Amicus Curiae Brief — Rapanos v. United States
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7
waters.” This Court has held that the constitutional source
of congressional power over the use of “navigable waters”
comes both from the Commerce Clause, Article 1, Section 8,
Clause 3 (Commerce Clause) and the Admiralty Clause.
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713, 724-725 (1866) (“The
power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that
purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable
waters of the United States .. .”) The federal government has
jurisdiction over the “navigable waters” of the United States
independent of the Commerce Clause through the Admiralty
Clause which implicitly contains three grants of power to the
federal government:
(1) It empowered Congress to confer admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction on the “Tribunals inferior to the
Supreme Court” which were authorized by Art. I, 8, cl.
9. (2) It empowered the federal courts in their exercise
of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction which had
been conferred on them, to draw on the substantive law
“inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,”
and to continue the development of this law within
constitutional limits. 3) It empowered Congress to
revise and supplement the maritime law within the limits
of the Constitution.
Romero v. International Term Co., 358 U.S. 354, 361-2
(1959) citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932).
~ Even if Congress had never enacted a single substantive law
affecting the navigable waters of the United States, the use
of those navigable waters of the United States would still be
governed by federal law through ine Admiralty Clause. If
there were no federal statutes, the Constitution still left power
convenience and general prosperity. Paraphrasing Black's Law Diction-
ary (Eighth Edition, 2004). Inherent in police powers is the right to prior
restraint and the nght to punish for conduct where no harm to a third party
has yet occurred. Police powers are distinct from the right to provide a
remedy to a private party after that private party has been injured.
8
to the federal courts to develop the substantive admiralty/
maritime law.’ Romero, 358 at 361-2.
Once Congress enacts a law governing the use of the
navigable waters of the United States, that law becomes
part of the substantive admiralty/maritime laws of the United
States. This Court has often said: “With admiralty jurisdic-
tion comes the application of substantive admiralty law.”
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, 527 at 545; Yamaha Motor
Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 206 (1996); East
River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858,
864 (1986). The converse must also be true: With the appli-
cation of substantive admiralty law comes admiralty jurisdic-
tion. When the question of law is whether a location is part
of the “navigable waters of the United States” that question is
an admiralty/maritime law question and that question has a
constitutional answer.
A. What is or is not “navigable waters” deter-
mines the boundaries of what falls within the
scope of admiralty/maritime jurisdiction.
The question of what constitutes the “navigable waters of
the United States” has always been intertwined with the scope
of admiralty/maritime jurisdiction. For most of the history of
this nation the jurisdictional test for admiralty/maritime torts
was the simple bright line situs test outlined in The Daniel
Ball.® As this Court often said “The traditional test for admi-
“While not relevant to this case, a significant amount of the federal
- admiralty/maritime law is developed through international treaty. United
States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
° The admiralty/maritime jurisdiction applies to both torts and con-
tructs. The jurisdictional test for contracts has traditionally been a nexus
test. The Jefferson, 61 U.S. 393, 401 (1857) (“The admiralty jurisdiction,
in cases of contract, depends primarily upon the nature of the contract, and
is limited to contracts, claims, and services, purely maritime, and touching
rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation.”)
9
ralty tort jurisdiction asked only whether the tort occurred on
navigable waters. If it did, admiralty jurisdiction followed; if
it did not, admiralty jurisdiction did not exist.” Jerome B.
Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S.
527, 531-2 (1995). See also Executive Jet Aviation v. City of
Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 253 (1972) (“If the wrong occurred
y aan sees waters, the action is within admiralty juris-
diction.” (citing Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (No.
13,902) (CC Me. 1813) (Story, J., on Circuit). See also The
Plymouth, 70 U.S. 20, 36 (1866) (“Every species of tort, how-
ever occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon
the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cogni-
zance”). See generally Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, 513
U.S. 527 (1995) for a discussion of the evolution of admiralty/
maritime tort jurisdiction.
Some members of this Court would return to this bright
line rule for admiralty/maritime jurisdiction. See Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock, 513 U.S. at 549 (Justices Thomas and Scalia
concurring in judgment). What is relevant to this case is that
the starting point for determining federal admiralty/maritime
jurisdiction under any test ever used by the Court is whether
the location is “navigable waters of the United States.”
Therefore, any shift in what constitutes the “navigable waters
of the United States” potentially could shift the admiralty/
maritime jurisdictional of the United States.
B. Federal power over the use of the navigable
waters of the United States is exclusive.
States have extremely limited police powers over the use of
navigable waters. The police powers over the use of the
navigable waters of the United States is vested exclusively in
the federal government through the Admiralty Clause:
By the Constitution, the entire admiralty power of the
country is lodged in the federal judiciary, and Congress
10
intended by the ninth section to invest the District Courts
with this power, as courts of original jurisdiction.
The New Jersey Steam Navigation Company, v. The Mer-
chants’ Bank or Boston, 47 U.S. 344, 390 (1848).
Since the beginning federal courts have recognized and
applied the rules and principles of maritime law as
something distinct from laws of the several states-not
derived from or dependent on their will. The foundation
of the right to do this, the purpose for which it was
granted, and the nature of the system so administered,
were distinctly pointed out long ago: “That we have a
maritime law of our own, operative throughout the
United States, cannot be doubted. . . . One thing, how-
ever, is unquestionable; the Constitution must have
referred to a system of law coextensive with, and oper-
ating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could
not have been the intention to place the rules and limits
of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the
several states, as that would have defeated the uniform-
ity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on
all subjects of a commercial character affecting the
intercourse of the states with each other or with foreign
states.”
