Respondents Brief — Kelo v. New London
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OFFICE OF THE CLERK
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
S
SUSETTE KELO, THELMA BRELESKY,
PASQUALE CRISTOFARO, WILHELMINA AND
CHARLES DERY, JAMES AND LAURA GURETSKY,
PATAYA CONSTRUCTION LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
and WILLIAM VON WINKLE,
Petitioners,
Vv.
CITY OF NEW LONDON and
NEW LONDON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondents.
>
On Writ Of Certiorari To The
Supreme Court Of The State Of Connecticut
o
BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENTS
r
WESLEY W. HorTon* THOMAS J. LONDREGAN
DANIEL J. KRISCH JEFFREY T. LONDREGAN
HORTON, SHIELDS & Conway & LONDREGAN, P.C.
Knox, P.C. 38 Huntington Street
90 Gillett Street New London, CT 06320
Hartford, CT 06105 (860) 447-3171
(860) 522-8338 EDWARD B. O’CONNELL
Davip P. CONDON
WALLER, SMITH & PALMER, PC.
52 Eugene O’Neill Drive
New London, CT 06320
(860) 442-0367
*Counsel of Record
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964 —
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
QUESTION PRESENTED
Does the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
forbid an economically distressed city from employing its
eminent domain power to condemn, and pay just compen-
sation for, private property in order to reverse decades of
economic decline, create thousands of jobs and signifi-
cantly increase property taxes and other sources of reve-
nue for the city, and to realize immediate structural and
environmental benefits for the city and its residents?
ii
LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The petitioners, who were the plaintiffs below, are:
Susette Kelo, Thelma Brelesky, Pasquale Cristofaro,
Wilhelmina and Charles Dery, James and Laura Guretsky,
Pataya Construction Limited Partnership and William
Von Winkle.
The respondents, who were the defendants below are:
the City of New London, Connecticut, and the New London
Development Corporation.
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The New London Development Corporation is a non-
stock, non-profit development corporation designated by
the City of New London, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-
188, as the official development agency for the Fort Trum-
bull Municipal Development Project.
lv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ................c0cccccsecccseseeseeeees i
LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
nT ee EON ii
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT.................. iii
Se Ca rccnceressesssesmsesssssenseeemenen: v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...............cccecceccsecceseeees 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................:0.cceeseeeeees 11
TTI conncenncsnenesmmmnnemsenssnensienienetememestvantenstin 13
Eee 50
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Comm’n of Webster
ee ae ee a crennsennenrtnenmeneestnenenmnntemenets 20
Aposporos v. Urban Redevelopment Commission,
ee 37, 38
Communities, Inc. v. Town of Orange,
ee ED Se hccennsesenssenesemsonmeneecenenetmenent 38
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)...............0cc0000+ passim
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S.
ee ccensnensinsnensmessmnmntmmennnens 19, 20, 28
Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386
PETE hcnessnsnetenstenneneenennnmnnsmnimenetiatatinmmimeennmnennnts 32
Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (1930).................... 40, 41
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
es EE IE hirtetcnnieiciienenntiennnmnensucainntanensenns 40
Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905)...............cccccccceeeeeeeeees 19
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).................... 16
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765
SEEEEEEE> SUI hernnesnsssnsnentusnemenetepeinnetermmenianmnineness 33, 37
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).............. 39, 40
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998)...... 12, 18
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112
Sr ansitusiidenniiniinsniennnnsidaneceiinacitanedietapiingiumamimemmmmnenmmnenanes 34
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) ..............cccc00000. 50
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)............ 18, 40
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
Feod & Drug Administration v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)........................ 21
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996)................. 20
General Motors v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997)............. 12, 20
Georgia Dept. of Transportation v. Jasper County,
OO 37
Hairston v. Dansville & Western Railroad Co., 208
Se ei ccertiuinatiinnttinnenaninnniieennsiateiiemaianimaeptaimaniaiiines 32
Harding v. Funk, 8 Kan. 315, 1871 WL 785 (1871).......... 31
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229
GE cenceverensnenensanenesenssensssnensinennnenmnnmaneeneemennets passim
Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885)................. 31
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis,
a es Ge ee circtnenemenmnrtinnnentinnecstiecamenen 13, 14
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).................... 12, 19
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
EE CE woscsrensnesneniatetnntinnnitenbanenindninteminunednieinamigieees 29
Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102
iia censcusnscsmncenenssiennniniasnnntmenitinainsiiingseiaiiinigeaipnintmni 23
Miller v. Troost, 14 Minn. 365, 1869 WL 2322 (1869)....... 31
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston &
Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992) ..0..........cccccceeeees passim
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928)........... 39
New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).... 20, 21
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) .............. 22
— Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825
Gai cnenssimsensnenemensnetemisvenensnennseusntasmananienns 17, 18, 39, 40
Vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532 (1866)................ccccccc0e 31
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
ETc nein tenieeaserinmpeadeninameatininenabareatieaminentanipepmennens 18
Pequonnock Yacht Club, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport,
ee ED, SE erernnsensnnensnsccartenssmsensrececesesi 38
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).................... 21
Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).......... 25, 47
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).......... 28
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) ................ccceeeeee 14
Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1832 WL
SETTING UTIs SII hainstusiiciinnidinpspamnpietninennentiieennenineneenes 31
State v. Travelers Ins. Co., 47 A. 299 (Conn. 1900)........... 20
Southwest Illinois Development Authority v. National
City Environmental, 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002) ..................... 37
United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U.S.
III coscucensnenensvenesnssutscsngempeninensnmapemmenenmess 15, 19, 40
United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546
TTI onsensertatnnetsineipnenniasdenepenuatemnimnsnmanemenimeniienmesnnnmenarees 19
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 US. 1
SET cennsnsnsnsentnnsnniensundasnantepnetedimensnnteenerammmgnsenquimenents 42
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).......... 19
Wilson v. Pittsburgh & L.E. Railroad Co., 72 A. 235
EPU,. TEIN cttevennnenssnennnsssemnensgensiniininumansascesmssnsseuadenninianiegne 32
STATUTES
I iceman 4, 34
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
a i ees ee cccerencccnnssnnennnnctiinncsnittiasendnitendiontians 36
Conn. Gen. Stat. $8-186 .00.............:ccccceseeeees 9, 11, 23, 24, 34
St iii, 1, 45
Gas SN I Siicccrnncrernetnenensempentscsenssaiaieees 5, 6, 43
I 43
I 6, 43
I ie 1, 36, 43
Ss Gas ts I accecsttenietienmsnninanenccntinensssnsinempsescsas 9, 43
Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-266, et seq. .............ccccccceesceeeeesseeeeeeeeees 8
Conn. Gen. Stat. §22a-1, et Seq. ............:ccccceeeessseeeesssrereeeeees 5
Sas Cs Ce crrnticcttencinncctnnniensnantdatiateimeianasiniiniass 2
a UTIs TTI sehierhcceriersnsihcsiecierinineiiaiientindaneannninedicnmnensmnnanasaieets 2
ee a htcncusenncctcnincvanimesentemtinitosemenneieasasaesntineiies 21
OTHER AUTHORITIES
4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES (Charlene B.
Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986)...0...........ccccccceeeeeee 17
Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in
Eminent Domain, 57 OREGON L. REV. 201 (1978)... 30, 31
Matthew P. Harrington, “Public Use” and the
Original Understanding of the So-Called “Tak-
ings” Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245 (2002) ................. 17
John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its
Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109
Harv. L. Rev. 1252 (1996)................ccccccccceeeeeeeeeeecees 29, 30
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
Cg YE ee 29
Errol E. Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of Eminent
Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENvTL. L. 1
IT nsasnacsnnsensnentenncantensonasensntennenseensenssnncetennemsesnents 29, 30
Thomas Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986) .............:00000+ 33, 34, 35, 36, 37
Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just
Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165
ESR erer enema En Ene 33
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3rd
I a innate teectaaadiatianantaeniitmentaneneneee 33
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
P| rere rae eennee 17
Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle Over the Public Use
Clause: Survey of Holdings and Trends, 1986-
2003, 39 R. Prop., PRoBATE & Trust J. 251
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Facts of the Case
The respondent City of New London occupies 5.79
square miles at the junction of the Thames River and Long
Island Sound in southeastern Connecticut. (Joint Appendix,
(“J.A.”) 91, 93). New London, which is geographically the
second smallest of the 169 municipalities in Connecticut,
was once a center of the whaling industry and later a
manufacturing hub. (J.A. 91, 93, 303). However, New
London has suffered through decades of economic decline.
(Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, (“Pet. App.”) 196, 272-
73). Staggering economic woes — which include an unem-
ployment rate close to double that of the rest of the state, a
shrinking population, a dearth of new home and business
construction and the departure of one of the region’s princi-
pal employers — caused the State of Connecticut Office of
Planning and Management (OPM) to designate New
London a “distressed municipality”. (J.A. 239, 253, 298,
303-04; Pet. App. 70-71, 272-73). In addition, local property
taxes are the main source of municipal funding in Connecti-
cut, but 54 percent of New London’s land is tax-exempt.
(J.A. 91).
Faced with this untenable economic situation, the
respondent New London Development Corporation (NLDC)
planned a development project for the city’s Fort Trumbull
section, which is located on a peninsula that juts out into
the Thames River. (J.A. 4, 36, 212). The NLDC is a statu-
tory, non-stock, non-profit development corporation with a
volunteer board and no independent power of eminent
domain. Under Connecticut law, a city may designate such
a corporation to act as its development agent for an eco-
nomic development project. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-188. A
city may then authorize the development corporation to
acquire real property through eminent domain in the
project area in the city’s name. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-193.
Pursuant to this statutory authority, the New London City
Council designated the NLDC as its development agent for
the Fort Trumbull Municipal Development Plan (MDP),
and authorized the use of eminent domain on New London’s
2
behalf. (J.A. 26-29). The MDP was designed, in the words of
the trial court, to “provide an economic and social uplift for
[the] city... .” (Pet. App. 197). Maps of the MDP area are at
pages 3-4 and 212 of the Joint Appendix.
The undisputed facts regarding the steady deteriora-
tion of New London’s economy from the 1970’s onwards
demonstrate the dire need for such a project. These facts
include:
¢ The 1990 designation of New London as a
“distressed municipality” by OPM, pursuant to
Conn. Gen. Stat. §32-9p. (Pet. App. 272).
¢ The steady decline of New London’s popula-
tion from_a high of 34,182 in 1960 to 23,860 in
1998, its lowest since 1930. (J.A. 298; Pet. App.
272).
¢ An unemployment rate, 7.6 percent, almost
twice as high as the overall figure for the state
and three percent higher than the neighboring
town of Groton. (J.A. 239; Pet. App. 272).
¢ The 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea War-
fare Center (NUWC), located on the Fort
Trumbull peninsula, which employed as many
as 1500 people in the late 1980's.’ (J.A. 253).
¢ Asluggish labor market that has been outper-
formed by a wide margin by both the state as
a whole and the surrounding region. (Pet. App.
272).
¢ Sixty-one percent of the city’s housing was
built before 1950, with a high percentage of
vacant housing. (Pet. App. 273).
In addition to these city-wide problems, the Fort
Trumbull area itself suffers from numerous ills:
’ As a part of the MDP, New London acquired the 32 acres formerly
occupied by NUWC from the federal government via an economic
development conveyance pursuant to the Base Closure and Realign-
ment Act, 10 U.S.C. §2687. Eighteen of those acres are now Fort
Trumbull State Park. (Pet. App. 4-5).
3
e An 82 percent vacancy rate for non-residential
buildings and a 20 percent rate for non-
commercial property. (J.A. 191; Pet. App. 273).
¢ Very low tax revenue for the MDP area
($325,000). (J.A. 191; Pet. App. 273).
¢ 55 percent of the buildings in the MDP area
were built prior to 1950. (J.A. 322).
e Sixty-six percent of the non-residential build-
ings are in fair to poor condition and less than
twelve percent of the residential buildings are
in average or better condition. (J.A. 323; Pet.
App. 273).
e Since 1990, existing buildings in the area have
undergone minimum private investment with
some sections of Fort Trumbull suffering from
disinvestment and owner neglect. (Pet. App.
273).
It is little wonder, then, that the trial court found New
London to be a “city buffeted for decades by hard times and
until recently declining prospects.” (Pet. App. 196).
The record is clear that New London was a city desper-
ate for economic rejuvenation. The NLDC, which originally
was established in 1978, was re-formed in 1997 following
the closure of NUWC to assist the city in planning that
economic rebirth at the site of the closed base. (J.A. 264;
Pet. App. 3). In January 1998, the first step in that rebirth
occurred when Connecticut’s State Bond Commission
authorized $5.35 million in bonds to support planning
activities and limited property acquisition and a further $10
million in bonds towards the creation of Fort Trumbull
State Park. (J.A. 4, 264). The following month Pfizer, Inc., a
world leader in pharmaceutical development, announced its
plan to build a global research facility in New London, on a
site adjacent to the Fort Trumbull peninsula. (J.A. 264; Pet.
App. 4). Construction of the $300 million Pfizer facility
began in April 1999. By the time the petitioners’ properties
were condemned in November 2000, the facility was almost
completed. Pfizer staff began moving in early in 2001. (Trial
Tr., 8/13/01, 69-70).
4
In April 1998, the New London City Council gave its
initial approval for the NLDC to prepare an economic
development plan for a 90-acre section of Fort Trumbull.
(J.A. 264-65; Pet. App. 4). Fort Trumbull was selected as the
best site for a planned development because of the avail-
ability of the NUWC site and because the majority of Fort
Trumbull is a “regional center”, for which the Connecticut
legislature has set the following goal:
Revitalization of the economic base of urban areas
by rebuilding older commercial and industrial ar-
eas, and encouraging new industries to locate in
the central cities in order to protect existing jobs
and create new job opportunities needed to pro-
vide meaningful economic opportunity for inner
city residents. .. .
Conn. Gen. Stat. §4-66b. This goal has special applicability
here, as most of the 90 acres — including the areas in which
the petitioners own properties — have been zoned for commer-
cial and light industrial use since 1928.* (J.A. 113-16, 288-91).
Upon initial approval by the city council, the NLDC
began a series of neighborhood meetings to educate the
residents about the development process. (J.A. 264; Pet. App.
4). The NLDC utilized a combination of notice techniques to
encourage resident attendance and participation at these
meetings — e.g., newspaper advertisements, direct mail, and
public announcements at city council meetings. In addition,
the meetings received extensive newspaper coverage. (J.A.
654-55). The NLDC held six such meetings between April
and October 1998, with speakers from the NLDC, the City of
New London and the State of Connecticut Department of
Economic and Community Development (DECD). (J.A. 655).
* Pursuant to state planning guidelines, regional centers “encom-
pass land areas containing traditional core area commercial, industrial,
transportation, specialized institutional services, and facilities of
intertown significance.” (J.A. 276).
* All of the residential properties in Fort Trumbull - including
those owned by the petitioners — were built before 1940, and most
predate zoning in New London. (J.A. 322; Def. City Exh. 6).
5
In May 1998, the city formally authorized the NLDC to
begin the development process. (J.A. 89; Pet. App. 4). In
June 1998, DECD found that the Fort Trumbull project
could have a significant environmental impact. (J.A. 90,
265). Under Connecticut law, see Conn. Gen. Stat. §22a-1,
et seq., this finding mandated a full-scale Environmental
Impact Evaluation. The Evaluation involved extensive
investigation of the effect of any development at Fort
Trumbull on the water supply, traffic patterns, noise and
air pollution levels, historically important buildings, flood
prevention, and a host of other concerns.‘ (J.A. 90, 239-41).
