Record and brief — Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Maclean
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Docketed
Sa Th re ye
SET
SLE:
Department of Homeland Securtty, Petitioner
V
Robert J. MacLean
January 27, 2014
Linked with 13A503
Lower Ct
Case Nos
Decision Date
Reheanng Denied
United States Court of Appeals for tne Federal Circurt
(2011-3231)
Apni 26, 2013
August 30, 2013
Questions Presented
Nov 18 2013
v19 2013
Dec 17 2013
Jan 27 2014
Feb 14 2014
Mar 28 2014
Apr 15 2014
Apr 16 2014
May 5 2014
May 19 2014
May 30 2014
May 30 2014
Jun 27 2014
25 2014
Jul 25 2014
eerenen Proceed
nas and Orders~~~~~~~-~~-- ~~
Application (13A503) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certioran fr
November 28, 2013 to December 28, 2013, submitted to The Chief Justice
Application (13A503) granted by The Chief Justice extending the time to file unti
December 28, 2013
Application (13A503) to extend further the time to file a petition
December 28, 2013 to January 27, 2014, submitted to The Chief Justice
for a writ of certioran from
pplication (13A503) granted file until January
27,2014
Petition for a writ of certioran filed. (Response d
by The Chief Justice extending the time to
2014)
Order extending time to file response to petition to and including March 28, 2014
sition filed
Reply of petitioner Department of Homeland Security filed
DISTRIBUTED for Confe
DISTRIBUTED for Conference
Petition GRANTED
The time to file the joint appendix and petitioners
ncluding July 25, 2014
The time to file respondent's bne
22, 2014
Consent to the filing
e February 26
Brief of respondent Robert J. MacLean in oppo
erence of May 2, 2014
of May 15, 2014
brief on the merits is extended to and
f on the ments is extended to and including Septembe
of amicus cunae briefs, in support of ether party or of neither party
received from counsel! for the respondent
Joint appendix filed. (Statement of costs filed.)
Brief of p Homeland
etitioner Department of Security filed
Aug 19 2014
Sep 4 2014
Sep 8 2014
Sep 9 2014
Sep 10 2014
Sep 22 2014
Sep 29 2014
Sep 29 2014
Sep 29 2014
Sep 29 2014
Sep 29 2014
Sep 29 2014
Sep 29 2014
Sep 29 2014
Oct 22 2014
Nov 4 2014
Jan 21 2015
Feb 23 2015
Consent to the filing of amicus cunae briefs in support of either party or of neither party
from counsel for the petitioner.
SET FOR ARGUMENT on Tuesday, November 4, 2014.
Record requested from U.S.C.A. for the Federal Circuit.
The Record received from U.S.C.A. Federal Circuit is electronic and located on PACER.
Brief amicus curiae of David B. Nolan. Sr. filed. Sep 19 2014 CIRCULATED
Brief of respondent Robert J. MacLean filed. (Distributed)
Brief amicus curiae of United States Office of Special Counsel filed. (Distributed)
Brief amicus curiae of American Federation of Government Employees filed. (Distributed)
Brief amicus curiae of Former US. Government Officials filed. (Distnbuted)
Brief amicus curiae of Rutherford Institute filed. (Distributed)
Brief amici cunae of Blacks in Government, et al. filed. (Distributed)
Brief amicus curiae of FlyersRights.org filed. (Distnbuted)
Brief amicus curiae of Project on Government Oversight filed. (Distributed)
Brief amici curiae of Members of Congress filed. (Distnbuted)
Reply of petitioner Department of Homeland Security filed. (Distributed)
Argued. For petitioner. lan H. Gershengorn, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of
Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D. C
Adjudged to be AFFIRMED. Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Kennedy, J.. joined
JUDGMENT ISSUED
PETITION
FOR
WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
No.
In the Supreme Court of the United States
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PETITIONER
v.
ROBERT J. MACLEAN
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
DONALD B. VERRILL.1, JR.
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
STUART F. DELERY
Assistant Attorney General
[AN HEATH GERSHENGORN
Deputy Solicitor General
ERIC J. FEIGIN
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
DOUGLAS N. LETTER
H. THOMAS ByRon III
MICHAEL P. GOODMAN
STEVAN E. BUNNELL Attorneys
Gereral Counsel Department of Justice
LS. Department of Washington, D.C. 20580-0001
Homeland Securit SuprenveCtBriefsta usdoj.qov
Washington, D.C. 2052: (202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Congress has directed that the Transportation Se-
curity Administration “shall prescribe regulations
prohibiting” the “disclosure of information obtained or
developed” in carrying out certain transportation-
security functions, if the agency “decides” that “dis-
closing the information would * * * be detriment-
tal” to transportation security. Aviation and Trans-
portation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101(e),
115 Stat. 603; Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L
No. 107-296, Tit. XVI, § 1601(b), 116 Stat. 2312. Such
information is referred to in the regulations as “Sensi-
tive Security Information.” See, e.g., 67 Fed. Reg.
8351 (Feb. 22, 2002).
The question presented is whether certain statuto-
ry protections codified at 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A),
which are inapplicable when an employee makes a dis-
closure “specifically prohibited by law,” can bar an
agency from taking an enforcement action against an
employee who intentionally discloses Sensitive Securi-
ty Information.
(1)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
EER a ee ae 1
RECESSES EES SAS Oe a 1
Statutes and regulations involved ..............csccsscessesseeeeeseeesensennes 2
EEE ea ee 2
Reasons for granting the petition..............ccccssssecesceesesseresensens 11
A. The disclosure of Sensitive Security Information
is “specifically prohibited by law” within the
meaning of 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A) .......ceccssesesscsrereseeeneeees 12
B. The Federal Circuit’s erroneous decision
WAITANtS IMMEAiate FEVIEW ......sccssersesseeserseresessserererseseees 22
EES a 26
Appendix A — Court of appeals opinion (Apr. 26, 2013).......la
Appendix B — Opinion and order (July 25, 2011)................ 19a
Appendix C — Initial decision (May 12, 2010)...................... 57a
Appendix D — Opinion and order (June 22, 2009)............. 113a
Appendix E — Order granting motion for certification
as interlocutory appeal and staying
proceedings (Feb. 10, 2009).............cccceees 140a
Appendix F — Order (Dec. 23, 2008).............c.ccccsseseseeeseeees 155a
Appendix G — Order (Aug. 30, 2018) ...........ccccccccseceseesees 165a
Appendix H — Statutory and regulatory provisions......... 167a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Administrator, FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255
ETE ELE 17
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) .0.....cccccccceeeseeeeeees 18
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).............. 14,15
SE SR EU EAR, BP CBO rccccncccecsssecesecccsscsssccecccssseccses 19
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania,
a sinc ceceeenmanscnnnsentens 18
Day v. Department of Homeland Sec., 119 M.S.P.R.
EES 1S SE 25
Cases—Continued: Page
Garcia v. Department of Agric., 110 M.S.P.R. 371
IIT ccssntisnieiencepeapendaatetanasemtadearceiiniantinstiaitemnasiadainmannenieinia 25
Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rint, Kramer &
Ulrich L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573 (2010) .......ccccccseseeeserneereeeennees 18
Marano v. Department of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137
PI Is SI eschcrrcrsctnictendeersnteniserroeiianimepecnusiniidieataiianianidatociiite 20
Constitution, statutes and regulations:
Os I, Sy ein a cee 5
Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272,
SPT: TIT cerscenucvsenshanamovecntnigniasimaunianmiiaidaiiadgiaaidameininniel 3
American Communities’ Right to Public Information
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 561(c)(1), 123 Stat. 2182 ........... 6
Antihijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366,
SpA TTI ITTY ‘scsicihiscsieenetbetstlinsntnsinamenieamlbaiensiedtieemnanateaniigatinnth 3
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597:
Be hc A ANI ssitiecciciesicusdecieiitisitasiscietictantictieimistessiaiel 2
SO ae, Be Ge Crs BI riceetesiserrseininacnenvensie 2
115 Stat. 597 (49 U.S.C. 114(d)(1)-(2)) .......cecceceeeeseees 2
115 Stat. 597 (49 U.S.C. 114(@)(1)) ................cccccsseeeeees 2
115 Stat. 598 (49 U.S.C. 114(£)(1)-(8))......eeecceesecseesenes 2
115 Stat. 598 (49 U.S.C. 114(f)(6)-(8)) 2.20.2... ceeeceeeees 2
115 Stat. 598 (49 U.S.C. 114(f)(10)-(11))........ ee. 2
§ 101(e), 115 Stat. 603 (49 U.S.C. 40119)... 3
§ 105(a), 115 Stat. 606 (49 U.S.C. 44917(a)(1)-(2)) .......... 6
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454,
a Ss SIU icsoseceatncntshomninieshlteniacetnninndenenmesaianipimnadndasieaniammen 18
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-161, Tit. V, § 568, 121 Stat. 2092 ........ occas 4
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552.............cccccceeeeeeees 3
V
Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page
© CBAs. GEG (RFID ccccccccccsccscccesserssncnscnsconsnnsenssnneoenen 17
0 es SI CIEE seceeseccnncnneninncenniinianiciieeneninaneniin 18
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296,
116 Stat. 2135:
Tit. IV, Subtit. A, § 403(2), 116 Stat. 2178 ......0.. 3
Tit. XVI:
I tN inact crincilaci aia 4
I, acts 4,12
National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, § 102(d)(3),
Te eee ec ome eee eee Nee ET 19
a ne Ne I oi scaicencctiersinionpeenictiveintenneietciatininias 20
Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1906.......cccccccccccccccscscsccscccscccccees 13
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012,
Pub. L. No. 112-199, Tit. I, § 108, 126 Stat. 1469 ............. 25
is Ca ceuiesesiasbindensseilieabiainadiniaadeiaade 21
es i eceameiunaemininslaainesemaianss 21
PR PIII sss ieetiianitcilienaidetdaiaiianesidanmldatiialieia 21
nS on ileal eda 21
es Se seisaaniicendeenatinabiedaaiimammmmaamuaidl 24
LE | Re” EERIE apie sonra ee OSE Ne I 25
I il ace elidmeaa 26
GER EE eee eee ee ee 26
ft ES REEREAES ees ani ere ner eee Seer 10, 20, 25, 26
es ID siccisesnccenciencsiniieiantiinneieninintanbonniaets passim
Os el all 8, 20
ED iciintsintcscinsicncininticiancnssiannt 8, 12, 20, 24
es I aaeinenmeiameiaaiell 12, 21
Ba eC EO 20
ee asia enaeleeatiialieieiedial 20
DUET, THe ctverccennctvinnencsinicienmiiniinnnucnsicinmnnnmmitasiia 8, 24
VI
Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page
ls i caiiainiaesinn i ietertnaiiecataarilacsgnhniiedaniieall fs)
ERT RN RMT SOS eee EE, 25
I a cahiemeeaiaailil 25
49 U.S.C. 114(r) (Supp. V 2011) .0........ececeeeseseees 3, 6, 8, 12, 16
49 U.S.C. 114(rX1) (Supp. V 2011) ........0..-ccccsccecscsereccereees 4,17
49 U.S.C. 114(r)(1)(A)-(C) (Supp. V 2011)... cceceeeseseeeeees 17
49 U.S.C. 114(r)(1)(C) (Supp. V 2011)... eceecesseeeees 11, 22
49 U.S.C. 114(r)(4)(A}{D) (Supp. V 2011)... ee eeeeeeee 6
Ff 7 ee ee EEN 17
lal 3
cma 4, 6,8
I a 8
14 C.F.R.:
a lien 3
cl 3
49 C.F.R.:
ERE ere ee Ne ee eee ee IO NS 5
Pt. 1520:
ES SE a RN a eR eS 5
Se Te Ce ntcctccencnccttneteerncniniinnantaenins 5,13
ESET ak ene ne iD beer 5
EL a aCe ay me eae 22
I ltl cael 22
is Ba iccciceiecceitscinsistsciniainnicineneiintsiiniaii 22
EITC ae mimes 5
Section 1520.7(a)-(f) (2002) ...............ccccssceseccsscenecessesens 5
Section 1580.7 (§) CRO0R) ......crcccssccccssecersssessecsesres 5, 9,13
IN I i nieitiedaeninsideiiatinaphinalimoaaiiiinnl 5
I alae 5
VII
Miscellaneous: Page
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1717, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
SSE UTIEIE ccsaieeeiesiduuiueaiiiisiteiiennhiniiieiaiaiaaaaieilaieiias 15, 19
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 296, 107th Cong., 1st Sess.
IIIT icsichihisiiiliieieeaeaaeiaabiegsilinhieiaiiapaielahdlnddasibid 2
H. Rep. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)................0.+ 19
S. Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)............ 10, 15, 19
67 Fed. Reg. (Feb. 22, 2002):
9), GE cteseasssensesnsmnsnssinsncenannesonsesennmamsnnennustnuineneasannniesaneeenetti +)
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In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
No.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY » PETITIONER
v.
ROBERT J. MACLEAN
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United
States Department of Homeland Security, respectful-
ly petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, la-
18a) is reported at 714 F.3d 1301. The opinions of the
Merit Systems Protection Board (App., infra, 19a-56a,
113a-139a) are reported at 112 M.S.P.R. 4 and 116
M.S.P.R. 562. The orders of the administrative judge
(App., infra, 57a-112a, 140a-164a) are unreported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on April 26, 2013. A petition for rehearing was denied
on August 30, 2013 (App., infra, 165a-166a). On No-
vember 19, 2013, the Chief Justice extended the time
(1)
2
within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to
and including December 28, 2013. On December 18,
2013, the Chief Justice further extended the time to
and including January 27, 2014. The jurisdiction of
this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
Pertinent statutory provisions are set forth in the
appendix to this petition. App., infra, 167a-189a.
STATEMENT
1. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001,
Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA), Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat.
597, to “address the security of the nation’s transpor-
tation system.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 296, 107th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 54 (2001). In enacting the ATSA, Congress
determined that “the best way to ensure effective
Federal management of the nation’s transportation
system is through the creation of a new Administra-
tion” within the Department of Transportation “to be
called the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA),” whose responsibilities would “encompass
security in all modes of transportation.” Jd. at 55; see
ATSA, § 101(a), 115 Stat. 597 (49 U.S.C. 114(a)). The
TSA’s duties under the ATSA include daily security
screening for air travel; receipt, analysis, and distri-
bution of intelligence relating to transportation secu-
rity; improvement of existing security procedures;
assessment of security measures for cargo transporta-
tion; and oversight of security at airports and other
transportation facilities. § 101(a), 115 Stat. 597-598
(49 U.S.C. 114(d)(1)-(2), (e)(1), ((1)-(3), (6)-(8) and
(10)-(11)).
In addition to creating the TSA and specifying its
responsibilities, the ATSA also ensured that certain
3
information acquired or developed in the conduct of
security activities, the dissemination of which could
potentially be harmful, would be shielded from public
disclosure. A pre-existing statute, 49 U.S.C. 40119(b)
(2000), had instructed the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration that, “notwithstanding” the Freedom of In-
formation Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, it was required to
“prescribe regulations prohibiting disclosure of infor-
mation obtained or developed in carrying out security
or research and development activities under” certain
security-related provisions of Title 49, if it determined
that “disclosing the information would * * * bean
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” “reveal a
trade secret or privileged or confidential commercial
or financial information,” or “be detrimental to the
safety of passengers in air transportation.” See Act of
July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1117; see
also Antihijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366,
§ 316, 88 Stat. 417. Pursuant to that congressional
mandate, the Federal Aviation Administration had
promulgated detailed regulations designating certain
information as “Sensitive Security Information” (SSI)
and restricting the dissemination of such information.
See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. Pt. 191 (1976); 14 C.F.R. Pt. 191
(2000). The ATSA reassigned the duty to promulgate
those regulations to the TSA, § 101(e), 115 Stat. 603,
and the SSI regulations were subsequently trans-
ferred over to the TSA’s authority, see 67 Fed. Reg.
8351 (Feb. 22, 2002).
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA), Pub. L.
No. 107-296, Tit. IV, Subtit. A, § 403(2), 116 Stat. 2178,
moved the TSA into the newly created Department of
Homeland Security. A separate provision of that Act,
currently codified at 49 U.S.C. 114(r), expanded upon
4
the TSA’s statutory mandate to prohibit the disclosure
of sensitive information. See HSA, Tit. XVI, § 1601(b),
116 Stat. 2312; see also Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, Tit. V, § 568, 121 Stat.
2092 (moving former Section 114(s) to Section 114(r)).
Section 114(r)(1) provides:
Notwithstanding section 552 of title 5, the Under
Secretary shall prescribe regulations prohibiting
the disclosure of information obtained or developed
in carrying out security under authority of the Avi-
ation and Transportation Security Act (Public Law
107-71) or under chapter 449 of this title if the Un-
der Secretary decides that disclosing the infor-
mation would—
(A) be an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy;
(B) reveal a trade secret or privileged or con-
fidential commercial or financial information; or
(C) be detrimental to the security of trans-
portation.
Congress also amended Section 40119(b) itself to
impose substantially similar obligations on the Secre-
tary of Transportation. HSA, Tit. XVI, § 1601(a), 116
Stat. 2312.
