Amicus Curiae Brief — Rapanos v. United States

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waters.” This Court has held that the constitutional source

of congressional power over the use of “navigable waters”

comes both from the Commerce Clause, Article 1, Section 8,

Clause 3 (Commerce Clause) and the Admiralty Clause.

Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713, 724-725 (1866) (“The

power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that

purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable

waters of the United States .. .”) The federal government has

jurisdiction over the “navigable waters” of the United States

independent of the Commerce Clause through the Admiralty

Clause which implicitly contains three grants of power to the

federal government:

(1) It empowered Congress to confer admiralty and

maritime jurisdiction on the “Tribunals inferior to the

Supreme Court” which were authorized by Art. I, 8, cl.

9. (2) It empowered the federal courts in their exercise

of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction which had

been conferred on them, to draw on the substantive law

“inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,”

and to continue the development of this law within

constitutional limits. 3) It empowered Congress to

revise and supplement the maritime law within the limits

of the Constitution.

Romero v. International Term Co., 358 U.S. 354, 361-2

(1959) citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932).

~ Even if Congress had never enacted a single substantive law

affecting the navigable waters of the United States, the use

of those navigable waters of the United States would still be

governed by federal law through ine Admiralty Clause. If

there were no federal statutes, the Constitution still left power

convenience and general prosperity. Paraphrasing Black's Law Diction-

ary (Eighth Edition, 2004). Inherent in police powers is the right to prior

restraint and the nght to punish for conduct where no harm to a third party

has yet occurred. Police powers are distinct from the right to provide a

remedy to a private party after that private party has been injured.

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to the federal courts to develop the substantive admiralty/

maritime law.’ Romero, 358 at 361-2.

Once Congress enacts a law governing the use of the

navigable waters of the United States, that law becomes

part of the substantive admiralty/maritime laws of the United

States. This Court has often said: “With admiralty jurisdic-

tion comes the application of substantive admiralty law.”

Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, 527 at 545; Yamaha Motor

Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 206 (1996); East

River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858,

864 (1986). The converse must also be true: With the appli-

cation of substantive admiralty law comes admiralty jurisdic-

tion. When the question of law is whether a location is part

of the “navigable waters of the United States” that question is

an admiralty/maritime law question and that question has a

constitutional answer.

A. What is or is not “navigable waters” deter-

mines the boundaries of what falls within the

scope of admiralty/maritime jurisdiction.

The question of what constitutes the “navigable waters of

the United States” has always been intertwined with the scope

of admiralty/maritime jurisdiction. For most of the history of

this nation the jurisdictional test for admiralty/maritime torts

was the simple bright line situs test outlined in The Daniel

Ball.® As this Court often said “The traditional test for admi-

“While not relevant to this case, a significant amount of the federal

- admiralty/maritime law is developed through international treaty. United

States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000).

° The admiralty/maritime jurisdiction applies to both torts and con-

tructs. The jurisdictional test for contracts has traditionally been a nexus

test. The Jefferson, 61 U.S. 393, 401 (1857) (“The admiralty jurisdiction,

in cases of contract, depends primarily upon the nature of the contract, and

is limited to contracts, claims, and services, purely maritime, and touching

rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation.”)

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ralty tort jurisdiction asked only whether the tort occurred on

navigable waters. If it did, admiralty jurisdiction followed; if

it did not, admiralty jurisdiction did not exist.” Jerome B.

Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S.

527, 531-2 (1995). See also Executive Jet Aviation v. City of

Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 253 (1972) (“If the wrong occurred

y aan sees waters, the action is within admiralty juris-

diction.” (citing Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (No.

13,902) (CC Me. 1813) (Story, J., on Circuit). See also The

Plymouth, 70 U.S. 20, 36 (1866) (“Every species of tort, how-

ever occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon

the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cogni-

zance”). See generally Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, 513

U.S. 527 (1995) for a discussion of the evolution of admiralty/

maritime tort jurisdiction.

Some members of this Court would return to this bright

line rule for admiralty/maritime jurisdiction. See Great Lakes

Dredge & Dock, 513 U.S. at 549 (Justices Thomas and Scalia

concurring in judgment). What is relevant to this case is that

the starting point for determining federal admiralty/maritime

jurisdiction under any test ever used by the Court is whether

the location is “navigable waters of the United States.”

Therefore, any shift in what constitutes the “navigable waters

of the United States” potentially could shift the admiralty/

maritime jurisdictional of the United States.

B. Federal power over the use of the navigable

waters of the United States is exclusive.

States have extremely limited police powers over the use of

navigable waters. The police powers over the use of the

navigable waters of the United States is vested exclusively in

the federal government through the Admiralty Clause:

By the Constitution, the entire admiralty power of the

country is lodged in the federal judiciary, and Congress

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intended by the ninth section to invest the District Courts

with this power, as courts of original jurisdiction.

The New Jersey Steam Navigation Company, v. The Mer-

chants’ Bank or Boston, 47 U.S. 344, 390 (1848).

Since the beginning federal courts have recognized and

applied the rules and principles of maritime law as

something distinct from laws of the several states-not

derived from or dependent on their will. The foundation

of the right to do this, the purpose for which it was

granted, and the nature of the system so administered,

were distinctly pointed out long ago: “That we have a

maritime law of our own, operative throughout the

United States, cannot be doubted. . . . One thing, how-

ever, is unquestionable; the Constitution must have

referred to a system of law coextensive with, and oper-

ating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could

not have been the intention to place the rules and limits

of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the

several states, as that would have defeated the uniform-

ity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on

all subjects of a commercial character affecting the

intercourse of the states with each other or with foreign

states.”

