Opposition Brief — Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center

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RECORD

AND

BRIEFS

Nos. 11-338 and 11-347

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

DOUG DECKER, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE CENTER,

Respondent.

GEORGIA-PACIFIC WEST, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

We

NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE CENTER,

Respondent.

On Petitions for Writs of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

CHRISTOPHER G. WINTER PAUL A. KAMPMEIER

CRAG LAW CENTER Counsel of Record

917 S.W. Oak Street WASH. FOREST LAW CTR.

Suite 417 615 Second Ave., Ste. 360

Portland, OR 97205 Seattle, WA 98104

(503) 525-2725 (206) 223-4088

pkampmeier@wiflc.org

SCOTT L. NELSON

PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION GROUP

1600 20th Street NW

Washington, DC 20009

(202) 588-1000

Attorneys for Respondent

Date: November 2011

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Clean Water Act defines “point source” to

mean “any discernible, confined and discrete convey-

ance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch [or]

channel ... from which pollutants are or may be dis-

charged.” 33 U.SC. § 1362(14). The U.S. Environmen-

tal Protection Agency’s stormwater regulation re-

quires National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys-

tem permits for point-source stormwater discharges

associated with the logging industry. 40 C.F.R.

§ 122.26(b)(14)(ii). And the agency’s “silvicultural

rule,” 40 C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(1), does not, on its face,

exclude any point sources of pollution associated with

logging from the Clean Water Act’s permit require-

ment. With these provisions in mind, respondent

Northwest Environmental Defense Center brought a

Clean Water Act citizen suit alleging that the peti-

tioners were in violation of the Act by discharging pol-

luted stormwater from pipes, ditches and channels

along active logging roads without the required per-

mits. The question presented is:

Did the court of appeals err by reversing the dis-

trict court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of respondent’s

complaint?

il

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Respondent Northwest Environmental Defense

Center has no parent corporations and no publicly

held company has any ownership interest in it.

QUESTION PRESENTED

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

I.

IV.

V.

1.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

This CWA citizen enforcement action

The NPDES permit program controls

“discharges of pollutants.” ..................

. EPA’s Phase I stormwater regulation

requires NPDES permits for storm-

water discharges associated with the

iia sninsisdsealecniinciinieinnen

The silvicultural rule.........................+.

The proceedings below ........................

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The court of appeals’ decision does

not conflict with decisions of other

circuits or of this Court .......................

A. No other court has addressed

whether the Phase I regulation

requires NPDES permits for

point-source discharges along

senmnaneons 5

iv

B. There is no conflict with cases

decided under section 509(b) of

the Act because NEDC did not

challenge, and the court of

appeals did not invalidate, any ac-

tion of the EPA administrator................ 19

C. The court of appeals’ methodology

for interpreting administrative

rules is consistent with this

I cciccctiticindeindsenencamnscsmins 26

D. The court of appeals’ decision

does not conflict with this Court’s

precedents affording deference to

agency statutory interpretations............ 31

Il. The court of appeals’ decision does not

present a quesiion of great practical

ITT snicacticondiseinsndalnctietionsiiaesitanihiensiiinmendinioins 34

IIIT bsscsiennsesiveecncaninisinsiteinindiceiniapintiaiateimipatinnsiannicie 37

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases:

Ass’n to Protect Hammersley, Eld, & Totten

Inlets v. Taylor Resources, 299 F.3d 1007

es SE inicniistraiucisniadiuitaidiiaiiatiieleiunbintitdaininnneiensal 19

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).................. 26, 31

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Defense

Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)... 26, 31, 32

Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576

STITT ichmoeinccetinessigemiadechih dalle neal 30

Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Con-

servation Council, 129 S. Ct.. 2458 (2009)........... 30

Conservation Law Foundation v. Hannaford

Bros. Co., 327 F. Supp. 2d 325 (D. Vt.

ST shsisiiieeiteibcentuhaensihdaeoahecuseasiabalibinaiaaehdelibbaaiaciprasiiiaaniat 18

Driscoll v. Adams, 181 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir.

Siti asitcuiciossesecduehinitshcecieahiadscmiasitiasibiabaiadabiinaddaneatinadaisaaiiiidieadnibat 16

Envtl. Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S.

i siiitihccteecsietincenisnidutteittnittneaplaminaiianinedinanbiaidioens passim

Envtl. Defense Center v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832

I TIT ennituisinhiiadaduniatntieniddelinhaddabinatbadenbedies 18

Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pacific Lumber Co.,

2003 WL 25506817 (N.D. Cal. 2003).................... 16

EPA v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S.

i ciniiiiicentdninsatiiasinsiiichieiaiialabibiabiadaliadinsintiiaidias 3, 35

Fishermen Against the Destruction of the En-

vironment v. Closter Farms, 300 F.3d 1294

Ss HI a siciiisicerpctencncscieiaiinincniniansesiniideiaiioniupstii 19

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.

BerUs.. GHB UTD. BOT CBG cccccnccccccecccsccccescccscese 3, 20

Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984)..................... 20

League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren,

309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002)............. 16, 24, 30, 36

Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d

a TS CIID ieisntcnccencbenstndiiaiantiniiinsmans 6, 36

Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 966 F.2d

Be NE INS. BI scocntcciniatstinecinnbensdiainnnenmningnncee 14

Newton County Wildlife Ass’n v. Rogers, 141

F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1998)...........-.cssccccccseresesssess 16, 17

North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v.

Holly Ridge Associates, 278 F. Supp. 2d

iy I it siicnrectechieninateniuidinmiaunvinmigtonss 16

Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. Gutierrez, U.S.

District Court for the District of Oregon,

5, ___,_ ne en 35

San Francisco Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Div.,

481 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2007)...............ccssssssssssrseeeees 4

S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe

of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004)................:c0 5, 6, 7

TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001)................ 33

U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp., 2010 WL 3023517

TE casiiteiiiniitsneasiisniienanicmmsiinainaniauadaiednitineienpesiee 22

U.S. v. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d 368 (10th

Ss: SUE icnenioseiindiasiasddiaisieannabieeanitiinqnndnaatiabedmiitenpeiagetiide 7

Statutes:

RINT TIIITTIIT nn chhiesc indecent peaidlalteiainniidlipesnanbiadinebindanibieiian 16

Be es OF SEE scerpnitvinenininnenccomanicninnpemdusianenbinniette 35

ON AA ROLLE AN LED 5

OTE I oii ceeccnencirexssntentdentansesnss 33

33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F) ...sccssescecsccscsscssssessecsseessencenes 33

CL nT ere eee 5, 35

$B U.S.C. § 1STA(AMA) ......-.cceccoccocssoscovsceccescnscesecsnceee: 33

a ee 35

I is ssccciesssrnieconsinanasionacosdtnorceenecs 5

83 U.S.C. § 1342(p).....cesccecccessecccessssescecssoscsecsaseeosee 7, 23

33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B) o.ccecececeessesseeeeeee 7, 14, 32, 33

33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(4)(A) ....sesssessessseessesseesseesee 7, 14, 33

BB U.S.C. § 1842(p)(5) «.......ceccescoesceecosssecssesceccvecceconeenss 7

BB U.S.C. § 1842(p)(6) «.....-..ceccesscescosscsecsescessnecceseceseesen 7

ee 6

B83 U.S.C. § 1844(P)(1)(A)....ccescescesscesccecsecccsccecssecsscosee: 33

se 6

th i 5

33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)........cecceccocscescosecoecnseees 6, 23, 31, 32

