Record and brief — Nickols v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 134 S. Ct. 2820 (2014) (No. 13-1052)
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No. 13-1052
Vide 13-1041
Title
Docketed
Jerome Nickols, et al., Petitioners
Vv
Mortgage Bankers Association
March 4, 2014
Linked with 13A643
Lower Ct United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Case Nos (12-5246)
Decision Date July 2, 2013
Rehearing Denied: October 2, 2013
Questions Presented
~~~Date~—
Dec 18 2013
Dec 20 2013
Jan 16 2014
Jan 21 2014
Feb 28 2014
Mar 18 2014
Mar 24 2014
Mar 26 2014
May 2 2014
May 15 2014
May 20 2014
Jun 9 2014
Jun 16 2014
Jun 25 2014
Jul 7 2014
~—~~~~~~Proceedings and Ordets~———~—~———
Application (13A643) to extend the time to file a petition for a wnt of certioran from
December 31, 2013 to January 30, 2014, submitted to The Chief Justice
Application (13A643) granted by The Chief Justice extending the time to file until
January 30, 2014
Application (13A643) to extend further the time from January 30, 2014 to February 28,
2014, submitted to The Chief Justice
Application (13A643) granted by The Chief Justice extending the time to file until
February 28, 2014
Petition for a wri of certiorari filed. (Response due Apni 3, 2014)
Consent to the fling of amicus curiae briefs, in support of ether party or of neither
party, received from counsel for the respondent. VIDED
Order extending time to file response to petition to and including May 2, 2014
Brief amici curiae of Administrative Law Scholars filed. VIDED.
Brief of respondent Mortgage Bankers Association in opposition filed. VIDED
Reply of petitioners Jerome Nickols, Ryan Henry, and Beverly Buck filed
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of June 5, 2014.
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of June 12, 2014
Petition GRANTED The petition for a writ of certioran in No. 13-1041 ts granted. The
cases are consolidated and a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument
Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitoners Jerome Nickols
et al
The time to file the joint appendix and petitioners’ bnets on the ments is extended to
and including August 13, 2014. VIDED
Jul 7 2014
Jul 21 2014
Aug 112014
Aug 112014
Aug 20 2014
Aug 20 2014
Sep 4 2014
Sep 4 2014
Sep 9 2014
Sep 22 2014
Sep 26 2014
Sep 30 2014
Oct 9 2014
Oct 16 2014
Oct 16 2014
Oct 16 2014
Oct 16 2014
Oct 16 2014
Oct 16 2014
Oct 16 2014
Oct 16 2014
Oct 16 2014
Oct 16 2014
Oct 16 2014
Oct 16 2014
Oct 27 2014
Oct 28 2014
Nov 10 2014
Nov 10 2014
Nov 10 2014
Dec 1 2014
Mar 9 2015
The time to file respondents’ brief(s) on the merits is extended to and including
September 25, 2014. VIDED
Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioner GRANTED.
The time to file the joint appendix and petitioners’ bnefs on the ments is further
extended to and including August 20, 2014.
The time to file respondents’ brief(s) on the merits is further extended to and including
October 9, 2014. VIDED
Brief of respondents Thomas E. Perez, Secretary of Labor, et al. fled. VIDED.
Brief of petitioners Jerome Nickols, et al. fied.
SET FOR ARGUMENT on Monday, December 1, 2014. VIDED
Consent to the fling of amicus curiae briefs in support of either party or neither party
received from counsel for the petitioners.
Consent to the fling of amicus curiae briefs in support of ether party or of neither party
from counsel for the respondents. VIDED
Record requested from U.S.C.A. Dist. of Columbia Circuit.
Record received from U.S.C.A. Dist. of Columbia Circuit. The record is electronic and
located on PACER.
Record received from U.S.C.A. Dist. of Columbia Circuit. 1 Envelope (this record is
SEALED)
Brief of respondents Mortgage Bankers Association, et al. filed. VIDED.
Brief amicus curiae of National Mining Association filed. VIDED.
Brief amici curiae of National Federation of Independent Business, et al. filed. VIDED.
Brief amici curiae of Washington Legal Foundation and Allied Educational Foundation
filed. VIDED.
Brief amici curiae of Cato Institute, et al. filed. VIDED.
Brief amici curiae of American Hospital Association, et al. filed. VIDED.
Brief amici curiae of Utifty Ar Regulatory Group and American Forest & Paper
Association filed. VIDED.
Brief amicus curiae of Quicken Loans Inc. fied. VIDED.
Brief amicus curiae of Thomas Jefferson Institute for Pubic Policy fied. VIDED.
Brief amicus curiae of Center for Constitutional Junsprudence filed. VIDED.
Motion for divided argument filed by petitioners Jerome Nickols, et al. VIDED.
Brief amici curiae of State and Local Government Associations filed. VIDED.
(Distributed)
Brief amici curiae of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al.
filed. Vided.
CIRCULATED.
Opposition of petitioners Perez, et al. to motion of Nickols, et al. for divded argument
fied. VIDED
Motion for divided argument filed by petitioners DENIED.
Reply of respondents Thomas E. Perez, Secretary of Labor filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Reply of petitioners Jerome Nickols, et al. fled. (Distributed)
Argued. For petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of
Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex.
Judgment REVERSED. Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., joined, and in which
Alto, J., joined except for Part III-B. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment. Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., filed opinions concurring in the
judgment. VIDED
Apr102015 JUDGMENT ISSUED.
PETITION
FOR
WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
13-1052
No.
In The
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
Jerome Nickols, Ryan Henry and Beverly Buck,
Petitioners,
Vv.
Mortgage Bankers Association,
Respondent.
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United
States Court Of Appeals For The District of
Columbia Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Adam W. Hansen Paul J. Lukas
Counsel of Record Rachhana T. Srey
Nichols Kaster, LLP Nichols Kaster, PLLP
One Embarcadero Center Minneapolis, MN 55402
Suite 720 (612) 256-3205
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 277-7236 Sundeep Hora
ahansen@nka.com Alderman, Devorsetz &
Hora PLLC
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 969-8220
(i)
QUESTION PRESENTED
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-59, “established the maximum procedural
requirements which Congress was willing to have
the courts impose upon agencies in conducting
rulemaking procedures.” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 524 (1978). Section 553 of the Act sets forth
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, but
exempts “interpretative rules,” among others, from
the notice-and-comment requirement. 5 U.S.C. §
553(b). The D.C. Circuit, in a line of cases
descending from Paralyzed Veterans of America uv.
D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997), has
created a per se rule holding that although an
agency may issue an initial interpretative rule
without going through notice and comment, “[o]nce
an agency gives its regulation an interpretation, it
can only change that interpretation as it would
formally modify the regulation itself: through the
process of notice and comment rulemaking.” Id. at
586. In this case, the D.C. Circuit invoked the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine—which is contrary to
the plain text of the Act, numerous decisions of this
Court, and the opinions of the majority of circuit
courts—to invalidate a Department of Labor
interpretation concluding that mortgage loan
officers do not qualify for the administrative
exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The question presented is:
Whether agencies subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act are categorically
prohibited from revising their interpretative rules
unless such revisions are made through notice-and-
comment rulemaking.
(ii)
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Jerome Nickols, Ryan Henry, and
Beverly Buck are former mortgage loan officers
seeking overtime compensation in lawsuits filed in
federal district court under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Petitioners
intervened before the district court as a matter of
right, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and participated as
Defendants before the district court and Appellees
before the court of appeals. Respondent Mortgage
Bankers Association, a financial services industry
trade group, was the Plaintiff in the district court
and Appellant in the court of appeals. The United
States Department of Labor, Secretary of Labor,
and Department of Labor Deputy Wage and Hour
Administrator were Defendants in the district court
case and Appellees in the court of appeals.
(aii)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ......................1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED. ............ 1
i
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..12
I. THis CouRT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW TO
RESOLVE THE CONFLICT OVER WHETHER
AGENCIES SUBJECT TO THE APA ARE
CATEGORICALLY PROHIBITED FROM REVISING
THEIR INTERPRETATIVE RULES UNLESS SUCH
REVISIONS ARE MADE ‘THROUGH NOTICE-
C.
i, The Paralyzed Veterans — |
conflicts with the plain language of
2. The Paralyzed Veterans doctrine
conflicts with numerous decisions
EE eC
a. Vermont VOM CC oovovvooccsccvccsceseesveseeee23
b. Skidmore v. Swift ...............000s00000005 26
3. The law affords numerous ‘checks
on shifting agency positions ................29
The Question Presented Is Important
and Recurring, and Has Far-Reaching
EET ITE 32
D. This Case Is the Ideal Vehicle To
meee the Question Presented................36
(iv)
SEIT crnticinsitecsncsepeniamninniiineeianmesiieaeniiag
Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966
EEE
Mortg. Bankers par v. Harris, No. 12-5246,
Judgment (D.C. Cir. July 2, 2013).....................18a
Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Solis, 864 F. anal
8 ERNE,
Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Solis, No. 11-
0073(RBW), Order (D.D.C. June 6, 2012).........49a
Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Perez, No. 11-
0073(RBW), Order (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2013) ........ 5la
Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Perez, No. 12-5246,
Order (D.C. Cir. Oct. 2, 20183)............................ 54a
Biggs v. Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 10-cv-
11928, Order (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, EEE 56a
Statutory Provisions Involved ....................0c0000 Tla
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,
Opinion Letter, WH-115, 1971 WL 33052
EEE RT SMem a mneR, ——
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,
Opinion Letter, 1999 WL 1002401 oa ' 17,
Sort ceseuicebieteasitencihtepininitasicinenaieiiaiaatteasieniisiiasianataeiaaeiaeiaiess
U.S. Dep't of iliind Wage & mee Div.,
+ ~onaaal Letter, 2001 WL 1558764 oe. | 16,
EER ER EO,
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,
Opinion Letter, FLSA2006-11, 2006 WL
1094597 (Mar. 31, 2006) .....................ccececeee00-+s 828
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,
Opinion Letter, FLSA2006-31, 2006 WL
Re =
(v)
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,
Administrator's Interpretation No. 2010-1,
2010 WL 1822423 (Mar. 24, 2010) ..................107a
(vi)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Abraham Lincoln Mem Hosp. v. Sebelius,
698 F.3d 536 (7th Cir. 2012).......................... 15, 18
Alaska Profl Hunters Ass'n v. and 177 F.3d
cf 5 ee 8 TT
Arnold v. Ben ae § Inc., 361 US. | 388
a EES Sn ET
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S, 452 asen................80
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977)............. 5
Biggs v. Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 10-cv-
11928, 2011 WL 5244819 «D. Mich. Mar.
oy v. “Quicken Same ao No. 10-cv-
11928 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, Teale ae hl 16
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).............19
Casas v. Conseco Fin. Corp., No. Civ.00-1512,
2002 WL 507059 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2002)........... 8
Chase Bank a, NA. v. re 131 S. Ct.
I a aN 30, 34
Chen Zhou Chai t v. Carroll, 48 F. 3d 1331 (4th
Chief Prob. “Officers of C Cal. v. - Shalala, 118
F.3d 1827 (Oth Cir. 1907)............cccccccccccccccssssceeees LD
Christensen v. Harris County, | 529 U.S. 576
Chrtetapher v. SmithKline Seiten Corp.,
I 30
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 1 (1979) _— 4
(vii)
Conn. Natl Bank v. Coma, @ 503 U.S. 249
Gen. Elec. Co. v. v. Gilbert, 429 US. 125 (1976).....28
Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v.
Metrophones Telecomms., Inc., 550 U.S. 45
Good Samaritan | Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S.
EES
Indep. Equip. pa Ass'n v. EPA, 372 F.3d
8 ESSEC een Neem 33
INS v. Corecnen-runenen, 480 US. 421
(viii)
Kennedy v. Plan Adm’ for DuPont Sav. &
Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009).......................00002.27
LC U-Bake, LLC v. United States, No. 3:12-
cv-0049-KI, 2012 WL 1379048 wal Or. —
ETE
Leavitt v. Baystate Health ‘Sy, 547 7 US.
bois v. - Retin Nati Bank, 838 F
Supp. 2d 703 (S.D. Ohio 2012)..................ccccee00002 17
Miller v v. Cal. “nati op. ., 536 F: 3d 1020
Minnesate » v. Cire. for pone & Medicaid
Servs., 495 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 2007)....................14
Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966
Sk 8 .. 1, 12, 14, 22
Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Solis, | 864 F. bite 4
ESRC reer si Bae EU
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of | the United
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
Natl Cable & itesnine Ass'n v. » eed x
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005)..............29, 35
NLRB v. Noel Cunamg, ° 705 F.3d 490 _ C.
Natt Rest. pun v. in, 411 F. yoy 993
ICI cusauniesisiosaenmieaianlll
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena
L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ............. ... passim
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 2 (2008) ...28
(ix)
Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F. 3d 139
es IT ini niiiessnciceiiadiinesisncenniiinianibnatichaiandindiianaion 34
SBC Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 2005) ....14
Shalala v. Guernsey Mem Hosp., 514 U.S.
__ , —_i(‘*é EE ORO ONO 4—5, 20—22, 30, 33
Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622
NG BEI cceertecsinsanctnnsensmmnesscimnenmmnesnnninatinanenioes 14
Skidmore uv. Swift, 323 U.S. 134
EEE ae PARC aT 13, 23, 26—27
Smith v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 590 F.3d 886
I NG, I nici anainclahitaealeh alla lsaae eal 9
Swigart v. Fifth Third Bank, 870 F. Supp. 2d
ee ID scesisicscesiicinnvsinsnciingmeniennaneitiabait 8, 17
St. Francis Health Care Ctr. v. Shalala, 205
ee re ee I i cnccenscnsecescinnsutssnnnsentnvennies 15
St. Marks Place Hous. Co., Inc. v. HUD, 610
EE Ps CG CD vovcccectinssncinnnacacsmeenteeseicnets 34
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S.
eT ee ener nen eee ana n re 30
United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th
I aaa rata 34
United States v. Magnesium Corp. of Am.,
G16 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2O010)........cccccccccscecccsceee 15
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218
IEEE cipiaschsinasbiinssinnseitepetaieideeiaelenainiateinianiieaiadelbamlinbansniinendiasit 28
United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60 (1940)...... 19
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434
Sassanid age inated 27
(x)
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
GAS AEE RTE ean 13, 23-25
Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73 (1st Cir.
STITT shcichcpieeaiihceiaiaiiiiceiniicaiiclaehiaahiiiaatiniaiihiiettedinaidniniain 14
Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir.
RRR IED it Ree 15-16
Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (1981)..........00..000... 28
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33
"SAAN RE TO 3, 24
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
I ad 20
Be: SEI thnticnitinisnndiandereninianesinieieaen 3—4, 18, 20
aad 26, 29-30
| TRS ane aE Neen Ree NTS eee 3
REECE ieee one Reeve ERE 31
a cen nananebeasiaiual 31
RIT TIN TIT ini sis i iciieh ianeisicstininsinidantemmaniabanniénnmets 25
TATE TI coins nsctniticsitunnsiiiniiipdeadnniethaianininieiiael 19
I inal iticenidineseniniaidndiaiiiniabdiiie 19
I a scsesdehusieniiaisaneienaaaiaie 1
EE Aree eR oN 16
SINE TTT isaac hecrinin ceria ipeetgatchenindomeieanbipaabigamedntes 5
CL TE 5
I St cits csiciiuninteennnciicedndiiepiinaniannenenaiiineiinnedl 5
I ee ne ena ee 31
a a iciteninsediicinsichannctiiipinnilitinticisiitiieiiaineiss 31
I a a a a et 31
i a le 31
Se RII caciccslocenh bbwinnasiicel iidiehantiadidendaiaioaiaia 5-6
ee eI inci intisstticishintentanciiitaciiniciapilnsibvapanidiaanad 6,9
29 C.F.R. § 541.201...... PES EEE A a BI RENE ENA 6,9
ek 2 TL ne eae en eee 6,9
ee te IIE Sesescsiicsisbeicsbincnuiiiasilaepaicaciinndali 6,9
MER RA Sannin misc lee sere 9
I ee isis cicinasinsnienitisdassiadcciesdeibeeceonne 9
Ak A 8 Sra nee ne NEE ener a nEnr Enron 9
I a a a 9
RULES
RI i il cal 11
MISCELLANEOUS
Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for
Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69
Fed. Reg. 22,122 (Apr. 23, 2004) (codified at
Ee is SED ccidsnnnssicntdidhnnindnemvenintionmatns 6, 8-9
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook,
2014-15 Edition, Loan Officers, available at
http://www.blis.gov/ooh/Business-and-
Financial/Loan-officers. htm ................0.eeceeeeeeeeeeees 7
(xii)
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,
Opinion Letter, WH-115, 1971 WL 33052
I I oie 7-8
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,
Opinion Letter, 1999 WL 1002401 (May 17,
STITT chien ccc debs leche dasieaiabenbiadiil 8
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,
Opinion Letter, 2001 WL 1558764 (Feb. 16,
en neta or eae EET ne See 8
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,
Opinion Letter, FLSA2006-11, 2006 WL
Ee Cs Gila HE ttcrcdcciesicninnsncnscvnsensenssscones 8
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,
Opinion Letter, FLSA2006-31, 2006 WL
I, Oe I ii siniicistsiicincnaninttaieneniennasacdons 9
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,
Administrator's Interpretation No. 2010-1,
2010 WL 1822423 (Mar. 24, 2010) .................. 7,10
Michael Asimow & Robert A. Anthony, A
Second Opinion? Inconsistent Interpretive
Rules, 25 Admin & Reg. L. News, No. 2
TERETE ee MMAR EET OT eR 36
Jon Connolly, Note, Alaska Hunters and the
D.C. Circuit: A Defense of Flexible
Interpretive Rulemaking, 101 Colum. L. Rev.
