Record and brief — Nickols v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 134 S. Ct. 2820 (2014) (No. 13-1052)

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Text

No. 13-1052

Vide 13-1041

Title

Docketed

Jerome Nickols, et al., Petitioners

Vv

Mortgage Bankers Association

March 4, 2014

Linked with 13A643

Lower Ct United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Case Nos (12-5246)

Decision Date July 2, 2013

Rehearing Denied: October 2, 2013

Questions Presented

~~~Date~—

Dec 18 2013

Dec 20 2013

Jan 16 2014

Jan 21 2014

Feb 28 2014

Mar 18 2014

Mar 24 2014

Mar 26 2014

May 2 2014

May 15 2014

May 20 2014

Jun 9 2014

Jun 16 2014

Jun 25 2014

Jul 7 2014

~—~~~~~~Proceedings and Ordets~———~—~———

Application (13A643) to extend the time to file a petition for a wnt of certioran from

December 31, 2013 to January 30, 2014, submitted to The Chief Justice

Application (13A643) granted by The Chief Justice extending the time to file until

January 30, 2014

Application (13A643) to extend further the time from January 30, 2014 to February 28,

2014, submitted to The Chief Justice

Application (13A643) granted by The Chief Justice extending the time to file until

February 28, 2014

Petition for a wri of certiorari filed. (Response due Apni 3, 2014)

Consent to the fling of amicus curiae briefs, in support of ether party or of neither

party, received from counsel for the respondent. VIDED

Order extending time to file response to petition to and including May 2, 2014

Brief amici curiae of Administrative Law Scholars filed. VIDED.

Brief of respondent Mortgage Bankers Association in opposition filed. VIDED

Reply of petitioners Jerome Nickols, Ryan Henry, and Beverly Buck filed

DISTRIBUTED for Conference of June 5, 2014.

DISTRIBUTED for Conference of June 12, 2014

Petition GRANTED The petition for a writ of certioran in No. 13-1041 ts granted. The

cases are consolidated and a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument

Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitoners Jerome Nickols

et al

The time to file the joint appendix and petitioners’ bnets on the ments is extended to

and including August 13, 2014. VIDED

Jul 7 2014

Jul 21 2014

Aug 112014

Aug 112014

Aug 20 2014

Aug 20 2014

Sep 4 2014

Sep 4 2014

Sep 9 2014

Sep 22 2014

Sep 26 2014

Sep 30 2014

Oct 9 2014

Oct 16 2014

Oct 16 2014

Oct 16 2014

Oct 16 2014

Oct 16 2014

Oct 16 2014

Oct 16 2014

Oct 16 2014

Oct 16 2014

Oct 16 2014

Oct 16 2014

Oct 16 2014

Oct 27 2014

Oct 28 2014

Nov 10 2014

Nov 10 2014

Nov 10 2014

Dec 1 2014

Mar 9 2015

The time to file respondents’ brief(s) on the merits is extended to and including

September 25, 2014. VIDED

Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioner GRANTED.

The time to file the joint appendix and petitioners’ bnefs on the ments is further

extended to and including August 20, 2014.

The time to file respondents’ brief(s) on the merits is further extended to and including

October 9, 2014. VIDED

Brief of respondents Thomas E. Perez, Secretary of Labor, et al. fled. VIDED.

Brief of petitioners Jerome Nickols, et al. fied.

SET FOR ARGUMENT on Monday, December 1, 2014. VIDED

Consent to the fling of amicus curiae briefs in support of either party or neither party

received from counsel for the petitioners.

Consent to the fling of amicus curiae briefs in support of ether party or of neither party

from counsel for the respondents. VIDED

Record requested from U.S.C.A. Dist. of Columbia Circuit.

Record received from U.S.C.A. Dist. of Columbia Circuit. The record is electronic and

located on PACER.

Record received from U.S.C.A. Dist. of Columbia Circuit. 1 Envelope (this record is

SEALED)

Brief of respondents Mortgage Bankers Association, et al. filed. VIDED.

Brief amicus curiae of National Mining Association filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of National Federation of Independent Business, et al. filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of Washington Legal Foundation and Allied Educational Foundation

filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of Cato Institute, et al. filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of American Hospital Association, et al. filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of Utifty Ar Regulatory Group and American Forest & Paper

Association filed. VIDED.

Brief amicus curiae of Quicken Loans Inc. fied. VIDED.

Brief amicus curiae of Thomas Jefferson Institute for Pubic Policy fied. VIDED.

Brief amicus curiae of Center for Constitutional Junsprudence filed. VIDED.

Motion for divided argument filed by petitioners Jerome Nickols, et al. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of State and Local Government Associations filed. VIDED.

(Distributed)

Brief amici curiae of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al.

filed. Vided.

CIRCULATED.

Opposition of petitioners Perez, et al. to motion of Nickols, et al. for divded argument

fied. VIDED

Motion for divided argument filed by petitioners DENIED.

Reply of respondents Thomas E. Perez, Secretary of Labor filed. VIDED. (Distributed)

Reply of petitioners Jerome Nickols, et al. fled. (Distributed)

Argued. For petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of

Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex.

Judgment REVERSED. Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which

Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., joined, and in which

Alto, J., joined except for Part III-B. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment. Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., filed opinions concurring in the

judgment. VIDED

Apr102015 JUDGMENT ISSUED.

PETITION

FOR

WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

13-1052

No.

In The

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

Jerome Nickols, Ryan Henry and Beverly Buck,

Petitioners,

Vv.

Mortgage Bankers Association,

Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United

States Court Of Appeals For The District of

Columbia Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Adam W. Hansen Paul J. Lukas

Counsel of Record Rachhana T. Srey

Nichols Kaster, LLP Nichols Kaster, PLLP

One Embarcadero Center Minneapolis, MN 55402

Suite 720 (612) 256-3205

San Francisco, CA 94111

(415) 277-7236 Sundeep Hora

ahansen@nka.com Alderman, Devorsetz &

Hora PLLC

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 969-8220

(i)

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

§§ 551-59, “established the maximum procedural

requirements which Congress was willing to have

the courts impose upon agencies in conducting

rulemaking procedures.” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power

Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.

519, 524 (1978). Section 553 of the Act sets forth

notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, but

exempts “interpretative rules,” among others, from

the notice-and-comment requirement. 5 U.S.C. §

553(b). The D.C. Circuit, in a line of cases

descending from Paralyzed Veterans of America uv.

D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997), has

created a per se rule holding that although an

agency may issue an initial interpretative rule

without going through notice and comment, “[o]nce

an agency gives its regulation an interpretation, it

can only change that interpretation as it would

formally modify the regulation itself: through the

process of notice and comment rulemaking.” Id. at

586. In this case, the D.C. Circuit invoked the

Paralyzed Veterans doctrine—which is contrary to

the plain text of the Act, numerous decisions of this

Court, and the opinions of the majority of circuit

courts—to invalidate a Department of Labor

interpretation concluding that mortgage loan

officers do not qualify for the administrative

exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The question presented is:

Whether agencies subject to the

Administrative Procedure Act are categorically

prohibited from revising their interpretative rules

unless such revisions are made through notice-and-

comment rulemaking.

(ii)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners Jerome Nickols, Ryan Henry, and

Beverly Buck are former mortgage loan officers

seeking overtime compensation in lawsuits filed in

federal district court under the Fair Labor

Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Petitioners

intervened before the district court as a matter of

right, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and participated as

Defendants before the district court and Appellees

before the court of appeals. Respondent Mortgage

Bankers Association, a financial services industry

trade group, was the Plaintiff in the district court

and Appellant in the court of appeals. The United

States Department of Labor, Secretary of Labor,

and Department of Labor Deputy Wage and Hour

Administrator were Defendants in the district court

case and Appellees in the court of appeals.

(aii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ......................1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED. ............ 1

i

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..12

I. THis CouRT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW TO

RESOLVE THE CONFLICT OVER WHETHER

AGENCIES SUBJECT TO THE APA ARE

CATEGORICALLY PROHIBITED FROM REVISING

THEIR INTERPRETATIVE RULES UNLESS SUCH

REVISIONS ARE MADE ‘THROUGH NOTICE-

C.

i, The Paralyzed Veterans — |

conflicts with the plain language of

2. The Paralyzed Veterans doctrine

conflicts with numerous decisions

EE eC

a. Vermont VOM CC oovovvooccsccvccsceseesveseeee23

b. Skidmore v. Swift ...............000s00000005 26

3. The law affords numerous ‘checks

on shifting agency positions ................29

The Question Presented Is Important

and Recurring, and Has Far-Reaching

EET ITE 32

D. This Case Is the Ideal Vehicle To

meee the Question Presented................36

(iv)

SEIT crnticinsitecsncsepeniamninniiineeianmesiieaeniiag

Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966

EEE

Mortg. Bankers par v. Harris, No. 12-5246,

Judgment (D.C. Cir. July 2, 2013).....................18a

Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Solis, 864 F. anal

8 ERNE,

Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Solis, No. 11-

0073(RBW), Order (D.D.C. June 6, 2012).........49a

Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Perez, No. 11-

0073(RBW), Order (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2013) ........ 5la

Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Perez, No. 12-5246,

Order (D.C. Cir. Oct. 2, 20183)............................ 54a

Biggs v. Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 10-cv-

11928, Order (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, EEE 56a

Statutory Provisions Involved ....................0c0000 Tla

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,

Opinion Letter, WH-115, 1971 WL 33052

EEE RT SMem a mneR, ——

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,

Opinion Letter, 1999 WL 1002401 oa ' 17,

Sort ceseuicebieteasitencihtepininitasicinenaieiiaiaatteasieniisiiasianataeiaaeiaeiaiess

U.S. Dep't of iliind Wage & mee Div.,

+ ~onaaal Letter, 2001 WL 1558764 oe. | 16,

EER ER EO,

U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,

Opinion Letter, FLSA2006-11, 2006 WL

1094597 (Mar. 31, 2006) .....................ccececeee00-+s 828

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,

Opinion Letter, FLSA2006-31, 2006 WL

Re =

(v)

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,

Administrator's Interpretation No. 2010-1,

2010 WL 1822423 (Mar. 24, 2010) ..................107a

(vi)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Abraham Lincoln Mem Hosp. v. Sebelius,

698 F.3d 536 (7th Cir. 2012).......................... 15, 18

Alaska Profl Hunters Ass'n v. and 177 F.3d

cf 5 ee 8 TT

Arnold v. Ben ae § Inc., 361 US. | 388

a EES Sn ET

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S, 452 asen................80

Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977)............. 5

Biggs v. Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 10-cv-

11928, 2011 WL 5244819 «D. Mich. Mar.

oy v. “Quicken Same ao No. 10-cv-

11928 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, Teale ae hl 16

Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).............19

Casas v. Conseco Fin. Corp., No. Civ.00-1512,

2002 WL 507059 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2002)........... 8

Chase Bank a, NA. v. re 131 S. Ct.

I a aN 30, 34

Chen Zhou Chai t v. Carroll, 48 F. 3d 1331 (4th

Chief Prob. “Officers of C Cal. v. - Shalala, 118

F.3d 1827 (Oth Cir. 1907)............cccccccccccccccssssceeees LD

Christensen v. Harris County, | 529 U.S. 576

Chrtetapher v. SmithKline Seiten Corp.,

I 30

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 1 (1979) _— 4

(vii)

Conn. Natl Bank v. Coma, @ 503 U.S. 249

Gen. Elec. Co. v. v. Gilbert, 429 US. 125 (1976).....28

Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v.

Metrophones Telecomms., Inc., 550 U.S. 45

Good Samaritan | Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S.

EES

Indep. Equip. pa Ass'n v. EPA, 372 F.3d

8 ESSEC een Neem 33

INS v. Corecnen-runenen, 480 US. 421

(viii)

Kennedy v. Plan Adm’ for DuPont Sav. &

Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009).......................00002.27

LC U-Bake, LLC v. United States, No. 3:12-

cv-0049-KI, 2012 WL 1379048 wal Or. —

ETE

Leavitt v. Baystate Health ‘Sy, 547 7 US.

bois v. - Retin Nati Bank, 838 F

Supp. 2d 703 (S.D. Ohio 2012)..................ccccee00002 17

Miller v v. Cal. “nati op. ., 536 F: 3d 1020

Minnesate » v. Cire. for pone & Medicaid

Servs., 495 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 2007)....................14

Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966

Sk 8 .. 1, 12, 14, 22

Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Solis, | 864 F. bite 4

ESRC reer si Bae EU

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of | the United

States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,

Natl Cable & itesnine Ass'n v. » eed x

Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005)..............29, 35

NLRB v. Noel Cunamg, ° 705 F.3d 490 _ C.

Natt Rest. pun v. in, 411 F. yoy 993

ICI cusauniesisiosaenmieaianlll

Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena

L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ............. ... passim

Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 2 (2008) ...28

(ix)

Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F. 3d 139

es IT ini niiiessnciceiiadiinesisncenniiinianibnatichaiandindiianaion 34

SBC Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 2005) ....14

Shalala v. Guernsey Mem Hosp., 514 U.S.

__ , —_i(‘*é EE ORO ONO 4—5, 20—22, 30, 33

Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622

NG BEI cceertecsinsanctnnsensmmnesscimnenmmnesnnninatinanenioes 14

Skidmore uv. Swift, 323 U.S. 134

EEE ae PARC aT 13, 23, 26—27

Smith v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 590 F.3d 886

I NG, I nici anainclahitaealeh alla lsaae eal 9

Swigart v. Fifth Third Bank, 870 F. Supp. 2d

ee ID scesisicscesiicinnvsinsnciingmeniennaneitiabait 8, 17

St. Francis Health Care Ctr. v. Shalala, 205

ee re ee I i cnccenscnsecescinnsutssnnnsentnvennies 15

St. Marks Place Hous. Co., Inc. v. HUD, 610

EE Ps CG CD vovcccectinssncinnnacacsmeenteeseicnets 34

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S.

eT ee ener nen eee ana n re 30

United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th

I aaa rata 34

United States v. Magnesium Corp. of Am.,

G16 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2O010)........cccccccccscecccsceee 15

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218

IEEE cipiaschsinasbiinssinnseitepetaieideeiaelenainiateinianiieaiadelbamlinbansniinendiasit 28

United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60 (1940)...... 19

Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434

Sassanid age inated 27

(x)

Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519

GAS AEE RTE ean 13, 23-25

Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73 (1st Cir.

STITT shcichcpieeaiihceiaiaiiiiceiniicaiiclaehiaahiiiaatiniaiihiiettedinaidniniain 14

Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir.

RRR IED it Ree 15-16

Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (1981)..........00..000... 28

Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33

"SAAN RE TO 3, 24

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

I ad 20

Be: SEI thnticnitinisnndiandereninianesinieieaen 3—4, 18, 20

aad 26, 29-30

| TRS ane aE Neen Ree NTS eee 3

REECE ieee one Reeve ERE 31

a cen nananebeasiaiual 31

RIT TIN TIT ini sis i iciieh ianeisicstininsinidantemmaniabanniénnmets 25

TATE TI coins nsctniticsitunnsiiiniiipdeadnniethaianininieiiael 19

I inal iticenidineseniniaidndiaiiiniabdiiie 19

I a scsesdehusieniiaisaneienaaaiaie 1

EE Aree eR oN 16

SINE TTT isaac hecrinin ceria ipeetgatchenindomeieanbipaabigamedntes 5

CL TE 5

I St cits csiciiuninteennnciicedndiiepiinaniannenenaiiineiinnedl 5

I ee ne ena ee 31

a a iciteninsediicinsichannctiiipinnilitinticisiitiieiiaineiss 31

I a a a a et 31

i a le 31

Se RII caciccslocenh bbwinnasiicel iidiehantiadidendaiaioaiaia 5-6

ee eI inci intisstticishintentanciiitaciiniciapilnsibvapanidiaanad 6,9

29 C.F.R. § 541.201...... PES EEE A a BI RENE ENA 6,9

ek 2 TL ne eae en eee 6,9

ee te IIE Sesescsiicsisbeicsbincnuiiiasilaepaicaciinndali 6,9

MER RA Sannin misc lee sere 9

I ee isis cicinasinsnienitisdassiadcciesdeibeeceonne 9

Ak A 8 Sra nee ne NEE ener a nEnr Enron 9

I a a a 9

RULES

RI i il cal 11

MISCELLANEOUS

Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for

Executive, Administrative, Professional,

Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69

Fed. Reg. 22,122 (Apr. 23, 2004) (codified at

Ee is SED ccidsnnnssicntdidhnnindnemvenintionmatns 6, 8-9

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s

Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor

Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook,

2014-15 Edition, Loan Officers, available at

http://www.blis.gov/ooh/Business-and-

Financial/Loan-officers. htm ................0.eeceeeeeeeeeeees 7

(xii)

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,

Opinion Letter, WH-115, 1971 WL 33052

I I oie 7-8

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,

Opinion Letter, 1999 WL 1002401 (May 17,

STITT chien ccc debs leche dasieaiabenbiadiil 8

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,

Opinion Letter, 2001 WL 1558764 (Feb. 16,

en neta or eae EET ne See 8

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,

Opinion Letter, FLSA2006-11, 2006 WL

Ee Cs Gila HE ttcrcdcciesicninnsncnscvnsensenssscones 8

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,

Opinion Letter, FLSA2006-31, 2006 WL

I, Oe I ii siniicistsiicincnaninttaieneniennasacdons 9

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,

Administrator's Interpretation No. 2010-1,

2010 WL 1822423 (Mar. 24, 2010) .................. 7,10

Michael Asimow & Robert A. Anthony, A

Second Opinion? Inconsistent Interpretive

Rules, 25 Admin & Reg. L. News, No. 2

TERETE ee MMAR EET OT eR 36

Jon Connolly, Note, Alaska Hunters and the

D.C. Circuit: A Defense of Flexible

Interpretive Rulemaking, 101 Colum. L. Rev.