In 2003, when the events giving rise to this case oc-
curred, the TSA’s SSI regulations generally defined
SSI to include, inter alia, “[a]ny approved, accepted,
or standard security program” adopted under certain
regulations; “Security Directives and Information
Circulars” promulgated under certain regulations;
“[a]ny selection criteria used in any security screening
process, including for persons, baggage, or cargo”;
5
“fajny security contingency plan or information and
any comments, instructions, or implementing guidance
pertaining thereto”; the technical specifications of
certain security equipment (such as screening equip-
ment); and “[s]pecific details of aviation security
measurcs, * * * includiling) * * * information
concerning specific numbers of Federal Air Marshals,
deployments or missions, and the methods involved in
such operations.” 49 C.F.R. 1520.7(a)-(f) and (j)
(2002); see 67 Fed. Reg. at 8340. The regulations
generally prohibited the disclosure of SSI unless the
recipient had a “need to know” the information, 49
C.F.R. 1520.5(a) (2002); specifically defined the cir-
cumstances in which an individual had such a “need to
know,” see 49 C.F.R. 1520.5(b) (2002); and stated that
an unauthorized disclosure was “grounds for a civil
penalty and other enforcement or corrective action.”
49 C.F.R. 1520.17; see 49 C.F.R. 1520.5(d) (2002).
The TSA’s current SSI regulations, as well as the
SSI regulations separately promulgated by the De-
partment of Transportation, are substantially similar
(but include some new categories of SSI that have
been added over the last decade). See 49 C.F.R.
1520.5, 1520.9{a)(2), 1520.17 (TSA); see also 49 C.F.R.
Pt. 15 (Department of Transportation). The TSA
often designates particular information as SSI without
seeking to have it formally classified under the Presi-
dent’s Article II national-security powers, in order
that the information can, if necessary, be shared
quickly and securely with non-government personnel
(such as airport and airline employees) whose cooper-
ation is critical to ensuring transportation security,
even if those recipients are not cleared for more sensi-
tive classified information. See, e.g., 70 Fed. Reg.
6
1380 (Jan. 7, 2005) (stating that an “original intent” of
the SSI regulations was “to share vulnerability as-
sessments and threat information with entities in all
transportation modes that need the information to
help forestall future attacks”). Since 2009, Section
114(r) has made clear that “[nJothing in this subsec-
tion, or any other provision of law, shall be construed
to authorize the designation of information as sensi-
tive security information” in order to “conceal a viola-
tion of law, inefficiency, or administrative error”;
“prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or
agency”; “restrain competition”; or “prevent or delay
the release of information that does not require pro-
tection in the interest of transportation security, in-
cluding basic scientific research information not clear-
ly related to transportation security.” 49 U.S.C.
114(r)(4)(A)-(D); see American Communities’ Right to
Public Information Act, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 561(c)(1),
123 Stat. 2182 (2009); see also 49 U.S.C. 40119(b) (sim-
ilar limitations on the Department of Transportation’s
authority).
2. Respondent is a former federal air marshal who
was hired by the TSA in 2001. App., infra, 2a. Under
the federal air marshal program, which was established
by the ATSA, the TSA stations federal air marshals on
passenger flights in order to protect those flights from
high security risks. 49 U.S.C. 44917(a)(1)-(2); see ATSA,
§ 105(a), 115 Stat. 606. The TSA has discretionary
authority to deploy federal air marshals on any flight,
and it is required to station a federal air marshal on
any flight that, in the agency’s judgment, “present(s]
high security risks.” 49 U.S.C. 44917(a)(1)-(2); see
ATSA, § 105(a), 115 Stat. 606.
7
In 2003, the TSA briefed respondent on a “poten-
tial plot” to hijack United States airliners. App., in-
fra, 2a (citation omitted). Shortly thereafter, he re-
ceived a text message from the TSA stating that, for a
particular window of time, the TSA would not be de-
ploying federal air marshals on overnight missions
from Las Vegas. J/bid.; id. at 2lan.1. Respondent
informed both his supervisor and the Office of the
Inspector General for the Department of Homeland
Security of his personal view that the TSA’s decision
about how to deploy its air marshals was not in the
best interests of public safety, but he was not satisfied
with the responses he received. /d. at 2la-22a.
Respondent then decided to reveal the TSA’s de-
ployment plans to the news media, in an effort to
“create a controversy” that would force the TSA to
change them. App., infra, 2a (citation omitted). He
told an MSNBC reporter about the TSA’s plans, and
the reporter published an article exposing those plans
to the public and criticizing them. Jbid. Members of
Congress and others criticized the plans. /bid. The
TSA ultimately did not follow the course of action that
had been outlined in the original text message. Jbid.
The TSA was not aware initially that respondent
had been the source of the disclosure. App., infra, 2a.
It learned of his involvement, however, when respond-
ent appeared on the NBC Nightly News to discuss a
separate incident, in a disguise that proved to be inad-
equate. Jbid. The TSA removed respondent from his
position as a federal air marshal for disclosing SSI
without authorization. /bid.
3. Respondent challenged his removal before the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), “an inde-
pendent Government agency that operates like a
8
court” and has jurisdiction to review certain personnel
actions. 5 C.F.R. 1200.1; see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 7513(d).
One of respondent’s claims was that his removal had
violated 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A). App., infra, 3a. Un-
der Section 2302(b)(8)(A), an agency generally cannot
“take * * * a personnel action” against an em-
ployee for disclosing certain types of information,
when the employee “reasonably believe[d]” that the
information showed a “violation of any law, rule, or
regulation” or “gross mismanagement, a gross waste
of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and
specific danger to public health or safety.” 5 U.S.C.
2302(b)(8)(A)(i) and (ii). Section 2302(b)(8)(A) does
not apply, however, if the employee’s disclosure was
“specifically prohibited by law.”
The MSPB ultimately rejected respondent’s Sec-
tion 2302(b)(8)(A) argument and sustained the agen-
cy’s decision to remove him. App, infra, 19a-56a. The
MSPB recognized that the TSA, pursuant to a legisla-
tive mandate to prescribe regulations preventing the
disclosure of certain types of information, had prom-
ulgated regulations that “identified SSI subject to
* * * statutory nondisclosure as including infor-
mation relating to [federal-air-marshal] deployments.”
Id. at 33a.” It additionally observed that the Ninth
" In the MSPB’s view, the relevant legislative mandate was the
version of 49 U.S.C. 40119%(b) that was in effect when the TSA
initially promulgated the regulations. App., infra, 33a n.9. The
briefs and decisions in this case have accordingly focused on Sec-
tion 40119(b). However, at the time of respondent’s disclosure, the
statute requiring and authorizing the TSA’s SSI regulations was
actually the provision now codified in Section 114(r). See pp. 4-5,
supra. For that reason, and for the sake of simplicity, this petition
will focus on Section 114(r). In any event, because the language of
9
Circuit, in a separate proceeding that respondent had
initiated, had “unequivocally declared that the infor-
mation disclosed by [him] constituted SSI as defined
in those regulations.” Jbid.; see MacLean v. Depart-
ment of Homeland Sec., 543 F.3d 1145, 1150 (2008);
49 C.F.R. 1520.7(j) (2002) (defining SSI to include
“information concerning specific numbers of Federal
Air Marshais, deployments or missions”). The MSPB
accordingly reasoned that because respondent had
“disclosed information that is specifically prohibited
from disclosure by a regulation promulgated pursuant
to an express legislative directive from Congress to
TSA,” the “disclosure was ‘specifically prohibited by
law” for purposes of Section 2302(b)(8)(A). App.,
infra, 34a-35a.
4. The Federal Circuit vacated the MSPB’s deci-
sion and remanded for further proceedings. App.,
infra, 1a-18a; see 5 U.S.C. 7703(a)(1) (authorizing an
employee to seek Federal Circuit review of an adverse
MSPB decision). The court of appeals recognized that
respondent’s removal had reflected a proper applica-
tion of the TSA’s regulations. App., infra, 5a-7a. It
also recognized that removal had been a reasonable
penalty for a disclosure that had “compromised flight
safety” and “could have had catastrophic consequenc-
es.” Jd. at Ta-9a. The court concluded, however, that
respondent’s disclosure had not been “specifically
prohibited by law” and that he was therefore entitled
to invoke the protections of Section 2302(b)(8)(A). Jd.
at 10a-17a.
In reaching that conclusion, the court of appeals fo-
cused on the text of the statute requiring the promui-
the two statutes is nearly identical, the legal analysis would be the
same under either one.
10
gation of the SSI regulations, rather than on the regu-
lations themselves. App., infra, 10a-17a. In the
court’s view, the parties were in agreement that “in
order to fall underthe * * * ‘specifically prohibit-
ed by law’ proviso,” a “disclosure must be prohibited
by a statute rather than by a regulation.” /d. at 12a;
see 7d. at 13a (perceiving the parties to agree that “a
regulation * * * cannot be ‘law’”). The court also
relied on a Senate Report addressing an unenacted
version of Section 2302(b)(8) that contained the phrase
“prohibited by statute” rather than the phrase “specif-
ically prohibited by law.” Jd. at 13a-14a (citing S. Rep.
No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978) (Senate Re-
port)); see Senate Report 154.
The court of appeals ultimately acknowledged,
however, that “[rlegulations promulgated pursuant to
Congress’s express instructions would qualify as spe-
cific legal prohibitions.” App., infra, 15a (emphasis
added). And it viewed the legislative mandate to
promulgate SSI regulations to present “a very close
case,” because the mandate included a direct “charge”
to the agency “to prescribe regulations pursuant to
specific criteria (i.e., only information that would be
detrimental to transportation safety).” Jbid. But the
court nevertheless concluded that, because the statute
“gives some discretion to the Agency to fashion regu-
lations for prohibiting disclosure,” the statute’s crite-
ria were too “general” to “‘specifically prohibit’ em-
ployee conduct.” Jd. at 14a.
Having decided the critical legal question, the court
of appeals remanded the case for a determination
whether respondent had reasonably believed his dis-
closure evidenced “a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety” or one of the other subjects
11
listed in Section 2302(b)(8)(A). App., infra, 16a.
Judge Wallach concurred to express the view that
“the facts alleged, if proven, allege conduct at the core
of” the activity protected by that provision. /d. at 18a.
The court of appeals denied the government’s petition
for rehearing en banc. /d. at 165a-166a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The Federal Circuit’s decision seriously under-
mines the effectiveness of the congressionally man-
dated SSI regime, invites individual federal employees
to make disclosures that will threaten public safety,
and warrants this Court’s immediate review. In the
course of its efforts to secure the Nation’s transporta-
tion network, the TSA necessarily develops and ac-
quires a great deal of information, including infor-
mation about security vulnerabilities, that has the
potential to cause extreme harm if publicly disclosed.
In recognition of that fact, Congress directed that the
TSA “shall prescribe regulations” prohibiting disclo-
sures that would, in the expert judgment of the TSA,
“be detrimental to the security of transportation.” 49
U.S.C. 114(r)(1)(C). The decision in this case, howev-
er, effectively permits individual federal employees to
override the TSA’s judgments about the dangers of
public disclosure.
According to the court of appeals, no matter how
harmful it might be for particular SSI to fall into the
wrong hands, an employee cannot be disciplined for
publicizing that SSI, so long as he reasonably believes
that the disclosure serves one of the interests listed in
5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A). The decision below thus clears
a path for any employee to do what respondent did
here: go public with an internal disagreement about
how best to allocate finite security resources; put lives
12
in danger by identifying the areas that have received
fewer resources; and then attempt to avoid any
employment-related repercussions by claiming that
publicizing such vulnerabilities revealed “a substantial
and specific danger to public health or safety,” 5
U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii).
That result contravenes the manifest intent of Con-
gress. The protections of Section 2302(b)(8)(A) ex-
pressly do not apply to disclosures that are “specifical-
ly prohibited by law.” That proviso squarely encom-
passes disclosures of SSI, which have been prohibited
pursuant to an express congressional directive. Em-
ployees can instead raise concerns that implicate SSI
through a separate set of procedures, covered by
Section 2302(b)(8)(B), that allow such concerns to be
addressed without harmful public disclosures. This
Court should grant certiorari and reverse.
A. The Disclosure Of Sensitive Security Information Is
“Specifically Prohibited By Law” Within The Mean-
ing Of 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A)
The Federal Circuit erred in permitting respond-
ent to invoke 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A) as a defense to his
removal. Section 2302(b)(8)(A) does not apply when
an employee has revealed information the disclosure
of which is “specifically prohibited by law.” 5 U.S.C.
2302(b)(8)(A). Respondent’s disclosure here falls
squarely within that proviso.
1. The TSA had at the time of respondent’s disclo-
sure and has today a statutory obligation to promul-
gate regulations “prohibiting * * * disclosure({s] of
information” that would, in the TSA’s judgment, “be
detrimental to the security of transportation.” HSA,
Tit. XVI, § 1601(b), 116 Stat. 2312; see 49 U.S.C.
114(r). Consistent with that statutory obligation, the
13
TSA has promulgated detailed regulations restricting
the dissemination of SSI. 67 Fed. Reg. 8351 (Feb. 22,
2002). Those regulations expressly foreclosed respon-
dent from sharing “information concerning specific
numbers of Federal Air Marshals, deployments or mis-
sions, and the methods involved in such operations”
with unauthorized persons. 49 C.F.R. 1520.7(j) (2002);
see 49 C.F.R. 1520.5(a) (2002); see also App., infra, 5a-
7a (concluding that respondent violated a nondisclo-
sure prohibition); MacLean v. Department of Home-
land Sec., 543 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 2008) (same).
Respondent’s disclosure of air-marshal-deployment
information was thus “specifically prohibited by law”
within the meaning of Section 2302(b)(8)(A).
The regulatory prohibition that respondent violat-
ed in this case is not meaningfully distinguishable
from other legal prohibitions that, even in the court of
appeals’ view, would be sufficient to render Section
2302(b)(8)(A) inapplicable. The court of appeals ac-
cepted, for example, that the “specifically prohibited
by law” proviso would be satisfied by the Trade Se-
crets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1905. See App., infra, 14a-15a.
That Act prohibits the disclosure of information that
“concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes,
operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the iden-
tity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of
any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any
person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association.”
18 U.S.C. 1905. A bar on disclosing information about
the “operations” of a “corporation,” ibid., is no more
specifically prohibitory than a bar on disclosing in-
formation about “specific numbers of Federal Air
Marshals, deployments or missions, and the methods
involved in such operations,” 49 C.F.R. 1520.7(j)
14
(2002). Indeed, it is difficult to see how the provisions
that respondent violated in this case could have pro-
hibited the disclosure of air-marshal-deployment in-
formation with any greater clarity or specificity.
The prohibition against respondent’s disclosure
was a prohibition “by law” whether it appeared direct-
ly in the statute or instead in the regulations that the
statute required the TSA to promulgate. As Congress
presumably understood, the term “law” is not limited
to congressional enactments. In Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), for example, this Court
construed the phrase “authorized by law” to include
not just authorization conferred by statute, but also
by “properly promulgated, substantive agency regula-
tions.” Jd. at 295. The Court observed that such
regulations “have the ‘force and effect of law’” and
that, in the absence of a “clear showing of contrary
legislative intent,” the “traditional understanding” of
the phrase “‘authorized by law’” would presumptively
include them. /d. at 295-296 (citation omitted).
In the context of Section 2302(b)(8)(A)’s “specifical-
ly prohibited by law” proviso, the “traditional under-
standing” of the word “law” would include, at a mini-
mum, substantive nondisclosure regulations, like the
SSI regulations, that were enacted pursuant to an
express congressional directive. See Chrysler Corp.,
441 U.S. at 308 (concluding that the phrase “author-
ized by law” would be satisfied by a procedurally valid
authorizing regulation enacted pursuant to a statute
that “contemplates the regulations issued”). And
nothing in Section 2302(b)(8)(A)’s history provides a
“clear showing of contrary legislative intent,” id. at
296, that would justify disregarding that traditional
understanding. Indeed, the history shows that Con-
15
gress specifically decided not to adopt a proposal by
the Senate that would have used the word “statute”
rather than the word “law.” See Senate Report 154;
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1717, 95th Cong,., 2d. Sess. 130
(1978) (Conference Report).
The government has not disputed, for purposes of
this case, that some regulatory prohibitions could fall
outside the reach of Section 2302(b)(8)(A)’s “specifi-
cally prohibited by law” proviso. See Gov’t C.A. Br.
46. The conference report accompanying the proviso’s
enactment states that the proviso “does not refer to
agency rules and regulations” but instead “to statuto-
ry law and court interpretations of those statutes.”
Conference Report 130. The phrase “agency rules
and regulations,” however, cannot be taken to encom-
pass congressionally mandated regulations like the
ones at issue here. As the court of appeals recognized
(App., infra, 14a), Congress was apparently concerned
with the possibility that agencies might adopt “inter-
nal procedural regulations against disclosure” that
would “discourage an employee from coming forward
with allegations of wrongdoing.” Senate Report 21
(emphasis added). That concern would not apply to
nondisclosure regulations that Congress itself ex-
pressly instructed the agency to promulgate. Such
regulations “implement the statute,” Chrysler Corp.,
441 U.S. at 302-303 (citation omitted), and thus would
have been considered by Congress to be part of “stat-
utory law” for Section 2302(b)(8)(A) purposes.