Knickerbocker at 160-161, quoting from The Lottawanna, 88
U.S. 558, 574-5 (1874).
The constitutional principle that federal admiralty/maritime
jurisdiction over the use of the navigable water: of the United
States is exclusive is also reflected in statute. One of the first
actions of the first Congress was to create the lower federal
courts in The Judiciary Act of 1789:
And be it further enacted, That the district courts . . .
shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including
all seizures under laws of impost, navigation or trade
of the United States, where the seizures are made, on
waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of
11
ten or more tons burthen, within their respective districts
as well as upon the high seas; saving to suitors, in all
cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the
common law is competent to give it; and shall also have
exclusive original cognizance of all seizures on land, or
other waters than as aforesaid, made, and of all suits for
penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the
United States.
The Judiciary Act of 1789: An Act to establish the Judicial
Courts of the United States, | Stat. 73, Section 9 (September
24, 1789) (The Judiciary Act). The admiralty/maritime com-
ponents of The Judiciary Act are now codified in Title 28 of
the United States Code:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclu-
sive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in
all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise
entitled. (2) Any prize brought into the United States
and all proceedings for the condemnation of property
taken as prize.
Admiralty, maritime and prize cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1333. The
second phrase of clause (1 )—‘saving to suitors in all cases all
other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled”—is
referred to as the “saving to suitors” clause and has lead to
some confusion over what jurisdiction states retain. The
modern view is that states are left with two authorities:
First, states are authorized to have their courts accept juris-
diction over admiralty/maritime cases. See Romero. Concur-
rent federal/state court jurisdiction allows state courts to hear
admiralty/maritime claims just as they hear most other federal
questions. But state court must apply federal admiralty/
maritime law, not state law, when sitting as admiralty courts.
Second, states are authorized to provide remedies to suit-
ors. Originally, this authority was limited to rights that were
available at common law at the time the Constitution was
12
adopted. In more recent years, this right has been amended
by Congress to include remedies that individuals “are other-
wise entitled” where no federal admiralty/maritime remedies
are otherwise available. A state may provide remedies “so
long as it does not attempt to make changes in the ‘sub-
stantive maritime law.”” Madruga v. Superior Court of Cal.,
County of San Diego, 346 U.S. 556, 561 (1954) quoting Red
Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124 (1924).
As a bottom line, once admiralty/maritime jurisdiction at-
taches, the Constitution and laws of the United States se-
verely limit state powers. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89
(2000) (“The authority of Congress to regulate interstate navi-
gation, without embarrassment from intervention of the sepa-
rate States and resulting difficulties with foreign nations, was
cited in the Federalist Papers as one of the reasons for
adopting the Constitution.”) citing The Federalist Nos. 44,
12, 64.
Declaring a location to be part of the navigable waters of
the United States has the corollary effect of removing state
police powers over the use of that location. If the navigable
waters of the United States are expanded in scope, the
admiralty/maritime jurisdiction also expands to the exclusion
of the states.
C. Federal power over the use of the navigable
waters of the United States is nondelegable.
Expanding the definition of what constitutes the “navigable
waters of the United States” has far more implications that
would an expansive reading of other statutory language. Not
only is federal power over the use of the “navigable waters of
the United States” exclusive as outlined above in section B,
once federal admiralty/maritime power attaches, it cannot be
delegated to the states. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253
U.S. 149, 160 (1920) (“Congress cannot transfer its legisla-
13
tive power [over admiralty/maritime matters] to the states-by
nature this [admiralty/maritime power] is non-delegable.”’)
As background to this proposition, when workers’ com-
pensation statutes were first enacted, states attempted to apply
their workers’ compensation laws to work place injuries that
would otherwise have been maritime torts. This Court struck
down this aspect of state workers’ compensation laws in
Southern Pacific Rail Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217
(1917), rejecting an argument that such laws could be applied
under the saving to suitors clause discussed above. After
Jensen, Congress amended the saving to suitors clause to
expressly authorize states to apply their workers’ compensa-
tion laws to maritime workplace torts. In Knickerbocker, this
Court again ruled against applying state workers’ compen-
sation laws in the admiralty/maritime context holding that
power under the Admiralty Clause is “non-delegable.” Knick-
erbocker, 253 at 160. Ultimately, Congress decided to cover
maritime injuries under a federal workers’ compensation
statute. LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. 901 et seg. To this day,
admiralty/maritime injuries are covered by federal law.
While this Court has not since revisited the question of
delegation under the Admiralty Clause, the Court has repeat-
edly supported the principle that was the underpinning of the
holding in Knickerbocker:
The fundamental interest giving rise to maritime juris-
dictions is “the protection of.maritime commerce,” and
we have said that that interest cannot be fully vindicated
unless “all operators of vessels on navigable waters are
subject to uniform rules of conduct.”
Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 367 (1990), quoting Foremost
Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1982).
The holding that Commerce Clause powers are delegable,
while Admiralty Clause powers are non-delegable is consis-
tent with the structure of the Constitution. As a general rule,
14
Congress can delegate powers that the Constitution otherwise
gives to Congress. The power to regulate commerce is found
in Article I of the Constitution and as such, is a power of
Congress. Congress cannot delegate powers that the Consti-
tution assigns to the other two branches of the federal govern-
ment. Since the Admiralty Clause is a federal power given
first and foremost to the federal courts in Article III, Congress
is without authority to place any of admiralty/maritime power
in the states—i.e., it is non-delegable.