The Evaluation also included the neighborhood meetings,
the solicitation of comments from members of the commu-
nity, and review of proposed findings by the community.
(J.A. 90, 239-41).
In addition, Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-189 requires a finding
that any economic development plan be
in accordance with the plan of development for
the municipality adopted by its planning commis-
sion and the plan of development of the regional
planning agency, if any, for the region within
which the municipality is located [and] that the
plan is not inimical to any state-wide planning
program objectives of the state or state agencies
as coordinated by the Secretary of the Office of
Policy and Management. .. .
§8-189. In accordance with this directive, the Evaluation
carefully considered a number of state and regional plan-
ning documents detailing the already-existing policies for
economic development in the region and the state. (J.A.
272-73).
* The entire Environmental Impact Evaluation is at pages 213-735
of the J.A. (Volumes II & IID).
* Section 8-189 contains a number of other requirements for
economic development projects relevant to the question of public use.
See Section II of the Respondents’ Brief, infra.
6
The Evaluation, started in June 1998, was completed
in November 1998. (J.A. 213, 241). After a mandatory 45-
day public comment period, the Evaluation was formally
approved and forwarded to OPM. (J.A. 90-91). In April
1999, OPM made the findings required by §8-189 and
determined that the Fort Trumbull project met all relevant
regulatory requirements. (J.A. 91). As required by Con-
necticut law; see Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-191; DECD, the
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection and
the Southeastern Connecticut Council of Governments also
approved the development plan. (Pet. App. 8 n.8).
The NLDC then began formulating the specifics of the
MDP. As part of that process, the NLDC considered six
possible plans of action for the Fort Trumbull area previ-
ously set out in the EIE.* (Pet. App. 7). The draft plan, (J.A.
83-212), completed in August 1999 and thereafter adopted
by the NLDC, is a composite of the positive elements of
alternatives 2, 4, 5, and 6. The plan carefully balances the
many environmental and developmental concerns ex-
pressed during the Evaluation process and contains the
fewest negative impacts for Fort Trumbull. (J.A. 195-97).
The plan divides the 90 acres into seven parceis:
¢ Parcel 1: A waterfront hotel and conference
center, marinas for tourist boats and commer-
cial vessels, and the Riverwalk (a public
walkway along the waterfront).
¢ Parcel 2: Eighty new residential properties or-
ganized in a planned urban-style neighborhood
* The alternate plans considered and rejected by the NLDC were:
“(1) no action, with the assumption that some development activities
would proceed under the direction of other entities, such as the United
States Navy, without action by the development corporation; (2)
recreational and cultural facilities to complement the adjacent state
park; (3) residential construction with minor amounts of retail and
office space; (4) a business campus supported by the hotel and confer-
ence center; and (5) two mixed use alternates combining residences,
recreational, commercial, hotel and retail uses in differing arrange-
ments.” (Pet. App. 7 n.6). These alternatives are described in more
detail at pages 193-95 of the J.A., and in a chart on page 248 of the J.A.
7
and linked by a public walkway to the rest of
the plan area; this parcel also includes space
reserved for the new site of the United States
Coast Guard Museum.
¢ Parcel 3: 90,000 square feet of high technology
research and development office space and
parking with direct vehicular access from out-
side the plan area.
¢ Parcel 4: Divided into two subparcels - 4A,
which will provide park support and marina
support, including parking and retail services;
and 4B, which will include a renovated marina
for both recreational and commercial boating.
In addition, the Riverwalk will continue
through Parcel 4B.
¢ Parcel 5: 140,000 square feet of office space,
¢ Parcel 6: Development of water-dependent
commercial uses.
¢ Parcel 7: Additional office space and/or re-
search and development space.
(J.A. 109-113; Pet. App. 5-6). Although divided into parcels
for ease of administration, the MDP does not consist of
seven independent development plans. Rather, it is one
plan to be considered as an integrated whole. (J.A. 139-40).
The petitioners own fifteen properties located in the
middle of the Fort Trumbull peninsula. (J.A. 3, 4). Four
properties owned by three of the petitioners are located in
Parcel 3. Eleven properties owned by the remaining peti-
tioners are located in Parcel 4A and comprise 0.76 acres.
(Pet. App. 6, 125). The properties owned by petitioners Kelo,
Brelesky, Cristofaro and Dery are either owner-occupied or
occupied by a family member. However, the lots owned by
petitioners Pataya Construction Ltd. Partnership and Von
Winkle, which constitute almost half the total, are invest-
ment or commercial properties for which the petitioners are
absentee landlords. (J.A. 10-11, 702-703; Trial Tr., 7/23/01,
97, 111).
The potential economic benefits of this plan as a whole
to the people of New London are enormous. The record
below demonstrates that the plan
is expected to generate approximately between:
(1) 518 and 867 construction jobs; (2) 718 and
1362 direct jobs; and (3) 500 and 940 indirect jobs.
The composite parcels of the development plan
also are expected to generate between $680,544
and $1,249,843 in [annual] property tax revenues
for the city. . . .
(Pet. App. 7; J.A. 203). As found by the trial court, this
influx of jobs and revenue will be critical in continuing the
economic revitalization of the city. (Pet. App. 196, 282, 327).
In addition to the jobs and tax revenues, the MDP will
have a number of immediate benefits for the people of New
London. Areas within the 100-year floodplain will be filled
to be made suitable for development. (Pet. App. 356 n.20).
There will be extensive improvements to the streets, sewers
and utilities in the MDP area, as well as much-needed
environmental remediation.’ (J.A. 143-47, 159-60, 180-81,
442-43, 718-21). The Riverwalk will provide public access
to, and use of, the waterfront, which was previously un-
available due to the presence of the NUWC facility. (J.A.
140-41). Nor are the needs of those residents displaced by
the MDP ignored. To the contrary, the MDP complies with
the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act; Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-
266, et seq.; and earmarks over $10 million in relocation
assistance funds for displaced home and business owners,
over and above the amounts for just compensation. (J.A.
206-207).
” The MDP earmarks $20 million in public funds for the creation of
the Fort Trumbull State Park on the former NUWC site; $7 million to
upgrade the regional sewage treatment facility located in Fort Trum-
bull; $9 million for environmental remediation; and $24 million for plan
preparation, property acquisition and infrastructure development, $2
million of which came from the United States Commerce Department in
the form of a Financial Assistance Award. (J.A. 258; Trial Tr., 7/24/01,
109; see also J.A. 186).
9
On January 18, 2000, the NLDC board adopted the
development plan. (J.A. 12). On the same day, the New
London City Council approved it and authorized the NLDC
to acquire the properties located in the plan area, by emi-
nent domain if necessary, in the name of the City of New
London. (J.A. 26). Thereafter, DECD also approved the
plan. (J.A. 12). The 90 acres contained approximately 115
parcels, (J.A. 91), the vast majority of which the NLDC
acquired voluntarily. (Trial Tr., 7/25/01, 224-25).
In October 2000, after months of unsuccessful negotia-
tions with the petitioners, the NLDC voted to acquire their
properties by eminent domain. In November 2000, the
NLDC, acting as the statutorily-designated development
agent for the city, brought condemnation actions for the
petitioners’ properties pursuant to Chapter 132 of the
Connecticut General Statutes (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§8-186 to
8-200b). (Pet. App. 8). The statements of compensation
describe the city, acting by the NLDC, as the official con-
demnor. (J.A. 6). In keeping with those statements of
compensation, and pursuant to Connecticut law, over $1.6
million has been placed in escrow with the clerk of the
Connecticut trial court as compensation for the petitioners’
properties. The NLDC will own all 90 acres in the project
area and will lease portions of that property to private
developers. (Pet. App. 6).
B. The State Court Proceedings
The respondents agree with the petitioners’ statement
of the proceedings in the trial court.’ After the trial court’s
decision, the petitioners appealed and the respondents cross
* The trial court put the issue most eloquently: “On the other side
of this controversy [from the petitioners] are what may be considered
abstract entities - the City of New London, the New London Redevel-
opment Agency. But the people behind these abstractions have a dream
also ... Their dream is for their city buffeted for decades by hard times
end until recently declining preapects.” (Pet. App. 196) (emphasis
added).
10
appealed the trial court’s decision. (Pet. App. 2). The Con-
necticut Supreme Court held that
the public use clauses of the federal and state con-
stitutions authorize the exercise of the eminent
domain power in furtherance of a significant eco-
nomic development plan that is projected to create
in excess of 1000 jobs, to increase tax and other
revenues, and to revitalize an economically dis-
tressed city, including its downtown and water-
front areas.
(Pet. App. 2). The majority upheld the trial court’s ruling
with respect to Parcel 3. The majority further held that the
trial court’s findings with respect to the necessity of the
takings on Parcel 4A were clearly erroneous and remanded
the case to the trial court with direction to render judgment
for the defendants with respect to the eleven properties
located in Parcel 4A. (Pet. App. 133).
The majority based its decision on Berman v. Parker, 348
US. 26 (1954), and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467
US. 229 (1984), and employed a “broad purposive approach to
the interpretation of the federal public use clause.” (Pet. App.
39). This approach, in keeping with Berman and Midkiff,
emphasizes “the legislative purpose and motive behind the
taking, and give(s] substantial deference to the legislative
determination of purpose.” (Pet. App. 42).
Three justices concurred in part and dissented in part
in one opinion. The three dissenters “agree[d] with the
conclusion of the majority” that “private economic develop-
ment projects ... which create new jobs, increase tax
revenue, and contribute to urban revitalization, satisfy the
takings clauses of the federal and state constitutions.” (Pet.
App. 171). With respect to this specific case, the ‘lissent also
agreed with the majority that
[t]he record clearly demonstrates that the devel-
opment plan was not intended primarily to serve
the interests of Pfizer, Inc., or any other private
entity but, rather, to revitalize the local economy
by creating temporary and permanent jobs, gen-
erating a significant increase in tax revenue,
11
encouraging spin-off economic activities and maxi-
mizing public access to the waterfront. Further-
more, the proposed project is being undertaken in
an economically ‘distressed’ municipality in need of
a stimulus to invigorate the local economy.
(Pet. App. 176) (emphasis added); (Pet. App. 70-71) (major-
ity opinion).
The dissent took issue only with the analytical process
employed by the majority, which it viewed as too deferen-
tial. In place of the majority's “purposive” test, the dissent
called for a heightened degree of judicial scrutiny to ensure
that a taking for economic development will, in fact, result
in a public benefit. (Pet. App. 134-90).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At the heart of this case are a series of decisions made
by the Connecticut legislature and the elected officials of
the City of New London as to what will best serve the
economic, social, structural and environmental interests of
New London’s citizens. In the exercise of its traditional
police power, the Connecticut legislature has declared that
economic development, and the acquisition of private
property to further such development “are public uses and
purposes for which public moneys may be expended.... ”
Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-186. In accordance with this statutory
directive and after a painstaking deliberative process, the
respondents determined that the economic revitalization of
New London, as well as its environmental, social and
structural health, would best be served by enacting the
MDP - and, as a necessary consequence thereof, taking the
petitioners’ properties through eminent domain.
This Court has a long history of deference to legisla-
tive and municipal wisdom in exercising the power of
eminent domain. See National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992); Midkiff,
supra; Berman, supra. This deference is premised on two
well-settled principles: (1) that courts are “unsuited to
gather the facts upon which economic predictions can be
made, and professionally untrained to make them|,]”
12
General Motors v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 308 (1997); and (2)
that the primary purpose of the Takings Clause is not to act
as a substantive restraint on government behavior, but to
assure compensation for any affected property owners
should the government choose to exercise its eminent
domain power; see Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S.
498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In keeping with
these principles, only once in its over two hundred years of
existence has the Court held a compensated physical taking
of property to be unconstitutional. Such jurisprudential
caution is in keeping with this Court’s longstanding policy —
aside from the ill-starred era of Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905) - of showing great deference to economic
decisions made by legislative and municipal officials.
This Court should adhere to these precedents and
affirm the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court.
This Court first should hold that economic development
constitutes a public use within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment. It is undisputed that maintaining the eco-
nomic health of a city falls within the police powers tradi-
tionally reserved to the states, and this Court has held that
“(t]he ‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the
scope of a sovereign’s police powers.” Midkiff, 467 U.S. at
240. Therefore, employing the power of eminent domain to
revitalize a municipality's economy satisfies the public use
requirement. This is especially true in urban settings, in
which the problem of land assembly often acts as a barrier
to economic revitalization.
Such holding is no less valid merely because the
economic improvements in question will be achieved by
allowing private entities to lease the property taken
through eminent domain. The principal focus of the public
use equation has always been whether the taking will
produce a significant benefit to the public and not the
means by which that benefit comes into being. Moreover,
such a holding would not only preserve the appropriate
balance between the legislative and judicial branches, but it
would be in keeping with the di’ sion between federal and
state authority that is at the core of our federalist system of
government.
13
This Court should then hold that the particular con-
demnations at issue in the present case satisfy the Public
Use Clause. As it has in the past, this Court should eschew
a lot-by-lot, building-by-building inquiry into whether each
individual piece of property is essential for the project as a
whole because such scrutiny interferes with the legisla-
ture’s role as “the main guardian of the public needs to be
served by social legislation. ... ” Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
However, even under the intrusive and unwieldy level of
scrutiny for compensated takings proposed by the petition-
ers, the particular condemnations at issue are constitu-
tional because they are reasonably certain to achieve
significant public benefits — e.g., the creation of thousands
of jobs, significant increases to New London’s annual
revenues, environmental remediation and improvements to
Fort Trumbull’s decaying infrastructure. Some of these
benefits — environmental remediation and infrastructure
improvements — already have taken place. With respect to
the economic benefits, the reasonable assurances and
enforcement mechanisms that are in place here are suffi-
cient to satisfy the Takings Clause.
ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT SHOULD ADHERE TO ITS DEF-
ERENTIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR LEG-
ISLATIVE OR MUNICIPAL DETERMINATIONS
OF PUBLIC USE AND HOLD THAT ECONOMIC
REVITALIZATION CONSTITUTES A PUBLIC
USE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE TAKINGS
CLAUSE.
In his dissent in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), Chief Justice Rehnquist
summed up the guiding principle of this Court’s Takings
Clause jurisprudence:
[O]ur inquiry into legislative purpose is not in-
tended as a license to judge the effectiveness of
legislation. When considering the Fifth Amend-
ment issues presented by Hawaii’s Land Reform
Act, we noted that the Act, “like any other, may
14
not be successful in achieving its intended goals.
But ‘whether in fact the provisions will accom-
plish the objectives is not the question: the [con-
stitutional requirement] is satisfied if... the...
[State] Legislature rationally could have believed
that the [Act] would promote its objective.’”
Id. at 511 n.3 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242) (emphasis
and ellipses in original).
This settled wisdom, agreed with by the majority in
Keystone — that an exercise of eminent domain authority
passes constitutional muster so long as the legislative or
municipal authority “rationally could have believed” in its
potential effectiveness — has long guided this Court’s
consideration of Takings Clause cases. It is wisdom born out
of this Court’s recognition of the necessary primacy of
legislative judgment in the realm of public welfare and the
Court’s self-admitted inadequacy at making predictive
judgments about society's economic or social future. It is
wisdom that acknowledges that the proper role of un-
elected, federal judges in a democracy is to act with re-
straint when reviewing economic or social policy choices
made by a state’s elected representatives. And, in spite of
the frenzied heat of the petitioners’ arguments, it is wisdom
that remains as valid in the twenty-first century as it was
in the nineteenth and twentieth, and as valid for economic
revitalization as it was for the myriad of other public
purposes upheld by this Court.
