Record and brief — Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Agency

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(49, SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 12-1146

Vide 12-1248, 12-

1254, 12-1268,

12-1269, 12-1272

Title: Utility Air Regulatory Group, Petitioner

V

Environmental Protection Agency

Docketed: March 21, 2013

Linked with 12A1181

Lower Ct United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Case Nos.: (10-1073, et al.)

Decision Date. June 26, 2012

Rehearing

Denied: December 20, 2012

Questions

Presented

~~~Date~~~ ~~~~~~~Proceedings and Orders

Mar 20 2013 Petition for a wnit of certioran filed. (Response due April 22, 2013)

Mar 20 2013 Appendix of Utility Air Regulatory Group filed. (Volumes |-II!)

Apr 10 2013 Brief of respondent National Mining Association in support filed.

Apr 11 2013 Order extending time to file response to petition to and including May 22, 2013,

for all respondents.

Apr 19 2013 Brief amicus curiae of Washington Legal Foundation filed.

May 8 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of

neither party, received from counsel for Texas, and eight other states

May 13 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of

neither party received from counsel for petitioners Southeastern Legal

Foundation, Inc., et al.

May 14 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of

neither party, received from counsel for the Federal Respondent.

May 14 2013 Letter of respondent National Environmental Development Association's Clean

Air Project in support of the petitioner received.

May 15 2013 Order further extending time to file response to petition to and including June

21, 2013, for all respondents.

May 17 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of

neither party, received from counsel for the State of Indiana

Jun 6 2013 Order further extending time to file response to petition to and including July

22, 2013, for all respondents.

Jun 7 2013

Jun 7 2013

Jul 12013

Jul 8 2013

Jul 22 2013

Jul 22 2013

Jul 22 2013

Aug 6 2013

Aug 7 2013

Oct 7 2013

Oct 15 2013

Oct 22 2013

Oct 24 2013

Oct 29 2013

Nov 1 2013

Nov 1 2013

Nov 1 2013

Nov 1 2013

Nov 7 2013

Nov 8 2013

Application (12A1181) to file consolidated bref in opposition in excess of word

limits, submitted to The Chief Justice.

Application (12A1181) to file consolidated brief in opposition in excess of word

limits granted by The Chief Justice The consolidated brief in opposition may

not exceed 12,000 words.

Application (13A35) to file consolidated brief in opposition in excess of word

limits, submitted to The Chief Justice.

Application (13A385) to file consolidated bref in opposition in excess of word

limits granted by The Chief Justice. The consolidated brief in opposition may

not exceed 11,000 words.

Brief of respondents Environmental Protection Agency in opposition filed

VIDED.

Brief of Environmental Organization respondents in opposition filed. VIDED.

Brief of respondents New York, et al. in opposition filed. VIDED.

Reply of petitioner Utility Air Regulatory Group filed.

DISTRIBUTED for Conference of September 30, 2013

DISTRIBUTED for Conference of October 11, 2013.

Petition GRANTED limited to the following question: Whether EPA permissibly

determined that its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor

vehicles triggered permitting requirements under the Clean Air Act for

stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases. The cases are consolidated

and a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument.

Bnefing proposal of the parties. VIDED

Letter from Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc., et al. regarding bnefing

proposal. VIDED.

Upon consideration of the letter of October 22, 2013, from counsel for

petitioners in No. 12-1248 on behalf of the parties, the briefing proposal set out

in the le*er is adopted with the exception that the bnefs of petitioners shall not

exceed 45,000 words in aggregate The briefs of respondents in support of

petitioners shall not exceed 6,000 words each. The brief of the Solicitor

General shall not exceed 15,000 words. The briefs of other respondents shall

not exceed 10,000 words each. Reply briefs shall not exceed 18.000 words in

aggregate. VIDED

The time to file joint appendix, petitioners’ briefs on the merits, and briefs of

respondents in support of petitioners is extended to and including December 9,

2013. VIDED

The time to file respondents’ briefs on the menits is extended to and including

January 21, 2014. VIDED

Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of

neither party, received from counsel for the United States Federal

Environmental Protection Agency, et al. VIDED.

Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of

neither party, received from counsel for petitioner Utility Air Regulatory Group.

VIDED.

Consent to the filing of amicus cunae briefs, In support of either party or of

neither party, received from counsel for Texas, et al. VIDED.

Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of

neither party, received from counsel for Southeastem Legal Foundation, Inc., et

al. VIDED.

Nov 8 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of

neither party, received from counsel for Coalition for Responsible Regulation,

inc., et al. VIDED.

Nov 12 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of

neither party, received from counsel for American Chemistry Council, et al.

VIDED.

Nov 12 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of

neither party, received from counsel for New York, California, et al. VIDED.

Nov 12 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or for

neither party, received from counsel! for Environmental Organizations, Center

for Biological Diversity, et al. VIDED.

Nov 19 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of

neither party, received from counsel for Energy-intensive Manufacturers

Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Regulation, et al. VIDED.

Nov 21 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support or either party or of

neither party, received from counsel for the Chamber of Commerce of the

United States of America, et al. VIDED.

Nov 25 2013 SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Monday, February 24, 2014

Dec 92013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of

neither party, received from counsel for the National Mining Association.

VIDED.

Dec 92013 Bnef of respondents Coalition for Responsible Regulation, |nc., et al. in support

of petitioners filed. VIDED.

Dec 92013 Brief of petitioners Amer'can Chemistry Council, et al. filed. VIDED.

Dec 92013 Brief of petitioners Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et

al. filed. VIDED.

Dec 92013 Brief of petitioners Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc., et al. filed. VIDED.

Dec 92013 Brief of petitioner Energy-Intensive Manufacturers Working Group on

Greenhouse Gas Regulation, et al. filed. VIDED.

Dec 92013 Bnef of petitioners Texas, et al. filed. VIDED.

Dec 92013 Joint appendix filed (5 volumes). (Statement of costs filed.) VIDED.

Dec 92013 Bref of petitioner Utility Air Reguiatory Group filed. VIDED.

Dec 12 2013 Brief amici curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation, et al. filed. VIDED.

Dec 13 2013 Record received from U.S.C.A. DC Circuit. The record is electronic and located

on PACER.

Dec 16 2013 Bnef amicus curiae of Washington Legal Foundation filed.

Dec 16 2013 Brief amici cunae of States of Kansas, et al. filed. VIDED.

Dec 16 2013 Brief amicus curiae of Peabody Energy Corporation filed. VIDED.

Dec 16 2013 Brief amici curiae of Political Economists Henry N. Butler, et al. filed. VIDED.

Dec 16 2013 Brief amici curiae of Economists Thomas C. Schelling, et al. filed. VIDED.

Dec 16 2013 Brief amicus curiae of Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow filed. VIDED.

Dec 16 2013 Brief amicus curiae of American Civil Rights Union filed. VIDED.

Dec 16 2013 Brief amici curiae of Texas Oil & Gas Association, et al. filed. VIDED.

Dec 16 2013 Brief amicus curiae of Senator Mitch McConnell and Other Members of the

United States Congress filed. VIDED.

Dec 16 2013 Bnef amicus curiae of Mountain States Legal Foundation filed. VIDED.

Dec 16 2013 Brief amici curiae of Five U.S. Senators filed. VIDED.

Dec 16 2013 Brief amicus curiae of Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence filed. VIDED

Dec 16 2013 Brief amici cunae of State and Local Chambers of Commerce, and Other

Business Associations filed. VIDED.

Dec 16 2013 Bnef amici cunae of Administrative Law Professors, et al. filed. VIDED

(Distnbuted)

Dec 16 2013 Bnef amicus curiae of American Road & Transportation Builders Association in

support of neither party filed. VIDED. (Distributed)

Dec 16 2013 Bnef amici curiae Scientists and Economists filed. VIDED. (Distributed)

Dec 20 2013 CIRCULATED.

Jan 62014 Motion for divided argument and enlargement of time for oral argument filed by

petitioners. VIDED.

Jan 21 2014 Brief of respondent Environmental Protection Agency filed. VIDED.

(Distributed)

Jan 21 2014 Brief of respondents Environmental Organization respondents filed. VIDED

(Distributed)

Jan 21 2014 Brief of respondents New York, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)

Jan 27 2014 Motion for divided argument filed by petitioners GRANTED. and the time is

divided as follows: 30 minutes for private party petitioners, 15 minutes for state

petitioners, and 45 minutes for respondents.

Jan 27 2014 Brief amici curiae of South Coast Air Quality Management District, et al. filed.

VIDED. (Distributed)

Jan 27 2014 Brief amicus curiae of Institute for Policy Integnty at New York University

School of Law filed. VIDED. (Distributed)

Jan 28 2014 Brief amicus curiae of Calpine Corporation filed. VIDED. (Distributed)

Jan 28 2014 Brief amicus curiae of American Thoracic Society filed. VIDED. (Distributed)

Jan 28 2014 Brief amicus curiae of Constitutional Accountability Center filed. VIDED.

(Distributed)

Feb 13 2014 Reply of respondents Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc., et al. in

support of petitioners filed. VIDED. (Distributed)

Feb 14 2014 Reply of petitioners in Nos. 12-1248, 12-1254, 12-1268, and 2-1272 filed.

VIDED. (Distributed)

Feb 14 2014 Reply of petitioners Texas, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)

Feb 14 2014 Reply of petitioner Utility Air Regulatory Group filed. VIDED. (Distributed)

Feb 24 2014 Argued. For private petitioners: Peter Keisler, Washington, D. C. For state

petitioners: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. For

respondents: Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Department of Justice,

Washington, D. C.

PETITION

FOR

WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

BRIEFS

“we =©6 12-1146... ;

No. atti Bal .

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP,

Petitioner,

Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_—

F. WILLIAM BROWNELL

(Counsel of Record)

NORMAN W. FICHTHORN

HENRY V. NICKEL

ALLISON D. Woop

HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP

2200 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., NW

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20037

(202) 955-1500

bbrownell@hunton.com

March 20, 2013 Counsel for Petitioner

(RR EL MRNA EATON 2 MRR AEE SNC EATR NAIA IE DRE O RIE: ANSE

Wicson-Epes PRintinc Co.. inc. — (202) 789-0096 -— WAasHInGcTon, D.C. 20002

Library of Congress

Law Library

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

After this Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA,

549 U.S. 497 (2007), the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) found that its promulgation of motor

vehicle greenhouse gas (GHG) emission standards

under Title II of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §

7521(a)(1), compelled regulation of carbon dioxide

and other GHGs under the CAA’s Title I prevention

of significant deterioration (PSD) and Title V sta-

tionary-source permitting programs. Even though

EPA determined that including GHGs in these pro-

grams would vastly expand the programs contrary to

Congress’s intent, EPA adopted rules adding GHGs

to the pollutants covered. The panel below held the

CAA and Massachusetts compelled inclusion of

GHGs and, based on that holding, dismissed all peti-

tions to review the GHG permitting program rules on

standing grounds. The questions presented are:

1. Whether Massachusetts compelled EPA to in-

clude GHGs in the PSD and Title V programs when

inclusion of GHGs wouid (i) transform the size and

scope of these programs into something that EPA

found would be “unrecognizable to ... Congress,” Pe-

tition Appendix 345a, 380a, and (ii) expand the PSD

program to cover a substance that does not deterio-

rate the quality of the air that people breathe.

2. Whether dismissal of the petitions to review

EPA’s GHG permit-program rules was inconsistent

with this Court’s standing jurisprudence where the

panel premised its holding that standing was absent

on its merits holding that GHGs are regulated “pur-

suant to automatic operation of the CAA.” Id. at 96a.

‘i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The following were parties to the proceedings in

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-

bia Circuit:

R 004 (Apr. 2, 201

(the “Timing Rule”):

1. The Utility Air Regulatory Group, petitioner

on review, was a petitioner below.

2. The United States Environmental Protection

Agency, respondent on review, was a respondent be-

low.

3. Additional petitioners below, who are nominal

respondents on review, were Coalition for Responsi-

ble Regulation, Inc.; Industrial Minerals Association

— North America; National Cattlemen’s Beef Associa-

tion; Great Northern Project Development, L.P.;

Rosebud Mining Co.; Alpha Natural Resources, Inc.;

Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc.; The Langdale

Company; Langdale Forest Products Company;

Langdale Farms, LLC; Langdale Fuel Company;

Langdale Chevrolet-Pontiac, Inc.; Langdale Ford

Company; Langboard, Inc. - MDF; Langboard, Inc. —

OSB; Georgia Motor Trucking Association, Inc.; Col-

lins Industries, Inc.; Collins Trucking Company, Inc.;

Kennesaw Transportation, Inc.; J&M Tank Lines,

Inc.; Southeast Trailer Mart, Inc.; Georgia Agribusi-

ness Council, Inc.; John Linder, U.S. Representative,

Georgia 7 District; Dana Rohrabacher, U.S. Repre-

sentative, California 46% District; John Shimkus,

U.S. Representative, [Illinois 19% District; Phil

Gingrey, U.S. Representative, Georgia 11% District;

Lynn Westmoreland, U.S. Representative, Georgia

34 District; Tom Price, U.S. Representative, Georgia

6% District; Paul Broun, U.S. Representative, Geor-

gia 10% District; Steve King, U.S. Representative,

Iowa 5% District; Nathan Deal, U.S. Representative,

Georgia 9% District; Jack Kingston, U.S. Representa-

tive, Georgia 1* District; Michele Bachmann, U.S.

Representative, Minnesota 6“ District; Kevin Brady,

U.S. Representative, Texas 8 District; John

Shadegg, U.S. Representative, Arizona 3” District;

Marsha Blackburn, U.S. Representative, Tennessee

7% District; Dan Burton, U.S. Representative, Indi-

ana 5% District; Clean Air Implementation Project;

American Iron and Steel Institute; Gerdau Amer-

isteel US Inc.; Energy-Intensive Manufacturers’

Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Regulation; Pea-

body Energy Company; American Farm Bureau Fed-

eration; National Mining Association; Chamber of

Commerce of the United States of America; Missouri

Joint Municipal Electric Utility Commission; Na-

tional Environmental Development Association’s

Clean Air Project; Ohio Coal Association; National

Association of Manufacturers; American Frozen Food

Institute; American Petroleum Institute; Brick In-

dustry Association; Corn Refiners Association; Glass

Packaging Institute; Independent Petroleum Associ-

ation of America; Indiana Cast Metals Association;

Michigan Manufacturers Association; Mississippi

Manufacturers Association; National Association of

Home Builders; National Federation of Independent

Business; National Oilseed Processors Association;

National Petrochemical & Refiners Association;

North American Die Casting Association; Specialty

Stee] Industry of North America; Tennessee Cham-

ber of Commerce and Industry; Western States Pe-

troleum Association; West Virginia Manufacturers

Association; Wisconsin Manufacturers and Com-

merce; State of Texas; State of Alabama; State of

South Carolina; State of South Dakota; State of Ne-

lV

braska; State of North Dakota; Commonwealth of

Virginia; Rick Perry, Governor of Texas; Greg Ab-

bott; Attorney General of Texas; Texas Commission

on Environmental Quality; Texas Agriculture Com-

mission; Texas Public Utilities Commission; Texas

Railroad Commission; Texas General Land Office;

Haley Barbour, Governor of the State of Mississippi;

and Portland Cement Association.

4. Petitioner-intervenors below (with respect to

certain petitions for review), who are nominal re-

spondents on review, were American Frozen Food

Institute; American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufac-

turers; American Petroleum Institute; Corn Refiners

Association; Glass Association of North America; In-

dependent Petroleum Association of America; Indi-

ana Cast Metals Association; Louisiana Department

of Environmental Quality; Michigan Manufacturers

Association; National Association Manufacturers;

Nationel Association of Home Builders; National

Oilseed Processors Association; Tennessee Chamber

of Commerce and Industry; Western States Petrole-

um Association; West Virginia Manufacturers Asso-

ciation; and Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce.

5. Respondent-intervenors below (with respect to

certain petitions for review), who are respondents

(or, in some cases, nominal respondents) on review,

were American Farm Bureau Federation; Brick In-

dustry Association; Center for Biological Diversity;

Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Conservation Law

Foundation; Environmental Defense Fund; Georgia

ForestWatch; Indiana Wildlife Federation; Michigan

Environmental Council; National Environmental

Development Association’s Clean Air Project; Na-

tional Mining Association; Peabody Energy Compa-

ny; Natural Resources Council of Maine; Natural Re-

Vv

sources Defense Council; Ohio Environmental Coun-

cil; Sierra Club; South Coast Air Quality Manage-

ment District; State of California; State of Illinois;

State of Iowa; State of Maine; State of Maryland;

State of New Hampshire; State of New Mexico; State

of New York; State of North Carolina; State of Ore-

gon; State of Rhode Island; Utility Air Regulatory

Group; Wild Virginia.

6. A respondent below, who is a nominal re-

spondent on review, was Lisa Perez Jackson, Admin-

istrator, United States Environmental Protection

Agency. Ms. Jackson ceased to hold the office of Ad-

ministrator, United States Environmental! Protection

Agency, on February 15, 2013; that office is currently

held in an acting capacity by Robert Perciasepe, Act-

ing Administrator, United States Environmental

Protection Agency.

31,514 (June 3, 2010

(the “Tailoring Rule”):

1. The Utility Air Regulatory Group, petitioner

on review, was a petitioner below.

2. The United States Environmental Protection

Agency, respondent on review, was a respondent be-

low.

3. Additional petitioners below, who are nominal

respondents on review, were Southeastern Legal

Foundation, Inc.; John Linder, U.S. Representative,

Georgia 7” District; Dana Rohrabacher, U.S. Repre-

sentative, California 46% District; John Shimkus,

U.S. Representative, [llinois 19% District; Phil

Gingrey, U.S. Representative, Georgia 11% District;

Lynn Westmoreland, U.S. Representative, Georgia

3 District; Tom Price, U.S. Representative, Georgia

6% District; Paul Broun, U.S. Representative, Geor-

vi

gia 10% District; Steve King, U.S. Representative,

Iowa 5% District; Jack Kingston, U.S. Representa-

tive, Georgia 1* District; Michele Bachmann, U:S.

Representative, Minnesota 6% District; Kevin Brady,

U.S. Representative, Texas 8% District; John

Shadegg, U.S. Representative, Arizona 3” District;

Marsha Blackburn, U.S. Representative, Tennessee