STITT sicsciedicsihlieiniediieenidhaaitbdegiaettaiiaabasiout 35

Kenneth Davis & Richard Pierce,

Administrative Law Treatise (3d ed. 1994)........... 4

William Funk, A Primer on Legislative Rules,

53 Admin. L. Rev. 1321 (2001) ...................... 35—36

William S. Jordan III, Interpretive Rules and

Statements of Policy—When Do They

(xiii)

Constitute Legislative Rules?, 29 Admin. &

Reg. L. News, No. 1 (20038)..................ccceseeceeeeeees 36

Sam Kalen, The Transformation of Modern

Administrative Law: Changing

Administrations and Environmental

Guidance Documents, 35 Ecology L.Q. 657

SESE EARN ey seaneot re AMne non yey peta a 35

Richard W. Murphy, Hunters for

Administrative Common Law, 58 Admin. L.

Bs ee EE nessteceeccbensntsonenitninnanidnddinennees 35-36

Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing

Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 52

Admin. L. Rev. 547 (2000) ....................... 14, 20, 35

Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA,

the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court,

ee , Sti I i cneesiscssnscntecessesonneuiennie 24-25

Brian J. Shearer, Comment, Outfoxing

Alaska Hunters: How Arbitrary and

Capricious Review of Changing Regulatory

Interpretations Can More Efficiently Police

Agency Discretion, 62 Am. U. L. Rev. 167

Ihsan dcaidinditiadhinbnidiaibieadundimiaieebinepeeienanbie: 35

Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the

Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper

Respect for an Essential Element, 53 Admin.

I i callie aetiniitesnee 35

Re: Tread Act Provisions Involving Defective

Tires, Nat Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,

Dep’t of Transp.,

http://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/12-

00245. ITA Defective_Tire_Exportation.htm

SE: EATEN daitcetilaceshcssdeinitciinshiesietebocesiadisinuaiineieniniadiadeeuditd 34

(xiv)

Regulations, Codes, & Code Interpretations,

U.S. Food & Drug Admin.

http://www.fda. gov/food/guidanceregulation/r

etailfoodprotection/regulationscodesinterpret

ations/default.htm (last updated Aug. 19,

ES a INAS EN te SSR ce ER ee Oe Oe

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners Jerome Nickols, Ryan Henry, and

Beverly Buck respectfully request that this Court

issue a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

reversing the district court is available at Mortgage

Bankers Association v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966 (D.C.

Cir. 2013) and is reproduced at App. la. The

district court’s opinion granting summary judgment

in favor of Petitioners and the Secretary of Labor is

available at Mortgage Bankers Association v. Solis,

864 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D.D.C. 2012) rev’d sub nom.

Mortgage Bankers Association v. Harris, 720 F.3d

966 (D.C. Cir. 2013) and is reproduced at App. 15a.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit issued its Opinion and

Final Judgment on July 2, 2013. App. 13a. The

D.C. Circuit denied Petitioners’ timely-filed petition

for rehearing en banc on October 2, 2013. App. 54a.

Chief Justice Roberts twice granted Petitioners’

timely applications for an extension of time within

which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari,

extending the deadline to and including February

28, 2014. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent provisions of the Administrative

Procedure Act are reproduced in the Appendix (at

71a).

2

STATEMENT

This case presents an important question at

the heart of federal administrative law: whether

agencies subject to the Administrative Procedure

Act are categorically prohibited from revising their

interpretative rules unless such revisions are made

through notice-and-comment rulemaking. The

question touches on the authority of all three

branches of government, carries crucial

implications for regulated communities, and

sharply divides the courts of appeals.

Congress authorized the Department of

Labor (“DOL”) to issue regulations defining various

statutory exemptions contained in the Fair Labor

Standards Act (“FLSA”). In addition to

promulgating formal regulations, the DOL—like

many other federal agencies—has traditionally

issued informal interpretations addressing how the

regulations apply to specific factual scenarios. Over

the years, the DOL had issued a series of opinion

letters concluding that mortgage loan officers—

bank employees who sell mortgage products to

customers—do not qualify for the FLSA’s

administrative exemption. In 2006, however, the

DOL changed its interpretation, concluding that

such employees do qualify for the exemption. In

2010, the DOL restored its original and long-

standing interpretation, concluding once again that

mortgage loan officers do not qualify for the

exemption.

Respondent Mortgage Bankers Association

(“MBA”) sued the Secretary of Labor, seeking to

invalidate the DOL’s 2010 interpretation. Applying

a controversial circuit precedent known colloquially

as the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, the D.C. Circuit

3

vacated the DOL’s 2010 interpretation. According

to the D.C. Circuit’s Paralyzed Veterans doctrine,

although an agency may issue an_ initial

interpretive rule without going through notice and

comment, “[o]nce an agency gives its regulation an

interpretation, it can only change that

interpretation as it would formally modify the

regulation itself: through the process of notice and

comment rulemaking.” Paralyzed Veterans of Am.

v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir.

1997).

The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in this case

deepened an intractable split of authority among

circuit courts on the question of whether notice-

and-comment rulemaking is required to modify an

interpretive rule. The opinion is also in plain

conflict with numerous decisions of this Court, as

well as the unambiguous text of the Administrative

Procedure Act, which exempts “interpretative

rules” from notice-and-comment rulemaking and

draws no distinction between initial interpretations

and subsequent interpretations, see 5 U.S.C. §

553(b).

A brief description of the _ relevant

background and procedural history of this case

follows.

1. In 1946, Congress enacted the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 60 Stat. 237

(1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq.), which

this Court has described as a “basic and

comprehensive regulation of procedures in many

agencies.” Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.

33, 36 (1950). Section 553 of the Act sets forth

various notice-and-comment rulemaking

procedures, but specifically exempts “interpretative

4

rules,” among others, from the notice-and-comment

requirement. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).

Courts and commentators refer to rules that

are subject to the APA’s formal rulemaking

procedures as “legislative rules,” “substantive

rules,” or simply “regulations.” See, e.g., Global

Crossing Telecomms., iac. v. Metrophones

Telecomms, Inc., 550 U.S. 45, 61 (2007); Kenneth

Davis & Richard Pierce, Administrative Law

Treatise 233 (3d ed. 1994). Legislative rules “bind[]

members of the public, the agency, and even the

courts, in the sense that courts must affirm a

legislative rule as long as it represents a valid

exercise of agency authority.” Kenneth Davis &

Richard Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise 233

(3d ed. 1994). “Legislative, or substantive,

regulations are ‘issued by an agency pursuant to

statutory authority and . . . implement the statute,

as, for example, the proxy rules issued by the

Securities and Exchange Commission. . . . Such

rules have the force and effect of law.” Chrysler

Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-03 (1979)

(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General's

Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 30 n.3

(1947)).

Interpretative rules (often referred to as

interpretive rules—the two terms are used

interchangeably in this Petition), by contrast, are

rules “issued by an agency to advise the public of

the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules

which it administers.” Jd. at 302, n.31; see also

Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’ Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99

(1995). Interpretative rules “do not require notice

and comment, although . . . they also do not have

the force and effect of law and are not accorded that

5

weight in the adjudicatory process.” Guernsey

Memorial Hospital, 514 U.S. at 99.

2. The FLSA requires employers to pay

employees both minimum wage and overtime

compensation. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207. There are

certain statutory exemptions, however, to the

FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime requirements.

Relevant here, Congress exempted employees

“employed in a bona fide executive, administrative,

or professional capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).

FLSA “exemptions are to be narrowly construed

against the employers seeking to assert them and

their application limited to those establishments

plainly and unmistakably within their terms and

spirit.” Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388,

392 (1960).

Congress has never defined the terms

“executive,” “administrative,” or “professional.” The

FLSA, however, grants the DOL authority to

“defin[e] and delimi[t]” the scope of the exemptions

for executive, administrative, and professional

employees. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). Because of

Congress’ broad delegation of rulemaking

authority, the regulations issued by the DOL have

the binding effect of law. See Batterton v. Francis,

432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977). The DOL has

promulgated detailed regulations defining these

white collar coemptene, see 29 C.F.R. § 541,' and

. | The gunesel rule for the administrative exemption states:

The term “employee employed in a bona fide

administrative capacity” in section 13(a)(1) of the

Act shall mean any employee:

(1) Compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of

not less than $455 per week (or $380 per week, if

6

“[t]he major substantive provisions of the [white

collar] regulations have remained virtually

unchanged for 50 years.” Defining and Delimiting

the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative,

Professional, Outside Sales and Computer

Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122 (Apr. 23, 2004)

(codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541).

Mortgage loan officers, like Petitioners, are

workers employed by banks and mortgage

companies who sell loan products to customers.”

empleyed i in » Amesien Samoa “ outs other

than the Federal Government), exclusive of board,

lodging or other facilities;

(2) Whose primary duty is the performance of office

or non-manual work directly related to the

management or general business operations of the

employer or the employer’s customers; and

2 Se Ey Say See Ge ce

cretion and — judgment with respect to

matte of tend sifi

29 C.F.R. § 541.200. Additional regulations further define and

delimit the terms of the general rule. See 29 C.F.R. §

541.201—203.

2 The DOL has described the typical job duties of mortgage

loan officers as follows:

Mortgage loan officers receive internal leads and

contact potential customers or receive contacts from

customers generated by direct mail or other

marketing activity. Mortgage loan officers collect

required financial information from customers they

contact or who contact them, including information

about income, employment history, assets,

investments, home ownership, debts, credit history,

7

According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, nearly

300,000 people—approximately 1 in every 500

workers in the United States—work as loan

officers.3

The DOL has, on six occasions, publicly

issued interpretive guidance addressing mortgage

loan officers’ exemption status under the FLSA. In

a series of four opinion letters published between

1971 and 2001, the agency’s position was clear and

consistently held: although loan officers could

qualify for the FLSA’s “outside sales” exemption if

the employees performed their job duties outside

the office, loan officers do not qualify for the Act’s

administrative exemption. * As courts have

prior besionstaien jedgmente, end liens. They also

run credit reports. Mortgage loan officers enter the

collected financial information into a computer

program that identifies which loan products may be

offered to customers based on the financial

information provided. They then assess the loan

products identified and discuss with the customers

the terms and conditions of particular loans, trying

to match the customers’ needs with one of the

company’s loan products. Mortgage loan officers also

compile customer documents for forwarding to an

underwriter or loan processor, and may finalize

documents for closings.

App. 107a; 2010AI, 2010 WL 1822423 at *1.

3’ See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,

Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2014-15 Edition, Loan

Officers, available at http://www.bls.gov/ooh/Business-and-

Financial/Loan-officers. htm.

* See App. 72a; U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div.,

Opinion Letter, WH-115, 1971 WL 33052 (January 15, 1971)

(concluding that mortgage loan officers who customarily and

8

recognized, by their very terms, these two

exemptions are mutually exclusive—“a floan

officer] cannot be simultaneously exempt under the

outside sales exemption and the administrative

exemption because the former requires the

employee to have a primary job dv’y of sales,

whereas that same primary job du‘, disqualifies an

employee from coverage under the latter.” See, e.g.,

Swigart v. Fifth Third Bank, 870 F. Supp. 2d 500,

511 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (citations omitted).

During the same time period, federal courts

uniformly held that mortgage loan officers do not

qualify for the FLSA'’s administrative exemption.

E.g., Casas v. Conseco Fin. Corp., No. Civ.00-1512,

2002 WL 507059, at *6-10 (D. Minn. Mar. 31

2002).

Following notice and comment, the DOL in

2004 issued revised regulations defining and

delimiting the FLSA’s white collar exemptions. See

generally Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions

for Executive, istrative, Professional,

Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed.

regularly performed work outside the office meet the

requirements of the FLSA’s outside sales exemption); App.

75a; U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter,

1999 WL 1002401 (May 17, 1999) (holding that mortgage loan

= do not meet the requirements of the FLSA's

iministrative exemption); App. 79a; U.S. Dep't of Labor,

Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter, 2001 WL 1558764 (Feb.

16, 2001) (reaffirming that loan officers do not meet the

quirements of the administrative exemption); App. 82a;

U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opi

WL 1094597 (March 31, 2006) (re ning that loan officers

who work outside the office meet the requirements of the

outside sales exemption).

9

Reg. 22,122. The revised regulations, however, did

not alter the substance of the administrative

exemption. See Smith v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 590

F.3d 886, 892 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (recognizing that

the most recent regulations were merely meant to

“consolidate and streamline” and ultimately be

“consistent with” the old regulations); 69 Fed. Reg.

22,122, 22,126 & 22,139. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 541.2—

207 (2003) with 29 C.F.R. § 541.200—203.

Despite intense lobbying from the financial

services industry, the DOL refused to issue

regulations in 2004 concluding that loan officers

qualify for the administrative exemption. On the

contrary, the DOL cited and discussed federal case

law holding that loan officers do not qualify for the

administrative exemption, see 69 Fed. Reg. 22,145—

46, and stated that the regulations were intended

to be “consistent with this case law.” Id.

On September 8, 2006, in a sharp break from

its long-settled position, the DOL issued an opinion

letter concluding that mortgage loan officers are

exempt employees under the FLSA’s

administrative exemption. See App. 91a; U.S. Dep't

of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter,

FLSA2006-31, 2006 WL 2792445 (Sept. 8, 2006).5

Although the 2006 opinion letter broke with over a

generation’s worth of DOL guidance and federal

case law, the 2006 letter did not cite—let alone

discuss—the mountain of prior’ authority

5 The DOL’s 2006 letter was signed by then-Wage and Hour

Administrator Paul DeCamp. After Congress refused to

confirm Mr. DeCamp, President Bush unilaterally appointed

Mr. DeCamp during a Senate intra-session recess. Whether

appointments such as Mr. DeCamp’s violate the Constitution

is under consideration in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d

490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013).

10

concluding that mortgage loan officers do not

qualify for the administrative exemption.

Three-and-a-half years later, on March 24,

2010, the DOL issued Administrator's

Interpretation No. 2010-1 (“2010AI’)®, restoring the

DOL’s original and long-held agency interpretation

that mortgage loan officers do not qualify for the

administrative exemption. App. 107a; 2010AI, 2010

WL 1822423. The 2010 interpretation forcefully

withdrew the contrary 2006 opinion letter,

analyzing the 2006 letter’s numerous analytical

flaws in detail, citing the letter’s inconsistency with

the governing regulations and case law, and

criticizing the 2006 letter’s “misleading assumption

and selective and narrow analysis.” App. 127a.

3. On January 12, 2011, Respondent MBA, the

financial industry trade group that solicited the

2006 letter, filed suit against the Secretary of

Labor in federal district court in the District of

Columbia seeking an order declaring unlawful,

vacating, and enjoining the implementation of

2010AI. MBA contended that the DOL violated the

APA by issuing 2010AI without notice and

comment, and argued alternatively that 2010AI

should be set aside as arbitrary, capricious, and

contrary to law. App. 15a.

Petitioners are former mortgage loan officers

who brought suit against Quicken Loans, Inc.

alleging that Quicken improperly misclassified

6 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Administrator's

Interpretation No. 2010-1, 2010 WL 1822423 (Mar. 24, 2010).

11

them as exempt under the FLSA.’ Petitioners

intervened as defendants before the district court

as a matter of right, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and

fully participated as parties before the district

court and court of appeals.

On June 6, 2012, the district court granted

Petitioners’ and the DOL’s motion for summary

judgment, concluding that the DOL was not

required to engage in_ notice-and-comment

rulemaking before issuing 2010AI, and holding that

the DOL’s 2010 interpretation was not arbitrary,

capricious, nor contrary to law. App. 15a; Mortgage

Bankers Ass’n, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 208-10.