Knickerbocker at 160-161, quoting from The Lottawanna, 88

U.S. 558, 574-5 (1874).

The constitutional principle that federal admiralty/maritime

jurisdiction over the use of the navigable water: of the United

States is exclusive is also reflected in statute. One of the first

actions of the first Congress was to create the lower federal

courts in The Judiciary Act of 1789:

And be it further enacted, That the district courts . . .

shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil

causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including

all seizures under laws of impost, navigation or trade

of the United States, where the seizures are made, on

waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of

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ten or more tons burthen, within their respective districts

as well as upon the high seas; saving to suitors, in all

cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the

common law is competent to give it; and shall also have

exclusive original cognizance of all seizures on land, or

other waters than as aforesaid, made, and of all suits for

penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the

United States.

The Judiciary Act of 1789: An Act to establish the Judicial

Courts of the United States, | Stat. 73, Section 9 (September

24, 1789) (The Judiciary Act). The admiralty/maritime com-

ponents of The Judiciary Act are now codified in Title 28 of

the United States Code:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclu-

sive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of

admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in

all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise

entitled. (2) Any prize brought into the United States

and all proceedings for the condemnation of property

taken as prize.

Admiralty, maritime and prize cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1333. The

second phrase of clause (1 )—‘saving to suitors in all cases all

other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled”—is

referred to as the “saving to suitors” clause and has lead to

some confusion over what jurisdiction states retain. The

modern view is that states are left with two authorities:

First, states are authorized to have their courts accept juris-

diction over admiralty/maritime cases. See Romero. Concur-

rent federal/state court jurisdiction allows state courts to hear

admiralty/maritime claims just as they hear most other federal

questions. But state court must apply federal admiralty/

maritime law, not state law, when sitting as admiralty courts.

Second, states are authorized to provide remedies to suit-

ors. Originally, this authority was limited to rights that were

available at common law at the time the Constitution was

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adopted. In more recent years, this right has been amended

by Congress to include remedies that individuals “are other-

wise entitled” where no federal admiralty/maritime remedies

are otherwise available. A state may provide remedies “so

long as it does not attempt to make changes in the ‘sub-

stantive maritime law.”” Madruga v. Superior Court of Cal.,

County of San Diego, 346 U.S. 556, 561 (1954) quoting Red

Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124 (1924).

As a bottom line, once admiralty/maritime jurisdiction at-

taches, the Constitution and laws of the United States se-

verely limit state powers. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89

(2000) (“The authority of Congress to regulate interstate navi-

gation, without embarrassment from intervention of the sepa-

rate States and resulting difficulties with foreign nations, was

cited in the Federalist Papers as one of the reasons for

adopting the Constitution.”) citing The Federalist Nos. 44,

12, 64.

Declaring a location to be part of the navigable waters of

the United States has the corollary effect of removing state

police powers over the use of that location. If the navigable

waters of the United States are expanded in scope, the

admiralty/maritime jurisdiction also expands to the exclusion

of the states.

C. Federal power over the use of the navigable

waters of the United States is nondelegable.

Expanding the definition of what constitutes the “navigable

waters of the United States” has far more implications that

would an expansive reading of other statutory language. Not

only is federal power over the use of the “navigable waters of

the United States” exclusive as outlined above in section B,

once federal admiralty/maritime power attaches, it cannot be

delegated to the states. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253

U.S. 149, 160 (1920) (“Congress cannot transfer its legisla-

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tive power [over admiralty/maritime matters] to the states-by

nature this [admiralty/maritime power] is non-delegable.”’)

As background to this proposition, when workers’ com-

pensation statutes were first enacted, states attempted to apply

their workers’ compensation laws to work place injuries that

would otherwise have been maritime torts. This Court struck

down this aspect of state workers’ compensation laws in

Southern Pacific Rail Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217

(1917), rejecting an argument that such laws could be applied

under the saving to suitors clause discussed above. After

Jensen, Congress amended the saving to suitors clause to

expressly authorize states to apply their workers’ compensa-

tion laws to maritime workplace torts. In Knickerbocker, this

Court again ruled against applying state workers’ compen-

sation laws in the admiralty/maritime context holding that

power under the Admiralty Clause is “non-delegable.” Knick-

erbocker, 253 at 160. Ultimately, Congress decided to cover

maritime injuries under a federal workers’ compensation

statute. LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. 901 et seg. To this day,

admiralty/maritime injuries are covered by federal law.

While this Court has not since revisited the question of

delegation under the Admiralty Clause, the Court has repeat-

edly supported the principle that was the underpinning of the

holding in Knickerbocker:

The fundamental interest giving rise to maritime juris-

dictions is “the protection of.maritime commerce,” and

we have said that that interest cannot be fully vindicated

unless “all operators of vessels on navigable waters are

subject to uniform rules of conduct.”

Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 367 (1990), quoting Foremost

Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1982).

The holding that Commerce Clause powers are delegable,

while Admiralty Clause powers are non-delegable is consis-

tent with the structure of the Constitution. As a general rule,

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Congress can delegate powers that the Constitution otherwise

gives to Congress. The power to regulate commerce is found

in Article I of the Constitution and as such, is a power of

Congress. Congress cannot delegate powers that the Consti-

tution assigns to the other two branches of the federal govern-

ment. Since the Admiralty Clause is a federal power given

first and foremost to the federal courts in Article III, Congress

is without authority to place any of admiralty/maritime power

in the states—i.e., it is non-delegable.

Ill. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IS WITHOUT

AUTHORITY TO INTERPRET A TERM THAT

THE COURTS HAVE ALREADY INTER-

PRETED.

