refused to
die even though the neurosurgeon stated in the record
that Zachary’s outlook was “devastating.” Now nine years
old, Zachary smiles in a picture wearing an Air Force
uniform, a testimony to his triumph over physical chal-
lenge. Certainly Congress may look to evidence such as
this and draw the line on the outer fringes of abortion and
declare the taking of human life that is almost born to be
beyond the pale of civil endurance.
Gianna just completed the London Marathon in
April 2006. While she endures cerebral palsy and other
afflictions that remain as a result of the botched abor-
tion, Gianna continues to live her life as a living testa-
ment to those that did not survive their own demise.
Her accomplishments are their accomplishments. Her
strides are for them. Cannot a legislative body look to this
woman and say it is an atrocity to end a life such as this?
Cannot Congress declare that it must draw the line here
for the living?
Congress may also consider the dark side of late-term
or partial-birth abortion procedures gone wrong. Abortion-
ist Benjamin Waddill, a member of the Association of
Planned Parenthood Physicians, performed a saline abortion
on 19 year-old Mary Weaver on March 2, 1977, at Califor-
nia’s Westminster Community Hospital. Mary Weaver was
estimated at 28 weeks pregnant. Dr. Waddill administered a
saline abortion. Ms. Weaver, however, gave birth to a live
baby. Dr. Waddill returned to the hospital’s newborn
22
nursery, where the baby was located. According to Dr.
Ronald Cornelsen, a witness, Dr. Waddill choked the baby
girl four separate times.”
“When the hospital’s chief pediatrician, Dr.
Ronald Cornelsen, arrived in the nursery, he said
Waddill put his hand around the baby’s throat
and complained, “This baby won’t quit breathing.’
Cornelsen says he checked the infant’s heart and
found it beating 60 to 70 times a minute. But
then, Cornelsen said, Waddill pressed down on
her throat and discussed other metnods of ‘dis-
posing’ of her, including drowning her in the
nursery sink. As Cornelsen tells it, Waddill said:
‘This baby can’t live. It will be a big mess. . . Can
you think of something else?’ Sick to his stomach,
Cornelsen retreated to another part of the nurs-
ery. Waddill joined him moments later. ‘I think
the baby is dead,’ he said.”
Susan Fraker & Janet Huck, The Trial of Dr. Waddiil,
NEWSWEEK, April 3, 1978, at 35. Cannot Congress consider
the callousness created by allowing such a procedure and
the damage that it causes?
At least Zachary was given comfort care. Ximena
Renaerts of Canada is the product of a botched late-term
abortion. After being born at the abortion clinic in a bed
pan on December 16, 1985, she was taken to Vancouver
General Hospital where, while alive, she was stored in a
room on a cold steel counter that was used to store “dead
* Jeffrey Perlman, Waddill Trial Has Heavy Impact, LOS ANGELES
TIMES, May 15, 1978, at Part I-3; Dexter Duggan, California Abortionist
Testifies in His Own Defense, LIFE ADVOCATE, May/June 1979, at 14-16;
Susan Fraker & Janet Huck, The Trial of Dr. Waddill, NEWSWEEK, April
3, 1978, at 35; The Ordeal of a Divided Jury, TIME, May 22, 1978, at 24.
23
fetuses.” A nurse found her alive forty minutes later, and
now Ximena, still alive, is confined to a wheelchair and
suffers from cerebral palsy.” Congress surely has the
power to look to this type of evidence and begin to draw
boundaries at the outer markers.
It is impossible to forget the picture of the little girl
missing an arm as the result of a botched late-term
abortion. In October of 1991, Rosa Rodriguez, twenty
years-old at the time, sought a late-term abortion on New
York’s Lower East Side from abortionist Abu Hayat. Ms.
Rodriguez, eight months pregnant, changed her mind and
did not want to go through with the abortion. Hayat
responded that it was impossible to stop, and that he had
to continue. Hayat’s assistants held Ms. Rodriguez down
while Hayat sedated her. When she became conscious,
she was told the abortion was incomplete and she needed
to return. After experiencing increasing pain and bleeding,
her mother took her to Jamaica Hospital by taxi. Five
hours later, baby Ana Rosa was born.” Although Hayat
tore off Ana Rosa’s right arm, she grew up as a healthy
little girl. This healthy baby girl, a teenager by now, will
forever be reminded that her arm was pulled from her
body due to a late-term abortion.
When beyond the margins of abortion, it is perfectly
appropriate for Congress to consider the horrors of the
partial-birth abortion procedure and draw a line that
" Neal Hall, Jury Will Hear Malpractice Lawsuit Over Girl Born
After Failed Abortion: A Judge Has Ruled That The Case of a Baby
Born Brain-damaged And Left to Die Is Not Too Complex For Jurors;
VANCOUVER SUN, April 29, 1998, at B3.
* David Kocieniewski, Ana’s Plight; Mom Says She'll Be Honest
With Baby Maimed In Abortion; NEwspDAyY, February 24, 1993, at 3.
24
distinguishes barbarism from civility. Nowhere is it more
clear that Congress has the right, the duty to protect those
children who are killed in the process of their birth. The
people through their elected representatives may make
this public policy decision if for no other reason than there
is no one else to speak for those that find only their head
caught in the great chasm between life and death, sus-
pended in the purgatory of the vestibule of life, the birth
canal. Perhaps it may be said that such children are
probably the most “discrete and insular” class of persons
ever described. United States v. Carolene Products, 304
U.S. 144, 153 (1938).
Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women;
when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no
court can save it; no constitution, no law, no
court can even do much to help it ... .the spirit
of liberty remembers that not even a sparrow
falls to earth unheeded.”
One of the reasons for this country’s greatness is that
it protects the vulnerable and the weak. That is the
American way. Partial-birth abortion involves deep public
policy considerations including brutality, life and death,
the coarsening of our society, and the danger of the degra-
dation of and callousness toward human life.
The People of this country have a right to make this
call. Judicially stripping it from the hands of the People
would be a mistake and a great loss of liberty.
o
* LEARNED HAND, THE Spirit OF LIBERTY 190 (Irving Dillard ed.,
3d ed. 1960) (“The Spirit of Liberty,” speech at an “I Am an American
Day” ceremony, Central Park, New York City, May 21, 1944).
25
CONCLUSION
The People, through their elected representatives in
Congress, are the rightful vessels of power to determine
public policy decisions. History and prudence continuously
caution against the Court traversing into the murky realm
of public policy determinations. The Court should reverse
the judgment of the court of appeals and let the People of
this country speak for themselves.
Respectfully submitted,
KELLY SHACKELFORD
Counsel of Record
HIRAM S. SASSER III
JONATHAN M. SAENZ
LIBERTY LEGAL INSTITUTE
903 East 18th Street, Suite 230
Plano, Texas 75074
(972) 423-3131
(972) 423-6570 (FAX)
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.