Respondents Brief — Kelo v. New London

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OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

S

SUSETTE KELO, THELMA BRELESKY,

PASQUALE CRISTOFARO, WILHELMINA AND

CHARLES DERY, JAMES AND LAURA GURETSKY,

PATAYA CONSTRUCTION LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

and WILLIAM VON WINKLE,

Petitioners,

Vv.

CITY OF NEW LONDON and

NEW LONDON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

Respondents.

>

On Writ Of Certiorari To The

Supreme Court Of The State Of Connecticut

o

BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENTS

r

WESLEY W. HorTon* THOMAS J. LONDREGAN

DANIEL J. KRISCH JEFFREY T. LONDREGAN

HORTON, SHIELDS & Conway & LONDREGAN, P.C.

Knox, P.C. 38 Huntington Street

90 Gillett Street New London, CT 06320

Hartford, CT 06105 (860) 447-3171

(860) 522-8338 EDWARD B. O’CONNELL

Davip P. CONDON

WALLER, SMITH & PALMER, PC.

52 Eugene O’Neill Drive

New London, CT 06320

(860) 442-0367

*Counsel of Record

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964 —

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment

forbid an economically distressed city from employing its

eminent domain power to condemn, and pay just compen-

sation for, private property in order to reverse decades of

economic decline, create thousands of jobs and signifi-

cantly increase property taxes and other sources of reve-

nue for the city, and to realize immediate structural and

environmental benefits for the city and its residents?

ii

LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The petitioners, who were the plaintiffs below, are:

Susette Kelo, Thelma Brelesky, Pasquale Cristofaro,

Wilhelmina and Charles Dery, James and Laura Guretsky,

Pataya Construction Limited Partnership and William

Von Winkle.

The respondents, who were the defendants below are:

the City of New London, Connecticut, and the New London

Development Corporation.

RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The New London Development Corporation is a non-

stock, non-profit development corporation designated by

the City of New London, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-

188, as the official development agency for the Fort Trum-

bull Municipal Development Project.

lv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ................c0cccccsecccseseeseeeees i

LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

nT ee EON ii

RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT.................. iii

Se Ca rccnceressesssesmsesssssenseeemenen: v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...............cccecceccsecceseeees 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................:0.cceeseeeeees 11

TTI conncenncsnenesmmmnnemsenssnensienienetememestvantenstin 13

Eee 50

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Comm’n of Webster

ee ae ee a crennsennenrtnenmeneestnenenmnntemenets 20

Aposporos v. Urban Redevelopment Commission,

ee 37, 38

Communities, Inc. v. Town of Orange,

ee ED Se hccennsesenssenesemsonmeneecenenetmenent 38

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)...............0cc0000+ passim

Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S.

ee ccensnensinsnensmessmnmntmmennnens 19, 20, 28

Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386

PETE hcnessnsnetenstenneneenennnmnnsmnimenetiatatinmmimeennmnennnts 32

Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (1930).................... 40, 41

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,

es EE IE hirtetcnnieiciienenntiennnmnensucainntanensenns 40

Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905)...............cccccccceeeeeeeeees 19

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).................... 16

County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765

SEEEEEEE> SUI hernnesnsssnsnentusnemenetepeinnetermmenianmnineness 33, 37

Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).............. 39, 40

Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998)...... 12, 18

Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112

Sr ansitusiidenniiniinsniennnnsidaneceiinacitanedietapiingiumamimemmmmnenmmnenanes 34

Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) ..............cccc00000. 50

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.

County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)............ 18, 40

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Feod & Drug Administration v. Brown & William-

son Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)........................ 21

Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996)................. 20

General Motors v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997)............. 12, 20

Georgia Dept. of Transportation v. Jasper County,

OO 37

Hairston v. Dansville & Western Railroad Co., 208

Se ei ccertiuinatiinnttinnenaninnniieennsiateiiemaianimaeptaimaniaiiines 32

Harding v. Funk, 8 Kan. 315, 1871 WL 785 (1871).......... 31

Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229

GE cenceverensnenensanenesenssensssnensinennnenmnnmaneeneemennets passim

Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885)................. 31

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis,

a es Ge ee circtnenemenmnrtinnnentinnecstiecamenen 13, 14

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).................... 12, 19

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.

EE CE woscsrensnesneniatetnntinnnitenbanenindninteminunednieinamigieees 29

Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102

iia censcusnscsmncenenssiennniniasnnntmenitinainsiiingseiaiiinigeaipnintmni 23

Miller v. Troost, 14 Minn. 365, 1869 WL 2322 (1869)....... 31

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston &

Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992) ..0..........cccccceeeees passim

Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928)........... 39

New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).... 20, 21

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) .............. 22

— Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825

Gai cnenssimsensnenemensnetemisvenensnennseusntasmananienns 17, 18, 39, 40

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532 (1866)................ccccccc0e 31

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393

ETc nein tenieeaserinmpeadeninameatininenabareatieaminentanipepmennens 18

Pequonnock Yacht Club, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport,

ee ED, SE erernnsensnnensnsccartenssmsensrececesesi 38

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).................... 21

Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).......... 25, 47

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).......... 28

Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) ................ccceeeeee 14

Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1832 WL

SETTING UTIs SII hainstusiiciinnidinpspamnpietninennentiieennenineneenes 31

State v. Travelers Ins. Co., 47 A. 299 (Conn. 1900)........... 20

Southwest Illinois Development Authority v. National

City Environmental, 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002) ..................... 37

United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U.S.

III coscucensnenensvenesnssutscsngempeninensnmapemmenenmess 15, 19, 40

United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546

TTI onsensertatnnetsineipnenniasdenepenuatemnimnsnmanemenimeniienmesnnnmenarees 19

Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 US. 1

SET cennsnsnsnsentnnsnniensundasnantepnetedimensnnteenerammmgnsenquimenents 42

Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).......... 19

Wilson v. Pittsburgh & L.E. Railroad Co., 72 A. 235

EPU,. TEIN cttevennnenssnennnsssemnensgensiniininumansascesmssnsseuadenninianiegne 32

STATUTES

I iceman 4, 34

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

a i ees ee cccerencccnnssnnennnnctiinncsnittiasendnitendiontians 36

Conn. Gen. Stat. $8-186 .00.............:ccccceseeeees 9, 11, 23, 24, 34

St iii, 1, 45

Gas SN I Siicccrnncrernetnenensempentscsenssaiaieees 5, 6, 43

I 43

I 6, 43

I ie 1, 36, 43

Ss Gas ts I accecsttenietienmsnninanenccntinensssnsinempsescsas 9, 43

Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-266, et seq. .............ccccccceesceeeeesseeeeeeeeees 8

Conn. Gen. Stat. §22a-1, et Seq. ............:ccccceeeessseeeesssrereeeeees 5

Sas Cs Ce crrnticcttencinncctnnniensnantdatiateimeianasiniiniass 2

a UTIs TTI sehierhcceriersnsihcsiecierinineiiaiientindaneannninedicnmnensmnnanasaieets 2

ee a htcncusenncctcnincvanimesentemtinitosemenneieasasaesntineiies 21

OTHER AUTHORITIES

4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL

CONGRESS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES (Charlene B.

Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986)...0...........ccccccceeeeeee 17

Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in

Eminent Domain, 57 OREGON L. REV. 201 (1978)... 30, 31

Matthew P. Harrington, “Public Use” and the

Original Understanding of the So-Called “Tak-

ings” Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245 (2002) ................. 17

John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its

Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109

Harv. L. Rev. 1252 (1996)................ccccccccceeeeeeeeeeecees 29, 30

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT

Cg YE ee 29

Errol E. Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of Eminent

Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENvTL. L. 1

IT nsasnacsnnsensnentenncantensonasensntennenseensenssnncetennemsesnents 29, 30

Thomas Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72

CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986) .............:00000+ 33, 34, 35, 36, 37

Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:

Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just

Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165

ESR erer enema En Ene 33

RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3rd

I a innate teectaaadiatianantaeniitmentaneneneee 33

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

P| rere rae eennee 17

Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle Over the Public Use

Clause: Survey of Holdings and Trends, 1986-

2003, 39 R. Prop., PRoBATE & Trust J. 251

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The Facts of the Case

The respondent City of New London occupies 5.79

square miles at the junction of the Thames River and Long

Island Sound in southeastern Connecticut. (Joint Appendix,

(“J.A.”) 91, 93). New London, which is geographically the

second smallest of the 169 municipalities in Connecticut,

was once a center of the whaling industry and later a

manufacturing hub. (J.A. 91, 93, 303). However, New

London has suffered through decades of economic decline.

(Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, (“Pet. App.”) 196, 272-

73). Staggering economic woes — which include an unem-

ployment rate close to double that of the rest of the state, a

shrinking population, a dearth of new home and business

construction and the departure of one of the region’s princi-

pal employers — caused the State of Connecticut Office of

Planning and Management (OPM) to designate New

London a “distressed municipality”. (J.A. 239, 253, 298,

303-04; Pet. App. 70-71, 272-73). In addition, local property

taxes are the main source of municipal funding in Connecti-

cut, but 54 percent of New London’s land is tax-exempt.

(J.A. 91).

Faced with this untenable economic situation, the

respondent New London Development Corporation (NLDC)

planned a development project for the city’s Fort Trumbull

section, which is located on a peninsula that juts out into

the Thames River. (J.A. 4, 36, 212). The NLDC is a statu-

tory, non-stock, non-profit development corporation with a

volunteer board and no independent power of eminent

domain. Under Connecticut law, a city may designate such

a corporation to act as its development agent for an eco-

nomic development project. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-188. A

city may then authorize the development corporation to

acquire real property through eminent domain in the

project area in the city’s name. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-193.

Pursuant to this statutory authority, the New London City

Council designated the NLDC as its development agent for

the Fort Trumbull Municipal Development Plan (MDP),

and authorized the use of eminent domain on New London’s

2

behalf. (J.A. 26-29). The MDP was designed, in the words of

the trial court, to “provide an economic and social uplift for

[the] city... .” (Pet. App. 197). Maps of the MDP area are at

pages 3-4 and 212 of the Joint Appendix.

The undisputed facts regarding the steady deteriora-

tion of New London’s economy from the 1970’s onwards

demonstrate the dire need for such a project. These facts

include:

¢ The 1990 designation of New London as a

“distressed municipality” by OPM, pursuant to

Conn. Gen. Stat. §32-9p. (Pet. App. 272).

¢ The steady decline of New London’s popula-

tion from_a high of 34,182 in 1960 to 23,860 in

1998, its lowest since 1930. (J.A. 298; Pet. App.

272).

¢ An unemployment rate, 7.6 percent, almost

twice as high as the overall figure for the state

and three percent higher than the neighboring

town of Groton. (J.A. 239; Pet. App. 272).

¢ The 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea War-

fare Center (NUWC), located on the Fort

Trumbull peninsula, which employed as many

as 1500 people in the late 1980's.’ (J.A. 253).

¢ Asluggish labor market that has been outper-

formed by a wide margin by both the state as

a whole and the surrounding region. (Pet. App.

272).

¢ Sixty-one percent of the city’s housing was

built before 1950, with a high percentage of

vacant housing. (Pet. App. 273).

In addition to these city-wide problems, the Fort

Trumbull area itself suffers from numerous ills:

’ As a part of the MDP, New London acquired the 32 acres formerly

occupied by NUWC from the federal government via an economic

development conveyance pursuant to the Base Closure and Realign-

ment Act, 10 U.S.C. §2687. Eighteen of those acres are now Fort

Trumbull State Park. (Pet. App. 4-5).

3

e An 82 percent vacancy rate for non-residential

buildings and a 20 percent rate for non-

commercial property. (J.A. 191; Pet. App. 273).

¢ Very low tax revenue for the MDP area

($325,000). (J.A. 191; Pet. App. 273).

¢ 55 percent of the buildings in the MDP area

were built prior to 1950. (J.A. 322).

e Sixty-six percent of the non-residential build-

ings are in fair to poor condition and less than

twelve percent of the residential buildings are

in average or better condition. (J.A. 323; Pet.

App. 273).

e Since 1990, existing buildings in the area have

undergone minimum private investment with

some sections of Fort Trumbull suffering from

disinvestment and owner neglect. (Pet. App.

273).

It is little wonder, then, that the trial court found New

London to be a “city buffeted for decades by hard times and

until recently declining prospects.” (Pet. App. 196).

The record is clear that New London was a city desper-

ate for economic rejuvenation. The NLDC, which originally

was established in 1978, was re-formed in 1997 following

the closure of NUWC to assist the city in planning that

economic rebirth at the site of the closed base. (J.A. 264;

Pet. App. 3). In January 1998, the first step in that rebirth

occurred when Connecticut’s State Bond Commission

authorized $5.35 million in bonds to support planning

activities and limited property acquisition and a further $10

million in bonds towards the creation of Fort Trumbull

State Park. (J.A. 4, 264). The following month Pfizer, Inc., a

world leader in pharmaceutical development, announced its

plan to build a global research facility in New London, on a

site adjacent to the Fort Trumbull peninsula. (J.A. 264; Pet.

App. 4). Construction of the $300 million Pfizer facility

began in April 1999. By the time the petitioners’ properties

were condemned in November 2000, the facility was almost

completed. Pfizer staff began moving in early in 2001. (Trial

Tr., 8/13/01, 69-70).

4

In April 1998, the New London City Council gave its

initial approval for the NLDC to prepare an economic

development plan for a 90-acre section of Fort Trumbull.

(J.A. 264-65; Pet. App. 4). Fort Trumbull was selected as the

best site for a planned development because of the avail-

ability of the NUWC site and because the majority of Fort

Trumbull is a “regional center”, for which the Connecticut

legislature has set the following goal:

Revitalization of the economic base of urban areas

by rebuilding older commercial and industrial ar-

eas, and encouraging new industries to locate in

the central cities in order to protect existing jobs

and create new job opportunities needed to pro-

vide meaningful economic opportunity for inner

city residents. .. .

Conn. Gen. Stat. §4-66b. This goal has special applicability

here, as most of the 90 acres — including the areas in which

the petitioners own properties — have been zoned for commer-

cial and light industrial use since 1928.* (J.A. 113-16, 288-91).

Upon initial approval by the city council, the NLDC

began a series of neighborhood meetings to educate the

residents about the development process. (J.A. 264; Pet. App.

4). The NLDC utilized a combination of notice techniques to

encourage resident attendance and participation at these

meetings — e.g., newspaper advertisements, direct mail, and

public announcements at city council meetings. In addition,

the meetings received extensive newspaper coverage. (J.A.

654-55). The NLDC held six such meetings between April

and October 1998, with speakers from the NLDC, the City of

New London and the State of Connecticut Department of

Economic and Community Development (DECD). (J.A. 655).

* Pursuant to state planning guidelines, regional centers “encom-

pass land areas containing traditional core area commercial, industrial,

transportation, specialized institutional services, and facilities of

intertown significance.” (J.A. 276).

* All of the residential properties in Fort Trumbull - including

those owned by the petitioners — were built before 1940, and most

predate zoning in New London. (J.A. 322; Def. City Exh. 6).

5

In May 1998, the city formally authorized the NLDC to

begin the development process. (J.A. 89; Pet. App. 4). In

June 1998, DECD found that the Fort Trumbull project

could have a significant environmental impact. (J.A. 90,

265). Under Connecticut law, see Conn. Gen. Stat. §22a-1,

et seq., this finding mandated a full-scale Environmental

Impact Evaluation. The Evaluation involved extensive

investigation of the effect of any development at Fort

Trumbull on the water supply, traffic patterns, noise and

air pollution levels, historically important buildings, flood

prevention, and a host of other concerns.‘ (J.A. 90, 239-41).

