Amicus Curiae Brief — Randall v. Sorrell

Nos. 04-1528 and 04-1530 | ee:

L tod

In The OFFICE OF ~ #E SuERix

Supreme Court of the Anited States .

¢

NEIL RANDALL, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

WILLIAM SORRELL, et al.,

Respondents.

VERMONT REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

WILLIAM H. SORRELL, et al.,

Respondents.

+

On Petitions For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of

For The Second Circuit

+

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE

SECRETARIES OF STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,

OREGON AND WISCONSIN IN SUPPORT

OF GRANTING THE PETITIONS WITH REGARD

TO THE FIRST QUESTION PRESENTED

S

RICHARD E. SCHWARTZ

DANIEL T. BROWN

Counsel of Record

HEATHER MAJOR

Of Counsel

CROWELL & Morinc LLP

1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20004-2595

June 15, 2005 (202) 624-2500

COCKLE LAW BRIEP PRINTING CO (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. .............ccccccccecsssessesesceeees

Ie CO nc ciiccncascciessbasicciniteeniiin 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............0cccccccescsceseeseeees 2

REASONS FOR PARTIALLY GRANTING THE

MR REL ERNE STREET Tee 3

REI ARG LE SURREAL SM 12

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200

AEE EE CELA LLG SEE CEL AEA DRE OEE EY TF Se 11

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) .0.......cccccccccceeeeeeeee passim

Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S.

RE SEES Sie eee ee A RN te 10

Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)....................... 11.

Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004)........... 2,5, 11

McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S.

ee a ae I CI sicisss ctiteliiacstnicnscccschintbartinmenntentuiliotnss 10

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932)........10

MISCELLANEOUS

Mark C. Alexander, Money in Political Campaigns

and Modern Vote Dilution, 23 Minn. J. of Law &

Ny See ccitierernticictibcicsnsniatesteccsiliinltanieriinininiinaiinins 6

Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of

Fund-Raising, 94 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1281 (1994).......... 4,7

John Bonifaz, Brenda Wright, and Gregory Luke,

Challenging Buckley v. Valeo: A Legal Strategy,

33 Akron L. Rev. 39, 41 (1999) ..........:..sssscsccsssserscersreenes 7

Kelly Burton, Money, Politics and Campaign

I IG Diiccectichierianncscttneitisachibcicithdeipemenensertenenic 6

California Clean Election Campaign, Arizona -

Clean Elections Works! at http://www.caclean.

org/content/victories/az_works.php?path=content/

I SI oo rcc cain cscnsceccnctcnidbeiiosictedneenttuniteens 9

lil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Beth Donovan, Constitutional Doubts Bedevil Hasty

Campaign Finance Bill, 51 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep.

BN CIGD wicscsvitttipes cavcmsuninensss cantvijigniasinsecmsasnitibers

Beth Donavan, Constitutional Issues Frame Consti-

tutional Options, 51 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 437

CRIB cncsciroinnisintsiastnencnscccstentntesanctigetneintinsaiesenamnasicin

Beth Donavan, Finance by Gutting Public Funding,

51 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 1534, 1539 (1993)...............

Beth Donovan, House Takes First Big Step in Over-

hauling System, 51 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 3246,

SIE ccerctetinsitinaseinschnsiciecisstiienintidiaaniotemnncdinezin

Beth Donovan, House Will Vote on Limits Nearly $1

Million in ’96, 51 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 3091 (1993)...

Elizabeth Drew, Politics and Money: The New Road

a CII Ge CI tn etcsccnnccdactsdcsnactiennscrinimasinnie

Free Speech and Campaign Finance Reform:

Subcommittee Hearing on the Constitution Before

the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.

Sess. 1 (1997) available at http-//www.house.gov.