7% District; Dan Burton, U.S. Representative, Indi-

ana 5% District; The Langdale Company; Langdale

Forest Products Company; Langdale Farms, LLC;

Langdale Fuel Company; Langdale Chevrolet-

Pontiac, Inc.; Langdale Ford Company; Langboard,

Inc. — MDF; ‘Langboard, Inc. — OSB; Georgia Motor

Trucking Association, Inc.; Collins Industries, Inc.;

Collins Trucking Company, Inc.; Kennesaw Trans-

portation, Inc.; J&M Tank Lines, Inc.; Southeast

Trailer Mart, Inc.; Georgia Agribusiness Council,

Inc.; Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc.; In-

dustrial Minerals Association — North America; Na-

tional Cattlemen’s Beef Association; Great Northern

Project Development, L.P.; Rosebud Mining Co.; Al-

pha Natural Resources, Inc.; The Ohio Coal Associa-

tion; American Iron and Steel Institute; Gerdau Am-

eristeel US Inc.; Chamber of Commerce of the United

States of America; Georgia Coalition for Sound Envi-

ronmental Policy; National Mining Association;

American Farm Bureau Federation; Peabody Energy

Company; Energy-Intensive Manufacturers’ Working

Group on Greenhouse Gas Regulation; South Caroli-

na Public Service Authority; Mark R. Levin; Land-

mark Legal Foundation; National Environmental

Development Association’s Clean Air Project; State of

Alabama; State of North Dakota; State of South Da-

kota; Haley Barbour, Governor of Mississippi; State

of South Carolina; State of Nebraska; Missouri Joint

Municipal Electric Utility Commission; Clean Air

vii

Implementation Project; National Association of

Manufacturers; American Frozen Food Institute;

American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers;

American Petroleum Institute; Brick Industry Asso-

ciation; Corn Refiners Association; Glass Association

of North America; Glass Packaging Institute; Inde-

pendent Petroleum Association of America; Indiana

Cast Metals Association; Michigan Manufacturers

Association; Mississippi Manufacturers Association;

National Oilseed Processors Association; Tennessee

Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Western States

Petroleum Association; West Virginia Manufacturers

Association; Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce;

National Association of Home Builders; National

Federation of Independent Business; Portland Ce-

ment Association; Louisiana Department of Envi-

ronmental Quality; Rick Perry, Governor of Texas;

Greg Abbott; Attorney General of Texas; Texas

Commission on Environmental Quality; Texas De-

partment of Agriculture; Texas Public Utilities

Commission; Texas Railroad Commission; Texas

General Land Office; and State of Texas.

4. Petitioner-intervenors below (with respect to

certain petitions for review), who are nominal re-

spondents on review, were American Frozen Food

Institute; American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufac-

turers; American Petroleum Institute; Corn Refiners

Association; Glass Association of North America; In-

dependent Petroleum Association of America; Indi-

ana Cast Metals Association; Michigan Manufactur-

ers Association; National Association of Home Build-

ers; National Association of Manufacturers; National

Oilseed Processors Association; Tennessee Chamber

of Commerce and Industry; Weatern States Petrole-

um Association; West Virginie Manufacturers Asso-

ciation; and Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce.

5. Respondent-intervenors below (with respect to

certain petitions for review), who are respondents

(or, in some cases, nominal respondents) on review,

were American Farm Bureau Federation; Brick In-

dustry Association; Center for Biological Diversity;

Clean Air Implementation Project; Commonwealth of

Massachusetts; Conservation Law Foundation; Envi-

ronmental Defense Fund; Georgia ForestWatch; Na-

_tional Environmental Development Association’s

Clean Air Project; National Mining Association; Nat-

ural Resources Council of Maine, Inc.; Natural Re-

sources Defense Council; Peabody Energy Company;

Sierra Club; South Coast Air Quality Management

District; State of California; State of Illinois; State of

Iowa; State of Maine; State of Maryland; State of

New Hampshire; State of New Mexico; State of New

York; State of North Carolina; State of Oregon; State

of Rhode Island; Utility Air Regulatory Group; and

Wild Virginia.

6. A respondent below, who is a nominal re-

spondent on review, was Lisa Perez Jackson, Admin-

istrator, United States Environmental Protection

Agency. Ms. Jackson ceased to hold the office of Ad-

ministrator, United States Environmental Protection

Agency, on February 15, 2013; that office is currently

held in an acting capacity by Robert Perciasepe, Act-

ing Administrator, United States Environmental

Protection Agency.

ix

RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Petitioner Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG)

is a not-for-profit association of individual electric

utilities and electric generating companies and na-

tional trade associations that participates on behalf

of its members collectively in administrative proceed-

ings under the Clean Air Act, and in litigation aris-

ing from those proceedings, that affect electric gen-

erators. UARG has no outstanding shares or debt

securities in the hands of the public and has no par-

ent company. No publicly held company has a 10%

or greater ownership interest in UARG.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .......000............cccccceneeseeeeeees i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING. ............................. u

RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ................. x

ee IE abinicininnicnisctininsinmniiiadeeniennenents xi

pg, ee xiv

IT sic cdnlnsicsemioniebpidainnchnininniennaedasdiin 2

tint ticnreasinicidhindntitiglienipinetiniaainiin 2

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND

REGULATORY PROVISIONS .................00...::00008 2

I hina ei encintaisntcinninnntieaiiienenannnaiitonatie 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......00............ceseeeeeeeeeeees 6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ....... 18

A Certiorari Is Needed To Address

Whether Massachusetts Compels Regu-

lation of GHGs, Which Include Carbon

Dioxide, Under the CAA’s Title I PSD

Program and Title V of the Act ....................... 19

Il. Certiorari Is Needed To Address the

Panel’s Decision that Petitioners Lack

Standing To Challenge the Timing and

_ ARSE eee en eo 28

Ill. This Petition Raises an Unusually Im-

portant Question of Federal Law. ................... 32

RE aes nisnniriconsivelipitencebininnieeniassineienneneinig 35

APPENDIX MATERIALS:

VOLUME I:

APPENDIX A: Order of U.S. Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Dismissing Petitions for Review of Timing

and Tailoring Rules and Denying Other Peti-

al ceaaiaantihidaledhdetniae la

APPENDIX B: Opinion of U.S. Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit................ 6a

APPENDIX C: U.S. Environmental Protec-

tion Agency, Reconsideration of Interpreta-

tion of Regulations That Determine Pollu-

tants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting

APPENDIX D: U.S. Environmental Protec-

tion Agency, Prevention of Significant Dete-

rioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-

ing Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010)

TTI Ti desechieicipcidenleraianiidedinininioieidbinntiniteativinn 149a

APPENDIX E: Order of U.S. Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Denying Panel Rehearing ...............................0020+- 598a

VOLUME III:

APPENDIX F: Order of U.S. Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Denying Petitions for Rehearing En Banc of

Chamber of Commerce of the United States

of America and National Association of

ss aa ian ientiaieimetiiial

APPENDIX G: Order of U.S. Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc of

Pacific Legal Foundation ......................00.c0eceeeeeeess

APPENDIX H: Federal Statutes .........................

APPENDIX I: Federal Regulations .....................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir.

I iiicinineyinnninanndinisicnmnmnnencinnmnniespeiiiinimesionesumanpaiienenes 23

Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C.

SERIE NEEL Reet enna Teac en Sauna 29

American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131

I nel 22

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) ................ccceeeeeeeeee 31

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-

fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).......... 3, 28

Environmental Defense vy. Duke Energy Corp.,

EERE ewer 21, 23

Food & Drug Administration v. Brown & Wil-

liamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)....... 32

General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,

SE IS EE ie ee a a 23

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555

xiv

Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253

(D.D.C.), affd per curiam, 4 Env?t Rep. Cas.

(BNA) 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), affd per curiam

by an equally divided Court sub nom. Fri v.

Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).............0. cece 9

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S.

BP CR ccenesisccscnsassnsensstedinniusessimemeandipasiabanensaaiae 31

Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Bae., GR Ge GP a a ctemtemniniiaieina 8,9

Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976)......... 8

United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co.,

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United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U:S.

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Constituti 1 Statutes:

ip Be eR ORE en 2

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, et seq.

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I .. ceoccsaceeseonnesenecses 12

42 U.S.C. § 7475(8)(4) .......cccccecescccscecececeseseesseeces. 12

42 U.S.C. § 7475(€)(1) ....ccccccceseccecseesceseceseceeees 12, 25

A 11, 22

42 U.S.C. § 7491(g)(7) .....-ceccceccesecesesescecsceceseececeees 22

42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) .....-cccecceceseeeeeeeene 1, 12, 13, 25

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Federal Register:

39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (Dec. 5, 1974) .......cccececsecseseceeeees 10

66 Fed. Reg. 7486 (Jan. 23, 2001)................:.ccceeeeee 12

68 Fed. Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003) .............. eee 12

73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (July 30, 2008).......................... 26

74 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (Oct. 27, 2009) ........ 10, 13, 14, 33

74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009)........000000000002.. 1,13

75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010)........................ 2,13

75 Fed. Reg. 49,556 (Aug. 13, 2010) ....................000205. 1

Legislative Materials:

S. Rep. No. 95-127 (1977), reprinted in 3 A Legis-

lative History of the Clean Air Act Amend-

ments of 1977, at 1375 (1979)...............cccccecssecsees 11

Miscellaneous:

EPA, Prevention of Significant Deteriora-

tion and Title V GHG Tailoring Rule:

EPA’s Response to Public Comments

(May 2010), Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-

ee tacesneinsicaienndenhiniiaiiniiniteneencnnsinneiit passim

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Utility Air Regulatory Group respectfully pe-

titions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment

of the United States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit dismissing its petitions to review

rules of the United States Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) that address (i) the date on which

greenhouse gases (GHGs) emitted from stationary

sources are considered regulated pollutants under

the Title I prevention of significant deterioration

(PSD) preconstruction permitting program and the

Title V general operating permit program of the

Clean Air Act (CAA or Act),! 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004

(Apr. 2, 2010) (the Timing Rule), Petition Appendix

(Pet. App.) 108a-148a, and (ii) how GHG emissions

from stationary sources are to be regulated under

those CAA provisions, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3,

2010) (the Tailoring Rule), Pet. App. 149a-597a.

This petition does not address other aspects of the

D.C. Circuit’s opinion and decision, including the as-

pects of the decision that concern (i) EPA’s rule find-

ing that GHG emissions from motor vehicles “endan-

ger” public health and welfare within the meaning of

42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15,

2009) (Endangerment Finding), (ii) EPA’s denial of

reconsideration of that finding, 75 Fed. Reg. 49,556

(Aug. 13, 2010), or (iti) EPA’s rule setting GHG emis-

sion standards for light-duty motor vehicles under 42

1! The PSD preconstruction permitting program is contained in

Subpart 1 of Part C of Title I of the CAA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-

7479. The Title V program is, as the name indicates, contained

in Title V of the Act. Id. §§ 7661-7661f.

2

U.S.C. §& 7521(a)(1), 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7,

2010) (Motor Vehicle Rule).

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the D.C. Circuit is reported at 684

F.3d 102 and reproduced at Pet. App. 6a-107a. The

D.C. Circuit’s orders denying panel rehearing and

rehearing en banc are reproduced at Pet. App. 598a-

663a. Relevant excerpts of the Timing Rule are re-

produced at Pet. App. 108a-148a, and the Tailoring

Rule is reproduced at Pet. App. 149a-597a.

JURISDICTION

The D.C. Circuit entered judgment dismissing the

Tailoring and Timing Rule cases on June 26, 2012,

Pet. App. 5a, and denied timely petitions for panel

rehearing or rehearing en banc on December 20,

2012, id. at 602a, 607a, 663a. This Court has juris-

diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND

REGULATORY PROVISIONS

The Constitution of the United States provides, in

pertinent part, that “[t]he judicial Power [of the

United States] shall extend to all Cases, in Law and

Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of

the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall

be made, under their Authority ... [and] to Contro-

versies to which the United States shall be a party.”

U.S. Const. art. ITI, § 2, cl. 1.

Relevant provisions of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401

et seq., are reproduced at Pet. App. 664a-680a.

3

Relevant provisions of EPA’s regulations imple-

menting the CAA are reproduced at Pet. App. 681a-

692a.

INTRODUCTION

Certiorari is needed to address a matter of excep-

tional importance: Did Massachusetts v. EPA, 549

U.S. 497 (2007), compel EPA to regulate GHGs un-

der the CAA Title I PSD and Title V operating per-

mit programs where doing so would (i) extend those

programs’ coverage to tens of thousands or even mil-

lions of small sources that Congress intended not to

regulate, and (ii) expand a program focused on pre-

venting significant deterioration to include a pollu-

tant — carbon dioxide — that does not deteriorate air

quality? As Judge Kavanaugh explained in dissent-

ing from denial of rehearing en banc, EPA’s monu-

mental extension of CAA regulatory authority by

administrative fiat puts “the bedrock underpinnings

of our system of separation of powers ... at stake,”

Pet. App. 658a (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).

Beyond the CAA, this case has significant implica-

tions for all complex regulatory statutes that contain

separate programs addressing different aspects of

the statutes’ regulatory objectives. The decision be-

low stands for the principle that, under step one of

the two-step test set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.

Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),

a regulatory agency must give a term that appears in

each of various different programs in a given statute

the same broad meaning given that term by the

statute’s general provisions, regardless of the focus

or scope of those individual programs. Here, EPA

4

insisted it had no choice but to apply to specific CAA

programs (i.e., the PSD and Title V programs) the

expansive reading this Court in Massachusetts gave

to “air pollutant” in the Act’s general provisions. As

Judge Kavanaugh observed, the (fact that

“[glreenhouse gases may qualify as ‘air pollutants’ in

the abstract” does not resolve how Congress intended

“air pollutant” to be understood in the context of any

individual, specialized CAA program. Pet. App.

650a-651a n.3 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).

This petition does not ask this Court to revisit its

holding in Massachusetts. Rather, it asks this Court

to address a distinct issue: whether Massachusetts

obligated EPA to regulate GHGs, including carbon

dioxide, under provisions of the Act — the Title I PSD

program and the Title V operating permit program —

that address regulatory requirements and standards

for regulation that are fundamentally different from

other CAA programs, including the mobile-source

provisions (Title IT) at issue in Massachusetts.

EPA freely acknowledged that regulation of carbon

dioxide emissions under the Title I and Title V per-

mitting programs subjects “an extraordinarily large

number of sources” to the CAA for the first time, con-

trary to explicit congressional intent to cover only a

limited number of large industrial facilities. Pet.

App. 339a, 345a (application of PSD to GHGs would

result in “more than 81,000 ... PSD [permits] each

year, an increase of almost 300-fold,” “result[ing] in a

program that would have been unrecognizable to the

Congress that designed PSD”); see also id. at 380a

(application of the Title V permitting program to

5

GHGs “would result in a program urrecognizable to

the Congress that enacted title V[,] ... expand|[ing]

[the program] from the current 14,700 sources to

some 6.1 million”). This unprece?enteu expansion of

CAA stationary-source jurisdiction, EPA said, would

in turn result in insurmountable burdens for (i) state

authorities required to conduct millions of new per-

mit proceedings,” and (ii) the countless sources that

would be subject to the CAA for the first time as a

result of carbon dioxide regulation (including shop-

ping malls, hospitals, stadiums, and apartment

buildings). Jd. at 155a.

To postpone results that EPA concluded would, “as

a practical matter, vitiate much of the purpose of”

the statutory language limiting application of these

programs to large industrial facilities, id. at 347a,

EPA promulgated the Tailoring Rule. EPA designed

that rule to exclude initially very small sources of

GHG emissions but then, in phases, to expand GHG

regulation “one-step-at-a-time,” id. at 457a-461a, un-

til all of the additional sources that Congress never

intended to cover are in the program. In doing so,

EPA declined the invitation to interpret the term “air

pollutant” as used in the Act’s PSD and Title V pro-

visions to exclude GHGs in order to confine those

programs to the bounds EPA recognized had been set

by Congress. See EPA, Prevention of Significant De-

terioration and Title V GHG Tailoring Rule: EPA's

2 States typically issue PSD and Title V permits to sources

within their borders. EPA issues these permits only in the rare

situation where the state delegates its responsibility to EPA or

EPA disapproves the state's plan to issue these permits.

6

Response to Public Comments at 34-43 (May 2010),

Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0517-19181 (Re-

sponse to Comments).

A panel of the D.C. Circuit dismissed petitioner's

challenge to the Tailoring Rule after concluding that

stationary-source GHG regulation was compelled by

“automatic operation of the statute” and “binding

Supreme Court precedent.” Pet. App. 10la, 612a.

According to the panel, because EPA’s “one-step-at-a-

time” rules would initially mitigate the extraordinar-

ily damaging impacts that “all-at-once” GHG sta-

tionary-source regulation would produce, “Petition-

ers lack Article III standing to challenge” the Tailor-

