Record and brief — Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Maclean

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Text

Docketed

Sa Th re ye

SET

SLE:

Department of Homeland Securtty, Petitioner

V

Robert J. MacLean

January 27, 2014

Linked with 13A503

Lower Ct

Case Nos

Decision Date

Reheanng Denied

United States Court of Appeals for tne Federal Circurt

(2011-3231)

Apni 26, 2013

August 30, 2013

Questions Presented

Nov 18 2013

v19 2013

Dec 17 2013

Jan 27 2014

Feb 14 2014

Mar 28 2014

Apr 15 2014

Apr 16 2014

May 5 2014

May 19 2014

May 30 2014

May 30 2014

Jun 27 2014

25 2014

Jul 25 2014

eerenen Proceed

nas and Orders~~~~~~~-~~-- ~~

Application (13A503) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certioran fr

November 28, 2013 to December 28, 2013, submitted to The Chief Justice

Application (13A503) granted by The Chief Justice extending the time to file unti

December 28, 2013

Application (13A503) to extend further the time to file a petition

December 28, 2013 to January 27, 2014, submitted to The Chief Justice

for a writ of certioran from

pplication (13A503) granted file until January

27,2014

Petition for a writ of certioran filed. (Response d

by The Chief Justice extending the time to

2014)

Order extending time to file response to petition to and including March 28, 2014

sition filed

Reply of petitioner Department of Homeland Security filed

DISTRIBUTED for Confe

DISTRIBUTED for Conference

Petition GRANTED

The time to file the joint appendix and petitioners

ncluding July 25, 2014

The time to file respondent's bne

22, 2014

Consent to the filing

e February 26

Brief of respondent Robert J. MacLean in oppo

erence of May 2, 2014

of May 15, 2014

brief on the merits is extended to and

f on the ments is extended to and including Septembe

of amicus cunae briefs, in support of ether party or of neither party

received from counsel! for the respondent

Joint appendix filed. (Statement of costs filed.)

Brief of p Homeland

etitioner Department of Security filed

Aug 19 2014

Sep 4 2014

Sep 8 2014

Sep 9 2014

Sep 10 2014

Sep 22 2014

Sep 29 2014

Sep 29 2014

Sep 29 2014

Sep 29 2014

Sep 29 2014

Sep 29 2014

Sep 29 2014

Sep 29 2014

Oct 22 2014

Nov 4 2014

Jan 21 2015

Feb 23 2015

Consent to the filing of amicus cunae briefs in support of either party or of neither party

from counsel for the petitioner.

SET FOR ARGUMENT on Tuesday, November 4, 2014.

Record requested from U.S.C.A. for the Federal Circuit.

The Record received from U.S.C.A. Federal Circuit is electronic and located on PACER.

Brief amicus curiae of David B. Nolan. Sr. filed. Sep 19 2014 CIRCULATED

Brief of respondent Robert J. MacLean filed. (Distributed)

Brief amicus curiae of United States Office of Special Counsel filed. (Distributed)

Brief amicus curiae of American Federation of Government Employees filed. (Distributed)

Brief amicus curiae of Former US. Government Officials filed. (Distnbuted)

Brief amicus curiae of Rutherford Institute filed. (Distributed)

Brief amici cunae of Blacks in Government, et al. filed. (Distributed)

Brief amicus curiae of FlyersRights.org filed. (Distnbuted)

Brief amicus curiae of Project on Government Oversight filed. (Distributed)

Brief amici curiae of Members of Congress filed. (Distnbuted)

Reply of petitioner Department of Homeland Security filed. (Distributed)

Argued. For petitioner. lan H. Gershengorn, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of

Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D. C

Adjudged to be AFFIRMED. Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which

Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a

dissenting opinion, in which Kennedy, J.. joined

JUDGMENT ISSUED

PETITION

FOR

WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PETITIONER

v.

ROBERT J. MACLEAN

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DONALD B. VERRILL.1, JR.

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

STUART F. DELERY

Assistant Attorney General

[AN HEATH GERSHENGORN

Deputy Solicitor General

ERIC J. FEIGIN

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

DOUGLAS N. LETTER

H. THOMAS ByRon III

MICHAEL P. GOODMAN

STEVAN E. BUNNELL Attorneys

Gereral Counsel Department of Justice

LS. Department of Washington, D.C. 20580-0001

Homeland Securit SuprenveCtBriefsta usdoj.qov

Washington, D.C. 2052: (202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Congress has directed that the Transportation Se-

curity Administration “shall prescribe regulations

prohibiting” the “disclosure of information obtained or

developed” in carrying out certain transportation-

security functions, if the agency “decides” that “dis-

closing the information would * * * be detriment-

tal” to transportation security. Aviation and Trans-

portation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101(e),

115 Stat. 603; Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L

No. 107-296, Tit. XVI, § 1601(b), 116 Stat. 2312. Such

information is referred to in the regulations as “Sensi-

tive Security Information.” See, e.g., 67 Fed. Reg.

8351 (Feb. 22, 2002).

The question presented is whether certain statuto-

ry protections codified at 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A),

which are inapplicable when an employee makes a dis-

closure “specifically prohibited by law,” can bar an

agency from taking an enforcement action against an

employee who intentionally discloses Sensitive Securi-

ty Information.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EER a ee ae 1

RECESSES EES SAS Oe a 1

Statutes and regulations involved ..............csccsscessesseeeeeseeesensennes 2

EEE ea ee 2

Reasons for granting the petition..............ccccssssecesceesesseresensens 11

A. The disclosure of Sensitive Security Information

is “specifically prohibited by law” within the

meaning of 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A) .......ceccssesesscsrereseeeneeees 12

B. The Federal Circuit’s erroneous decision

WAITANtS IMMEAiate FEVIEW ......sccssersesseeserseresessserererseseees 22

EES a 26

Appendix A — Court of appeals opinion (Apr. 26, 2013).......la

Appendix B — Opinion and order (July 25, 2011)................ 19a

Appendix C — Initial decision (May 12, 2010)...................... 57a

Appendix D — Opinion and order (June 22, 2009)............. 113a

Appendix E — Order granting motion for certification

as interlocutory appeal and staying

proceedings (Feb. 10, 2009).............cccceees 140a

Appendix F — Order (Dec. 23, 2008).............c.ccccsseseseeeseeees 155a

Appendix G — Order (Aug. 30, 2018) ...........ccccccccseceseesees 165a

Appendix H — Statutory and regulatory provisions......... 167a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Administrator, FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255

ETE ELE 17

Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) .0.....cccccccceeeseeeeeees 18

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).............. 14,15

SE SR EU EAR, BP CBO rccccncccecsssecesecccsscsssccecccssseccses 19

Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania,

a sinc ceceeenmanscnnnsentens 18

Day v. Department of Homeland Sec., 119 M.S.P.R.

EES 1S SE 25

Cases—Continued: Page

Garcia v. Department of Agric., 110 M.S.P.R. 371

IIT ccssntisnieiencepeapendaatetanasemtadearceiiniantinstiaitemnasiadainmannenieinia 25

Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rint, Kramer &

Ulrich L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573 (2010) .......ccccccseseeeserneereeeennees 18

Marano v. Department of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137

PI Is SI eschcrrcrsctnictendeersnteniserroeiianimepecnusiniidieataiianianidatociiite 20

Constitution, statutes and regulations:

Os I, Sy ein a cee 5

Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272,

SPT: TIT cerscenucvsenshanamovecntnigniasimaunianmiiaidaiiadgiaaidameininniel 3

American Communities’ Right to Public Information

Act, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 561(c)(1), 123 Stat. 2182 ........... 6

Antihijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366,

SpA TTI ITTY ‘scsicihiscsieenetbetstlinsntnsinamenieamlbaiensiedtieemnanateaniigatinnth 3

Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L.

No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597:

Be hc A ANI ssitiecciciesicusdecieiitisitasiscietictantictieimistessiaiel 2

SO ae, Be Ge Crs BI riceetesiserrseininacnenvensie 2

115 Stat. 597 (49 U.S.C. 114(d)(1)-(2)) .......cecceceeeeseees 2

115 Stat. 597 (49 U.S.C. 114(@)(1)) ................cccccsseeeeees 2

115 Stat. 598 (49 U.S.C. 114(£)(1)-(8))......eeecceesecseesenes 2

115 Stat. 598 (49 U.S.C. 114(f)(6)-(8)) 2.20.2... ceeeceeeees 2

115 Stat. 598 (49 U.S.C. 114(f)(10)-(11))........ ee. 2

§ 101(e), 115 Stat. 603 (49 U.S.C. 40119)... 3

§ 105(a), 115 Stat. 606 (49 U.S.C. 44917(a)(1)-(2)) .......... 6

Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454,

a Ss SIU icsoseceatncntshomninieshlteniacetnninndenenmesaianipimnadndasieaniammen 18

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L.

No. 110-161, Tit. V, § 568, 121 Stat. 2092 ........ occas 4

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552.............cccccceeeeeeees 3

V

Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page

© CBAs. GEG (RFID ccccccccccsccscccesserssncnscnsconsnnsenssnneoenen 17

0 es SI CIEE seceeseccnncnneninncenniinianiciieeneninaneniin 18

Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296,

116 Stat. 2135:

Tit. IV, Subtit. A, § 403(2), 116 Stat. 2178 ......0.. 3

Tit. XVI:

I tN inact crincilaci aia 4

I, acts 4,12

National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, § 102(d)(3),

Te eee ec ome eee eee Nee ET 19

a ne Ne I oi scaicencctiersinionpeenictiveintenneietciatininias 20

Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1906.......cccccccccccccccscscsccscccscccccees 13

Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012,

Pub. L. No. 112-199, Tit. I, § 108, 126 Stat. 1469 ............. 25

is Ca ceuiesesiasbindensseilieabiainadiniaadeiaade 21

es i eceameiunaemininslaainesemaianss 21

PR PIII sss ieetiianitcilienaidetdaiaiianesidanmldatiialieia 21

nS on ileal eda 21

es Se seisaaniicendeenatinabiedaaiimammmmaamuaidl 24

LE | Re” EERIE apie sonra ee OSE Ne I 25

I il ace elidmeaa 26

GER EE eee eee ee ee 26

ft ES REEREAES ees ani ere ner eee Seer 10, 20, 25, 26

es ID siccisesnccenciencsiniieiantiinneieninintanbonniaets passim

Os el all 8, 20

ED iciintsintcscinsicncininticiancnssiannt 8, 12, 20, 24

es I aaeinenmeiameiaaiell 12, 21

Ba eC EO 20

ee asia enaeleeatiialieieiedial 20

DUET, THe ctverccennctvinnencsinicienmiiniinnnucnsicinmnnnmmitasiia 8, 24

VI

Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page

ls i caiiainiaesinn i ietertnaiiecataarilacsgnhniiedaniieall fs)

ERT RN RMT SOS eee EE, 25

I a cahiemeeaiaailil 25

49 U.S.C. 114(r) (Supp. V 2011) .0........ececeeeseseees 3, 6, 8, 12, 16

49 U.S.C. 114(rX1) (Supp. V 2011) ........0..-ccccsccecscsereccereees 4,17

49 U.S.C. 114(r)(1)(A)-(C) (Supp. V 2011)... cceceeeseseeeeees 17

49 U.S.C. 114(r)(1)(C) (Supp. V 2011)... eceecesseeeees 11, 22

49 U.S.C. 114(r)(4)(A}{D) (Supp. V 2011)... ee eeeeeeee 6

Ff 7 ee ee EEN 17

lal 3

cma 4, 6,8

I a 8

14 C.F.R.:

a lien 3

cl 3

49 C.F.R.:

ERE ere ee Ne ee eee ee IO NS 5

Pt. 1520:

ES SE a RN a eR eS 5

Se Te Ce ntcctccencnccttneteerncniniinnantaenins 5,13

ESET ak ene ne iD beer 5

EL a aCe ay me eae 22

I ltl cael 22

is Ba iccciceiecceitscinsistsciniainnicineneiintsiiniaii 22

EITC ae mimes 5

Section 1520.7(a)-(f) (2002) ...............ccccssceseccsscenecessesens 5

Section 1580.7 (§) CRO0R) ......crcccssccccssecersssessecsesres 5, 9,13

IN I i nieitiedaeninsideiiatinaphinalimoaaiiiinnl 5

I alae 5

VII

Miscellaneous: Page

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1717, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

SSE UTIEIE ccsaieeeiesiduuiueaiiiisiteiiennhiniiieiaiaiaaaaieilaieiias 15, 19

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 296, 107th Cong., 1st Sess.

IIIT icsichihisiiiliieieeaeaaeiaabiegsilinhieiaiiapaielahdlnddasibid 2

H. Rep. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)................0.+ 19

S. Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)............ 10, 15, 19

67 Fed. Reg. (Feb. 22, 2002):

9), GE cteseasssensesnsmnsnssinsncenannesonsesennmamsnnennustnuineneasannniesaneeenetti +)

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In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY » PETITIONER

v.

ROBERT J. MACLEAN

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United

States Department of Homeland Security, respectful-

ly petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judg-

ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, la-

18a) is reported at 714 F.3d 1301. The opinions of the

Merit Systems Protection Board (App., infra, 19a-56a,

113a-139a) are reported at 112 M.S.P.R. 4 and 116

M.S.P.R. 562. The orders of the administrative judge

(App., infra, 57a-112a, 140a-164a) are unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on April 26, 2013. A petition for rehearing was denied

on August 30, 2013 (App., infra, 165a-166a). On No-

vember 19, 2013, the Chief Justice extended the time

(1)

2

within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to

and including December 28, 2013. On December 18,

2013, the Chief Justice further extended the time to

and including January 27, 2014. The jurisdiction of

this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent statutory provisions are set forth in the

appendix to this petition. App., infra, 167a-189a.

STATEMENT

1. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001,

Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation

Security Act (ATSA), Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat.

597, to “address the security of the nation’s transpor-

tation system.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 296, 107th Cong.,

Ist Sess. 54 (2001). In enacting the ATSA, Congress

determined that “the best way to ensure effective

Federal management of the nation’s transportation

system is through the creation of a new Administra-

tion” within the Department of Transportation “to be

called the Transportation Security Administration

(TSA),” whose responsibilities would “encompass

security in all modes of transportation.” Jd. at 55; see

ATSA, § 101(a), 115 Stat. 597 (49 U.S.C. 114(a)). The

TSA’s duties under the ATSA include daily security

screening for air travel; receipt, analysis, and distri-

bution of intelligence relating to transportation secu-

rity; improvement of existing security procedures;

assessment of security measures for cargo transporta-

tion; and oversight of security at airports and other

transportation facilities. § 101(a), 115 Stat. 597-598

(49 U.S.C. 114(d)(1)-(2), (e)(1), ((1)-(3), (6)-(8) and

(10)-(11)).

In addition to creating the TSA and specifying its

responsibilities, the ATSA also ensured that certain

3

information acquired or developed in the conduct of

security activities, the dissemination of which could

potentially be harmful, would be shielded from public

disclosure. A pre-existing statute, 49 U.S.C. 40119(b)

(2000), had instructed the Federal Aviation Admin-

istration that, “notwithstanding” the Freedom of In-

formation Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, it was required to

“prescribe regulations prohibiting disclosure of infor-

mation obtained or developed in carrying out security

or research and development activities under” certain

security-related provisions of Title 49, if it determined

that “disclosing the information would * * * bean

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” “reveal a

trade secret or privileged or confidential commercial

or financial information,” or “be detrimental to the

safety of passengers in air transportation.” See Act of

July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1117; see

also Antihijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366,

§ 316, 88 Stat. 417. Pursuant to that congressional

mandate, the Federal Aviation Administration had

promulgated detailed regulations designating certain

information as “Sensitive Security Information” (SSI)

and restricting the dissemination of such information.

See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. Pt. 191 (1976); 14 C.F.R. Pt. 191

(2000). The ATSA reassigned the duty to promulgate

those regulations to the TSA, § 101(e), 115 Stat. 603,

and the SSI regulations were subsequently trans-

ferred over to the TSA’s authority, see 67 Fed. Reg.

8351 (Feb. 22, 2002).

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA), Pub. L.

No. 107-296, Tit. IV, Subtit. A, § 403(2), 116 Stat. 2178,

moved the TSA into the newly created Department of

Homeland Security. A separate provision of that Act,

currently codified at 49 U.S.C. 114(r), expanded upon

4

the TSA’s statutory mandate to prohibit the disclosure

of sensitive information. See HSA, Tit. XVI, § 1601(b),

116 Stat. 2312; see also Consolidated Appropriations

Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, Tit. V, § 568, 121 Stat.

2092 (moving former Section 114(s) to Section 114(r)).

Section 114(r)(1) provides:

Notwithstanding section 552 of title 5, the Under

Secretary shall prescribe regulations prohibiting

the disclosure of information obtained or developed

in carrying out security under authority of the Avi-

ation and Transportation Security Act (Public Law

107-71) or under chapter 449 of this title if the Un-

der Secretary decides that disclosing the infor-

mation would—

(A) be an unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy;

(B) reveal a trade secret or privileged or con-

fidential commercial or financial information; or

(C) be detrimental to the security of trans-

portation.

Congress also amended Section 40119(b) itself to

impose substantially similar obligations on the Secre-

tary of Transportation. HSA, Tit. XVI, § 1601(a), 116

Stat. 2312.