I vicctcinieitisdinnceinetiihnittinidisninemnignnnsd

Ken Hechier, Financing Elections: West Virginia,

the States, and the Nation, 7 W. VA PUBLIC AF-

FAIRS REPORTER 3 (1990), at http://www.polsci.

wvu.edu/ipa/par/report_7_3.html.....................c0000

Paul S. Herrnson and Ronald A. Faucheaux,

Candidates Devote Substantial Time and Effort

to Fundraising, (July 7, 2000), at http://www.

bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/herrnson/reporttime.htm].........

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Hoover Institution: Public Policy Inquiry, Campaign

Finance, State and Local Overview, at http//www.

campaignfinancesite.org/structure/states1.html

(last updated Sept. 20, 2004).......... Siscoctlinhdidsnccesthiabaantes 8

PETER LINDSTROM, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLI-

TICS, CONGRESS SPEAKS: A SURVEY OF THE 100TH

5

CRRIIIIIED- BO C1 sccececscscostcctpiststiiebtlattleniee ei

1

INTEREST OF AMICI

Amici include the following Secretaries of State:

William M. Gardner, Secretary of State of New Hamp-

shire, Bill Bradbury, Secretary of State of Oregon, and

Douglas La Follette, Secretary of State of Wisconsin.’

Amici serve as the chief elections officers of their states,

which gives them extensive experience with the issues

raised in this case.

Amici seek review of the Second Circuit’s decision

because, although they believe that it is supported by this

Court’s holding in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), it is

contrary to similar decisions of the Sixth and Tenth

Circuits. As the chief elections officers in their states, they

are particularly concerned about the impact that the split

in the Circuits’ decision will have on the ability of States

and localities to enact effective reform measures sought by

their citizens and legislators. Moreover, Amici are con-

cerned about the detrimental impact that the split among

the Second, Sixth and Tenth Circuits will have on their

efforts to enact innovative campaign finance laws. As

discussed further below, the present uncertainty regarding

mandatory spending limits has a chilling effect on the

creativity of the State and local governments which should

be serving as laboratories of democracy.

If the Sixth and Tenth Circuits correctly interpreted

Buckley as imposing a per se ban on mandatory campaign

spending limits, Amici urge this Court to reconsider its

holding in Buckley and permit Vermont to demonstrate

* The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Their letters

are on file with the Clerk of this Court. Pursuant to Rule 37.6, Amici

state that no counsel for any party has authored this brief in whole or

in part, and no person or entity made a financial contribution to the

preparation or submission of this brief.

2

that its campaign expenditure limits satisfy constitutional

requirements. If such a per se ban truly exists as a result

of Buckley that ban will stifle the creativity of States and

localities in this arena. As the Respondents demonstrate,

the circumstances that led this Court to enact that barrier

29 years ago have changed. This Court should reconsider

the extent of First Amendment limits on campaign expen-

diture laws.’

+

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves amendments to its campaign

finance laws enacted by the State of Vermont in 1997.

These amendments were adopted with the overwhelming

approval of bipartisan majorities of both houses of the

Vermont Legislature. See Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 100

(2d Cir. 2004). The amendments have succeeded in “prevent-

ing the reality and appearance of corruption, and protecting

the time of candidates and elected officials.” Jd. at 124. As

the Landeil District Court found, and the Second Circuit

agreed, limits on campaign contributions alone have been

ineffective in achieving those goals in federal elections. Jd. at

116-125. The Second Circuit summarized additional ills

attributable to the lack of spending limits in our current

system of campaign finance. See id. at 115.

A split among the circuits exists on this important

issue. The Second Circuit, in this case, held that Buckley

does not crect a campaign spending limits barrier while

the Sixth and Tenth Circuits have held that such a barrier

” Amici also support the conditional cross-petitions of both William H.

Sorrell, et al., the Respondent-Conditional Cross Petitioner and Vermont

Public Interest Research Group, et al., Respondent-Intervenors-Conditional

Cross Petitioners.

3

exists. See Randall Petition for Certiorari at 22; Vermont

Republican State Committee (“VRSC”) Petition for Certio-

rari at 5-7. The importance of this issue is demonstrated

by studies that show the current degree of cynicism among

the population and diminishing voter turnout. Regardless

of the actual scope of Buckley’s holding, Amici urge this

Court to grant the Petition and remove the cloud over the

constitutionality of campaign spending limits.

