Record and brief — Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Agency
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(49, SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 12-1146
Vide 12-1248, 12-
1254, 12-1268,
12-1269, 12-1272
Title: Utility Air Regulatory Group, Petitioner
V
Environmental Protection Agency
Docketed: March 21, 2013
Linked with 12A1181
Lower Ct United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Case Nos.: (10-1073, et al.)
Decision Date. June 26, 2012
Rehearing
Denied: December 20, 2012
Questions
Presented
~~~Date~~~ ~~~~~~~Proceedings and Orders
Mar 20 2013 Petition for a wnit of certioran filed. (Response due April 22, 2013)
Mar 20 2013 Appendix of Utility Air Regulatory Group filed. (Volumes |-II!)
Apr 10 2013 Brief of respondent National Mining Association in support filed.
Apr 11 2013 Order extending time to file response to petition to and including May 22, 2013,
for all respondents.
Apr 19 2013 Brief amicus curiae of Washington Legal Foundation filed.
May 8 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of
neither party, received from counsel for Texas, and eight other states
May 13 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of
neither party received from counsel for petitioners Southeastern Legal
Foundation, Inc., et al.
May 14 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of
neither party, received from counsel for the Federal Respondent.
May 14 2013 Letter of respondent National Environmental Development Association's Clean
Air Project in support of the petitioner received.
May 15 2013 Order further extending time to file response to petition to and including June
21, 2013, for all respondents.
May 17 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of
neither party, received from counsel for the State of Indiana
Jun 6 2013 Order further extending time to file response to petition to and including July
22, 2013, for all respondents.
Jun 7 2013
Jun 7 2013
Jul 12013
Jul 8 2013
Jul 22 2013
Jul 22 2013
Jul 22 2013
Aug 6 2013
Aug 7 2013
Oct 7 2013
Oct 15 2013
Oct 22 2013
Oct 24 2013
Oct 29 2013
Nov 1 2013
Nov 1 2013
Nov 1 2013
Nov 1 2013
Nov 7 2013
Nov 8 2013
Application (12A1181) to file consolidated bref in opposition in excess of word
limits, submitted to The Chief Justice.
Application (12A1181) to file consolidated brief in opposition in excess of word
limits granted by The Chief Justice The consolidated brief in opposition may
not exceed 12,000 words.
Application (13A35) to file consolidated brief in opposition in excess of word
limits, submitted to The Chief Justice.
Application (13A385) to file consolidated bref in opposition in excess of word
limits granted by The Chief Justice. The consolidated brief in opposition may
not exceed 11,000 words.
Brief of respondents Environmental Protection Agency in opposition filed
VIDED.
Brief of Environmental Organization respondents in opposition filed. VIDED.
Brief of respondents New York, et al. in opposition filed. VIDED.
Reply of petitioner Utility Air Regulatory Group filed.
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of September 30, 2013
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of October 11, 2013.
Petition GRANTED limited to the following question: Whether EPA permissibly
determined that its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles triggered permitting requirements under the Clean Air Act for
stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases. The cases are consolidated
and a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument.
Bnefing proposal of the parties. VIDED
Letter from Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc., et al. regarding bnefing
proposal. VIDED.
Upon consideration of the letter of October 22, 2013, from counsel for
petitioners in No. 12-1248 on behalf of the parties, the briefing proposal set out
in the le*er is adopted with the exception that the bnefs of petitioners shall not
exceed 45,000 words in aggregate The briefs of respondents in support of
petitioners shall not exceed 6,000 words each. The brief of the Solicitor
General shall not exceed 15,000 words. The briefs of other respondents shall
not exceed 10,000 words each. Reply briefs shall not exceed 18.000 words in
aggregate. VIDED
The time to file joint appendix, petitioners’ briefs on the merits, and briefs of
respondents in support of petitioners is extended to and including December 9,
2013. VIDED
The time to file respondents’ briefs on the menits is extended to and including
January 21, 2014. VIDED
Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of
neither party, received from counsel for the United States Federal
Environmental Protection Agency, et al. VIDED.
Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of
neither party, received from counsel for petitioner Utility Air Regulatory Group.
VIDED.
Consent to the filing of amicus cunae briefs, In support of either party or of
neither party, received from counsel for Texas, et al. VIDED.
Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of
neither party, received from counsel for Southeastem Legal Foundation, Inc., et
al. VIDED.
Nov 8 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of
neither party, received from counsel for Coalition for Responsible Regulation,
inc., et al. VIDED.
Nov 12 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of
neither party, received from counsel for American Chemistry Council, et al.
VIDED.
Nov 12 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of
neither party, received from counsel for New York, California, et al. VIDED.
Nov 12 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or for
neither party, received from counsel! for Environmental Organizations, Center
for Biological Diversity, et al. VIDED.
Nov 19 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of
neither party, received from counsel for Energy-intensive Manufacturers
Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Regulation, et al. VIDED.
Nov 21 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support or either party or of
neither party, received from counsel for the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America, et al. VIDED.
Nov 25 2013 SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Monday, February 24, 2014
Dec 92013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of
neither party, received from counsel for the National Mining Association.
VIDED.
Dec 92013 Bnef of respondents Coalition for Responsible Regulation, |nc., et al. in support
of petitioners filed. VIDED.
Dec 92013 Brief of petitioners Amer'can Chemistry Council, et al. filed. VIDED.
Dec 92013 Brief of petitioners Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et
al. filed. VIDED.
Dec 92013 Brief of petitioners Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc., et al. filed. VIDED.
Dec 92013 Brief of petitioner Energy-Intensive Manufacturers Working Group on
Greenhouse Gas Regulation, et al. filed. VIDED.
Dec 92013 Bnef of petitioners Texas, et al. filed. VIDED.
Dec 92013 Joint appendix filed (5 volumes). (Statement of costs filed.) VIDED.
Dec 92013 Bref of petitioner Utility Air Reguiatory Group filed. VIDED.
Dec 12 2013 Brief amici curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation, et al. filed. VIDED.
Dec 13 2013 Record received from U.S.C.A. DC Circuit. The record is electronic and located
on PACER.
Dec 16 2013 Bnef amicus curiae of Washington Legal Foundation filed.
Dec 16 2013 Brief amici cunae of States of Kansas, et al. filed. VIDED.
Dec 16 2013 Brief amicus curiae of Peabody Energy Corporation filed. VIDED.
Dec 16 2013 Brief amici curiae of Political Economists Henry N. Butler, et al. filed. VIDED.
Dec 16 2013 Brief amici curiae of Economists Thomas C. Schelling, et al. filed. VIDED.
Dec 16 2013 Brief amicus curiae of Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow filed. VIDED.
Dec 16 2013 Brief amicus curiae of American Civil Rights Union filed. VIDED.
Dec 16 2013 Brief amici curiae of Texas Oil & Gas Association, et al. filed. VIDED.
Dec 16 2013 Brief amicus curiae of Senator Mitch McConnell and Other Members of the
United States Congress filed. VIDED.
Dec 16 2013 Bnef amicus curiae of Mountain States Legal Foundation filed. VIDED.
Dec 16 2013 Brief amici curiae of Five U.S. Senators filed. VIDED.
Dec 16 2013 Brief amicus curiae of Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence filed. VIDED
Dec 16 2013 Brief amici cunae of State and Local Chambers of Commerce, and Other
Business Associations filed. VIDED.
Dec 16 2013 Bnef amici cunae of Administrative Law Professors, et al. filed. VIDED
(Distnbuted)
Dec 16 2013 Bnef amicus curiae of American Road & Transportation Builders Association in
support of neither party filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Dec 16 2013 Bnef amici curiae Scientists and Economists filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Dec 20 2013 CIRCULATED.
Jan 62014 Motion for divided argument and enlargement of time for oral argument filed by
petitioners. VIDED.
Jan 21 2014 Brief of respondent Environmental Protection Agency filed. VIDED.
(Distributed)
Jan 21 2014 Brief of respondents Environmental Organization respondents filed. VIDED
(Distributed)
Jan 21 2014 Brief of respondents New York, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Jan 27 2014 Motion for divided argument filed by petitioners GRANTED. and the time is
divided as follows: 30 minutes for private party petitioners, 15 minutes for state
petitioners, and 45 minutes for respondents.
Jan 27 2014 Brief amici curiae of South Coast Air Quality Management District, et al. filed.
VIDED. (Distributed)
Jan 27 2014 Brief amicus curiae of Institute for Policy Integnty at New York University
School of Law filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Jan 28 2014 Brief amicus curiae of Calpine Corporation filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Jan 28 2014 Brief amicus curiae of American Thoracic Society filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Jan 28 2014 Brief amicus curiae of Constitutional Accountability Center filed. VIDED.
(Distributed)
Feb 13 2014 Reply of respondents Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc., et al. in
support of petitioners filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Feb 14 2014 Reply of petitioners in Nos. 12-1248, 12-1254, 12-1268, and 2-1272 filed.
VIDED. (Distributed)
Feb 14 2014 Reply of petitioners Texas, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Feb 14 2014 Reply of petitioner Utility Air Regulatory Group filed. VIDED. (Distributed)
Feb 24 2014 Argued. For private petitioners: Peter Keisler, Washington, D. C. For state
petitioners: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. For
respondents: Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.
PETITION
FOR
WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
BRIEFS
“we =©6 12-1146... ;
No. atti Bal .
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP,
Petitioner,
Vv.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
_—
F. WILLIAM BROWNELL
(Counsel of Record)
NORMAN W. FICHTHORN
HENRY V. NICKEL
ALLISON D. Woop
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP
2200 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., NW
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20037
(202) 955-1500
bbrownell@hunton.com
March 20, 2013 Counsel for Petitioner
(RR EL MRNA EATON 2 MRR AEE SNC EATR NAIA IE DRE O RIE: ANSE
Wicson-Epes PRintinc Co.. inc. — (202) 789-0096 -— WAasHInGcTon, D.C. 20002
Library of Congress
Law Library
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
After this Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497 (2007), the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) found that its promulgation of motor
vehicle greenhouse gas (GHG) emission standards
under Title II of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §
7521(a)(1), compelled regulation of carbon dioxide
and other GHGs under the CAA’s Title I prevention
of significant deterioration (PSD) and Title V sta-
tionary-source permitting programs. Even though
EPA determined that including GHGs in these pro-
grams would vastly expand the programs contrary to
Congress’s intent, EPA adopted rules adding GHGs
to the pollutants covered. The panel below held the
CAA and Massachusetts compelled inclusion of
GHGs and, based on that holding, dismissed all peti-
tions to review the GHG permitting program rules on
standing grounds. The questions presented are:
1. Whether Massachusetts compelled EPA to in-
clude GHGs in the PSD and Title V programs when
inclusion of GHGs wouid (i) transform the size and
scope of these programs into something that EPA
found would be “unrecognizable to ... Congress,” Pe-
tition Appendix 345a, 380a, and (ii) expand the PSD
program to cover a substance that does not deterio-
rate the quality of the air that people breathe.
2. Whether dismissal of the petitions to review
EPA’s GHG permit-program rules was inconsistent
with this Court’s standing jurisprudence where the
panel premised its holding that standing was absent
on its merits holding that GHGs are regulated “pur-
suant to automatic operation of the CAA.” Id. at 96a.
‘i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The following were parties to the proceedings in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit:
R 004 (Apr. 2, 201
(the “Timing Rule”):
1. The Utility Air Regulatory Group, petitioner
on review, was a petitioner below.
2. The United States Environmental Protection
Agency, respondent on review, was a respondent be-
low.
3. Additional petitioners below, who are nominal
respondents on review, were Coalition for Responsi-
ble Regulation, Inc.; Industrial Minerals Association
— North America; National Cattlemen’s Beef Associa-
tion; Great Northern Project Development, L.P.;
Rosebud Mining Co.; Alpha Natural Resources, Inc.;
Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc.; The Langdale
Company; Langdale Forest Products Company;
Langdale Farms, LLC; Langdale Fuel Company;
Langdale Chevrolet-Pontiac, Inc.; Langdale Ford
Company; Langboard, Inc. - MDF; Langboard, Inc. —
OSB; Georgia Motor Trucking Association, Inc.; Col-
lins Industries, Inc.; Collins Trucking Company, Inc.;
Kennesaw Transportation, Inc.; J&M Tank Lines,
Inc.; Southeast Trailer Mart, Inc.; Georgia Agribusi-
ness Council, Inc.; John Linder, U.S. Representative,
Georgia 7 District; Dana Rohrabacher, U.S. Repre-
sentative, California 46% District; John Shimkus,
U.S. Representative, [Illinois 19% District; Phil
Gingrey, U.S. Representative, Georgia 11% District;
Lynn Westmoreland, U.S. Representative, Georgia
34 District; Tom Price, U.S. Representative, Georgia
6% District; Paul Broun, U.S. Representative, Geor-
gia 10% District; Steve King, U.S. Representative,
Iowa 5% District; Nathan Deal, U.S. Representative,
Georgia 9% District; Jack Kingston, U.S. Representa-
tive, Georgia 1* District; Michele Bachmann, U.S.
Representative, Minnesota 6“ District; Kevin Brady,
U.S. Representative, Texas 8 District; John
Shadegg, U.S. Representative, Arizona 3” District;
Marsha Blackburn, U.S. Representative, Tennessee
7% District; Dan Burton, U.S. Representative, Indi-
ana 5% District; Clean Air Implementation Project;
American Iron and Steel Institute; Gerdau Amer-
isteel US Inc.; Energy-Intensive Manufacturers’
Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Regulation; Pea-
body Energy Company; American Farm Bureau Fed-
eration; National Mining Association; Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America; Missouri
Joint Municipal Electric Utility Commission; Na-
tional Environmental Development Association’s
Clean Air Project; Ohio Coal Association; National
Association of Manufacturers; American Frozen Food
Institute; American Petroleum Institute; Brick In-
dustry Association; Corn Refiners Association; Glass
Packaging Institute; Independent Petroleum Associ-
ation of America; Indiana Cast Metals Association;
Michigan Manufacturers Association; Mississippi
Manufacturers Association; National Association of
Home Builders; National Federation of Independent
Business; National Oilseed Processors Association;
National Petrochemical & Refiners Association;
North American Die Casting Association; Specialty
Stee] Industry of North America; Tennessee Cham-
ber of Commerce and Industry; Western States Pe-
troleum Association; West Virginia Manufacturers
Association; Wisconsin Manufacturers and Com-
merce; State of Texas; State of Alabama; State of
South Carolina; State of South Dakota; State of Ne-
lV
braska; State of North Dakota; Commonwealth of
Virginia; Rick Perry, Governor of Texas; Greg Ab-
bott; Attorney General of Texas; Texas Commission
on Environmental Quality; Texas Agriculture Com-
mission; Texas Public Utilities Commission; Texas
Railroad Commission; Texas General Land Office;
Haley Barbour, Governor of the State of Mississippi;
and Portland Cement Association.
4. Petitioner-intervenors below (with respect to
certain petitions for review), who are nominal re-
spondents on review, were American Frozen Food
Institute; American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufac-
turers; American Petroleum Institute; Corn Refiners
Association; Glass Association of North America; In-
dependent Petroleum Association of America; Indi-
ana Cast Metals Association; Louisiana Department
of Environmental Quality; Michigan Manufacturers
Association; National Association Manufacturers;
Nationel Association of Home Builders; National
Oilseed Processors Association; Tennessee Chamber
of Commerce and Industry; Western States Petrole-
um Association; West Virginia Manufacturers Asso-
ciation; and Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce.
5. Respondent-intervenors below (with respect to
certain petitions for review), who are respondents
(or, in some cases, nominal respondents) on review,
were American Farm Bureau Federation; Brick In-
dustry Association; Center for Biological Diversity;
Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Conservation Law
Foundation; Environmental Defense Fund; Georgia
ForestWatch; Indiana Wildlife Federation; Michigan
Environmental Council; National Environmental
Development Association’s Clean Air Project; Na-
tional Mining Association; Peabody Energy Compa-
ny; Natural Resources Council of Maine; Natural Re-
Vv
sources Defense Council; Ohio Environmental Coun-
cil; Sierra Club; South Coast Air Quality Manage-
ment District; State of California; State of Illinois;
State of Iowa; State of Maine; State of Maryland;
State of New Hampshire; State of New Mexico; State
of New York; State of North Carolina; State of Ore-
gon; State of Rhode Island; Utility Air Regulatory
Group; Wild Virginia.
6. A respondent below, who is a nominal re-
spondent on review, was Lisa Perez Jackson, Admin-
istrator, United States Environmental Protection
Agency. Ms. Jackson ceased to hold the office of Ad-
ministrator, United States Environmental! Protection
Agency, on February 15, 2013; that office is currently
held in an acting capacity by Robert Perciasepe, Act-
ing Administrator, United States Environmental
Protection Agency.
31,514 (June 3, 2010
(the “Tailoring Rule”):
1. The Utility Air Regulatory Group, petitioner
on review, was a petitioner below.
2. The United States Environmental Protection
Agency, respondent on review, was a respondent be-
low.
