Amicus Curiae Brief — Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center

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Nos. 11-338 anu 11-347

3n the Supreme Court of the United States

DouG DECKER, in his official capacity as

Oregon State Forester, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE CENTER, et ail.,

Respondents.

GEORGIA-PACIFIC WEST, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE CENTER, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writs of Certiorari to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE CHAMBER OF

COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

ROBIN S. CONRAD ROBERT R. GASAWAY

RACHEL L. BRAND Counsel of Record

SHELDON GILBERT JEFFREY BOSSERT CLARK

NATIONAL CHAMBER ADITYA BAMZAI

LITIGATION CENTER, INC. AARON L. NIELSON

1615 H Street, NW KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP

Washington, DC 20062 655 Fifteenth Street, NW

(202) 463-5337 Washington, DC 20005

(202) 879-5000

September 4, 2012 rgasaway@kirkland.com

9

WILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 — WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIBG.....................sccssscsseccesees il

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ................0.c000c0000 1

DUFREPEARES CF RE TUIOIIS D cccecccsccscccvscsssevescossonnsaness 2

DEPRESS, ccecesesisesesesepnmncsinntimesennbeginaimeniadiail 5

I. COURTS ADJUDICATING CITIZEN

SUITS UNDER THE CLEAN WATER

ACT LACK JURISDICTION TO

INVALIDATE AGENCY RULEG..................... 6

Il. THE LINE BETWEEN “INVALIDATING”

A RULE AND “INTERPRETING” IT

MUST BE DILIGENTLY ENFORCED. .......... 9

lil. THE NINTH CIRCUIT EXCEEDED ITS

JURISDICTION BY INVALIDATING

THE SILVICULTURAL RULE IN THIS

CPS EIOT GFE s coccecenscoccsesnnnsunenntaneniumsinndiinstiiinn 14

A. The Silvicultural Rule

Unambiguously Exempts Logging

Ditches And Culverts From

NPDES Permitting Requirements. ..... 14

B. EPA Cannot Read The

Silvicultural Rule To Mean

Something Other Than What Its

RE UD CII cnccccccsccvnevssctinansebienniiaes 19

A

C. The Ninth Circuit's

“Interpretation” Of The

Silvicultural Rule In Fact

Invalidates The Rule. .......................66- 22

ET TN ae 25

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,

ee iatiniceinniabiciiiniiehamniedcaniteeniaibianis 8, 9, 11

Auer v. Robbins,

AN I iittala 19

Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC,

O34 F'.26 1138 (D.C. Cie. 1GB2) .....cccccccocccceccccscess 19

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.

Def. Council, Inc.,

ee ee i iitnidcniciepricisasinniiinntinniiainsinial 20

Christensen v. Harris Cnty.,

ee a EE iinciissichtinsiisncteisinadhishaiieiivesnenbiiaidibinia 19

Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.,

8 een 20, 21

Comcast Corp. v. FCC,

ee ee Cs TEs SE cccctensncecnnsocnncnsinenennnnie 13

Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp.,

Ff 060U0d)6ll"d ee 3, 9, 22, 23, 25

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Enutl.

Servs. (TOC), Inc.,

ee Se IT ic csncssintisisnnciedannsutadiiniiianiensinned 8, 12

Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc.,

IRENE na eaeee Ronen mennE ener Et 7,9

lV

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,

a ees Ge Ce iiictientcsnenntnscasenvsnassecnniee

Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics

Intelligence & Coordination Unit,

ee Se Ce ccienicsinnnnicinntonnseimenssene

Lubrizol Corp. v. Train,

547 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1976)..................6

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

ee GF ND QD ccccncecnccescccccccncecnnenseenes

Maier v. EPA,

114 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 1997)................

Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Natl Sea

Clammers Ass'n,

GD TA. B Gi etccccceccceccsscecscncscsscecesscesen

Nat'l Ass’n of Home Builders v.

Defenders of Wildlife,

ee Rs ED ee ievaievccansessunsnensscasesvongnes

NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC,

548 F.3d 116 (D.C. Cir. 2008)..................

NRDC v. EPA,

512 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1975)................

NRDC o. EPA,

571 F.3d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2009)................

Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown,

640 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2011)..................

Vv

Old Dominion Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC,

518 F.3d 43 (D.C. Cir. 2008)............................... 20

Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA,

oe fog. i Eee: 7

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,

gt EE eee ean Ee 12

Talk Am., Inc. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co.,

ee ee i I iinrnintirncimnitsinnatttiiegaaniddinnpeld 22

Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC,

750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ............. 0. cccec cece eee eeee 12

United States v. Ethyl Corp.,

761 F.2d 1153 (Sth Cir. 1985)......................c.ccce00- 8

United States v. Kubrick,

ios eaidisiatiianiialiaian 10

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. FDIC,

$10 F.3d 202 (D.C. Cir. BOOB) ........cccccoccccccccscccece 20

Statutes

I TTT cin cisisicciniteiaieansiniieandigienibeeianbeumin 10, 12

Se TEEN: Tin AI cinsstesncsinciienesesiaeiibciigepiianhtsianiadiiemnnaieansediiautiiidans 12