The Evaluation also included the neighborhood meetings,

the solicitation of comments from members of the commu-

nity, and review of proposed findings by the community.

(J.A. 90, 239-41).

In addition, Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-189 requires a finding

that any economic development plan be

in accordance with the plan of development for

the municipality adopted by its planning commis-

sion and the plan of development of the regional

planning agency, if any, for the region within

which the municipality is located [and] that the

plan is not inimical to any state-wide planning

program objectives of the state or state agencies

as coordinated by the Secretary of the Office of

Policy and Management. .. .

§8-189. In accordance with this directive, the Evaluation

carefully considered a number of state and regional plan-

ning documents detailing the already-existing policies for

economic development in the region and the state. (J.A.

272-73).

* The entire Environmental Impact Evaluation is at pages 213-735

of the J.A. (Volumes II & IID).

* Section 8-189 contains a number of other requirements for

economic development projects relevant to the question of public use.

See Section II of the Respondents’ Brief, infra.

6

The Evaluation, started in June 1998, was completed

in November 1998. (J.A. 213, 241). After a mandatory 45-

day public comment period, the Evaluation was formally

approved and forwarded to OPM. (J.A. 90-91). In April

1999, OPM made the findings required by §8-189 and

determined that the Fort Trumbull project met all relevant

regulatory requirements. (J.A. 91). As required by Con-

necticut law; see Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-191; DECD, the

Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection and

the Southeastern Connecticut Council of Governments also

approved the development plan. (Pet. App. 8 n.8).

The NLDC then began formulating the specifics of the

MDP. As part of that process, the NLDC considered six

possible plans of action for the Fort Trumbull area previ-

ously set out in the EIE.* (Pet. App. 7). The draft plan, (J.A.

83-212), completed in August 1999 and thereafter adopted

by the NLDC, is a composite of the positive elements of

alternatives 2, 4, 5, and 6. The plan carefully balances the

many environmental and developmental concerns ex-

pressed during the Evaluation process and contains the

fewest negative impacts for Fort Trumbull. (J.A. 195-97).

The plan divides the 90 acres into seven parceis:

¢ Parcel 1: A waterfront hotel and conference

center, marinas for tourist boats and commer-

cial vessels, and the Riverwalk (a public

walkway along the waterfront).

¢ Parcel 2: Eighty new residential properties or-

ganized in a planned urban-style neighborhood

* The alternate plans considered and rejected by the NLDC were:

“(1) no action, with the assumption that some development activities

would proceed under the direction of other entities, such as the United

States Navy, without action by the development corporation; (2)

recreational and cultural facilities to complement the adjacent state

park; (3) residential construction with minor amounts of retail and

office space; (4) a business campus supported by the hotel and confer-

ence center; and (5) two mixed use alternates combining residences,

recreational, commercial, hotel and retail uses in differing arrange-

ments.” (Pet. App. 7 n.6). These alternatives are described in more

detail at pages 193-95 of the J.A., and in a chart on page 248 of the J.A.

7

and linked by a public walkway to the rest of

the plan area; this parcel also includes space

reserved for the new site of the United States

Coast Guard Museum.

¢ Parcel 3: 90,000 square feet of high technology

research and development office space and

parking with direct vehicular access from out-

side the plan area.

¢ Parcel 4: Divided into two subparcels - 4A,

which will provide park support and marina

support, including parking and retail services;

and 4B, which will include a renovated marina

for both recreational and commercial boating.

In addition, the Riverwalk will continue

through Parcel 4B.

¢ Parcel 5: 140,000 square feet of office space,

¢ Parcel 6: Development of water-dependent

commercial uses.

¢ Parcel 7: Additional office space and/or re-

search and development space.

(J.A. 109-113; Pet. App. 5-6). Although divided into parcels

for ease of administration, the MDP does not consist of

seven independent development plans. Rather, it is one

plan to be considered as an integrated whole. (J.A. 139-40).

The petitioners own fifteen properties located in the

middle of the Fort Trumbull peninsula. (J.A. 3, 4). Four

properties owned by three of the petitioners are located in

Parcel 3. Eleven properties owned by the remaining peti-

tioners are located in Parcel 4A and comprise 0.76 acres.

(Pet. App. 6, 125). The properties owned by petitioners Kelo,

Brelesky, Cristofaro and Dery are either owner-occupied or

occupied by a family member. However, the lots owned by

petitioners Pataya Construction Ltd. Partnership and Von

Winkle, which constitute almost half the total, are invest-

ment or commercial properties for which the petitioners are

absentee landlords. (J.A. 10-11, 702-703; Trial Tr., 7/23/01,

97, 111).

The potential economic benefits of this plan as a whole

to the people of New London are enormous. The record

below demonstrates that the plan

is expected to generate approximately between:

(1) 518 and 867 construction jobs; (2) 718 and

1362 direct jobs; and (3) 500 and 940 indirect jobs.

The composite parcels of the development plan

also are expected to generate between $680,544

and $1,249,843 in [annual] property tax revenues

for the city. . . .

(Pet. App. 7; J.A. 203). As found by the trial court, this

influx of jobs and revenue will be critical in continuing the

economic revitalization of the city. (Pet. App. 196, 282, 327).

In addition to the jobs and tax revenues, the MDP will

have a number of immediate benefits for the people of New

London. Areas within the 100-year floodplain will be filled

to be made suitable for development. (Pet. App. 356 n.20).

There will be extensive improvements to the streets, sewers

and utilities in the MDP area, as well as much-needed

environmental remediation.’ (J.A. 143-47, 159-60, 180-81,

442-43, 718-21). The Riverwalk will provide public access

to, and use of, the waterfront, which was previously un-

available due to the presence of the NUWC facility. (J.A.

140-41). Nor are the needs of those residents displaced by

the MDP ignored. To the contrary, the MDP complies with

the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act; Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-

266, et seq.; and earmarks over $10 million in relocation

assistance funds for displaced home and business owners,

over and above the amounts for just compensation. (J.A.

206-207).

” The MDP earmarks $20 million in public funds for the creation of

the Fort Trumbull State Park on the former NUWC site; $7 million to

upgrade the regional sewage treatment facility located in Fort Trum-

bull; $9 million for environmental remediation; and $24 million for plan

preparation, property acquisition and infrastructure development, $2

million of which came from the United States Commerce Department in

the form of a Financial Assistance Award. (J.A. 258; Trial Tr., 7/24/01,

109; see also J.A. 186).

9

On January 18, 2000, the NLDC board adopted the

development plan. (J.A. 12). On the same day, the New

London City Council approved it and authorized the NLDC

to acquire the properties located in the plan area, by emi-

nent domain if necessary, in the name of the City of New

London. (J.A. 26). Thereafter, DECD also approved the

plan. (J.A. 12). The 90 acres contained approximately 115

parcels, (J.A. 91), the vast majority of which the NLDC

acquired voluntarily. (Trial Tr., 7/25/01, 224-25).

In October 2000, after months of unsuccessful negotia-

tions with the petitioners, the NLDC voted to acquire their

properties by eminent domain. In November 2000, the

NLDC, acting as the statutorily-designated development

agent for the city, brought condemnation actions for the

petitioners’ properties pursuant to Chapter 132 of the

Connecticut General Statutes (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§8-186 to

8-200b). (Pet. App. 8). The statements of compensation

describe the city, acting by the NLDC, as the official con-

demnor. (J.A. 6). In keeping with those statements of

compensation, and pursuant to Connecticut law, over $1.6

million has been placed in escrow with the clerk of the

Connecticut trial court as compensation for the petitioners’

properties. The NLDC will own all 90 acres in the project

area and will lease portions of that property to private

developers. (Pet. App. 6).

B. The State Court Proceedings

The respondents agree with the petitioners’ statement

of the proceedings in the trial court.’ After the trial court’s

decision, the petitioners appealed and the respondents cross

* The trial court put the issue most eloquently: “On the other side

of this controversy [from the petitioners] are what may be considered

abstract entities - the City of New London, the New London Redevel-

opment Agency. But the people behind these abstractions have a dream

also ... Their dream is for their city buffeted for decades by hard times

end until recently declining preapects.” (Pet. App. 196) (emphasis

added).

10

appealed the trial court’s decision. (Pet. App. 2). The Con-

necticut Supreme Court held that

the public use clauses of the federal and state con-

stitutions authorize the exercise of the eminent

domain power in furtherance of a significant eco-

nomic development plan that is projected to create

in excess of 1000 jobs, to increase tax and other

revenues, and to revitalize an economically dis-

tressed city, including its downtown and water-

front areas.

(Pet. App. 2). The majority upheld the trial court’s ruling

with respect to Parcel 3. The majority further held that the

trial court’s findings with respect to the necessity of the

takings on Parcel 4A were clearly erroneous and remanded

the case to the trial court with direction to render judgment

for the defendants with respect to the eleven properties

located in Parcel 4A. (Pet. App. 133).

The majority based its decision on Berman v. Parker, 348

US. 26 (1954), and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467

US. 229 (1984), and employed a “broad purposive approach to

the interpretation of the federal public use clause.” (Pet. App.

39). This approach, in keeping with Berman and Midkiff,

emphasizes “the legislative purpose and motive behind the

taking, and give(s] substantial deference to the legislative

determination of purpose.” (Pet. App. 42).

Three justices concurred in part and dissented in part

in one opinion. The three dissenters “agree[d] with the

conclusion of the majority” that “private economic develop-

ment projects ... which create new jobs, increase tax

revenue, and contribute to urban revitalization, satisfy the

takings clauses of the federal and state constitutions.” (Pet.

App. 171). With respect to this specific case, the ‘lissent also

agreed with the majority that

[t]he record clearly demonstrates that the devel-

opment plan was not intended primarily to serve

the interests of Pfizer, Inc., or any other private

entity but, rather, to revitalize the local economy

by creating temporary and permanent jobs, gen-

erating a significant increase in tax revenue,

11

encouraging spin-off economic activities and maxi-

mizing public access to the waterfront. Further-

more, the proposed project is being undertaken in

an economically ‘distressed’ municipality in need of

a stimulus to invigorate the local economy.

(Pet. App. 176) (emphasis added); (Pet. App. 70-71) (major-

ity opinion).

The dissent took issue only with the analytical process

employed by the majority, which it viewed as too deferen-

tial. In place of the majority's “purposive” test, the dissent

called for a heightened degree of judicial scrutiny to ensure

that a taking for economic development will, in fact, result

in a public benefit. (Pet. App. 134-90).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

At the heart of this case are a series of decisions made

by the Connecticut legislature and the elected officials of

the City of New London as to what will best serve the

economic, social, structural and environmental interests of

New London’s citizens. In the exercise of its traditional

police power, the Connecticut legislature has declared that

economic development, and the acquisition of private

property to further such development “are public uses and

purposes for which public moneys may be expended.... ”

Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-186. In accordance with this statutory

directive and after a painstaking deliberative process, the

respondents determined that the economic revitalization of

New London, as well as its environmental, social and

structural health, would best be served by enacting the

MDP - and, as a necessary consequence thereof, taking the

petitioners’ properties through eminent domain.

This Court has a long history of deference to legisla-

tive and municipal wisdom in exercising the power of

eminent domain. See National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.

Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992); Midkiff,

supra; Berman, supra. This deference is premised on two

well-settled principles: (1) that courts are “unsuited to

gather the facts upon which economic predictions can be

made, and professionally untrained to make them|,]”

12

General Motors v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 308 (1997); and (2)

that the primary purpose of the Takings Clause is not to act

as a substantive restraint on government behavior, but to

assure compensation for any affected property owners

should the government choose to exercise its eminent

domain power; see Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S.

498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In keeping with

these principles, only once in its over two hundred years of

existence has the Court held a compensated physical taking

of property to be unconstitutional. Such jurisprudential

caution is in keeping with this Court’s longstanding policy —

aside from the ill-starred era of Lochner v. New York, 198

U.S. 45 (1905) - of showing great deference to economic

decisions made by legislative and municipal officials.

This Court should adhere to these precedents and

affirm the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court.

This Court first should hold that economic development

constitutes a public use within the meaning of the Fifth

Amendment. It is undisputed that maintaining the eco-

nomic health of a city falls within the police powers tradi-

tionally reserved to the states, and this Court has held that

“(t]he ‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the

scope of a sovereign’s police powers.” Midkiff, 467 U.S. at

240. Therefore, employing the power of eminent domain to

revitalize a municipality's economy satisfies the public use

requirement. This is especially true in urban settings, in

which the problem of land assembly often acts as a barrier

to economic revitalization.

Such holding is no less valid merely because the

economic improvements in question will be achieved by

allowing private entities to lease the property taken

through eminent domain. The principal focus of the public

use equation has always been whether the taking will

produce a significant benefit to the public and not the

means by which that benefit comes into being. Moreover,

such a holding would not only preserve the appropriate

balance between the legislative and judicial branches, but it

would be in keeping with the di’ sion between federal and

state authority that is at the core of our federalist system of

government.

13

This Court should then hold that the particular con-

demnations at issue in the present case satisfy the Public

Use Clause. As it has in the past, this Court should eschew

a lot-by-lot, building-by-building inquiry into whether each

individual piece of property is essential for the project as a

whole because such scrutiny interferes with the legisla-

ture’s role as “the main guardian of the public needs to be

served by social legislation. ... ” Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.

However, even under the intrusive and unwieldy level of

scrutiny for compensated takings proposed by the petition-

ers, the particular condemnations at issue are constitu-

tional because they are reasonably certain to achieve

significant public benefits — e.g., the creation of thousands

of jobs, significant increases to New London’s annual

revenues, environmental remediation and improvements to

Fort Trumbull’s decaying infrastructure. Some of these

benefits — environmental remediation and infrastructure

improvements — already have taken place. With respect to

the economic benefits, the reasonable assurances and

enforcement mechanisms that are in place here are suffi-

cient to satisfy the Takings Clause.

ARGUMENT

I. THIS COURT SHOULD ADHERE TO ITS DEF-

ERENTIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR LEG-

ISLATIVE OR MUNICIPAL DETERMINATIONS

OF PUBLIC USE AND HOLD THAT ECONOMIC

REVITALIZATION CONSTITUTES A PUBLIC

USE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE TAKINGS

CLAUSE.

In his dissent in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.

DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), Chief Justice Rehnquist

summed up the guiding principle of this Court’s Takings

Clause jurisprudence:

[O]ur inquiry into legislative purpose is not in-

tended as a license to judge the effectiveness of

legislation. When considering the Fifth Amend-

ment issues presented by Hawaii’s Land Reform

Act, we noted that the Act, “like any other, may

14

not be successful in achieving its intended goals.

But ‘whether in fact the provisions will accom-

plish the objectives is not the question: the [con-

stitutional requirement] is satisfied if... the...

[State] Legislature rationally could have believed

that the [Act] would promote its objective.’”

Id. at 511 n.3 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242) (emphasis

and ellipses in original).

This settled wisdom, agreed with by the majority in

Keystone — that an exercise of eminent domain authority

passes constitutional muster so long as the legislative or

municipal authority “rationally could have believed” in its

potential effectiveness — has long guided this Court’s

consideration of Takings Clause cases. It is wisdom born out

of this Court’s recognition of the necessary primacy of

legislative judgment in the realm of public welfare and the

Court’s self-admitted inadequacy at making predictive

judgments about society's economic or social future. It is

wisdom that acknowledges that the proper role of un-

elected, federal judges in a democracy is to act with re-

straint when reviewing economic or social policy choices

made by a state’s elected representatives. And, in spite of

the frenzied heat of the petitioners’ arguments, it is wisdom

that remains as valid in the twenty-first century as it was

in the nineteenth and twentieth, and as valid for economic

revitalization as it was for the myriad of other public

purposes upheld by this Court.