ing Rule. Jd. at 96a (emphasis in original). Judges

Brown and Kavanaugh wrote opinions dissenting

from denial of petitions for en banc rehearing of the

panel’s decision. Jd. at 613a-661a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. This case concerns the decision of a panel of the

lower court that EPA was bound by (i) this Court’s

decision in Massachusetts interpreting 42 U.S.C. §

7602(g) in the context of Title II of the CAA, and (ii)

the term “air pollutant” in the Act’s PSD and Title V

provisions, to regulate stationary source emissions of

GHGs under the Title I and Title V permitting pro-

grams.5

3 Because the Title V program provides that requirements ap-

plicable to a given stationary source under the CAA be collected

in an “operating permit,” 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a), and because the

only GHG requirements for stationary sources that currently

exist for electric generating facilities owned and operated by

7

2. Carbon dioxide is the most ubiquitous and the

largest by volume of the six pollutants that are en-

compassed by EPA’s definition of GHGs. Carbon di-

oxide is not a substance like sulfur dioxide, nitrogen

oxides, or particulate matter that pollutes the air

people breathe. Ground-level carbon dioxide is part

of the atmosphere and is necessary to life. Carbon

dioxide (like other GHGs) mixes rapidly and is dis-

tributed uniformly in the sea of carbon dioxide and

other GHGs already present in the atmosphere at

ground level (and above). Plants need, and people

and animals exhale, carbon dioxide as part of the el-

ementary processes of life. Because carbon dioxide is

typically released by stationary sources in amounts

that are orders of magnitude greater than other pol-

lutants, hospitals, schools, apartment buildings,

shopping malls, and innumerable other small

sources would become CAA-regulated stationary

sources if carbon dioxide is regulated as an air pollu-

tant under Title I and Title V. Pet. App. 154a-155a.

As a result, carbon dioxide is unique — fundamental-

ly different from the other substances that have been

regulated under the CAA Title I and Title V permit-

ting programs.

members of petitioner arise from the PSD preconstruction per-

mit program, resolution of the PSD applicability issue here will

resolve their existing Title V concerns, cf. Response to Com-

ments at 43 (EPA agrees ... that where a source has previously

been issued a Title V permit, the permit need not be revised ...

if the source is not subject to any additional applicable re-

quirements.”). Accordingly, this petition focuses principally on

the Title I PSD program.

8

3. The CAA contains six titles, each of which es-

tablishes different programs to address different air

pollution problems in different geographic areas and

for different types of sources. For example, Title II of

the Act addresses emission standards for mobile

sources, including motor vehicles and aircraft (42

U.S.C. §§ 7521-7590); Title [TV addresses acid rain,

including emissions from stationary combustion

sources (id. §§ 7651-7651lo); and Title VI addresses

stratospheric ozone protection (id. §§ 7671-7671q).

Title I of the CAA establishes a variety of programs

governing emissions from stationary sources, includ-

ing programs addressing ambient air quality stand-

ards, emission control technology standards, air tox-

ics regulation, visibility protection, and others. Ti-

tles I and V also include programs for preconstruc-

tion permits (PSD) and operating permits (Title V)

for large industrial sources.

4. The starting point for regulating stationary

sources under CAA Title I is the national ambient air

quality standards (NAAQS) program. Id. § 7409;

Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249 (1976) (the

NAAQS program is the “heart” of the CAA). NAAQS

define the maximum allowed concentrations of spe-

cific pollutants (called “criteria pollutants”) in the

“ambient” air — i.e., ground-level air quality concen-

trations of substances in the air to which people are

exposed and which they breathe. See 40 C.F.R. §

50.1(e) (defining “ambient air” as “that portion of the

atmosphere, external to buildings, to which the gen-

eral public has access”); Train v. Natural Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 65 (1975) (ambient air is

9

the “statute’s term for the outdoor air used by the

general public”). EPA sets NAAQS at the level that

is requisite to protect public health and welfare. 42

U.S.C. § 7409(b). Following promulgation of a

NAAQS, states have primary responsibility to ensure

that the ambient air within their borders attains and

maintains the NAAQS. Id. § 7407. States do this by

adopting emission limitations for sources and other

measures in a state implementation plan (SIP) that

is submitted to EPA for its review and approval (or

disapproval). Id. § 7410(a), (k). The CAA assigns re-

sponsibility for achieving NAAQS on a geographic

basis. Id. § 7407. With respect to each NAAQS, EPA

designates each area as “attainment” (meaning am-

bient air quality in the area is as good as or better

than the level represented by the NAAQS), “nonat-

tainment” (ambient air quality in the area is worse

than the NAAQS), or “unclassifiable,” based on

measured ambient air quality concentrations in that

area. Id. § 7407(d)(1)(A). A single geographic area

may be in attainment with one NAAQS but nonat-

tainment with another.

The PSD program (the principal program at issue

here) originated from litigation that followed EPA’s

approval of the first SIPs in 1972. In Sierra Club v.

Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), affd per cu-

riam, 4 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972),

affd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub

nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973), EPA

was ordered to disapprove any SIP that allowed am-

bient air quality in an area measured to be in “at-

tainment” to deteriorate to the level of a NAAQS. Id.

10

at 257. In 1974, implementing the district court’s

decision, EPA established the initial PSD program

through rulemaking. 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510, 42,514-17

(Dec. 5, 1974).

EPA’s PSD regulations sought to “prevent signifi-

cant deterioration” of local ambient air quality in at-

tainment areas by requiring preconstruction permits

before construction of major new sources or modifica-

tions of major existing sources of air pollutants that

are subject to NAAQS could occur. Deterioration of

local air quality would be avoided by requiring that

the source (i) not cause ambient air quality impacts

above specified numerical “increments” for two crite-

ria pollutants (sulfur dioxide and particulate mat-

ter), in order to prevent the “significant deteriora-

tion” of ambient air quality, and (ii) use “best availa-

ble control technology” (BACT) for these pollutants.

The 1974 PSD program applied to sulfur dioxide, ni-

trogen oxides, and particulate matter, air pollutants

that can deteriorate the quality of the air people

breathe.

In 1977, Congress enacted a statutory PSD pro-

gram largely based on the 1974 regulatory program.

Like the 1974 regulations, the statutory PSD pro-

gram required source owners and operators to obtain

preconstruction permits for the proposed construc-

tion of major new sources and for proposed major

modifications of major existing sources, in order to

prevent significant deterioration of ambient air qual-

ity. 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,308 (Oct. 27, 2009) (“As

the legislative history makes clear, Congress enacted

... PSD ... to resolve issues arising when sources of

11

criteria pollutants seek to build or expand in areas

with air quality that meets the [NAAQS].”).

Concerned about the PSD program’s potentially

adverse economic impacts, Congress set precise, nu-

merical tonnage amounts restricting the program’s

applicability to a relatively small number of large in-

dustrial facilities, which the statute refers to as “ma-

jor emitting facilities.” See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 95-127,

at 96-97 (1977), reprinted in 3 A Legislative History

of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, at 1375,

1470-71 (1979); see also Pet. App. 344a (“Congress

paid careful attention to the types and sizes of

sources that would be subject to the PSD program

and designed the thresholds deliberately to limit the

program’s scope....”). Congress defined “major emit-

ting facility” as a large facility that emits (or has the

potential to emit) at least 250 tons per year (tpy) of

“any air pollutant,” or at least 100 tpy of “any air pol-

lutant” if the facility is within certain, statutorily

enumerated industrial source categories. 42 U.S.C. §

7479(1); see also Pet. App. 346a (“Congress did not

expect PSD to apply to large numbers of small

sources ... and instead expected the 100/250 tpy

thresholds to limit PSD’s applicability to larger

sources.”).

Reflecting the PSD program’s focus on pollutants

that can deteriorate ambient air quality, Congress in

1977 enacted statutory air quality “increments” to

prevent deterioration of ambient air quality with re-

spect to sulfur dioxide and particulate matter. Con-

gress also authorized EPA to promulgate regulations

to “preventi] ... significant deterioration of air quali-

12

ty” for certain other pollutants with local air quality

effects. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a). And it directed EPA to

promulgate regulations for “analysis ... of the ambi-

ent air quality at the proposed site [of the new facili-

ty] and in areas which may be affected by emissions

from such facility for each pollutant subject to regu-

lation under this [Act] which will be emitted from

such facility.” Id. § 7475(e)(1) (emphasis added). Fi-

nally, Congress provided that PSD permits are to

contain emission limitations based on BACT for pol-

lutants that are “subject to regulation” under the

Act. Id. § 7475(a)(4).

5. In 1999, public interest groups filed a petition

for rulemaking asking EPA to regulate emissions of

GHGs, including carbon dioxide, from motor vehicles

under Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). See

66 Fed. Reg. 7486 (Jan. 23, 2001). EPA denied the

petition on the ground that GHGs are not an “air pol-

lutant” under the general definitional provision in

Title III of the Act, i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).4 68 Fed.

Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003).

On review, this Court rejected EPA’s arguments

that (a) the Act’s general definition of “air pollutant”

was not broad enough to encompass GHGs, and (b)

GHGs therefore were not an “air pollutant” that was

potentially eligible for regulation under Title II.

« 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) provides that “[t/he term ‘air pollutant’

means any air pollution agent or combination of such agents,

including any physical, chemical, biological, [or] radioactive ...

substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters

the ambient air.”

13

Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528-29. According to the

Court, “[o]n its face, the [42 U.S.C. § 7602(g)] defini-

tion embraces all airborne compounds of whatever

stripe.” Id. at 529. The Court then turned its atten-

tion to Title IT of the Act and found that GHG regula-

tion would not fundamentally change the Title II

program: “The broad language of § 202(a)(1) reflects

an intentional effort to confer the flexibility neces-

sary” to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehi-

cles. Id. at 532 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)).

6. After this Court decided Massachusetts, EPA

determined in 2009 in the Endangerment Finding

that GHG emissions from vehicles throughout the

nation “cause, or contribute to, air pollution which

may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public

hee'th or welfare,” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

7521(a)(1). 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,505. EPA did not, and

could not, find that GHGs deteriorate local ambient

air quality; rather, it found that GHGs disperse

throughout the globa’ »tmosphere and affect climate.

Id. at 66,514-16. Following issuance of its 2009 En-

dangerment Finding, EPA promulgated the Motor

Vehicle Rule, regulating GHG emissions from pas-

senger vehicles under 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) of the Act.

75 Fed. Reg. at 25,324.

7. In 2010, EPA explained that “[c]urrently, EPA

does not consider GHG emissions to be ‘regulated ...

pollutants’ under the [Title I] PSD program.... EPA

is in the process of reviewing its approach to PSD

applicability.” 74 Fed. Reg. at 55,299. EPA’s review

produced the Title I stationary source rules — the

Timing Rule and the Tailoring Rule — at issue here.

14

In the Timing Rule, EPA addressed when GHGs

would become “subject to regulation” for purposes of

the PSD program. Pet App. 125a. According to EPA,

the Timing Rule “concludes only that ... GHGs would

not be considered ‘subject to regulation’ ... earlier

than January 2, 2011,” the date the Motor Vehicle

Rule took effect. Id. at 126a. EPA said it would ad-

dress in a companion rule “the applicability of PSD

requirements for GHG-emitting sources.” Jd.

In the companion rule (the Tailoring Rule), EPA

explained its view that once the Motor Vehicle Rule

took effect, regulation of GHG emissions from sta-

tionary sources was required by operation of law un-

der the Title I PSD permit program and the Title V

operating permit program. Id. at 154a. According to

EPA, “our legal basis for this rule is our interpreta-

tion of the PSD and Title V applicability provisions,”

id. at 150a, which is “that GHG sources would be-

come subject to the PSD and title V permitting pro-

grams upon finalization of the [Motor Vehicle Rule],”

Response to Comments at 34.

Given the statutory 100-tpy and 250-tpy PSD ap-

plicability thresholds, however, EPA also concluded

that regulating GHGs under the PSD and Title V

programs would extend the programs to cover

sources Congress never intended to regulate. See,

e.g., Pet. App. 235a-236a, 380a-381a; 74 Fed. Reg. at

55,304 (“Congress, focused as it was fin 1977] on

sources of conventional pollutants and not global

warming pollutants, expected that the 100/250 tpy

applicability thresholds would limit PSD to larger

sources.”). According to EPA, “[t]hese results are not

15

consistent with other provisions of the PSD and title

V requirements, and are inconsistent with — and, in-

deed, undermine — congressional purposes for the

PSD and title V provisions.” Pet. App. 305a. EPA

concluded that “applying PSD requirements literally

to GHG sources ... would result in a program that

would have been unrecognizable to the Congress that

designed PSD.” Id. at 345a; see also id. at 380a (ap-

plying Title V requirements literally to GHG sources

“would result in a program unrecognizable to the

Congress that enacted title V”).

The Tailoring Rule was EPA’s response to what it

viewed as a conflict between the explicit statutory

100/250 tpy applicability thresholds and clear con-

gressional intent not to apply the PSD program to

tens of thousands, and the Title V program to mil-

lions, of small sources. In this rule, EPA amended 40

C.F.R. § 51.166 (which provides minimum criteria for

PSD provisions in SIPs) by purporting to make

GHGs subject to PSD starting on January 2, 2011.

This amended rule defines the GHGs regulated un-

der PSD as those GHGs emitted in amounts above

100,000 tpy of “carbon dioxide equivalent”® for new

construction (and above 75,000 tpy of carbon dioxide

equivalent for modifications), id. at 587a, and defines

the GHGs regulated under Title V as those GHGs

5 “GHGs,” as defined by EPA, consist of six separate air pollu-

tants. Each of those pollutants has been assigned a numerical

value based on the pollutant’s “global warming potential,”

which measures each pollutant relative to carbon dioxide. For

example, according to EPA, one ton of methane equals twenty-

one tons of carbon dioxide equivalent. Pet. App. 167a.

16

emitted in amounts above 100,000 tpy of carbon diox-

ide equivalent, id. at 591a. These thresholds are or-

ders of magnitude above the CAA’s 100/250-tpy

thresholds for PSD and Title V permit applicability.‘

Because EPA interpreted the Act to require that

GHGs be regulated the same as other § 7602(g) pol-

lutants, notwithstanding that such regulation would

be contrary to congressional intent for PSD and Title

V, EPA determined that it would reserve authority to

expand regulation of GHGs “step by step” until

GHGs became subject to regulation at the statutory

100/250 tpy thresholds. Jd. at 159a.

8. In promulgating the Tailoring Rule, EPA re-

jected rulemaking comments arguing that (i) Massa-

chusetts did not require EPA to interpret the term

“air pollutant” in the Act’s PSD provisions to include

GHGs, and (ii) EPA was prohibited from undertak-

ing, step by step, to implement a program that con-

tradicts congressional intent. See Response to

Comments at 34-43; see also Comments of the Utility

Air Regulatory Group on the Proposed Prevention of

Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse

Gas Tailoring Rule at 15, 19-40 (Dec. 28, 2009),

Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0517-5317 (UARG

Comments). A panel of the lower court agreed with

EPA on the ground that this result was dictated by

“binding Supreme Court precedent.” Pet. App. 612a.

® Under the Tailoring Rule, GHGs emitted below the rule’s

75,000-tpy and 100,000-tpy PSD thresholds and the rule’s

100,000-tpy Title V threshold are not “air pollutants” subject to

regulation under the PSD and Title V programs, respectively.

17

According to the panel, “Congress made perfectly

clear that the PSD program was meant to protect

against precisely the types of harms caused by

greenhouse gases” because the PSD program’s decla-

ration of purpose includes a reference to the word

“welfare,” which, this Court observed in Massachu-

setts, includes effects on weather and climate. Id. at

76a (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h)). “[G]iven both the

statute’s plain language and the Supreme Court’s

decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,” the panel said it

“ha[d] little trouble concluding that the phrase ‘any

air pollutant’ [in PSD] includes all regulated air pol-

lutants, including greenhouse gases.” Id. at 73a

(emphasis in original).

Having concluded that “Industry Petitioners were

regulated and State Petitioners required to issue

permits not because of anything EPA did in the Tim-

ing and Tailoring Rules, but by automatic operation

of statute,” the panel then concluded that Petitioners

lacked standing to challenge either the Timing Rule

or the Tailoring Rule. Jd. at 100a-101a. According to

the panel, “neither the Timing nor Tailoring Rules

caused the injury Petitioners allege: having to com-

ply with PSD and Title V for greenhouse gases.” Id.

at 10la. These injuries, the panel said, were caused

by the statute and were not remediable by any judg-

ment of the court.

9. The D.C. Circuit denied petitions for rehearing

en banc, with dissenting opinions filed by Judges

Brown and Kavanaugh. In a concurring opinion filed

by the original panel members, those judges reiterat-

ed their conclusions that the Court in Massachusetts

18

“expressly held that the Clean Air Act’s ‘sweeping

definition of “air pollutant” unambiguously includes

greenhouse gases,” id. at 609a (emphasis in original),

and that, based on that reading of Massachusetts,

“the panel’s interpretation of the statute is the only

plausible one,” id. at 611a (emphasis added). By con-

trast, Judges Brown and Kavanaugh explained in

dissent that the statute was open to other readings

and that those readings, which would avoid conflicts

with congressional intent, were plausible. They

would have granted rehearing “for the full court to

consider the propriety of extending Massachusetts to

Title V and the PSD program,” id. at 614a-615a

(Brown, J., dissenting), and “to carefully but firmly