Sa rs 4

OEM, BEI aici sci cssceesctrrcerneene 3

AEN LE EEO EE 20

SB UBC. © UOTE sec cseeceevccesvcscocsovccvecescesceseonce. 12

SIG, 6 GI oooicsiisiessieeenes 14, 15, 19, 20, 21

SB UG.C. § 1SODDNA) 8c ascceesccccesccnccsscccsscnvssenvee 20, 26

33 U.S.C. $ 1369 (Io)(2) «........ccscccscescccscoescsecescessvees passim

ee Pith tcsastsnenesisninivninicnientineoiunin 21, 22

Oregon Revised Statutes Ch. 468B........................004. 34

Oregon Revised Statutes Ch. 527 .............cccecececee eee 34

Regulations:

| RIN ry nr ene aN eee e Pere rE 7, 8, 10

Ss ERE reertner ene nee ena ne epronme 17

se isciieirinstcaisncatcesinsctrsdiacsteseieicbecciteinnoviilinateia 1,7

es Se scncrenscercccicntonciiccsstnesevetenyein 5

SF ae BOD ccc cccnentensccresenintervemenenmnsieie 34

es I oii cc ccinisiiunniinnsisniiniipintieneemloninbbs 8

OD cerecesnnicscttieniscccescssnnntinns passim

40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(ii)............eeeeeeees 9, 28, 34, 37

SG ae OB I vin ccvvccccntsrciececssncsesetsenesiese 9

et FS | _. en EEEN 9

Sr cate © ID on cnesntaiscsecncssececensenssenrscovnns 9

er ai OF I I cccccccesicnenecseeninccsnseemensensectnens 5

ee Oe iniienscesincenisnicessalinninmmeniaiaiiie

40 C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(1)

Oregon Admin. Rules Ch. 340-041 ...........0... eee 34

Oregon Admin. Rules Ch. 340-042 ........0... ee 34

Oregon Admin. Rules Ch. 340-045 ..................cccceeee 34

Other:

44 Fed. Reg. 32854 (June 7, 1979).............ceceeeeeeeeeeees 11

45 Fed. Reg. 33290 (May 19, 1980)..............0.0.... 10, 12

55 Fed. Reg. 47990 (Nov. 16, 1990)......... 7, 8, 9, 29, 30

64 Fed. Reg. 68722 (Dec. 8, 1999)...............ccesseseeeseesens 7

ERT Comnm. Bee. SB, FTOB-GD (B71) nccccccscscccecessccccsscecesscose

INTRODUCTION

In this Clean Water Act citizen suit, the court of

appeals correctly held that a complaint filed by re-

spondent Northwest Environmental Defense Center

(NEDC) stated a claim for relief by alleging that the

petitioners must comply with a stormwater regulation

of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),

40 C.F.R. § 122.26, which requires National Pollutant

Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits for

point-source stormwater discharges associated with

the logging industry. The court further held that an-

other regulation, 40 C.F.R. § 122.27, does not exclude

point-source discharges along active logging roads

from EPA’s stormwater regulation or otherwise rede-

fine those discharges as nonpoint-source pollution

that is exempt from the NPDES permit requirement.

The court of appeals’ decision does not merit re-

view because it does not conflict with decisions of any

other court of appeals. No other decision has ad-

dressed whether 40 C.F.R. § 122.26 requires NPDES

permits for point-source stormwater discharges along

logging roads. Nor does the lower court’s interpreta-

tion of the NPDES regulations, or the Clean Water

Act (CWA or Act) provisions that they implement,

conflict in principle with decisions of this Court or an-

other court of appeals. The court’s resolution of these

narrow regulatory issues, in a non-final ruling that

sustains a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) and that

does not determine what relief, if any, respondent

may ultimately receive, does not merit review by this

Court.

2

The petitioners’ attempts to identify some aspect

of the court of appeals’ decision that requires further

review are without merit.’ Pursuing an argument that

the United States (as amicus) initially advanced but

then conceded was incorrect, the petitioners claim that

the court effectively invalidated EPA rules during a

civil enforcement proceeding in violation of section

509(b)(2) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2). But

NEDC did not challenge, and the court of appeals did

not strike down, any rule. Nor did the court effective-

ly invalidate a rule by construing it in a way that con-

flicts with its text. Rather, in rejecting the petitioners’

claimed regulatory defenses, the court relied on “a

purposeful but permissible reading of the regulation

adopted to bring it into harmony with the Court of

Appeals’s view of the statute.” Envtl. Defense v. Duke

Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 573 (2007). The court of

appeals did not grant NEDC relief that is barred by

section 509(b)(2).

Nor did the court err by declining to defer to the

claim that the rules do not require permits for storm-

water discharges from pipes, ditches and channels

along logging roads. The petitioners do not dispute

that the roads are used for hauling timber or that

they discharge stormwater from pipes, ditches and

channels. They nonetheless seek an interpretation of

the rules that: ignores EPA’s decision to include “log-

ging” on the list of industries subject to the storm-

water rule; treats pipes, ditches and channels—

' The petitioners in No. 11-338 are referred to as “the State”

and the petitioners in No. 11-347 are referred to as “Georgia-

Pacific” (collectively, “the petitioners”).

3

statutory “point sources”—as “nonpoint sources” that

are excluded from the NPDES permit program; and

deems stormwater discharged from elaborately engi-

neered stormwater collection systems to be “natural

runoff.” The court of appeals correctly refused to ac-

cept that interpretation.

Nearly forty years ago, Congress created the

NPDES permit program precisely because state water

pollution control programs were not adequately pro-

tecting the Nation’s waters. EPA v. State Water Res.

Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202-205 (1976); 117 Cong.

Rec. 38,798-99 (1971). The petitioners ignore this

fundamental purpose of the NPDES permit program

in asking this Court to grant review so that Oregon

may continue treating stormwater discharges from

pipes, ditches and channels as nonpoint-source pollu-

tion. Where, as here, active logging roads discharge

pollution from pipes, ditches and channels, Congress

prohibited those discharges unless they are in compli-

ance with an NPDES permit. The court of appeals’

decision implements Congressional intent; it does not

thwart it.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. This CWA citizen enforcement action.

To enhance enforcement of the CWA, section

505(a)(1) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 13865(a)(1), authorizes

adversely affected citizens to bring suit against any

person “who is alleged to be in violation” of an “efflu-

ent standard or limitation” or a related federal or

state order. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw En-

vtl. Seruvs., 528 U.S. 167, 174 (2000). “The purpose of

4

the citizen suit provision of the CWA, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365, is to permit citizens to enforce the Clean Wa-

ter Act when the responsible agencies fail or refuse to

do so.” San Francisco Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Div.,

481 F.3d 700, 706 (9th Cir. 2007).

Seeking to enforce EPA regulations, NEDC

brought this citizen suit against the petitioners be-

cause they failed to apply for and obtain NPDES per-

mits for stormwater discharges from pipes, ditches

and channels along logging roads used to haul timber

out of the Tillamook State Forest in northwest Ore-

gon. ER 07 (NEDC’s First Amended Complaint) at 2-

4.* The State of Oregon owns the Tillamook State

Forest and manages it as a working forest to produce

revenue from the harvest and sale of timber. Jd. at 3,

6-7, 18-20. All of the defendants participate in the log-

ging operations that take place. Jd. The members of

the Oregon Board of Forestry set policy for the Ore-

gon Department of Forestry, the agency that manages

logging activities and logging roads in the Tillamook

State Forest. Jd. at 6-7. Mr. Decker, the Oregon State

Forester, supervises the Department and administers

its timber sale and state forests programs. Jd. The

four timber companies purchase timber from the

state; harvest timber in the Tillamook State Forest;

haul timber on logging roads that are specifically des-

ignated in timber sale contracts as timber hauling

routes; and maintain those roads to facilitate the log-

ging activities that take place. Id. at 7-8, 19-20.

* ER refers to the Appellant’s Excerpts of Record on file with

the court of appeals. They are cited as “ER [document number]

at [excerpts of record page number].”