A. The deferential standard employed by this
Court since Berman v. Parker remains the
appropriate standard by which to judge leg-
islative or municipal claims of public use.
It long has been recognized by this Court that the
primary responsibility for addressing society's economic and
social ills belongs to the legislative branch. As this Court
noted in Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981), the
legislature is “the appropriate representative body through
which the public makes democratic choices among alterna-
tive solutions to social and economic problems.” Jd. at 230.
15
Such an approach is no less warranted simply because
the democratic choice in question involves the legislative or
municipal decision to spend public money in order to
acquire property through eminent domain. In either case,
for the judicial branch, deference is the better part of valor.
Indeed, a half-century ago this Court spoke clearly as to the
limits of judicial authority in takings cases:
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when
the legislature has spoken, the public interest has
been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In
such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the
main guardian of the public needs to be served by
social legislation. ... This principle admits of no
exception merely because the power of eminent
domain is involved. The role of the judiciary in de-
termining whether that power is being exercised
for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 (emphasis added).
Thirty years later, in Midkiff, this Court reiterated and
refined the holding of Berman. Although the courts have a
role to play in reviewing the determination of a public use,
that role is “an extremely narrow” one. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at
240 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 32). Because “[t}he ‘public
use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a
sovereign’s police powers|,]” Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240, the
standard of review for Takings Clause cases is extremely
deferential: “[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain
power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose,
the Court has never held a compensated taking to be
proscribed by the Public Use Clause.” Jd. at 241. A court
should be unwilling to “substitute its judgment for a legisla-
ture’s judgment as to what constitutes a public use ‘unless
the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.’” Jd.
(quoting United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160
U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
Eight years after Midkiff, this Court again coated
its extremely limited role in reviewing questions of public
use. In National Railroad Passenger Corp., supra, which,
involved re-transfer of ownership of the condemned property
16
to another private entity, this Court repeated its earlier
holding that “the public use requirement of the Takings
Clause is coterminous with the regulatory power, and that
[we] will not strike down a condemnation on the basis that
it lacks a public use so long as the taking is ‘rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose.’” National Rail-
road, 503 U.S. at 422 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240-41).
One of the primary lessons of Berman, Midkiff and
National Railroad is that the need for such deference does
not depend on the nature of the public use at issue. After
all, deference was the guiding principle in Berman, Midkiff
and National Railroad even though those three cases
concerned three widely divergent government endeavors:
the elimination of blighted slums’ (Berman); the dissolution
of an oligarchic property ownership structure (Midkiff); and
the facilitation of interstate rail service (National Railroad).
What matters about those three cases is their recognition
that unelected judges are ill-suited to the task of determin-
ing what is an appropriate public use.
The historical, legal and logical bases for Berman,
Midkiff and National Railroad remain unaltered in this
case. A review of those principles makes it clear that eco-
nomic revitalization constitutes a public use pursuant to
the Takings Clause.
1. The text and history of the Takings
Clause demonstrates that its principal
focus is to provide compensation and not
to act as a substantive restraint on gov-
ernment behavior.
The text of a constitutional provision is the starting
point for its construction. See Crawford v. Washington, 541
US. 36, __, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1359 (2004). In this case, that
* As the trial court observed, “[t]he bleak economic conditions that
earned [New London’s designation as a distressed municipality] are
conditions just as worthy of attention and dangerous to the economic
and moral health of the state as slum or blighted areas. . . . ” (Pet. App.
255 n.10).
17
text — “nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation” — contains a clear syntactic -
signal that its primary purpose is not to regulate legislative
determinations of public use. That signal is the placement
of the word “without,” which announces the emphasized
prepositional phrase in the Clause, i.e., “without just
compensation”. In contrast, “public use” appears in the
Clause without any exclusionary word to complement “nor”.
Indeed, in its phrasing the Clause almost assumes that any
private property taken by eminent domain would ipso facto
be for a public use, otherwise one would expect “for public
use” to be preceded by “except,” or some other exclusionary
preposition. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 589-90 & 590 n.10 (2nd Ed. 1988) (compensa-
tion is surrogate assurance of public use).
This construction is borne out by the history of the
Clause. In an earlier draft of the Fifth Amendment, James
Madison proposed that the Clause should read, “[nJo person
shall be .. . obliged to relinquish his property, where it may
be necessary for public use, without just compensation.” 4
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES 10 (Charlene B. Bickford & Helen E.
Veit eds., 1986) (emphasis added). Madison’s draft — which
was amended without comment by the House to its present
form — arguably places more emphasis on the public use
question. See Matthew P. Harrington, “Pw lic Use” and the
Original Understanding of the So-Calied “Takings” Clause,
53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245 (2002). Madison’s draft seems to call
for an inquiry akin to that proposed by the petitioners; i.e.,
whether a particular taking is, in fact, “necessary” for public
use. However, our founding fathers chose, by their alteration
of Madison’s proposal, not to endorse such an intrusion into
what was thought to be a legislative area (although they did
reject purely private takings). See id. at 1248.
The notion that the Takings Clause was not primarily
meant to act as a restraint on government action in the
realm of compensated takings is a familiar one to the Court.
Indeed, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in WNollan uv.
California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), concludes
with this telling comment:
18
The Commission may well be right that [beach ac-
cess] is a good idea, but that does not establish
that the Nollans (and other coastal residents)
alone can be compelled to contribute to its realiza-
tion. Rather, California is free to advance its com-
prehensive program, if it wishes, by using its
power of eminent domain for this public purpose
... but if it wants an easement across the Nollans’
property, it must pay for it.
Id. at 841-42 (emphasis added; internal citation and quota-
tion marks omitted); see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“[t]he rights of the public in a
street purchased ... by eminent domain are those that it
has paid for”).
Finally, in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, supra, Justice
Kennedy wrote that the Takings Clause “operates as a
conditional limitation, permitting the government to do
what it wants so long as it pays the charge.” Eastern
Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring). His
concurrence, quoting this Court’s earlier decision in First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1987), pointed out that the
language of the Takings Clause “makes clear that it is
designed not to limit the governmental interference with
property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in
the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a
taking.” Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 545. Justice
Breyer, writing for himself and the three other dissenting
Justices, agreed with Justice Kennedy — and numerous
earlier decisions of this Court — that “at the heart of the
Clause lies a concern, not with preventing arbitrary or
unfair government action, but with providing compensation
for legitimate government action that takes ‘private prop-
erty to serve the ‘public’ good.” Jd. at 554 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original). The plurality opinion in
Eastern Enterprises did not quarrel with these observations
by Justices Kennedy and Breyer. Eastern Enterprises, 524
U.S. at 522-23.
19
2. The courts are ill suited to determining
whether a taking is for a legitimate pub-
lic use.
In our constitutional system, the judiciary appropri-
ately has a very limited role in reviewing the wisdom of
economic decisions made by the legislature. See United
States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946) (“[alny
departure from this judicial restraint would result in courts
deciding on what is and is not a governmental function and
in their invalidating legislation on the basis of their view on
that question at the moment of decision”). Since the demise
of the Lochner era, this Court no longer strikes down
economic choices made by the legislature “because they may
be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular
school of thought.” Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483, 488 (1955).
It would be a mistake similar in scope to the improvi-
dent jurisprudence of Lochner and its progeny for this
Court once again to substitute its judgment as to the
wisdom of an economic choice made by legislative and
- municipal officials. It would be ironic if the economic choice
to declare a public use and spend the public’s money for
that use were subjected to stricter judicial review under the
Takings Clause than the economic choice to regulate an
employer’s relationship with its employees under the Due
Process Clause, given that even the Lochner era saw great
deference to legislative determinations of public use; see
Gettysburg, 160 U.S. at 680; Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361
(1905); no doubt because legislation with compensation is
more palatable than legislation without.
As this Court recently noted in support of the decision
to uphold Washington’s IOLTA program against a Takings
Clause challenge, “[i]f the State had imposed a special tax,
or perhaps a system of user fees, to generate the funds to
finance the legal services supported by the Foundation,
there would be no question as to the legitimacy of the use of
the public’s money.” Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washing-
ton, 538 U.S. 216, 232 (2003) (emphasis added). But while
20
due process and equal protections challenges to economic
legislation receive the tender mercies of rational basis
review, the petitioners would have this Court eviscerate the
power of a state or municipality to use eminent domain in
order to achieve precisely the same end — economic health —
by barring the use of eminent domain for economic revitali-
zation.”
This Court should not sanction such an illogical dichot-
omy. The very same institutional concerns that historically
have motivated judicial deference to economic regulation
apply with equal force to economic action through eminent
domain. First, reviewing courts simply are “institutionally
unsuited to gather the facts upon which economic predic-
tions can be made, and professionally untrained to make
them.” General Motors, 519 U.S. at 308. As a result, this
Court “customarily ... declin[es] to engage in elaborate
analysis of real-world economic effects.... ” Id. at 309.
Answering such questions, fraught as they are with the
“complexities of factual economic proof,” is a task with
which courts generally have little familiarity and even less
expertise. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 342
(1996). The answers are better left to state and municipal
governments, which have the freedom and expert ability to
conduct “novel social and economic experiments.” New State
” The dissent in Brown raises the question whether an analogy to
taxation would reduce the public use requirement to a “negligible
impediment” because taxation is not subject to that requirement.
Brown, 538 U.S. at 242 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But taxation, in
most states, is subject to the well-recognized bounds of the police power.
A classic case is from Connecticut, State v. Travelers Ins. Co., 47 A. 299,
302-03 (Conn. 1900). This traditional police power informs the limits of
the public use requirement. Berman, 348 U.S. at 31-32. To say that
courts must give great deference to legislative findings of public use is
not to say that public use is a negligible impediment. No one suggests,
for example, that rational basis review under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is a negligible impediment. See, e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal
Co. v. Comm'n of Webster City, 488 U.S. 336 (1989) (applying rational
basis review and overturning West Virginia property tax ruling on
Equal Protection grounds).
21
Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
The second institutional concern arises out of the
insularity of courts from the democratic process. When
state and municipal officials make economic or social policy
decisions, the people whom those officials represent have
the opportunity to voice their opinions on those decisions at
the next election. So if the choice is disagreeable to enough
people, the consequences of that disagreement will become
evident through the political process. See Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 957 n.18 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (“to the extent that a particular action proves politi-
cally unpopular, we may be confident that elected officials
charged with implementing it will be quite clear to their
constituents where the source of the misfortune lies”). The
same cannot be said for economic choices made by unelected
judges, for whom the will of the people does not act as a
brake on their power. It is for this reason that, in a democ-
racy, judicial deference to economic decisions is the appro-
priate course. See Food & Drug Administration v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (“[t}he
responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views
of the public interest are not judicial ones”).
Finally, federal court deference to the economic and
other policy decisions of state legislatures and municipali-
ties helps retain the appropriate balance between state and
federal power that is a hallmark of our federalist system.
Abandoning such deference in the name of the Takings
Clause by requiring the courts to engage in close scrutiny of
proposed takings would result in the undue concentration of
power in federal hands at the expense of the states. See
Brief of the National League of Cities, et al., as Amici
Curiae (“NLC Brief”), at 12-17; Brief of the Connecticut
Conference of Municipalities, et al., as Amici Curiae (“CCM
Brief”), at 3-4 & n.2-3. The federal courts — perhaps through
the medium of actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (which was
asserted here, although the petitioners chose to file in state
court) — would become the de facto arbiters in areas such as
economic health that traditionally are within the police
22
powers reserved to the states; areas in which this Court
historically has given state and local governments a great
deal of leeway to explore policy solutions. This result would
threaten not merely state and local authority, but individ-
ual liberty as well. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 181 (1992) (“the Constitution divides authority be-
tween federal and state governments for the protection of
individuals”).
In sum, the reasons behind this Court’s traditional
deference to legislative or municipal determinations of
public use are valid ones which this Court should not
abandon. To the contrary, that deference should be the lens
through which the Court views the issues and facts of this
case.
B. Economic development constitutes a public
use as this Court traditionally has under-
stood that term because it is rationally re-
lated to a conceivable public purpose.
The appropriate starting point for this Court’s inquiry
is the clear statement by the Connecticut legislature that
economic development, and the acquisition of private
property necessary to further such development, is a
public use:
It is found and declared that the economic
welfare of the state depends upon the continued
growth of industry and business within the state;
that the acquisition and improvement of unified
land and water areas and vacated commercial
plants to meet the needs of industry and busi-
ness should be in accordance with local, regional
and state planning objectives; that such acquisi-
tion and improvement often cannot be accom-
plished through the ordinary operations of
private enterprise at competitive rates of pro-
gress and economies of cost; that permitting and
assisting municipalities to acquire and improve
unified land and water areas and to acquire and
improve or demolish vacated commercial plants
23
—
for industrial and business purposes and, in dis-
tressed municipalities, to lend funds to busi-
nesses and industries within a project area in
accordance with such planning objectives are
public uses and purposes for which public mon-
eys may be expended; and that the necessity in
the public interest for the provisions of this chap-
ter is hereby declared as a matter of legislative
determination.
Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-186.
As discussed supra in Section IA, this statement of
public use is entitled to great deference. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
at 241. Moreover, it is beyond dispute that the police
power — with which the concept of public use is “cotermi-
nous” — encompasses the maintenance of a state’s eco-
nomic well-being through the promotion of private
business and industry." See id. at 239-40. As this Court
pointed out 168 years ago, the police power is
not only the right, but the bounden and solemn
duty of a state, to advance the safety, happiness
and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its
general welfare, by any and every act of legisla-
tion, which it may deem conducive to these ends.
Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 139
(1837); see also Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. Under this expan-
sive definition, promoting the economic health of a state
by encouraging the development of business and industry
— and thereby ensuring jobs for that state’s citizens and
tax revenues for its coffers — certainly qualifies as a valid
exercise of the police power.
Indeed, the Connecticut Supreme Court was unani-
mous on this point. (Pet. App., 42, 172). Although the
dissent was not convinced that the petitioners’ properties
" Even the petitioners concede the importance of encouraging such
development to the lifeblood of a community. See Pet. Brief at 12
(“businesses, if they are successful, generate tax revenue, employ
individuals, and contribute to the overall vitality of a community”).
24
“actually will be developed to achieve a public purpose”;
(Pet. App. 170); the dissent agreed that the legislative
determination of public use in §8-186 is constitutional, and
that “the primary purpose of the takings is to benefit the
public.” (Pet. App. 176).
The petitioners, on the other hand, dispute the valid-
ity of economic development as a public purpose and — in
spite of clear findings to the contrary by the trial court and
the emphatic rejection of their claim by the Connecticut
Supreme Court — continue to insinuate that the primary
purpose of such takings generally, and these takings in
particular, is to benefit a specific private party, in this
case, Pfizer. The petitioners would have the Court lay
down a bright-line rule barring the use of eminent domain
for economic development simply because the very real
public benefits achieved by that development will come to
pass, in part, through the activity of private entities. Such
a rule has no basis in this Court’s jurisprudence or the
history of the Takings Clause; nor will a holding that
economic development constitutes a public use result in
the parade of horribles that the petitioners posit. This
Court therefore should reject the petitioners’ attempt to
circumscribe the power of eminent domain in such a
dangerous fashion.