A. The deferential standard employed by this

Court since Berman v. Parker remains the

appropriate standard by which to judge leg-

islative or municipal claims of public use.

It long has been recognized by this Court that the

primary responsibility for addressing society's economic and

social ills belongs to the legislative branch. As this Court

noted in Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981), the

legislature is “the appropriate representative body through

which the public makes democratic choices among alterna-

tive solutions to social and economic problems.” Jd. at 230.

15

Such an approach is no less warranted simply because

the democratic choice in question involves the legislative or

municipal decision to spend public money in order to

acquire property through eminent domain. In either case,

for the judicial branch, deference is the better part of valor.

Indeed, a half-century ago this Court spoke clearly as to the

limits of judicial authority in takings cases:

Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when

the legislature has spoken, the public interest has

been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In

such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the

main guardian of the public needs to be served by

social legislation. ... This principle admits of no

exception merely because the power of eminent

domain is involved. The role of the judiciary in de-

termining whether that power is being exercised

for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.

Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 (emphasis added).

Thirty years later, in Midkiff, this Court reiterated and

refined the holding of Berman. Although the courts have a

role to play in reviewing the determination of a public use,

that role is “an extremely narrow” one. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at

240 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 32). Because “[t}he ‘public

use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a

sovereign’s police powers|,]” Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240, the

standard of review for Takings Clause cases is extremely

deferential: “[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain

power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose,

the Court has never held a compensated taking to be

proscribed by the Public Use Clause.” Jd. at 241. A court

should be unwilling to “substitute its judgment for a legisla-

ture’s judgment as to what constitutes a public use ‘unless

the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.’” Jd.

(quoting United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160

U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).

Eight years after Midkiff, this Court again coated

its extremely limited role in reviewing questions of public

use. In National Railroad Passenger Corp., supra, which,

involved re-transfer of ownership of the condemned property

16

to another private entity, this Court repeated its earlier

holding that “the public use requirement of the Takings

Clause is coterminous with the regulatory power, and that

[we] will not strike down a condemnation on the basis that

it lacks a public use so long as the taking is ‘rationally

related to a conceivable public purpose.’” National Rail-

road, 503 U.S. at 422 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240-41).

One of the primary lessons of Berman, Midkiff and

National Railroad is that the need for such deference does

not depend on the nature of the public use at issue. After

all, deference was the guiding principle in Berman, Midkiff

and National Railroad even though those three cases

concerned three widely divergent government endeavors:

the elimination of blighted slums’ (Berman); the dissolution

of an oligarchic property ownership structure (Midkiff); and

the facilitation of interstate rail service (National Railroad).

What matters about those three cases is their recognition

that unelected judges are ill-suited to the task of determin-

ing what is an appropriate public use.

The historical, legal and logical bases for Berman,

Midkiff and National Railroad remain unaltered in this

case. A review of those principles makes it clear that eco-

nomic revitalization constitutes a public use pursuant to

the Takings Clause.

1. The text and history of the Takings

Clause demonstrates that its principal

focus is to provide compensation and not

to act as a substantive restraint on gov-

ernment behavior.

The text of a constitutional provision is the starting

point for its construction. See Crawford v. Washington, 541

US. 36, __, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1359 (2004). In this case, that

* As the trial court observed, “[t]he bleak economic conditions that

earned [New London’s designation as a distressed municipality] are

conditions just as worthy of attention and dangerous to the economic

and moral health of the state as slum or blighted areas. . . . ” (Pet. App.

255 n.10).

17

text — “nor shall private property be taken for public use

without just compensation” — contains a clear syntactic -

signal that its primary purpose is not to regulate legislative

determinations of public use. That signal is the placement

of the word “without,” which announces the emphasized

prepositional phrase in the Clause, i.e., “without just

compensation”. In contrast, “public use” appears in the

Clause without any exclusionary word to complement “nor”.

Indeed, in its phrasing the Clause almost assumes that any

private property taken by eminent domain would ipso facto

be for a public use, otherwise one would expect “for public

use” to be preceded by “except,” or some other exclusionary

preposition. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-

TIONAL LAW 589-90 & 590 n.10 (2nd Ed. 1988) (compensa-

tion is surrogate assurance of public use).

This construction is borne out by the history of the

Clause. In an earlier draft of the Fifth Amendment, James

Madison proposed that the Clause should read, “[nJo person

shall be .. . obliged to relinquish his property, where it may

be necessary for public use, without just compensation.” 4

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS:

LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES 10 (Charlene B. Bickford & Helen E.

Veit eds., 1986) (emphasis added). Madison’s draft — which

was amended without comment by the House to its present

form — arguably places more emphasis on the public use

question. See Matthew P. Harrington, “Pw lic Use” and the

Original Understanding of the So-Calied “Takings” Clause,

53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245 (2002). Madison’s draft seems to call

for an inquiry akin to that proposed by the petitioners; i.e.,

whether a particular taking is, in fact, “necessary” for public

use. However, our founding fathers chose, by their alteration

of Madison’s proposal, not to endorse such an intrusion into

what was thought to be a legislative area (although they did

reject purely private takings). See id. at 1248.

The notion that the Takings Clause was not primarily

meant to act as a restraint on government action in the

realm of compensated takings is a familiar one to the Court.

Indeed, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in WNollan uv.

California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), concludes

with this telling comment:

18

The Commission may well be right that [beach ac-

cess] is a good idea, but that does not establish

that the Nollans (and other coastal residents)

alone can be compelled to contribute to its realiza-

tion. Rather, California is free to advance its com-

prehensive program, if it wishes, by using its

power of eminent domain for this public purpose

... but if it wants an easement across the Nollans’

property, it must pay for it.

Id. at 841-42 (emphasis added; internal citation and quota-

tion marks omitted); see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,

260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“[t]he rights of the public in a

street purchased ... by eminent domain are those that it

has paid for”).

Finally, in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, supra, Justice

Kennedy wrote that the Takings Clause “operates as a

conditional limitation, permitting the government to do

what it wants so long as it pays the charge.” Eastern

Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring). His

concurrence, quoting this Court’s earlier decision in First

English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los

Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1987), pointed out that the

language of the Takings Clause “makes clear that it is

designed not to limit the governmental interference with

property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in

the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a

taking.” Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 545. Justice

Breyer, writing for himself and the three other dissenting

Justices, agreed with Justice Kennedy — and numerous

earlier decisions of this Court — that “at the heart of the

Clause lies a concern, not with preventing arbitrary or

unfair government action, but with providing compensation

for legitimate government action that takes ‘private prop-

erty to serve the ‘public’ good.” Jd. at 554 (Breyer, J.,

dissenting) (emphasis in original). The plurality opinion in

Eastern Enterprises did not quarrel with these observations

by Justices Kennedy and Breyer. Eastern Enterprises, 524

U.S. at 522-23.

19

2. The courts are ill suited to determining

whether a taking is for a legitimate pub-

lic use.

In our constitutional system, the judiciary appropri-

ately has a very limited role in reviewing the wisdom of

economic decisions made by the legislature. See United

States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946) (“[alny

departure from this judicial restraint would result in courts

deciding on what is and is not a governmental function and

in their invalidating legislation on the basis of their view on

that question at the moment of decision”). Since the demise

of the Lochner era, this Court no longer strikes down

economic choices made by the legislature “because they may

be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular

school of thought.” Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.

483, 488 (1955).

It would be a mistake similar in scope to the improvi-

dent jurisprudence of Lochner and its progeny for this

Court once again to substitute its judgment as to the

wisdom of an economic choice made by legislative and

- municipal officials. It would be ironic if the economic choice

to declare a public use and spend the public’s money for

that use were subjected to stricter judicial review under the

Takings Clause than the economic choice to regulate an

employer’s relationship with its employees under the Due

Process Clause, given that even the Lochner era saw great

deference to legislative determinations of public use; see

Gettysburg, 160 U.S. at 680; Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361

(1905); no doubt because legislation with compensation is

more palatable than legislation without.

As this Court recently noted in support of the decision

to uphold Washington’s IOLTA program against a Takings

Clause challenge, “[i]f the State had imposed a special tax,

or perhaps a system of user fees, to generate the funds to

finance the legal services supported by the Foundation,

there would be no question as to the legitimacy of the use of

the public’s money.” Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washing-

ton, 538 U.S. 216, 232 (2003) (emphasis added). But while

20

due process and equal protections challenges to economic

legislation receive the tender mercies of rational basis

review, the petitioners would have this Court eviscerate the

power of a state or municipality to use eminent domain in

order to achieve precisely the same end — economic health —

by barring the use of eminent domain for economic revitali-

zation.”

This Court should not sanction such an illogical dichot-

omy. The very same institutional concerns that historically

have motivated judicial deference to economic regulation

apply with equal force to economic action through eminent

domain. First, reviewing courts simply are “institutionally

unsuited to gather the facts upon which economic predic-

tions can be made, and professionally untrained to make

them.” General Motors, 519 U.S. at 308. As a result, this

Court “customarily ... declin[es] to engage in elaborate

analysis of real-world economic effects.... ” Id. at 309.

Answering such questions, fraught as they are with the

“complexities of factual economic proof,” is a task with

which courts generally have little familiarity and even less

expertise. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 342

(1996). The answers are better left to state and municipal

governments, which have the freedom and expert ability to

conduct “novel social and economic experiments.” New State

” The dissent in Brown raises the question whether an analogy to

taxation would reduce the public use requirement to a “negligible

impediment” because taxation is not subject to that requirement.

Brown, 538 U.S. at 242 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But taxation, in

most states, is subject to the well-recognized bounds of the police power.

A classic case is from Connecticut, State v. Travelers Ins. Co., 47 A. 299,

302-03 (Conn. 1900). This traditional police power informs the limits of

the public use requirement. Berman, 348 U.S. at 31-32. To say that

courts must give great deference to legislative findings of public use is

not to say that public use is a negligible impediment. No one suggests,

for example, that rational basis review under the Fourteenth Amend-

ment is a negligible impediment. See, e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal

Co. v. Comm'n of Webster City, 488 U.S. 336 (1989) (applying rational

basis review and overturning West Virginia property tax ruling on

Equal Protection grounds).

21

Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,

dissenting).

The second institutional concern arises out of the

insularity of courts from the democratic process. When

state and municipal officials make economic or social policy

decisions, the people whom those officials represent have

the opportunity to voice their opinions on those decisions at

the next election. So if the choice is disagreeable to enough

people, the consequences of that disagreement will become

evident through the political process. See Printz v. United

States, 521 U.S. 898, 957 n.18 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissent-

ing) (“to the extent that a particular action proves politi-

cally unpopular, we may be confident that elected officials

charged with implementing it will be quite clear to their

constituents where the source of the misfortune lies”). The

same cannot be said for economic choices made by unelected

judges, for whom the will of the people does not act as a

brake on their power. It is for this reason that, in a democ-

racy, judicial deference to economic decisions is the appro-

priate course. See Food & Drug Administration v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (“[t}he

responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy

choices and resolving the struggle between competing views

of the public interest are not judicial ones”).

Finally, federal court deference to the economic and

other policy decisions of state legislatures and municipali-

ties helps retain the appropriate balance between state and

federal power that is a hallmark of our federalist system.

Abandoning such deference in the name of the Takings

Clause by requiring the courts to engage in close scrutiny of

proposed takings would result in the undue concentration of

power in federal hands at the expense of the states. See

Brief of the National League of Cities, et al., as Amici

Curiae (“NLC Brief”), at 12-17; Brief of the Connecticut

Conference of Municipalities, et al., as Amici Curiae (“CCM

Brief”), at 3-4 & n.2-3. The federal courts — perhaps through

the medium of actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (which was

asserted here, although the petitioners chose to file in state

court) — would become the de facto arbiters in areas such as

economic health that traditionally are within the police

22

powers reserved to the states; areas in which this Court

historically has given state and local governments a great

deal of leeway to explore policy solutions. This result would

threaten not merely state and local authority, but individ-

ual liberty as well. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S.

144, 181 (1992) (“the Constitution divides authority be-

tween federal and state governments for the protection of

individuals”).

In sum, the reasons behind this Court’s traditional

deference to legislative or municipal determinations of

public use are valid ones which this Court should not

abandon. To the contrary, that deference should be the lens

through which the Court views the issues and facts of this

case.

B. Economic development constitutes a public

use as this Court traditionally has under-

stood that term because it is rationally re-

lated to a conceivable public purpose.

The appropriate starting point for this Court’s inquiry

is the clear statement by the Connecticut legislature that

economic development, and the acquisition of private

property necessary to further such development, is a

public use:

It is found and declared that the economic

welfare of the state depends upon the continued

growth of industry and business within the state;

that the acquisition and improvement of unified

land and water areas and vacated commercial

plants to meet the needs of industry and busi-

ness should be in accordance with local, regional

and state planning objectives; that such acquisi-

tion and improvement often cannot be accom-

plished through the ordinary operations of

private enterprise at competitive rates of pro-

gress and economies of cost; that permitting and

assisting municipalities to acquire and improve

unified land and water areas and to acquire and

improve or demolish vacated commercial plants

23

—

for industrial and business purposes and, in dis-

tressed municipalities, to lend funds to busi-

nesses and industries within a project area in

accordance with such planning objectives are

public uses and purposes for which public mon-

eys may be expended; and that the necessity in

the public interest for the provisions of this chap-

ter is hereby declared as a matter of legislative

determination.

Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-186.

As discussed supra in Section IA, this statement of

public use is entitled to great deference. Midkiff, 467 U.S.

at 241. Moreover, it is beyond dispute that the police

power — with which the concept of public use is “cotermi-

nous” — encompasses the maintenance of a state’s eco-

nomic well-being through the promotion of private

business and industry." See id. at 239-40. As this Court

pointed out 168 years ago, the police power is

not only the right, but the bounden and solemn

duty of a state, to advance the safety, happiness

and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its

general welfare, by any and every act of legisla-

tion, which it may deem conducive to these ends.

Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 139

(1837); see also Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. Under this expan-

sive definition, promoting the economic health of a state

by encouraging the development of business and industry

— and thereby ensuring jobs for that state’s citizens and

tax revenues for its coffers — certainly qualifies as a valid

exercise of the police power.

Indeed, the Connecticut Supreme Court was unani-

mous on this point. (Pet. App., 42, 172). Although the

dissent was not convinced that the petitioners’ properties

" Even the petitioners concede the importance of encouraging such

development to the lifeblood of a community. See Pet. Brief at 12

(“businesses, if they are successful, generate tax revenue, employ

individuals, and contribute to the overall vitality of a community”).

24

“actually will be developed to achieve a public purpose”;

(Pet. App. 170); the dissent agreed that the legislative

determination of public use in §8-186 is constitutional, and

that “the primary purpose of the takings is to benefit the

public.” (Pet. App. 176).

The petitioners, on the other hand, dispute the valid-

ity of economic development as a public purpose and — in

spite of clear findings to the contrary by the trial court and

the emphatic rejection of their claim by the Connecticut

Supreme Court — continue to insinuate that the primary

purpose of such takings generally, and these takings in

particular, is to benefit a specific private party, in this

case, Pfizer. The petitioners would have the Court lay

down a bright-line rule barring the use of eminent domain

for economic development simply because the very real

public benefits achieved by that development will come to

pass, in part, through the activity of private entities. Such

a rule has no basis in this Court’s jurisprudence or the

history of the Takings Clause; nor will a holding that

economic development constitutes a public use result in

the parade of horribles that the petitioners posit. This

Court therefore should reject the petitioners’ attempt to

circumscribe the power of eminent domain in such a

dangerous fashion.