Be i Oe a iicnctiencterisihepantinsinnnininlinniinapnadaninnniniiainiaieniion 10

UG Me I is crararincsctreriniinnneniiannieniiinbniiaianaeit 10

Be es Se I ois ciicsicinninsnrcianinnddiinesnnininpieandeiamneaniidanaia 3, 7

33 U.S.C. § 1369(b).................... 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 13, 21, 25

ee ice tcctnntnictternimnimeniinnimeniia 10

RES SEES EET ESS RET 10

kL ae Anarene 10

I 10

Rules

a ie OD creicececcnrecestenemnncssenesnensanientia 14, 15

Gk ie SPE ceccnnnscnssnncnetennsonecssentnins 2,4, 14, 15

Other Authorities

R. STACCIOLI,

THE ROADS OF THE ROMANS (2003) ................----+ 16

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE*

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States

of America (the “Chamber”) is the world’s largest

business federation. It directly represents 300,000

members and indirectly represents the interests of

over three million business, trade, and professional

organizations of every size, in every sector, and from

every region of the country. Over 96% of the

Chamber’s members are small businesses with 100

or fewer employees. One of the Chamber’s primary

functions is to represent the interests of its members

by filing amicus briefs in cases implicating issues of

vital concern to American business.

This case presents an important question

regarding the jurisdiction of federal courts under the

Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and other statutes

enforced by citizen suit provisions: whether a court

hearing a “citizen suit” brought pursuant to the CWA

can invalidate an Environmental Protection Agency

(“EPA”) regulation in the guise of interpreting it.

The rule-of-law principles at stake in answering that

question are of central importance to the Chamber’s

members, especially given the frequency with which

citizen suit provisions appear in the United States

Code. Countless companies have _ structured

important elements of their businesses around the

plain text of EPA’s Silvicultural Rule (40 C.F.R.

* The parties have consented to the filing of this brief, and

their letters of consent are on file with the Clerk. In accordance

with Rule 37.6, Amicus states that no counsel for any party has

authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity,

other than Amicus, its members, and ita counsel, made a

monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or

submission of this brief.

2

§ 122.27(b)(1)), or other, similar agency rules

enforced by citizen suit provisions. The profound

implications for Chamber members of any decision

upending settled regulatory expectations underscore

the Chamber’s strong interest in ensuring that the

Ninth Circuit’s decision is carefully examined and

appropriately corrected.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.

Where Congress has set the bounds of a federal

court’s power, Article III demands that those bounds

be respected. In resolving the case below, however,

the Ninth Circuit violated that elementary principle

of law by invalidating the EPA’s longstanding

Silvicultura] Rule in the context of adjudicating this

citizen suit. Because courts sitting to hear citizen

suits enjoy jurisdiction only to enforce EPA’s rules,

not to invalidate them, the decision below must be

vacated, and the case remanded with instructions to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Congress enacted two distinct jurisdictional

provisions for suits involving EPA’s_ rules

implementing the National Pollutant Discharge

Elimination System’s permitting program. One of

the provisions, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b), gives federal

appellate courts exclusive jurisdiction to review the

lawfulness of EPA’s NPDES rules. See id.

§§ 1369(b)(1)(E)-(F). In these direct review actions,

EPA is a respondent and review generally must be

sought within 120 days of a rule’s promulgation. See

id. § 1369(b)(1)(G). By statute, Congress has decreed

that review of an NPDES rule can only be sought

under Section 1369(b)(1). Such a rule “shall not be

3

subject to judicial review in any civil ... proceeding

for enforcement.” Id. § 1369(b)(2).

The second jurisdictional provision, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(a), allows federal district courts to adjudicate

citizen suits. Citizen suits are not subject to Section

1369(b)’s 120-day time limit, and EPA need not be a

party to the litigation.

The reason for this marked contrast between

Sections 1369(b) and 1365(a) is that the two

provisions serve different functions. Section 1369(b)

provides for review of the lawfulness of EPA’s rules;

Section 1365(a) serves to ensure the rules are

properly enforced. Accordingly, as this Court

unanimously acknowledged in the analogous Clean

Air Act (“CAA”) context, “an attack on the validity of

the regulation ... [cannot] be raised in an

enforcement proceeding.” Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy

Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 572 (2007).

Here, the Ninth Circuit ignored the line

separating these two jurisdictional provisions. No

party disputes that the _ Silvicultural Rule

implements EPA’s NPDES permitting program.

That means that under Section 1369(b)(1), the

Silvicultural Rule itself may be reviewed only: (i) ina

circuit court; (ii) in a case in which EPA is a

respondent; and (iii) if review is timely sought. But

not one of those conditions was met in this case.

This suit was commenced in district court under

Section 1365(a); the EPA was not made a party to

the litigation; and this suit was filed decades after

the Silvicultural Rule’s adoption. The Ninth Circuit

thus had jurisdiction only to ensure that the district

court properly enforced the Silvicultural Rule—not to

examine its lawfulness vel non.