To the extent the Federal Circuit believed that the
government waived the argument that the regulations
in this case can be “law” for purposes of the Section
2302(b)(8)(A) proviso, that belief was incorrect. The
government’s argument in the court of appeals did
16
focus principally on the statute as the relevant source
of “law.” See, e.g., Gov’t C.A. Br. 45 (explaining that
the MSPB had held that “the ‘law’ that specifically
prohibits the disclosure of SSI is the statute passed by
Congress”); id. at 46-47 (agreeing that the proviso ap-
plies only when Congress has “explicitly prohibited” a
particular disclosure “via legislative enactment” and
characterizing the dispute as “whether 49 U.S.C.
§ 40119 serves as that legislative enactment”) (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted). But the
government also expressly defended the proposition
that “when an agency has adopted non-disclosure
regulations pursuant to a specific Congressional man-
date to do so, the agency may discipline the employee
who violates that non-disclosure regulation.” Jd. at
48; see, e.g., id. at 45 (arguing that the disclosure of
SSI “was both ‘specifically prohibited by’ 49 U.S.C.
§ 40119, as well as by the TSA regulation”) (emphasis
added); id. at 46 (describing the MSPB’s decision,
which the government was defending, as “encom-
pass[ing] regulations * * * to the extent that
those regulations implement a specific statutory re-
quirement that an agency describe the information
that must be protected”). And the court of appeals
itself acknowledged that “[rjegulations promulgated
pursuant to Congress’s express instructions would
qualify as specific legal prohibitions.” App., infra,
15a. It erred in failing to apply that principle to the
regulations here.
2. Even if the relevant inquiry were restricted to
the four corners of the statute, the disclosure in this
case would still have been “specifically prohibited by
law” within the meaning of Section 2302(b)(8)(A).
Section 114(r) sets forth three “specific[]” categories
17
of information: information whose disclosure, in the
TSA’s judgment, would “be an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy”; information whose disclosure, in
the TSA’s judgment, would “reveal a trade secret or
privileged or confidential commercial or financial
information”; and information whose disclosure would,
in the TSA’s judgment, “be detrimental to the security
of transportation.” 49 U.S.C. 114(r)(1)(A)-(C). And
Section 114(r) “prohibit[s}” the disclosure of that
information by providing that the TSA “shall pre-
scribe regulations” to that effect. 49 U.S.C. 114(r)(1).
The Federal Circuit’s view (App., infra, 14a) that
the statute “does not ‘specifically prohibit’” disclo-
sures because it “provides only general criteria for
withholding information and gives some discretion to
the Agency” cannot be squared with this Court’s deci-
sion in Administrator, FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S.
255 (1975). That case involved a provision of the
FOIA, known as Exemption 3, which at that time
permitted an agency to withhold from the public any
information “specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute.” Jd. at 257 (quoting 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3) (1970)).
The Court construed Exemption 3 to apply even in
circumstances where an agency’s discretionary deci-
sion was a prerequisite to nondisclosure. /d. at 261-
267; see id. at 258 n.4. In particular, the Court found
the provision applicable to information that became
nondisclosable only after the relevant agency had
made a “judgment” that disclosure was “not required
in the interest of the public” and “would adversely
affect the interests” of someone objecting to the dis-
closure. /d. at 258 n.4 (quoting 49 U.S.C. 1504 (1970)).
The proviso at issue here (“specifically prohibited by
law”) is at least as broad as the proviso at issue in
18
Robertson (“specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute”); the degree of agency discretion here is, if
anything, narrower than the degree of agency discre-
tion in Robertson; and the applicability of the proviso
here thus follows a fortiori from Robertson.
In the wake of Robertson, Congress narrowed the
language of FOIA’s Exemption 3 to apply only to in-
formation “specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided
that such statute (A) requires that the matters be
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave
no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular
criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of
matters to be withheld.” 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3) (1976)
(emphasis added); see Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 121 n.18 (1980).
But when Congress enacted Section 2302(b)(8)(A)
shortly thereafter, it included a “specifically prohibit-
ed by law” proviso that was not subject to any such
limitations. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1116. The natural infer-
ence is that Congress intended the “specifically pro-
hibited by law” proviso in Section 2302(b)(8)(A) to be
interpreted at least as broadly as the “specifically
exempted from disclosure by statute” proviso at issue
in Robertson. See, e.g., Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie,
Rini, Kramer & Ulrich L.P.A., 559 U.S. 578, 589-590
(2010) (“We have often observed that when ‘judicial
interpretations have settled the meaning of an exist-
ing statutory provision, repetition of the same lan-
guage in a new statute indicates, as a general matter,
the intent to incorporate its . . . judicial interpreta-
tions as well.’”) (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624, 645 (1998)).
19
The legislative history of Section 2302(b)(8)(A)
supports that inference. As noted above, the Senate
proposed a version of the proviso that would have
applied only to disclosures “prohibited by statute.”
Senate Report 154. The Senate Report accompanying
that proposal expressed the view that the proviso
should be limited to the types of statutes covered by
the amended Exemption 3. /d. at 21. But Congress
rejected the Senate’s proposal in favor of the language
proposed by the House, which used the phrase “specif-
ically prohibited by law.” H. Rep. No. 1403, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1978); Conference Report 130.
Even if adoption of the Senate version would have
implied the existence of the various nontextual limita-
tions to which the Senate Report referred, rejection of
the Senate’s version implies the opposite.
In any event, assuming arguendo that the Section
2302(b)(8)(A) proviso did incorporate those implicit
limitations, the legislative mandate to promulgate the
SSI regulations would satisfy them. Even under the
Senate Report’s restrictive view, “a statute which
establishes particular criteria for withholding or re-
fers to particular types of matters to be withheld”
would be sufficient to render Section 2302(b)(8)(A)
inapplicable. Senate Report 21. The legislative man-
date here, which describes specific categories of in-
formation that the TSA is required to keep confiden-
tial, “refers to particular types of matters to be with-
held.” And it compares favorably in those respects
with a statute that the Senate Report specifically
identified as one that would satisfy the proviso, “sec-
‘ion 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947.”
Id. at 21-22; see CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167-168
(1985) (agreeing with the “uniform view among other
20
federal courts” that Section 102(d)(3) is “a withholding
statute under Exemption 3”). Section 102(d)(3) pro-
vided that “the Director of Central Intelligence shall
be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure.” 50 U.S.C.
403(d)(3) (1976). The legislative mandate here—which
expressly directs the TSA to prohibit the disclosure of
three particular categories of information in a particu-
lar manner (promulgation of regulations)—is no less
specific or prohibitory.
3. The Federal Circuit’s conclusion that respond-
ent can invoke the protections of Section 2302(b)(8){A)
undermines the careful line that Congress drew be-
tween concerns that an employee may air in public
and those that he may not. The general purpose of
Section 2302(b)(8) is to “encourage government per-
sonnel to blow the whistle on wasteful, corrupt or
illegal government practices without fearing retaliato-
ry action by their supervisors or those harmed by the
disclosures.” Marano v. Department of Justice, 2
F.3d 1137, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1993). But that general
purpose is limited by a countervailing concern that
employees not publicly reveal information that has
legitimately been shielded from public view for rea-
sons unrelated to whistleblowing.
Under Section 2302(b)(8), any employee who comes
across information that he “reasonably believes”
shows a “violation of any law, rule, or regulation” or
“gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an
abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific dan-
ger to public health or safety” can raise his concerns
without fear of employment-related reprisal. 5 U.S.C.
2302(b)(8)(A)(i) and (ii), (B)(i) and (ii). But the man-
ner in which he may raise those concerns depends
21
upon whether the disclosure of information is “specifi-
cally prohibited by law” (or “specifically required by
Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs”). 5
U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A). If no such prohibition exists,
then there is no reason to believe that any harm to the
public interest caused by public disclosure will be
significant enough to outweigh the benefits of public
debate, and the employee may go public with the in-
formation. See ibid.
If such a prohibition does exist, however, Section
2302(b)(8) does not permit the employee himself to
decide whether the benefits of public disclosure out-
weigh the interests animating the prohibition against
it. Instead, the employee must raise his concerns
through internal channels: he may go either “to the
Inspector General of [the] agency or another employ-
ee designated by the head of the agency to receive
such disclosures” or “to the Special Counsel,” who
operates independently of the agency. 5 U.S.C.
2302(b)(8)(B); see 5 U.S.C. 1211-1212. Those channels
provide substantial procedures for the exposure of
problems within an agency that warrant corrective
action, while at the same time respecting the need to
shield particular information from public view.
If, for example, the employee goes to the Special
Counsel, the Special Counsel is required to evaluate
the information within 15 days, 5 U.S.C. 1213(b); may
compel the agency to investigate the matter and file a
written report, 5 U.S.C. 1213(c)-(d); and must trans-
mit the report (generally along with any comments
from the employee whose disclosure initiated the
investigation) to the President, relevant congressional
committees, and, potentially, other agencies (such as
22
the Department of Justice), 5 U.S.C. 1213(e). Under
the Federal Circuit’s decision, however, an employee
may disregard those procedures and individually
choose to make public disclosures that the TSA has
legitimately determined, in response to a congression-
al directive, to “be detrimental to the security of
transportation.” 49 U.S.C. 114(r)(1)(C). The Federal
Circuit’s decision is erroneous and should be reversed.
B. The Federal Circuit’s Erroneous Decision Warrants
Immediate Review
1. The court of appeals’ decision creates grave
public-safety concerns that warrant this Court’s im-
mediate intervention. The court’s holding that an
employee who discloses SSI may invoke Section
2302(b)(8)(A) as a defense to a resulting employment
action will embolden federal employees to disclose
SSI. The TSA estimates that it has more than 65,000
employees with access to SSI. Disclosures by such
employees will, as judged by the expert agency desig-
nated by Congress for the task, be “detrimental to the
security of transportation,” 49 U.S.C. 114(r)(1)(C), and
create serious risks to transportation safety.
Information classified as SSI includes “[sJecurity
programs and contingency plans”; “[sJecurity [dJirec-
tives”; specifications of security equipment and proce-
dures; “[vjulnerability assessments”; methods used
to detect threats; operational and technical details
of particular security measures; security screening
procedures; “[slecurity training materials”; “[i]denti-
fying information of certain transportation security
personnel”; and lists of systems and assets “the inca-
pacity or destruction of [which] would have a debilitat-
ing impact on transportation security.” 49 C.F.R.
1520.5(b)(1)-(2), (4)-(5) and (7)-(12) (emphasis omitted).
23
Any of that information, if improperly disclosed, could
present a serious threat to the security of the Nation’s
transportation network and put lives at risk.
Armed with such information, someone might, for
example, gain the ability to circumvent existing secu-
rity measures, evade existing threat-detection proce-
dures, or pinpoint specific vulnerabilities in the na-
tional transportation network. As the Federal Circuit
recognized, respondent’s own disclosure of flights that
would not be protected by federal air marshals “com-
promised flight safety,” created a “threat to public
safety,” and “could have had catastrophic consequenc-
es.” App., infra, 8a. Even information that might not
appear on its face to expose a security vulnerability
(say, the fact that a particular federal air marshal will
be on a particular flight) could potentially be exploited
to create one (say, by interfering with the air mar-
shal’s ability to make the flight). It will not always be
possible, as it was in this case, for the TSA to shift its
plans in time to eliminate the disclosed vulnerability.
Even when it is possible to do so, the effort may, as in
this case, “force[] the Agency to reallocate scarce
resources,” ibid., thereby diminishing the resources
available in areas that the agency initially determined
to be more critical. And a disclosure of information
about screening technology, for example, would re-
quire major investments of time, resources, and infra-
structure improvements to remedy; could take
months, if not years, to complete; and would require
considerable expenditure of federal funds.
The Federal Circuit attempted to downplay the
impact of its decision by pointing out that the govern-
ment may still “discipline employees who reveal SSI
for personal gain or due to negligence, or who disclose
24
information that the employee does not reasonably
believe evidences a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety.” App., infra, 16a-17a. But
that is cold comfort. SSI, by its very nature, concerns
security matters. Employees will thus frequently be
able to claim that they are publicly disclosing SSI in
an effort to expose flaws in transportation security.
Many of those employees may later be deemed by the
MSPB, or a court, to have had a “reasonabl[e] belie[f]”
that the disclosure “evidences * * * a substantial
and specific danger to public health or safety,” 5
U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii), or another type of “reason-
abl{e} belie[f]” that qualifies for protection under
Section 2302(b)(8)(A). Even if some of those employ-
ees’ claims are not ultimately deemed to be within the
scope of Section 2302(b)(8)(A), the increased likeli-
hood of that result will itself erode the SSI scheme’s
deterrent effect and encourage more disclosures,
which are immediately harmful whether or not the
responsible employee is ultimately subject to discipli-
nary action.
2. Certiorari is warranted notwithstanding the ab-
sence of a circuit conflict on the question presented.
The Federal Circuit has outsized influence in this
area, and the potential for a circuit conflict ever to
develop is more theoretical than real.
An employee’s challenge to a personnel action un-
der Section 2302(b)(8)(A) is generally channeled to the
MSPB. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 7513(d) (MSPB jurisdiction
over appeals of adverse actions against covered em-
ployees); 5 U.S.C. 1214(a)(3) (MSPB jurisdiction to
hear Section 2302(b)(8) claims that the Special Coun-
sel terminates or does not timely act upon). The
MSPB has generally viewed Federal Circuit prece-
25
dent to be controlling. See, e.g., Garcia v. Depart-
ment of Agric., 110 M.S.P.R. 371, 379-380 (2009). And,
except in cases involving antidiscrimination claims,
MSPB decisions have historically been reviewable
only in the Federal Circuit. See 5 U.S.C. 7703(b)(1)
(2006).
In the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act
of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, Tit. I, § 108, 126 Stat.
1469-1470, Congress established a two-year window
(which expires at the end of 2014) during which cer-
tain Section 2302(b)(8) cases can be appealed not only
to the Federal Circuit, but to “any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction.” 5 U.S.C. 7703(b)(1)(B). In
light of that temporary provision, the MSPB has re-
laxed its view that Federal Circuit precedent is neces-
sarily controlling in such cases. See Day v. Depart-
ment of Homeland Sec., 119 M.S.P.R. 589, 595 n.5
(2013) (declining to follow a Federal Circuit decision
that represented a “minority approach among the
courts of appeal”). But the government is unaware of
any case involving the question presented that is on
track to be decided before the two-year window ex-
pires. In any event, even during the two-year window,
an employee could still elect to appeal any MSPB
decision in the government’s favor to the Federal
Circuit, which will then be bound by the decision in
this case. See App., infra, 165a-166a (denying rehear-
ing en banc); 5 U.S.C. 7703(b)(1)(B).
It is, moreover, unlikely that another good vehicle
for addressing the question presented will arise, be-
cause the Federal Circuit’s decision will deter federal
officials in the future from attempting to discipline an
employee who discloses SSI and appears to have a
colorable Section 2302(b)(8)(A) defense. Under 5
26
U.S.C. 1215(a), the independent Special Counsel is
empowered to bring a case before the MSPB seeking
personal sanctions against any agency official who
takes action against an employee in violation of Sec-
tion 2302(b)(8). The potential sanctions include re-
moval of the official, debarment from federal employ-
ment, and monetary penalties up to $1000. 5 U.S.C.
1215(a)(8)(A)(i) and (ii). A federal official is unlikely
to risk such personal repercussions simply to provide
another vehicle for this Court’s review. As a result,
future SSI disclosures may go unchecked (and thus
would not generate litigation). And even assuming the
government could raise the question presented again
at a later date, the delay would provide additional op-
portunity for harmful disclosures that could endanger
public safety. This Court should accordingly grant
certiorari now.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR.
Solicitor General
STUART F. DELERY
Assistant Attorney General
IAN HEATH GERSHENGORN
Deputy Solicitor General
ERIC J. FEIGIN
Assistant to the Solicitor
‘ ee General
TEVAN E.. BUNNELL DOUGLAS N. LETTER
General Counsel H. THOMAS BYRON III
U.S. Department of MICHAEL P. GOODMAN
Homeland Security Attorneys
JANUARY 2014
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
No. 2011-3231
ROBERT J. MACLEAN, PETITIONER
Vv.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, RESPONDENT
OPINION
Apr. 26, 2013
Before: PROST, MOORE, and WALLACH, Circuit
Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge
MooRE. Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge
WALLACH.
MOORE, Circuit Judge.
Robert J. MacLean petitions for review of a final
decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board
(Board), which sustained the Transportation Security
Administration’s (Agency’s) removal of Mr. MacLean
from the position of Federal Air Marshal (Marshal).
See MacLean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 116 M.S.PR.
562 (2011) (MacLean II). Because the Board incor-
(1a)
2a
rectly interpreted the Whistleblower Protection Act
(WPA), we vacate and remand.
BACKGROUND
Mr. MacLean became a Marshal in 2001. In July
2003, all Marshals received a briefing from the Agency
that there was a “‘potential plot’ to hijack U.S. Airlin-
ers.” MacLean II, 116 M.S.PR. at 564. Soon after
that briefing, however, the Agency sent an unen-
crypted text message to the Marshals’ cell phones
cancelling all missions on flights from Las Vegas until
early August. After receiving this directive, Mr. Mac-
Lean became concerned that “suspension of overnight
missions during a hijacking alert created a danger to
the flying public.” Jd. He complained to his super-
visor and to the Office of Inspector General, but they
responded that nothing could be done. J.A. 212-13.