In 2003, when the events giving rise to this case oc-

curred, the TSA’s SSI regulations generally defined

SSI to include, inter alia, “[a]ny approved, accepted,

or standard security program” adopted under certain

regulations; “Security Directives and Information

Circulars” promulgated under certain regulations;

“[a]ny selection criteria used in any security screening

process, including for persons, baggage, or cargo”;

5

“fajny security contingency plan or information and

any comments, instructions, or implementing guidance

pertaining thereto”; the technical specifications of

certain security equipment (such as screening equip-

ment); and “[s]pecific details of aviation security

measurcs, * * * includiling) * * * information

concerning specific numbers of Federal Air Marshals,

deployments or missions, and the methods involved in

such operations.” 49 C.F.R. 1520.7(a)-(f) and (j)

(2002); see 67 Fed. Reg. at 8340. The regulations

generally prohibited the disclosure of SSI unless the

recipient had a “need to know” the information, 49

C.F.R. 1520.5(a) (2002); specifically defined the cir-

cumstances in which an individual had such a “need to

know,” see 49 C.F.R. 1520.5(b) (2002); and stated that

an unauthorized disclosure was “grounds for a civil

penalty and other enforcement or corrective action.”

49 C.F.R. 1520.17; see 49 C.F.R. 1520.5(d) (2002).

The TSA’s current SSI regulations, as well as the

SSI regulations separately promulgated by the De-

partment of Transportation, are substantially similar

(but include some new categories of SSI that have

been added over the last decade). See 49 C.F.R.

1520.5, 1520.9{a)(2), 1520.17 (TSA); see also 49 C.F.R.

Pt. 15 (Department of Transportation). The TSA

often designates particular information as SSI without

seeking to have it formally classified under the Presi-

dent’s Article II national-security powers, in order

that the information can, if necessary, be shared

quickly and securely with non-government personnel

(such as airport and airline employees) whose cooper-

ation is critical to ensuring transportation security,

even if those recipients are not cleared for more sensi-

tive classified information. See, e.g., 70 Fed. Reg.

6

1380 (Jan. 7, 2005) (stating that an “original intent” of

the SSI regulations was “to share vulnerability as-

sessments and threat information with entities in all

transportation modes that need the information to

help forestall future attacks”). Since 2009, Section

114(r) has made clear that “[nJothing in this subsec-

tion, or any other provision of law, shall be construed

to authorize the designation of information as sensi-

tive security information” in order to “conceal a viola-

tion of law, inefficiency, or administrative error”;

“prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or

agency”; “restrain competition”; or “prevent or delay

the release of information that does not require pro-

tection in the interest of transportation security, in-

cluding basic scientific research information not clear-

ly related to transportation security.” 49 U.S.C.

114(r)(4)(A)-(D); see American Communities’ Right to

Public Information Act, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 561(c)(1),

123 Stat. 2182 (2009); see also 49 U.S.C. 40119(b) (sim-

ilar limitations on the Department of Transportation’s

authority).

2. Respondent is a former federal air marshal who

was hired by the TSA in 2001. App., infra, 2a. Under

the federal air marshal program, which was established

by the ATSA, the TSA stations federal air marshals on

passenger flights in order to protect those flights from

high security risks. 49 U.S.C. 44917(a)(1)-(2); see ATSA,

§ 105(a), 115 Stat. 606. The TSA has discretionary

authority to deploy federal air marshals on any flight,

and it is required to station a federal air marshal on

any flight that, in the agency’s judgment, “present(s]

high security risks.” 49 U.S.C. 44917(a)(1)-(2); see

ATSA, § 105(a), 115 Stat. 606.

7

In 2003, the TSA briefed respondent on a “poten-

tial plot” to hijack United States airliners. App., in-

fra, 2a (citation omitted). Shortly thereafter, he re-

ceived a text message from the TSA stating that, for a

particular window of time, the TSA would not be de-

ploying federal air marshals on overnight missions

from Las Vegas. J/bid.; id. at 2lan.1. Respondent

informed both his supervisor and the Office of the

Inspector General for the Department of Homeland

Security of his personal view that the TSA’s decision

about how to deploy its air marshals was not in the

best interests of public safety, but he was not satisfied

with the responses he received. /d. at 2la-22a.

Respondent then decided to reveal the TSA’s de-

ployment plans to the news media, in an effort to

“create a controversy” that would force the TSA to

change them. App., infra, 2a (citation omitted). He

told an MSNBC reporter about the TSA’s plans, and

the reporter published an article exposing those plans

to the public and criticizing them. Jbid. Members of

Congress and others criticized the plans. /bid. The

TSA ultimately did not follow the course of action that

had been outlined in the original text message. Jbid.

The TSA was not aware initially that respondent

had been the source of the disclosure. App., infra, 2a.

It learned of his involvement, however, when respond-

ent appeared on the NBC Nightly News to discuss a

separate incident, in a disguise that proved to be inad-

equate. Jbid. The TSA removed respondent from his

position as a federal air marshal for disclosing SSI

without authorization. /bid.

3. Respondent challenged his removal before the

Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), “an inde-

pendent Government agency that operates like a

8

court” and has jurisdiction to review certain personnel

actions. 5 C.F.R. 1200.1; see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 7513(d).

One of respondent’s claims was that his removal had

violated 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A). App., infra, 3a. Un-

der Section 2302(b)(8)(A), an agency generally cannot

“take * * * a personnel action” against an em-

ployee for disclosing certain types of information,

when the employee “reasonably believe[d]” that the

information showed a “violation of any law, rule, or

regulation” or “gross mismanagement, a gross waste

of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and

specific danger to public health or safety.” 5 U.S.C.

2302(b)(8)(A)(i) and (ii). Section 2302(b)(8)(A) does

not apply, however, if the employee’s disclosure was

“specifically prohibited by law.”

The MSPB ultimately rejected respondent’s Sec-

tion 2302(b)(8)(A) argument and sustained the agen-

cy’s decision to remove him. App, infra, 19a-56a. The

MSPB recognized that the TSA, pursuant to a legisla-

tive mandate to prescribe regulations preventing the

disclosure of certain types of information, had prom-

ulgated regulations that “identified SSI subject to

* * * statutory nondisclosure as including infor-

mation relating to [federal-air-marshal] deployments.”

Id. at 33a.” It additionally observed that the Ninth

" In the MSPB’s view, the relevant legislative mandate was the

version of 49 U.S.C. 40119%(b) that was in effect when the TSA

initially promulgated the regulations. App., infra, 33a n.9. The

briefs and decisions in this case have accordingly focused on Sec-

tion 40119(b). However, at the time of respondent’s disclosure, the

statute requiring and authorizing the TSA’s SSI regulations was

actually the provision now codified in Section 114(r). See pp. 4-5,

supra. For that reason, and for the sake of simplicity, this petition

will focus on Section 114(r). In any event, because the language of

9

Circuit, in a separate proceeding that respondent had

initiated, had “unequivocally declared that the infor-

mation disclosed by [him] constituted SSI as defined

in those regulations.” Jbid.; see MacLean v. Depart-

ment of Homeland Sec., 543 F.3d 1145, 1150 (2008);

49 C.F.R. 1520.7(j) (2002) (defining SSI to include

“information concerning specific numbers of Federal

Air Marshais, deployments or missions”). The MSPB

accordingly reasoned that because respondent had

“disclosed information that is specifically prohibited

from disclosure by a regulation promulgated pursuant

to an express legislative directive from Congress to

TSA,” the “disclosure was ‘specifically prohibited by

law” for purposes of Section 2302(b)(8)(A). App.,

infra, 34a-35a.

4. The Federal Circuit vacated the MSPB’s deci-

sion and remanded for further proceedings. App.,

infra, 1a-18a; see 5 U.S.C. 7703(a)(1) (authorizing an

employee to seek Federal Circuit review of an adverse

MSPB decision). The court of appeals recognized that

respondent’s removal had reflected a proper applica-

tion of the TSA’s regulations. App., infra, 5a-7a. It

also recognized that removal had been a reasonable

penalty for a disclosure that had “compromised flight

safety” and “could have had catastrophic consequenc-

es.” Jd. at Ta-9a. The court concluded, however, that

respondent’s disclosure had not been “specifically

prohibited by law” and that he was therefore entitled

to invoke the protections of Section 2302(b)(8)(A). Jd.

at 10a-17a.

In reaching that conclusion, the court of appeals fo-

cused on the text of the statute requiring the promui-

the two statutes is nearly identical, the legal analysis would be the

same under either one.

10

gation of the SSI regulations, rather than on the regu-

lations themselves. App., infra, 10a-17a. In the

court’s view, the parties were in agreement that “in

order to fall underthe * * * ‘specifically prohibit-

ed by law’ proviso,” a “disclosure must be prohibited

by a statute rather than by a regulation.” /d. at 12a;

see 7d. at 13a (perceiving the parties to agree that “a

regulation * * * cannot be ‘law’”). The court also

relied on a Senate Report addressing an unenacted

version of Section 2302(b)(8) that contained the phrase

“prohibited by statute” rather than the phrase “specif-

ically prohibited by law.” Jd. at 13a-14a (citing S. Rep.

No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978) (Senate Re-

port)); see Senate Report 154.

The court of appeals ultimately acknowledged,

however, that “[rlegulations promulgated pursuant to

Congress’s express instructions would qualify as spe-

cific legal prohibitions.” App., infra, 15a (emphasis

added). And it viewed the legislative mandate to

promulgate SSI regulations to present “a very close

case,” because the mandate included a direct “charge”

to the agency “to prescribe regulations pursuant to

specific criteria (i.e., only information that would be

detrimental to transportation safety).” Jbid. But the

court nevertheless concluded that, because the statute

“gives some discretion to the Agency to fashion regu-

lations for prohibiting disclosure,” the statute’s crite-

ria were too “general” to “‘specifically prohibit’ em-

ployee conduct.” Jd. at 14a.

Having decided the critical legal question, the court

of appeals remanded the case for a determination

whether respondent had reasonably believed his dis-

closure evidenced “a substantial and specific danger to

public health or safety” or one of the other subjects

11

listed in Section 2302(b)(8)(A). App., infra, 16a.

Judge Wallach concurred to express the view that

“the facts alleged, if proven, allege conduct at the core

of” the activity protected by that provision. /d. at 18a.

The court of appeals denied the government’s petition

for rehearing en banc. /d. at 165a-166a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Federal Circuit’s decision seriously under-

mines the effectiveness of the congressionally man-

dated SSI regime, invites individual federal employees

to make disclosures that will threaten public safety,

and warrants this Court’s immediate review. In the

course of its efforts to secure the Nation’s transporta-

tion network, the TSA necessarily develops and ac-

quires a great deal of information, including infor-

mation about security vulnerabilities, that has the

potential to cause extreme harm if publicly disclosed.

In recognition of that fact, Congress directed that the

TSA “shall prescribe regulations” prohibiting disclo-

sures that would, in the expert judgment of the TSA,

“be detrimental to the security of transportation.” 49

U.S.C. 114(r)(1)(C). The decision in this case, howev-

er, effectively permits individual federal employees to

override the TSA’s judgments about the dangers of

public disclosure.

According to the court of appeals, no matter how

harmful it might be for particular SSI to fall into the

wrong hands, an employee cannot be disciplined for

publicizing that SSI, so long as he reasonably believes

that the disclosure serves one of the interests listed in

5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A). The decision below thus clears

a path for any employee to do what respondent did

here: go public with an internal disagreement about

how best to allocate finite security resources; put lives

12

in danger by identifying the areas that have received

fewer resources; and then attempt to avoid any

employment-related repercussions by claiming that

publicizing such vulnerabilities revealed “a substantial

and specific danger to public health or safety,” 5

U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii).

That result contravenes the manifest intent of Con-

gress. The protections of Section 2302(b)(8)(A) ex-

pressly do not apply to disclosures that are “specifical-

ly prohibited by law.” That proviso squarely encom-

passes disclosures of SSI, which have been prohibited

pursuant to an express congressional directive. Em-

ployees can instead raise concerns that implicate SSI

through a separate set of procedures, covered by

Section 2302(b)(8)(B), that allow such concerns to be

addressed without harmful public disclosures. This

Court should grant certiorari and reverse.

A. The Disclosure Of Sensitive Security Information Is

“Specifically Prohibited By Law” Within The Mean-

ing Of 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A)

The Federal Circuit erred in permitting respond-

ent to invoke 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A) as a defense to his

removal. Section 2302(b)(8)(A) does not apply when

an employee has revealed information the disclosure

of which is “specifically prohibited by law.” 5 U.S.C.

2302(b)(8)(A). Respondent’s disclosure here falls

squarely within that proviso.

1. The TSA had at the time of respondent’s disclo-

sure and has today a statutory obligation to promul-

gate regulations “prohibiting * * * disclosure({s] of

information” that would, in the TSA’s judgment, “be

detrimental to the security of transportation.” HSA,

Tit. XVI, § 1601(b), 116 Stat. 2312; see 49 U.S.C.

114(r). Consistent with that statutory obligation, the

13

TSA has promulgated detailed regulations restricting

the dissemination of SSI. 67 Fed. Reg. 8351 (Feb. 22,

2002). Those regulations expressly foreclosed respon-

dent from sharing “information concerning specific

numbers of Federal Air Marshals, deployments or mis-

sions, and the methods involved in such operations”

with unauthorized persons. 49 C.F.R. 1520.7(j) (2002);

see 49 C.F.R. 1520.5(a) (2002); see also App., infra, 5a-

7a (concluding that respondent violated a nondisclo-

sure prohibition); MacLean v. Department of Home-

land Sec., 543 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 2008) (same).

Respondent’s disclosure of air-marshal-deployment

information was thus “specifically prohibited by law”

within the meaning of Section 2302(b)(8)(A).

The regulatory prohibition that respondent violat-

ed in this case is not meaningfully distinguishable

from other legal prohibitions that, even in the court of

appeals’ view, would be sufficient to render Section

2302(b)(8)(A) inapplicable. The court of appeals ac-

cepted, for example, that the “specifically prohibited

by law” proviso would be satisfied by the Trade Se-

crets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1905. See App., infra, 14a-15a.

That Act prohibits the disclosure of information that

“concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes,

operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the iden-

tity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of

any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any

person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association.”

18 U.S.C. 1905. A bar on disclosing information about

the “operations” of a “corporation,” ibid., is no more

specifically prohibitory than a bar on disclosing in-

formation about “specific numbers of Federal Air

Marshals, deployments or missions, and the methods

involved in such operations,” 49 C.F.R. 1520.7(j)

14

(2002). Indeed, it is difficult to see how the provisions

that respondent violated in this case could have pro-

hibited the disclosure of air-marshal-deployment in-

formation with any greater clarity or specificity.

The prohibition against respondent’s disclosure

was a prohibition “by law” whether it appeared direct-

ly in the statute or instead in the regulations that the

statute required the TSA to promulgate. As Congress

presumably understood, the term “law” is not limited

to congressional enactments. In Chrysler Corp. v.

Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), for example, this Court

construed the phrase “authorized by law” to include

not just authorization conferred by statute, but also

by “properly promulgated, substantive agency regula-

tions.” Jd. at 295. The Court observed that such

regulations “have the ‘force and effect of law’” and

that, in the absence of a “clear showing of contrary

legislative intent,” the “traditional understanding” of

the phrase “‘authorized by law’” would presumptively

include them. /d. at 295-296 (citation omitted).

In the context of Section 2302(b)(8)(A)’s “specifical-

ly prohibited by law” proviso, the “traditional under-

standing” of the word “law” would include, at a mini-

mum, substantive nondisclosure regulations, like the

SSI regulations, that were enacted pursuant to an

express congressional directive. See Chrysler Corp.,

441 U.S. at 308 (concluding that the phrase “author-

ized by law” would be satisfied by a procedurally valid

authorizing regulation enacted pursuant to a statute

that “contemplates the regulations issued”). And

nothing in Section 2302(b)(8)(A)’s history provides a

“clear showing of contrary legislative intent,” id. at

296, that would justify disregarding that traditional

understanding. Indeed, the history shows that Con-

15

gress specifically decided not to adopt a proposal by

the Senate that would have used the word “statute”

rather than the word “law.” See Senate Report 154;

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1717, 95th Cong,., 2d. Sess. 130

(1978) (Conference Report).

The government has not disputed, for purposes of

this case, that some regulatory prohibitions could fall

outside the reach of Section 2302(b)(8)(A)’s “specifi-

cally prohibited by law” proviso. See Gov’t C.A. Br.

46. The conference report accompanying the proviso’s

enactment states that the proviso “does not refer to

agency rules and regulations” but instead “to statuto-

ry law and court interpretations of those statutes.”

Conference Report 130. The phrase “agency rules

and regulations,” however, cannot be taken to encom-

pass congressionally mandated regulations like the

ones at issue here. As the court of appeals recognized

(App., infra, 14a), Congress was apparently concerned

with the possibility that agencies might adopt “inter-

nal procedural regulations against disclosure” that

would “discourage an employee from coming forward

with allegations of wrongdoing.” Senate Report 21

(emphasis added). That concern would not apply to

nondisclosure regulations that Congress itself ex-

pressly instructed the agency to promulgate. Such

regulations “implement the statute,” Chrysler Corp.,

441 U.S. at 302-303 (citation omitted), and thus would

have been considered by Congress to be part of “stat-

utory law” for Section 2302(b)(8)(A) purposes.

