Amicus Curiae Brief — San Remo Hotel, LP v. City and County of San Francisco

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— CETICE OF THE Cuca, |

No. «4-340 —

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 2004

SAN REMO HOTEL L.P., THOMAS FIELD,

ROBERT FIELD, AND T&R INVESTMENT CORP.,

Petitioners,

V.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, DEPARTMENT

OF CITY PLANNING, CITY PLANNING COMMISSION,

BOARD OF PERMIT APPEALS, BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

Respondents.

On Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS

IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONERS

MARY V. DiCRESCENZO KENNETH B. BLEY

DUANE J. DESIDERIO (Counsel of Record)

THOMAS J. WARD Cox, CASTLE & NICHOLSON, LLP

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 2049 Century Park East, 28th FI.

Or HOME BUILDERS Los Angeles, CA 90067

1201 15th Street, NW. (310) 284-2231

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 266-8200

Attorneys for The National Association of Home Builders

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page (s)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................... 2

BIE -acesisa tesictilinidalnidintideba initiate he a 3

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL (ISSUE PRECLUSION)

SHOULD NOT BAR FEDERAL COURT

ADJUDICIATION OF A FIFTH AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS

SE acces cnsereienttinciubalonesedapeaicicbainiasindninsinnmsinsaie 3

THE PROCEDURE SET FORTH IN

WILLIAMSON COUNTY, WHICH REQUIRES A

TAKINGS CLAIMANT TO FIRST SEEK JUST

COMPENSATION IN STATE COURT IN

ORDER TO RIPEN A FEDERAL ACTION,

SHOULD BE ELIMINATED...................c0cessseseeseseee 7

A. Landowners Bear a Staggering Burden by

Being Forced to Litigate Their Takings Cases

Fk RES eS See 8

B. Williamson County’s State Court Element has

been Resoundingly Criticized by Congress, the

Courts, Academics, and Even Planners............... 9

C. Nothing in the Constitution Requires that State

Court Litigation Precede Federal Adjudication

on the Merits of a Takings Claim...................... 13

Re Et RN sdiaigobadisasieasidiheds 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page (s)

Armstrong v. United States,

SOS UB. GD CI GG GD. ncccnccscececsesctisciinspnsncnssseianaia 6

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002), aff'd and

remanded by 124 S.Ct. 2783 (2004) .0.0....cccccceeeeeeeeees 16

Balbirer v. Austin, 790 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1986)......... 6

Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.,

BTS U.S. FIR CIGD) .nnncecsscsssoisassicebssiseslesieaiaanieaniaae 3

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,

DEO UB. GET (EDGR vascccccncrcivnsonisnisisstosunniieceaen nanan 4

City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons,

Dade Uh BIO (BOW T Pacctnsnyastesiniveinvedsuatianeeaaen 12,15

Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Town of Groton,

Fw Fl ge) ms ee eS 5

DLX, Inc. v Commonwealth of Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511

Le | NEN a +

England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs,

BID UB. 409 (IDB) ..cs<.-inesccotsasccessssatpinheneuniioniea

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of

Ag TERE ie Fe COMB ccticosscinscipsoriedercuaianniaan 11-12

Hensler v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043

(Cal. 1994), cert. denied, $13 U.S. 1184 (1995).......... 4

ws

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.

Cases Page (s)

Kenmen Eng'g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468

CRS Bee ecosctcincnsinneenetvcticiitibideassiasatenRedceainandaad 6

Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038 (8" Cir.),

cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 178 (2003) ..........cccccccccceeeeeeeee 13

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,

GED ULE. SIC iictaicinsceaesecbiciciicnsepisuttindactainnbiiasiatins 15

Lucas v. §.C. Coastal Council,

SOB UG. OGGD CGP cciessenisicdctecsdiesssictasntnnttdentininintasaal 8

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) ....cccccccccccceeees 16

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).....15

Mount San Jacinto Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Superior Court,

11 Cal. Rptr.3d 465 (Cal. App. 2004) ooo... ees 5

Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).....15

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001)............. 3

Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,

43568 UB, 0OB CUB GED ccccinrcsnnactinnttntinicatsinsaaiaadenal 3,14

Rekhi v. Wildwood Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 1313

(7G Car Fe ccncnccacctsinntnndceniahicndhenaidanitiinediaeimiaieniiensd 6

San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco City & County,

366 P.36 BOBS COBB cccccisccncennticvininsentieain passim

Vv

Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv.,

342 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied,

vii leh |. 5-6

Suitum v. Tahoe Reg 'l Planning Agency,

ky. Ue ee rene en eee Rs 8

Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.

Tahoe Reg 'l Planning Agency,

Fe es De I acticstpicniencsnaiccidainitninaliotia 3,6, 15

Towtaaated ¥. Salt, STE U.S. ZFS ..0000.s.sesvsvesesessscosesessessoves 3

Williamson County Reg 'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton

Me Lt he) ee: passim

Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. $19 (1992).............. 15

Statutes and Bills

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)......... vistaesilbiiatie iciansaaneihenpnitiniaaialiteltl 12

Private Property Rights Implementation Act,

I I cdacbeenlieieanioaiel 10

Private Property Rights Implementation Act,

H.R. 2372, §2(e 4) (2000)... ek ane Dee are 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.)

Page (s)

Other

13A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and

Procedure, § 3532.1, Ripeness, Sources of Doctrine, 123

GE Fe cenercuicisaincncistiguiiniinntndpiieibaaittinicenadtatiensiaciaas 5

American Planning Ass’n, Brief Amicus Curiae,

Suitum v. Tahoe Reg 'l Planning Agency,

Seas SEs IED sscccsstnctbhnteninssierigplsnibcadhibicadadiaiamtiats 11-12

American Planning Ass’n,.Brief Amicus Curiae,

Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning

PS 8 eee aman 10-11

Michael M. Berger and Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You

Can't Get There from Here: Supreme Court Ripeness

Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches

the Self-parody Stage,

Gf a eA 12, 15

Peter A. Buchsbaum, Should Land Use be Different?

Reflections on Williamson County, in Taking Sides on

Takings Issues: Public and Private Perspectives,

(A.B.A. 2002; Thomas E. Roberts, ed.) .............000006: 9

John J. Delaney and Duane J. Desiderio, Who Will Clean

Up the “Ripeness Mess"? A Call for Reform So Takings

Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal Courthouse,

og GR en 9

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.)

Page (s)

Robert H. Freilich, The Public Interest is Vindicated:

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes,

CR OR Re eee ee 9

Timothy J. Kassoum, The Ripeness Doctrine and the

Judicial Relegation of Constitutionally Protected

Property Rights, 29 Cal. West. L. Rev. 1 (1992).... 9-10

Prof. Daniel R. Mandelker, Testimony before the

U.S. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee,

reprinted in 3\ Urb. Law. 234 (1999).000000 ee. 9

Gregory Overstreet, Update on the Continuing and

Dramatic Effect of the Ripeness Doctrine on Federal

Land Use Litigation, 20 Zoning & Plan. L. Rep. 17

CUTIRIEFE scucannscscinepndannin tasentesestieissbaniinnns iikdildadadilietiic i tala 9

Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in

Fifth Amendment Takings Litigation, || J. Land Use

9 GR RE ee CE 9-10

Glenn P. Sugamelh, “7akings” Bills Threaten People,

Property, Zoning and the Environment,

Fe Ce. CR. CIF Ce ctsicsiitistbiniediniatiie ides 15

Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American

Revolution 324 (First Vintage Books ed. 1993).... 16-17

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS IN SUPPORT

OF THE PETITIONERS

The National Association of Home Builders

(“NAHB”) has received the parties’ written consent to file

this brief as amicus curiae in s of the petitioners, and

letters of consent are filed with the Clerk of the Court.!

THE NAHB’S INTEREST ARISES FROM ITS

MEMBERS’ CONCERNS AS TO THEIR ABILITY

TO BRING AN ACTION IN FEDERAL COURT

CLAIMING A TAKING UNDER THE FIFTH AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

The NAHB represents over 220,000 builder and

associate members throughout the United States. Its

members include people and firms that construct and

supply single family homes as well as apartment,

condominium, commercial and industrial builders, land

developers and remodelers. It is the voice of the American

shelter a It is, therefore, concerned with a

procedure which effectively strips the federal courts of any

role in the judicial review process when a takings claim is

asserted.

The NAHB has appeared before the Court as an

amicus curiae or as “of counsel” in a number of cases

involving the rights and remedies of landowners who have

been adversely affected by governmental actions. These

include: Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); San

Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621

( 198 1); Williamson C. a Reg 1 Planning Comm'n vy.

Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); MacDonald, Sommer

& Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); First

1 No counsel for any of the parties authored rT | ~ of this

bref. No person or entity other than the NAHB has made

me Am ree he contribution to the preparation or submission

of this brief.

tw

English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale vy.

County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (1987), Nollan v. Cal. Coastal

Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)2; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal

Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), Dolan v. City of Tigard,

512 U.S. 374 (1994); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of

Commun. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 697 (1995); Suitum v.

Tahoe Reg 'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997), City of

Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S.

687 (1999), Palazzolo-¥=Rhedelsland, 533 U.S. 606

(2001); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United

States Army Corps of Eng 'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Tahoe-

Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,

§35 U.S. 302 (2002), Borden Ranch P'Ship v. United States

Army Corps of Eng’rs, 537 U.S. 99 (2002), City of

Cuvahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S.

188 (2003); S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe

of Indians, 124 §.Ct. 1537 (2004); Kelo v. City of New

London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), cert. granted, 125

S.Ct.27 (2004); and Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 363

F.3d 846, cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 314 (2004).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) should not

apply when a landowner is required to assert a takings

claim in state court in order to ripen its federal claim

because it effectively denies a federal forum to a plaintiff

asserting a federal claim for relief. It is not mandated by

anything in Williamson County nor does it represent good

policy.

Indeed, good policy calls for eliminating the state

litigation prong of Williamson County all together.