Dissatisfied, Mr. MacLean told an MSNBC reporter
about the directive so as to “create a controversy re-
sulting in [its] rescission.” MacLean II, 116 M.S.PR.
at 565. MSNBC published an article criticizing the
directive, and the Agency withdrew it after several
members of Congress joined in the criticism.
In 2004, Mr. MacLean appeared on NBC Nightly
News in disguise to criticize the Agency dress code,
which he believed allowed Marshals to be easily identi-
fied. However, someone from the Agency recognized
his voice. During the Agency’s subsequent investiga-
tion, Mr. MacLean admitted that he revealed the can-
cellation directive to an MSNBC reporter in 2003.
Eventually, Mr. MacLean was removed from his posi-
tion because his contact with the MSNBC reporter
3a
constituted an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive se-
curity information (SSI). Although the Agency had
not initially labeled the text message as SSI when it
was sent, it subsequently issued an order stating that
its content was SSI.
Mr. MacLean challenged the SSI order in the Ninth
Circuit as a violation of the Agency’s own regulations
and as an impermissible retroactive action, but the
court rejected Mr. MacLean’s challenges. MacLean
v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 543 F.3d 1145, 1150-52 (9th
Cir. 2008). It held that substantial evidence support-
ed designating the text message as SSI under the ap-
plicable regulations, id. at 1150, and that the Agency
did not engage in retroactive action because it “applied
regulations . . . in force in 2003” to determine
that the text message was SSI, zd. at 1152.
Mr. MacLean challenged his removal before the
Board, arguing that his disclosure of the text message
was protected whistleblowing activity. After an inter-
locutory appeal from the Administrative Judge (AJ),
the full Board determined that Mr. MacLean’s disclo-
sure fell outside the WPA because it was “specifically
prohibited by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2008).
The Board reasoned that the regulation prohibiting
disclosure of SSI, upon which the Agency relied when
it removed Mr. MacLean, had the force of law. Mac-
Lean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 112 M.S.PR. 4, 12-18
(2009) (MacLean !).
The AJ then upheld Mr. MacLean’s removal and the
Board affirmed in MacLean II, the decision now on
appeal. Reconsidering MacLean I, the Board ex-
4a
plained that a regulation is not a “law” within the
meaning of the WPA. Instead, the Board held that
the disclosure of the text message could not qualify for
WPA protection because it was directly prohibited by a
statute, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA). MacLean I], 116 M.S.PR. at 570-71.
The Board also determined that the AJ applied the
correct regulation in upholding the Agency’s removal
of Mr. MacLean, and that the penalty of removal was
reasonable. Moreover, the Board upheld the AJ’s
finding that the Agency did not terminate Mr. Mac-
Lean in retaliation for his activities on behalf of the
Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association
(FLEOA) because the unauthorized disclosure of SSI
was a non-retaliatory reason for removal. Therefore,
the Board sustained the removal.
This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
DISCUSSION
We must affirm the Board’s decision unless it is
“(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained
without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation
having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substan-
tial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2012). We review
the Board’s legal determinations de novo. Welshans
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 550 F.3d 1100, 1102 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
5a
I. Application of Agency Regulations
to Mr. MacLean’s Removal
The Board explained that, “[uJnder the regulations
in effect in July 2003, information relating to the de-
ployment of [Marshals] was included within the defini-
tion of SSI,” and concluded that, as a result, Mr. Mac-
Lean’s communication with a reporter constituted an
unauthorized disclosure. MacLean IJ, 116 M.S.PR.
at 569. Mr. MacLean argues, however, that the Board
erred by upholding his removal because he was not
charged under the right regulation. He explains that
the regulation quoted in the initial charge, 49 C.ER.
§ 1520.5(b)(8)(ii), was not in force in 2003 and only
became codified in 2005. Mr. MacLean contends that
the Board wrongly concluded that the regulation it
ultimately relied on to uphold his removal, 49 C.F.R.
§ 1520.7(j), which was in force in 2003, is the same as
the 2005 regulation. Mr. MacLean argues that the
Board violated the rule of SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 80, 87, 63 S. Ct. 454, 87 L. Ed. 626 (1943), because
the Board affirmed his removal on grounds different
from those under which he was initially charged by the
deciding official.
Mr. MacLean also maintains that, although the
Ninth Circuit upheld the Agency’s eventual designa-
tion of the text message as SSI, his removal violated
his due process rights because the message was not la-
beled SSI when it was sent. He argues that the term-
ination was improper because he did not know that he
was violating any Agency rules by revealing the con-
tent of the text message. Mr. MacLean admits that
6a
he signed a nondisclosure agreement as a condition of
his employment, which states that Marshals “may be
removed” for “({uJnauthorized release of security-
sensitive or classified information.” MacLean I], 116
M.S.PR. at 580. He argues, however, that he believed
that the message was not SSI and that, in any event,
he was protected as a whistleblower. Repeating the
argument rejected by the Board, Mr. MacLean thus
insists that he tried in good faith to proceed within the
law.
We do not find Mr. MacLean’s arguments challeng-
ing the Agency’s charge to be persuasive. The regu-
lation that the Board ultimately relied upon to uphold
Mr. MacLean’s removal, 49 C.F-R. § 1520.7(j) (2002), is
no different from the regulation under which he was
initially charged, 49 C.F.R. § 1520.5(b)(8)(ii) (2005).
The earlier regulation bars disclosing “[s]pecific de-
tails of aviation security measures,” including “in-
for-mation concerning specific numbers of [Marshals],
deployments or missions,” while the latter prohibits
revealing “specific details of aviation . . . securi-
ty measures” and “[iJnformation concerning deploy-
ments.” In fact, the regulation’s history shows that
§ 1520.5(b)(8)(ii) is simply a recodified version § 1520,7()).
See J.A. 36. Because the Agency removed Mr. Mac-
Lean for revealing SSI, and the Board affirmed the
termination for that same reason, the Board did not
violate the Chenery doctrine.
We likewise reject Mr. MacLean’s due process and
“good faith” arguments. Both the applicable regula-
tion and the nondisclosure agreement that Mr. Mac-
Ta
Lean signed put him on notice that revealing infor-
mation concerning coverage of flights by Marshals
could lead to termination. Thus, the Agency did not
violate due process even though it formally designated
the text message as SSI only after it was sent. Fur-
thermore, we agree with the government that, because
the regulation prohibiting disclosure of SSI does not
include an intent element, Mr. MacLean cannot be
exonerated by his subjective belief that the content of
the text message was not SSI or that he was protected
as a whistleblower.
II. Reasonableness of Mr. MacLean’s Removal
Mr. MacLean argues that the Board failed to ade-
quately analyze the factors listed in Douglas v. Veter-
ans Administration, 5 MSPB 313, 5 M.S.PR. 280,
305-06 (1981), for possible mitigation of the penalty of
removal. Mr. MacLean contends that the Board did
not take into account the fact that he was a one-time
offender and otherwise had an unblemished record.
Mr. MacLean also argues that Douglas’s “comparative
discipline” factor did not weigh in favor of removal
because other Marshals were not terminated even
though they disclosed SSI regarding specific flights.
Mr. MacLean contends that the Board ignored the fact
that other Marshals’ disclosures were for personal
gain, while his disclosure exposed and led to correcting
an Agency mistake. He thus argues that revealing
the text message to a reporter served the public in-
terest, and that his termination undermined the effi-
ciency of the service.
8a
The government counters that the Board did not
abuse its discretion when it determined that Mr. Mac-
Lean’s termination promoted the efficiency of the ser-
vice. The government argues that there is no evi-
dence that Mr. MacLean’s actions made the flying pub-
lic safer. The government contends that, because
even a possibility that a Marshal may be onboard is an
important deterrent to terrorist activity, Mr. Mac-
Lean’s disclosure compromised flight safety and forced
the Agency to reallocate scarce resources to address
this new vulnerability. The government explains that,
although Mr. MacLean was a first-time offender with a
clean record, he was properly removed because his dis-
closure could have had catastrophic consequences.
The government argues that Mr. MacLean differs from
the Marshals who kept their jobs in spite of SSI
breaches because those Marshals compromised only
individual flights and showed remorse.
We agree with the government. The Board ana-
lyzed the relevant Douglas factors and did not abuse
its discretion in concluding that Mr. MacLean’s re-
moval was not a disparate penalty. MacLean II, 116
M.S.PR. at 576, 580-81. Unlike other Marshals, Mr.
MacLean revealed that multiple flights would be un-
protected, and we cannot say that it was unreasonable
for the Board to find that Mr. MacLean’s belief that he
was doing the right thing was outweighed by the re-
sulting threat to public safety. Moreover, it was not
unreasonable for the Board to determine that Mr.
MacLean’s conduct “caused the [A]gency to lose trust
in him,” id. at 579, because Mr. MacLean admitted that
he has “no regrets” and “feel[s] no remorse for going
9a
to a credible and responsible media representative,”
id. at 576. Given these circumstances, the Board did
not abuse its discretion by upholding Mr. MacLean’s
removal.
III. Mr. MacLean’s Prohibited
Personnel Practice Claim
The Board rejected Mr. MacLean’s argument that
the Agency violated the Civil Service Reform Act by
investigating him in retaliation for his FLEOA activi-
ties.’ The statute at issue prohibits individuals in
positions of authority from discriminating against a
government employee “on the basis of conduct which
does not adversely affect the performance of the em-
ployee ... or the performance of others.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(10)(A). The Board concluded that Mr.
MacLean’s prohibited personnel practice challenge
failed because he did not “meet his burden to establish
that the reason articulated by the [A]gency was pre-
textual and that the real reason underlying that deci-
sion was his FLEOA activities.” MacLean IJ, 116
M.S.PR. at 575. Mr. MacLean reasserts his discrimi-
' The government submitted a letter arguing that the Board
lacked jurisdiction over Mr. MacLean’s prohibited personnel prac-
tice claim. The government’s argument is unsupported by the ap-
plicable statutes. The Board has jurisdiction to entertain prohib-
ited personnel practice claims under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2), which
states that “the agency’s decision may not be sustained .. . if
the employee . . . shows that the decision was based on any
prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) of this
title.” Section 7701 applies to Agency employees by virtue of 49
U.S.C. § 40122(g)(2)(H).
10a
nation argument on appeal. He contends that the
Agency investigated him because of his 2004 appear-
ance on NBC Nightly News, which he made as part of
his advocacy on behalf of FLEOA.
We agree with the government that substantial ev-
idence supports the Board’s conclusion that the Agen-
cy did not discriminate against Mr. MacLean on the
basis of his FLEOA activities. Agency Policy Direc-
tive ADM 3700 “regulate[s] and prohibit{s} [Marshals’]
unauthorized contact with the media,” and record evi-
dence is consistent with the AJ’s determination that
Mr. MacLean was initially investigated for his unau-
thorized media appearance, not for his FLEOA activi-
ties. J.A. 27. Indeed, it is undisputed that the
Agency began to investigate Mr. MacLean “within
days of his unauthorized appearance” on NBC Nightly
News, which was “approximately 22 months after he
began organizing and leading the [FLEOA] chapter.”
J.A. 55 (quotation marks omitted). Although the
Agency ultimately did not pursue the media appear-
ance charge and focused on the SSI disclosure charge,
the initial investigation does not appear to be frivolous
or pretextual because it was justified by Directive
ADM 3700.
IV. Mr. MacLean’s Affirmative Defense
Under the WPA
The WPA prohibits individuals in positions of au-
thority from taking a “personnel action” against a gov-
ernment employee in certain circumstances, particu-
larly
lla
because of any disclosure of information by an em-
ployee . . . which the employee .. . rea-
sonably believes evidences .. . a substantial
and specific danger to public health or safety, if
such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by
nS a
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (emphasis added). The Board
rejected Mr. MacLean’s affirmative defense that his
disclosure of the text message was protected whistle-
blowing activity because it determined that the dis-
closure was “specifically prohibited by law” within the
meaning of the WPA. The law that the Board relied
upon is the ATSA, which states, in relevant part:
Notwithstanding section 552 of title 5 ... ,
the Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe reg-
ulations prohibiting disclosure of information ob-
tained or developed in ensuring security under this
title if the Secretary of Transportation decides dis- _
closing the information would . . . be detri-
mental to transportation safety.
49 U.S.C. § 40119(b)(1) (2009) (emphases added). Be-
cause its conclusion that revealing the content of the
text message was specifically prohibited by the ATSA
made further WPA inquiry unnecessary, the Board did
not reach the question of whether Mr. MacLean “rea-
sonably believe[d]” that this information “evidence[d]
a substantial and specific danger to public
2 The WPA was recently amended by the Whistleblower Protec-
tion Enhancement Act (WPEA). Neither party argues that the
WPEA applies to this appeal.
12a
. . . Safety.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8); see MacLean
IT, 116 M.S.P.R. at 581.
The parties do not dispute that, in order to fall un-
der the WPA’s “specifically prohibited by law” proviso,
the disclosure must be prohibited by a statute rather
than by a regulation. Thus, the core of the disagree-
ment is whether the ATSA “specifically prohibit[s]}”
disclosure of information concerning coverage of
flights by Marshals within the meaning of the WPA.
Mr. MacLean and his amici (three members of Con-
gress) argue that the Board erroneously concluded
that the ATSA’s mandate to the Secretary of Trans-
portation to “prescribe regulations prohibiting disclo-
sure” of certain kinds of information is a specific pro-
hibition under the WPA. They contend that the
phrase “specifically prohibited by law” in the WPA can
only refer to explicit statutory language that identifies
specific classes of information. They argue that the
ATSA’s “detrimental to transportation safety” lan-
guage does not establish particular criteria for with-
holding information and leaves a great deal! of discre-
tion to the Agency, which is inconsistent with the
WPA’s requirement of specificity. They contrast the
ATSA with the Trade Secrets Act, which directly au-
thorizes removal of any federal employee who divulges
information that falls into particular categories. 18
U.S.C. § 1905 (2008); see also Kent v. Gen. Servs. Ad-
min., 56 M.S.P R. 536, 540-46 (1993).
The government cousters that Mr. MacLean vio-
lated a regulation promulgated pursuant to an express
legislative directive in the ATSA, which made his dis-
13a
closure “specifically prohibited” by a statute. It thus
argues that Mr. MacLean’s disclosure does not qualify
for WPA protection. The government contends that
Mr. MacLean’s reading of the WPA eviscerates laws
that provide for any Agency discretion in classifying
information as SSI, and thus disables Congress from
directing agencies to pass nondisclosure regulations.
Lastly, the government argues that it does not make
sense for Congress to order an agency to promulgate
nondisclosure regulations and at the same time pro-
hibit that agency from disciplining an employee for
violating those regulations by providing a defense
under the WPA.
We agree with Mr. MacLean that the ATSA does
not “specifically prohibit” the disclosure at issue in this
case. The ATSA’s plain language does not expressly
prohibit employee disclosures, and only empowers the
Agency to prescribe regulations prohibiting disclosure
of SSI “if the Secretary decides disclosing the infor-
mation would . . . be detrimental to public safety.”
49 U.S.C. § 40119(b) (emphasis added). Thus, the
ultimate source of prohibition of Mr. MacLean’s dis-
closure is not a statute but a regulation, which the
parties agree cannot be “law” under the WPA.
Notably, Congress changed the language “specifi-
cally prohibited by law, rule, or regulation” in the stat-
ute’s draft version to simply “specifically prohibited by
law.” Congress did so because it was concerned that
the broader language “would encourage the adoption
of internal procedural regulations against disclosure,
and thereby enable an agency to discourage an em-
l4a
ployee from coming forward with allegations of wrong-
doing.” S. Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2748. Congress
explained that only “a statute which requires that mat-
ters be withheld from the public as to leave no discre-
tion on the issue, or . . . which establishes partic-
ular criteria for withholding or refers to particular
types of matters to be withheld” could qualify as a suf-
ficiently specific prohibition. Jd. In contrast, the
“detrimental to transportation safety” language of the
ATSA does not describe specific matters to be with-
held. It provides only general criteria for withhold-
ing information and gives some discretion to the
Agency to fashion regulations for prohibiting disclo-
sure. Thus, the ATSA does not “specifically prohibit”
employee conduct within the meaning of the WPA.
The ATSA’s insufficient specificity becomes even
more apparent when it is contrasted with statutes that
have been determined to fall under the WPA’s “specifi-
cally prohibited by law” proviso. For example, the
Trade Secrets Act, which the Board in Kent held to
qualify as a specific prohibition, is extremely detailed
and comprehensive. 56 M.S.PR. at 543-46. That
statute penalizes federal employees who “divulge[]
any information coming to [them] in the course
of [their] employment . . . which information con-
cerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, opera-
tions, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity,
confidential statistical data, amount or source of any
income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person,
firm, partnership, corporation, or association.
” 18 U.S.C. § 1905. The same is true of § 6013
15a
of the Internal Revenue Code, which the Ninth Circuit
in Coons v. Secretary of the Treasury, 383 F.3d 879,
890-91 (9th Cir. 2004), held to fall within the meaning
of the WPA’s “specifically prohibited” language. That
statute prohibits federal employees from “disclos[ing]
any return or return information obtained by him in
any manner in connection with his service,” 26 U.S.C.