1. This Court consistently has upheld the
constitutional validity of using eminent
domain to create public benefits through
the re-transfer of private property.
On five occasions in the past half-century, this Court
has upheld the re-transfer of private property to another
private party against Takings Clause challenges because
of the public benefits created by the re-transfer. This clear
line of precedent - which receives scant attention in the
petitioners’ brief — should be controlling on the general
question of whether economic development is permitted
under the Takings Clause.
25
The seminal case in this Court’s modern” Takings
Clause jurisprudence is Berman v. Parker, supra. In
Berman, owners of property condemned pursuant to the
District of Columbia Redevelopment Act challenged the
Act’s constitutionality. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28. One of the
specific challenges was that the Act authorized the resale
of the condemned properties to other private entities; in
fact, §7(g) of the Act specifically gave “[p]reference ... to
private enterprise over public agencies in executing the
redevelopment plan.” Jd. at 30. The owners argued that
“this makes the project a taking from one businessman for
the benefit of another businessman.” Jd. at 33.
The Court unanimously rejected this claim. In keep-
ing with the deference to legislative wisdom discussed in
Section IA, supra, the Court held that “the means of
executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone
to determine, once the public purpose has been estab-
lished.” Jd. The Court then recognized that “[t)he public
end may be as well or better served through an agency of
private enterprise than through a department of govern-
ment — or so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say
that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the
public purposes of community redevelopment projects.” Id.
at 33-34 (emphasis added).
The petitioners attempt to minimize the significance
of Berman by arguing that the public purpose in that case
was the removal of blighted slums, and that “[o]nce that
public use was accomplished and the blight removed,
transfer of the cleared land to a private party was accept-
able.” (Pet. Brief at 25). But the petitioners never offer any
authority for their novel proposition that re-transfer to a
“ Even prior to Berman, this Court “long ago rejected any literal
requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general
public.” Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244; see Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262
U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (“[i]t is not essential that the entire community,
nor even any considerable portion, should directly enjoy or participate
in an improvement in order to constitute a public use”).
26
private party for economic development — which the D.C.
Act specifically envisioned — suddenly becomes constitu-
tionally “acceptable” merely because of an intervening
event. Moreover, the petitioners’ exclusive focus on blight
elimination ignores §6 of the D.C. Act, which, like the Fort
Trumbull MDP, mandated the creation of “a comprehen-
sive or general plan’ of the District, including ‘a land-use
plan’ which designates land for use for ‘housing, business,
industry, recreation, education, public buildings, public
reservations, and other ... public and private uses of the
land.” Berman, 348 U.S. at 29. This part of the Act, with
its requirement of a plan for Washington’s rejuvenation,
employs the tool of re-transfer in order to do far more than
merely eliminate blight.
This Court reached a similar conclusion in Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, supra, in which the Court
unanimously upheld the constitutionality of Hawaii’s Land
Reform Act, which authorized the condemnation of large
tracts of leased residential property and the subsequent
transfer of ownership of the condemned parcels to their
respective lessees, who provided the funds for the just
compensation payments. Jd. at 233. Although it is true
that the principal public use in that case was the disman-
tling of Hawaii’s feudal property system, that public use
has an ironic analogy in the present case. In Midkiff, the
concentration of the land ownership led to a failure of the
market economy necessitating government intervention;
here the wide dispersal of land ownership (into tenths of
an acre) also leads to a failure of the market economy due
to the inability to assemble commercially viable parcels for
development, as Connecticut’s statutory scheme clearly
anticipates.
In any event, Midkiff is not solely about oligopoly. The
Hawaii Act also contains requirements governing the
future use of the condemned land — e.g., that a lessee, in
order to be eligible, must have “a bona fide intent to live
on the lot or be a resident of the State... .” Jd. at 233 n.1.
Such a requirement is an expression of public purpose
27
beyond the mere elimination of an oligarchy. Finally,
Midkiff reaffirms the broad language of Berman about the
extremely limited judicial role in determining public use.
This Court issued yet another clear statement regard-
ing the constitutionality of re-transfer to a private party in
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine
Corp., supra. In National Railroad, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission — at the behest of the petitioner Na-
tional Railroad (AMTRAK) — condemned 48.8 miles of
railroad track owned by Boston & Maine (BM). National
Railroad, 503 U.S. at 409-10. Prior to the condemnation,
AMTRAK had entered into an agreement with the Central
Vermont Railroad (CV), BM’s chief competitor, “to at once
reconvey the track to CV, and to provide up to $3.1 million
to upgrade and rehabilitate the segment.” Jd. at 412.
In spite of this obvious boon to a specific private party
(CV), this Court soundly rejected Boston & Maine’s claim
that the taking was not for a public use because the re-
transfer to CV was intended to effect significant long-term
public benefits (i.e., improving passenger rail service). Jd.
at 422. According to Justice Kennedy's majority” opinion:
In both Midkiff and Berman, as in the present
case, condemnation resulted in the transfer of
ownership from one private party to another,
with the basic use of the property by the govern-
ment remaining unchanged. The Court held
these exercises of the condemnation power to be
constitutional, as long as the condemning au-
thorities were rational in their positions that
some public purpose was served... . That suffices
to satisfy the Constitution, and we need not make
a specific factual determination whether the con-
demnation will accomplish its objectives.
* Justices White, Blackmun and Thomas dissented on an issue
unrelated to the public use question. National Railroad, 503 U.S. at
424-28. -
28
Id. at 422-23 (emphasis added).* See also Brown, 538 U.S.
at 232 (taking of interest on clients’ funds to fund legal
services for indigent litigants valid public use); Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014-16 (1984) (public
disclosure of pesticide data pursuant to FIFRA, which made
data available to other manufacturers and effected taking,
valid public use).
At the end of the day, the petitioners advance no cogent
reason for this Court to reverse this long line of decisions
upholding the re-transfer of condemned property to a
private party, So long as the re-transfer will result in a
substantial public benefit. While the Berman-Midkiff-
National Railroad line of cases is, by itself, reason enough
to uphold the validity of a taking for economic development,
both the history of takings in our country and considera-
tions of public policy also support such a holding.
2. There is a long history of using the
power of eminent domain to achieve a
public good through re-transfer of con-
demned property to a private entity.
This Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence has, for
more than a century, taken a “broad” view of public use.
Moreover, the narrow reading urged by the petitioners is
more wishful thinking than historical fact. The history of
eminent domain authority demonstrates that a taking could
be for a public use 2ven if a private entity benefited from
“The petitioners’ assessment of National Railroad as merely
another common carrier case ignores the crucial distinctions between
National Railroad and those cases. See infra, Section IB(2). In National
Railroad, unlike this Court’s railroad decisions from the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, the condemnation was not necessary to
allow the construction of a straight line of track because the track had
already been built and was in operation. The government was therefore
taking a functioning segment of railway track from one operator and
giving it to another. What is more, in National Railroad, the beneficiary
of the government's use of eminent domain was a specific, knowe
private company in competition with the condemnee - a situation not
found in earlier railroad cases, nor in this case. —
. 29
the taking or if a private entity was the condemnor. Indeed,
the common thread running through this entire history,
from colonial times until the present, is that the public
often benefits greatly from takings that result in use of the
condemned property by another private entity — and that
the only relevant constitutional inquiry is whether the
public benefits from the condemnation.
The framers of our Constitution drafted the Takings
Clause against the background of “a concept of property
which permitted extensive regulation of the use of that
property for the public benefit....” Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1056 (1992) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Proscribing limits on
this pewer via a restrictive view of public use apparently
“was nct high among the concerns of those debating the Bill
of Rights ... [as] the framers may well have assumed that
representative government would adequately protect
against abuses of eminent domain ....” Errol E. Meid-
inger, The “Public Uses” of Eminent Domain: History and
Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1, 17-18 (1980) (emphasis added). This
is not surprising, given the Lockean premise that the
consent necessary for the expropriation of property could be
implied from the decision of Parliament to take the prop-
erty. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 378,
380 (Peter Laslett ed., 1967).
This deferential attitude- necessarily informs any
understanding of colonial land use policy. During the
colonial era, the government often exercised its eminent
domain authority, or permitted private individuals to do so
on its behalf, in ways which specifically benefited private
parties. For example, a number of colonies imposed affirma-
tive use requirements on landowners - so that if a property
owner failed to make proper use of his land, he would forfeit
title and the land might be sold to another private owner.
John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance
for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1252, 1260
(1996). This process occurred in urban settings as well.
During the period of Dutch ownership of New York (then
New Amsterdam), owners of unimproved lots often forfeited
title to the government, which then conveyed those lots to
30
new purchasers, in return for a “reasonable indemnity at
the discretion of the Street Surveyors”. Id. at 1277-78
(citation omitted).
Nor was unused land the only context in which colonial
era state governments exercised the power of eminent
domain for the benefit of private entities. Legislatures often
redirected private property towards some other private use
thought to be more advantageous for the common good —
e.g., land thought to be suitable for mills or ironworks, or
land being farmed individually that legislators thought
better suited for a common field. Hart, supra at 1282-83. In
addition, eminent domain sometimes was used to take land
for private rights-of-way. While these roads often were built
to allow landlocked owners access to public highways, many
of the roads thus created remained private even though
eminent domain had been used to acquire the land for
them. Meidinger, supra at 14; Lawrence Berger, The Public
Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OREGON L. REV.
201, 207 (1978). Finally, a number of states enacted legisla-
tion during the colonial era that compelled owners of
wetlands to engage in compulsory drainage projects and
share the costs of drainage projects for the financial benefit
of neighbors who could farm the drained areas. Hart, supra
at 1270.
Although colonial governments generally were scrupu-
lous about providing compensation for outright takings,
their aggressive land use policy speaks volumes with
respect to any original understanding of the Takings
Clause. As Professor Hart summarizes it, in colonial times
[t]he preferences of landowners were regularly
subordinated to a vision of the public good that
embraced many objectives beyond protecting
health and safety. In regulating land use, the gov-
ernment sought benefits for the public, not just
avoidance of harm. The government often acted
simply to encourage a publicly preferred use of
private land — to rationalize or optimize private
land use.
Id. at 1291.
31
The notion of using eminent domain authority to
achieve a public good -— even if the method includes re-
transfer to another private owner — did not end with the
enactment of the Fifth Amendment. In the late eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, numerous states passed so-called
Mill Acts, pursuant to which the owner of downstream land
could build a dam to power a mill even if that dam caused
the flooding of an upstream owner’s land. Berger, supra at
206. By 1884, twenty-nine states had such Acts. Jd.
These mills were not always “analogous to public
utilities now and subject to common carrier regulations.”
(Pet. Brief at 22). In one of the seminal mill cases, O/mstead
v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532 (1866), the Connecticut Supreme
Court permitted a mill owner to flood his neighbor’s land, in
exchange for compensation, even though the owner was
under no legal obligation to grant public access to his mill,
or to mill grain himself for the public at-large.” Id. at 537,
552. In language that would be echoed by this Court more
than a century later, the Olmstead Court justified its
decision by noting that “any appropriating of private
property by the state under its right of eminent domain for
purposes of great advantage to the community, is a taking
for public use.” Id. at 546. That the public had no right of
access to, or right to use, the mill itself, did not alter the
Olmstead Court’s conclusion. Id. at 551. Olmstead was cited
favorably by this Court in Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113
USS. 9, 26 (1885).
* Olmstead is not alone in this conclusion. See Harding v. Funk, 8
Kan. 315, 1871 WL 785 at *7 (1871) (“liJt has never been deemed
essential that the entire community, or considerable portion of it,
should directly enjoy or participate in an improvement .r enterprise in
order to constitute a public use”); Miller v. Troost, 14 Minn. 365, 1869
WL 2322 at *2 (1869); Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1832 WL
_ 2274 at *21 (N.J. Ch. 1832) (mill was for public use even though owners
were “under no obligation to let the public participate in the immediate
‘profits of their undertaking”); see also Brief of the American Planning
Association, et al., as Amici Curiae (“APA Brief”) at 9.
32
The development of our nation’s railroads continued
this trend of permitting a private company to benefit
directly from the taking of private property, so long as the
main beneficiary was the public. Indeed, in many of the
railroad cases, the power of eminent domain was delegated
to the railroad companies themselves, to use as the compa-
nies deemed necessary. See Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v.
Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386, 393 (1892). Although part of the
justification for this was the status of railroads as common
carriers and the regulation of the railroad industry by the
federal government, that is hardly the end of the story.
Indeed, this Court and other courts have permitted railroad
condemnations that were not necessary for the assembly of
narrow, straight tracts of land, but which were useful to the
railway companies’ fiscal health. See Hairston v. Dansville
& Western Railroad Co., 208 U.S. 598 (1908) (railroad
permitted to condemn land for spur track to reach factory of
large tobacco shipper); Wilson v. Pittsburgh & L.E. Railroad
Co., 72 A. 235 (Pa. 1909) (railroad permitted to condemn
private property for water tanks).
Moreover, even those condemnations that involved only
the acquisition of land necessary for straight lines of track
also involved direct and immediate benefits to the railroad
companies — i.e., the massive profits generated by a virtual
monopoly on interstate commerce and travel. Although very
real, the public goods created by the railroads arose as a by-
product of that monopoly. This is not unlike the public
benefits from economic development, which, although very
real and often substantial, come into being as a result of
private profit and private benefit due to an earlier taking.
In sum, the history of land use policy in this country
demonstrates a willingness to allow the re-transfer of
private property to another private owner to ensure that
the property was being put to the most economically benefi-
cial use. Any original understanding of the Takings Clause
must take that history into account.
33
3. The power of eminent domain is a neces-
sary tool in urban development for over-
coming barriers to land assembly.
There is another significant similarity between the use
of eminent domain for railroads and the use of eminent
domain for economic development — a similarity that belies
the petitioners’ attempt to distinguish the railroad cases.
Relying on County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765
(Mich. 2004), the petitioners assert that railroad cases are
unusual because they require “coordination of land assem-
bly ... and could be thwarted by hold-outs.” (Pet. Brief at
21). The petitioners then quote the Hathcock Court’s
distinction of economic development from uses “whose very
existence depends on the use of land that can be assembled
only by the coordination central government alone is
capable of achieving.” Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781 (em-
phasis in original).
What the petitioners refuse to acknowledge is that this
very same problem exists to just as great a degree in urban
economic development as it does in railroad building. It has
long been recognized that eminent domain authority serves
the valuable function in our society of providing the means
for the government to overcome market barriers that might
otherwise halt economic and social progress. See, e.g.,
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§3.6-3.7 (3rd
Ed. 1986); Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fair-
ness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Com-
pensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. REv. 1165, 1175-76 (1967). In
this fashion, eminent domain acts as a lubrizant for the
market machinery, overcoming “barriers to voluntary
exchange created when a seller of resources is in position to
extract economic rents from a buyer.” Thomas Merrill, The
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 65 (1986).
“ Hathcock also holds, solely under the Michigan Constitution,
that “public use” is narrower than “public purpose”. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d at 775-76. It thus follows a different path than has this Court —
a path without sound logical or jurisprudential federal underpinnings.
See APA Brief, at 14-19.