To the extent the Federal Circuit believed that the

government waived the argument that the regulations

in this case can be “law” for purposes of the Section

2302(b)(8)(A) proviso, that belief was incorrect. The

government’s argument in the court of appeals did

16

focus principally on the statute as the relevant source

of “law.” See, e.g., Gov’t C.A. Br. 45 (explaining that

the MSPB had held that “the ‘law’ that specifically

prohibits the disclosure of SSI is the statute passed by

Congress”); id. at 46-47 (agreeing that the proviso ap-

plies only when Congress has “explicitly prohibited” a

particular disclosure “via legislative enactment” and

characterizing the dispute as “whether 49 U.S.C.

§ 40119 serves as that legislative enactment”) (inter-

nal quotation marks and citation omitted). But the

government also expressly defended the proposition

that “when an agency has adopted non-disclosure

regulations pursuant to a specific Congressional man-

date to do so, the agency may discipline the employee

who violates that non-disclosure regulation.” Jd. at

48; see, e.g., id. at 45 (arguing that the disclosure of

SSI “was both ‘specifically prohibited by’ 49 U.S.C.

§ 40119, as well as by the TSA regulation”) (emphasis

added); id. at 46 (describing the MSPB’s decision,

which the government was defending, as “encom-

pass[ing] regulations * * * to the extent that

those regulations implement a specific statutory re-

quirement that an agency describe the information

that must be protected”). And the court of appeals

itself acknowledged that “[rjegulations promulgated

pursuant to Congress’s express instructions would

qualify as specific legal prohibitions.” App., infra,

15a. It erred in failing to apply that principle to the

regulations here.

2. Even if the relevant inquiry were restricted to

the four corners of the statute, the disclosure in this

case would still have been “specifically prohibited by

law” within the meaning of Section 2302(b)(8)(A).

Section 114(r) sets forth three “specific[]” categories

17

of information: information whose disclosure, in the

TSA’s judgment, would “be an unwarranted invasion

of personal privacy”; information whose disclosure, in

the TSA’s judgment, would “reveal a trade secret or

privileged or confidential commercial or financial

information”; and information whose disclosure would,

in the TSA’s judgment, “be detrimental to the security

of transportation.” 49 U.S.C. 114(r)(1)(A)-(C). And

Section 114(r) “prohibit[s}” the disclosure of that

information by providing that the TSA “shall pre-

scribe regulations” to that effect. 49 U.S.C. 114(r)(1).

The Federal Circuit’s view (App., infra, 14a) that

the statute “does not ‘specifically prohibit’” disclo-

sures because it “provides only general criteria for

withholding information and gives some discretion to

the Agency” cannot be squared with this Court’s deci-

sion in Administrator, FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S.

255 (1975). That case involved a provision of the

FOIA, known as Exemption 3, which at that time

permitted an agency to withhold from the public any

information “specifically exempted from disclosure by

statute.” Jd. at 257 (quoting 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3) (1970)).

The Court construed Exemption 3 to apply even in

circumstances where an agency’s discretionary deci-

sion was a prerequisite to nondisclosure. /d. at 261-

267; see id. at 258 n.4. In particular, the Court found

the provision applicable to information that became

nondisclosable only after the relevant agency had

made a “judgment” that disclosure was “not required

in the interest of the public” and “would adversely

affect the interests” of someone objecting to the dis-

closure. /d. at 258 n.4 (quoting 49 U.S.C. 1504 (1970)).

The proviso at issue here (“specifically prohibited by

law”) is at least as broad as the proviso at issue in

18

Robertson (“specifically exempted from disclosure by

statute”); the degree of agency discretion here is, if

anything, narrower than the degree of agency discre-

tion in Robertson; and the applicability of the proviso

here thus follows a fortiori from Robertson.

In the wake of Robertson, Congress narrowed the

language of FOIA’s Exemption 3 to apply only to in-

formation “specifically exempted from disclosure by

statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided

that such statute (A) requires that the matters be

withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave

no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular

criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of

matters to be withheld.” 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3) (1976)

(emphasis added); see Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n

v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 121 n.18 (1980).

But when Congress enacted Section 2302(b)(8)(A)

shortly thereafter, it included a “specifically prohibit-

ed by law” proviso that was not subject to any such

limitations. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,

Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1116. The natural infer-

ence is that Congress intended the “specifically pro-

hibited by law” proviso in Section 2302(b)(8)(A) to be

interpreted at least as broadly as the “specifically

exempted from disclosure by statute” proviso at issue

in Robertson. See, e.g., Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie,

Rini, Kramer & Ulrich L.P.A., 559 U.S. 578, 589-590

(2010) (“We have often observed that when ‘judicial

interpretations have settled the meaning of an exist-

ing statutory provision, repetition of the same lan-

guage in a new statute indicates, as a general matter,

the intent to incorporate its . . . judicial interpreta-

tions as well.’”) (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.

624, 645 (1998)).

19

The legislative history of Section 2302(b)(8)(A)

supports that inference. As noted above, the Senate

proposed a version of the proviso that would have

applied only to disclosures “prohibited by statute.”

Senate Report 154. The Senate Report accompanying

that proposal expressed the view that the proviso

should be limited to the types of statutes covered by

the amended Exemption 3. /d. at 21. But Congress

rejected the Senate’s proposal in favor of the language

proposed by the House, which used the phrase “specif-

ically prohibited by law.” H. Rep. No. 1403, 95th

Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1978); Conference Report 130.

Even if adoption of the Senate version would have

implied the existence of the various nontextual limita-

tions to which the Senate Report referred, rejection of

the Senate’s version implies the opposite.

In any event, assuming arguendo that the Section

2302(b)(8)(A) proviso did incorporate those implicit

limitations, the legislative mandate to promulgate the

SSI regulations would satisfy them. Even under the

Senate Report’s restrictive view, “a statute which

establishes particular criteria for withholding or re-

fers to particular types of matters to be withheld”

would be sufficient to render Section 2302(b)(8)(A)

inapplicable. Senate Report 21. The legislative man-

date here, which describes specific categories of in-

formation that the TSA is required to keep confiden-

tial, “refers to particular types of matters to be with-

held.” And it compares favorably in those respects

with a statute that the Senate Report specifically

identified as one that would satisfy the proviso, “sec-

‘ion 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947.”

Id. at 21-22; see CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167-168

(1985) (agreeing with the “uniform view among other

20

federal courts” that Section 102(d)(3) is “a withholding

statute under Exemption 3”). Section 102(d)(3) pro-

vided that “the Director of Central Intelligence shall

be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and

methods from unauthorized disclosure.” 50 U.S.C.

403(d)(3) (1976). The legislative mandate here—which

expressly directs the TSA to prohibit the disclosure of

three particular categories of information in a particu-

lar manner (promulgation of regulations)—is no less

specific or prohibitory.

3. The Federal Circuit’s conclusion that respond-

ent can invoke the protections of Section 2302(b)(8){A)

undermines the careful line that Congress drew be-

tween concerns that an employee may air in public

and those that he may not. The general purpose of

Section 2302(b)(8) is to “encourage government per-

sonnel to blow the whistle on wasteful, corrupt or

illegal government practices without fearing retaliato-

ry action by their supervisors or those harmed by the

disclosures.” Marano v. Department of Justice, 2

F.3d 1137, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1993). But that general

purpose is limited by a countervailing concern that

employees not publicly reveal information that has

legitimately been shielded from public view for rea-

sons unrelated to whistleblowing.

Under Section 2302(b)(8), any employee who comes

across information that he “reasonably believes”

shows a “violation of any law, rule, or regulation” or

“gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an

abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific dan-

ger to public health or safety” can raise his concerns

without fear of employment-related reprisal. 5 U.S.C.

2302(b)(8)(A)(i) and (ii), (B)(i) and (ii). But the man-

ner in which he may raise those concerns depends

21

upon whether the disclosure of information is “specifi-

cally prohibited by law” (or “specifically required by

Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of

national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs”). 5

U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A). If no such prohibition exists,

then there is no reason to believe that any harm to the

public interest caused by public disclosure will be

significant enough to outweigh the benefits of public

debate, and the employee may go public with the in-

formation. See ibid.

If such a prohibition does exist, however, Section

2302(b)(8) does not permit the employee himself to

decide whether the benefits of public disclosure out-

weigh the interests animating the prohibition against

it. Instead, the employee must raise his concerns

through internal channels: he may go either “to the

Inspector General of [the] agency or another employ-

ee designated by the head of the agency to receive

such disclosures” or “to the Special Counsel,” who

operates independently of the agency. 5 U.S.C.

2302(b)(8)(B); see 5 U.S.C. 1211-1212. Those channels

provide substantial procedures for the exposure of

problems within an agency that warrant corrective

action, while at the same time respecting the need to

shield particular information from public view.

If, for example, the employee goes to the Special

Counsel, the Special Counsel is required to evaluate

the information within 15 days, 5 U.S.C. 1213(b); may

compel the agency to investigate the matter and file a

written report, 5 U.S.C. 1213(c)-(d); and must trans-

mit the report (generally along with any comments

from the employee whose disclosure initiated the

investigation) to the President, relevant congressional

committees, and, potentially, other agencies (such as

22

the Department of Justice), 5 U.S.C. 1213(e). Under

the Federal Circuit’s decision, however, an employee

may disregard those procedures and individually

choose to make public disclosures that the TSA has

legitimately determined, in response to a congression-

al directive, to “be detrimental to the security of

transportation.” 49 U.S.C. 114(r)(1)(C). The Federal

Circuit’s decision is erroneous and should be reversed.

B. The Federal Circuit’s Erroneous Decision Warrants

Immediate Review

1. The court of appeals’ decision creates grave

public-safety concerns that warrant this Court’s im-

mediate intervention. The court’s holding that an

employee who discloses SSI may invoke Section

2302(b)(8)(A) as a defense to a resulting employment

action will embolden federal employees to disclose

SSI. The TSA estimates that it has more than 65,000

employees with access to SSI. Disclosures by such

employees will, as judged by the expert agency desig-

nated by Congress for the task, be “detrimental to the

security of transportation,” 49 U.S.C. 114(r)(1)(C), and

create serious risks to transportation safety.

Information classified as SSI includes “[sJecurity

programs and contingency plans”; “[sJecurity [dJirec-

tives”; specifications of security equipment and proce-

dures; “[vjulnerability assessments”; methods used

to detect threats; operational and technical details

of particular security measures; security screening

procedures; “[slecurity training materials”; “[i]denti-

fying information of certain transportation security

personnel”; and lists of systems and assets “the inca-

pacity or destruction of [which] would have a debilitat-

ing impact on transportation security.” 49 C.F.R.

1520.5(b)(1)-(2), (4)-(5) and (7)-(12) (emphasis omitted).

23

Any of that information, if improperly disclosed, could

present a serious threat to the security of the Nation’s

transportation network and put lives at risk.

Armed with such information, someone might, for

example, gain the ability to circumvent existing secu-

rity measures, evade existing threat-detection proce-

dures, or pinpoint specific vulnerabilities in the na-

tional transportation network. As the Federal Circuit

recognized, respondent’s own disclosure of flights that

would not be protected by federal air marshals “com-

promised flight safety,” created a “threat to public

safety,” and “could have had catastrophic consequenc-

es.” App., infra, 8a. Even information that might not

appear on its face to expose a security vulnerability

(say, the fact that a particular federal air marshal will

be on a particular flight) could potentially be exploited

to create one (say, by interfering with the air mar-

shal’s ability to make the flight). It will not always be

possible, as it was in this case, for the TSA to shift its

plans in time to eliminate the disclosed vulnerability.

Even when it is possible to do so, the effort may, as in

this case, “force[] the Agency to reallocate scarce

resources,” ibid., thereby diminishing the resources

available in areas that the agency initially determined

to be more critical. And a disclosure of information

about screening technology, for example, would re-

quire major investments of time, resources, and infra-

structure improvements to remedy; could take

months, if not years, to complete; and would require

considerable expenditure of federal funds.

The Federal Circuit attempted to downplay the

impact of its decision by pointing out that the govern-

ment may still “discipline employees who reveal SSI

for personal gain or due to negligence, or who disclose

24

information that the employee does not reasonably

believe evidences a substantial and specific danger to

public health or safety.” App., infra, 16a-17a. But

that is cold comfort. SSI, by its very nature, concerns

security matters. Employees will thus frequently be

able to claim that they are publicly disclosing SSI in

an effort to expose flaws in transportation security.

Many of those employees may later be deemed by the

MSPB, or a court, to have had a “reasonabl[e] belie[f]”

that the disclosure “evidences * * * a substantial

and specific danger to public health or safety,” 5

U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii), or another type of “reason-

abl{e} belie[f]” that qualifies for protection under

Section 2302(b)(8)(A). Even if some of those employ-

ees’ claims are not ultimately deemed to be within the

scope of Section 2302(b)(8)(A), the increased likeli-

hood of that result will itself erode the SSI scheme’s

deterrent effect and encourage more disclosures,

which are immediately harmful whether or not the

responsible employee is ultimately subject to discipli-

nary action.

2. Certiorari is warranted notwithstanding the ab-

sence of a circuit conflict on the question presented.

The Federal Circuit has outsized influence in this

area, and the potential for a circuit conflict ever to

develop is more theoretical than real.

An employee’s challenge to a personnel action un-

der Section 2302(b)(8)(A) is generally channeled to the

MSPB. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 7513(d) (MSPB jurisdiction

over appeals of adverse actions against covered em-

ployees); 5 U.S.C. 1214(a)(3) (MSPB jurisdiction to

hear Section 2302(b)(8) claims that the Special Coun-

sel terminates or does not timely act upon). The

MSPB has generally viewed Federal Circuit prece-

25

dent to be controlling. See, e.g., Garcia v. Depart-

ment of Agric., 110 M.S.P.R. 371, 379-380 (2009). And,

except in cases involving antidiscrimination claims,

MSPB decisions have historically been reviewable

only in the Federal Circuit. See 5 U.S.C. 7703(b)(1)

(2006).

In the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act

of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, Tit. I, § 108, 126 Stat.

1469-1470, Congress established a two-year window

(which expires at the end of 2014) during which cer-

tain Section 2302(b)(8) cases can be appealed not only

to the Federal Circuit, but to “any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction.” 5 U.S.C. 7703(b)(1)(B). In

light of that temporary provision, the MSPB has re-

laxed its view that Federal Circuit precedent is neces-

sarily controlling in such cases. See Day v. Depart-

ment of Homeland Sec., 119 M.S.P.R. 589, 595 n.5

(2013) (declining to follow a Federal Circuit decision

that represented a “minority approach among the

courts of appeal”). But the government is unaware of

any case involving the question presented that is on

track to be decided before the two-year window ex-

pires. In any event, even during the two-year window,

an employee could still elect to appeal any MSPB

decision in the government’s favor to the Federal

Circuit, which will then be bound by the decision in

this case. See App., infra, 165a-166a (denying rehear-

ing en banc); 5 U.S.C. 7703(b)(1)(B).

It is, moreover, unlikely that another good vehicle

for addressing the question presented will arise, be-

cause the Federal Circuit’s decision will deter federal

officials in the future from attempting to discipline an

employee who discloses SSI and appears to have a

colorable Section 2302(b)(8)(A) defense. Under 5

26

U.S.C. 1215(a), the independent Special Counsel is

empowered to bring a case before the MSPB seeking

personal sanctions against any agency official who

takes action against an employee in violation of Sec-

tion 2302(b)(8). The potential sanctions include re-

moval of the official, debarment from federal employ-

ment, and monetary penalties up to $1000. 5 U.S.C.

1215(a)(8)(A)(i) and (ii). A federal official is unlikely

to risk such personal repercussions simply to provide

another vehicle for this Court’s review. As a result,

future SSI disclosures may go unchecked (and thus

would not generate litigation). And even assuming the

government could raise the question presented again

at a later date, the delay would provide additional op-

portunity for harmful disclosures that could endanger

public safety. This Court should accordingly grant

certiorari now.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR.

Solicitor General

STUART F. DELERY

Assistant Attorney General

IAN HEATH GERSHENGORN

Deputy Solicitor General

ERIC J. FEIGIN

Assistant to the Solicitor

‘ ee General

TEVAN E.. BUNNELL DOUGLAS N. LETTER

General Counsel H. THOMAS BYRON III

U.S. Department of MICHAEL P. GOODMAN

Homeland Security Attorneys

JANUARY 2014

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 2011-3231

ROBERT J. MACLEAN, PETITIONER

Vv.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, RESPONDENT

OPINION

Apr. 26, 2013

Before: PROST, MOORE, and WALLACH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge

MooRE. Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge

WALLACH.

MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Robert J. MacLean petitions for review of a final

decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board

(Board), which sustained the Transportation Security

Administration’s (Agency’s) removal of Mr. MacLean

from the position of Federal Air Marshal (Marshal).

See MacLean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 116 M.S.PR.

562 (2011) (MacLean II). Because the Board incor-

(1a)

2a

rectly interpreted the Whistleblower Protection Act

(WPA), we vacate and remand.

BACKGROUND

Mr. MacLean became a Marshal in 2001. In July

2003, all Marshals received a briefing from the Agency

that there was a “‘potential plot’ to hijack U.S. Airlin-

ers.” MacLean II, 116 M.S.PR. at 564. Soon after

that briefing, however, the Agency sent an unen-

crypted text message to the Marshals’ cell phones

cancelling all missions on flights from Las Vegas until

early August. After receiving this directive, Mr. Mac-

Lean became concerned that “suspension of overnight

missions during a hijacking alert created a danger to

the flying public.” Jd. He complained to his super-

visor and to the Office of Inspector General, but they

responded that nothing could be done. J.A. 212-13.

