Record and brief — Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid

Supreme Court brief2012

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

%

} SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 10-507

Title Pacific Operators Offshore LLP et al., Petitioners

Vv

Luisa L. Valladolid, et a!

Docketed October 15, 2010

Lower Ct United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Case Nos (08-73862)

Decision Date May 13, 2010

Rehearing Denied July 19, 2010

Questions

Presented

~~~Date~~~ ~~~~-~~~Proceedings and Orders —~

Oct 13 2010 Petition for a writ of certioran filed. (Response due November 15. 2010)

Nov 92010 Order extending time to file response to petition to and including December 15, 2010, for

all respondents

Dec 62010 Order further extending time to file response to petition to and including January 14

2011, for all respondents

Jan 14 2011 Bnef of Federal Respondent in opposition filed

Jan 14 2011 Bnef of respondent Luisa L_ Valladolid in opposition filed

Jan 21 2011 Reply of petitioners Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP. et al filed

Jan 26 2011 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of February 18, 2011

Feb 22 2011 Petition GRANTED

Mar 17 2011 The time to file the joint appendix and petitioners’ brief on the merits is extended to and

including May 23, 2011

Mar 17 2011 The time to file respondent's brief on the merits is extended to and including August 8

2011

May 23 2011 Joint appendix filed (Statement of costs filed)

May 23 2011 Bref of petitioners Pacific Operators Offshore LLP et al filed

Jul 152011 CIRCULATED

Jul 192011 SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Tuesday October 11, 2011

Jul 27 2011 The time to file respondents’ briefs on the merits is further extended to and including

August 31, 2011

Aug 11 2011 Record received from U S.C.A for Sth Circuit. (1 envelope)

Aug 30 2011 Record received from U S. Departrment of Labor Benefits Review Board

Aug 31 2011 Bnef of respondent Luisa L_ Valladolid filed (Distributed)

Aug 31 2011 Bnef of respondent Director Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs filed

(Distributed)

Sep 7 2011 Motion for divided argument filed by the Solicitor General

Sep 27 2011 Motion for divided argument filed by the Solicitor General GRANTED

Sep 30 2011 Reply of petitioners Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP, et al filed (Distnbuted)

Oct 11 2011 Argued For petitioners: Paul D. Clement, Washington. D.C. For federal respondent

Joseph R_ Palmore. Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Washington. D. C. For private respondent David C Frederick, Washington, D C

PETITION

FOR

WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

rsccwe

20029 10-907 CCT 13 anip

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

°

PACIFIC OPERATORS OFFSHORE, LLP.

and INSURANCE COMPANY OF

THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Petitioners,

v.

LUISA L. VALLADOLID,

Respondent.

¢

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

e

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

¢

HORVITZ & LEVY LLP THOMAS, QUINN &

PEDER K. BATALDEN KRIEGER, LLP

*PETER ABRAHAMS MICHAEL W. THOMAS

15760 Ventura Boulevard, 199 Fremont Street,

18th Floor 20th Floor

Encino, California 91436 San Francisco, California

(818) 995-0800 « 94105

Fax: (818) 995-3157 (415) 546-6100 «

pbatalden@horvitzlevy.com Fax: (415) 358-5868

pabrahams@horvitzlevy.com mthomas@tqklaw.com

*Counsel of Record

Counsel for Petitioners

Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP and

Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania

os

oe

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43

U.S.C., §§ 1331-1356 (OCSLA), governs those who

work on oil drilling platforms and other fixed struc-

tures beyond state maritime boundaries. Workers are

eligible for compensation for “any injury occurring as

the result of operations conducted on the outer Conti-

nental Shelf.” 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (2006). When an

outer continental shelf worker is injured on land, is

he (or his heir):

(1) always eligible for compensation, because

his employer’s operations on the shelf are the but for

cause of his injury (as the Third Circuit holds); or

(2) never eligible for compensation, because the

Act applies only to injuries occurring on the shelf (as

the Fifth Circuit holds);

(3) sometimes eligible for compensation, because

eligibility for benefits depends on the nature and

extent of the factual relationship between the injury

and the operations on the shelf (as the Ninth Circuit

holds)?

a3

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

All parties are listed in the caption.

Petitioner Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP, is a

limited liability corporation wholly-owned by