34
In his seminal study of the purpose of the power of
eminent domain in a free market, Professor Merrill notes
the danger to necessary economic and social development of
so-called hold-outs. In a “thin market,” where the seller
owns property uniquely suitable for the buyer’s needs, it
“can lead to monopoly pricing by the seller, to unacceptably
high transaction costs, or to both.” Jd. Such market barriers
often are found in the assembly of the numerous contiguous
pieces of land needed for major public or private develop-
ments. Jd. at 75-76. In such a scenario, “each owner is a
monopolist, effectively dominating a resource needed to
complete the project. Each owner can thereby engage in
monopoly pricing, that is, can set his price well above the
opportunity cost of the needed resource.” Jd. at 75. This
danger is even greater when subjective factors — such as
sentimental attachment to the property — enter into the
equation. Jd. at 83. In such a scenario, no amount of money
would persuade these sentimental hold-outs to sell, creating
a high obstacle to a project for the greater good.
In the urban setting, this assembly problem often is the
biggest barrier to development, a fact expressly recognized
by the Connecticut legislature. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§4-
66b & 8-186. While the land necessary for economic revi-
talization in suburban or rural areas often can be acquired
from a handful of landowners, in a city assembling a parcel
large enough to be of use in improving the city’s economy
necessitates dealing with dozens of landowners.” Indeed,
this Court recognized that very dilemma in Berman, noting
that “[iJf owner after owner were permitted to resist these
redevelopment programs on the ground that his particular
property was not being used against the public interest,
integrated plans for redevelopment would suffer greatly.”
Berman, 348 U.S. at 35; see also Fallbrook Irrigation Dist.
v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161-62 (1896). If a few hold-outs
may block a development project designed to renew the
"’ New London is a classic example of the urban assembly problem:
a geographically minuscule city composed of hundreds of small proper-
ties. See Part II of Respondents’ Brief, infra.
35
economic prosperity of a city, opportunities for urban
economic development in the near future will be few and far
between. Having the tools necessary to overcome these
obstacles — including, if necessary, the power of eminent
domain — is therefore vital to the economic health of every
city in this country. See NLC Brief, at 20-30; CCM Brief, at
3-4 & n.2-3.
4. The inherent transaction costs of eminent
domain, and the inherent checks on the
abuse of eminent domain that exist in a
democracy, provide sufficient assurance
that economic development will not ren-
der the public use requirement a nullity.
In lieu of a coherent constitutional theory grounded in
this Court’s prior decisions, the petitioners devote the first
half of their brief to an exercise in Chicken Littleism.
According to the petitioners, “the unfettered sweep of the
[Connecticut Supreme Court’s] opinion places all home and
small business owners at risk, especially property owners of
more modest means.” (Pet. Brief at 12). However, the
petitioners ignore several important brakes along their
slippery slope.
First, there are inherent transaction costs that often
make eminent domain an unattractive or even unfeasible
alternative for municipalities and would-be developers.
According to Professor Merrill:
First, and most important, legislatures must au-
thorize the exercise of eminent domain. It is thus
necessary to persuade a legislature to grant the
power of eminent domain, or, if a general grant of
the power already exists, to persuade officials to
exercise it. Second, the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments, as well as local
statutes and rules, impose various procedural re-
quirements upon the exercise of eminent domain.
At a minimum, these include drafting and filing a
formal judicial complaint and service of process on
the owner. Third, nearly all jurisdictions require
36
at least one professional appraisal of the con-
demned property, something generally not done
(or not done as formally) in a private sale. Finally,
both court-made and statutory law guarantee a
person whose property is subject to condemnation
some sort of hearing on the condemnation’s legal-
ity and the amount of compensation due.
Merrill, supra at 77. These inherent transaction costs were
incurred in this case — as well as the more obvious costs of
millions of dollars in just compensation and millions more
in relocation assistance, none of which will be paid by a
private party.”
Given these transaction costs, which often make
eminent domain a much more expensive method of acquir-
ing property than market exchange, “the decision whether
to use eminent domain should be, from an economic
perspective, self-regulating.” Jd. at 78. In other words,
because it requires the expenditure of significant sums of
public money - to plan an economic development project,
to acquire the property and to litigate - eminent domain is
likely to remain a tool of last resort for municipalities.
Economic self-interest is hardly the only built-in check
on eminent domain; political self-interest will have that
effect as well. As with the abuse of any form of government
power, popular dissatisfaction with the abuse of eminent
domain, especially if used for the benefit of private industry,
will eventually make itself felt at the ballot box. Indeed, the
threat of such electoral consequences likely will act as a
deterrent to most questionable uses of the power of eminent
domain. Although the petitioners prophesy a world in which
“ Under Connecticut law, the taking authority must pay the
condemnee the full and fair market value of his property and deposit
that sum in escrow with the Connecticut Superior Court at the time of
the condemnation. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-193 (incorporating Conn.
Gen. Stat. §§8-129 & 8-130).
37
churches are replaced by Walmarts, that cynical forecast
does not account for the democratic process.”
In fact, the petitioners’ dire predictions notwithstand-
ing, their brief actually identifies yet another potential
check on the abuse of eminent domain - the state courts.
The petitioners cite several recent state court decisions
striking down an exercise of eminent domain to further
economic development as not beirg for a valid public use.
See Hathcock, supra; Georgia Dept. of Transportation uv.
Jasper County, 586 S.E.2d 853 (S.C. 2003); Southwest
Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environ-
mental, 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002) (SWIDA). These cases —
which invalidated takings either solely or principally under
their respective state constitutions - serve as examples of
the healthy balance between state and federal judicial
authority necessary in a federalist system of government.
Nor is it mere wishful thinking to regard the state courts as
the principal bulwarks against the abuse of eminent do-
main. See Merrill, supra at 96-97 (between 1954 and 1985,
over 16 percent of state court decisions on public use
question invalidated takings as not being for public use);
Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle Over the Public Use Clause:
Survey of Holdings and Trends, 1986-2003, 39 R. PRop.,
PROBATE & TrusT J. 251, 258 (2004) (over 17 percent
between 1986 and 2003).
Finally, to the extent that the petitioners raise the
specter of the arbitrary or capricioWS exercise of the
power of eminent domain by municipalities without any
judicial check, the Connecticut Supreme Court has
demonstrated several times in the past few years that it
will not tolerate such nefarious behavior. See Aposporos
” Eminent domain presents a situation far different from one in
which the constitutional rights of a small minority of the population are
threatened by the tyranny of the majority because of unpopularity or
bigotry. Because the exercise of eminent domain does not single out a
particular group, property rights therefore are not subject to attack in
the same fashion as the right to free speech or the rights of religious,
racial or ethnic minorities.
38
v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 790 A.2d 1167 (Conn.
2002) (reversing condemnation due to inadequate findings of
blight); Pequonnock Yacht Club, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport,
790 A.2d 1178 (Conn. 2002) (affirming injunction against
condemnation due to failure of defendants to consider
integration of plaintiff's property); AvalonBay Communities,
Inc. v. Town of Orange, 775 A.2d 284 (Conn. 2001) (affirming
injunction barring implementation of plan adopted in bad
faith as pretext to thwart affordable housing).
The Connecticut Supreme Court’s opinion in the
present case only reinforces that intolerance of municipal
misbehavior. First, although it generally adhered to the
deference mandated by Berman and Midkiff, the “primary
purpose” standard enunciated in Kelo actually is more
stringent than either Berman or Midkiff. This standard
presupposes at least some inquiry into the reasons for the
legislative or municipal takings decision beyond whether it
is “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose”. This
is buttressed by the Court’s detailed discussion of the
“particularly egregious set of facts” that led the [Illinois
Supreme Court to declare a taking unconstitutional in
SWIDA. The Connecticut Supreme Court’s express ac-
knowledgement that it may be appropriate to invalidate a
taking when, as in the SWIDA case, an agency clearly has
exercised its eminent domain authority for the primary
benefit of another, specific private entity, belies the peti-
tioners’ contention that the Kelo decision drains the mean-
ing and substance out of the public use requirement.
Il. THE EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN AU-
THORITY BY THE RESPONDENTS IN THIS
CASE SATISFIES THE PUBLIC USE RE-
QUIREMENT.
In keeping with this Court’s oft-stated rule of great
deference to legislative statements of public use, “it is only
the taking’s purpose, and not its mechanics, that must
pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause.” Midkiff, 467
U.S. at 244. For the reasons that follow, this Court should
decline the petitioners’ invitation to impose a new and
39
more rigorous standard of review for compensated takings.
However, even under the intrusive system of means-ends
scrutiny proposed in the petitioners’ brief, the specific
benefits that are the likely result of the MDP are more than
sufficient for the plan to pass constitutional muster.
A. This Court should adhere to the level of
scrutiny traditionally employed for com-
pensated takings.
For the reasons discussed in more detail supra, this
Court has been loath to scrutinize a legislative determina-
tion as to whether an economic decision serves a public
purpose. Courts are not only institutionally unsuited to
making such predictive judgments, but also are unbound by
the restraints of the democratic process that limit elected
officials. As such, great deference to legislative decision-
making in this area is the proper judicial role. See Nectow v.
City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928).
This Court employs precisely the same deference in the
Takings Clause context. In fact, the Court has never im-
posed any form of heightened scrutiny with respect to a
compensated taking, even though several of this Court’s
cases involved takings for the benefit of a private party. See
NLC Brief at 8-11. To the contrary, in National Railroad,
after concluding that the condemnation and re-transfer to a
private party was a proper public use, this Court declined to
“make a specific factual determination whether the con-
demnation will accomplish its objectives.” National Rail-
road, 503 U.S. at 422-23. The Court has required greater
scrutiny only with respect to uncompensated exactions; i.e.,
when the government conditions the grant of a building
permit on the permittee’s willingness to allow a public
right-of-way across his property. See Dolan v. City of Ti-
gard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm’n, supra.
The Nollan/Dolan rule - which requires a “nexus”
between some substantial public purpose and the means
chosen to achieve that interest and, if such a nexus exists,
“rough proportionality” between the government-imposed
40
condition and the anticipated impacts of the permitted
construction — makes sense only in the narrow realm of
uncompensated exactions. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385, 391;
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836 n.3, 837. Indeed, this Court ex-
pressly held as much in City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702-03 (1999).
The need for heightened scrutiny in the Nollan/Dolan
scenario was born out of the concern that the government
might use a property owner’s desire for a permit to compel
the owner’s acquiescence to a permanent physical occupa-
tion of his property — an occupation that otherwise would
constitute a per se taking requiring compensation. See
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834. In other words, the concern was
that the government would use the permitting process as
an end-run around the just compensation requirement.
This concern obviously does not apply to the compensated
takings in this case. See First English, 482 U.S. at 314-15.
The “reasonable certainty” test proposed by the peti-
tioners for takings involving a re-transfer of the condemned
property lacks any foundation in either logic or this Court’s
jurisprudence. The petitioners cite only one decision of this
Court as even arguably supporting heightened scrutiny:
United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. at 680.
However, the quoted dicta in Gettysburg must be read in
light of its actual holding:
[W]hen the legislature has declared the use or
purpose to be a public one, its judgment will be
respected by the courts, unless the use be palpa-
bly without reasonable foundation. Many authori-
ties are cited in the note, and, indeed, the rule
commends itself as a rational and proper one.
Id. Indeed, Midkiff expressly relies on Gettysburg in its
formulation of the deferential standard of review on public
use.” Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.
” The petitioners also cite Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (1930),
for the proposition that a public use must be “a known use” in order to
pass constitutional muster. The petitioners simply ignore the fact that
this Court expressly refused to decide the constitutional issue presented
(Continued on following page)
41
The petitioners’ other arguments are equally meritless.
Their (somewhat mutually contradictory) assertions that
the benefits of the MDP are too speculative, and that it is
not necessary to take the petitioners’ properties in order to
achieve those benefits, are discussed infra in Section IIB.
Their claim that heightened scrutiny is warranted because
“[e]minent domain forces some people to bear a burden that
should be, but cannot be, borne by all[,]” (Pet. Brief at 32),
says nothing unique about either eminent domain for
economic development or about re-transfer cases. After all,
in every instance that it is used, the power of eminent
domain places a greater burden on certain individuals than
society at large — this is true for roads, schools, prisons, all
of the “traditional” public uses lauded by the petitioners.
The constitutional remedy for that (however little the
petitioners wish to acknowleage it) is just compensation.
In sum, there simply is no principled reason to impose
— for the first time with respect to compensated takings — a
heightened degree of scrutiny. This Court has never coun-
tenanced such an interference with the legislative and
municipal prerogative and it should not do so here. So long
as a taking is related to a rational public purpose, this
Court should do what it did in National Railroad and
uphold the taking.
B. Under any standard of review, the takings in
this case satisfy the public use requirement.
It is clear that, as a general matter, economic develop-
ment satisfies the public use requirement, even when that
development takes place through the medium of re-transfer
to a private entity. In the present case, the need for such
development is undisputed — the petitioners quibble only
with the efficacy and necessity of the methods chosen by the
respondents and set forth in the MDP to achieve the as-
serted public purpose. However, those quibbles are not
in Vester because the case could be resolved on a point of Ohio statutory
law. Id. at 448-49.
See
—_
42
supported by the factual record. To the contrary, the facts
demonstrate that there is more than a reasonable likelihood
that the projected benefits of the MDP will come to pass
and that the proposed takings are therefore necessary to
the economic rejuvenation of New London.”
New London’s severe economic distress, discussed in
detail supra, makes the need for economic revitalization
much more compelling than would be the case in a city that
was thriving. In any takings situation, a municipal exercise
of eminent domain power must bear some rational relation-
ship to a problem of which the correction is within the
sphere of the police power. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240. There-
fore, the more severe the problem, the more necessary is a
municipal response to it, if municipal authorities are to
fulfill their role to adjust “the burdens and benefits of
economic life... . ” Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
1J.S. 1, 15 (1976). Moreover, “he MDP already has resulted
in significant non-economic benefits for the people of New
London. These immediate benefits include large-scale
environmental remediation; creation of public access to the
Thames River via the Riverwalk; improvements to the city’s
roads, sewers, water and power lines; and the filling of flood
plain areas. (J.A. 140-41, 143-47, 159-60, 180-81, 442-43,
718-21).
It is equally as important that the MDP was not a
hastily cobbled-together midnight deal. It was the product
" For the reasons set forth in Sections IA and IIA, the respondents
believe that it would be inappropriate for this Court to adopt a height-
ened standard of proof for economic development takings. However, it is
noteworthy that the Connecticut Supreme Court, in considering
whether the claimed public benefits of the MDP would come to pass,
required a finding of “reasonable assurances of future public use... . ”
(Pet. App. 73). If the petitioners are attempting to impose an even
stricter standard of proof with their “reasonable certainty” test, they
simply are trying to halt most economic development condemnations
through the back door of an unreasonable standard of proof. To
paraphrase the Connecticut Supreme Court, it would be hard to see
how predictions of future economic events ever can be proved with the
high level of certainty proposed by the petitioners. (Pet. App. 74 n.62).
43
of a comprehensive and public process designed to alleviate
many of New London’s problems by creating thousands of
jobs, greatly increasing the city’s tax revenues and modern-
izing its building stock, streets and sewers. This process
included a detailed analysis of six possible options for the
MDP. See note 10, supra. Thereafter, a detailed marketing
study was conducted by a potential developer, Corcoran
Jennison, which ultimately was selected from a group of
applicants to be the developer for much of the MDP. (J.A.
30-82; Pet. App. 66). Moreover, contrary to the suggestion in
the petitioners’ brief, the NLDC, and any private developers
to whom property is leased, will not simply be left to run
things as they see fit while the city and its residents hope
that these benefits materialize. In fact, the MDP is subject
to numerous statutory and contractual controls.