Dissatisfied, Mr. MacLean told an MSNBC reporter

about the directive so as to “create a controversy re-

sulting in [its] rescission.” MacLean II, 116 M.S.PR.

at 565. MSNBC published an article criticizing the

directive, and the Agency withdrew it after several

members of Congress joined in the criticism.

In 2004, Mr. MacLean appeared on NBC Nightly

News in disguise to criticize the Agency dress code,

which he believed allowed Marshals to be easily identi-

fied. However, someone from the Agency recognized

his voice. During the Agency’s subsequent investiga-

tion, Mr. MacLean admitted that he revealed the can-

cellation directive to an MSNBC reporter in 2003.

Eventually, Mr. MacLean was removed from his posi-

tion because his contact with the MSNBC reporter

3a

constituted an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive se-

curity information (SSI). Although the Agency had

not initially labeled the text message as SSI when it

was sent, it subsequently issued an order stating that

its content was SSI.

Mr. MacLean challenged the SSI order in the Ninth

Circuit as a violation of the Agency’s own regulations

and as an impermissible retroactive action, but the

court rejected Mr. MacLean’s challenges. MacLean

v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 543 F.3d 1145, 1150-52 (9th

Cir. 2008). It held that substantial evidence support-

ed designating the text message as SSI under the ap-

plicable regulations, id. at 1150, and that the Agency

did not engage in retroactive action because it “applied

regulations . . . in force in 2003” to determine

that the text message was SSI, zd. at 1152.

Mr. MacLean challenged his removal before the

Board, arguing that his disclosure of the text message

was protected whistleblowing activity. After an inter-

locutory appeal from the Administrative Judge (AJ),

the full Board determined that Mr. MacLean’s disclo-

sure fell outside the WPA because it was “specifically

prohibited by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2008).

The Board reasoned that the regulation prohibiting

disclosure of SSI, upon which the Agency relied when

it removed Mr. MacLean, had the force of law. Mac-

Lean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 112 M.S.PR. 4, 12-18

(2009) (MacLean !).

The AJ then upheld Mr. MacLean’s removal and the

Board affirmed in MacLean II, the decision now on

appeal. Reconsidering MacLean I, the Board ex-

4a

plained that a regulation is not a “law” within the

meaning of the WPA. Instead, the Board held that

the disclosure of the text message could not qualify for

WPA protection because it was directly prohibited by a

statute, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act

(ATSA). MacLean I], 116 M.S.PR. at 570-71.

The Board also determined that the AJ applied the

correct regulation in upholding the Agency’s removal

of Mr. MacLean, and that the penalty of removal was

reasonable. Moreover, the Board upheld the AJ’s

finding that the Agency did not terminate Mr. Mac-

Lean in retaliation for his activities on behalf of the

Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association

(FLEOA) because the unauthorized disclosure of SSI

was a non-retaliatory reason for removal. Therefore,

the Board sustained the removal.

This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

We must affirm the Board’s decision unless it is

“(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained

without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation

having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substan-

tial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2012). We review

the Board’s legal determinations de novo. Welshans

v. U.S. Postal Serv., 550 F.3d 1100, 1102 (Fed. Cir.

2008).

5a

I. Application of Agency Regulations

to Mr. MacLean’s Removal

The Board explained that, “[uJnder the regulations

in effect in July 2003, information relating to the de-

ployment of [Marshals] was included within the defini-

tion of SSI,” and concluded that, as a result, Mr. Mac-

Lean’s communication with a reporter constituted an

unauthorized disclosure. MacLean IJ, 116 M.S.PR.

at 569. Mr. MacLean argues, however, that the Board

erred by upholding his removal because he was not

charged under the right regulation. He explains that

the regulation quoted in the initial charge, 49 C.ER.

§ 1520.5(b)(8)(ii), was not in force in 2003 and only

became codified in 2005. Mr. MacLean contends that

the Board wrongly concluded that the regulation it

ultimately relied on to uphold his removal, 49 C.F.R.

§ 1520.7(j), which was in force in 2003, is the same as

the 2005 regulation. Mr. MacLean argues that the

Board violated the rule of SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318

U.S. 80, 87, 63 S. Ct. 454, 87 L. Ed. 626 (1943), because

the Board affirmed his removal on grounds different

from those under which he was initially charged by the

deciding official.

Mr. MacLean also maintains that, although the

Ninth Circuit upheld the Agency’s eventual designa-

tion of the text message as SSI, his removal violated

his due process rights because the message was not la-

beled SSI when it was sent. He argues that the term-

ination was improper because he did not know that he

was violating any Agency rules by revealing the con-

tent of the text message. Mr. MacLean admits that

6a

he signed a nondisclosure agreement as a condition of

his employment, which states that Marshals “may be

removed” for “({uJnauthorized release of security-

sensitive or classified information.” MacLean I], 116

M.S.PR. at 580. He argues, however, that he believed

that the message was not SSI and that, in any event,

he was protected as a whistleblower. Repeating the

argument rejected by the Board, Mr. MacLean thus

insists that he tried in good faith to proceed within the

law.

We do not find Mr. MacLean’s arguments challeng-

ing the Agency’s charge to be persuasive. The regu-

lation that the Board ultimately relied upon to uphold

Mr. MacLean’s removal, 49 C.F-R. § 1520.7(j) (2002), is

no different from the regulation under which he was

initially charged, 49 C.F.R. § 1520.5(b)(8)(ii) (2005).

The earlier regulation bars disclosing “[s]pecific de-

tails of aviation security measures,” including “in-

for-mation concerning specific numbers of [Marshals],

deployments or missions,” while the latter prohibits

revealing “specific details of aviation . . . securi-

ty measures” and “[iJnformation concerning deploy-

ments.” In fact, the regulation’s history shows that

§ 1520.5(b)(8)(ii) is simply a recodified version § 1520,7()).

See J.A. 36. Because the Agency removed Mr. Mac-

Lean for revealing SSI, and the Board affirmed the

termination for that same reason, the Board did not

violate the Chenery doctrine.

We likewise reject Mr. MacLean’s due process and

“good faith” arguments. Both the applicable regula-

tion and the nondisclosure agreement that Mr. Mac-

Ta

Lean signed put him on notice that revealing infor-

mation concerning coverage of flights by Marshals

could lead to termination. Thus, the Agency did not

violate due process even though it formally designated

the text message as SSI only after it was sent. Fur-

thermore, we agree with the government that, because

the regulation prohibiting disclosure of SSI does not

include an intent element, Mr. MacLean cannot be

exonerated by his subjective belief that the content of

the text message was not SSI or that he was protected

as a whistleblower.

II. Reasonableness of Mr. MacLean’s Removal

Mr. MacLean argues that the Board failed to ade-

quately analyze the factors listed in Douglas v. Veter-

ans Administration, 5 MSPB 313, 5 M.S.PR. 280,

305-06 (1981), for possible mitigation of the penalty of

removal. Mr. MacLean contends that the Board did

not take into account the fact that he was a one-time

offender and otherwise had an unblemished record.

Mr. MacLean also argues that Douglas’s “comparative

discipline” factor did not weigh in favor of removal

because other Marshals were not terminated even

though they disclosed SSI regarding specific flights.

Mr. MacLean contends that the Board ignored the fact

that other Marshals’ disclosures were for personal

gain, while his disclosure exposed and led to correcting

an Agency mistake. He thus argues that revealing

the text message to a reporter served the public in-

terest, and that his termination undermined the effi-

ciency of the service.

8a

The government counters that the Board did not

abuse its discretion when it determined that Mr. Mac-

Lean’s termination promoted the efficiency of the ser-

vice. The government argues that there is no evi-

dence that Mr. MacLean’s actions made the flying pub-

lic safer. The government contends that, because

even a possibility that a Marshal may be onboard is an

important deterrent to terrorist activity, Mr. Mac-

Lean’s disclosure compromised flight safety and forced

the Agency to reallocate scarce resources to address

this new vulnerability. The government explains that,

although Mr. MacLean was a first-time offender with a

clean record, he was properly removed because his dis-

closure could have had catastrophic consequences.

The government argues that Mr. MacLean differs from

the Marshals who kept their jobs in spite of SSI

breaches because those Marshals compromised only

individual flights and showed remorse.

We agree with the government. The Board ana-

lyzed the relevant Douglas factors and did not abuse

its discretion in concluding that Mr. MacLean’s re-

moval was not a disparate penalty. MacLean II, 116

M.S.PR. at 576, 580-81. Unlike other Marshals, Mr.

MacLean revealed that multiple flights would be un-

protected, and we cannot say that it was unreasonable

for the Board to find that Mr. MacLean’s belief that he

was doing the right thing was outweighed by the re-

sulting threat to public safety. Moreover, it was not

unreasonable for the Board to determine that Mr.

MacLean’s conduct “caused the [A]gency to lose trust

in him,” id. at 579, because Mr. MacLean admitted that

he has “no regrets” and “feel[s] no remorse for going

9a

to a credible and responsible media representative,”

id. at 576. Given these circumstances, the Board did

not abuse its discretion by upholding Mr. MacLean’s

removal.

III. Mr. MacLean’s Prohibited

Personnel Practice Claim

The Board rejected Mr. MacLean’s argument that

the Agency violated the Civil Service Reform Act by

investigating him in retaliation for his FLEOA activi-

ties.’ The statute at issue prohibits individuals in

positions of authority from discriminating against a

government employee “on the basis of conduct which

does not adversely affect the performance of the em-

ployee ... or the performance of others.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(10)(A). The Board concluded that Mr.

MacLean’s prohibited personnel practice challenge

failed because he did not “meet his burden to establish

that the reason articulated by the [A]gency was pre-

textual and that the real reason underlying that deci-

sion was his FLEOA activities.” MacLean IJ, 116

M.S.PR. at 575. Mr. MacLean reasserts his discrimi-

' The government submitted a letter arguing that the Board

lacked jurisdiction over Mr. MacLean’s prohibited personnel prac-

tice claim. The government’s argument is unsupported by the ap-

plicable statutes. The Board has jurisdiction to entertain prohib-

ited personnel practice claims under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2), which

states that “the agency’s decision may not be sustained .. . if

the employee . . . shows that the decision was based on any

prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) of this

title.” Section 7701 applies to Agency employees by virtue of 49

U.S.C. § 40122(g)(2)(H).

10a

nation argument on appeal. He contends that the

Agency investigated him because of his 2004 appear-

ance on NBC Nightly News, which he made as part of

his advocacy on behalf of FLEOA.

We agree with the government that substantial ev-

idence supports the Board’s conclusion that the Agen-

cy did not discriminate against Mr. MacLean on the

basis of his FLEOA activities. Agency Policy Direc-

tive ADM 3700 “regulate[s] and prohibit{s} [Marshals’]

unauthorized contact with the media,” and record evi-

dence is consistent with the AJ’s determination that

Mr. MacLean was initially investigated for his unau-

thorized media appearance, not for his FLEOA activi-

ties. J.A. 27. Indeed, it is undisputed that the

Agency began to investigate Mr. MacLean “within

days of his unauthorized appearance” on NBC Nightly

News, which was “approximately 22 months after he

began organizing and leading the [FLEOA] chapter.”

J.A. 55 (quotation marks omitted). Although the

Agency ultimately did not pursue the media appear-

ance charge and focused on the SSI disclosure charge,

the initial investigation does not appear to be frivolous

or pretextual because it was justified by Directive

ADM 3700.

IV. Mr. MacLean’s Affirmative Defense

Under the WPA

The WPA prohibits individuals in positions of au-

thority from taking a “personnel action” against a gov-

ernment employee in certain circumstances, particu-

larly

lla

because of any disclosure of information by an em-

ployee . . . which the employee .. . rea-

sonably believes evidences .. . a substantial

and specific danger to public health or safety, if

such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by

nS a

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (emphasis added). The Board

rejected Mr. MacLean’s affirmative defense that his

disclosure of the text message was protected whistle-

blowing activity because it determined that the dis-

closure was “specifically prohibited by law” within the

meaning of the WPA. The law that the Board relied

upon is the ATSA, which states, in relevant part:

Notwithstanding section 552 of title 5 ... ,

the Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe reg-

ulations prohibiting disclosure of information ob-

tained or developed in ensuring security under this

title if the Secretary of Transportation decides dis- _

closing the information would . . . be detri-

mental to transportation safety.

49 U.S.C. § 40119(b)(1) (2009) (emphases added). Be-

cause its conclusion that revealing the content of the

text message was specifically prohibited by the ATSA

made further WPA inquiry unnecessary, the Board did

not reach the question of whether Mr. MacLean “rea-

sonably believe[d]” that this information “evidence[d]

a substantial and specific danger to public

2 The WPA was recently amended by the Whistleblower Protec-

tion Enhancement Act (WPEA). Neither party argues that the

WPEA applies to this appeal.

12a

. . . Safety.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8); see MacLean

IT, 116 M.S.P.R. at 581.

The parties do not dispute that, in order to fall un-

der the WPA’s “specifically prohibited by law” proviso,

the disclosure must be prohibited by a statute rather

than by a regulation. Thus, the core of the disagree-

ment is whether the ATSA “specifically prohibit[s]}”

disclosure of information concerning coverage of

flights by Marshals within the meaning of the WPA.

Mr. MacLean and his amici (three members of Con-

gress) argue that the Board erroneously concluded

that the ATSA’s mandate to the Secretary of Trans-

portation to “prescribe regulations prohibiting disclo-

sure” of certain kinds of information is a specific pro-

hibition under the WPA. They contend that the

phrase “specifically prohibited by law” in the WPA can

only refer to explicit statutory language that identifies

specific classes of information. They argue that the

ATSA’s “detrimental to transportation safety” lan-

guage does not establish particular criteria for with-

holding information and leaves a great deal! of discre-

tion to the Agency, which is inconsistent with the

WPA’s requirement of specificity. They contrast the

ATSA with the Trade Secrets Act, which directly au-

thorizes removal of any federal employee who divulges

information that falls into particular categories. 18

U.S.C. § 1905 (2008); see also Kent v. Gen. Servs. Ad-

min., 56 M.S.P R. 536, 540-46 (1993).

The government cousters that Mr. MacLean vio-

lated a regulation promulgated pursuant to an express

legislative directive in the ATSA, which made his dis-

13a

closure “specifically prohibited” by a statute. It thus

argues that Mr. MacLean’s disclosure does not qualify

for WPA protection. The government contends that

Mr. MacLean’s reading of the WPA eviscerates laws

that provide for any Agency discretion in classifying

information as SSI, and thus disables Congress from

directing agencies to pass nondisclosure regulations.

Lastly, the government argues that it does not make

sense for Congress to order an agency to promulgate

nondisclosure regulations and at the same time pro-

hibit that agency from disciplining an employee for

violating those regulations by providing a defense

under the WPA.

We agree with Mr. MacLean that the ATSA does

not “specifically prohibit” the disclosure at issue in this

case. The ATSA’s plain language does not expressly

prohibit employee disclosures, and only empowers the

Agency to prescribe regulations prohibiting disclosure

of SSI “if the Secretary decides disclosing the infor-

mation would . . . be detrimental to public safety.”

49 U.S.C. § 40119(b) (emphasis added). Thus, the

ultimate source of prohibition of Mr. MacLean’s dis-

closure is not a statute but a regulation, which the

parties agree cannot be “law” under the WPA.

Notably, Congress changed the language “specifi-

cally prohibited by law, rule, or regulation” in the stat-

ute’s draft version to simply “specifically prohibited by

law.” Congress did so because it was concerned that

the broader language “would encourage the adoption

of internal procedural regulations against disclosure,

and thereby enable an agency to discourage an em-

l4a

ployee from coming forward with allegations of wrong-

doing.” S. Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978),

reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2748. Congress

explained that only “a statute which requires that mat-

ters be withheld from the public as to leave no discre-

tion on the issue, or . . . which establishes partic-

ular criteria for withholding or refers to particular

types of matters to be withheld” could qualify as a suf-

ficiently specific prohibition. Jd. In contrast, the

“detrimental to transportation safety” language of the

ATSA does not describe specific matters to be with-

held. It provides only general criteria for withhold-

ing information and gives some discretion to the

Agency to fashion regulations for prohibiting disclo-

sure. Thus, the ATSA does not “specifically prohibit”

employee conduct within the meaning of the WPA.

The ATSA’s insufficient specificity becomes even

more apparent when it is contrasted with statutes that

have been determined to fall under the WPA’s “specifi-

cally prohibited by law” proviso. For example, the

Trade Secrets Act, which the Board in Kent held to

qualify as a specific prohibition, is extremely detailed

and comprehensive. 56 M.S.PR. at 543-46. That

statute penalizes federal employees who “divulge[]

any information coming to [them] in the course

of [their] employment . . . which information con-

cerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, opera-

tions, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity,

confidential statistical data, amount or source of any

income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person,

firm, partnership, corporation, or association.

” 18 U.S.C. § 1905. The same is true of § 6013

15a

of the Internal Revenue Code, which the Ninth Circuit

in Coons v. Secretary of the Treasury, 383 F.3d 879,

890-91 (9th Cir. 2004), held to fall within the meaning

of the WPA’s “specifically prohibited” language. That

statute prohibits federal employees from “disclos[ing]

any return or return information obtained by him in

any manner in connection with his service,” 26 U.S.C.