S

REASONS FOR PARTIALLY

GRANTING THE PETITIONS

Amici urge granting the petitions with regard to the

first question presented for three reasons. The first is the

strong citizen desire for reform. That desire has expressed

itself in numerous reform efforts. While some State and

local legislative bodies have interpreted Buckley to allow

mandatory campaign spending limits, the available data

show that many have not enacted such limits because they

believe chat Buckley bars them. Second, this Court has

recognized the benefit of allowing state legislatures — as

the laboratories of democracy — to function as unfettered by

judicial constraints as reasonably possible. Third, whether or

not Buckley is correctly read to impose a per se barrier,

declaring now that no such barrie: exists will enable States

and localities to address the problem more effectively be-

cause more minds will come to bear on the issue.

1. There is a strong desire for reform and experimen-

tation in State and local governments. The results are

simple expressions of disappointment with the high cost of

campaigns and the perception of corruption that flows

from the realities of fund raising. This appetite becomes

4

apparent with attempts to enact campaign spending

limitations at the federal, State and local levels.

a. Politicians consider the fund-raising process

debilitating because it takes away time that could be spent

more valuably by serving their constituents. Politicians

and commentators alike believe that too much valuable

time is devoted to this ceaseless endeavor to raise funds.’

This problem presents itself at the federal and local levels.

At the state level, one study has shown that a majority of

candidates for statewide office spend at least one-quarter

of their time fund raising for their campaigns; nearly one-

third of candidates for state legislative office are similarly

preoccupied with fund raising.

In addition, numerous Congressmen have recounted

their fund raising experiences. For example, one Republi-

can Senator (unnamed) admitted, “I knew Congress well

before I came here, but I did not know the amount of time

consumed by fundraising and how that encroaches on your

* See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-

Raising, 94 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1281 (1994) (stating that candidates

spend too much time fund raising) fhereinafter Blasi, Free Speech)

citing, DAN CLAWSON ET AL., MONEY TALKS: CORPORATE PACS AND

POLITICAL INFLUENCE 79, 203-04 (1992); FRANK J. SORAUPF, INSIDE

CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES 72-73, (1992); BROOKS

JACKSON, HONEST Grarr: BIG MONEY And THE AMERICAN POLITICAL

Process 69, 91-92, 108 (1990); Davip B. Mactesy & Canpice J.

NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE: CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Rerorm 43-45, 197 (1990); BuRDETT LOOMIS, THE NEW AMERICAN

POLITICIAN: AMBITION, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND THE CHANGING FACE OF

POLITICAL Lire 195-96 (1988); ExizaBpeTH Drew, POLITICS AND MONEY:

THE New ROAD TO CORRUPTION 96 (1983). Jd. at 1281 n.1.

* Paul S. Herrnson and Ronald A. Faucheaux, Candidates Devote

Substantial Time and Effort to Fundraising (July 7, 2000), at http-//

www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/herrnson/reporttime html.

5

ability to work here. It devours one’s time — you spend the

two or three years before your re-election fundraising. The

other years, you're helping others.” Likewise, former

House Majority leader Richard Gephardt has also ex-

plained that “[iJf you have the need to raise three or four

hundred thousand dollars, you’re taking an enormous

amount of the member’s time just to raise money.”

The costs of elections at both the Federal and State

levels have continued to skyrocket. This trend of rising

costs, while evident to the Buckley Court in 1976, has

continued to increase in the ensuing 29 years. The need for

politicians to spend huge sums to win elections raises the

perception of, and conditions for, corruption. Campaign

funds often come from special interest groups with legisla-

tive agendas. When politicians win elections with these

funds and then continue to receive financial backing from

these same special interest groups, these politicians are

likely to feel pressure to cater to these groups. See Lan-

dell, 382 F.3d at 117-118. Perhaps that is why the phrase

“special interest politics” has become so commonplace in

our national political discourse.