3. Additional petitioners below, who are nominal
respondents on review, were Southeastern Legal
Foundation, Inc.; John Linder, U.S. Representative,
Georgia 7” District; Dana Rohrabacher, U.S. Repre-
sentative, California 46% District; John Shimkus,
U.S. Representative, [llinois 19% District; Phil
Gingrey, U.S. Representative, Georgia 11% District;
Lynn Westmoreland, U.S. Representative, Georgia
3 District; Tom Price, U.S. Representative, Georgia
6% District; Paul Broun, U.S. Representative, Geor-
vi
gia 10% District; Steve King, U.S. Representative,
Iowa 5% District; Jack Kingston, U.S. Representa-
tive, Georgia 1* District; Michele Bachmann, U:S.
Representative, Minnesota 6% District; Kevin Brady,
U.S. Representative, Texas 8% District; John
Shadegg, U.S. Representative, Arizona 3” District;
Marsha Blackburn, U.S. Representative, Tennessee
7% District; Dan Burton, U.S. Representative, Indi-
ana 5% District; The Langdale Company; Langdale
Forest Products Company; Langdale Farms, LLC;
Langdale Fuel Company; Langdale Chevrolet-
Pontiac, Inc.; Langdale Ford Company; Langboard,
Inc. — MDF; ‘Langboard, Inc. — OSB; Georgia Motor
Trucking Association, Inc.; Collins Industries, Inc.;
Collins Trucking Company, Inc.; Kennesaw Trans-
portation, Inc.; J&M Tank Lines, Inc.; Southeast
Trailer Mart, Inc.; Georgia Agribusiness Council,
Inc.; Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc.; In-
dustrial Minerals Association — North America; Na-
tional Cattlemen’s Beef Association; Great Northern
Project Development, L.P.; Rosebud Mining Co.; Al-
pha Natural Resources, Inc.; The Ohio Coal Associa-
tion; American Iron and Steel Institute; Gerdau Am-
eristeel US Inc.; Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America; Georgia Coalition for Sound Envi-
ronmental Policy; National Mining Association;
American Farm Bureau Federation; Peabody Energy
Company; Energy-Intensive Manufacturers’ Working
Group on Greenhouse Gas Regulation; South Caroli-
na Public Service Authority; Mark R. Levin; Land-
mark Legal Foundation; National Environmental
Development Association’s Clean Air Project; State of
Alabama; State of North Dakota; State of South Da-
kota; Haley Barbour, Governor of Mississippi; State
of South Carolina; State of Nebraska; Missouri Joint
Municipal Electric Utility Commission; Clean Air
vii
Implementation Project; National Association of
Manufacturers; American Frozen Food Institute;
American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers;
American Petroleum Institute; Brick Industry Asso-
ciation; Corn Refiners Association; Glass Association
of North America; Glass Packaging Institute; Inde-
pendent Petroleum Association of America; Indiana
Cast Metals Association; Michigan Manufacturers
Association; Mississippi Manufacturers Association;
National Oilseed Processors Association; Tennessee
Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Western States
Petroleum Association; West Virginia Manufacturers
Association; Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce;
National Association of Home Builders; National
Federation of Independent Business; Portland Ce-
ment Association; Louisiana Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality; Rick Perry, Governor of Texas;
Greg Abbott; Attorney General of Texas; Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality; Texas De-
partment of Agriculture; Texas Public Utilities
Commission; Texas Railroad Commission; Texas
General Land Office; and State of Texas.
4. Petitioner-intervenors below (with respect to
certain petitions for review), who are nominal re-
spondents on review, were American Frozen Food
Institute; American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufac-
turers; American Petroleum Institute; Corn Refiners
Association; Glass Association of North America; In-
dependent Petroleum Association of America; Indi-
ana Cast Metals Association; Michigan Manufactur-
ers Association; National Association of Home Build-
ers; National Association of Manufacturers; National
Oilseed Processors Association; Tennessee Chamber
of Commerce and Industry; Weatern States Petrole-
um Association; West Virginie Manufacturers Asso-
ciation; and Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce.
5. Respondent-intervenors below (with respect to
certain petitions for review), who are respondents
(or, in some cases, nominal respondents) on review,
were American Farm Bureau Federation; Brick In-
dustry Association; Center for Biological Diversity;
Clean Air Implementation Project; Commonwealth of
Massachusetts; Conservation Law Foundation; Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund; Georgia ForestWatch; Na-
_tional Environmental Development Association’s
Clean Air Project; National Mining Association; Nat-
ural Resources Council of Maine, Inc.; Natural Re-
sources Defense Council; Peabody Energy Company;
Sierra Club; South Coast Air Quality Management
District; State of California; State of Illinois; State of
Iowa; State of Maine; State of Maryland; State of
New Hampshire; State of New Mexico; State of New
York; State of North Carolina; State of Oregon; State
of Rhode Island; Utility Air Regulatory Group; and
Wild Virginia.
6. A respondent below, who is a nominal re-
spondent on review, was Lisa Perez Jackson, Admin-
istrator, United States Environmental Protection
Agency. Ms. Jackson ceased to hold the office of Ad-
ministrator, United States Environmental Protection
Agency, on February 15, 2013; that office is currently
held in an acting capacity by Robert Perciasepe, Act-
ing Administrator, United States Environmental
Protection Agency.
ix
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Petitioner Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG)
is a not-for-profit association of individual electric
utilities and electric generating companies and na-
tional trade associations that participates on behalf
of its members collectively in administrative proceed-
ings under the Clean Air Act, and in litigation aris-
ing from those proceedings, that affect electric gen-
erators. UARG has no outstanding shares or debt
securities in the hands of the public and has no par-
ent company. No publicly held company has a 10%
or greater ownership interest in UARG.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .......000............cccccceneeseeeeeees i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING. ............................. u
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ................. x
ee IE abinicininnicnisctininsinmniiiadeeniennenents xi
pg, ee xiv
IT sic cdnlnsicsemioniebpidainnchnininniennaedasdiin 2
tint ticnreasinicidhindntitiglienipinetiniaainiin 2
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS .................00...::00008 2
I hina ei encintaisntcinninnntieaiiienenannnaiitonatie 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......00............ceseeeeeeeeeeees 6
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ....... 18
A Certiorari Is Needed To Address
Whether Massachusetts Compels Regu-
lation of GHGs, Which Include Carbon
Dioxide, Under the CAA’s Title I PSD
Program and Title V of the Act ....................... 19
Il. Certiorari Is Needed To Address the
Panel’s Decision that Petitioners Lack
Standing To Challenge the Timing and
_ ARSE eee en eo 28
Ill. This Petition Raises an Unusually Im-
portant Question of Federal Law. ................... 32
RE aes nisnniriconsivelipitencebininnieeniassineienneneinig 35
APPENDIX MATERIALS:
VOLUME I:
APPENDIX A: Order of U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Dismissing Petitions for Review of Timing
and Tailoring Rules and Denying Other Peti-
al ceaaiaantihidaledhdetniae la
APPENDIX B: Opinion of U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit................ 6a
APPENDIX C: U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, Reconsideration of Interpreta-
tion of Regulations That Determine Pollu-
tants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting
APPENDIX D: U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, Prevention of Significant Dete-
rioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-
ing Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010)
TTI Ti desechieicipcidenleraianiidedinininioieidbinntiniteativinn 149a
APPENDIX E: Order of U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Denying Panel Rehearing ...............................0020+- 598a
VOLUME III:
APPENDIX F: Order of U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Denying Petitions for Rehearing En Banc of
Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America and National Association of
ss aa ian ientiaieimetiiial
APPENDIX G: Order of U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc of
Pacific Legal Foundation ......................00.c0eceeeeeeess
APPENDIX H: Federal Statutes .........................
APPENDIX I: Federal Regulations .....................
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases:
Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir.
I iiicinineyinnninanndinisicnmnmnnencinnmnniespeiiiinimesionesumanpaiienenes 23
Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C.
SERIE NEEL Reet enna Teac en Sauna 29
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131
I nel 22
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) ................ccceeeeeeeeee 31
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).......... 3, 28
Environmental Defense vy. Duke Energy Corp.,
EERE ewer 21, 23
Food & Drug Administration v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)....... 32
General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,
SE IS EE ie ee a a 23
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
xiv
Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253
(D.D.C.), affd per curiam, 4 Env?t Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), affd per curiam
by an equally divided Court sub nom. Fri v.
Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).............0. cece 9
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S.
BP CR ccenesisccscnsassnsensstedinniusessimemeandipasiabanensaaiae 31
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Bae., GR Ge GP a a ctemtemniniiaieina 8,9
Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976)......... 8
United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co.,
ee CR Ge IE cesscrsencckndsnnnisemmeeepndieniiednaanala 23
United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U:S.
IE ocnccicsssicivihtnateieubtiiindpiiadiadeeaaenalel 28
Constituti 1 Statutes:
ip Be eR ORE en 2
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, et seq.
Ga CGAL, © DOG rcctcisienieeeresicnnncsticniiidescnianl 9, 25
GB EAE B Pe eetccctcrniesceinsnticcimmsnsnniemaiaiaa 9
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GD TE AE: FB Pe centestcncssnssvmnuinsiniongnmmnnaaan 9
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i sousmmtonsenponee 25
I .. ceoccsaceeseonnesenecses 12
42 U.S.C. § 7475(8)(4) .......cccccecescccscecececeseseesseeces. 12
42 U.S.C. § 7475(€)(1) ....ccccccceseccecseesceseceseceeees 12, 25
A 11, 22
42 U.S.C. § 7491(g)(7) .....-ceccceccesecesesescecsceceseececeees 22
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) .....-cccecceceseeeeeeeene 1, 12, 13, 25
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42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-76616... occccccccccceeeeseeeeeeeee 1
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Regulations:
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Federal Register:
39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (Dec. 5, 1974) .......cccececsecseseceeeees 10
66 Fed. Reg. 7486 (Jan. 23, 2001)................:.ccceeeeee 12
68 Fed. Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003) .............. eee 12
73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (July 30, 2008).......................... 26
74 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (Oct. 27, 2009) ........ 10, 13, 14, 33
74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009)........000000000002.. 1,13
75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010)........................ 2,13
75 Fed. Reg. 49,556 (Aug. 13, 2010) ....................000205. 1
Legislative Materials:
S. Rep. No. 95-127 (1977), reprinted in 3 A Legis-
lative History of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977, at 1375 (1979)...............cccccecssecsees 11
Miscellaneous:
EPA, Prevention of Significant Deteriora-
tion and Title V GHG Tailoring Rule:
EPA’s Response to Public Comments
(May 2010), Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-
ee tacesneinsicaienndenhiniiaiiniiniteneencnnsinneiit passim
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
The Utility Air Regulatory Group respectfully pe-
titions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit dismissing its petitions to review
rules of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) that address (i) the date on which
greenhouse gases (GHGs) emitted from stationary
sources are considered regulated pollutants under
the Title I prevention of significant deterioration
(PSD) preconstruction permitting program and the
Title V general operating permit program of the
Clean Air Act (CAA or Act),! 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004
(Apr. 2, 2010) (the Timing Rule), Petition Appendix
(Pet. App.) 108a-148a, and (ii) how GHG emissions
from stationary sources are to be regulated under
those CAA provisions, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3,
2010) (the Tailoring Rule), Pet. App. 149a-597a.
This petition does not address other aspects of the
D.C. Circuit’s opinion and decision, including the as-
pects of the decision that concern (i) EPA’s rule find-
ing that GHG emissions from motor vehicles “endan-
ger” public health and welfare within the meaning of
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15,
2009) (Endangerment Finding), (ii) EPA’s denial of
reconsideration of that finding, 75 Fed. Reg. 49,556
(Aug. 13, 2010), or (iti) EPA’s rule setting GHG emis-
sion standards for light-duty motor vehicles under 42
1! The PSD preconstruction permitting program is contained in
Subpart 1 of Part C of Title I of the CAA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-
7479. The Title V program is, as the name indicates, contained
in Title V of the Act. Id. §§ 7661-7661f.
2
U.S.C. §& 7521(a)(1), 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7,
2010) (Motor Vehicle Rule).
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the D.C. Circuit is reported at 684
F.3d 102 and reproduced at Pet. App. 6a-107a. The
D.C. Circuit’s orders denying panel rehearing and
rehearing en banc are reproduced at Pet. App. 598a-
663a. Relevant excerpts of the Timing Rule are re-
produced at Pet. App. 108a-148a, and the Tailoring
Rule is reproduced at Pet. App. 149a-597a.
JURISDICTION
The D.C. Circuit entered judgment dismissing the
Tailoring and Timing Rule cases on June 26, 2012,
Pet. App. 5a, and denied timely petitions for panel
rehearing or rehearing en banc on December 20,
2012, id. at 602a, 607a, 663a. This Court has juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS
The Constitution of the United States provides, in
pertinent part, that “[t]he judicial Power [of the
United States] shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority ... [and] to Contro-
versies to which the United States shall be a party.”
U.S. Const. art. ITI, § 2, cl. 1.
Relevant provisions of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401
et seq., are reproduced at Pet. App. 664a-680a.
3
Relevant provisions of EPA’s regulations imple-
menting the CAA are reproduced at Pet. App. 681a-
692a.
INTRODUCTION
Certiorari is needed to address a matter of excep-
tional importance: Did Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497 (2007), compel EPA to regulate GHGs un-
der the CAA Title I PSD and Title V operating per-
mit programs where doing so would (i) extend those
programs’ coverage to tens of thousands or even mil-
lions of small sources that Congress intended not to
regulate, and (ii) expand a program focused on pre-
venting significant deterioration to include a pollu-
tant — carbon dioxide — that does not deteriorate air
quality? As Judge Kavanaugh explained in dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing en banc, EPA’s monu-
mental extension of CAA regulatory authority by
administrative fiat puts “the bedrock underpinnings
of our system of separation of powers ... at stake,”
Pet. App. 658a (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Beyond the CAA, this case has significant implica-
tions for all complex regulatory statutes that contain
separate programs addressing different aspects of
the statutes’ regulatory objectives. The decision be-
low stands for the principle that, under step one of
the two-step test set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
a regulatory agency must give a term that appears in
each of various different programs in a given statute
the same broad meaning given that term by the
statute’s general provisions, regardless of the focus
or scope of those individual programs. Here, EPA
4
insisted it had no choice but to apply to specific CAA
programs (i.e., the PSD and Title V programs) the
expansive reading this Court in Massachusetts gave
to “air pollutant” in the Act’s general provisions. As
Judge Kavanaugh observed, the (fact that
“[glreenhouse gases may qualify as ‘air pollutants’ in
the abstract” does not resolve how Congress intended
“air pollutant” to be understood in the context of any
individual, specialized CAA program. Pet. App.
650a-651a n.3 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
This petition does not ask this Court to revisit its
holding in Massachusetts. Rather, it asks this Court
to address a distinct issue: whether Massachusetts
obligated EPA to regulate GHGs, including carbon
dioxide, under provisions of the Act — the Title I PSD
program and the Title V operating permit program —
that address regulatory requirements and standards
for regulation that are fundamentally different from
other CAA programs, including the mobile-source
provisions (Title IT) at issue in Massachusetts.
EPA freely acknowledged that regulation of carbon
dioxide emissions under the Title I and Title V per-
mitting programs subjects “an extraordinarily large
number of sources” to the CAA for the first time, con-
trary to explicit congressional intent to cover only a
limited number of large industrial facilities. Pet.
App. 339a, 345a (application of PSD to GHGs would
result in “more than 81,000 ... PSD [permits] each
year, an increase of almost 300-fold,” “result[ing] in a
program that would have been unrecognizable to the
Congress that designed PSD”); see also id. at 380a
(application of the Title V permitting program to
5
GHGs “would result in a program urrecognizable to
the Congress that enacted title V[,] ... expand|[ing]
[the program] from the current 14,700 sources to
some 6.1 million”). This unprece?enteu expansion of
CAA stationary-source jurisdiction, EPA said, would
in turn result in insurmountable burdens for (i) state
authorities required to conduct millions of new per-
mit proceedings,” and (ii) the countless sources that
would be subject to the CAA for the first time as a
result of carbon dioxide regulation (including shop-
ping malls, hospitals, stadiums, and apartment
buildings). Jd. at 155a.
To postpone results that EPA concluded would, “as
a practical matter, vitiate much of the purpose of”
the statutory language limiting application of these
programs to large industrial facilities, id. at 347a,
EPA promulgated the Tailoring Rule. EPA designed
that rule to exclude initially very small sources of
GHG emissions but then, in phases, to expand GHG
regulation “one-step-at-a-time,” id. at 457a-461a, un-
til all of the additional sources that Congress never
intended to cover are in the program. In doing so,
EPA declined the invitation to interpret the term “air
pollutant” as used in the Act’s PSD and Title V pro-
visions to exclude GHGs in order to confine those
programs to the bounds EPA recognized had been set
by Congress. See EPA, Prevention of Significant De-
terioration and Title V GHG Tailoring Rule: EPA's
2 States typically issue PSD and Title V permits to sources
within their borders. EPA issues these permits only in the rare
situation where the state delegates its responsibility to EPA or
EPA disapproves the state's plan to issue these permits.
6
Response to Public Comments at 34-43 (May 2010),
Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0517-19181 (Re-
sponse to Comments).