Ill. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IS WITHOUT
AUTHORITY TO INTERPRET A TERM THAT
THE COURTS HAVE ALREADY INTER-
PRETED.
Amicus submits that any Executive Branch interpretations
of the term “navigable waters” should be irrelevant to the
Court’s inquiry. Executive branch regulation on this point
should not even be considered by the Court. Amicus ad-
vances two grounds for this position: First, no executive
branch interpretation of the term “navigable waters” is per-
missible because the meaning of the term was clear and well
establishéd at the time of enactment of the CWA. Second,
because the term “navigable waters” and phrase “waters of
the United States” have constitutional importance, it is the
courts and not the executive branch that have the sole author-
ity to establish the appropriate legal test.
A. No alternative executive branch interpretation
of a term is allowed when the interpretation of
the term is clear at the time of enactment.
The question of when executive branch regulations are
relevant to a judicial enquiry is governed by the Administra-
tive Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seg. (APA):
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented,
the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
15
law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an
agency action. The reviewing court shall— .. . (2) hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be—{A) arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privi-
lege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right . . .
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Under the APA, it is the responsibil-
ity of the courts to decide questions of law and interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions. See also Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is.”) The Court addressed this issue in Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-3 (1984):
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the
statute which it administers, it is confronted with two
questions. First, always, is the question whether Con-
gress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress. If, however, the court determines Congress has
not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on the
Statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is
based.on a permissible construction of the statute. (in-
ternal citations omitted).
As has been demonstrated above, the intent of Congress
when it used the term “navigable waters” and the phrase
“waters of the United States” could not have been clearer. It
would be hard to find other words that have been more
16
thoroughly defined over our nation’s history. In the language
of Chevron, once Congress used the term “navigable waters”
and the phrase “waters of the United States,” “that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”
Chevron, 467 at 842.
While the so-called Chevron doctrine encompasses a gen-
eral principle of deference to agency decisions, an agency is
not automatically entitled to deference:
But the principle [of deference] has its limits. Deference
does not mean acquiescence. As in other contexts in
which we defer to an administrative interpretation of a
statute, we do so only if Congress has not expressed its
intent with respect to the question and then only if the
administrative interpretation is reasonable.
Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 508-509
(1992) (emphasis added) citing Chevron, 837 at 842-844. In
the case at hand, Congress has clearly expressed its intent by
using a term that has a long established meaning. Any other
interpretation that is inconsistent with that long established
meaning is simply not reasonable.
B. The Courts are the sole source of interpreting
what is and is not a navigable water.
Furthermore, the Constitution has delegated to the Courts
the authority to define the legal test for what is and is not
“navigable waters” and what are and are not the “waters of
the United States.” Congress is without authority to take that
power away from the courts and delegate that power instead
to the Executive Branch or usurp that power for itself. The
Steamer St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. 522, 527 (1862):
This difficulty was increased by the complex character
of our Government, where separate and distinct specified
powers of sovereignty are exercised by the United States
and a State independently of each other within the same
17
territorial limits. And the reports of the decisions of this
court will show that the subject has often been before it,
and carefully considered, without being able to fix with
precision its definite boundaries; but certainly no State
law can enlarge it, nor can an act of Congress or rule of
court make it broader than the judicial power may
determine to be its true limits. And this boundary is to be
ascertained by a reasonable and just construction of the
words used in the Constitution, taken in connection with
the whole instrument, and the purposes for which admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdiction was granted to the Fed-
eral Government.
(emphasis added.)
In further support of this proposition consider this hypo-
thetical—Congress gives the Executive Branch statutory
authority to conduct “reasonable searches and seizures” along
with authority to issue regulations. Could it seriously be
argued that the Executive Branch would be free to issue
regulations defining what is an unreasonable search and
seizure in a way that violated the meaning given to that term
by the courts? Would such regulation be entitled to defer-
ence? The answer is of course not. Likewise, no Act of
Congress can give a federal agency the right to “overrule”
this Court’s legal test for what constitutes the “waters of the
United States.”
To the extent an administrative agency conducts a fact
based adjudication and determines that certain waters are or
are not navigable, such a determination may be entitled to
deference under the APA. But only the federal courts have to
power to define what legal test will be used to establish what
waters are the “waters of the United States.” The Constitution
delegated that power to the federal courts and Congress is
without constitutional authority to give that power to the
Executive Branch.
Thus, for the reasons outlined above, administrative regula-
tions on what constitutes “navigable waters” and “waters of
the United States” are irrelevant to this inquiry. The Court
should instead look to its own decisions when deciding this
case and the controlling authority is The Daniel Ball and it
progeny.
IV.THE FEDERAL COURTS AND CONGRESS
HAVE CONSISTENTLY USED THE TERM
“NAVIGABLE WATERS” AND PHRASE
“WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” IN
THEIR ADMIRALTY/MARITIME CONTEXT.
For most of the history of this nation, the federal courts and
Congress have used the term “navigable waters” and the
phrase “waters of the United States” to delineate the bound-
ary between federal admiralty/maritime jurisdiction and state
non-admiralty jurisdiction. The question repeatedly con- -
fronted by the Court is whether a given location in our nation
is part of the “navigable waters of the United States.” In the
early case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. | (1824), this Court
discussed what constitutes “waters of the United States: ”
It is not unreasonable to say, that what are called the
waters of New-York, are, to purposes of navigation and
commercial regulation, the waters of the United States.