1. This Court consistently has upheld the

constitutional validity of using eminent

domain to create public benefits through

the re-transfer of private property.

On five occasions in the past half-century, this Court

has upheld the re-transfer of private property to another

private party against Takings Clause challenges because

of the public benefits created by the re-transfer. This clear

line of precedent - which receives scant attention in the

petitioners’ brief — should be controlling on the general

question of whether economic development is permitted

under the Takings Clause.

25

The seminal case in this Court’s modern” Takings

Clause jurisprudence is Berman v. Parker, supra. In

Berman, owners of property condemned pursuant to the

District of Columbia Redevelopment Act challenged the

Act’s constitutionality. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28. One of the

specific challenges was that the Act authorized the resale

of the condemned properties to other private entities; in

fact, §7(g) of the Act specifically gave “[p]reference ... to

private enterprise over public agencies in executing the

redevelopment plan.” Jd. at 30. The owners argued that

“this makes the project a taking from one businessman for

the benefit of another businessman.” Jd. at 33.

The Court unanimously rejected this claim. In keep-

ing with the deference to legislative wisdom discussed in

Section IA, supra, the Court held that “the means of

executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone

to determine, once the public purpose has been estab-

lished.” Jd. The Court then recognized that “[t)he public

end may be as well or better served through an agency of

private enterprise than through a department of govern-

ment — or so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say

that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the

public purposes of community redevelopment projects.” Id.

at 33-34 (emphasis added).

The petitioners attempt to minimize the significance

of Berman by arguing that the public purpose in that case

was the removal of blighted slums, and that “[o]nce that

public use was accomplished and the blight removed,

transfer of the cleared land to a private party was accept-

able.” (Pet. Brief at 25). But the petitioners never offer any

authority for their novel proposition that re-transfer to a

“ Even prior to Berman, this Court “long ago rejected any literal

requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general

public.” Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244; see Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262

U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (“[i]t is not essential that the entire community,

nor even any considerable portion, should directly enjoy or participate

in an improvement in order to constitute a public use”).

26

private party for economic development — which the D.C.

Act specifically envisioned — suddenly becomes constitu-

tionally “acceptable” merely because of an intervening

event. Moreover, the petitioners’ exclusive focus on blight

elimination ignores §6 of the D.C. Act, which, like the Fort

Trumbull MDP, mandated the creation of “a comprehen-

sive or general plan’ of the District, including ‘a land-use

plan’ which designates land for use for ‘housing, business,

industry, recreation, education, public buildings, public

reservations, and other ... public and private uses of the

land.” Berman, 348 U.S. at 29. This part of the Act, with

its requirement of a plan for Washington’s rejuvenation,

employs the tool of re-transfer in order to do far more than

merely eliminate blight.

This Court reached a similar conclusion in Hawaii

Housing Authority v. Midkiff, supra, in which the Court

unanimously upheld the constitutionality of Hawaii’s Land

Reform Act, which authorized the condemnation of large

tracts of leased residential property and the subsequent

transfer of ownership of the condemned parcels to their

respective lessees, who provided the funds for the just

compensation payments. Jd. at 233. Although it is true

that the principal public use in that case was the disman-

tling of Hawaii’s feudal property system, that public use

has an ironic analogy in the present case. In Midkiff, the

concentration of the land ownership led to a failure of the

market economy necessitating government intervention;

here the wide dispersal of land ownership (into tenths of

an acre) also leads to a failure of the market economy due

to the inability to assemble commercially viable parcels for

development, as Connecticut’s statutory scheme clearly

anticipates.

In any event, Midkiff is not solely about oligopoly. The

Hawaii Act also contains requirements governing the

future use of the condemned land — e.g., that a lessee, in

order to be eligible, must have “a bona fide intent to live

on the lot or be a resident of the State... .” Jd. at 233 n.1.

Such a requirement is an expression of public purpose

27

beyond the mere elimination of an oligarchy. Finally,

Midkiff reaffirms the broad language of Berman about the

extremely limited judicial role in determining public use.

This Court issued yet another clear statement regard-

ing the constitutionality of re-transfer to a private party in

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine

Corp., supra. In National Railroad, the Interstate Com-

merce Commission — at the behest of the petitioner Na-

tional Railroad (AMTRAK) — condemned 48.8 miles of

railroad track owned by Boston & Maine (BM). National

Railroad, 503 U.S. at 409-10. Prior to the condemnation,

AMTRAK had entered into an agreement with the Central

Vermont Railroad (CV), BM’s chief competitor, “to at once

reconvey the track to CV, and to provide up to $3.1 million

to upgrade and rehabilitate the segment.” Jd. at 412.

In spite of this obvious boon to a specific private party

(CV), this Court soundly rejected Boston & Maine’s claim

that the taking was not for a public use because the re-

transfer to CV was intended to effect significant long-term

public benefits (i.e., improving passenger rail service). Jd.

at 422. According to Justice Kennedy's majority” opinion:

In both Midkiff and Berman, as in the present

case, condemnation resulted in the transfer of

ownership from one private party to another,

with the basic use of the property by the govern-

ment remaining unchanged. The Court held

these exercises of the condemnation power to be

constitutional, as long as the condemning au-

thorities were rational in their positions that

some public purpose was served... . That suffices

to satisfy the Constitution, and we need not make

a specific factual determination whether the con-

demnation will accomplish its objectives.

* Justices White, Blackmun and Thomas dissented on an issue

unrelated to the public use question. National Railroad, 503 U.S. at

424-28. -

28

Id. at 422-23 (emphasis added).* See also Brown, 538 U.S.

at 232 (taking of interest on clients’ funds to fund legal

services for indigent litigants valid public use); Ruckelshaus

v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014-16 (1984) (public

disclosure of pesticide data pursuant to FIFRA, which made

data available to other manufacturers and effected taking,

valid public use).

At the end of the day, the petitioners advance no cogent

reason for this Court to reverse this long line of decisions

upholding the re-transfer of condemned property to a

private party, So long as the re-transfer will result in a

substantial public benefit. While the Berman-Midkiff-

National Railroad line of cases is, by itself, reason enough

to uphold the validity of a taking for economic development,

both the history of takings in our country and considera-

tions of public policy also support such a holding.

2. There is a long history of using the

power of eminent domain to achieve a

public good through re-transfer of con-

demned property to a private entity.

This Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence has, for

more than a century, taken a “broad” view of public use.

Moreover, the narrow reading urged by the petitioners is

more wishful thinking than historical fact. The history of

eminent domain authority demonstrates that a taking could

be for a public use 2ven if a private entity benefited from

“The petitioners’ assessment of National Railroad as merely

another common carrier case ignores the crucial distinctions between

National Railroad and those cases. See infra, Section IB(2). In National

Railroad, unlike this Court’s railroad decisions from the late nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries, the condemnation was not necessary to

allow the construction of a straight line of track because the track had

already been built and was in operation. The government was therefore

taking a functioning segment of railway track from one operator and

giving it to another. What is more, in National Railroad, the beneficiary

of the government's use of eminent domain was a specific, knowe

private company in competition with the condemnee - a situation not

found in earlier railroad cases, nor in this case. —

. 29

the taking or if a private entity was the condemnor. Indeed,

the common thread running through this entire history,

from colonial times until the present, is that the public

often benefits greatly from takings that result in use of the

condemned property by another private entity — and that

the only relevant constitutional inquiry is whether the

public benefits from the condemnation.

The framers of our Constitution drafted the Takings

Clause against the background of “a concept of property

which permitted extensive regulation of the use of that

property for the public benefit....” Lucas v. South Caro-

lina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1056 (1992) (Black-

mun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Proscribing limits on

this pewer via a restrictive view of public use apparently

“was nct high among the concerns of those debating the Bill

of Rights ... [as] the framers may well have assumed that

representative government would adequately protect

against abuses of eminent domain ....” Errol E. Meid-

inger, The “Public Uses” of Eminent Domain: History and

Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1, 17-18 (1980) (emphasis added). This

is not surprising, given the Lockean premise that the

consent necessary for the expropriation of property could be

implied from the decision of Parliament to take the prop-

erty. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 378,

380 (Peter Laslett ed., 1967).

This deferential attitude- necessarily informs any

understanding of colonial land use policy. During the

colonial era, the government often exercised its eminent

domain authority, or permitted private individuals to do so

on its behalf, in ways which specifically benefited private

parties. For example, a number of colonies imposed affirma-

tive use requirements on landowners - so that if a property

owner failed to make proper use of his land, he would forfeit

title and the land might be sold to another private owner.

John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance

for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1252, 1260

(1996). This process occurred in urban settings as well.

During the period of Dutch ownership of New York (then

New Amsterdam), owners of unimproved lots often forfeited

title to the government, which then conveyed those lots to

30

new purchasers, in return for a “reasonable indemnity at

the discretion of the Street Surveyors”. Id. at 1277-78

(citation omitted).

Nor was unused land the only context in which colonial

era state governments exercised the power of eminent

domain for the benefit of private entities. Legislatures often

redirected private property towards some other private use

thought to be more advantageous for the common good —

e.g., land thought to be suitable for mills or ironworks, or

land being farmed individually that legislators thought

better suited for a common field. Hart, supra at 1282-83. In

addition, eminent domain sometimes was used to take land

for private rights-of-way. While these roads often were built

to allow landlocked owners access to public highways, many

of the roads thus created remained private even though

eminent domain had been used to acquire the land for

them. Meidinger, supra at 14; Lawrence Berger, The Public

Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OREGON L. REV.

201, 207 (1978). Finally, a number of states enacted legisla-

tion during the colonial era that compelled owners of

wetlands to engage in compulsory drainage projects and

share the costs of drainage projects for the financial benefit

of neighbors who could farm the drained areas. Hart, supra

at 1270.

Although colonial governments generally were scrupu-

lous about providing compensation for outright takings,

their aggressive land use policy speaks volumes with

respect to any original understanding of the Takings

Clause. As Professor Hart summarizes it, in colonial times

[t]he preferences of landowners were regularly

subordinated to a vision of the public good that

embraced many objectives beyond protecting

health and safety. In regulating land use, the gov-

ernment sought benefits for the public, not just

avoidance of harm. The government often acted

simply to encourage a publicly preferred use of

private land — to rationalize or optimize private

land use.

Id. at 1291.

31

The notion of using eminent domain authority to

achieve a public good -— even if the method includes re-

transfer to another private owner — did not end with the

enactment of the Fifth Amendment. In the late eighteenth

and nineteenth centuries, numerous states passed so-called

Mill Acts, pursuant to which the owner of downstream land

could build a dam to power a mill even if that dam caused

the flooding of an upstream owner’s land. Berger, supra at

206. By 1884, twenty-nine states had such Acts. Jd.

These mills were not always “analogous to public

utilities now and subject to common carrier regulations.”

(Pet. Brief at 22). In one of the seminal mill cases, O/mstead

v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532 (1866), the Connecticut Supreme

Court permitted a mill owner to flood his neighbor’s land, in

exchange for compensation, even though the owner was

under no legal obligation to grant public access to his mill,

or to mill grain himself for the public at-large.” Id. at 537,

552. In language that would be echoed by this Court more

than a century later, the Olmstead Court justified its

decision by noting that “any appropriating of private

property by the state under its right of eminent domain for

purposes of great advantage to the community, is a taking

for public use.” Id. at 546. That the public had no right of

access to, or right to use, the mill itself, did not alter the

Olmstead Court’s conclusion. Id. at 551. Olmstead was cited

favorably by this Court in Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113

USS. 9, 26 (1885).

* Olmstead is not alone in this conclusion. See Harding v. Funk, 8

Kan. 315, 1871 WL 785 at *7 (1871) (“liJt has never been deemed

essential that the entire community, or considerable portion of it,

should directly enjoy or participate in an improvement .r enterprise in

order to constitute a public use”); Miller v. Troost, 14 Minn. 365, 1869

WL 2322 at *2 (1869); Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1832 WL

_ 2274 at *21 (N.J. Ch. 1832) (mill was for public use even though owners

were “under no obligation to let the public participate in the immediate

‘profits of their undertaking”); see also Brief of the American Planning

Association, et al., as Amici Curiae (“APA Brief”) at 9.

32

The development of our nation’s railroads continued

this trend of permitting a private company to benefit

directly from the taking of private property, so long as the

main beneficiary was the public. Indeed, in many of the

railroad cases, the power of eminent domain was delegated

to the railroad companies themselves, to use as the compa-

nies deemed necessary. See Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v.

Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386, 393 (1892). Although part of the

justification for this was the status of railroads as common

carriers and the regulation of the railroad industry by the

federal government, that is hardly the end of the story.

Indeed, this Court and other courts have permitted railroad

condemnations that were not necessary for the assembly of

narrow, straight tracts of land, but which were useful to the

railway companies’ fiscal health. See Hairston v. Dansville

& Western Railroad Co., 208 U.S. 598 (1908) (railroad

permitted to condemn land for spur track to reach factory of

large tobacco shipper); Wilson v. Pittsburgh & L.E. Railroad

Co., 72 A. 235 (Pa. 1909) (railroad permitted to condemn

private property for water tanks).

Moreover, even those condemnations that involved only

the acquisition of land necessary for straight lines of track

also involved direct and immediate benefits to the railroad

companies — i.e., the massive profits generated by a virtual

monopoly on interstate commerce and travel. Although very

real, the public goods created by the railroads arose as a by-

product of that monopoly. This is not unlike the public

benefits from economic development, which, although very

real and often substantial, come into being as a result of

private profit and private benefit due to an earlier taking.

In sum, the history of land use policy in this country

demonstrates a willingness to allow the re-transfer of

private property to another private owner to ensure that

the property was being put to the most economically benefi-

cial use. Any original understanding of the Takings Clause

must take that history into account.

33

3. The power of eminent domain is a neces-

sary tool in urban development for over-

coming barriers to land assembly.

There is another significant similarity between the use

of eminent domain for railroads and the use of eminent

domain for economic development — a similarity that belies

the petitioners’ attempt to distinguish the railroad cases.

Relying on County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765

(Mich. 2004), the petitioners assert that railroad cases are

unusual because they require “coordination of land assem-

bly ... and could be thwarted by hold-outs.” (Pet. Brief at

21). The petitioners then quote the Hathcock Court’s

distinction of economic development from uses “whose very

existence depends on the use of land that can be assembled

only by the coordination central government alone is

capable of achieving.” Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781 (em-

phasis in original).

What the petitioners refuse to acknowledge is that this

very same problem exists to just as great a degree in urban

economic development as it does in railroad building. It has

long been recognized that eminent domain authority serves

the valuable function in our society of providing the means

for the government to overcome market barriers that might

otherwise halt economic and social progress. See, e.g.,

RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§3.6-3.7 (3rd

Ed. 1986); Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fair-

ness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Com-

pensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. REv. 1165, 1175-76 (1967). In

this fashion, eminent domain acts as a lubrizant for the

market machinery, overcoming “barriers to voluntary

exchange created when a seller of resources is in position to

extract economic rents from a buyer.” Thomas Merrill, The

Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 65 (1986).

“ Hathcock also holds, solely under the Michigan Constitution,

that “public use” is narrower than “public purpose”. Hathcock, 684

N.W.2d at 775-76. It thus follows a different path than has this Court —

a path without sound logical or jurisprudential federal underpinnings.

See APA Brief, at 14-19.