enforce the statutory boundaries” that they conclud-

ed EPA had transgressed, id. at 661a (Kavanaugh,

J., dissenting).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This Court should grant certiorari to address

whether Massachusetts v. EPA compels regulation of

GHGs under the PSD and Title V permitting pro-

grams of the CAA. Certiorari is also needed to clari-

fy that petitioner has standing under this Court’s

settled law on justiciability and to ensure that the

regulated community can obtain judicial review of

agency action regulating GHGs in the D.C. Circuit,

which has exclusive jurisdiction to review many

agency rulemakings, including national rulemakings

under the CAA. Finally, given the expansive regula-

tion that the rules at issue here would compel, this is

an issue of great importance to the Nation.

19

L Certiorari Is Needed To Address Whether

Massachusetts Compels Regulation of

GHGs, Which Include Carbon Dioxide,

Under the CAA’s Title I PSD Program and

Title V of the Act.

According to the panel, Massachusetts unleashed a

cascade of CAA requirements automatically and by

operation of law. The panel found that because un-

der “Massachusetts ... greenhouse gases ‘unambigu-

ous[ly]’ may be regulated as an ‘air pollutant’ under

the Clean Air Act,” id. at 25a, “once [the Motor Vehi-

cle] Rule took effect and made greenhouse gases a

regulated pollutant under Title II of the Act,” that

triggered application of the Title I PSD program “au-

tomatically ... to facilities emitting over 100/250 tpy

of greenhouse gases.” Id. at 71a (emphasis added).

Because millions of small facilities throughout the

Nation emit GHGs at rates greater than 100 tpy,

EPA’s interpretation that Massachusetts compels

regulation of GHGs under these programs would

cause a radical expansion of Title I PSD and Title V

jurisdiction. Programs that Congress enacted to ap-

ply to only a comparative handful of large industrial

facilities would be transformed, overnight, into pro-

grams encompassing innumerable small sources. Id.

at 345a-346a. As EPA explained, these programs

would thereby become unrecognizable to the Con-

gress that enacted them, id. at 345a, and this result

“would, as a practical matter, vitiate much of the

purpose of the 100 tpy [statutory] cut-off for [CAA

applicability to] industrial sources,” id. at 347a.

20

Yet, according to the panel, “given both the stat-

ute’s plain language and the Supreme Court’s deci-

sion in Massachusetts v. EPA, {it had] little trouble

concluding that the phrase ‘any air pollutant’ in-

cludes all regulated air pollutants, including green-

house gases,” for purposes of PSD and Title V. Id. at

73a (emphasis in original). This, the panel held,

“forecloses” any argument that EPA had authority to

interpret the term “air pollutant” more narrowly for

these other CAA programs. Z/d. at 81a; cf. id. at 650a

(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“The panel opinion ...

appears to have been heavily if not dispositively in-

fluenced by Massachusetts v. EPA.”).

But Massachusetts does not compel the conclusion

that an “air pollutant” under 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) is

necessarily an air pollutant for purposes of any indi-

vidual program under the CAA. No party in Massa-

chusetts argued that the scope of the term “air pollu-

tant” under 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) was narrower

than the definition of air pollutant in 42 U.S.C. §

7602(g). And this Court found no reason to adopt a

narrowing interpretation, concluding that “[t]jhe

broad language of [42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) in Title IT}

reflects an intentional effort to confer the flexibility”

needed to regulate a broad range of substances, in-

cluding GHGs. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532.

42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) defines the outer bounds of the

“air pollutants” that are potentially eligible for regu-

lation under the various CAA programs. This is un-

derstandable in a lengthy, expansive statute like the

CAA, which has different programs addressing dif-

ferent pollution problems. In such a statute with

21

several titles and programs, a general definition of

pollutant has to be broad enough to reflect the entire

range of substances that might be regulated under

any one or more of the diverse programs it establish-

es.

EPA’s argument in Massachusetts that GHGs

were not an “air pollutant” under 42 U.S.C. §

7602(g), if accepted, would have been sufficient to re-

solve the question whether GHGs were pollutants

eligible for regulation under 42 U.S.C. § 7521. But,

as Judge Kavanaugh observed, the fact that

“[g]reenhouse gases may qualify as ‘air pollutants’ in

the abstract” does not resolve the definition of “air

pollutant” for each individual regulatory program of

the CAA. Pet. App. 65la n.3 (Kavanaugh, J., dis-

senting); cf. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549

U.S. 561, 574 (2007) (a CAA case decided the same

day as Massachusetts and holding that statutory

terms must be interpreted in light of their context

and the statute as a whole and that the same term

may mean different things in different parts of the

statute).

Indeed, in implementing the CAA over the past

decades, EPA has been careful to define which of the

42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) air pollutants are to be regulated

under each individual CAA program. Thus, while 42

U.S.C. § 7411 provides that new source performance

standards (NSPS) apply whenever a source under-

takes a “physical change ... which increases the

amount of any air pollutant emitted,” 42 U.S.C. §

7411(a)(4) (emphasis added), EPA by regulation has

narrowed the universe of air pollutants that trigger

22

NSPS to those “[air] pollutant(s] to which a standard

applies” under 40 C.F.R. part 60. 40 C.F.R. §

60.14(a). Although 42 U.S.C. § 7491 defines “major

stationary source[s]” to which the CAA visibility pro-

tection program applies as sources that “emit 250

tons or more of any pollutant,” 42 U.S.C. § 7491(g)(7)

(emphasis added), EPA by regulation has defined the

pollutants that trigger this program as a specific set

of “visibility-impairing pollutants,” see, eg., 40

C.F.R. Part 61, App. Y, § [I11.A.2. And, although 42

U.S.C. § 7479 defines “major emitting facilit[ies]”

that are subject to the PSD program as those that

emit more than 100 or 250 tpy of “any air pollutant,”

42 U.S.C. § 7479(1), EPA has by regulation narrowed

the scope of air pollutants that can trigger PSD to

“any regulated NSR [new source review] pollutant,”

40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(1). Finally, in the very rulemak-

ing at issue here, although EPA (and the panel) read

Massachusetts to compel PSD and Title V regulation

of all GHGs, EPA defined GHGs for PSD and Title V

to include only those emitted above the 100,000- or

75,000-tpy levels of carbon dioxide equivalent. Pet.

App. 587a, 591a.

The historic approach that identifies which of the

42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) “air pollutants” are air pollutants

subject to individual CAA programs makes eminent

sense. “Of necessity, Congress selects different regu-

latory regimes to address different problems.” Am.

Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538

(2011). And the same term appearing in different

statutory programs can (indeed, must) be given dif-

ferent regulatory meanings where congressional in-

23

tent is different. See Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d

984, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[I]}t is not impermissible

under Chevron for an agency to interpret an impre-

cise term differently in two separate sections of a

statute which have different purposes.”). “A given

term in the same statute may take on distinct char-

acters from association with distinct statutory ob-

jects calling for different implementation strategies.”

Envtl. Def., 549 U.S. at 574; see also Gen. Dynamics

Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 596-97 (2004)

(‘age” has different meanings within Age Discrimi-

nation in Employment Act); United States v. Cleve-

land Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 212-13

(2001) (‘wages paid” has different meanings within

Social Security Act Amendments of 1939); Robinson

v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1997) (“em-

ployee” has different meanings within Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964).

The CAA is not self-implementing. Rather, rule-

making is required under each of the separate CAA

programs to spell out the specific elements of each.

including the pollutants to which the program ap-

plies. When EPA -— or a reviewing court — seeks to

give content to the term “air pollutant” as used in

each of these programs, 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g)’s broad

definition of air pollutant is always the beginning,

but not the end, of the analysis.

If EPA had engaged in this inquiry here, it would

have narrowed the scope of “air pollutants” covered

by the Title I PSD and Title V permitting programs

to exclude carbon dioxide entirely from those pro-

grams, and not partially and temporarily as FPA did.

24

First, as EPA acknowledged, the explicit statutory

100/250-tpy “threshold limitations” for PSD applica-

bility served as “Congress’s mechanism for limiting

PSD” to a limited number of large industrial facili-

ties. Pet. App. 343a; see also id. at 380a-383a (Title

V). The Act’s 100/250-tpy “major source” numerical

thresholds have a singular meaning that is not sub-

ject to alteration through “interpretation”; these nu-

merical limitations restrict PSD and Title V’s cover-

age to relatively few “large industrial sources,” while

excluding numerous smaller “commercial and resi-

dential sources.” Jd. at 345a-346a; see also id. at

319a (“Congress had reason to expect the total size of

the PSD program to be measured in the hundreds of

permits a year,” not tens of thousands); id. at 382a

(“Congress did not expect” to include “small commer-

cial and residential sources” in Title V).

Thus, the 100/250-tpy statutory language must be

read te define what pollutants are PSD and Title V-

regulated: only those pollutants that “a relatively

small number of large industrial sources” emit in

amounts above the statutory thresholds. Id. at 345a;

see also Response to Comments at 37 (The statutory

“threshold for these source categories makes sense

only in terms of conventional pollutants ... and can-

not be reconciled with an unbounded reading of the

phrase ‘any pollutant subject to regulation.”). Be-

cause many thousands or even millions of small!

sources emit carbon dioxide above these statutory

thresholds, carbon dioxide cannot be a PSD or Title

V pollutant.

25

Furthermore, while 42 U.S.C. § 7521 in Title II of

the CAA focuses on emissions whose presence in the

atmosphere generally may “endanger public health

or welfare,” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), the PSD program

in Title I of the Act focuses on protection of localized

ambient “air quality” — 1.e., the air people breathe in

certain geographically defined 42 U.S.C. § 7407 areas

within a state. Thus, 42 U.S.C. § 7471 provides that

“each applicable [SIP] shall contain emission limita-

tions and such other measures as may be necessary

... to prevent significant deterioration of air quality

in each [air quality control] region,” i.e., the local air

quality control regions designated pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 7407 based on ground-level pollutant meas-

urements. (Emphasis added). Further, 42 U.S.C. §

7475 directs EPA to promulgate regulations govern-

ing analysis of impacts on “ambient air quality” that

might flow from “emissions from [the PSD] facility.”

Id. § 7475(e)(1). Through such provisions, Congress

made clear that the statute’s PSD requirements are

directed not to regulation of emissions of air pollu-

tants that may endanger public health or welfare

due to their uniform presence throughout the global

atmosphere, but rather to such regulation “as may be

necessary ... to prevent significant deterioration” of

the air that people breathe. Id. § 7471.

The PSD program addresses pollutants that dete-

riorate local air quality. By contrast, EPA’s regula-

tion of carbon dioxide, the most prevalent GHG in-

cluded in EPA’s definition of GHGs, is driven not by

concerns over deterioration of local or regional

ground-level air quality but by distinct environmen-

26

tal concerns. As EPA explained in an Advance No-

tice of Proposed Rulemaking published in 2008 (prior

to concluding that it was compelled by the statute

and Massachusetts to regulate stationary-source

GHG emissions), “GHGs become well mixed

throughout the global atmosphere so that the long-

term distribution of GHG concentrations is not de-

pendent on local emission sources. Instead, GHG

concentrations tend to be relatively uniform around

the world.” 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,401 (July 30,

2008). Thus, according to EPA, “GHGs emitted any-

where in the world affect climate everywhere in the

world.” Id.

Accordingly, as EPA recognized, the “global nature

and effect of GHG emissions raise questions regard-

ing the suitability of CAA provisions [like the PSD

provisions] that are designed to protect local and re-

gional air quality by controlling local and regional

emission sources.” Id. at 44,408. Among other

things, “the geographic location of emission sources

and reductions. [is] generally not important to miti-

gating global climate change.” Jd. Moreover,

“Icjurrent and projected levels of ambient concentra-

tions” of GHGs, including carbon dioxide, were “not

expected to cause any direct adverse health effects,

such as respiratory or toxic effects, which would oc-

cur as a result of the elevated GHG concentrations

themselves.” Id. at 44,427. As a result, carbon diox-

ide simply does not have the characteristics of a PSD

pollutant.

Finally, contrary to the panel’s suggestion, see

Pet. App. 76a, the existence of the term “welfare” in

27

the “Congressional declaration of purpose” — a term

that the Act describes (at 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h)) as in-

cluding “effects on ... weather ... and climate” — does

not relieve EPA of its statutory responsibility to de-

termine whether a 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) pollutant such

as GHGs falls within the scope of the PSD program.

As with “air pollutant,” the CAA broadly defines

“welfare” in the general definitions section so as to be

able to serve, to the degree relevant, various pro-

grams within the Act addressing regulation of specif-

ic types of pollution.

In Massachusetts, this Court found that regulation

of GHGs under Title IJ, triggered by a general en-

dangerment finding, would not lead to “extreme,”

“counterintuitive” measures not contemplated by

Congress. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 531. This

Court observed that “EPA has not identified any

congressional action that conflicts in any way with

the regulation of greenhouse gases from new motor

vehicles.” Id. (emphasis added). By contrast, neither

EPA nor the D.C. Circuit ever examined here wheth-

er the GHG “welfare” effects targeted for regulation

were welfare effects addressed by the PSD program,

i.e., effects related to local, ground-level pollution of

the quality of the air people breathe. For all the rea-

sons discussed above, whether GHGs present welfare

concerns on a global basis is immaterial to the ques-

tion before EPA here: whether GHGs are a PSD pol-

lutant.

Certiorari should be granted to address the panel’s

conclusion that this Court’s decision in Massachu-

setts compelled inclusion of a pollutant in the PSD

28

program that does not deteriorate air quality, where

that inclusion expands regulation demonstrably be-

yond the bounds set by Congress.

Il. Certiorari Is Needed To Address the Pan-

el’s Decision that Petitioners Lack Stand-

ing To Challenge the Timing and Tailor-

ing Rules.

In the proceedings below, petitioner challenged

EPA rules that, for the first time in the history of the

CAA, make GHGs a regulated air pollutant under

the PSD and Title V programs. EPA’s Tailoring Rule

definition of what GHGs are subject to PSD and Title

V covers GHG emissions from facilities owned and

operated by members of petitioner, subjecting peti-

tioner's members to new regulatory restrictions. If

petitioner’s challenge to these rules were accepted on

the merits, GHGs could not be included in the PSD

program and any further harm to petitioner's mem-

bers from the rules would thereby be averted.

As predicates for its rulemaking actions at issue

here, EPA simultaneously embraced two incompati-

ble principles of administrative law. See Pet. App.

642a-643a n.1. The first was a “traditional tool[] of

statutory construction,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843

n.9, that EPA labeled the “absurdity” doctrine. Pet.

App. 150a-15la. Under this doctrine, an agency

must refrain from adopting the literal — or most ex-

pansive — reading of a statutory term where such a

construction would be contrary to congressional in-

tent. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489

U.S. 235, 242 (1989). The second was the so-called

doctrine of “administrative necessity,” which applies

29

where an agency cannot fully implement Congress’s

clear intent immediately. See, e.g., Ala. Power Co. v.

Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The ad-

ministrative necessity doctrine allows the agency to

implement a program in phases — one step at a time,

if need be — and thereby, by proceeding incremental-

ly, give full effect to clear congressional intent over

time.

Petitioner argued in EPA’s Tailoring Rule rule-

making and to the court below that, once EPA found

(as it plainly did) that defining “air pollutant” under

the PSD and Title V programs to include GHGs

would produce results inimical to congressional in-

tent, EPA was obligated to interpret “air pollutant”

as used in PSD and Title V more narrowly to exclude

GHGs. Administrative necessity, a doctrine designed

to give effect to congressional intent, could never be

invoked to justify agency rulemaking action designed

to transform — even incrementally — the PSD and Ti-

tle V programs into something Congress indisputably

never contemplated.

Yet, after reaching its conclusion that Massachu-

setts compelled rejection of petitioner’s statutory ar-

gument, the panel dismissed for lack of subject mat-

ter jurisdiction the petitions for review of the Timing

and Tailoring Rules, including the argument of peti-

tioner that “EPA exceeded the boundaries of its law-

ful [statutory] authority” in adopting a phased pro-

gram for GHG regulation that would end in PSD and

Title V programs that Congress never intended. Pet.

App. 99a. According to the panel, the CAA’s defini-

tion of “air pollutant,” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g), as inter-

30

preted by this Court in Massachusetts, “requires PSD

and Title V permits for major emitters of greenhouse

gases.” Pet. App. 95a. As a result, the panel con-

cluded,

Industry Petitioners were regulated ... not

because of anything EPA did in the Timing

and Tailoring Rules, but by automatic op-

eration of the statute. Given this, neither

the Timing nor Tailoring Rules caused the

injury Petitioners allege: having to comply

with PSD and Title V for greenhouse gases.

Indeed, the Timing and Tailoring Rules ac-

tually mitigate Petitioners’ purported inju-

ries.

Id. at 100a-101a (emphases added). Only by reach-

ing the merits on Massachusetts grounds (without

even mentioning the “congressional intent” canon of

construction upon which petitioner’s statutory inter-

pretation argument was based) could the panel find

that “Petitioners lack Article III standing to chal-

lenge both [the Timing and Tailoring] rules.” Id. at

96a (emphasis omitted).

In this case, petitioner argued that EPA’s conclu-

sion that PSD and Title V regulation of GHGs would

produce results contrary to congressional intent re-