Landowners should be allowed to assert their federal

constitutional claims in federal court in the first instance.

2 The Court’s opimon cited the NAHB’s brief. (483 US. at

840)

ARGUMENT

I.

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL (ISSUE PRECLUSION)

. SHOULD NOT BAR FEDERAL COURT

ADJUDICATION OF A FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT TAKINGS CLAIM

This Court has, with a few exceptions not applicable

to the case at bar, characterized the jurisdiction of

regulatory takings as requiring

“... ‘essentially ad hoc, factual

inquiries,’ Penn Central, 438 U.S., at 124,

designed to allow ‘careful examination and

weighing of all the relevant circumstances.’

Palazzolo, 553 U.S., at 636 (O’CONNOR, J.,

peony» al Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,

Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.

302, 322 (2002).

A takings claim alleges that governmental action

requires the pa t of just compensation under the

mandate of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Those

claims frequently turn on the facts peculiar to the case.

“How the facts are found will often dictate the

decision of the federal claims. ‘It is the

typical, not the rare, case in which

constitutional claims turn upon the resolution

of contested factual issues.’ Townsend v. Sain,

372 U.S. 293, 312.” England v. La. State Bd.

of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 416-417

(1964).

To the same effect, Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.,

475 U.S. 534, 542 n. 5 (1986) (“We have ao

recognized the importance of the facts and the fact finding

process in constitutional adjudication.”’).

If the Ninth Circuit's decision ts allowed to stand, it

will effectively strip the federal courts of any role in the

elaboration of takings jurisprudence because of the overlap

between staie court interpretations of state constitutional

protection: against uncompensated takings on the one hand,

and simiiar federal law on the other. DLX, Inc. v.

Commonwealth of Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 521 (6th Cir.

2004). Indeed, that was the situation in the case at bar. San

Remo Hotel L.P. v. San Francisco City and County, 364

F.3d 1088, 1094 (2004). However, there are significant

differences between the manner in which facts are found in

federal and state courts.

More particularly, an action brought under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 — the mechanism used by the plaintiffs here

(364 F.3d at 1093) — requires that factual issues regarding

the government's /iability for a taking must be determined

by a jury:

“[WJe hold that the issue whether a

landowner has been deprived of all

economically viable use of his property 1s a

predominantly fact question. As our implied

acknowledgement of the procedure’ in

Williamson County, supra, suggests, In actions

at law otherwise within the purview of the

Seventh Amendment, this question is for the

jury.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at

Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 720-721 (1999).

On the other hand, a landowner who brings an

inverse condemnation action in the State of California has a

right to a jury trial “but that right is limited to the question

: damages.” Hensler v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043,

1052 (Cal. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 1184 (1995).

More specifically,

“In both eminent domain and inverse

condemnation proceedings, the issue of just

compensation is to be tried to the jury. All

other questions of fact, or of mixed fact and

law, are to be tried ... without reference to a

jury. Consistent with this rule, the court,

rather than the jury, typically decides

questions concerning the preconditions to

recovery of a particular compensation, even if

the determination turns on contested issues of

fact.” Mount San Jacinto Cmty. Coll. Dist. v.

Superior Court, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 465, 469 (Cal.

App. 2004) [internal quotation marks and

citations omitted; italics in the original].

See also, Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Town of Groton, 808

A.2d 1107, 1123-24 (Conn. 2002) (landowner had no right

to a jury trial on issues of liability in inverse condemnation

case). Thus, while Del Monte Dunes held that takings

claimants have a Seventh Amendment nght to a jury trial in

the federal courts, the states do not extend a similar night.

Moreover, the resemblance between the state

procedure element mandated by Williamson County, and

abstention, is obvious. Both would defer (or even outright

relinquish) federal court jurisdiction in favor of state court

adjudication:

“Ripeness becomes closely mingled

with abstention doctrines when deference rests

on the prospect of some future state court

proceeding rather than an ongoing eo

13A Wright, Miller & Co ederal

Practice and Procedure, § 3532.1, Ripeness,

Sources of Doctrine, 123 (2d ed. 1984).

The Second Circuit relied on the resemblance

between ripeness and abstention in Santini v. Conn.

Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 128-129 (2d

Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct.104 (2004). Santini held

that a landowner who was, after all, involuntarily in state

court litigating a takings claim, could preserve his right to

have a federal court adjudicate his federal takings hen b A

filing a reservation — similar to that called for in in Engla

Santini was based on the evident unfairness of first forcing

a landowner into state court in order to ripen his federal

claim, and then holding that the act of ripening the federal

claim also barred it. (342 F.3d at 130.)

The plaintiffs in the case at bar made use of a

Santini reservation because they “specifically reserved

their federal claims for adjudication in federal court,

pursuant to England ...” (San Remo, 364 F.3d at 1093.)

However, the Ninth Circuit just as specifically reyected the

use of that procedure. (id. at 1095.)

In light of the procedure set forth by this Court in

Williamson County, the position taken by the Second

Circuit states the better policy. Santini requires the takings

claimant to first seek compensation in state court but,

having done so, then allows a full and free adjudication of

that claim —-including factual determinations — under

federal law im a federal court.

Finally, there is simply no jurisdictional bar to the

reservation procedure used by the plaintiffs here and

endorsed by the Second Circuit. Neither res judicata (claim

preclusion) nor collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) 1s

jurisdictional, each of them is an affirmative defense which

may be waived. Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d

468, 479 (10th Cir. 2002) (res judicata); and Rekhi v.

Wildwood Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 1313, 1317 (7th Cir 1995)

(collateral estoppel). | Moreover, whether or not the

preclusion doctrines may be triggered im any case 1s a

matter of judicial discretion? In fact, all of the Circuits

which have considered the question, including the Ninth

Circuit in the case at bar (364 F.3d at 1094), have held that

an appropriate reservation “will suffice to defeat claim

preclusion in a subsequent federal action.” DLX, Inc.,

supra, 381 F.3d at 523 n. 9.

3 See, e.g., Balbirer v. Austin, 790 F.2d 1524, 1526 (11th Cir.

1986) (“We note at the outset that application of collateral

estoppel in a particular case is a matter of tnal court

discretion ... but that this court [on appeal] exercises plenary

review over the rules governing collateral estoppel’).

“[CJonsiderations of fairness and justice” must

support any takings analysis. Twhoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at

333. See also, Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49

(1960)(the Fifth Amendment bars “forcing some people

alone to bear the public burden which, in all fairness,

should be borne by the public as a whole.”) It is neither fair

nor just to tell a property owner, “Go to state court before

you come to federal court,” and then after she pursues that

rocedure, say “Sorry. You can’t get into federal court

cause the state court already decided your case.” The

Ninth Circuit’s decision should be reversed.

THE PROCEDURE SET FORTH IN WILLIAMSON

COUNTY, WHICH REQUIRES A TAKINGS

CLAIMANT TO FIRST SEEK JUST

COMPENSATION IN STATE COURT IN ORDER TO

RIPEN A FEDERAL ACTION, SHOULD BE

ELIMINATED

The requirement that a landowner first assert a

takings claim in state court rests on prudential ripeness

principles. Thus, Williamson County does not present a

jurisdictional bar to a federal court determination of

whether a taking has occurred and, if so, what just

compensation should be awarded. In Suitum, this Court

stated:

“The only issue presented is whether

Suitum’s claim of regulatory taking of her land

in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments is ready for judicial review under

prudential ripeness principles. There are two

independent prudential hurdles to a regulatory

takings claim brought against a state entity in

federal court. Williamson County ...

explained that a plaintiff must demonstrate that

she has both received a ‘final decision

regarding the application of the [challenged]

regulations to the pr at issue’ from ‘the

government entity charged with implementing

8

the regulations,’ id. at 186, and sought

‘compensation through the procedures the

State has provided for doing so,’ id., at 194.”

Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520

U.S. 725, 733-734 (1997) emphasis supplied;

[footnote omitted].

Similarly, in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505

U.S. 1003, 1012-1013 (1992), this Court held that the

landowner had “properly alleged Article III] injury in fact”

and proceeded to a determination on the merits. It did so

even though a permit procedure had been implemented

while state court litigation was ongoing, because this Court

did not think it fair to apply the prudential requirement of

finality set forth in Williamson County.

A. Landowners Bear a Staggering Burden by Being

Forced to Litigate Their Takings Cases in State

Court First.

The cost to the landowner of having to detour

through state court litigation should give this Court pause.

The plaintiffs in the case at bar initially filed their § 1983

action in federal court in May 1993. (San Remo, 364 F.3d

at 1093.) They will have a decision on jurisdiction by

mid-2005. Twelve years, and still counting, with no

decision by a federal court on the merits in sight.

Unfortunately, the resemblance to abstention is also

apparent in terms of the time necessary to obtain federal

resolution. Forty years ago, Justice Douglas voiced his

unhappiness with the delay resulting from abstention,

noting that eight and ten year periods between initiation and

resolution of a lawsuit were not unheard of. England,

supra, 375 U.S. at 425-429 (Douglas, J., concurring). As a

result, although not raised by the parties, he argued that it

was time for this Court, sua sponte, to reevaluate the

abstention doctrine. (id. at 423.)

Professor Daniel R. Mandelker, one of the leading

academics of the land use bar and typically an advocate on

dehalf of local government on land use issues, in his

testimony to Congress, referred to a survey of federal

district court cases involving takings claims between 1990

and 1997 and found that 81% of them were decided on

procedural grounds and never reached the merits.

Testimony of Dantel R. Mandelker Before the Judiciary

Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, reproduced at

31 Urb. Law. 234, 236-237 (1999) (“Mandelker

Testimony”).

__ That same survey also determined that litigation

which did result in an opinion on the merits by a Court of

Appeals took, on the average, 9.6 years. John J. Delaney &

Duane J. Desiderio, Who Will Clean Up the “Ripeness

Mess”? A Call for Reform So Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter

the Federal Courthouse, 31 Urb. Law. 195, 205 (1999).