AnAmerica Corporation, a successor to AnAmerica &

Drilling Company. Petitioner the Insurance Company

of the State of Pennsylvania (ICSOP) is a direct,

wholly-owned subsidiary of Chartis U.S., Inc. Chartis

U.S., Inc., is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Chartis,

Inc. Chartis, Inc., is a wholly-owned subsidiary of

American International Group, Inc., which is a publi-

cally held corporation. With the exception of the AIG

Credit Facility Trust (a trust established for the sole

benefit of the United States Treasury), no parent

corporation or publicly held corporation owns 10

percent or more of the stock of American Internation-

al Group, Inc.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED................. aa aeaeanees _

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS AND RULE

eo ccc ce cdacocetuspressessceessees Te

pr OP Le Bee yy 4. y\. ee . ill

eG gy tg | + ee ek,

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORART ....... l

sc usaakenndevsnweccecceccrecees ]

a nnceiedrluthecéueccessccacses: l

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED............ 2

RE 2

Ree EET E GPP BEE CADE..........000.cccccccscccccves. 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........... 8

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION

CREATES A THREE-WAY CIRCUIT

SPLIT ON THE IMPORTANT QUES-

TION OF OIL PLATFORM WORKERS’

ELIGIBILITY FOR OCSLA BENEFITS ..... 8

Il. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETA-

TION OF OCSLA IS INCONSISTENT

WITH CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE AND

THIS COURT'S STATEMENTS ................. il

rial iceidsenes Kdasbbeccesccccaseseceeses 18

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS ~— Continued

Page

APPENDIX

Be wrnticindennsetclicebcatndadddiabsiliiiat aa teX gs ite hee App. 1

Res Se GR oe os App. 35

Order Denying the Claimant’s Motion to With-

draw or Amend Admissions, Denying the

Respondents’ Motion to Strike, and Granting

RUIN CPI os scencncedecsdscvciatissccivcceneaponens App. 53

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En

SN sccciisnuicadadiasasacesoomevmdiceckaenibenb certs oes App. 94

33 U.S.C. section 903(a) ..........0..0.20ccecceceeececeeeeee App. 96

43 U.S.C. section 1301(aX(b) & (c) -.......0.2- 00.0... App. 97

CP as SE Beret ei App. 99

SO AAs. CR BROOD ocssssidscesiessccicoiscovscnane App. 100

GP AEA MEE Beek dnc ee App. 101

OB UA. BURRIS Bia iitiisiiiinniimiines App. 102

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Curtis v. Schlumberger Offshore Serv., Inc., 849

eee GE CE RE DD ci ctiidevsdeccccccesccensosisekacotes 2,8,9

Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414

RRR raat elle Rit en eee eerea em ELS. 15, 16, 17

Mills v. Dir, Office of Workers’ Comp. Pro-

grams, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 877 F.2d 356 (5th

Be CE dnavecipcinnnedactiasseciedanedsvacthoessetestanerkiesees passim

Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S.

SET I avai sinpcnaicataceemscamianinanuinatedcuasan 14, 15, 16, 17

Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 US.

ERIE SONATA in de> SUSI s AD Ok eS 11

Valladolid v. Pac. Operations Offshore, LLP,

604 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2010)...............00000000... passim

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Se se ED I ii neckenccncciesccaveccccsanicdessconsssnins 1

33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2006) .......................cceeeees passim

RR TB ER UT ee RN nee Sm eee 2

Se as Oe I i iiciccakintcciiaisasthcakandsenaesabosedals 4

See ces Oe Me SII a inicnidccancaccincsicanercecscdcoanensis 1

Se ee ae ND I ai dik sic ina cnandepnanisuisauiicsbevinéiiouins 1

43 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1312, 1331, 1332, and 1333

RRL SPE ERS SS Pease Rn Ree EAST ya RS LOTS MASE 2

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2006) .................c0eeene passim

Cf BERETS Se eR I Ee 14, 17

OO ARA, © BI oink encnscceeiscsdececcoccs 11

43 U.S.C. § 1333(a2)(A) (2006) «2... eee. 12, 14

SB DA. BB Ci tesicicccccccesccensccessscesceses passim

46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30308 (2006) ....................2.....2-0-- 14

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Pacific Operators and ICSOP petition for a writ

of certiorari to review the judgment of the Ugited

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The unpublished decision of the Administrative

Law Judge in the Department of Labor’s Office of

Workers’ Compensation Programs is printed in the

appendix (App.) at 53a. The unpublished decision of

the Benefits Review Board is reprinted in the appen-

dix at App. 35a. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is

reported at 604 F.3d 1126 and is reprinted in the