Amicus submits that any Executive Branch interpretations

of the term “navigable waters” should be irrelevant to the

Court’s inquiry. Executive branch regulation on this point

should not even be considered by the Court. Amicus ad-

vances two grounds for this position: First, no executive

branch interpretation of the term “navigable waters” is per-

missible because the meaning of the term was clear and well

establishéd at the time of enactment of the CWA. Second,

because the term “navigable waters” and phrase “waters of

the United States” have constitutional importance, it is the

courts and not the executive branch that have the sole author-

ity to establish the appropriate legal test.

A. No alternative executive branch interpretation

of a term is allowed when the interpretation of

the term is clear at the time of enactment.

The question of when executive branch regulations are

relevant to a judicial enquiry is governed by the Administra-

tive Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seg. (APA):

To the extent necessary to decision and when presented,

the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of

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law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and

determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an

agency action. The reviewing court shall— .. . (2) hold

unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and

conclusions found to be—{A) arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with

law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privi-

lege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction,

authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right . . .

APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Under the APA, it is the responsibil-

ity of the courts to decide questions of law and interpret

constitutional and statutory provisions. See also Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the

province and duty of the judicial department to say what the

law is.”) The Court addressed this issue in Chevron, U.S.A.,

Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837, 842-3 (1984):

When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the

statute which it administers, it is confronted with two

questions. First, always, is the question whether Con-

gress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.

If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the

matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give

effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-

gress. If, however, the court determines Congress has

not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the

court does not simply impose its own construction on the

Statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an

administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is

silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the

question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is

based.on a permissible construction of the statute. (in-

ternal citations omitted).

As has been demonstrated above, the intent of Congress

when it used the term “navigable waters” and the phrase

“waters of the United States” could not have been clearer. It

would be hard to find other words that have been more

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thoroughly defined over our nation’s history. In the language

of Chevron, once Congress used the term “navigable waters”

and the phrase “waters of the United States,” “that is the end

of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency must give

effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”

Chevron, 467 at 842.

While the so-called Chevron doctrine encompasses a gen-

eral principle of deference to agency decisions, an agency is

not automatically entitled to deference:

But the principle [of deference] has its limits. Deference

does not mean acquiescence. As in other contexts in

which we defer to an administrative interpretation of a

statute, we do so only if Congress has not expressed its

intent with respect to the question and then only if the

administrative interpretation is reasonable.

Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 508-509

(1992) (emphasis added) citing Chevron, 837 at 842-844. In

the case at hand, Congress has clearly expressed its intent by

using a term that has a long established meaning. Any other

interpretation that is inconsistent with that long established

meaning is simply not reasonable.

B. The Courts are the sole source of interpreting

what is and is not a navigable water.

Furthermore, the Constitution has delegated to the Courts

the authority to define the legal test for what is and is not

“navigable waters” and what are and are not the “waters of

the United States.” Congress is without authority to take that

power away from the courts and delegate that power instead

to the Executive Branch or usurp that power for itself. The

Steamer St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. 522, 527 (1862):

This difficulty was increased by the complex character

of our Government, where separate and distinct specified

powers of sovereignty are exercised by the United States

and a State independently of each other within the same

17

territorial limits. And the reports of the decisions of this

court will show that the subject has often been before it,

and carefully considered, without being able to fix with

precision its definite boundaries; but certainly no State

law can enlarge it, nor can an act of Congress or rule of

court make it broader than the judicial power may

determine to be its true limits. And this boundary is to be

ascertained by a reasonable and just construction of the

words used in the Constitution, taken in connection with

the whole instrument, and the purposes for which admi-

ralty and maritime jurisdiction was granted to the Fed-

eral Government.

(emphasis added.)

In further support of this proposition consider this hypo-

thetical—Congress gives the Executive Branch statutory

authority to conduct “reasonable searches and seizures” along

with authority to issue regulations. Could it seriously be

argued that the Executive Branch would be free to issue

regulations defining what is an unreasonable search and

seizure in a way that violated the meaning given to that term

by the courts? Would such regulation be entitled to defer-

ence? The answer is of course not. Likewise, no Act of

Congress can give a federal agency the right to “overrule”

this Court’s legal test for what constitutes the “waters of the

United States.”

To the extent an administrative agency conducts a fact

based adjudication and determines that certain waters are or

are not navigable, such a determination may be entitled to

deference under the APA. But only the federal courts have to

power to define what legal test will be used to establish what

waters are the “waters of the United States.” The Constitution

delegated that power to the federal courts and Congress is

without constitutional authority to give that power to the

Executive Branch.

Thus, for the reasons outlined above, administrative regula-

tions on what constitutes “navigable waters” and “waters of

the United States” are irrelevant to this inquiry. The Court

should instead look to its own decisions when deciding this

case and the controlling authority is The Daniel Ball and it

progeny.

IV.THE FEDERAL COURTS AND CONGRESS

HAVE CONSISTENTLY USED THE TERM

“NAVIGABLE WATERS” AND PHRASE

“WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” IN

THEIR ADMIRALTY/MARITIME CONTEXT.

For most of the history of this nation, the federal courts and

Congress have used the term “navigable waters” and the

phrase “waters of the United States” to delineate the bound-

ary between federal admiralty/maritime jurisdiction and state

non-admiralty jurisdiction. The question repeatedly con- -

fronted by the Court is whether a given location in our nation

is part of the “navigable waters of the United States.” In the

early case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. | (1824), this Court

discussed what constitutes “waters of the United States: ”

It is not unreasonable to say, that what are called the

waters of New-York, are, to purposes of navigation and

commercial regulation, the waters of the United States.