There is no cession, indeed, of the waters themselves,
but their use, for those purposes, seemed to be entrusted
to the exclusive power of Congress.
Gibbons at 21. The Court went on to conclude what consti-
tutes “waters of the United States” is a function of whether or
not those waters are navigable:
It is a common principle, that arms of the sea, including
navigable rivers, belong to the sovereign, so far as navi-
gation is concerned. Their use is navigation. The
United States possess the general power over navigation,
and, of course, ought to control, in general, the use of
navigable waters.
Gibbons at 22. That principle that “navigable waters” are the
“waters of the United States” has been a bedrock principle of
19
federal law ever since. The Court outlined the test for what
are and are not “navigable waters” of the United States in The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870) and The Montello, 87 U.S.
430 (1874). Of significance to this case is that The Daniel
Ball involved the interpretation of a statute that used the
phrase “navigable waters of the United States:”
The act of July 7th, 1838, provides, in its second section,
that it shall not be lawful for the owner, master, or
captain of any vessel, propelled in whole or in part by
steam, to transport any merchandise or passengers upon
the bays, lakes, rivers, or other navigable waters of the
United States ....
The Daniel Ball at 558. The Court went on to address the
issue of what constitutes “navigable waters of the United
States:”
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers
in law which are navigable in fact. And they are naviga-
ble in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of
being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel
on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the
United States within the meaning of the acts of
Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters
of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition
by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a
continued highway over which commerce is or may be
carried on with other States or foreign countries in the
customary modes in which such commerce is conducted
by water.
The Daniel Ball at 563. A few years later in The Montello, 87
U.S. 430 (1874), this Court went on to further define what is
and is not part of the “navigable waters of the United States:”
It would be a narrow rule to hold that in this country,
unless a river was capable of being navigated by steam
or sail vessels, it could not be treated as a public high-
20
way. The capability of use by the public for purposes of
transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of
the navigability of a river, rather than the extent and
manner of that use. If it be capable in its natural state of
being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what
mode the commerce may be conducted, it is navigable
in fact, and becomes in law a public river or highway.
Vessels of any kind that can float upon the water,
whether propelled by animal power, by the wind, or by
the agency of steam, are, or may become, the mode by
which a vast commerce can be conducted, and it would
be a mischievous rule that would exclude either in deter-
mining the navigability of a river. It is not, however, as
Chief Justice Shaw said, “every small creek in which a
fishing skiff or gunning canoe can be made to float at
high water which is deemed navigable, but, in order to
give it the character of a navigable stream, it must be
generally and commonly useful to some purpose of trade
or agriculture.”
The Montello at 441-2.
Since The Daniel Ball, the same test has been used by the
federal courts to evaluate what constitutes “navigable waters,”
whether evaluating statutes or constitutional questions. In
Economy Light & Power Co. v. U.S., 256 U.S. 113 (1921),
this Court interpreted a statute using the term “navigable
waters” and the phrase “navigable waters of the United
States.” This Court as always looked to The Daniel Ball:
The Circuit Court of Appeals, in passing upon the ques-
tion of navigability, correctly applied the test laid down
by this court in The Daniel Ball and The Montello, that
is, the test whether the river, in its natural state, is used,
or capable of being used as a highway for commerce,
over which trade and travel is or may be conducted in
the customary modes of trade and travel on water.
Navigability, in the sense of the law, is not destroyed
because the water course is interrupted by occasional
natural obstructions or portages; nor need the navigation
21
be open at all seasons of the year, or at all stages of the
water.
Economy Light at 121-2. See also US. v. Appalachian
Electric Power Co., 3\1 U.S. 377 (1940):
It was heiZ early in our history that the power to regulate
commerce necessarily included power over navigation.
To make its control effective the Congress may keep the
navigable waters of the United States open and free and
provide by sanctions against any interference with the
country's water assets. It may legislate to forbid or
license dams in the waters; its power over improvements
for navigation in rivers is “absolute.”
The states possess control of the waters within their
borders, “subject to the acknowledged jurisdiction of the
United States under the constitution in regard to com-
merce and the navigation of the waters of rivers.” It is
this subordinate local control that, even as to navigable
rivers, creates between the respective governments a
contrariety of interests relating to the regulation and
protection of waters through licenses, the operation of
structures and the acquisition of projects at the end of the
license term. But there is no doubt that the United States
possesses the power to control the erection of structures
in navigable waters.
The navigability of the New River is, of course, a factual
question but to call it a fact cannot obscure the diverse
elements that enter into the application of the legal tests
as to navigability. We are dealing here with the sover-
eign powers of the Union, the Nation’s right that its
waterways be utilized for the interests of the commerce
of the whole country. It is obvious that the uses to
which the streams may be put vary from the carriage of
ocean liners to the floating out of logs; that the density
of traffic varies equally widely from the busy harbors
of the seacoast to the sparsely settled regions of the
~
22
Western mountains. The tests as to navigability must
take these variations into consideration.
Appalachian Electric at 404-6.”
At the time Congress used the term “navigable waters” in
the CWA and defined that term to be the “waters of the
United States,” Congress knew what that term meant. Con-
gress has used that term for over 100 years in statute after
statute. This Court has interpreted that term in statute after
statute and in numerous constitutional cases so there was no
question of the meaning.
One definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and
over again and expecting a different result. It would be
insanity for Congress to have used a term that this Court had
interpreted the same way over and over again and expect the
Court to reach a different conclusion. If Congress had in-
tended a different jurisdictional reach for the CWA, Congress
undoubtedly would have used a different term to define that
jurisdictional reach.