quired a narrowing interpretation of the broad defi-

nition of “air pollutant” to exclude GHGs for purpos-

es of the PSD and Title V programs. See UARG

Comments at 34-39. The panel’s refusal — on pur-

ported standing grounds — to “address the merits of

[petitioner's] ... claims” that any EPA phase-in of

31

GHG requirements would produce results contrary to

congressional intent, Pet. App. 99a, improperly con-

flated the merits with Article III standing. See Steel

Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93, 95-

97 (1998) (rejecting an approach that “convert{s] the

merits issue in this case into a jurisdictional one”); cf.

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (nonexistence of a

cause of action not a proper basis for a jurisdictional

dismissal).

Here, petitioner suffers injury in fact from EPA

rules that require its members’ stationary sources to

apply for permits that restrict their GHG emissions

beginning January 2, 2011 (the date established by

EPA’s Timing Rule). If petitioner’s statutory con-

struction argument were accepted — thereby estab-

lishing that GHGs are not an air pollutant that is

subject to PSD and Title V requirements — its mem-

bers’ present injury caused by GHG regulation would

be redressed. Nothing more is required for petitioner

to demonstrate standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The panel's

decision is, thus, at odds with this Court’s settled

case law on justiciability.

The panel’s standing decision is particularly trou-

blesome insofar as it establishes precedent with re-

spect to future phases of EPA’s PSD regulatory pro-

gram for GHGs. If petitioner lacks Article III stand-

ing here — on the asserted grounds that EPA’s pur-

suit of an expansion of CAA stationary-source juris-

diction that is incompatible with congressional ..:tent

in steps, rather than all at once, “mitigate[s] Peti-

tioners’ purported injuries,” Pet. App. 10la — then

32

petitioner's standing to object to further steps in pur-

suit of this unlawful end is also at risk. Certiorari is

needed to clarify the law on standing for the D.C.

Circuit — the court with exclusive jurisdiction to re-

view nationally applicable rules under the CAA and

many other federal regulatory statutes — in a context

that is of extraordinary importance for the Nation.

ll. This Petition Raises an Unusually Im-

portant Question of Federal Law.

In Massachusetts, this Court recognized the “unu-

sual importance” of questions concerning EPA’s au-

thority to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA.

549 U.S. at 506. This case presents, if anything, is-

sues of even greater importance than the questions

presented in that case, given the extraordinary ex-

pansion of CAA Title I jurisdiction at stake.

The Court observed in Massachusetts that reading

42 U.S.C. § 7521 to encompass regulation of emis-

sions of GHGs under Title II of the CAA from new

motor vehicles “would lead to no ... extreme

measures.” Id. at 531 (emphasis added). In fact, the

Court observed, regulation of GHG emissions from

motor vehicles and engines under Title II would “not

directly expand or contract the universe of vehicles

and engines subject to” that program. Pet. App.

632a. On this basis the Court distinguished its deci-

sion in Food & Drug Administration v. Brown & Wil-

liamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), setting

aside a regulatory expansion of Food and Drug Ad-

ministration authority over tobacco products. Mas-

sachusetts, 549 U.S. at 531 (“common sense’ intui-

33

tion [suggested] that Congress never meant to re-

move those products from circulation”).

In contrast, as EPA acknowledged, extending PSD

and Title V requirements to GHG emissions from

stationary sources would “subject an extraordinarily

large number of sources, more than 81,000, to PSD

each year, an increase of almost 300-fold” in CAA ju-

risdiction, Pet. App. 339a, and would “expand [the

Title V program] from the current 14,700 sources to

some 6.1 million,” id. at 380a. This, EPA observed,

would impose impossible burdens on states that are

responsible for issuing CAA permits and that will be

confronted with a massive and unprecedented esca-

lation in the number of permit proceedings. And be-

cause PSD permits are required prior to construction

of new and modified sources, reading Massachusetts

to mandate automatic application of PSD require-

ments to GHGs threatens to give se to profound

economic impacts across the Nation. As EPA recog-

nized, if source owners and operators are unable to

obtain PSD permits authorizing new construction or

existing-source modifications for tens of thousands of

facilities per year, for any reason — including the

states’ and EPA’s inability to process a large number

of permits - economic activity in many areas of the

country would be seriously impaired. See 74 Fed.

Reg. at 55,344 (According to EPA, once GHGs were

regulated under Title II, the PSD program, “by its

terms, prohibits a source that is subject to PSD from

constructing or modifying without a permit.”); see

also id. at 55,294.

34

EPA’s action here opened uncharted vistas of CAA

Title I and Title V jurisdiction over small sources

across the country and for every state permitting au-

thority — jurisdiction Congress never contemplated

would exist. And because the panel below found that

no petitioner had standing to challenge the merits of

EPA’s two rules authorizing a step-by-step expansion

of CAA Title I and Title V jurisdiction to capture

hosts of small sources throughout the Nation, EPA’s

continuing regulatory actions could wholly escape

judicial review if the panel’s judgment is left undis-

turbed.

This Court should grant certiorari to address a de-

cision that has profound and far-reaching implica-

tions for administrative law generally, for states, for

the Nation’s economy, and for the present and future

administration of the CAA.

35

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

F. WILLIAM BROWNELL

(Counsel of Record)

NORMAN W. FICHTHORN

HENRY V. NICKEL

ALLISON D. Woop

HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP

2200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 955-1500

bbrownell@hunton.com

March 20, 2013 Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDIX

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No.

BRIEFS ae

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP,

Petitioner,

Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

APPENDIX VOLUME I OF ITI

F. WILLIAM BROWNELL

(Counsel of Record)

NORMAN W. FICHTHORN

HENRY V. NICKEL

ALLISON D. Woop

HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP

2200 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., NW

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20037

(202) 955-1500

bbrownell@hunton.com

March 20, 2013 Counsel for Petitioner

RF SN RN, TERMITE A OH ERE ANNO CRN A TR NN AN AT

WILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 — WAsHiINGTON, D. C. 20002

Library of Congress

Law Library

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME I:

APPENDIX A: Order of U.S. Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Dismissing Petitions for Review of Timing

and Tailoring Rules and Denying Other Peti-

SS Re OE nee

APPENDIX B: Opinion of U.S. Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit..........

APPENDIX C: U.S. Environmental Protec-

tion Agency, Reconsideration of Interpreta-

tion of Regulations That Determine Pollu-

tants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting

APPENDIX D: U.S. Environmental Protec-

tion Agency, Prevention of Significant Dete-

rioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-

ing Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010)

SN SIME Pictcncusndconnsesdiniinasennsiionnsnineninmnenese

Page

APPENDIX E: Order of U.S. Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Denying Panel Rehearing.............................-.00000

VOLUME IIT:

APPENDIX F: Order of U.S. Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Denying Petitions for Rehearing En Banc of

Chamber of Commerce of the United States

of America and National Association of

APPENDIX G: Order of U.S. Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc of

Pacific Legal Foundation ....................ccccecceeeeeeeeeee

APPENDIX H: Federal Statutes .........................

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 09-1322 September Term, 2011

Filed On: June 26, 2012

COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC.,

ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT

STATE OF MICHIGAN, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with 10-1024, 10-1025, 10-1026, 10-

1030, 10-1035, 10-1036, 10-1037, 10-1038, 10-1039,

10-1040, 10-1041, 10-1042, 10-1044, 10-1045, 10-

1046, 10-1234, 10-1235, 10-1239, 10-1245, 10-1281,

10-1310, 10-1318, 10-1319, 10-1320, 10-1321

No. 10-1073

COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC.,

ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT

AMERICAN FROZEN FOOD INSTITUTE, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with 10-1083, 10-1099, 10-1109, 10-

1110, 10-1114, 10-1118, 10-1119, 10-1120, 10-1122,

10-1123, 10-124, 10-1125, 10-1126, 10-1127, 10-1128,

10-1129, 10-1131, 10-1132, 10-1145, 10-1147, 10-

1148, 10-1199, 10-1200, 10-1201, 10-1202, 10-1203,

10-1206, 10-1207, 10-1208, 10-1210, 10-1211, 10-

1212, 10-1213, 10-1216, 10-1218, 10-1219, 10-1220,

10-1221, 10-1222

No. 10-1092

COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC.,

ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT

LANGBOARD, INC. — MDF, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with 10-1094, 10-1134, 10-1143, 10-

1144, 10-1152, 10-1156, 10-1158, 10-1159, 10-1160,

10-1161, 10-1162, 10-1163, 10-1164, 10-1166, 10-

1182

No. 10-1167

AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL,

PETITIONER

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND

LISA PEREZ JACKSON , ADMINISTRATOR,

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENTS

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with 10-1168, 10-1169, 10-1170, 10-

1173, 10-1174, 10-1175, 10-1176, 10-1177, 10-1178,

10-1179, 10-1180

On Petitions for Review of Final Actions of the

Environmental Protection Agency

BEFORE: Sentelle, Chief Judge, Rogers and Tatel,

Circuit Judges

5a

JUDGMENT

These causes came on to be heard on the petitions

for review of final actions of the Environmental! Pro-

tection Agency and were argued by counsel. On con-

sideration thereof, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Timing

and Tailoring petitions for review be dismissed, and

the remainder of the petitions be denied, in accord-

ance with the opinion of the court filed herein this

date.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY:

/a/

Jennifer M. Clark

Deputy Clerk

Date: June 26, 2012

Opinion Per Curiam

6a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 28 and 29, 2012

Decided June 26, 2012

No. 09-1322

COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC.,

ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT

STATE OF MICHIGAN, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with 10-1024, 10-1025, 10-1026, 10-

1030, 10-1035, 10-1036, 10-1037, 10-1038, 10-1039,

10-1040, 10-1041, 10-1042, 10-1044, 10-1045, 10-

1046, 10-1234, 10-1235, 10-1239, 10-1246, 10-1281,

10-1310, 10-1318, 10-1319, 10-1320, 10-1321

On Petitions for Review of Final Actions

of the Environmental Protection Agency

Ta

Patrick R. Day, Harry W. MacDougald, and Jef-

frey Bossert Clark argued the causes for Non-State

Petitioners and Supporting Intervenors. With them

on the briefs were John J. Burns, Attorney General,

Office of the Attorney General of the State of Alaska,

Steven E. Mulder, Chief Assistant Attorney General,

Peter Glaser, Mark E. Nagle, Matthew Dukes, Paul

D. Phillips, John A. Bryson, Ellen Steen, Eric Groten,

John P. Elwood, James A. Holtkamp, Chet M.

Thompson, Robin S. Conrad, Rachel L. Brand, Shel-

don Gilbert, Quentin Riegel, Jeffrey A. Rosen, Robert

R. Gasaway, William H. Burgess, Sam Kazman,

Hans Bader, Matthew G. Paulson, Harry Moy Ng,

Michele Marie Schoeppe, Michael R. Barr, Alexandra

M. Walsh, Adam J. White, Jeffrey A. Lamken, Timo-

thy K. Webster, Roger R. Martella, Neal J. Cabral,

Theodore Hadzi-Antich, Ashley C. Parrish, Cynthia

A. M. Stroman, Scott C. Oostdyk, Gordon R. Alphon-

so, Shannon L. Goessling, Edward A. Kazmarek, F.

William Brownell, Norman W. Fichthorn, Henry V.

Nickel, and Allison D. Wood. Paul D. Clement, Mark

W. DeLaquil, Andrew M. Grossman, and David B.

Rivin, Jr. entered appearances.

E. Duncan Getchell, Jr., Solicitor General, Office

of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of

Virginia, argued the cause for State Petitioners Tex-

as and Virginia on Denial of Reconsideration of the

Endangerment Finding and State Petitioners and

Supporting Intervenors on Endangerment Finding

Delegation Issues. With him on the briefs were Ken-

neth T. Cuccinelli, IT, Attorney General, Stephen R.

McCullough, Senior Appellate Counsel, Charles E.

8a

James Jr., Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Wes-

ley G. Russell, Jr., Deputy Attorney General.

Greg Abbott, Attorney General, Office of the At-

torney General for the State of Texas, Bill Cobb,

Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation, J. Reed

Ciay, Jr., Special Assistant and Senior Counsel to

the Attorney General, Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor

General, Michael P. Murphy, Assistant Solicitor

General, Luther Strange III, Attorney General, Office

of the Attorney General for the State of Alabama,

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Office of the At-

torney General for the State of Florida, Gregory F.

Zoeller, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney

General for the State of Indiana, Jack Conway, At-

torney General, Office of the Attorney General for

the Commonwealth of Kentucky, James D. “Buddy”

Caldwell, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney

General for the State of Louisiana, Bill Schuette, At-

torney General, Office of the Attorney General for

the State of Michigan, John J. Bursch, Solicitor Gen-

eral, Neil D. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General,

Gary C. Rikard, Jon Bruning, Attorney General, Of-

fice of the Attorney General for the State of Nebras-

ka, Katherine J. Spohn, Special Counsel to the At-

torney General, Wayne Stenehjem, Attorney General,

Office of the Attorney General for the State of North

Dakota, Margaret Olson, Assistant Attorney Gen-

eral, Scott Pruitt, Attorney General, Office of the At-

torney General for the State of Oklahoma, Alan Wil-

son, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General

for the State of South Carolina, Marty Jackley, At-

torney General, Office of the Attorney General for

9a

the States of South Dakota, Roxanne Giedd, Chief,

Civil Litigation Division, Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney

General, Office of the Attorney General for the State

of Utah, and Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, IT, Attorney Gen-

eral, Office of the Attorney General for the Com-

monwealth of Virginia were on the briefs for State

Petitioners and Supporting Intervenors. Robert D.

Tambling, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General for the State of Alabama, entered

an appearance.

Christian J. Ward, Scott A. Keller, and April L.

Farris were on the brief for amici curiae Scientists in

support of Petitioners.

Derek Schmidt, Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General for the State of Kansas, and John

Campbell, Chief Deputy Attorney General, were on

the brief for amicus curiae State of Kansas in sup-

port of Petitioners.

Martin R. Levin, Michael J. O'Neill, Donald M.

Falk, Mark S. Kaufman, Steven J. Lechner, and

Richard P. Hutchison were on the brief for amici cu-

riae Landmark Legal Foundation, et al. in support of

Petitioners.

Jon M. Lipshultz and Angeline Purdy, Attorneys,

U.S. Department of Justice, argued the causes for

respondent. With them on the brief were John Han-

non, Carol Holmes, and Steven Silverman, U.S. En-

vironmental Protection Agency, Attorneys. Thomas

A. Lorenzen, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

entered an appearance.

10a

Carol Iancu, Assistant Attorney General, Office of

the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Mas-

sachusetts, argued the cause for State and Environ-

mental Intervenors in support of respondents. With

her on the briefs were Martha Coakley, Attorney

General, William L. Pardee, Attorney Assistant Gen-

eral, Sean H. Donahue, Howard I. Fox, David S.

Baron, Megan Ceronsky, Vickie L. Patton, Peter Zal-

zal, Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Office of

the Attorney General for the State of California,

Kathleen A. Kenealy, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen-

eral, Marc N. Melnick and Nicholas Stern, Deputy

Attorneys General, Joseph R. Biden, III, Attorney

General, Office of the Attorney General for the State

of Delaware, Valerie M. Satterfield, Deputy Attorney

General, George Jepsen, Attorney General, Office of

the Attorney General for the State of Connecticut,

Kimberly P. Massicotte, Matthew I. Levine, Scott N.

Koschwitz, Assistant Attorneys General, Lisa Madi-

gan, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney Gen-

eral for the State of Illinois, Gerald T. Karr, Assis-

tant Attorney General, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney

General, Office of the Attorney General for the State

of Iowa, David R. Sheridan, Assistant Attorney Gen-

eral, Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General, Office of

the Attorney General for the State of Maryland,

Mary E. Raivel, Assistant Attorney General, Michael

A. Delaney, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney

General for the State of New Hampshire, K. Allen

Brooks, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William

J. Schneider, Attorney General, Office of the Attor-

ney General for the State of Maine, Gerald D. Reid,

lla

Assistant Attorney General, Lori Swanson, Attorney

General, Office of the Attorney General for the State

of Minnesota, Jocelyn F. Olson, Assistant Attorney

General, Gary K. King, Attorney General, Office of

the Attorney General for the State of New Mexico,

Stephen R. Farris, Assistant Attorney General, Eric

T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Office of the At-

torney General for the State of New York, Michael -/.

Myers and Yueh-Ru Chu, Assistant Attorneys Gen-

eral, John Kroger, Attorney General, Office of the At-

torney General for the State of Oregon, Paul Logan,

Assistant Attorney-in-Charge, Robert M. McKenna,

Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for

the State of Washington, Leslie R. Seffern, Assistant

Attorney General, Peter F. Kilmartin, Attorney Gen-

eral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of

Rhode Island, Gregory S. Schultz, Special Assistant

Attorney General, William H. Sorrell, Attorney Gen-

eral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of

Vermont, Thea J. Schwartz, Assistant Attorney Gen-

eral, Christopher King, Assistant Corporation Coun-

sel, Corporation Counsel for the City Of New York,

Ann B. Weeks, Helen D. Silver, David Doniger, Mele-

ah Geertsma, Morgan Butler, Frank W. Rambo, Jo-

seph Mendelson III, Craig Holt Segall, and Joanne

Spalding.

Deborah Sivas, Douglas A. Ruley, Edward Lloyd,

and Susan J. Kraham were on the brief for amici cu-

riae America’s Great Waters Coalition, et al. in sup-

port of respondent. James K. Thornton entered an

appearance.

12a

No. 10-1073

COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC.,

ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT

AMERICAN FROZEN FOOD INSTITUTE, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with 10-1083, 10-1099, 10-1109, 10-

1110, 10-1114, 10-1118, 10-1119, 10-1120, 10-1122,

10-1123, 10-1124, 10-1125, 10-1126, 10-1127, 10-

1128, 10-1129, 10-1131, 10-1132, 10-1145, 10-1147,

10-1148, 10-1199, 10-1200, 10-1201, 10-1202, 10-

1203, 10-1206, 10-1207, 10-1208, 10-1210, 10-1211,