The logging roads at issue collect, channel and dis-

charge polluted stormwater to rivers and streams. Id.

at 2, 17-18, 31-35. The roads were intentionally de-

signed and built to move stormwater that falls on

them into roadside ditches, which then convey storm-

water through pipes, ditches and channels before dis-

charging it directly into surface waters. Jd. Water

quality sampling confirmed that the stormwater is

heavily polluted with sediment generated by heavy

logging trucks that grind up gravel and other surface

materials placed on the roads to facilitate industrial

activity—logging and timber hauling. Jd. at 3-4, 33,

35. NEDC alleged that these “discharges of storm-

water associated with industrial activity” require

NPDES permits. Id. at 3, 20-24, 31; and see 40 C.F.R.

§ 122.26(a)(1)(ii) and (e)(1)(i).

Il. The NPDES permit program controls

“discharges of pollutants.”

Congress enacted the CWA to “restore and main-

tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of

the Nation’s waters” and to eliminate discharges of

pollutants to navigable waters by 1985. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1251(a). The Act’s centerpieces are sections 301(a)

and 402(a), which prohibit the “discharge of any pol-

lutant” unless it is authorized by an NPDES permit.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a); S. Fla. Water Mgmt.

Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 102

(2004).

The Act expansively defines “discharge of a pollu-

tant” in part as “any addition of any pollutant to nav-

igable waters from any point source.” 33 U.S.C.

6

§ 1362(12)(A) (emphases added). The Act also broadly

defines “point source” as

any discernible, confined and discrete convey-

ance, including but not limited to any pipe,

ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete

fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated

‘animal feeding operation, or vessel or other

floating craft, from which pollutants are or may

be discharged. This term does not include agri-

cultural stormwater discharges and return

flows from irrigated agriculture.

33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (emphases added); Miccosukee,

541 U.S. at 105.

These statutory prohibitions apply to discharges

associated with logging. Congress expressly exempted

some stormwater discharges associated with mining

and oil and gas exploration. 33 U.S.C. § 1342()).

Through statutory definitions, Congress also excluded

certain “point sources,” including “agricultural

stormwater discharges,” and certain “pollutants.” 33

U.S.C. § 1362(6) & (14). But Congress did not adopt

any NPDES permit exemption for the logging indus-

try. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d

1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (striking down an NPDES per-

mit exemption for point-source stormwater discharges

associated with silvicultural activities).

Sections 301(a) and 402(a) thus codify the central

principle of the Act: pollutant discharges from “point

sources” require NPDES permits, while pollution

from something other than a point source—generally

referred to as a nonpoint source—does not. Notably, a

7

single activity can generate both point and nonpoint

source pollution. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 106; U.S. v.

Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d 368, 372-73 (10th Cir. 1979).

Ill, EPA’s Phase I stormwater regulation re-

quires NPDES permits for stormwater

discharges associated with the logging

industry.

Since its adoption in 1972, the CWA has also pro-

hibited point-source discharges of polluted storm-

water that are not authorized by an NPDES permit.

EPA regulations have long defined the term “dis-

charge of a pollutant” to include “additions of pollu-

tants into waters of the United States from: surface

runoff which is collected or channelled by man.” 40

C.F.R. § 122.2 (emphasis added).

Dissatisfied with the pace of stormwater permit-

ting, however, Congress enacted section 402(p) of the

Act in 1987 to better control] discharges of polluted

stormwater. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p). For stormwater dis-

charges “associated with industrial activity,” sections

402(p)(2)(B) & (4)(A) required EPA to issue storm-

water regulations by 1989 and required EPA and the

states to process NPDES permit applications by 1991.

Section 402(p)(5)-(6) then required EPA to study oth-

er stormwater discharges and decide whether and how

to regulate them. EPA implemented section 402(p) by

issuing stormwater regulations in 1990 (Phase I), 55

Fed. Reg. 47990 (Nov. 16, 1990), and 1999 (Phase II),

64 Fed. Reg. 68722 (Dec. 8, 1999). Those regulations

are codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122.26.

8

Like the definition of “discharge of a pollutant” in

40 C.F.R. § 122.2, EPA’s Phase I regulation treats

stormwater that is collected and channeled by man as

a point-source discharge requiring an NPDES permit.

The regulations define the term “storm water”

(standing alone) to mean “storm water runoff, snow

melt runoff, and surface runoff and drainage.” 40

C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(13). But the rules require a permit

for a “{s)torm water discharge associated with indus-

trial activity,” which means in part “the discharge

from any conveyance that is used for collecting and

conveying storm water....” 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)

(emphases added). This language clarifies that the

Phase I regulation requires permits only for point-

source discharges of industrial stormwater. See also

55 Fed. Reg. at 47996 (“this rulemaking only covers

storm water discharges from point sources”). Uncol-

lected stormwater is thus nonpoint-source runoff,

while stormwater that is collected and conveyed be-

fore being added to waters of the United States is a

point-source discharge that requires an NPDES per-

mit.

In the Phase I rule, EPA identified the industrial

activities required to obtain NPDES permits for their

point-source stormwater discharges by naming indus-

tries and listing Standard Industrial Classification

(SIC) codes. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(i) - (xi). Be-

fore listing the industries and SIC codes, the regula-

tion states: “The following categories of facilities are

considered to be engaging in ‘industrial activity’ for

purposes of paragraph (b)(14)....” See id.

§ 122.26(b)(14) and 55 Fed. Reg. at 48011 (“EPA in-

tends that the list of applicable SICs will define and

9

identify what industrial facilities are required to ap-

ply.”)

The Phase I rule includes “Logging” on the list of

regulated industries. In 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(ii),

EPA required permits for facilities classified as SIC

24, which is entitled “Lumber and Wood Products,

Except Furniture.” ER 47 at 93. One of the sub-

categories of SIC 24 is SIC 2411, “Logging,” which in-

cludes “[e]stablishments primarily engaged in cutting

timber and in producing ... primary forest or wood

raw materials ... in the field.” Jd.

The rule also requires NPDES permits for many

other industrial activities that do not occur at tradi-

tional industrial opplants. See 40 #£C.F.R.

§ 122.26(b)(14)(iii) (inactive mines), (v) (landfills and

open dumps), (x) (construction). EPA clearly regulat-

ed discharges from “manufacturing, processing or raw

materials storage areas at an industrial plant,” id.

§ 122.26(b)(14), but EPA also stated that it was “sup-

plementing” that language “with a description of var-

ious types of areas that are directly related to an in-

dustrial process.” 55 Fed. Reg. at 48007.

In addition to listing the industries subject to the

rule, the Phase I regulation explains which storm-

water discharges are “associated with” the regulated

industries:

For the categories of industries identified in this

section, the term [stormwater discharge associ-

ated with industrial activity] includes, but is not

limited to, storm water discharges from indus-

trial plant yards; immediate access roads and

10

rail lines used or traveled by carriers of raw ma-

terials, manufactured products, waste material,

or by-products used or created by the facility;

[and] material handling sites ....

40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (emphasis added). EPA’s

rules define “site” to include “the land or water area

where any ‘facility or activity’ is physically located or

conducted...,” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, and define “material

handling activities” to include the “storage, loading

and unloading, transportation, or conveyance of any

raw material,” 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14). “Material

handling sites” thus refers to locations used for trans-

porting or conveying any raw material.