STITT sicsciedicsihlieiniediieenidhaaitbdegiaettaiiaabasiout 35
Kenneth Davis & Richard Pierce,
Administrative Law Treatise (3d ed. 1994)........... 4
William Funk, A Primer on Legislative Rules,
53 Admin. L. Rev. 1321 (2001) ...................... 35—36
William S. Jordan III, Interpretive Rules and
Statements of Policy—When Do They
(xiii)
Constitute Legislative Rules?, 29 Admin. &
Reg. L. News, No. 1 (20038)..................ccceseeceeeeeees 36
Sam Kalen, The Transformation of Modern
Administrative Law: Changing
Administrations and Environmental
Guidance Documents, 35 Ecology L.Q. 657
SESE EARN ey seaneot re AMne non yey peta a 35
Richard W. Murphy, Hunters for
Administrative Common Law, 58 Admin. L.
Bs ee EE nessteceeccbensntsonenitninnanidnddinennees 35-36
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing
Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 52
Admin. L. Rev. 547 (2000) ....................... 14, 20, 35
Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA,
the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court,
ee , Sti I i cneesiscssnscntecessesonneuiennie 24-25
Brian J. Shearer, Comment, Outfoxing
Alaska Hunters: How Arbitrary and
Capricious Review of Changing Regulatory
Interpretations Can More Efficiently Police
Agency Discretion, 62 Am. U. L. Rev. 167
Ihsan dcaidinditiadhinbnidiaibieadundimiaieebinepeeienanbie: 35
Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the
Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper
Respect for an Essential Element, 53 Admin.
I i callie aetiniitesnee 35
Re: Tread Act Provisions Involving Defective
Tires, Nat Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
Dep’t of Transp.,
http://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/12-
00245. ITA Defective_Tire_Exportation.htm
SE: EATEN daitcetilaceshcssdeinitciinshiesietebocesiadisinuaiineieniniadiadeeuditd 34
(xiv)
Regulations, Codes, & Code Interpretations,
U.S. Food & Drug Admin.
http://www.fda. gov/food/guidanceregulation/r
etailfoodprotection/regulationscodesinterpret
ations/default.htm (last updated Aug. 19,
ES a INAS EN te SSR ce ER ee Oe Oe
1
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners Jerome Nickols, Ryan Henry, and
Beverly Buck respectfully request that this Court
issue a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversing the district court is available at Mortgage
Bankers Association v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) and is reproduced at App. la. The
district court’s opinion granting summary judgment
in favor of Petitioners and the Secretary of Labor is
available at Mortgage Bankers Association v. Solis,
864 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D.D.C. 2012) rev’d sub nom.
Mortgage Bankers Association v. Harris, 720 F.3d
966 (D.C. Cir. 2013) and is reproduced at App. 15a.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit issued its Opinion and
Final Judgment on July 2, 2013. App. 13a. The
D.C. Circuit denied Petitioners’ timely-filed petition
for rehearing en banc on October 2, 2013. App. 54a.
Chief Justice Roberts twice granted Petitioners’
timely applications for an extension of time within
which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari,
extending the deadline to and including February
28, 2014. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Pertinent provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act are reproduced in the Appendix (at
71a).
2
STATEMENT
This case presents an important question at
the heart of federal administrative law: whether
agencies subject to the Administrative Procedure
Act are categorically prohibited from revising their
interpretative rules unless such revisions are made
through notice-and-comment rulemaking. The
question touches on the authority of all three
branches of government, carries crucial
implications for regulated communities, and
sharply divides the courts of appeals.
Congress authorized the Department of
Labor (“DOL”) to issue regulations defining various
statutory exemptions contained in the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”). In addition to
promulgating formal regulations, the DOL—like
many other federal agencies—has traditionally
issued informal interpretations addressing how the
regulations apply to specific factual scenarios. Over
the years, the DOL had issued a series of opinion
letters concluding that mortgage loan officers—
bank employees who sell mortgage products to
customers—do not qualify for the FLSA’s
administrative exemption. In 2006, however, the
DOL changed its interpretation, concluding that
such employees do qualify for the exemption. In
2010, the DOL restored its original and long-
standing interpretation, concluding once again that
mortgage loan officers do not qualify for the
exemption.
Respondent Mortgage Bankers Association
(“MBA”) sued the Secretary of Labor, seeking to
invalidate the DOL’s 2010 interpretation. Applying
a controversial circuit precedent known colloquially
as the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, the D.C. Circuit
3
vacated the DOL’s 2010 interpretation. According
to the D.C. Circuit’s Paralyzed Veterans doctrine,
although an agency may issue an_ initial
interpretive rule without going through notice and
comment, “[o]nce an agency gives its regulation an
interpretation, it can only change that
interpretation as it would formally modify the
regulation itself: through the process of notice and
comment rulemaking.” Paralyzed Veterans of Am.
v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in this case
deepened an intractable split of authority among
circuit courts on the question of whether notice-
and-comment rulemaking is required to modify an
interpretive rule. The opinion is also in plain
conflict with numerous decisions of this Court, as
well as the unambiguous text of the Administrative
Procedure Act, which exempts “interpretative
rules” from notice-and-comment rulemaking and
draws no distinction between initial interpretations
and subsequent interpretations, see 5 U.S.C. §
553(b).
A brief description of the _ relevant
background and procedural history of this case
follows.
1. In 1946, Congress enacted the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 60 Stat. 237
(1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq.), which
this Court has described as a “basic and
comprehensive regulation of procedures in many
agencies.” Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33, 36 (1950). Section 553 of the Act sets forth
various notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures, but specifically exempts “interpretative
4
rules,” among others, from the notice-and-comment
requirement. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
Courts and commentators refer to rules that
are subject to the APA’s formal rulemaking
procedures as “legislative rules,” “substantive
rules,” or simply “regulations.” See, e.g., Global
Crossing Telecomms., iac. v. Metrophones
Telecomms, Inc., 550 U.S. 45, 61 (2007); Kenneth
Davis & Richard Pierce, Administrative Law
Treatise 233 (3d ed. 1994). Legislative rules “bind[]
members of the public, the agency, and even the
courts, in the sense that courts must affirm a
legislative rule as long as it represents a valid
exercise of agency authority.” Kenneth Davis &
Richard Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise 233
(3d ed. 1994). “Legislative, or substantive,
regulations are ‘issued by an agency pursuant to
statutory authority and . . . implement the statute,
as, for example, the proxy rules issued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. . . . Such
rules have the force and effect of law.” Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-03 (1979)
(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General's
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 30 n.3
(1947)).
Interpretative rules (often referred to as
interpretive rules—the two terms are used
interchangeably in this Petition), by contrast, are
rules “issued by an agency to advise the public of
the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules
which it administers.” Jd. at 302, n.31; see also
Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’ Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99
(1995). Interpretative rules “do not require notice
and comment, although . . . they also do not have
the force and effect of law and are not accorded that
5
weight in the adjudicatory process.” Guernsey
Memorial Hospital, 514 U.S. at 99.
2. The FLSA requires employers to pay
employees both minimum wage and overtime
compensation. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207. There are
certain statutory exemptions, however, to the
FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime requirements.
Relevant here, Congress exempted employees
“employed in a bona fide executive, administrative,
or professional capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
FLSA “exemptions are to be narrowly construed
against the employers seeking to assert them and
their application limited to those establishments
plainly and unmistakably within their terms and
spirit.” Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388,
392 (1960).
Congress has never defined the terms
“executive,” “administrative,” or “professional.” The
FLSA, however, grants the DOL authority to
“defin[e] and delimi[t]” the scope of the exemptions
for executive, administrative, and professional
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). Because of
Congress’ broad delegation of rulemaking
authority, the regulations issued by the DOL have
the binding effect of law. See Batterton v. Francis,
432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977). The DOL has
promulgated detailed regulations defining these
white collar coemptene, see 29 C.F.R. § 541,' and
. | The gunesel rule for the administrative exemption states:
The term “employee employed in a bona fide
administrative capacity” in section 13(a)(1) of the
Act shall mean any employee:
(1) Compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of
not less than $455 per week (or $380 per week, if
6
“[t]he major substantive provisions of the [white
collar] regulations have remained virtually
unchanged for 50 years.” Defining and Delimiting
the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative,
Professional, Outside Sales and Computer
Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122 (Apr. 23, 2004)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541).
Mortgage loan officers, like Petitioners, are
workers employed by banks and mortgage
companies who sell loan products to customers.”
empleyed i in » Amesien Samoa “ outs other
than the Federal Government), exclusive of board,
lodging or other facilities;
(2) Whose primary duty is the performance of office
or non-manual work directly related to the
management or general business operations of the
employer or the employer’s customers; and
2 Se Ey Say See Ge ce
cretion and — judgment with respect to
matte of tend sifi
29 C.F.R. § 541.200. Additional regulations further define and
delimit the terms of the general rule. See 29 C.F.R. §
541.201—203.
2 The DOL has described the typical job duties of mortgage
loan officers as follows:
Mortgage loan officers receive internal leads and
contact potential customers or receive contacts from
customers generated by direct mail or other
marketing activity. Mortgage loan officers collect
required financial information from customers they
contact or who contact them, including information
about income, employment history, assets,
investments, home ownership, debts, credit history,
7
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, nearly
300,000 people—approximately 1 in every 500
workers in the United States—work as loan
officers.3
The DOL has, on six occasions, publicly
issued interpretive guidance addressing mortgage
loan officers’ exemption status under the FLSA. In
a series of four opinion letters published between
1971 and 2001, the agency’s position was clear and
consistently held: although loan officers could
qualify for the FLSA’s “outside sales” exemption if
the employees performed their job duties outside
the office, loan officers do not qualify for the Act’s
administrative exemption. * As courts have
prior besionstaien jedgmente, end liens. They also
run credit reports. Mortgage loan officers enter the
collected financial information into a computer
program that identifies which loan products may be
offered to customers based on the financial
information provided. They then assess the loan
products identified and discuss with the customers
the terms and conditions of particular loans, trying
to match the customers’ needs with one of the
company’s loan products. Mortgage loan officers also
compile customer documents for forwarding to an
underwriter or loan processor, and may finalize
documents for closings.
App. 107a; 2010AI, 2010 WL 1822423 at *1.
3’ See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2014-15 Edition, Loan
Officers, available at http://www.bls.gov/ooh/Business-and-
Financial/Loan-officers. htm.
* See App. 72a; U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,
Opinion Letter, WH-115, 1971 WL 33052 (January 15, 1971)
(concluding that mortgage loan officers who customarily and
8
recognized, by their very terms, these two
exemptions are mutually exclusive—“a floan
officer] cannot be simultaneously exempt under the
outside sales exemption and the administrative
exemption because the former requires the
employee to have a primary job dv’y of sales,
whereas that same primary job du‘, disqualifies an
employee from coverage under the latter.” See, e.g.,
Swigart v. Fifth Third Bank, 870 F. Supp. 2d 500,
511 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (citations omitted).
During the same time period, federal courts
uniformly held that mortgage loan officers do not
qualify for the FLSA'’s administrative exemption.
E.g., Casas v. Conseco Fin. Corp., No. Civ.00-1512,
2002 WL 507059, at *6-10 (D. Minn. Mar. 31
2002).
Following notice and comment, the DOL in
2004 issued revised regulations defining and
delimiting the FLSA’s white collar exemptions. See
generally Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions
for Executive, istrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed.
regularly performed work outside the office meet the
requirements of the FLSA’s outside sales exemption); App.
75a; U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter,
1999 WL 1002401 (May 17, 1999) (holding that mortgage loan
= do not meet the requirements of the FLSA's
iministrative exemption); App. 79a; U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter, 2001 WL 1558764 (Feb.
16, 2001) (reaffirming that loan officers do not meet the
quirements of the administrative exemption); App. 82a;
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opi
WL 1094597 (March 31, 2006) (re ning that loan officers
who work outside the office meet the requirements of the
outside sales exemption).
9
Reg. 22,122. The revised regulations, however, did
not alter the substance of the administrative
exemption. See Smith v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 590
F.3d 886, 892 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (recognizing that
the most recent regulations were merely meant to
“consolidate and streamline” and ultimately be
“consistent with” the old regulations); 69 Fed. Reg.
22,122, 22,126 & 22,139. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 541.2—
207 (2003) with 29 C.F.R. § 541.200—203.
Despite intense lobbying from the financial
services industry, the DOL refused to issue
regulations in 2004 concluding that loan officers
qualify for the administrative exemption. On the
contrary, the DOL cited and discussed federal case
law holding that loan officers do not qualify for the
administrative exemption, see 69 Fed. Reg. 22,145—
46, and stated that the regulations were intended
to be “consistent with this case law.” Id.
On September 8, 2006, in a sharp break from
its long-settled position, the DOL issued an opinion
letter concluding that mortgage loan officers are
exempt employees under the FLSA’s
administrative exemption. See App. 91a; U.S. Dep't
of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter,
FLSA2006-31, 2006 WL 2792445 (Sept. 8, 2006).5
Although the 2006 opinion letter broke with over a
generation’s worth of DOL guidance and federal
case law, the 2006 letter did not cite—let alone
discuss—the mountain of prior’ authority
5 The DOL’s 2006 letter was signed by then-Wage and Hour
Administrator Paul DeCamp. After Congress refused to
confirm Mr. DeCamp, President Bush unilaterally appointed
Mr. DeCamp during a Senate intra-session recess. Whether
appointments such as Mr. DeCamp’s violate the Constitution
is under consideration in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d
490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013).
10
concluding that mortgage loan officers do not
qualify for the administrative exemption.
Three-and-a-half years later, on March 24,
2010, the DOL issued Administrator's
Interpretation No. 2010-1 (“2010AI’)®, restoring the
DOL’s original and long-held agency interpretation
that mortgage loan officers do not qualify for the
administrative exemption. App. 107a; 2010AI, 2010
WL 1822423. The 2010 interpretation forcefully
withdrew the contrary 2006 opinion letter,
analyzing the 2006 letter’s numerous analytical
flaws in detail, citing the letter’s inconsistency with
the governing regulations and case law, and
criticizing the 2006 letter’s “misleading assumption
and selective and narrow analysis.” App. 127a.
3. On January 12, 2011, Respondent MBA, the
financial industry trade group that solicited the
2006 letter, filed suit against the Secretary of
Labor in federal district court in the District of
Columbia seeking an order declaring unlawful,
vacating, and enjoining the implementation of
2010AI. MBA contended that the DOL violated the
APA by issuing 2010AI without notice and
comment, and argued alternatively that 2010AI
should be set aside as arbitrary, capricious, and
contrary to law. App. 15a.
Petitioners are former mortgage loan officers
who brought suit against Quicken Loans, Inc.
alleging that Quicken improperly misclassified
6 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Administrator's
Interpretation No. 2010-1, 2010 WL 1822423 (Mar. 24, 2010).
11
them as exempt under the FLSA.’ Petitioners
intervened as defendants before the district court
as a matter of right, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and
fully participated as parties before the district
court and court of appeals.
On June 6, 2012, the district court granted
Petitioners’ and the DOL’s motion for summary
judgment, concluding that the DOL was not
required to engage in_ notice-and-comment
rulemaking before issuing 2010AI, and holding that
the DOL’s 2010 interpretation was not arbitrary,
capricious, nor contrary to law. App. 15a; Mortgage
Bankers Ass’n, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 208-10.