10-1212, 10-1213, 10-1216, 10-1218, 10-1219, 10-

1220, 10-1221, 10-1222

On Petitions for Review of Final Agency Action

of the Environmental Protection Agency

13a

Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, Office of

the Attorney General for the State of Texas, argued

the cause for State Petitioners and Supporting Inter-

venor. With him on the briefs were Gregg Abbott, At-

torney General, Bill Cobb, Deputy Attorney General,

J. Reed Clay, Jr., Special Assistant and Senior Coun-

sel to the Attorney General, Michael P. Murphy and

James P. Sullivan, Assistant Solicitors General, Lu-

ther Strange, Attorney General, Office of the Attor-

ney General for the State of Alabama, Herman Rob-

inson, Donald Trahan, Kathy M. Wright, Gary C. Ri-

kard, John Bruning, Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General for the State of Nebraska, Kathe-

rine J. Spohn, Special Counsel, Wayne Stenehjem,

Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for

the State of North Dakota, Margaret Olson, Assis-

tant Attorney General, Alan Wilson, Attorney Gen-

eral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of

South Carolina, J. Emory Smith, Jr., Assistant Dep-

uty Attorney General, Marty Jackley, Attorney Gen-

eral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of

South Dakota, Roxanne Giedd, Chief, and Kenneth T..

Cuccinelli, IT, Attorney General, Office of the Attor-

ney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia.

Mark W. DeLaquil, Earle D. Getchell, Jr., Assistant

Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for

the Commonwealth of Virginia, Andrew M. Gross-

man, David B. Rivkin, Jr., and Robert D. Tambling,

Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney

General for the State of Alabama, entered appear-

ances.

l4a

F. William Brownell and Peter Keisler argued the

causes for Non-State Petitioners and Supporting In-

tervenors. With them on the briefs were Norman W.

Fichthorn, Henry V. Nickel, Allison D. Wood, Charles

H. Knauss, Shannon S. Broome, Timothy K. Webster,

Roger R. Martella, Eric Groten, Patrick R. Day, John

A. Bryson, Matthew G. Paulson, John P. Elwood,

Paul D. Phillips, James A. Holtkamp, Shannon L.

Goessling, Harry W. MacDougald, William H. Lewis,

Jr., Ronald J. Tenpas, Gordon R. Alphonso, Edward

A. Kazmarek, Chet M. Thompson, Neal J. Cabral,

Scott C. Oostdyk, Richard P. Hutchison, John Jd.

McMackin, dr., Robin S. Conrad, Sheldon Gilbert,

Michael W. Steinberg, Levi McAllister, Jeffrey A.

Rosen, Robert R. Gasaway, Jeffrey Bossert Clark,

William H. Burgess, Ashley C. Parrish, Cynthia A.M.

Stroman, Ellen Steen, Leslie Sue Ritts, Peter Glaser,

Mark E. Nagle, Terry J. Satterlee, Thomas J. Grever,

Margaret Claiborne Campbell, Bryon W. Kirkpatrick,

Quentin Riegel, Elizabeth Gaudio, Elizabeth Henry

Warner, Harry Moy Ng, Michele Marie Schoeppe,

Thomas J. Ward, and Peter H. Wyckoff. Mark A.

Behrens, Paul D. Clement, Matthew Dukes, Virginia

L. Hudson, and David B. Salmons entered appear-

ances.

Jonathan S. Massey was on the brief for amicus

curtae Municipal Gas Commission of Missouri.

John G. Horne, II, Samuel B. Boxerman and

Leslie A. Hulse were on the brief for amici curiae the

Commonwealth of Kentucky and the American

15a

Chemistry Council in support of petitioners. Angus

Macbeth entered an appearance.

Amanda Shafer Berman and Perry M Rosen, At-

torneys, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the

causes for respondents. With them on the briefs were

Howard Hoffman, Elliott Zenick, Brian Doster, and

David Orlin, Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency. Thomas A. Lorenzen and Kim N. Smaczniak,

Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, and John D.

Gunter, IT and Michele L. Walter, Counsel, U.S. En-

vironmental Protection Agency, entered appearances.

Sean H. Donahue and Michael J. Myers argued

the causes for State and Environmental Intervenors

in support of respondents. With them on the briefs

were Vickie L. Patton, Pamela A. Campos, Megan Ce-

ronsky, Petere Zalzal, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attor-

ney General, Office of the Attorney General for the

State of New York, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor

General, Morgan A. Costello, Assistant Attorney

General, Monica Wagner, Howard I. Fox, David S.

Baron, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General for the State of Illinois, Gerald T.

Karr, Assistant Attorney General, Joanne Spalding,

Nathan Matthews, Craig Holt Segall, Kamala D.

Harris, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney

General for the State of California, Kathleen A. Ke-

nealy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan

Durbin, Raissa Lerner, Marc N. Melnick, and Nicho-

las Stern, Deputy Attorneys General, Martha Coak-

ley, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General

for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, William L.

16a

Pardee and Carol Iancu, Assistant Attorneys Gen-

eral, David Doniger, Meleah Geertsma, William J.

Schneider, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney

General for the State of Maine, Gerald D. Ried, As-

sistant Attorney General, Ann B. Weeks, Helen D.

Silver, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Office of

the Attorney General for the State of Iowa, David R.

Sheridan, Assistant Attorney General, Douglas F.

Gansler, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney

General for the State of Maryland, Mary Raivel,

Deputy Attorney General, Michael A. Delaney, At-

torney General, Office of the Attorney General for

the State of New Hampshire, K. Allen Brooks, Senior

Assistant Attorney General, Barbara Baird, William

B.Wong, Peter F. Kilmartin, Attorney General, Office

of the Attorney General for the State of Rhode Is-

land, Gregory S. Schultz, Special Assistant Attorney

General, Frank Rambo, Morgan Butler, Gary K.

King, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney Gen-

eral for the State of New Mexico, Stephen Farris, As-

sistant Attorney General, John Kroger, Attorney

General, Office of the Attorney General for the State

of Oregon, Paul Logan, Assistant Attorney-in-

Charge, Roy Cooper, Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General for the State of North Carolina,

and J. Allen Jernigan and Marc Bernstein, Special

Deputy Attorneys General. Kenneth P. Alex and

Gavin G. McCabe, Deputy Assistant Attorneys Gen-

eral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of

California, entered appearances.

17a

No. 10-1092

COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC.,

ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENT

LANGBOARD, INC. -MDF, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with 10-1094, 10-1134, 10-1143, 10-

1144, 10-1152, 10-1156, 10-1158, 10-1159, 10-1160,

10-1161, 10-1162, 10-1163, 10-1164, 10-1166, 10-

1182

On Petitions for Review of Final Actions

of the Environmental Protection Agency

Peter Glaser argued the cause for petitioners.

With him on the briefs were John P. Elwood, Eric

Groten, Patrick R. Day, John A. Bryson, Shannon L.

Goessling, Harry W. MacDougald, Paul D. Phillips,

James A. Holtkamp, Edward A. Kazmarek, Chet M.

18a

Thompson, Sam Kazman, Hans Bader, Gordon R.

Alphonso, Richard P. Hutchison, Neal J. Cabral,

Scott C. Oostdyk, Ronald J. Tenpas, Michael W.

Steinberg, Levi McAllister, John J. McMackin Jdr.,

Robin S. Conrad, Rachel L. Brand, Sheldon Gilbert,

F. William Brownell, Norman W. Fichthorn, Henry

V. Nickel, Allison D. Wood, Ashley C. Parrish. Cyn-

thia A.M. Stroman, Mark E. Nagle, Michael ‘iiggins,

Ellen Steen, Timothy K. Websier, Roger R. Martella,

Matthew G. Paulson, Charles H. Knauss, Shannon S.

Broome, Quentin Riegel, Elizabeth Gaudio, Thomas

J. Ward, Harry Moy Ng, and Michele Marie

Schoeppe.

Greg Abbott, Attorney General, Office of the At-

torney General for the State of Texas, Bill Cobb,

Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation, Jona-

than F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, J. Reed Clay ¢Jr.,

Special Assistant and Senior Counsel to the Attorney

General, Michael P. Murphy, Assistant Solicitor

General, Luther Strange, Attorney General, Office of

the Attorney General for the State of Alabama,

Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Office of the At-

torney General for the State of Georgia, John E.

Hennelly, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Gary

C. Rikard, Jon C. Bruning, Attorney General, Office

of the Attorney General for the State of Nebraska,

Katherine J. Spohn, Special Counsel to the Attorney

General, Wayne K. Stenehjem, Attorney General, Of-

fice of the Attorney General for the State of North

Dakota, Margaret Olson, Assistant Attorney General,

Alan Wilson, Attorney General, Office of the Attor-

ney General for the State of South Carolina, -/.

19a

Emory Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Attorney Gen-

eral, Marty Jackley, Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General for the State of North Dakota,

Roxanne Giedd, Chief, Civil Litigation Division, and

Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, IT, Attorney General, Office of

the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Vir-

ginia, were on the briefs for State Petitioners and

Supporting Intervenor. Paul D. Clement, James W.

Coleman, Wayne J. D'Angelo, Mark W. DeLaquil, E.

Duncan Getchell Jr., Solicitor General, Office of the

Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia,

Andrew M. Grossman, Virginia L. Hudson, David B.

Rivkin Jr., and Robert D. Tambling, Assistant Attor-

ney General, Office of the Attorney General for the

State of Alabama, entered appearances.

Samuel B. Boxerman and Leslie A. Hulse were on

the brief for amicus curiae American Chemistry

Council in support of petitioners. Angus Macbeth en-

tered an appearance.

Eric G. Hostetler, Attorney, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the cause for respondents. With him

on the brief were John Hannon and Steven Silver-

man, Attorneys, U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency.

Raymond B. Ludwiszewski argued the cause for

intervenors Association of Global Automakers, et al.

With him on the brief were Kathleen M. Sullivan,

Sanford I. Weisburst, and William B. Adams.

Gavin G. McCabe, Deputy Attorney General, Of-

fice of the Attorney General for the State of Califor-

20a

nia, argued the cause for intervenor State of Califor-

nia. On the brief were Kamala D. Harris, Attorney

General, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Senior Assistant At-

torney General, Marc N. Melnick and Nicholas Stern,

Deputy Attorneys General, Sean H. Donahue, How-

ard I. Fox, David S. Baron, Pamela Campos, Megan

Ceronsky, Vickie L. Patton, Peter Zalzal, Joseph R.

Biden, III, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney

General for the State of Delaware, Valerie M. Satter-

field, Deputy Attorney General, Thomas J. Miller,

Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for

the State of Iowa, David R. Sheridan, Assistant At-

torney General, Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney Gen-

eral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of

Maryland, Roberta R. James, Assistant Attorney

General, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General. Office of

the Attorney General for the State of Illinois, Gerald

T. Karr, Assistant Attorney General, William T.

Schneider, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney

General for the State of Maine, Gerald D. Reid, As-

sistant Attorney General, Martha Coakley, Attorney

General, Office of the Attorney General for the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Carol Iancu, Tra-

cy Triplett, and William L. Pardee, Assistant Attor-

neys General, Gary K. King, Attorney General, Office

of the Attorney General for the State of New Mexico,

Stephen R. Farris, Assistant Attorney General, John

Kroger, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney

General for the State of Oregon, Paul Logan, Assis-

tant Attorney-in-Charge, William H. Sorrell, Attor-

ney General, Office of the Attorney General for the

State of Vermont, Thea J. Schwartz, Assistant At-

2la

torney General, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney

General, Office of the Attorney General for the State

of New York, Michael J. Myers and Yueh-Ru Chu,

Assistant Attorneys General, Peter F. Kilmartin, At-

torney General, Office of the Attorney General for

the State of Rhode Island, Gregory S. Schultz, Spe-

cial Assistant Attorney General, Robert M. McKenna,

Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for

the State of Washington, Leslie R. Seffern, Assistant

Attorney General, Christopher King, Assistant Cor-

poration Counsel, Corporation Counsel for the City of

New York, Joanne Spalding, Craig Holt Segall, Da-

vid Doniger and Meleah Geertsma. Judith A. Stahl

Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the At-

torney General for the State of New Mexico, and

John D. Walke entered appearances.

Richard E. Ayres, Jessica L. Olson, and Kristin L.

Hines were on the brief for amicus curiae Honeywell

International, Inc. in support of respondents.

Richard L. Revesz, Michael A. Livermore, and

Jennifer S. Rosenberg were on the brief for amicus

curiae Institute for Policy Integrity at New York

University School of Law in support of respondents.

22a

No. 10-1167

AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL,

PETITIONER

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND

LISA PEREZ JACKSON, ADMINISTRATOR,

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENTS

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

’ AMERICA, ET AL..,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with 10-1168, 10-1169, 10-1170, 10-

1173, 10-1174, 10-1175, 10-1176, 10-1177, 10-1178,

10-1179, 10-1180

On Petitions for Review of a Final Action

of the Environmental Protection Agency

Timothy K. Webster, Roger R. Martella, /dr.,

James W. Coleman, William H. Lewis, Jr., Ronald J.

Tenpas, Charles H. Knauss, Shannon S. Broome,

Bryan M. Killian, and Matthew G. Paulson were on

23a

the ix1ei%s for petitioners. Peter D. Keisler, Leslie A.

Hulse, and Quentin Riegel entered appearances.

Amanda Shafer Berman and Perry M. Rosen, At-

torneys, U.S. Department of Justice, and Elliott Zen-

ick and Howard J. Hoffman, Counsel, U.S. Environ-

mental Protection Agency, were on the brief for re-

spondents. Jon M. Lipshultz, Senior Counsel, U.S.

Department of Justice, entered and appearance.

Ann Brewster Weeks, Sean H. Donahue, Vickie

Patton, Peter Zaizal, Joanne Spalding, Craig Segall,

David Doniger, and Meleah Geertsma were on the

brief of intervenors in support of respondents. David

S. Baron, Pamela A. Campos, Colin C. O’Brien, and

John D. Walke entered appearances.

Vera P. Pardee, Brendan R. Cummings, and Kev-

in P. Bundy were on the brief for amicus curiae Cen-

ter for Biological Diversity in support of respondents.

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge; ROGERS and

TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: Following the Supreme Court’s de-

cision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497

(2007)—-which clarified that greenhouse gases are an

“air pollutant” subject to regulation under the Clean

Air Act (CAA)—the Environmental Protection Agen-

cy promulgated a series of greenhouse gas-related

rules. First, EPA issued an Endangerment Finding,

in which it determined that greenhouse gases may

“reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health

or welfare.” See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). Next, it is-

24a

sued the Tailpipe Rule, which set emission standards

for cars and light trucks. Finally, EPA determined

that the CAA requires major stationary sources of

greenhouse gases to obtain construction and operat-

ing permits. But because immediate regulation of all

such sources would result in overwhelming permit-

ting burdens on permitting authorities and sources,

EPA issued the Timing and Tailoring Rules, in which

it determined that only the largest stationary sources

would initially be subject to permitting require-

ments.

Petitioners, various states and industry groups,

challenge all these rules, arguing that they are based

on improper constructions of the CAA and are other-

wise arbitrary and capricious. But for the reasons set

forth below, we conclude: 1) the Endangerment Find-

ing and Tailpipe Rule are neither arbitrary nor ca-

pricious; 2) EPA’s interpretation of the governing

CAA provisions is unambiguously correct; and 3) no

petitioner has standing to challenge the Timing and

Tailoring Rules. We thus dismiss for lack of jurisdic-

tion all petitions for review of the Timing and Tailor-

ing Rules, and deny the remainder of the petitions.

I.

We begin with a brief primer on greenhouse gas-

es. As their name suggests, when released into the

atmosphere, these gases act “like the ceiling of a

greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the

escape of reflected heat.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549

U.S. at 505. A wide variety of modern human activi-

ties result in greenhouse gas emissions; cars, power

25a

plants, and industrial sites all release significant

amounts of these heat- trapping gases. In recent dec-

ades “[a] well-documented rise in global tempera-

tures has coincided with a significant increase in the

concentration of [greenhouse gases] in the atmos-

phere.” Id. at 504-05. Many scientists believe that

mankind’s greenhouse gas emissions are driving this

climate change. These scientists predict that global

climate change will cause a host of deleterious conse-

quences, including drought, increasingly severe

weather events, and rising sea levels.

The genesis of this litigation came in 2007, when

the Supreme Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA

that greenhouse gases “unambiguousi[ly]” may be

regulated as an “air pollutant” under the Clean Air

Act (“CAA”). Id. at 529. Squarely rejecting the con-

tention—then advanced by EPA—that “greenhouse

gases cannot be ‘air pollutants’ within the meaning of

the Act,” id. at 513, the Court held that the CAA’s

definition of “air pollutant” “embraces all airborne

compounds of whatever stripe.” Id. at 529 (emphasis

added). Moreover, because the CAA requires EPA to

establish motor-vehicle emission standards for “any

air pollutant ... which may reasonably be anticipat-

ed to endanger public health or welfare,” 42 U.S.C.

§ 7521(a)(1) (emphasis added), the Court held that

EPA had a “statutory obligation” to regulate harmful

greenhouse gases. Jd. at 534. “Under the clear terms

of the Clean Air Act,” the Court concluded, “EPA can

avoid taking further action only if it determines that

greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change

or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to

26a

why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to de-

termine whether they do.” Id. at 533. The Court thus

directed EPA to determine “whether sufficient in-

formation exists to make an endangerment finding”

for greenhouse gases. Id. at 534.

Massachusetts v. EPA spurred a cascading series of

greenhouse gas-related rules and regulations. First,

in direct response to the Supreme Court's directive,

EPA issued an Endangerment Finding for green-

house gases. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute

Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a)

of the Clean Air Act (“Endangerment Finding”), 74

Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). The Endangerment

Finding defined as a single “air pollutant” an “aggre-

gate group of six long-lived and directly-emitted

greenhouse gases” that are “well mixed” together in

the atmosphere and cause global climate change:

carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydroflouro-

carbons, perflourocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.

Id. at 66,536-37. Following “common practice,” EPA

measured the impact of these gases on a “carbon di-

oxide equivalent basis,” (COge) which is based on the

gases “warming effect relative to carbon diox-

ide ...over a specified timeframe.” Id. at 66,519.