B. Williamson County’s State Court Element has

been Resoundingly Criticized by Congress, the

Courts, Academics, and Even Planners.

Put simply, Williamson County’s state court

procedure is a disaster. Commentators have derided the

problems spawned by Williamson County as “worse than

mere chaos,”* “absurd,”5 “nonsense,” “riddled with

4 Robert H. Freilich, The Public Interest is Vindicated: City of

Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 31 Urb. Law 371, 387 (1999).

5 Gregory Overstreet, Update on the Continuing and Dramatic

Effect of the Ripeness Doctrine on Federal Land Use

Litigation, 20 Zoning & Flan. L. Rep. 17, 27 (1997).

© Peter A. Buchsbaum, Should Land Use be Different?

Reflections on Williamson County, in Taking Sides on

Takings Issues: Public and Private Perspectives 480

(A.B.A. 2002; Thomas E. Roberts, ed.).

10

obfuscation and inconsistency,”’ a “Kafkaesque maze,”®

and “a fraud or hoax on landowners,” just to name a few.

On two occasions, the House of Representatives

passed bills (by substantial margins) that would have

dispensed with Williamson County's state court procedure

element.'” In reaching that conclusion, the House Judiciary

Committee received testimony from Professor Mandelker

who declared that his review of lower federal court

decisions showed a “wholesale abdication of federal

jurisdiction in law suits where issues are raised concerning

the constitutional validity of land use regulation,” because

“federal judges have distorted the Supreme Court's ripeness

precedents to achieve [the] undeserved and unwarranted

result [of] avoiding the vast majority of takings claims on

their merits.” Mandelker Testimony, 31 Urb. Law. at 236-

237. His conclusion, and testimony, was that the “state

court first” requirement should be eliminated.

7 Mandelker Testimony, 31 Urb. Law. at 236.

8 Timothy J. Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the

Judicial Relegation of Constitutionally Protected Property

Rights, 29 Cal. West. L. Rev. 1, 51 (1992).

9 Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in Fifth

Amendment Takings Litigation, 11 J. Land Use & Envtl. L.

37, 71 (1995).

10 See H.R. 1534, 105" Cong. Private Property Rights

Implementation Act of 1997 (passed House on Oct. 22, 1997,

by vote of 248-178) (§2(e)(3): “[A] final decision shall not

require the party seeking redress to exhaust judicial remedies

provided by any State ....”); H.R. 2372, 106" Cong., Private

Property Rights Implementation Act of 2000 (passed House

on Mar. 16, 2000, by vote of 226-182) (§2(e)(4): “[A] case is

ripe for adjudication even if the party seeking redress does

not exhaust judicial remedies provided by any State ....”).

Both bills are available at the Library of Congress's

“Thomas” website, http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last visited Jan.

20, 2005).

Even the American Planning Association

(“APA”),'' which submitted an amicus curiae brief on

behalf of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in Suitum

(No. 96-243), believed that the ripeness requirement set

forth in Williamson County was wrong; the heading to its

fifth argument in that brief states:

“THE COURT SHOULD ELIMINATE THE

SECOND PRONG OF THE RIPENESS

DOCTRINE REQUIRING THE LAND-

OWNER TO HAVE SOUGHT AND BEEN

DENIED JUST COMPENSATION

THROUGH AVAILABLE STATE PRO-

CEDURES AND ALLOW LANDOWNERS

WITH REGULATORY TAKINGS CLAIMS

TO PURSUE THEIR FEDERAL REMEDY

= eo COURT.” APA Suitum Amicus

r. at 23.

The brief goes on to explain why the APA took the

position it did:

“Amicus curiae submits that the rule the

takings plaintiffs must first sue in state court

for compensation under the federal constitution

is incorrect. When this Court first adopted the

ripeness rules, there was no remedy for

compensation in federal courts. | this

Court adopted mpeness rules to avoid deciding

whether a federal compensation 1s

available. In the absence of a l

compensation remedy, it perhaps made sense

'! The APA has described itself as “the oldest and largest

organization devoted to advancing state

planning,” and its constituents i

Sed ae ne canes Get So Lapa of adverts

land use are minimized.” APA Amicus Br., Tahoe-Sierra

Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, (No.

1?

to require takings plaintiffs to seek a state

compensation remedy first.

“This situation has now changed. In

1987, in First English Evangelical Lutheran

Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S.

302 (1987), this Court held that a remedy for

compensation in takings cases 1s available

under the federal constitution. Federal courts

should not require takings plaintiffs to go to

court to seek compensation before taking

advantage of this federal remedy.” APA

Suitum Amicus Br. at 25-26.

Aside from the serious policy implications that arise

from the state court procedures element, commentators

have noted that Williamson County's second element 1s

difficult, 1f not impossible, to reconcile with the holding in

City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156

(1997).'° The upshot of College of Surgeons is that a

municipal defendant, sued by a landowner for a taking and

other constitutional violations, may remove that case to

federal court. (522 U.S. at 164-66). Yet the pertinent

federal statute allows removal from state court only if the

plaintuff could have filed the case in federal court in the first

instance. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). How can that be? How

can it be that a takings plaintiff must file his case 1m state

court first (as Williamson County purportedly requires), but

then a municipal defendant has the option to game the

system and control jurisdiction by removing to federal court

(under College of Surgeons)? Yet, that plaintiff apparently

could not have filed in federal court initially, so the removal

12 The Williamson County/C. ollege of Surgeons conundrum 1s

fully explained in Michael M. Berger and Gideon Kanner,

Shell Game! You Can't Get There from Here: Supreme

Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last

oe the Self-parody Stage, %6 Urb. Law. 671, 676-682

(2004).

13

statute should presumably not apply (but College of

Surgeons holds removal is appropriate in_ these

circumstances). It hurts just to think through this problem.

Reams of articles will be written on this dilemma,

and everyone involved—municipalities, property owners,

and the federal judiciary—will spend years scratching their

heads on whether, and how, Williamson County and

College of Surgeons can be reconciled. The Eighth Circuit

described the situation as an “anomalous ... in

Supreme Court juri e.” Kottschade v. City of

Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 124

S.Ct. 178 (2003).

In the end, landowners who want to assert a takings

claim deserve to know whether, and under what

circumstances, they can access a federal forum for their

constitutional grievances. Respectfully, the only way to

have those questions completely and fairly answered 1s for

this Court to now re-consider Williamson County's state

court detour procedure and tackle it head-on.!>

C. Nothing in the Constitution Reguires that State

Court tion Precede Federal Adjudication

on the of a Takings Claim.

It must be noted that just compensation can only be

awarded after a taking has been found. That does not

represent a problem when a governmental entity has taken

13 Asa tical matter, the only realistic opportunity the Court

will have to directly address the state court procedures

element from Williamson County is in a case postured such

as the one at bar. In the current jurisprudential climate, it

would border on malpractice for an attorney to direct his

client to file a takings claim in federal court initially. This is

especially so in light of the Kottschade case, where the

property owner filed initially mm federal court but the Eighth

Circuit required him to repair to state court. As the Eighth

Circuit concluded, resolution of the Williamson

County/College of conundrum “is for the Supreme

Court to say, not us.” (319 F.3d at 1038.)

i4

possession of land, whether by a physical invasion or by

formal condemnation proceedings, ause there is no

question that a taking has occurred. The only issue left in

such a situation 1s to decide the amount of just

compensation to which the landowner ts entitled. However,

things are not so simple when a landowner alleges that a

regulatory taking has occurred. In that case, the first issue

is whether a taking has occurred at all. This Court’s

discussion in Williamson County on the state compensation

procedure ripeness issue focused entirely on the recovery of

just compensation; it says not a word about whether a

regulatory taking had actually occurred. (473 U.S. at 194-

196.)

However, the resulting detour through the state

courts means that the issue of whether a regulatory taking

has occurred must be litigated by the landowner in the state

court proceeding.'+ As it now stands, based on this Court's

statement in Williamson County that the Fifth Amendment

proscnbes only taking without sust compensation (473 U.S.

at 194), there 1s no federal jurisdiction to determine whether

14 And yet another puzzle arises. A state inverse condemnation

lawsuit begins by determining whether the government is

liable for a taking in the first place. In that suit, the state tnal

court must review the validity and assess the vag! of the

municipality's underlying conduct. Yet, in Williamson

County, this Court held that “[e})xhaustion of review

procedures 1s not required” of § 1983 takings claimants, they

do not have to exhaust “administrative and judicial

procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an

adverse decision ...” (473 U.S. at 194 n. 13; 193). But thar

is an integral part of a state inverse condemnation action -

the taking claimant seeks review of an adverse land use

decision. Indeed, applying the polestar test from Penn

Central and conducting an “ad hoc” inquiry into the facts

necessanly entails review of the underlying government

action. How could the factors from Penn Central — the

character of the government's action, the economic |! of

the regulation, and the property owner’s investment-backed

expectations (see 438 U.S. at 124) — be considered by a state

court unless wt reviewed the underlying land use decision?

15

a taking has occurred in an as-applied context where facts

are of paramount 1 . At the same time, a facial

attack — which presents only a question of law — claiming a

taking can be brought directly in a federal court. Yee v.

City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 533-534 (1992).'5

Of course, the NAHB recognizes that, for takings

purposes, the Constitution is infringed only when just

compensation is not paid after a taking has occurred. But,

nothing in the Constitution requires that a state court must

issue some kind of certification that one of its

municipalities owes a landowner for a taking. “You can

read the Fifth Amendment forward, backward, upside-down

or sideways, and you will not find that requirement

here.” Berger and Kanner, Shell Game!, supra, 36

Urb. Law. at 696. A federal court is as well-equipped as a

state court to interpret the Fifth Amendment, determine that

a municipality has committed a takin q

pa t of just compensation to avoid a constitutional

infraction. '©

Finally, doomsday cries that federal court review

will unduly interfere with local ee ring hollow.