Similar to the problem with “special interest politics,”

a select few wealthy individuals and groups contribute the

majority of campaign finances and thus possess a concen-

tration of the political power. At least one commentator

has posited that this power concentration creates a form of

* Perer Liypstrom, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE PoLiTics, CONGRESS

SPEAKS: A SURVEY OF THE 100TH ConGRESS 80 (1988).

* Elizabeth Drew, Politics and Money: The New Road to Corruption

51 (1983).

6

vote dilution and is “incompatible with the Constitution's

command of equality.”

Politicians routinely confirm that this problem is real.

For example, former Rep. Dan Glickman (D-Kan.) admits

that “[mJjoney has made it more difficult for Democrats to

define an economic agenda that is different from the

Republican agenda; we are taking from the same contribu-

tors.™ These very reasons are why Congress periodically

considers solutions to free candidates from excessive fund-

raising obligations.”

” Mark C. Alexander, Money in Political Campaigns and Modern

Vote Dilution, 23 Minn. J. of Law & Inequality 239, 244-45 (2005).

* Ken Hechier, Financing Elections: West Virginia, the States, and

the Nation, 7 W. VA PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORTER 3 (1990), available at

http//www.polsci.wvu.edu/ipa/par/report_7_3 html] [hereinafter Hechier,

Financing Elections]. See also, Free Speech and Campaign Finance

Reform: Subcommittee Hearing on the Constitution Before the House

Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. Sess. 1 (1997) (attaching state-

ment of Gene Karpinski, Executive Director of U.S. Public Interest

Research Group stating “with this kind of influence accorded to big

money in our political system, the candidates and the political parties will

increasingly look alike on all issues of importance to moneyed inter-

ests”), available at http://www.house.gov judiciary/22226.htm [hereinaf-

ter Karpinski, Free Speech and Campaign Finance Reform).

* In 1993, Members of the House of Representatives frequently

commented on it. See, e.g, 139 Conc. Rec. H10656 (daily ed. Nov. 22,

1993) (remarks of Rep. Gejdenson); id. at H10665 (remarks of Rep.

Harman), id. at H10670 (remarks of Rep. Reed); id. at H10671 (re-

marks of Rep. Hughes); id. at H10672 (remarks of Rep. Beilenson); id.

at H10675 (remarks of Rep. Woolsey); Beth Donovan, House Takes First

Big Step in Overhauling System, 51 Conc. Q. WKLY. REP. 3246, 3248

(1993); Beth Donovan, House Will Vote on Limits Nearly $1 Million in

‘96, 51 Conc. Q. WKLY. REP. 3091 (1993). See also, Marcus & Babcock,

One Day in the Fundraising Trail: Dawn to Dusk/Chasing the Dollars,

THE Boston GLOBE, May 16, 1997 at Al, quoting U.S. Senator Robert

Byrd of West Virginia in a March 1997 Senate floor speech: “The

incessant money chase that permeates every crevice of our political

(Continued on following page)

7

b. To address this need, which is felt at the State and

loca] levels as much as at the federal level, various State

and local governments have enacted — or considered but

declined to enact - campaign spending limits. Since this

Court’s ruling in Buckley in 1976, however, legislatures

and legal scholars have often understood the first Amend-

ment as prohibiting per se mandatory campaign spending

limits regulation.” In January 1997, Senator Arlen Spec-

ter (of Pennsylvania) commented that fundamental cam-

paign finance reform remained impossible without

overturning Buckley." In advocating for campaign finance

reform, he further stated, “[mly concept of running for

elective office . . . is a matter of issues, a matter of tenacity,

a matter of integrity and how you conduct a campaign.””

system is like an unending circular marathon. And it is a race that

sends a clear message to the people: that it is money, money, money

that reigns supreme in American politics.”