A. Congress repeatedly used the term “navigable
waters” and the phrase “navigable waters of
the United States.”
Not only has the term “navigable waters” and the phrase
“waters of the United States” been used for over 100 years in
statutes, the term and phrase are still found in numerous other
federal statutes today. See Title 33 of the United States Code
generally covering Navigation and Navigabie Waters, in-
cluding 33 U.S.C. 1 (“It shall be the duty of the Secretary of
the Army to prescribe such regulations for the use, admini-
stration, and navigation of the navigable waters of the United
States . . .”); 33 U.S.C. 10 (“All the navigable rivers and
waters in the former Territories of Orleans and Louisiana
shall be and forever remain public highways.”); 33 U.S.C.
59b (“Bayou Terrebonne west of Barrow Street and Bayou
LeCarpe west of the Intracoastal Waterway in the city of
23
Houma, State of Louisiana, are declared to be not navigable
waters of the United States within the meaning of the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States.”); 33 U.S.C. 401 (“It
shall not be lawful to construct or commence the construction
of any bridge, causeway, dam, or dike over or in any port,
roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, or other
navigable water of the United States .. .”); 33 U.S.C. 414(a)
(“Whenever the navigation of any river, lake, harbor, sound,
bay, canal, or other navigable waters of the United States
shall be obstructed or-endangered . . .”); 33 U.S.C. 902(4)
(“The term ‘employer’ means an employer any of whose
employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole
or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States
...”); 33 U.S.C. 1222(5) (“ ‘Navigable waters of the United
States’ includes all waters of the territorial sea of the United
States as described in Presidential Proclamation No. 5928 of
December 27, 1988.”’).’
See also Title 46 of the United States Code generally
covering Shipping including 46 U.S.C. 2101(17a) (“ ‘naviga-
ble waters of the United States’ includes all waters of the
territorial sea of the United States as described in Presidential
Proclamation No. 5928 of December 27, 1988.”); 46 U.S.C.
4301(c) (“Until there is a final judicial decision that they are
navigable waters of the United States, the following waters
Tying entirely in New Hampshire are declared not to be waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States within the
’ The conclusion that the term “navigable waters” must be evaluated in
light of traditional admiralty/maritime law principles is also supported by
the CWA’s placement in the United States Code. Many of the other
federal environmental statutes are found in Title 42 of the United States
Code governing The Public Health and Welfare. Sve solid waste statutes
in 42 U.S.C. Chapter 82 and clean air statutes in 42 U.S.C. Chapter 85.
The Clean Water Act on the other hand is found in Title 33 of the United
States Code regulating Navigation and Navigable Waters. Title 33 con-
tains a significant amount of the admiralty/maritime laws of the United
States.
24
meaning of this section . . .””); 46 U.S.C. 4701(3) (“ ‘navigable
waters of the United States’ means waters of the United
States, including the territorial sea.”); 46 U.S.C. 6101(d)(1)
(“This part applies to a foreign vessel when involved in
a marine casualty on the navigable waters of the United
States.”); 46 U.S.C. 8304(g) (“A foreign vessel to which the
convention described in subsection (b) of this section applies,
on the navigable waters of the United States, is subject to
detention under subsection (f) of this section, and to an ex-
amination that may be necessary to decide if there is compli-
ance with the convention.”); 46 U.S.C. 11108(2) (“This
subsection applies to an individual . . . (B) who performs
regularly-assigned duties while engaged as a master, officer,
or crewman on a vessel operating on the navigable waters of
more than one State.”’)
These examples are by no means an exhaustive list of
federal statutes that use the term “navigable waters” and/or
phrase “waters of the United States.” Instead, they simply
represent a sampling.
Over and over again, Congress has used the term “naviga-
ble waters” and/or the phrase “waters of the United States” to
define the jurisdictional scope of federal statutes. Congress
has repeatedly used its constitutional authority to regulation
“navigable waters” to enact such legislation. Congress has
used the term “navigable waters” and the phrase “waters of
the United States” consistently and repeatedly in the tradi-
tional The Daniel Ball sense: Waters must be regarded as
navigable in law which are navigable in fact and they are
navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of
being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for com-
merce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted
in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.
25
Even the Army Corps of Engineers initially used a tradi-
tional definition of “navigable waters” in the early regulations
for the CWA:
Indeed, the Corps’ original interpretation of the CWA,
promulgated two years after its enactment, is incon-
sistent with that which it espouses here. Its 1974
regulations defined §404(a)’s navigable waters to mean
“those waters of the United States which are subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently, or
have been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible
for use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce.”
33 CFR §209.120(d)(1). The Corps emphasized that
“[{i]t is the water body’s capability of use by the public
for purposes of transportation or commerce which is the
determinative factor.” §209.260(e)(1). Respondents put
forward no persuasive evidence that the Corps mistook
Congress’ intent in 1974.
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 168 (2001).
There is simply no evidence that Congress intended “naviga-
ble waters” in the CWA to mean anything other than its
traditional and ordinary meaning. Therefore, the term must
be given its traditional and ordinary meaning.
V. FEDERAL RESPONDENT’S POSITION
It is against this long judicial and statutory history under
the Admiralty Clause that the federal respondent’s position
must be evaluated. The federal respondent asks this Court to
ignore the almost 200 year of this Court’s holdings and
instead create a new category of “navigable waters.” The
federal respondent calls the “navigable waters” that are navi-
gable in fact “traditional navigable waters.” Brief for the
United States in Opposition to Certiorari in Rapanos v.