appendix at App. la. The unpublished order of the

Court of Appeals denying rehearing en banc is re-

printed in the appendix at App. 94a.

¢

JURISDICTION

The Benefits Review Board had jurisdiction

under 33 U.S.C. § 921(bX3). The Ninth Circuit had

jurisdiction to review the decision of the Benefits

Review Board under 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). The Ninth

Circuit entered judgment on May 13, 2010, App. la,

and denied petitioners’ timely petition for rehearing

en banc on July 19, 2010. App. 94a. The jurisdiction

of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

>

2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant portions of 33 U.S.C. § 903 and 43

U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1312, 1331, 1332, and 1333 are re-

produced at App. 96a-106a.

+

INTRODUCTION

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA),

43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356, extends the jurisdiction of

the United States to the seabed, subsoil, and fixed

structures of the outer continental shelf, an area that

lies more than three miles offshore and beyond the

territorial jurisdiction of the States. The Act governs

the rights and obligations of those who own, operate,

and work on offshore oil drilling platforms. The Act

creates (and Department of Labor regulations imple-

ment) an administrative scheme for compensating

injured workers that resembles the workers’ compen-

sation schemes developed in most States. Under the

Act, a worker is eligible for compensation for “any

injury occurring as the result of operations conducted

on the outer Continental Shelf.” 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b).

Three circuit courts have considered whether a

worker injured on land is eligible for compensation

under the Act. Each circuit has adopted a different

test for resolving that question. The Third Circuit has

adopted a “status” test: a worker is eligible for bene-

fits no matter where he is injured, so long as he is

involved in operations conducted on the outer conti-

nental shelf. See Curtis v. Schlumberger Offshore

3

Serv., Inc., 849 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying the

Act to a rig worker killed in a car accident on a

New Jersey freeway while traveling to a helicopter

that would have taken him to a rig on the shelf). The

Fifth Circuit requires a worker to meet both a “sta-

tus” test and a “situs” test: a worker is eligible for

benefits only if his work is related to development on

the outer continental shelf and the injury occurs

while working on the shelf. Thus, injuries on land

are not compensable. See Mills v. Director, Office of

Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 877

F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1989) (refusing to apply the Act to

a welder injured on land while constructing an off-

shore oil platform). And the Ninth Circuit (in the case

below) has adopted a separate and fact-specific test: a

worker injured on land is eligible for benefits if there

is “a substantial nexus between the injury and ex-

tractive operations on the shelf,” meaning that “the

work performed directly furthers outer continental

shelf operations and is in the regular course of such

operations.” Valladolid v. Pac. Operations Offshore,

LLP, 604 F.3d 1126, 1139 (9th Cir. 2010), App. 28a.

This disputed legal issue — the proper test of

eligibility for OCSLA benefits — is one of nationwide

importance because the three circuit courts that have

divided on this question cover a majority of the Na-

tion’s coastline and offshore drilling operations. There

is no reason to believe that this circuit split will

resolve itself. The Third and Fifth Circuits have both

followed their standards for more than two decades.

Because each of the three circuits has adopted a

4

fundamentally different test, the split will not be

resolved even if one of the circuits were to alter

its standard through the en banc process. In sum, a

writ of certiorari should be granted here because a

worker’s eligibility for OCSLA benefits should not

depend on the circuit in which his injury occurs.

+

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compen-

sation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, provides

benefits to employees engaged in maritime employ-

ment who are injured upon navigable waters, includ-

ing adjoining piers, wharfs, and other structures

customarily used in loading, unloading, repairing or

building vessels. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (2006). Section 4

of OCSLA extends LHWCA benefits to cover the

disability or death of non-maritime employees “result-

ing from any injury occurring as the result of opera-

tions conducted on the outer Continental Shelf for the

purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, or

transporting by pipeline the natural resources, or

involving rights to the natural resources, of the

subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf.” 43

U.S.C. § 1333(b). The outer continental shelf is com-

prised of “all submerged lands lying seaward and

outside of the area of lands beneath navigable wa-

ters,” that is, submerged lands lying outside the

territorial jurisdiction of the states, which generally

extends three miles from the coast line. 43 U.S.C.

§§ 1301(a\(2), 1312, 1331(a) (2006).

5

Respondent Luisa Valladolid, the widow of dece-

dent Juan Valladolid, brought this proceeding against

Pacific Operators and ICSOP for workers’ compensa-

tion benefits under the LHWCA and the OCSLA.

Pacific’s primary business involves oil exploration

and extraction. The decedent worked for Pacific as a

roustabout, stationed primarily on one of Pacific’s two

drilling platforms located on the outer continental

shelf off the coast of California. He spent approxi-

mately 98 percent of his working time on one of the

drilling platforms, primarily performing maintenance

and repair duties. He also spent time working at

Pacific’s onshore oil flocculation facility. The facility

is separated from the Pacific Ocean by railroad

tracks, a highway, and a beach. The facility received

crude oil slurry from the offshore platforms via pipe-

line. Pacific processed the slurry, separating its oil,

gas, water, and solid constituents, then routed the oil

and gas through pipelines to third parties. The dece-

dent performed maintenance duties at the facility,

including painting, sandblasting, weed-pulling, clean-

ing drain-culverts, and operating a forklift.

Pacific's employees traveled to and from the

offshore platforms on a crew boat departing from a

pier located approximately three miles from the oil

flocculation facility. The boat was also used to ferry

equipment and supplies, and to remove scrap metal

from the platforms. The scrap metal was ferried to

the pier, where it was loaded into trucks and driven

to the facility. There it was dumped at various spots

on the property. One of the decedent’s duties at the

6

onshore facility was to use a forklift to retrieve the

scattered scrap metal and transport it to a central

location so that third-party scrap metal vendors could

pick the metal up and haul it away. He performed

this process roughly once every two years.

Between May 5, 2004 and June 5, 2004, Pacific

assigned decedent to work at the onshore facility

assisting in an ongoing project painting a water tank.

He performed that work most of the day on June 2,

2004. At 4:00 p.m. that day, the decedent’s supervisor

directed him to take a forklift to the rear yard of the

facility and move some scrap metal. One hour and 15

minutes later, the supervisor found the decedent next

to a tree roughly 10 feet from a service road in the

facility, with the forklift resting on his abdomen and

chest. He was pronounced dead at the scene. The

decedent had not moved any of the scrap metal he

had been directed to move.

The accident report stated that the decedent

apparently had stood on the top of one of the raised

tines of the forklift to cut fruit hanging from a tree

that was out of reach of a person on the ground. The

forklift apparently moved forward while the decedent

was attempting to harvest the fruit, which caused

him to lose his balance, fall in front of the forklift,

and sustain fatal injuries when it rolled over him.

Respondent received death benefits under Cali-

fornia’s workers’ compensation scheme. She also filed

a claim for benefits under the LHWCA and under

OCSLA’s extension to outer continental shelf workers.

7

An administrative law judge in the Department of

Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs

denied respondent’s OCSLA claim on the ground the

death had not occurred on the outer continental shelf,

and denied the LHWCA claim on the grounds the

decedent was not engaged in maritime employment

and was not injured on a maritime situs. App. 81a,

93a. The Benefits Review Board upheld the adminis-

trative law judge’s decision. App. 42a-43a, 51a-52a.

On respondent’s petition for review, the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld

the Board’s finding that the facility was not a mari-

time situs, meaning she had no direct right to

LHWCA benefits. Valladolid v. Pac. Operations

Offshore LLP, 604 F.3d 1126, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010),

App. 32a. However, the court rejected the Board’s

situs-of-injury test for determining the applicability

of OCSLA’s extension of the LHWCA. Id. at 1137-38,

App. 23a-24a. The Ninth Circuit formulated a new

and different test: “An injury is ‘the result of’ outer

continental shelf operations if there is a substantial