MBA appealed, and the D.C. Circuit
reversed. The D.C. Circuit began by reaffirming the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, which holds that
although an agency may issue an_ initial
interpretive rule without going through notice and
comment, “[o]Jnce an agency gives its regulation an
interpretation, it can only change that
interpretation as it would formally modify the
regulation itself: through the process of notice and
7 Petitioner Ryan Henry is a plaintiff in Henry v. Quicken
Loans Inc., No. 04-cv-40346 (E.D. Mich.). Petitioner Beverly
Buck is a plaintiff in Mathis v. Quicken Loans Inc., No. 07-cv-
10981 (E.D. Mich.), and Petitioner Jerome Nickols is a
plaintiff in Chasteen v. Rock Fin. Inc., No. 07-cv-10558 (E.D.
Mich.).
8 MBA did not appeal the district court’s substantive
determination that 2010AI was not arbitrary, capricious, or
inconsistent with the underlying regulations. Rather, the
MBA focused its appeal to the D.C. Circuit on the sole issue
before this Court: whether the APA required the DOL to
engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking before issuing
2010AI.
12
comment rulemaking.” Paralyzed Veterans of Am..,
117 F.3d at 586. Applying the doctrine, the court
concluded that “[w]hen an agency has given its
regulation a definitive interpretation, and later
significantly revises that interpretation, the agency
has in effect amended its rule, something it may
not accomplish [under the APA] without notice and
comment.” App. 2a; Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Harris,
720 F.3d 966, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing Paralyzed
Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 586, and Alaska Prof
Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir.
1999)). The D.C. Circuit candidly acknowledged the
circuit split on the question of whether agencies
must engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking
before revising interpretive rules. See App. 2a.;
Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 720 F.3d at 969 n.3 (citing
cases).
Petitioners filed a petition for rehearing en
banc, which the court of appeals denied on October
2, 2013. App. 54a. This petition for a writ of
certiorari follows.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I. THis CouRT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW TO
RESOLVE THE CONFLICT OVER WHETHER
AGENCIES SUBJECT TO THE APA ARE
CATEGORICALLY PROHIBITED FROM REVISING
THEIR INTERPRETATIVE RULES UNLESS SUCH
REVISIONS ARE MADE THROUGH NOTICE-AND-
COMMENT RULEMAKING.
This case cries out for Supreme Court review
for several independent and compelling reasons.
First, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion deepened an
intractable circuit split on the Question Presented.
While the First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits have squarely held that agencies need not
13
engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking before
revising their interpretive rules, the Fifth and D.C.
Circuits have taken the exact opposite view.
Supreme Court review is the only means to resolve
the conflict.
Second, the D.C. Circuit’s Paralyzed Veterans
doctrine—which controlled the outcome in this
case—is plainly wrong. The doctrine conflicts
irreconcilably with the bare text of the APA, which
states unambiguously that all interpretative rules
are exempt from notice and comment—without
reference to whether the interpretation is the first
adopted or a later revision. The Paralyzed Veterans
doctrine also conflicts with two lines of cases from
this Court, which hold that (1) courts may not
impose rulemaking procedures beyond those
contemplated by the APA, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 524 (1978), and (2) an interpretation’s
consistency with earlier pronouncements is merely
one factor courts must consider in evaluating the
latest interpretation’s persuasive value, e.g.,
Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
Critically, the doctrine ignores the numerous firmly
grounded checks—arbitrary and capricious review,
statutory safe harbors, and due process, among
others—protecting regulated communities from
arbitrary changes in agency interpretations.
Third, the Question Presented in this case is
both important and recurring. Until this Court
resolves the Question Presented in this case,
agencies will—in countless daily interactions with
citizen and businesses—become less transparent,
less predictable, and more hesitant to provide any
guidance at all for fear of having their informal
positions locked in.
14
A. The Circuits Are Intractably Divided
The Question Presented in this case has
sharply divided the courts of appeals. Absent
review by this Court, the conflict is likely to persist
indefinitely.
In the fifty-year period between the enactment
of the APA in 1946 and the issuance of the D.C.
Circuit’s opinion in Paralyzed Veterans, every court
that addressed the Question Presented concluded
that notice-and-comment rulemaking was not
required for an agency to amend its interpretive
rules. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing
Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 52
Admin. L. Rev. 547, 567 n.136 (2000).
After Paralyzed Veterans, the controversial
doctrine has been applied by the D.C. Circuit, see
Mortg. Bankers Ass’n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966, 967
(D.C. Cir. 2013); Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA,
425 F.3d 992 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Alaska Prof!
Hunters Ass'n, 177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and
adopted by the Fifth Circuit, see Shell Offshore Inc.
v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2001).°
The First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits, by contrast, have explicitly rejected the
D.C. Circuit’s approach. See Warder v. Shalala, 149
F.3d 73, 79-82 (lst Cir. 1998) (rejecting the
argument that a revised interpretation of a
Medicare regulation was improperly issued without
® The Paralyzed Veterans doctrine has been cited approvingly
in dicta by panels in the Third and Eighth Circuits. See SBC
Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 498 (3d Cir. 2005); Minnesota v.
Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., 495 F.3d 991, 996—97
(8th Cir. 2007).
15
notice and comment); Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll,
48 F.3d 1331, 1840-41 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that
the Attorney General was not required to engage in
notice-and-comment rulemaking before revising its
interpretation of an immigration regulation); St.
Francis Health Care Ctr. v. Shalala, 205 F.3d 937,
947 n.11 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that notice and
comment was not required where the Secretary of
Health and Human _. Services. revised an
interpretation of the department’s own regulation);
Abraham Lincoln Mem1 Hosp. v. Sebelius, 698 F.3d
536, 560 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine is “not persuasive”
because it “conflicts with the APA’s rulemaking
provisions, which exempt all interpretive rules
from notice and comment”); Miller v. Cal. Speedway
Corp., 536 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[E]ven
if the DOJ’s interpretation constituted a change in
the understanding of its original regulations, the
DOJ was not required to proceed by notice and
comment because both the . . . original position...
and the [revised position] would constitute
interpretive rules.”); Erringer v. Thompson, 371
F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[N]o notice-and-
comment rulemaking is required to amend a
previous interpretive rule.”) (emphasis in original);
Chief Prob. Officers of Cal. v. Shalala, 118 F.3d
1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that “[t]he
Agency was free to change [its] interpretation”
without notice and comment.).!°
10 The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have acknowledged the
circuit split but declined to take sides. See United States v.
Magnesium Corp. of Am., 616 F.3d 1129, 1139—40 (10th Cir.
2010) (acknowledging the split of authority and pointing out
that “Paralyzed Veterans and Alaska Hunters have generated
considerable debate” among courts and commentators);
16
The split of authority between the D.C. Circuit
and a plurality of other circuits on the Question
Presented creates a uniquely compelling
justification for review: the potential for forum
shopping. Because virtually any APA action can be
brought in the District of Columbia, see 28 U.S.C. §
1391(e), sophisticated parties opposing agency
action will always avail themselves of the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine by filing suit in the
District of Columbia. Parties supporting an
agency's revised position will sue in jurisdictions on
the other side of the divide. The result is chaos and
confusion over the validity of countless
interpretations. See, e.g., App. 56a; Biggs v.
Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 10-cv-11928, slip op. at 7—
10 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2014) (concluding that
courts outside the D.C. circuit are not bound by the
reasoning of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in this case,
but suggesting in dicta that the D.C. Circuit's
mandate bars the DOL from enforcing 2010AI
nationwide). As a consequence, the need for
national uniformity on the Question Presented in
this case is especially acute.
The divide over the validity of the DOL’s
interpretation at issue in this case further
illustrates the pressing need for Supreme Court
review. Except for the D.C. Circuit below, every
court to consider the question has rejected the
precise reasoning adopted by the D.C. Circuit,
concluding that no notice and comment was
Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1338-39 (11th Cir. 2009)
(acknowledging the split of authority and counting the Second
Circuit, in addition to the First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth, as in agreement that “changes in interpretations do
not require notice and comment because both the original and
current positions constitute interpretive rules”).
17
required before the DOL issued 2010AI. See Mortg.
Bankers Ass'n, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 193; Swigart, 870
F. Supp. 2d at 512-13 (“[T]he APA’s notice and
comment procedures are not required for an
interpretive rule such as the 2010 AI that modifies
a prior interpretation of the same agency
regulation ... .”); Lewis v. Huntington Natl Bank,
838 F. Supp. 2d 703, 707-13 (S.D. Ohio 2012)
(concluding that notice-and-comment rulemaking
was not required before issuing 2010AD; accord
Biggs v. Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 10-cv-11928, 2011
WL 5244819, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2011).
The split of authority on the validity of
2010AI has caused considerable confusion for the
nearly 300,000 loan officers and their employers in
the financial services industry. Of course, that
confusion pales in comparison to the enormous
shadow cast by Paralyzed Veterans—and its uneven
application—over federal agencies and regulated
communities generally.
B. The D.C. Circuit’s Paralyzed Veterans
Doctrine Is Clearly Wrong
Even setting aside the persistent split of
authority over the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, the
Question Presented in this case merits
consideration by this Court. The doctrine conflicts
irreconcilably with the APA itself, contravenes
numerous decisions of this Court, and disregards
the firmly-established safeguards protecting
regulated communities from arbitrary shifts in
agency policy.
(1) The Paralyzed Veterans doctrine
conflicts with the plain language of
the APA
18
This case begins and ends with the text of
the APA. “[I]n interpreting a statute a court should
always turn to one cardinal canon before all others.
. [C]ourts must presume that a legislature says
in a statute what it means and means in a statute
what it says there.” Conn. Nat? Bank v. Germain,
503 U.S. 249, 253—54 (1992).
Section 553 of the APA sets forth the
procedural requirements for rule making, including
notice, comment, and publication of rules. 5 U.S.C.
§ 553. Section 553(b), however, exempts from the
notice-and-comment requirement “interpretative
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice.” 5
U.S.C. § 553. Interpretative rules are exempt from
notice and comment; the APA draws no distinction
whatsoever between initial rules and subsequent
rules. In the absence of any contrary congressional
intent, Paralyzed Veterans’ one-bite rule cannot be
reconciled with the text of the APA. See Abraham
Lincoln Mem Hosp., 698 F.3d at 560 (concluding
that the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine is “not
persuasive” because it “conflicts with the APA’s
rulemaking provisions, which exempt all
interpretive rules from notice and comment”
(emphasis added)).
The Paralyzed Veterans doctrine fares no
better examined through the lens of other relevant
canons of statutory construction. The familiar in
pari materia canon “is a reflection of practical
experience in the interpretation of statutes: a
legislative body generally uses a particular word
with a consistent meaning in a given context. Thus,
for example, a ‘later act can . . . be regarded as a
legislative interpretation of (an) earlier act .
Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-44
19
(1972) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S.
60, 64 (1940)).
Numerous statutory provisions illustrate
that Congress knew how to write the Paralyzed
Veterans doctrine inta law, and chose not to do so
when it enacted the APA. For example, under the
Tariff Act of 1930, the Secretary of the Treasury
may not issue an interpretive ruling modifying or
revoking a previous interpretive ruling without
first engaging in notice and comment. 19 U.S.C.
§1625(c). As a_ second example, the FDA
Modernization Act explicitly requires opportunity
for public comment before the Secretary makes
“changes in interpretation” of a “statute or
regulation.” 21 U.S.C. § 371.
These statutes illustrate that Congress is
capable of writing the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine
into law in circumstances where it sees fit. Indeed,
the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine makes these
provisions superfluous, running afoul of the “canon
against interpreting any statutory provision in a
manner that would render another provision
superfluous.” Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,
3228 (2010). This antisuperfluousness canon
“applies to interpreting any two provisions in the
U.S. Code, even when Congress enacted the
provisions at different times.” Id. at 3229.
The Paralyzed Veterans opinion itself, taken
on its own terms, similarly fails to persuade. The
opinion—remarkable for its atextual character—
makes almost no effort to square its sweeping rule
with the APA. Without citation to any statute, case,
or other authority, Paralyzed Veterans simply
declares that “[o]nce an agency gives its regulation
an interpretation, it can only change that
20
interpretation as it would formally modify the
regulation itself: through the process of notice and
comment rulemaking.” Paralyzed Veterans of Am.,
117 F.3d at 586.
In a later passage, Paralyzed Veterans cites
Section 551(5) of the APA and this Court’s opinion
in Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U.S.
87 (1995), but neither authority supports the
court’s sweeping proposition.
Citing Section 551(5), the court stated that
“[uJnder the APA, agencies are obliged to engage in
notice and comment before formulating regulations,
which applies as well to ‘repeals’ or ‘amendments.”
Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586 (emphasis in
original). But Section 551(5) merely supplies the
APA's definition of “rule making,” stating that the
term “means agency process for formulating,
amending, or repealing a rule.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(5).
Section 553 sets forth the actual procedures
required for rule making, and exempts interpretive
rules from notice and comment. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
Reading the two sections together, it is readily
apparent that when an agency “formulat(es), 7
“amend{s],” or “repeal[s]” a legislative rule—that i is,
a formal regulation—notice and comment is
required. But by the same token, an agency
remains free to issue an interpretive rule, whether
by formulation, amendment, or repeal, without
notice and comment. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretive
Rules, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 547, 567 (2000) (“When an
agency issues, amends, or repeals a legislative rule,
it must use the notice and comment procedure.
When it issues, amends, or repeals an
interpretative rule, it is not required to use the
notice and comment procedure.”).
1
Paralyzed Veterans’ citation to this Court’s
decision in Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital
similarly misses the mark. Paralyzed Veterans cites
Guernsey Memorial Hospital for the proposition
that “APA rulemaking is required where an
interpretation ‘adopt[s] a new position inconsistent
with . . . existing regulations.’” Paralyzed Veterans,
117 F. 3d at 586 (citing Guernsey Mem1 Hosp., 514
U.S. at 100). But Guernsey Memorial Hospital is
actually one of this Court’s seminal cases
reaffirming the principle that interpretive rules
need not be the product of notice and comment. At
issue in Guernsey Memorial Hospital was the
validity of a Medicare Provider Reimbursement
Manual. Guernsey Mem7 Hosp., 514 U.S. at 90. The
Manual, which was issued without notice and
comment, interpreted various Medicare legislative
rules (referred to in the opinion simply as
“regulations”) to mean that certain reimbursable
losses must be amortized over a period of years
rather than reimbursed in the year of the loss. Jd.
After assuring itself that the Manual was
consistent with the regulations, id. at 92-95, this
Court held that it was “proper for the Secretary to
issue a guideline or interpretive rule,” calling the
rule issued by an agency to advise the public of the
agency's construction of the statutes and rules
which it administers.” Jd. at 97, 99 (citations
omitted). Guernsey Memorial Hospital's language
quoted in Paralyzed Veterans, in context, reads as
follows:
We can agree that APA rulemaking
would still be required if [the Manual]
adopted a new position inconsistent with
any of the Secretary's existing regulations.
22
As set forth in Part LI, however, her
regulations do not require reimbursement
according to GAAP. [The Manual] does not,
as the Court of Appeals concluded it does,
“effec[t] a substantive change in the
regulations.”
Id. at 100 (citations omitted). Put in context, this
Court’s observation in Guernsey Memorial Hospital
stands for the unremarkable proposition that an
interpretive rule that conflicts with the legislative
rules it purports to interpret is invalid. Paralyzed
Veterans dramatically and improperly expands this
concept to hold that an interpretive rule that is
consistent with the legislative rules it interprets
but inconsistent with a prior interpretive rule is
procedurally invalid. Nothing in the APA or
Guernsey Memorial Hospital supports such a
In the D.C. Circuit’s opinion below, the court
offered a novel textual defense of the Paralyzed
Veterans doctrine, but still failed to square the
doctrine with the text of the APA. The court called
the Doctrine’s “operative assumption” “the belief
that a definitive interpretation is so closely
intertwined with the regulation that a significant
change to the former constitutes a repeal or
amendment of the latter.” Mortg. Bankers Ass'n,
720 F.3d at 969 n.3 (emphasis in original). This
“operative assumption” is flat wrong. A changed
interpretation leaves the formal regulations
unchanged, sitting comfortably in the Code of
Federal Regulations in identical form before and
after the interpretive change. To the extent the
D.C. Circuit now believes that any interpretation
“closely intertwined” with the underlying
regulations (in other words, any interpretation)
23
becomes a formal, legislative rule simply by virtue
of appearing in an opinion letter, amicus brief, or
internal guideline, the assertion finds no support in
the APA (or any other authority construing the
nearly seventy-year-old Act).