E.g., Glenn P. Sugameli, “7akings” Bills Threaten People,

Property, Zoning and the Environment, 31 Urb. Law. 177

(1999). Federal courts decide matter of local concern all of

the time in a variety of parochial contexts. Consider, as one

1S The Court has remarked on the “uphill battle” facing a

takings plaintiff who brings a facial challenge. TJahve-

Sierra, 535 U.S. at 321, quoting from Keystone Bituminous

Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987).

16 “{A] case containing claims that local administrative action

violates federal law ... is within the jurisdiction of federal

district courts.” College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 163.

There 1s nothing ing about that point. Section

1983 states that those acting “under color of state law” must

pay when they commit actions that infringe the federal

* constitution — and that includes municipalities. See Owen v.

wy Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 636-637 (1980), Monell

v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

and order the

16

example, the standards for determining whether speech 1s

obscene and therefore loses First Amendment protections.

From the Nixon Administration up through the current

Bush Administration, it has been well-established that

whether an artistic or literary work is obscene is determined

by “contemporary community standards” and definitions

under the “applicable state law.” Miller v. California, 413

U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 US.

564 (2002), aff'd and remanded by 124 S.Ct. 2783 (2004) -

(whether on-line materials are harmful to minors will

depend in part on “local community standards”). There has

never been a requirement that a state court must first

determine what those “local community standards” are, as a

ripening prerequisite to federal court adjudication of a First

Amendment claim.

This would be a much simpler judicial world if this

Court were to review its holding in Williamson County and

make clear that a landowner could, if it wished, go directly

to federal court to have a determination made whether, first,

a taking had occurred and then, second, what just

compensation should be awarded.

| |

CONCLUSION

According to the dean of historians of the American

Revolution, an independent judiciary is embedded as an

essential part of the constitutional scheme to preserve

property rights:

“Placing legal boundaries around issues such

as property rights ... had the effect of

isolating these issdes from popular tampering,

partisan debate, and the clashes of interest-

group politics. Some things, including the

power to define property and _ interpret

constitutions, became matters not of political

interest to be determined by legislatures but of

the ‘fixed principles’ of law to be determined

by judges.” Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism

17

of the American Revolution 324-25 (First

Vintage Books ed. 1993).

Slamming the doors of the federal courthouse shut

on land owners — to the extent that virtually none of the

lower federal courts interpret the Just Compensation Clause

or adjudicate the merits of takings claim — cannot be

countenanced under the Founders’ vision.

| per pry the NAHB contends that both good

policy and this Court’s prior opinions require that neither

res judicata nor collateral estoppel apply when a landowner

is forced to begin litigation in state court in order to ripen a

federal takings claim. The Santini reservation used by the

Second Circuit would at least allow a federal court to

adjudicate the federal takings claim.

The NAHB further contends that it is time for this

Court to reconsider — and to abandon — the requirement that

a landowner first seek co sation through state litigation

procedures before its federal takings claim is ripe for

adjudication in federal court.

In short, the requirement of initial state court

litigation should have no preclusive effect whatsoever on

subsequent takings litigation in federal court or, better yet,

the requirement should be entirely eliminated.

Dated: January 24, 2005

Respectfully submitted,

Mary V. DiCRESCENZO

DUANE J. DESIDERIO

THOMAS J. WARD

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

OF HOME BUILDERS

1201 15th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 266-8200

KENNETH B. BLEY

(Counsel of Record)

Cox, CASTLE & NICHOLSON, LLP

2049 Century Park East, 28th Fl.

Los Angeles, CA 90067

(310) 284-2231

Attorneys for The National Association of Home Builders

AMICUS CURIAE

BRIEF

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(2) JAN 2 4 2005

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No. 04-340 wa «|

In the Supreme Court of the United States

SAN REMO HOTEL, L.P.., ET AL.

Petitioners

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

Respondents

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE FOR ELIZABETH J.

NEUMONT (AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY

SITUATED) IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

ERIC GRANT

ATTORNEY AT LAW

Suite 100

8001 Folsom Boulevard

Sacramento, California 95826

(916) 388-0833

Counsel for Amici Curiae

473 U.S. 172, 194-97 (1985), which mandates that property

owners exhaust state judicial remedies before pursuing fed-

eral claims for just compensation in federal court, should be

es.

“+> ‘

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to - ——

3

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Pi

at

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ee es cco s din dave necsede ecden i

ee EE. dg coc bkcsbeeses betes iv

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ...........0005 ceues 1

I ok eee hd Oe is ues wmeeeed 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............. ee Pee 3

FREE gre SCE gs ge Se 4

I. In Creating the State Procedures Require-

ment, Williamson County Deviated Sharply

from the Established Understanding of the

Just Compensation Clause ..............6...5.5. 4

A. At Issue Here Is the Right to Recover

Just Compensation for Takings of Pri-

vate Property for Public Use ................ 4

B. It Was Always the Law That the Right

to Recover Just Compensation Accrues

at the Time of the Taking .................. 5

Il. In Creating the State Procedures Require-

ment, Williamson County Built a House on

SES cae ecucduceessecmecese 8

A. The Requirement Was Fabricated Without

Benefit of Serious Briefing or Argument ...... 9

B. The Requirement Rests Principally on Tvo

Flawed Analogies to Inapposite Decisions .... 10

1. Ruckelshaus v. MonsantoCo............ 11

DS Mo’ seb eet ¥eseees meee 13

C. The Requirement Finds No Support in the

Principle That the Amendment Proscribe

Only Takings Without Just Compensation .... 14

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Ill. The State Procedures Requirement Has Other

Defects that Show Its Doctrinal Incoherence. ..... 16

A. The Requirement Is Inconsistent with the

No-Exhaustion-of-Remedies Rule Govern-

Page

ing Other Federal Rights .................. 16

B. The Requirement Is in Practice Ignored

by State Courts and by this Court........... 18

C. The Requirement Invites Disrespect for

State Courts by Treating Them as Mere

Stations on the Read to Federal Court ....... 20

iT cpseney dpsceehe 6a De a adg ewe 22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Alliance of Descendants of Texas

Land Grants v. United States,

37 F.3d 1478 (Ped. Cir. 1904) ..........62e-eeee.

Armstrong v. United States,

Be es GD’ vddeocccaneds dedecesbek Koves

City of Chicago v. International College

of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997) ................

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes,

BOG, Ge Was Ge GED 6 cd ctnedceuceentectaces

Commonwealth v. DLX, Inc.,

BG. Ware Ge Gh GE occ ccteccceceetcescece

Creppel v. United States,

41 F.3d 627 (Fed. Cir. 1994) .....6.....ecceeeees

DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky,

381 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2004) ..............0065.

Dolan v. City of Tigard,

Sa DE SPO GED eve vetéenescaseésvuduencese

Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,

SO Wis GG cccccuceccccedddcnctestennl

Eide v. Sarasota County,

908 F.2d 716 (11th Cir. 1990),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120(1991) ...............

First English Evangelical Lutheran

Church v. County of Los Angeles,

482 U.S. 304 (1987) .................7..+. passim

Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,

Ge eas Ge GD vc ccncndccudeuoecs 4c htnkde

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

| Page

Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Macklin,

961 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2004) ..... cece ccc ccndens 7

Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission,

Re PSS Serer Pret. * 21

Hudson v. Palmer,

a eee ee ee ee 13

Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v.

United States, 680 F.2d 122 (Ct. Cl.),

cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982) ...............4.. 7

Jacobs v. United States,

RR RE Reena Se a SE AEE ye 5

Jacobs Wind Electric Co., Inc. v.

Department of Transportation,

G36 Se. 3d 1333 (Pla. 1908) ..... ccc ccc ccc ccees 18

Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control

Board, 941 P.2d 851 (Cal. 1997),

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1077 (1998) ............ 18-19

Lawrence v. Texas,

ot ee ee 2, 22-23

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,

— ft 0 UD ee 19, 21

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,

404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991),

rev'd, 506 U.S. 1008 (1902)... 0c ccc ccc cecccces 20

Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale,

fk s | |, errr 19

” Neumont v. Monroe County, Florida,

242 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (S.D. Fla. 2002),

appeal docketed, No. 04-13610-EE

(11th Cir. July 22,2004) .......... 2. cece ceeeeee 1

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,

RE RS Ree ee ee y 1, 19, 21

Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707 (RI.

2000), affd in part, rev'd in part,

Se ee OED - Kec uctscebucdseauabenes 19-20

Parratt v. Taylor,

' f ! & free 13-14

Patsy v. Board of Regents,

Ge ee ED pctndvdscdcécdusksesaue 16-18

Payne v. Tennessee,

Se Ge, EE 64 ok pan teeneantabeadbaues 2, 22

Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,

Ge es BOE édb ocd oudde Ktveséuuweeue 20-21

Richardson v. City & County

of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150

(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,

§25 U.S. 871, 921, 1018 (1996) ..............6.. 22

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,

ff ) kee 11-12, 14-15

San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City

of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) .............. 7-8

Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United

& §! & |: Berry 6

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,

See a SGD ccuecuaseséseneseeeansesees 2

Soriano v. United States,

ee Cs OED . ov vcccudciurnescone eds 6, 16

Stafford Ordinance Corp. v. United

States, 108 F. Supp. 378 (Ct. Cl. 1952) ............ 7

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Steel Improvement & Forge Co. v.

Unitec' States, 355 F.2d 627

St Ge SD on cc cdiuocudeetoutasWaendeeenanne 7

Steffel v. Thompson,

| 16-17, 21, 23

Tafflin v. Levitt,

Ge ers GOED bus dakddccictewicehetseees’ 21

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v.