Chief among these is Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-189, which
requires multiple and specific details in any development
plan regarding the need for development and the benefits of
a Aen mse gs - 5 oa age of the number of jobs
created; a mar ility plan; a financing plan; an
administrative plan; and a finding that the plan will
contribute to the economic welfare of the municipality and
the state. Id. Section 8-189 also requires oversight of the
development by the state to ensure that any development
plan conforms to state regulations and other statewide and
regional plans of development. Jd. Furthermore, in Cun-
necticut, no municipality can use eminent domain for
economic development without the approval of the Execu-
tive Branch and continued state oversight. All of those
requirements were met in this case.
A number of other statutes provide control over eco-
nomic development plans as well. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-
190 (state may make planning grants and advise develop-
ment agency); Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-191 (state must approve
final development plan if state grants have been made);
Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-193(a) (if state grants have been made,
department and city must approve land transfers by sale or
lease in accordance with plan); and Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-
200(a) (“substantial” changes to development plan require
approval in same manner as original plan). In fact, the
44
state itself is a “signatory to the development agreement; it
‘provides the funding without which nothing goes forward.’”
(Pet. App. 74). The MDP, and any modifications thereto, is
in effect for 30 years, and any parcel in the plan area must
be devoted principally to the uses contemplated by the
MDP. (Pet. App. 75 & n.64).
In accordance with these statutory controls, both the
trial court and the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded
that state and city would have sufficient control over the
NLDC to ensure that neither it nor any private developer
leasing any part of the property would be “able to act
according to its own ‘will and caprice’.... ” (Pet. App. 75
n.63). This conclusion is buttressed by the MDP’s require-
~—~wnent that any redeveloper
[agree] for itself and its successors and assigns as
successors in interest to the parcel, or any part
thereof, that the deed conveying the Parcel shall
contain language covenanting on the part of Re-
developer and its successors and assigns that:
The Parcel shall be devoted principally to the
uses contemplated by the Plan, and shall not be
used or devoted for any other purpose, or contrary
to any of the limitations or requirements of said
Plan. All improvements made pursuant to the
Plan and this Agreement shall be used in accor-
dance with the Plan unless prior written consent is
given by the [development corporation] and [de-
partment] for a different use;
The Parcel shall not be sold, leased, or other-
wise disposed of for the purposes of speculation.
(Pet. App. 75 n.64) (emphasis added). These contractual
obligations act as a bar to any future-redeveloper that
might lease property in the MDP area from the NLDC from
making use of the property in a way not in accordance with
the MDP. Moreover, these obligations are buttressed by the
fact that the redeveloper will not own the property, but will
lease it from the NLDC. There is also no evidence that any
non-governmental entity will pay any portion of the just
compensation to the petitioners.
45
Taken together, these statutory and contractual con-
trols give reasunable assurance that it is the State of
Connecticut arid the City of New London, and not either the
NLDC or those developers to whom space is leased, which
will exercise final control over the future of the MDP.
Indeed, although the city has designated the NLDC as its
agent for economic development pursuant to §8-188, noth-
ing in that statute, or Connecticut law in general, prevents
that designation from being withdrawn. In that sense, the
city always has the ultimate form of control over the NLDC
because the city can take away ali of the NLDC’s power by
simply un-designating it. (Pet. App. 219).
The same reasonable assurance exists that the pro-
posed benefits to New London’s economy and infrastructure
are likely to take place. With respect to Parcel 3, the peti-
tioners have taken a few isolated comments from a market-
ing study performed in 2000 by Corcoran Jennison (the
company designated to lease the office space in Parcel 3)
and simply ignored the many other parts of the record that
demonstrate the viability of the use of Parcel 3. For exam-
ple, that very same marketing study found that “rental rate
and occupancy trends [in New London] have been generally
positive over the past few years....” (J.A. 38). The study
characterizes the market for Class A office space in New
London as “quite healthy,” and notes that “there has been a
positive demand for Class A & B office space over the past
four years. Between October 1996 and October 1999,
approximately 185,000 square feet were absorbed-itn New
London.” (J.A. 41-42) (emphasis added). It is telling that the
petitioners’ brief never addresses this fact.” In addition,
™ The petitioners’ assertion that the office space will only be built
at some unknown, and likely far-off, time in the future also is belied by
the facts. According to the record, Corcoran Jennison “intend[ed) to
select a brokerage firm no later [than] March 31, 2001 and to commence
the marketing of the commercial space as soon as possible thereafter.”
(J.A. 75-76). Indeed, a careful examination of the very time-line
trumpeted by the petitioners in their brief shows that —- were it not for
the current litigation — much of the office space slated for Parcel 3 could
have been either completed or under construction. (J.A. 46-48, 73).
46
there was ample testimony that the presence of Pfizer in
New London would act as a spur in the commercial real
estate market in keepifig with the demand for office and
research space envisioned by Parcel 3.”
The proposed uses for Parcel 4A also are sufficiently
well-defined. As the Connecticut Supreme Court opinion
notes, the MDP envisions two uses for Parcel 4A: park
support and marina support.” (Pet. App. 125-26; J.A. 111-
12). Understood in their proper context — the size of Parcel
4A, and its placement within the overall plan for Fort
Trumbull — these proposed uses are not speculative. Parcel
4A is 2.4 acres in size and is situated in the middle of the
plan area, sandwiched between a waste water treatment
facility and Fort Trumbull State Park. (J.A. 4). It is the only
parcel which can possibly be used to connect the rest of the
project to the marina and Fort Trumbull State Park. It
certainly is not irrational to designate a small parcel of land
adjoining a 16-acre state park for park support, especially
when that parcel’s other principal neighbor, a waste water
treatment facility, makes it less suitable for other functions.
The same thing is true regarding use of Parcel 4A for
marina support because immediately to the south of Parcel
4A is Parcel 4B, which is slated to contain a marina. Viewed
in light of its location, the proposed uses of Parcel 4A make
a great deal of sense.
That the 90-acre plan area itself is surrounded on three
sides by water has an obvious jtapact on the uses of Parcel
* The petitioners’ assertion that the clear intent of the MDP was to
benefit Pfizer, rather than merely to take advantage of its presence in
the city, is not only contradicted by the findings of the trial court and
the majority opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, but by the
dissent as well. (Pet. App. 70-71, 176). Moreover, as the majority opinion
notes, Pfizer’s supposed “requirements,” which is the only evidence
proffered by the petitioners of any intent to benefit Pfizer, do not impact
Parcels 3 and 4A. (Pet. App. 65, 69). Furthermore, Pfizer will have no
ownership or management interest in any of the facilities in the plan
area. (Pet. App. 63).
* Another possible use of Parcel 4A is for a United States Coast
Guard Museum. (Pet. App. 126-27).
47
4A. (J.A. 4). It means that parking, and most other park or
marina support facilities, cannot go in those directions. This
supports the reasonableness of the taking of Parcel 4A for
those uses. Not to take Parcel 4A also would leave 11 tiny
plots — totaling 0.76 acres — completely surrounded by a 90-
acre development project that cannot expand in three
directions due to its peninsular nature.
Furthermore, to the extent that the petitioners argue
that these proposed uses are too speculative, that argument
is actually no more than a thinly-disguised attempt to trap
the city between a constitutional Scylla and Charibdis. On
the one hand, the petitioners note the constitutional bar
against takings designed solely to benefit a private party.
See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245. So, if an economic develop-
ment plan were to contain very specific details as to specific
private companies that were going to be given the use of
properties taken through eminent domain, that in the
petitioners’ view would run afoul of the public use require-
ment because those private companies, and not the public,
would be the true beneficiaries of the takings. On the other
hand, the petitioners want this Court to bar any plan
unless it states who will develop the condemned land and
for what specific uses. Of course, it is precisely economi-
cally-distressed cities that have the most difficulty in
enticing private developers to commit themselves to urban
revitalization — and it is these same cities (and their mil-
lions of residents) that will be the losers if they must prove
to a high degree of certainty that their plans will succeed.
This sort of gamesmanship - which ignores the clear
distinction between judicial review of the overarching
public use and judicial review of the means by which that
use is implemented — cannot be what the constitution
intended. As this Court said in Rindge, supra, 262 U.S. at
707, a public use may be a use “fairly anticipated in the
future.”
Finally, the petitioners contend that, because their
properties “comprise a miniscule portion of the land” in the
MDP, it is not necessary to take their properties in order to
advance the public good. (Pet. Brief at 48). In Berman, this
Court rejected an identical argument by the owners of a
48
non-blighted department store situated in the part of
Washington designated for redevelopment. Berman, 348
U.S. at 31, 34. The store owners claimed that, because
“their building [did] not imperil health or safety nor con-
tribute to the making of a slum or a blighted area,” id. at
34, it should have been exempted from the dictates of the
District redevelopment. In response, this Court emphati-
cally rejected such a piecemeal approach. The Court de-
ferred to the expertise of the legislators and administrators
who formulated the redevelopment and held:
It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of
the boundary line nor to sit in review on the size of a
particular project area. Once the question of the
public purpose has been decided, the amount and
character of land to be taken for the project and the
need for a particular tract to complete the integrated
plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.
Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added).
A property-by-property approach to the question of
constitutionality would pose just as grave a threat to the
integrated plan in this case as it did in Berman. First, as
Berman intimates, it would be incongruous, to say the least,
to have the federal courts micromanage state and local
development projects. Not only are judges professionally ill-
suited to such a role, but that sort of heavy-handed intru-
sion into state and local affairs does not comport with our
federalist system of government.
Second, there is the “spotted leopard” problem.” This
occurs when there are small parcels of untouchable land
scattered within an area set for development. It is an
enormous hindrance for the project as a whale to have to
build around these so-called spots. For example, much of
the MDP area will be raised above the flood plain. Obvi-
ously, this cannot take place if there are little exempted
* According to the record, the rssidential properties are “scattered
throughout the MDP area contribating to a sawtooth visual impression
in the various blocks.” (J.A. 323); see also (Pet. App. 301-305).
49 ~
islands of property within the area to be raised. For this
and other reasons, building around the petitioners is not a
feasible alternative. Moreover, even if development of the
property could go forward, the spotted leopard problem
would be just as great a hindrance once the development
was complete. It is important to remember that the land in
Parcels 3 & 4A has been zoned for commercial and light
industrial use for decades and, under the MDP, will be
zoned for “water dependent and water related industrial
and major commercial use. ... ” (J.A. 114, 116, 126). The
properties, which cannot be renovated for commercial use,
therefore will simply be incompatible with all of the uses
going on around them.
Indeed, this is another important facet of the assembly
problem faced by cities. See supra, Section IB3. In suburban
and rural areas, there generally is no spotted leopard prob-
lem because the land needed for development often can be
acquired through the marketplace from a few owners. In
cities, however, properties are generally much smaller in size
and owned by many more individuals. As such, a city that
wants to improve a downtrodden economy and revamp its
infrastructure must contend with the spotted leopard. Tbo
often, the result is the exodus of businesses and developers to
the suburbs and the creation of still more suburban sprawl.
The condemnation of the petitioners’ properties is clearly
rational. If the Court believes that a higher standard should
be imposed for compensated takings, this case falls on the
constitutional side of any reasonable line. New London is
economically downtrodden and has given all of the assur-
ances of successful development that reasonably can be
expected of a city. The respondents have provided a carefully
thought-out and publicly-vetted plan with state and local
oversight; a plan that is subject to detailed statutory and
would be asking for an absolute guarantee of the future —
and that is a standard too harsh for any city to satisfy.
50
For most of this century, our courts have followed the
time-honored “original constitutional proposition that
courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for
the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass
laws.” Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). The
power of eminent domain, although formidable, is merely
one of the many tools that the Constitution grants to the
legislative branch in order to fulfill its role as the progeni-
tors of economic and social policy. Contrary to the petition-
ers’ assertion that a ruling in their favor would have only a
limited impact, such a ruling would result in a seismic shift
in our constitutional landscape that would upset not only
the careful balance between judicial and legislative author-
ity, but would also result in the intrusion of federal courts
into state and local affairs.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Con-
necticut Supreme Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WESLEY W. HORTON
Counsel of Record
DANIEL J. KRISCH
HORTON, SHIELDS & KNox, P.-C.
90 Gillett Street
Hartford, CT 06105
(860) 522-8338
THOMAS J. LONDREGAN
JEFFREY T. LONDREGAN
Conway & LONDREGAN, PC.
38 Huntington Street
New London, CT 06320
(860) 447-3171
pigs EDWARD B. O’CONNELL
Davip P. CONDON
WALLER, SMITH & PALMER, P.C.
52 Eugene O’Neill Drive
New London, CT 06320
(860) 442-0367
Counsel for the Respondents
App. 1
Connecticut Statutes
Sec. 4-66b. Capital development impact state-
ments. The Secretary of the Office of Policy and Man-
agement shall develop a form for capital development
impact statements on which state agencies shall indicate
the manner in which a planned or requested capital
project or program addresses the following goals: (1)
Revitalization of the economic base of urban areas by
rebuilding older commercial and industrial areas, and
encouraging new industries to locate in the central cities
in order to protect existing jobs and create new job oppor-
tunities needed to provide meaningful economic opportu-
nity for inner city residents; (2) revitalization of urban
neighborhoods to reduce the isolation of various income,
age and minority groups through the promotion of fair and
balanced housing opportunities for low and moderate
income residents; (3) revitalization of the quality of life for
the residents of urban areas by insuring quality education,
comprehensive health care, access to balanced transporta-
tion, adequate recreation facilities, responsive public
safety, coordinated effective human service programs,
decent housing and employment and clean water and by
insuring full and equal rights and opportunities for all
people to reap the economic and social benefits of society;
(4) coordination of the conservation and growth of all areas
of the state to insure that each area preserves its unique
character and sense of community and further insure a
balanced growth and prudent use of the state’s resources.
App. 2
CHAPTER 135
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT:
UNIFORM RELOCATION ASSISTANCE ACT
Sec. 8-266. Short title: Uniform Relocation Assis-
tance Act. Purpose. Policy. This chapter shall be
—~ known as the “Uniform Relocation Assistance Act”. The
purpose of this chapter is to establish a uniform policy for
the fair and equitable treatment of persons displaced by
the acquisition of real property by state and local land
acquisition programs, by building code enforcement
activities, or by a program of voluntary rehabilitation of
buildings or other improvements conducted pursuant to
governmental supervision. Such policy shall be uniform as
to (1) relocation payments, (2) advisory assistance, (3)
assurance of availability of standard housing, and (4) state
reimbursement for local relocation payments under state
assisted and local programs.