* Indeed, in “Congressional deliberations, opposition to campaign

spending limits has most often been expressed in terms of constitu-

tional concerns.” See Blasi, Free Speech, supra note 2, at 1288, citing,

Beth Donovan, Constitutional Doubts Bedevil Hasty Campaign Finance

Bill, 51 Conc. Q. WKLY. Rep. 2215, 2217 (1993); Beth Donavan, Finance

by Gutting Public Funding, 51 Conc. Q. WKLY. REP. 1534, 1539 (1993);

Beth Donavan, Constitutional Issues Frame Constitutional Options, 51

CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 437 (1993).

" Senator Specter also noted in his remarks on the floor of the

Senate that a growing group of prominent legal scholars have called for

the reversal of Buckley. 143 Conc. Rec. S557-01, S558 (daily ed. Jan.

21, 1997) (statement of Sen. Specter). See also Karpinski, Free Speech

and Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 7.

* 143 Cong. Rec. at S558, supra note 10.; see also, John C. Bonifaz,

Brenda Wright, and Gregory Luke, Challenging Buckley v. Valeo: A

Legal Strategy, 33 AKRON L. REV. 39, 41 (1999) (“Members of Congress

have introduced 11 bills since 1976 which would establish campaign

spending limits for federal elections.”) Further, the note cites the

following examples: S. 1684, 98th Cong. (1st Sess. 1983); S. 1185, 98th

Cong. (1st Sess. 1983); S. 59, 99th Cong. (1st Sess. 1985); H.R. 2473,

(Continued on following page)

8

He emphasized that running for office should not be a

simple function of money.

In spite of this adversity, the appetite for reform

remains strong, and State and local legislatures have

attempted to adopt reforms within the constraints of

Buckley's perceived per se barrier. For example, as noted

by The Hoover Institution:

¢ Since 1990, 30 states have radically changed

their campaign finance laws, 17 of them be-

tween 1995-98.

¢ From 1972-1996, 45 initiatives and/or refer-

enda, as well as charter amendments on elec-

tion reform, were placed on state ballots. In 36

of these cases, a majority of voters supported

enactment.

* 24 states, as of 1998, have statutes on the books

providing some sort of public financing for elec-

tion campaigns. Also, 12 states and New York

City have some form of expenditure limitation.

¢ What these various states — and many mu-

nicipalities - have in common is strong voter

sentiment for change, harnessed by diverse

grassroots coalitions and reform-minded legis-

lators.”

100th Cong. (ist Sess. 1987); H.R. 1456, 101st Cong. (1st Sess. 1988);

H. Res. 168, 103rd Cong. (ist Sess. 1993); H.R. 3571, 103rd Cong. (1st

Sess. 1993); H.R. 3651, 104th Cong. (2d Sess. 1996); H.R. 3658, 104th

Cong. (2d Sess. 1996); S. 1057, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1997); H.R. 77,

105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1997). Jd. at 41, n.17.

" Hoover Institution: Public Policy Inquiry, Campaign Finance,

State and Local Overview, at http//www.campaignfinancesite.org/structure

states1.html (last updated Sept. 20, 2004).

9

Various state and federal polls confirm that voters are

overwhelmingly in favor of more effective campaign

finance reform.

* Between 1976 to 1986, campaign spending in

West Virginia state Senate races increased an

average of 875% from approximately $155,000

to $1,511,000. In 1986, a sample of West Vir-

ginia voters were polled regarding whether

they believed “there should be a limit on how

much a person can spend on running for pub-

lic office.” 75.5% said yes, 16.8% said no, and

7.7% were undecided.”

* 64% of Arizonans support public funding for

campaigns (Arizona Republic poll, Oct. 2002)

and 66% specifically support Clean Elections

(KAET poll, June, 2002). 80% of Arizonans be-

lieve that contributions influence votes on

public policy (Behavior Research Center poll,

December, 2001).”