United States, No. 04-1034, 2-3, footnote |. The government
then asks the Court to recognize a new category of “navigable
waters” under the CWA—navigable waters that are not
26
. navigable in fact. Thus, if the government prevails there will
be two categories of “navigable waters” under federal law:
“navigable navigable waters” and “non-navigahle navigable
waters.” The country will be confronted with “wafer waters
of the United States” and “waterless waters of the United
States.”
In reviewing the federal respondent’s position in this case,
amicus is reminded of something that former Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynahan often said: In a democracy, we each are
free to have our own opinions, but we are not free to make up
our own facts. In this case, the federal respondent wants to
make up its own facts about what is in fact navigable. If the
federal respondent prevails, it will require something like the
Ministry of Truth from George Orwell’s “1984” to explain to
the public how dry land is in fact part of the “navigable
waters of the United States.” Maybe they can paraphrase the
pigs in Orwell’s “Animal Farm” and explain that: All land in
the United States is navigable by maritime vessels, but some
land is more navigable than other.*
The federal respondent’s position in this case begs the
question of whether the term “navigable waters” either
(1) should be redefined under federal admiralty/maritime
laws to include “non-navigable navigable waters;” or in the
alternative (2) could be redefined under other federal admi-
ralty/maritime laws to include “non-navigable navigable
waters.” Could a worker who got injured filling in the “non-
navigable navigable waters” on Mr. Rapanos’ land seek
compensation under the federal LHWCA because the worker
was “employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part,
upon the navigable waters of the United States?” 33 U.S.C.
902(4). Or maybe Mr. Rapanos could seek federal harbor
maintenance funds to maintain his land since his land would
* The actual quote is “All animals are equal but some animals are more
equal than others.”
27
be part of the “navigable waters of the United States.” When
the state wants to exercise its police powers over Mr. Rapanos’
land, can he raise the affirmative defense that the state no
longer has jurisdiction over his land use because his land is
part of the “navigable waters of the United States.” The pos-
sibilities of new applications of old federal laws are endless if
the Court recognizes the existence of “non-navigable naviga-
ble waters.”
_ There is absolutely no evidence that Congress intended
such an absurd result under any federal statute including the
CWA. Absent some clean, unequivocal expression by Con-
gress to the contrary, the Court should conclude that Congress
intended “navigable waters” to mean the same thing the term
has meant in every otiver context it has been uses since the
adoption of the Constitution. What is navigable in law is
what is navigable in fact.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, amicus urges the Court to
declare that what constitutes the “navigable waters of the
United States” is a question of fact, defined by the Constitu-
tion under the Admiralty Clause. The test outlined in The
Daniel Ball is the test that should be used whenever Congress
defined the jurisdiction scope of a statute to be “navigable
waters” and/or “ vaters of the United States.”
Respectfully submitted,
FRANCIS EDWIN FROELICH *
CHARLES T. CARROLL, JR.
CARROLL & FROELICH, PLLC
919 18th Street, NW
Suite 901
Washington, DC 20006
* Counsel of Record (202) 587-4850
ou . - ;
FIL J |
\2 t Cae 2. uD
Nos. 04-1034, 04-1 |
3u the
Supreme Court of the Anited States
JOHN A. RAPANOS et ex, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
JUNE CARABELL, ef al.,
Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of
for the Sixth
BRIEF FOR THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
INDEPENDENT BUSINESS LEGAL FOUNDATION
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
KAREN R. HARNED ROBERT R. GASAWAY
ELIZABETH GAUDIO Counsel of Record
NFIB LEGAL FOUNDATION ASHLEY C. PARRISH
1201 F Street, NW ERIN E. MORROW
Washi DC 20004 KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
(202) 554-9000 655 Fifteenth Street, NW
Washi DC 20005
(202) 879-5000
Attorneys for the Amicus Curiae
December 2, 2005
WILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 788-0086 — WasHmGTON, D.C. 20001
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the United States Army Corps of Engineers’
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Clean Water Act
lawfully and constitutionally vest the Army Corps with
broad, land-use decisionmaking authority over essentially
any and every wetland in the United States.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED ...0.....s-csessssesssseesssessssesseneecessereneee
I A iii
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE c.cccccoccescccesessesessescsecessesee. !