(2)The Paralyzed Veterans doctrine
conflicts with numerous decisions
of this Court
Although this case can be resolved by
reference to the text of the APA and nothing more,
review is also warranted because the Paralyzed
Veterans doctrine fundamentally conflicts with this
Court’s prior cases. Two lines of cases bear
mentioning here. First, in a line of cases beginning
with Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435
U.S. at 524, this Court has held that the APA
“established the maximum procedural
requirements which Congress was willing to have
the courts impose upon agencies in conducting
rulemaking procedures.” Jd. at 524. Applying
Vermont Yankee to a revised agency interpretation
in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S.
502 (2009), this Court stated that “[t]he [APA]
makes no distinction . . . between initial agency
action and subsequent agency action undoing or
revising that action.” Jd. at 515. Second, this Court
has held many times over that an agency’s change
in interpretation is merely one factor to consider in
evaluating the interpretation’s weight. See, e.g.,
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. The Paralyzed Veterans
doctrine cannot be reconciled with these
authorities.
(a) Vermont Yankee
In Vermont Yankee, this Court held that the
D.C. Circuit erred in invalidating, on the grounds of
24
inadequate procedures, a rule issued by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 435 U.S. at 525,
528-30. In issuing the rule, the Commission had
changed its policy by declaring that earlier
decisions of its appeal board had no further effect.
Id. at 530. This Court began with the premise that
the APA was “a legislative enactment which settled
‘long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and
enacts a formula upon which opposing social and
political forces have come to rest.” Jd. at 523
(quoting Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 40). The
Court unanimously held that the D.C. Circuit had
“seriously misread or misapplied . . . statutory and
decisional law cautioning reviewing courts against
engrafting their own notions of proper procedures
upon agencies entrusted with substantive functions
by Congress.” Id. at 525. The Court reasoned that
Section 553 of the APA “established the maximum
procedural requirements which Congress was
willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in
conducting rulemaking procedures[,|” id. at 524,
and noted that “reviewing courts are generally not
free to impose” any “additional procedural rights.”
Id.
Scholars have read Vermont Yankee as a
rebuke of the D.C. Circuit, which had aggrandized
its own authority to establish procedures for agency
action at the expense of Congress and the
Executive branch. Then-professor Scalia authored
the leading commentary on Vermont Yankee. See
Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the
D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 345. Justice Scalia called Vermont Yankee a
“tongue-lashing,” undertaken in response to the
D.C. Circuit’s “progressive evisceration of the APA.”
Id. at 359, 400. He continued: “It does not go too far
25
to say that the D.C. Circuit was in the process of
replacing the rudimentary procedural mandates of
the Act .. . with a much more elaborate, ‘evolving,’
courtmade scheme... .” Id. at 359.
The Paralyzed Veterans doctrine fits
comfortably within Justice Scalia’s critique. Here,
as in Vermont Yankee, the D.C. Circuit has
invented a procedural rule unmoored from the text
of the APA, “stray[ing} beyond the judicial province
to explore the procedural format [and] impos[ing]
upon the agency [the court’s] own notion of which
procedures are ‘best’ or most likely to further some
vague, undefined public good.” Jd. at 369~70
(quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S.
at 549).
This Court applied Vermont Yankee most
recently in Fox Television, this time reaffirming the
principle that courts may not impose requirements
beyond those prescribed in the APA—even where,
as here, the agency changes its position. In Fox
Television, the Court upheld the FCC’s changed
interpretation of the ban on broadcasting “obscene,
indecent, or profane language.” 18 U.S.C. § 1464.
See Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 502. The Second
Circuit had _ rejected the FCC’s’ changed
interpretation on the ground that the APA requires
“a more substantial explanation for agency action
that changes prior policy.” Jd. at 514. But this
Court rejected the Second Circuit’s approach,
pointing out that the APA “makes no distinction . . .
between initial agency action and subsequent
agency action undoing or revising that action.” Jd.
at 515.
This case, of course, directly parallels Fox
Television. Although Fox Television addressed the
26
APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard, the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine achieves the exact
same mistaken result—rejected in Fox Television—
under the guise of a procedural rule. But just as
Fox Television recognized that the arbitrary and
capricious standard does not change when applied
to a revised interpretation, the APA’s procedural
requirements do not change when an agency
modifies its informal interpretations. Notice-
comment-rulemaking is not required.
Paralyzed Veterans—and the D.C. Circuit’s
decision below—cannot be reconciled with Vermont
Yankee or Fox Television. Whatever courts may
think of the wisdom of agencies revising their
informal interpretations, courts may not impose
upon agencies additional procedural hurdles
beyond those established by Congress. The APA
authorizes courts to set aside agency action found
to be “without observance of procedure required by
law,” and nothing more. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D)
(emphasis added).
(b) Skidmore v. Swift
In another line of cases, this Court has
consistently held that an agencys change in
interpretation is merely one factor to consider in
evaluating the interpretation’s weight. The D.C.
Circuit’s per se rule conflicts irreconcilably with
these opinions by making one factor—a changed
interpretation—wholly dispositive of an
interpretation’s validity.
In the seminal case of Skidmore v. Swift, the
Court examined a DOL “Interpretive Bulletin,”
which the Court described as a “practical guide to
employers and employees as to how the office
representing the public interest in [the Act’s]
27
enforcement will seek to apply it.” 323 U.S. at 138.
Describing the weight courts should give such
informal interpretations, the Court made clear that
the consistency of agencies’ interpretations is
simply one factor among many for courts to
consider:
We consider that the _ rulings,
interpretations and opinions of _ the
Administrator under this Act, while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of
their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance. The weight of such a judgment in
a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.
Id. at 140 (emphasis added). The Court has
endorsed Skidmore’s formula dozens of times, most
recently last term. See Vance v. Ball State Univ.,
133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 n.4 (2013).
Indeed, this Court is no stranger to cases
involving shifting agency interpretations. In
evaluating changed interpretations—none of which
was the product of notice-and-comment
rulemaking—this Court has never strayed from
Skidmore’s multifactor, totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Plan
Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285,
296 n.7 (2009) (noting that a “change in
interpretation alone presents no separate ground
for disregarding [the] Department’s present
28
interpretation” (citations omitted)); Riegel uv.
Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326-27 (2008)
(holding that where the agency changed its
interpretation, “the degree of deference might be
reduced by the fact that the agency’s earlier
position was different”); id. at 338 n.8 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (same); United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (when confronted with a
changed interpretation, instructing courts to
consider “consistency” as one factor in evaluating
the persuasiveness of an agency’s position); Good
Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417
(1993) (“[T]he consistency of an agency’s position is
a factor in assessing the weight that position is
due.”); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446
n.30 (1987) (according “considerably less deference”
to a revised agency interpretation); Watt v. Alaska,
451 U.S. 259, 272—73 (1981) (concluding that where
an agency changed its interpretation, “[t]he
Department’s current interpretation, being in
conflict with its initial position, is entitled to
considerably less deference”); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-43 (1976) (considering
conflicting EEOC interpretive guidance as one
factor in the deference analysis).
The D.C. Circuit’s per se rule is flatly
inconsistent with these decisions and many others.
Simply put, courts cannot evaluate whether to
adopt a changed interpretation if such
interpretations are categorically imvalid, as the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine necessarily holds. The
D.C. Circuit’s rule is at war with these cases and
must be cast aside.
29
(3) The law affords numerous checks
on shifting agency positions
Paralyzed Veterans is’ perhaps best
understood as an expression of judicial disapproval
of agency flip flops. But Paralyzed Veterans’ per se
rule ignores the numerous tools in the judicial
toolbox that protect regulated communities from
shifting agency interpretations. Ironically, once
these tools are taken into account, the Paralyzed
Veterans doctrine, by its own force, only serves to
prevent agencies from correcting their own
mistakes.
First, agencies that change _ their
interpretations “must show that there are good
reasons for the new policy.” Fox Television, 556
U.S. at 515. Absent a good reason for the shift, the
APA authorizes courts to strike down the revised
interpretation as “arbitrary” or “capricious.” See 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the
U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 34 (1983). “Unexplained inconsistency is,
at most, a reason for holding an interpretation to be
an arbitrary and capricious change from agency
practice under the [APA].” Nat7T Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 46-57) (emphasis added).
To pass muster under the APA’s arbitrary or
capricious standard, “the agency must explain why
it now reject{[s] the considerations that led it to
adopt that initial policy.” Fox Television, 556 U.S.
at 535 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Importantly, agencies
must address any reliance interests upset by the
interpretive shift. Jd. at 515 (majority opinion); id.
30
at 535 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
Second, as previously discussed, courts
considering changed interpretations are less likely
to defer to the agency. “An agency interpretation of
a relevant provision which conflicts with the
agencys earlier interpretation is entitled to
considerably less deference than a consistently held
agency view.” INS, 480 U.S. at 446 n.30. Thus,
while an agency is generally free to change its
interpretation, courts will review the changed
interpretation carefully, using traditional
interpretive tools, and will not blindly adhere to the
agency’s substantive conclusions.!!
Third, an agency can only change its
interpretation if the revised interpretation is
consistent with the underlying regulations. Thus,
wile agencies may replace one _ reasonable
interpretation with another reasonable
interpretation, courts must set aside as “contrary to
law” any agencys new “interpretation” that
conflicts with the underlying legislative rules. See 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Guernsey Mem7 Hosp., 514 U.S.
at 100. Agencies may not, “under the guise of
interpreting a regulation . . . create de facto a new
regulation.” Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131
S. Ct. 871, 882 (2011) (citing Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)).
11 [mportantly, this Court has almost never granted deference
under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), to an agency
position that has vacillated over the years. Auer deference is
typically not warranted “when the agency’s interpretation
conflicts with a prior interpretation.” See Christopher v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (citing
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)).
31
Fourth, Congress has created numerous safe
harbors insulating regulated communities from
liability when they rely on agency interpretations
that are later withdrawn. Relevant here, Section
259 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 absolves
employers from liability for past violations of the
FLSA if employers can show they acted in “good
faith in conformity with and in reliance on any
written administrative regulation, order, ruling,
approval, or interpretation.” 29 U.S.C. § 259(a).
Such a defense, if established, “shall be a bar to the
action or proceeding, notwithstanding that after
such act or omission, such administrative . .
interpretation . . . is modified or rescinded... .” Jd.
Indeed, Congress has created numerous such safe
harbors, which serve to protect regulated entities
that rely in good faith on informal agency guidance.
See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 57b-4(b); Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15
U.S.C. § 1640); Age Discrimination § in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 626(e);
Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1028; Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b).
Fifth, due process itself provides a baseline
of protection for regulated communities. “A
fundamental principle in our legal system is that
laws which regulate persons or entities must give
fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required.”
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct.
2307, 2317 (2012). For example in Fox Television,
this Court, in its second look at the FCC’s new
“fleeting expletives” policy, concluded that the FCC
violated due process when it sought to sanction two
television networks under its new interpretation for
32
conduct that occurred before the networks had fair
notice of the FCC’s new policy. Jd. at 2230.
The Paralyzed Veterans doctrine must be
evaluated in context with these firmly-rooted and
robust protections. Once existing protections are
taken into account, the D.C. Circuit’s per se rule
has the unfortunate effect of invalidating, by its
own force, only interpretations that are consistent
with the underlying regulations, thoroughly
reasoned, cognizant of the reliance interests of the
regulated community, worthy of respect by the
courts, and imposed after fair notice—in other
words, interpretations that are correct. The DOL’s
present interpretation that loan officers do not
qualify for the FLSA’s administrative exemption,
which is consistent with the regulations and the
DOL’s long-standing position prior to 2006—and
recognized by numerous courts as substantively
correct—is precisely such a casualty of the D.C.
Circuit’s misguided doctrine.
C. The Question Presented Is Important
and Recurring, and Has Far-Reaching
Consequences
The Question Presented in this Petition is both
critically important and perpetually recurring,
warranting Supreme Court review.
As this Court has recognized, the modern
administrative state “touches almost every aspect
of daily life.” Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156
(2010). Legislative and interpretive rules both
serve critical—but different—functions in the way
administrative law affects those aspects of daily
life. While legislative rules fill statutory gaps with
binding law, interpretive rules constitute the very
33
dialogue between citizen and government about
how the government will seek to apply that law.
Shalala, 514 U.S. at 99. Paralyzed Veterans
threatens that dialogue, creating a powerful
incentive for agencies to remain silent.
Consider, for example, a grocer who asks the
DOL for advice on whether his assistant manager
is exempt under the FLSA. In a world without
Paralyzed Veterans, the DOL responds promptly. If
the DOL finds the employee exempt, the owner can
be more confident in his choice. If the agency later
changes its interpretation, the initial interpretation
provides the owner with a powerful tool in court.
Agencies subject to the D.C. Circuit’s Paralyzed
Veterans doctrine, on the other hand, will behave
entirely differently. They will become less
transparent, hesitant to provide any guidance for
fear of having their informal positions locked in.
The DOL will remain silent (or render tentative
guidance hedged with caveats, so as to avoid
Paralyzed Veterans’ sweep) rather than risk having
a potentially erroneous interpretation calcified into
the formal regulations, and the store owner will
receive no advice. Paralyzed Veterans serves only to
“muzzle any informal communications between
agencies and their regulated communities—
communications that are vital to the smooth
operation of both government and business.” Indep.
Equip. Dealers Ass’n v. EPA, 372 F.3d 420, 428
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.).
The dialogue between agencies and
citizens—threatened by Paralyzed Veterans—plays
out in many subtle ways thousands of times each
day. Agency interpretations regularly touch on
issues with important implications for citizens’
34
daily lives, including safety,!? civil rights,!* access
to social benefits,‘ consumer _rights,'5
immigration,’ housing,!’ taxes,'® and _ the
protection of environmental resources,!® to name a
few. When administering complex regulatory
regimes, agencies must resort to flexible
12 Re: Tread Act Provisions Involving Defective Tires, Nat'l
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Dep't of Transp.,
http://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/12-
00245. ITA_Defective_Tire_Exportation. htm (Oct. 3, 2012)
(explaining the proper method for disposing of or destroying
dangerous recalled auto part); Regulations, Codes, & Code
Interpretations, US. Food & Drug Admin.,
http://www.fda. gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/RetailFoodProte
ction/RegulationsCodesInterpretations/ (last updated Aug. 19,
2013) (providing interpretive guidance to retailers on
handling and storing food in compliance with the food code).
18 See Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 675 F. Supp.
2d 660, 669 (W.D. Va. 2009), affd, 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011).
14 Encarnacion ex rel. George v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 72, 76 (2d
Cir. 2009); LC U-Bake, LLC v. United States, No. 3:12-CV-
0049-KI, 2012 WL 1379048 (D. Or. Apr. 20, 2012).
15 Chase Bank USA, N.A., 131 S. Ct. at 878; FTC v. Asia Pac.
Telecom, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
16 Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 146 (1st Cir.
2007).
17 St. Marks Place Hous. Co., Inc. v. HUD., 610 F.3d 75, 78
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
18 Natl Rest. Ass’n v. Simon, 411 F. Supp. 993, 999 (D.D.C.
1976).
19 United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 708 (4th Cir. 2003).
35
interpretive rules to address the “myriad details
that are not explicitly resolved by the legislative
rules.” See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing
Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 52
Admin. L. Rev. 547, 553-54 (2000). “An initial
agency interpretation is not instantly carved in
stone. On the contrary, the agency . . . must
consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of
its policy on a continuing basis... .” Nat? Cable &
Telecommc’ns Assn., 545 U.S. at 981 (citations
omitted). By chilling the interpretive process, the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine’ hinders’. the
conversation between government and citizen on a
wide range of regulatory issues. Forcing the
government to speak only with the force of law or
remain silent benefits no one. 2°
20 Further illustrating the importance of the Question
Presented, the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine has drawn
universal scorn from administrative law scholars of all
stripes, who criticize the doctrine as at war with the APA,
unwise, and practically unworkable. E.g., William Funk, A
Primer on Legislative Rules, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1321, 1329-30
(2001); Sam Kalen, The Transformation of Modern
Administrative Law: Changing Administrations and
Environmental Guidance Documents, 35 Ecology L.Q. 657,
717-20 (2008); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing
Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 Admin. L. Rev.
547 (2000); Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the
Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an
Essential Element, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 803, 807—09 (2001); Jon
Connolly, Note, Alaska Hunters and the D.C. Circuit: A
Defense of Flexible Interpretive Rulemaking, 101 Colum. L.