* Hechier, Financing Elections, supra note 5. In its 1990 sessions,

West Virginia’s House of Delegates “passed, by a vote of 86-14, a

constitutional amendment ‘to amend the State Constitution to permit

the Legislature to limit the amount of money which can be spent

advocating or opposing a nomination or election of any candidate, or the

passage or defeat of any issue, thing or item to be voted upon at public

election.’ The elation of supporters of the constitutional amendment,

scheduled to be placed on the general election ballot in 1990, was short-

lived, however. The state Senate quickly buried the amendment by

double referencing it to the Government Organization and Judiciary

Committees, where it died without further consideration despite frantic

and repeated efforts of the secretary of state to revive it.” Jd.

“ California Clean Election Campaign, Arizona - Clean Elections

Works! at http//www.caclean.org/content/victories/az_works.php?path=

content/victories/az_works.php&.

10

2. At various times and in various contexts, this

Court has espoused the value of deferring to the legislative

process to produce creative solutions to pressing social

problems. Indeed, it is a canon of this Court that such cases

should be decided narrowly. See McConnell v. Federal

Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619, 688 (2003).

Aside from a constraint on overbroad pronouncements, the

benefits to society that flow from allowing our legislatures

to conduct the business of policy making through law

weigh strongly in favor of clarifying that no per se barrier

exists. As Justice Brandeis famously observed:

To stay experimentation in things social and eco-

nomic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the

right to experiment may be fraught with serious

consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy

incidents of the federal system that a single coura-

geous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a

laboratory; and try novel social and economic ex-

periments without risk to the rest of the country.

This Court has the power to prevent an experi-

ment. We may strike down the statute which em-

bodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the

measure is arbitrary, capricious or unreason-

able. ... But in the exercise of this high power, we

must ever be on guard, lest we erect our prejudices

into legal principles. If we would guide by the light

of reason, we must let our minds be bold.

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)

(dissenting opinion) (cited in Boy Scouts of America and

Monmouth Council v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 664 (2000)

(Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept.

of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concur-

ring) (the “challenging task of crafting procedures for

11

safeguarding ... liberty interests is entrusted to the

‘laboratory’ of the states . . . in the first instance.”)

This Court should remove the artificial limit on States

and localities imposed by a per se prohibition on campaign

spending limits and, instead, make clear that the proper

standard of review of such legislation is and will be mean-

ingful scrutiny that is not “‘strict in theory, but fatal in

fact.’” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,

237 (1995) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,

519 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)).

3. The current split among the circuits on this

important issue demonstrates that it should be clarified by

this Court. By clarifying now that no per se barrier is

imposed by the First Amendment, this Court will be

opening an avenue of reform to the States and localities

eager to enact reform that they have avoided because of

the belief that Buckley imposes a per se barrier to cam-

paign spending limits.

Allowing the perception that the Sixth and Tenth

Circuits correctly interpreted Buckley deprives citizens

who reside within those Circuits of the creativity of the

State and local legislatures whose spending limits legisla-

tion would surely be struck down.

The perception of a per se barrier constrains the

legislative process in States and localities outside of those

circuits. The chilling effect that flows from the uncertainty

inherent in a circuit split is further compounded by the

fact that every panel of circuit judges that has considered

this issue has split on the question of whether Buckley

imposes a per se barrier. The decision by the Second

Circuit not to hear Landell en banc, alone, generated a 50-

plus page collection of concurrences and dissents for a type

—_

12

of decision typically disposed of with a single sentence.

This effect cannot be ignored, for it extends far beyond the

Tenth and Sixth Circuits.

Amici urge this Court to grant certiorari to decide

whether to free our State and local legislatures from the

constraints on their ability to experiment in the realm of

campaign finance reform that are the byproduct of the

belief that the First Amendment imposes a per se prohibi-

tion on campaign spending limits laws.

+

CONCLUSION

The petition for certiorari should be granted.

June 15, 2005

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD E. SCHWARTZ

DANIEL T. BROWN a

Counsel of Record

HEATHER MAJOR

Of Counsel

CROWELL & MorING LLP

1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 624-2500