34

In his seminal study of the purpose of the power of

eminent domain in a free market, Professor Merrill notes

the danger to necessary economic and social development of

so-called hold-outs. In a “thin market,” where the seller

owns property uniquely suitable for the buyer’s needs, it

“can lead to monopoly pricing by the seller, to unacceptably

high transaction costs, or to both.” Jd. Such market barriers

often are found in the assembly of the numerous contiguous

pieces of land needed for major public or private develop-

ments. Jd. at 75-76. In such a scenario, “each owner is a

monopolist, effectively dominating a resource needed to

complete the project. Each owner can thereby engage in

monopoly pricing, that is, can set his price well above the

opportunity cost of the needed resource.” Jd. at 75. This

danger is even greater when subjective factors — such as

sentimental attachment to the property — enter into the

equation. Jd. at 83. In such a scenario, no amount of money

would persuade these sentimental hold-outs to sell, creating

a high obstacle to a project for the greater good.

In the urban setting, this assembly problem often is the

biggest barrier to development, a fact expressly recognized

by the Connecticut legislature. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§4-

66b & 8-186. While the land necessary for economic revi-

talization in suburban or rural areas often can be acquired

from a handful of landowners, in a city assembling a parcel

large enough to be of use in improving the city’s economy

necessitates dealing with dozens of landowners.” Indeed,

this Court recognized that very dilemma in Berman, noting

that “[iJf owner after owner were permitted to resist these

redevelopment programs on the ground that his particular

property was not being used against the public interest,

integrated plans for redevelopment would suffer greatly.”

Berman, 348 U.S. at 35; see also Fallbrook Irrigation Dist.

v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161-62 (1896). If a few hold-outs

may block a development project designed to renew the

"’ New London is a classic example of the urban assembly problem:

a geographically minuscule city composed of hundreds of small proper-

ties. See Part II of Respondents’ Brief, infra.

35

economic prosperity of a city, opportunities for urban

economic development in the near future will be few and far

between. Having the tools necessary to overcome these

obstacles — including, if necessary, the power of eminent

domain — is therefore vital to the economic health of every

city in this country. See NLC Brief, at 20-30; CCM Brief, at

3-4 & n.2-3.

4. The inherent transaction costs of eminent

domain, and the inherent checks on the

abuse of eminent domain that exist in a

democracy, provide sufficient assurance

that economic development will not ren-

der the public use requirement a nullity.

In lieu of a coherent constitutional theory grounded in

this Court’s prior decisions, the petitioners devote the first

half of their brief to an exercise in Chicken Littleism.

According to the petitioners, “the unfettered sweep of the

[Connecticut Supreme Court’s] opinion places all home and

small business owners at risk, especially property owners of

more modest means.” (Pet. Brief at 12). However, the

petitioners ignore several important brakes along their

slippery slope.

First, there are inherent transaction costs that often

make eminent domain an unattractive or even unfeasible

alternative for municipalities and would-be developers.

According to Professor Merrill:

First, and most important, legislatures must au-

thorize the exercise of eminent domain. It is thus

necessary to persuade a legislature to grant the

power of eminent domain, or, if a general grant of

the power already exists, to persuade officials to

exercise it. Second, the due process clauses of the

fifth and fourteenth amendments, as well as local

statutes and rules, impose various procedural re-

quirements upon the exercise of eminent domain.

At a minimum, these include drafting and filing a

formal judicial complaint and service of process on

the owner. Third, nearly all jurisdictions require

36

at least one professional appraisal of the con-

demned property, something generally not done

(or not done as formally) in a private sale. Finally,

both court-made and statutory law guarantee a

person whose property is subject to condemnation

some sort of hearing on the condemnation’s legal-

ity and the amount of compensation due.

Merrill, supra at 77. These inherent transaction costs were

incurred in this case — as well as the more obvious costs of

millions of dollars in just compensation and millions more

in relocation assistance, none of which will be paid by a

private party.”

Given these transaction costs, which often make

eminent domain a much more expensive method of acquir-

ing property than market exchange, “the decision whether

to use eminent domain should be, from an economic

perspective, self-regulating.” Jd. at 78. In other words,

because it requires the expenditure of significant sums of

public money - to plan an economic development project,

to acquire the property and to litigate - eminent domain is

likely to remain a tool of last resort for municipalities.

Economic self-interest is hardly the only built-in check

on eminent domain; political self-interest will have that

effect as well. As with the abuse of any form of government

power, popular dissatisfaction with the abuse of eminent

domain, especially if used for the benefit of private industry,

will eventually make itself felt at the ballot box. Indeed, the

threat of such electoral consequences likely will act as a

deterrent to most questionable uses of the power of eminent

domain. Although the petitioners prophesy a world in which

“ Under Connecticut law, the taking authority must pay the

condemnee the full and fair market value of his property and deposit

that sum in escrow with the Connecticut Superior Court at the time of

the condemnation. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-193 (incorporating Conn.

Gen. Stat. §§8-129 & 8-130).

37

churches are replaced by Walmarts, that cynical forecast

does not account for the democratic process.”

In fact, the petitioners’ dire predictions notwithstand-

ing, their brief actually identifies yet another potential

check on the abuse of eminent domain - the state courts.

The petitioners cite several recent state court decisions

striking down an exercise of eminent domain to further

economic development as not beirg for a valid public use.

See Hathcock, supra; Georgia Dept. of Transportation uv.

Jasper County, 586 S.E.2d 853 (S.C. 2003); Southwest

Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environ-

mental, 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002) (SWIDA). These cases —

which invalidated takings either solely or principally under

their respective state constitutions - serve as examples of

the healthy balance between state and federal judicial

authority necessary in a federalist system of government.

Nor is it mere wishful thinking to regard the state courts as

the principal bulwarks against the abuse of eminent do-

main. See Merrill, supra at 96-97 (between 1954 and 1985,

over 16 percent of state court decisions on public use

question invalidated takings as not being for public use);

Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle Over the Public Use Clause:

Survey of Holdings and Trends, 1986-2003, 39 R. PRop.,

PROBATE & TrusT J. 251, 258 (2004) (over 17 percent

between 1986 and 2003).

Finally, to the extent that the petitioners raise the

specter of the arbitrary or capricioWS exercise of the

power of eminent domain by municipalities without any

judicial check, the Connecticut Supreme Court has

demonstrated several times in the past few years that it

will not tolerate such nefarious behavior. See Aposporos

” Eminent domain presents a situation far different from one in

which the constitutional rights of a small minority of the population are

threatened by the tyranny of the majority because of unpopularity or

bigotry. Because the exercise of eminent domain does not single out a

particular group, property rights therefore are not subject to attack in

the same fashion as the right to free speech or the rights of religious,

racial or ethnic minorities.

38

v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 790 A.2d 1167 (Conn.

2002) (reversing condemnation due to inadequate findings of

blight); Pequonnock Yacht Club, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport,

790 A.2d 1178 (Conn. 2002) (affirming injunction against

condemnation due to failure of defendants to consider

integration of plaintiff's property); AvalonBay Communities,

Inc. v. Town of Orange, 775 A.2d 284 (Conn. 2001) (affirming

injunction barring implementation of plan adopted in bad

faith as pretext to thwart affordable housing).

The Connecticut Supreme Court’s opinion in the

present case only reinforces that intolerance of municipal

misbehavior. First, although it generally adhered to the

deference mandated by Berman and Midkiff, the “primary

purpose” standard enunciated in Kelo actually is more

stringent than either Berman or Midkiff. This standard

presupposes at least some inquiry into the reasons for the

legislative or municipal takings decision beyond whether it

is “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose”. This

is buttressed by the Court’s detailed discussion of the

“particularly egregious set of facts” that led the [Illinois

Supreme Court to declare a taking unconstitutional in

SWIDA. The Connecticut Supreme Court’s express ac-

knowledgement that it may be appropriate to invalidate a

taking when, as in the SWIDA case, an agency clearly has

exercised its eminent domain authority for the primary

benefit of another, specific private entity, belies the peti-

tioners’ contention that the Kelo decision drains the mean-

ing and substance out of the public use requirement.

Il. THE EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN AU-

THORITY BY THE RESPONDENTS IN THIS

CASE SATISFIES THE PUBLIC USE RE-

QUIREMENT.

In keeping with this Court’s oft-stated rule of great

deference to legislative statements of public use, “it is only

the taking’s purpose, and not its mechanics, that must

pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause.” Midkiff, 467

U.S. at 244. For the reasons that follow, this Court should

decline the petitioners’ invitation to impose a new and

39

more rigorous standard of review for compensated takings.

However, even under the intrusive system of means-ends

scrutiny proposed in the petitioners’ brief, the specific

benefits that are the likely result of the MDP are more than

sufficient for the plan to pass constitutional muster.

A. This Court should adhere to the level of

scrutiny traditionally employed for com-

pensated takings.

For the reasons discussed in more detail supra, this

Court has been loath to scrutinize a legislative determina-

tion as to whether an economic decision serves a public

purpose. Courts are not only institutionally unsuited to

making such predictive judgments, but also are unbound by

the restraints of the democratic process that limit elected

officials. As such, great deference to legislative decision-

making in this area is the proper judicial role. See Nectow v.

City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928).

This Court employs precisely the same deference in the

Takings Clause context. In fact, the Court has never im-

posed any form of heightened scrutiny with respect to a

compensated taking, even though several of this Court’s

cases involved takings for the benefit of a private party. See

NLC Brief at 8-11. To the contrary, in National Railroad,

after concluding that the condemnation and re-transfer to a

private party was a proper public use, this Court declined to

“make a specific factual determination whether the con-

demnation will accomplish its objectives.” National Rail-

road, 503 U.S. at 422-23. The Court has required greater

scrutiny only with respect to uncompensated exactions; i.e.,

when the government conditions the grant of a building

permit on the permittee’s willingness to allow a public

right-of-way across his property. See Dolan v. City of Ti-

gard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal

Comm’n, supra.

The Nollan/Dolan rule - which requires a “nexus”

between some substantial public purpose and the means

chosen to achieve that interest and, if such a nexus exists,

“rough proportionality” between the government-imposed

40

condition and the anticipated impacts of the permitted

construction — makes sense only in the narrow realm of

uncompensated exactions. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385, 391;

Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836 n.3, 837. Indeed, this Court ex-

pressly held as much in City of Monterey v. Del Monte

Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702-03 (1999).

The need for heightened scrutiny in the Nollan/Dolan

scenario was born out of the concern that the government

might use a property owner’s desire for a permit to compel

the owner’s acquiescence to a permanent physical occupa-

tion of his property — an occupation that otherwise would

constitute a per se taking requiring compensation. See

Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834. In other words, the concern was

that the government would use the permitting process as

an end-run around the just compensation requirement.

This concern obviously does not apply to the compensated

takings in this case. See First English, 482 U.S. at 314-15.

The “reasonable certainty” test proposed by the peti-

tioners for takings involving a re-transfer of the condemned

property lacks any foundation in either logic or this Court’s

jurisprudence. The petitioners cite only one decision of this

Court as even arguably supporting heightened scrutiny:

United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. at 680.

However, the quoted dicta in Gettysburg must be read in

light of its actual holding:

[W]hen the legislature has declared the use or

purpose to be a public one, its judgment will be

respected by the courts, unless the use be palpa-

bly without reasonable foundation. Many authori-

ties are cited in the note, and, indeed, the rule

commends itself as a rational and proper one.

Id. Indeed, Midkiff expressly relies on Gettysburg in its

formulation of the deferential standard of review on public

use.” Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.

” The petitioners also cite Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (1930),

for the proposition that a public use must be “a known use” in order to

pass constitutional muster. The petitioners simply ignore the fact that

this Court expressly refused to decide the constitutional issue presented

(Continued on following page)

41

The petitioners’ other arguments are equally meritless.

Their (somewhat mutually contradictory) assertions that

the benefits of the MDP are too speculative, and that it is

not necessary to take the petitioners’ properties in order to

achieve those benefits, are discussed infra in Section IIB.

Their claim that heightened scrutiny is warranted because

“[e]minent domain forces some people to bear a burden that

should be, but cannot be, borne by all[,]” (Pet. Brief at 32),

says nothing unique about either eminent domain for

economic development or about re-transfer cases. After all,

in every instance that it is used, the power of eminent

domain places a greater burden on certain individuals than

society at large — this is true for roads, schools, prisons, all

of the “traditional” public uses lauded by the petitioners.

The constitutional remedy for that (however little the

petitioners wish to acknowleage it) is just compensation.

In sum, there simply is no principled reason to impose

— for the first time with respect to compensated takings — a

heightened degree of scrutiny. This Court has never coun-

tenanced such an interference with the legislative and

municipal prerogative and it should not do so here. So long

as a taking is related to a rational public purpose, this

Court should do what it did in National Railroad and

uphold the taking.

B. Under any standard of review, the takings in

this case satisfy the public use requirement.

It is clear that, as a general matter, economic develop-

ment satisfies the public use requirement, even when that

development takes place through the medium of re-transfer

to a private entity. In the present case, the need for such

development is undisputed — the petitioners quibble only

with the efficacy and necessity of the methods chosen by the

respondents and set forth in the MDP to achieve the as-

serted public purpose. However, those quibbles are not

in Vester because the case could be resolved on a point of Ohio statutory

law. Id. at 448-49.

See

—_

42

supported by the factual record. To the contrary, the facts

demonstrate that there is more than a reasonable likelihood

that the projected benefits of the MDP will come to pass

and that the proposed takings are therefore necessary to

the economic rejuvenation of New London.”

New London’s severe economic distress, discussed in

detail supra, makes the need for economic revitalization

much more compelling than would be the case in a city that

was thriving. In any takings situation, a municipal exercise

of eminent domain power must bear some rational relation-

ship to a problem of which the correction is within the

sphere of the police power. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240. There-

fore, the more severe the problem, the more necessary is a

municipal response to it, if municipal authorities are to

fulfill their role to adjust “the burdens and benefits of

economic life... . ” Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428

1J.S. 1, 15 (1976). Moreover, “he MDP already has resulted

in significant non-economic benefits for the people of New

London. These immediate benefits include large-scale

environmental remediation; creation of public access to the

Thames River via the Riverwalk; improvements to the city’s

roads, sewers, water and power lines; and the filling of flood

plain areas. (J.A. 140-41, 143-47, 159-60, 180-81, 442-43,

718-21).

It is equally as important that the MDP was not a

hastily cobbled-together midnight deal. It was the product

" For the reasons set forth in Sections IA and IIA, the respondents

believe that it would be inappropriate for this Court to adopt a height-

ened standard of proof for economic development takings. However, it is

noteworthy that the Connecticut Supreme Court, in considering

whether the claimed public benefits of the MDP would come to pass,

required a finding of “reasonable assurances of future public use... . ”

(Pet. App. 73). If the petitioners are attempting to impose an even

stricter standard of proof with their “reasonable certainty” test, they

simply are trying to halt most economic development condemnations

through the back door of an unreasonable standard of proof. To

paraphrase the Connecticut Supreme Court, it would be hard to see

how predictions of future economic events ever can be proved with the

high level of certainty proposed by the petitioners. (Pet. App. 74 n.62).

43

of a comprehensive and public process designed to alleviate

many of New London’s problems by creating thousands of

jobs, greatly increasing the city’s tax revenues and modern-

izing its building stock, streets and sewers. This process

included a detailed analysis of six possible options for the

MDP. See note 10, supra. Thereafter, a detailed marketing

study was conducted by a potential developer, Corcoran

Jennison, which ultimately was selected from a group of

applicants to be the developer for much of the MDP. (J.A.