Sec. 8-267. Definitions. As used in this chapter:
(1) “State agency” means any department, agency or
instrumentality of the state or of a political subdivision of
the state, or local housing authorities, or any department,
agency or instrumentality of two or more political subdivi-
sions of the state, but shall not include community hous-
ing development corporations authorized under section 8-
217;
(2) “Person” means any individual, partnership,
corporation, limited liability company or association;
(3) “Displaced person” means (a) any person who, on
or after July 6, 1971, moves from real property, or moves
App. 3
his personal property from real property, as a result of the
acquisition of such real property, in whole or in part, or as
the result of the written order of the acquiring agency to
vacate real property, for a program or project undertaken
by or supervised by a state agency or unit of local govern-
ment and solely for the purposes of subsections (a) and (b)
of section 8-268 and section 8-271 as a result of the acqui-
sition of or as a result of the written order of the acquiring
agency to vacate other real property, on which such person
conducts a business or farm operation, for such program or
project; or (b) any person who so moves as the direct result
of code enforcement activities or a program of rehabilita-
tion of buildings pursuant to such governmental program
or under such governmental supervision, except a business
which moves from real property or which moves its per-
sonal property from real property acquired by a state
agency when such move occurs at the end of a lease term
or as a result of eviction for nonpayment of rent, provided
the state agency acquired the property at least ten years
before the move;
(4) “Nonprofit organization” means associations
incorporated under chapters 598 and 600;
(5) “Business” means any lawful activity, excepting a
farm operation, conducted primarily (A) for the purchase,
sale, lease and rental of personal and real property, and
for the manufacture, processing or marketing of products,
commodities or any other personal property; (B) for the
sale of services to the public; (C) by a nonprofit organiza-
tion; or (D) solely for the purposes of subsection (a) of
section 8-268, for assisting in the purchase, sale, resale,
manufacture, processing, or marketing of products, com-
modities, personal property, or services by the erection and
maintenance of an outdoor advertising display or displays,
App. 4
whether or not such display or displays are located on the
premises on which any of the above activities are con-
ducted;
(6) “Farm operation” means any activity conducted
solely or primarily for the production of one or more
agricultural products or commodities, including timber, for
sale or home use, and customarily producing such prod-
ucts or commodities in sufficient quantity to be capable of
contributing materially to the operator’s support;
(7) “Mortgage” means such classes of liens as are
commonly given to secure advances on, or the unpaid
purchase price of, real property, under the laws of this
state, together with the credit instruments, if any, secured
thereby.
Sec. 8-267a. Compliance with federal Uniform
Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisi-
tion Policies Act. All state agencies, as defined in
section 8-267, are authorized to comply with the applicable
provisions of 42 USC Sections 4601-4655 and any subse-
quent amendments, for the purpose of participating in a
federal or federally assisted project or program.
Sec. 8-268. Payment for displacement expenses
and losses. Moving expenses and dislocation allow-
ances. Fixed payments. Landlord’s responsibility in
certain cases. (a) Whenever a program or project
undertaken by a state agency or under the supervision of a
state agency will result in the displacement of any person
on or after July 6, 1971, the head of such state agency
shall make payment to any displaced person, upon proper
App. 5
application as approved by such agency head, for (1) actual
reasonable expenses in moving himself, his family, busi-
ness, farm operation ur other personal property; (2) actual
direct losses of tangible personal property as a result of
moving or discontinuing a business or farm operation, but
not to exceed an amount equal to the reasonable expenses
that would have been required to relocate such property,
as determined by the state agency, and (3) actual reason-
able expenses in searching for a replacement business or
farm, provided, whenever any tenant in any dwelling unit
is displaced as the result of the enforcement of any code to
which this section is applicable by any town, city or
borough or agency thereof, the landlord of such dwelling
unit shall be liable for any payments made by such town,
city or borough pursuant to this section or by the state
pursuant to subsection (b) of section 8-280, and the town,
city or borough or the state may place a lien on any real
property owned by such landlord to secure repayment to
the town, city or borough or the state of such payments,
which lien shall have the same priority as and shall be
filed, enforced and discharged in the same manner as a
lien for municipal taxes under chapter 205.
(b) Any displaced person eligible for payments under
subsection (a) of this section who is displaced from a
dwelling and who elects to accept the payments authorized
by this subsection in lieu of the payments authorized by
subsection (a) of this section may receive a moving expense
allowance, determined according to a schedule established
by the state agency, not to exceed three hundred dollars
and a dislocation allowance of two hundred dollars.
(c) Any displaced person eligible for payments under
subsection (a) of this section who is displaced from his
place of business or from his farm operation and who
App. 6
elects to accept the payment authorized by this subsection
in lieu of the payment authorized by subsection (a) of this
section, may receive a fixed payment in an amount equal
to the average annual net earnings of the business or farm
operation, except that such payment shall not be less than
two thousand five hundred dollars nor more than ten
thousand dollars. In the case of a business no payment
shall be made under this subsection unless the state
agency is satisfied that the business (1) cannot be relo-
cated without a substantial loss of its existing patronage,
and (2) is not a part of a commercial enterprise having at
least one other establishment not being acquired by the
state, which is engaged in the same or similar business.
For purposes of this subsection, the term “average annual
net earnings” means one half of any net earnings of the
business or farm operation, before federal, state and local
income taxes, during the two taxable years immediately
preceding the taxable year in which such business or farm
operation moves from the real property acquired for such
project, or during such other period as such agency deter-
mines to be more equitable for establishing such earnings,
and includes any compensation paid by the business or
farm operation to the owner, his spouse or his dependents
during such period.
Sec. 8-269. Additional payment to owner dis-
placed from dwelling. (a) In addition to payments
otherwise authorized by this chapter, the state agency
shall make an additional payment not in excess of fifteen
thousand dollars to any displaced person who is displaced
from a dwelling actually owned and occupied by such
displaced person for not less than one hundred and eighty
App. 7
days prior to the initiation of negotiations for the acquisi-
tion of the property. Such additional payment shall include
the following elements: (1) The amount, if any, which when
added to the acquisition cost of the dwelling acquired,
equals the reasonable cost of a comparable replacement
dwelling which is a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling
adequate to accommodate such displaced person, reasona-
bly accessible to public services and places of employment
and available on the private market. All determinations
required to carry out this subparagraph shall be made by
the applicable regulations issued pursuant to section 8-
273; (2) the amount, if any, which will compensate such
displaced person for any increased interest cost which
such person is required to pay for financing the acquisition
of any such comparable replacement dwelling. Such
amount shall be paid only if the dwelling acquired was
encumbered by a bona fide mortgage which was a valid
lien on such dwelling for not less than one hundred and
eighty days prior to the initiation of negotiations for the
acquisition of such dwelling. Such amount shall be equal
to the excess in the aggregate interest and other debt
service costs of that amount of the principal of the mort-
gage on the replacement dwelling which is equal to the
unpaid balance of the mortgage on the acquired dwelling,
over the remainder term of the mortgage on the acquired
dwelling, reduced to discounted present value. The dis-
count rate shall be the prevailing interest rate on savings
deposits by commercial banks in the general area in which
the replacement dwelling is located; (3) reasonable ex-
penses incurred by such displaced person for evidence of
title, recording fees and other closing costs incident to the
purchase of the replacement dwelling, but not including
prepaid expenses.
App. 8
(b) The additional payment authorized by this
section shall be made only to such a displaced person who
purchases and occupies a replacement dwelling which is
decent, safe and sanitary not later than the end of the one
year period beginning on the date on which he receives
final payment of all costs of the acquired dwelling, or on
the date on which he moves from the acquired dwelling,
whichever is the later date.
Sec. 8-270. Additional payment for persons
displaced from dwelling. Landlord’s responsibility
in certain cases. In addition to amounts otherwise
authorized by this chapter, a state agency shall make a
payment to or for any displaced person displaced from any
dwelling not eligible to receive a payment under section 8-
269 which dwelling was actually and lawfully occupied by
such displaced person for not less than ninety days prior to
the initiation of negotiations for acquisition of such dwell-
ing under the program or project which results in such
person being displaced. Such payment shall be either (1)
the amount necessary to enable such displaced person to
lease or rent for a period not to exceed four years, a decent,
safe, and sanitary dwelling of standards adequate to
accommodate such person in areas not generally less
desirable in regard to public utilities and public and
commercial facilities, and reasonably accessible to his
place of employment, but not to exceed four thousand
dollars, or (2) the amount necessary to enable such person
to make a downpayment, including reasonable expenses
incurred by such displaced person for evidence of title,
recording fees, and other closing costs incident to the
purchase of a decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling of stan-
dards adequate to accommodate such person in areas not
App. 9
generally less desirable in regard to public utilities and
public and commercial facilities, but not to exceed four
thousand dollars, except that if such amour.t exceeds two
thousand dollars, such person must equally match any
such amount in excess of two thousand dollars in making
the downpayment, and provided, whenever any tenant in
any dwelling unit is displaced as the result of the enforce-
ment of any code to which this section is applicable by any
town, city or borough or agency thereof, the landlord of
such dwelling unit shall be liable for any payments made
by such town, city or borough pursuant to this section or
by the state pursuant to subsection (b) of section 8-280,
and the town, city or borough or the state may place a lien
on any real property owned by such landlord to secure
repayment to the town, city or borough or the state of such
payments, which lien shall have the same priority as and
shall be filed, enforced and discharged in the same manner
as a lien for municipal taxes under chapter 205.
Sec. 8-270a. Actions against landlords by towns,
cities and boroughs and the state. If any landlord
fails to reimburse any town, city or borough for any
payments which the town, city or borough has made to any
displaced tenant and for which the landlord is liable
pursuant to section 8-268 or 8-270, such town, city or
borough or the state pursuant to subsection (b) of section
8-280 may bring a civil action against such landlord in the
superior court for the judicial district in which the town,
city or borough is located or for the judicial district in
which such landlord resides for the recovery of such
payments, and for the costs, together with reasonable
attorney’s fees, of the town, city or borough or the state in
bringing such action. In any such action, it shall be an
App. 10
affirmative defense for the landlord that the displacement
was not the result of the landlord’s violation of section 47a-
7.
Sec. 8-271. Relocation assistance advisory pro-
gram. (a) Whenever a program or project undertaken by
a state agency or under the supervision of a state agency
will result in the displacement of any person on or after
July 6, 1971, such agency shall provide a relocation
assistance advisory program for displaced persons which
shall offer the services described herein. If the state
agency determines that any person occupying property
immediately adjacent to any real property acquired is
caused substantial economic injury because of such acqui-
sition, it may offer such person relocation advisory ser-
vices under such program.
(b) Each relocation advisory assistance program
required by subsection (a) shall include such measures,
facilities, or services as may be necessary or appropriate in
order (1) to determine the needs, if any, of displaced
persons for relocation assistance; (2) to provide current
and continuing information on the availability, prices and
rentals, of comparable decent, safe and sanitary sales and
rental housing, and of comparable commercial properties
and locations for displaced businesses; (3) to assure that,
within a reasonable period of time, prior to displacement
there will be available in areas not generally less desirable
in regard to public utilities and public and commercial
facilities and at rents or prices within the financial means
of the families and individuals displaced, decent, safe and
sanitary dwellings, as defined by the Commissioner of
Transportation for transportation projects and by the
App. 11
Commissioner of Economic and Community Development
for all other state agency programs and projects, equal in
number to the number of and available to such displaced
persons who require such dwellings and reasonably
accessible to their places of employment, except that the
Commissioner of Transportation for transportation pro-
jects and the Commissioner of Economic and Community
Development for all other state agency programs and
projects may prescribe by regulation situations when such
assurances may be waived; (4) to assist a displaced person
displaced from his business or farm operation in obtaining
and becoming established in a suitable replacement
location; (5) to supply information concerning federal and
state housing programs, disaster loan programs and other
federal and state programs offering assistance to displaced
persons; (6) to provide other advisory assistance services
to displaced persons in order to minimize hardship to such
persons in adjusting to relocation.
(c) The heads of state agencies shall coordinate
relocation activities with project work, and other planned
or proposed governmental actions in the community or
nearby areas which may affect the carrying out of the
relocation assistance programs.
Sec. 8-272. Necessity of provision of housing. (a)
If a project or program cannot proceed to actual construc-
tion because comparable replacement sale or rental
housing is not available, and the Commissioner of Trans-
portation for transportation projects or the Commissioner
of Economic and Community Development for any other
state agency program or project determines that such
App. 12
housing cannot otherwise be made available after consul-
tation with the chief executive officer of the municipality
within which such project or program occurs, he may take
such action as is necessary or appropriate to provide such
housing by use of funds authorized for such project or
program, the provisions of any other state statute to the
contrary notwithstanding.
(b) No person shall be required to move from his
dwelling on or after July 6, 1971, on account of any state
agency project or program unless the Commissioner of
Transportation for transportation projects or the Commis-
sioner of Economic and Community Development for any
other state agency program or project is satisfied that
replacement housing, in accordance with subdivision (3) of
subsection (b) of section 8-271 is available to such person.
Sec. 8-273. Establishment of regulations and
procedures. (a) In order to promote uniform and effec-
tive administration of relocation assistance and land
acquisition of state agencies, the Commissioner of Trans-
portation and Commissioner of Economic and Community
Development shall consult together on the establishment
of regulations and procedures for the implementation of
such projects and programs.
(b) The Commissioner of Transportation is author-
ized to establish for transportation projects and the
Commissioner of Economic and Community Development
for all other state agency programs and projects such
regulations and procedures as each may determine to be
necessary to assure (1) that the payments and assistance
authorized by this chapter shall be administered in a
manner which is fair and reasonable, and as uniform as
App. 13
practicable; (2) that a displaced person who makes proper
application for a payment authorized for such person by
this chapter shall be paid promptly after a move or, in
hardship cases, be paid in advance; and (3) that any person
aggrieved by * determination as to eligibility for a payment
authorized by this chapter, or the amount of a payment, may
have his aplication reviewed by the Commissioner of
Transportation for transportation projects and by the Com-
missioner of Economic and Community Development for any
other state agency program or project.
(c) The Commissioner of Transportation is author-
ized to establish for transportation projects and the
Commissioner of Economic and Community Development
for all other state agency programs and projects such other
regulations and procedures, censistent with the provisions
of this chapter, as each deems necessary or appropriate to
carry out this chapter.
Sec. 8-273a. Relocation assistance by the De-
partment of Transportation. Notwithstanding any
other provisions of the general statutes to the contrary,
whenever the Commissioner of Transportation undertakes
the acquisition of real property on a state or federally-
funded project which results in any person being displaced
from his home, business, or farm, the Commissioner of
Transportation is hereby authorized to provide relocation
assistance and to make relocation payments to such
displaced persons and to do such other acts and follow
procedures and practices as may be necessary to comply with
or to provide the same relocation assistance and relocation
payments as provided under the federal Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of
App. 14
1970, 42 USC 4601 et seq. and any subsequent amend-
ments thereto and regulations promulgated thereunder.
Sec. 8-274. Contracts and agreements for ser-
vices. In order to prevent unnecessary expenses and
duplications of functions, and to promote uniform and
effective administration of relocation assistance programs for
displaced persons authorized under this chapter, the Com-
missioner of Transportation may, for transportation projects,
and the Commissioner of Economic and Community Devel-
opment may, for all other state agency programs or projects,
enter into contracts or agreements with any individual, firm,
association, or corporation for services in connection with
such projects or programs, or may carry out its functions
under this chapter through any federal, state or local gov-
ernmental agency or instrumentality having an established
organization for conducting relocation assistance programs.
A state agency shall, in carrying out the relocation assistance
activities described in section 8-272, whenever practicable,
utilize the services of state or local housing agencies, or other
agencies having experience in the administration or conduct
of similar housing assistance activities.
Sec. 8-275. Availability of funds. Funds appropri-
ated or otherwise available to any state agency for a
particular program or project, or for the acquisition of real
property or any interest therein for a particular program
or project, shall be available also for obligation and expen-
diture to carry out the provisions of this chapter as applied
to that program or project.