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,

SE CED ccocoteusndéiadescuseuneas 14

United States v. Causby,

PUEDE cv cduccccbuasnceeeuceténen 11

United States v. Clarke,

Ge GED n.cenc veces snaseddbveséeden 6,8

United States v. Dickinson,

Sd SPEED ccccccccsdesdinecustésensas 6

United States v. Dow,

Es DEED cuccveek cbecccsenknecucdane 6,8

United States v. Rogers,

SP a 1: WEED. whee curasedcivecesssdénavat 6

Willi County Regional Planni

Commission v. Hamilton Bank,

Gs BED cvaccedhdcnbetsvsnchin passim

Yee v. City of Escondido,

ER OED cdscdcoadccdedtseadtovsenes 10

Younger v. Harris,

Ge Ws BE GUND ccccccccccccesscs Jaap? eee: 20

vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Statutes, Legislative Materials,

and Court Rules

Be ee ED oc cunvbdcbudccenpebsncdsaebeasi 17

DED 6s ubaceck evawaceueeudas Guneeacauesees 11

GU OED 6a ncddkinecduuacneedeenanueieestan 17

Private Property Rights Implementation

Act of 1997, H.R. 1534, 105th Cong. ............. 17

Private Property Rights Implementation

Act of 2000, H.R. 2372, 106th Cong. ............. 17

H.R. Rep. No. 106-518 (2000) ............... 17, 20-21

a Gams TGS ae 6c tccstcccsedecivedsureus 1

SED cc cuccecee’éesuvescsessuakenuseeee 1

Other Authorities

Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner,

Shell Game! You Can't Get There

from Here, 36 URB. LAW. 672 (2004) ............. 16

Brief for Respondent in Williamson

SSG bc cncteiadternnsas Vedakseaul 10

Brief for the United States as Amicus

Curiae Supporting Petitioners in

Williamson County (No. 84-4) .................. 10

Transcript of Argument in Williamson

County (No. 84-4), 1985 U.S. TRANS

Ee CPG GE, ED 0 cna oo bne sedkesdieuahnd ts 10

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Amici curiae are a certified class of property owners in

Monroe County, Florida, who are currently litigating a fed-

eral takings claim in the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit. See Neumont v. State of Florida, No. 04-13610-EE

(appeal docketed July 22, 2004). Like petitioners (and thou-

sands of other property owners across the nation), amici are

facing “ripeness” arguments by a governmental defendant

who seeks to avoid federal adjudication of a federal consti-

tutional claim. In particular, despite class members having

filed at least two actions in state court concerning the reg-

ulatory action for which they now seek just compensation,

amici have been denied their day in federal court because

they have assertedly failed to satisfy the “state procedures”

requirement of Williamson County Regional Planning Com-

mission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194-97 (1985). See

Neumont v. Monroe County, Florida, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1265,

1274 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (dismissing amici's federal claims for

just compensation “because plaintiffs have failed to exhaust

their state remedies”).

Accordingly, for themselves and their fellow property

owners around the country, amici file this brief to explain

that Williamson County’s state procedures requirement was

wrong in its inception and is wrong today. As such, it ought

to be scrapped in its entirety.

Amici’s counsel represented the petitioner in Palazzolo

v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), and he has filed num-

erous briefs in takings cases in this Court and in the lower

courts, both federal and state.’

' Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.2(a), all parties have consented

to the filing of this brief. Letters evidencing such consent have

been filed with the Clerk of the Court.

Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici curiae affirm that no counsel for

any party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no per-

son or entity made a monetary contribution for the preparation or

submission of this brief.

2

+

INTRODUCTION

This Court granted certiorari to consider a particular

matter (issue preclusion) arising from Williamson County’s

mandate that a property owner “ripen [its] federal Takings

claim” in state court before litigating that claim in federal

court. Pet. for Cert. at i. Amici curiae respectfully submit

that consideration of this issue is like rearranging the deck

chairs on a legal Titanic. As explained at length herein, the

“state procedures” requirement of Williamson County “was

not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today”;

therefore, the requirement “ought not to remain as binding

precedent.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2004). In

a word, it should be overruled.

Amici acknowledge that the Court rarely overrules a

prior decision without full briefing of that point by the par-

ties. But as set forth in Part II of the Argument below, the

state procedures requirement was not one of the questions

presented in Williamson County, and so that requirement

was fabricated without any serious briefing or argument.

Accordingly, it is not surprising that the state procedures

requirement deviated sharply from the established under-

standing of the Just Compensation Clause and that it has

generated massive doctrinal incoherence. No subsequent

decision of this Court has defended the state procedures re-

quirement, and virtually no one in the academy will defend

it either as a theoretical matter. And for good reason—the

requirement is indefensible, a jurisprudential embarrass-

ment that ought to be discarded as soon as possible.

As the Court has repeatedly stated, when “governing

decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, this Court

has never felt constrained to follow precedent.” Seminole

Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) (quoting Payne v.

Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)). Therefore, now is the

time to overrule the unworkable and badly reasoned state

procedures requirement of Williamson County.

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. Itis important to comprehend the precise federal

right at issue in cases within the sweep of the state proce-

dures requirement. The property owner in such cases sues

to enforce a right to recover just compensation for a taking.

That right, and the corresponding obligation of the govern-

ment to pay just compensation, was always understood to

accrue or arise at the time of the taking, and not later. In

asserting that the right and the obligation accrued at some

later point after the denial of state-law remedies in a state

court, Williamson County deviated sharply from the estab-

lished understanding of the Just Compensation Clause.

2. The state procedures requirement was not one of

the questions presented in Williamson County, and so it re-

ceived only the most cursory treatment in the briefing and

argument. Not surprisingly, therefore, the requirement is

poorly reasoned. It rests principally on two flawed analo-

gies to inapposite decisions that decree the unavailability

of (1) equitable relief against compensable takings, and of

(2) relief under the Due Process Clause for random and un- -

authorized deprivations of property, neither of which is re-

motely at issue. Nor can the requirement be justified by the

principle that the Fifth Amendment proscribes only takings

without just compensation, which supports a no-equitable-

relief rule but not exhaustion of state judicial remedies.

3. The state procedures requirement has other de-

fects that show its doctrinal incoherence. Among these are

that the requirement is really an exhaustion mandate that

conflicts with the no-exhaustion-of-remedies rule governing

other federal rights, as twice recognized in bills passed by

the House of Representatives. In addition, the requirement

is in practice ignored by state courts (anc by this Court in

cases originating from state courts), even though it logically

should apply in those fora. Finally, though touted as pro-

moting local decisionmaking, the requirement affirmatively

invites disrespect for state courts by treating them as mere

stations on the road to federal court.

4

ARGUMENT

For the following reasons, the Court should overrule

the state procedures requirement fabricated in Williamson

County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,

473 U.S. 172, 194-97 (1985).

I. In Creating the State Procedures Require-

ment, Williamson County Deviated Sharply

from the Established Understanding of the

Just Compensation Clause.

The question presented focuses on the preclusive effect

vel non of the “state court proceeding that was required to

ripen [petitioners’] federal Takings claim.” Pet. for Cert. at

i. That petitioners had to “ripen” that claim by proceeding

in state court is, of course, a consequence of this Court’s

decision in Williamson County. The “state procedures” re-

quirement of that decision—so called to distinguish it from

the “final decision” requirement, which is not at issue here

—decreed that a property owner must “seek compensation

through the [state-law] procedures the State has provided

for doing so” before presenting to a federal court a federal

claim for just compensation. 473 U.S. at 194.

A. At Issue Here Is the Right to Recover

Just Compensation for Takings of Pri-

vate Property for Public Use.

In fabricating the state procedures requirement, the

Williamson County opinion referred to a property owner’s

claiming or suffering “a violation of the Just Compensation

Clause.” 472 U.S. at 194-95; accord id. at 195 n.13 (refer-

ring to a “constitutional violation” stemming from a taking).

While it is not unusual to use the term violation in a loose

sense in connection with a claim for just compensation, this

terminology obscures the true “nature of the constitutional

right” at issue. Jd. Property owners who seek just compen-

sation in court under the Fifth Amendment are not claim-

ing “constitutional violations” in the sense that they sue to

enjoin or remedy state action that violates or transgresses

5

constitutional norms.’ Rather, as the Court articulated in

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los

Angeles, these property owners sue to enforce the govern-

ment’s “constitutional obligation to pay just compensation”

along with their corresponding “right to recover just com-

pensation.” 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (quoting Armstrong v.

United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), and Jacobs v. United

States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933)). Thus, the owners are pur-

suing a monetary remedy that ‘s “grounded in the Consti-

tution itself.” Id. at 315; accord id. at 316 (“the Court has

frequently repeated the view that, in the event of a taking,

the compensation remedy is required by the Constitution”).°

B. It Was Always the Law That the Right

to Recover Just Compensation Accrues

at the Time of the Taking.

When does the government’s constitutional obligation

to pay just compensation arise? Or, to ask the same thing,

when does a property owner’s claim for just compensation

accrue? The answer is that the taking, the obligation of the

taker to pay just compensation, and the owner’s claim for

‘compensation come into being simultaneously, as this Court

and the lower federal courts consistently held for decades

prior to Williamson County. This Court has explained:

? In certain circumstances, of course, one may allege a “violation”

of the Takings Clause and ask a court’s aid in enjoining that vio-

lation. A typical example is the allegation that a statute effects

an uncompensated taking and that just compensation is not even

potentially available. See, e.g., Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524

U.S. 498, 538 (1998) (plurality opinion) (concluding that “the Coal

Act’s allocation of liability to Eastern violates the Takings Clause,

and that [the statute] should be enjoined as applied to Eastern”).

* A three-Justice plurality in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes,

Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 710 (1999), suggested that the property owner

“sought not just compensation per se but rather damages for the

unconstitutional denial of such compensation.” Yet the plurality’s

analysis did not turn on the distinction between that view and a

view of the case “as a simple suit for just compensation.” Id.

6

When a taking occurs by physical invasion, .. .

the usual rule is that the time of the invasion con-

stitutes the act of taking, and “[it] is that event

which gives rise to the claim for compensation

and fixes the date as of which the land is to be

valued... .”

United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 258 (1980) (quoting

United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 22 (1958)).