A panel of the D.C. Circuit dismissed petitioner's
challenge to the Tailoring Rule after concluding that
stationary-source GHG regulation was compelled by
“automatic operation of the statute” and “binding
Supreme Court precedent.” Pet. App. 10la, 612a.
According to the panel, because EPA’s “one-step-at-a-
time” rules would initially mitigate the extraordinar-
ily damaging impacts that “all-at-once” GHG sta-
tionary-source regulation would produce, “Petition-
ers lack Article III standing to challenge” the Tailor-
ing Rule. Jd. at 96a (emphasis in original). Judges
Brown and Kavanaugh wrote opinions dissenting
from denial of petitions for en banc rehearing of the
panel’s decision. Jd. at 613a-661a.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. This case concerns the decision of a panel of the
lower court that EPA was bound by (i) this Court’s
decision in Massachusetts interpreting 42 U.S.C. §
7602(g) in the context of Title II of the CAA, and (ii)
the term “air pollutant” in the Act’s PSD and Title V
provisions, to regulate stationary source emissions of
GHGs under the Title I and Title V permitting pro-
grams.5
3 Because the Title V program provides that requirements ap-
plicable to a given stationary source under the CAA be collected
in an “operating permit,” 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a), and because the
only GHG requirements for stationary sources that currently
exist for electric generating facilities owned and operated by
7
2. Carbon dioxide is the most ubiquitous and the
largest by volume of the six pollutants that are en-
compassed by EPA’s definition of GHGs. Carbon di-
oxide is not a substance like sulfur dioxide, nitrogen
oxides, or particulate matter that pollutes the air
people breathe. Ground-level carbon dioxide is part
of the atmosphere and is necessary to life. Carbon
dioxide (like other GHGs) mixes rapidly and is dis-
tributed uniformly in the sea of carbon dioxide and
other GHGs already present in the atmosphere at
ground level (and above). Plants need, and people
and animals exhale, carbon dioxide as part of the el-
ementary processes of life. Because carbon dioxide is
typically released by stationary sources in amounts
that are orders of magnitude greater than other pol-
lutants, hospitals, schools, apartment buildings,
shopping malls, and innumerable other small
sources would become CAA-regulated stationary
sources if carbon dioxide is regulated as an air pollu-
tant under Title I and Title V. Pet. App. 154a-155a.
As a result, carbon dioxide is unique — fundamental-
ly different from the other substances that have been
regulated under the CAA Title I and Title V permit-
ting programs.
members of petitioner arise from the PSD preconstruction per-
mit program, resolution of the PSD applicability issue here will
resolve their existing Title V concerns, cf. Response to Com-
ments at 43 (EPA agrees ... that where a source has previously
been issued a Title V permit, the permit need not be revised ...
if the source is not subject to any additional applicable re-
quirements.”). Accordingly, this petition focuses principally on
the Title I PSD program.
8
3. The CAA contains six titles, each of which es-
tablishes different programs to address different air
pollution problems in different geographic areas and
for different types of sources. For example, Title II of
the Act addresses emission standards for mobile
sources, including motor vehicles and aircraft (42
U.S.C. §§ 7521-7590); Title [TV addresses acid rain,
including emissions from stationary combustion
sources (id. §§ 7651-7651lo); and Title VI addresses
stratospheric ozone protection (id. §§ 7671-7671q).
Title I of the CAA establishes a variety of programs
governing emissions from stationary sources, includ-
ing programs addressing ambient air quality stand-
ards, emission control technology standards, air tox-
ics regulation, visibility protection, and others. Ti-
tles I and V also include programs for preconstruc-
tion permits (PSD) and operating permits (Title V)
for large industrial sources.
4. The starting point for regulating stationary
sources under CAA Title I is the national ambient air
quality standards (NAAQS) program. Id. § 7409;
Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249 (1976) (the
NAAQS program is the “heart” of the CAA). NAAQS
define the maximum allowed concentrations of spe-
cific pollutants (called “criteria pollutants”) in the
“ambient” air — i.e., ground-level air quality concen-
trations of substances in the air to which people are
exposed and which they breathe. See 40 C.F.R. §
50.1(e) (defining “ambient air” as “that portion of the
atmosphere, external to buildings, to which the gen-
eral public has access”); Train v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 65 (1975) (ambient air is
9
the “statute’s term for the outdoor air used by the
general public”). EPA sets NAAQS at the level that
is requisite to protect public health and welfare. 42
U.S.C. § 7409(b). Following promulgation of a
NAAQS, states have primary responsibility to ensure
that the ambient air within their borders attains and
maintains the NAAQS. Id. § 7407. States do this by
adopting emission limitations for sources and other
measures in a state implementation plan (SIP) that
is submitted to EPA for its review and approval (or
disapproval). Id. § 7410(a), (k). The CAA assigns re-
sponsibility for achieving NAAQS on a geographic
basis. Id. § 7407. With respect to each NAAQS, EPA
designates each area as “attainment” (meaning am-
bient air quality in the area is as good as or better
than the level represented by the NAAQS), “nonat-
tainment” (ambient air quality in the area is worse
than the NAAQS), or “unclassifiable,” based on
measured ambient air quality concentrations in that
area. Id. § 7407(d)(1)(A). A single geographic area
may be in attainment with one NAAQS but nonat-
tainment with another.
The PSD program (the principal program at issue
here) originated from litigation that followed EPA’s
approval of the first SIPs in 1972. In Sierra Club v.
Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), affd per cu-
riam, 4 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
affd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub
nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973), EPA
was ordered to disapprove any SIP that allowed am-
bient air quality in an area measured to be in “at-
tainment” to deteriorate to the level of a NAAQS. Id.
10
at 257. In 1974, implementing the district court’s
decision, EPA established the initial PSD program
through rulemaking. 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510, 42,514-17
(Dec. 5, 1974).
EPA’s PSD regulations sought to “prevent signifi-
cant deterioration” of local ambient air quality in at-
tainment areas by requiring preconstruction permits
before construction of major new sources or modifica-
tions of major existing sources of air pollutants that
are subject to NAAQS could occur. Deterioration of
local air quality would be avoided by requiring that
the source (i) not cause ambient air quality impacts
above specified numerical “increments” for two crite-
ria pollutants (sulfur dioxide and particulate mat-
ter), in order to prevent the “significant deteriora-
tion” of ambient air quality, and (ii) use “best availa-
ble control technology” (BACT) for these pollutants.
The 1974 PSD program applied to sulfur dioxide, ni-
trogen oxides, and particulate matter, air pollutants
that can deteriorate the quality of the air people
breathe.
In 1977, Congress enacted a statutory PSD pro-
gram largely based on the 1974 regulatory program.
Like the 1974 regulations, the statutory PSD pro-
gram required source owners and operators to obtain
preconstruction permits for the proposed construc-
tion of major new sources and for proposed major
modifications of major existing sources, in order to
prevent significant deterioration of ambient air qual-
ity. 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,308 (Oct. 27, 2009) (“As
the legislative history makes clear, Congress enacted
... PSD ... to resolve issues arising when sources of
11
criteria pollutants seek to build or expand in areas
with air quality that meets the [NAAQS].”).
Concerned about the PSD program’s potentially
adverse economic impacts, Congress set precise, nu-
merical tonnage amounts restricting the program’s
applicability to a relatively small number of large in-
dustrial facilities, which the statute refers to as “ma-
jor emitting facilities.” See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 95-127,
at 96-97 (1977), reprinted in 3 A Legislative History
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, at 1375,
1470-71 (1979); see also Pet. App. 344a (“Congress
paid careful attention to the types and sizes of
sources that would be subject to the PSD program
and designed the thresholds deliberately to limit the
program’s scope....”). Congress defined “major emit-
ting facility” as a large facility that emits (or has the
potential to emit) at least 250 tons per year (tpy) of
“any air pollutant,” or at least 100 tpy of “any air pol-
lutant” if the facility is within certain, statutorily
enumerated industrial source categories. 42 U.S.C. §
7479(1); see also Pet. App. 346a (“Congress did not
expect PSD to apply to large numbers of small
sources ... and instead expected the 100/250 tpy
thresholds to limit PSD’s applicability to larger
sources.”).
Reflecting the PSD program’s focus on pollutants
that can deteriorate ambient air quality, Congress in
1977 enacted statutory air quality “increments” to
prevent deterioration of ambient air quality with re-
spect to sulfur dioxide and particulate matter. Con-
gress also authorized EPA to promulgate regulations
to “preventi] ... significant deterioration of air quali-
12
ty” for certain other pollutants with local air quality
effects. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a). And it directed EPA to
promulgate regulations for “analysis ... of the ambi-
ent air quality at the proposed site [of the new facili-
ty] and in areas which may be affected by emissions
from such facility for each pollutant subject to regu-
lation under this [Act] which will be emitted from
such facility.” Id. § 7475(e)(1) (emphasis added). Fi-
nally, Congress provided that PSD permits are to
contain emission limitations based on BACT for pol-
lutants that are “subject to regulation” under the
Act. Id. § 7475(a)(4).
5. In 1999, public interest groups filed a petition
for rulemaking asking EPA to regulate emissions of
GHGs, including carbon dioxide, from motor vehicles
under Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). See
66 Fed. Reg. 7486 (Jan. 23, 2001). EPA denied the
petition on the ground that GHGs are not an “air pol-
lutant” under the general definitional provision in
Title III of the Act, i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).4 68 Fed.
Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003).
On review, this Court rejected EPA’s arguments
that (a) the Act’s general definition of “air pollutant”
was not broad enough to encompass GHGs, and (b)
GHGs therefore were not an “air pollutant” that was
potentially eligible for regulation under Title II.
« 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) provides that “[t/he term ‘air pollutant’
means any air pollution agent or combination of such agents,
including any physical, chemical, biological, [or] radioactive ...
substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters
the ambient air.”
13
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528-29. According to the
Court, “[o]n its face, the [42 U.S.C. § 7602(g)] defini-
tion embraces all airborne compounds of whatever
stripe.” Id. at 529. The Court then turned its atten-
tion to Title IT of the Act and found that GHG regula-
tion would not fundamentally change the Title II
program: “The broad language of § 202(a)(1) reflects
an intentional effort to confer the flexibility neces-
sary” to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehi-
cles. Id. at 532 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)).
6. After this Court decided Massachusetts, EPA
determined in 2009 in the Endangerment Finding
that GHG emissions from vehicles throughout the
nation “cause, or contribute to, air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
hee'th or welfare,” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
7521(a)(1). 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,505. EPA did not, and
could not, find that GHGs deteriorate local ambient
air quality; rather, it found that GHGs disperse
throughout the globa’ »tmosphere and affect climate.
Id. at 66,514-16. Following issuance of its 2009 En-
dangerment Finding, EPA promulgated the Motor
Vehicle Rule, regulating GHG emissions from pas-
senger vehicles under 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) of the Act.
75 Fed. Reg. at 25,324.
7. In 2010, EPA explained that “[c]urrently, EPA
does not consider GHG emissions to be ‘regulated ...
pollutants’ under the [Title I] PSD program.... EPA
is in the process of reviewing its approach to PSD
applicability.” 74 Fed. Reg. at 55,299. EPA’s review
produced the Title I stationary source rules — the
Timing Rule and the Tailoring Rule — at issue here.
14
In the Timing Rule, EPA addressed when GHGs
would become “subject to regulation” for purposes of
the PSD program. Pet App. 125a. According to EPA,
the Timing Rule “concludes only that ... GHGs would
not be considered ‘subject to regulation’ ... earlier
than January 2, 2011,” the date the Motor Vehicle
Rule took effect. Id. at 126a. EPA said it would ad-
dress in a companion rule “the applicability of PSD
requirements for GHG-emitting sources.” Jd.
In the companion rule (the Tailoring Rule), EPA
explained its view that once the Motor Vehicle Rule
took effect, regulation of GHG emissions from sta-
tionary sources was required by operation of law un-
der the Title I PSD permit program and the Title V
operating permit program. Id. at 154a. According to
EPA, “our legal basis for this rule is our interpreta-
tion of the PSD and Title V applicability provisions,”
id. at 150a, which is “that GHG sources would be-
come subject to the PSD and title V permitting pro-
grams upon finalization of the [Motor Vehicle Rule],”
Response to Comments at 34.
Given the statutory 100-tpy and 250-tpy PSD ap-
plicability thresholds, however, EPA also concluded
that regulating GHGs under the PSD and Title V
programs would extend the programs to cover
sources Congress never intended to regulate. See,
e.g., Pet. App. 235a-236a, 380a-381a; 74 Fed. Reg. at
55,304 (“Congress, focused as it was fin 1977] on
sources of conventional pollutants and not global
warming pollutants, expected that the 100/250 tpy
applicability thresholds would limit PSD to larger
sources.”). According to EPA, “[t]hese results are not
15
consistent with other provisions of the PSD and title
V requirements, and are inconsistent with — and, in-
deed, undermine — congressional purposes for the
PSD and title V provisions.” Pet. App. 305a. EPA
concluded that “applying PSD requirements literally
to GHG sources ... would result in a program that
would have been unrecognizable to the Congress that
designed PSD.” Id. at 345a; see also id. at 380a (ap-
plying Title V requirements literally to GHG sources
“would result in a program unrecognizable to the
Congress that enacted title V”).
The Tailoring Rule was EPA’s response to what it
viewed as a conflict between the explicit statutory
100/250 tpy applicability thresholds and clear con-
gressional intent not to apply the PSD program to
tens of thousands, and the Title V program to mil-
lions, of small sources. In this rule, EPA amended 40
C.F.R. § 51.166 (which provides minimum criteria for
PSD provisions in SIPs) by purporting to make
GHGs subject to PSD starting on January 2, 2011.
This amended rule defines the GHGs regulated un-
der PSD as those GHGs emitted in amounts above
100,000 tpy of “carbon dioxide equivalent”® for new
construction (and above 75,000 tpy of carbon dioxide
equivalent for modifications), id. at 587a, and defines
the GHGs regulated under Title V as those GHGs
5 “GHGs,” as defined by EPA, consist of six separate air pollu-
tants. Each of those pollutants has been assigned a numerical
value based on the pollutant’s “global warming potential,”
which measures each pollutant relative to carbon dioxide. For
example, according to EPA, one ton of methane equals twenty-
one tons of carbon dioxide equivalent. Pet. App. 167a.
16
emitted in amounts above 100,000 tpy of carbon diox-
ide equivalent, id. at 591a. These thresholds are or-
ders of magnitude above the CAA’s 100/250-tpy
thresholds for PSD and Title V permit applicability.‘
Because EPA interpreted the Act to require that
GHGs be regulated the same as other § 7602(g) pol-
lutants, notwithstanding that such regulation would
be contrary to congressional intent for PSD and Title
V, EPA determined that it would reserve authority to
expand regulation of GHGs “step by step” until
GHGs became subject to regulation at the statutory
100/250 tpy thresholds. Jd. at 159a.
8. In promulgating the Tailoring Rule, EPA re-
jected rulemaking comments arguing that (i) Massa-
chusetts did not require EPA to interpret the term
“air pollutant” in the Act’s PSD provisions to include
GHGs, and (ii) EPA was prohibited from undertak-
ing, step by step, to implement a program that con-
tradicts congressional intent. See Response to
Comments at 34-43; see also Comments of the Utility
Air Regulatory Group on the Proposed Prevention of
Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse
Gas Tailoring Rule at 15, 19-40 (Dec. 28, 2009),
Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0517-5317 (UARG
Comments). A panel of the lower court agreed with
EPA on the ground that this result was dictated by
“binding Supreme Court precedent.” Pet. App. 612a.
® Under the Tailoring Rule, GHGs emitted below the rule’s
75,000-tpy and 100,000-tpy PSD thresholds and the rule’s
100,000-tpy Title V threshold are not “air pollutants” subject to
regulation under the PSD and Title V programs, respectively.
17
According to the panel, “Congress made perfectly
clear that the PSD program was meant to protect
against precisely the types of harms caused by
greenhouse gases” because the PSD program’s decla-
ration of purpose includes a reference to the word
“welfare,” which, this Court observed in Massachu-
setts, includes effects on weather and climate. Id. at
76a (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h)). “[G]iven both the
statute’s plain language and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,” the panel said it
“ha[d] little trouble concluding that the phrase ‘any
air pollutant’ [in PSD] includes all regulated air pol-
lutants, including greenhouse gases.” Id. at 73a
(emphasis in original).
Having concluded that “Industry Petitioners were
regulated and State Petitioners required to issue
permits not because of anything EPA did in the Tim-
ing and Tailoring Rules, but by automatic operation
of statute,” the panel then concluded that Petitioners
lacked standing to challenge either the Timing Rule
or the Tailoring Rule. Jd. at 100a-101a. According to
the panel, “neither the Timing nor Tailoring Rules
caused the injury Petitioners allege: having to com-
ply with PSD and Title V for greenhouse gases.” Id.
at 10la. These injuries, the panel said, were caused
by the statute and were not remediable by any judg-
ment of the court.