4

Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit did more than

enforce the Silvicultural Rule; it invalidated it.

Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that “runoff from

logging roads that [is] collected in a system of

ditches, culverts, and channels” requires an NPDES

permit. Nw. Envitl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d

1063, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2011). The Rule, however,

says the opposite—that “site preparation,” “surface

drainage,” and “road construction and maintenance”

are all activities that do not require a permit. 40

C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(1). Because the Silvicultural Rule

is unambiguous, not even EPA has discretion to read

it any other way.

The dispositive issue for this case thus does not

involve the scope of EPA’s authority but the entirely

distinct question of the scope of the district court’s

jurisdiction to review—and potentially’ to

invalidate—EPA regulations. The point here is that

Congress withheld from the district courts any

jurisdiction to review or revise the Silvicultural Rule

when adjudicating citizen suits. The Ninth Circuit's

decision to the contrary dispenses with the Clean

Water Act’s jurisdictional limitations; discards

Congress’s carefully drawn review regime; gives

district courts review authority that they have

heretofore lacked; and upsets the stability of

comparable rules and review provisions. If allowed

to stand, the Ninth Circuit decision would subject

countless Chamber members and other regulated

parties to new degrees of legal uncertainty across the

entire swath of the Code of Federal Regulations

provisions that are subject to enforcement via citizen

suits. To restore certainty to the operation of the

Clean Water Act and similar statutory regimes, the

Ninth Circuit’s decision should be vacated and the

5

case remanded with instructions to dismiss for want

of subject matter jurisdiction.

ARGUMENT

The Ninth Circuit’s “invalidation by

interpretation” approach has serious consequences

for the stability of settled regulatory understandings

under the NPDES permitting regime and other

regulatory regimes enforced by citizen suits. The

Ninth Circuit’s wholesale willingness to replace

congressional limitations on when, where, and how

regulations may be challenged with an uncertain

regime in which courts may invalidate regulations

long after their promulgation and through sleight of

hand can only undermine the stability of the law.

The Chamber’s members have strong interests in

ensuring that all regulated parties play on an even

field defined by settled rules of the road for seeking

judicial review of agency enactments. Only through

adherence to such settled rules will judicial review

determinations be orderly, predictable, and capable

of allowing businesses to responsibly plan their

affairs.

The decision below deprives regulated parties

throughout the Ninth Circuit of these most basic and

essential rule-of-law benefits. The Silvicultural Rule

is unambiguous: no NPDES permit is required for

ditches and culverts that drain water off the surface

of logging roads. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit

declined to give the Rule the only reading its text

reasonably permits. The Ninth Circuit’s decision

thus discarded core limitations on review of agency

action and deprived Chamber members of the

benefits of the previously settled understanding of

the Silvicultural Rule and other similar rules.

6

I. COURTS ADJUDICATING CITIZEN SUITS

UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT LACK

JURISDICTION TO INVALIDATE AGENCY

RULES.

Congress has limited how, when, and where

review of EPA rules implementing the NPDES

permitting program can be obtained.

Under the CWA, review of an NPDES rule can be

had “in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United

States for the Federal judicial district in which [the

applicant] resides or transacts business,” and “within

120 days ... or after such date only if such

application is based solely on grounds which arose

after such 120th day.” 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1); see

also NRDC v. EPA, 571 F.3d 1245, 1269 (D.C. Cir. :

2009) (“[Under the CAA, t]he triggering date was

July 2, 1979, when the EPA .... unequivocally

asserted its authority to exempt new sources from

permitting requirements under section VI. Thus, the

petitioners’ challenge to such authority in this case

comes almost thirty years late and we are precluded

from considering it.”).

Congress left no doubt that judicial review of EPA

rulemakings under Section 1369(b) is exclusive:

“Action of the Administrator with respect to which

review could have been obtained under paragraph

(1) of this subsection shall not be subject to judicial

review in any civil or criminal proceeding for

enforcement.” 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2); see also

Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Natl Sea

Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981) (“Where

review could have been obtained under this

provision, the action at issue may not be challenged

in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding for

7

enforcement.”) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2)); Paper

Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 882 F.2d 287, 288 (7th Cir. 1989)

(“Because the [CWA] bars review in enforcement

proceedings of actions that could have been reviewed

earlier, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2), careful lawyers must

apply for judicial review of anything remotely

resembling a reviewable order.”). As a result, subject

to due process limitations, “any agency action that

was reviewable in the courts of appeals cannot be

challenged in an enforcement proceeding, whether or

not review was actually sought.” Harrison v. PPG

Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 605 (1980) (emphasis

added).

Relatedly, federal district courts’ jurisdiction to

entertain citizen suits is also carefully circumscribed

by statute. Section 1365(a) of the Clean Water Act

provides that district courts enjoy jurisdiction only

“to enforce ... an effluent standard,” not to adjudicate

whether a standard is lawful. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a);

see also Maier v. EPA, 114 F.3d 1032, 1036-39 (10th

Cir. 1997) (explaining that Section 1365(a) cannot be

used to challenge a rule’s validity).