Rev. 155 (2001); Brian J. Shearer, Comment, Outfoxing
Alaska Hunters: How Arbitrary and Capricious Review of
Changing Regulatory Interpretations Can More Efficiently
Police Agency Discretion, 62 Am. U. L. Rev. 167 (2012); see
also Richard W. Murphy, Hunters for Administrative Common
36
D. This Case Is the Ideal Vehicle To
Review the Question Presented
This case is an excellent vehicle to consider
the Question Presented. There is no dispute that
the DOL changed its interpretation of its own
regulations. Further, the resolution of the Question
Presented is the dispositive issue in the case.
Although MBA argued before the district court that
2010AI was arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent
with the governing regulations, the district court
upheld the substance of 2010AI. MBA chose not to
appeal that ruling to the D.C. Circuit, and the
district court’s substantive ruling is now final.
Thus, this Court need not take a position on the
substantive correctness of 2010AI.
CONCLUSION
Petitioners respectfully request that this
petition for a writ of certiorari be granted to review
the judgment and opinion of the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit. In the alternative, Petitioners
respectfully request that this Court call for the
views of the Solicitor General in this matter.?!
Law, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 917, 918; Wiliem S. Jordan III,
Interpretive Rules and Statements of Poluy—When Do They
Constitute Legislative Rules?, 29 Admin. & Reg. L. News, No.
1 (2003); Michael Asimow & Robert A. Anthony, A Second
Opinion? Inconsistent Interpretive Rules, 25 Admin & Reg. L.
News, No. 2 (2000).
21 The Solicitor General’s office has asked this Court to
overrule Paralyzed Veterans on at least one prior occasion.
See Petition for Certiorari, Leavitt v. Baystate Health Sys.,
547 U.S. 1054, No. 05-936, 2006 WL 207778, at *24—25 (Jan.
26, 2006). The Solicitor General should be given an
opportunity, however, to express his views in this case as
well.
37
Respectfully submitted.
Adam W. Hansen Paul J. Lukas
Counsel of Record Rachhana T. Srey
Nichols Kaster, LLP Nichols Kaster, PLLP
One Embarcadero Center Minneapolis, MN 55402
Suite 720 (612) 256-3205
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 277-7236 Sundeep Hora
ahansen@nka.com Alderman, Devorsetz &
Hora PLLC
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 969-8220
February 28, 2014
APPENDIX
la
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued March 22, 2013 Decided July 2, 2013
No. 12-5246
MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION,
APPELLANT
v
SETH D. HARRIS, SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY, ACTING SECRETARY OF UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ET AL..,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:11-cv-00073)
Michael W. Steinberg argued the cause for
appellant. With him on the briefs were Sam S.
Shaulson and David M. Kerr.
Anthony J. Steinmeyer, Assistant Director,
U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for
appellees. With him on the brief were Stuart F.
Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and
Douglas N. Letter, Director.
Sundeep Hora and Adam W. Hansen were on
the brief for intervenors-appellees Jerome Nickols,
et al.
2a
Before: TATEL and BROWN, Circuit Judges,
and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge
BROWN.
BROWN, Circuit Judge: The tandem of
Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P.,
117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997) and Alaska
Professional Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Alaska Hunters”) announced an
ostensibly straightforward rule: “When an agency
has given its regulation a definitive interpretation,
and later significantly revises that interpretation,
the agency has in effect amended its rule,
something it may not accomplish [under the APA]
without notice and comment.” Alaska Hunters, 177
F.3d at 1034. The only question properly before this
three-judge panel is a narrow one: what is the role
of reliance in this analysis?! Is it, as the
government contends, a “separate and independent
requirement.” Oral Arg. 10:42-10:45, or is it just
one of several factors courts can look to in order to
determine whether an agency’ interpretation
qualifies as definitive,? as Mortgage Bankers
Association (“MBA”) suggests? We find ourselves in
general agreement with the industry association
1 Bound as we are by Paralyzed Veterans and Alaska
Hunters, we decline the government’s invitation to “call” for
“the full Court [to]* * * lay the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine to
rest.” Letter of Clarification, No. 12-5246 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 25,
2013) (quoting Appellee Br. 47).
2 Our case law uses the terms “definitive” and
“authoritative” interchangeably. Compare Paralyzed
Veterans, 11 F.3d at 586 (“authoritative interpretation”), with
Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1034 (“definitive interpretation”).
3a
that there is no discrete reliance element. Reliance
is ust one part of the definitiveness calculus.
Fortunately, this is as far as our inquiry
need go. Having conceded the existence of two
definitive—and conflicting—agency interpretations,
the government acknowledged at oral argument
that petitioner “prevail[s] if ... the only reason
[courts] look to reliance is to find out if there is a
definitive interpretation.” Oral Arg. 10:56-11:10. So
stipulated, we reverse the District Court order
dismissing MBA’s Motion for Summary Judgment
and remand the case with instructions to vacate
the 2010 Administrator Interpretation significantly
revising the agency’s 2006 Opinion Letter. If the
Department of Labor (“DOL”) wishes to readopt the
later-in-time interpretation, it is free to. We take no
position on the merits of their interpretation. DOL
must, however, conduct the required notice and
comment rulemaking.
Petitioner MBA is a national trade
association representing over 2,200 real estate
finance companies with more than 280,000
employees nationwide. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n v.
Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d 193, 197 (D.D.C 2012). We
focus here on the mortgage loan officers who
typically assist prospective borrowers in identifying
and then applying for various mortgage offerings.
Though the recent financial crisis has thrust
members of this profession into the forefront of the
4a
news, our concern here is more mundane: the
method and manner of their pay.
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seg., and old law DOL
must adapt to new circumstances, employers are
generally required to pay overtime wages to
employees who work longer than 40 hours per
week. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). The Act provides
several exceptions to this rule. Those “employed in
a bona fide’ executive, administrative, or
professional capacity[,]... or in the capacity of
outside salesman,” for example, are exempt from
the statute’s minimum wage and maximum hour
requirements. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). Whether
mortgage loan officers qualify for this
“administrative exemption” is a difficult and at
times contentious question. So difficult, in fact,
DOL has found itself on both sides of the debate. In
2006, the agency issued an opinion letter
concluding on the facts presented that mortgage
loan officers with archetypal job duties fell within
the administrative exemption. Just four years
later, in 2010, Deputy Administrator Nancy J.
Leppink issued an “Administrator’s Interpretation”
declaring that “employees-who perform the typical
job duties” of the hypothetical mortgage loan officer
“do not qualify as bona fide administrative
employees.” J.A. 259. The 2010 pronouncement
“explicitly withdrew the 2006 Opinion Letter.”
Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
Citing Paralyzed Veterans and its progeny,
MBA challenged DOL’s decision to change their
“definitive interpretation” without first undergoing
5a
notice-and-comment rulemaking as a violation of
the APA. Compl. { 38. [J.A. 22] The District Court
rejected the argument. After assuring itself that
Paralyzed Veterans remains good law, see Mortgage
Bankers Ass’n, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 204-05, the court
read our recent decision in MetWest Inc. uv.
Secretary of Labor, 560 F.3d 506 (D.C. Cir. 2009), to
require a showing of “substantial and justifiable
reliance on a well-established agency
interpretation.” See id. at 207. (internal quation
marks and emphasis omitted). Although petitioner
had argued reliance in the alternative, the court
concluded MBA was unable to “satisfy the standard
for demonstrating reliance recognized in Met West.”
id. at 208. The court then denied MBA’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, but not before dismissing the
association’s substantive challenge to the 2010
interpretation as inconsistent with the agency’s
2004 regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b). The
present appeal followed.
il
On its face, the Paralyzed Veterans analysis
contains just two elements: definitive
interpretations (“definitiveness”) and a significant
change (“significant revision”). But as with most
things doctrinal, the devil is in the details.
3 The doctrine’s operative assumption—the belief that
a definitive interpretation is so closely intertwined with the
regulation that a significant change to the former constitutes
a repeal or amendment of the latter—is established law in
this Circuit, see, e.g., Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d
992, 997-98 (D.C. Cir. 2005), but the Courts of Appeals are
split on the issue. According to one recent survey, the Fifth
6a
Despite its age, few cases discuss Paralyzed
Veterans at length.‘ One critical question—and a
dispositive one here—concerns the role of reliance.
Borrowing heavily from MetWest and Honeywell
International, Inc. v. NRC, 628 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir.
2010), two recent cases that draw on our Alaska
Hunters decision, DOL suggests that the Paralyzed
Veterans analysis contains an independent third
element: substantial and justified reliance. MBA
takes a different approach to Alaska Hunters
altogether. In its view, that case stands only for the
proposition that reliance can elevate an otherwise
non-definitive interpretation into a_ definitive
interpretation; as such, it falls squarely within the
existing definitiveness element. Of the two, we
Circuit has adopted our approach and “the Eighth and Third
Circuits have mentioned [it] in dicta,” but “[t]he First, Second,
Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits agree that
changes in interpretations do not require notice and comment
because both the original and current position constitute
interpretive rules.” Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1338
(11th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Magnesium Corp. of
Am., 616 F.3d 1129, 1138-39 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting a
slightly different circuit split between the Third, Fifth, and
Sixth Circuits on one hand, and the First and Ninth Circuit
on the other).
4 It need not reflect poorly on the doctrine that so few
of our cases haven taken up Paralyzed Veterans’s banner—
and still fewer have used its reasoning to invalidate an
agency interpretation for failing to conduct notice and
comment rulemaking. See Appellee Br. 40-41 (counting
Alaska Hunters and arguably Environmental Integrity Project
as the lone exceptions). Paralyzed Veterans may very well
serve as a prophylactic that discourages agencies from
attempting to circumvent notice and comment requirements
in the first instance. We are unable to quantify these effects
by reference to case citations alone.
7a
believe MBA’s approach better explains Alaska
Hunters.
Alaska Hunters is an exceptional case with
an otherwise straightforward premise. In 1963, the
Federal Aviation Administration’s Alaska office
(the “Alaskan Region”) began a thirty year practice
of “uniformly advis[ing] all guides, lodge managers
and guiding services in Alaska that they could meet
their regulatory responsibilities by complying with
the requirements of [14 C.F.R. Part 91] only.”
Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1035. It was not until
1997 that officials in FAA’s Washington, D.C.
headquarters formally pushed back against the
regional office’s long-standing interpretation.®
Through a “Notice to Operators” published in the
Federal Register without notice and opportunity for
comment, the agency announced that certain
Alaskan guides would now have to comply with
other, more onerous regulations. Individuals who
had “opened lodges and built up _ businesses
dependent on aircraft” in reliance on the Alaskan
Region’s interpretation promptly brought suit
challenging the agency’s about-face. Jd. at 1035.
In relevant part, FAA argued Paralyzed
Veterans was “inapposite” because the Alaskan
Region’s interpretation was not definitive; it
5 It is “uncertain” whether the D.C.-based officials had
knowledge of the Alaskan Region’s interpretive position prior
to the 1990s—that is, before FAA consolidated power in its
national headquarters following a near three-decade-long
experiment with a decentralized organizational structure
“that transferred much authority to regional organizations.”
Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1032.
8a
“represented simply a local enforcement omission,
in conflict with the agency’s policy in the rest of the
country.” Jd. at 1034-35. We disagreed. Although a
local office’s interpretation of a regulation or
provision of advice to a regulated party “will not
necessarily constitute an authoritative
administrative position, particularly if the
interpretation or advice contradicts the view of the
agency as a whole,” the situation in Alaska Hunters
was “quite different.” Id. at 1035.
For one thing, there was no evidence in the
record of any conflicting interpretation. The
Alaskan Region uniformly enforced its interpretive
position for thirty years and both FAA and the
National Transportation Safety Board had at some
point referred to it as FAA policy. See id. at 1035.
And even if “FAA as a whole somehow had in mind
an interpretation different from that of its Alaskan
Region, guides and lodge operators in Alaska had
no reason to know this.” Jd. All the regulated
parties had before them was the formal,§
uncontradicted, and uniformly-applied
interpretation of a local office—an interpretation
Alaskan guide pilots reasonably relied on for three
decades. Such advice might not necessarily qualify
as definitive, but here, we concluded, it “became an
authoritative departmental interpretation, and
administrative common law applicable to Alaskan
guide pilots” that could not be rewritten without
notice and comment rulemaking. Jd.
6 “(T]he regional office’s position was reflected in
official agency adjudications holding that Alaskan guides
need not comply with commercial pilot standards.” Ass’n of
Am. R.R. v. DOT, 198 F.3d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
9a
Alaska Hunters’s takeaway is clear: reliance
is but one factor courts must consider in assessing
whether an agency interpretation qualifies as
definitive or authoritative. Or to put matters more
precisely, because regulated entities are unlikely to
substantially—and often cannot be said _ to
justifiably—rely on agency pronouncements lacking
some or all the hallmarks of a_ definitive
interpretation, significant reliance functions as a
rough proxy for definitiveness. The converse also
holds true. Agency pronouncements effectively
ignored by regulated entities are unlikely to bear
the marks of an authoritative decision. See Ass’n of
Am. R.R., 198 F.3d at 949-50 (finding no definitive
interpretation in part because “[njothing in thfe]
record suggests that railroads relied on the [agency
statements] in any comparable way” to the Alaska
guides).? This is more art than science. Courts must
weigh the role reliance plays on a case-by-case
basis to ascertain its value.
DOL pushes back against this framework by
treating reliance as a separate and independent
third element.® That, the agency claims, is exactly
7 Obviously, this is not to suggest any measure of
reliance will automatically render an _ interpretation
definitive.
8 The agency never develops the implications of its
alternative vision, but we think two points obvious. First, by
dissociating reliance from definitiveness and calling it an
independent requirement, DOL believes courts will have to
address the reliance issue in all cases, including cases like the
present in which definitiveness has been established. Second,
DOL assumes the third element would be satisfied only if the
reliance is equal to or greater than that of Alaska Hunters, a
unique case. Meaning, the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine would
10a
what our MetWest decision did in (1) addressing
reliance only in the alternative, i.e., after assuming
a definitive interpretation, see Met West, 560 F.3d at
510-11, and (2) speaking of Alaska Hunters’s
“substantial and justifiable reliance on a well-
established agency interpretation,” id. at 511, a
phrase “most natural[ly] read[]” to distinguish
definitiveness and reliance as “separate
requirements,” Appellee Br. 23-24; see also
Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 205-
08.9
We do not think this characterization of
MetWest’s dicta could possibly be _ correct.
“Definitive” is a term of art as used in the
Paralyzed Veterans context. Once a court has
classified an agency interpretation as such, it
cannot be significantly revised without notice and
comment rulemaking. No intervening decision of
this Court ever read Alaska Hunters to require
only ever apply where the parties can demonstrate
substantial and justified reliance akin to that of the Alaska
Guides—a reliance interest the government describes as
“especially strong” since affected parties uprooted their lives
to move to Alaska to start businesses. Appellee Br. 19; see
also MetWest, 628 F.3d at 511; Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 864
F. Supp. 2d at 207 (“[T}his Court is convinced that Met West
intended to set the bar for what a plaintiff must establish to
satisfy the reliance component of the Paralyzed Veterans
doctrine.”). If adopted, this position effectively renders
Paralyzed Veterans dead letter law by limiting its application
to a most extreme fact pattern—one unlikely to ever be
duplicated.
® Because Honeywell unceremoniously adopts
MetWest’s language and approach, see Honeywell, 568 F.3d at
579-80, we focus our discussion primarily on Met West.
lla
anything to the contrary, and that includes
Association of American Railroads, the lone pre-
Met West case DOL cites as having treated “reliance
and definitive interpretation as two independent
requirements.” Appellee Br. 24.19 Whether reliance
played a significant role in the analysis, see, e.g.,
Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1035-36; Ass’n of Am.
R.R., 198 F.3d at 950; or took a back seat where the
definitive nature of the interpretation was treated
as self-evident, see Envtl. Integrity Project, 425 F.3d
at 998; Monmouth Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 257 F.3d
807, 814 (D.C. Cir. 2001), we have always
considered it as part of the first element. In short,
we have been too consistent in our treatment of
these so-called agency flip-flops to now read dictum
in MetWest as sub silentio reconfiguring the
doctrine in the absence of either a unanimous /rons
footnote or a decision of the en banc court.
Finally, we disagree with the suggestion that
the only way to protect agencies from inadvertently
locking in disfavored, informally promulgated
positions is to impose a separate and independent
reliance element. Practically speaking, reliance
considered as part of the _ definitiveness
determination will more than adequately protect
agencies from this ossification threat. We thus
decline DOL’s invitation to spin a third
10 See Ass'n of Am. R.R., 198 F.3d at 948 (“We find
nothing in these materials, individually or taken together,
that comes even close to the definitive interpretation that
triggered notice and comment rulemaking in Alaska
Professional Hunters.”); see also Devon Energy Corp. uv.