IV. The silvicultural rule.

In addition to regulating the logging industry, the

Phase I regulation incorporates by reference the gen-

eral NPDES permit regulations. Jd. (“The term

[storm water discharge associated with industrial ac-

tivity] does not include discharges from facilities or

activities excluded from the NPDES program under

this part 122.”). The Part 122 regulations include 40

C.F.R. § 122.27, which was promulgated in 1980 and

addresses silvicultural activities. 45 Fed. Reg. 33290,

33446-33447 (May 19, 1980). The subsection of the

rule at issue in this case states:

Silvicultural point source means any discerni-

ble, confined and discrete conveyance related to

rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, or

log storage facilities which are operated in con-

nection with silvicultural activities and from

which pollutants are discharged into waters of

1]

the United States. The term does not include

non-point source silvicultural activities such as

nursery operations, site preparation, reforesta-

tion and subsequent cultural treatment, thin-

ning, prescribed burning, pest and fire control,

harvesting operations, surface drainage, or road

construction and maintenance from which there

is natural runoff. However, some of these activi-

ties (such as stream crossing for roads) may in-

volve point source discharges of dredged or fill

material which may require a CWA section 404

permit (See 33 C.F.R. 209.120 and part 233).

40 C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(1) (the silvicultural rule).

As its text demonstrates, the silvicultural rule pro-

vides a definition of the term “silvicultural point

source”; clarifies that nonpoint-source activities that

generate “natural runoff” are excluded from that

term; and notes that some activities that generate

nonpoint-source pollution may also generate point-

source pollution that requires a CWA permit.

When EPA promulgated the current version of the

rule in 1980, one could not have known that it might

be construed to exclude point-source discharges from

the NPDES program. The text of the prior, 1979 ver-

sion of the rule only addressed nonpoint source silvi-

cultural activities in a comment and did not use the

phrase “natural runoff.” See 44 Fed. Reg. 32854,

32914-15 (June 7, 1979). The text of the 1980 rule,

however, included new regulatory language stating

that the term “silvicultural point source” did not in-

clude “nonpoint source silvicultural activities” from

which there is “natural runoff.” See 45 Fed. Reg. at

12

33446-33447. Moreover, the 1980 rule did not explain

the meaning of “natural runoff” either in the rule it-

self or in its preamble.

V. The proceedings below.

After NEDC filed suit, the petitioners moved to

dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(6), contending that

NEDC had failed to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted. State Pet. App. 56. The petitioners

argued that the Phase I rule incorporated the silvicul-

tural rule by reference, and that the silvicultural rule

redefined their pipes, ditches and channels as non-

point sources that do not require NPDES permits. Jd.

at 65-67. According to the petitioners, the second sen-

tence of the silvicultural rule—which addresses natu-

ral runoff from nonpoint source silvicultural activi-

ties—categorically defines all pollution from the listed

activities as nonpoint-source pollution. Jd. at 66. The

United States, which did not exercise its right to in-

tervene, see 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2), submitted an ami-

cus brief in support of the petitioners. The district

court dismissed NEDC’s complaint, finding that it had

jurisdiction over the case but that the silvicultural

rule redefined “the road/ditch/culvert system” as a

nonpoint source of pollution. State Pet. App. 62, 70,

72, 76.

On appeal, the court of appeals focused on the

merits because alli the petitioners acknowledged that

the court had jurisdiction. See State Appellee’s Br. at

1; Industry Appellee’s Br. at 1. The court of appeals

concluded that stormwater that is collected by and

discharged from a system of ditches, culverts, and

channels along logging roads is a point-source dis-

13

charge requiring an NPDES permit. State Pet. App.

52. The court therefore reversed the judgment of the

district court and remanded the case for further pro-

ceedings. Id.

Specifically, after determining that the silvicultur-

al rule was ambiguous, the court declined to construe

the rule as an NPDES permit exemption for discharg-

es from pipes, ditches and channels because, as the

court stated, “[i]f the Rule is read in this fashion, it is

inconsistent with § 502(14) [33 U.S.C. § 1362(14), the

statutory definition of “point source”) and is, to that

extent, invalid.” State Pet. App. 36-37. Instead, and

consistent with the statute and the silvicultural rule’s

own language, the court construed the rule as exempt-

ing only “natural runoff” from nonpoint sources. Id.

at 37. The court concluded that “the exemption ceases

to exist as soon as the natural runoff is channeled and

controlled in some systematic way through a ‘discern-

ible, confined and discrete conveyance’ and discharged

into the waters of the United States.” Jd.

The court then considered the 1987 amendments

to the CWA and EPA’s Phase I regulation. The court

recognized that by incorporating the silvicultural rule

into the Phase I rule EPA intended “to exempt from

the definition of ‘discharges associated with industrial

activity’ any activity that is defined as a nonpoint

source in the Silvicultural Rule.” Jd. at 43 (emphasis

added). However, for two reasons, the court refused to

import into the Phase I rule a construction of the sil-

vicultural rule that exempted point-source discharges.

First, because the Act requires NPDES permits for

“stormwater discharges associated with industrial ac-

14

tivity,” and because EPA clearly designated “logging”

as an industrial activity, that construction would

bring the regulation into conflict with the statute by

exempting some “stormwater discharges associated

with industrial activity” from the NPDES permit re-

quirement. Jd. at 44 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B)

and (4)(A) and Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 966

F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1992)) and 47-48. Second, it fol-

lowed from the court’s construction of the silvicultur-

al rule that the “reference to the Silvicultural Rule in

40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) does not ... exempt [point-

source] discharges from EPA’s Phase I regulations....”

Id. at 47-48 (emphasis added). The court therefore

held that neither the silvicultural rule nor the 1987

amendments to the CWA exempt from the NPDES

permit requirement any stormwater that is collected

and channeled in ditches, channels and conduits along

logging roads before being discharged into rivers and

streams. Id.

The petitioners sought rehearing and rehearing en

banc on non-jurisdictional grounds. The court of ap-

peals, at the request of a judge not on the original

panel, directed the parties to submit supplemental

briefs addressing the United States’ contention, as

amicus curiae, that NEDC’s appeal was a challenge to

the silvicultural rule that was barred by CWA section

509(b)(2), which prohibits review of certain EPA or-

ders during enforcement actions. Jd. at 8. In their re-

ply in support of the petitions for rehearing, and for

the first time since NEDC filed suit in 2006, the peti-

tioners then argued that section 509(b) barred the

court from hearing the case. The United States, how-

ever, submitted a second amicus brief conceding that

15

section 509(b) did not bar the court from construing

the regulations as the panel had done. Id. at 8.

The panel voted unanimously to deny rehearing,

and not a single judge requested a vote on whether to

hear the case en banc. Id. at 4. Accordingly, the court

issued a revised opinion that held that section

509(b)(2) did not bar NEDC from contesting the regu-

latory interpretations offered by the United States in

its amicus brief and that reiterated the court’s hold-

ing that EPA’s rules require NPDES permits for

stormwater discharges from pipes, ditches and chan-

nels along logging roads used for hauling timber.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. The court of appeals’ decision does not

conflict with decisions of other circuits or

of this Court.

A. No other court has addressed whether

the Phase I regulation requires

NPDES permits for point-source dis-

charges along logging roads.

1. Georgia-Pacific incorrectly claims that the

court of appeals’ construction of the Phase I and silvi-

cultural rules conflicts with decisions of other courts

of appeals. GP at 25-28. Yet Georgia-Pacific has not

identified any case holding that the Phase I regulation

exempts industrial logging activities from the NPDES

permit requirement. Nor can they: the decision below

is the first appellate opinion to address whether 40

C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) requires NPDES permits for

stormwater discharges from pipes and ditches along

16

active logging roads. No conflict could possibly result

from its holding.