MBA appealed, and the D.C. Circuit

reversed. The D.C. Circuit began by reaffirming the

Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, which holds that

although an agency may issue an_ initial

interpretive rule without going through notice and

comment, “[o]Jnce an agency gives its regulation an

interpretation, it can only change that

interpretation as it would formally modify the

regulation itself: through the process of notice and

7 Petitioner Ryan Henry is a plaintiff in Henry v. Quicken

Loans Inc., No. 04-cv-40346 (E.D. Mich.). Petitioner Beverly

Buck is a plaintiff in Mathis v. Quicken Loans Inc., No. 07-cv-

10981 (E.D. Mich.), and Petitioner Jerome Nickols is a

plaintiff in Chasteen v. Rock Fin. Inc., No. 07-cv-10558 (E.D.

Mich.).

8 MBA did not appeal the district court’s substantive

determination that 2010AI was not arbitrary, capricious, or

inconsistent with the underlying regulations. Rather, the

MBA focused its appeal to the D.C. Circuit on the sole issue

before this Court: whether the APA required the DOL to

engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking before issuing

2010AI.

12

comment rulemaking.” Paralyzed Veterans of Am..,

117 F.3d at 586. Applying the doctrine, the court

concluded that “[w]hen an agency has given its

regulation a definitive interpretation, and later

significantly revises that interpretation, the agency

has in effect amended its rule, something it may

not accomplish [under the APA] without notice and

comment.” App. 2a; Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Harris,

720 F.3d 966, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing Paralyzed

Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 586, and Alaska Prof

Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir.

1999)). The D.C. Circuit candidly acknowledged the

circuit split on the question of whether agencies

must engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking

before revising interpretive rules. See App. 2a.;

Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 720 F.3d at 969 n.3 (citing

cases).

Petitioners filed a petition for rehearing en

banc, which the court of appeals denied on October

2, 2013. App. 54a. This petition for a writ of

certiorari follows.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. THis CouRT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW TO

RESOLVE THE CONFLICT OVER WHETHER

AGENCIES SUBJECT TO THE APA ARE

CATEGORICALLY PROHIBITED FROM REVISING

THEIR INTERPRETATIVE RULES UNLESS SUCH

REVISIONS ARE MADE THROUGH NOTICE-AND-

COMMENT RULEMAKING.

This case cries out for Supreme Court review

for several independent and compelling reasons.

First, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion deepened an

intractable circuit split on the Question Presented.

While the First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth

Circuits have squarely held that agencies need not

13

engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking before

revising their interpretive rules, the Fifth and D.C.

Circuits have taken the exact opposite view.

Supreme Court review is the only means to resolve

the conflict.

Second, the D.C. Circuit’s Paralyzed Veterans

doctrine—which controlled the outcome in this

case—is plainly wrong. The doctrine conflicts

irreconcilably with the bare text of the APA, which

states unambiguously that all interpretative rules

are exempt from notice and comment—without

reference to whether the interpretation is the first

adopted or a later revision. The Paralyzed Veterans

doctrine also conflicts with two lines of cases from

this Court, which hold that (1) courts may not

impose rulemaking procedures beyond those

contemplated by the APA, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear

Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435

U.S. 519, 524 (1978), and (2) an interpretation’s

consistency with earlier pronouncements is merely

one factor courts must consider in evaluating the

latest interpretation’s persuasive value, e.g.,

Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).

Critically, the doctrine ignores the numerous firmly

grounded checks—arbitrary and capricious review,

statutory safe harbors, and due process, among

others—protecting regulated communities from

arbitrary changes in agency interpretations.

Third, the Question Presented in this case is

both important and recurring. Until this Court

resolves the Question Presented in this case,

agencies will—in countless daily interactions with

citizen and businesses—become less transparent,

less predictable, and more hesitant to provide any

guidance at all for fear of having their informal

positions locked in.

14

A. The Circuits Are Intractably Divided

The Question Presented in this case has

sharply divided the courts of appeals. Absent

review by this Court, the conflict is likely to persist

indefinitely.

In the fifty-year period between the enactment

of the APA in 1946 and the issuance of the D.C.

Circuit’s opinion in Paralyzed Veterans, every court

that addressed the Question Presented concluded

that notice-and-comment rulemaking was not

required for an agency to amend its interpretive

rules. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing

Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 52

Admin. L. Rev. 547, 567 n.136 (2000).

After Paralyzed Veterans, the controversial

doctrine has been applied by the D.C. Circuit, see

Mortg. Bankers Ass’n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966, 967

(D.C. Cir. 2013); Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA,

425 F.3d 992 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Alaska Prof!

Hunters Ass'n, 177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and

adopted by the Fifth Circuit, see Shell Offshore Inc.

v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2001).°

The First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth

Circuits, by contrast, have explicitly rejected the

D.C. Circuit’s approach. See Warder v. Shalala, 149

F.3d 73, 79-82 (lst Cir. 1998) (rejecting the

argument that a revised interpretation of a

Medicare regulation was improperly issued without

® The Paralyzed Veterans doctrine has been cited approvingly

in dicta by panels in the Third and Eighth Circuits. See SBC

Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 498 (3d Cir. 2005); Minnesota v.

Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., 495 F.3d 991, 996—97

(8th Cir. 2007).

15

notice and comment); Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll,

48 F.3d 1331, 1840-41 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that

the Attorney General was not required to engage in

notice-and-comment rulemaking before revising its

interpretation of an immigration regulation); St.

Francis Health Care Ctr. v. Shalala, 205 F.3d 937,

947 n.11 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that notice and

comment was not required where the Secretary of

Health and Human _. Services. revised an

interpretation of the department’s own regulation);

Abraham Lincoln Mem1 Hosp. v. Sebelius, 698 F.3d

536, 560 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the

Paralyzed Veterans doctrine is “not persuasive”

because it “conflicts with the APA’s rulemaking

provisions, which exempt all interpretive rules

from notice and comment”); Miller v. Cal. Speedway

Corp., 536 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[E]ven

if the DOJ’s interpretation constituted a change in

the understanding of its original regulations, the

DOJ was not required to proceed by notice and

comment because both the . . . original position...

and the [revised position] would constitute

interpretive rules.”); Erringer v. Thompson, 371

F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[N]o notice-and-

comment rulemaking is required to amend a

previous interpretive rule.”) (emphasis in original);

Chief Prob. Officers of Cal. v. Shalala, 118 F.3d

1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that “[t]he

Agency was free to change [its] interpretation”

without notice and comment.).!°

10 The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have acknowledged the

circuit split but declined to take sides. See United States v.

Magnesium Corp. of Am., 616 F.3d 1129, 1139—40 (10th Cir.

2010) (acknowledging the split of authority and pointing out

that “Paralyzed Veterans and Alaska Hunters have generated

considerable debate” among courts and commentators);

16

The split of authority between the D.C. Circuit

and a plurality of other circuits on the Question

Presented creates a uniquely compelling

justification for review: the potential for forum

shopping. Because virtually any APA action can be

brought in the District of Columbia, see 28 U.S.C. §

1391(e), sophisticated parties opposing agency

action will always avail themselves of the

Paralyzed Veterans doctrine by filing suit in the

District of Columbia. Parties supporting an

agency's revised position will sue in jurisdictions on

the other side of the divide. The result is chaos and

confusion over the validity of countless

interpretations. See, e.g., App. 56a; Biggs v.

Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 10-cv-11928, slip op. at 7—

10 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2014) (concluding that

courts outside the D.C. circuit are not bound by the

reasoning of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in this case,

but suggesting in dicta that the D.C. Circuit's

mandate bars the DOL from enforcing 2010AI

nationwide). As a consequence, the need for

national uniformity on the Question Presented in

this case is especially acute.

The divide over the validity of the DOL’s

interpretation at issue in this case further

illustrates the pressing need for Supreme Court

review. Except for the D.C. Circuit below, every

court to consider the question has rejected the

precise reasoning adopted by the D.C. Circuit,

concluding that no notice and comment was

Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1338-39 (11th Cir. 2009)

(acknowledging the split of authority and counting the Second

Circuit, in addition to the First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and

Ninth, as in agreement that “changes in interpretations do

not require notice and comment because both the original and

current positions constitute interpretive rules”).

17

required before the DOL issued 2010AI. See Mortg.

Bankers Ass'n, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 193; Swigart, 870

F. Supp. 2d at 512-13 (“[T]he APA’s notice and

comment procedures are not required for an

interpretive rule such as the 2010 AI that modifies

a prior interpretation of the same agency

regulation ... .”); Lewis v. Huntington Natl Bank,

838 F. Supp. 2d 703, 707-13 (S.D. Ohio 2012)

(concluding that notice-and-comment rulemaking

was not required before issuing 2010AD; accord

Biggs v. Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 10-cv-11928, 2011

WL 5244819, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2011).

The split of authority on the validity of

2010AI has caused considerable confusion for the

nearly 300,000 loan officers and their employers in

the financial services industry. Of course, that

confusion pales in comparison to the enormous

shadow cast by Paralyzed Veterans—and its uneven

application—over federal agencies and regulated

communities generally.

B. The D.C. Circuit’s Paralyzed Veterans

Doctrine Is Clearly Wrong

Even setting aside the persistent split of

authority over the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, the

Question Presented in this case merits

consideration by this Court. The doctrine conflicts

irreconcilably with the APA itself, contravenes

numerous decisions of this Court, and disregards

the firmly-established safeguards protecting

regulated communities from arbitrary shifts in

agency policy.

(1) The Paralyzed Veterans doctrine

conflicts with the plain language of

the APA

18

This case begins and ends with the text of

the APA. “[I]n interpreting a statute a court should

always turn to one cardinal canon before all others.

. [C]ourts must presume that a legislature says

in a statute what it means and means in a statute

what it says there.” Conn. Nat? Bank v. Germain,

503 U.S. 249, 253—54 (1992).

Section 553 of the APA sets forth the

procedural requirements for rule making, including

notice, comment, and publication of rules. 5 U.S.C.

§ 553. Section 553(b), however, exempts from the

notice-and-comment requirement “interpretative

rules, general statements of policy, or rules of

agency organization, procedure, or practice.” 5

U.S.C. § 553. Interpretative rules are exempt from

notice and comment; the APA draws no distinction

whatsoever between initial rules and subsequent

rules. In the absence of any contrary congressional

intent, Paralyzed Veterans’ one-bite rule cannot be

reconciled with the text of the APA. See Abraham

Lincoln Mem Hosp., 698 F.3d at 560 (concluding

that the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine is “not

persuasive” because it “conflicts with the APA’s

rulemaking provisions, which exempt all

interpretive rules from notice and comment”

(emphasis added)).

The Paralyzed Veterans doctrine fares no

better examined through the lens of other relevant

canons of statutory construction. The familiar in

pari materia canon “is a reflection of practical

experience in the interpretation of statutes: a

legislative body generally uses a particular word

with a consistent meaning in a given context. Thus,

for example, a ‘later act can . . . be regarded as a

legislative interpretation of (an) earlier act .

Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-44

19

(1972) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S.

60, 64 (1940)).

Numerous statutory provisions illustrate

that Congress knew how to write the Paralyzed

Veterans doctrine inta law, and chose not to do so

when it enacted the APA. For example, under the

Tariff Act of 1930, the Secretary of the Treasury

may not issue an interpretive ruling modifying or

revoking a previous interpretive ruling without

first engaging in notice and comment. 19 U.S.C.

§1625(c). As a_ second example, the FDA

Modernization Act explicitly requires opportunity

for public comment before the Secretary makes

“changes in interpretation” of a “statute or

regulation.” 21 U.S.C. § 371.

These statutes illustrate that Congress is

capable of writing the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine

into law in circumstances where it sees fit. Indeed,

the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine makes these

provisions superfluous, running afoul of the “canon

against interpreting any statutory provision in a

manner that would render another provision

superfluous.” Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,

3228 (2010). This antisuperfluousness canon

“applies to interpreting any two provisions in the

U.S. Code, even when Congress enacted the

provisions at different times.” Id. at 3229.

The Paralyzed Veterans opinion itself, taken

on its own terms, similarly fails to persuade. The

opinion—remarkable for its atextual character—

makes almost no effort to square its sweeping rule

with the APA. Without citation to any statute, case,

or other authority, Paralyzed Veterans simply

declares that “[o]nce an agency gives its regulation

an interpretation, it can only change that

20

interpretation as it would formally modify the

regulation itself: through the process of notice and

comment rulemaking.” Paralyzed Veterans of Am.,

117 F.3d at 586.

In a later passage, Paralyzed Veterans cites

Section 551(5) of the APA and this Court’s opinion

in Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U.S.

87 (1995), but neither authority supports the

court’s sweeping proposition.

Citing Section 551(5), the court stated that

“[uJnder the APA, agencies are obliged to engage in

notice and comment before formulating regulations,

which applies as well to ‘repeals’ or ‘amendments.”

Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586 (emphasis in

original). But Section 551(5) merely supplies the

APA's definition of “rule making,” stating that the

term “means agency process for formulating,

amending, or repealing a rule.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(5).

Section 553 sets forth the actual procedures

required for rule making, and exempts interpretive

rules from notice and comment. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.

Reading the two sections together, it is readily

apparent that when an agency “formulat(es), 7

“amend{s],” or “repeal[s]” a legislative rule—that i is,

a formal regulation—notice and comment is

required. But by the same token, an agency

remains free to issue an interpretive rule, whether

by formulation, amendment, or repeal, without

notice and comment. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,

Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretive

Rules, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 547, 567 (2000) (“When an

agency issues, amends, or repeals a legislative rule,

it must use the notice and comment procedure.

When it issues, amends, or repeals an

interpretative rule, it is not required to use the

notice and comment procedure.”).

1

Paralyzed Veterans’ citation to this Court’s

decision in Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital

similarly misses the mark. Paralyzed Veterans cites

Guernsey Memorial Hospital for the proposition

that “APA rulemaking is required where an

interpretation ‘adopt[s] a new position inconsistent

with . . . existing regulations.’” Paralyzed Veterans,

117 F. 3d at 586 (citing Guernsey Mem1 Hosp., 514

U.S. at 100). But Guernsey Memorial Hospital is

actually one of this Court’s seminal cases

reaffirming the principle that interpretive rules

need not be the product of notice and comment. At

issue in Guernsey Memorial Hospital was the

validity of a Medicare Provider Reimbursement

Manual. Guernsey Mem7 Hosp., 514 U.S. at 90. The

Manual, which was issued without notice and

comment, interpreted various Medicare legislative

rules (referred to in the opinion simply as

“regulations”) to mean that certain reimbursable

losses must be amortized over a period of years

rather than reimbursed in the year of the loss. Jd.

After assuring itself that the Manual was

consistent with the regulations, id. at 92-95, this

Court held that it was “proper for the Secretary to

issue a guideline or interpretive rule,” calling the

rule issued by an agency to advise the public of the

agency's construction of the statutes and rules

which it administers.” Jd. at 97, 99 (citations

omitted). Guernsey Memorial Hospital's language

quoted in Paralyzed Veterans, in context, reads as

follows:

We can agree that APA rulemaking

would still be required if [the Manual]

adopted a new position inconsistent with

any of the Secretary's existing regulations.

22

As set forth in Part LI, however, her

regulations do not require reimbursement

according to GAAP. [The Manual] does not,

as the Court of Appeals concluded it does,

“effec[t] a substantive change in the

regulations.”

Id. at 100 (citations omitted). Put in context, this

Court’s observation in Guernsey Memorial Hospital

stands for the unremarkable proposition that an

interpretive rule that conflicts with the legislative

rules it purports to interpret is invalid. Paralyzed

Veterans dramatically and improperly expands this

concept to hold that an interpretive rule that is

consistent with the legislative rules it interprets

but inconsistent with a prior interpretive rule is

procedurally invalid. Nothing in the APA or

Guernsey Memorial Hospital supports such a

In the D.C. Circuit’s opinion below, the court

offered a novel textual defense of the Paralyzed

Veterans doctrine, but still failed to square the

doctrine with the text of the APA. The court called

the Doctrine’s “operative assumption” “the belief

that a definitive interpretation is so closely

intertwined with the regulation that a significant

change to the former constitutes a repeal or

amendment of the latter.” Mortg. Bankers Ass'n,

720 F.3d at 969 n.3 (emphasis in original). This

“operative assumption” is flat wrong. A changed

interpretation leaves the formal regulations

unchanged, sitting comfortably in the Code of

Federal Regulations in identical form before and

after the interpretive change. To the extent the

D.C. Circuit now believes that any interpretation

“closely intertwined” with the underlying

regulations (in other words, any interpretation)

23

becomes a formal, legislative rule simply by virtue

of appearing in an opinion letter, amicus brief, or

internal guideline, the assertion finds no support in

the APA (or any other authority construing the

nearly seventy-year-old Act).

(2)The Paralyzed Veterans doctrine

conflicts with numerous decisions

of this Court

Although this case can be resolved by

reference to the text of the APA and nothing more,

review is also warranted because the Paralyzed

Veterans doctrine fundamentally conflicts with this

Court’s prior cases. Two lines of cases bear

mentioning here. First, in a line of cases beginning

with Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435

U.S. at 524, this Court has held that the APA

“established the maximum procedural

requirements which Congress was willing to have

the courts impose upon agencies in conducting

rulemaking procedures.” Jd. at 524. Applying

Vermont Yankee to a revised agency interpretation

in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S.