§ 6013(a)(1), and then goes on to define “return” and

“return information” in explicit detail, mentioning

such things as “a taxpayer’s identity, the nature, source

or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deduc-

tions, exemptions, credits, assets, overassessments, or

tax payments .. . ,” td. § 6013(b)(1), (2). Thus,

when Congress seeks to prohibit disclosure of specific

types of information, it has the ability to draft the

statute accordingly.

Nonetheless, we note that the ATSA’s charge to the

Secretary of Transportation to prescribe regulations

pursuant to specific criteria (i.e., only information that

would be detrimental to transportation safety) makes

this a very close case. Indeed, the ATSA appears to

fall in the middle of the spectrum of statutes flanked at

opposite ends by (a) those that fall squarely under the

WPA’s “specifically prohibited by law” proviso, such as

the Trade Secrets Act and § 6013 of the Internal Rev-

enue Code, and (b) those in which Congress delegates

legislative authority to an administrative agency with-

out circumscribing the agency’s discretion. Regula-

tions promulgated pursuant to Congress’s express in-

structions would qualify as specific legal prohibitions.

In this case, given the clarity of the statutory language

and legislative intent behind the WPA’s specificity re-

l6a

quirement,: the parameters set by Congress are not

enough to push the ATSA over that threshold.

We are similarly unpersuaded by the government’s

argument that a parade of horribles necessarily fol-

lows our adoption of Mr. MacLean’s interpretation of

the WPA. The government argues that, if Mr. Mac-

Lean is allowed to pursue his whistleblower defense,

the WPA would in effect prohibit later Congresses

from directing agencies to pass nondisclosure regula-

tions. The government is concerned that, under Mr.

MacLean’s reading, the WPA would prohibit agencies

from disciplining employees for violating nondisclosure

regulations and thereby prevent agencies from en-

forcing such regulations.

The government is mistaken. In spite of the WPA,

Congress remains free to enact statutes empowering

agencies to promulgate and enforce nondisclosure reg-

ulations, and it has done sointhe ATSA. The govern-

ment ignores the fact that the ATSA covers a wide

range of conduct that would not qualify as whistle-

blowing. For example, no one disputes that the ATSA

empowers the Agency to promulgate regulations that

enable it to discipline employees who reveal SSI for

personal gain or due to negligence, or who disclose in-

formation that the employee does not reasonably be-

lieve evidences a substantial and specific danger to

public health or safety. The WPA also does not pro-

hibit the Agency from following the ATSA’s mandate to

regulate public access to information that the Agency

might otherwise be forced to disclose under the Free-

dom of Information Act (FOIA). Indeed, it appears

17a

that the paramount goal of the ATSA is to empower

the Agency to reject the public’s requests for Agenoy

intelligence because the statute recites that, “[{nJot-

withstanding [FOIA] .. . _, the Secretary of

Transportation shall prescribe regulations prohibiting

disclosure of information obtained or developed in en-

suring security under this title.” 49 U.S.C. § 40119(b)(1);

see also Public Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 194-

196 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (analyzing the predecessor statute

to the ATSA and explaining that Congress’s desire to

enable the Agency to bar FOIA requests for informa-

tion that qualifies as SSI was one of the driving forces

behind the passage of that statute). Our interpreta-

tion of the WPA does not deprive the ATSA of mean-

ing.

CONCLUSION

Because Mr. MacLean’s disclosure is nvt “specifi-

cally prohibited by law” within the meaning of the

WPA, we vacate the Board’s decision and remand for a

determination whether Mr. MacLean’s disclosure qual-

ifies for WPA protection. For example, it remains to

be determined whether Mr. MacLean reasonably be-

lieved that the content of his disclosure evidenced a

substantial and specific danger to pu’ « health or

safety.

VACATED AND REMANDED

WALLACH, Circuit Judge, concurring.

Mr. MacLean presented substantial evidence that

he was not motivated by personal gain but by the de-

sire to protect the public. He averred proof that he

18a

sought direction from his supervisors before making

allegedly protected disclosures. While I join in the

analysis and the result of the majority opinion, I con-

cur to emphasize that the facts alleged, if proven,

allege conduct at the core of the Whistleblower Pro-

tection Act.

19a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

2011MSPB 70

Docket No.: SF-0752-06-0611-1-2

ROBERT J. MACLEAN, APPELLANT

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, AGENCY

July 25, 2011

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman

Mary M. Rose, Member

PINION R

11 The appellant petitions for review of the initial

decision that sustained his removal. For the

reasons set forth below, we DENY the petition for

review and AFFIRM the initial decision AS

MODIFIED herein. The appellant’s removal is

SUSTAINED.

BACKGROUND

12

13

20a

Except where specified otherwise, the follow-

ing facts are not in dispute. Shortly after the

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the ap-

pellant was appointed to the position of Civil Avi-

ation Security Specialist, also known as Federal

Air Marshal (FAM). He was originally employed

in the Department of Transportation, specifically

the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Ini-

tial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4, Subtabs 4S, 4U.

He was transferred to the Transportation Secu-

rity Administration (TSA) when that agency was

created in late 2001 for the purpose of promoting

aviation security, among other things. See Pub.

L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597, § 101. In early

2003 the appellant became an employee of the

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) when

TSA’s workforce and functions were transferred

to DHS. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135,

2178, § 403.

In July 2003, the appellant received a briefing

from TSA concerning a “potential plot” to hijack

U.S. airliners. Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 80-82.

Soon after the briefing, TSA officials sent a di-

rective to FAMs that all Remain Overnight

(RON) missions in early August would be can-

celled.’ At the time of the directive, the perti-

' The record is not entirely clear as to the precise dates that

overnight missions were to be cancelled, but there is no dispute

that the directive covered multiple days during the period August

1-9, 2008. Tr. at 52,112. Pinpointing the exact dates is unneces-

sary to our analysis.

14

Zla

nent regulations prohibited disclosure of Sensi-

tive Security Information (SSI) to the public. 67

Fed. Reg. 8340, 8351 (2002) (promulgating 49

C.F-R. §§ 1520.3 & 1520.5 as a Final Rule). Un-

der the definition in effect at the time of the di-

rective, SSI consisted of, among other things,

“{s]pecific details of aviation security measures,”

including but not limited to “information con-

cerning specific numbers of Federal Air Marshals,

deployments, or missions.” 67 Fed. Reg. 8340,

8352 (2002) (promulgating 49 C.FR. § 1520.7).

In July 2003, each FAM was equipped with a

Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) on which he

could receive encrypted messages from TSA.

The appellant received the directive cancelling

RONs as an unencrypted text message on his cell

phone, however. ‘Tr. at 78-82. The message was

not labeled as SSI. /d. at 82-83.

The appellant believed that the suspension of

overnight missions during a hijacking alert cre-

ated a danger to the flying public and was incon-

sistent with what “the law mandated.” Tr. at 84,

88. He raised his concerns with his supervisor

and with an employee in the agency’s Inspector

General’s office but was not satisfied with the re-

sponses he received. Jd. at 84-88. The appel-

lant then revealed the contents of the RON di-

rective to a reporter from MSNBC, with the hope

that the reporter could create a controversy re-

sulting in rescission of the directive. Tr. at

108-110; IAF, Tab 4, Subtab 4J at 11. On Tues-

day, July 29, 2003, MSNBC published an article

15

16

22a

on its website entitled “Air Marshals Pulled from

Key Flights.” The article stated that “[d]espite

renewed warnings about possible airline hijack-

ings, the Transportation Security Administration

has alerted federal air marshals that as of Friday

they will no longer be covering cross-country or

international flights, MSNBC.com has learned.”

IAF, Tab 4, Subtab 4J at 17. The appellant was

not identified in the article. See id. Members

of Congress criticized TSA’s suspension of over-

night missions, and the directive was withdrawn

before it went into effect. Tr. at 92.

After this series of events, the appellant came

to believe that FAMs should speak with “a collec-

tive voice,” so he became active in the Federal

Law Enforcement Officers Association (F LEQA).

Tr. at 92. About a year later, the appellant ap-

peared on NBC Nightly News, in disguise and

identified as Air Marshal “Mike,” when he as-

serted that the agency’s dress code allowed

would-be terrorists to identify FAMs. IAF, Tab

4, Subtab 4J at 10; Refiled Appeal File (RAF),

Tab 45, Ex. TT. Someone from TSA recognized

his voice, and TSA ordered an investigation into

the appellant’s “unauthorized media appearance.”

During the investigation, the appellant admitted

that he was the one who told the press about the

2003 suspension of overnight missions. IAF, Tab

4, Subtab 4J at 10.

The agency proposed the appellant's removal

on charges of: (1) Unauthorized Media Ap-

17

23a

pearance; (2) Unauthorized Release of Infor-

mation to the Media; and (3) Unauthorized Dis-

closure of Sensitive Security Information. LAF

Tab 4, Subtab 4G. The deciding official, Special

Agent in Charge Frank Donzati, sustained only

the third charge and imposed removal. /d.,

Subtab 4A. Subsequently, TSA issued an August

31, 2006 order finding that the 2003 directive re-

garding overnight missions was SSI. IAF, Tab

22 (attachment).

On appeal, and following a dismissal without

prejudice to allow the appellant to contest the

agency’s August 31, 2006 order in the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

IAF, Tab 29, the administrative judge certified

several rulings for interlocutory review, RAF, Tab

14. In the resulting decision, the Board held as

follows:

e The Board lacks the authority to determine

for itself whether the particular information

the appellant disclosed in 2003 was SSI. The

appellant obtained a dismissal without preju-

dice for the purpose of instituting an action in

federal court seeking a declaration that the

information he disclosed was not SSI. The

court found that the information he disclosed

was SSI. The Board and the parties are

2 The Court also determined that the TSA order did not consti-

tute an improper, retroactive agency adjudication, but that “the

agency applied regulations that were in force in 2003 to determine

24a

. bound by the result of that litigation, regard-

less of the fact that the agency did not ex-

pressly deem the 2003 instruction to be SSI

until after it removed the appellant.

The appellant’s disclosure of SSI to the media

cannot constitute protected whistleblowing

because the appellant violated agency regula-

tions when he made the disclosure. The de-

cision in Kent v. General Services Admin-

istration, 56 M.S.P.R. 536 (1993)—where the

Board had held that the exception to whistle-

blower coverage for disclosures “specifically

prohibited by law,” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b\8)(A),

applies only to disclosures prohibited by

statute—was modified.

MacLean v. Department of Homeland Security,

112 M.S.P.R. 4 (2009) (MacLean J).

18

Upon return of the case to the regional office,

the administrative judge held a hearing and is-

sued an initial decision upholding the appellant’s

removal. RAF, Tab 84. The administrative

judge first explained at length why he found not

credible the appellant’s testimony that he did not

think the 2003 directive was SSI when he dis-

closed it to the reporter. Jd. at 14-18. The ad-

ministrative judge then sustained the charge of

unauthorized disclosure of SSI. /d. at 18-19.

that information created in 2003 was [SSI].” MacLean v. Depart-

ment of Homeland Security, 543 F.3d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008).

19

110

25a

The administrative judge found unproven the

appellant’s affirmative defense that. the agency

violated 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10), which prohibits

discrimination because of “conduct which does not

adversely affect the performance of the employee

or applicant or the performance of others.” ®

According to the appellant, the agency targeted

him because he became active in FLEOA, and his

removal for unauthorized disclosure of SSI was a

pretext. The administrative judge weighed the

evidence and concluded that this claim was un-

proven. /d. at 20-23. Turning to the appellant’s

First Amendment claim, the administrative judge

found that the appelliant’s 2003 disclosure to

MSNBC addressed a matter of public concern,

but that the appellant’s right to speak was out-

weighed by the agency’s need to control dissemi-

nation of information about aviation security

measures. /d. at 23-28.

Finally, the administrative judge found that the

penalty was reasonable. In doing so, he conclud-

ed that deciding official Donzanti properly con-

sidered the relevant factors under Douglas v.

Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.PR. 280 (1981).

RAF, Tab 84 at 30. The administrative judge

specifically found that, among other things,

Donzanti considered that the appellant’s disclo-

sure of SSI was serious because it created a

* The appellant concedes that, as a FAM, he was not covered by

the federal labor-relations statute at 5 U.S.C. ch. 71, and thus his ac-

tivity was not protected by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9). RAF’, Tab 67 at 5.

711

26a

“vulnerability” as soon as the appellant made the

disclosure. /d. at 30-31. The administrative

judge further found that the offense was inten-

tional, i.e., the appellant intentionally made a

statement including the SSI to a reporter and he

was on clear notice that the information should

not be publicly revealed. /d. at 31-33. He not-

ed the appellant’s sworn statement that he had no

regrets and felt no remorse for going to the me-

dia, and his sworn deposition testimony that it did

not matter to him whether or not the information

conveyed to the reporter was SSI. /d. at 31-32.

The administrative judge also distinguished the

comparison employees identified by the appellant

purporting to evidence inconsistency of penalties.

Id. at 35-37.

The appellant has filed a timely petition for

review contesting all of the administrative judge’s

major findings and conclusions, raises affirmative

defenses not raised below, and requests to submit

evidence not submitted below. Petition for Re-

view (PFR) File, Tabs 1 (original submission), 2

(supplement to PFR) & 4 (corrected PFR). The

agency has responded in opposition to the PFR.

Id., Tab 8. The appellant has filed a reply to the

agency’s response. /d., Tab 9. The agency

moves to strike the appellant’s reply, id., Tab 10,

and the appellant opposes the motion to strike,

id.,Tab 11.4 The appellant also has filed another

* The Board’s rules do not provide for replies to responses to

petitions for review. See 5 C.F.R § 1201.114(); Santella v. Special

27a

motion to introduce “new” evidence, which the

agency has opposed. /d., Tabs 12-13. The Hon-

orable Dennis Kucinich and Honorable Carolyn

Maloney, U.S. House of Representatives, have

filed a motion with the Board requesting leave to

file an amicus curiae brief. Jd., Tab 14. We

grant the Representatives’ motion.°

ANALYSIS

The administrative judge correctly sustained the charge.

"12 The agency removed the appellant based on the

charge of “Unauthorized Disclosure of Sensitive

Security Information.” In support of the charge,

the agency specified as follows:

On July 29, 2003, you disclosed Sensitive Secu-

rity Information in an unauthorized manner.

Specifically, you informed the media that all

Counsel, 86 M.S.P.R. 48, 4 10 (2000), aff'd on reconsideration, 90

M.S.P.R. 172 (2001), aff'd, 328 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. (2003). We

therefore grant the agency’s motion to strike the appellant’s reply

for this reason and because it was filed weeks after the date the re-

cord closed on review (as extended), does not purport to be based

on previously-unavailable evidence, and is largely repetitive of ar-

guments raised in the petition for review. Nonetheless, while we

thus did not consider the reply in deciding this matter, we have

directed the Clerk of the Board to retain the appellant’s reply in

the case file in order to preserve the appellate record.

® We accept the Representatives’ amicus brief into the record,

and we have considered it in deciding the appeal. Because we con-

clude that the arguments contained in the amicus brief do not affect

the outcome of the appeal, we have not requested any response

from the agency or the appellant.

28a

Las Vegas FAMs were sent a text message to

their government issued mobile phones that all

RON (Remain Overnight) missions up August

9th would be cancelled, or words to that effect.

You admitted and acknowledged the foregoing

during an official, administrative inquiry re-

garding your conduct.

The media person to whom you disclosed this

information is not a covered person within the

meaning of the SSI regulations, 49 C.F.R. Part

1520. The information you improperly dis-

closed concerned RON deployments. Such

information is protected as SSI pursuant to 49

C.F.R. § 1520.5(b)(8)(ii)[,] which safeguards

“Information concerning the deployments,

numbers and operations of . . . Federal

Air Marshals .. . ” The disclosure of this

SSI had the potential to reveal vulnerabilities

in the aviation security system, and as such,

was extremely dangerous to the public we

serve.

IAF’, Tab 4, Subtab 4G at 2 (punctuation and capitaliza-

tion in original).®

° The regulation quoted in the charge, 49 C.F.R. § 1520.5(b)(8Xii),

is from the version in effect when the agency issued the proposal

notice. See 69 Fed. Reg. 28066, 28083 (2004) (promulgating a re-

vised 49 C.F.R. Part 1520 as an interim final rule with request for

comments). The version in effect in July 2003 when the appellant

divulged the text message to the reporter was codified under a dif-

ferent number but was substantively the same as the regulation

quoted in the charge. See 67 Fed. Reg. 8340, 8352 (2002) (promul-

gating a final rule defining SSI at 49 C.F.R. § 1520.7(j) as including

113

29a

The appellant argues that the administrative

judge erred in sustaining the charge without

making a finding whether he had a “good faith

belief” that he was permitted to disclose the con-

tents of the text message to the reporter. PFR

File, Tab 4 at 18. The appellant also argues at

length that the administrative judge was wrong to

reject, as not credible, his testimony that he did

not know the text message was SSI. /d. at

19-30. The agency argues that intent is not an

element of the charge. PFR File, Tab 8 at 9.

We agree with the agency. The charge, as titled

and as described in the specification, did not con-

tain a specific intent element; the agency did not

allege in its charge that the appellant engaged in

intentional misconduct. Some charges, such as

falsification, by their very nature require a show-

ing of intent. See Naekel v. Department of

Transportation, 782 F.2d 975, 978 n.3 (Fed. Cir.