Kempthorne, 551 F.3d 1030, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Air
Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. FAA, 291 F.3d 49, 56-58 (D.C. Cir.
2002); Envtl. Integrity Project, 425 F.3d at 997-98.
12a
requirement from whole cloth. Emphatically, that
is an issue for the full Court to take up at its
discretion, not this three-judge panel.
iil
In view of the government’s concession that
the case need go no further than this, we reverse
the District Court order denying MBA’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and remand the case with
istructions to vacate DOL’s 2010 Administrator
Interpretation.
So Ordered.
13a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Filed On: July 2, 2013
No. 12-5246
MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION,
APPELLANT
Vv
SETH D. HARRIS, SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY, ACTING SECRETARY OF UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ET AL..,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:11-cv-00073)
BEFORE: TATEL and BROWN, Circuit Judges,
and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge
JUDGMENT
This cause came on to be heard on the record
on appeal from the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia and was argued by
counsel. On consideration thereof, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the
order of the District Court denying MBA’s Motion
for Summary Judgment appealed from in this
cause is hereby reversed and the case is remanded
14a
with instructions to vacate DOL’s 2010
Administrator Interpretation, in accordance with
the opinion of the court filed herein this date.
Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT:
Mark J. Langer, Clerk
BY:
/s/
Jennifer M. Clark
Deputy Clerk
Date: July 2, 2013
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Brown.
15a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MORTGAGE BANKERS
ASSOCIATION, Civil Action No.
Plaintiff, 11-0073 (RBW)
Vv.
HILDA SOLIS, Secretary of Labor;
NANCY LEPPINK,
Acting Wage and Hour Administrator; and
THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The plaintiff, the Mortgage Bankers
Association (“Association”), seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief in this civil lawsuit brought
against the defendants, Hilda Solis, in her official
capacity as Secretary of the United States
Department of Labor (“DOL”), Nancy Leppink, in
her official capacity as Deputy Administrator of the
Wage and Hour Division of the DOL, and the DOL
itself, under the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (“Compl.”) 7 1.
Specifically, the plaintiff seeks judicial review of
the defendants’ issuance of DOL Administrative
Interpretation 2010-1 (“2010 AI”), which conflicts
with a prior position taken by the DOL. Id. ¥¥ 2,
26-27. Currently before the Court is the
16a
Association’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
the DOL’s Cross Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment. Upon
consideration of the complaint, the parties’ cross-
motions, all memoranda of law and the exhibits
submitted with the motions, and the administrative
record,! the Court concludes that it must grant in
part and deny in part the DOL’s cross-motion and
deny the Association’s motion for summary
judgment.
I, BACKGROUND
A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
This case concerns the Fair Labor Standards
Act (“FLSA” or “Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006),
and the regulations promulgated by the DOL to
implement the Act. See Defendants’ Cross Motion
to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment (“Defs.’ Mot.”) at 1. Enacted by Congress
in 1938, Compl. { 14, the FLSA generally requires
that covered employers pay overtime wages to their
employees who work more than 40 hours per week,
unless they are exempted by the Act from this
requirement. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Section
‘ In addition to the documents already identified, the Court
considered the following submissions in reaching its decision:
(1) the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Mem.”), (2)
the Defendants’ Cross—Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Defs.’ Mot.”), (3) the
Plaintiffs Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment and Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment (“P1.’s Reply”),
and (4) the Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to
Defendants’ Cross Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,
for Summary Judgment (“Defs.’ Reply”).
17a
213(a)(1) of the FLSA provides for such an
exemption, stating that “any employee employed in
a bona fide executive, administrative, or
professional capacity[,] ... or in the capacity of
outside salesman (as such terms are defined and
delimited from time to time by regulations of the
Secretary[,]...)” is exempt from the “[m]inimum
wage and maximum hour requirements” otherwise
required by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
The Wage and Hour Division of the DOL
(‘Wage and Hour Division”) is responsible for
“administering and enforcing the FLSA, and it
periodically issues regulations that define the scope
of the FLSA’s exemptions and interpretations of
those regulations.” Defs.’ Mot. at 4. After the
passage of the FLSA, the Wage and Hour Division
“promulgated regulations defining and delimiting
the FLSA’s exemptions from overtime pay
requirements.” Compl. § 14. Those regulations
were most recently amended on August 23, 2004.
See Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 8-78
(Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for
Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside
Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg.
22122—191 (Apr. 23, 2004) (codified at 29 C.F.R. §
541)). As revised, the regulations state that the
administrative exemption of section 213(a)(1) of the
FLSA applies to an employee:
(1) Compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate
of not less than $455 per week ...;
(2) Whose primary duty is the performance of
office or non-manual work directly related to the
management or general business operations of
the employer or the employer’s customers; and
(3) Whose primary duty includes the exercise of
18a
discretion and independent judgment with
respect to matters of significance.
29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a). The 2004 regulations were
accompanied by a preamble “Summary,” which
explained that the administrative “exemption is
intended to be limited to those employees whose
duties relate to the administrative as distinguished
from the production operations of a business.” 69
Fed. Reg. 22122, 22141 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The 2004 regulations also provide
examples that illustrate how the administrative
duties exemption can be applied to employees in
various occupations, including the following
example regarding the financial services industry:
Employees in the financial services
industry generally meet the duties
requirements for the
administrative exemption if their
duties include work such as
collecting and analyzing
information regarding the
customer’s income, assets,
investments or debts; determining
which financial products best meet
the customer’s needs and financial
circumstances; advising the
customer regarding the advantages
and disadvantages of different
financial products; and marketing,
servicing or promoting’ the
employers financial products.
However, an employee whose
primary duty is selling financial
products does not qualify for the
administrative exemption.
29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b) (entitled “Administrative
19a
exemption examples’).
B. Factual and Procedural Background
1. Pre-2004 Interpretation of _ the
Administrative Exemption
The following facts are not in dispute and are
taken from either the Association’s complaint or
the administrative record filed in this case.
The plaintiff is a national trade association
that represents the real estate finance industry.
Compl. § 7. The Association “has over 2,200
member companies, including all elements of real
estate finance: mortgage companies, mortgage
brokers, commercial banks, thrifts, life insurance
companies, and others in the mortgage lending
field.” Id. These companies employ over 280,000
individuals throughout the United States. Id. The
Association’s primary goals are “to ensure the
continued strength of the nation’s residential and
commercial real estate market, to expand home
ownership and extend access to affordable housing
to all Americans.” Id.
From as early as 1964, and until March 24,
2010, the DOL announced its interpretation of the
FLSA through the issuance of “[o]pinion [l]etters.”
Id. § 15. These opinion letters were written in
response to inquiries from private parties seeking
guidance about the application of the FLSA to their
business activities. Jd. Access to the opinion letters
was available through several avenues, including,
in recent years, electronic legal research databases
and the DOL’s own website. See id. And as the
plaintiff correctly points out, the District of
Columbia Circuit has held that “DOL Opinion
Letters ... constitute final agency action subject to
judicial review.” Id. ¥ 16 (citing Natl Automatic
20a
Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d
689, 701-02 (D.C.Cir.1971) (holding that although
the opinion letters lack formality, they are intended
as a “deliberative determination of the agency’s
position” and thus are subject to judicial review)).
The administrative record in this case
contains two opinion letters issued by the DOL
prior to the 2004 amendment of its regulations. The
first, dated July 23, 1997, discussed whether a
wholesale salesman is exempt from the FLSA’s
overtime requirements. A.R. at 1-3 (Opinion
Letter, 1997 WL 970727 (DOL WAGE-HOUR)).
This opinion letter concluded that “[t]he decisions
of wholesale salesmen typically do not involve
matters of policy or significant importance, but are
limited to routine day-to-day operational matters.”
Id. at 2—3. While the Wage and Hour Division did
not. come to an ultimate conclusion on the
exemption question, the opinion letter suggested
that wholesale salesmen are not covered by the
administrative exemption.? Jd. The second pre—
2004 opinion letter found in the administrative
record, dated May 17, 1999, determined that “loan
officers are engaged in carrying out the employer’s
day-to-day activities rather than in determining
the overall course and policies of the business” and
were therefore non-exempt employees entitled to
2 If the party does not provide the DOL with sufficient facts
regarding the nature of their inquiry, the DOL will not
provide an ultimate conclusion; rather, it will state what set
of facts would need to exist in order for the employee to be
exempt. See generally Defs.’ Mot. at 11-12 (citing A.R. at 87—
93 (Opinion Letter FLSA2006—31 (“2006 Opinion Letter”)))
(providing an opinion that an employee would be exempt if
the assumptions provided by the requestor and other relevant
facts are true).
2la
overtime. See id. at 5 (Opinion Letter, 1999 WL
1002401 (DOL WAGE-HOUR) (“1999 Opinion
Letter”)).
Effective August 23, 2004, the DOL amended
its regulations interpreting the wage and hour
requirements set forth by the FLSA. Compl. 4 21.
As noted earlier, the amended regulations, as they
pertain to the financial service industry, provide:
Employees in the financial services
industry generally meet the duties
requirements for the
administrative exemption if their
duties include work such as
collecting and analyzing
information regarding the
customer’s income, assets,
investments or debts; determining
which financial products best meet
the customer’s needs and financial
circumstances; advising the
customer regarding the advantages
and disadvantages of different
financial products; and marketing,
servicing or promoting’. the
employer's financial products.
However, an employee whose
primary duty is selling financial
products does not qualify for the
administrative exemption.
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b)). And as already
noted, the amended regulations included a
preamble, id. § 22, which makes it clear that “many
financial services employees qualify as exempt
administrative employees, even if they are involved
in some selling to consumers.” 69 Fed.Reg. at
22146.
22a
2. The 2006 Opinion Letter
On September 8, 2006, the DOL issued an
opinion letter to the Association (“2006 Opinion
Letter”), see AR. at 87-93 (Opinion Letter
FLSA2006-31 (“2006 Opinion Letter”)), at the
Association’s request. Defs.’ Mot. at 11 n. 6.5 In
requesting the letter, the Association asked the
DOL to assume that the mortgage loan officers who
were the subject of the letter spent less than fifty
percent of their working time on “customer-specific
persuasive sales activity.” Jd. at 11-12 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The 2006
Opinion Letter began by reminding the Association
that an employee’s exempt status is “determined by
analyzing each particular employee’s actual job
duties and compensation under the applicable
regulations.” A.R. at 87 (2006 Opinion Letter).
The Association also asked whether the
DOL’s analysis of the administrative exemption
was altered by the 2004 regulations. Jd. at 88—89.
In response, the DOL noted that “[bJecause the
criteria in the duties test for the administrative
exemption in the 2004 revised final regulations are
substantially the same as under the prior rule, the
outcome of this opinion would be essentially
identical under either version of the regulations.”
Id. at 89 (citation omitted).
The 2006 Opinion Letter reinforced that the
2004 revised regulations made the administrative
exception applicable to employees when their
8 Generally, the DOL does not release the name of the
requestor for an opinion letter. Defs.’ Mot. at 11 n. 6.
However, the Association has acknowledged that it requested
the 2006 opinion letter. Jd.
23a
employment satisfied the following’ three
components:
(1) Compensated on a salary or fee
basis at a rate of not less than $455
per week ..., exclusive of board,
lodging or other facilities;
(2) Whose primary duty is the
performance of office or non-
manual work directly related to the
management or general business
operations of the employer or the
employer’s customers; and
(3) Whose primary duty includes
the exercise of discretion and
independent judgment with respect
to matters of significance.
Id. (citation omitted). With regard to the second
prong of this test, the letter defined “[w]Jork that is
‘directly related to the management or general
business operations’ of the employer ... as ‘work
directly related to assisting with the running or
servicing of the business, as distinguished, for
example, from working on a manufacturing
production line or selling a product in a retail or
service establishment.’ ” Jd. (citation omitted). As to
the third component of the test, the term “primary
duty” is defined in the letter as “the principal,
main, major or most important duty that the
employee performs.” Jd. (quoting 29 C.F.R. §
541.700(a)). The letter explained that the amount
of time an employee spends performing exempt
work is a factor to consider in assessing the
applicability of the exemption, but time alone “is
not the sole test.” Jd. (quoting 29 C.F.R. §
541.700(b)).
24a
The 2006 Opinion Letter further noted that
although employees whose primary duty involves
sales cannot qualify for the administrative
exemption, many financial services employees
could and had been found to fall under this
exemption. Jd. at 90 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(b)).
Accordingly, the DOL concluded that the loan
officers who were the subject of the 2006 Opinion
Letter
ha[d] a primary duty other than
sales, as their work includefd]
collecting and analyzing a
customer’s financial information,
advising the customer about the
risks and benefits of various
mortgage loan alternatives in light
of their individual financial
circumstances, and advising the
customer about avenues to obtain a
more advantageous loan program.
Id. at 90-91. The letter concluded that “the use of
software programs or tools to assess risk and to
narrow the scope of products available to the
customer does not necessarily disqualify the
employees from the administrative exemption for
lack of discretion and independent judgment.” Jd.
at 91. Finally, the letter noted that its “opinion
[was] based exclusively on the facts and
circumstances described in [the Association’s]
request and is given based on [the Association’s]
representation, express or implied, that [the
Association] ha[d] provided a full and fair
description of all the facts and circumstances that
would be pertinent to [the DOL’s] consideration of
the question presented.” Jd. at 93.
According to the Association, relying on the
25a
2006 Opinion Letter, many members of the
financial services industry, including many of the
Association’s members, classified mortgage loan
officers as exempt employees. Compl. | 24. Thus,
mortgage loan officers were not compensated with
overtime pay. Jd. 4 25. Rather, the members of the
Association ensured that their mortgage loan
officers were well compensated through other
means, like competitive salaries, bonuses, and
commissions. Id.
3. The 2010 Administrative Interpretation
On March 24, 2010, the DOL, “sua sponte,”
issued an Administrative Interpretation, the 2010
Al, expressly withdrawing the 2006 Opinion Letter.
Id. § 26. Nancy Leppink, Acting Administrator of
the Wage and Hour Division, issued the 2010 AI.
See A.R. at 102 (U.S. Department of Labor,
Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-01
(“Administrator's Interpretation No. 2010—01”)).
The 2010 AI focuses on “[wjhether the primary
duty of employees who perform the typical job
duties of a mortgage loan officer is office or non-
manual work directly related to the management or
general business operations of their employer or
their employer’s customers.” Jd. at 103. The 2010
AI expressed that to qualify for the exemption, an
employee’s “[wlork [must be] directly related to
management or general business operations of an
employer [, which] includes work in functional
areas such as accounting, budgeting, quality
control, purchasing, advertising, research, human
resources, labor relations, and similar areas.” Id.
(citation omitted). In essence, the 2010 AI states
that the administrative exemption was designed for
“employees whose work involves servicing the
business itself].]” Id. at 104.
26a
The 2010 AI relies on a District of Minnesota
decision, Casas v. Conseco Finance Corp., No.
Civ.00—1512, 2002 WL 507059 (D.Minn. March 31,
2002) in addition to several other cases, as support
for its position that mortgage loan officers are non-
exempt employees. Jd. at 105. In Casas, loan
originators asserted they were entitled to overtime
compensation from the defendants under the FLSA,
requiring the court to decide whether the plaintiffs
were exempt from FLSA overtime pay provisions.
The court found that because “Conseco’s primary
business purpose [was] to design, create and sell
home lending products,” the mortgage loan officers’
primary duty was to sell those lending products on
a day-to-day basis, not “ ‘the running of [the]
business [itself]’ or determining its overall course or
policies.” Casas, 2002 WL 507059, at *9 (citation
omitted) (alterations in original). Relying on the
ruling in Casas, the 2010 AI reasons that “because
Conseco’s loan officers’ duties were ‘selling loans
directly to individual customers, one loan at a
time,’ ” the administrative exemption did not apply
to them. A.R. at 105 #$£=(Administrator’s
Interpretation No. 2010-01) (internal citation
omitted). The 2010 AI further notes that the 2004
amended regulations examined the difference
between mortgage loan officers who spend the
majority of their time selling mortgage products to
consumers, like the Casas plaintiffs, as compared to
those who “promotfe] the employer’s financial
products generally, decid[e}) on an advertising
budget and techniques, run[ ] an office, hirfe] staff
and set [ ] their pay, service[ ] existing customers
..., and advis[e] customers.” Jd. at 105 (citing 69
Fed. Reg. at 22145-46). The 2010 AI concluded that
in order for mortgage loan officers to be properly
classified as exempt employees, their primary
27a
duties must be administrative in nature. Jd. at 105.