9. The D.C. Circuit denied petitions for rehearing
en banc, with dissenting opinions filed by Judges
Brown and Kavanaugh. In a concurring opinion filed
by the original panel members, those judges reiterat-
ed their conclusions that the Court in Massachusetts
18
“expressly held that the Clean Air Act’s ‘sweeping
definition of “air pollutant” unambiguously includes
greenhouse gases,” id. at 609a (emphasis in original),
and that, based on that reading of Massachusetts,
“the panel’s interpretation of the statute is the only
plausible one,” id. at 611a (emphasis added). By con-
trast, Judges Brown and Kavanaugh explained in
dissent that the statute was open to other readings
and that those readings, which would avoid conflicts
with congressional intent, were plausible. They
would have granted rehearing “for the full court to
consider the propriety of extending Massachusetts to
Title V and the PSD program,” id. at 614a-615a
(Brown, J., dissenting), and “to carefully but firmly
enforce the statutory boundaries” that they conclud-
ed EPA had transgressed, id. at 661a (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting).
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
This Court should grant certiorari to address
whether Massachusetts v. EPA compels regulation of
GHGs under the PSD and Title V permitting pro-
grams of the CAA. Certiorari is also needed to clari-
fy that petitioner has standing under this Court’s
settled law on justiciability and to ensure that the
regulated community can obtain judicial review of
agency action regulating GHGs in the D.C. Circuit,
which has exclusive jurisdiction to review many
agency rulemakings, including national rulemakings
under the CAA. Finally, given the expansive regula-
tion that the rules at issue here would compel, this is
an issue of great importance to the Nation.
19
L Certiorari Is Needed To Address Whether
Massachusetts Compels Regulation of
GHGs, Which Include Carbon Dioxide,
Under the CAA’s Title I PSD Program and
Title V of the Act.
According to the panel, Massachusetts unleashed a
cascade of CAA requirements automatically and by
operation of law. The panel found that because un-
der “Massachusetts ... greenhouse gases ‘unambigu-
ous[ly]’ may be regulated as an ‘air pollutant’ under
the Clean Air Act,” id. at 25a, “once [the Motor Vehi-
cle] Rule took effect and made greenhouse gases a
regulated pollutant under Title II of the Act,” that
triggered application of the Title I PSD program “au-
tomatically ... to facilities emitting over 100/250 tpy
of greenhouse gases.” Id. at 71a (emphasis added).
Because millions of small facilities throughout the
Nation emit GHGs at rates greater than 100 tpy,
EPA’s interpretation that Massachusetts compels
regulation of GHGs under these programs would
cause a radical expansion of Title I PSD and Title V
jurisdiction. Programs that Congress enacted to ap-
ply to only a comparative handful of large industrial
facilities would be transformed, overnight, into pro-
grams encompassing innumerable small sources. Id.
at 345a-346a. As EPA explained, these programs
would thereby become unrecognizable to the Con-
gress that enacted them, id. at 345a, and this result
“would, as a practical matter, vitiate much of the
purpose of the 100 tpy [statutory] cut-off for [CAA
applicability to] industrial sources,” id. at 347a.
20
Yet, according to the panel, “given both the stat-
ute’s plain language and the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Massachusetts v. EPA, {it had] little trouble
concluding that the phrase ‘any air pollutant’ in-
cludes all regulated air pollutants, including green-
house gases,” for purposes of PSD and Title V. Id. at
73a (emphasis in original). This, the panel held,
“forecloses” any argument that EPA had authority to
interpret the term “air pollutant” more narrowly for
these other CAA programs. Z/d. at 81a; cf. id. at 650a
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“The panel opinion ...
appears to have been heavily if not dispositively in-
fluenced by Massachusetts v. EPA.”).
But Massachusetts does not compel the conclusion
that an “air pollutant” under 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) is
necessarily an air pollutant for purposes of any indi-
vidual program under the CAA. No party in Massa-
chusetts argued that the scope of the term “air pollu-
tant” under 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) was narrower
than the definition of air pollutant in 42 U.S.C. §
7602(g). And this Court found no reason to adopt a
narrowing interpretation, concluding that “[t]jhe
broad language of [42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) in Title IT}
reflects an intentional effort to confer the flexibility”
needed to regulate a broad range of substances, in-
cluding GHGs. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532.
42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) defines the outer bounds of the
“air pollutants” that are potentially eligible for regu-
lation under the various CAA programs. This is un-
derstandable in a lengthy, expansive statute like the
CAA, which has different programs addressing dif-
ferent pollution problems. In such a statute with
21
several titles and programs, a general definition of
pollutant has to be broad enough to reflect the entire
range of substances that might be regulated under
any one or more of the diverse programs it establish-
es.
EPA’s argument in Massachusetts that GHGs
were not an “air pollutant” under 42 U.S.C. §
7602(g), if accepted, would have been sufficient to re-
solve the question whether GHGs were pollutants
eligible for regulation under 42 U.S.C. § 7521. But,
as Judge Kavanaugh observed, the fact that
“[g]reenhouse gases may qualify as ‘air pollutants’ in
the abstract” does not resolve the definition of “air
pollutant” for each individual regulatory program of
the CAA. Pet. App. 65la n.3 (Kavanaugh, J., dis-
senting); cf. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549
U.S. 561, 574 (2007) (a CAA case decided the same
day as Massachusetts and holding that statutory
terms must be interpreted in light of their context
and the statute as a whole and that the same term
may mean different things in different parts of the
statute).
Indeed, in implementing the CAA over the past
decades, EPA has been careful to define which of the
42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) air pollutants are to be regulated
under each individual CAA program. Thus, while 42
U.S.C. § 7411 provides that new source performance
standards (NSPS) apply whenever a source under-
takes a “physical change ... which increases the
amount of any air pollutant emitted,” 42 U.S.C. §
7411(a)(4) (emphasis added), EPA by regulation has
narrowed the universe of air pollutants that trigger
22
NSPS to those “[air] pollutant(s] to which a standard
applies” under 40 C.F.R. part 60. 40 C.F.R. §
60.14(a). Although 42 U.S.C. § 7491 defines “major
stationary source[s]” to which the CAA visibility pro-
tection program applies as sources that “emit 250
tons or more of any pollutant,” 42 U.S.C. § 7491(g)(7)
(emphasis added), EPA by regulation has defined the
pollutants that trigger this program as a specific set
of “visibility-impairing pollutants,” see, eg., 40
C.F.R. Part 61, App. Y, § [I11.A.2. And, although 42
U.S.C. § 7479 defines “major emitting facilit[ies]”
that are subject to the PSD program as those that
emit more than 100 or 250 tpy of “any air pollutant,”
42 U.S.C. § 7479(1), EPA has by regulation narrowed
the scope of air pollutants that can trigger PSD to
“any regulated NSR [new source review] pollutant,”
40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(1). Finally, in the very rulemak-
ing at issue here, although EPA (and the panel) read
Massachusetts to compel PSD and Title V regulation
of all GHGs, EPA defined GHGs for PSD and Title V
to include only those emitted above the 100,000- or
75,000-tpy levels of carbon dioxide equivalent. Pet.
App. 587a, 591a.
The historic approach that identifies which of the
42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) “air pollutants” are air pollutants
subject to individual CAA programs makes eminent
sense. “Of necessity, Congress selects different regu-
latory regimes to address different problems.” Am.
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538
(2011). And the same term appearing in different
statutory programs can (indeed, must) be given dif-
ferent regulatory meanings where congressional in-
23
tent is different. See Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d
984, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[I]}t is not impermissible
under Chevron for an agency to interpret an impre-
cise term differently in two separate sections of a
statute which have different purposes.”). “A given
term in the same statute may take on distinct char-
acters from association with distinct statutory ob-
jects calling for different implementation strategies.”
Envtl. Def., 549 U.S. at 574; see also Gen. Dynamics
Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 596-97 (2004)
(‘age” has different meanings within Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act); United States v. Cleve-
land Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 212-13
(2001) (‘wages paid” has different meanings within
Social Security Act Amendments of 1939); Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1997) (“em-
ployee” has different meanings within Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
The CAA is not self-implementing. Rather, rule-
making is required under each of the separate CAA
programs to spell out the specific elements of each.
including the pollutants to which the program ap-
plies. When EPA -— or a reviewing court — seeks to
give content to the term “air pollutant” as used in
each of these programs, 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g)’s broad
definition of air pollutant is always the beginning,
but not the end, of the analysis.
If EPA had engaged in this inquiry here, it would
have narrowed the scope of “air pollutants” covered
by the Title I PSD and Title V permitting programs
to exclude carbon dioxide entirely from those pro-
grams, and not partially and temporarily as FPA did.
24
First, as EPA acknowledged, the explicit statutory
100/250-tpy “threshold limitations” for PSD applica-
bility served as “Congress’s mechanism for limiting
PSD” to a limited number of large industrial facili-
ties. Pet. App. 343a; see also id. at 380a-383a (Title
V). The Act’s 100/250-tpy “major source” numerical
thresholds have a singular meaning that is not sub-
ject to alteration through “interpretation”; these nu-
merical limitations restrict PSD and Title V’s cover-
age to relatively few “large industrial sources,” while
excluding numerous smaller “commercial and resi-
dential sources.” Jd. at 345a-346a; see also id. at
319a (“Congress had reason to expect the total size of
the PSD program to be measured in the hundreds of
permits a year,” not tens of thousands); id. at 382a
(“Congress did not expect” to include “small commer-
cial and residential sources” in Title V).
Thus, the 100/250-tpy statutory language must be
read te define what pollutants are PSD and Title V-
regulated: only those pollutants that “a relatively
small number of large industrial sources” emit in
amounts above the statutory thresholds. Id. at 345a;
see also Response to Comments at 37 (The statutory
“threshold for these source categories makes sense
only in terms of conventional pollutants ... and can-
not be reconciled with an unbounded reading of the
phrase ‘any pollutant subject to regulation.”). Be-
cause many thousands or even millions of small!
sources emit carbon dioxide above these statutory
thresholds, carbon dioxide cannot be a PSD or Title
V pollutant.
25
Furthermore, while 42 U.S.C. § 7521 in Title II of
the CAA focuses on emissions whose presence in the
atmosphere generally may “endanger public health
or welfare,” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), the PSD program
in Title I of the Act focuses on protection of localized
ambient “air quality” — 1.e., the air people breathe in
certain geographically defined 42 U.S.C. § 7407 areas
within a state. Thus, 42 U.S.C. § 7471 provides that
“each applicable [SIP] shall contain emission limita-
tions and such other measures as may be necessary
... to prevent significant deterioration of air quality
in each [air quality control] region,” i.e., the local air
quality control regions designated pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 7407 based on ground-level pollutant meas-
urements. (Emphasis added). Further, 42 U.S.C. §
7475 directs EPA to promulgate regulations govern-
ing analysis of impacts on “ambient air quality” that
might flow from “emissions from [the PSD] facility.”
Id. § 7475(e)(1). Through such provisions, Congress
made clear that the statute’s PSD requirements are
directed not to regulation of emissions of air pollu-
tants that may endanger public health or welfare
due to their uniform presence throughout the global
atmosphere, but rather to such regulation “as may be
necessary ... to prevent significant deterioration” of
the air that people breathe. Id. § 7471.
The PSD program addresses pollutants that dete-
riorate local air quality. By contrast, EPA’s regula-
tion of carbon dioxide, the most prevalent GHG in-
cluded in EPA’s definition of GHGs, is driven not by
concerns over deterioration of local or regional
ground-level air quality but by distinct environmen-
26
tal concerns. As EPA explained in an Advance No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking published in 2008 (prior
to concluding that it was compelled by the statute
and Massachusetts to regulate stationary-source
GHG emissions), “GHGs become well mixed
throughout the global atmosphere so that the long-
term distribution of GHG concentrations is not de-
pendent on local emission sources. Instead, GHG
concentrations tend to be relatively uniform around
the world.” 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,401 (July 30,
2008). Thus, according to EPA, “GHGs emitted any-
where in the world affect climate everywhere in the
world.” Id.
Accordingly, as EPA recognized, the “global nature
and effect of GHG emissions raise questions regard-
ing the suitability of CAA provisions [like the PSD
provisions] that are designed to protect local and re-
gional air quality by controlling local and regional
emission sources.” Id. at 44,408. Among other
things, “the geographic location of emission sources
and reductions. [is] generally not important to miti-
gating global climate change.” Jd. Moreover,
“Icjurrent and projected levels of ambient concentra-
tions” of GHGs, including carbon dioxide, were “not
expected to cause any direct adverse health effects,
such as respiratory or toxic effects, which would oc-
cur as a result of the elevated GHG concentrations
themselves.” Id. at 44,427. As a result, carbon diox-
ide simply does not have the characteristics of a PSD
pollutant.
Finally, contrary to the panel’s suggestion, see
Pet. App. 76a, the existence of the term “welfare” in
27
the “Congressional declaration of purpose” — a term
that the Act describes (at 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h)) as in-
cluding “effects on ... weather ... and climate” — does
not relieve EPA of its statutory responsibility to de-
termine whether a 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) pollutant such
as GHGs falls within the scope of the PSD program.
As with “air pollutant,” the CAA broadly defines
“welfare” in the general definitions section so as to be
able to serve, to the degree relevant, various pro-
grams within the Act addressing regulation of specif-
ic types of pollution.
In Massachusetts, this Court found that regulation
of GHGs under Title IJ, triggered by a general en-
dangerment finding, would not lead to “extreme,”
“counterintuitive” measures not contemplated by
Congress. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 531. This
Court observed that “EPA has not identified any
congressional action that conflicts in any way with
the regulation of greenhouse gases from new motor
vehicles.” Id. (emphasis added). By contrast, neither
EPA nor the D.C. Circuit ever examined here wheth-
er the GHG “welfare” effects targeted for regulation
were welfare effects addressed by the PSD program,
i.e., effects related to local, ground-level pollution of
the quality of the air people breathe. For all the rea-
sons discussed above, whether GHGs present welfare
concerns on a global basis is immaterial to the ques-
tion before EPA here: whether GHGs are a PSD pol-
lutant.
Certiorari should be granted to address the panel’s
conclusion that this Court’s decision in Massachu-
setts compelled inclusion of a pollutant in the PSD
28
program that does not deteriorate air quality, where
that inclusion expands regulation demonstrably be-
yond the bounds set by Congress.
Il. Certiorari Is Needed To Address the Pan-
el’s Decision that Petitioners Lack Stand-
ing To Challenge the Timing and Tailor-
ing Rules.
In the proceedings below, petitioner challenged
EPA rules that, for the first time in the history of the
CAA, make GHGs a regulated air pollutant under
the PSD and Title V programs. EPA’s Tailoring Rule
definition of what GHGs are subject to PSD and Title
V covers GHG emissions from facilities owned and
operated by members of petitioner, subjecting peti-
tioner's members to new regulatory restrictions. If
petitioner’s challenge to these rules were accepted on
the merits, GHGs could not be included in the PSD
program and any further harm to petitioner's mem-
bers from the rules would thereby be averted.
As predicates for its rulemaking actions at issue
here, EPA simultaneously embraced two incompati-
ble principles of administrative law. See Pet. App.
642a-643a n.1. The first was a “traditional tool[] of
statutory construction,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843
n.9, that EPA labeled the “absurdity” doctrine. Pet.
App. 150a-15la. Under this doctrine, an agency
must refrain from adopting the literal — or most ex-
pansive — reading of a statutory term where such a
construction would be contrary to congressional in-
tent. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489
U.S. 235, 242 (1989). The second was the so-called
doctrine of “administrative necessity,” which applies
29
where an agency cannot fully implement Congress’s
clear intent immediately. See, e.g., Ala. Power Co. v.
Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The ad-
ministrative necessity doctrine allows the agency to
implement a program in phases — one step at a time,
if need be — and thereby, by proceeding incremental-
ly, give full effect to clear congressional intent over
time.
Petitioner argued in EPA’s Tailoring Rule rule-
making and to the court below that, once EPA found
(as it plainly did) that defining “air pollutant” under
the PSD and Title V programs to include GHGs
would produce results inimical to congressional in-
tent, EPA was obligated to interpret “air pollutant”
as used in PSD and Title V more narrowly to exclude
GHGs. Administrative necessity, a doctrine designed
to give effect to congressional intent, could never be
invoked to justify agency rulemaking action designed
to transform — even incrementally — the PSD and Ti-
tle V programs into something Congress indisputably
never contemplated.
Yet, after reaching its conclusion that Massachu-
setts compelled rejection of petitioner’s statutory ar-
gument, the panel dismissed for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction the petitions for review of the Timing
and Tailoring Rules, including the argument of peti-
tioner that “EPA exceeded the boundaries of its law-
ful [statutory] authority” in adopting a phased pro-
gram for GHG regulation that would end in PSD and
Title V programs that Congress never intended. Pet.
App. 99a. According to the panel, the CAA’s defini-
tion of “air pollutant,” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g), as inter-
30
preted by this Court in Massachusetts, “requires PSD
and Title V permits for major emitters of greenhouse
gases.” Pet. App. 95a. As a result, the panel con-
cluded,
Industry Petitioners were regulated ... not
because of anything EPA did in the Timing
and Tailoring Rules, but by automatic op-
eration of the statute. Given this, neither
the Timing nor Tailoring Rules caused the
injury Petitioners allege: having to comply
with PSD and Title V for greenhouse gases.
Indeed, the Timing and Tailoring Rules ac-
tually mitigate Petitioners’ purported inju-
ries.