As this Court has explained in a criminal

prosecution under the CAA:

The narrow inquiry to be addressed by the

court ... is not whether the Administrator

has complied with appropriate procedures

in promulgating the regulation § in

question, or whether the particular

regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or

supported by the administrative record.

Nor is the court to pursue any of the other

familiar inquiries which arise in the

8

course of an administrative review

proceeding.

Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275,

285 (1978); see also United States v. Ethyl Corp., 761

F.2d 1153, 1157 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Adamo

Wrecking Co. in the civil context).

Congress’ decision to cabin the scope of citizen

suits in the Clean Water Act and other statutes is

understandable, both as a matter of prudence and as

a matter of constitutional principle. As members of

the Court have remarked, private enforcement of

public law raises “[djifficult and fundamental

questions ... in view of the responsibilities committed

to the Executive by Article II of the Constitution of

the United States.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.

Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 197

(2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Lujan uv.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992)

(holding in a citizen suit case that Congress could not

allow private prosecution of any and all violations of

federal law because that would infringe on “the Chief

Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to

‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’ Art.

II, § 3”). If read too broadly, citizen suit provisions

could enable every court of competent jurisdiction to

dip its own interpretive oar into agencies’ most

important regulatory waters—thus undermining the

uniformity, predictability and even legitimacy of the

resulting administrative regimes.

In short, Congress clearly and wisely established

Section 1369(b) as the exclusive vehicle for obtaining

judicial review of EPA _ regulations, while

establishing Section 1365(a) citizen suits as a vehicle

9

for enforcing—but not for reviewing—such

regulations.

II. THE LINE BETWEEN “INVALIDATING” A

RULE AND “INTERPRETING” IT MUST BE

DILIGENTLY ENFORCED.

Against the backdrop of these different review

provisions, the line between “invalidating” a rule and

“enforcing” it must be diligently policed. Most

importantly, the judicial inquiry into the distinction.

between a rule’s enforcement and its invalidation

must go beyond mere labels.

As the Court has recognized, provisions for

funneling challenges to rulemakings quickly into

court serve important functions. So long as they are

interpreted consistent with due process, such

provisions, including Section 1369(b)(2) of the CWA,

properly ensure that regulations are “uniformly

applied” and “quickly reviewed by a single court

intimately familiar with administrative procedures.”

Adamo Wrecking Co., 434 U.S. at 284.

Indeed, as the United States’ briefing explained

in Duke Energy, such provisions “avoid[] inconsistent

results and forum shopping, provide[] speedy and

authoritative review in a court of appeals with

particular expertise in the relevant area, and

ensure{] that regulated entities are _ treated

consistently throughout the country, thus ensuring a

level playing field for the regulated community.”

Brief for the United States as Respondent

Supporting Petitioners, Duke Energy, 549 U.S. 561

(No. 05-848) (2006 WL 2066660) (July 21, 2006), at

18 (citing Harrison, 446 U.S. at 593; NRDC v. EPA,

512 F.2d 1351, 1356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Lubrizol

Corp. v. Train, 547 F.2d 310, 317 (6th Cir. 1976)).

10

Accordingly, any failure to police the line between

“invalidation” and “interpretation” of a rule would

unsettle doctrine far beyond the boundaries of this

case—and create confusion in the application of

timing, exclusive jurisdiction, and remedial rules in a

variety of administrative law contexts.

In particular, failing to police this jurisdictional

line would subject Chamber members to challenges

to agency rulemakings and orders brought long after

the end of the specified review period. Importantly,

the Clean Water Act is by no means alone in

establishing comparatively short deadlines for

judicial review of agency rulemakings. See, e.g., 47

U.S.C. § 402(b) (Federal Communications

Commission: 30 days); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (CAA: 60

days); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7(a) (Safe Drinking Water

Act: 45 days); 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1) (Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act: 90 days); 30 U.S.C.

§ 1276(a)(1) (Surface Mining Control and

Reclamation Act: 60 days); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2342, 2344

(numerous agencies including Atomic Energy

Commission, Surface Transportation Board, and

Federal Maritime Commission: 60 days).

Like statutes of limitations, such judicial review

deadlines often serve to bar litigation of the merits of

otherwise valid legal challenges. See, e.g., United

States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 (1979) (“It goes

without saying that statutes of limitations often

make it impossible to enforce what were otherwise

perfectly valid claims. But that is their very purpose

...). The larger point, however, is that Congress

weighed the costs and benefits of time-barring

otherwise meritorious claims against the costs and

benefits of creating stability and certainly in a

11

particular regulatory regime. Cf., Adamo Wrecking

Co., 434 U.S. at 284 (explaining that Congress

intended rulemakings in the environmental context

to be “quickly reviewed by a single court intimately

familiar with administrative procedures’). The

balance struck by Congress in these provisions

creates clear, well-defined avenues for bringing

challenges to regulations, while permitting regulated

parties to know the rules and plan their businesses

accordingly.