Numerous decisions of this Court state essentially the

same rule using slightly different phraseology. In United

States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947), the Court rejected

the government’s argument that Dickinson’s reclamation of

a portion of property previously taken by flooding rendered

him ineligible to be paid for the original taking: “[N]o use

to which Dickinson could subsequently put the property by

his reclamation efforts changed the fact that the land was

taken when it was taken and an obligation to pay for it then

arose.” Id. at 751 (emphasis added). In Soriano v. United

States, 352 U.S. 270, 275 (1957), the Court affirmed as time-

barred the dismissal of petitioner’s claim against the gov-

ernment “for just compensation for supplies . . . taken from

him... during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines.”

As it rejected petitioner’s argument that the hostilities tol-

led the applicable statute of limitations, the Court agreed

that petitioner’s compensation claim “accrued at the time of

the taking.” Id.; accord United States v. Rogers, 255 U.S.

163, 169 (1921) (“Having taken the lands of the [claimants],

it was the duty of the government to make just compensa-

tion as of the time when the owners were deprived of their

property.”); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261

U.S. 299, 306 (1923) (same).*

* The law in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the

old Court of Claims is the same. See Alliance of Descendants of

Texas Land Grants v. United States, 37 F.3d 1478, 1481 (Fed. Cir.

1994) (“A claimant under the Fifth Amendment must show that

the United States, by some specific action, took a private property

7

The foregoing cases involved physical takings rather

than regulatory takings, but that distinction makes no dif-

ference in this context. Thus, the Court of Appeals for the

Federal! Circuit applies the above-described rule to regula-

tory takings claims. See Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d

627, 633 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (applying rule to a claim that the

EPA effected a regulatory taking by blocking a reclamation

project). Moreover, nothing in Williamson County’s discus-

sion of state procedures hinges on the physical/regulatory

distinction: the opinion purports to rest on “the nature of

the constitutional right” in general, 473 U.S. at 195 n.13,

not the nature of a specifically regulatory taking. See, e.g.,

Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 958 & n.28

(7th Cir. 2004) (applying the state procedures requirement

to physical takings, in accord with other courts of appeals).

In any event, the limited discussion in this Court re-

garding the accrual of regulatory takings claims confirms

the coincidence of taking and duty to pay compensation. In

San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.

621, 623 (1981), the Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction

to address the question presented—whether “a State must

provide a monetary remedy to a landowner whose property

allegedly has been ‘taken’ by a regulatory ordinance.” But

writing for four Justices—and commanding the substantial

agreement ofa fifth, see id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concur-

interest for a public use without just compensation. Therefore, a

claim under the Fifth Amendment accrues when that taking ac-

tion occurs.”); Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States,

680 F.2d 122, 127 (Ct. Cl.) (holding that because the “alleged act

of taking was the Settlement Act, the takings claims “accrued on

... the date on which the Settlement Act became effective”), cert.

denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982); Steel Improvement & Forge Co. v.

United States, 355 F.2d 627, 631 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (“It is axiomatic

that a cause of action for an unconstitutional taking accrues at

the time the taking occurs.”); Stafford Ordinance Corp. v. United

States, 108 F. Supp. 378, 381 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (holding that a “claim

accrues in requisitioning property at the time of the actual taking

of the property.”).

ring)—Justice Brennan would have reached that question

and answered it in the affirmative, see id. at 653-60 (Eren-

nan, J., dissenting). His analysis was grounded in part on

the recognition that “[a]s soon as private property has seen

taken, ... ‘the self-executing character of the constitutional

provision with respect to just compensation’ is triggeved.” _

Id. at 654 (quoting Clarke, 445 U.S. at 257). When Justice

Brennan’s dissent later became law in First English, and

the Court expressly reaffirmed “the self-executing character

of the constitutional provision with respect to just compen-

sation,” 482 U.S. at 315, the Court necessarily reaffirmed

as well that this constitutional provision is triggered “[a]s

soon as private property has been taken.”

In short, it was the consistent rule of this Court and

the lower federal courts for many decades that the consti-

tutional obligation to pay just compensation arises, and the

claim for just compensation accrues, at the time of the tak-

ing. Whether stated that the event of taking “gives rise to

the claim for compensation,” Dow, 357 U.S. at 22; Clerke,

445 U.S. at 258, or that the obligation to pay just compen-

sation is triggered “[a]s soon as private property has been

taken,” San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 654 (Brennan, J. dis-

senting), the rule was well-established. In asserting that a

property owner’s monetary claim under the Just Compen-

sation Clause does not accrue “until just compensation has

been denied” by the state judicial system, 473 U.S. at 195

n.13, Williamson County deviated sharply from the tradi-

tional understanding of that Clause.

II. In Creating the State Procedures Require-

ment, Williamson County Built a House on

Jurisprudential Sand.

Did such a sharp deviation from decades of consistent

constitutional interpretation come after sustained reflection

in the face of compelling new authority? Was the state pro-

cedures requirement forged in the fires of intensive and ex-

tensive doctrinal reassessment in light of developments in

9

the law of just compensation? In a word, mo. In fact, quite

the opposite: as explained below, the requirement was fab-

ricated without benefit of serious briefing or argument, and

it rests principally on flawed analogies to inapposite cases,

as well as other misreadings of precedent.

A. The Requirement Was Fabricated Without

Benefit of Serious Briefing or Argument.

In the Court’s own words, it granted certiorari in the

Williamson County case to decide “whether Federal, State,

and Local governments must pay money damages to a land-

owner whose property allegedly has been ‘taken’ temporar-

ily by the application of government regulations.” 473 U.S.

at 185. The attorneys general of 19 states and territories,

together with the Solicitor General of the United States, the

National Association of Counties, the City of New York, and

the City of St. Petersburg, Florida, joined the petitioner in

urging the Court to reverse the court of appeals’ judgment

in favor of the property owner on two alternative grounds:

“that a temporary regulatory interference with an investor’s

profit expectation does not constitute a ‘taking,’” and “that

even if such interference does constitute a taking, the Just

Compensation Clause does not require money damages as

recompense.” Jd. at 175 (emphases added). Four profes-

sional and public-interest organizations filed amicus curiae

briefs urging affirmance of the judgment. See id. at 174.

In the end, all of this briefing was for naught, because

the Court did not decide the questions presented. Instead,

Williamson County left the temporary takings issue “for an-

other day,” as it concluded that the property owner’s claim

for just compensation was “premature.” Jd. at 186; cf. First

English, 482 U.S. at 310 (deciding the issue after observing

that Williamson County, among other cases, had left it un-

decided). The conclusion that the just compensation claim

was premature rested primarily on the Court’s applying the

rule that a regulatory takings claim “is not ripe until the

government entity charged with implementing the regula-

tions has reached a final decision regarding the application

10

of the regulations to the property at issue.” Id.; see also id.

at 186-94 (explicating this “final decision” requirement).

Logically, the opinion could have stopped at that point,

but it did not. Instead, the opinion put forth a “second rea-

son [why] the taking(s] claim is not yet ripe,” namely, that

the property owner “did not seek compensation through the

procedures the State has provided for doing so.” Id. at 194.

Of the twelve merits briefs filed in Williamson County, only

the Solicitor General’s amicus brief—and only in a single

paragraph in its Summary of Argument—argued for any-

thing approaching this “second reason.” See Brief for the

United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at

10; see also Brief for Respondent at 39 (responding to point

in two short paragraphs). Furthermore, although the “state

procedures” issue did arise very briefly at oral argument in

Williamson County, the Solicitor General’s representative

refused even to give an unequivocal answer to the question

whether “a property owner would have to follow judicial re-

view remedies as well for [regulatory action] to ripen into a

taking.” 1985 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 76, at *25-26 (Feb. 19,

1985); see also id. at *26 (“I think it tends to blend in with

the question of whether there should be abstention on the

state law question of whether the commission had properly

applied state law.”).

B. The Requirement Rests Principally on Two

Flawed Analogies to Inapposite Decisions.

There are very good reasons why the Court “ordinarily

do[es] not consider questions outside those presented in the

petition for certiorari,” and why the Court disregards that

rule “only in the most exceptional cases.” Yee v. City of Es-

condido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992). The “state procedures”

aspect of Williamson County is a perfect illustration of such

reasons. Given that the questions presented did not even

touch on state judicial remedies and that the matter did not

receive serious briefing or argument, it is no surprise that

the fabrication of the state procedures requirement rested

principally on two flawed analogies to inapposite decisions.

11

1. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.

First, the opinion cited Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,

467 U.S. 986, 1016-20 (1984), for the notion that “takings

claims against the Federal Government are premature until

the property owner has availed itself of the process provided

by the Tucker Act.” 473 U.S. at 195. From this notion, the

opinion purported to draw an analogy: “Similarly, if a State

provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensa-

tion, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just

Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and

been denied just compensation.” Granting that the analogy

is not wholly implausible, the premise is wholly bogus. If

“takings claims” are meant in this passage to refer to mone-

tary claims for just compensation for completed takings of

private property—the very claim that the property owner

asserted in Williamson County—then the cited passage in

Monsanto did not even consider such claims, let alone de-

clare them “premature” until after the property owner had

sued the United States under the Tucker Act.*

In Monsanto, a company sued in federal district court

“seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from the operation

of” various provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, -

and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), alleging that “all of the chal-

lenged provisions effected a ‘taking’ of property without just

compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.” 467

U.S. at 998-99 (emphasis added). Having concluded that

some of the challenged provisions might conceivably operate

to take the company’s property in some circumstances, the

Court proceeded to consider (in the passage later cited by

* The Tucker Act grants subject matter jurisdiction to the Court

of Federal Claims to hear “any claim against the United States

founded upon ... the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(aX1). This

grant authorizes the Court of Federal Claims to adjudicate mone-

tary claims against the United States for just compensation. See,

e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946) (“If there is

a taking, the claim is ‘founded upon the Constitution’ and within

the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to determine.”).