30-82; Pet. App. 66). Moreover, contrary to the suggestion in

the petitioners’ brief, the NLDC, and any private developers

to whom property is leased, will not simply be left to run

things as they see fit while the city and its residents hope

that these benefits materialize. In fact, the MDP is subject

to numerous statutory and contractual controls.

Chief among these is Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-189, which

requires multiple and specific details in any development

plan regarding the need for development and the benefits of

a Aen mse gs - 5 oa age of the number of jobs

created; a mar ility plan; a financing plan; an

administrative plan; and a finding that the plan will

contribute to the economic welfare of the municipality and

the state. Id. Section 8-189 also requires oversight of the

development by the state to ensure that any development

plan conforms to state regulations and other statewide and

regional plans of development. Jd. Furthermore, in Cun-

necticut, no municipality can use eminent domain for

economic development without the approval of the Execu-

tive Branch and continued state oversight. All of those

requirements were met in this case.

A number of other statutes provide control over eco-

nomic development plans as well. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-

190 (state may make planning grants and advise develop-

ment agency); Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-191 (state must approve

final development plan if state grants have been made);

Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-193(a) (if state grants have been made,

department and city must approve land transfers by sale or

lease in accordance with plan); and Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-

200(a) (“substantial” changes to development plan require

approval in same manner as original plan). In fact, the

44

state itself is a “signatory to the development agreement; it

‘provides the funding without which nothing goes forward.’”

(Pet. App. 74). The MDP, and any modifications thereto, is

in effect for 30 years, and any parcel in the plan area must

be devoted principally to the uses contemplated by the

MDP. (Pet. App. 75 & n.64).

In accordance with these statutory controls, both the

trial court and the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded

that state and city would have sufficient control over the

NLDC to ensure that neither it nor any private developer

leasing any part of the property would be “able to act

according to its own ‘will and caprice’.... ” (Pet. App. 75

n.63). This conclusion is buttressed by the MDP’s require-

~—~wnent that any redeveloper

[agree] for itself and its successors and assigns as

successors in interest to the parcel, or any part

thereof, that the deed conveying the Parcel shall

contain language covenanting on the part of Re-

developer and its successors and assigns that:

The Parcel shall be devoted principally to the

uses contemplated by the Plan, and shall not be

used or devoted for any other purpose, or contrary

to any of the limitations or requirements of said

Plan. All improvements made pursuant to the

Plan and this Agreement shall be used in accor-

dance with the Plan unless prior written consent is

given by the [development corporation] and [de-

partment] for a different use;

The Parcel shall not be sold, leased, or other-

wise disposed of for the purposes of speculation.

(Pet. App. 75 n.64) (emphasis added). These contractual

obligations act as a bar to any future-redeveloper that

might lease property in the MDP area from the NLDC from

making use of the property in a way not in accordance with

the MDP. Moreover, these obligations are buttressed by the

fact that the redeveloper will not own the property, but will

lease it from the NLDC. There is also no evidence that any

non-governmental entity will pay any portion of the just

compensation to the petitioners.

45

Taken together, these statutory and contractual con-

trols give reasunable assurance that it is the State of

Connecticut arid the City of New London, and not either the

NLDC or those developers to whom space is leased, which

will exercise final control over the future of the MDP.

Indeed, although the city has designated the NLDC as its

agent for economic development pursuant to §8-188, noth-

ing in that statute, or Connecticut law in general, prevents

that designation from being withdrawn. In that sense, the

city always has the ultimate form of control over the NLDC

because the city can take away ali of the NLDC’s power by

simply un-designating it. (Pet. App. 219).

The same reasonable assurance exists that the pro-

posed benefits to New London’s economy and infrastructure

are likely to take place. With respect to Parcel 3, the peti-

tioners have taken a few isolated comments from a market-

ing study performed in 2000 by Corcoran Jennison (the

company designated to lease the office space in Parcel 3)

and simply ignored the many other parts of the record that

demonstrate the viability of the use of Parcel 3. For exam-

ple, that very same marketing study found that “rental rate

and occupancy trends [in New London] have been generally

positive over the past few years....” (J.A. 38). The study

characterizes the market for Class A office space in New

London as “quite healthy,” and notes that “there has been a

positive demand for Class A & B office space over the past

four years. Between October 1996 and October 1999,

approximately 185,000 square feet were absorbed-itn New

London.” (J.A. 41-42) (emphasis added). It is telling that the

petitioners’ brief never addresses this fact.” In addition,

™ The petitioners’ assertion that the office space will only be built

at some unknown, and likely far-off, time in the future also is belied by

the facts. According to the record, Corcoran Jennison “intend[ed) to

select a brokerage firm no later [than] March 31, 2001 and to commence

the marketing of the commercial space as soon as possible thereafter.”

(J.A. 75-76). Indeed, a careful examination of the very time-line

trumpeted by the petitioners in their brief shows that —- were it not for

the current litigation — much of the office space slated for Parcel 3 could

have been either completed or under construction. (J.A. 46-48, 73).

46

there was ample testimony that the presence of Pfizer in

New London would act as a spur in the commercial real

estate market in keepifig with the demand for office and

research space envisioned by Parcel 3.”

The proposed uses for Parcel 4A also are sufficiently

well-defined. As the Connecticut Supreme Court opinion

notes, the MDP envisions two uses for Parcel 4A: park

support and marina support.” (Pet. App. 125-26; J.A. 111-

12). Understood in their proper context — the size of Parcel

4A, and its placement within the overall plan for Fort

Trumbull — these proposed uses are not speculative. Parcel

4A is 2.4 acres in size and is situated in the middle of the

plan area, sandwiched between a waste water treatment

facility and Fort Trumbull State Park. (J.A. 4). It is the only

parcel which can possibly be used to connect the rest of the

project to the marina and Fort Trumbull State Park. It

certainly is not irrational to designate a small parcel of land

adjoining a 16-acre state park for park support, especially

when that parcel’s other principal neighbor, a waste water

treatment facility, makes it less suitable for other functions.

The same thing is true regarding use of Parcel 4A for

marina support because immediately to the south of Parcel

4A is Parcel 4B, which is slated to contain a marina. Viewed

in light of its location, the proposed uses of Parcel 4A make

a great deal of sense.

That the 90-acre plan area itself is surrounded on three

sides by water has an obvious jtapact on the uses of Parcel

* The petitioners’ assertion that the clear intent of the MDP was to

benefit Pfizer, rather than merely to take advantage of its presence in

the city, is not only contradicted by the findings of the trial court and

the majority opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, but by the

dissent as well. (Pet. App. 70-71, 176). Moreover, as the majority opinion

notes, Pfizer’s supposed “requirements,” which is the only evidence

proffered by the petitioners of any intent to benefit Pfizer, do not impact

Parcels 3 and 4A. (Pet. App. 65, 69). Furthermore, Pfizer will have no

ownership or management interest in any of the facilities in the plan

area. (Pet. App. 63).

* Another possible use of Parcel 4A is for a United States Coast

Guard Museum. (Pet. App. 126-27).

47

4A. (J.A. 4). It means that parking, and most other park or

marina support facilities, cannot go in those directions. This

supports the reasonableness of the taking of Parcel 4A for

those uses. Not to take Parcel 4A also would leave 11 tiny

plots — totaling 0.76 acres — completely surrounded by a 90-

acre development project that cannot expand in three

directions due to its peninsular nature.

Furthermore, to the extent that the petitioners argue

that these proposed uses are too speculative, that argument

is actually no more than a thinly-disguised attempt to trap

the city between a constitutional Scylla and Charibdis. On

the one hand, the petitioners note the constitutional bar

against takings designed solely to benefit a private party.

See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245. So, if an economic develop-

ment plan were to contain very specific details as to specific

private companies that were going to be given the use of

properties taken through eminent domain, that in the

petitioners’ view would run afoul of the public use require-

ment because those private companies, and not the public,

would be the true beneficiaries of the takings. On the other

hand, the petitioners want this Court to bar any plan

unless it states who will develop the condemned land and

for what specific uses. Of course, it is precisely economi-

cally-distressed cities that have the most difficulty in

enticing private developers to commit themselves to urban

revitalization — and it is these same cities (and their mil-

lions of residents) that will be the losers if they must prove

to a high degree of certainty that their plans will succeed.

This sort of gamesmanship - which ignores the clear

distinction between judicial review of the overarching

public use and judicial review of the means by which that

use is implemented — cannot be what the constitution

intended. As this Court said in Rindge, supra, 262 U.S. at

707, a public use may be a use “fairly anticipated in the

future.”

Finally, the petitioners contend that, because their

properties “comprise a miniscule portion of the land” in the

MDP, it is not necessary to take their properties in order to

advance the public good. (Pet. Brief at 48). In Berman, this

Court rejected an identical argument by the owners of a

48

non-blighted department store situated in the part of

Washington designated for redevelopment. Berman, 348

U.S. at 31, 34. The store owners claimed that, because

“their building [did] not imperil health or safety nor con-

tribute to the making of a slum or a blighted area,” id. at

34, it should have been exempted from the dictates of the

District redevelopment. In response, this Court emphati-

cally rejected such a piecemeal approach. The Court de-

ferred to the expertise of the legislators and administrators

who formulated the redevelopment and held:

It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of

the boundary line nor to sit in review on the size of a

particular project area. Once the question of the

public purpose has been decided, the amount and

character of land to be taken for the project and the

need for a particular tract to complete the integrated

plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.

Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added).

A property-by-property approach to the question of

constitutionality would pose just as grave a threat to the

integrated plan in this case as it did in Berman. First, as

Berman intimates, it would be incongruous, to say the least,

to have the federal courts micromanage state and local

development projects. Not only are judges professionally ill-

suited to such a role, but that sort of heavy-handed intru-

sion into state and local affairs does not comport with our

federalist system of government.

Second, there is the “spotted leopard” problem.” This

occurs when there are small parcels of untouchable land

scattered within an area set for development. It is an

enormous hindrance for the project as a whale to have to

build around these so-called spots. For example, much of

the MDP area will be raised above the flood plain. Obvi-

ously, this cannot take place if there are little exempted

* According to the record, the rssidential properties are “scattered

throughout the MDP area contribating to a sawtooth visual impression

in the various blocks.” (J.A. 323); see also (Pet. App. 301-305).

49 ~

islands of property within the area to be raised. For this

and other reasons, building around the petitioners is not a

feasible alternative. Moreover, even if development of the

property could go forward, the spotted leopard problem

would be just as great a hindrance once the development

was complete. It is important to remember that the land in

Parcels 3 & 4A has been zoned for commercial and light

industrial use for decades and, under the MDP, will be

zoned for “water dependent and water related industrial

and major commercial use. ... ” (J.A. 114, 116, 126). The

properties, which cannot be renovated for commercial use,

therefore will simply be incompatible with all of the uses

going on around them.

Indeed, this is another important facet of the assembly

problem faced by cities. See supra, Section IB3. In suburban

and rural areas, there generally is no spotted leopard prob-

lem because the land needed for development often can be

acquired through the marketplace from a few owners. In

cities, however, properties are generally much smaller in size

and owned by many more individuals. As such, a city that

wants to improve a downtrodden economy and revamp its

infrastructure must contend with the spotted leopard. Tbo

often, the result is the exodus of businesses and developers to

the suburbs and the creation of still more suburban sprawl.

The condemnation of the petitioners’ properties is clearly

rational. If the Court believes that a higher standard should

be imposed for compensated takings, this case falls on the

constitutional side of any reasonable line. New London is

economically downtrodden and has given all of the assur-

ances of successful development that reasonably can be

expected of a city. The respondents have provided a carefully

thought-out and publicly-vetted plan with state and local

oversight; a plan that is subject to detailed statutory and

would be asking for an absolute guarantee of the future —

and that is a standard too harsh for any city to satisfy.

50

For most of this century, our courts have followed the

time-honored “original constitutional proposition that

courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for

the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass

laws.” Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). The

power of eminent domain, although formidable, is merely

one of the many tools that the Constitution grants to the

legislative branch in order to fulfill its role as the progeni-

tors of economic and social policy. Contrary to the petition-

ers’ assertion that a ruling in their favor would have only a

limited impact, such a ruling would result in a seismic shift

in our constitutional landscape that would upset not only

the careful balance between judicial and legislative author-

ity, but would also result in the intrusion of federal courts

into state and local affairs.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Con-

necticut Supreme Court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

WESLEY W. HORTON

Counsel of Record

DANIEL J. KRISCH

HORTON, SHIELDS & KNox, P.-C.

90 Gillett Street

Hartford, CT 06105

(860) 522-8338

THOMAS J. LONDREGAN

JEFFREY T. LONDREGAN

Conway & LONDREGAN, PC.

38 Huntington Street

New London, CT 06320

(860) 447-3171

pigs EDWARD B. O’CONNELL

Davip P. CONDON

WALLER, SMITH & PALMER, P.C.

52 Eugene O’Neill Drive

New London, CT 06320

(860) 442-0367

Counsel for the Respondents

App. 1

Connecticut Statutes

Sec. 4-66b. Capital development impact state-

ments. The Secretary of the Office of Policy and Man-

agement shall develop a form for capital development

impact statements on which state agencies shall indicate

the manner in which a planned or requested capital

project or program addresses the following goals: (1)

Revitalization of the economic base of urban areas by

rebuilding older commercial and industrial areas, and

encouraging new industries to locate in the central cities

in order to protect existing jobs and create new job oppor-

tunities needed to provide meaningful economic opportu-

nity for inner city residents; (2) revitalization of urban

neighborhoods to reduce the isolation of various income,

age and minority groups through the promotion of fair and

balanced housing opportunities for low and moderate

income residents; (3) revitalization of the quality of life for

the residents of urban areas by insuring quality education,

comprehensive health care, access to balanced transporta-

tion, adequate recreation facilities, responsive public

safety, coordinated effective human service programs,

decent housing and employment and clean water and by

insuring full and equal rights and opportunities for all

people to reap the economic and social benefits of society;

(4) coordination of the conservation and growth of all areas

of the state to insure that each area preserves its unique

character and sense of community and further insure a

balanced growth and prudent use of the state’s resources.

App. 2

CHAPTER 135

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT:

UNIFORM RELOCATION ASSISTANCE ACT

Sec. 8-266. Short title: Uniform Relocation Assis-

tance Act. Purpose. Policy. This chapter shall be

—~ known as the “Uniform Relocation Assistance Act”. The

purpose of this chapter is to establish a uniform policy for

the fair and equitable treatment of persons displaced by

the acquisition of real property by state and local land

acquisition programs, by building code enforcement

activities, or by a program of voluntary rehabilitation of

buildings or other improvements conducted pursuant to

governmental supervision. Such policy shall be uniform as

to (1) relocation payments, (2) advisory assistance, (3)

assurance of availability of standard housing, and (4) state

reimbursement for local relocation payments under state

assisted and local programs.