502 (2009), this Court stated that “[t]he [APA]

makes no distinction . . . between initial agency

action and subsequent agency action undoing or

revising that action.” Jd. at 515. Second, this Court

has held many times over that an agency’s change

in interpretation is merely one factor to consider in

evaluating the interpretation’s weight. See, e.g.,

Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. The Paralyzed Veterans

doctrine cannot be reconciled with these

authorities.

(a) Vermont Yankee

In Vermont Yankee, this Court held that the

D.C. Circuit erred in invalidating, on the grounds of

24

inadequate procedures, a rule issued by the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 435 U.S. at 525,

528-30. In issuing the rule, the Commission had

changed its policy by declaring that earlier

decisions of its appeal board had no further effect.

Id. at 530. This Court began with the premise that

the APA was “a legislative enactment which settled

‘long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and

enacts a formula upon which opposing social and

political forces have come to rest.” Jd. at 523

(quoting Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 40). The

Court unanimously held that the D.C. Circuit had

“seriously misread or misapplied . . . statutory and

decisional law cautioning reviewing courts against

engrafting their own notions of proper procedures

upon agencies entrusted with substantive functions

by Congress.” Id. at 525. The Court reasoned that

Section 553 of the APA “established the maximum

procedural requirements which Congress was

willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in

conducting rulemaking procedures[,|” id. at 524,

and noted that “reviewing courts are generally not

free to impose” any “additional procedural rights.”

Id.

Scholars have read Vermont Yankee as a

rebuke of the D.C. Circuit, which had aggrandized

its own authority to establish procedures for agency

action at the expense of Congress and the

Executive branch. Then-professor Scalia authored

the leading commentary on Vermont Yankee. See

Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the

D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. Ct.

Rev. 345. Justice Scalia called Vermont Yankee a

“tongue-lashing,” undertaken in response to the

D.C. Circuit’s “progressive evisceration of the APA.”

Id. at 359, 400. He continued: “It does not go too far

25

to say that the D.C. Circuit was in the process of

replacing the rudimentary procedural mandates of

the Act .. . with a much more elaborate, ‘evolving,’

courtmade scheme... .” Id. at 359.

The Paralyzed Veterans doctrine fits

comfortably within Justice Scalia’s critique. Here,

as in Vermont Yankee, the D.C. Circuit has

invented a procedural rule unmoored from the text

of the APA, “stray[ing} beyond the judicial province

to explore the procedural format [and] impos[ing]

upon the agency [the court’s] own notion of which

procedures are ‘best’ or most likely to further some

vague, undefined public good.” Jd. at 369~70

(quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S.

at 549).

This Court applied Vermont Yankee most

recently in Fox Television, this time reaffirming the

principle that courts may not impose requirements

beyond those prescribed in the APA—even where,

as here, the agency changes its position. In Fox

Television, the Court upheld the FCC’s changed

interpretation of the ban on broadcasting “obscene,

indecent, or profane language.” 18 U.S.C. § 1464.

See Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 502. The Second

Circuit had _ rejected the FCC’s’ changed

interpretation on the ground that the APA requires

“a more substantial explanation for agency action

that changes prior policy.” Jd. at 514. But this

Court rejected the Second Circuit’s approach,

pointing out that the APA “makes no distinction . . .

between initial agency action and subsequent

agency action undoing or revising that action.” Jd.

at 515.

This case, of course, directly parallels Fox

Television. Although Fox Television addressed the

26

APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard, the

Paralyzed Veterans doctrine achieves the exact

same mistaken result—rejected in Fox Television—

under the guise of a procedural rule. But just as

Fox Television recognized that the arbitrary and

capricious standard does not change when applied

to a revised interpretation, the APA’s procedural

requirements do not change when an agency

modifies its informal interpretations. Notice-

comment-rulemaking is not required.

Paralyzed Veterans—and the D.C. Circuit’s

decision below—cannot be reconciled with Vermont

Yankee or Fox Television. Whatever courts may

think of the wisdom of agencies revising their

informal interpretations, courts may not impose

upon agencies additional procedural hurdles

beyond those established by Congress. The APA

authorizes courts to set aside agency action found

to be “without observance of procedure required by

law,” and nothing more. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D)

(emphasis added).

(b) Skidmore v. Swift

In another line of cases, this Court has

consistently held that an agencys change in

interpretation is merely one factor to consider in

evaluating the interpretation’s weight. The D.C.

Circuit’s per se rule conflicts irreconcilably with

these opinions by making one factor—a changed

interpretation—wholly dispositive of an

interpretation’s validity.

In the seminal case of Skidmore v. Swift, the

Court examined a DOL “Interpretive Bulletin,”

which the Court described as a “practical guide to

employers and employees as to how the office

representing the public interest in [the Act’s]

27

enforcement will seek to apply it.” 323 U.S. at 138.

Describing the weight courts should give such

informal interpretations, the Court made clear that

the consistency of agencies’ interpretations is

simply one factor among many for courts to

consider:

We consider that the _ rulings,

interpretations and opinions of _ the

Administrator under this Act, while not

controlling upon the courts by reason of

their authority, do constitute a body of

experience and informed judgment to which

courts and litigants may properly resort for

guidance. The weight of such a judgment in

a particular case will depend upon the

thoroughness evident in its consideration,

the validity of its reasoning, its consistency

with earlier and later pronouncements, and

all those factors which give it power to

persuade, if lacking power to control.

Id. at 140 (emphasis added). The Court has

endorsed Skidmore’s formula dozens of times, most

recently last term. See Vance v. Ball State Univ.,

133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 n.4 (2013).

Indeed, this Court is no stranger to cases

involving shifting agency interpretations. In

evaluating changed interpretations—none of which

was the product of notice-and-comment

rulemaking—this Court has never strayed from

Skidmore’s multifactor, totality-of-the-

circumstances analysis. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Plan

Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285,

296 n.7 (2009) (noting that a “change in

interpretation alone presents no separate ground

for disregarding [the] Department’s present

28

interpretation” (citations omitted)); Riegel uv.

Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326-27 (2008)

(holding that where the agency changed its

interpretation, “the degree of deference might be

reduced by the fact that the agency’s earlier

position was different”); id. at 338 n.8 (Ginsburg,

J., dissenting) (same); United States v. Mead Corp.,

533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (when confronted with a

changed interpretation, instructing courts to

consider “consistency” as one factor in evaluating

the persuasiveness of an agency’s position); Good

Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417

(1993) (“[T]he consistency of an agency’s position is

a factor in assessing the weight that position is

due.”); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446

n.30 (1987) (according “considerably less deference”

to a revised agency interpretation); Watt v. Alaska,

451 U.S. 259, 272—73 (1981) (concluding that where

an agency changed its interpretation, “[t]he

Department’s current interpretation, being in

conflict with its initial position, is entitled to

considerably less deference”); Gen. Elec. Co. v.

Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-43 (1976) (considering

conflicting EEOC interpretive guidance as one

factor in the deference analysis).

The D.C. Circuit’s per se rule is flatly

inconsistent with these decisions and many others.

Simply put, courts cannot evaluate whether to

adopt a changed interpretation if such

interpretations are categorically imvalid, as the

Paralyzed Veterans doctrine necessarily holds. The

D.C. Circuit’s rule is at war with these cases and

must be cast aside.

29

(3) The law affords numerous checks

on shifting agency positions

Paralyzed Veterans is’ perhaps best

understood as an expression of judicial disapproval

of agency flip flops. But Paralyzed Veterans’ per se

rule ignores the numerous tools in the judicial

toolbox that protect regulated communities from

shifting agency interpretations. Ironically, once

these tools are taken into account, the Paralyzed

Veterans doctrine, by its own force, only serves to

prevent agencies from correcting their own

mistakes.

First, agencies that change _ their

interpretations “must show that there are good

reasons for the new policy.” Fox Television, 556

U.S. at 515. Absent a good reason for the shift, the

APA authorizes courts to strike down the revised

interpretation as “arbitrary” or “capricious.” See 5

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the

U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463

U.S. 29, 34 (1983). “Unexplained inconsistency is,

at most, a reason for holding an interpretation to be

an arbitrary and capricious change from agency

practice under the [APA].” Nat7T Cable &

Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545

U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs.

Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 46-57) (emphasis added).

To pass muster under the APA’s arbitrary or

capricious standard, “the agency must explain why

it now reject{[s] the considerations that led it to

adopt that initial policy.” Fox Television, 556 U.S.

at 535 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment). Importantly, agencies

must address any reliance interests upset by the

interpretive shift. Jd. at 515 (majority opinion); id.

30

at 535 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment).

Second, as previously discussed, courts

considering changed interpretations are less likely

to defer to the agency. “An agency interpretation of

a relevant provision which conflicts with the

agencys earlier interpretation is entitled to

considerably less deference than a consistently held

agency view.” INS, 480 U.S. at 446 n.30. Thus,

while an agency is generally free to change its

interpretation, courts will review the changed

interpretation carefully, using traditional

interpretive tools, and will not blindly adhere to the

agency’s substantive conclusions.!!

Third, an agency can only change its

interpretation if the revised interpretation is

consistent with the underlying regulations. Thus,

wile agencies may replace one _ reasonable

interpretation with another reasonable

interpretation, courts must set aside as “contrary to

law” any agencys new “interpretation” that

conflicts with the underlying legislative rules. See 5

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Guernsey Mem7 Hosp., 514 U.S.

at 100. Agencies may not, “under the guise of

interpreting a regulation . . . create de facto a new

regulation.” Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131

S. Ct. 871, 882 (2011) (citing Christensen v. Harris

County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)).

11 [mportantly, this Court has almost never granted deference

under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), to an agency

position that has vacillated over the years. Auer deference is

typically not warranted “when the agency’s interpretation

conflicts with a prior interpretation.” See Christopher v.

SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (citing

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)).

31

Fourth, Congress has created numerous safe

harbors insulating regulated communities from

liability when they rely on agency interpretations

that are later withdrawn. Relevant here, Section

259 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 absolves

employers from liability for past violations of the

FLSA if employers can show they acted in “good

faith in conformity with and in reliance on any

written administrative regulation, order, ruling,

approval, or interpretation.” 29 U.S.C. § 259(a).

Such a defense, if established, “shall be a bar to the

action or proceeding, notwithstanding that after

such act or omission, such administrative . .

interpretation . . . is modified or rescinded... .” Jd.

Indeed, Congress has created numerous such safe

harbors, which serve to protect regulated entities

that rely in good faith on informal agency guidance.

See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 57b-4(b); Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15

U.S.C. § 1640); Age Discrimination § in

Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 626(e);

Employment Retirement Income Security Act

(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1028; Civil Rights Act, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b).

Fifth, due process itself provides a baseline

of protection for regulated communities. “A

fundamental principle in our legal system is that

laws which regulate persons or entities must give

fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required.”

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct.

2307, 2317 (2012). For example in Fox Television,

this Court, in its second look at the FCC’s new

“fleeting expletives” policy, concluded that the FCC

violated due process when it sought to sanction two

television networks under its new interpretation for

32

conduct that occurred before the networks had fair

notice of the FCC’s new policy. Jd. at 2230.

The Paralyzed Veterans doctrine must be

evaluated in context with these firmly-rooted and

robust protections. Once existing protections are

taken into account, the D.C. Circuit’s per se rule

has the unfortunate effect of invalidating, by its

own force, only interpretations that are consistent

with the underlying regulations, thoroughly

reasoned, cognizant of the reliance interests of the

regulated community, worthy of respect by the

courts, and imposed after fair notice—in other

words, interpretations that are correct. The DOL’s

present interpretation that loan officers do not

qualify for the FLSA’s administrative exemption,

which is consistent with the regulations and the

DOL’s long-standing position prior to 2006—and

recognized by numerous courts as substantively

correct—is precisely such a casualty of the D.C.

Circuit’s misguided doctrine.

C. The Question Presented Is Important

and Recurring, and Has Far-Reaching

Consequences

The Question Presented in this Petition is both

critically important and perpetually recurring,

warranting Supreme Court review.

As this Court has recognized, the modern

administrative state “touches almost every aspect

of daily life.” Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co.

Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156

(2010). Legislative and interpretive rules both

serve critical—but different—functions in the way

administrative law affects those aspects of daily

life. While legislative rules fill statutory gaps with

binding law, interpretive rules constitute the very

33

dialogue between citizen and government about

how the government will seek to apply that law.

Shalala, 514 U.S. at 99. Paralyzed Veterans

threatens that dialogue, creating a powerful

incentive for agencies to remain silent.

Consider, for example, a grocer who asks the

DOL for advice on whether his assistant manager

is exempt under the FLSA. In a world without

Paralyzed Veterans, the DOL responds promptly. If

the DOL finds the employee exempt, the owner can

be more confident in his choice. If the agency later

changes its interpretation, the initial interpretation

provides the owner with a powerful tool in court.

Agencies subject to the D.C. Circuit’s Paralyzed

Veterans doctrine, on the other hand, will behave

entirely differently. They will become less

transparent, hesitant to provide any guidance for

fear of having their informal positions locked in.

The DOL will remain silent (or render tentative

guidance hedged with caveats, so as to avoid

Paralyzed Veterans’ sweep) rather than risk having

a potentially erroneous interpretation calcified into

the formal regulations, and the store owner will

receive no advice. Paralyzed Veterans serves only to

“muzzle any informal communications between

agencies and their regulated communities—

communications that are vital to the smooth

operation of both government and business.” Indep.

Equip. Dealers Ass’n v. EPA, 372 F.3d 420, 428

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.).

The dialogue between agencies and

citizens—threatened by Paralyzed Veterans—plays

out in many subtle ways thousands of times each

day. Agency interpretations regularly touch on

issues with important implications for citizens’

34

daily lives, including safety,!? civil rights,!* access

to social benefits,‘ consumer _rights,'5

immigration,’ housing,!’ taxes,'® and _ the

protection of environmental resources,!® to name a

few. When administering complex regulatory

regimes, agencies must resort to flexible

12 Re: Tread Act Provisions Involving Defective Tires, Nat'l

Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Dep't of Transp.,

http://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/12-

00245. ITA_Defective_Tire_Exportation. htm (Oct. 3, 2012)

(explaining the proper method for disposing of or destroying

dangerous recalled auto part); Regulations, Codes, & Code

Interpretations, US. Food & Drug Admin.,

http://www.fda. gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/RetailFoodProte

ction/RegulationsCodesInterpretations/ (last updated Aug. 19,

2013) (providing interpretive guidance to retailers on

handling and storing food in compliance with the food code).

18 See Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 675 F. Supp.

2d 660, 669 (W.D. Va. 2009), affd, 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011).

14 Encarnacion ex rel. George v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 72, 76 (2d

Cir. 2009); LC U-Bake, LLC v. United States, No. 3:12-CV-

0049-KI, 2012 WL 1379048 (D. Or. Apr. 20, 2012).

15 Chase Bank USA, N.A., 131 S. Ct. at 878; FTC v. Asia Pac.

Telecom, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931 (N.D. Ill. 2011).

16 Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 146 (1st Cir.

2007).

17 St. Marks Place Hous. Co., Inc. v. HUD., 610 F.3d 75, 78

(D.C. Cir. 2010).

18 Natl Rest. Ass’n v. Simon, 411 F. Supp. 993, 999 (D.D.C.

1976).

19 United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 708 (4th Cir. 2003).

35

interpretive rules to address the “myriad details

that are not explicitly resolved by the legislative

rules.” See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing

Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 52

Admin. L. Rev. 547, 553-54 (2000). “An initial

agency interpretation is not instantly carved in

stone. On the contrary, the agency . . . must

consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of

its policy on a continuing basis... .” Nat? Cable &

Telecommc’ns Assn., 545 U.S. at 981 (citations

omitted). By chilling the interpretive process, the

Paralyzed Veterans doctrine’ hinders’. the

conversation between government and citizen on a

wide range of regulatory issues. Forcing the

government to speak only with the force of law or

remain silent benefits no one. 2°

20 Further illustrating the importance of the Question

Presented, the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine has drawn

universal scorn from administrative law scholars of all

stripes, who criticize the doctrine as at war with the APA,

unwise, and practically unworkable. E.g., William Funk, A

Primer on Legislative Rules, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1321, 1329-30

(2001); Sam Kalen, The Transformation of Modern

Administrative Law: Changing Administrations and

Environmental Guidance Documents, 35 Ecology L.Q. 657,

717-20 (2008); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing

Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 Admin. L. Rev.

547 (2000); Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the

Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an

Essential Element, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 803, 807—09 (2001); Jon

Connolly, Note, Alaska Hunters and the D.C. Circuit: A

Defense of Flexible Interpretive Rulemaking, 101 Colum. L.