§ 6013(a)(1), and then goes on to define “return” and
“return information” in explicit detail, mentioning
such things as “a taxpayer’s identity, the nature, source
or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deduc-
tions, exemptions, credits, assets, overassessments, or
tax payments .. . ,” td. § 6013(b)(1), (2). Thus,
when Congress seeks to prohibit disclosure of specific
types of information, it has the ability to draft the
statute accordingly.
Nonetheless, we note that the ATSA’s charge to the
Secretary of Transportation to prescribe regulations
pursuant to specific criteria (i.e., only information that
would be detrimental to transportation safety) makes
this a very close case. Indeed, the ATSA appears to
fall in the middle of the spectrum of statutes flanked at
opposite ends by (a) those that fall squarely under the
WPA’s “specifically prohibited by law” proviso, such as
the Trade Secrets Act and § 6013 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code, and (b) those in which Congress delegates
legislative authority to an administrative agency with-
out circumscribing the agency’s discretion. Regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to Congress’s express in-
structions would qualify as specific legal prohibitions.
In this case, given the clarity of the statutory language
and legislative intent behind the WPA’s specificity re-
l6a
quirement,: the parameters set by Congress are not
enough to push the ATSA over that threshold.
We are similarly unpersuaded by the government’s
argument that a parade of horribles necessarily fol-
lows our adoption of Mr. MacLean’s interpretation of
the WPA. The government argues that, if Mr. Mac-
Lean is allowed to pursue his whistleblower defense,
the WPA would in effect prohibit later Congresses
from directing agencies to pass nondisclosure regula-
tions. The government is concerned that, under Mr.
MacLean’s reading, the WPA would prohibit agencies
from disciplining employees for violating nondisclosure
regulations and thereby prevent agencies from en-
forcing such regulations.
The government is mistaken. In spite of the WPA,
Congress remains free to enact statutes empowering
agencies to promulgate and enforce nondisclosure reg-
ulations, and it has done sointhe ATSA. The govern-
ment ignores the fact that the ATSA covers a wide
range of conduct that would not qualify as whistle-
blowing. For example, no one disputes that the ATSA
empowers the Agency to promulgate regulations that
enable it to discipline employees who reveal SSI for
personal gain or due to negligence, or who disclose in-
formation that the employee does not reasonably be-
lieve evidences a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety. The WPA also does not pro-
hibit the Agency from following the ATSA’s mandate to
regulate public access to information that the Agency
might otherwise be forced to disclose under the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA). Indeed, it appears
17a
that the paramount goal of the ATSA is to empower
the Agency to reject the public’s requests for Agenoy
intelligence because the statute recites that, “[{nJot-
withstanding [FOIA] .. . _, the Secretary of
Transportation shall prescribe regulations prohibiting
disclosure of information obtained or developed in en-
suring security under this title.” 49 U.S.C. § 40119(b)(1);
see also Public Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 194-
196 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (analyzing the predecessor statute
to the ATSA and explaining that Congress’s desire to
enable the Agency to bar FOIA requests for informa-
tion that qualifies as SSI was one of the driving forces
behind the passage of that statute). Our interpreta-
tion of the WPA does not deprive the ATSA of mean-
ing.
CONCLUSION
Because Mr. MacLean’s disclosure is nvt “specifi-
cally prohibited by law” within the meaning of the
WPA, we vacate the Board’s decision and remand for a
determination whether Mr. MacLean’s disclosure qual-
ifies for WPA protection. For example, it remains to
be determined whether Mr. MacLean reasonably be-
lieved that the content of his disclosure evidenced a
substantial and specific danger to pu’ « health or
safety.
VACATED AND REMANDED
WALLACH, Circuit Judge, concurring.
Mr. MacLean presented substantial evidence that
he was not motivated by personal gain but by the de-
sire to protect the public. He averred proof that he
18a
sought direction from his supervisors before making
allegedly protected disclosures. While I join in the
analysis and the result of the majority opinion, I con-
cur to emphasize that the facts alleged, if proven,
allege conduct at the core of the Whistleblower Pro-
tection Act.
19a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
2011MSPB 70
Docket No.: SF-0752-06-0611-1-2
ROBERT J. MACLEAN, APPELLANT
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, AGENCY
July 25, 2011
BEFORE
Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman
Mary M. Rose, Member
PINION R
11 The appellant petitions for review of the initial
decision that sustained his removal. For the
reasons set forth below, we DENY the petition for
review and AFFIRM the initial decision AS
MODIFIED herein. The appellant’s removal is
SUSTAINED.
BACKGROUND
12
13
20a
Except where specified otherwise, the follow-
ing facts are not in dispute. Shortly after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the ap-
pellant was appointed to the position of Civil Avi-
ation Security Specialist, also known as Federal
Air Marshal (FAM). He was originally employed
in the Department of Transportation, specifically
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Ini-
tial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4, Subtabs 4S, 4U.
He was transferred to the Transportation Secu-
rity Administration (TSA) when that agency was
created in late 2001 for the purpose of promoting
aviation security, among other things. See Pub.
L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597, § 101. In early
2003 the appellant became an employee of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) when
TSA’s workforce and functions were transferred
to DHS. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135,
2178, § 403.
In July 2003, the appellant received a briefing
from TSA concerning a “potential plot” to hijack
U.S. airliners. Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 80-82.
Soon after the briefing, TSA officials sent a di-
rective to FAMs that all Remain Overnight
(RON) missions in early August would be can-
celled.’ At the time of the directive, the perti-
' The record is not entirely clear as to the precise dates that
overnight missions were to be cancelled, but there is no dispute
that the directive covered multiple days during the period August
1-9, 2008. Tr. at 52,112. Pinpointing the exact dates is unneces-
sary to our analysis.
14
Zla
nent regulations prohibited disclosure of Sensi-
tive Security Information (SSI) to the public. 67
Fed. Reg. 8340, 8351 (2002) (promulgating 49
C.F-R. §§ 1520.3 & 1520.5 as a Final Rule). Un-
der the definition in effect at the time of the di-
rective, SSI consisted of, among other things,
“{s]pecific details of aviation security measures,”
including but not limited to “information con-
cerning specific numbers of Federal Air Marshals,
deployments, or missions.” 67 Fed. Reg. 8340,
8352 (2002) (promulgating 49 C.FR. § 1520.7).
In July 2003, each FAM was equipped with a
Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) on which he
could receive encrypted messages from TSA.
The appellant received the directive cancelling
RONs as an unencrypted text message on his cell
phone, however. ‘Tr. at 78-82. The message was
not labeled as SSI. /d. at 82-83.
The appellant believed that the suspension of
overnight missions during a hijacking alert cre-
ated a danger to the flying public and was incon-
sistent with what “the law mandated.” Tr. at 84,
88. He raised his concerns with his supervisor
and with an employee in the agency’s Inspector
General’s office but was not satisfied with the re-
sponses he received. Jd. at 84-88. The appel-
lant then revealed the contents of the RON di-
rective to a reporter from MSNBC, with the hope
that the reporter could create a controversy re-
sulting in rescission of the directive. Tr. at
108-110; IAF, Tab 4, Subtab 4J at 11. On Tues-
day, July 29, 2003, MSNBC published an article
15
16
22a
on its website entitled “Air Marshals Pulled from
Key Flights.” The article stated that “[d]espite
renewed warnings about possible airline hijack-
ings, the Transportation Security Administration
has alerted federal air marshals that as of Friday
they will no longer be covering cross-country or
international flights, MSNBC.com has learned.”
IAF, Tab 4, Subtab 4J at 17. The appellant was
not identified in the article. See id. Members
of Congress criticized TSA’s suspension of over-
night missions, and the directive was withdrawn
before it went into effect. Tr. at 92.
After this series of events, the appellant came
to believe that FAMs should speak with “a collec-
tive voice,” so he became active in the Federal
Law Enforcement Officers Association (F LEQA).
Tr. at 92. About a year later, the appellant ap-
peared on NBC Nightly News, in disguise and
identified as Air Marshal “Mike,” when he as-
serted that the agency’s dress code allowed
would-be terrorists to identify FAMs. IAF, Tab
4, Subtab 4J at 10; Refiled Appeal File (RAF),
Tab 45, Ex. TT. Someone from TSA recognized
his voice, and TSA ordered an investigation into
the appellant’s “unauthorized media appearance.”
During the investigation, the appellant admitted
that he was the one who told the press about the
2003 suspension of overnight missions. IAF, Tab
4, Subtab 4J at 10.
The agency proposed the appellant's removal
on charges of: (1) Unauthorized Media Ap-
17
23a
pearance; (2) Unauthorized Release of Infor-
mation to the Media; and (3) Unauthorized Dis-
closure of Sensitive Security Information. LAF
Tab 4, Subtab 4G. The deciding official, Special
Agent in Charge Frank Donzati, sustained only
the third charge and imposed removal. /d.,
Subtab 4A. Subsequently, TSA issued an August
31, 2006 order finding that the 2003 directive re-
garding overnight missions was SSI. IAF, Tab
22 (attachment).
On appeal, and following a dismissal without
prejudice to allow the appellant to contest the
agency’s August 31, 2006 order in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
IAF, Tab 29, the administrative judge certified
several rulings for interlocutory review, RAF, Tab
14. In the resulting decision, the Board held as
follows:
e The Board lacks the authority to determine
for itself whether the particular information
the appellant disclosed in 2003 was SSI. The
appellant obtained a dismissal without preju-
dice for the purpose of instituting an action in
federal court seeking a declaration that the
information he disclosed was not SSI. The
court found that the information he disclosed
was SSI. The Board and the parties are
2 The Court also determined that the TSA order did not consti-
tute an improper, retroactive agency adjudication, but that “the
agency applied regulations that were in force in 2003 to determine
24a
. bound by the result of that litigation, regard-
less of the fact that the agency did not ex-
pressly deem the 2003 instruction to be SSI
until after it removed the appellant.
The appellant’s disclosure of SSI to the media
cannot constitute protected whistleblowing
because the appellant violated agency regula-
tions when he made the disclosure. The de-
cision in Kent v. General Services Admin-
istration, 56 M.S.P.R. 536 (1993)—where the
Board had held that the exception to whistle-
blower coverage for disclosures “specifically
prohibited by law,” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b\8)(A),
applies only to disclosures prohibited by
statute—was modified.
MacLean v. Department of Homeland Security,
112 M.S.P.R. 4 (2009) (MacLean J).
18
Upon return of the case to the regional office,
the administrative judge held a hearing and is-
sued an initial decision upholding the appellant’s
removal. RAF, Tab 84. The administrative
judge first explained at length why he found not
credible the appellant’s testimony that he did not
think the 2003 directive was SSI when he dis-
closed it to the reporter. Jd. at 14-18. The ad-
ministrative judge then sustained the charge of
unauthorized disclosure of SSI. /d. at 18-19.
that information created in 2003 was [SSI].” MacLean v. Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, 543 F.3d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008).
19
110
25a
The administrative judge found unproven the
appellant’s affirmative defense that. the agency
violated 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10), which prohibits
discrimination because of “conduct which does not
adversely affect the performance of the employee
or applicant or the performance of others.” ®
According to the appellant, the agency targeted
him because he became active in FLEOA, and his
removal for unauthorized disclosure of SSI was a
pretext. The administrative judge weighed the
evidence and concluded that this claim was un-
proven. /d. at 20-23. Turning to the appellant’s
First Amendment claim, the administrative judge
found that the appelliant’s 2003 disclosure to
MSNBC addressed a matter of public concern,
but that the appellant’s right to speak was out-
weighed by the agency’s need to control dissemi-
nation of information about aviation security
measures. /d. at 23-28.
Finally, the administrative judge found that the
penalty was reasonable. In doing so, he conclud-
ed that deciding official Donzanti properly con-
sidered the relevant factors under Douglas v.
Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.PR. 280 (1981).
RAF, Tab 84 at 30. The administrative judge
specifically found that, among other things,
Donzanti considered that the appellant’s disclo-
sure of SSI was serious because it created a
* The appellant concedes that, as a FAM, he was not covered by
the federal labor-relations statute at 5 U.S.C. ch. 71, and thus his ac-
tivity was not protected by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9). RAF’, Tab 67 at 5.
711
26a
“vulnerability” as soon as the appellant made the
disclosure. /d. at 30-31. The administrative
judge further found that the offense was inten-
tional, i.e., the appellant intentionally made a
statement including the SSI to a reporter and he
was on clear notice that the information should
not be publicly revealed. /d. at 31-33. He not-
ed the appellant’s sworn statement that he had no
regrets and felt no remorse for going to the me-
dia, and his sworn deposition testimony that it did
not matter to him whether or not the information
conveyed to the reporter was SSI. /d. at 31-32.
The administrative judge also distinguished the
comparison employees identified by the appellant
purporting to evidence inconsistency of penalties.
Id. at 35-37.
The appellant has filed a timely petition for
review contesting all of the administrative judge’s
major findings and conclusions, raises affirmative
defenses not raised below, and requests to submit
evidence not submitted below. Petition for Re-
view (PFR) File, Tabs 1 (original submission), 2
(supplement to PFR) & 4 (corrected PFR). The
agency has responded in opposition to the PFR.
Id., Tab 8. The appellant has filed a reply to the
agency’s response. /d., Tab 9. The agency
moves to strike the appellant’s reply, id., Tab 10,
and the appellant opposes the motion to strike,
id.,Tab 11.4 The appellant also has filed another
* The Board’s rules do not provide for replies to responses to
petitions for review. See 5 C.F.R § 1201.114(); Santella v. Special
27a
motion to introduce “new” evidence, which the
agency has opposed. /d., Tabs 12-13. The Hon-
orable Dennis Kucinich and Honorable Carolyn
Maloney, U.S. House of Representatives, have
filed a motion with the Board requesting leave to
file an amicus curiae brief. Jd., Tab 14. We
grant the Representatives’ motion.°
ANALYSIS
The administrative judge correctly sustained the charge.
"12 The agency removed the appellant based on the
charge of “Unauthorized Disclosure of Sensitive
Security Information.” In support of the charge,
the agency specified as follows:
On July 29, 2003, you disclosed Sensitive Secu-
rity Information in an unauthorized manner.
Specifically, you informed the media that all
Counsel, 86 M.S.P.R. 48, 4 10 (2000), aff'd on reconsideration, 90
M.S.P.R. 172 (2001), aff'd, 328 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. (2003). We
therefore grant the agency’s motion to strike the appellant’s reply
for this reason and because it was filed weeks after the date the re-
cord closed on review (as extended), does not purport to be based
on previously-unavailable evidence, and is largely repetitive of ar-
guments raised in the petition for review. Nonetheless, while we
thus did not consider the reply in deciding this matter, we have
directed the Clerk of the Board to retain the appellant’s reply in
the case file in order to preserve the appellate record.
® We accept the Representatives’ amicus brief into the record,
and we have considered it in deciding the appeal. Because we con-
clude that the arguments contained in the amicus brief do not affect
the outcome of the appeal, we have not requested any response
from the agency or the appellant.
28a
Las Vegas FAMs were sent a text message to
their government issued mobile phones that all
RON (Remain Overnight) missions up August
9th would be cancelled, or words to that effect.
You admitted and acknowledged the foregoing
during an official, administrative inquiry re-
garding your conduct.
The media person to whom you disclosed this
information is not a covered person within the
meaning of the SSI regulations, 49 C.F.R. Part
1520. The information you improperly dis-
closed concerned RON deployments. Such
information is protected as SSI pursuant to 49
C.F.R. § 1520.5(b)(8)(ii)[,] which safeguards
“Information concerning the deployments,
numbers and operations of . . . Federal
Air Marshals .. . ” The disclosure of this
SSI had the potential to reveal vulnerabilities
in the aviation security system, and as such,
was extremely dangerous to the public we
serve.
IAF’, Tab 4, Subtab 4G at 2 (punctuation and capitaliza-
tion in original).®
° The regulation quoted in the charge, 49 C.F.R. § 1520.5(b)(8Xii),
is from the version in effect when the agency issued the proposal
notice. See 69 Fed. Reg. 28066, 28083 (2004) (promulgating a re-
vised 49 C.F.R. Part 1520 as an interim final rule with request for
comments). The version in effect in July 2003 when the appellant
divulged the text message to the reporter was codified under a dif-
ferent number but was substantively the same as the regulation
quoted in the charge. See 67 Fed. Reg. 8340, 8352 (2002) (promul-
gating a final rule defining SSI at 49 C.F.R. § 1520.7(j) as including
113
29a
The appellant argues that the administrative
judge erred in sustaining the charge without
making a finding whether he had a “good faith
belief” that he was permitted to disclose the con-
tents of the text message to the reporter. PFR
File, Tab 4 at 18. The appellant also argues at
length that the administrative judge was wrong to
reject, as not credible, his testimony that he did
not know the text message was SSI. /d. at
19-30. The agency argues that intent is not an
element of the charge. PFR File, Tab 8 at 9.