Citizen suit provisions, by very nature, divide the

authority to promulgate rules from the authority to

enforce them in ways that threaten to undermine

statutorily specified judicial-review windows.

Outside the citizen suit context, the promulgator and

enforcer of agency regulations is typically one and

the same entity—the agency itself. In those

circumstances, if an agency comes to question the

wisdom of its own regulations, all it need do is take

proper steps to amend them. Under citizen suit

provisions, by contrast, private citizens, as agency

outsiders, are authorized to enforce but not to amend

agency regulations. This partial authority often

leads to situations where these outside enforcers find

they may enforce but may not challenge regulations

with which they fundamentally disagree.

The bottom line is that, under any regime like the

Clean Water Act, the coupling of a short window for

review with a perpetual opportunity for private

enforcement sorely tempts citizen litigants to dress

up time-barred challenges to the validity of

regulations as permissible actions seeking to enforce

them. These incentives to engage in a sleight of

hand (which, as explained below, are nicely

12

exemplified by the proceedings in this case) are

precisely why a too-expansive compass for citizen

suits undermines statutory review deadlines,

unsettles the law, and upsets the well founded

expectations of the business community.

In addition to specifying short time windows for

challenging agency rulemakings, Congress also often

provides that review of rulemakings occurs

exclusively in particular courts, such as the courts of

appeal. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2343 (“The venue of a

proceeding under this chapter is in the judicial

circuit in which the petitioner resides or has its

principal office, or in the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.”)

(applying to review of orders of agencies listed in 28

U.S.C. § 2342). Because of the “institutional

differences between trial and appellate courts,”

Congress's express statement “as to the particular

type of court it wants to review agency action, ...

should not be set aside lightly.” NetworkIP, LLC uv.

FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Telecomms.

Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 78 (D.C.

Cir. 1984) (“Appellate courts develop an expertise

concerning the agencies assigned them for review.

Exclusive jurisdiction promotes judicial economy and

fairness to the litigants by taking advantage of that

expertise. In addition, exclusive jurisdiction

eliminates duplicative and potentially conflicting

review, and the delay and expense incidental

thereto.”) (citation omitted).

Citizen suits by contrast are brought almost

uniformly in the district courts. See Laidlaw, 528

U.S. at 173; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’,

523 U.S. 83, 88 (1998). Allowing parties to challenge

13

the NPDES regulations and similar agency rules

through citizen suits would mean that district courts,

not appellate courts, would evaluate the lawfulness

of such rules in the first instance—contrary to

Congress's entrustment of such review to the courts

of appeal. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1369(b)(1)-(b)(2). In

view of the heavy reliance of regulated parties on the

special review competence of appellate courts, there

is no reason to think that Congress intended to

permit forum substitutions in cases involving

challenges to agency rulemakings under the Clean

Water Act and other statutory regimes that involve

regulatory enforcement through citizen suits.

Finally, in ordinary administrative law cases, if a

court invalidates a rule, it typically vacates the rule

and remands to the agency for further proceedings.

See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C.

Cir. 2009) (“[W]e have not hesitated to vacate a rule

when the agency has not responded to empirical data

or to an argument inconsistent with its conclusion.”);

see also id. at 10 (Randolph, J., concurring) (arguing

that “whenever a_ reviewing court finds an

administrative rule or order unlawful,’ the

Administrative Procedure Act requires the court to

vacate the agency’s action”). Under this common

procedure, regulated parties like Chamber members

receive an opportunity to submit a new round of

comments in connection with the agency remand and

obtain the benefit of orderly, transparent agency

decisionmaking in the wake of the instigating

judicial review decision.

By contrast, invalidation-by-interpretation review

acts to short-circuit and muddy up the typical agency

remand process. In response to such an invalidation,

14

an agency may well choose to retain the federal

court’s rewriting of the regulation or to reject it—at

least outside the circuit in which the review decision

was issued. Such an outcome would greatly

prejudice regulated parties by undermining the

regularity of administrative practice, the uniformity

of agency regulations, and the statutory review

scheme enacted by Congress.

Ill. THE NINTH CIRCUIT EXCEEDED ITS

JURISDICTION BY INVALIDATING THE

SILVICULTURAL RULE IN THIS CITIZEN

SUIT.

Here, the Ninth Circuit claimed only to enforce

EPA’s regulation and not to invalidate it. But a

simple examination of the Rule, perusal of the Ninth

Circuit opinion, and comparison between the Rule’s

operation before and after the Ninth Circuit’s review

decision shows without doubt that the Rule has been

nullified.

A. The Silvicultural Rule Unambiguously

Exempts Logging Ditches And Culverts

From NPDES Permitting Requirements.

The Silvicultural Rule distinguishes between

“(sjilvicultural point sources,” which are “subject to

the NPDES permit program,” 40 C.F.R. § 122.27(a),

and “non-point source silvicultural activities,” which

do not require an NPDES permit, id. § 122.27(b)(1).