(Using the carbon dioxide equivalent equation, for

example, a mixture of X amount of nitrous oxide and

Y amount of sulfur hexafluoride is expressed as Z

amount of COge). After compiling and considering a

considerable body of scientific evidence, EPA con-

cluded that motor-vehicle emissions of these six well-

mixed gases “contribute to the total greenhouse gas

27a

air pollution, and thus to the climate change prob-

lem, which is reasonably anticipated to endanger

public health and welfare.” Jd. at 66,499.

Next, and pursuant to the CAA’s requirement that

EPA establish motor-vehicle emission standards for

“any air pollutant ... which may reasonably be an-

ticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” 42

U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), the agency promulgated its Tail-

pipe Rule for greenhouse gases. Light-Duty Vehicle

Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate

Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule (“Tail-

pipe Rule”), 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010). Effec-

tive January 2, 2011, the Tailpipe Rule set green-

house gas emission standards for cars and light

trucks as part of a joint rulemaking with fuel econo-

my standards issued by the National Highway Traf-

fic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Id. at 25,326.

Under EPA’s longstanding interpretation of the

CAA, the Tailpipe Rule automatically triggered regu-

lation of stationary greenhouse gas emitters under

two separate sections of the Act. The first, the Pre-

vention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality

(PSD) program, requires state-issued construction

permits for certain types of stationary sources—for

example, iron and steel mill plants—if they have the

potential to emit over 100 tons per year (tpy) of “any

air pollutant.” See 42 U.S.C. § 7475; 7479(1). All oth-

er stationary sources are subject to PSD permitting if

they have the potential to emit over 250 tpy of “any

air pollutant.” Id. § 7479(1). The second provision,

Title V, requires state-issued operating permits for

28a

stationary sources that have the potential to emit at

least 100 tpy of “any air pollutant.” Id. § 7602(j). EPA

has long interpreted the phrase “any air pollutant” in

both these provisions to mean any air pollutant that

is regulated under the CAA. See Requirements for

Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implemen-

tation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Imple-

mentation Plans (“1980 Implementation Plan Re-

quirements”), 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,711 (Aug. 7,

1980) (PSD program); Prevention of Significant Dete-

rioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule

(“Tailoring Rule”), 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,553-54

(June 3, 2010) (discussing history of Title V regula-

tion and applicability). And once the Tailpipe Rule

set motor-vehicle emission standards for greenhouse

gases; they became a regulated pollutant under the

Act, requiring PSD and Title V greenhouse permit-

ting.

Acting pursuant to this longstanding interpreta-

tion of the PSD and Title V programs, EPA issued

two rules phasing in stationary source greenhouse

gas regulation. First, in the Timing Rule, EPA con-

cluded that an air pollutant becomes “subject to reg-

ulation” under the Clean Air Act—and thus subject

to PSD and Title V permitting—only once a regula-

tion requiring control of that pollutant takes effect.

Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That

Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Per-

mitting Programs (“Timing Rule”), 75 Fed. Reg.

17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010). Therefore, EPA concluded, ma-

jor stationary emitters of greenhouse gases would be

subject to PSD and Title V permitting regulations on

29a

January 2, 2011—the date on which the Tailpipe

Rule became effective, and thus, the date when

greenhouse gases first became regulated under the

CAA. Id. at 17,019.

Next, EPA promulgated the Tailoring Rule. In the

Tailoring Rule, EPA noted that greenhouse gases are

emitted in far greater volumes than other pollutants.

Indeed, millions of industrial, residential, and com-

mercial sources exceed the 100/250 tpy statutory

emissions threshold for COge. Tailoring Rule, 75

Fed. Reg. at 31,534-36. Immediately adding these

sources to the PSD and Title V programs would, EPA

predicted, result in tremendous costs to industry and

state permitting authorities. See id. As a result, EPA

announced that it was “relieving overwhelming per-

mitting burdens that would, in the absence of this

rule, fall on permitting authorities and sources.” Id.

at 31,516. Departing from the CAA’s 100/250 tpy

emissions threshold, the Tailoring Rule provided

that only the largest sources—those exceeding

75,000 or 100,000 tpy COge, depending on the pro-

gram and project—would initially be subject to

greenhouse gas permitting. Jd. at 31,523. (The Tai-

loring Rule further provided that regulated sources

must also emit greenhouse gases at levels that ex-

ceed the 100/250 tpy emissions threshold on a mass

basis. That is, they must emit over 100/250 tpy of ac-

tual pollutants, in addition to exceeding the

75,000/100,000 tpy carbon dioxide equivalent. Id. at

31,523.)

30a

A number of groups—including states and regulat-

ed industries—filed petitions for review of EPA’s

greenhouse gas regulations, contending that the

agency misconstrued the CAA and otherwise acted

arbitrarily and capriciously. This appeal consolidates

the petitions for review of the four aforementioned

rules: the Endangerment Finding, the Tailpipe Rule,

the Timing Rule, and the Tailoring Rule.

“The Clean Air Act empowers us to reverse the

Administrator's action in rulemaking if it is ‘arbi-

trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise

not in accordance with the law.” Med. Waste Inst. &

Energy Recovery Council v. EPA, 645 F.3d 420, 424

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A)).

Questions of statutory interpretation are governed

by the familiar Chevron two-step: “First . . . if the in-

tent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the mat-

ter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give

effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-

gress.” Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-

fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). But

“if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to

the specific issue, the question for the court is

whether the agency's answer is based on a permissi-

ble construction of the statute.” Jd. at 843.

This opinion proceeds in several steps. Part II ex-

plains why the Endangerment Finding was neither

arbitrary nor capricious, while Part III does the same

for the Tailpipe Rule. Turning to stationary source

regulation, Part [TV examines whether any petition-

ers may timely challenge EPA’s longstanding inter-

3la

pretation of the PSD statute. Because we conclude

that they may, Part V addresses the merits of their

statutory arguments, and explains why EPA's inter-

pretation of the CAA was compelled by the statute.

Next, Part VI explains why petitioners lack standing

to challenge the Timing and Tailoring Rules them-

selves. Finally, Part VII disposes of several argu-

ments that have nothing to do with the rules under

review, and thus are not properly before us.

Il.

We turn first to State and Industry Petitioners’

challenges to the Endangerment Finding, the first of

the series of rules EPA issued after the Supreme

Court remanded Massachusetts v. EPA. In the deci-

sion ordering the remand, the Supreme Court held

that EPA had failed in its statutory obligations when

it “offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to

decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute

to climate change.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.

at 534. On remand, EPA compiled a substantial sci-

entific record, which is before us in the present re-

view, and determined that “greenhouse gases in the

atmosphere may reasonably be anticipated both to

endanger public health and to endanger public we!-

fare.” Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at

66,497. EPA went on to find that motor-vehicle emis-

sions of greenhouse gases “contribute to the total

greenhouse gas air pollution, and thus to the climate

change problem, which is reasonably anticipated to

endanger public health and welfare.” Id. at 66,499.

32a

State and Industry Petitioners challenge several

aspects of EPA’s decision, including (1) EPA’s inter-

pretation of CAA § 202(a)(1), which sets out the en-

dangerment-finding standard; (2) the adequacy of

the scientific record supporting the Endangerment

Finding; (3) EPA’s decision not to “quantify” the risk

of endangerment to public health or welfare created

by climate change; (4) EPA’s choice to define the “air

pollutant” at issue as an aggregate of six greenhouse

gases; (5) EPA’s failure to consult its Science Adviso-

ry Board before issuing the Endangerment Finding;

and (6) EPA’s denial of all petitions for reconsidera-

tion of the Endangerment Finding. We ultimately

conclude that the Endangerment Finding is con-

sistent with Massachusetts v. EPA and the text and

structure of the CAA, and is adequately supported by

the administrative record.

A.

Industry Petitioners contend that EPA improper-

ly interpreted CAA § 202(a)(1) as restricting the En-

dangerment Finding to a science-based judgment de-

void of considerations of policy concerns and regula-

tory consequences. They assert that CAA § 202(a)(1)

requires EPA to consider, e.g., the benefits of activi-

ties that require greenhouse gas emissions, the effec-

tiveness of emissions regulation triggered by the En-

dangerment Finding, and the potential for societal

adaptation to or mitigation of climate change. They

maintain that eschewing those considerations also

made the Endangerment Finding arbitrary and ca-

pricious.

33a

These contentions are foreclosed by the language

of the statute and the Supreme Court’s decision in

Massachusetts v. EPA. Section 202(a) of the CAA

states in relevant part that EPA’s Administrator

shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to

time revise) in accordance with the provisions

of this section, standards applicable to the

emission of any air pollutant from any class or

classes of new motor vehicles or new motor

vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause,

or contribute to, air pollution which may rea-

sonably be anticipated to endanger public

health or welfare.

42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). This language requires that

the endangerment evaluation “relate to whether an

air pollutant ‘cause[s], or contribute[s]} to, air pollu-

tion which may reasonably be anticipated to endan-

ger public health or welfare.” Massachusetts v. EPA,

549 U.S. at 532-33. At bottom, § 202(a)(1) requires

EPA to answer only two questions: whether particu-

lar “air pollution”"—here, greenhouse gases—"may

reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health

or welfare,” and whether motor-vehicle emissions

“cause, or contribute to” that endangerment.

These questions require a “scientific judgment”

about the potential risks greenhouse gas emissions

pose to public health or welfare—not policy discus-

sions. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 534. In

Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court rebuffed

an attempt by EPA itself to inject considerations of

34a

policy into its decision. At the time, EPA had “offered

a laundry list of reasons not to regulate” greenhouse

gases, including

that a number of voluntary Executive Branch

programs already provide an effective re-

sponse to the threat of global warming, that

regulating greenhouse gases might impair the

President's ability to negotiate with “key de-

veloping nations” to reduce emissions, and

that curtailing motor-vehicle emissions would

reflect “an inefficient, piecemeal approach to

address the climate change issue.”

Id. at 533 (citations omitted). The Court noted that

“these policy judgments... have nothing to do with

whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to cli-

mate change. Still less do they amount to a reasoned

justification for declining to form a scientific judg-

ment.” Id. at 533-34. In the Court’s view, EPA’s poli-

cy- based explanations contained “no reasoned ex-

planation for [EPA's] refusal to decide” the key part

of the endangerment inquiry: “whether greenhouse

gases cause or contribute to climate change.” Jd. at

534.

As in Massachusetts v. EPA, a “laundry list of

reasons not to regulate” simply has “nothing to do

with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to

climate change.” Id. at 533—34. The additional exer-

cises State and Industry Petitioners would have EPA

undertake—e.g., performing a cost-benefit analysis

for greenhouse gases, gauging the effectiveness of

whatever emission standards EPA would enact to

35a

limit greenhouse gases, and predicting society's

adaptive response to the dangers or harms caused by

climate change—do not inform the “scientific judg-

ment” that § 202(a)(1) requires of EPA. Instead of

focusing on the question whether greenhouse gas

emissions may reasonably be anticipated to endanger

public health or welfare, the factors State and Indus-

try Petitioners put forth only address what might

happen were EPA to answer that question in the af-

firmative. As EPA stated in the Endangerment Find-

ing, such inquiries “muddle the rather straightfor-

ward scientific judgment about whether there may

be endangerment by throwing the potential impact of

responding to the danger into the initial question.”

74 Fed. Reg. at 66,515. To be sure, the subsection fol-

lowing § 202(a)(1), § 202(a)(2), requires that EPA ad-

dress limited questions about the cost of compliance

with new emission standards and the availability of

technology for meeting those standards, see infra

Part III, but these judgments are not part of the

§ 202(a)(1) endangerment inquiry. The Supreme

Court made clear in Massachusetts v. EPA that it

was not addressing the question “whether policy con-

cerns can inform EPA’s actions in the event that it

makes such a finding,” 549 U.S. at 534-35, but that

policy concerns were not part of the calculus for the

determination of the endangerment finding in the

first instance. The Supreme Court emphasized that

it was holding “that EPA must ground its reasons for

action or inaction in the statute.” Id. at 535. The

statute speaks in terms of endangerment, not in

36a

terms of policy, and EPA has complied with the stat-

ute.

State and Industry Petitioners insist that because

statutes should be interpreted to avoid absurd re-

sults, EPA should have considered at least the “ab-

surd” consequences that would follow from an en-

dangerment finding for greenhouse gases. Specifical-

ly: having made an endangerment finding, EPA will

proceed to promulgate emission standards under

§ 202(a)(1). Issuing those standards triggers regula-

tion—under EPA’s PSD and Title V programs—of

stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases at

levels above longstanding statutory thresholds. Be-

cause greenhouse gases are emitted in much higher

volumes than other air pollutants, hundreds of thou-

sands of small stationary sources would exceed those

thresholds. This would subject those sources to PSD

and Title V permitting requirements despite what

Petitioners claim was Congress’s clear intent that

the requirements apply only to large industrial

sources. Petitioners assert that even EPA believed

such overbroad regulation to be an absurd result,

which it attempted to rectify by adopting the Tailor-

ing Rule to raise the statutory thresholds, see infra

Part VI.

However “absurd” Petitioners consider this con-

sequence, though, it is still irrelevant to the endan-

germent inquiry. That EPA adjusted the statutory

thresholds to accommodate regulation of greenhouse

gases emitted by stationary sources may indicate

that the CAA is a regulatory scheme less-than- per-

37a

fectly tailored to dealing with greenhouse gases. But

the Supreme Court has already held that EPA in-

deed wields the authority to regulate greenhouse

gases under the CAA. See Massachusetts v. EPA.

The plain language of § 202(a)(1) of that Act does not

leave room for EPA to consider as part of the endan-

germent inquiry the stationary-source regulation

triggered by an endangerment finding, even if the

degree of regulation triggered might at a later stage

be characterized as “absurd.”

State and Industry Petitioners next challenge the

adequacy of the scientific record underlying the En-

dangerment Finding, objecting to both the type of ev-

idence upon which EPA relied and EPA’s decision to

make an Endangerment Finding in light of what In-

dustry Petitioners view as significant scientific un-

certainty. Neither objection has merit.

1.

As an initial matter, State and Industry Petition-

ers question EPA’s reliance on “major assessments”

addressing greenhouse gases and climate change is-

sued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change (IPCC), the U.S. Global Climate Research

Program (USGCRP), and the National Research

Council (NRC). Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg.

at 66,510—11. These peer- reviewed assessments syn-

thesized thousands of individual studies on various

aspects of greenhouse gases and climate change and

drew “overarching conclusions” about the state of the

38a

science in this field. Jd. at 66,511. The assessments

provide data and information on, inter alia, “the

amount of greenhouse gases being emitted by human

activities”; their continued accumulation in the at-

mosphere; the resulting observed changes to Earth’s

energy balance, temperature and climate at global

and regional levels, and other “climate-sensitive sec-

tors and systems of the human and natural environ-

ment”; the extent to which these changes “can be at-

tributed to human-induced buildup of atmospheric

greenhouse gases’; “future projected climate change”;

and “projected risks and impacts to human health,

society and the environment.”/d. at 66,510—11.

State and Industry Petitioners assert that EPA

improperly “delegated” its judgment to the IPCC,

USGCRP, and NRC by relying on these assessments

of climate-change science. See U.S. Telecom Assa’n v.

FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2004). This argu-

ment is little more than a semantic trick. EPA did

not delegate, explicitly or otherwise, any decision-

making to any of those entities. EPA simply did here

what it and other decision- makers often must do to

make a science-based judgment: it sought out and

reviewed existing scientific evidence to determine

whether a particular finding was warranted. It

makes no difference that much of the scientific evi-

dence in large part consisted of “syntheses” of indi-

vidual studies and research. Even individual studies

and research papers often synthesize past work in an

area and then build upon it. This is how science

works. EPA is not required to re-prove the existence

39a

of the atom every time it approaches a scientific

question.

Moreover, it appears from the record that EPA

used the assessment reports not as substitutes for its

own judgment but as evidence upon which it relied to

make that judgment. EPA evaluated the processes

used to develop the various assessment reports, re-

viewed their contents, and considered the depth of

the scientific consensus the reports represented.

Based on these evaluations, EPA determined the as-

sessments represented the best source material to

use in deciding whether greenhouse gas emissions

may be reasonably anticipated to endanger public

health or welfare. Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed.

Reg. at 66,510—-11. It then reviewed those reports

along with comments relevant to the scientific con-

siderations involved to determine whether the evi-

dence warranted an endangerment finding for

greenhouse gases as it was required to do under the

Supreme Court’s mandate in Massachusetts v. EPA.