We agree with the agency. The charge, as titled
and as described in the specification, did not con-
tain a specific intent element; the agency did not
allege in its charge that the appellant engaged in
intentional misconduct. Some charges, such as
falsification, by their very nature require a show-
ing of intent. See Naekel v. Department of
Transportation, 782 F.2d 975, 978 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Baracker v. Department of the Interior, 70
M.S.PR. 594, 599 (1996). Because the agency in
this case did not bring such a charge, the Board
may sustain the charge without a showing of in-
tentionality, willfulness, knowingness, or the like,
as long as imposing discipline for the conduct
promotes the efficiency of the service. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7513(a); see Fernandez v. Department of Agri-
“information concerning specific numbers of Federal Air Marshals,
deployments, or missions”). The appellant does not contend that
he was prejudiced by the agency’s citation of the later version of
the regulation in the charge.
30a
culture, 95 M.S.PR. 63 99 6-8 (2003); Cross v.
Department of the Army, 89 M.S.PR. 62, 41 8-9
(2001).
714 Under the regulations in effect in July 2003,
information relating to the deployment of FAMs
was included within the definition of SSI. 67
Fed. Reg. 8352 (2002) (49 C.F.R. § 1520.7()).
The appellant was not authorized to release SSI
to a reporter, 67 Fed. Reg. 8351 (49 C.FR. §§
1520.1(a), 1520.3(a)-(b)), nor was the reporter
someone with a “need to know” SSI, 67 Fed. Reg.
8352 (49 C.F-R. § 1520.5). Imposing discipline
for the appellant’s disclosure of the text message
to a reporter promotes the efficiency of the ser-
vice because maintaining confidentiality of plans
for FAM deployments goes to the heart of one of
TSA’s missions, that of promoting civil aviation
safety and security.
The appellant’s discl MSNBC reporter is
no whi lowin cause it was “specifi-
cally prohibited by law.”
"415 It is a prohibited personnel practice for an
agency to impose discipline because of an em-
ployee’s disclosure of “information
which the employee . . . reasonably believes
evidences—{i) a violation of any law, rule, or reg-
ulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross
waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a sub-
stantial and specific danger to public health or
safety, if such disclosure is not specifically pro-
hibited by law. . . 5 U.S.C.
116
3la
§ 2302(b)(8)(A). In MacLean I, the Board held
that the appellant’s disclosure of the 2003 di-
rective concerning overnight missions to a re-
porter was not protected whistleblowing because
it was “specifically prohibited by law.” Mac-
Lean, |12 M.S.PR. 4, 19 20-33. The appellant
argues that this holding was incorrect and asks
that we overrule it. PFR File, Tab 4 at 60-63.
The law of the case doctrine refers to the prac-
tice of courts in refusing to reopen what already
has been decided in an appeal, and of following a
prior decision in an appeal of the same case.
Hoover v. Department of the Navy, 57 M.S.PR.
545, 552 (1993). These rules do not involve pre-
clusion by final judgment, but instead regulate
judicial affairs before final judgment. Peartree
v. U.S. Postal Service, 66 M.S.PR. 332, 339 (1995).
There are three recognized exceptions to the law
of the case doctrine: The availability of new and
substantially different evidence; a contrary deci-
sion of law by controlling authority that is appli-
cable to the question at issue; or a showing that
the prior decision in the same appeal was clearly
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.
Hudson v. Principi, 260 F.3d 1357, 1363-64 (Fed.
Cir. 2001); Peartree, 66 M.S.PR. at 337; Hoover,
57 M.S.PR. at 553. We decline the appellant’s
invitation to overrule the Board’s 2009 decision
because that decision was not “clearly erroneous,”
and he has not alleged any other bases for devi-
ating from the law of the case.
117
32a
We recognize that the Board’s decision in
MacLean I could be read broadly to allow any
regulation that meets certain conditions to be ac-
corded the full force and effect of law, and thus, a
disclosure in violation of such a regulation could
be construed as “prohibited by law” under 5
U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). We find that such a
broad ruling is unnecessary to resolve the issues
presented by this appeal and is inconsistent with
the policies that Congress embodied in the Whis-
tleblower Protection Act (“WPA”). We therefore
modify MacLean I to the extent it is inconsistent
with the decision we issue today. Rather, we find
that the appellant’s disclosure of SSI was “spe-
cifically prohibited by law” because the regulation
that he violated when he disclosed information
about FAM deployments was promulgated pur-
suant to an explicit Congressional mandate that
required TSA to prohibit such disclosures. Spe-
cifically, in enacting Pub. L. No. 108-272, § 101, 108
Stat. 745, 1117 (July 5, 1994), codified at 49 U.S.C. §
40119,’ Congress expressly required that TSA is-
7 The statute states in pertinent part as follows:
(b) DISCLOSURE. (1) Notwithstanding section 552 of title 5,
the Administrator shall prescribe regulations prohibiting dis-
closure of information obtained or developed in carrying out
security or research and development activities under section
44501(a) or (c), 44502(a)(1) or (3), (b), or (c), 44504, 44505, 44507,
44508, 44511, 44512, 44513, 44901, 44903(a), (b), (c), or (e),
44905, 44912, 44935, 44936, or 44938(a) or (b) of this title if the
Administrator decides disclosing the information would—(A) be
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (B) reveal a trade
33a
sue aviation-related regulations “prohibiting disclo-
sure of information obtained or developed in carry-
ing out security” if, in the agency’s view, “disclosing
the information” would “be detrimental to the
safety of passengers in air transportation.” 49
U.S.C. § 40119(b)(1)(C). Citing 49 U.S.C. § 40119
(among other authorities), on February 22, 2002,
the Under Secretary of TSA® issued regulations
on February 22, 2002, which identified SSI sub-
ject to this statutory nondisclosure as including
information relating to FAM deployments. 67
Fed. Reg. 8340, 8351-52 (2002). Furthermore,
secret or privileged or confidential commercial or financial in-
formation; or (C) be detrimental to the safety of passengers in
air transportation.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not authorize infor-
mation to be withheld from a committee of Congress authorized
to have the information.
* In 2001, Congress enacted the legislation creating the Trans-
portation Security Administration, which was charged with carry-
ing out certain functions previously performed by the Federal
Aviation Administration. See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597,
603 (Nov. 19, 2001). Section 101(e)(2) of that statute replaced the
word “Administrator” [of the Federal Aviation Administration] in
section 40119(b) with “Under Secretary,” which refers to the Under
Secretary of Transportation Security, see 49 U.S. § 1154(b){1).
® The Board’s 2009 decision cited 49 U.S.C. § 114(s) as the author-
ity for the SSI regulations at 49 C.F.R. Part 1520. 112 M.S.P.R. 4,
710. However, section 114(s) (which was later redesignated as
subsection (r), see Pub. L. No. 110-161, Div. E, § 568(a)), became
law on November 25, 2002, see Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135,
2312, and TSA did not issue regulations under that specific statu-
tory authority until May 18, 2004, see 69 Fed. Reg. 28066, 28082
34a
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has unequivo-
cally declared that the information disclosed by
the appellant constituted SSI as defined in those
regulations. See MacLean, 543 F3d at 1150."
Consequently, because the appellant disclosed in-
formation that is specifically prohibited from dis-
closure by a regulation promulgated pursuant to
an express legislative directive from Congress to
TSA,” we find that his disclosure was “specifi-
(2004). Nevertheless, as explained above, 49 U.S.C. § 40119 (which
is substantively similar to section 114(s)) gave the Under Secretary
for Transportation Security the authority to issue regulations pro-
hibiting the disclosure of information if such disclosure would be
“detrimental to the safety of passengers in air transportation,” the
Under Secretary issued such regulations in 2002, see 67 Fed. Reg.
8340, 8351-52, and the appellant violated those regulations. The ci-
tation to 49 U.S.C. § 114(s) instead of section 40119 in the Board’s
2009 decision had no affect on the outcome.
‘0 Congress established judicial review of TSA final orders in
the federal courts of appeals with exclusive review by the Supreme
Court. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 46110(a) and (e) (“A decision by a court
under this section may be reviewed only by the Supreme Court un-
der section 1254 of title 28.”) Thus, this Board has no authority to
review the decision of the Ninth Circuit holding that the informa-
tion that the appellant disclosed constituted SSI because it “con-
tained ‘specific details of aviation security measures’ regarding ‘de-
ployment and missions’ of {[FAMs)]” in violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 1520.7(i). MacLean, 543 F.3d at 1150.
‘\ The Board has no authority to review either the statutory
mandate against disclosure, or the legality of the regulation issued
pursuant thereto. See Maddoz v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (the Board's jurisdiction is not ple-
nary; it is limited to those matters over which it has been given
jurisdiction by law, rule or regulation); 5 U.S.C. § 1204(f).
118
119
35a
cally prohibited by law” so as to bring it outside
the scope of the whistleblower protection provi-
sions of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
We would share some of the concerns ex-
pressed by Representatives Kucinich and Malo-
ney if MacLean I were given the broad sweep
that they address in their amicus brief. As we
have explained above, however, we limit our hold-
ing here and the reach of MacLean I in order to
give effect to both the WPA and Congress’s ex-
press intent to prohibit the public disclosure of
aviation security information. The appellant’s
disclosure of FAM deployment information was
not protected by the WPA because it was prohib-
ited by SSI regulations issued by TSA in compli-
ance with an express statutory requirement of
Congress to issue regulations “prohibiting dis-
closure of information obtained or developed in
carrying out security” if, in TSA’s view, “disclos-
ing the information” would “be detrimental to the
safety of passengers in air transportation.”
49 U.S.C. § 40119(b)(1)(C). To the extent that
this statutory mandate encroaches upon the pro-
tections afforded by the WPA, it is for Congress,
not the Board, to resolve the competing legisla-
tive objectives underlying these statutes.
Although the appellant’s disclosure of infor-
mation relating to FAM deployments to an
MSNBC reporter does not constitute protected
whistleblowing activity, our holding today does
not mean that TSA may rely on its SSI regula-
1 20
36a
tions as authority for prohibiting all disclosures
relating to aviation security and safety. On the
contrary, Congress has specified that the regula-
tions issued pursuant to its mandate in 49 U.S.C.
§ 40119 may not prohibit disclosures to “a com-
mittee of Congress authorized to have the infor-
mation.” 49 U.S.C. § 40119(b); see also 49 U.S.C.
§ 114(r)(2). Additionally, we note that the “spe-
cifically prohibited by law” exclusion from WPA
protection does not apply to disclosures made to
the Office of Special Counsel. 5 U.S.C. §
2302(b)(8)(B); see Parikh v. Department of Vet-
erans Affairs, 110 M.S.PR. 295. 97 23 n.1 (2008).
The appellant did not pursue either of these
channels.”
Finally, the case of Chambers v. Department of
the Interior, 602 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2010), while
appearing to have some similarity to this case, is
distinguishable. Ms. Chambers, like the appellant
herein, publicly disclosed information about the
deployment of law enforcement officers. Jd. at
1378. Ms. Chambers’s disclosure of a substantial
and specific danger to public health or safety, id.
at 1379, was protected under 5 U.S.C. §
2302(b)(8)(A)(ii), however, because it was not
2 Because the appellant did not make his disclosure through
either of the two authorized channels described above, we make no
finding on whether, if he had, his disclosure would have been pro-
tected as evidencing a violation of law, rule, or regulation, a sub-
stantial and specific danger to public health or safety, or some
other condition described at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
37a
“specifically prohibited by law.” By contrast,
while the appellant was also arguably disclosing a
substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety, his disclosure cannot similarly be protect-
ed under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii) because it
contained SSI, the disclosure of which was “spe-
cifically prohibited by law” under a regulatory
nondisclosure scheme mandated by Congress.
The appellant’s removal based on his 2003 SSI disclo-
sure did not violate his First Amendment right of free
speech.
4 21
The appellant contends that the agency violat-
ed his First Amendment right to freedom of
speech by removing him for his 2003 disclosure of
SSI to the MSNBC reporter.* The administra-
tive judge found the appellant’s First Amendment
claim unproven, finding that under the balancing
test outlined in Pickering v. Board of Education
of Township High School District 205, Will
Count, Illinois, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), the ap-
13
In the summary of the prehearing conference, the administra-
tive judge did not list as an affirmative defense a claim by the ap-
pellant that that his disclosure to MSNBC in 2003 about the sus-
pension of overnight missions was protected under the First Am-
endment. RAF, Tab 67. The appellant made that argument in
his post-hearing brief, however, RAF, Tab 79 at 16-18, the admini-
strative judge addressed it in the initial decision, RAF, Tab 84 at
23-28, and the agency does not argue on review that the issue
should not have been considered, PFR File, Tab 8 at 19-20. Un-
der the circumstances, we deem the appellant’s claim that his 2003
disclosure to MSNBC was protected free speech under the First
Amendment to be properly before us.
7 22
38a
pellant’s interest in commenting on a matter of
public concern, 2.e., the 2003 directive regarding
overnight missions, was outweighed by the inte-
rest of the agency, as employer, in promoting avi-
ation security. The appellant challenges this
finding. PFR File, Tab 4 at 56-57. We note, in
this regard, courts have recognized that law en-
forcement duties entail special obligations with
regard to public trust that may be considered in
the Pickering balancing. See, e.g., United States
v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 606 (1995); O’'De _ vell v.
Barry, 148 F3d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Cochran v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F:3d 1195, 1201
(9th Cir. 2000); Bennett v. City of Holyoke, 230 F-
Supp. 2d 207, 225 (D. Mass. 2002), aff'd, 362 F.3d 1
(Ist Cir. 2004); Pierson v. Gondles, 693 F. Supp.
408, 418 (E.D. Va. 1988).
Here, the record reflects that the appellant
revealed information about FAM deployments
that the agency legitimately expected to remain
confidential, and which created a vulnerability in
the aviation system. We find that disciplining
the appellant for releasing details of aviation se-
curity measures to a reporter did not violate his
First Amendment right of free speech. Cf
Chambers v. Department of the Interior, 103
M.S.PR. 375, 11 36-42 (2006) (disciplining a Chief
of Police for disclosing information about officer
patrols and her agency’s budget to a reporter did
not violate her First Amendment right of free
speech), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other
4 23
39a
grounds, and remanded, 515 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
We also believe the fact that the agency acted
in this instance pursuant to, and consistent with,
the aforementioned statutory and regulatory
nondisclosure scheme mandated by Congress re-
garding aviation security, undercuts the appel-
lant’s constitutional claim. To the extent that the
appellant’s claim implicitly involves a challenge to
the constitutionality of the statute authorizing the
agency to issue the nondisclosure regulations, the
Board lacks jurisdiction to hear such a claim.
See May wv. Office of Personnel Management, 38
M.S.PR. 534, 538 (1988) (the Board has authority
to adjudicate a constitutional challenge to an
agency's application of a statute, but it is without
authority to determine the constitutionality of
federal statutes).
The a ] did not prove his prohibi onne
actice claim under 5 , 02(b)(10).
124
As discussed above, the appellant also contends
that the agency retaliated against him because of
his FLEOA activities, thereby committing a pro-
hibited personnel practice in violation of 5 U.S.C. §
2302(bX10). The relevant statute pertinently
provides:
Any employee who has authority to take, direct
others to take, recommend, or approve any per-
sonnel action, shall not, with respect to such au-
thority—
40a
(10) discriminate for or against any employee or
applicant for employment on the basis of conduct
which does not adversely affect the performance of
the employee or applicant or the performance of
others;
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10).
7 25
1 26
The Board has not previously established the
precise elements for proving a violation of 5
U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10). Depending on the specific
facts and circumstances, the proscription of §
2302(b)(10) may be analogous to either (1) the
prohibition against retaliation for exercising ap-
peal rights, filing grievances, etc., found at 5
U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9), or to (2) a traditional claim of
discrimination governed by the principles of Title
VII. We find it unnecessary in this case, howev-
er, to decide the specific legal framework that the
Board will apply to future § 2302(b)(10) claims be-
cause the appellant has failed to prove his claim
under either standard.
To establish a prima facie violation of 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(10) applying the (b)(9) framework, the
appellant must demonstrate that: (1) He en-
gaged in activity that did not adversely affect his
performance; (2) he was subsequently treated in
an adverse fashion by the agency; (3) the deciding
official had actual or constructive knowledge of
the appellant’s (b)(10) activity; and (4) there is a
causal connection between the (b)(10) activity and
1 27
4la
the adverse action. See Crump v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 114 M.S.PR. 224, 4 10 (2010);
Wildeman v. Department of the Air Force, 23
M.S.PR. 313, 320 (1984); see also Warren v. De-
partment of the Army, 804 F.2d 654 (Fed. Cir.
1986). Where, as here, the agency has already
articulated a non-retaliatory reason for its action,
i.e., the charged misconduct, it has done every-
thing that would be required of it if the appellant
had made a prima facie case. Thus, our inquiry
proceeds directly to the ultimate question of
whether, weighing all the evidence, the appellant
has met his burden of proving illegal retaliation.
Cyump, 114 M.S.PR. 224, 1 10; see U.S. Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711, 715 (1983).
If analyzed under the legal framework for
traditional Title VII claims, in order to prevail the
appellant had to show by preponderant evidence
that he engaged in conduct that did not adversely
affect his performance and that the agency inten-
tionally discriminated against him for that con-
duct. In the absence of direct evidence of inten-
tional discrimination, the appellant could meet
this burden by introducing evidence giving rise to
an inference of disparate treatment because of his
conduct unrelated to his performance. Davis v.