Specifically, the rule provides in relevant part:

(a) Permit requirement. Silvicultural

point sources, as defined in this section,

are point sources subject to the NPDES

permit program.

15

(b) Definitions. (1) Silvicultural point

source means any discernible, confined

and discrete conveyance related to rock

crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, or

log storage facilities which are operated in

connection with silvicultural activities and

from which pollutants are discharged into

waters of the United States. The term

does not include non-point source

silvicultural activities such as nursery

operations, site preparation, reforestation

and subsequent cultural treatment,

thinning, prescribed burning, pest and fire

control, harvesting operations, surface

drainage, or road construction and

maintenance from which there is natural

runoff.

Id. §§ 122.27(a)-(b)(1) (emphasis added).

In three ways, the Rule establishes that ditches

and culverts draining water from logging roads

“operated in connection with silvicultural activities”

do not qualify as point sources and are hence exempt

from NPDES permitting requirements.

First, the Rule expressly defines the scope of a

“silvicultural point source” in a manner that does not

include drainage ditches and culverts for roads.

Under the Rule, a “discernible, confined and discrete

conveyance[]}”—such as a ditch or culvert—is a

“silvicultural point source” subject to a permit

requirement only if it is “related to rock crushing,

gravel washing, log sorting, or log storage facilities.”

By implication, conveyances not “related to rock

crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, or log storage

facilities” are not “point sources subject to the

16

NPDES permit program.” See, e.g., Leatherman uv.

Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination

Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (applying the

expressio unius canon). The Rule thus expressly

defines the scope of silvicultural point sources in a

way that excludes ditches and culverts made for

logging roads.

Second, ditches and culverts for logging roads fall

within the scope of the Rule’s express NPDES permit

exemption for certain categories of conduct dubbed

“non-point source silvicultural activities.” These

exempted activities include, inter alia, “site

preparation, ... surface drainage, [and] road

construction and maintenance from which there is

natural runoff.”

Given the reality of silvicultural operations, the

codified exemptions for “site preparation,” “surface

drainage,” and “road construction and maintenance

from which there is natural runoff’ necessarily

exempt from NPDES permitting all water

management activities associated with rainwater

runoff from logging roads—such as the use of

ditches, culverts, and the like. Since at least the

time of the Romans, road builders have recognized

that well-functioning roads require that rainwater be

drained away from road surfaces and into drainage

ditches. See, e.g., R. STACCIOLI, THE ROADS OF THE

ROMANS 108 (2003) (“[T]he top surface of the

roadway was normally curved or slightly pitched to

allow rainwater to flow toward the drainage ditches

on the sides and to prevent it from stagnating.”).

This drainage requires channeling rainwater away

from roads and nearby areas. Hence, under most

topographical conditions, it is practically impossible

17

to build well-constructed logging roads without also

building accompanying ditches and culverts.

Accordingly, part of properly constructing and

maintaining logging roads is properly constructing

and maintaining ditches and culverts to ensure that

the roads’ inevitable periodic inundation does not

cause a wash out—a fact that the United States itself

recognized before the District Court in this litigation.

See U.S. Amicus Brief, Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown,

No. 3:06 CV-01270, at 16-17 (D. Or. filed Dec. 6,

2006) [“U.S. D.Ct. Br.”] (“NECD’s interpretation of

section 122.27 ignores the plain language of the

regulation. The regulation refers to ‘road

construction and maintenance. It is practically

impossible to construct and maintain a road without

including systems for the control of precipitation

through ditches, culverts and the like. Otherwise,

the roads would wash out. These structures are an

integral part of forest roads and reading them as

outside the scope of the regulation does not make

sense because it defeats the plain language of the

regulation.”).

Simply put, if building logging-road ditches

always required NPDES permits, then building

logging roads themselves would practically always

require such permits, because the latter can almost

never be properly constructed without the former.

Under that assumption, the Silvicultural Rule’s

express exemption for logging road “construction and

maintenance” would be rendered largely

meaningless. See U.S. D.Ct. Amicus Br. at 16

(accepting NEDC’s “interpretation would render the

second sentence of the rule superfluous”). That

surely is no way to read a regulation. See, e.g., Nati

18

Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551

U.S. 644, 669 (2007) (rejecting “reading [that] would

render the regulation entirely superfluous’).

Third, even assuming that the Silvicultural

Rule’s references to “site preparation,” “surface

drainage,” and “road construction and maintenance”

were not sufficient, of themselves, to capture logging-

road ditches, the Rule’s listing of exempted activities

is notably non-exhaustive. The Silvicultural Rule

expressly provides that other activities “such as” the

listed activities are exempted from NPDES

permitting requirements. Indeed, the use of a

phrase like “such as” to introduce the non-exclusive

list of non-point sources is particularly notable in

light of the use of an exclusive list to define

“silvicultural point sources.” Given that ditches and

culverts are part and parcel of preparing sites,

draining surfaces, and constructing and maintaining

roads, drainage from these structures must also be

included within the category of “non-point source

silvicultural activities.” Having adopted a non-

exhaustive list of exempted activities, EPA may not

give the Silvicultural Rule so narrow a reading that

the rule no longer accomplishes its evident purposes.