Id. at 100a-101a (emphases added). Only by reach-
ing the merits on Massachusetts grounds (without
even mentioning the “congressional intent” canon of
construction upon which petitioner’s statutory inter-
pretation argument was based) could the panel find
that “Petitioners lack Article III standing to chal-
lenge both [the Timing and Tailoring] rules.” Id. at
96a (emphasis omitted).
In this case, petitioner argued that EPA’s conclu-
sion that PSD and Title V regulation of GHGs would
produce results contrary to congressional intent re-
quired a narrowing interpretation of the broad defi-
nition of “air pollutant” to exclude GHGs for purpos-
es of the PSD and Title V programs. See UARG
Comments at 34-39. The panel’s refusal — on pur-
ported standing grounds — to “address the merits of
[petitioner's] ... claims” that any EPA phase-in of
31
GHG requirements would produce results contrary to
congressional intent, Pet. App. 99a, improperly con-
flated the merits with Article III standing. See Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93, 95-
97 (1998) (rejecting an approach that “convert{s] the
merits issue in this case into a jurisdictional one”); cf.
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (nonexistence of a
cause of action not a proper basis for a jurisdictional
dismissal).
Here, petitioner suffers injury in fact from EPA
rules that require its members’ stationary sources to
apply for permits that restrict their GHG emissions
beginning January 2, 2011 (the date established by
EPA’s Timing Rule). If petitioner’s statutory con-
struction argument were accepted — thereby estab-
lishing that GHGs are not an air pollutant that is
subject to PSD and Title V requirements — its mem-
bers’ present injury caused by GHG regulation would
be redressed. Nothing more is required for petitioner
to demonstrate standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The panel's
decision is, thus, at odds with this Court’s settled
case law on justiciability.
The panel’s standing decision is particularly trou-
blesome insofar as it establishes precedent with re-
spect to future phases of EPA’s PSD regulatory pro-
gram for GHGs. If petitioner lacks Article III stand-
ing here — on the asserted grounds that EPA’s pur-
suit of an expansion of CAA stationary-source juris-
diction that is incompatible with congressional ..:tent
in steps, rather than all at once, “mitigate[s] Peti-
tioners’ purported injuries,” Pet. App. 10la — then
32
petitioner's standing to object to further steps in pur-
suit of this unlawful end is also at risk. Certiorari is
needed to clarify the law on standing for the D.C.
Circuit — the court with exclusive jurisdiction to re-
view nationally applicable rules under the CAA and
many other federal regulatory statutes — in a context
that is of extraordinary importance for the Nation.
ll. This Petition Raises an Unusually Im-
portant Question of Federal Law.
In Massachusetts, this Court recognized the “unu-
sual importance” of questions concerning EPA’s au-
thority to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA.
549 U.S. at 506. This case presents, if anything, is-
sues of even greater importance than the questions
presented in that case, given the extraordinary ex-
pansion of CAA Title I jurisdiction at stake.
The Court observed in Massachusetts that reading
42 U.S.C. § 7521 to encompass regulation of emis-
sions of GHGs under Title II of the CAA from new
motor vehicles “would lead to no ... extreme
measures.” Id. at 531 (emphasis added). In fact, the
Court observed, regulation of GHG emissions from
motor vehicles and engines under Title II would “not
directly expand or contract the universe of vehicles
and engines subject to” that program. Pet. App.
632a. On this basis the Court distinguished its deci-
sion in Food & Drug Administration v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), setting
aside a regulatory expansion of Food and Drug Ad-
ministration authority over tobacco products. Mas-
sachusetts, 549 U.S. at 531 (“common sense’ intui-
33
tion [suggested] that Congress never meant to re-
move those products from circulation”).
In contrast, as EPA acknowledged, extending PSD
and Title V requirements to GHG emissions from
stationary sources would “subject an extraordinarily
large number of sources, more than 81,000, to PSD
each year, an increase of almost 300-fold” in CAA ju-
risdiction, Pet. App. 339a, and would “expand [the
Title V program] from the current 14,700 sources to
some 6.1 million,” id. at 380a. This, EPA observed,
would impose impossible burdens on states that are
responsible for issuing CAA permits and that will be
confronted with a massive and unprecedented esca-
lation in the number of permit proceedings. And be-
cause PSD permits are required prior to construction
of new and modified sources, reading Massachusetts
to mandate automatic application of PSD require-
ments to GHGs threatens to give se to profound
economic impacts across the Nation. As EPA recog-
nized, if source owners and operators are unable to
obtain PSD permits authorizing new construction or
existing-source modifications for tens of thousands of
facilities per year, for any reason — including the
states’ and EPA’s inability to process a large number
of permits - economic activity in many areas of the
country would be seriously impaired. See 74 Fed.
Reg. at 55,344 (According to EPA, once GHGs were
regulated under Title II, the PSD program, “by its
terms, prohibits a source that is subject to PSD from
constructing or modifying without a permit.”); see
also id. at 55,294.
34
EPA’s action here opened uncharted vistas of CAA
Title I and Title V jurisdiction over small sources
across the country and for every state permitting au-
thority — jurisdiction Congress never contemplated
would exist. And because the panel below found that
no petitioner had standing to challenge the merits of
EPA’s two rules authorizing a step-by-step expansion
of CAA Title I and Title V jurisdiction to capture
hosts of small sources throughout the Nation, EPA’s
continuing regulatory actions could wholly escape
judicial review if the panel’s judgment is left undis-
turbed.
This Court should grant certiorari to address a de-
cision that has profound and far-reaching implica-
tions for administrative law generally, for states, for
the Nation’s economy, and for the present and future
administration of the CAA.
35
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
F. WILLIAM BROWNELL
(Counsel of Record)
NORMAN W. FICHTHORN
HENRY V. NICKEL
ALLISON D. Woop
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP
2200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20037
(202) 955-1500
bbrownell@hunton.com
March 20, 2013 Counsel for Petitioner
APPENDIX
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No.
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP,
Petitioner,
Vv.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
APPENDIX VOLUME I OF ITI
F. WILLIAM BROWNELL
(Counsel of Record)
NORMAN W. FICHTHORN
HENRY V. NICKEL
ALLISON D. Woop
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP
2200 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., NW
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20037
(202) 955-1500
bbrownell@hunton.com
March 20, 2013 Counsel for Petitioner
RF SN RN, TERMITE A OH ERE ANNO CRN A TR NN AN AT
WILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 — WAsHiINGTON, D. C. 20002
Library of Congress
Law Library
TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME I:
APPENDIX A: Order of U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Dismissing Petitions for Review of Timing
and Tailoring Rules and Denying Other Peti-
SS Re OE nee
APPENDIX B: Opinion of U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit..........
APPENDIX C: U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, Reconsideration of Interpreta-
tion of Regulations That Determine Pollu-
tants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting
APPENDIX D: U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, Prevention of Significant Dete-
rioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-
ing Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010)
SN SIME Pictcncusndconnsesdiniinasennsiionnsnineninmnenese
Page
APPENDIX E: Order of U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Denying Panel Rehearing.............................-.00000
VOLUME IIT:
APPENDIX F: Order of U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Denying Petitions for Rehearing En Banc of
Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America and National Association of
APPENDIX G: Order of U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc of
Pacific Legal Foundation ....................ccccecceeeeeeeeeee
APPENDIX H: Federal Statutes .........................
la
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 09-1322 September Term, 2011
Filed On: June 26, 2012
COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC.,
ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
RESPONDENT
STATE OF MICHIGAN, ET AL.,
INTERVENORS
Consolidated with 10-1024, 10-1025, 10-1026, 10-
1030, 10-1035, 10-1036, 10-1037, 10-1038, 10-1039,
10-1040, 10-1041, 10-1042, 10-1044, 10-1045, 10-
1046, 10-1234, 10-1235, 10-1239, 10-1245, 10-1281,
10-1310, 10-1318, 10-1319, 10-1320, 10-1321
No. 10-1073
COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC.,
ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
Vv.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
RESPONDENT
AMERICAN FROZEN FOOD INSTITUTE, ET AL.,
INTERVENORS
Consolidated with 10-1083, 10-1099, 10-1109, 10-
1110, 10-1114, 10-1118, 10-1119, 10-1120, 10-1122,
10-1123, 10-124, 10-1125, 10-1126, 10-1127, 10-1128,
10-1129, 10-1131, 10-1132, 10-1145, 10-1147, 10-
1148, 10-1199, 10-1200, 10-1201, 10-1202, 10-1203,
10-1206, 10-1207, 10-1208, 10-1210, 10-1211, 10-
1212, 10-1213, 10-1216, 10-1218, 10-1219, 10-1220,
10-1221, 10-1222
No. 10-1092
COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC.,
ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
RESPONDENT
LANGBOARD, INC. — MDF, ET AL.,
INTERVENORS
Consolidated with 10-1094, 10-1134, 10-1143, 10-
1144, 10-1152, 10-1156, 10-1158, 10-1159, 10-1160,
10-1161, 10-1162, 10-1163, 10-1164, 10-1166, 10-
1182
No. 10-1167
AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL,
PETITIONER
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND
LISA PEREZ JACKSON , ADMINISTRATOR,
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
RESPONDENTS
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, ET AL.,
INTERVENORS
Consolidated with 10-1168, 10-1169, 10-1170, 10-
1173, 10-1174, 10-1175, 10-1176, 10-1177, 10-1178,
10-1179, 10-1180
On Petitions for Review of Final Actions of the
Environmental Protection Agency
BEFORE: Sentelle, Chief Judge, Rogers and Tatel,
Circuit Judges
5a
JUDGMENT
These causes came on to be heard on the petitions
for review of final actions of the Environmental! Pro-
tection Agency and were argued by counsel. On con-
sideration thereof, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Timing
and Tailoring petitions for review be dismissed, and
the remainder of the petitions be denied, in accord-
ance with the opinion of the court filed herein this
date.
Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT:
Mark J. Langer, Clerk
BY:
/a/
Jennifer M. Clark
Deputy Clerk
Date: June 26, 2012
Opinion Per Curiam
6a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued February 28 and 29, 2012
Decided June 26, 2012
No. 09-1322
COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC.,
ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
RESPONDENT
STATE OF MICHIGAN, ET AL.,
INTERVENORS
Consolidated with 10-1024, 10-1025, 10-1026, 10-
1030, 10-1035, 10-1036, 10-1037, 10-1038, 10-1039,
10-1040, 10-1041, 10-1042, 10-1044, 10-1045, 10-
1046, 10-1234, 10-1235, 10-1239, 10-1246, 10-1281,
10-1310, 10-1318, 10-1319, 10-1320, 10-1321
On Petitions for Review of Final Actions
of the Environmental Protection Agency
Ta
Patrick R. Day, Harry W. MacDougald, and Jef-
frey Bossert Clark argued the causes for Non-State
Petitioners and Supporting Intervenors. With them
on the briefs were John J. Burns, Attorney General,
Office of the Attorney General of the State of Alaska,
Steven E. Mulder, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Peter Glaser, Mark E. Nagle, Matthew Dukes, Paul
D. Phillips, John A. Bryson, Ellen Steen, Eric Groten,
John P. Elwood, James A. Holtkamp, Chet M.
Thompson, Robin S. Conrad, Rachel L. Brand, Shel-
don Gilbert, Quentin Riegel, Jeffrey A. Rosen, Robert
R. Gasaway, William H. Burgess, Sam Kazman,
Hans Bader, Matthew G. Paulson, Harry Moy Ng,
Michele Marie Schoeppe, Michael R. Barr, Alexandra
M. Walsh, Adam J. White, Jeffrey A. Lamken, Timo-
thy K. Webster, Roger R. Martella, Neal J. Cabral,
Theodore Hadzi-Antich, Ashley C. Parrish, Cynthia
A. M. Stroman, Scott C. Oostdyk, Gordon R. Alphon-
so, Shannon L. Goessling, Edward A. Kazmarek, F.
William Brownell, Norman W. Fichthorn, Henry V.
Nickel, and Allison D. Wood. Paul D. Clement, Mark
W. DeLaquil, Andrew M. Grossman, and David B.
Rivin, Jr. entered appearances.
E. Duncan Getchell, Jr., Solicitor General, Office
of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of
Virginia, argued the cause for State Petitioners Tex-
as and Virginia on Denial of Reconsideration of the
Endangerment Finding and State Petitioners and
Supporting Intervenors on Endangerment Finding
Delegation Issues. With him on the briefs were Ken-
neth T. Cuccinelli, IT, Attorney General, Stephen R.
McCullough, Senior Appellate Counsel, Charles E.
8a
James Jr., Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Wes-
ley G. Russell, Jr., Deputy Attorney General.
Greg Abbott, Attorney General, Office of the At-
torney General for the State of Texas, Bill Cobb,
Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation, J. Reed
Ciay, Jr., Special Assistant and Senior Counsel to
the Attorney General, Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor
General, Michael P. Murphy, Assistant Solicitor
General, Luther Strange III, Attorney General, Office
of the Attorney General for the State of Alabama,
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Office of the At-
torney General for the State of Florida, Gregory F.
Zoeller, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
General for the State of Indiana, Jack Conway, At-
torney General, Office of the Attorney General for
the Commonwealth of Kentucky, James D. “Buddy”
Caldwell, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
General for the State of Louisiana, Bill Schuette, At-
torney General, Office of the Attorney General for
the State of Michigan, John J. Bursch, Solicitor Gen-
eral, Neil D. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General,
Gary C. Rikard, Jon Bruning, Attorney General, Of-
fice of the Attorney General for the State of Nebras-
ka, Katherine J. Spohn, Special Counsel to the At-
torney General, Wayne Stenehjem, Attorney General,
Office of the Attorney General for the State of North
Dakota, Margaret Olson, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Scott Pruitt, Attorney General, Office of the At-
torney General for the State of Oklahoma, Alan Wil-
son, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General
for the State of South Carolina, Marty Jackley, At-
torney General, Office of the Attorney General for
9a
the States of South Dakota, Roxanne Giedd, Chief,
Civil Litigation Division, Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney
General, Office of the Attorney General for the State
of Utah, and Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, IT, Attorney Gen-
eral, Office of the Attorney General for the Com-
monwealth of Virginia were on the briefs for State
Petitioners and Supporting Intervenors. Robert D.
Tambling, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General for the State of Alabama, entered
an appearance.
Christian J. Ward, Scott A. Keller, and April L.
Farris were on the brief for amici curiae Scientists in
support of Petitioners.
Derek Schmidt, Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General for the State of Kansas, and John
Campbell, Chief Deputy Attorney General, were on
the brief for amicus curiae State of Kansas in sup-
port of Petitioners.
Martin R. Levin, Michael J. O'Neill, Donald M.
Falk, Mark S. Kaufman, Steven J. Lechner, and
Richard P. Hutchison were on the brief for amici cu-
riae Landmark Legal Foundation, et al. in support of
Petitioners.
Jon M. Lipshultz and Angeline Purdy, Attorneys,
U.S. Department of Justice, argued the causes for
respondent. With them on the brief were John Han-
non, Carol Holmes, and Steven Silverman, U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency, Attorneys. Thomas
A. Lorenzen, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
entered an appearance.
10a
Carol Iancu, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts, argued the cause for State and Environ-
mental Intervenors in support of respondents. With
her on the briefs were Martha Coakley, Attorney
General, William L. Pardee, Attorney Assistant Gen-
eral, Sean H. Donahue, Howard I. Fox, David S.
Baron, Megan Ceronsky, Vickie L. Patton, Peter Zal-
zal, Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Office of
the Attorney General for the State of California,
Kathleen A. Kenealy, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Marc N. Melnick and Nicholas Stern, Deputy
Attorneys General, Joseph R. Biden, III, Attorney
General, Office of the Attorney General for the State
of Delaware, Valerie M. Satterfield, Deputy Attorney
General, George Jepsen, Attorney General, Office of
the Attorney General for the State of Connecticut,
Kimberly P. Massicotte, Matthew I. Levine, Scott N.
Koschwitz, Assistant Attorneys General, Lisa Madi-
gan, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral for the State of Illinois, Gerald T. Karr, Assis-
tant Attorney General, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney
General, Office of the Attorney General for the State
of Iowa, David R. Sheridan, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General, Office of
the Attorney General for the State of Maryland,
Mary E. Raivel, Assistant Attorney General, Michael
A. Delaney, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
General for the State of New Hampshire, K. Allen
Brooks, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William
J. Schneider, Attorney General, Office of the Attor-
ney General for the State of Maine, Gerald D. Reid,
lla
Assistant Attorney General, Lori Swanson, Attorney
General, Office of the Attorney General for the State
of Minnesota, Jocelyn F. Olson, Assistant Attorney
General, Gary K. King, Attorney General, Office of
the Attorney General for the State of New Mexico,
Stephen R. Farris, Assistant Attorney General, Eric
T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Office of the At-
torney General for the State of New York, Michael -/.