Department of the Interior, 114 M.S.PR. 527, 9 7
(2010), citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). Assuming that he
did so, the burden of production shifts to the
agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
1 28
42a
tery reason for its action. /d., 18. If the
agency meets this burden, the appellant then
must prove that the agency’s stated reason is
merely a pretext for discrimination prohibited by
(b)(10) and the activity unrelated to his perfor-
mance was the real reason for the disparate
treatment. /d. In most adverse action appeals
taken pursuant to 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, the agency
has already articulated a nondiscriminatory rea-
son for its action, z.e., the charged misconduct;
accordingly, the agency has done everything that
would be required of it if an appellant had made
out a prima facie case, and whether he in fact did
so is no longer relevant. See id., 1 9 n.3, citing
Marshall v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 111
M.S.PR. 5, 7 6 (2008). As a result, the inquiry
proceeds directly to the ultimate question of
whether, upon weighing all of the evidence, the
appellant has met his overall burden of proving
illegal discrimination. See id.
Because either framework requires us to pro-
ceed to the ultimate question of whether the agen-
cy intentionally retaliated or discriminated against
the appellant for his (b)(10) activities,“ we have
reviewed the record and we conclude that the ap-
pellant has failed to meet his burden to establish
that the reason articulated by the agency for its
decision to remove him was pretextual and that
¢ We assume, without deciding, that the agency would commit a
prohibited personnel practice in violation of § 2302(b)(10) if it re-
moved the appellant in retaliation for his FLEOA activities.
1 29
43a
the real reason underlying that decision was his
FLEOA activities. Even if we were to accept
appellant’s contentions that agency managers
disapproved of his FLEOA activities, see, e.g.,
RAF, Tab 45 at 5-8, 19-27, there is no direct evi-
dence that the agency retaliated or discriminated
against him for engaging in FLEOA activities
when it removed him from employment.
There is no question that the appellant dis-
closed SSI in violation of agency regulations pro-
hibiting such disclosure and that this was the
agency’s stated basis for his removal. The appel-
lant contends, though, that he was treated more
harshly than other similarly situated individuals
who disclosed SSI and also that he and other
FLEOA leaders were singled out for retaliatory
treatment. RAF, Tab 45 at 6-8. While the rec-
ord reflects that the agency treated other em-
ployees less harshly for their disclosures of SSI,
the circumstances surrounding those disclosures
are sufficiently distinct from the instant case as to
undercut any inference that the reason for the
difference is discrimination based on the appel-
lant’s FLEOA activities. For instance, the dis-
ciosures attributed to J.S. or J.M. were limited to
a small number of individuals (to a few passen-
gers on a plane under exigent circumstances and
to some airline personnel for personal reasons,
respectively). As for A.R., we note that, in the
single specification of the unauthorized disclosure
of SSI charge, the agency alleged that A.R.
“posted a message on www.delphiforums.com that
1 30
131
44a
revealed security measures concerning the de-
ployment of FAMS on international flights from
the Atlanta Field Office.” RAK Tab 45, Exhibit
F. Unlike the appellant’s disclosure, which cre-
ated a vulnerability in aviation security by re-
vealing to a national news reporter that FAMs
were no longer going to be present on any RON
missions, A.R.’s disclosure appears to have been
more limited because: it was disclosed on a sin-
gle message board; it only identified FAM deploy-
ments out of the Atlanta Field Office; and it ap-
peared to leave open the possibility that other of-
fices would be responsible for those flights.
Further, the appellant’s reliance on another
individual, Frank Terreri, as similarly situated
appears misplaced as the comparison actually
undermines his claim that his FLEOA activities
resulted in a harsher penalty. Mr. Terreri was
the president of the air marshal chapter of
FLEOA, engaged in outspoken criticism of agen-
cy management and its policies, and was in-
vestigated for releasing SSI. But he continues
to be employed by TSA after the allegations made
against him were deemed to be unfounded. _ Tr.
at 60, 116-17.
Significantly, the administrative judge correct-
ly found that the appellant demonstrated a lack of
regret for disclosing the RON information, re-
flected, for example, in his deposition testimony
to the effect that it did not matter to him if the
information was confidential, law enforcement
45a
sensitive, SSI or classified information. RAF
Tab 44, Exhibit 8; Tr. at 113-15, 118-23. The appel-
lant also admitted during the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Profes-
sional Responsibility (OPR) investigation:
Due to the fact that my chain of command, the
DHS OIG and my Congressmen all ignored my
complaints and would not follow them up with in-
vestigations, 1 have NO REGRETS or feel NO
REMORSE for going to a credible and responsi-
ble media representative, Brock Meeks. Brock
Meeks reporting these gross mismanagement is-
sues has resulted in immediate and positive change
in deadly FAMS policies.
IAF, Tab 4, Subtab 4J, Exhibit 2 (emphasis in original).
1 32
In the face of a clear Congressional directive
for nondisclosure and a regulatory provision
promulgated pursuant to that directive, which ex-
plicitly prohibits the type of public disclosure
made by the appellant, the agency could and did
reasonably infer a risk from the appellant’s lack
of remorse that he would continue to make dis-
closures that were prohibited by law. Thus, un-
der the circumstances, we find that the appel-
lant’s lack of remorse to be a significant distinc-
tion justifying the agency’s decision to remove
him rather than imposing a lesser penalty. Cf
RAF, Tab 45, Exhibit F (the deciding official in
A.R.’s case stated that he “plac[ed] a great deal of
weight” on the fact that A.R. “demonstrated sin-
cere remorse over this current incident” and “as-
46a
sured” the deciding official that he would
“demoustrate the utmost diligence when handling
SSI information.”).
133 Considering the record as a whole, we find that
the appellant has not proven by a preponderance
of the evidence that the agency intentionally dis-
criminated or retaliated against him on the basis
of his FLEOA activities in violation of 5 U.S.C. §
2302(b)(10)."°
The Board will not consider the appellant’s claim raise
for the first time on petition for review that the agency
initiated its investigation in retaliation for his engaging
in protected whistleblowing and First Amendment
speech.
1 34 For the first time on petition for review, the
appellant argues that his 2004 appearance on
NBC Nightly News was protected free speech
under the First Amendment and protected whis-
tleblowing under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), and that
the agency’s investigation in response to his ap-
pearance was unlawful retaliation in violation of
the First Amendment and the WPA. PFR File,
Tab 4 at 53-60.
‘© To the extent the appellant contends that the agency violated
his First Amendment rights based on his involvement with
FLEOA, we find, for all of the reasons explained by the adminis-
trative judge and in our discussion of the appellant’s § 2302(b)(10)
claim, that the agency took its actions based on the charged mis-
conduct and not for his association with or activities on behalf of
the FLEOA.
47a
1 35 In the summary of the prehearing conference,
the administrative judge stated as follows with
respect to the appellant’s affirmative defenses:
Here, the appellant alleges that the agency dis-
criminated and retaliated against him based on
his membership and leadership status with the
F'LEOA for other than merit reasons in violation of
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10); and that this discrimination
and retaliation violated his First Amendment
right of free association and his right to free
speech. No other affirmative defenses are al-
leged in this appeal.
RAF, Tab 67 at 6. The administrative jidge advised
the parties that additional issues were precluded absent
a timely meritorious objection. Jd. at 5-6. The ap-
pellant did not make any objection, and the issues he
now attempts to raise were not mentioned in the sum-
mary of the prehearing conference. The general rule
under such circumstances is that the issues raised for
the first time on review will not be considered. See
Henson v. U.S. Postal Service, 110 M.S.P.R. 624, 1 10
(2009); Wilson v. Department of Justice, 58 M.S.P.R.
96, 101 n.4 (1993).
1 36 The appellant argues that we should make an
exception to this general rule. He cites Board
and federal appeals decisions for the principle
that a new claim may be raised on review when
the administrative judge confused or misled a
party with respect to the claim, or when the party
raising the claim has newly-discovered evidence.
PFR File, Tab 4 at 58-60. While we do not
7 37
48a
quarrel with the appellant’s reading of the cases,
the appellant makes no attempt to explain how the
decisions he cites apply here. He does not allege,
nor is there any evidence, that the administrative
judge confused or misled him with respect to his
claim regarding his 2004 appearance on NBC
Nightly News. Rather, the appellant contends
that by rejecting his FLEOA defense, in part, on
the grounds of the appellant’s own testimony that
the 2004 television appearance was the catalyst
for the agency’s investigation, the administrative
judge somehow “converted [his FLEOA defense]
to a dispositive First Amendment violation” and
“created a violation of the [WPA].” /d. at 54,
57-58. Even assuming the administrative judge
found that the appellant’s television appearance
was the impetus for the investigation, we disagree
with the appellant that this conclusion somehow
“created” new claims that were not previously
known to him.
Indeed, the appellant does not allege that he
only discovered that his appearance on NBC
Nightly News spurred the investigation after the
record closed below. In fact, the appellant testi-
fied before the administrative judge that his 2004
appearance on NBC Nightly News is what caused
the agency to initiate the investigation in which he
admitted revealing the 2003 RON directive to
MSNBC. Tr. at 93. In other words, the appel-
lant knew before the record closed below what
caused the agency to begin its investigation.
Thus, this is not a case in which a party attempts
49a
to raise a new claim on review based on evidence
discovered after the record closed below. For
these reasons, we will not consider the issues the
appellant raises for the first time in his petition
for review.
The Board also will not consider the new evidence sub-
mitted by the appellant on petition for review.
1 38 The Board does not accept the evidence that
the appellant attempts to submit for the first time
on review. The appellant requests to supplement
the record with a transcript of a statement he
gave to agency investigators on May 4, 2005.
According to the appellant, the transcript under-
cuts the administrative judge’s credibility deter-
mination on the question of whether the appellant
was revealing SSI when he shared the July 2003
RON directive with MSNBC. See RAF, Tab 84
at 14-18; PFR File, Tab 1 at 73-89; id., Tab 4 at 14.
We deny the appellant’s request to supplement
the record for two reasons. First, the Board will
not consider evidence submitted for the first time
with the petition for review absent a showing that
it was unavailable before the record was closed
despite the party’s due diligence. Avansino v.
U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.PR. 211, 214 (1980).
The appellant’s own submission shows that he
was provided with the transcript more than 3
years before the hearing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 71.
Second, as we discuss in our analysis of the
charge and penalty, the outcome of this case does
not turn on whether the appellant credibly testi-
The penalty of removal thin the d
50a
fied that he did not know the RON directive was
SSI when he disclosed it to the MSNBC reporter.
Thus, the transcript is immaterial to the outcome
in the appeal.
n removal is within the bounds of reasona-
len
bleness.
139
4 40
We affirm the administrative judge’s thorough
analysis of the penalty and we need not repeat all
of it here. RAF, Tab 84 at 28-40. Some factors
warrant further discussion, however. When the
Board sustains all the charges, it reviews the
agency’s choice of penalty only to determine
whether the agency considered all of the relevant
factors and exercised management discretion
within the parameters of reasonableness. Ellis uv
Department of Defense, 114 M.S.PR. 407, 1 11
(2010). The Board’s function is not to displace
management’s responsibility, but to ensure that
managerial judgment has been properly exercised.
Id.; see also Douglas, 5 M.S.PR. at 305-06. Here,
as the administrative judge found, there is ample
evidence that the agency considered all of the
relevant factors. Tr. at 12-22; RAF Tab 84 at 30.
The most important factor in an agency’s pen-
alty determination is the nature and seriousness
of the misconduct and its relation to the appel-
lant’s duties, including whether the offense was
intentional. Jinks v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 106 M.S.PR. 627, 1 17 (2007). The ap-
pellant revealed information about FAM deploy-
ments in violation of regulations requiring that it
7 41
5la
remain confidential. His actions caused the
agency to lose trust in him, and divulging security
measures to the media created an immediate vul-
nerability in the aviation system. Tr. at 15,
21-22. The appellant’s revelation of confidential
information to a reporter was intentional, by his
own admission. Tr. at 108-110. Also significant
to rehabilitative potential and the agency’s pen-
alty determination is that the appellant lacked
remorse for disclosing the RON information, as
reflected in his deposition. RAF, Tab 44, Exhibit
8; Tr. at 113-15, 118-23. The agency could and
did reasonably infer a risk from the appellant’s
lack of remorse that he would continue to make
disclosures that were specifically prohibited by
law.
After thoughtfully considering the entire rec-
ord, we also are not persuaded that the appellant
believed in “good faith” that he was permitted to
share plans for the deployment of FAMs with the
MSNBC r~orter. PFR File, Tab 4 at 29-30.
At the ti. of his appointment in 2001, the appel-
lant w... presented with a single-page form cap-
tioned “Conditions of Employment for Federal
Air Marshals.” The appellant signed the form at
the bottom, and initialed the form next to the fol-
lowing words: “I accept the position of Federal
Air Marshal. I have read and I accept the Condi-
tions of Employment.” One of those conditions
was that a FAM “may be removed” for “(uJn-
authorized release of security-sensitive or classi-
fied information.” IAF, Tab 4, Subtab 4T.
7 42
52a
Apart from this written acknowledgment of the
seriousness of unauthorized disclosure of SSI in
general, the appellant testified that in his training
it was made “very, very clear” that FAMs should
not tell anyone, not even their spouses, which
flights they would be on because the information
could be repeated to “the wrong people.” Tr. at
106-07. The appellant further testified that tell-
ing someone a flight would not have a FAM on it
would endanger the flight. Jd. at 108. Based
on the foregoing, we find that the appellant knew
that he was not permitted to share information
about FAM coverage with a reporter, regardless
of the fact that he received the information as a
text message on his cell phone instead of on his
encrypted PDA, and even if he was unsure of its
SSI classification.
It makes no difference to our penalty analysis
whether the appellant knew that the message
suspending overnight missions fell within the
regulatory definition of SSI. As explained im-
mediately above, the appellant admittedly knew
that he was not permitted to tell anyone about
FAM scheduling, yet he did so anyway, and it
could have created a significant security risk. As
a law enforcement officer, the appellant can be
held to a high standard of conduct. Mahan v.
Department of the Treasury, 89 M.S.PR. 140, 9
11 (2001); Crawford v. Department of Justice, 45
M.S.PR. 234, 237 (1990). The appellant’s actions
in July 2003 did not exhibit the good judgment
that the agency can legitimately expect of its law
1 43
7 44
53a
enforcement personnel. Mahan, 89 M.S.PR. 140, 9
11.
The appellant contends that he was treated
more harshly than other similarly situated indi-
viduals who disclosed SSI and also that he and
other FLEOA leaders were singled out for retali-
atory treatment. RAF, Tab 45 at 6-8. As we
explained when addressing the appellant’s claim
under 5 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(10), although the record
reflects that the agency treated other employees
less harshly for their disclosures of SSI, the cir-
cumstances surrounding those disclosures are
plainly distinguishable and do no suggest that the
agency subjected him to a disparate penalty.
We also accept, without finding, that the appel-
lant believed he did the right thing in disclosing
the information. We have specifically considered
the appellant’s testimony regarding his belief that
TSA’s plan to eliminate FAMs from overnight
flights was “serious” and “dangerous to the
. . public,” and that his disclosure was mo-
tivated by his desire to protect the flying public.
Tr. at 88, 90; see id. at 122 (“All I wanted to do was
protect lives and .. . uphold the law.”).
The appellant also testified: “If I saved—if I
saved a plane from falling out of the sky or saved
a life, I believe I did my job, and I shouldn't re-
gret it.” Tr. at 115. Further, as the administra-
tive judge concluded, we also have no reason to
doubt that the appellant’s motivation was sincere.
RAF, Tab 84 at 28 (the administrative judge, when
1 45
4 46
54a
discussing the appellant’s First Amendment
claim, stated that he had “no reason to doubt the
appellant’s assertion that he took these actions to
benefit the nation. . . .”). However, even if
the appellant could have established the classic
elements of whistleblowing, i.e., that he disclosed
a substantial and specific danger to public safety
and that his disclosure was a contributing factor
in his removal,”* he cannot invoke WPA protec-
tion because his disclosure was specifically pro-
hibited by law.
For all of the above reasons as well as those
explained by the administrative judge, we find
that the agency’s removal penalty did not exceed
the bounds of reasonableness. The appellant’s
removal is SUSTAINED.
ORDER
This is the final decision of the Merit Systems
Protection Board in this appeal. Title 5 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113(c)
(6 C.FR. § 1201.113(c)).
NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
THER IE IGHT
You have the right to request the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to review this
‘6 As we noted earlier, we do not determine whether the appel-
lant’s disclosure would be protected under the WPA because he did
not make it through authorized channels. /nfra, n.12.
55a
final decision. You must submit your request to the
court at the following address:
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, DC 20439
The court must receive your request for review no later
than 60 calendar days after your receipt of this order.
If you have a representative in this case and your rep-
resentative receives this order before you do, then you
must file with the court no later than 60 calendar days
after receipt by your representative. If you choose to
file, be very careful to file on time. The court has held
that normally it dees not have the authority to waive
this statutory deadline and that filings that do not com-
ply with the deadline must be dismissed. See Pinat v.
Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
If you need further information about your right to
appeal this decision to court, you should refer to the
federal law that gives you this right. It is found in
Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C.
§ 7703). You may read this law, as well as review the
Board’s regulations and other related material, at our
website, http:/;Wwww.mspb.gov. Additional information
is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.
gov. Of particular relevance is the court’s “Guide for
Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained
within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and
11.