App. 15
Sec. 8-276. Cost of payments and services in-
cluded in project costs. Ifa state agency acquires real
property, and state financial assistance is available to pay
the cost, in whole or part, of the acquisition of such real
property, or of the improvement for which such property is
acquired, the cost to the state agency of providing the
payments and services prescribed by this chapter shall be
included as part of the costs of the project for which state
financial assistance is available to such municipality and
shall be eligible for state financial assistance in the same
manner and to the same extent as other project costs.
Sec. 8-277. Payments to displaced persons not
considered income or resources. No payment re-
ceived by a displaced person under this chapter shall be
considered as income or resources for the purpose of
determining the eligibility or extent of eligibility of any
person for assistance under any state law or for the
purposes of the state’s personal income tax law, corpora-
tion tax, or other tax laws. Such payments shall not be
considered as income or resources of any recipient of
public assistance and such payments shall not be deducted
from the amount of aid to which the recipient would
otherwise be entitled.
Sec. 8-278. Appeals to commissioners. Any
person or business concern aggrieved by any agency action,
concerning their eligibility for relocation payments author-
ized by this chapter may appeal such determination to the
Commissioner of Transportation in the case of relocation
made necessary by a transportation project or to the Com-
missioner of Economic and Community Development in the
App. 16
case of relocation made necessary by any other state
agency program or project. The Commissioner of Transpor-
tation and the Commissioner of Economic and Community
Development shall have the power to certify official
documents and to issue subpoenas to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses or the production of books, papers,
correspondence, memoranda or other records deemed
necessary as evidence in connection with an appeal pursu-
ant to this section. If any person to whom such subpoena is
issued fails to appear, or having appeared refuses to give
testimony or fails to produce the evidence required, the
Superior Court, upon application of the Attorney General
representing the appropriate commissioner, shall have
jurisdiction to order such person to appear or to give
testimony or produce the evidence required, as the case
may be. The Commissioner of Transportation, or a hearing
officer duly appointed by said commissioner, or the Com-
missioner of Economic and Community Development, or a
hearing officer duly appointed by said commissioner, shall
have the power to administer oaths and affirmations in
connection with an appeal pursuant to this section.
Sec. 8-279. Application of chapter. (a) Nothing in
this chapter shall be construed as creating in any condem-
nation proceedings, brought under the power of eminent
domain, any element of value or of damage not in exis-
tence immediately prior to July 6, 1971.
(b) No payment provided for any item or items under
the provisions of this chapter shall be made by the state
agency if reimbursement for such item or items has been
made in a condemnation proceeding.
App. 17
(c) Nothing in this chapter, shall be construed to
limit, restrict or derogate from any power, right or author-
ity of a state agency or any commissioner thereof, con-
tained in any other statute, to proceed with any programs,
projects or activities within such state agency’s or commis-
sioner’s power to accomplish under such statutes.
(d) If Congress enacts legislation permitting, or
giving the states the option, to make payments for reloca-
tion assistance of a lesser amount than is provided for in
this chapter, or in Public Law 91-646, or as amended at a
later date, the state agency shall make the payments in
such lesser amount, notwithstanding the provisions of this
chapter.
(e) All state agencies charged with preparing reloca-
tion plans or carrying out such plans pursuant to the
provisions of this chapter shall file such plans with the
Commissioner of Economic and Community Development
who shall maintain a file of such plans which may be
inspected at reasonable times by any person, owner or
lessee of any affected business or farm, or governmental
agency.
(f) This chapter shall apply to any displacement of a
person occurring within the state of Connecticut as a
result of a state agency program or project, notwithstand-
ing the source of funding for such program or project.
Sec. 8-280. State grants-in-aid. Conditions. (a)
The state, acting by and in the discretion of the Commis-
sioner of Economic and Community Development, may
enter into a contract or agreement with a state agency to
provide state financial assistance to such state agency in
App. 18
the form of a grant-in-aid equal to two-thirds of the net
cost of carrying out a program of relocation assistance
pursuant to a relocation plan as provided under section 8-
281 and approved by the commissioner. Such grant-in-aid
shall: (1) Provide actual administration costs not to exceed
one hundred dollars for each dwelling unit and two hun-
dred fifty dollars for each farm or business relocated in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter; (2) provide
advance grants for relocation assistance paid pursuant to
the provisions of said section to persons, families, busi-
nesses and farm operations and nonprofit organizations
not otherwise entitled to relocation assistance from any
program of any other state agency or any program of the
federal government and who have not been reimbursed for
moving costs in a condemnation proceeding; (3) include the
cost of the preparation of the relocation plan.
(b) The Commissioner of Economic and Community
Development shall not provide a grant-in-aid pursuant to
subsection (a) of this section to any town, city or borough
for the cost of carrying out a program of relocation assis-
tance for persons displaced as the direct result of code
enforcement activities undertaken by a town, city or
borough, unless such town, city or borough (1) places,
pursuant to section 8-270, a lien on all real property in
such town, city or borough, which is owned by the landlord
of the persons who are displaced by such code enforcement
activities, and (2) assigns to the state the claim of the
town, city or borough against such landlord for the costs of
carrying out such program of relocation assistance. The
Attorney General shall be responsible for collecting such
claim and may carry out such responsibility by (A) enforc-
ing any such lien assigned to the state by the town, city or
borough, (B) placing and enforcing a lien on any other real
App. 19
property owned by the landlord in the state or (C) institut-
ing civil proceedings in the Superior Court against such
landlord. Two-thirds of all funds collected by the Attorney
General from a landlord pursuant to this subsection shall
be deposited in the General Fund and the remaining one-
third of such funds shall be remitted to the town, city or
borough which brought code enforcement activities against
such landlord.
Sec. 8-281. Approval of relocation plan required
for receipt of state grant-in-aid. To be eligible to
receive financial assistance under section 8-280, a state
agency shall cause to be prepared and file with the De-
partment of Economic and Community Development for
the approval of the commissioner a relocation plan based
upon a plan or program of governmental action within the
area of operation of the state agency which will cause the
displacement of persons, families, businesses, farm opera-
tions and nonprofit organizations. Such relocation plan
shall conform to the provisions of this chapter and shall
include but not be limited to the following: (a) The number
of persons, families, businesses and farms to be displaced
by the proposed governmental action; (b) a statement
concerning availability of sufficient, suitable accommoda-
tions as shall meet the requirements for occupancy of
those persons, families, businesses and farms displaced
and the dates when such accommodations will be avail-
able; (c) a plan for carrying out the relocation of such
displaced persons, families, businesses and farms; (d) a
description and identification of the area to be affected.
App. 20
Sec. 8-282. Reimbursement for fees, penalty
costs, taxes. In addition to amounts otherwise author-
ized by sections 8-266 to 8-281, inclusive, the state agency,
as defined in section 8-267, shall reimburse the owner of
real property acquired for a project for reasonable and
necessary expenses incurred for (1) recording fees, transfer
taxes and similar expenses incidental to conveying such
real property; (2) penalty costs for prepayment of any
preexisting recorded mortgage entered into in good faith
encumbering such property; and (3) the pro rata portion of
real property taxes paid which are allocable to a period
subsequent to the date of vesting title in the state, or the
effective date of possession of such real property by the
state agency, whichever is earlier.
CHAPTER 439
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DEPARTMENT
AND STATE POLICY
Sec. 22a-1. Policy of the state. The General
Assembly finds that the growing population and expand-
ing economy of the state have had a profound impact on
the life-sustaining natural environment. The air, water,
land and other natural resources, taken for granted since
the settlement of the state, are now recognized as finite
and precious. It is now understood that human activity
must be guided by and in harmony with the system of
relationships among the elements of nature. Therefore the
General Assembly hereby declares that the policy of the
state of Connecticut is to conserve, improve and protect its
natural resources and environment and to control air, land
and water pollution in order to enhance the health, safety
and welfare of the people of the state. It shall further be
App. 21
the policy of the state to improve and coordinate the
environmental plans, functions, powers and programs of
the state, in cooperation with the federal government,
regions, local governments, other public and private
organizations and concerned individuals, and to manage
the basic resources of air, land and water to the end that
the state may fulfill its responsibility as trustee of the
environment for the present and future generations.
Sec. 22a-la. Declaration of policy: Coordination
of state plans and programs. (a) In furtherance of and
pursuant to sections 22a-1 and 22a-15, the General As-
sembly, recognizing the profound impact of man’s activity
on the interrelations of all components of the natural
environment, particularly the profound influence of
population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial
expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding
technological advances, and recognizing further the
critical importance of restoring and maintaining environ-
mental quality to the overall welfare and development of
man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the state
government, in cooperation with federal and local govern-
ments, and other concerned public and private organiza-
tions, to use all practicable means and measures,
including financial and technical assistance, in a manner
calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to
create and maintain conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the
social, economic, and other requirements of present and
future generations of Connecticut residents.
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in
sections 22a-la to 22a-1f, inclusive, it is the continuing
App 22
responsibility of the state government to use all practica-
ble means, consistent with other essential considerations
of state policy, to improve and coordinate state plans,
functions, programs, and resources to the end that the
state may: (1) Fulfill the responsibility of each generation
as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all residents of the state safe, healthful,
productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing
surroundings; (3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses
of the environment without degradation, risk to health or
safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural
aspects of our Connecticut heritage, and maintain, wher-
ever possible, an environment which supports diversity
and variety of individual choice; (5) achieve an ecological
balance between population and resource use which will
permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s
amenities; (6) enhance the quality of renewable resources
and approach the maximum attainable recycling of deplet-
able resources; and (7) practice conservation in the use of
energy, maximize the use of energy efficient systems and
minimize the environmental impact of energy production
and use.
Sec. 22a-1b. Evaluation by state agencies of
actions affecting the environment. Public scoping
process. Environmental monitor. The General Assem-
bly directs that, to the fullest extent possible:
(a) Each state department, institution or agency
shall review its policies and practices to insure that they
are consistent with the state’s environmental policy as set
forth in sections 22a-1 and 22a-la.
App. 23
(b)1) Each sponsoring agency shall, prior to a
decision to draft an environmental impact evaluation
pursuant to subsection (c) of this section for an action
which may significantly affect the environment, conduct
an early public scoping process.
(2) To initiate an early public scoping process, the
sponsoring agency shall provide notice on 2 ferm that has
been approved by the Council on Environmental Quality,
which shall include, but not be limited to, the date, time
and location of any proposed public scoping meeting and
the duration of the public comment period pursuant to
subdivision (3) of this subsection, to the council, the Office
of Policy and Management and to any other state agency
whose activities may reasonably be expected to affect or be
affected by the propused action.
(3) Members of the public and any interested state
agency representatives may submit comments on the
nature and extent of any environmental impacts of the
proposed action during the thirty days following the
publication of the notice of the early public scoping process
pursuant to this section.
(4) A public scoping meeting shall be held at the
discretion of the sponsoring agency or if twenty-five
persons or an association having not less than twenty-five
persons requests such a meeting within ten days of the
publication of the notice in the Environmental Monitor. A
scoping meeting shall be held not less than ten days
following the notice of the project in the Environmental
Monitor. The public comment period shall remain open for
at least five days following the meeting.
(5) A sponsoring agency shall provide the following
at a public scoping meeting: (A) A description of the
App. 24
proposed action; (B) a description of the purpose and need
of the proposed action; (C) a list of the criteria for a site for
the proposed action; (D) a list of potential sites for the
proposed action; (E) the resources of any proposed site of
the proposed action; (F) the environmental limitations of
such sites; (G) potential alternatives to the proposed
action; and (H) any of the information the sponsoring
agency deems necessary.
(6) Any agency submitting comments or participat-
ing in the public scoping meeting pursuant to this section
shall include, to the extent practicable, but not be limited
to, information about (A) the resources of any proposed
site of the proposed action, (B) any plans of the comment-
ing agency that may affect or be affected by the proposed
action, (C) any permits or approvals that may be necessary
for the proposed action, and (D) any appropriate measures
that would mitigate the impact of the proposed action,
including, but not limited to, recommendations as to
preferred sites for the proposed action or alternatives for
the proposed action that have not been identified by the
sponsoring agency.
(7) The sponsoring agency shall consider any com-
ments received pursuant to this section or any information
obtained during the public scoping meeting in selecting
the proposed actions to be addressed in the environmental
impact evaluation and shall evaluate in its environmental
impact evaluation any substantive issues raised during
the early public scoping process that pertain to a proposed
action or site or alternative actions or sites. |
(c) Each state department, institution or agency
responsible for the primary recommendation or initiation
of actions which may significantly affect the environment
App. 25
shall in the case of each such proposed action make a
detailed written evaluation of its environmental impact
before deciding whether to undertake or approve such
action. All such environmental impact evaluations shall be
detailed statements setting forth the following: (1) A
description of the proposed action which shall include, but
not be limited to, a description of the purpose and need of
the proposed action, and, in the case of a proposed facility,
a description of the infrastructure needs of such facility,
including, but not limited to, parking, water supply,
wastewater treatment and the square footage of the
facility; (2) the environmental consequences of the pro-
posed action, including cumulative, direct and indirect
effects which might result during and subsequent to the
proposed action; (3) any adverse environmental effects
which cannot be avoided and irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources should the proposal be imple-
mented; (4) alternatives to the proposed action, including
the alternative of not proceeding with the proposed action
and, in the case of a proposed facility, a list of all the sites
controlled by or reasonably available to the sponsoring
agency that would meet the stated purpose of such facility;
(5) an evaluation of the proposed action’s consistency and
each alternative’s consistency with the state plan of
conservation and development, an evaluation of each
alternative including, to the extent practicable, in terms of
whether it avoids, minimizes or mitigates environmental
impacts, and, where appropriate, detailed mitigation
measures proposed to minimize environmental impacts,
including, but not limited to, where appropriate, a site
plan; (6) an analysis of the short term and long term
economic, social and environmental costs and benefits of
the proposed action; (7) the effect of the proposed action on
the use and conservation of energy resources; and (8) a
App. 26
description of the effects of the proposed action on sacred
sites or archaeological sites of state or national impor-
tance. In the case of an action which affects existing
housing, the evaluation shall also contain a detailed
statement analyzing (A) housing consequences of the
proposed action, including direct and indirect effects which
might result during and subsequent to the proposed action
by income group as defined in section 8-37aa and by race,
and (B) the consistency of the housing consequences with
the long-range state housing plan adopted under section 8-
37t. As used in this section, “sacred sites” and “archaeo-
logical sites” shall have the same meaning as in section
10-381.
(d)(1) The Council on Environmental Quality shall
publish a document at least once a month to be called the
Environmental Monitor which shall include any notices
the council receives pursuant to sections 22a-1b to 22a-li,
inclusive, and shall include notice of the opportunity to
petition for a public scoping meeting. Filings of such
notices received by five o’clock p.m. on the first day of each
month shall be published in the Environmental Monitor
that is issued not later than ten days thereafter.
(2) The Council on Environmental Quality shall post
the Environmental Monitor on its Internet site and dis-
tribute a subscription or a copy of the Environmental
Monitor by electronic mail to any state agency, municipal-
ity or person upon request. The council shall also provide
the Environmental Monitor to the clerk of each municipal-
ity for posting in its town hall.
App. 27
Sec. 22a-lc. Actions which may significantly affect
the environment. Definition. As used in sections 22a-1
to 22a-1i, inclusive, “actions which may significantly affect
the environment” means individual activities or a se-
quence of planned activities proposed to be undertaken by
state departments, institutions or agencies, or funded in
whole or in par
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