Rev. 155 (2001); Brian J. Shearer, Comment, Outfoxing

Alaska Hunters: How Arbitrary and Capricious Review of

Changing Regulatory Interpretations Can More Efficiently

Police Agency Discretion, 62 Am. U. L. Rev. 167 (2012); see

also Richard W. Murphy, Hunters for Administrative Common

36

D. This Case Is the Ideal Vehicle To

Review the Question Presented

This case is an excellent vehicle to consider

the Question Presented. There is no dispute that

the DOL changed its interpretation of its own

regulations. Further, the resolution of the Question

Presented is the dispositive issue in the case.

Although MBA argued before the district court that

2010AI was arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent

with the governing regulations, the district court

upheld the substance of 2010AI. MBA chose not to

appeal that ruling to the D.C. Circuit, and the

district court’s substantive ruling is now final.

Thus, this Court need not take a position on the

substantive correctness of 2010AI.

CONCLUSION

Petitioners respectfully request that this

petition for a writ of certiorari be granted to review

the judgment and opinion of the Court of Appeals

for the D.C. Circuit. In the alternative, Petitioners

respectfully request that this Court call for the

views of the Solicitor General in this matter.?!

Law, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 917, 918; Wiliem S. Jordan III,

Interpretive Rules and Statements of Poluy—When Do They

Constitute Legislative Rules?, 29 Admin. & Reg. L. News, No.

1 (2003); Michael Asimow & Robert A. Anthony, A Second

Opinion? Inconsistent Interpretive Rules, 25 Admin & Reg. L.

News, No. 2 (2000).

21 The Solicitor General’s office has asked this Court to

overrule Paralyzed Veterans on at least one prior occasion.

See Petition for Certiorari, Leavitt v. Baystate Health Sys.,

547 U.S. 1054, No. 05-936, 2006 WL 207778, at *24—25 (Jan.

26, 2006). The Solicitor General should be given an

opportunity, however, to express his views in this case as

well.

37

Respectfully submitted.

Adam W. Hansen Paul J. Lukas

Counsel of Record Rachhana T. Srey

Nichols Kaster, LLP Nichols Kaster, PLLP

One Embarcadero Center Minneapolis, MN 55402

Suite 720 (612) 256-3205

San Francisco, CA 94111

(415) 277-7236 Sundeep Hora

ahansen@nka.com Alderman, Devorsetz &

Hora PLLC

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 969-8220

February 28, 2014

APPENDIX

la

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 22, 2013 Decided July 2, 2013

No. 12-5246

MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION,

APPELLANT

v

SETH D. HARRIS, SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY, ACTING SECRETARY OF UNITED

STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ET AL..,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-00073)

Michael W. Steinberg argued the cause for

appellant. With him on the briefs were Sam S.

Shaulson and David M. Kerr.

Anthony J. Steinmeyer, Assistant Director,

U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for

appellees. With him on the brief were Stuart F.

Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney

General, Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and

Douglas N. Letter, Director.

Sundeep Hora and Adam W. Hansen were on

the brief for intervenors-appellees Jerome Nickols,

et al.

2a

Before: TATEL and BROWN, Circuit Judges,

and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge

BROWN.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: The tandem of

Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P.,

117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997) and Alaska

Professional Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Alaska Hunters”) announced an

ostensibly straightforward rule: “When an agency

has given its regulation a definitive interpretation,

and later significantly revises that interpretation,

the agency has in effect amended its rule,

something it may not accomplish [under the APA]

without notice and comment.” Alaska Hunters, 177

F.3d at 1034. The only question properly before this

three-judge panel is a narrow one: what is the role

of reliance in this analysis?! Is it, as the

government contends, a “separate and independent

requirement.” Oral Arg. 10:42-10:45, or is it just

one of several factors courts can look to in order to

determine whether an agency’ interpretation

qualifies as definitive,? as Mortgage Bankers

Association (“MBA”) suggests? We find ourselves in

general agreement with the industry association

1 Bound as we are by Paralyzed Veterans and Alaska

Hunters, we decline the government’s invitation to “call” for

“the full Court [to]* * * lay the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine to

rest.” Letter of Clarification, No. 12-5246 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 25,

2013) (quoting Appellee Br. 47).

2 Our case law uses the terms “definitive” and

“authoritative” interchangeably. Compare Paralyzed

Veterans, 11 F.3d at 586 (“authoritative interpretation”), with

Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1034 (“definitive interpretation”).

3a

that there is no discrete reliance element. Reliance

is ust one part of the definitiveness calculus.

Fortunately, this is as far as our inquiry

need go. Having conceded the existence of two

definitive—and conflicting—agency interpretations,

the government acknowledged at oral argument

that petitioner “prevail[s] if ... the only reason

[courts] look to reliance is to find out if there is a

definitive interpretation.” Oral Arg. 10:56-11:10. So

stipulated, we reverse the District Court order

dismissing MBA’s Motion for Summary Judgment

and remand the case with instructions to vacate

the 2010 Administrator Interpretation significantly

revising the agency’s 2006 Opinion Letter. If the

Department of Labor (“DOL”) wishes to readopt the

later-in-time interpretation, it is free to. We take no

position on the merits of their interpretation. DOL

must, however, conduct the required notice and

comment rulemaking.

Petitioner MBA is a national trade

association representing over 2,200 real estate

finance companies with more than 280,000

employees nationwide. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n v.

Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d 193, 197 (D.D.C 2012). We

focus here on the mortgage loan officers who

typically assist prospective borrowers in identifying

and then applying for various mortgage offerings.

Though the recent financial crisis has thrust

members of this profession into the forefront of the

4a

news, our concern here is more mundane: the

method and manner of their pay.

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act

(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seg., and old law DOL

must adapt to new circumstances, employers are

generally required to pay overtime wages to

employees who work longer than 40 hours per

week. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). The Act provides

several exceptions to this rule. Those “employed in

a bona fide’ executive, administrative, or

professional capacity[,]... or in the capacity of

outside salesman,” for example, are exempt from

the statute’s minimum wage and maximum hour

requirements. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). Whether

mortgage loan officers qualify for this

“administrative exemption” is a difficult and at

times contentious question. So difficult, in fact,

DOL has found itself on both sides of the debate. In

2006, the agency issued an opinion letter

concluding on the facts presented that mortgage

loan officers with archetypal job duties fell within

the administrative exemption. Just four years

later, in 2010, Deputy Administrator Nancy J.

Leppink issued an “Administrator’s Interpretation”

declaring that “employees-who perform the typical

job duties” of the hypothetical mortgage loan officer

“do not qualify as bona fide administrative

employees.” J.A. 259. The 2010 pronouncement

“explicitly withdrew the 2006 Opinion Letter.”

Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 201.

Citing Paralyzed Veterans and its progeny,

MBA challenged DOL’s decision to change their

“definitive interpretation” without first undergoing

5a

notice-and-comment rulemaking as a violation of

the APA. Compl. { 38. [J.A. 22] The District Court

rejected the argument. After assuring itself that

Paralyzed Veterans remains good law, see Mortgage

Bankers Ass’n, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 204-05, the court

read our recent decision in MetWest Inc. uv.

Secretary of Labor, 560 F.3d 506 (D.C. Cir. 2009), to

require a showing of “substantial and justifiable

reliance on a well-established agency

interpretation.” See id. at 207. (internal quation

marks and emphasis omitted). Although petitioner

had argued reliance in the alternative, the court

concluded MBA was unable to “satisfy the standard

for demonstrating reliance recognized in Met West.”

id. at 208. The court then denied MBA’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, but not before dismissing the

association’s substantive challenge to the 2010

interpretation as inconsistent with the agency’s

2004 regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b). The

present appeal followed.

il

On its face, the Paralyzed Veterans analysis

contains just two elements: definitive

interpretations (“definitiveness”) and a significant

change (“significant revision”). But as with most

things doctrinal, the devil is in the details.

3 The doctrine’s operative assumption—the belief that

a definitive interpretation is so closely intertwined with the

regulation that a significant change to the former constitutes

a repeal or amendment of the latter—is established law in

this Circuit, see, e.g., Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d

992, 997-98 (D.C. Cir. 2005), but the Courts of Appeals are

split on the issue. According to one recent survey, the Fifth

6a

Despite its age, few cases discuss Paralyzed

Veterans at length.‘ One critical question—and a

dispositive one here—concerns the role of reliance.

Borrowing heavily from MetWest and Honeywell

International, Inc. v. NRC, 628 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir.

2010), two recent cases that draw on our Alaska

Hunters decision, DOL suggests that the Paralyzed

Veterans analysis contains an independent third

element: substantial and justified reliance. MBA

takes a different approach to Alaska Hunters

altogether. In its view, that case stands only for the

proposition that reliance can elevate an otherwise

non-definitive interpretation into a_ definitive

interpretation; as such, it falls squarely within the

existing definitiveness element. Of the two, we

Circuit has adopted our approach and “the Eighth and Third

Circuits have mentioned [it] in dicta,” but “[t]he First, Second,

Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits agree that

changes in interpretations do not require notice and comment

because both the original and current position constitute

interpretive rules.” Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1338

(11th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Magnesium Corp. of

Am., 616 F.3d 1129, 1138-39 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting a

slightly different circuit split between the Third, Fifth, and

Sixth Circuits on one hand, and the First and Ninth Circuit

on the other).

4 It need not reflect poorly on the doctrine that so few

of our cases haven taken up Paralyzed Veterans’s banner—

and still fewer have used its reasoning to invalidate an

agency interpretation for failing to conduct notice and

comment rulemaking. See Appellee Br. 40-41 (counting

Alaska Hunters and arguably Environmental Integrity Project

as the lone exceptions). Paralyzed Veterans may very well

serve as a prophylactic that discourages agencies from

attempting to circumvent notice and comment requirements

in the first instance. We are unable to quantify these effects

by reference to case citations alone.

7a

believe MBA’s approach better explains Alaska

Hunters.

Alaska Hunters is an exceptional case with

an otherwise straightforward premise. In 1963, the

Federal Aviation Administration’s Alaska office

(the “Alaskan Region”) began a thirty year practice

of “uniformly advis[ing] all guides, lodge managers

and guiding services in Alaska that they could meet

their regulatory responsibilities by complying with

the requirements of [14 C.F.R. Part 91] only.”

Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1035. It was not until

1997 that officials in FAA’s Washington, D.C.

headquarters formally pushed back against the

regional office’s long-standing interpretation.®

Through a “Notice to Operators” published in the

Federal Register without notice and opportunity for

comment, the agency announced that certain

Alaskan guides would now have to comply with

other, more onerous regulations. Individuals who

had “opened lodges and built up _ businesses

dependent on aircraft” in reliance on the Alaskan

Region’s interpretation promptly brought suit

challenging the agency’s about-face. Jd. at 1035.

In relevant part, FAA argued Paralyzed

Veterans was “inapposite” because the Alaskan

Region’s interpretation was not definitive; it

5 It is “uncertain” whether the D.C.-based officials had

knowledge of the Alaskan Region’s interpretive position prior

to the 1990s—that is, before FAA consolidated power in its

national headquarters following a near three-decade-long

experiment with a decentralized organizational structure

“that transferred much authority to regional organizations.”

Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1032.

8a

“represented simply a local enforcement omission,

in conflict with the agency’s policy in the rest of the

country.” Jd. at 1034-35. We disagreed. Although a

local office’s interpretation of a regulation or

provision of advice to a regulated party “will not

necessarily constitute an authoritative

administrative position, particularly if the

interpretation or advice contradicts the view of the

agency as a whole,” the situation in Alaska Hunters

was “quite different.” Id. at 1035.

For one thing, there was no evidence in the

record of any conflicting interpretation. The

Alaskan Region uniformly enforced its interpretive

position for thirty years and both FAA and the

National Transportation Safety Board had at some

point referred to it as FAA policy. See id. at 1035.

And even if “FAA as a whole somehow had in mind

an interpretation different from that of its Alaskan

Region, guides and lodge operators in Alaska had

no reason to know this.” Jd. All the regulated

parties had before them was the formal,§

uncontradicted, and uniformly-applied

interpretation of a local office—an interpretation

Alaskan guide pilots reasonably relied on for three

decades. Such advice might not necessarily qualify

as definitive, but here, we concluded, it “became an

authoritative departmental interpretation, and

administrative common law applicable to Alaskan

guide pilots” that could not be rewritten without

notice and comment rulemaking. Jd.

6 “(T]he regional office’s position was reflected in

official agency adjudications holding that Alaskan guides

need not comply with commercial pilot standards.” Ass’n of

Am. R.R. v. DOT, 198 F.3d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

9a

Alaska Hunters’s takeaway is clear: reliance

is but one factor courts must consider in assessing

whether an agency interpretation qualifies as

definitive or authoritative. Or to put matters more

precisely, because regulated entities are unlikely to

substantially—and often cannot be said _ to

justifiably—rely on agency pronouncements lacking

some or all the hallmarks of a_ definitive

interpretation, significant reliance functions as a

rough proxy for definitiveness. The converse also

holds true. Agency pronouncements effectively

ignored by regulated entities are unlikely to bear

the marks of an authoritative decision. See Ass’n of

Am. R.R., 198 F.3d at 949-50 (finding no definitive

interpretation in part because “[njothing in thfe]

record suggests that railroads relied on the [agency

statements] in any comparable way” to the Alaska

guides).? This is more art than science. Courts must

weigh the role reliance plays on a case-by-case

basis to ascertain its value.

DOL pushes back against this framework by

treating reliance as a separate and independent

third element.® That, the agency claims, is exactly

7 Obviously, this is not to suggest any measure of

reliance will automatically render an _ interpretation

definitive.

8 The agency never develops the implications of its

alternative vision, but we think two points obvious. First, by

dissociating reliance from definitiveness and calling it an

independent requirement, DOL believes courts will have to

address the reliance issue in all cases, including cases like the

present in which definitiveness has been established. Second,

DOL assumes the third element would be satisfied only if the

reliance is equal to or greater than that of Alaska Hunters, a

unique case. Meaning, the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine would

10a

what our MetWest decision did in (1) addressing

reliance only in the alternative, i.e., after assuming

a definitive interpretation, see Met West, 560 F.3d at

510-11, and (2) speaking of Alaska Hunters’s

“substantial and justifiable reliance on a well-

established agency interpretation,” id. at 511, a

phrase “most natural[ly] read[]” to distinguish

definitiveness and reliance as “separate

requirements,” Appellee Br. 23-24; see also

Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 205-

08.9

We do not think this characterization of

MetWest’s dicta could possibly be _ correct.

“Definitive” is a term of art as used in the

Paralyzed Veterans context. Once a court has

classified an agency interpretation as such, it

cannot be significantly revised without notice and

comment rulemaking. No intervening decision of

this Court ever read Alaska Hunters to require

only ever apply where the parties can demonstrate

substantial and justified reliance akin to that of the Alaska

Guides—a reliance interest the government describes as

“especially strong” since affected parties uprooted their lives

to move to Alaska to start businesses. Appellee Br. 19; see

also MetWest, 628 F.3d at 511; Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 864

F. Supp. 2d at 207 (“[T}his Court is convinced that Met West

intended to set the bar for what a plaintiff must establish to

satisfy the reliance component of the Paralyzed Veterans

doctrine.”). If adopted, this position effectively renders

Paralyzed Veterans dead letter law by limiting its application

to a most extreme fact pattern—one unlikely to ever be

duplicated.

® Because Honeywell unceremoniously adopts

MetWest’s language and approach, see Honeywell, 568 F.3d at

579-80, we focus our discussion primarily on Met West.

lla

anything to the contrary, and that includes

Association of American Railroads, the lone pre-

Met West case DOL cites as having treated “reliance

and definitive interpretation as two independent

requirements.” Appellee Br. 24.19 Whether reliance

played a significant role in the analysis, see, e.g.,

Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1035-36; Ass’n of Am.

R.R., 198 F.3d at 950; or took a back seat where the

definitive nature of the interpretation was treated

as self-evident, see Envtl. Integrity Project, 425 F.3d

at 998; Monmouth Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 257 F.3d

807, 814 (D.C. Cir. 2001), we have always

considered it as part of the first element. In short,

we have been too consistent in our treatment of

these so-called agency flip-flops to now read dictum

in MetWest as sub silentio reconfiguring the

doctrine in the absence of either a unanimous /rons

footnote or a decision of the en banc court.

Finally, we disagree with the suggestion that

the only way to protect agencies from inadvertently

locking in disfavored, informally promulgated

positions is to impose a separate and independent

reliance element. Practically speaking, reliance

considered as part of the _ definitiveness

determination will more than adequately protect

agencies from this ossification threat. We thus

decline DOL’s invitation to spin a third

10 See Ass'n of Am. R.R., 198 F.3d at 948 (“We find

nothing in these materials, individually or taken together,

that comes even close to the definitive interpretation that

triggered notice and comment rulemaking in Alaska

Professional Hunters.”); see also Devon Energy Corp. uv.