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
NS | EEE CBG LEE ES POOLE 2
EAE EEL ALRE AER Se PRAM OMA E SRA 4
I. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S EXPANSIVE READING
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT RENDERS THE
ETE Ce rg cretisetetccntsntcescttnrsinipiavrnicens 4
A. The Corps’ Regulations Seek To Impose
Nationwide Land-Use Requirements On A Vast
Array Of Privately Owned Wetlands. ........................ 5
B. Under Our System Of Government, Land-Use
Planning Is The “Quintessential” Function Of
RO IE cencetienarecintiorienaeatennlnorenctajenpeonindsviniiian 6
C. The Corps’ Regulations Violate Constitutional
Federalism Princigles.. ...........ccscecssecsessesesssesecassvosees 10
ll. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S EXPANSIVE READING
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT CANNOT BE
SQUARED WITH SWANCC. ........cccc0sesssssesscsrsnssneeeeess 14
A. The Clean Water Act Does Not Prohibit The
Employment Of Fill Materials For Purposes Of
Improving Privately Owned Parcels Of Land. ......... 14
B. Riverside Bayview Cannot Be Read To Give The
Federal Government Authority To Make Land-
Use Determinations For Wetlands Not “Actually
Abutting” Navigable Waters. ..................2....cc0eee00 20
Ill. THE CORPS EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN
ASSERTING LAND-USE JURISDICTION OVER
THE CARABELL AND RAPANOS WETLANDG......... 23
IP en IT sca nrsecenivticotisbeenmnbstcanitiddeiseninnipptiiitnndnnibmnnite 27
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Agostini v. Felton,
ee I i TD alain tcinintiassececinccctntinscidvs 21
Arkansas v. Oklahoma Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Rf Eke Se aa re 19
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
Fs A Ai irecsnssntnesesicctscncenccctiogneses 14
Brown v. Board of Education,
ee Oe ee sdiiteiccepnsctinsstncstnececencnihinnabdiinn 2
Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Engr’s,
391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004) 00... cccseseeeeeeee 23
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.,
Ie ey PF Ce eh ccccscttsnsncctsscccesnntissens 15
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan,
Pe Sa PE OE lial cciphnsstetinincdpecatntecbineiiin 19
Coleman v. Thompson,
re BP OD cekticrnpenscnnsinecenccasccrcotiantoianes 26
Dolan v. City of Tigard,
ee en 7,15
Duncan v. Walker,
ls Wee iii acicnriitstrtnnsccntccadeseniisannees 25
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
a I tidirccinensnteetibicniccccneiupschotnne 15
FERC v. Mississippi,
gt Ls . eee oe 7, 15
iv
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
SGD U5 Bc FEB CESS) secicictortesticconesesvscscamntanaiiias 21
Gonzales v. Raich,
yk Ro | Te nena ere oe 11, 13
Gregory v. Ashcroft,
RS ee, | SAREE 10, 14
Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,
FED eres COD cedictdithitaanncsicemcannesestnniense 7a 88
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,
SORE Teale Se EE FD iatirlasctctnccecnnictonapataiiiantieanite 18
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois,
PE ET CPD sdiinntiinedenorsesitotagungiitiipediat 18
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
EE EEE edeiniclsiieninatochauneuiendn 19, 20
Jones v. United States,
Fe AE IED eicrcirectncentianvinvapnindaunasnie 13
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’]
Planning Agency,
CF ae Fee Cr OTE ntticctiscsdttactaninnsiitantiel 6, 15
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
FED SEs ED OPN hcinndothevrcicscernetctienniiainibii 16
Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) 0.0.0... cccceeeeeeeee ll
National Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998) oo... cece eeeeeees 16
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
Po 8. NE ee ae en 8 8
NRDC, Inc. v. Callaway,
392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975) ..........cccccccceeees 8
Vv
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers,
531 U.S. 159 (2001)
epaloushbainabiin 2, 3, 12, 15, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
a, Satan nennseresnansidnensititin 26
United States v. Lopez,
en 11, 12, 13
United States v. Morrison,
en 11,12
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
494 US. 121 CIDGS) ...n...2000010.02<0000000002 20, 22, 23
Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States,
a 18
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
Ges: 7,15
Warth v. Seldin,
2 | 8 aaa 7, 15
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
eR 17
Younger v. Harris,
ER eee il
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
LT 7
Statutes and Regulations
A YRS: 2 ee 19
ED a ee ee 19
ly i ceitcincinancutiahadittigtprenanmntmnipiitiueiniens 19
a 19
BD is. Be crtctetettnconenstrnsenteenmanceninitiioen 19
a a OP SE leteininistrthiteneereintinccnenplilatdpnani 5
ee 5
FP Ce be rcstrctiindeningetarntbincemiitinienmneeia 5
i Sb 8 SRE ee 5
a eis Ob i rndiecinceretanictapuinniiagiipenettiitintiens 19, 25
ere 3,15
BP ieee © Fe certirncsesttnetgesenenctitttinene 16
ES SS 3
gt P| EY Se 6
En 6
eM 6
RR eS Re rere 6
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of
“Waters of the United States,”
68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15; 2003)...................... 2
Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs,
58 Fed. Reg. 45,008 (Aug. 25, 1993)............... 13
Final Notice of Modification of Nationwide
Permit 29 For Single Family Homes,
64 Fed. Reg. 47 (Aug. 30, 1999)... 12
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 130, § 27A,
1963 Mass. Acts 426, repealed by
1972 Mass. Acts 784, § 2,
superceded by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 131,
ee EE OS ee 8
vii
Other Authorities
Adler, Jonathan H.,
Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal
Environmental Regulation,
90 IOWA L. REV. 377 (2005) .............cccccceeeeeeeees 8
Adler, Jona-han H.,
Letting Fifty Flowers Bloom:
Transforming The States Into
Laboratories Of Environmental Policy
available at http://www. federalism
Adler, Jonathan H.,
Wetlands, Waterfowl and The Menace of
Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and
the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation,
ee 7,8
Albrecht, Virginia S. & Bernard N. Goode,
Wetland Regulation in the Real World (1994). 13
Dawson, Alexandra D.,
Massachusetts’ Experience in Regulating
Wetlands in Wetland Protection:
Strengthening the Role of the States
(Ass'n of State Wetland Managers, 1985) ......... 8
Gerhardt, Michael J.,
The Curious Flight of the Migratory Bird Ruie,
31 ENVTL. L. Rep. 11079 (2001)...................... 10
vill
Jaffe, Caleb A.,
Tragedy of the Wetlands Commons:
What the Virginia Nontidal Wetlands Resources
Act Says About The Future Of
Environmental Regulation,
20 VA. ENVTL L.J. 329 (2001) -..0....22--.eeececeeeee 10
Kusler, Jon A., et al.,
State Wetland Regulation: Status of
Programs and Emerging Trends
(Ass’n of State Wetland Managers, 1994) ......... 9
Regulatory Warning: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Commercial and Administrative Law
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of Robert McMackin) ....................... 4u
Release No. PA-00-05, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Announces Replacement Nationwide Permits,
available at http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/
cepa/releases/nationwidepermits. htm................. ?