FOR THE BOARD:
William D. Spencer
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
57a
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
WESTERN REGIONAL OFFICE
Docket No.: SF-0752-06-0611-I-2
ROBERT J. MACLEAN , APPELLANT
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, AGENCY
INITIAL DECISION
Date: May 12, 2010
Before: FRANKLIN M. KANG, Administrative Judge
INTRODUCTION
The appellant timely appealed the Transportation
Security Administration’s (TSA) decision to remove
him from the position of Federal Air Marshal (FAM),
with duties in Los Angeles, California, effective April
11, 2006. Initial Appeal File 1 (IAF-1), Tab 1,4. On
October 5, 2006, an administrative judge dismissed this
appeal without prejudice at the request of the appel-
lant. IAF Tab 29. This initial decision (ID) became
final on November 9, 2006 when the parties declined to
file a petition for review. See id.
58a
On October 15, 2008, the appellant timely refiled
this appeal. Initial Appeal File 2 (IAF-2), Tab 1.
The Board assigned this refiled appeal to a second
administrative judge. IAF-2. On June 22, 2009, the
Board issued an Opinion and Order addressing mat-
ters certified for interlocutory appeal. IAF-2, Tab 27.
On July 138, 2009, the second administrative judge
informed the parties that the Board had ruled on the
issues certified for interlocutory appeal and advised
the parties that the adjudication would resume.
IAF-2, Tab 29. Thereafter, this appeal was reas-
signed to a third administrative judge. IAF-2, Tab 31.
A hearing was held on November 5, 2009 as speci-
fied below. Hearing Compact Disc (HCD). The ap-
pellant traveled from California to Virginia to appear
with his attorneys from the Board’s Washington Re-
gional Office by video-conference (VTC), while the
agency appeared from the Board’s Western Regional
Office in California as well as the Washington Regional
Office. Jd. The Board has jurisdiction under 5
U.S.C. §§ 7511-7513 and 7701. For the reasons ex-
plained below, the agency’s action is AFFIRMED.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Burden of Proof and Applicable Law
The agency bears the burden of proof by prepon-
derant evidence with respect to the reasons for the
action and its choice of penalty. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a).
Preponderant evidence is defined as the degree of
relevant evidence that a reasonable person, consider-
ing the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to
59a
find that a contested fact is more likely to be true than
untrue. 5C.FER. § 1201.56(c).
Background
At the time of his removal, the appellant, born in
1970 with a service computation date in 1992, was a
preference eligible FAM, SV-1801-9, assigned to Los
Angeles, California. IAF-1, Tab 4, Subtab 4F; IAF-2,
Tab 45; Exhibit S. It is undisputed that the appellant
was an employee pursuant te 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) at
the time of his removal.
According to a Report of Investigation (ROI) ir
record evidence, based on a September 2004 report |i
an unauthorized media appearance by the appellant,
the agency initiated an investigation. IAF-1, Tab 4,
Subtab 4J. On May 4, 2005, during an investigative
interview conducted by the agency’s Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR), the appellant submitted a signed
and sworn affidavit stating in relevant part:
For the July 29, 2003 article, I informed [the re-
porter] that all Las Vegas FAMs were sent a text
message to their Government issued mobile phones
that all RON (Remain Overnight) missions up to
August 9 would be canceled. My supervisor told
me that the Service ran out of funds for overtime,
per diem, mileage and lodging.
Due to the fact that my chain of command, the DHS
OIG and my Congressmen all ignored my com-
plaints and would not follow them up with investi-
60a
gations, I have NO REGRETS or feel NO RE-
MORSE for going to a credible and responsible
media representative, [the reporter]. [The repor-
ter] reporting these gross mismanagement issues
has resulted in immediate and positive change in
deadly FAMS policies.
IAF-1, Tab 4, Subtab 4J (appellant’s affidavit) (upper
case lettering in original). Following this interview,
the agency’s investigators concluded, inter alia, that
the appellant made an unauthorized release of infor-
mation to the media. /d., Subtab 4J.
On September 13, 2005, the appellant received a
Proposal to Remove (proposal or proposed removal),
charging the appellant with Unauthorized Media Ap-
pearance, Unauthorized Release of Information to the
Media, and Unauthorized Disclosure of Sensitive Se-
curity Information (SSI). IAF-l, Tab 4, Subtab 4G.
On April 10, 2006, Special Agent in Charge (SAC)
Frank Donzanti issued a decision on the proposed re-
moval, sustaining only the third charge and the pro-
posed penalty. J/d., Subtab 4A.
The third charge, Unauthorized Disclosure of SSI,
is accompanied by a single specification. IAF-2, Tab
67 at 5-6. The underlying specification contains back-
ground information and alleges that on July 29, 2003,
the appellant informed the media that all Las Vegas
FAMs were sent a text message on their government
issued mobile phones that all remain overnight (RON)
missions up to August 9th would be cancelled; or words
to that effect, and that this constituted an improper
disclosure of SSI because the media person to whom
6la
this information was disclosed was not a covered per-
son within the meaning of SSI regulations, and the
information about RON deployments was protected as
SSI. Jd. On May 10, 2006, the appellant timely filed
his petition for appeal. IAF-1, Tab 1.
On August 31, 2006, the agency’s SSI Office Direc-
tor issued a final order (AFO) on SSI related to this
appeal, stating in part:
[I]t is my determination that, on July 29, 2003, the
information in question constituted SSI under
the SSI regulation then in effect, 49 C.F.R.
§ 1520.7(j),[] as the information concerned specific
FAM deployments or missions on long-distance
flights.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46110, any person disclos-
ing a substantial interest in this Order may, within
60 days of its issuance, apply for review by filing a
petition for review in an appropriate U.S. Court of
Appeals.
IAF-1, Tab 22, Attachment. The AFO explained
through a footnote that on May 18, 2004, the agency
recodified section 1520.7(j) at section 1520.5(8)(ii).
Id.
The text of 49 C.F.R. § 1520.7(j)’ in effect at that
time, current through October 1, 2003 defined SSI as
follows:
' Under 49 C.F.R. § 1520.5(b)(8)(ii), information concerning de-
ployments, numbers, and operations of FAMs is considered SSI.
62a
Specific details of aviation security measures
whether applied directly by the TSA or entities
subject to the rules listed in § 1520(a)(1) through 6.
This includes, but is not limited to, information
concerning specific numbers of Federal Air Mar-
shals, deployments or missions, and the methods
involved in such operations.
See IAF-1, Tab 4, Subtab 4M.
In granting the appellant’s request for a dismissal
without prejudice, the ID stated:
After the action was taken and the appellant filed
his appeal, the agency issued a “Final Order” dated
August 31, 2006, determining that the appellant’s
disclosure is covered under the regulation at issue.
A right of review is provided in the U.S. Court of
Appeals pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46110.
IAF-1, Tab 29. The ID explained that the appellant
intended to pursue such a review, and the appellant’s
appeal was dismissed without prejudice to refiling.
Id. The ID thereafter became the final decision of
the Board. See id.
On September 16, 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit ruled on the appellant’s petition
for review of the AFO. MacLean v. Department of
Homeland Security, 543 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2008). In
denying the appellant’s petition through this per cu-
riam opinion, the 9th Circuit wrote, in part:
In late July, 2003, while working as a Federal Air
Marshal in Nevada, MacLean received a text mes-
sage on his government-issued cell phone stating
63a
that “all RON (Remain Overnight) missions
. . up to August 9th would be cancelled.”
This message indicated to MacLean that there
would be no Federal Air Marshals on overnight
flights from the time of the text message up to Au-
gust 9, 2003. MacLean believed that the cancella-
tion of these missions was detrimental to public
safety. He raised this concern with his supervi-
sor,[] who did not make further inquiry. MacLear,
then attempted unsuccessfully to alert the Office of
Inspector General. On July 29, 2003, MacLean
disclosed the text message to members of the press.
The Federal Air Marshal] Service later confirmed
that the text message’s contents did not reflect a
final decision of its director and there was no can-
cellation of overnight missions.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c), we have jurisdic-
tion to review only final agency “orders”. 4
We have jurisdiction to review the TSA-order.
Section 1520.7(j) (2003) designates as “sensitive
security information . . . [s]pecific details of
aviation security measures . . . applied di-
rectly bythe TSA . . ._ [which] includes, but is
not limited to, information concerning specific
numbers of Federal Air Marshals, deployments or
missions, and the methods involved in such opera-
tions.” Information falling within this designation
is automatically considered “sensitive security in-
formation” without further action from the TSA, 49
C.F.R. § 1520.7 (2003). The TSA has authority to
64a
designate information as “sensitive security infor-
mation” pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 114(s) and 49
C.F.R. § 1520.
[] The information contained in the text message
qualifies as “sensitive security information.” The
message contained “specific details of aviation se-
curity measures” regarding “deployment and mis-
sions” of Federal Air Marshals. 49 C.F.R.
§ 1520.7(j) (2003).
MacLean has failed to demonstrate what more the
TSA needed to show to support the order. The
order is valid
The Whistleblower Protection Act does not apply to
the order. The order is not a “personnel action,”
as required by the Act.[] It is merely a determi-
nation that [] the text message contained “sensitive
security information” pursuant to 49 C.F.R.
§ 1520.7(j). The fact that the order has some im-
pact on MacLean’s proceedings before the MSPB
does not convert it to a “personnel action.”
The TSA order does not constitute a retroactive
agency adjudication. Rather, the agency applied
regulations that were in force in 2003 to determine
that information created in 2003 was “sensitive se-
curity information.” . . . The TSA order
comports with the “principle that the legal effect of
conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law
that existed when the conduct took place.”
65a
Id. (italics added). On October 15, 2008, the appellant
timely refiled this appeal, and the Board assigned this
appeal the second administrative judge. IAF-2, Tabs
1,2. Itis undisputed that at the time of the events at
issue, inclusive of the specification before the Board,
the appellant was assigned to the FAM service center
in Las Vegas, Nevada. See IAF-2, Tab 45, Exhibit X;
IAF -2, Tab 49, Exhibit PPP.
On February 10, 2009, the second administrative
judge granted a motion to certify specific rulings for
interlocutory appeal as follows. IAF-2, Tab 23. The
issues were: (1) whether the Board has the authority
to review the determination by the agency, and af-
firmed by the Ninth Circuit, that the information the
appellant disclosed constituted SSI; (2) whether the
fact that the agency did not issue its order finding the
information the appellant disclosed to be SSI until
after it had removed him has any effect on the issue in
(1), above; and (3) whether a disclosure of information
that is SSI can also be a disclosure protected by the
Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA).
On June 22, 2009, the Board issued its Opinion and
Order, ruling on the above enumerated items as fol-
lows. MacLean v. Department of Homeland Securi-
ty, 112 M.S.PR. 4 (2009). In addressing question (1),
the Board held that under the facts of this appeal, the
Board does not have the authority to review the agen-
cy’s SSI determination because the Ninth Circuit has
issued a decision upholding the agency’s determina-
tion. Jd. at 11. For question (2), the Board ex-
plained that the timing of the AFO did not alter its
66a
conclusion on question (1) because Congress provided
individuals a judicial mechanism to challenge the SSI
determination through the U.S. Court of Appeals, and
the appellant actually availed himself of that oppor-
tunity. Jd. at 12. The Board continued, explaining
that the grant of exclusive jurisdiction in Federal court
was triggered in this particular case, therefore, the
Board lacks authority to review the agency’s determi-
nation on this matter. Jd. On question (3), the
Board found that a disclosure in violation of the regu-
lations governing SSI is prohibited by law within the
meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) and cannot give
rise to whistleblower protection. /d. at 18.
On July 13, 2009, the second administrative judge
scheduled a status conference to address the adjudica-
tion schedule for this matter IAF-2, Tab 29. On July 22,
2009, prior to this status conference, this case was
reassigned to a third administrative judge. IAF-2, Tab
31.
On September 22, 2009, the parties appeared for a
prehearing conference. IAF-2, Tab 59; see IAF-2,
Tabs 73, 75. At the request of the appellant, the
hearing and the remainder of the prehearing confer-
ence were delayed. Jd. The hearing was thereafter
further delayed at the request of the agency, then
convened on November 5, 2009 as described above.
[AF-2; Tabs 62, 75; HCD. On November 16, 2009, the
parties filed their closing arguments and the record
was closed for all matters. HCD; IAF-2, Tabs 77-79.
On February 23, 2010, the appellant moved to reo-
pen the record to receive additional evidence identified
67a
as newly discovered evidence. IAF-2, Tab 80.
Through this motion, the appellant argues that on
February 17, 2010, the agency’s Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) issued a report on the breach of SSI
finding that the agency’s Office of SSI violated many
of its own SSI policies, resulting in the unauthorized
release of SSI, without appropriate redaction. See id.
The appellant argues that this evidence is material
because the Office of SSI “cannot follow its own direc-
tives” then he should not have been removed as a FAM
for the charge at issue. /d. The appellant adds that
the controls for SSI were found to be defective and
deficient creating inconsistency and confusion. Jd.
In response, the agency opposed the appellant’s mo-
tion to reopen the record, arguing that the proffer is
procedurally defective, untimely filed without good
cause, speculative, and irrelevant. JIAF-2, Tab 81.
The agency argues that the OIG report involved “in-
advertent” disclosures of SSI while the charged mis-
conduct at issue involves an intentional disclosure.
Id. The appellant thereafter replied to the agency’s
response, arguing that the OIG report was issued after
the close of the record, and that it is relevant to the
appellant’s argument that the appellant acted in good
faith under rules that were inconsistent and confusing.
IAF-2, Tab 82. Through his reply, the appellant cor-
rectly points out that the “charge at issue[,]” distinct
from the penalty consideration, “does not allege that
Mr. MacLean intentionally disclosed SSI _ infor-
mation[.}” Jd. In responding to the appellant’s re-
ply, the agency argued the OIG report did not involve
any law enforcement officers, and that the scope of the
68a
report did not include any disciplinary actions.
IAF-2, Tab 83. The agency further adds that the
appellant’s charged misconduct differs from using “the
use of computer-made redactions that failed to conceal
SSI permanently.” Jd.
In addressing another point through his underlying
motion, the appellant states that Mr. Donzanti has,
since the time of the actions at issue, been demoted
to Deputy SAC, adding that Mr. Donzanti “is alleged
by several current and former Los Angeles Federal
Air Marshals” to have a past agreement with the Di-
rector of the agency’s FAM Service (Director), based
on “an illicit affair” with a subordinate FAM who was
previously assigned to headquarters (subordinate
FAM). IAF-2, Tab 80. The appellant explains that
in 2004, under an agreement between Mr. Donzanti
and the Director, the subordinate FAM was trans-
ferred from headquarters to Los Angeles and no disci-
plinary action taken against Mr. Donzanti, in exchange
for Mr. Donzanti terminating the appellant at the
direction of the Director. Jd. The appellant argues
that this 2004 agreement between Mr. Donzanti and
the Director allowed the agency to issue the 2006 deci-
sion on the appealed removal! at the field level, rather
than the headquarters level. See id. In addition to
the opposition above, the agency argues that the ap-
pellant could have introduced and/or cross examined
Mr. Donzanti about these 2004 matters at the hearing,
adding that the appellant deposed Mr. Donzanti in
2006. IAF-2, Tab 81. Through his reply, the appel-
lant argues that the information about Mr. Donzanti is
relevant to showing that Mr. Donzanti acted to ensure
69a
his professional survival. IAF-2, Tab 82. Through
its response to the reply, the agency argues that the
motion on this issue is speculative and irrelevant.
IAF-2, Tab 83.
While I have no reason to doubt that there have
been subsequent breaches of SSI procedures by the
agency employees as alleged, it is unclear how showing
the occurrences of other such events constitutes good
cause for reopening the record, in light of the fact that
the evidence does not address what disciplinary ac-
tions or penalties, if any, were taken against or im-
posed on any agency employees, and the fact that the
evidence does not affect whether or not the charged
misconduct occurred.
With respect to the allegations involving Mr.
Donzanti’s change from SAC to Deputy SAC, and his
interactions with the agency’s headquarters personnel,
the appellant fails to explain why these matters are
being raised following the close of the record, since the
appellant could have elicited testimony about these
specific topics during Mr. Donzanti’s deposition and/or
during the hearing, prior to the record closing. See
HCD. Specifically, in addition to having the oppor-
tunity to depose Mr. Donzanti, the appellant had a
subsequent opportunity to question Mr. Donzanti
about these matters at the hearing including his ser-
vice as a Deputy SAC at the hearing:
JUDGE KANG: Please state your full name for
the record, spelling your last name.
70a
THE. WITNESS: Frank Joseph Donzanti,
D-o-n-z-a-n-t-i.
JUDGE KANG: Mr. Donzanti, please state your
current position and title for the record.
THE WITNESS: I am the Deputy Special Agent
in charge of the Los Angeles Field Office for the
Federal Air Marshal Service.
HCD. With regard to the role of headquarters and/or
the Director, including the headquarters Policy Com-
pliance Unit (PCU), the appellant’s attorneys ques-
tioned Mr. Donzanti as follows:
Q. And did you work on this removal letter with
anyone from—from Headquarters?
A. To some extent I may have had some impact.
I don’t remember exactly what it was. But most of
the letter was drafted by Headquarters personnel.
And that would be in HR, Human Resources.
Q. During—thank you. And duri
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