Kempthorne, 551 F.3d 1030, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Air

Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. FAA, 291 F.3d 49, 56-58 (D.C. Cir.

2002); Envtl. Integrity Project, 425 F.3d at 997-98.

12a

requirement from whole cloth. Emphatically, that

is an issue for the full Court to take up at its

discretion, not this three-judge panel.

iil

In view of the government’s concession that

the case need go no further than this, we reverse

the District Court order denying MBA’s Motion for

Summary Judgment and remand the case with

istructions to vacate DOL’s 2010 Administrator

Interpretation.

So Ordered.

13a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed On: July 2, 2013

No. 12-5246

MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION,

APPELLANT

Vv

SETH D. HARRIS, SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY, ACTING SECRETARY OF UNITED

STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ET AL..,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-00073)

BEFORE: TATEL and BROWN, Circuit Judges,

and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the record

on appeal from the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia and was argued by

counsel. On consideration thereof, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the

order of the District Court denying MBA’s Motion

for Summary Judgment appealed from in this

cause is hereby reversed and the case is remanded

14a

with instructions to vacate DOL’s 2010

Administrator Interpretation, in accordance with

the opinion of the court filed herein this date.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY:

/s/

Jennifer M. Clark

Deputy Clerk

Date: July 2, 2013

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Brown.

15a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MORTGAGE BANKERS

ASSOCIATION, Civil Action No.

Plaintiff, 11-0073 (RBW)

Vv.

HILDA SOLIS, Secretary of Labor;

NANCY LEPPINK,

Acting Wage and Hour Administrator; and

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

LABOR

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The plaintiff, the Mortgage Bankers

Association (“Association”), seeks declaratory and

injunctive relief in this civil lawsuit brought

against the defendants, Hilda Solis, in her official

capacity as Secretary of the United States

Department of Labor (“DOL”), Nancy Leppink, in

her official capacity as Deputy Administrator of the

Wage and Hour Division of the DOL, and the DOL

itself, under the Administrative Procedure Act

(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). Complaint for

Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (“Compl.”) 7 1.

Specifically, the plaintiff seeks judicial review of

the defendants’ issuance of DOL Administrative

Interpretation 2010-1 (“2010 AI”), which conflicts

with a prior position taken by the DOL. Id. ¥¥ 2,

26-27. Currently before the Court is the

16a

Association’s Motion for Summary Judgment and

the DOL’s Cross Motion to Dismiss or, in the

Alternative, for Summary Judgment. Upon

consideration of the complaint, the parties’ cross-

motions, all memoranda of law and the exhibits

submitted with the motions, and the administrative

record,! the Court concludes that it must grant in

part and deny in part the DOL’s cross-motion and

deny the Association’s motion for summary

judgment.

I, BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

This case concerns the Fair Labor Standards

Act (“FLSA” or “Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006),

and the regulations promulgated by the DOL to

implement the Act. See Defendants’ Cross Motion

to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary

Judgment (“Defs.’ Mot.”) at 1. Enacted by Congress

in 1938, Compl. { 14, the FLSA generally requires

that covered employers pay overtime wages to their

employees who work more than 40 hours per week,

unless they are exempted by the Act from this

requirement. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Section

‘ In addition to the documents already identified, the Court

considered the following submissions in reaching its decision:

(1) the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Mem.”), (2)

the Defendants’ Cross—Motion to Dismiss or, in the

Alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Defs.’ Mot.”), (3) the

Plaintiffs Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary

Judgment and Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment (“P1.’s Reply”),

and (4) the Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to

Defendants’ Cross Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,

for Summary Judgment (“Defs.’ Reply”).

17a

213(a)(1) of the FLSA provides for such an

exemption, stating that “any employee employed in

a bona fide executive, administrative, or

professional capacity[,] ... or in the capacity of

outside salesman (as such terms are defined and

delimited from time to time by regulations of the

Secretary[,]...)” is exempt from the “[m]inimum

wage and maximum hour requirements” otherwise

required by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).

The Wage and Hour Division of the DOL

(‘Wage and Hour Division”) is responsible for

“administering and enforcing the FLSA, and it

periodically issues regulations that define the scope

of the FLSA’s exemptions and interpretations of

those regulations.” Defs.’ Mot. at 4. After the

passage of the FLSA, the Wage and Hour Division

“promulgated regulations defining and delimiting

the FLSA’s exemptions from overtime pay

requirements.” Compl. § 14. Those regulations

were most recently amended on August 23, 2004.

See Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 8-78

(Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for

Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside

Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg.

22122—191 (Apr. 23, 2004) (codified at 29 C.F.R. §

541)). As revised, the regulations state that the

administrative exemption of section 213(a)(1) of the

FLSA applies to an employee:

(1) Compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate

of not less than $455 per week ...;

(2) Whose primary duty is the performance of

office or non-manual work directly related to the

management or general business operations of

the employer or the employer’s customers; and

(3) Whose primary duty includes the exercise of

18a

discretion and independent judgment with

respect to matters of significance.

29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a). The 2004 regulations were

accompanied by a preamble “Summary,” which

explained that the administrative “exemption is

intended to be limited to those employees whose

duties relate to the administrative as distinguished

from the production operations of a business.” 69

Fed. Reg. 22122, 22141 (internal quotation marks

omitted). The 2004 regulations also provide

examples that illustrate how the administrative

duties exemption can be applied to employees in

various occupations, including the following

example regarding the financial services industry:

Employees in the financial services

industry generally meet the duties

requirements for the

administrative exemption if their

duties include work such as

collecting and analyzing

information regarding the

customer’s income, assets,

investments or debts; determining

which financial products best meet

the customer’s needs and financial

circumstances; advising the

customer regarding the advantages

and disadvantages of different

financial products; and marketing,

servicing or promoting’ the

employers financial products.

However, an employee whose

primary duty is selling financial

products does not qualify for the

administrative exemption.

29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b) (entitled “Administrative

19a

exemption examples’).

B. Factual and Procedural Background

1. Pre-2004 Interpretation of _ the

Administrative Exemption

The following facts are not in dispute and are

taken from either the Association’s complaint or

the administrative record filed in this case.

The plaintiff is a national trade association

that represents the real estate finance industry.

Compl. § 7. The Association “has over 2,200

member companies, including all elements of real

estate finance: mortgage companies, mortgage

brokers, commercial banks, thrifts, life insurance

companies, and others in the mortgage lending

field.” Id. These companies employ over 280,000

individuals throughout the United States. Id. The

Association’s primary goals are “to ensure the

continued strength of the nation’s residential and

commercial real estate market, to expand home

ownership and extend access to affordable housing

to all Americans.” Id.

From as early as 1964, and until March 24,

2010, the DOL announced its interpretation of the

FLSA through the issuance of “[o]pinion [l]etters.”

Id. § 15. These opinion letters were written in

response to inquiries from private parties seeking

guidance about the application of the FLSA to their

business activities. Jd. Access to the opinion letters

was available through several avenues, including,

in recent years, electronic legal research databases

and the DOL’s own website. See id. And as the

plaintiff correctly points out, the District of

Columbia Circuit has held that “DOL Opinion

Letters ... constitute final agency action subject to

judicial review.” Id. ¥ 16 (citing Natl Automatic

20a

Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d

689, 701-02 (D.C.Cir.1971) (holding that although

the opinion letters lack formality, they are intended

as a “deliberative determination of the agency’s

position” and thus are subject to judicial review)).

The administrative record in this case

contains two opinion letters issued by the DOL

prior to the 2004 amendment of its regulations. The

first, dated July 23, 1997, discussed whether a

wholesale salesman is exempt from the FLSA’s

overtime requirements. A.R. at 1-3 (Opinion

Letter, 1997 WL 970727 (DOL WAGE-HOUR)).

This opinion letter concluded that “[t]he decisions

of wholesale salesmen typically do not involve

matters of policy or significant importance, but are

limited to routine day-to-day operational matters.”

Id. at 2—3. While the Wage and Hour Division did

not. come to an ultimate conclusion on the

exemption question, the opinion letter suggested

that wholesale salesmen are not covered by the

administrative exemption.? Jd. The second pre—

2004 opinion letter found in the administrative

record, dated May 17, 1999, determined that “loan

officers are engaged in carrying out the employer’s

day-to-day activities rather than in determining

the overall course and policies of the business” and

were therefore non-exempt employees entitled to

2 If the party does not provide the DOL with sufficient facts

regarding the nature of their inquiry, the DOL will not

provide an ultimate conclusion; rather, it will state what set

of facts would need to exist in order for the employee to be

exempt. See generally Defs.’ Mot. at 11-12 (citing A.R. at 87—

93 (Opinion Letter FLSA2006—31 (“2006 Opinion Letter”)))

(providing an opinion that an employee would be exempt if

the assumptions provided by the requestor and other relevant

facts are true).

2la

overtime. See id. at 5 (Opinion Letter, 1999 WL

1002401 (DOL WAGE-HOUR) (“1999 Opinion

Letter”)).

Effective August 23, 2004, the DOL amended

its regulations interpreting the wage and hour

requirements set forth by the FLSA. Compl. 4 21.

As noted earlier, the amended regulations, as they

pertain to the financial service industry, provide:

Employees in the financial services

industry generally meet the duties

requirements for the

administrative exemption if their

duties include work such as

collecting and analyzing

information regarding the

customer’s income, assets,

investments or debts; determining

which financial products best meet

the customer’s needs and financial

circumstances; advising the

customer regarding the advantages

and disadvantages of different

financial products; and marketing,

servicing or promoting’. the

employer's financial products.

However, an employee whose

primary duty is selling financial

products does not qualify for the

administrative exemption.

Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b)). And as already

noted, the amended regulations included a

preamble, id. § 22, which makes it clear that “many

financial services employees qualify as exempt

administrative employees, even if they are involved

in some selling to consumers.” 69 Fed.Reg. at

22146.

22a

2. The 2006 Opinion Letter

On September 8, 2006, the DOL issued an

opinion letter to the Association (“2006 Opinion

Letter”), see AR. at 87-93 (Opinion Letter

FLSA2006-31 (“2006 Opinion Letter”)), at the

Association’s request. Defs.’ Mot. at 11 n. 6.5 In

requesting the letter, the Association asked the

DOL to assume that the mortgage loan officers who

were the subject of the letter spent less than fifty

percent of their working time on “customer-specific

persuasive sales activity.” Jd. at 11-12 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). The 2006

Opinion Letter began by reminding the Association

that an employee’s exempt status is “determined by

analyzing each particular employee’s actual job

duties and compensation under the applicable

regulations.” A.R. at 87 (2006 Opinion Letter).

The Association also asked whether the

DOL’s analysis of the administrative exemption

was altered by the 2004 regulations. Jd. at 88—89.

In response, the DOL noted that “[bJecause the

criteria in the duties test for the administrative

exemption in the 2004 revised final regulations are

substantially the same as under the prior rule, the

outcome of this opinion would be essentially

identical under either version of the regulations.”

Id. at 89 (citation omitted).

The 2006 Opinion Letter reinforced that the

2004 revised regulations made the administrative

exception applicable to employees when their

8 Generally, the DOL does not release the name of the

requestor for an opinion letter. Defs.’ Mot. at 11 n. 6.

However, the Association has acknowledged that it requested

the 2006 opinion letter. Jd.

23a

employment satisfied the following’ three

components:

(1) Compensated on a salary or fee

basis at a rate of not less than $455

per week ..., exclusive of board,

lodging or other facilities;

(2) Whose primary duty is the

performance of office or non-

manual work directly related to the

management or general business

operations of the employer or the

employer’s customers; and

(3) Whose primary duty includes

the exercise of discretion and

independent judgment with respect

to matters of significance.

Id. (citation omitted). With regard to the second

prong of this test, the letter defined “[w]Jork that is

‘directly related to the management or general

business operations’ of the employer ... as ‘work

directly related to assisting with the running or

servicing of the business, as distinguished, for

example, from working on a manufacturing

production line or selling a product in a retail or

service establishment.’ ” Jd. (citation omitted). As to

the third component of the test, the term “primary

duty” is defined in the letter as “the principal,

main, major or most important duty that the

employee performs.” Jd. (quoting 29 C.F.R. §

541.700(a)). The letter explained that the amount

of time an employee spends performing exempt

work is a factor to consider in assessing the

applicability of the exemption, but time alone “is

not the sole test.” Jd. (quoting 29 C.F.R. §

541.700(b)).

24a

The 2006 Opinion Letter further noted that

although employees whose primary duty involves

sales cannot qualify for the administrative

exemption, many financial services employees

could and had been found to fall under this

exemption. Jd. at 90 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(b)).

Accordingly, the DOL concluded that the loan

officers who were the subject of the 2006 Opinion

Letter

ha[d] a primary duty other than

sales, as their work includefd]

collecting and analyzing a

customer’s financial information,

advising the customer about the

risks and benefits of various

mortgage loan alternatives in light

of their individual financial

circumstances, and advising the

customer about avenues to obtain a

more advantageous loan program.

Id. at 90-91. The letter concluded that “the use of

software programs or tools to assess risk and to

narrow the scope of products available to the

customer does not necessarily disqualify the

employees from the administrative exemption for

lack of discretion and independent judgment.” Jd.

at 91. Finally, the letter noted that its “opinion

[was] based exclusively on the facts and

circumstances described in [the Association’s]

request and is given based on [the Association’s]

representation, express or implied, that [the

Association] ha[d] provided a full and fair

description of all the facts and circumstances that

would be pertinent to [the DOL’s] consideration of

the question presented.” Jd. at 93.

According to the Association, relying on the

25a

2006 Opinion Letter, many members of the

financial services industry, including many of the

Association’s members, classified mortgage loan

officers as exempt employees. Compl. | 24. Thus,

mortgage loan officers were not compensated with

overtime pay. Jd. 4 25. Rather, the members of the

Association ensured that their mortgage loan

officers were well compensated through other

means, like competitive salaries, bonuses, and

commissions. Id.

3. The 2010 Administrative Interpretation

On March 24, 2010, the DOL, “sua sponte,”

issued an Administrative Interpretation, the 2010

Al, expressly withdrawing the 2006 Opinion Letter.

Id. § 26. Nancy Leppink, Acting Administrator of

the Wage and Hour Division, issued the 2010 AI.

See A.R. at 102 (U.S. Department of Labor,

Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-01

(“Administrator's Interpretation No. 2010—01”)).

The 2010 AI focuses on “[wjhether the primary

duty of employees who perform the typical job

duties of a mortgage loan officer is office or non-

manual work directly related to the management or

general business operations of their employer or

their employer’s customers.” Jd. at 103. The 2010

AI expressed that to qualify for the exemption, an

employee’s “[wlork [must be] directly related to

management or general business operations of an

employer [, which] includes work in functional

areas such as accounting, budgeting, quality

control, purchasing, advertising, research, human

resources, labor relations, and similar areas.” Id.

(citation omitted). In essence, the 2010 AI states

that the administrative exemption was designed for

“employees whose work involves servicing the

business itself].]” Id. at 104.

26a

The 2010 AI relies on a District of Minnesota

decision, Casas v. Conseco Finance Corp., No.

Civ.00—1512, 2002 WL 507059 (D.Minn. March 31,

2002) in addition to several other cases, as support

for its position that mortgage loan officers are non-

exempt employees. Jd. at 105. In Casas, loan

originators asserted they were entitled to overtime

compensation from the defendants under the FLSA,

requiring the court to decide whether the plaintiffs

were exempt from FLSA overtime pay provisions.

The court found that because “Conseco’s primary

business purpose [was] to design, create and sell

home lending products,” the mortgage loan officers’

primary duty was to sell those lending products on

a day-to-day basis, not “ ‘the running of [the]

business [itself]’ or determining its overall course or

policies.” Casas, 2002 WL 507059, at *9 (citation

omitted) (alterations in original). Relying on the

ruling in Casas, the 2010 AI reasons that “because

Conseco’s loan officers’ duties were ‘selling loans

directly to individual customers, one loan at a

time,’ ” the administrative exemption did not apply

to them. A.R. at 105 #$£=(Administrator’s

Interpretation No. 2010-01) (internal citation

omitted). The 2010 AI further notes that the 2004

amended regulations examined the difference

between mortgage loan officers who spend the

majority of their time selling mortgage products to

consumers, like the Casas plaintiffs, as compared to

those who “promotfe] the employer’s financial

products generally, decid[e}) on an advertising

budget and techniques, run[ ] an office, hirfe] staff

and set [ ] their pay, service[ ] existing customers

..., and advis[e] customers.” Jd. at 105 (citing 69

Fed. Reg. at 22145-46). The 2010 AI concluded that

in order for mortgage loan officers to be properly

classified as exempt employees, their primary

27a

duties must be administrative in nature. Jd. at 105.