1986); Baracker v. Department of the Interior, 70

M.S.PR. 594, 599 (1996). Because the agency in

this case did not bring such a charge, the Board

may sustain the charge without a showing of in-

tentionality, willfulness, knowingness, or the like,

as long as imposing discipline for the conduct

promotes the efficiency of the service. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7513(a); see Fernandez v. Department of Agri-

“information concerning specific numbers of Federal Air Marshals,

deployments, or missions”). The appellant does not contend that

he was prejudiced by the agency’s citation of the later version of

the regulation in the charge.

30a

culture, 95 M.S.PR. 63 99 6-8 (2003); Cross v.

Department of the Army, 89 M.S.PR. 62, 41 8-9

(2001).

714 Under the regulations in effect in July 2003,

information relating to the deployment of FAMs

was included within the definition of SSI. 67

Fed. Reg. 8352 (2002) (49 C.F.R. § 1520.7()).

The appellant was not authorized to release SSI

to a reporter, 67 Fed. Reg. 8351 (49 C.FR. §§

1520.1(a), 1520.3(a)-(b)), nor was the reporter

someone with a “need to know” SSI, 67 Fed. Reg.

8352 (49 C.F-R. § 1520.5). Imposing discipline

for the appellant’s disclosure of the text message

to a reporter promotes the efficiency of the ser-

vice because maintaining confidentiality of plans

for FAM deployments goes to the heart of one of

TSA’s missions, that of promoting civil aviation

safety and security.

The appellant’s discl MSNBC reporter is

no whi lowin cause it was “specifi-

cally prohibited by law.”

"415 It is a prohibited personnel practice for an

agency to impose discipline because of an em-

ployee’s disclosure of “information

which the employee . . . reasonably believes

evidences—{i) a violation of any law, rule, or reg-

ulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross

waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a sub-

stantial and specific danger to public health or

safety, if such disclosure is not specifically pro-

hibited by law. . . 5 U.S.C.

116

3la

§ 2302(b)(8)(A). In MacLean I, the Board held

that the appellant’s disclosure of the 2003 di-

rective concerning overnight missions to a re-

porter was not protected whistleblowing because

it was “specifically prohibited by law.” Mac-

Lean, |12 M.S.PR. 4, 19 20-33. The appellant

argues that this holding was incorrect and asks

that we overrule it. PFR File, Tab 4 at 60-63.

The law of the case doctrine refers to the prac-

tice of courts in refusing to reopen what already

has been decided in an appeal, and of following a

prior decision in an appeal of the same case.

Hoover v. Department of the Navy, 57 M.S.PR.

545, 552 (1993). These rules do not involve pre-

clusion by final judgment, but instead regulate

judicial affairs before final judgment. Peartree

v. U.S. Postal Service, 66 M.S.PR. 332, 339 (1995).

There are three recognized exceptions to the law

of the case doctrine: The availability of new and

substantially different evidence; a contrary deci-

sion of law by controlling authority that is appli-

cable to the question at issue; or a showing that

the prior decision in the same appeal was clearly

erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.

Hudson v. Principi, 260 F.3d 1357, 1363-64 (Fed.

Cir. 2001); Peartree, 66 M.S.PR. at 337; Hoover,

57 M.S.PR. at 553. We decline the appellant’s

invitation to overrule the Board’s 2009 decision

because that decision was not “clearly erroneous,”

and he has not alleged any other bases for devi-

ating from the law of the case.

117

32a

We recognize that the Board’s decision in

MacLean I could be read broadly to allow any

regulation that meets certain conditions to be ac-

corded the full force and effect of law, and thus, a

disclosure in violation of such a regulation could

be construed as “prohibited by law” under 5

U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). We find that such a

broad ruling is unnecessary to resolve the issues

presented by this appeal and is inconsistent with

the policies that Congress embodied in the Whis-

tleblower Protection Act (“WPA”). We therefore

modify MacLean I to the extent it is inconsistent

with the decision we issue today. Rather, we find

that the appellant’s disclosure of SSI was “spe-

cifically prohibited by law” because the regulation

that he violated when he disclosed information

about FAM deployments was promulgated pur-

suant to an explicit Congressional mandate that

required TSA to prohibit such disclosures. Spe-

cifically, in enacting Pub. L. No. 108-272, § 101, 108

Stat. 745, 1117 (July 5, 1994), codified at 49 U.S.C. §

40119,’ Congress expressly required that TSA is-

7 The statute states in pertinent part as follows:

(b) DISCLOSURE. (1) Notwithstanding section 552 of title 5,

the Administrator shall prescribe regulations prohibiting dis-

closure of information obtained or developed in carrying out

security or research and development activities under section

44501(a) or (c), 44502(a)(1) or (3), (b), or (c), 44504, 44505, 44507,

44508, 44511, 44512, 44513, 44901, 44903(a), (b), (c), or (e),

44905, 44912, 44935, 44936, or 44938(a) or (b) of this title if the

Administrator decides disclosing the information would—(A) be

an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (B) reveal a trade

33a

sue aviation-related regulations “prohibiting disclo-

sure of information obtained or developed in carry-

ing out security” if, in the agency’s view, “disclosing

the information” would “be detrimental to the

safety of passengers in air transportation.” 49

U.S.C. § 40119(b)(1)(C). Citing 49 U.S.C. § 40119

(among other authorities), on February 22, 2002,

the Under Secretary of TSA® issued regulations

on February 22, 2002, which identified SSI sub-

ject to this statutory nondisclosure as including

information relating to FAM deployments. 67

Fed. Reg. 8340, 8351-52 (2002). Furthermore,

secret or privileged or confidential commercial or financial in-

formation; or (C) be detrimental to the safety of passengers in

air transportation.

(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not authorize infor-

mation to be withheld from a committee of Congress authorized

to have the information.

* In 2001, Congress enacted the legislation creating the Trans-

portation Security Administration, which was charged with carry-

ing out certain functions previously performed by the Federal

Aviation Administration. See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597,

603 (Nov. 19, 2001). Section 101(e)(2) of that statute replaced the

word “Administrator” [of the Federal Aviation Administration] in

section 40119(b) with “Under Secretary,” which refers to the Under

Secretary of Transportation Security, see 49 U.S. § 1154(b){1).

® The Board’s 2009 decision cited 49 U.S.C. § 114(s) as the author-

ity for the SSI regulations at 49 C.F.R. Part 1520. 112 M.S.P.R. 4,

710. However, section 114(s) (which was later redesignated as

subsection (r), see Pub. L. No. 110-161, Div. E, § 568(a)), became

law on November 25, 2002, see Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135,

2312, and TSA did not issue regulations under that specific statu-

tory authority until May 18, 2004, see 69 Fed. Reg. 28066, 28082

34a

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has unequivo-

cally declared that the information disclosed by

the appellant constituted SSI as defined in those

regulations. See MacLean, 543 F3d at 1150."

Consequently, because the appellant disclosed in-

formation that is specifically prohibited from dis-

closure by a regulation promulgated pursuant to

an express legislative directive from Congress to

TSA,” we find that his disclosure was “specifi-

(2004). Nevertheless, as explained above, 49 U.S.C. § 40119 (which

is substantively similar to section 114(s)) gave the Under Secretary

for Transportation Security the authority to issue regulations pro-

hibiting the disclosure of information if such disclosure would be

“detrimental to the safety of passengers in air transportation,” the

Under Secretary issued such regulations in 2002, see 67 Fed. Reg.

8340, 8351-52, and the appellant violated those regulations. The ci-

tation to 49 U.S.C. § 114(s) instead of section 40119 in the Board’s

2009 decision had no affect on the outcome.

‘0 Congress established judicial review of TSA final orders in

the federal courts of appeals with exclusive review by the Supreme

Court. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 46110(a) and (e) (“A decision by a court

under this section may be reviewed only by the Supreme Court un-

der section 1254 of title 28.”) Thus, this Board has no authority to

review the decision of the Ninth Circuit holding that the informa-

tion that the appellant disclosed constituted SSI because it “con-

tained ‘specific details of aviation security measures’ regarding ‘de-

ployment and missions’ of {[FAMs)]” in violation of 49 C.F.R.

§ 1520.7(i). MacLean, 543 F.3d at 1150.

‘\ The Board has no authority to review either the statutory

mandate against disclosure, or the legality of the regulation issued

pursuant thereto. See Maddoz v. Merit Systems Protection Board,

759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (the Board's jurisdiction is not ple-

nary; it is limited to those matters over which it has been given

jurisdiction by law, rule or regulation); 5 U.S.C. § 1204(f).

118

119

35a

cally prohibited by law” so as to bring it outside

the scope of the whistleblower protection provi-

sions of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).

We would share some of the concerns ex-

pressed by Representatives Kucinich and Malo-

ney if MacLean I were given the broad sweep

that they address in their amicus brief. As we

have explained above, however, we limit our hold-

ing here and the reach of MacLean I in order to

give effect to both the WPA and Congress’s ex-

press intent to prohibit the public disclosure of

aviation security information. The appellant’s

disclosure of FAM deployment information was

not protected by the WPA because it was prohib-

ited by SSI regulations issued by TSA in compli-

ance with an express statutory requirement of

Congress to issue regulations “prohibiting dis-

closure of information obtained or developed in

carrying out security” if, in TSA’s view, “disclos-

ing the information” would “be detrimental to the

safety of passengers in air transportation.”

49 U.S.C. § 40119(b)(1)(C). To the extent that

this statutory mandate encroaches upon the pro-

tections afforded by the WPA, it is for Congress,

not the Board, to resolve the competing legisla-

tive objectives underlying these statutes.

Although the appellant’s disclosure of infor-

mation relating to FAM deployments to an

MSNBC reporter does not constitute protected

whistleblowing activity, our holding today does

not mean that TSA may rely on its SSI regula-

1 20

36a

tions as authority for prohibiting all disclosures

relating to aviation security and safety. On the

contrary, Congress has specified that the regula-

tions issued pursuant to its mandate in 49 U.S.C.

§ 40119 may not prohibit disclosures to “a com-

mittee of Congress authorized to have the infor-

mation.” 49 U.S.C. § 40119(b); see also 49 U.S.C.

§ 114(r)(2). Additionally, we note that the “spe-

cifically prohibited by law” exclusion from WPA

protection does not apply to disclosures made to

the Office of Special Counsel. 5 U.S.C. §

2302(b)(8)(B); see Parikh v. Department of Vet-

erans Affairs, 110 M.S.PR. 295. 97 23 n.1 (2008).

The appellant did not pursue either of these

channels.”

Finally, the case of Chambers v. Department of

the Interior, 602 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2010), while

appearing to have some similarity to this case, is

distinguishable. Ms. Chambers, like the appellant

herein, publicly disclosed information about the

deployment of law enforcement officers. Jd. at

1378. Ms. Chambers’s disclosure of a substantial

and specific danger to public health or safety, id.

at 1379, was protected under 5 U.S.C. §

2302(b)(8)(A)(ii), however, because it was not

2 Because the appellant did not make his disclosure through

either of the two authorized channels described above, we make no

finding on whether, if he had, his disclosure would have been pro-

tected as evidencing a violation of law, rule, or regulation, a sub-

stantial and specific danger to public health or safety, or some

other condition described at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).

37a

“specifically prohibited by law.” By contrast,

while the appellant was also arguably disclosing a

substantial and specific danger to public health or

safety, his disclosure cannot similarly be protect-

ed under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii) because it

contained SSI, the disclosure of which was “spe-

cifically prohibited by law” under a regulatory

nondisclosure scheme mandated by Congress.

The appellant’s removal based on his 2003 SSI disclo-

sure did not violate his First Amendment right of free

speech.

4 21

The appellant contends that the agency violat-

ed his First Amendment right to freedom of

speech by removing him for his 2003 disclosure of

SSI to the MSNBC reporter.* The administra-

tive judge found the appellant’s First Amendment

claim unproven, finding that under the balancing

test outlined in Pickering v. Board of Education

of Township High School District 205, Will

Count, Illinois, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), the ap-

13

In the summary of the prehearing conference, the administra-

tive judge did not list as an affirmative defense a claim by the ap-

pellant that that his disclosure to MSNBC in 2003 about the sus-

pension of overnight missions was protected under the First Am-

endment. RAF, Tab 67. The appellant made that argument in

his post-hearing brief, however, RAF, Tab 79 at 16-18, the admini-

strative judge addressed it in the initial decision, RAF, Tab 84 at

23-28, and the agency does not argue on review that the issue

should not have been considered, PFR File, Tab 8 at 19-20. Un-

der the circumstances, we deem the appellant’s claim that his 2003

disclosure to MSNBC was protected free speech under the First

Amendment to be properly before us.

7 22

38a

pellant’s interest in commenting on a matter of

public concern, 2.e., the 2003 directive regarding

overnight missions, was outweighed by the inte-

rest of the agency, as employer, in promoting avi-

ation security. The appellant challenges this

finding. PFR File, Tab 4 at 56-57. We note, in

this regard, courts have recognized that law en-

forcement duties entail special obligations with

regard to public trust that may be considered in

the Pickering balancing. See, e.g., United States

v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 606 (1995); O’'De _ vell v.

Barry, 148 F3d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1998);

Cochran v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F:3d 1195, 1201

(9th Cir. 2000); Bennett v. City of Holyoke, 230 F-

Supp. 2d 207, 225 (D. Mass. 2002), aff'd, 362 F.3d 1

(Ist Cir. 2004); Pierson v. Gondles, 693 F. Supp.

408, 418 (E.D. Va. 1988).

Here, the record reflects that the appellant

revealed information about FAM deployments

that the agency legitimately expected to remain

confidential, and which created a vulnerability in

the aviation system. We find that disciplining

the appellant for releasing details of aviation se-

curity measures to a reporter did not violate his

First Amendment right of free speech. Cf

Chambers v. Department of the Interior, 103

M.S.PR. 375, 11 36-42 (2006) (disciplining a Chief

of Police for disclosing information about officer

patrols and her agency’s budget to a reporter did

not violate her First Amendment right of free

speech), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other

4 23

39a

grounds, and remanded, 515 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir.

2008).

We also believe the fact that the agency acted

in this instance pursuant to, and consistent with,

the aforementioned statutory and regulatory

nondisclosure scheme mandated by Congress re-

garding aviation security, undercuts the appel-

lant’s constitutional claim. To the extent that the

appellant’s claim implicitly involves a challenge to

the constitutionality of the statute authorizing the

agency to issue the nondisclosure regulations, the

Board lacks jurisdiction to hear such a claim.

See May wv. Office of Personnel Management, 38

M.S.PR. 534, 538 (1988) (the Board has authority

to adjudicate a constitutional challenge to an

agency's application of a statute, but it is without

authority to determine the constitutionality of

federal statutes).

The a ] did not prove his prohibi onne

actice claim under 5 , 02(b)(10).

124

As discussed above, the appellant also contends

that the agency retaliated against him because of

his FLEOA activities, thereby committing a pro-

hibited personnel practice in violation of 5 U.S.C. §

2302(bX10). The relevant statute pertinently

provides:

Any employee who has authority to take, direct

others to take, recommend, or approve any per-

sonnel action, shall not, with respect to such au-

thority—

40a

(10) discriminate for or against any employee or

applicant for employment on the basis of conduct

which does not adversely affect the performance of

the employee or applicant or the performance of

others;

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10).

7 25

1 26

The Board has not previously established the

precise elements for proving a violation of 5

U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10). Depending on the specific

facts and circumstances, the proscription of §

2302(b)(10) may be analogous to either (1) the

prohibition against retaliation for exercising ap-

peal rights, filing grievances, etc., found at 5

U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9), or to (2) a traditional claim of

discrimination governed by the principles of Title

VII. We find it unnecessary in this case, howev-

er, to decide the specific legal framework that the

Board will apply to future § 2302(b)(10) claims be-

cause the appellant has failed to prove his claim

under either standard.

To establish a prima facie violation of 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(10) applying the (b)(9) framework, the

appellant must demonstrate that: (1) He en-

gaged in activity that did not adversely affect his

performance; (2) he was subsequently treated in

an adverse fashion by the agency; (3) the deciding

official had actual or constructive knowledge of

the appellant’s (b)(10) activity; and (4) there is a

causal connection between the (b)(10) activity and

1 27

4la

the adverse action. See Crump v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, 114 M.S.PR. 224, 4 10 (2010);

Wildeman v. Department of the Air Force, 23

M.S.PR. 313, 320 (1984); see also Warren v. De-

partment of the Army, 804 F.2d 654 (Fed. Cir.

1986). Where, as here, the agency has already

articulated a non-retaliatory reason for its action,

i.e., the charged misconduct, it has done every-

thing that would be required of it if the appellant

had made a prima facie case. Thus, our inquiry

proceeds directly to the ultimate question of

whether, weighing all the evidence, the appellant

has met his burden of proving illegal retaliation.

Cyump, 114 M.S.PR. 224, 1 10; see U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.

711, 715 (1983).

If analyzed under the legal framework for

traditional Title VII claims, in order to prevail the

appellant had to show by preponderant evidence

that he engaged in conduct that did not adversely

affect his performance and that the agency inten-

tionally discriminated against him for that con-

duct. In the absence of direct evidence of inten-

tional discrimination, the appellant could meet

this burden by introducing evidence giving rise to

an inference of disparate treatment because of his

conduct unrelated to his performance. Davis v.