There is no cession, indeed, of the waters themselves,

but their use, for those purposes, seemed to be entrusted

to the exclusive power of Congress.

Gibbons at 21. The Court went on to conclude what consti-

tutes “waters of the United States” is a function of whether or

not those waters are navigable:

It is a common principle, that arms of the sea, including

navigable rivers, belong to the sovereign, so far as navi-

gation is concerned. Their use is navigation. The

United States possess the general power over navigation,

and, of course, ought to control, in general, the use of

navigable waters.

Gibbons at 22. That principle that “navigable waters” are the

“waters of the United States” has been a bedrock principle of

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federal law ever since. The Court outlined the test for what

are and are not “navigable waters” of the United States in The

Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870) and The Montello, 87 U.S.

430 (1874). Of significance to this case is that The Daniel

Ball involved the interpretation of a statute that used the

phrase “navigable waters of the United States:”

The act of July 7th, 1838, provides, in its second section,

that it shall not be lawful for the owner, master, or

captain of any vessel, propelled in whole or in part by

steam, to transport any merchandise or passengers upon

the bays, lakes, rivers, or other navigable waters of the

United States ....

The Daniel Ball at 558. The Court went on to address the

issue of what constitutes “navigable waters of the United

States:”

Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers

in law which are navigable in fact. And they are naviga-

ble in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of

being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for

commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be

conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel

on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the

United States within the meaning of the acts of

Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters

of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition

by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a

continued highway over which commerce is or may be

carried on with other States or foreign countries in the

customary modes in which such commerce is conducted

by water.

The Daniel Ball at 563. A few years later in The Montello, 87

U.S. 430 (1874), this Court went on to further define what is

and is not part of the “navigable waters of the United States:”

It would be a narrow rule to hold that in this country,

unless a river was capable of being navigated by steam

or sail vessels, it could not be treated as a public high-

20

way. The capability of use by the public for purposes of

transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of

the navigability of a river, rather than the extent and

manner of that use. If it be capable in its natural state of

being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what

mode the commerce may be conducted, it is navigable

in fact, and becomes in law a public river or highway.

Vessels of any kind that can float upon the water,

whether propelled by animal power, by the wind, or by

the agency of steam, are, or may become, the mode by

which a vast commerce can be conducted, and it would

be a mischievous rule that would exclude either in deter-

mining the navigability of a river. It is not, however, as

Chief Justice Shaw said, “every small creek in which a

fishing skiff or gunning canoe can be made to float at

high water which is deemed navigable, but, in order to

give it the character of a navigable stream, it must be

generally and commonly useful to some purpose of trade

or agriculture.”

The Montello at 441-2.

Since The Daniel Ball, the same test has been used by the

federal courts to evaluate what constitutes “navigable waters,”

whether evaluating statutes or constitutional questions. In

Economy Light & Power Co. v. U.S., 256 U.S. 113 (1921),

this Court interpreted a statute using the term “navigable

waters” and the phrase “navigable waters of the United

States.” This Court as always looked to The Daniel Ball:

The Circuit Court of Appeals, in passing upon the ques-

tion of navigability, correctly applied the test laid down

by this court in The Daniel Ball and The Montello, that

is, the test whether the river, in its natural state, is used,

or capable of being used as a highway for commerce,

over which trade and travel is or may be conducted in

the customary modes of trade and travel on water.

Navigability, in the sense of the law, is not destroyed

because the water course is interrupted by occasional

natural obstructions or portages; nor need the navigation

21

be open at all seasons of the year, or at all stages of the

water.

Economy Light at 121-2. See also US. v. Appalachian

Electric Power Co., 3\1 U.S. 377 (1940):

It was heiZ early in our history that the power to regulate

commerce necessarily included power over navigation.

To make its control effective the Congress may keep the

navigable waters of the United States open and free and

provide by sanctions against any interference with the

country's water assets. It may legislate to forbid or

license dams in the waters; its power over improvements

for navigation in rivers is “absolute.”

The states possess control of the waters within their

borders, “subject to the acknowledged jurisdiction of the

United States under the constitution in regard to com-

merce and the navigation of the waters of rivers.” It is

this subordinate local control that, even as to navigable

rivers, creates between the respective governments a

contrariety of interests relating to the regulation and

protection of waters through licenses, the operation of

structures and the acquisition of projects at the end of the

license term. But there is no doubt that the United States

possesses the power to control the erection of structures

in navigable waters.

The navigability of the New River is, of course, a factual

question but to call it a fact cannot obscure the diverse

elements that enter into the application of the legal tests

as to navigability. We are dealing here with the sover-

eign powers of the Union, the Nation’s right that its

waterways be utilized for the interests of the commerce

of the whole country. It is obvious that the uses to

which the streams may be put vary from the carriage of

ocean liners to the floating out of logs; that the density

of traffic varies equally widely from the busy harbors

of the seacoast to the sparsely settled regions of the

~

22

Western mountains. The tests as to navigability must

take these variations into consideration.

Appalachian Electric at 404-6.”

At the time Congress used the term “navigable waters” in

the CWA and defined that term to be the “waters of the

United States,” Congress knew what that term meant. Con-

gress has used that term for over 100 years in statute after

statute. This Court has interpreted that term in statute after

statute and in numerous constitutional cases so there was no

question of the meaning.

One definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and

over again and expecting a different result. It would be

insanity for Congress to have used a term that this Court had

interpreted the same way over and over again and expect the

Court to reach a different conclusion. If Congress had in-

tended a different jurisdictional reach for the CWA, Congress

undoubtedly would have used a different term to define that

jurisdictional reach.