12

Williamson County) whether that conclusion supported the

requested injunctive relief. Monsanto ruled that it did not,

based on the established rule that “le]quitable relief is not

available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for

public use . . . when a suit for compensation can be brought

against the sovereign subsequent to the taking.” Jd. at 1016

(emphasis added); see also id. at 1017-19 (concluding that

such a suit could be brought under the Tucker Act). Thus,

the company’s request for equitable relief under the Fifth

Amendment was not merely premature, it was not avail 1ble

at all. In other words, there was nothing the company could

do to “ripen” its claim for equitable relief; that claim simply

had no merit, period.

What about a Tucker Act suit against the government

in the Court of Federal Claims? Could such a suit be called

a prerequisite to asserting a monetary claim against the gov-

ernment for just compensation for a taking of property? No,

as the Monsanto decision confirms, a Tucker Act suit is the

assertion of a claim for just compensation: “whatever taking

may occur is one for public use, and a Tucker Act remedy is

available to provide Monsanto with just compensation.” Jd.

at 1020; accord supra note 5. So if Williamson County were

correct that a property owner must “availl[) itself of the pro-

cess provided by the Tucker Act” before pursuing its claim

for just compensation, 473 U.S. at 195, then it would be the

rule that a property owner must essentially bring a Tucker

Act suit before bringing a Tucker Act suit. In other words,

an owner’s Tucker Act suit for just compensation would be

“premature” until the property owner had brought a Tucker

Act suit for just compensation. Jd. Obviously, this reductio

ad absurdum deserves no respect, and Monsanto provides

no reasoned basis for the state procedures requirement.®

* Although the no-equitable-relief rule could be applied to claims

against state and local governments, it has no relevance for the

state procedures aspect of Williamson County, which makes prop-

erty owners “seek compensation through the procedures the State

has provided for doing so.” 473 U.S. at 194 (emphasis added).

13

2. Parratt v. Taylor

The fabrication of the state procedures requirement in

Williamson County also rested on the supposed analogy be-

tween takings of private property “without just compensa-

tion” and deprivations of property “without due process of

law.” The Court relied on Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527

(1981), which it described as having “ruled that a person de-

prived of property through a random and unauthorized act

by a state employee does not state a claim under the Due

Process Clause merely by alleging the deprivation of prop-

erty.” 473 U.S. at 195. In such circumstances, “the State’s

action is not ‘complete’ in the sense of causing a constitu-

tional injury ‘unless or until the State fails to provide an ad-

equate postdeprivation remedy for the property loss.’” Id.

(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.12 (1984)).

Then, another purported analogy: “Likewise, because the

Constitution does not require pretaking compensation, and

is instead satisfied by a reasonable and adequate provision

for obtaining compensation after the taking, the State’s ac-

tion here is not ‘complete’ until the State fails to provide ad-

equate compensation for the taking.” Jd.

This analogy has two fatal flaws.’ First, it provides no

support for the go-first-to-state-court requirement actually

imposed by the second prong of Williamson County. When

a state does indeed “provide an adequate postdeprivation

remedy for the property loss” as contemplated by Parratt,

the deprived property owner does not pursue that state-law

remedy before suing in federal court under the Due Process

” One should really say two fatal flaws in addition to the one that

the Court itself acknowledged: “The analogy to Parratt is imper-

fect because Parratt does not extend to situations . . . in which the

deprivation of property is effected pursuant to an established state

policy or procedure.” 473 U.S. at 195.14. By definition, a taking

is always effected pursuant to an established state policy or pro-

cedure, for if the relevant injury to property results from a truly

“random and unauthorized act by a state employee,” the property

owner has suffered a tort, not a taking.

14

Clause: To the contrary, the property owner must pursue

the state-law remedy instead of suing in federal court. As

Williamson County put it, the owner who has such a remedy

categorically “does not state a claim under the Due Process

-Clause.”-473 US. at 195. If the analogy with the Just Com-

pensation Clause were valid, the property owner having a

state-law remedy for just compensation categorically could

not state a claim under the Just Compensation Clause in

any court. Obviously, no one believes that, then or now.

“econd, and more important, the specific notion that

“the State’s action [in respect to a taking] is not ‘complete’

until the State fails to provide adequate compensation for

the taking,” id., is flatly contrary to the Court’s sustained

and reasoned consideration of the matter in First English.

There, the Court held that the government’s taking of prop-

erty, without more, gives rise to an “obligation to pay just

compensation” on the part of the government, and a corres-

ponding “right to recover just compensation” on the part of

the owner. 482 US. at 315. While a postdeprivation rem-

edy might allow the government to escape liability for a de-

nial of procedural due process (as in Parratt), once a taking

has occurred, governmental liability for just compensation

is inescapable: “no subsequent action by the government

can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation.” Id. at

321 (emphasis added). This formulation has continued to

command the Court’s assent. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation

Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,

328 (2002) (quoting passage and opining that “nothing that

we say today qualifies [that] holding” of First English).

C. The Requirement rinds No Support in the

Principle That the Amendment Proscribes

Only Takings Without Just Compensation.

Along with flawed analogies to Monsanto and Parratt,

Williamson County relied on the uncontroversial principle

that the “Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of

property; it proscribes taking without just compensation.”

473 U.S. at 194. Indeed, this principle was so significant

15

that the opinion both reiterated and emphasized the point:

“because the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings without

Just compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until

just compensation has been denied.” Jd. at 195 n.13.

Both of these propositions are quite true; both are also

quite irrelevant to whether property owners must seek just

compensation in state court under state law. As explained

in Part I.A above (pp. 4-5), property owners who seek just

compensation under the Fifth Amendment are neither seek-

ing to “proscribe” (i.e., enjoin) takings nor asserting “consti-

tutional violations.” Instead, they are asserting a federal

“right to recover just compensation,” the monetary remedy

that is “grounded in the Constitution itself.”

To put the point another way, the principle that the

Fifth Amendment proscribes (only) those takings that are

without just compensation leads not to the state procedures

requirement but rather to the rule (reiterated in Monsanto)

that “[e]quitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged

taking of private property for public use . .. when a suit for

compensation can be brought against the sovereign subse-

quent to the taking.” 467 U.S. at 1016, discussed at supra

note 6 and accompanying text. That is, the “proscribes tak-

ings without just compensation” point cited by Williamson

County is a fine basis for rebuffing property owners who ask

federal courts to enjoin state regulatory programs; however,

it is no basis at all for rebuffing property owners who ask

federal courts to award just compensation.

* First English, 482 U.S. at 315. There is no tension between First

English and principle that the Fifth Amendment proscribes tak-

ings without just compensation. To the contrary, in the sentence

immediately preceding the opinion’s reiteration that takings trig-

ger the “constitutional obligation to pay just compensation,” First

English emphasized that the Fifth Amendment “is designed not

to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se,

but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper

interference amounting to a taking.” 482 U.S. at 315.

16

Ill. The State Procedures Requirement Has Other

Defects that Show Its Doctrinal Incoherence.

If Williamson County’s state procedures requirement

was not correct when it was decided, then it is also defective

in additional ways that hev- come to light in the past two

decades. Other amici hav» ce :cribed many of these defects:

the requirement is fundamentally unfair (the present case,

for example, has consumed twelve years without a resolu-

tion on the merits, and amici began their own state-court

actions nearly ten years ago); it is irreconcilable with City of

Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156

(1997); and it spawns litigation about litigation instead of

promoting resolution of federal constitutional claims on the

merits. Two longtime and respected advocates in this Court

have exhaustively catalogued the depths to which William-

son County has brought takings procedure. See Michael M.

Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There

from Here, 36 URB. LAW. 672 (2004). In the following sec-

tions, amici discuss three other defects.

A. The Requirement Is Inconsistent with the

No-Exhaustion-of-Remedies Rule Govern-

ing Other Federal Rights.

The intended effect of Williamson County’s state pro-

cedures requirement is to remit property owners with what

had long been described as “accrued” federal claimis for just

compensation, Soriano, 352 U.S. at 275, to state courts to

pursue remedies under state law. This result is anomalous

on its face, and it is especially jarring in light of the Court’s

long-standing and firm refusal, with respect to other federal

claims asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to “require[]

exhaustion of state judicial . . . remedies, recognizing the

paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts

to protect constitutional rights.” Steffel v. Thompson, 415

U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974) (emphasis added), quoted in Patsy

v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500 (1982). In practice,

therefore, the state procedures requirement has effectively

caused the Just Compensation Clause, “as much a part of

17

the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or [the] Fourth

Amendment, [to] be relegated to the status of a poor rela-

tion,” notwithstanding the Court’s protestations to the con-

trary in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).

The House of Representatives views the state proce-

dures requirement as an “exhaustion” mechanism applying

only to claims for just compensation, and has twice passed

bills to eliminate it.? The House Judiciary Committee’s re-

port on the latter bill made clear that the non-exhaustion

provision had as its target Williamson County’s state pro-

cedures requirement because the House viewed the require-

ment as a kind of exhaustion-of-judicial-remedies rule that

was rejected in Steffel, Patsy, and many other decisions of

this Court. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-518, at 13 & n.3 (2000).

The committee report explained that the “combined effect of

Williamson County, and the application of issue and claim

preclusion [as presented in this case], is to drive out of Fed-

eral court virtually all Federal claims for just compensation

for takings of private property by local governments.” Jd. at

13. As a result of the state procedures requirement, then,

“property rights are procedurally disadvantaged compared

to other civil rights.” Jd. (section heading).”

® See Private Property Rights Implementation Act of 1997, H.R.

1534, 105th Cong., § 2 (adding 28 U.S.C. § 1343(eX3) to provide

that property owners seeking to enforce the Just Compensation

Clause pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not “exhaust judicial

remedies provided by any State or territory”); Private Property

Rights Implementation Act of 2000, H.R. 2372, 106th Cong., § 2

(adding 28 U.S.C. § 1343(e)4) to provide that claims for just com-

pensation asserted pursuant to § 1983 are “ripe for adjudication

even if the party seeking redress does not exhaust judicial reme-

dies provided by any State or territory”).