Relying on the facts that a significant
portion of mortgage loan officers’ compensation is
composed of commissions from sales, that their job
performance is evaluated based on their sales
volume, and that much of the non-sales work
performed by the officers is completed in
furtherance of their sales duties, the 2010 Al
concluded “that a mortgage loan officer’s primary
duty is making sales.” Jd. at 106—07. And because
their primary duty is making sales, the 2010 AI
further concludes that “mortgage loan officers
perform the production[, not the administrative,]
work of their employers.” Id. at 107.
After concluding that the work of mortgage
loan officers is not related to the general business
operation of their employers, the 2010 AI
considered another factor that could provide the
basis for finding that mortgage loan officers are
subject to the administrative exemption. /d. at 108.
The AI states that “[t]he administrative exemption
can also apply if the employee’s primary duty is
directly related to the management or general
business operations of the employer’s customers.”
Id. In making this assessment, the 2010 AI notes
that “it is necessary to focus on the identity of the
custemer.” Id. The 2010 AI finds that “work for an
employer's customers does not qualify for the
administrative exemption where the customers are
individuals seeking advice for their personal needs,
such as people seeking mortgages for their homes.”
Id. However, it recognizes that a mortgage loan
officer “might qualify under the administrative
exemption” if the customer that the officer is
working with “is a business seeking advice about,
for example, a mortgage to purchase land for a new
28a
manufacturing plant, to buy a building for office
space, or to acquire a warehouse for storage of
finished goods.” Jd. Nevertheless, the 2010 AI
concludes that the typical mortgage loan officers’
“primary duty is making sales for the employer [to
homeowners], and because homeowners do not
have management or general business operations, a
typical mortgage loan officer’s primary duty is not
related to the management or general business
operations of the employer’s customers.” Id. at 109.
Finally, the 2010 AI took exception with the
2006 Opinion Letter’s apparent assumption “that
the example provided in 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b)
creates an alternative standard ffor the
administrative exemption for employees in the
financial services industry.” Jd. Rather, the 2010 AI
states that 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b) merely illustrates
an example of an employee who might otherwise
qualify for the exemption based on “the
requirements set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 541.200.” Id.
Thus, the 2010 AI clarifies that “the administrative
exemption is only applicable to employees that
meet the requirements set forth in 29 C.F.R. §
541.200.” Id. In providing this clarification, the
2010 AI states, “[t]he fact example at 29 C.F.R. §
541.203(b) is not an alternative test, and its
guidance cannot result in it ‘swallowing’ the
requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 541.200."4 Id.
‘ The 2010 AI also “expressly withdrew ... 2001 Opinion
Letter.” Pl.’s Mem. at 13; Defs.’ Mot. at 14 (“[T]he Wage and
Hour Division withdrew the 2001 Opinion Letter as
inconsistent with the analysis in the 2010 AI, inasmuch as it
had erroneously concluded that mortgage loan officers
performed work that was directly related to the management
or general business operations of the employer or the
employer’s customers.”).
29a
In summation, the DOL through the
issuance of the 2010 AI explicitly withdrew the
2006 Opinion Letter “[blecause of its misleading
assumption and selective and narrow analysis[.]”
Id. Before taking this action, the DOL did not
utilize the APA’s notice and comment process.
Compl. 94 32—33.
Following the issuance of the 2010 Al, the
Association filed its Complaint in this case on
January 12, 2011, asserting that the DOL violated
the APA by issuing the 2010 AI. Id. 4{ 36—52.
First, the Association argues that “[o]nce an agency
gives its regulation an interpretation, it can only
change that interpretation as it would formally
modify the regulation itself: through the process of
notice and comment rulemaking.” Jd. | 36 (citing
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d
579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Second, the Association
argues that “[b]ecause the AI conflicts with existing
DOL regulations, and because those regulations
have been afforded the force of law by courts, DOL’s
issuance of the 2010 AI is arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in
accordance with law.” Id. J 50. The Association
seeks to have the 2010 AI “[vjacat[ed] and set
aside” and the defendants “[e]njoin[ed] and
restrain[ed] ... from enforcing, applying, or
implementing ... the AI.” Id. at 12 (Prayer for
Relief).5
The Association filed its Motion for
Summary Judgment simultaneously with the
5 The Association also seeks an award of its litigation costs
and attorney’s fees. These requests are not addressed in this
opinion.
30a
Complaint. In response, the DOL has filed a Cross
Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, Motion
for Summary Judgment.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The DOL has moved for dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), and
alternatively moves for summary judgment under
Rule 56. Rule 12(d) provides that “[i]f, on a motion
under Rule 12(b)(6) ... matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion must be treated as one for
summary judgment under Rule 56. [And if the
motion is considered under Rule 56, ajll parties
must be given a reasonable opportunity to present
all the material that is pertinent to the motion.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). Here, because both parties have
presented materials outside the pleadings (namely,
the administrative record) for the Court to consider
in adjudicating their motions, the Court deems it
appropriate to treat both submissions as motions
for summary judgment. See Marshall Cnty. Health
Care. Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 & n: 5
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that a district court
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “can consult the
{fadministrative] record to answer the legal
question[s] before the court,” but that “[iJt is
probably the better practice for a district court
always to convert to summary judgment”).
“Summary judgment is the _ proper
mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law,
whether an agency action is supported by the
6 In resolving these motions, the Court also considered the
memorandum of law submitted on behalf of the three
intervenors, Ryan Henry, Beverly Buck, and Jerome Nichols.
3la
administrative record and consistent with the APA
standard of review.” Loma Linda Univ. Med. Ctr. v.
Sebelius, 684 F. Supp. 2d 42, 52 (D.D.C. 2010)
(citing Stuttering Found. of Am. v. Springer, 498 F.
Supp. 2d 203, 207 (D.D.C. 2007)); see also Richards
v. INS, 554 F.2d 1173, 1177 & n.28 (D.C. Cir.
1977). However, due to the limited role of a court in
reviewing the administrative record, the typical
summary judgment standards set forth in Rule
56(c) are not applicable. Stuttering, 498 F. Supp. 2d
at 207 (citation omitted). Rather, “[u]nder the APA,
it is the role of the agency to resolve factual issues
to arrive at a decision that is supported by the
administrative record, whereas ‘the function of the
district court is to determine whether or not as a
matter of law the evidence in the administrative
record permitted the agency to make the decision it
did.’” Id. (quoting Occidental Eng’g Co. v. INS, 753
F.2d 766, 769—70 (9th Cir.1985)).
A reviewing court will “hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law.” Ludlow v. Mabus, 793 F. Supp. 2d 352, 354
(D.D.C. 2011) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006)).
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of U.S. v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the
Supreme Court explained the “arbitrary and
capricious’ review by noting that “an agency rule
would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended
it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view
or the product of agency expertise.” 463 U.S. 29, 43
32a
(1983). However, the “standard of review is a
narrow one.” Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). “The court is not
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency.” Id. “[Tjhe party challenging an
agency’s action as arbitrary and capricious bears
the burden of proof,” San Luis Obispo Mothers for
Peace v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 789 F.2d
26, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1986), and the APA directs a
reviewing court to “review the whole record or
those parts of it cited by a party” in making this
assessment, 5 U.S.C. § 706.
Ill. ANALYSIS
The plaintiff seeks relief based on two
distinct theories. First, relying on Paralyzed
Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586, the plaintiff argues that
once an agency issues an _ authoritative
interpretation of its own regulation, it must utilize
the notice and comment process if it desires to
modify that interpretation. Compl. § 36. Second,
the plaintiff argues that the 2010 AI does not
comport vith the 2004 regulations and is therefore
“arbitra , capricious, an abused of discretion, and
othei “ise not in accordance with law.” Compl. § 50.
The Court will analyze each argument in turn.?
7 The Court notes that the plaintiff contends, and, in fact,
takes the position that the 2010 AI is an “interpretation of
[the Agency’s] own regulation[], as it was signed by the
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, published on
DOL’s website, and held out to employees as guidance for
complying with the FLSA.” Pls.’ Mem. at 1. The defendants do
not take exception with this position, indeed, they endorse it.
Specifically the defendants state, “the 2010 interpretation
corrected a short-lived 2006 issuance,” Defs.’ Mem. at 1
(emphasis added), and further concedes that it cannot be
construed as a legislative rule, see id. at 14-16, 16 n.9 (stating
33a
A. The Paralyzed Veterans and Alaska
Professional Hunters Cases
It is well established that there is “no barrier
to an agency altering its initial interpretation to
adopt another reasonable interpretation—even one
that represents a new policy response generated by
a different administration.” Paralyzed Veterans,
117 F.3d at 586 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863
(1984)). However, the District of Columbia Circuit
has held that “[o]nce an agency gives its regulation
an interpretation, it can only change that
interpretation as it would formally modify the
regulation itself: through the process of notice and
comment rulemaking.” Id. at 586; Transp. Workers
Union of Am. v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 492 F.3d 471,
475 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[AJn agency cannot
significantly change its position, cannot flip-flop,
even between two interpretive rules, without prior
notice and comment.”).
The District of Columbia Circuit had the
opportunity to reexamine its holding in Paralyzed
Veterans in Alaska Professional Hunters Ass'n v.
FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Alaska Professional Hunters concerned an
interpretation by the Federal Aviation
Administration (“FAA”) that several provisions of
its regulations that “applied to (among others)
‘commercial operator{s]’ ” did not “govern guide
pilots whose flights were incidental to their guiding
that the 2010 AI is an interpretive rule as opposed to
substantive rule, and therefore, notice and comment is not
necessary). The Court agrees that the 2010 AI is an
interpretive rule and will accordingly conduct its analysis
from that perspective.
34a
business and were not billed separately.” Id. at
1031. The FAA’s position was based on its reading
of the Civil Aeronautics Board’s decision in
Administrator v. Marshall, 39 C.A.B. 948 (1963).
Id. “Although the [agency] never set forth its
interpretation of [the several regulations at issue]
in a written statement,” the parties “agree[d] that
[the] FAA personnel in Alaska consistently followed
the interpretation in official advice to guides and
guide services.” Jd. at 1031-32.
In January 1998, the FAA reversed course
and published a “Notice to Operators” that
“required the[] guide pilots to abide by FAA
regulations applicable to commercial air
operations.” Id. at 1030. Drawing on its decision in
Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586, the Circuit
found that this modification of the FAA’s
longstanding policy exempting the guide pilots from
the FAA regulations mandated the use of notice
and comment rulemaking. Jd. at 1035-36. The
Circuit concluded that *204 “current doubts about
the wisdom of the regulatory system followed in
Alaska for more than thirty years does not justify
disregarding the requisite procedures for changing
that system.” Jd. at 1035.
1. Is Paralyzed Veterans still good law?
The defendants argue that two Supreme
Court cases conflict with Paralyzed Veterans and
Alaska Professional Hunters. Defs.’ Mot. at 15-17.
First, they argue that Paralyzed Veterans cannot be
reconciled with the holding in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). Defs.’ Mot.
at 15-17. In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court
reiterated its previous conclusion “that generally
speaking,” the APA’s notice and comment
35a
requirements “established the maximum
procedural requirements which Congress was
willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in
conducting rulemaking procedures.” Vermont
Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524. The Supreme Court
further stated that “[a]gencies are free to grant
additional procedural rights in the exercise of their
discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not
free to impose [additional procedural requirements]
if the agencies have not chosen to grant them.” Jd.
(emphasis added). The defendants argue that this
hmitation imposed on courts by Vermont Yankee
conflicts with the requirements imposed by
Paralyzed Veterans; namely, the requirement that
an agency must employ the notice and comment
process if they wish to change a prior interpretation
of their own regulations, Def's. Mot. at 16—17, since
the Supreme Court observed that only in
“extremely rare” circumstances may courts impose
“procedures beyond those required by the statute,”
Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524; see Def's. Mot. At
16—17.
This Court is “obligated to follow controlling
[C]ircuit precedent until either [the Circuit], sitting
en banc, or the Supreme Court, overrule it.” United
States v. Torres, 115 F.3d 1033, 1036 (D.C. Cir.
1997). Thus, even if this Court “disagree[d] with
circuit precedent” its “obligation” to follow such
precedent would not be relieved. Jd. Moreover,
having been decided nearly twenty years before
Paralyzed Veterans, the District of Columbia
Circuit was presumably aware of the existence of
Vermont Yankee when it authored its opinion in
Paralyzed Veterans. And this Court is not prepared
to find that the Circuit disregarded Supreme Court
precedent when it decided Paralyzed Veterans.
36a
The defendants are correct in stating that
seven courts of appeals have held that the notice
and comment provisions found in section 553 of the
APA do not apply to interpretative rules.
Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to
Defendants’ Cross Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Defs.’
Reply”) at 9. However, this Circuit, in deciding
Paralyzed Veterans, Alaska Professional Hunters,
and other cases that have addressed the same
subject, see, e.g., Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1108
(D.C. Cir. 1994); Am. Mining Cong. v. MSHA, 995
F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993), has ruled that if
an interpretation of a statute or rule “itself carries
the force and effect of law,” Paralyzed Veterans, 117
F.3d at 588 (quotation marks and citations
omitted), the agency is required to use notice and
comment procedures. And this Court had the
occasion to apply Paralyzed Veterans in a case with
similarities to this case. See Tripoli Rocketry Ass’n
v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &
Explosives; 337 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2004),
rev'd on other grounds, 437 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(Walton, J.) (“[Bjefore the [agency] could alter[] its
earlier interpretation of the [regulation], it was
required to undertake notice-and-comment
rulemaking as required by the APA[.]”). Thus, this
Court cannot, and will not, find that Vermont
Yankee commands that it refuse to follow a Circuit
case that was decided two decades later, and has
remained good law in this Circuit for almost fifteen
years.
Second, the DOL argues that Paralyzed
Veterans and Alaska Professional Hunters were
overturned by the recent Supreme Court decision in
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502
(2009). The DOL relies on language from Fox
37a
Television, stating that the APA “makes no
distinction ... between initial agency action and
subsequent agency action undoing or revising that
action.” Defs.’ Mot. at 15 (quoting Fox Television,
556 U.S. at 515). Fox Television concerned two
television live broadcasts during which expletives
were used, resulting in the Federal Communication
Commission’s (“FCC”) issuance of two “[nJotices of
[aJpparent [ljiability” based on the FCC’s finding
that the two occurrences were “actionably
indecent.” 556 U.S. at 508-512. Prior to the
commission of these two incidents, the FCC had
permitted networks to broadcast “fleeting”
expletives without punishment. Id. The FCC
reversed course with regard to the two incidents in
question, finding that the broadcasts were
indecent, even though both contained only
“fleeting” expletives. Jd. at 512, 530. The Second
Circuit found that the FCC’s decision changing its
policy was not in compliance with the APA due, in
part, to its failure to provide an adequate reason for
the change. Id. at 513—514; see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
On review of that ruling, the Supreme Court
rejected the Second Circuit’s position, “find[ing] no
basis in the [APA] or in [its] opinions for a
requirement that all agency change be subjected to
more searching review.” Fox Television, 556 U.S. at
514.
The language in Fox Television which the
defendants contend invalidates Paralyzed Veterans,
when considered in conjunction with the entire
majority opinion in Fox Television, implicates the
APA’s arbitrary and capricious review, not its
notice and comment process. In fact, the Supreme
Court made perfectly clear the question it was
addressing, holding that “we find the [FCC’s]
orders neither arbitrary nor capricious.” Jd. at 530.
38a
So what the defendants are seeking to do is have
this Court expand the reach of Fox Television
beyond the question the Supreme Court actually
addressed. That, this Court cannot do, as the Fox
Television decision has no bearing on whether an
agency must employ the notice and comment
process before changing its policies. The answer to
that question requires this Court to look to
Paralyzed Veterans and its progeny, in the absence
of en banc Circuit authority or Supreme Court
repudiation of those decisions. Torres, 115 F.3d at
1036. Neither has occurred, so Paralyzed Veterans
and its line of cases remains controlling authority
in this Circuit.
2. The Paralyzed Vetetans Doctrine and
Alaska Professional Hunters Rationale
Having determined that Paralyzed Veterans
remains controlling authority in this Circuit, the
Court must now turn its attention to the exceptions
to Paralyzed Veterans, which the defendants
contend have been recognized by the Circuit and
are relied upon by the defendants in this litigation.