Department of the Interior, 114 M.S.PR. 527, 9 7

(2010), citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). Assuming that he

did so, the burden of production shifts to the

agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscrimina-

1 28

42a

tery reason for its action. /d., 18. If the

agency meets this burden, the appellant then

must prove that the agency’s stated reason is

merely a pretext for discrimination prohibited by

(b)(10) and the activity unrelated to his perfor-

mance was the real reason for the disparate

treatment. /d. In most adverse action appeals

taken pursuant to 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, the agency

has already articulated a nondiscriminatory rea-

son for its action, z.e., the charged misconduct;

accordingly, the agency has done everything that

would be required of it if an appellant had made

out a prima facie case, and whether he in fact did

so is no longer relevant. See id., 1 9 n.3, citing

Marshall v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 111

M.S.PR. 5, 7 6 (2008). As a result, the inquiry

proceeds directly to the ultimate question of

whether, upon weighing all of the evidence, the

appellant has met his overall burden of proving

illegal discrimination. See id.

Because either framework requires us to pro-

ceed to the ultimate question of whether the agen-

cy intentionally retaliated or discriminated against

the appellant for his (b)(10) activities,“ we have

reviewed the record and we conclude that the ap-

pellant has failed to meet his burden to establish

that the reason articulated by the agency for its

decision to remove him was pretextual and that

¢ We assume, without deciding, that the agency would commit a

prohibited personnel practice in violation of § 2302(b)(10) if it re-

moved the appellant in retaliation for his FLEOA activities.

1 29

43a

the real reason underlying that decision was his

FLEOA activities. Even if we were to accept

appellant’s contentions that agency managers

disapproved of his FLEOA activities, see, e.g.,

RAF, Tab 45 at 5-8, 19-27, there is no direct evi-

dence that the agency retaliated or discriminated

against him for engaging in FLEOA activities

when it removed him from employment.

There is no question that the appellant dis-

closed SSI in violation of agency regulations pro-

hibiting such disclosure and that this was the

agency’s stated basis for his removal. The appel-

lant contends, though, that he was treated more

harshly than other similarly situated individuals

who disclosed SSI and also that he and other

FLEOA leaders were singled out for retaliatory

treatment. RAF, Tab 45 at 6-8. While the rec-

ord reflects that the agency treated other em-

ployees less harshly for their disclosures of SSI,

the circumstances surrounding those disclosures

are sufficiently distinct from the instant case as to

undercut any inference that the reason for the

difference is discrimination based on the appel-

lant’s FLEOA activities. For instance, the dis-

ciosures attributed to J.S. or J.M. were limited to

a small number of individuals (to a few passen-

gers on a plane under exigent circumstances and

to some airline personnel for personal reasons,

respectively). As for A.R., we note that, in the

single specification of the unauthorized disclosure

of SSI charge, the agency alleged that A.R.

“posted a message on www.delphiforums.com that

1 30

131

44a

revealed security measures concerning the de-

ployment of FAMS on international flights from

the Atlanta Field Office.” RAK Tab 45, Exhibit

F. Unlike the appellant’s disclosure, which cre-

ated a vulnerability in aviation security by re-

vealing to a national news reporter that FAMs

were no longer going to be present on any RON

missions, A.R.’s disclosure appears to have been

more limited because: it was disclosed on a sin-

gle message board; it only identified FAM deploy-

ments out of the Atlanta Field Office; and it ap-

peared to leave open the possibility that other of-

fices would be responsible for those flights.

Further, the appellant’s reliance on another

individual, Frank Terreri, as similarly situated

appears misplaced as the comparison actually

undermines his claim that his FLEOA activities

resulted in a harsher penalty. Mr. Terreri was

the president of the air marshal chapter of

FLEOA, engaged in outspoken criticism of agen-

cy management and its policies, and was in-

vestigated for releasing SSI. But he continues

to be employed by TSA after the allegations made

against him were deemed to be unfounded. _ Tr.

at 60, 116-17.

Significantly, the administrative judge correct-

ly found that the appellant demonstrated a lack of

regret for disclosing the RON information, re-

flected, for example, in his deposition testimony

to the effect that it did not matter to him if the

information was confidential, law enforcement

45a

sensitive, SSI or classified information. RAF

Tab 44, Exhibit 8; Tr. at 113-15, 118-23. The appel-

lant also admitted during the Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Profes-

sional Responsibility (OPR) investigation:

Due to the fact that my chain of command, the

DHS OIG and my Congressmen all ignored my

complaints and would not follow them up with in-

vestigations, 1 have NO REGRETS or feel NO

REMORSE for going to a credible and responsi-

ble media representative, Brock Meeks. Brock

Meeks reporting these gross mismanagement is-

sues has resulted in immediate and positive change

in deadly FAMS policies.

IAF, Tab 4, Subtab 4J, Exhibit 2 (emphasis in original).

1 32

In the face of a clear Congressional directive

for nondisclosure and a regulatory provision

promulgated pursuant to that directive, which ex-

plicitly prohibits the type of public disclosure

made by the appellant, the agency could and did

reasonably infer a risk from the appellant’s lack

of remorse that he would continue to make dis-

closures that were prohibited by law. Thus, un-

der the circumstances, we find that the appel-

lant’s lack of remorse to be a significant distinc-

tion justifying the agency’s decision to remove

him rather than imposing a lesser penalty. Cf

RAF, Tab 45, Exhibit F (the deciding official in

A.R.’s case stated that he “plac[ed] a great deal of

weight” on the fact that A.R. “demonstrated sin-

cere remorse over this current incident” and “as-

46a

sured” the deciding official that he would

“demoustrate the utmost diligence when handling

SSI information.”).

133 Considering the record as a whole, we find that

the appellant has not proven by a preponderance

of the evidence that the agency intentionally dis-

criminated or retaliated against him on the basis

of his FLEOA activities in violation of 5 U.S.C. §

2302(b)(10)."°

The Board will not consider the appellant’s claim raise

for the first time on petition for review that the agency

initiated its investigation in retaliation for his engaging

in protected whistleblowing and First Amendment

speech.

1 34 For the first time on petition for review, the

appellant argues that his 2004 appearance on

NBC Nightly News was protected free speech

under the First Amendment and protected whis-

tleblowing under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), and that

the agency’s investigation in response to his ap-

pearance was unlawful retaliation in violation of

the First Amendment and the WPA. PFR File,

Tab 4 at 53-60.

‘© To the extent the appellant contends that the agency violated

his First Amendment rights based on his involvement with

FLEOA, we find, for all of the reasons explained by the adminis-

trative judge and in our discussion of the appellant’s § 2302(b)(10)

claim, that the agency took its actions based on the charged mis-

conduct and not for his association with or activities on behalf of

the FLEOA.

47a

1 35 In the summary of the prehearing conference,

the administrative judge stated as follows with

respect to the appellant’s affirmative defenses:

Here, the appellant alleges that the agency dis-

criminated and retaliated against him based on

his membership and leadership status with the

F'LEOA for other than merit reasons in violation of

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10); and that this discrimination

and retaliation violated his First Amendment

right of free association and his right to free

speech. No other affirmative defenses are al-

leged in this appeal.

RAF, Tab 67 at 6. The administrative jidge advised

the parties that additional issues were precluded absent

a timely meritorious objection. Jd. at 5-6. The ap-

pellant did not make any objection, and the issues he

now attempts to raise were not mentioned in the sum-

mary of the prehearing conference. The general rule

under such circumstances is that the issues raised for

the first time on review will not be considered. See

Henson v. U.S. Postal Service, 110 M.S.P.R. 624, 1 10

(2009); Wilson v. Department of Justice, 58 M.S.P.R.

96, 101 n.4 (1993).

1 36 The appellant argues that we should make an

exception to this general rule. He cites Board

and federal appeals decisions for the principle

that a new claim may be raised on review when

the administrative judge confused or misled a

party with respect to the claim, or when the party

raising the claim has newly-discovered evidence.

PFR File, Tab 4 at 58-60. While we do not

7 37

48a

quarrel with the appellant’s reading of the cases,

the appellant makes no attempt to explain how the

decisions he cites apply here. He does not allege,

nor is there any evidence, that the administrative

judge confused or misled him with respect to his

claim regarding his 2004 appearance on NBC

Nightly News. Rather, the appellant contends

that by rejecting his FLEOA defense, in part, on

the grounds of the appellant’s own testimony that

the 2004 television appearance was the catalyst

for the agency’s investigation, the administrative

judge somehow “converted [his FLEOA defense]

to a dispositive First Amendment violation” and

“created a violation of the [WPA].” /d. at 54,

57-58. Even assuming the administrative judge

found that the appellant’s television appearance

was the impetus for the investigation, we disagree

with the appellant that this conclusion somehow

“created” new claims that were not previously

known to him.

Indeed, the appellant does not allege that he

only discovered that his appearance on NBC

Nightly News spurred the investigation after the

record closed below. In fact, the appellant testi-

fied before the administrative judge that his 2004

appearance on NBC Nightly News is what caused

the agency to initiate the investigation in which he

admitted revealing the 2003 RON directive to

MSNBC. Tr. at 93. In other words, the appel-

lant knew before the record closed below what

caused the agency to begin its investigation.

Thus, this is not a case in which a party attempts

49a

to raise a new claim on review based on evidence

discovered after the record closed below. For

these reasons, we will not consider the issues the

appellant raises for the first time in his petition

for review.

The Board also will not consider the new evidence sub-

mitted by the appellant on petition for review.

1 38 The Board does not accept the evidence that

the appellant attempts to submit for the first time

on review. The appellant requests to supplement

the record with a transcript of a statement he

gave to agency investigators on May 4, 2005.

According to the appellant, the transcript under-

cuts the administrative judge’s credibility deter-

mination on the question of whether the appellant

was revealing SSI when he shared the July 2003

RON directive with MSNBC. See RAF, Tab 84

at 14-18; PFR File, Tab 1 at 73-89; id., Tab 4 at 14.

We deny the appellant’s request to supplement

the record for two reasons. First, the Board will

not consider evidence submitted for the first time

with the petition for review absent a showing that

it was unavailable before the record was closed

despite the party’s due diligence. Avansino v.

U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.PR. 211, 214 (1980).

The appellant’s own submission shows that he

was provided with the transcript more than 3

years before the hearing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 71.

Second, as we discuss in our analysis of the

charge and penalty, the outcome of this case does

not turn on whether the appellant credibly testi-

The penalty of removal thin the d

50a

fied that he did not know the RON directive was

SSI when he disclosed it to the MSNBC reporter.

Thus, the transcript is immaterial to the outcome

in the appeal.

n removal is within the bounds of reasona-

len

bleness.

139

4 40

We affirm the administrative judge’s thorough

analysis of the penalty and we need not repeat all

of it here. RAF, Tab 84 at 28-40. Some factors

warrant further discussion, however. When the

Board sustains all the charges, it reviews the

agency’s choice of penalty only to determine

whether the agency considered all of the relevant

factors and exercised management discretion

within the parameters of reasonableness. Ellis uv

Department of Defense, 114 M.S.PR. 407, 1 11

(2010). The Board’s function is not to displace

management’s responsibility, but to ensure that

managerial judgment has been properly exercised.

Id.; see also Douglas, 5 M.S.PR. at 305-06. Here,

as the administrative judge found, there is ample

evidence that the agency considered all of the

relevant factors. Tr. at 12-22; RAF Tab 84 at 30.

The most important factor in an agency’s pen-

alty determination is the nature and seriousness

of the misconduct and its relation to the appel-

lant’s duties, including whether the offense was

intentional. Jinks v. Department of Veterans

Affairs, 106 M.S.PR. 627, 1 17 (2007). The ap-

pellant revealed information about FAM deploy-

ments in violation of regulations requiring that it

7 41

5la

remain confidential. His actions caused the

agency to lose trust in him, and divulging security

measures to the media created an immediate vul-

nerability in the aviation system. Tr. at 15,

21-22. The appellant’s revelation of confidential

information to a reporter was intentional, by his

own admission. Tr. at 108-110. Also significant

to rehabilitative potential and the agency’s pen-

alty determination is that the appellant lacked

remorse for disclosing the RON information, as

reflected in his deposition. RAF, Tab 44, Exhibit

8; Tr. at 113-15, 118-23. The agency could and

did reasonably infer a risk from the appellant’s

lack of remorse that he would continue to make

disclosures that were specifically prohibited by

law.

After thoughtfully considering the entire rec-

ord, we also are not persuaded that the appellant

believed in “good faith” that he was permitted to

share plans for the deployment of FAMs with the

MSNBC r~orter. PFR File, Tab 4 at 29-30.

At the ti. of his appointment in 2001, the appel-

lant w... presented with a single-page form cap-

tioned “Conditions of Employment for Federal

Air Marshals.” The appellant signed the form at

the bottom, and initialed the form next to the fol-

lowing words: “I accept the position of Federal

Air Marshal. I have read and I accept the Condi-

tions of Employment.” One of those conditions

was that a FAM “may be removed” for “(uJn-

authorized release of security-sensitive or classi-

fied information.” IAF, Tab 4, Subtab 4T.

7 42

52a

Apart from this written acknowledgment of the

seriousness of unauthorized disclosure of SSI in

general, the appellant testified that in his training

it was made “very, very clear” that FAMs should

not tell anyone, not even their spouses, which

flights they would be on because the information

could be repeated to “the wrong people.” Tr. at

106-07. The appellant further testified that tell-

ing someone a flight would not have a FAM on it

would endanger the flight. Jd. at 108. Based

on the foregoing, we find that the appellant knew

that he was not permitted to share information

about FAM coverage with a reporter, regardless

of the fact that he received the information as a

text message on his cell phone instead of on his

encrypted PDA, and even if he was unsure of its

SSI classification.

It makes no difference to our penalty analysis

whether the appellant knew that the message

suspending overnight missions fell within the

regulatory definition of SSI. As explained im-

mediately above, the appellant admittedly knew

that he was not permitted to tell anyone about

FAM scheduling, yet he did so anyway, and it

could have created a significant security risk. As

a law enforcement officer, the appellant can be

held to a high standard of conduct. Mahan v.

Department of the Treasury, 89 M.S.PR. 140, 9

11 (2001); Crawford v. Department of Justice, 45

M.S.PR. 234, 237 (1990). The appellant’s actions

in July 2003 did not exhibit the good judgment

that the agency can legitimately expect of its law

1 43

7 44

53a

enforcement personnel. Mahan, 89 M.S.PR. 140, 9

11.

The appellant contends that he was treated

more harshly than other similarly situated indi-

viduals who disclosed SSI and also that he and

other FLEOA leaders were singled out for retali-

atory treatment. RAF, Tab 45 at 6-8. As we

explained when addressing the appellant’s claim

under 5 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(10), although the record

reflects that the agency treated other employees

less harshly for their disclosures of SSI, the cir-

cumstances surrounding those disclosures are

plainly distinguishable and do no suggest that the

agency subjected him to a disparate penalty.

We also accept, without finding, that the appel-

lant believed he did the right thing in disclosing

the information. We have specifically considered

the appellant’s testimony regarding his belief that

TSA’s plan to eliminate FAMs from overnight

flights was “serious” and “dangerous to the

. . public,” and that his disclosure was mo-

tivated by his desire to protect the flying public.

Tr. at 88, 90; see id. at 122 (“All I wanted to do was

protect lives and .. . uphold the law.”).

The appellant also testified: “If I saved—if I

saved a plane from falling out of the sky or saved

a life, I believe I did my job, and I shouldn't re-

gret it.” Tr. at 115. Further, as the administra-

tive judge concluded, we also have no reason to

doubt that the appellant’s motivation was sincere.

RAF, Tab 84 at 28 (the administrative judge, when

1 45

4 46

54a

discussing the appellant’s First Amendment

claim, stated that he had “no reason to doubt the

appellant’s assertion that he took these actions to

benefit the nation. . . .”). However, even if

the appellant could have established the classic

elements of whistleblowing, i.e., that he disclosed

a substantial and specific danger to public safety

and that his disclosure was a contributing factor

in his removal,”* he cannot invoke WPA protec-

tion because his disclosure was specifically pro-

hibited by law.

For all of the above reasons as well as those

explained by the administrative judge, we find

that the agency’s removal penalty did not exceed

the bounds of reasonableness. The appellant’s

removal is SUSTAINED.

ORDER

This is the final decision of the Merit Systems

Protection Board in this appeal. Title 5 of the

Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113(c)

(6 C.FR. § 1201.113(c)).

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

THER IE IGHT

You have the right to request the United States

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to review this

‘6 As we noted earlier, we do not determine whether the appel-

lant’s disclosure would be protected under the WPA because he did

not make it through authorized channels. /nfra, n.12.

55a

final decision. You must submit your request to the

court at the following address:

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

The court must receive your request for review no later

than 60 calendar days after your receipt of this order.

If you have a representative in this case and your rep-

resentative receives this order before you do, then you

must file with the court no later than 60 calendar days

after receipt by your representative. If you choose to

file, be very careful to file on time. The court has held

that normally it dees not have the authority to waive

this statutory deadline and that filings that do not com-

ply with the deadline must be dismissed. See Pinat v.

Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed.

Cir. 1991).

If you need further information about your right to

appeal this decision to court, you should refer to the

federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C.

§ 7703). You may read this law, as well as review the

Board’s regulations and other related material, at our

website, http:/;Wwww.mspb.gov. Additional information

is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.

gov. Of particular relevance is the court’s “Guide for

Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained

within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and

11.