Relying on the facts that a significant

portion of mortgage loan officers’ compensation is

composed of commissions from sales, that their job

performance is evaluated based on their sales

volume, and that much of the non-sales work

performed by the officers is completed in

furtherance of their sales duties, the 2010 Al

concluded “that a mortgage loan officer’s primary

duty is making sales.” Jd. at 106—07. And because

their primary duty is making sales, the 2010 AI

further concludes that “mortgage loan officers

perform the production[, not the administrative,]

work of their employers.” Id. at 107.

After concluding that the work of mortgage

loan officers is not related to the general business

operation of their employers, the 2010 AI

considered another factor that could provide the

basis for finding that mortgage loan officers are

subject to the administrative exemption. /d. at 108.

The AI states that “[t]he administrative exemption

can also apply if the employee’s primary duty is

directly related to the management or general

business operations of the employer’s customers.”

Id. In making this assessment, the 2010 AI notes

that “it is necessary to focus on the identity of the

custemer.” Id. The 2010 AI finds that “work for an

employer's customers does not qualify for the

administrative exemption where the customers are

individuals seeking advice for their personal needs,

such as people seeking mortgages for their homes.”

Id. However, it recognizes that a mortgage loan

officer “might qualify under the administrative

exemption” if the customer that the officer is

working with “is a business seeking advice about,

for example, a mortgage to purchase land for a new

28a

manufacturing plant, to buy a building for office

space, or to acquire a warehouse for storage of

finished goods.” Jd. Nevertheless, the 2010 AI

concludes that the typical mortgage loan officers’

“primary duty is making sales for the employer [to

homeowners], and because homeowners do not

have management or general business operations, a

typical mortgage loan officer’s primary duty is not

related to the management or general business

operations of the employer’s customers.” Id. at 109.

Finally, the 2010 AI took exception with the

2006 Opinion Letter’s apparent assumption “that

the example provided in 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b)

creates an alternative standard ffor the

administrative exemption for employees in the

financial services industry.” Jd. Rather, the 2010 AI

states that 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b) merely illustrates

an example of an employee who might otherwise

qualify for the exemption based on “the

requirements set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 541.200.” Id.

Thus, the 2010 AI clarifies that “the administrative

exemption is only applicable to employees that

meet the requirements set forth in 29 C.F.R. §

541.200.” Id. In providing this clarification, the

2010 AI states, “[t]he fact example at 29 C.F.R. §

541.203(b) is not an alternative test, and its

guidance cannot result in it ‘swallowing’ the

requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 541.200."4 Id.

‘ The 2010 AI also “expressly withdrew ... 2001 Opinion

Letter.” Pl.’s Mem. at 13; Defs.’ Mot. at 14 (“[T]he Wage and

Hour Division withdrew the 2001 Opinion Letter as

inconsistent with the analysis in the 2010 AI, inasmuch as it

had erroneously concluded that mortgage loan officers

performed work that was directly related to the management

or general business operations of the employer or the

employer’s customers.”).

29a

In summation, the DOL through the

issuance of the 2010 AI explicitly withdrew the

2006 Opinion Letter “[blecause of its misleading

assumption and selective and narrow analysis[.]”

Id. Before taking this action, the DOL did not

utilize the APA’s notice and comment process.

Compl. 94 32—33.

Following the issuance of the 2010 Al, the

Association filed its Complaint in this case on

January 12, 2011, asserting that the DOL violated

the APA by issuing the 2010 AI. Id. 4{ 36—52.

First, the Association argues that “[o]nce an agency

gives its regulation an interpretation, it can only

change that interpretation as it would formally

modify the regulation itself: through the process of

notice and comment rulemaking.” Jd. | 36 (citing

Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d

579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Second, the Association

argues that “[b]ecause the AI conflicts with existing

DOL regulations, and because those regulations

have been afforded the force of law by courts, DOL’s

issuance of the 2010 AI is arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in

accordance with law.” Id. J 50. The Association

seeks to have the 2010 AI “[vjacat[ed] and set

aside” and the defendants “[e]njoin[ed] and

restrain[ed] ... from enforcing, applying, or

implementing ... the AI.” Id. at 12 (Prayer for

Relief).5

The Association filed its Motion for

Summary Judgment simultaneously with the

5 The Association also seeks an award of its litigation costs

and attorney’s fees. These requests are not addressed in this

opinion.

30a

Complaint. In response, the DOL has filed a Cross

Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, Motion

for Summary Judgment.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The DOL has moved for dismissal under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), and

alternatively moves for summary judgment under

Rule 56. Rule 12(d) provides that “[i]f, on a motion

under Rule 12(b)(6) ... matters outside the

pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the

court, the motion must be treated as one for

summary judgment under Rule 56. [And if the

motion is considered under Rule 56, ajll parties

must be given a reasonable opportunity to present

all the material that is pertinent to the motion.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). Here, because both parties have

presented materials outside the pleadings (namely,

the administrative record) for the Court to consider

in adjudicating their motions, the Court deems it

appropriate to treat both submissions as motions

for summary judgment. See Marshall Cnty. Health

Care. Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 & n: 5

(D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that a district court

considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “can consult the

{fadministrative] record to answer the legal

question[s] before the court,” but that “[iJt is

probably the better practice for a district court

always to convert to summary judgment”).

“Summary judgment is the _ proper

mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law,

whether an agency action is supported by the

6 In resolving these motions, the Court also considered the

memorandum of law submitted on behalf of the three

intervenors, Ryan Henry, Beverly Buck, and Jerome Nichols.

3la

administrative record and consistent with the APA

standard of review.” Loma Linda Univ. Med. Ctr. v.

Sebelius, 684 F. Supp. 2d 42, 52 (D.D.C. 2010)

(citing Stuttering Found. of Am. v. Springer, 498 F.

Supp. 2d 203, 207 (D.D.C. 2007)); see also Richards

v. INS, 554 F.2d 1173, 1177 & n.28 (D.C. Cir.

1977). However, due to the limited role of a court in

reviewing the administrative record, the typical

summary judgment standards set forth in Rule

56(c) are not applicable. Stuttering, 498 F. Supp. 2d

at 207 (citation omitted). Rather, “[u]nder the APA,

it is the role of the agency to resolve factual issues

to arrive at a decision that is supported by the

administrative record, whereas ‘the function of the

district court is to determine whether or not as a

matter of law the evidence in the administrative

record permitted the agency to make the decision it

did.’” Id. (quoting Occidental Eng’g Co. v. INS, 753

F.2d 766, 769—70 (9th Cir.1985)).

A reviewing court will “hold unlawful and set

aside agency action, findings, and conclusions

found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the

law.” Ludlow v. Mabus, 793 F. Supp. 2d 352, 354

(D.D.C. 2011) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006)).

In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of U.S. v.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the

Supreme Court explained the “arbitrary and

capricious’ review by noting that “an agency rule

would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has

relied on factors which Congress has not intended

it to consider, entirely failed to consider an

important aspect of the problem, offered an

explanation for its decision that runs counter to the

evidence before the agency, or is so implausible

that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view

or the product of agency expertise.” 463 U.S. 29, 43

32a

(1983). However, the “standard of review is a

narrow one.” Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v.

Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). “The court is not

empowered to substitute its judgment for that of

the agency.” Id. “[Tjhe party challenging an

agency’s action as arbitrary and capricious bears

the burden of proof,” San Luis Obispo Mothers for

Peace v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 789 F.2d

26, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1986), and the APA directs a

reviewing court to “review the whole record or

those parts of it cited by a party” in making this

assessment, 5 U.S.C. § 706.

Ill. ANALYSIS

The plaintiff seeks relief based on two

distinct theories. First, relying on Paralyzed

Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586, the plaintiff argues that

once an agency issues an _ authoritative

interpretation of its own regulation, it must utilize

the notice and comment process if it desires to

modify that interpretation. Compl. § 36. Second,

the plaintiff argues that the 2010 AI does not

comport vith the 2004 regulations and is therefore

“arbitra , capricious, an abused of discretion, and

othei “ise not in accordance with law.” Compl. § 50.

The Court will analyze each argument in turn.?

7 The Court notes that the plaintiff contends, and, in fact,

takes the position that the 2010 AI is an “interpretation of

[the Agency’s] own regulation[], as it was signed by the

Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, published on

DOL’s website, and held out to employees as guidance for

complying with the FLSA.” Pls.’ Mem. at 1. The defendants do

not take exception with this position, indeed, they endorse it.

Specifically the defendants state, “the 2010 interpretation

corrected a short-lived 2006 issuance,” Defs.’ Mem. at 1

(emphasis added), and further concedes that it cannot be

construed as a legislative rule, see id. at 14-16, 16 n.9 (stating

33a

A. The Paralyzed Veterans and Alaska

Professional Hunters Cases

It is well established that there is “no barrier

to an agency altering its initial interpretation to

adopt another reasonable interpretation—even one

that represents a new policy response generated by

a different administration.” Paralyzed Veterans,

117 F.3d at 586 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.

Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863

(1984)). However, the District of Columbia Circuit

has held that “[o]nce an agency gives its regulation

an interpretation, it can only change that

interpretation as it would formally modify the

regulation itself: through the process of notice and

comment rulemaking.” Id. at 586; Transp. Workers

Union of Am. v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 492 F.3d 471,

475 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[AJn agency cannot

significantly change its position, cannot flip-flop,

even between two interpretive rules, without prior

notice and comment.”).

The District of Columbia Circuit had the

opportunity to reexamine its holding in Paralyzed

Veterans in Alaska Professional Hunters Ass'n v.

FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

Alaska Professional Hunters concerned an

interpretation by the Federal Aviation

Administration (“FAA”) that several provisions of

its regulations that “applied to (among others)

‘commercial operator{s]’ ” did not “govern guide

pilots whose flights were incidental to their guiding

that the 2010 AI is an interpretive rule as opposed to

substantive rule, and therefore, notice and comment is not

necessary). The Court agrees that the 2010 AI is an

interpretive rule and will accordingly conduct its analysis

from that perspective.

34a

business and were not billed separately.” Id. at

1031. The FAA’s position was based on its reading

of the Civil Aeronautics Board’s decision in

Administrator v. Marshall, 39 C.A.B. 948 (1963).

Id. “Although the [agency] never set forth its

interpretation of [the several regulations at issue]

in a written statement,” the parties “agree[d] that

[the] FAA personnel in Alaska consistently followed

the interpretation in official advice to guides and

guide services.” Jd. at 1031-32.

In January 1998, the FAA reversed course

and published a “Notice to Operators” that

“required the[] guide pilots to abide by FAA

regulations applicable to commercial air

operations.” Id. at 1030. Drawing on its decision in

Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586, the Circuit

found that this modification of the FAA’s

longstanding policy exempting the guide pilots from

the FAA regulations mandated the use of notice

and comment rulemaking. Jd. at 1035-36. The

Circuit concluded that *204 “current doubts about

the wisdom of the regulatory system followed in

Alaska for more than thirty years does not justify

disregarding the requisite procedures for changing

that system.” Jd. at 1035.

1. Is Paralyzed Veterans still good law?

The defendants argue that two Supreme

Court cases conflict with Paralyzed Veterans and

Alaska Professional Hunters. Defs.’ Mot. at 15-17.

First, they argue that Paralyzed Veterans cannot be

reconciled with the holding in Vermont Yankee

Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). Defs.’ Mot.

at 15-17. In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court

reiterated its previous conclusion “that generally

speaking,” the APA’s notice and comment

35a

requirements “established the maximum

procedural requirements which Congress was

willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in

conducting rulemaking procedures.” Vermont

Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524. The Supreme Court

further stated that “[a]gencies are free to grant

additional procedural rights in the exercise of their

discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not

free to impose [additional procedural requirements]

if the agencies have not chosen to grant them.” Jd.

(emphasis added). The defendants argue that this

hmitation imposed on courts by Vermont Yankee

conflicts with the requirements imposed by

Paralyzed Veterans; namely, the requirement that

an agency must employ the notice and comment

process if they wish to change a prior interpretation

of their own regulations, Def's. Mot. at 16—17, since

the Supreme Court observed that only in

“extremely rare” circumstances may courts impose

“procedures beyond those required by the statute,”

Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524; see Def's. Mot. At

16—17.

This Court is “obligated to follow controlling

[C]ircuit precedent until either [the Circuit], sitting

en banc, or the Supreme Court, overrule it.” United

States v. Torres, 115 F.3d 1033, 1036 (D.C. Cir.

1997). Thus, even if this Court “disagree[d] with

circuit precedent” its “obligation” to follow such

precedent would not be relieved. Jd. Moreover,

having been decided nearly twenty years before

Paralyzed Veterans, the District of Columbia

Circuit was presumably aware of the existence of

Vermont Yankee when it authored its opinion in

Paralyzed Veterans. And this Court is not prepared

to find that the Circuit disregarded Supreme Court

precedent when it decided Paralyzed Veterans.

36a

The defendants are correct in stating that

seven courts of appeals have held that the notice

and comment provisions found in section 553 of the

APA do not apply to interpretative rules.

Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to

Defendants’ Cross Motion to Dismiss or, in the

Alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Defs.’

Reply”) at 9. However, this Circuit, in deciding

Paralyzed Veterans, Alaska Professional Hunters,

and other cases that have addressed the same

subject, see, e.g., Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1108

(D.C. Cir. 1994); Am. Mining Cong. v. MSHA, 995

F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993), has ruled that if

an interpretation of a statute or rule “itself carries

the force and effect of law,” Paralyzed Veterans, 117

F.3d at 588 (quotation marks and citations

omitted), the agency is required to use notice and

comment procedures. And this Court had the

occasion to apply Paralyzed Veterans in a case with

similarities to this case. See Tripoli Rocketry Ass’n

v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &

Explosives; 337 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2004),

rev'd on other grounds, 437 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(Walton, J.) (“[Bjefore the [agency] could alter[] its

earlier interpretation of the [regulation], it was

required to undertake notice-and-comment

rulemaking as required by the APA[.]”). Thus, this

Court cannot, and will not, find that Vermont

Yankee commands that it refuse to follow a Circuit

case that was decided two decades later, and has

remained good law in this Circuit for almost fifteen

years.

Second, the DOL argues that Paralyzed

Veterans and Alaska Professional Hunters were

overturned by the recent Supreme Court decision in

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502

(2009). The DOL relies on language from Fox

37a

Television, stating that the APA “makes no

distinction ... between initial agency action and

subsequent agency action undoing or revising that

action.” Defs.’ Mot. at 15 (quoting Fox Television,

556 U.S. at 515). Fox Television concerned two

television live broadcasts during which expletives

were used, resulting in the Federal Communication

Commission’s (“FCC”) issuance of two “[nJotices of

[aJpparent [ljiability” based on the FCC’s finding

that the two occurrences were “actionably

indecent.” 556 U.S. at 508-512. Prior to the

commission of these two incidents, the FCC had

permitted networks to broadcast “fleeting”

expletives without punishment. Id. The FCC

reversed course with regard to the two incidents in

question, finding that the broadcasts were

indecent, even though both contained only

“fleeting” expletives. Jd. at 512, 530. The Second

Circuit found that the FCC’s decision changing its

policy was not in compliance with the APA due, in

part, to its failure to provide an adequate reason for

the change. Id. at 513—514; see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

On review of that ruling, the Supreme Court

rejected the Second Circuit’s position, “find[ing] no

basis in the [APA] or in [its] opinions for a

requirement that all agency change be subjected to

more searching review.” Fox Television, 556 U.S. at

514.

The language in Fox Television which the

defendants contend invalidates Paralyzed Veterans,

when considered in conjunction with the entire

majority opinion in Fox Television, implicates the

APA’s arbitrary and capricious review, not its

notice and comment process. In fact, the Supreme

Court made perfectly clear the question it was

addressing, holding that “we find the [FCC’s]

orders neither arbitrary nor capricious.” Jd. at 530.

38a

So what the defendants are seeking to do is have

this Court expand the reach of Fox Television

beyond the question the Supreme Court actually

addressed. That, this Court cannot do, as the Fox

Television decision has no bearing on whether an

agency must employ the notice and comment

process before changing its policies. The answer to

that question requires this Court to look to

Paralyzed Veterans and its progeny, in the absence

of en banc Circuit authority or Supreme Court

repudiation of those decisions. Torres, 115 F.3d at

1036. Neither has occurred, so Paralyzed Veterans

and its line of cases remains controlling authority

in this Circuit.

2. The Paralyzed Vetetans Doctrine and

Alaska Professional Hunters Rationale

Having determined that Paralyzed Veterans

remains controlling authority in this Circuit, the

Court must now turn its attention to the exceptions

to Paralyzed Veterans, which the defendants

contend have been recognized by the Circuit and

are relied upon by the defendants in this litigation.

As the alternative position to their argument that

this Court should not follow Paralyzed Veterans,

the defendants argue that these two purported

exceptions to the applicability of Paralyzed

Veterans weigh in favor of granting them summary

judgment. First, they contend that MetWest Inc. v.