Myers and Yueh-Ru Chu, Assistant Attorneys Gen-
eral, John Kroger, Attorney General, Office of the At-
torney General for the State of Oregon, Paul Logan,
Assistant Attorney-in-Charge, Robert M. McKenna,
Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for
the State of Washington, Leslie R. Seffern, Assistant
Attorney General, Peter F. Kilmartin, Attorney Gen-
eral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of
Rhode Island, Gregory S. Schultz, Special Assistant
Attorney General, William H. Sorrell, Attorney Gen-
eral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of
Vermont, Thea J. Schwartz, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Christopher King, Assistant Corporation Coun-
sel, Corporation Counsel for the City Of New York,
Ann B. Weeks, Helen D. Silver, David Doniger, Mele-
ah Geertsma, Morgan Butler, Frank W. Rambo, Jo-
seph Mendelson III, Craig Holt Segall, and Joanne
Spalding.
Deborah Sivas, Douglas A. Ruley, Edward Lloyd,
and Susan J. Kraham were on the brief for amici cu-
riae America’s Great Waters Coalition, et al. in sup-
port of respondent. James K. Thornton entered an
appearance.
12a
No. 10-1073
COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC.,
ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
Vv.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
RESPONDENT
AMERICAN FROZEN FOOD INSTITUTE, ET AL.,
INTERVENORS
Consolidated with 10-1083, 10-1099, 10-1109, 10-
1110, 10-1114, 10-1118, 10-1119, 10-1120, 10-1122,
10-1123, 10-1124, 10-1125, 10-1126, 10-1127, 10-
1128, 10-1129, 10-1131, 10-1132, 10-1145, 10-1147,
10-1148, 10-1199, 10-1200, 10-1201, 10-1202, 10-
1203, 10-1206, 10-1207, 10-1208, 10-1210, 10-1211,
10-1212, 10-1213, 10-1216, 10-1218, 10-1219, 10-
1220, 10-1221, 10-1222
On Petitions for Review of Final Agency Action
of the Environmental Protection Agency
13a
Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, Office of
the Attorney General for the State of Texas, argued
the cause for State Petitioners and Supporting Inter-
venor. With him on the briefs were Gregg Abbott, At-
torney General, Bill Cobb, Deputy Attorney General,
J. Reed Clay, Jr., Special Assistant and Senior Coun-
sel to the Attorney General, Michael P. Murphy and
James P. Sullivan, Assistant Solicitors General, Lu-
ther Strange, Attorney General, Office of the Attor-
ney General for the State of Alabama, Herman Rob-
inson, Donald Trahan, Kathy M. Wright, Gary C. Ri-
kard, John Bruning, Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General for the State of Nebraska, Kathe-
rine J. Spohn, Special Counsel, Wayne Stenehjem,
Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for
the State of North Dakota, Margaret Olson, Assis-
tant Attorney General, Alan Wilson, Attorney Gen-
eral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of
South Carolina, J. Emory Smith, Jr., Assistant Dep-
uty Attorney General, Marty Jackley, Attorney Gen-
eral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of
South Dakota, Roxanne Giedd, Chief, and Kenneth T..
Cuccinelli, IT, Attorney General, Office of the Attor-
ney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Mark W. DeLaquil, Earle D. Getchell, Jr., Assistant
Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for
the Commonwealth of Virginia, Andrew M. Gross-
man, David B. Rivkin, Jr., and Robert D. Tambling,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
General for the State of Alabama, entered appear-
ances.
l4a
F. William Brownell and Peter Keisler argued the
causes for Non-State Petitioners and Supporting In-
tervenors. With them on the briefs were Norman W.
Fichthorn, Henry V. Nickel, Allison D. Wood, Charles
H. Knauss, Shannon S. Broome, Timothy K. Webster,
Roger R. Martella, Eric Groten, Patrick R. Day, John
A. Bryson, Matthew G. Paulson, John P. Elwood,
Paul D. Phillips, James A. Holtkamp, Shannon L.
Goessling, Harry W. MacDougald, William H. Lewis,
Jr., Ronald J. Tenpas, Gordon R. Alphonso, Edward
A. Kazmarek, Chet M. Thompson, Neal J. Cabral,
Scott C. Oostdyk, Richard P. Hutchison, John Jd.
McMackin, dr., Robin S. Conrad, Sheldon Gilbert,
Michael W. Steinberg, Levi McAllister, Jeffrey A.
Rosen, Robert R. Gasaway, Jeffrey Bossert Clark,
William H. Burgess, Ashley C. Parrish, Cynthia A.M.
Stroman, Ellen Steen, Leslie Sue Ritts, Peter Glaser,
Mark E. Nagle, Terry J. Satterlee, Thomas J. Grever,
Margaret Claiborne Campbell, Bryon W. Kirkpatrick,
Quentin Riegel, Elizabeth Gaudio, Elizabeth Henry
Warner, Harry Moy Ng, Michele Marie Schoeppe,
Thomas J. Ward, and Peter H. Wyckoff. Mark A.
Behrens, Paul D. Clement, Matthew Dukes, Virginia
L. Hudson, and David B. Salmons entered appear-
ances.
Jonathan S. Massey was on the brief for amicus
curtae Municipal Gas Commission of Missouri.
John G. Horne, II, Samuel B. Boxerman and
Leslie A. Hulse were on the brief for amici curiae the
Commonwealth of Kentucky and the American
15a
Chemistry Council in support of petitioners. Angus
Macbeth entered an appearance.
Amanda Shafer Berman and Perry M Rosen, At-
torneys, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the
causes for respondents. With them on the briefs were
Howard Hoffman, Elliott Zenick, Brian Doster, and
David Orlin, Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency. Thomas A. Lorenzen and Kim N. Smaczniak,
Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, and John D.
Gunter, IT and Michele L. Walter, Counsel, U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency, entered appearances.
Sean H. Donahue and Michael J. Myers argued
the causes for State and Environmental Intervenors
in support of respondents. With them on the briefs
were Vickie L. Patton, Pamela A. Campos, Megan Ce-
ronsky, Petere Zalzal, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attor-
ney General, Office of the Attorney General for the
State of New York, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor
General, Morgan A. Costello, Assistant Attorney
General, Monica Wagner, Howard I. Fox, David S.
Baron, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General for the State of Illinois, Gerald T.
Karr, Assistant Attorney General, Joanne Spalding,
Nathan Matthews, Craig Holt Segall, Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
General for the State of California, Kathleen A. Ke-
nealy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan
Durbin, Raissa Lerner, Marc N. Melnick, and Nicho-
las Stern, Deputy Attorneys General, Martha Coak-
ley, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General
for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, William L.
16a
Pardee and Carol Iancu, Assistant Attorneys Gen-
eral, David Doniger, Meleah Geertsma, William J.
Schneider, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
General for the State of Maine, Gerald D. Ried, As-
sistant Attorney General, Ann B. Weeks, Helen D.
Silver, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Office of
the Attorney General for the State of Iowa, David R.
Sheridan, Assistant Attorney General, Douglas F.
Gansler, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
General for the State of Maryland, Mary Raivel,
Deputy Attorney General, Michael A. Delaney, At-
torney General, Office of the Attorney General for
the State of New Hampshire, K. Allen Brooks, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Barbara Baird, William
B.Wong, Peter F. Kilmartin, Attorney General, Office
of the Attorney General for the State of Rhode Is-
land, Gregory S. Schultz, Special Assistant Attorney
General, Frank Rambo, Morgan Butler, Gary K.
King, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral for the State of New Mexico, Stephen Farris, As-
sistant Attorney General, John Kroger, Attorney
General, Office of the Attorney General for the State
of Oregon, Paul Logan, Assistant Attorney-in-
Charge, Roy Cooper, Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General for the State of North Carolina,
and J. Allen Jernigan and Marc Bernstein, Special
Deputy Attorneys General. Kenneth P. Alex and
Gavin G. McCabe, Deputy Assistant Attorneys Gen-
eral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of
California, entered appearances.
17a
No. 10-1092
COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC.,
ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
Vv.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
RESPONDENT
LANGBOARD, INC. -MDF, ET AL.,
INTERVENORS
Consolidated with 10-1094, 10-1134, 10-1143, 10-
1144, 10-1152, 10-1156, 10-1158, 10-1159, 10-1160,
10-1161, 10-1162, 10-1163, 10-1164, 10-1166, 10-
1182
On Petitions for Review of Final Actions
of the Environmental Protection Agency
Peter Glaser argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were John P. Elwood, Eric
Groten, Patrick R. Day, John A. Bryson, Shannon L.
Goessling, Harry W. MacDougald, Paul D. Phillips,
James A. Holtkamp, Edward A. Kazmarek, Chet M.
18a
Thompson, Sam Kazman, Hans Bader, Gordon R.
Alphonso, Richard P. Hutchison, Neal J. Cabral,
Scott C. Oostdyk, Ronald J. Tenpas, Michael W.
Steinberg, Levi McAllister, John J. McMackin Jdr.,
Robin S. Conrad, Rachel L. Brand, Sheldon Gilbert,
F. William Brownell, Norman W. Fichthorn, Henry
V. Nickel, Allison D. Wood, Ashley C. Parrish. Cyn-
thia A.M. Stroman, Mark E. Nagle, Michael ‘iiggins,
Ellen Steen, Timothy K. Websier, Roger R. Martella,
Matthew G. Paulson, Charles H. Knauss, Shannon S.
Broome, Quentin Riegel, Elizabeth Gaudio, Thomas
J. Ward, Harry Moy Ng, and Michele Marie
Schoeppe.
Greg Abbott, Attorney General, Office of the At-
torney General for the State of Texas, Bill Cobb,
Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation, Jona-
than F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, J. Reed Clay ¢Jr.,
Special Assistant and Senior Counsel to the Attorney
General, Michael P. Murphy, Assistant Solicitor
General, Luther Strange, Attorney General, Office of
the Attorney General for the State of Alabama,
Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Office of the At-
torney General for the State of Georgia, John E.
Hennelly, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Gary
C. Rikard, Jon C. Bruning, Attorney General, Office
of the Attorney General for the State of Nebraska,
Katherine J. Spohn, Special Counsel to the Attorney
General, Wayne K. Stenehjem, Attorney General, Of-
fice of the Attorney General for the State of North
Dakota, Margaret Olson, Assistant Attorney General,
Alan Wilson, Attorney General, Office of the Attor-
ney General for the State of South Carolina, -/.
19a
Emory Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Marty Jackley, Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General for the State of North Dakota,
Roxanne Giedd, Chief, Civil Litigation Division, and
Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, IT, Attorney General, Office of
the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, were on the briefs for State Petitioners and
Supporting Intervenor. Paul D. Clement, James W.
Coleman, Wayne J. D'Angelo, Mark W. DeLaquil, E.
Duncan Getchell Jr., Solicitor General, Office of the
Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia,
Andrew M. Grossman, Virginia L. Hudson, David B.
Rivkin Jr., and Robert D. Tambling, Assistant Attor-
ney General, Office of the Attorney General for the
State of Alabama, entered appearances.
Samuel B. Boxerman and Leslie A. Hulse were on
the brief for amicus curiae American Chemistry
Council in support of petitioners. Angus Macbeth en-
tered an appearance.
Eric G. Hostetler, Attorney, U.S. Department of
Justice, argued the cause for respondents. With him
on the brief were John Hannon and Steven Silver-
man, Attorneys, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency.
Raymond B. Ludwiszewski argued the cause for
intervenors Association of Global Automakers, et al.
With him on the brief were Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Sanford I. Weisburst, and William B. Adams.
Gavin G. McCabe, Deputy Attorney General, Of-
fice of the Attorney General for the State of Califor-
20a
nia, argued the cause for intervenor State of Califor-
nia. On the brief were Kamala D. Harris, Attorney
General, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Senior Assistant At-
torney General, Marc N. Melnick and Nicholas Stern,
Deputy Attorneys General, Sean H. Donahue, How-
ard I. Fox, David S. Baron, Pamela Campos, Megan
Ceronsky, Vickie L. Patton, Peter Zalzal, Joseph R.
Biden, III, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
General for the State of Delaware, Valerie M. Satter-
field, Deputy Attorney General, Thomas J. Miller,
Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for
the State of Iowa, David R. Sheridan, Assistant At-
torney General, Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney Gen-
eral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of
Maryland, Roberta R. James, Assistant Attorney
General, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General. Office of
the Attorney General for the State of Illinois, Gerald
T. Karr, Assistant Attorney General, William T.
Schneider, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
General for the State of Maine, Gerald D. Reid, As-
sistant Attorney General, Martha Coakley, Attorney
General, Office of the Attorney General for the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Carol Iancu, Tra-
cy Triplett, and William L. Pardee, Assistant Attor-
neys General, Gary K. King, Attorney General, Office
of the Attorney General for the State of New Mexico,
Stephen R. Farris, Assistant Attorney General, John
Kroger, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
General for the State of Oregon, Paul Logan, Assis-
tant Attorney-in-Charge, William H. Sorrell, Attor-
ney General, Office of the Attorney General for the
State of Vermont, Thea J. Schwartz, Assistant At-
2la
torney General, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney
General, Office of the Attorney General for the State
of New York, Michael J. Myers and Yueh-Ru Chu,
Assistant Attorneys General, Peter F. Kilmartin, At-
torney General, Office of the Attorney General for
the State of Rhode Island, Gregory S. Schultz, Spe-
cial Assistant Attorney General, Robert M. McKenna,
Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for
the State of Washington, Leslie R. Seffern, Assistant
Attorney General, Christopher King, Assistant Cor-
poration Counsel, Corporation Counsel for the City of
New York, Joanne Spalding, Craig Holt Segall, Da-
vid Doniger and Meleah Geertsma. Judith A. Stahl
Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the At-
torney General for the State of New Mexico, and
John D. Walke entered appearances.
Richard E. Ayres, Jessica L. Olson, and Kristin L.
Hines were on the brief for amicus curiae Honeywell
International, Inc. in support of respondents.
Richard L. Revesz, Michael A. Livermore, and
Jennifer S. Rosenberg were on the brief for amicus
curiae Institute for Policy Integrity at New York
University School of Law in support of respondents.
22a
No. 10-1167
AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL,
PETITIONER
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND
LISA PEREZ JACKSON, ADMINISTRATOR,
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
RESPONDENTS
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
’ AMERICA, ET AL..,
INTERVENORS
Consolidated with 10-1168, 10-1169, 10-1170, 10-
1173, 10-1174, 10-1175, 10-1176, 10-1177, 10-1178,
10-1179, 10-1180
On Petitions for Review of a Final Action
of the Environmental Protection Agency
Timothy K. Webster, Roger R. Martella, /dr.,
James W. Coleman, William H. Lewis, Jr., Ronald J.
Tenpas, Charles H. Knauss, Shannon S. Broome,
Bryan M. Killian, and Matthew G. Paulson were on
23a
the ix1ei%s for petitioners. Peter D. Keisler, Leslie A.
Hulse, and Quentin Riegel entered appearances.
Amanda Shafer Berman and Perry M. Rosen, At-
torneys, U.S. Department of Justice, and Elliott Zen-
ick and Howard J. Hoffman, Counsel, U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, were on the brief for re-
spondents. Jon M. Lipshultz, Senior Counsel, U.S.
Department of Justice, entered and appearance.
Ann Brewster Weeks, Sean H. Donahue, Vickie
Patton, Peter Zaizal, Joanne Spalding, Craig Segall,
David Doniger, and Meleah Geertsma were on the
brief of intervenors in support of respondents. David
S. Baron, Pamela A. Campos, Colin C. O’Brien, and
John D. Walke entered appearances.
Vera P. Pardee, Brendan R. Cummings, and Kev-
in P. Bundy were on the brief for amicus curiae Cen-
ter for Biological Diversity in support of respondents.
Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge; ROGERS and
TATEL, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.
PER CURIAM: Following the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007)—-which clarified that greenhouse gases are an
“air pollutant” subject to regulation under the Clean
Air Act (CAA)—the Environmental Protection Agen-
cy promulgated a series of greenhouse gas-related
rules. First, EPA issued an Endangerment Finding,
in which it determined that greenhouse gases may
“reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare.” See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). Next, it is-
24a
sued the Tailpipe Rule, which set emission standards
for cars and light trucks. Finally, EPA determined
that the CAA requires major stationary sources of
greenhouse gases to obtain construction and operat-
ing permits. But because immediate regulation of all
such sources would result in overwhelming permit-
ting burdens on permitting authorities and sources,
EPA issued the Timing and Tailoring Rules, in which
it determined that only the largest stationary sources
would initially be subject to permitting require-
ments.
Petitioners, various states and industry groups,
challenge all these rules, arguing that they are based
on improper constructions of the CAA and are other-
wise arbitrary and capricious. But for the reasons set
forth below, we conclude: 1) the Endangerment Find-
ing and Tailpipe Rule are neither arbitrary nor ca-
pricious; 2) EPA’s interpretation of the governing
CAA provisions is unambiguously correct; and 3) no
petitioner has standing to challenge the Timing and
Tailoring Rules. We thus dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
tion all petitions for review of the Timing and Tailor-
ing Rules, and deny the remainder of the petitions.
I.
We begin with a brief primer on greenhouse gas-
es. As their name suggests, when released into the
atmosphere, these gases act “like the ceiling of a
greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the
escape of reflected heat.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. at 505. A wide variety of modern human activi-
ties result in greenhouse gas emissions; cars, power
25a
plants, and industrial sites all release significant
amounts of these heat- trapping gases. In recent dec-
ades “[a] well-documented rise in global tempera-
tures has coincided with a significant increase in the
concentration of [greenhouse gases] in the atmos-
phere.” Id. at 504-05. Many scientists believe that
mankind’s greenhouse gas emissions are driving this
climate change. These scientists predict that global
climate change will cause a host of deleterious conse-
quences, including drought, increasingly severe
weather events, and rising sea levels.