Revesz, Richard L.,
Federalism and Environmental Regulation:
A Public Choice Analysis,
115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (20...) .......2.-.cccceeeeceeeees 9
I ST ]
S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1971),
reprinted in 1972, U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668 ............. 17
Stone, Geoffrey R., et ai.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1986) .......ccccccccceeeeees 21
THE COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE'
The National Federation of Independent Business Legal
Foundation (“NFIB Legal Foundation”), a nonprofit, public
interest law firm established to protect the rights of
America’s small-business owners, is the legal arm of the
National Federation of Independent Business (“NFIB”).
NFIB is the nation’s oldest and largest organization dedicated
to representing the interests of small-business owners
throughout all 50 States. The 600,000 NFIB members own a
wide variety of small businesses, including restaurants,
family farms, neighborhood retailers, service companies, and
technology manufacturers. NFIB represents small employers
who make up an important segment of the business
community. Members typically have about five employees
and report gross sales of $350,000; the average member nets
$40,000 to $50,000 annually. These small businesses face
challenges and opportunities that distinguish them from
publicly traded corporations.
NFIB members have an important interest in these cases
because small businesses continue to bear a disproportionate
share of the federal regulatory burden associated with
environmental regulations. A September 2005 study
commissioned by the Small Business Administration reveals
that environmental and tax compliance regulations are the
main cost drivers in determining the severity of the
disproportionate impact on small firms. Compliance with
environmental regulations alone costs small firms 364
percent more than large firms.
' Both petitioners and respondents have consented to the filing of this
brief in letters that are on file in the Clerk's office. Pursuant to S. Ct. R.
37.6, amicus curiae state that no counsel for a party authored any part of
this brief, and no person or entity other than amicus curiae, their
members, or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the
preparation or submission of this brief.
2
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The five years following Brown v. Board of Education,
349 U.S. 294 (1955), are often termed years of “massive
resistance” to that decision’s holding. In similar fashion, the
five years following this Court’s 2001 decision in Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers, 531 US. 159 (2001)
(“SWANCC”), might be termed years of “passive
resistance”—both to SWANCC’s holding itself and to any
serious attempt to reconcile state with federal authority as
regards wetlands protection and water-quality preservation.
The Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps” or “Corps”)
initially considered making a good-faith attempt to reconcile
its wetlands regulations with SWANCC’s statutory and
constitutional teachings. See Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of
“Waters of the United States,” 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15,
2003). But in the end the Corps retreated from that objective;
hunkered down with a modest redeployment of what was left
of its pre-SWANCC legal position; and failed to make
meaningful changes to its regulatory program. With the
notable exception of the Fifth Circuit, the lower federal
courts have acquiesced, consistently upholding applications
of Army Corps regulations that SWANCC rendered unlawful.
These consolidated cases present a_ tailor-made
opportunity for the Court to vindicate the authoritative status
of SWANCC in particular and the binding nature of this
Court’s decisions more generally. In two separate but
equally misguided rulings below, the Sixth Circuit failed to
acknowledge that the fundamental assumptions underlying
the Corps’ regulations—not merely the regulatory provision
aimed at migratory birds—were undermined by SWANCC.
More specifically, the Sixth Circuit overlooked or ignored
that SWANCC forecloses giving deference to the Corps’
administrative interpretations and that the motive force
3
driving SWANCC’s result was this Court’s constitutionally
essential solicitude for preserving the States’ prerogatives
over land-use decisionmaking.
SWANCC drew a _ landmark jurisprudential line
reconciling federal interests in the navigability and quality of
“waters of the United States” with the States’ concededly
exclusive authority to make land-use decisions for wetlands,
dry land, and other property outside the federal ambit.
Noting the important federalism aspects of such a
reconciliation, SWANCC’s reading of the Clean Water Act,
while not comprehensive, established at a minimum that the
Corps lacked land-use authority over “ponds that are not
adjacent to open water.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168
(emphasis in original). The regrettable “passive resistance”
to SWANCC has undoubtedly been caused in part by
governmental chaffing at the bridle of law. But that
resistance has also been partly caused by genuine confusion
over what suffices to confer Clean Water Act jurisdiction.
This submission, in addition to underscoring the practical
importance of these cases to small businesses, seeks to dispel
this confusion by defining and distinguishing the two types
of constitutional and statutory authority the Army Corps
exercises—a distinction that thus far has largely eluded the
lower courts.
Courts have typically wandered astray by failing to
appreciate that the Clean Water Act provision at issue here,
section 404(a), governs “the discharge of dredged or fill
material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a); (emphasis added). As SWANCC
indicated, “discharges of dredged or fill material” can
logically come in only two relevant varieties—{i) discharges
directly involving highways of water-borne commerce, such
as the Mississippi River System or St. Lawrence Seaway;
and (ii) discharges involving, not great aquatic highways, but
other “waters of the United States” used in interstate
commerce. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). This distinction,
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.