nexus between the injury and the operations.” 7d. at

1142, App. 34a. “To meet the standard, the claimant

must show that the work performed directly furthers

outer continental shelf operations and is in the regu-

lar course of such operations.” Jd. at 1139, App. 28a.

The Ninth Circuit remanded for further agency

proceedings involving the new test. Jd. at 1142, App.

34a.

8

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION CRE-

ATES A THREE-WAY CIRCUIT SPLIT ON

THE IMPORTANT QUESTION OF OIL

PLATFORM WORKERS’ ELIGIBILITY FOR

OCSLA BENEFITS.

Three Courts of Appeals have considered whether

a worker injured on land is eligible for LHWCA

benefits, as extended by section 4 of OCSLA, 43

U.S.C. § 1333(b). One court adopted a status test —

the employee’s work must further mineral extraction

from the outer continental shelf. Another court re-

quired an employee to satisfy both a status and a

situs test — the employee’s work must be related to

development on the outer continental shelf and he

must have suffered injury or death from an occur-

rence on the shelf. And a third court rejected both the

status and situs tests in favor of a fact-intensive

inquiry into the nature and extent of the employee’s

work.

_ In Curtis v. Schlumberger Offshore Ser., Inc., 849

F.2d 805, 809 (3d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted), the

Third Circuit adopted the status test. It held that an

oil rig worker injured in a car accident on a New

Jersey freeway while traveling to a helicopter that

would have taken him to an offshore rig was entitled

to LHWCA benefits. As interpreted by the Third

Circuit, “[t]he only criterion [under OCSLA] ... for

securing LHWCA benefits is for injured employees to

be involved in ‘any operations conducted on the outer

Continental Shelf for the purpose of exploring for,

9

[and] developing ... the natural resources ... of the

outer Continental Shelf.’ There [is] ... no limitation

... to ‘artificial islands and fixed structures’... .”: Jd.

at 810 n.9 (“[sJitus does not control the application of

the LHWCA”). Thus, the Third Circuit has adopted a

“but for” test: the employee’s injury on the freeway

occurred as a result of operations on the outer conti-

nental shelf because “‘{bJut for’ his traveling to the

[offshore rig] for the purpose of conducting ‘opera-

tions’ within § 1333(b), [he] would not have sustained

injuries in the automobile accident.” Jd. at 811.

The Fifth Circuit took a different approach in

Mills v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S.

Dep’t of Labor, 877 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1989), holding

that an employee must satisfy both a status and a

situs test to be eligible for benefits under the LHWCA

as extended by OCSLA: “We interpret § 1333(b) to

require that covered operations be (1) related to OCS

development; and (2) conducted on the OCS. Given

the second requirement, activity conducted off the

OCS, even though related to OCS mineral extraction,

does not satisfy § 1333(b).” Id. at 359. Accordingly, the

Fifth Circuit in Mills held that a welder injured

during the onshore construction of a platform de-

signed for the outer continental shelf was not eligible

for LHWCA benefits.

In this case, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with

both the Third and Fifth Circuits. Rejecting the Fifth

Circuit’s holding in Mills, it held that “a situs-of-

injury test is unambiguously absent from § 1333(b).”

Valladolid, 604 F.3d at 1135, App. 19a. However,

10

refusing to follow the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit

did not “find that Congress intended to enact a simple

‘but for’ test in covering injuries that occur ‘as the

result of’ outer continental shelf operations. Injuries

with a tenuous connection to the outer continental

shelf are not covered.” Jd. at 1139, App. 27a.

Instead, the Ninth Circuit adopted the following

test:

[T]he claimant must establish a substantial

nexus between the injury and extractive op-

erations on the shelf. To meet the standard,

the claimant must show that the work per-

formed directly furthers outer continental

shelf operations and is in the regular course

of such operations. An injury sustained dur-

ing employment on the outer continental

shelf itself would, by definition, meet the

standard. However, an accountant’s work-

place injury would not be covered even if re-

lated to outer continental shelf operations,

while a roustabout’s injury in a helicopter en

route to the outer continental shelf likely

would be. We leave more precise line-

drawing to the specific factual circumstances

of later cases.

Id., App. 28a.

Although the facts in this case are undisputed

(the decedent suffered fatal injuries while attempting

to harvest fruit at Pacific’s onshore facility), the