Nor have the courts issued conflicting interpreta-

tions of the silvicultural rule. See League of Wilder-

ness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding that 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 is not an

NPDES exemption for point-source pesticide dis-

charges associated with forestlands); North Carolina

Shellfish Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Associates, 278

F. Supp. 2d 654 (E.D.N.C. 2003) (holding that 40

C.F.R. § 122.27 is not an NPDES permit exemption

for stormwater drainage ditches associated with for-

estlands); Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pacific Lumber Co.,

2003 WL 25506817 (N.D. Cal.) (holding that 40 C.F.R.

§ 122.27 does not exempt stormwater drainage ditches

associated with forestlands from the NPDES permit

requirement); and see also Driscoll v. Adams, 181

F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that discharges of

collected and channeled stormwater associated with

timber harvest were subject to NPDES permit re-

quirements). There is no final decision that considers

the silvicultural rule and holds that it exempts point-

source discharges associated with timber hauling from

the NPDES permit requirement.

2. Georgia-Pacific’s reliance on Newton County

Wildlife Association v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803 (8th Cir.

1998), is misplaced because that case did not address

the regulation of logging roads under the Phase I rule.

Newton County considered whether the Forest Ser-

vice’s failure to obtain NPDES permits for logging

and road construction activities rendered its approval

of timber sales unlawful under the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). The court found no

17

violation because EPA regulations require operators

to obtain the permits and because the plaintiff cited

no authority requiring the Forest Service to obtain

permits “before contracting to allow others to harvest

timber and build roads.” Newton County, 141 F.3d at

810 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(b)). The court then

added a single sentence stating that EPA regulations

do not require NPDES permits for “logging and road

building activities.” Id. (citing, inter alia, the silvicul-

tural rule).

Newton County’s passing mention of the silvicul-

tural rule does not justify review of the court of ap-

peals’ unanimous holding in this case. First, the

court’s statement about NPDES permits for “logging

and road building” was dicta unnecessary to its hold-

ing that the Forest Service did not violate the APA by

approving a timber sale without obtaining an NPDES

permit. Second, the Eighth Circuit’s passing comment

did not cite, much less consider, the Phase I regula-

tion, nor did it analyze the terms or scope of the silvi-

cultural rule. Indeed, Newton County did not in any

way address the issue here, which is not whether

“logging and road building activities” by themselves

require NPDES permits, but whether discharges from

point sources—that is, pipes, ditches and channels—

along timber hauling routes require NPDES permits.

As to whether the silvicultural rule excludes point

sources, every court that has examined the rule has

determined that it does not. There is no conflict be-

tween the unanimous court of appeals’ decision and

Newton County.

3. The court of appeals’ decision also does not

conflict with the district court’s decision in Conserva-

18

tion Law Foundation v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 327 F.

Supp. 2d 325 (D. Vt. 2004), which the Second Circuit

affirmed in an unpublished order, 139 F. App’x 3381

(2005). In Conservation Law Foundation, 327 F. Supp.

2d at 330-32, the district court held that stormwater

discharges only require NPDES permits if they are

from activities listed in EPA’s stormwater rules.

Georgia-Pacific now claims that the decision below

conflicts with Conservation Law Foundation by re-

quiring NPDES permits for stormwater discharges

not listed in EPA’s stormwater rules. GP at 26-27.

The fatal flaw in Georgia-Pacific’s argument is

that the court of appeals did not rule that NPDES

permits are required for stormwater discharges that

are not listed in EPA’s rules. Rather, it held that by

listing logging in the Phase I rule EPA required per-

mits for stormwater discharges associated with that

industry. State Pet. App. 42-48. Even if a conflict with

a single district court opinion would merit review (but

see S. Ct. R. 10), there is no conflict: the two cases

have different outcomes because logging is listed in

the stormwater rule and the parking lot at issue in

Conservation Law Foundation was not. But the deci-

sions are otherwise consistent.

4. The court of appeals’ decision also does not

conflict with the other cases cited by Georgia-Pacific.

GP at 28. It does not conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s

own decision in Environmental Defense Center v. EPA,

344 F.3d 832, 860-63 (9th Cir. 2003), because that de-

cision did not address the Phase I rule or hold that

logging roads are subject to the Phase II rule. Rather,

in Environmental Defense Center the court remanded

the question whether logging roads should be covered

19

by the Phase II rule because EPA had not adequately

addressed that issue in responding to comments.

There is no intra-circuit conflict with Environmental

Defense Center, as the court of appeals explained.

State Pet. App. 48.

Nor does the court of appeals’ decision conflict

with Fishermen Against the Destruction of the Envi-

ronment v. Closter Farms, 300 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir.

2002) (holding that a sugar-cane farm was entitled to

a statutory exemption for agricultural stormwater

discharges) or Association to Protect Hammersley, Eid,

& Totten Inlets v. Taylor Resources, 299 F.3d 1007

(9th Cir. 2002) (deferring to EPA’s determination that

mussel-harvesting rafts are not point sources). Nei-

ther decision creates an inter- or intra-circuit conflict

because neither addresses logging, logging roads, the

silvicultural rule, or the Phase I stormwater regula-

tion.

B. There is no conflict with cases decided

under section 509(b) of the Act be-

cause NEDC did not challenge, and the

court of appeals did not invalidate, any

action of the EPA administrator.

The petitioners contend that the court of appeals

held, in conflict with decisions from other circuits,

that it had jurisdiction in a citizen suit to invalidate

an EPA rule. The petitioners rely on decisions holding

that section 509(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b),

provides the sole opportunity for judicial review of

certain “Actions of the Administrator,” including, the

petitioners contend, judicial review of NPDES permit

regulations. State at 19-24; GP at 29-30. Although pe-

20

titioners contend that this issue is jurisdictional, their

argument is not really that the district court lacked

jurisdiction over respondent’s citizen suit, but rather

that section 509(b) limits the construction that a

court may place upon an EPA regulation in a suit over

which it Aas jurisdiction. The petitioners waived their

section 509(b) arguments by failing to raise them un-

til their joint reply brief in support of the petitions for

rehearing. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 574 n.25

(1984). Moreover, as EPA essentially conceded when

it abandoned its section 509(b) argument below, the

petitioners’ arguments are without merit.

The CWA limits citizen suits in two important

ways. First, district courts only have jurisdiction if the

plaintiff provides notice of the alleged violations to

EPA, the state in which the alleged violations are oc-

curring, and the alleged violators, and if neither EPA

nor the state files an enforcement action before the

citizen files suit. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b); Laidlaw, 528

U.S. at 174-75. Second, the CWA limits the relief

available to citizen plaintiffs: section 509(b)(2) prohib-

its courts in civil enforcement actions from providing

judicial review of any “Actions of the Administrator”

that could have been reviewed under section

509(b)(1), which authorizes direct review in the courts

of appeals of certain EPA actions. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b).

1. The decision below does not conflict with deci-

sions applying section 509(b). The bar on judicial re-

view in section 509(b)(2) is inapplicable to this case

because NEDC did not challenge any “Action of the

Administrator.” ER 07 at 2, 24-25. After complying

with the Act’s jurisdictional requirements, see id. at 2-

5, 26-71, NEDC filed suit contending that EPA’s regu-

21

lations as written require the petitioners to obtain

NPDES permits. NEDC has never alleged in this liti-

gation that the Phase I regulation or the silvicultural

rule violates the CWA or is otherwise invalid. See ER

O07 at 24-25 (prayer for relief). NEDC simply sought

enforcement of the Phase I regulation.

2. Consistent with NEDC’s complaint, the court

of appeals did not invalidate any rule. Rather, the

court interpreted the rules when it held that they re-

quire NPDES permits for stormwater discharges from

pipes, ditches and channels along logging roads used

for hauling timber. Based on those holdings the court

reversed the judgment of the district court and re-

manded the case for further proceedings, but it did

not vacate any rule. State Pet. App. 52.

3. The court of appeals was well within its author-

ity to interpret the NPDES permit regulations as it

did. In applying what the State calls the “near-

identical” provision of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(b), (State at 20), this Court recently recognized

that federal courts can construe Clean Air Act regula-

tions during civil enforcement proceedings, provided

they do not determine that a regulation as written is

invalid. Envtl. Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S.