FOR THE BOARD:

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

57a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

WESTERN REGIONAL OFFICE

Docket No.: SF-0752-06-0611-I-2

ROBERT J. MACLEAN , APPELLANT

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, AGENCY

INITIAL DECISION

Date: May 12, 2010

Before: FRANKLIN M. KANG, Administrative Judge

INTRODUCTION

The appellant timely appealed the Transportation

Security Administration’s (TSA) decision to remove

him from the position of Federal Air Marshal (FAM),

with duties in Los Angeles, California, effective April

11, 2006. Initial Appeal File 1 (IAF-1), Tab 1,4. On

October 5, 2006, an administrative judge dismissed this

appeal without prejudice at the request of the appel-

lant. IAF Tab 29. This initial decision (ID) became

final on November 9, 2006 when the parties declined to

file a petition for review. See id.

58a

On October 15, 2008, the appellant timely refiled

this appeal. Initial Appeal File 2 (IAF-2), Tab 1.

The Board assigned this refiled appeal to a second

administrative judge. IAF-2. On June 22, 2009, the

Board issued an Opinion and Order addressing mat-

ters certified for interlocutory appeal. IAF-2, Tab 27.

On July 138, 2009, the second administrative judge

informed the parties that the Board had ruled on the

issues certified for interlocutory appeal and advised

the parties that the adjudication would resume.

IAF-2, Tab 29. Thereafter, this appeal was reas-

signed to a third administrative judge. IAF-2, Tab 31.

A hearing was held on November 5, 2009 as speci-

fied below. Hearing Compact Disc (HCD). The ap-

pellant traveled from California to Virginia to appear

with his attorneys from the Board’s Washington Re-

gional Office by video-conference (VTC), while the

agency appeared from the Board’s Western Regional

Office in California as well as the Washington Regional

Office. Jd. The Board has jurisdiction under 5

U.S.C. §§ 7511-7513 and 7701. For the reasons ex-

plained below, the agency’s action is AFFIRMED.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Burden of Proof and Applicable Law

The agency bears the burden of proof by prepon-

derant evidence with respect to the reasons for the

action and its choice of penalty. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a).

Preponderant evidence is defined as the degree of

relevant evidence that a reasonable person, consider-

ing the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to

59a

find that a contested fact is more likely to be true than

untrue. 5C.FER. § 1201.56(c).

Background

At the time of his removal, the appellant, born in

1970 with a service computation date in 1992, was a

preference eligible FAM, SV-1801-9, assigned to Los

Angeles, California. IAF-1, Tab 4, Subtab 4F; IAF-2,

Tab 45; Exhibit S. It is undisputed that the appellant

was an employee pursuant te 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) at

the time of his removal.

According to a Report of Investigation (ROI) ir

record evidence, based on a September 2004 report |i

an unauthorized media appearance by the appellant,

the agency initiated an investigation. IAF-1, Tab 4,

Subtab 4J. On May 4, 2005, during an investigative

interview conducted by the agency’s Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Professional

Responsibility (OPR), the appellant submitted a signed

and sworn affidavit stating in relevant part:

For the July 29, 2003 article, I informed [the re-

porter] that all Las Vegas FAMs were sent a text

message to their Government issued mobile phones

that all RON (Remain Overnight) missions up to

August 9 would be canceled. My supervisor told

me that the Service ran out of funds for overtime,

per diem, mileage and lodging.

Due to the fact that my chain of command, the DHS

OIG and my Congressmen all ignored my com-

plaints and would not follow them up with investi-

60a

gations, I have NO REGRETS or feel NO RE-

MORSE for going to a credible and responsible

media representative, [the reporter]. [The repor-

ter] reporting these gross mismanagement issues

has resulted in immediate and positive change in

deadly FAMS policies.

IAF-1, Tab 4, Subtab 4J (appellant’s affidavit) (upper

case lettering in original). Following this interview,

the agency’s investigators concluded, inter alia, that

the appellant made an unauthorized release of infor-

mation to the media. /d., Subtab 4J.

On September 13, 2005, the appellant received a

Proposal to Remove (proposal or proposed removal),

charging the appellant with Unauthorized Media Ap-

pearance, Unauthorized Release of Information to the

Media, and Unauthorized Disclosure of Sensitive Se-

curity Information (SSI). IAF-l, Tab 4, Subtab 4G.

On April 10, 2006, Special Agent in Charge (SAC)

Frank Donzanti issued a decision on the proposed re-

moval, sustaining only the third charge and the pro-

posed penalty. J/d., Subtab 4A.

The third charge, Unauthorized Disclosure of SSI,

is accompanied by a single specification. IAF-2, Tab

67 at 5-6. The underlying specification contains back-

ground information and alleges that on July 29, 2003,

the appellant informed the media that all Las Vegas

FAMs were sent a text message on their government

issued mobile phones that all remain overnight (RON)

missions up to August 9th would be cancelled; or words

to that effect, and that this constituted an improper

disclosure of SSI because the media person to whom

6la

this information was disclosed was not a covered per-

son within the meaning of SSI regulations, and the

information about RON deployments was protected as

SSI. Jd. On May 10, 2006, the appellant timely filed

his petition for appeal. IAF-1, Tab 1.

On August 31, 2006, the agency’s SSI Office Direc-

tor issued a final order (AFO) on SSI related to this

appeal, stating in part:

[I]t is my determination that, on July 29, 2003, the

information in question constituted SSI under

the SSI regulation then in effect, 49 C.F.R.

§ 1520.7(j),[] as the information concerned specific

FAM deployments or missions on long-distance

flights.

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46110, any person disclos-

ing a substantial interest in this Order may, within

60 days of its issuance, apply for review by filing a

petition for review in an appropriate U.S. Court of

Appeals.

IAF-1, Tab 22, Attachment. The AFO explained

through a footnote that on May 18, 2004, the agency

recodified section 1520.7(j) at section 1520.5(8)(ii).

Id.

The text of 49 C.F.R. § 1520.7(j)’ in effect at that

time, current through October 1, 2003 defined SSI as

follows:

' Under 49 C.F.R. § 1520.5(b)(8)(ii), information concerning de-

ployments, numbers, and operations of FAMs is considered SSI.

62a

Specific details of aviation security measures

whether applied directly by the TSA or entities

subject to the rules listed in § 1520(a)(1) through 6.

This includes, but is not limited to, information

concerning specific numbers of Federal Air Mar-

shals, deployments or missions, and the methods

involved in such operations.

See IAF-1, Tab 4, Subtab 4M.

In granting the appellant’s request for a dismissal

without prejudice, the ID stated:

After the action was taken and the appellant filed

his appeal, the agency issued a “Final Order” dated

August 31, 2006, determining that the appellant’s

disclosure is covered under the regulation at issue.

A right of review is provided in the U.S. Court of

Appeals pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46110.

IAF-1, Tab 29. The ID explained that the appellant

intended to pursue such a review, and the appellant’s

appeal was dismissed without prejudice to refiling.

Id. The ID thereafter became the final decision of

the Board. See id.

On September 16, 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit ruled on the appellant’s petition

for review of the AFO. MacLean v. Department of

Homeland Security, 543 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2008). In

denying the appellant’s petition through this per cu-

riam opinion, the 9th Circuit wrote, in part:

In late July, 2003, while working as a Federal Air

Marshal in Nevada, MacLean received a text mes-

sage on his government-issued cell phone stating

63a

that “all RON (Remain Overnight) missions

. . up to August 9th would be cancelled.”

This message indicated to MacLean that there

would be no Federal Air Marshals on overnight

flights from the time of the text message up to Au-

gust 9, 2003. MacLean believed that the cancella-

tion of these missions was detrimental to public

safety. He raised this concern with his supervi-

sor,[] who did not make further inquiry. MacLear,

then attempted unsuccessfully to alert the Office of

Inspector General. On July 29, 2003, MacLean

disclosed the text message to members of the press.

The Federal Air Marshal] Service later confirmed

that the text message’s contents did not reflect a

final decision of its director and there was no can-

cellation of overnight missions.

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c), we have jurisdic-

tion to review only final agency “orders”. 4

We have jurisdiction to review the TSA-order.

Section 1520.7(j) (2003) designates as “sensitive

security information . . . [s]pecific details of

aviation security measures . . . applied di-

rectly bythe TSA . . ._ [which] includes, but is

not limited to, information concerning specific

numbers of Federal Air Marshals, deployments or

missions, and the methods involved in such opera-

tions.” Information falling within this designation

is automatically considered “sensitive security in-

formation” without further action from the TSA, 49

C.F.R. § 1520.7 (2003). The TSA has authority to

64a

designate information as “sensitive security infor-

mation” pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 114(s) and 49

C.F.R. § 1520.

[] The information contained in the text message

qualifies as “sensitive security information.” The

message contained “specific details of aviation se-

curity measures” regarding “deployment and mis-

sions” of Federal Air Marshals. 49 C.F.R.

§ 1520.7(j) (2003).

MacLean has failed to demonstrate what more the

TSA needed to show to support the order. The

order is valid

The Whistleblower Protection Act does not apply to

the order. The order is not a “personnel action,”

as required by the Act.[] It is merely a determi-

nation that [] the text message contained “sensitive

security information” pursuant to 49 C.F.R.

§ 1520.7(j). The fact that the order has some im-

pact on MacLean’s proceedings before the MSPB

does not convert it to a “personnel action.”

The TSA order does not constitute a retroactive

agency adjudication. Rather, the agency applied

regulations that were in force in 2003 to determine

that information created in 2003 was “sensitive se-

curity information.” . . . The TSA order

comports with the “principle that the legal effect of

conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law

that existed when the conduct took place.”

65a

Id. (italics added). On October 15, 2008, the appellant

timely refiled this appeal, and the Board assigned this

appeal the second administrative judge. IAF-2, Tabs

1,2. Itis undisputed that at the time of the events at

issue, inclusive of the specification before the Board,

the appellant was assigned to the FAM service center

in Las Vegas, Nevada. See IAF-2, Tab 45, Exhibit X;

IAF -2, Tab 49, Exhibit PPP.

On February 10, 2009, the second administrative

judge granted a motion to certify specific rulings for

interlocutory appeal as follows. IAF-2, Tab 23. The

issues were: (1) whether the Board has the authority

to review the determination by the agency, and af-

firmed by the Ninth Circuit, that the information the

appellant disclosed constituted SSI; (2) whether the

fact that the agency did not issue its order finding the

information the appellant disclosed to be SSI until

after it had removed him has any effect on the issue in

(1), above; and (3) whether a disclosure of information

that is SSI can also be a disclosure protected by the

Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA).

On June 22, 2009, the Board issued its Opinion and

Order, ruling on the above enumerated items as fol-

lows. MacLean v. Department of Homeland Securi-

ty, 112 M.S.PR. 4 (2009). In addressing question (1),

the Board held that under the facts of this appeal, the

Board does not have the authority to review the agen-

cy’s SSI determination because the Ninth Circuit has

issued a decision upholding the agency’s determina-

tion. Jd. at 11. For question (2), the Board ex-

plained that the timing of the AFO did not alter its

66a

conclusion on question (1) because Congress provided

individuals a judicial mechanism to challenge the SSI

determination through the U.S. Court of Appeals, and

the appellant actually availed himself of that oppor-

tunity. Jd. at 12. The Board continued, explaining

that the grant of exclusive jurisdiction in Federal court

was triggered in this particular case, therefore, the

Board lacks authority to review the agency’s determi-

nation on this matter. Jd. On question (3), the

Board found that a disclosure in violation of the regu-

lations governing SSI is prohibited by law within the

meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) and cannot give

rise to whistleblower protection. /d. at 18.

On July 13, 2009, the second administrative judge

scheduled a status conference to address the adjudica-

tion schedule for this matter IAF-2, Tab 29. On July 22,

2009, prior to this status conference, this case was

reassigned to a third administrative judge. IAF-2, Tab

31.

On September 22, 2009, the parties appeared for a

prehearing conference. IAF-2, Tab 59; see IAF-2,

Tabs 73, 75. At the request of the appellant, the

hearing and the remainder of the prehearing confer-

ence were delayed. Jd. The hearing was thereafter

further delayed at the request of the agency, then

convened on November 5, 2009 as described above.

[AF-2; Tabs 62, 75; HCD. On November 16, 2009, the

parties filed their closing arguments and the record

was closed for all matters. HCD; IAF-2, Tabs 77-79.

On February 23, 2010, the appellant moved to reo-

pen the record to receive additional evidence identified

67a

as newly discovered evidence. IAF-2, Tab 80.

Through this motion, the appellant argues that on

February 17, 2010, the agency’s Office of the Inspector

General (OIG) issued a report on the breach of SSI

finding that the agency’s Office of SSI violated many

of its own SSI policies, resulting in the unauthorized

release of SSI, without appropriate redaction. See id.

The appellant argues that this evidence is material

because the Office of SSI “cannot follow its own direc-

tives” then he should not have been removed as a FAM

for the charge at issue. /d. The appellant adds that

the controls for SSI were found to be defective and

deficient creating inconsistency and confusion. Jd.

In response, the agency opposed the appellant’s mo-

tion to reopen the record, arguing that the proffer is

procedurally defective, untimely filed without good

cause, speculative, and irrelevant. JIAF-2, Tab 81.

The agency argues that the OIG report involved “in-

advertent” disclosures of SSI while the charged mis-

conduct at issue involves an intentional disclosure.

Id. The appellant thereafter replied to the agency’s

response, arguing that the OIG report was issued after

the close of the record, and that it is relevant to the

appellant’s argument that the appellant acted in good

faith under rules that were inconsistent and confusing.

IAF-2, Tab 82. Through his reply, the appellant cor-

rectly points out that the “charge at issue[,]” distinct

from the penalty consideration, “does not allege that

Mr. MacLean intentionally disclosed SSI _ infor-

mation[.}” Jd. In responding to the appellant’s re-

ply, the agency argued the OIG report did not involve

any law enforcement officers, and that the scope of the

68a

report did not include any disciplinary actions.

IAF-2, Tab 83. The agency further adds that the

appellant’s charged misconduct differs from using “the

use of computer-made redactions that failed to conceal

SSI permanently.” Jd.

In addressing another point through his underlying

motion, the appellant states that Mr. Donzanti has,

since the time of the actions at issue, been demoted

to Deputy SAC, adding that Mr. Donzanti “is alleged

by several current and former Los Angeles Federal

Air Marshals” to have a past agreement with the Di-

rector of the agency’s FAM Service (Director), based

on “an illicit affair” with a subordinate FAM who was

previously assigned to headquarters (subordinate

FAM). IAF-2, Tab 80. The appellant explains that

in 2004, under an agreement between Mr. Donzanti

and the Director, the subordinate FAM was trans-

ferred from headquarters to Los Angeles and no disci-

plinary action taken against Mr. Donzanti, in exchange

for Mr. Donzanti terminating the appellant at the

direction of the Director. Jd. The appellant argues

that this 2004 agreement between Mr. Donzanti and

the Director allowed the agency to issue the 2006 deci-

sion on the appealed removal! at the field level, rather

than the headquarters level. See id. In addition to

the opposition above, the agency argues that the ap-

pellant could have introduced and/or cross examined

Mr. Donzanti about these 2004 matters at the hearing,

adding that the appellant deposed Mr. Donzanti in

2006. IAF-2, Tab 81. Through his reply, the appel-

lant argues that the information about Mr. Donzanti is

relevant to showing that Mr. Donzanti acted to ensure

69a

his professional survival. IAF-2, Tab 82. Through

its response to the reply, the agency argues that the

motion on this issue is speculative and irrelevant.

IAF-2, Tab 83.

While I have no reason to doubt that there have

been subsequent breaches of SSI procedures by the

agency employees as alleged, it is unclear how showing

the occurrences of other such events constitutes good

cause for reopening the record, in light of the fact that

the evidence does not address what disciplinary ac-

tions or penalties, if any, were taken against or im-

posed on any agency employees, and the fact that the

evidence does not affect whether or not the charged

misconduct occurred.

With respect to the allegations involving Mr.

Donzanti’s change from SAC to Deputy SAC, and his

interactions with the agency’s headquarters personnel,

the appellant fails to explain why these matters are

being raised following the close of the record, since the

appellant could have elicited testimony about these

specific topics during Mr. Donzanti’s deposition and/or

during the hearing, prior to the record closing. See

HCD. Specifically, in addition to having the oppor-

tunity to depose Mr. Donzanti, the appellant had a

subsequent opportunity to question Mr. Donzanti

about these matters at the hearing including his ser-

vice as a Deputy SAC at the hearing:

JUDGE KANG: Please state your full name for

the record, spelling your last name.

70a

THE. WITNESS: Frank Joseph Donzanti,

D-o-n-z-a-n-t-i.

JUDGE KANG: Mr. Donzanti, please state your

current position and title for the record.

THE WITNESS: I am the Deputy Special Agent

in charge of the Los Angeles Field Office for the

Federal Air Marshal Service.

HCD. With regard to the role of headquarters and/or

the Director, including the headquarters Policy Com-

pliance Unit (PCU), the appellant’s attorneys ques-

tioned Mr. Donzanti as follows:

Q. And did you work on this removal letter with

anyone from—from Headquarters?

A. To some extent I may have had some impact.

I don’t remember exactly what it was. But most of

the letter was drafted by Headquarters personnel.

And that would be in HR, Human Resources.

Q. During—thank you. And duri

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Record and brief — Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Maclean · 572 U.S. 1114 | Frix