Secretary of Labor, 560 F.3d 506 (D.C.Cir.2009),

alleviates the requirement of utilizing notice and

comment when a party did not “substantially and

justifiably” rely upon an_ earlier agency

interpretation. Defs.’ Mot. at 22~—26. Second, the

defendants argue that the “invalid prior

interpretation” exception purportedly recognized in

Monmouth Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 807

39a

(D.C. Cir. 2001), applies here. Jd. at 18—22.

The MetWest case raised the question of

whether MetWest could “be held liable for violating

a regulation governing the removal of needles from

equipment used to extract blood.” 560 F.3d at 507—

508. Dating back to 1991 when the needle removal

regulation was adopted, the Occupation, Safety and

Health Administration (“OSHA”) “declined to

enforce [the regulation] against employers who

supplied their employees with reusable blood tube

holders.” Id. at 508-09. In October 2003, OSHA

changed its policy through the issuance of a

“guidance document,” which stated that the use of

reusable blood holders “likely violated” the

regulation. Jd. at 509. MetWest brought suit

following the change, arguing that the agency was

required to employ notice and comment rulemaking

before altering its interpretation of the needle

removal regulation. Id.

The Circuit in MetWest reiterated that its

holding in Alaska Professional Hunters was “that

an agency’s practice of advising affected entities—

in a prior agency adjudication and the consistent

advice of agency officials over a 30-year period—

that a regulation did not apply to them established

‘an authoritative departmental interpretation’ that

could not be changed without notice and comment.”

Id. at 511 (citation omitted). The MetWest court

emphasized that “[a] fundamental rationale of

Alaska Professional Hunters was the affected

parties’ substantial and justifiable reliance on a

well-established agency interpretation.” Id.

8 The MetWest opinion was authored by Judge Raymond

Randolph, who also authored the Alaska Professional Hunters

opinion.

40a

(emphasis added). The Circuit noted that “[t]his is

a crucial part of the analysis” and that “[t]o ignore

it is to misunderstand Alaska Professional Hunters

to mean that an agency’s initial interpretation,

once informally adopted, freezes the state of agency

law, which cannot subsequently be altered without

notice-and-comment rule-making.” Jd. at 511 n.4

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

And in Alaska Professional Hunters, notice and

comment rulemaking was deemed necessary before

an interpretation of a regulation could be changed,

because, in that case, people had moved to Alaska

and started businesses with the understanding

that an agency's regulations did not apply *> an

essential component of their operations du the

position the agency had taken over a SU-year

period. Jd. at 511 (citing Alaska Professional

Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1035 (alterations in original)).

Concluding that “[t]he situation [in MetWest was]

not comparable” to the situation in Alaska

Professional Hunters, MetWest’s challenge to the

Agency action was rejected because “OSHA never

established an authoritative interpretation of its

regulation on which MetWest justifiably relied to

its detriment.” Jd.

The plaintiff takes exception to the

defendants’ claim that MetWest limits. the

applicability of Paralyzed Veterans to cases where a

“party's reliance upon a prior interpretation [of an

agency's regulation] was both substantial and

justifiable.” Plaintiffs Reply in Support of its

Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative

for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Reply”) at 15

(internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff

argues that “some new reliance exception to

Paralyzed Veterans ” was not created by MetWest

4la

because “MetWest’s discussion of substantial and

justifiable reliance was in the content of assessing

whether an informal interpretation by [OSHA]

could even be an authoritative departmental

interpretation” Jd. (internal quotation marks

omitted).

While it is true that the court in MetWest

noted that the agency “never established an

authoritative interpretation of its regulation on

which MetWest justifiably relied to its detriment,”

the court’s holding was not grounded solely on that

fact. MetWest, 560 F.3d at 511. Rather, the ruling of

the circuit was also based on the assessment of

whether there had been “substantial and justifiable

reliance on 4 well-established agency

interpretation” by MetWest, which was essential to

imposing the notice and comment obligation on the

agency. Id. (emphasis added). So regardless of

whether MetWest carved out an exception to

Paralyzed Veterans or just clarified what the court

intended to convey when it said in Alaska

Professional Hunters that the plaintiffs there had

“relied” on the agency’s initial interpretation, 177

F.3d at 1035, this Court is convinced that Met West

intended to set the bar for what a plaintiff must

establish to satisfy the reliance component of the

Paralyzed Veterans doctrine.

The plaintiff argues alternatively that even

if MetWest did add a substantial and justifiable

reliance component to the Paralyzed Veterans

doctrine, they “quite plainly relied, substantially

and justifiably so, on the 2006 Opinion Letter.” Pl.’s

Reply at 17. The Association relies in part upon the

Portal—to—Portal Act of 1947 for this position, id. at

17—25, which gives employers a complete defense to

liability if they rely in good faith on the opinion of

42a

the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division.

This Act states that

“no employer shall be subject to

any liability or punishment for or

on account of the failure of the

employer to pay ... overtime

compensation under the [FLSA], if

he pleads and proves that the act

or omission complained of was in

good faith in conformity with and

in reliance on any written

administrative regulation, order,

ruling, approval, or

interpretation....”

29 U.S.C. § 259(a) (2006). In a footnote, the plaintiff

points to a number of other trade associations that

have been sued since the issuance of the 2010 AI,

and purportedly relied upon the 2006 Opinion

Letter as a defense under 29 U.S.C. § 259(a). Pl.’s

Reply at 19 n. 26. And the plaintiff takes exception

to what it claims is the defendants’ position that

reliance must equate to circumstances analogous to

those in Alaska Professional Hunters, opining that

“fijt would thus be quite odd to read the APA as

requiring notice and comment only where an

industry can demonstrate it will be put out of

business.” Id. at 20. In opposition, the defendants

argue that “[t]he contrast between Alaska

Professional! Hunters and the present matter is

stark.” Defs.’ Reply at 5. They note that in Alaska

Professional Hunters, “people uprooted their lives,

moved across the country, and spent 30 years

building up an entire industry in particularly

substantial and justifiable reliance on an agency

interpretation.” Id. They further posit that it was

precisely this reliance that “stirred the [District of

43a

Columbia] Circuit to act.” Id. The defendants opine

that “at most [the Association] and its members

operated under the misapprehension that mortgage

loan officers were administratively exempt for four

years, and. structured their pay systems

accordingly, before [the] DOL corrected th[e] error.”

Id.

The Court agrees with the defendants. As

noted above, the Met West court stressed that a core

tenant of the Alaska Professional Hunters decision

was “substantial and justifiable reliance on a well-

established agency interpretation.” MetWest, 560

F.3d at 511. The interpretation allegedly relied

upon by the Association and its members here was

only in effect for a period of four years, from 2006 to

2010. See A.R. 87—93 (2006 Opinion Letter). Prior

to that, the DOL had taken the position that

mortgage loan officers were not exempt employees,

and were therefore entitled to overtime pay. See,

e.g., A.R. 4—5 (1999 Opinion Letter). Unlike the

plaintiffs in Alaska Professional Hunters, here the

Association does not allege that any of its members

uprooted their families and moved to a new location

in search of business opportunities. Pl.’s Reply at

23. Rather, in the words of the Association itself,

employees of financial service firms have merely

“become accustomed to the freedom to contro] their

own hours and breaks.” Jd. While the Court

appreciates that having to keep accurate time

records may impose an additional burden on the

Association’s members and their employees, the

loss of the freedom to control one’s work hours and

break times is not the kind of “substantial and

justifiable reliance” that Alaska Professional

Hunters had in mind, especially when such reliance

was short lived given the many years that the

parties had previously relied upon’ the

44a

interpretation that mortgage loan officers were not

covered by the administrative exemption.

Further, the argument that the Association

makes under the Portalto—Portal Act actually

weakens its overall position. See Pl.’s Reply at 17—

18. As the Association points out, the Portal—to—

Portal Act provides that, if the employer “proves

that the [failure to pay overtime] was in good faith

in conformity with and in reliance on any written

administrative ... interpretation,” then the

employer “shall [not] be subject to any liability or

punishment.” 29 U.S.C. § 259(a). Thus, assuming

this provision applies, the plaintiff could not be said

to have relied upon the prior interpretation to its

detriment, as its members will not be liable for any

damages resulting from the prior interpretation

due to their good faith reliance. Jd. While the Court

need not reach that conclusion, it is at least worth

nothing that the Association’s invocation of the

Portal—to—Portal Act undermines its position that it

“substantial[ly] and justifiabl[ly]” relied upon the

2006 Opinion Letter to the level required by the

Circuit in Met West, 560 F.3d at 511.

Having concluded that the association has

failed to satisfy the standard for demonstrating

reliance recognized in Met West, the Court need not

address the defendants’ additional argument that

notice and comment was not required for the 2010

AI based on the Circuit’s decision in Monmouth,

257 F.3d at 807.

B. Is the 2010 AI Inconsistent with the DOL’s

2004 Regulations?

The plaintiff argues that even if the 2010 AI

was lawfully adopted, it is “inconsistent with the

plain language of 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b),”

45a

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support

of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (“P1.’s

Mem.”) at 26, and thus “it is arbitrary, capricious,

and contrary to law,” id. at 3. In essence, the

plaintiff argues that the work performed by

mortgage loan officers discussed in the 2010 AI are

identical to the job duties discussed in 29 C.F.R. §

541.203(b), which provides examples of job duties

that are exempt from the FLSA’s overtime pay

requirement. Pl.’s Mem. at 26-27. 29 C.F.R. §

541.203(b) contemplates that an employee who

“collect[s] and analyz[es] information regarding the

customer's income, assets, investments or debts,”

“determin[es) which financial products best meet

the customer’s needs and financial circumstances,”

and “advis[es] the customer regarding the

advantages and disadvantages of different financial

products” might be found exempt under the

administrative exemption. In its memorandum

submitted in support of its motion, the plaintiff

notes that very similar language was used in the

2010 AI, but that in the 2010 AI, the DOL reached

a different result in finding mortgage loan officers

non-exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirement.

Pl.’s Mem. at 26—27.

The DOL does not dispute that the language

found in the two documents is similar. Defs.’ Reply

at 15. However, it contends that the job duties

found in 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b) are merely intended

to provide examples of when a financial services

employee might be exempt under _ the

administrative exception. Jd. The defendants argue

that by “[a]pplying the general administrative

duties test in § 541.200(a), in conjunction with the

financial services example in § 541.203(b),” the

2010 AI came to the conclusion that the mortgage

loan officers in question were not exempt from the

46a

FLSA’s overtime pay requirement. Jd. (citing A.R.

105-108 (Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010—

01)).9

The Court finds the DOL’s argument

persuasive. The administrative exemption of 29

C.F.R. § 541.200, entitled “General rule for

administrative employees,” provides in part that an

“employee employed in a bona fide administrative

capacity’ is one “[w]lhose primary duty is the

performance of office or non-manual work directly

related to the management or general business

operations of the employer or the employer's

customers.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(2). The language

relied upon by the plaintiff is found in 29 C.F.R. §

541.203(b), which is entitled “Administrative

exemption examples,” and it provides, in part, that

“fe]mployees in the financial services industry

generally meet the duties requirements for the

administrative exemption.... However, an employee

whose primary duty is selling financial products

does not qualify for the administrative exemption.”

29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b) (emphasis added). On its

face, and considering the title of the provision, it is

® The defendants have offered supplemental authority—Lewis

v. Huntington National Bank, No. C211CV0058, 2012 WL

765077 (S.D.Ohio Mar. 12, 2012)—as additional support for

their position that the 2010 AI is not arbitrary and capricious.

See Defendants’ Notice of Supplemental Authority. Although

the case is distinguishable from this case for a variety of

reasons, the Southern District of Ohio did find that “because

the [2010 AI] applies the test set forth in § 541.200(a),

consistently with the example contained in § 541.203(b), there

can be no serious argument that [the 2010 AI] was either

erroneous or inconsistent with the 2004 revised regulations.”

Lewis, No. C211CV0058, 2012 WL 765077 at 32 (S.D.Ohio

Mar. 12, 2012).

47a

clear that § 541.203(b) was intended to provide

examples, not an alternative test for the

applicability of the administrative exception. Id.

Thus, while financial services employees who

perform the duties listed in § 541.203(b) are

“generally” able to qualify for the administrative

exemption, the DOL is still tasked with

determining whether specific employees’ “primary

duty is selling financial products.” Id. If so, the

employee “does not qualify for the administrative

exemption.” Jd. Given the DOL’s reasoning for why

the exemption does not apply here, the Court must

find that the 2010 AI is not inconsistent with the

2004 regulations; thus, the 2010 AI is not arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not

in accordance with the law.!°

IV. CONCLUSION

The Association has failed to satisfy the

Paralyzed Veterans doctrine of substantial and

justifiable reliance, which was also recognized in

Met West; thus, both their arguments as to reliance

10 The Court is aware that there is currently a dispute

between the defendants and the intervenors as to whether the

2010 AI applies both prospectively and retroactively. In

resolving this case, however, the Court need not reach a

conclusion on that issue, as the intervenors, the plaintiff, and

the defendants acknowledge. See Intervenors’ Memorandum

of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion

for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss at 31-32 n.12; Defendants’ Reply to Intervenors’

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for

Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss at 1; Plaintiffs Reply in Support of its Motion for

Summary Judgment (Response to Intervenors filed on March

14, 2012) at 3. The Court agrees with the parties and,

therefore, declines to address the issue.

48a

and as to notice and comment procedures must fail.

Further, § 541.203(b) was not intended to serve as

an alternative test for the applicability of the

administrative exception. As such, the 2010 AI is

not inconsistent with the 2004 regulations and is

not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with the law.

Accordingly, the Court must grant in part and deny

in part the Defendants’ Cross-motion to Dismiss or,

in the Alternative for Summary Judgment and

deny the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.

SO ORDERED."

REGGIE B. WALTON

United States District Judge

(DATE: June 6, 2012]

11 The Court will issue an Order contemporaneously with this

Memorandum Opinion.

49a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MORTGAGE BANKERS

ASSOCIATION, Civil Action No.

Plaintiff, 11-0073 (RBW)

Vv.

HILDA SOLIS, Secretary of Labor;

NANCY LEPPINK,

Acting Wage and Hour Administrator; and

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

LABOR

Defendants.

ORDER

In accordance with the memorandum

Opinion issued contemporaneously with this Order,

it is hereby

ORDERED that the Defendants’ Cross

Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for

Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. It is further

ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for

dismissal is DENIED and the defendants’ motion

for summary judgment is GRANTED. It is further

ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion for

Summary Judgment is DENIED. It is further

ORDERED that this case is CLOSED.

50a

SO ORDERED this 6th day of June, 2012.

REGGIE B. WALTON

United States District Judge

5la

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MORTGAGE BANKERS

ASSOCIATION, Civil Action No.

Plaintiff, and 11-0073 (RBW)

JEROME NICKOLS, et ai.,

Intervenor-Plaintiffs,

Vv.

THOMAS E. PEREZ,}

Sued in his official capacity, Secretary of

United States Department of Labor, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on remand

from the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit. The case was brought

by plaintiff Mortgage bankers Association against

United States Department of Labor (“DOL”)

Secretary Thomas E. Perez in his official capacity,

Deputy Administrator of the DOL Wage and Hour

1 The plaintiff filed suit against Hilda L. Solis, then Secretary

of the United States Department of Labor, in her official

capacity. While this case was pending on appeal, Seth D.

Harria succeeded Solis as Secretary. Pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 25(d), the Court substitutes Thomas E.

Perez, who has now succeeded Harris as Secretary.

52a

Division Laura A. Fortman? in her official capacity,

and the DOL, challenging the DOL’s issuance of

DOL Administrator Interpretation 2010-1 as a

violation of the notice and comment rulemaking

procedures required by the Administrative

Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012), and

as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law, also in

violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 7

35-52. On June 6, 2012, this Court granted the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment and

denied the plaintiffs motion for summary

judgment, holding that the DOL was not required

to employ notice and comment rulemaking

procedures prior to issuing its 2010 interpretation,

and that its interpretation was not inconsistent

with DOL regulations. See Mortg. Bankers Ass’n v.

Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d 193, 207-10 (D.D.C. 2012);

ECF No. 43. The plaintiff subsequently appealed

the Court’s decision.

On July 2, 2013, the Circuit issued an

opinion and judgment reversing this Court’s order

and remanding the case “with instructions to

vacate DOL’s 2010 Administrator Interpretation.”

See Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966,

972 (D.C. Cir. 2013). On October 16, 2013, the

Court received the mandate with this directive. See

ECF No. 47. Accordingly, for the reasons stated by

the Circuit in its opinion, it is hereby

2 The plaintiff filed suit against Nancy Leppink, then Deputy

Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division. The Court

substitutes Laura A. Fortman, current Deputy Administrator

of the Wage and Hour Division. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)

53a

ORDERED that this Court’s June 6, 2

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Record and brief — Nickols v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 134 S. Ct. 2820 (2014) (No. 13-1052) | Frix