A. Congress repeatedly used the term “navigable

waters” and the phrase “navigable waters of

the United States.”

Not only has the term “navigable waters” and the phrase

“waters of the United States” been used for over 100 years in

statutes, the term and phrase are still found in numerous other

federal statutes today. See Title 33 of the United States Code

generally covering Navigation and Navigabie Waters, in-

cluding 33 U.S.C. 1 (“It shall be the duty of the Secretary of

the Army to prescribe such regulations for the use, admini-

stration, and navigation of the navigable waters of the United

States . . .”); 33 U.S.C. 10 (“All the navigable rivers and

waters in the former Territories of Orleans and Louisiana

shall be and forever remain public highways.”); 33 U.S.C.

59b (“Bayou Terrebonne west of Barrow Street and Bayou

LeCarpe west of the Intracoastal Waterway in the city of

23

Houma, State of Louisiana, are declared to be not navigable

waters of the United States within the meaning of the Con-

stitution and laws of the United States.”); 33 U.S.C. 401 (“It

shall not be lawful to construct or commence the construction

of any bridge, causeway, dam, or dike over or in any port,

roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, or other

navigable water of the United States .. .”); 33 U.S.C. 414(a)

(“Whenever the navigation of any river, lake, harbor, sound,

bay, canal, or other navigable waters of the United States

shall be obstructed or-endangered . . .”); 33 U.S.C. 902(4)

(“The term ‘employer’ means an employer any of whose

employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole

or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States

...”); 33 U.S.C. 1222(5) (“ ‘Navigable waters of the United

States’ includes all waters of the territorial sea of the United

States as described in Presidential Proclamation No. 5928 of

December 27, 1988.”’).’

See also Title 46 of the United States Code generally

covering Shipping including 46 U.S.C. 2101(17a) (“ ‘naviga-

ble waters of the United States’ includes all waters of the

territorial sea of the United States as described in Presidential

Proclamation No. 5928 of December 27, 1988.”); 46 U.S.C.

4301(c) (“Until there is a final judicial decision that they are

navigable waters of the United States, the following waters

Tying entirely in New Hampshire are declared not to be waters

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States within the

’ The conclusion that the term “navigable waters” must be evaluated in

light of traditional admiralty/maritime law principles is also supported by

the CWA’s placement in the United States Code. Many of the other

federal environmental statutes are found in Title 42 of the United States

Code governing The Public Health and Welfare. Sve solid waste statutes

in 42 U.S.C. Chapter 82 and clean air statutes in 42 U.S.C. Chapter 85.

The Clean Water Act on the other hand is found in Title 33 of the United

States Code regulating Navigation and Navigable Waters. Title 33 con-

tains a significant amount of the admiralty/maritime laws of the United

States.

24

meaning of this section . . .””); 46 U.S.C. 4701(3) (“ ‘navigable

waters of the United States’ means waters of the United

States, including the territorial sea.”); 46 U.S.C. 6101(d)(1)

(“This part applies to a foreign vessel when involved in

a marine casualty on the navigable waters of the United

States.”); 46 U.S.C. 8304(g) (“A foreign vessel to which the

convention described in subsection (b) of this section applies,

on the navigable waters of the United States, is subject to

detention under subsection (f) of this section, and to an ex-

amination that may be necessary to decide if there is compli-

ance with the convention.”); 46 U.S.C. 11108(2) (“This

subsection applies to an individual . . . (B) who performs

regularly-assigned duties while engaged as a master, officer,

or crewman on a vessel operating on the navigable waters of

more than one State.”’)

These examples are by no means an exhaustive list of

federal statutes that use the term “navigable waters” and/or

phrase “waters of the United States.” Instead, they simply

represent a sampling.

Over and over again, Congress has used the term “naviga-

ble waters” and/or the phrase “waters of the United States” to

define the jurisdictional scope of federal statutes. Congress

has repeatedly used its constitutional authority to regulation

“navigable waters” to enact such legislation. Congress has

used the term “navigable waters” and the phrase “waters of

the United States” consistently and repeatedly in the tradi-

tional The Daniel Ball sense: Waters must be regarded as

navigable in law which are navigable in fact and they are

navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of

being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for com-

merce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted

in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.

25

Even the Army Corps of Engineers initially used a tradi-

tional definition of “navigable waters” in the early regulations

for the CWA:

Indeed, the Corps’ original interpretation of the CWA,

promulgated two years after its enactment, is incon-

sistent with that which it espouses here. Its 1974

regulations defined §404(a)’s navigable waters to mean

“those waters of the United States which are subject to

the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently, or

have been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible

for use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce.”

33 CFR §209.120(d)(1). The Corps emphasized that

“[{i]t is the water body’s capability of use by the public

for purposes of transportation or commerce which is the

determinative factor.” §209.260(e)(1). Respondents put

forward no persuasive evidence that the Corps mistook

Congress’ intent in 1974.

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United

States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 168 (2001).

There is simply no evidence that Congress intended “naviga-

ble waters” in the CWA to mean anything other than its

traditional and ordinary meaning. Therefore, the term must

be given its traditional and ordinary meaning.

V. FEDERAL RESPONDENT’S POSITION

It is against this long judicial and statutory history under

the Admiralty Clause that the federal respondent’s position

must be evaluated. The federal respondent asks this Court to

ignore the almost 200 year of this Court’s holdings and

instead create a new category of “navigable waters.” The

federal respondent calls the “navigable waters” that are navi-

gable in fact “traditional navigable waters.” Brief for the

United States in Opposition to Certiorari in Rapanos v.