561 (2007). In Duke Energy, this Court vacated a

judgment because the lower court “effectively invali-

dated” a regulation by giving it a reading “incon-

sistent with its terms” (id. at 566) in derogation of

section 7607(b), which, like section 509(b), “limit[s]

challenges to the validity of a regulation during en-

forcement proceedings” when such review could have

been obtained in a court of appeals. Jd. at 581 (citing

42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)). Because this Court viewed a

22

construction of the regulation that contradicted its

text as “an implicit invalidation” of that rule, this

Court remanded the matter so the lower courts could

consider the “applicability or effect” of section

7607(b). Jd. On remand, the district court determined

it could interpret and apply the regulations at issue in

resolving EPA’s civil enforcement action. U.S. v. Duke

Energy Corp., 2010 WL 3023517, *6 (M.D.N.C.).

Duke Energy is pertinent here for two reasons.

First, this Court recognized a distinction between in-

terpreting a regulation to “bring it into harmony”

with a statute, which is permissible, and determining

that the regulation as written is invalid, which runs

afoul of the prohibition on judicial review in enforce-

ment proceedings. As this Court put it, the preclusion

of review does not bar “a purposeful but permissible

reading of the regulation adopted to bring it into

harmony with the Court of Appeals’s view of the stat-

ute....” Duke Energy, 549 U.S. at 573. Second, this

Court looked to the plain language of the rule to de-

termine whether the court of appeals’ interpretation

“effectively invalidated” the regulation. Jd. at 577-

578. This Court held “that the Court of Appeals’s

reading of the 1980 PSD regulations, intended to

align them with the NSPS, was inconsistent with their

terms and effectively invalidated them; any such result

must be shown to comport with the Act’s restrictions

on judicial review of EPA regulations for validity.” Id.

at 566 (emphasis added).

In this case, the court of appeals permissibly con-

strued the silvicultural rule to ensure harmony with

the statute. Finding the rule to be ambiguous, the

court rejected the petitioners’ interpretation because

23

it would redefine pipes, ditches and channels as non-

point sources, thereby creating an impermissible con-

flict with the statutory definition of point source.

State Pet. App. 34-37. Instead, and consistent with

both the statute and the regulatory text, the court

construed the rule as excluding only stormwater that

is not channeled and controlled through point sources.

Id. at 37. The court’s determination that stormwater

discharged through point sources is not “nonpoint

source” “natural runoff” is entirely consistent with

the rule’s text; it does not “implicitly invalidate” it in

any way.

Nor is there any credible argument that the court

invalidated the Phase I regulation. The court relied on

the rule’s plain language in holding that EPA includ-

ed SIC 2411 in the list of regulated “industrial activi-

ties.” Id. at 44-47. The court further relied on its hold-

ing that the silvicultural rule does not exclude point-

source discharges from the NPDES permit require-

ment. Id. at 47-48. And the court bolstered its reading

of the Phase I regulation by noting that reading the

rule to exempt point-source discharges associated

with logging would be contrary to sections 502(14)

and 402(p) of the Act. Jd. But the court did not give

the Phase I rule a meaning that conflicts with its text;

consequently, it did not “effectively invalidate” that

rule or grant NEDC any relief barred by section

509(b)(2).

4. To demonstrate error under Duke Energy, the

petitioners must establish that the court of appeals’

interpretations are impermissible because they are

inconsistent with the text of the rules. 549 U.S. at 566.

Yet the petitioners make little attempt to explain how

24

the court’s interpretations conflict with the regulato-

ry text. Instead, they fail to alert this Court to obvi-

ously pertinent authority—Duke Energy—and they

rely on bare assertions that lack specificity and analy-

sis. Those failures alone render the petitioners’ argu-

ments unpersuasive.

Any argument that the court of appeals’ reading of

the rules is impermissible—that it is inconsistent with

the regulatory text—ultimately must rest on a

demonstration that the silvicultural rule expressly ex-

empts certain activities from the NPDES permit re-

quirement even when they convey pollution through

statutory point sources. The petitioners rely on the

second sentence of the silvicultural rule, but that sen-

tence does not categorically define the listed activities

as “nonpoint sources” nor does it redefine any point-

source discharge as a nonpoint source of pollution, as

claimed. GP at 18; State at 31-32. “Simply put, the

regulation excludes nonpoint source silvicultural ac-

tivities from NPDES permit requirements....”

Forsgren, 309 F.3d at 1186. Indeed, the plain lan-

guage of the rule does not allow for a construction

that excludes statutory point sources from regulation.

But even if there is some ambiguity in the language,

as the court of appeals concluded, the court’s con-

struction is at least a permissible one.

Two elements of the text confirm this. First, the

phrase “the term” at the beginning of the second sen-

tence indicates that the subsequent text elaborates on

the definition of “silvicultural point source” by ex-

plaining that it does not include “non-point source

silvicultural activities ... from which there is natural

runoff.” The second sentence is thus not an additional

25

definition of a new term but rather a continuation of

the definition of “silvicultural point source.” Togeth-

er, the first two sentences reflect the Act’s

point/nonpoint dichotomy and explain the axiom that

“silvicultural point source” does not include “non-

point source silvicultural activities.”

Indeed, and second, the text demonstrates that the

second sentence only excludes nonpoint source “natu-

ral runoff.” The phrases “such as” and “from which

there is natural runoff” demonstrate that the second

sentence is providing a list of silvicultural activities

that are considered to be nonpoint sources of pollu-

tion when and where they produce “natural runoff.”

In other words, the phrase “from which there is natu-

ral runoff” conditions the nonpoint status of a pollu-

tion source on its production of “natural runoff.” The

rule also gives meaning to the term “natural runoff”:

the phrase “nonpoint source silvicultural activi-

ties...from which there is natural runoff” equates the

terms “nonpoint source” and “natural runoff.” In do-

ing so, the rule indicates that “natural runoff” refers

to stormwater that is not discharged from point

sources like pipes, ditches and channels.

The silvicultural rule does not categorically define

the listed activities as nonpoint sources nor redefine

any point-source discharge as a nonpoint source of

pollution. Consequently, there is no credible argu-

ment that the court of appeals’ interpretations con-

flict with the regulatory text or that the court granted

NEDC relief that is barred by section 509(b)(2). The

court of appeals did not “effectively invalidate” the

26

rules by giving the terms “nonpoint source” and

“natural runoff” their natural and accepted meaning.*

C. The court of appeals’ methodology for

interpreting administrative rules is

consistent with this Court’s prece-

dents.

The petitioners contend that the court of appeals’

approach to interpreting the Phase I regulation con-

flicts with this Court’s methodology for interpreting

administrative rules. State at 28-30; GP at 16-17, 24.

According to the petitioners, the court should have

deferred to EPA’s claim that the Phase I regulation

excludes point-source discharges along logging roads

by generally incorporating the NPDES program rules.

State at 29; GP at 20-21. Here again, the petitioners’

arguments are without merit.

1. The court of appeals explicitly recognized and

applied the well-accepted principle that courts must

defer to an agency’s construction of its regulation un-

less it is plainly erroneous, contrary to its text, or in-

consistent with the statute. State Pet. App. 10-11 (cit-

ing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457, 461-62 (1997)

and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Defense Council,

467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)); see also Duke Energy,

549 U.S. at 573. The petitioners’ complaint is there-

fore that the court misapplied a properly stated rule

* Should this Court grant the petitions, NEDC would also ar-

gue that the position EPA stated in its rehearing amicus brief is

correct and, additionally, that the rules at issue are not subject

to section 509(b)(1) or (2) at all because they are not the result of

any of the reviewable “actions” listed in section 509(b)(1).

27

of law to a highly particular set of circumstances. But

even that is incorrect.