Sec. 8-267. Definitions. As used in this chapter:

(1) “State agency” means any department, agency or

instrumentality of the state or of a political subdivision of

the state, or local housing authorities, or any department,

agency or instrumentality of two or more political subdivi-

sions of the state, but shall not include community hous-

ing development corporations authorized under section 8-

217;

(2) “Person” means any individual, partnership,

corporation, limited liability company or association;

(3) “Displaced person” means (a) any person who, on

or after July 6, 1971, moves from real property, or moves

App. 3

his personal property from real property, as a result of the

acquisition of such real property, in whole or in part, or as

the result of the written order of the acquiring agency to

vacate real property, for a program or project undertaken

by or supervised by a state agency or unit of local govern-

ment and solely for the purposes of subsections (a) and (b)

of section 8-268 and section 8-271 as a result of the acqui-

sition of or as a result of the written order of the acquiring

agency to vacate other real property, on which such person

conducts a business or farm operation, for such program or

project; or (b) any person who so moves as the direct result

of code enforcement activities or a program of rehabilita-

tion of buildings pursuant to such governmental program

or under such governmental supervision, except a business

which moves from real property or which moves its per-

sonal property from real property acquired by a state

agency when such move occurs at the end of a lease term

or as a result of eviction for nonpayment of rent, provided

the state agency acquired the property at least ten years

before the move;

(4) “Nonprofit organization” means associations

incorporated under chapters 598 and 600;

(5) “Business” means any lawful activity, excepting a

farm operation, conducted primarily (A) for the purchase,

sale, lease and rental of personal and real property, and

for the manufacture, processing or marketing of products,

commodities or any other personal property; (B) for the

sale of services to the public; (C) by a nonprofit organiza-

tion; or (D) solely for the purposes of subsection (a) of

section 8-268, for assisting in the purchase, sale, resale,

manufacture, processing, or marketing of products, com-

modities, personal property, or services by the erection and

maintenance of an outdoor advertising display or displays,

App. 4

whether or not such display or displays are located on the

premises on which any of the above activities are con-

ducted;

(6) “Farm operation” means any activity conducted

solely or primarily for the production of one or more

agricultural products or commodities, including timber, for

sale or home use, and customarily producing such prod-

ucts or commodities in sufficient quantity to be capable of

contributing materially to the operator’s support;

(7) “Mortgage” means such classes of liens as are

commonly given to secure advances on, or the unpaid

purchase price of, real property, under the laws of this

state, together with the credit instruments, if any, secured

thereby.

Sec. 8-267a. Compliance with federal Uniform

Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisi-

tion Policies Act. All state agencies, as defined in

section 8-267, are authorized to comply with the applicable

provisions of 42 USC Sections 4601-4655 and any subse-

quent amendments, for the purpose of participating in a

federal or federally assisted project or program.

Sec. 8-268. Payment for displacement expenses

and losses. Moving expenses and dislocation allow-

ances. Fixed payments. Landlord’s responsibility in

certain cases. (a) Whenever a program or project

undertaken by a state agency or under the supervision of a

state agency will result in the displacement of any person

on or after July 6, 1971, the head of such state agency

shall make payment to any displaced person, upon proper

App. 5

application as approved by such agency head, for (1) actual

reasonable expenses in moving himself, his family, busi-

ness, farm operation ur other personal property; (2) actual

direct losses of tangible personal property as a result of

moving or discontinuing a business or farm operation, but

not to exceed an amount equal to the reasonable expenses

that would have been required to relocate such property,

as determined by the state agency, and (3) actual reason-

able expenses in searching for a replacement business or

farm, provided, whenever any tenant in any dwelling unit

is displaced as the result of the enforcement of any code to

which this section is applicable by any town, city or

borough or agency thereof, the landlord of such dwelling

unit shall be liable for any payments made by such town,

city or borough pursuant to this section or by the state

pursuant to subsection (b) of section 8-280, and the town,

city or borough or the state may place a lien on any real

property owned by such landlord to secure repayment to

the town, city or borough or the state of such payments,

which lien shall have the same priority as and shall be

filed, enforced and discharged in the same manner as a

lien for municipal taxes under chapter 205.

(b) Any displaced person eligible for payments under

subsection (a) of this section who is displaced from a

dwelling and who elects to accept the payments authorized

by this subsection in lieu of the payments authorized by

subsection (a) of this section may receive a moving expense

allowance, determined according to a schedule established

by the state agency, not to exceed three hundred dollars

and a dislocation allowance of two hundred dollars.

(c) Any displaced person eligible for payments under

subsection (a) of this section who is displaced from his

place of business or from his farm operation and who

App. 6

elects to accept the payment authorized by this subsection

in lieu of the payment authorized by subsection (a) of this

section, may receive a fixed payment in an amount equal

to the average annual net earnings of the business or farm

operation, except that such payment shall not be less than

two thousand five hundred dollars nor more than ten

thousand dollars. In the case of a business no payment

shall be made under this subsection unless the state

agency is satisfied that the business (1) cannot be relo-

cated without a substantial loss of its existing patronage,

and (2) is not a part of a commercial enterprise having at

least one other establishment not being acquired by the

state, which is engaged in the same or similar business.

For purposes of this subsection, the term “average annual

net earnings” means one half of any net earnings of the

business or farm operation, before federal, state and local

income taxes, during the two taxable years immediately

preceding the taxable year in which such business or farm

operation moves from the real property acquired for such

project, or during such other period as such agency deter-

mines to be more equitable for establishing such earnings,

and includes any compensation paid by the business or

farm operation to the owner, his spouse or his dependents

during such period.

Sec. 8-269. Additional payment to owner dis-

placed from dwelling. (a) In addition to payments

otherwise authorized by this chapter, the state agency

shall make an additional payment not in excess of fifteen

thousand dollars to any displaced person who is displaced

from a dwelling actually owned and occupied by such

displaced person for not less than one hundred and eighty

App. 7

days prior to the initiation of negotiations for the acquisi-

tion of the property. Such additional payment shall include

the following elements: (1) The amount, if any, which when

added to the acquisition cost of the dwelling acquired,

equals the reasonable cost of a comparable replacement

dwelling which is a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling

adequate to accommodate such displaced person, reasona-

bly accessible to public services and places of employment

and available on the private market. All determinations

required to carry out this subparagraph shall be made by

the applicable regulations issued pursuant to section 8-

273; (2) the amount, if any, which will compensate such

displaced person for any increased interest cost which

such person is required to pay for financing the acquisition

of any such comparable replacement dwelling. Such

amount shall be paid only if the dwelling acquired was

encumbered by a bona fide mortgage which was a valid

lien on such dwelling for not less than one hundred and

eighty days prior to the initiation of negotiations for the

acquisition of such dwelling. Such amount shall be equal

to the excess in the aggregate interest and other debt

service costs of that amount of the principal of the mort-

gage on the replacement dwelling which is equal to the

unpaid balance of the mortgage on the acquired dwelling,

over the remainder term of the mortgage on the acquired

dwelling, reduced to discounted present value. The dis-

count rate shall be the prevailing interest rate on savings

deposits by commercial banks in the general area in which

the replacement dwelling is located; (3) reasonable ex-

penses incurred by such displaced person for evidence of

title, recording fees and other closing costs incident to the

purchase of the replacement dwelling, but not including

prepaid expenses.

App. 8

(b) The additional payment authorized by this

section shall be made only to such a displaced person who

purchases and occupies a replacement dwelling which is

decent, safe and sanitary not later than the end of the one

year period beginning on the date on which he receives

final payment of all costs of the acquired dwelling, or on

the date on which he moves from the acquired dwelling,

whichever is the later date.

Sec. 8-270. Additional payment for persons

displaced from dwelling. Landlord’s responsibility

in certain cases. In addition to amounts otherwise

authorized by this chapter, a state agency shall make a

payment to or for any displaced person displaced from any

dwelling not eligible to receive a payment under section 8-

269 which dwelling was actually and lawfully occupied by

such displaced person for not less than ninety days prior to

the initiation of negotiations for acquisition of such dwell-

ing under the program or project which results in such

person being displaced. Such payment shall be either (1)

the amount necessary to enable such displaced person to

lease or rent for a period not to exceed four years, a decent,

safe, and sanitary dwelling of standards adequate to

accommodate such person in areas not generally less

desirable in regard to public utilities and public and

commercial facilities, and reasonably accessible to his

place of employment, but not to exceed four thousand

dollars, or (2) the amount necessary to enable such person

to make a downpayment, including reasonable expenses

incurred by such displaced person for evidence of title,

recording fees, and other closing costs incident to the

purchase of a decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling of stan-

dards adequate to accommodate such person in areas not

App. 9

generally less desirable in regard to public utilities and

public and commercial facilities, but not to exceed four

thousand dollars, except that if such amour.t exceeds two

thousand dollars, such person must equally match any

such amount in excess of two thousand dollars in making

the downpayment, and provided, whenever any tenant in

any dwelling unit is displaced as the result of the enforce-

ment of any code to which this section is applicable by any

town, city or borough or agency thereof, the landlord of

such dwelling unit shall be liable for any payments made

by such town, city or borough pursuant to this section or

by the state pursuant to subsection (b) of section 8-280,

and the town, city or borough or the state may place a lien

on any real property owned by such landlord to secure

repayment to the town, city or borough or the state of such

payments, which lien shall have the same priority as and

shall be filed, enforced and discharged in the same manner

as a lien for municipal taxes under chapter 205.

Sec. 8-270a. Actions against landlords by towns,

cities and boroughs and the state. If any landlord

fails to reimburse any town, city or borough for any

payments which the town, city or borough has made to any

displaced tenant and for which the landlord is liable

pursuant to section 8-268 or 8-270, such town, city or

borough or the state pursuant to subsection (b) of section

8-280 may bring a civil action against such landlord in the

superior court for the judicial district in which the town,

city or borough is located or for the judicial district in

which such landlord resides for the recovery of such

payments, and for the costs, together with reasonable

attorney’s fees, of the town, city or borough or the state in

bringing such action. In any such action, it shall be an

App. 10

affirmative defense for the landlord that the displacement

was not the result of the landlord’s violation of section 47a-

7.

Sec. 8-271. Relocation assistance advisory pro-

gram. (a) Whenever a program or project undertaken by

a state agency or under the supervision of a state agency

will result in the displacement of any person on or after

July 6, 1971, such agency shall provide a relocation

assistance advisory program for displaced persons which

shall offer the services described herein. If the state

agency determines that any person occupying property

immediately adjacent to any real property acquired is

caused substantial economic injury because of such acqui-

sition, it may offer such person relocation advisory ser-

vices under such program.

(b) Each relocation advisory assistance program

required by subsection (a) shall include such measures,

facilities, or services as may be necessary or appropriate in

order (1) to determine the needs, if any, of displaced

persons for relocation assistance; (2) to provide current

and continuing information on the availability, prices and

rentals, of comparable decent, safe and sanitary sales and

rental housing, and of comparable commercial properties

and locations for displaced businesses; (3) to assure that,

within a reasonable period of time, prior to displacement

there will be available in areas not generally less desirable

in regard to public utilities and public and commercial

facilities and at rents or prices within the financial means

of the families and individuals displaced, decent, safe and

sanitary dwellings, as defined by the Commissioner of

Transportation for transportation projects and by the

App. 11

Commissioner of Economic and Community Development

for all other state agency programs and projects, equal in

number to the number of and available to such displaced

persons who require such dwellings and reasonably

accessible to their places of employment, except that the

Commissioner of Transportation for transportation pro-

jects and the Commissioner of Economic and Community

Development for all other state agency programs and

projects may prescribe by regulation situations when such

assurances may be waived; (4) to assist a displaced person

displaced from his business or farm operation in obtaining

and becoming established in a suitable replacement

location; (5) to supply information concerning federal and

state housing programs, disaster loan programs and other

federal and state programs offering assistance to displaced

persons; (6) to provide other advisory assistance services

to displaced persons in order to minimize hardship to such

persons in adjusting to relocation.

(c) The heads of state agencies shall coordinate

relocation activities with project work, and other planned

or proposed governmental actions in the community or

nearby areas which may affect the carrying out of the

relocation assistance programs.

Sec. 8-272. Necessity of provision of housing. (a)

If a project or program cannot proceed to actual construc-

tion because comparable replacement sale or rental

housing is not available, and the Commissioner of Trans-

portation for transportation projects or the Commissioner

of Economic and Community Development for any other

state agency program or project determines that such

App. 12

housing cannot otherwise be made available after consul-

tation with the chief executive officer of the municipality

within which such project or program occurs, he may take

such action as is necessary or appropriate to provide such

housing by use of funds authorized for such project or

program, the provisions of any other state statute to the

contrary notwithstanding.

(b) No person shall be required to move from his

dwelling on or after July 6, 1971, on account of any state

agency project or program unless the Commissioner of

Transportation for transportation projects or the Commis-

sioner of Economic and Community Development for any

other state agency program or project is satisfied that

replacement housing, in accordance with subdivision (3) of

subsection (b) of section 8-271 is available to such person.

Sec. 8-273. Establishment of regulations and

procedures. (a) In order to promote uniform and effec-

tive administration of relocation assistance and land

acquisition of state agencies, the Commissioner of Trans-

portation and Commissioner of Economic and Community

Development shall consult together on the establishment

of regulations and procedures for the implementation of

such projects and programs.

(b) The Commissioner of Transportation is author-

ized to establish for transportation projects and the

Commissioner of Economic and Community Development

for all other state agency programs and projects such

regulations and procedures as each may determine to be

necessary to assure (1) that the payments and assistance

authorized by this chapter shall be administered in a

manner which is fair and reasonable, and as uniform as

App. 13

practicable; (2) that a displaced person who makes proper

application for a payment authorized for such person by

this chapter shall be paid promptly after a move or, in

hardship cases, be paid in advance; and (3) that any person

aggrieved by * determination as to eligibility for a payment

authorized by this chapter, or the amount of a payment, may

have his aplication reviewed by the Commissioner of

Transportation for transportation projects and by the Com-

missioner of Economic and Community Development for any

other state agency program or project.

(c) The Commissioner of Transportation is author-

ized to establish for transportation projects and the

Commissioner of Economic and Community Development

for all other state agency programs and projects such other

regulations and procedures, censistent with the provisions

of this chapter, as each deems necessary or appropriate to

carry out this chapter.

Sec. 8-273a. Relocation assistance by the De-

partment of Transportation. Notwithstanding any

other provisions of the general statutes to the contrary,

whenever the Commissioner of Transportation undertakes

the acquisition of real property on a state or federally-

funded project which results in any person being displaced

from his home, business, or farm, the Commissioner of

Transportation is hereby authorized to provide relocation

assistance and to make relocation payments to such

displaced persons and to do such other acts and follow

procedures and practices as may be necessary to comply with

or to provide the same relocation assistance and relocation

payments as provided under the federal Uniform Relocation

Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of

App. 14

1970, 42 USC 4601 et seq. and any subsequent amend-

ments thereto and regulations promulgated thereunder.

Sec. 8-274. Contracts and agreements for ser-

vices. In order to prevent unnecessary expenses and

duplications of functions, and to promote uniform and

effective administration of relocation assistance programs for

displaced persons authorized under this chapter, the Com-

missioner of Transportation may, for transportation projects,

and the Commissioner of Economic and Community Devel-

opment may, for all other state agency programs or projects,

enter into contracts or agreements with any individual, firm,

association, or corporation for services in connection with

such projects or programs, or may carry out its functions

under this chapter through any federal, state or local gov-

ernmental agency or instrumentality having an established

organization for conducting relocation assistance programs.

A state agency shall, in carrying out the relocation assistance

activities described in section 8-272, whenever practicable,

utilize the services of state or local housing agencies, or other

agencies having experience in the administration or conduct

of similar housing assistance activities.

Sec. 8-275. Availability of funds. Funds appropri-

ated or otherwise available to any state agency for a

particular program or project, or for the acquisition of real

property or any interest therein for a particular program

or project, shall be available also for obligation and expen-

diture to carry out the provisions of this chapter as applied

to that program or project.