© If the present brief echoes the language of the cited committee

report, that is because the report echoes the language of the Brief

Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation authored and filed by

present amici’s counsel in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educa-

tion Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).

18

B. The Requirement Is in Practice Ignored

by State Courts and by this Court.

If the state procedures requirement truly derives from

the “nature” of the federal right to just compensation—as

opposed to being merely a “procedural scheme under which

claims may be heard in federal courts,” Patsy, 457 U.S. at

501—then the requirement necessarily governs regardless

of the judicial forum in which the federal right is asserted.

That is, under the logic of Williamson County, “a property

owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation

Clause” even in state court until it has used the “procedure

for seeking just compensation” provided by the state. 473

U.S. at 195. In other words, no federal claim for just com-

pensation may be presented to a state court unless and until

the property owner has fully (and unsuccessfully) litigated

his state-law claim for compensation (in the state judicial

system).

This precept follows unassailably from the state pro-

cedures requirement; this precept is also uniformly ignored

both by state courts themselves and by this Court. As for

state courts, amici are aware of none that refuses to adjudi-

cate federal claims for just compensation on the ground that

they are premature until a property owner has pursued to

completion all claims for compensation under state law. To

the contrary, it is not difficult to cite numerous examples of

state judicial systems that will hear and determine federal

claims for just compensation before state-law compensation

claims have been fully litigated."

" See, e.g., Jacobs Wind Electric Co. v. Department of Transporta-

tion, 626 So. 2d 1333, 1337 (Fla. 1993) (contemplating that a pat-

ent holder would assert its claims under the Just Compensation

Clause along with its claims under the state analogue thereto and

under state common law); Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control

Board, 941 P.2d 851, 855 (Cal. 1997) (observing that the property

owner brought a claim for “just compensation’ in the form of lost

rental income and interest” under both “article I, section 19 of the

California Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the United

19

As for this Court, consider the last two pure regulatory

takings cases it has entertained on certiorari to state courts.

In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,

1009 (1992), the Court observed that following enactment

of the relevant state statute, “Lucas promptly filed suit in

the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, contending that

the Beachfront Management Act’s construction bar effected

a taking of his property without just compensation.” Even

though the Court postponed its discussion of the merits to

address whether Lucas had satisfied Williamson County’s

“final decision” requirement, see id. at 1010-14, the Court

was not concerned in the least whether Lucas had also sat-

isfied Williamson County's “state procedures” requirement

by litigating to completion whatever state-law claims for

compensation he might have prior to asserting his federal

claim for just compensation.

Likewise, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,

611 (2001), the Court observed that following proceedings

before the state Coastal Resources Management Council,

Palazzolo “sued in state court, asserting the Council’s appli-

cation of its wetlands regulations took the property without

compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth

Amendment.” Again, while the Court addressed the final

decision requirement at length, see id. at 618-26, it gave no

attention to the state procedures requirement. In contrast

to Williamson County, the Court certainly did not go out of

its way to assure itself that, before Palazzolo first asserted

his federal claim for just compensation, he did indeed “seek

States Constitution”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1077 (1998); Mayhew

v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 930 (Tex. 1997) (finding

ripe the plaintiff's “just compensation takings claims” brought at

the same time “under the United States Constitution and Texas

Constitution”); Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 711 (R.I. 2000)

(observing that plaintiff “brought an inverse condemnation action”

that asserted “a taking of his property for which he was entitled

to compensation pursuant to the United States and Rhode Island

Constitutions”), affd in part, rev’d in part, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).

20

compensation through the procedures the State has provid-

ed for doing so.””

Amici point out these anomalies not to urge the state

courts to be more eager in rebuffing federal takings claims

on procedural grounds (or this Court to be more vigilant in

exercising its certiorari jurisdiction) but rather to highlight

the profound impact to state courts that would result from

applying the state procedures requirement to the limits of

its ineluctable logic. As explained in the following section,

that impact also includes the fostering of an institutional

disrespect for state courts.

C. The Requirement Invites Disrespect for

State Courts by Treating Them as Mere

Stations on the Road to Federal Court.

In a letter expressing its (unsuccessful) opposition to

passage by the House of a bill eliminating the state proce-

dures requirement, see supra note 9 and accompanying text,

the Department of Justice cited “‘a proper respect for State

functions’” in arguing that “State courts are as capable as

Federal courts in adjudicating local land use cases.” H.R.

Rep. No. 106-518, at 37, 42 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401

U.S. 37, 44 (1971)). These arguments naturally evoke the

decisions of this Court that call for a “proper respect for the

ability of state courts to resolve federal questions presented

in state-court litigation.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481

” Tn fact, neither Lucas nor Palazzolo litigated state-law claims to

completion prior to asserting their federal claims. It is doubtful

whether Lucas even asserted a state-law claim at all, the majority

opinion of the South Carolina Supreme Court being devoid of any

references to such a claim. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal

Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991); but cf. id. at 907 (Hartwell, J.,

dissenting) (“Having determined that application of the Act con-

stitutes a taking under the Constitution of the United States, it is

not necessary to examine whether it constitutes a taking under

the South Carolina Constitution.”). Palazzolo did assert a state-

law claim—at the same very time as he asserted his federal claim.

See Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 711 (R.I. 2000).

21

U.S. 1, 14 (1987). Amici concur with the Department that

this respect should influence the Court’s thinking about the

state procedures requirement. As set forth below, however,

the requirement actually invites disrespect for state courts

and their ability to resolve federal questions.

It has long been recognized that, notwithstanding “the

paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts

to protect constitutional rights,” Steffel, 415 U.S. at 473, as

a general matter “the state and federal courts have concur-

rent jurisdiction of suits of a civil nature arising under the

Constitution and laws of the United States.” Grubb v. Pub-

lic Utilities Commission, 281 U.S. 470, 476 (1930); accord,

e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990). Monetary

claims arising under the Just Compensation Clause are en-

compassed by this general rule, and state courts routinely

adjudicate such federal claims against state and local gov-

ernments. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010-32 (reviewing

South Carolina courts’ disposition of such claim); Palazzolo,

533 U.S. at 617-32 (reviewing Rhode Island courts’ disposi-

tion of such claim).

Consider a procedural regime in which both the state

courts and the lower federal courts adjudicate the federal

claims for just compensation respectively presented to each.

Property owners who agree with the Justice Department’s

prediction that “State courts are likely to be as sympathetic

to local property owners as Federal courts,” H.R. Rep. No.

106-518, at 37, will naturally gravitate toward the former;

those who disagree, the latter. Each court system will de-

velop federal takings law subject to this Court’s review and,

significantly, without interference from the other. Such a

regime would not only yield more efficient decisionmaking,

it would also truly show that “proper respect for ability of

state courts to resolve federal questions presented in state-

court litigation” enunciated in Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 14.

By contrast, consider the regime created by the state

procedures requirement of Williamson County. Under that

regime, federal courts consider state courts not as parallel

22

departments of a dual sovereign but rather as “hurdles” to

be overcome on the road to resolution of claims by federal

courts. E.g., Richardson v. City & County of Honolulu, 124

F.3d 1150, 1165 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 871,

921, 1018 (1998); Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716,

720-21 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120 (1991).

Moreover, federal courts send property owners packing off

to state courts to litigate state-law claims they do not wish

to pursue and to obtain rulings that may have absolutely no

consequence in subsequent federal proceedings.” Forcing

pointless detours to state courts to litigate sideshow issues

demonstrates affirmative disrespect for those courts rather

than the requisite proper respect.

+

CONCLUSION

As the Court recently reiterated, the doctrine of stare

decisis is “not .. . an inexorable command.” Lawrence, 539

U.S. at 577 (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 828). It is, instead,

“a principle of policy” that must yield when the rationale of

a prior decision “does not withstand careful analysis.” Jd.

As this brief has shown, the state procedures requirement

of Williamson County does not withstand such analysis: it

was fashioned in circumstances that warrant no confidence

its soundness, and “precedents before and after its issuance

contradict its central holding.” Id. Though state and local

governments “rely” on it as a ready means to exhaust those

® DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 515-16 (6th Cir. 2004), is

a very recently reported example. The property owner spent four

years fulfilling the state procedures requirement in the Kentucky

Circuit Court, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, and the Kentucky

Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. DLX, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 624

(Ky. 2001). At the end of this marathon, the state courts denied

compensation under state law based on “the operation of a state

procedural rule without analogue in federal law,” 351 F.3d at 520

—a ruling that advanced resolution of the owner’s federal claim

for just compensation not a single bit, see id. at 516-26.

23

property owners having temerity enough to assert federal

claims for just compensation, “there has been no individual

or societal reliance on [the state procedures requirement] of

the sort that could counsel against overturning its holding

once there are compelling reasons to do so.” Id.

This last point is crucial, for we may expect a chorus

from respondents and their amici about how the state pro-

cedures requirement is a pillar of Western Civilization and

how overruling it will usher in a new Dark Ages. We think

this chorus is largely driven by the desire of governments

and their allies to narrow the substantive scope of regula-

tory takings law. Although that desire is understandable

and, in the proper case, a legitimate litigating position, we

trust that Members of this Court will resist the temptation

to treat the state procedures requirement as a stand-in for

disputing the substantive reach of the Just Compensation

Clause. Whether that Clause affords broad relief to regu-

lated property owners, narrow relief, or even no relief at all

ought not to matter here: consistent with “the paramount

role Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect

constitutional rights,” Steffel, 415 U.S. at 473, the answers

to that question should be resolved in federal court without

requiring exhaustion of state-law remedies in state court.

For these reasons, the state procedures requirement of

Williamson County should be overruled, and the judgment

of the court of appeals should be reversed.

DATED: J»,auary, 2005.

Respectfully submitted,

ERIC GRANT

ATTORNEY AT LAW

Suite 100

8001 Folsom Boulevard

Sacramento, California 95826

(916) 388-0833

. Counsel for Amici Curiae

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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