United States, No. 04-1034, 2-3, footnote |. The government

then asks the Court to recognize a new category of “navigable

waters” under the CWA—navigable waters that are not

26

. navigable in fact. Thus, if the government prevails there will

be two categories of “navigable waters” under federal law:

“navigable navigable waters” and “non-navigahle navigable

waters.” The country will be confronted with “wafer waters

of the United States” and “waterless waters of the United

States.”

In reviewing the federal respondent’s position in this case,

amicus is reminded of something that former Senator Daniel

Patrick Moynahan often said: In a democracy, we each are

free to have our own opinions, but we are not free to make up

our own facts. In this case, the federal respondent wants to

make up its own facts about what is in fact navigable. If the

federal respondent prevails, it will require something like the

Ministry of Truth from George Orwell’s “1984” to explain to

the public how dry land is in fact part of the “navigable

waters of the United States.” Maybe they can paraphrase the

pigs in Orwell’s “Animal Farm” and explain that: All land in

the United States is navigable by maritime vessels, but some

land is more navigable than other.*

The federal respondent’s position in this case begs the

question of whether the term “navigable waters” either

(1) should be redefined under federal admiralty/maritime

laws to include “non-navigable navigable waters;” or in the

alternative (2) could be redefined under other federal admi-

ralty/maritime laws to include “non-navigable navigable

waters.” Could a worker who got injured filling in the “non-

navigable navigable waters” on Mr. Rapanos’ land seek

compensation under the federal LHWCA because the worker

was “employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part,

upon the navigable waters of the United States?” 33 U.S.C.

902(4). Or maybe Mr. Rapanos could seek federal harbor

maintenance funds to maintain his land since his land would

* The actual quote is “All animals are equal but some animals are more

equal than others.”

27

be part of the “navigable waters of the United States.” When

the state wants to exercise its police powers over Mr. Rapanos’

land, can he raise the affirmative defense that the state no

longer has jurisdiction over his land use because his land is

part of the “navigable waters of the United States.” The pos-

sibilities of new applications of old federal laws are endless if

the Court recognizes the existence of “non-navigable naviga-

ble waters.”

_ There is absolutely no evidence that Congress intended

such an absurd result under any federal statute including the

CWA. Absent some clean, unequivocal expression by Con-

gress to the contrary, the Court should conclude that Congress

intended “navigable waters” to mean the same thing the term

has meant in every otiver context it has been uses since the

adoption of the Constitution. What is navigable in law is

what is navigable in fact.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, amicus urges the Court to

declare that what constitutes the “navigable waters of the

United States” is a question of fact, defined by the Constitu-

tion under the Admiralty Clause. The test outlined in The

Daniel Ball is the test that should be used whenever Congress

defined the jurisdiction scope of a statute to be “navigable

waters” and/or “ vaters of the United States.”

Respectfully submitted,

FRANCIS EDWIN FROELICH *

CHARLES T. CARROLL, JR.

CARROLL & FROELICH, PLLC

919 18th Street, NW

Suite 901

Washington, DC 20006

* Counsel of Record (202) 587-4850

ou . - ;

FIL J |

\2 t Cae 2. uD

Nos. 04-1034, 04-1 |

3u the

Supreme Court of the Anited States

JOHN A. RAPANOS et ex, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

JUNE CARABELL, ef al.,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of

for the Sixth

BRIEF FOR THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF

INDEPENDENT BUSINESS LEGAL FOUNDATION

AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

KAREN R. HARNED ROBERT R. GASAWAY

ELIZABETH GAUDIO Counsel of Record

NFIB LEGAL FOUNDATION ASHLEY C. PARRISH

1201 F Street, NW ERIN E. MORROW

Washi DC 20004 KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP

(202) 554-9000 655 Fifteenth Street, NW

Washi DC 20005

(202) 879-5000

Attorneys for the Amicus Curiae

December 2, 2005

WILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 788-0086 — WasHmGTON, D.C. 20001

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the United States Army Corps of Engineers’

regulations promulgated pursuant to the Clean Water Act

lawfully and constitutionally vest the Army Corps with

broad, land-use decisionmaking authority over essentially

any and every wetland in the United States.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ...0.....s-csessssesssseesssessssesseneecessereneee

I A iii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE c.cccccoccescccesessesessescsecessesee. !

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

NS | EEE CBG LEE ES POOLE 2

EAE EEL ALRE AER Se PRAM OMA E SRA 4

I. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S EXPANSIVE READING

OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT RENDERS THE

ETE Ce rg cretisetetccntsntcescttnrsinipiavrnicens 4

A. The Corps’ Regulations Seek To Impose

Nationwide Land-Use Requirements On A Vast

Array Of Privately Owned Wetlands. ........................ 5

B. Under Our System Of Government, Land-Use

Planning Is The “Quintessential” Function Of

RO IE cencetienarecintiorienaeatennlnorenctajenpeonindsviniiian 6

C. The Corps’ Regulations Violate Constitutional

Federalism Princigles.. ...........ccscecssecsessesesssesecassvosees 10

ll. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S EXPANSIVE READING

OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT CANNOT BE

SQUARED WITH SWANCC. ........cccc0sesssssesscsrsnssneeeeess 14

A. The Clean Water Act Does Not Prohibit The

Employment Of Fill Materials For Purposes Of

Improving Privately Owned Parcels Of Land. ......... 14

B. Riverside Bayview Cannot Be Read To Give The

Federal Government Authority To Make Land-

Use Determinations For Wetlands Not “Actually

Abutting” Navigable Waters. ..................2....cc0eee00 20

Ill. THE CORPS EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN

ASSERTING LAND-USE JURISDICTION OVER

THE CARABELL AND RAPANOS WETLANDG......... 23

IP en IT sca nrsecenivticotisbeenmnbstcanitiddeiseninnipptiiitnndnnibmnnite 27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Agostini v. Felton,