2. The State fundamentally misunderstands the

Phase I rule when it claims that it excludes “from the

definition of ‘industrial activity’ those activities de-

fined to be nonpoint-source silvicultural activities in

the silvicultural rule.” State at 29. The Phase I regu-

lation does not exclude any silvicultural activities

from the definition of “industrial activity”; rather, the

rule applies to the logging industry but does not re-

quire NPDES permits for nonpoint sources of pollu-

tion. The State’s argument has two critical flaws.

First, to the extent the State is arguing that the

Phase I rule incorporates an interpretation of the sil-

vicultural rule that defines all pollution from the

listed activities as nonpoint-source, that construction

of the rule is not entitled to deference because it is in-

consistent with the regulation’s text. The petitioners

completely fail to parse the silvicultural rule or ex-

plain how its text redefines the discharges at issue in

this case as nonpoint-source pollution. Parsing the

rule, however, demonstrates that it does not categori-

cally “define” any activity as exclusively nonpoint in

nature. As explained in section I.B.4., supra, the silvi-

cultural rule excludes only nonpoint source natural

runoff associated with certain logging activities; it

does not exempt any point-source discharge from reg-

ulation.

Second, to the extent the State is arguing that the

Phase I rule categorically excludes some silvicultural

activities from the set of “industrial activities” cov-

ered by the rule, that interpretation is not entitled to

28

deference because it is inconsistent with the Phase I

regulation. The rule contradicts that claim by stating

explicitly that logging is an “industrial activity.” The

regulation states: “The following categories of facili-

ties are considered to be engaging in ‘industrial activi-

ty’ for purposes of paragraph (b)(14)....” 40 C.F.R.

§ 122.26(b)(14) (emphasis added). The rule then un-

disputedly includes logging on the list of regulated in-

dustries. See id. § 122.26(b)(14)(ii) (listing facilities

classified as SIC 24, which includes SIC 2411, “Log-

ging”).

Further, the rule does not place any limits on the

logging activities that require permits for point-source

stormwater discharges. Where EPA intended to ex-

clude a category of facilities, it clearly stated that ex-

clusion in the list of regulated industries. See, e.g., id.

§ 122.26(b)(14)(ii) (“Facilities classified as Standard

Industrial Classification 24 (except 2434), 26 (except

265 and 267), 28 (except 283)...”) (emphases added).

EPA excluded SIC 2434 from SIC 24, but did not ex-

clude SIC 2411. Jd. Moreover, the Phase I regulation

does not even mention the silvicultural rule in connec-

tion with the list of regulated industries. Jd.

The rest of the regulatory text confirms that the

rule applies to logging roads that support timber haul-

ing. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14). The rule requires per-

mits for “immediate access roads traveled by carriers

of raw materials” and for “material handling sites”

“used for the transportation or conveyance of any raw

material.” Jd. Additionally, the rule’s narrative text is

illustrative, not exhaustive, so stormwater discharges

that are clearly “associated with” logging require

NPDES permits even if they are not specifically listed.

29

See id. (“For the categories of industries identified in

this section, the term includes, but is not limited

to....”). Under any of these criteria, forest roads used

for timber hauling are clearly “associated with” the

logging industry. See also ER 47 at 94-100 (Klahnber-

ry Timber Sale Contract).

3. Because there is no textual support for their in-

terpretations, the petitioners look elsewhere for sup-

port. The petitioners’ invitation to pore over regulato-

ry preambles and litigation briefs to discern an intent

not shown in the text of the rules does not, however,

demonstrate that the court of appeals’ decision con-

flicts with established principles of regulatory review;

it is merely an argument that the lower court erred in

applying those principles to the particular regulatory

framework before the court. But even as a claim of

error, the petitioners’ arguments are unconvincing.

The State incorrectly claims that the preamble to

the Phase I rule “reiterates” that EPA did not intend

to require permits for stormwater discharged from

logging roads. State at 29. But the preamble says

nothing about excluding logging roads from the Phase

I rule. To the contrary, it demonstrates that EPA fully

intended that the list of applicable SIC codes would

determine what activities require permits.

In response to public comments requesting that

EPA exclude SIC 2411 from the Phase I rule, EPA re-

fused to do so. Instead, EPA noted that the silvicul-

tural rule “excludes certain sources.” See 55 Fed. Reg.

at 48011. But the preamble does not say anything

about which sources are excluded, let alone suggest

that the rule excludes any point-source discharges.

30

Instead, at the end of the discussion about SIC 2411,

the preamble states: “EPA intends that the list of ap-

plicable SICs will define and identify what industrial

facilities are required to apply.” Id. (emphasis added).

Taking a different approach, Georgia-Pacific seeks

support for its argument in miscellaneous Federal

Register notices and agency practice. Yet the Ninth

Circuit has twice canvassed “the yellowed pages of the

Federal Register,” Forsgren, 309 F.3d at 1188, and

twice ruled that the silvicultural rule is not an exemp-

tion for point-source discharges. Id. at 1186-88; State

Pet. App. 20-32. The materials cited by Georgia-

Pacific cannot justify construing the silvicultural rule

in conflict with its text.

Nor can those materials justify construing the sil-

vicultural rule in a manner that conflicts with the

statute, which unambiguously defines pipes, ditches

and channels as point sources. If, as NEDC has con-

tended throughout this litigation, the silvicultural

rule unambiguously excludes only nonpoint sources

from the NPDES permit requirement, then the text’s

plain meaning controls and those materials are irrele-

vant. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588

(2000) (Auer is deference only at issue where a regula-

tion is ambiguous); Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast

Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct.. 2458, 2469

(2009). Alternatively, if the silvicultural rule is am-

biguous, as the court of appeals found, then those ma-

terials and agency practice may be relevant to discern-

ing the agency’s intent. Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct.. at

2469, 2472-77. But their relevance for that purpose

cannot justify, much less require, construing the rule

in conflict with the statutory definition of point

31

source. Indeed, if the silvicultural rule is ambiguous

then the court of appeals was fully empowered to con-

strue the rule in harmony with the CWA. Duke Ener-

gy, 549 U.S. at 573. Either way, federal register notic-

es and agency practice cannot justify deferring to an

interpretation of the silvicultural rule that directly

conflicts with Congress’ unambiguous determination

that “any pipe, ditch [or] channel” is a point source.

33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).

D. The court of appeals’ decision does not

conflict with this Court’s precedents

affording deference to agency statuto-

ry interpretations.

The petitioners incorrectly contend that the court

of appeals’ decision conflicts with this Court’s estab-

lished methodology for reviewing an agency’s inter-

pretation of a statute that it administers. State at 30-

33; GP at 17, 20-24. The court of appeals explicitly

recognized that a court reviewing an agency’s con-

struction of a statute must first determine whether

Congress has directly spoken to the precise question

at issue. State Pet. App. 10-11, 16; Chevron, 467 U.S.

at 842. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the

end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,

must give effect to the unambiguously expressed in-

tent of Congress.” Jd. at 842-843. If the statute is si-

lent or ambiguous, however, the court must defer to a

reasonable construction of the statute embodied in an

agency’s lawful exercise of delegated authority. Jd. at

843.

1. Here, the court of appeals’ decision is entirely

consistent with Chevron. The court was not obligated

32

to defer to an interpretation of the silvicultural rule

that conflicts with the unambiguous statutory defini-

tion of point source. Jd. at 842-43; Duke Energy, 549

U.S. at 573. Nor did the court have to defer to an in-

terpretation of the Phase I rule that conflicts with the

plain statutory obligation to require NPDES permits

for point-source stormwater discharges associated

with industrial activity. Jd.