The genesis of this litigation came in 2007, when
the Supreme Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA
that greenhouse gases “unambiguousi[ly]” may be
regulated as an “air pollutant” under the Clean Air
Act (“CAA”). Id. at 529. Squarely rejecting the con-
tention—then advanced by EPA—that “greenhouse
gases cannot be ‘air pollutants’ within the meaning of
the Act,” id. at 513, the Court held that the CAA’s
definition of “air pollutant” “embraces all airborne
compounds of whatever stripe.” Id. at 529 (emphasis
added). Moreover, because the CAA requires EPA to
establish motor-vehicle emission standards for “any
air pollutant ... which may reasonably be anticipat-
ed to endanger public health or welfare,” 42 U.S.C.
§ 7521(a)(1) (emphasis added), the Court held that
EPA had a “statutory obligation” to regulate harmful
greenhouse gases. Jd. at 534. “Under the clear terms
of the Clean Air Act,” the Court concluded, “EPA can
avoid taking further action only if it determines that
greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change
or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to
26a
why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to de-
termine whether they do.” Id. at 533. The Court thus
directed EPA to determine “whether sufficient in-
formation exists to make an endangerment finding”
for greenhouse gases. Id. at 534.
Massachusetts v. EPA spurred a cascading series of
greenhouse gas-related rules and regulations. First,
in direct response to the Supreme Court's directive,
EPA issued an Endangerment Finding for green-
house gases. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute
Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a)
of the Clean Air Act (“Endangerment Finding”), 74
Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). The Endangerment
Finding defined as a single “air pollutant” an “aggre-
gate group of six long-lived and directly-emitted
greenhouse gases” that are “well mixed” together in
the atmosphere and cause global climate change:
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydroflouro-
carbons, perflourocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.
Id. at 66,536-37. Following “common practice,” EPA
measured the impact of these gases on a “carbon di-
oxide equivalent basis,” (COge) which is based on the
gases “warming effect relative to carbon diox-
ide ...over a specified timeframe.” Id. at 66,519.
(Using the carbon dioxide equivalent equation, for
example, a mixture of X amount of nitrous oxide and
Y amount of sulfur hexafluoride is expressed as Z
amount of COge). After compiling and considering a
considerable body of scientific evidence, EPA con-
cluded that motor-vehicle emissions of these six well-
mixed gases “contribute to the total greenhouse gas
27a
air pollution, and thus to the climate change prob-
lem, which is reasonably anticipated to endanger
public health and welfare.” Jd. at 66,499.
Next, and pursuant to the CAA’s requirement that
EPA establish motor-vehicle emission standards for
“any air pollutant ... which may reasonably be an-
ticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” 42
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), the agency promulgated its Tail-
pipe Rule for greenhouse gases. Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule (“Tail-
pipe Rule”), 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010). Effec-
tive January 2, 2011, the Tailpipe Rule set green-
house gas emission standards for cars and light
trucks as part of a joint rulemaking with fuel econo-
my standards issued by the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Id. at 25,326.
Under EPA’s longstanding interpretation of the
CAA, the Tailpipe Rule automatically triggered regu-
lation of stationary greenhouse gas emitters under
two separate sections of the Act. The first, the Pre-
vention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality
(PSD) program, requires state-issued construction
permits for certain types of stationary sources—for
example, iron and steel mill plants—if they have the
potential to emit over 100 tons per year (tpy) of “any
air pollutant.” See 42 U.S.C. § 7475; 7479(1). All oth-
er stationary sources are subject to PSD permitting if
they have the potential to emit over 250 tpy of “any
air pollutant.” Id. § 7479(1). The second provision,
Title V, requires state-issued operating permits for
28a
stationary sources that have the potential to emit at
least 100 tpy of “any air pollutant.” Id. § 7602(j). EPA
has long interpreted the phrase “any air pollutant” in
both these provisions to mean any air pollutant that
is regulated under the CAA. See Requirements for
Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implemen-
tation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Imple-
mentation Plans (“1980 Implementation Plan Re-
quirements”), 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,711 (Aug. 7,
1980) (PSD program); Prevention of Significant Dete-
rioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule
(“Tailoring Rule”), 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,553-54
(June 3, 2010) (discussing history of Title V regula-
tion and applicability). And once the Tailpipe Rule
set motor-vehicle emission standards for greenhouse
gases; they became a regulated pollutant under the
Act, requiring PSD and Title V greenhouse permit-
ting.
Acting pursuant to this longstanding interpreta-
tion of the PSD and Title V programs, EPA issued
two rules phasing in stationary source greenhouse
gas regulation. First, in the Timing Rule, EPA con-
cluded that an air pollutant becomes “subject to reg-
ulation” under the Clean Air Act—and thus subject
to PSD and Title V permitting—only once a regula-
tion requiring control of that pollutant takes effect.
Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That
Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Per-
mitting Programs (“Timing Rule”), 75 Fed. Reg.
17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010). Therefore, EPA concluded, ma-
jor stationary emitters of greenhouse gases would be
subject to PSD and Title V permitting regulations on
29a
January 2, 2011—the date on which the Tailpipe
Rule became effective, and thus, the date when
greenhouse gases first became regulated under the
CAA. Id. at 17,019.
Next, EPA promulgated the Tailoring Rule. In the
Tailoring Rule, EPA noted that greenhouse gases are
emitted in far greater volumes than other pollutants.
Indeed, millions of industrial, residential, and com-
mercial sources exceed the 100/250 tpy statutory
emissions threshold for COge. Tailoring Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. at 31,534-36. Immediately adding these
sources to the PSD and Title V programs would, EPA
predicted, result in tremendous costs to industry and
state permitting authorities. See id. As a result, EPA
announced that it was “relieving overwhelming per-
mitting burdens that would, in the absence of this
rule, fall on permitting authorities and sources.” Id.
at 31,516. Departing from the CAA’s 100/250 tpy
emissions threshold, the Tailoring Rule provided
that only the largest sources—those exceeding
75,000 or 100,000 tpy COge, depending on the pro-
gram and project—would initially be subject to
greenhouse gas permitting. Jd. at 31,523. (The Tai-
loring Rule further provided that regulated sources
must also emit greenhouse gases at levels that ex-
ceed the 100/250 tpy emissions threshold on a mass
basis. That is, they must emit over 100/250 tpy of ac-
tual pollutants, in addition to exceeding the
75,000/100,000 tpy carbon dioxide equivalent. Id. at
31,523.)
30a
A number of groups—including states and regulat-
ed industries—filed petitions for review of EPA’s
greenhouse gas regulations, contending that the
agency misconstrued the CAA and otherwise acted
arbitrarily and capriciously. This appeal consolidates
the petitions for review of the four aforementioned
rules: the Endangerment Finding, the Tailpipe Rule,
the Timing Rule, and the Tailoring Rule.
“The Clean Air Act empowers us to reverse the
Administrator's action in rulemaking if it is ‘arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with the law.” Med. Waste Inst. &
Energy Recovery Council v. EPA, 645 F.3d 420, 424
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A)).
Questions of statutory interpretation are governed
by the familiar Chevron two-step: “First . . . if the in-
tent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the mat-
ter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress.” Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). But
“if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissi-
ble construction of the statute.” Jd. at 843.
This opinion proceeds in several steps. Part II ex-
plains why the Endangerment Finding was neither
arbitrary nor capricious, while Part III does the same
for the Tailpipe Rule. Turning to stationary source
regulation, Part [TV examines whether any petition-
ers may timely challenge EPA’s longstanding inter-
3la
pretation of the PSD statute. Because we conclude
that they may, Part V addresses the merits of their
statutory arguments, and explains why EPA's inter-
pretation of the CAA was compelled by the statute.
Next, Part VI explains why petitioners lack standing
to challenge the Timing and Tailoring Rules them-
selves. Finally, Part VII disposes of several argu-
ments that have nothing to do with the rules under
review, and thus are not properly before us.
Il.
We turn first to State and Industry Petitioners’
challenges to the Endangerment Finding, the first of
the series of rules EPA issued after the Supreme
Court remanded Massachusetts v. EPA. In the deci-
sion ordering the remand, the Supreme Court held
that EPA had failed in its statutory obligations when
it “offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to
decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute
to climate change.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
at 534. On remand, EPA compiled a substantial sci-
entific record, which is before us in the present re-
view, and determined that “greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere may reasonably be anticipated both to
endanger public health and to endanger public we!-
fare.” Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at
66,497. EPA went on to find that motor-vehicle emis-
sions of greenhouse gases “contribute to the total
greenhouse gas air pollution, and thus to the climate
change problem, which is reasonably anticipated to
endanger public health and welfare.” Id. at 66,499.
32a
State and Industry Petitioners challenge several
aspects of EPA’s decision, including (1) EPA’s inter-
pretation of CAA § 202(a)(1), which sets out the en-
dangerment-finding standard; (2) the adequacy of
the scientific record supporting the Endangerment
Finding; (3) EPA’s decision not to “quantify” the risk
of endangerment to public health or welfare created
by climate change; (4) EPA’s choice to define the “air
pollutant” at issue as an aggregate of six greenhouse
gases; (5) EPA’s failure to consult its Science Adviso-
ry Board before issuing the Endangerment Finding;
and (6) EPA’s denial of all petitions for reconsidera-
tion of the Endangerment Finding. We ultimately
conclude that the Endangerment Finding is con-
sistent with Massachusetts v. EPA and the text and
structure of the CAA, and is adequately supported by
the administrative record.
A.
Industry Petitioners contend that EPA improper-
ly interpreted CAA § 202(a)(1) as restricting the En-
dangerment Finding to a science-based judgment de-
void of considerations of policy concerns and regula-
tory consequences. They assert that CAA § 202(a)(1)
requires EPA to consider, e.g., the benefits of activi-
ties that require greenhouse gas emissions, the effec-
tiveness of emissions regulation triggered by the En-
dangerment Finding, and the potential for societal
adaptation to or mitigation of climate change. They
maintain that eschewing those considerations also
made the Endangerment Finding arbitrary and ca-
pricious.
33a
These contentions are foreclosed by the language
of the statute and the Supreme Court’s decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA. Section 202(a) of the CAA
states in relevant part that EPA’s Administrator
shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to
time revise) in accordance with the provisions
of this section, standards applicable to the
emission of any air pollutant from any class or
classes of new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause,
or contribute to, air pollution which may rea-
sonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). This language requires that
the endangerment evaluation “relate to whether an
air pollutant ‘cause[s], or contribute[s]} to, air pollu-
tion which may reasonably be anticipated to endan-
ger public health or welfare.” Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. at 532-33. At bottom, § 202(a)(1) requires
EPA to answer only two questions: whether particu-
lar “air pollution”"—here, greenhouse gases—"may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare,” and whether motor-vehicle emissions
“cause, or contribute to” that endangerment.
These questions require a “scientific judgment”
about the potential risks greenhouse gas emissions
pose to public health or welfare—not policy discus-
sions. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 534. In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court rebuffed
an attempt by EPA itself to inject considerations of
34a
policy into its decision. At the time, EPA had “offered
a laundry list of reasons not to regulate” greenhouse
gases, including
that a number of voluntary Executive Branch
programs already provide an effective re-
sponse to the threat of global warming, that
regulating greenhouse gases might impair the
President's ability to negotiate with “key de-
veloping nations” to reduce emissions, and
that curtailing motor-vehicle emissions would
reflect “an inefficient, piecemeal approach to
address the climate change issue.”
Id. at 533 (citations omitted). The Court noted that
“these policy judgments... have nothing to do with
whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to cli-
mate change. Still less do they amount to a reasoned
justification for declining to form a scientific judg-
ment.” Id. at 533-34. In the Court’s view, EPA’s poli-
cy- based explanations contained “no reasoned ex-
planation for [EPA's] refusal to decide” the key part
of the endangerment inquiry: “whether greenhouse
gases cause or contribute to climate change.” Jd. at
534.
As in Massachusetts v. EPA, a “laundry list of
reasons not to regulate” simply has “nothing to do
with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to
climate change.” Id. at 533—34. The additional exer-
cises State and Industry Petitioners would have EPA
undertake—e.g., performing a cost-benefit analysis
for greenhouse gases, gauging the effectiveness of
whatever emission standards EPA would enact to
35a
limit greenhouse gases, and predicting society's
adaptive response to the dangers or harms caused by
climate change—do not inform the “scientific judg-
ment” that § 202(a)(1) requires of EPA. Instead of
focusing on the question whether greenhouse gas
emissions may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare, the factors State and Indus-
try Petitioners put forth only address what might
happen were EPA to answer that question in the af-
firmative. As EPA stated in the Endangerment Find-
ing, such inquiries “muddle the rather straightfor-
ward scientific judgment about whether there may
be endangerment by throwing the potential impact of
responding to the danger into the initial question.”
74 Fed. Reg. at 66,515. To be sure, the subsection fol-
lowing § 202(a)(1), § 202(a)(2), requires that EPA ad-
dress limited questions about the cost of compliance
with new emission standards and the availability of
technology for meeting those standards, see infra
Part III, but these judgments are not part of the
§ 202(a)(1) endangerment inquiry. The Supreme
Court made clear in Massachusetts v. EPA that it
was not addressing the question “whether policy con-
cerns can inform EPA’s actions in the event that it
makes such a finding,” 549 U.S. at 534-35, but that
policy concerns were not part of the calculus for the
determination of the endangerment finding in the
first instance. The Supreme Court emphasized that
it was holding “that EPA must ground its reasons for
action or inaction in the statute.” Id. at 535. The
statute speaks in terms of endangerment, not in
36a
terms of policy, and EPA has complied with the stat-
ute.
State and Industry Petitioners insist that because
statutes should be interpreted to avoid absurd re-
sults, EPA should have considered at least the “ab-
surd” consequences that would follow from an en-
dangerment finding for greenhouse gases. Specifical-
ly: having made an endangerment finding, EPA will
proceed to promulgate emission standards under
§ 202(a)(1). Issuing those standards triggers regula-
tion—under EPA’s PSD and Title V programs—of
stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases at
levels above longstanding statutory thresholds. Be-
cause greenhouse gases are emitted in much higher
volumes than other air pollutants, hundreds of thou-
sands of small stationary sources would exceed those
thresholds. This would subject those sources to PSD
and Title V permitting requirements despite what
Petitioners claim was Congress’s clear intent that
the requirements apply only to large industrial
sources. Petitioners assert that even EPA believed
such overbroad regulation to be an absurd result,
which it attempted to rectify by adopting the Tailor-
ing Rule to raise the statutory thresholds, see infra
Part VI.
However “absurd” Petitioners consider this con-
sequence, though, it is still irrelevant to the endan-
germent inquiry. That EPA adjusted the statutory
thresholds to accommodate regulation of greenhouse
gases emitted by stationary sources may indicate
that the CAA is a regulatory scheme less-than- per-
37a
fectly tailored to dealing with greenhouse gases. But
the Supreme Court has already held that EPA in-
deed wields the authority to regulate greenhouse
gases under the CAA. See Massachusetts v. EPA.
The plain language of § 202(a)(1) of that Act does not
leave room for EPA to consider as part of the endan-
germent inquiry the stationary-source regulation
triggered by an endangerment finding, even if the
degree of regulation triggered might at a later stage
be characterized as “absurd.”
State and Industry Petitioners next challenge the
adequacy of the scientific record underlying the En-
dangerment Finding, objecting to both the type of ev-
idence upon which EPA relied and EPA’s decision to
make an Endangerment Finding in light of what In-
dustry Petitioners view as significant scientific un-
certainty. Neither objection has merit.
1.
As an initial matter, State and Industry Petition-
ers question EPA’s reliance on “major assessments”
addressing greenhouse gases and climate change is-
sued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), the U.S. Global Climate Research
Program (USGCRP), and the National Research
Council (NRC). Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg.
at 66,510—11. These peer- reviewed assessments syn-
thesized thousands of individual studies on various
aspects of greenhouse gases and climate change and
drew “overarching conclusions” about the state of the
38a
science in this field. Jd. at 66,511. The assessments
provide data and information on, inter alia, “the
amount of greenhouse gases being emitted by human
activities”; their continued accumulation in the at-
mosphere; the resulting observed changes to Earth’s
energy balance, temperature and climate at global
and regional levels, and other “climate-sensitive sec-
tors and systems of the human and natural environ-
ment”; the extent to which these changes “can be at-
tributed to human-induced buildup of atmospheric
greenhouse gases’; “future projected climate change”;
and “projected risks and impacts to human health,
society and the environment.”/d. at 66,510—11.
State and Industry Petitioners assert that EPA
improperly “delegated” its judgment to the IPCC,
USGCRP, and NRC by relying on these assessments
of climate-change science. See U.S. Telecom Assa’n v.
FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2004). This argu-
ment is little more than a semantic trick. EPA did
not delegate, explicitly or otherwise, any decision-
making to any of those entities. EPA simply did here
what it and other decision- makers often must do to
make a science-based judgment: it sought out and
reviewed existing scientific evidence to determine
whether a particular finding was warranted. It
makes no difference that much of the scientific evi-
dence in large part consisted of “syntheses” of indi-
vidual studies and research. Even individual studies
and research papers often synthesize past work in an
area and then build upon it. This is how science
works. EPA is not required to re-prove the existence
39a
of the atom every time it approaches a scientific
question.
Moreover, it appears from the record that EPA
used the assessment reports not as substitutes for its
own judgment but as evidence upon which it relied to
make that judgment. EPA evaluated the processes
used to develop the various assessment reports, re-
viewed their contents, and considered the depth of
the scientific consensus the reports represented.
Based on these evaluations, EPA determined the as-
sessments represented the best source material to
use in deciding whether greenhouse gas emissions
may be reasonably anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare. Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed.
Reg. at 66,510—-11. It then reviewed those reports
along with comments relevant to the scientific con-
siderations involved to determine whether the evi-
dence warranted an endangerment finding for
greenhouse gases as it was required to do under the
Supreme Court’s mandate in Massachusetts v. EPA.
2.
Industry Petitioners also assert that the scientific
evidence does not adequately support the Endan-
germent Finding. As we have stated before in review-
ing the science-based decisions of agencies such as
EPA, “fa]lthough we perform a searching and careful
inquiry into the facts underlying the agency’s deci-
sions, we will presume the validity of agency action
as long as a rational basis for it is presented.” Am.
Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 519 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In so
40a
doing, “we give an extreme degree of deference to the
agency when it is evaluating scientific data within its
technical expertise.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The body of scientific evidence marshalled by EPA
in support of the Endangerment Finding is substan-
tial. EPA’s scientific evidence of record included sup-
port for the proposition that greenhouse gases trap
heat on earth that would otherwise dissipate into
space; that this “greenhouse effect” warms the cli-
mate; that human activity is contributing to in-
creased atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases; and
that the climate system is warming.
Based on this scientific record, EPA made the
linchpin finding: in its judgment, the “root cause” of
the recently observed climate change is “very likely”
the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse
gas emissions. Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg.
at 66,518. EPA found support for this finding in
three lines of evidence. First, it drew upon our “basic
physical understanding” of the impacts of various
natural and manmade changes on the climate sys-
tem. For instance, EPA relied on evidence that the
past half-century of warming has occurred at a time
when natural forces such as solar and volcanic activ-
ity likely would have produced cooling. Endanger-
ment Finding, Response to Comments (RTC) Vol. 3,
at 20. Other evidence supports EPA’s conclusion that
the observed warming pattern—warming of the bot-
tommost layer of the atmosphere and cooling imme-
4la
diately above it—is consistent with greenhouse-gas
causation. Id.
EPA further relied upon evidence of historical es-
timates of past climate change, supporting EPA’s
conclusion that global temperatures over the last
half-century are unusual. Endangerment Finding, 74
Fed. Reg. at 66,518. Scientific studies upon which
EPA relied place high confidence in the assertion
that global mean surface temperatures over the last
few decades are higher than at any time in the last
four centuries. Technical Support Document for the
Endangerment Finding (TSD), at 31. These studies
also show, albeit with significant uncertainty, that
temperatures at many individual locations were
higher over the last twenty-five years than during
any period of comparable length since 900 A.D. Id.
For its third line of evidence that anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases spurred the perceived
warming trend, EPA turned to computer-based cli-
mate-model simulations. Scientists have used global
climate models built on basic principles of physics
and scientific knowledge about the climate to try to
simulate the recent climate change. These models
have only been able to replicate the observed warm-
ing by including anthropogenic emissions of green-
house gases in the simulations. Endangerment Find-
ing, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,523.
To recap, EPA had before it substantial record ev-
idence that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse
gases “very likely” caused warming of the climate
over the last several decades. EPA further had evi-
42a
dence of current and future effects of this warming
on public health and welfare. Relying again upon
substantial scientific evidence, EPA determined that
anthropogenically induced climate change threatens
both public health and public welfare. It found that
extreme weather events, changes in air quality, in-
creases in food- and water-borne pathogens, and in-
creases in temperatures are likely to have adverse
health effects. Id. at 66,497—98. The record also sup-
ports EPA’s conclusion that climate change endan-
gers human welfare by creating risk to food produc-
tion and agriculture, forestry, energy, infrastructure,
ecosystems, and wildlife. Substantial evidence fur-
ther supported EPA’s conclusion that the warming
resulting from the greenhouse gas emissions could be
expected to create risks to water resources and in
general to coastal areas as a result of expected in-
crease in sea level. Jd. at 66,498. Finally, EPA de-
termined from substantial evidence that motor-
vehicle emissions of greenhouse gases contribute to
climate change and thus to the endangerment of
public health and welfare.
Industry Petitioners do not find fault with much
of the substantial record EPA amassed in support of
the Endangerment Finding. Rather, they contend
that the record evidences too much uncertainty to
support that judgment. But the existence of some
uncertainty does not, without more, warrant invali-
dation of an endangerment finding. If a statute is
“precautionary in nature” and “designed to protect
the public health,” and the relevant evidence is “dif-
ficult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it
43a
is on the frontiers of scientific knowledge,” EPA need
not provide “rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and
effect” to support an endangerment finding. Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976). As we
have stated before, “Awaiting certainty will often al-
low for only reactive, not preventive. regulation.” Jd.
at 25.
Congress did not restrict EPA to remedial regula-
tion when it enacted CAA § 202(a). That section
mandates that EPA promulgate new emission stand-
ards if it determines that the air pollution at issue
“may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). This lan-
guage requires a precautionary, forward-looking sci-
entific judgment about the risks of a particular air
pollutant, consistent with the CAA’s “precautionary
and preventive orientation.” Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc.
v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Requir-
ing that EPA find “certain” endangerment of public
health or welfare before regulating greenhouse gases
would effectively prevent EPA from doing the job
Congress gave it in § 202(a)—utilizing emission
standards to prevent reasonably anticipated endan-
germent from maturing into concrete harm. Cf. id.
([Rjequiring EPA to wait until it can conclusively
demonstrate that a particular effect is adverse to
health before it acts is inconsistent with both the
[CAA]’s precautionary and preventive orientation
and the nature of the Administrator’s statutory re-
sponsibilities. Congress provided that the Adminis-
trator is to use his judgment in setting air quality
44a
standards precisely to permit him to act in the face of
uncertainty.”).
In Massachusetts v. EPA the Supreme Court con-
firmed that EPA may make an endangerment find-
ing despite lingering scientific uncertainty. Indeed,
the Court held that the existence of “some residual
uncertainty” did not excuse EPA’s decision to decline
to regulate greenhouse gases. Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. at 534. To avoid regulating emissions of
greenhouse gases, EPA would need to show “scien-
tific uncertainty ...so profound that it precludes
EPA from making a reasoned judgment as to wheth-
er greenhouse gases contribute to global warming.”
Id. Clearly, then, EPA may issue an endangerment
finding even while the scientific record still contains
at least “some residual uncertainty.” Industry Peti-
tioners have shown no more than that.
In the end, Petitioners are asking us to re-weigh
the scientific evidence before EPA and reach our own
conclusion. This is not our role. As with other re-
views of administrative proceedings, we do not de-
termine the convincing force of evidence, nor the con-
clusion it should support, but only whether the con-
clusion reached by EPA is supported by substantial
evidence when considered on the record as a whole.
See, e.g., New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 30 (D.C. Cir.
2005). When EPA evaluates scientific evidence in its
bailiwick, we ask only that it take the scientific rec-
ord into account “in a rational manner.” Am. Petrole-
um Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1187 (D.C. Cir.
45a
1981). Industry Petitioners have not shown that EPA
failed to do so here.
C.
State Petitione.'s, here led by Texas, contend that
the Endangerment Finding is arbitrary and capri-
cious because EPA did not “define,” “measure,” or
“quantify” either the atmospheric concentration at
which greenhouse gases endanger public health or
welfare, the rate or type of climate change that it an-
ticipates will endanger public health or welfare, or
the risks or impacts of climate change. According to
Texas, without defining these thresholds and distin-
guishing “safe” climate change from climate change
that endangers, EPA’s Endangerment Finding is just
a “subjective conviction.”
It is true that EPA did not provide a quantitative
threshold at which greenhouse gases or climate
change will endanger or cause certain impacts to
public health or welfare. The text of CAA § 202(a)(1)
does not require that EPA set a precise numerical
value as part of an endangerment finding. Quite the
opposite; the § 202(a)(1) inquiry necessarily entails a
case-by- case, sliding-scale approach to endanger-
ment because “[djanger . . . is not set by a fixed prob-
ability of harm, but rather is composed of reciprocal
elements of risk and harm, or probability and severi-
ty.” Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 18. EPA need not establish a
minimum threshold of risk or harm before determin-
ing whether an air pollutant endangers. It may base
an endangerment finding on “a lesser risk of greater
46a
harm ...or a greater risk of lesser harm” or any
combination in between. Id.
Ethyl is instructive. There, EPA made an endan-
germent finding for airborne lead. During its endan-
germent inquiry, EPA initially tried to do what Tex-
as asks of it here: find a specific concentration of the
air pollutant below which it would be considered
“safe” and above which it would endanger public
health. Id. at 56. However, EPA abandoned that ap-
proach because it failed to account for “the wide var-
iability of dietary lead intake” and lacked predictive
value. EPA substituted a “more qualitative” ap-
proach, which relied on “predictions based on uncer-
tain data” along with clinical studies. Jd. at 56—57.
This court upheld the endangerment finding that
used that qualitative approach despite the lack of a
specific endangerment “threshold.”
In its essence, Texas’s call for quantification of
the endangerment is no more than a specialized ver-
sion of Industry Petitioners’ claim that the scientific
record contains too much uncertainty to find endan-
germent. EPA relied on a substantial record of em-
pirical data and scientific evidence, making many
specific and often quantitative findings regarding the
impacts of greenhouse gases on climate change and
the effects of climate change on public health and
welfare. Its failure to distill this ocean of evidence
into a specific number at which greenhouse gases
cause “dangerous” climate change is a function of the
precautionary thrust of the CAA and the multivari-
ate and sometimes uncertain nature of climate sci-
47a
ence, not a sign of arbitrary or capricious decision-
making.
D.
EPA defined both the “air pollution” and the “air
pollutant” that are the subject of the Endangerment
Finding as an aggregate of six greenhouse gases,
which EPA called “well mixed greenhouse gases”:
carbon dioxide (CO9), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide
(N92 O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons
(PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SFg¢). Industry Peti-
tioners argue that EPA’s decision to include PFCs
and SF¢ in this group of greenhouse gases was arbi-
trary and capricious primarily because motor vehi-
cles generally do not emit these two gases.
No petitioner for review of the Endangerment
Finding has established standing to make this ar-
gument. Industry Petitioners concede that EPA’s de-
cision to regulate PFCs and SF¢ along with the other
four greenhouse gases does not injure any motor- ve-
hicle-related petitioner. Nor has any non-motor-
vehicle- related petitioner shown an injury-in-fact
resulting from EPA’s inclusion of these two gases in
the six-gas amalgam of “well- mixed greenhouse gas-
es.” At oral argument, Industry Petitioners asserted
for the first time that certain: utility companies—
members of associations that petitioned for review of
the Endangerment Finding—own utility transform-
ers that emit SFg. However, they never demonstrat-
ed or even definitively asserted that any of these
companies would not be subject to regulation or per-
48a
mitting requirements but for EPA’s decision to in-
clude SF¢ as part of the “well-mixed greenhouse gas-
es” that are the subject of the Endangerment Find-
ing. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898—900
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (requiring that a petitioner seeking
review of agency action demonstrate standing by af-
fidavit or other evidence if standing is not “self-
evident” from the administrative record). Absent a
petitioner with standing to challenge EPA’s inclusion
of PFCs and SF¢ in the “air pollution” at issue, this
court lacks jurisdiction to address the merits of In-
dustry Petitioners’ contention.
E.
EPA did not submit the Endangerment Finding
for review by its Science Advisory Board (SAB). In-
dustry Petitioners claim that EPA’s failure to do so
violates its mandate to “make available” to the SAB
“any proposed criteria document, standard, limita-
tion, or regulation under the Clean Air Act” at the
time it provides the same “to any other Federal
agency for formal review and comment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 4365(c)(1); see Am. Petroleum Inst., 665 F.2d at
1188.
To begin with, it is not clear that EPA provided
the Endangerment Finding “to any other Federal
agency for formal review and comment,” which trig-
gers this duty to submit a regulation to the SAB.
EPA only submitted a draft of the Endangerment
Finding to the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs pursuant to Executive Order 12,866. EPA
49a
contends that this was merely an informal review
process, not “formal review and comment”—at least
when compared with a _ statutory review-and-
comment requirement in which other agencies are
given the opportunity to provide written comments
about the impacts of a proposed regulation on the re-
viewing agency’s universe of responsibility. See, e.g.,
49 U.S.C. § 32902(j). Industry Petitioners failed to
respond to this contention.
In any event, even if EPA violated its mandate by
failing to submit the Endangerment Finding to the
SAB, Industry Petitioners have not shown that this
error was “of such central relevance to the rule that
there is a substantial likelihood that the rule would
have been significantly changed if such errors had
not been made.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(8); see Am. Pe-
troleum Inst., 665 F.2d at 1188-89 (applying this
standard to EPA’s failure to submit an ozone stand-
ard to the SAB).
F.
Lastly, State Petitioners maintain that EPA erred
by denying all ten petitions for reconsideration of the
Endangerment Finding. Those petitions asserted
that internal e- mails and documents released from
the University of East Anglia’s Climate Research
Unit (CRU)}—a contributor to one of the global tem-
perature records and to the IPCC’s assessment re-
port—undermined the scientific evidence supporting
the Endangerment Finding by calling into question
whether the IPCC scientists adhered to “best science
practices.” EPA’s Denial of the Petitions To Reconsid-
50a
er the Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Find-
ings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of
the Clean Air Act (“Reconsideration Denial”), 75 Fed.
Reg. 49,556, 49,556—57 (Aug. 13, 2010). The petitions
pointed to factual mistakes in the IPCC’s assessment
report resulting from the use of non-peer-reviewed
studies and several scientific studies postdating the
Endangerment Finding as evidence that the Endan-
germent Finding was flawed. Id.
On August 13, 2010, EPA issued a denial of the
petitions for reconsideration accompanied by a 360-
page response to petitions (RTP). Id. at 49,556. It de-
termined that the petitions did not provide substan-
tial support for the argument that the Endanger-
ment Finding should be revised. According to EPA,
the petitioners’ claims based on the CRU documents
were exaggerated, contradicted by other evidence,
and not a material or reliable basis for questioning
the credibility of the body of science at issue; two of
the factual inaccuracies alleged in the petitions were
in fact mistakes, but both were “tangential and mi-
nor” and did not change the key IPCC conclusions;
and the new scientific studies raised by some peti-
tions were either already considered by EPA, misin-
terpreted or misrepresented by petitioners, or put
forth without acknowledging other new studies. 7d.
at 49,557—58.
1.
EPA is required to convene a proceeding for re-
consideration of a rule if a party raising an objection
to the rule ,
5la
can demonstrate to the Administrator that it
was impracticable to raise such objection with-
in such time or if the grounds for such objec-
tion arose after the period for public comment
(but within the time specified for judicial re-
view) and if such objection is of central rele-
vance to the outcome of the rule.
42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B). For the purpose of deter-
mining whether to commence reconsideration of a
rule, EPA considers an objection to be of “central rel-
evance to the outcome” of that rule “if it provides
substantial support for the argument that the regu-
lation should be revised.” Reconsideration Denial, 75
Fed. Reg. at 49,561.
State Petitioners have not provided substantial
support for their argument that the Endangerment
Finding should be revised. State Petitioners point
out that some studies the IPCC referenced in its as-
sessment were not peer-reviewed, but they ignore
the fact that (1) the IPCC assessment relied on
around 18,000 studies that were peer-reviewed, and
(2) the IPCC’s report development procedures ex-
pressly permitted the inclusion in the assessment of
some non-peer-reviewed studies (gray” literature).
Moreover, as EPA determined, the limited inac-
curate information developed from the gray litera-
ture does not appear sufficient to undermine the
substantial overall evidentiary support for the En-
dangerment Finding. State Petitioners have not, as
they assert, uncovered a “pattern” of flawed science.
Only two of the errors they point out seem to be er-
52a
rors at all, and EPA relied on neither in making the
Endangerment Finding. First, as State Petitioners
assert, the IPCC misstated the percentage of the
Netherlands that is below sea level, a statistic that
was used for background information. However, the
IPCC corrected the error, and EPA concluded that
the error was “minor and had no impact,” and the
Endangerment Finding did not refer to the statistic
in any way. Id. at 49,576—-77. Second, the IPCC
acknowledged misstating the rate at which Himala-
yan glaciers are receding. EPA also did not rely on
that projection in the Endangerment Finding. /d. at
49,577.
State Petitioners also contend that a new study
contradicts EPA’s reliance on a projection of more
violent storms in the future as a result of climate
change, but the study they cite only concerns past
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