ee I i TD alain tcinintiassececinccctntinscidvs 21

Arkansas v. Oklahoma Envtl. Prot. Agency,

Rf Eke Se aa re 19

Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,

Fs A Ai irecsnssntnesesicctscncenccctiogneses 14

Brown v. Board of Education,

ee Oe ee sdiiteiccepnsctinsstncstnececencnihinnabdiinn 2

Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Engr’s,

391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004) 00... cccseseeeeeeee 23

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.,

Ie ey PF Ce eh ccccscttsnsncctsscccesnntissens 15

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan,

Pe Sa PE OE lial cciphnsstetinincdpecatntecbineiiin 19

Coleman v. Thompson,

re BP OD cekticrnpenscnnsinecenccasccrcotiantoianes 26

Dolan v. City of Tigard,

ee en 7,15

Duncan v. Walker,

ls Wee iii acicnriitstrtnnsccntccadeseniisannees 25

Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf

Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,

a I tidirccinensnteetibicniccccneiupschotnne 15

FERC v. Mississippi,

gt Ls . eee oe 7, 15

iv

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,

SGD U5 Bc FEB CESS) secicictortesticconesesvscscamntanaiiias 21

Gonzales v. Raich,

yk Ro | Te nena ere oe 11, 13

Gregory v. Ashcroft,

RS ee, | SAREE 10, 14

Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,

FED eres COD cedictdithitaanncsicemcannesestnniense 7a 88

Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,

SORE Teale Se EE FD iatirlasctctnccecnnictonapataiiiantieanite 18

Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois,

PE ET CPD sdiinntiinedenorsesitotagungiitiipediat 18

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,

EE EEE edeiniclsiieninatochauneuiendn 19, 20

Jones v. United States,

Fe AE IED eicrcirectncentianvinvapnindaunasnie 13

Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’]

Planning Agency,

CF ae Fee Cr OTE ntticctiscsdttactaninnsiitantiel 6, 15

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,

FED SEs ED OPN hcinndothevrcicscernetctienniiainibii 16

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) 0.0.0... cccceeeeeeeee ll

National Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,

145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998) oo... cece eeeeeees 16

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,

Po 8. NE ee ae en 8 8

NRDC, Inc. v. Callaway,

392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975) ..........cccccccceeees 8

Vv

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.

United States Army Corps of Engineers,

531 U.S. 159 (2001)

epaloushbainabiin 2, 3, 12, 15, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,

a, Satan nennseresnansidnensititin 26

United States v. Lopez,

en 11, 12, 13

United States v. Morrison,

en 11,12

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,

494 US. 121 CIDGS) ...n...2000010.02<0000000002 20, 22, 23

Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States,

a 18

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,

Ges: 7,15

Warth v. Seldin,

2 | 8 aaa 7, 15

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,

eR 17

Younger v. Harris,

ER eee il

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,

LT 7

Statutes and Regulations

A YRS: 2 ee 19

ED a ee ee 19

ly i ceitcincinancutiahadittigtprenanmntmnipiitiueiniens 19

a 19

BD is. Be crtctetettnconenstrnsenteenmanceninitiioen 19

a a OP SE leteininistrthiteneereintinccnenplilatdpnani 5

ee 5

FP Ce be rcstrctiindeningetarntbincemiitinienmneeia 5

i Sb 8 SRE ee 5

a eis Ob i rndiecinceretanictapuinniiagiipenettiitintiens 19, 25

ere 3,15

BP ieee © Fe certirncsesttnetgesenenctitttinene 16

ES SS 3

gt P| EY Se 6

En 6

eM 6

RR eS Re rere 6

Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on

the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of

“Waters of the United States,”

68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15; 2003)...................... 2

Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs,

58 Fed. Reg. 45,008 (Aug. 25, 1993)............... 13

Final Notice of Modification of Nationwide

Permit 29 For Single Family Homes,

64 Fed. Reg. 47 (Aug. 30, 1999)... 12

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 130, § 27A,

1963 Mass. Acts 426, repealed by

1972 Mass. Acts 784, § 2,

superceded by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 131,

ee EE OS ee 8

vii

Other Authorities

Adler, Jonathan H.,

Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal

Environmental Regulation,

90 IOWA L. REV. 377 (2005) .............cccccceeeeeeeees 8

Adler, Jona-han H.,

Letting Fifty Flowers Bloom:

Transforming The States Into

Laboratories Of Environmental Policy

available at http://www. federalism

Adler, Jonathan H.,

Wetlands, Waterfowl and The Menace of

Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and

the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation,

ee 7,8

Albrecht, Virginia S. & Bernard N. Goode,

Wetland Regulation in the Real World (1994). 13

Dawson, Alexandra D.,

Massachusetts’ Experience in Regulating

Wetlands in Wetland Protection:

Strengthening the Role of the States

(Ass'n of State Wetland Managers, 1985) ......... 8

Gerhardt, Michael J.,

The Curious Flight of the Migratory Bird Ruie,

31 ENVTL. L. Rep. 11079 (2001)...................... 10

vill

Jaffe, Caleb A.,

Tragedy of the Wetlands Commons:

What the Virginia Nontidal Wetlands Resources

Act Says About The Future Of

Environmental Regulation,

20 VA. ENVTL L.J. 329 (2001) -..0....22--.eeececeeeee 10

Kusler, Jon A., et al.,

State Wetland Regulation: Status of

Programs and Emerging Trends

(Ass’n of State Wetland Managers, 1994) ......... 9

Regulatory Warning: Hearings Before the Subcomm.

on Commercial and Administrative Law

of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,

104th Cong. (1996)

(statement of Robert McMackin) ....................... 4u

Release No. PA-00-05, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Announces Replacement Nationwide Permits,

available at http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/

cepa/releases/nationwidepermits. htm................. ?