2. The State claims there is a conflict with Chev-

ron because the court of appeals did not defer to what

the State claims is EPA’s construction of the statuto-

ry term “a storm water discharge associated with in-

dustrial activity.” State at 29 (citing U.S. Amicus Br.

at 28-31) and at 30-33. But the cited pages of EPA’s

amicus brief were not entitled to Chevron deference

because in those pages EPA did not present a statuto-

ry argument that EPA claimed was entitled to Chev-

ron deference. EPA did not assert that it identified a

statutory ambiguity or gap in section 402(p)(2)(B)

that it then construed and clarified by excluding log-

ging roads from the Phase I rule. The court of appeals

was not obligated to defer to a construction of the

CWA that EPA did not present.

Nor did the court of appeals err by declining to de-

fer to the statutory argument that EPA did present.

EPA asserted in its amicus brief that the statutory

definition of point source is ambiguous and that EPA’s

interpretation of the silvicultural rule was a reasona-

ble construction of the Act. U.S. Amicus Br. at 13-20.

The court of appeals explicitly relied on Chevron in

rejecting that argument because Congress unambigu-

ously defined pipes, ditches and channels as point

sources. State Pet. App. 10-16; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).

33

Similarly, the court correctly declined to accept the

contention that EPA could exclude logging roads from

the Phase I rule even though EPA had determined

that logging is an “industrial activity” subject to sec-

tions 402(p)(2)(B) and (4)(A) of the Act. See pp. 13-14,

supra, and State Pet. App. 44-45, 47-48.

3. Making an altogether different argument,

Georgia-Pacific now claims for the first time that the

Act’s definition of “point source” excludes “agricul-

tural stormwater discharges” from the NPDES permit

requirement and that silviculture is a form of agricul-

ture. GP at 17, 20-24. Georgia-Pacific waived its new

argument by failing to raise it below. TRW, Inc. v.

Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 33-34 (2001). But the argument

also fails for two other reasons.

First, the CWA itself demonstrates that Congress

did not intend the agricultural exemption to include

logging activities: the plain language of the statute

distinguishes agriculture from silviculture by refer-

ring to the two separately when it means a statutory

provision to apply to both. See 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1288(b)(2)(F); 1281(d)(1); 1314(f(A); 1344(9(1)(A).

Because the statutory definition of point source only

references “agricultural” stormwater, it does not also

include stormwater discharges associated with silvi-

cultural activities.

Second, EPA does not consider stormwater dis-

charges associated with logging to be “agricultural

stormwater discharges.” That is clear enough from

the Phase I regulation, which excludes agricultural

stormwater from regulation but requires NPDES

permits for the logging industry. See 40 C.F.R.

34

§ 122.26(a)(1)(v) and (b)(14)(ii). Georgia-Pacific has

cited no evidence that EPA construes the agricultural

stormwater exemption to include logging. Here again,

the court of appeals was not obligated to defer to an

interpretation of the statute that EPA never adopted.

Il. The court of appeals’ decision does not

present a question of great practical im-

portance.

Finally, the State contends that the court of ap-

peals’ decision warrants review because it “displaces”

Oregon’s regulatory scheme and requires Oregon to

develop an NPDES permit for logging roads. State at

24-28. Georgia-Pacific complains that the decision un-

settles the state-federal balance; that NPDES permits

and associated legal requirements will overly burden

logging road owners and operators; and that the court

of appeals’ ruling is bad environmental policy. GP at

30-35. According to the petitioners, owners and opera-

tors of logging roads must be allowed to continue col-

lecting, channeling and dumping heavily polluted

stormwater into waters of the United States without

NPDES permits.

As an initial matter, NPDES permits will supple-

ment, not eliminate, Oregon’s existing regulatory

programs. Oregon regulates forest practices through

its Forest Practices Act; regulates nonpoint source

pollution through its state water quality programs;

and regulates point-source pollution through its au-

thorized NPDES program. See generally Oregon Re-

vised Statutes Ch. 468B and 527; Oregon Admin.

Rules Ch. 340-041, -042, and -045. Although those

programs have been in place for decades, Oregon still

35

does not adequately protect waters in its coastal areas

from nonpoint-source pollution generated by logging

activities.‘ In any event, to the extent Oregon current-

ly regulates logging road pollution at all, NPDES

permits will supplement those programs, not displace

them.

More importantly, for point-source discharges of

pollutants and stormwater, Congress fully intended to

supplement ineffective state programs with the

NPDES permit program. See State Water Res. Control

Bd., 426 U.S. at 202-205. Far from unsettling “the

balance of environmental responsibilities between the

State and federal government” (GP at 33), the court

of appeals’ decision implements longstanding Con-

gressional intent to regulate point-source discharges

of pollution to our Nation’s waters, while leaving

nonpoint-source pollution control to the states. 33

U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1329.

For this reason, any complaints about hypothetical

regulatory burdens should be directed to the district

court on remand or to the Oregon Department of En-

vironmental] Quality, the agency that will develop an

NPDES permit for logging roads in Oregon. Georgia-

Pacific claims that the court’s decision “severely im-

pacts” owners of logging roads and that “[t]he burden

of NPDES permitting is substantial.” GP at 30-31.

Yet Georgia-Pacific cannot know anything about regu-

latory burdens until it obtains and complies with

* See 16 U.S.C. § 1455b; the complaint and agreed dismissal

order in Northwest Environmental Advocates v. Gutierrez, U.S.

District Court for the District of Oregon, No. 09-cv-00017; and

http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/nonpoint/pro_approve. htm].

36

NPDES permits, which it has yet to do. Speculation

about the effects of the decision is particularly prema-

ture because the court of appeals has only determined

that NEDC’s complaint states a cause of action. On

remand, the district court has bifurcated liability and

remedy proceedings and has not yet even determined

liability. The petitioners’ concerns can, and likely will,

be addressed through the district court proceedings or

through the upcoming public and transparent NPDES

permit development process.

Congress long ago determined it would be good en-

vironmental policy to require NPDES permits for the

logging industry when it opted not to exempt that in-

dustry from the NPDES permit program. Since then,

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

has rejected EPA’s NPDES permit exemption for

point-source stormwater discharges associated with

silvicultural activities (1977); EPA has required per-

mits for stormwater discharges associated with the

logging industry (1990); and the Ninth Circuit has

held that EPA’s silvicultural rule does not exempt

statutory point sources from the NPDES permit pro-

gram (2002). Costle, 568 F.2d at 1379; 40 C.F.R.

§ 122.26(b)(14)(ii); Forsgren, 309 F.3d at 1185-86.

Notwithstanding those developments, Congress has

refused to adopt a statutory exemption for the logging

industry. Far from acquiescing in the petitioners’

claimed exemption (GP at 23-24), Congress has stead-

fastly maintained its determination that discharges of

pollutants associated with logging are prohibited un-

less authorized by an NPDES permit.

Under the court of appeals’ decision, the petition-

ers will have to comply with the CWA like nearly eve-

37

ry other American industry. See 40 C.F.R.

122.26(b)(14)(i)-(xi). And just like those industries,

the logging industry will adjust to NPDES permitting

requirements, whatever they may turn out to be. This

case is important to the parties, and it is important to

water quality in Oregon’s Coast Range, but it does not

present an issue of great practical importance that

warrants Supreme Court review.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petitions for writs of

certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL A. KAMPMEIER

Counsel of Record

WASHINGTON FOREST LAW CENTER

615 Second Avenue

Suite 360

Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 223-4088 extension 4

pkampmeier@wflc.org

CHRISTOPHER G. WINTER

CRAG LAW CENTER

917 S.W. Oak Street

Suite 417

Portland, OR 97205

(503) 525-2725

chris@crag.org

38

ScoTT L. NELSON

PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION GROUP

1600 20“ Street NW

Washington, DC 20009

(202) 588-1000

snelson@citizen.org

Attorneys for Respondent Northwest

Environmental Defense Center

Date: November 2011

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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