The upshot is that, even leaving aside the fact

that EPA has always said that the Silvicultural Rule

exempts ditches that direct runoff away from logging

roads—thus precluding EPA from claiming deference

for an interpretive reversal at this late date—the

Rule itself leaves no doubt as to its meaning.

19

B. EPA Cannot Read The Silvicultural Rule

To Mean Something Other Than What Its

Plain Text Says.

Given the foregoing, it is apparent that even EPA

has no discretion to read the Silvicultural Rule as

the Ninth Circuit did. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris

Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (“Auer deference is

warranted only when the language of the regulation

is ambiguous.”) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,

461 (1997)). Here, as in Christensen, to “defer to the

agency’s position would be to permit the agency,

under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create

de facto a new regulation.” 529 U.S. at 588.

Nonetheless, at the petition stage, the United

States refused to acknowledge that the Silvicultural

Rule always unambiguously exempted logging-road

ditches and culverts. Instead, the United States

argued that the Silvicultural Rule is ambiguous, but

that EPA’s position as articulated in its amicus brief

is entitled to deference as to the Rule’s

interpretation. See CVSG Brief at 12. While the

United States ultimately reaches the _ correct

outcome—that the Ninth Circuit erred—its analysis

is plainly wrong. Contrary to the United States’

current position, the Silvicultural Rule contains no

ambiguity.

The United States’ characterization of the

Silvicultural Rule as ambiguous deserves no

deference. At the outset, the question whether a

statute or regulation is ambiguous is for this Court

to decide. “An agency is given no deference at all on

the question whether a statute is ambiguous ....”

Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 924 F.2d

1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Silberman, J., joined by

20

Ginsburg, R.B., J., and Thomas, J.); see also Old

Dominion Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 518 F.3d 43, 48

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (same); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.

FDIC, 310 F.3d 202, 205-06 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same);

see generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (‘If,

however, the court determines Congress has not

directly addressed the precise question at issue, the

court does not simply impose its own construction on

the statute ....”) (emphasis added).

No less importantly, the United States’ shifting

positions in this Litigation undermine any agency

deference that the EPA might otherwise be entitled

to claim. See Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham

Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167-68 (2012) (refusing to

defer to an _ interpretation that upended a

“longstanding practice”); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,

480 U.S. 421, 446, n.30 (1987) (refusing to defer to an

interpretation due to “the inconsistency of the

positions the [agency] has taken”).

Before the district court, EPA argued, in addition

to a call for deference, that the Silvicultural Rule’s

“language” is “plain” and that the “validity” of the

rule could not be litigated in a “citizen suit.” U.S.

D.Ct. Br. at 10; see also id. at 16-17 (“[RJjeading

[ditches, culverts and the like] as outside the scope of

the regulation does not make sense because it

defeats the plain language of the regulation.”). In

the Ninth Circuit, the United States initially took

the same position: the Silvicultural Rule exempts

logging-road ditches from NPDES permitting

requirements; any challenge to the Rule is

jurisdictionally barred; and, in any event, the EPA is

entitled to deference. See JA Vol. I at 27 (“This rule

21

categorically defines stormwater runoff from forest

roads and harvesting activities as nonpoint

sources.”); JA Vol. I at 28 (“NEDC, having not

challenged the silvicultural rule within the time

frame provided by the statute, cannot now challenge

the rule some thirty years later.”) (discussing

33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)); JA Vol. I at 29 (“Should this

Court nevertheless consider NEDC’s improper and

untimely challenge, this Court should defer to EPA’s

reasonable interpretation of the CWA to not require

regulation of stormwater runoff from forest roads as

point sources.”).

Only in its 2011 Ninth Circuit brief in response to

the panel’s questions did the government perform its

pirouette. In that brief, not only did the United

States newly seek to concede all jurisdictional

objections, it also dropped any argument that the

Silvicultural Rule’s text is plain. Instead, the

government solely argued that the rule is ambiguous

but that the Ninth Circuit should have deferred to

the EPA’s interpretation of it. See JA Vol. I at 53

(“Where EPA promulgates an ambiguous regulation

and (as here) subsequently offers an interpretation of

that regulation in an amicus brief,’ that

interpretation is entitled to a high level of deference

under Auer ....”). The government repeated this

newly minted position in its certiorari briefing. See,

e.g., CVSG Br. at 12.

This Court has recognized that agencies face

perverse incentives propelling them toward crafting

ambiguous rules when they are asked—as they are

every day—to implement statutes through

regulations. See Smithkline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at

2168 (“Our practice of deferring to an agency’s

22

interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations

undoubtedly has important advantages, but this

practice also creates a risk that agencies will

promulgate vague and open-ended regulations that

they can later interpret as they see fit, thereby

‘frustrat[ing] the notice and predictability purposes

of rulemaking.”’) (quoting Talk Am., Inc. v. Michigan

Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J.,

concurring)).