Revesz, Richard L.,

Federalism and Environmental Regulation:

A Public Choice Analysis,

115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (20...) .......2.-.cccceeeeceeeees 9

I ST ]

S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1971),

reprinted in 1972, U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668 ............. 17

Stone, Geoffrey R., et ai.,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1986) .......ccccccccceeeeees 21

THE COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE'

The National Federation of Independent Business Legal

Foundation (“NFIB Legal Foundation”), a nonprofit, public

interest law firm established to protect the rights of

America’s small-business owners, is the legal arm of the

National Federation of Independent Business (“NFIB”).

NFIB is the nation’s oldest and largest organization dedicated

to representing the interests of small-business owners

throughout all 50 States. The 600,000 NFIB members own a

wide variety of small businesses, including restaurants,

family farms, neighborhood retailers, service companies, and

technology manufacturers. NFIB represents small employers

who make up an important segment of the business

community. Members typically have about five employees

and report gross sales of $350,000; the average member nets

$40,000 to $50,000 annually. These small businesses face

challenges and opportunities that distinguish them from

publicly traded corporations.

NFIB members have an important interest in these cases

because small businesses continue to bear a disproportionate

share of the federal regulatory burden associated with

environmental regulations. A September 2005 study

commissioned by the Small Business Administration reveals

that environmental and tax compliance regulations are the

main cost drivers in determining the severity of the

disproportionate impact on small firms. Compliance with

environmental regulations alone costs small firms 364

percent more than large firms.

' Both petitioners and respondents have consented to the filing of this

brief in letters that are on file in the Clerk's office. Pursuant to S. Ct. R.

37.6, amicus curiae state that no counsel for a party authored any part of

this brief, and no person or entity other than amicus curiae, their

members, or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the

preparation or submission of this brief.

2

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The five years following Brown v. Board of Education,

349 U.S. 294 (1955), are often termed years of “massive

resistance” to that decision’s holding. In similar fashion, the

five years following this Court’s 2001 decision in Solid

Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States

Army Corps of Engineers, 531 US. 159 (2001)

(“SWANCC”), might be termed years of “passive

resistance”—both to SWANCC’s holding itself and to any

serious attempt to reconcile state with federal authority as

regards wetlands protection and water-quality preservation.

The Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps” or “Corps”)

initially considered making a good-faith attempt to reconcile

its wetlands regulations with SWANCC’s statutory and

constitutional teachings. See Advance Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of

“Waters of the United States,” 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15,

2003). But in the end the Corps retreated from that objective;

hunkered down with a modest redeployment of what was left

of its pre-SWANCC legal position; and failed to make

meaningful changes to its regulatory program. With the

notable exception of the Fifth Circuit, the lower federal

courts have acquiesced, consistently upholding applications

of Army Corps regulations that SWANCC rendered unlawful.

These consolidated cases present a_ tailor-made

opportunity for the Court to vindicate the authoritative status

of SWANCC in particular and the binding nature of this

Court’s decisions more generally. In two separate but

equally misguided rulings below, the Sixth Circuit failed to

acknowledge that the fundamental assumptions underlying

the Corps’ regulations—not merely the regulatory provision

aimed at migratory birds—were undermined by SWANCC.

More specifically, the Sixth Circuit overlooked or ignored

that SWANCC forecloses giving deference to the Corps’

administrative interpretations and that the motive force

3

driving SWANCC’s result was this Court’s constitutionally

essential solicitude for preserving the States’ prerogatives

over land-use decisionmaking.

SWANCC drew a _ landmark jurisprudential line

reconciling federal interests in the navigability and quality of

“waters of the United States” with the States’ concededly

exclusive authority to make land-use decisions for wetlands,

dry land, and other property outside the federal ambit.

Noting the important federalism aspects of such a

reconciliation, SWANCC’s reading of the Clean Water Act,

while not comprehensive, established at a minimum that the

Corps lacked land-use authority over “ponds that are not

adjacent to open water.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168

(emphasis in original). The regrettable “passive resistance”

to SWANCC has undoubtedly been caused in part by

governmental chaffing at the bridle of law. But that

resistance has also been partly caused by genuine confusion

over what suffices to confer Clean Water Act jurisdiction.

This submission, in addition to underscoring the practical

importance of these cases to small businesses, seeks to dispel

this confusion by defining and distinguishing the two types

of constitutional and statutory authority the Army Corps

exercises—a distinction that thus far has largely eluded the

lower courts.

Courts have typically wandered astray by failing to

appreciate that the Clean Water Act provision at issue here,

section 404(a), governs “the discharge of dredged or fill

material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”

33 U.S.C. § 1344(a); (emphasis added). As SWANCC

indicated, “discharges of dredged or fill material” can

logically come in only two relevant varieties—{i) discharges

directly involving highways of water-borne commerce, such

as the Mississippi River System or St. Lawrence Seaway;

and (ii) discharges involving, not great aquatic highways, but

other “waters of the United States” used in interstate

commerce. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). This distinction,

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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