2.

Industry Petitioners also assert that the scientific

evidence does not adequately support the Endan-

germent Finding. As we have stated before in review-

ing the science-based decisions of agencies such as

EPA, “fa]lthough we perform a searching and careful

inquiry into the facts underlying the agency’s deci-

sions, we will presume the validity of agency action

as long as a rational basis for it is presented.” Am.

Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 519 (D.C.

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In so

40a

doing, “we give an extreme degree of deference to the

agency when it is evaluating scientific data within its

technical expertise.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted).

The body of scientific evidence marshalled by EPA

in support of the Endangerment Finding is substan-

tial. EPA’s scientific evidence of record included sup-

port for the proposition that greenhouse gases trap

heat on earth that would otherwise dissipate into

space; that this “greenhouse effect” warms the cli-

mate; that human activity is contributing to in-

creased atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases; and

that the climate system is warming.

Based on this scientific record, EPA made the

linchpin finding: in its judgment, the “root cause” of

the recently observed climate change is “very likely”

the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse

gas emissions. Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg.

at 66,518. EPA found support for this finding in

three lines of evidence. First, it drew upon our “basic

physical understanding” of the impacts of various

natural and manmade changes on the climate sys-

tem. For instance, EPA relied on evidence that the

past half-century of warming has occurred at a time

when natural forces such as solar and volcanic activ-

ity likely would have produced cooling. Endanger-

ment Finding, Response to Comments (RTC) Vol. 3,

at 20. Other evidence supports EPA’s conclusion that

the observed warming pattern—warming of the bot-

tommost layer of the atmosphere and cooling imme-

4la

diately above it—is consistent with greenhouse-gas

causation. Id.

EPA further relied upon evidence of historical es-

timates of past climate change, supporting EPA’s

conclusion that global temperatures over the last

half-century are unusual. Endangerment Finding, 74

Fed. Reg. at 66,518. Scientific studies upon which

EPA relied place high confidence in the assertion

that global mean surface temperatures over the last

few decades are higher than at any time in the last

four centuries. Technical Support Document for the

Endangerment Finding (TSD), at 31. These studies

also show, albeit with significant uncertainty, that

temperatures at many individual locations were

higher over the last twenty-five years than during

any period of comparable length since 900 A.D. Id.

For its third line of evidence that anthropogenic

emissions of greenhouse gases spurred the perceived

warming trend, EPA turned to computer-based cli-

mate-model simulations. Scientists have used global

climate models built on basic principles of physics

and scientific knowledge about the climate to try to

simulate the recent climate change. These models

have only been able to replicate the observed warm-

ing by including anthropogenic emissions of green-

house gases in the simulations. Endangerment Find-

ing, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,523.

To recap, EPA had before it substantial record ev-

idence that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse

gases “very likely” caused warming of the climate

over the last several decades. EPA further had evi-

42a

dence of current and future effects of this warming

on public health and welfare. Relying again upon

substantial scientific evidence, EPA determined that

anthropogenically induced climate change threatens

both public health and public welfare. It found that

extreme weather events, changes in air quality, in-

creases in food- and water-borne pathogens, and in-

creases in temperatures are likely to have adverse

health effects. Id. at 66,497—98. The record also sup-

ports EPA’s conclusion that climate change endan-

gers human welfare by creating risk to food produc-

tion and agriculture, forestry, energy, infrastructure,

ecosystems, and wildlife. Substantial evidence fur-

ther supported EPA’s conclusion that the warming

resulting from the greenhouse gas emissions could be

expected to create risks to water resources and in

general to coastal areas as a result of expected in-

crease in sea level. Jd. at 66,498. Finally, EPA de-

termined from substantial evidence that motor-

vehicle emissions of greenhouse gases contribute to

climate change and thus to the endangerment of

public health and welfare.

Industry Petitioners do not find fault with much

of the substantial record EPA amassed in support of

the Endangerment Finding. Rather, they contend

that the record evidences too much uncertainty to

support that judgment. But the existence of some

uncertainty does not, without more, warrant invali-

dation of an endangerment finding. If a statute is

“precautionary in nature” and “designed to protect

the public health,” and the relevant evidence is “dif-

ficult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it

43a

is on the frontiers of scientific knowledge,” EPA need

not provide “rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and

effect” to support an endangerment finding. Ethyl

Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976). As we

have stated before, “Awaiting certainty will often al-

low for only reactive, not preventive. regulation.” Jd.

at 25.

Congress did not restrict EPA to remedial regula-

tion when it enacted CAA § 202(a). That section

mandates that EPA promulgate new emission stand-

ards if it determines that the air pollution at issue

“may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public

health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). This lan-

guage requires a precautionary, forward-looking sci-

entific judgment about the risks of a particular air

pollutant, consistent with the CAA’s “precautionary

and preventive orientation.” Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc.

v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Requir-

ing that EPA find “certain” endangerment of public

health or welfare before regulating greenhouse gases

would effectively prevent EPA from doing the job

Congress gave it in § 202(a)—utilizing emission

standards to prevent reasonably anticipated endan-

germent from maturing into concrete harm. Cf. id.

([Rjequiring EPA to wait until it can conclusively

demonstrate that a particular effect is adverse to

health before it acts is inconsistent with both the

[CAA]’s precautionary and preventive orientation

and the nature of the Administrator’s statutory re-

sponsibilities. Congress provided that the Adminis-

trator is to use his judgment in setting air quality

44a

standards precisely to permit him to act in the face of

uncertainty.”).

In Massachusetts v. EPA the Supreme Court con-

firmed that EPA may make an endangerment find-

ing despite lingering scientific uncertainty. Indeed,

the Court held that the existence of “some residual

uncertainty” did not excuse EPA’s decision to decline

to regulate greenhouse gases. Massachusetts v. EPA,

549 U.S. at 534. To avoid regulating emissions of

greenhouse gases, EPA would need to show “scien-

tific uncertainty ...so profound that it precludes

EPA from making a reasoned judgment as to wheth-

er greenhouse gases contribute to global warming.”

Id. Clearly, then, EPA may issue an endangerment

finding even while the scientific record still contains

at least “some residual uncertainty.” Industry Peti-

tioners have shown no more than that.

In the end, Petitioners are asking us to re-weigh

the scientific evidence before EPA and reach our own

conclusion. This is not our role. As with other re-

views of administrative proceedings, we do not de-

termine the convincing force of evidence, nor the con-

clusion it should support, but only whether the con-

clusion reached by EPA is supported by substantial

evidence when considered on the record as a whole.

See, e.g., New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 30 (D.C. Cir.

2005). When EPA evaluates scientific evidence in its

bailiwick, we ask only that it take the scientific rec-

ord into account “in a rational manner.” Am. Petrole-

um Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1187 (D.C. Cir.

45a

1981). Industry Petitioners have not shown that EPA

failed to do so here.

C.

State Petitione.'s, here led by Texas, contend that

the Endangerment Finding is arbitrary and capri-

cious because EPA did not “define,” “measure,” or

“quantify” either the atmospheric concentration at

which greenhouse gases endanger public health or

welfare, the rate or type of climate change that it an-

ticipates will endanger public health or welfare, or

the risks or impacts of climate change. According to

Texas, without defining these thresholds and distin-

guishing “safe” climate change from climate change

that endangers, EPA’s Endangerment Finding is just

a “subjective conviction.”

It is true that EPA did not provide a quantitative

threshold at which greenhouse gases or climate

change will endanger or cause certain impacts to

public health or welfare. The text of CAA § 202(a)(1)

does not require that EPA set a precise numerical

value as part of an endangerment finding. Quite the

opposite; the § 202(a)(1) inquiry necessarily entails a

case-by- case, sliding-scale approach to endanger-

ment because “[djanger . . . is not set by a fixed prob-

ability of harm, but rather is composed of reciprocal

elements of risk and harm, or probability and severi-

ty.” Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 18. EPA need not establish a

minimum threshold of risk or harm before determin-

ing whether an air pollutant endangers. It may base

an endangerment finding on “a lesser risk of greater

46a

harm ...or a greater risk of lesser harm” or any

combination in between. Id.

Ethyl is instructive. There, EPA made an endan-

germent finding for airborne lead. During its endan-

germent inquiry, EPA initially tried to do what Tex-

as asks of it here: find a specific concentration of the

air pollutant below which it would be considered

“safe” and above which it would endanger public

health. Id. at 56. However, EPA abandoned that ap-

proach because it failed to account for “the wide var-

iability of dietary lead intake” and lacked predictive

value. EPA substituted a “more qualitative” ap-

proach, which relied on “predictions based on uncer-

tain data” along with clinical studies. Jd. at 56—57.

This court upheld the endangerment finding that

used that qualitative approach despite the lack of a

specific endangerment “threshold.”

In its essence, Texas’s call for quantification of

the endangerment is no more than a specialized ver-

sion of Industry Petitioners’ claim that the scientific

record contains too much uncertainty to find endan-

germent. EPA relied on a substantial record of em-

pirical data and scientific evidence, making many

specific and often quantitative findings regarding the

impacts of greenhouse gases on climate change and

the effects of climate change on public health and

welfare. Its failure to distill this ocean of evidence

into a specific number at which greenhouse gases

cause “dangerous” climate change is a function of the

precautionary thrust of the CAA and the multivari-

ate and sometimes uncertain nature of climate sci-

47a

ence, not a sign of arbitrary or capricious decision-

making.

D.

EPA defined both the “air pollution” and the “air

pollutant” that are the subject of the Endangerment

Finding as an aggregate of six greenhouse gases,

which EPA called “well mixed greenhouse gases”:

carbon dioxide (CO9), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide

(N92 O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons

(PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SFg¢). Industry Peti-

tioners argue that EPA’s decision to include PFCs

and SF¢ in this group of greenhouse gases was arbi-

trary and capricious primarily because motor vehi-

cles generally do not emit these two gases.

No petitioner for review of the Endangerment

Finding has established standing to make this ar-

gument. Industry Petitioners concede that EPA’s de-

cision to regulate PFCs and SF¢ along with the other

four greenhouse gases does not injure any motor- ve-

hicle-related petitioner. Nor has any non-motor-

vehicle- related petitioner shown an injury-in-fact

resulting from EPA’s inclusion of these two gases in

the six-gas amalgam of “well- mixed greenhouse gas-

es.” At oral argument, Industry Petitioners asserted

for the first time that certain: utility companies—

members of associations that petitioned for review of

the Endangerment Finding—own utility transform-

ers that emit SFg. However, they never demonstrat-

ed or even definitively asserted that any of these

companies would not be subject to regulation or per-

48a

mitting requirements but for EPA’s decision to in-

clude SF¢ as part of the “well-mixed greenhouse gas-

es” that are the subject of the Endangerment Find-

ing. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898—900

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (requiring that a petitioner seeking

review of agency action demonstrate standing by af-

fidavit or other evidence if standing is not “self-

evident” from the administrative record). Absent a

petitioner with standing to challenge EPA’s inclusion

of PFCs and SF¢ in the “air pollution” at issue, this

court lacks jurisdiction to address the merits of In-

dustry Petitioners’ contention.

E.

EPA did not submit the Endangerment Finding

for review by its Science Advisory Board (SAB). In-

dustry Petitioners claim that EPA’s failure to do so

violates its mandate to “make available” to the SAB

“any proposed criteria document, standard, limita-

tion, or regulation under the Clean Air Act” at the

time it provides the same “to any other Federal

agency for formal review and comment.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 4365(c)(1); see Am. Petroleum Inst., 665 F.2d at

1188.

To begin with, it is not clear that EPA provided

the Endangerment Finding “to any other Federal

agency for formal review and comment,” which trig-

gers this duty to submit a regulation to the SAB.

EPA only submitted a draft of the Endangerment

Finding to the Office of Information and Regulatory

Affairs pursuant to Executive Order 12,866. EPA

49a

contends that this was merely an informal review

process, not “formal review and comment”—at least

when compared with a _ statutory review-and-

comment requirement in which other agencies are

given the opportunity to provide written comments

about the impacts of a proposed regulation on the re-

viewing agency’s universe of responsibility. See, e.g.,

49 U.S.C. § 32902(j). Industry Petitioners failed to

respond to this contention.

In any event, even if EPA violated its mandate by

failing to submit the Endangerment Finding to the

SAB, Industry Petitioners have not shown that this

error was “of such central relevance to the rule that

there is a substantial likelihood that the rule would

have been significantly changed if such errors had

not been made.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(8); see Am. Pe-

troleum Inst., 665 F.2d at 1188-89 (applying this

standard to EPA’s failure to submit an ozone stand-

ard to the SAB).

F.

Lastly, State Petitioners maintain that EPA erred

by denying all ten petitions for reconsideration of the

Endangerment Finding. Those petitions asserted

that internal e- mails and documents released from

the University of East Anglia’s Climate Research

Unit (CRU)}—a contributor to one of the global tem-

perature records and to the IPCC’s assessment re-

port—undermined the scientific evidence supporting

the Endangerment Finding by calling into question

whether the IPCC scientists adhered to “best science

practices.” EPA’s Denial of the Petitions To Reconsid-

50a

er the Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Find-

ings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of

the Clean Air Act (“Reconsideration Denial”), 75 Fed.

Reg. 49,556, 49,556—57 (Aug. 13, 2010). The petitions

pointed to factual mistakes in the IPCC’s assessment

report resulting from the use of non-peer-reviewed

studies and several scientific studies postdating the

Endangerment Finding as evidence that the Endan-

germent Finding was flawed. Id.

On August 13, 2010, EPA issued a denial of the

petitions for reconsideration accompanied by a 360-

page response to petitions (RTP). Id. at 49,556. It de-

termined that the petitions did not provide substan-

tial support for the argument that the Endanger-

ment Finding should be revised. According to EPA,

the petitioners’ claims based on the CRU documents

were exaggerated, contradicted by other evidence,

and not a material or reliable basis for questioning

the credibility of the body of science at issue; two of

the factual inaccuracies alleged in the petitions were

in fact mistakes, but both were “tangential and mi-

nor” and did not change the key IPCC conclusions;

and the new scientific studies raised by some peti-

tions were either already considered by EPA, misin-

terpreted or misrepresented by petitioners, or put

forth without acknowledging other new studies. 7d.

at 49,557—58.

1.

EPA is required to convene a proceeding for re-

consideration of a rule if a party raising an objection

to the rule ,

5la

can demonstrate to the Administrator that it

was impracticable to raise such objection with-

in such time or if the grounds for such objec-

tion arose after the period for public comment

(but within the time specified for judicial re-

view) and if such objection is of central rele-

vance to the outcome of the rule.

42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B). For the purpose of deter-

mining whether to commence reconsideration of a

rule, EPA considers an objection to be of “central rel-

evance to the outcome” of that rule “if it provides

substantial support for the argument that the regu-

lation should be revised.” Reconsideration Denial, 75

Fed. Reg. at 49,561.

State Petitioners have not provided substantial

support for their argument that the Endangerment

Finding should be revised. State Petitioners point

out that some studies the IPCC referenced in its as-

sessment were not peer-reviewed, but they ignore

the fact that (1) the IPCC assessment relied on

around 18,000 studies that were peer-reviewed, and

(2) the IPCC’s report development procedures ex-

pressly permitted the inclusion in the assessment of

some non-peer-reviewed studies (gray” literature).

Moreover, as EPA determined, the limited inac-

curate information developed from the gray litera-

ture does not appear sufficient to undermine the

substantial overall evidentiary support for the En-

dangerment Finding. State Petitioners have not, as

they assert, uncovered a “pattern” of flawed science.

Only two of the errors they point out seem to be er-

52a

rors at all, and EPA relied on neither in making the

Endangerment Finding. First, as State Petitioners

assert, the IPCC misstated the percentage of the

Netherlands that is below sea level, a statistic that

was used for background information. However, the

IPCC corrected the error, and EPA concluded that

the error was “minor and had no impact,” and the

Endangerment Finding did not refer to the statistic

in any way. Id. at 49,576—-77. Second, the IPCC

acknowledged misstating the rate at which Himala-

yan glaciers are receding. EPA also did not rely on

that projection in the Endangerment Finding. /d. at

49,577.

State Petitioners also contend that a new study

contradicts EPA’s reliance on a projection of more

violent storms in the future as a result of climate

change, but the study they cite only concerns past

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Record and brief — Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Agency · 571 U.S. 951 | Frix