App. 15

Sec. 8-276. Cost of payments and services in-

cluded in project costs. Ifa state agency acquires real

property, and state financial assistance is available to pay

the cost, in whole or part, of the acquisition of such real

property, or of the improvement for which such property is

acquired, the cost to the state agency of providing the

payments and services prescribed by this chapter shall be

included as part of the costs of the project for which state

financial assistance is available to such municipality and

shall be eligible for state financial assistance in the same

manner and to the same extent as other project costs.

Sec. 8-277. Payments to displaced persons not

considered income or resources. No payment re-

ceived by a displaced person under this chapter shall be

considered as income or resources for the purpose of

determining the eligibility or extent of eligibility of any

person for assistance under any state law or for the

purposes of the state’s personal income tax law, corpora-

tion tax, or other tax laws. Such payments shall not be

considered as income or resources of any recipient of

public assistance and such payments shall not be deducted

from the amount of aid to which the recipient would

otherwise be entitled.

Sec. 8-278. Appeals to commissioners. Any

person or business concern aggrieved by any agency action,

concerning their eligibility for relocation payments author-

ized by this chapter may appeal such determination to the

Commissioner of Transportation in the case of relocation

made necessary by a transportation project or to the Com-

missioner of Economic and Community Development in the

App. 16

case of relocation made necessary by any other state

agency program or project. The Commissioner of Transpor-

tation and the Commissioner of Economic and Community

Development shall have the power to certify official

documents and to issue subpoenas to compel the atten-

dance of witnesses or the production of books, papers,

correspondence, memoranda or other records deemed

necessary as evidence in connection with an appeal pursu-

ant to this section. If any person to whom such subpoena is

issued fails to appear, or having appeared refuses to give

testimony or fails to produce the evidence required, the

Superior Court, upon application of the Attorney General

representing the appropriate commissioner, shall have

jurisdiction to order such person to appear or to give

testimony or produce the evidence required, as the case

may be. The Commissioner of Transportation, or a hearing

officer duly appointed by said commissioner, or the Com-

missioner of Economic and Community Development, or a

hearing officer duly appointed by said commissioner, shall

have the power to administer oaths and affirmations in

connection with an appeal pursuant to this section.

Sec. 8-279. Application of chapter. (a) Nothing in

this chapter shall be construed as creating in any condem-

nation proceedings, brought under the power of eminent

domain, any element of value or of damage not in exis-

tence immediately prior to July 6, 1971.

(b) No payment provided for any item or items under

the provisions of this chapter shall be made by the state

agency if reimbursement for such item or items has been

made in a condemnation proceeding.

App. 17

(c) Nothing in this chapter, shall be construed to

limit, restrict or derogate from any power, right or author-

ity of a state agency or any commissioner thereof, con-

tained in any other statute, to proceed with any programs,

projects or activities within such state agency’s or commis-

sioner’s power to accomplish under such statutes.

(d) If Congress enacts legislation permitting, or

giving the states the option, to make payments for reloca-

tion assistance of a lesser amount than is provided for in

this chapter, or in Public Law 91-646, or as amended at a

later date, the state agency shall make the payments in

such lesser amount, notwithstanding the provisions of this

chapter.

(e) All state agencies charged with preparing reloca-

tion plans or carrying out such plans pursuant to the

provisions of this chapter shall file such plans with the

Commissioner of Economic and Community Development

who shall maintain a file of such plans which may be

inspected at reasonable times by any person, owner or

lessee of any affected business or farm, or governmental

agency.

(f) This chapter shall apply to any displacement of a

person occurring within the state of Connecticut as a

result of a state agency program or project, notwithstand-

ing the source of funding for such program or project.

Sec. 8-280. State grants-in-aid. Conditions. (a)

The state, acting by and in the discretion of the Commis-

sioner of Economic and Community Development, may

enter into a contract or agreement with a state agency to

provide state financial assistance to such state agency in

App. 18

the form of a grant-in-aid equal to two-thirds of the net

cost of carrying out a program of relocation assistance

pursuant to a relocation plan as provided under section 8-

281 and approved by the commissioner. Such grant-in-aid

shall: (1) Provide actual administration costs not to exceed

one hundred dollars for each dwelling unit and two hun-

dred fifty dollars for each farm or business relocated in

accordance with the provisions of this chapter; (2) provide

advance grants for relocation assistance paid pursuant to

the provisions of said section to persons, families, busi-

nesses and farm operations and nonprofit organizations

not otherwise entitled to relocation assistance from any

program of any other state agency or any program of the

federal government and who have not been reimbursed for

moving costs in a condemnation proceeding; (3) include the

cost of the preparation of the relocation plan.

(b) The Commissioner of Economic and Community

Development shall not provide a grant-in-aid pursuant to

subsection (a) of this section to any town, city or borough

for the cost of carrying out a program of relocation assis-

tance for persons displaced as the direct result of code

enforcement activities undertaken by a town, city or

borough, unless such town, city or borough (1) places,

pursuant to section 8-270, a lien on all real property in

such town, city or borough, which is owned by the landlord

of the persons who are displaced by such code enforcement

activities, and (2) assigns to the state the claim of the

town, city or borough against such landlord for the costs of

carrying out such program of relocation assistance. The

Attorney General shall be responsible for collecting such

claim and may carry out such responsibility by (A) enforc-

ing any such lien assigned to the state by the town, city or

borough, (B) placing and enforcing a lien on any other real

App. 19

property owned by the landlord in the state or (C) institut-

ing civil proceedings in the Superior Court against such

landlord. Two-thirds of all funds collected by the Attorney

General from a landlord pursuant to this subsection shall

be deposited in the General Fund and the remaining one-

third of such funds shall be remitted to the town, city or

borough which brought code enforcement activities against

such landlord.

Sec. 8-281. Approval of relocation plan required

for receipt of state grant-in-aid. To be eligible to

receive financial assistance under section 8-280, a state

agency shall cause to be prepared and file with the De-

partment of Economic and Community Development for

the approval of the commissioner a relocation plan based

upon a plan or program of governmental action within the

area of operation of the state agency which will cause the

displacement of persons, families, businesses, farm opera-

tions and nonprofit organizations. Such relocation plan

shall conform to the provisions of this chapter and shall

include but not be limited to the following: (a) The number

of persons, families, businesses and farms to be displaced

by the proposed governmental action; (b) a statement

concerning availability of sufficient, suitable accommoda-

tions as shall meet the requirements for occupancy of

those persons, families, businesses and farms displaced

and the dates when such accommodations will be avail-

able; (c) a plan for carrying out the relocation of such

displaced persons, families, businesses and farms; (d) a

description and identification of the area to be affected.

App. 20

Sec. 8-282. Reimbursement for fees, penalty

costs, taxes. In addition to amounts otherwise author-

ized by sections 8-266 to 8-281, inclusive, the state agency,

as defined in section 8-267, shall reimburse the owner of

real property acquired for a project for reasonable and

necessary expenses incurred for (1) recording fees, transfer

taxes and similar expenses incidental to conveying such

real property; (2) penalty costs for prepayment of any

preexisting recorded mortgage entered into in good faith

encumbering such property; and (3) the pro rata portion of

real property taxes paid which are allocable to a period

subsequent to the date of vesting title in the state, or the

effective date of possession of such real property by the

state agency, whichever is earlier.

CHAPTER 439

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DEPARTMENT

AND STATE POLICY

Sec. 22a-1. Policy of the state. The General

Assembly finds that the growing population and expand-

ing economy of the state have had a profound impact on

the life-sustaining natural environment. The air, water,

land and other natural resources, taken for granted since

the settlement of the state, are now recognized as finite

and precious. It is now understood that human activity

must be guided by and in harmony with the system of

relationships among the elements of nature. Therefore the

General Assembly hereby declares that the policy of the

state of Connecticut is to conserve, improve and protect its

natural resources and environment and to control air, land

and water pollution in order to enhance the health, safety

and welfare of the people of the state. It shall further be

App. 21

the policy of the state to improve and coordinate the

environmental plans, functions, powers and programs of

the state, in cooperation with the federal government,

regions, local governments, other public and private

organizations and concerned individuals, and to manage

the basic resources of air, land and water to the end that

the state may fulfill its responsibility as trustee of the

environment for the present and future generations.

Sec. 22a-la. Declaration of policy: Coordination

of state plans and programs. (a) In furtherance of and

pursuant to sections 22a-1 and 22a-15, the General As-

sembly, recognizing the profound impact of man’s activity

on the interrelations of all components of the natural

environment, particularly the profound influence of

population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial

expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding

technological advances, and recognizing further the

critical importance of restoring and maintaining environ-

mental quality to the overall welfare and development of

man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the state

government, in cooperation with federal and local govern-

ments, and other concerned public and private organiza-

tions, to use all practicable means and measures,

including financial and technical assistance, in a manner

calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to

create and maintain conditions under which man and

nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the

social, economic, and other requirements of present and

future generations of Connecticut residents.

(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in

sections 22a-la to 22a-1f, inclusive, it is the continuing

App 22

responsibility of the state government to use all practica-

ble means, consistent with other essential considerations

of state policy, to improve and coordinate state plans,

functions, programs, and resources to the end that the

state may: (1) Fulfill the responsibility of each generation

as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;

(2) assure for all residents of the state safe, healthful,

productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing

surroundings; (3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses

of the environment without degradation, risk to health or

safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;

(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural

aspects of our Connecticut heritage, and maintain, wher-

ever possible, an environment which supports diversity

and variety of individual choice; (5) achieve an ecological

balance between population and resource use which will

permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s

amenities; (6) enhance the quality of renewable resources

and approach the maximum attainable recycling of deplet-

able resources; and (7) practice conservation in the use of

energy, maximize the use of energy efficient systems and

minimize the environmental impact of energy production

and use.

Sec. 22a-1b. Evaluation by state agencies of

actions affecting the environment. Public scoping

process. Environmental monitor. The General Assem-

bly directs that, to the fullest extent possible:

(a) Each state department, institution or agency

shall review its policies and practices to insure that they

are consistent with the state’s environmental policy as set

forth in sections 22a-1 and 22a-la.

App. 23

(b)1) Each sponsoring agency shall, prior to a

decision to draft an environmental impact evaluation

pursuant to subsection (c) of this section for an action

which may significantly affect the environment, conduct

an early public scoping process.

(2) To initiate an early public scoping process, the

sponsoring agency shall provide notice on 2 ferm that has

been approved by the Council on Environmental Quality,

which shall include, but not be limited to, the date, time

and location of any proposed public scoping meeting and

the duration of the public comment period pursuant to

subdivision (3) of this subsection, to the council, the Office

of Policy and Management and to any other state agency

whose activities may reasonably be expected to affect or be

affected by the propused action.

(3) Members of the public and any interested state

agency representatives may submit comments on the

nature and extent of any environmental impacts of the

proposed action during the thirty days following the

publication of the notice of the early public scoping process

pursuant to this section.

(4) A public scoping meeting shall be held at the

discretion of the sponsoring agency or if twenty-five

persons or an association having not less than twenty-five

persons requests such a meeting within ten days of the

publication of the notice in the Environmental Monitor. A

scoping meeting shall be held not less than ten days

following the notice of the project in the Environmental

Monitor. The public comment period shall remain open for

at least five days following the meeting.

(5) A sponsoring agency shall provide the following

at a public scoping meeting: (A) A description of the

App. 24

proposed action; (B) a description of the purpose and need

of the proposed action; (C) a list of the criteria for a site for

the proposed action; (D) a list of potential sites for the

proposed action; (E) the resources of any proposed site of

the proposed action; (F) the environmental limitations of

such sites; (G) potential alternatives to the proposed

action; and (H) any of the information the sponsoring

agency deems necessary.

(6) Any agency submitting comments or participat-

ing in the public scoping meeting pursuant to this section

shall include, to the extent practicable, but not be limited

to, information about (A) the resources of any proposed

site of the proposed action, (B) any plans of the comment-

ing agency that may affect or be affected by the proposed

action, (C) any permits or approvals that may be necessary

for the proposed action, and (D) any appropriate measures

that would mitigate the impact of the proposed action,

including, but not limited to, recommendations as to

preferred sites for the proposed action or alternatives for

the proposed action that have not been identified by the

sponsoring agency.

(7) The sponsoring agency shall consider any com-

ments received pursuant to this section or any information

obtained during the public scoping meeting in selecting

the proposed actions to be addressed in the environmental

impact evaluation and shall evaluate in its environmental

impact evaluation any substantive issues raised during

the early public scoping process that pertain to a proposed

action or site or alternative actions or sites. |

(c) Each state department, institution or agency

responsible for the primary recommendation or initiation

of actions which may significantly affect the environment

App. 25

shall in the case of each such proposed action make a

detailed written evaluation of its environmental impact

before deciding whether to undertake or approve such

action. All such environmental impact evaluations shall be

detailed statements setting forth the following: (1) A

description of the proposed action which shall include, but

not be limited to, a description of the purpose and need of

the proposed action, and, in the case of a proposed facility,

a description of the infrastructure needs of such facility,

including, but not limited to, parking, water supply,

wastewater treatment and the square footage of the

facility; (2) the environmental consequences of the pro-

posed action, including cumulative, direct and indirect

effects which might result during and subsequent to the

proposed action; (3) any adverse environmental effects

which cannot be avoided and irreversible and irretrievable

commitments of resources should the proposal be imple-

mented; (4) alternatives to the proposed action, including

the alternative of not proceeding with the proposed action

and, in the case of a proposed facility, a list of all the sites

controlled by or reasonably available to the sponsoring

agency that would meet the stated purpose of such facility;

(5) an evaluation of the proposed action’s consistency and

each alternative’s consistency with the state plan of

conservation and development, an evaluation of each

alternative including, to the extent practicable, in terms of

whether it avoids, minimizes or mitigates environmental

impacts, and, where appropriate, detailed mitigation

measures proposed to minimize environmental impacts,

including, but not limited to, where appropriate, a site

plan; (6) an analysis of the short term and long term

economic, social and environmental costs and benefits of

the proposed action; (7) the effect of the proposed action on

the use and conservation of energy resources; and (8) a

App. 26

description of the effects of the proposed action on sacred

sites or archaeological sites of state or national impor-

tance. In the case of an action which affects existing

housing, the evaluation shall also contain a detailed

statement analyzing (A) housing consequences of the

proposed action, including direct and indirect effects which

might result during and subsequent to the proposed action

by income group as defined in section 8-37aa and by race,

and (B) the consistency of the housing consequences with

the long-range state housing plan adopted under section 8-

37t. As used in this section, “sacred sites” and “archaeo-

logical sites” shall have the same meaning as in section

10-381.

(d)(1) The Council on Environmental Quality shall

publish a document at least once a month to be called the

Environmental Monitor which shall include any notices

the council receives pursuant to sections 22a-1b to 22a-li,

inclusive, and shall include notice of the opportunity to

petition for a public scoping meeting. Filings of such

notices received by five o’clock p.m. on the first day of each

month shall be published in the Environmental Monitor

that is issued not later than ten days thereafter.

(2) The Council on Environmental Quality shall post

the Environmental Monitor on its Internet site and dis-

tribute a subscription or a copy of the Environmental

Monitor by electronic mail to any state agency, municipal-

ity or person upon request. The council shall also provide

the Environmental Monitor to the clerk of each municipal-

ity for posting in its town hall.

App. 27

Sec. 22a-lc. Actions which may significantly affect

the environment. Definition. As used in sections 22a-1

to 22a-1i, inclusive, “actions which may significantly affect

the environment” means individual activities or a se-

quence of planned activities proposed to be undertaken by

state departments, institutions or agencies, or funded in

whole or in par

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Respondents Brief — Kelo v. New London · 545 U.S. 469 | Frix