As the alternative position to their argument that
this Court should not follow Paralyzed Veterans,
the defendants argue that these two purported
exceptions to the applicability of Paralyzed
Veterans weigh in favor of granting them summary
judgment. First, they contend that MetWest Inc. v.
Secretary of Labor, 560 F.3d 506 (D.C.Cir.2009),
alleviates the requirement of utilizing notice and
comment when a party did not “substantially and
justifiably” rely upon an_ earlier agency
interpretation. Defs.’ Mot. at 22~—26. Second, the
defendants argue that the “invalid prior
interpretation” exception purportedly recognized in
Monmouth Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 807
39a
(D.C. Cir. 2001), applies here. Jd. at 18—22.
The MetWest case raised the question of
whether MetWest could “be held liable for violating
a regulation governing the removal of needles from
equipment used to extract blood.” 560 F.3d at 507—
508. Dating back to 1991 when the needle removal
regulation was adopted, the Occupation, Safety and
Health Administration (“OSHA”) “declined to
enforce [the regulation] against employers who
supplied their employees with reusable blood tube
holders.” Id. at 508-09. In October 2003, OSHA
changed its policy through the issuance of a
“guidance document,” which stated that the use of
reusable blood holders “likely violated” the
regulation. Jd. at 509. MetWest brought suit
following the change, arguing that the agency was
required to employ notice and comment rulemaking
before altering its interpretation of the needle
removal regulation. Id.
The Circuit in MetWest reiterated that its
holding in Alaska Professional Hunters was “that
an agency’s practice of advising affected entities—
in a prior agency adjudication and the consistent
advice of agency officials over a 30-year period—
that a regulation did not apply to them established
‘an authoritative departmental interpretation’ that
could not be changed without notice and comment.”
Id. at 511 (citation omitted). The MetWest court
emphasized that “[a] fundamental rationale of
Alaska Professional Hunters was the affected
parties’ substantial and justifiable reliance on a
well-established agency interpretation.” Id.
8 The MetWest opinion was authored by Judge Raymond
Randolph, who also authored the Alaska Professional Hunters
opinion.
40a
(emphasis added). The Circuit noted that “[t]his is
a crucial part of the analysis” and that “[t]o ignore
it is to misunderstand Alaska Professional Hunters
to mean that an agency’s initial interpretation,
once informally adopted, freezes the state of agency
law, which cannot subsequently be altered without
notice-and-comment rule-making.” Jd. at 511 n.4
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
And in Alaska Professional Hunters, notice and
comment rulemaking was deemed necessary before
an interpretation of a regulation could be changed,
because, in that case, people had moved to Alaska
and started businesses with the understanding
that an agency's regulations did not apply *> an
essential component of their operations du the
position the agency had taken over a SU-year
period. Jd. at 511 (citing Alaska Professional
Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1035 (alterations in original)).
Concluding that “[t]he situation [in MetWest was]
not comparable” to the situation in Alaska
Professional Hunters, MetWest’s challenge to the
Agency action was rejected because “OSHA never
established an authoritative interpretation of its
regulation on which MetWest justifiably relied to
its detriment.” Jd.
The plaintiff takes exception to the
defendants’ claim that MetWest limits. the
applicability of Paralyzed Veterans to cases where a
“party's reliance upon a prior interpretation [of an
agency's regulation] was both substantial and
justifiable.” Plaintiffs Reply in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative
for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Reply”) at 15
(internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff
argues that “some new reliance exception to
Paralyzed Veterans ” was not created by MetWest
4la
because “MetWest’s discussion of substantial and
justifiable reliance was in the content of assessing
whether an informal interpretation by [OSHA]
could even be an authoritative departmental
interpretation” Jd. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
While it is true that the court in MetWest
noted that the agency “never established an
authoritative interpretation of its regulation on
which MetWest justifiably relied to its detriment,”
the court’s holding was not grounded solely on that
fact. MetWest, 560 F.3d at 511. Rather, the ruling of
the circuit was also based on the assessment of
whether there had been “substantial and justifiable
reliance on 4 well-established agency
interpretation” by MetWest, which was essential to
imposing the notice and comment obligation on the
agency. Id. (emphasis added). So regardless of
whether MetWest carved out an exception to
Paralyzed Veterans or just clarified what the court
intended to convey when it said in Alaska
Professional Hunters that the plaintiffs there had
“relied” on the agency’s initial interpretation, 177
F.3d at 1035, this Court is convinced that Met West
intended to set the bar for what a plaintiff must
establish to satisfy the reliance component of the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine.
The plaintiff argues alternatively that even
if MetWest did add a substantial and justifiable
reliance component to the Paralyzed Veterans
doctrine, they “quite plainly relied, substantially
and justifiably so, on the 2006 Opinion Letter.” Pl.’s
Reply at 17. The Association relies in part upon the
Portal—to—Portal Act of 1947 for this position, id. at
17—25, which gives employers a complete defense to
liability if they rely in good faith on the opinion of
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the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division.
This Act states that
“no employer shall be subject to
any liability or punishment for or
on account of the failure of the
employer to pay ... overtime
compensation under the [FLSA], if
he pleads and proves that the act
or omission complained of was in
good faith in conformity with and
in reliance on any written
administrative regulation, order,
ruling, approval, or
interpretation....”
29 U.S.C. § 259(a) (2006). In a footnote, the plaintiff
points to a number of other trade associations that
have been sued since the issuance of the 2010 AI,
and purportedly relied upon the 2006 Opinion
Letter as a defense under 29 U.S.C. § 259(a). Pl.’s
Reply at 19 n. 26. And the plaintiff takes exception
to what it claims is the defendants’ position that
reliance must equate to circumstances analogous to
those in Alaska Professional Hunters, opining that
“fijt would thus be quite odd to read the APA as
requiring notice and comment only where an
industry can demonstrate it will be put out of
business.” Id. at 20. In opposition, the defendants
argue that “[t]he contrast between Alaska
Professional! Hunters and the present matter is
stark.” Defs.’ Reply at 5. They note that in Alaska
Professional Hunters, “people uprooted their lives,
moved across the country, and spent 30 years
building up an entire industry in particularly
substantial and justifiable reliance on an agency
interpretation.” Id. They further posit that it was
precisely this reliance that “stirred the [District of
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Columbia] Circuit to act.” Id. The defendants opine
that “at most [the Association] and its members
operated under the misapprehension that mortgage
loan officers were administratively exempt for four
years, and. structured their pay systems
accordingly, before [the] DOL corrected th[e] error.”
Id.
The Court agrees with the defendants. As
noted above, the Met West court stressed that a core
tenant of the Alaska Professional Hunters decision
was “substantial and justifiable reliance on a well-
established agency interpretation.” MetWest, 560
F.3d at 511. The interpretation allegedly relied
upon by the Association and its members here was
only in effect for a period of four years, from 2006 to
2010. See A.R. 87—93 (2006 Opinion Letter). Prior
to that, the DOL had taken the position that
mortgage loan officers were not exempt employees,
and were therefore entitled to overtime pay. See,
e.g., A.R. 4—5 (1999 Opinion Letter). Unlike the
plaintiffs in Alaska Professional Hunters, here the
Association does not allege that any of its members
uprooted their families and moved to a new location
in search of business opportunities. Pl.’s Reply at
23. Rather, in the words of the Association itself,
employees of financial service firms have merely
“become accustomed to the freedom to contro] their
own hours and breaks.” Jd. While the Court
appreciates that having to keep accurate time
records may impose an additional burden on the
Association’s members and their employees, the
loss of the freedom to control one’s work hours and
break times is not the kind of “substantial and
justifiable reliance” that Alaska Professional
Hunters had in mind, especially when such reliance
was short lived given the many years that the
parties had previously relied upon’ the
44a
interpretation that mortgage loan officers were not
covered by the administrative exemption.
Further, the argument that the Association
makes under the Portalto—Portal Act actually
weakens its overall position. See Pl.’s Reply at 17—
18. As the Association points out, the Portal—to—
Portal Act provides that, if the employer “proves
that the [failure to pay overtime] was in good faith
in conformity with and in reliance on any written
administrative ... interpretation,” then the
employer “shall [not] be subject to any liability or
punishment.” 29 U.S.C. § 259(a). Thus, assuming
this provision applies, the plaintiff could not be said
to have relied upon the prior interpretation to its
detriment, as its members will not be liable for any
damages resulting from the prior interpretation
due to their good faith reliance. Jd. While the Court
need not reach that conclusion, it is at least worth
nothing that the Association’s invocation of the
Portal—to—Portal Act undermines its position that it
“substantial[ly] and justifiabl[ly]” relied upon the
2006 Opinion Letter to the level required by the
Circuit in Met West, 560 F.3d at 511.
Having concluded that the association has
failed to satisfy the standard for demonstrating
reliance recognized in Met West, the Court need not
address the defendants’ additional argument that
notice and comment was not required for the 2010
AI based on the Circuit’s decision in Monmouth,
257 F.3d at 807.
B. Is the 2010 AI Inconsistent with the DOL’s
2004 Regulations?
The plaintiff argues that even if the 2010 AI
was lawfully adopted, it is “inconsistent with the
plain language of 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b),”
45a
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (“P1.’s
Mem.”) at 26, and thus “it is arbitrary, capricious,
and contrary to law,” id. at 3. In essence, the
plaintiff argues that the work performed by
mortgage loan officers discussed in the 2010 AI are
identical to the job duties discussed in 29 C.F.R. §
541.203(b), which provides examples of job duties
that are exempt from the FLSA’s overtime pay
requirement. Pl.’s Mem. at 26-27. 29 C.F.R. §
541.203(b) contemplates that an employee who
“collect[s] and analyz[es] information regarding the
customer's income, assets, investments or debts,”
“determin[es) which financial products best meet
the customer’s needs and financial circumstances,”
and “advis[es] the customer regarding the
advantages and disadvantages of different financial
products” might be found exempt under the
administrative exemption. In its memorandum
submitted in support of its motion, the plaintiff
notes that very similar language was used in the
2010 AI, but that in the 2010 AI, the DOL reached
a different result in finding mortgage loan officers
non-exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirement.
Pl.’s Mem. at 26—27.
The DOL does not dispute that the language
found in the two documents is similar. Defs.’ Reply
at 15. However, it contends that the job duties
found in 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b) are merely intended
to provide examples of when a financial services
employee might be exempt under _ the
administrative exception. Jd. The defendants argue
that by “[a]pplying the general administrative
duties test in § 541.200(a), in conjunction with the
financial services example in § 541.203(b),” the
2010 AI came to the conclusion that the mortgage
loan officers in question were not exempt from the
46a
FLSA’s overtime pay requirement. Jd. (citing A.R.
105-108 (Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010—
01)).9
The Court finds the DOL’s argument
persuasive. The administrative exemption of 29
C.F.R. § 541.200, entitled “General rule for
administrative employees,” provides in part that an
“employee employed in a bona fide administrative
capacity’ is one “[w]lhose primary duty is the
performance of office or non-manual work directly
related to the management or general business
operations of the employer or the employer's
customers.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(2). The language
relied upon by the plaintiff is found in 29 C.F.R. §
541.203(b), which is entitled “Administrative
exemption examples,” and it provides, in part, that
“fe]mployees in the financial services industry
generally meet the duties requirements for the
administrative exemption.... However, an employee
whose primary duty is selling financial products
does not qualify for the administrative exemption.”
29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b) (emphasis added). On its
face, and considering the title of the provision, it is
® The defendants have offered supplemental authority—Lewis
v. Huntington National Bank, No. C211CV0058, 2012 WL
765077 (S.D.Ohio Mar. 12, 2012)—as additional support for
their position that the 2010 AI is not arbitrary and capricious.
See Defendants’ Notice of Supplemental Authority. Although
the case is distinguishable from this case for a variety of
reasons, the Southern District of Ohio did find that “because
the [2010 AI] applies the test set forth in § 541.200(a),
consistently with the example contained in § 541.203(b), there
can be no serious argument that [the 2010 AI] was either
erroneous or inconsistent with the 2004 revised regulations.”
Lewis, No. C211CV0058, 2012 WL 765077 at 32 (S.D.Ohio
Mar. 12, 2012).
47a
clear that § 541.203(b) was intended to provide
examples, not an alternative test for the
applicability of the administrative exception. Id.
Thus, while financial services employees who
perform the duties listed in § 541.203(b) are
“generally” able to qualify for the administrative
exemption, the DOL is still tasked with
determining whether specific employees’ “primary
duty is selling financial products.” Id. If so, the
employee “does not qualify for the administrative
exemption.” Jd. Given the DOL’s reasoning for why
the exemption does not apply here, the Court must
find that the 2010 AI is not inconsistent with the
2004 regulations; thus, the 2010 AI is not arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with the law.!°
IV. CONCLUSION
The Association has failed to satisfy the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine of substantial and
justifiable reliance, which was also recognized in
Met West; thus, both their arguments as to reliance
10 The Court is aware that there is currently a dispute
between the defendants and the intervenors as to whether the
2010 AI applies both prospectively and retroactively. In
resolving this case, however, the Court need not reach a
conclusion on that issue, as the intervenors, the plaintiff, and
the defendants acknowledge. See Intervenors’ Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss at 31-32 n.12; Defendants’ Reply to Intervenors’
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss at 1; Plaintiffs Reply in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment (Response to Intervenors filed on March
14, 2012) at 3. The Court agrees with the parties and,
therefore, declines to address the issue.
48a
and as to notice and comment procedures must fail.
Further, § 541.203(b) was not intended to serve as
an alternative test for the applicability of the
administrative exception. As such, the 2010 AI is
not inconsistent with the 2004 regulations and is
not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law.
Accordingly, the Court must grant in part and deny
in part the Defendants’ Cross-motion to Dismiss or,
in the Alternative for Summary Judgment and
deny the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
SO ORDERED."
REGGIE B. WALTON
United States District Judge
(DATE: June 6, 2012]
11 The Court will issue an Order contemporaneously with this
Memorandum Opinion.
49a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MORTGAGE BANKERS
ASSOCIATION, Civil Action No.
Plaintiff, 11-0073 (RBW)
Vv.
HILDA SOLIS, Secretary of Labor;
NANCY LEPPINK,
Acting Wage and Hour Administrator; and
THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR
Defendants.
ORDER
In accordance with the memorandum
Opinion issued contemporaneously with this Order,
it is hereby
ORDERED that the Defendants’ Cross
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. It is further
ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for
dismissal is DENIED and the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment is DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that this case is CLOSED.
50a
SO ORDERED this 6th day of June, 2012.
REGGIE B. WALTON
United States District Judge
5la
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MORTGAGE BANKERS
ASSOCIATION, Civil Action No.
Plaintiff, and 11-0073 (RBW)
JEROME NICKOLS, et ai.,
Intervenor-Plaintiffs,
Vv.
THOMAS E. PEREZ,}
Sued in his official capacity, Secretary of
United States Department of Labor, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on remand
from the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. The case was brought
by plaintiff Mortgage bankers Association against
United States Department of Labor (“DOL”)
Secretary Thomas E. Perez in his official capacity,
Deputy Administrator of the DOL Wage and Hour
1 The plaintiff filed suit against Hilda L. Solis, then Secretary
of the United States Department of Labor, in her official
capacity. While this case was pending on appeal, Seth D.
Harria succeeded Solis as Secretary. Pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 25(d), the Court substitutes Thomas E.
Perez, who has now succeeded Harris as Secretary.
52a
Division Laura A. Fortman? in her official capacity,
and the DOL, challenging the DOL’s issuance of
DOL Administrator Interpretation 2010-1 as a
violation of the notice and comment rulemaking
procedures required by the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012), and
as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law, also in
violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 7
35-52. On June 6, 2012, this Court granted the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and
denied the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment, holding that the DOL was not required
to employ notice and comment rulemaking
procedures prior to issuing its 2010 interpretation,
and that its interpretation was not inconsistent
with DOL regulations. See Mortg. Bankers Ass’n v.
Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d 193, 207-10 (D.D.C. 2012);
ECF No. 43. The plaintiff subsequently appealed
the Court’s decision.
On July 2, 2013, the Circuit issued an
opinion and judgment reversing this Court’s order
and remanding the case “with instructions to
vacate DOL’s 2010 Administrator Interpretation.”
See Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966,
972 (D.C. Cir. 2013). On October 16, 2013, the
Court received the mandate with this directive. See
ECF No. 47. Accordingly, for the reasons stated by
the Circuit in its opinion, it is hereby
2 The plaintiff filed suit against Nancy Leppink, then Deputy
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division. The Court
substitutes Laura A. Fortman, current Deputy Administrator
of the Wage and Hour Division. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)
53a
ORDERED that this Court’s June 6, 2
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