This case illustrates a related danger. Even

where a regulation itself is not ambiguous, an agency

might well strain to manufacture a false, post hoc

ambiguity and thereby create administrative

flexibility that allows the agency to dispense with

notice and comment before effecting regulatory

changes. We see here just such a tidy morality play.

In the proceedings below, the EPA first nobly

resisted and then meanly succumbed to the

omnipresent temptation to claim _ regulatory

ambiguity and the additional degrees of interpretive

freedom that accompany it. The Court should see

the agency’s course of action for what it is—and

respond by ensuring that such efforts to manufacture

artificial ambiguity are not rewarded.

C. The Ninth Circuit’s “Interpretation” Of

The Silvicultural Rule In Fact Invalidates

The Rule.

As this Court unanimously recognized in Duke

Energy, a party cannot “attack ... the validity of [a]

regulation ... in an enforcement proceeding.” 549

U.S. at 572. Duke Energy remanded the Fourth

Circuit decision then under consideration, because

that decision could “only be seen as an implicit

declaration that the PSD regulations were invalid as

23

written.” Jd. at 573. While “no precise line runs

between a purposeful but permissible reading of the

regulation adopted to bring it into harmony with the

[enforcing court’s] view of the statute, and a

determination that the regulation as written is

invalid,” there are cases, such as Duke Energy, where

the only way to describe what the court has done is

invalidation. Id.

A careful review of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion

below confirms that here, as in Duke Energy, the

Court of Appeals outright invalidated the agency

rule at issue. To be sure, the Ninth Circuit

attempted to walk an interpretive tightrope by

drawing a fine distinction between direct runoff from

logging roads—which concededly does not constitute

a point source—and logging-road runoff “channeled

and controlled through a ‘discernible, confined and

discrete conveyance’ in a system of ditches, culverts,

and channels.” Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 640 F.3d at

1079. According to the Ninth Circuit, “challenged

and controlled” runoff, in contrast to direct runoff,

does constitute a point source. See id. But this

proffered distinction, aside from its novelty, runs

headlong into the Silvicultural Rule’s text. It results

in a rule that means something fundamentally

different from what the Rule plainly says.

The ultimate, and acknowledged, rationale for the

Ninth Circuit’s reading of the Rule was the court’s

belief that the Clean Water Act mandates the

tenuous distinction it found itself attempting to

draw. To its credit, the Ninth Circuit forthrightly

acknowledged that its “interpretation” of the Rule

“does not reflect the intent of EPA.” The Ninth

Circuit nonetheless adopted this “interpretation” out

24

of a belief that EPA’s regulation, as written, was an

invalid application of the statute. See, e.g., id. at

1080 (“{[T}here are two possible readings of the

Silvicultural Rule. The first reading reflects the

intent of EPA in adopting the Rule. Under this

reading, the Rule exempts all natural runoff from

silvicultural activities ... irrespective of whether, and

the manner in which, the runoff is_ collected,

channeled, and discharged into protected water. If

the Rule is read in this fashion, it is inconsistent

with § 502(14) and is, to that extent, invalid. The

second reading does not reflect the intent of EPA, but

would allow us to construe the Rule to be consistent

with the statute.”) (emphasis added).

Remarkably, the Ninth Circuit also acknowledged

that its judgment would require the EPA—not even

a direct party to the case—to act affirmatively to

create a new NPDES “permitting process” for

silvicultural activities. According to the Ninth

Circuit:

Until now, EPA has acted on the

assumption that NPDES permits are not

required for discharges of pollutants from

ditches, culverts, and channels that collect

stormwater runoff from logging roads.

EPA has therefore not had occasion to

establish a permitting process for such

discharges. But we are confident, given

the closely analogous NPDES permitting

process for stormwater runoff from other

kinds of roads, that EPA will be able to do

so effectively and relatively expeditiously.

Id. at 1087.

25

While becoming in its own way, the Ninth

Circuit’s candor is fatal to the viability of its decision.

A decision premised on the rejection of “the intent of

EPA” and requiring the creation of a brand new EPA

“permitting process” can hardly be said to be

enforcing—as opposed to invalidating—a preexisting

EPA regime that lacks such a process.

There is at the end of the day no way to read the

Ninth Circuit's decision other than as invalidating

the Silvicultural Rule. The judgment below is

therefore ultra vires and should be vacated. See

Duke Energy, 549 U.S. at 573; 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1369(b)(1)-(b)(2).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

Court of Appeals should be vacated and the case

remanded with instructions to dismiss for want of

subject matter jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBIN S. CONRAD ROBERT R. GASAWAY*

RACHEL L. BRAND Counsel of Record

SHELDON GILBERT JEFFREY BOSSERT CLARK

NATIONAL CHAMBER ADITYA BAMZAI

LITIGATION CENTER, INC. AARON L. NIELSON

1615 H Street, NW KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP

Washington, DC 20062 655 Fifteenth St., N.W.

(202) 463-5337 Washington, DC 20005

(202) 879-5000

rgasaway@kirkland.com

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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