Ninth Circuit declined to decide whether they satis-

fied its “substantial nexus” test. Instead, it remanded

1]

the case for further consideration by the agency. /d. at

1142, App. 34a.

These three circuit courts are hopelessly divtded,

and their territories include a majority of the Nation’s

coastline, giving rise to the vast majority of OCSLA

claims. The purely legal question of whether outer

continental shelf workers injured on land are eligible

for OCSLA benefits therefore deserves this Court’s

review.

i. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETA-

TION OF OCSLA IS INCONSISTENT WITH

CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE AND THIS

COURT’S STATEMENTS.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case disre-

garded Congress’ purpose in enacting OCSLA. Before

the enactment of OCSLA in 1953, the outer conti-

nental shelf was “an area of intense activity that

lacked an established legal system because it lies

beyond state boundaries.” Mills, 877 F.2d at 358.

Consequently, “to define a body of law applicable to

the seabed, the subsoil, and the fixed structures ...

on the outer Continental Shelf,” Rodrigue v. Aetna

Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969), Congress

extended “[t]he Constitution and laws and civil and

political jurisdiction of the United States” to those

locales “to the same extent as if the outer Continental

Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction

located within a state....” 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1)

(2006). In the event no federal law existed on a

12

particular issue, Congress borrowed the adjacent

state’s law as surrogate federal law. 43 U.S.C.

§ 1333(a)(2\A) (2006).

“One obvious void in the law governing the OCS

was the lack of a workers’ compensation scheme for

thousands of workers employed in the dangerous

oilfield extraction industry. Congress filled that void

in § 1333(b) when it adopted the LHWCA’s benefits

provision to cover non-seamen employed in the oil

patch on the OCS.” Mills, 877 F.2d at 358.

No such void existed when outer continental

shelf workers were injured on land. Like the decedent

in this case, those workers were covered by the appli-

cable state workers’ compensation scheme. As the

Fifth Circuit in Mills correctly observed, “Congress

intended to regulate the OCS, not those areas that

already were governed by state law.” Jd. at 359. There

was no “legislative history suggesting that Congress

intended to single out OCSLA’s workers’ compensa-

tion scheme for different treatment.” Jd. The Ninth

Circuit’s decision anticipates that some outer conti-

nental shelf workers injured on land will be eligible

for OCSLA benefits (and even some workers who

never set foot on the outer continental shelf, so long

as their work “directly furthers outer continental

shelf development”), and to that extent the decision

runs afoul of Congress’ intentions.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision also has important

insurance consequences that are inconsistent with

Congress’ intentions. If, as the Ninth Circuit held

13

here, workers injured on land are entitled to both

state workers’ compensation benefits and OCSLA

benefits so long as their work “directly furthers outer

continental shelf operations,” Valladolid, 604 F.3d at

1139, App. 28a, then employers must purchase insur-

ance covering their liability to land based workers

(like the welder in Mills) under both the state and

federal compensation acts. As the Fifth Circuit ex-

plained, however, there is “no evidence indicating

that Congress intended to create such a cumbersome

and uncertain compensation scheme or that it in-

tended to intrude in a significant way on established

state workers’ compensation programs.” Mills, 877

F.2d at 362.

The Ninth Circuit believed its decision was

compelled by what it characterized as OCSLA’s plain

language, asserting that “a situs-of-injury test is

unambiguously absent from § 1333(b).” Valladolid,

604 F.3d at 1135, App. 19a. The language of § 1333(b)

is anything but plain, however. Interpreting the same

language, the Fifth Circuit showed that eligibility for

benefits rests on an injury occurring on the shelf:

although the phrase “‘[injured) as the result of opera-

tions conducted on the outer Continental Shelf for the

purpose of ... developing ... the natural resources

. of the [OCS])’ [in §1333(b)] is open to interpreta-

tion,” given the congressional purpose underlying

OCSLA, “under [a] . . . plausible reading of 43 U.S.C.

§ 1333(b), coverage requires that the relevant ‘opera-

tions’ out of which the injury arises occur on the

OCS.” Mills, 877 F.2d at 359.

14

Moreover, even if the Ninth Circuit’s interpreta-

tion of 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) were correct, there was no

reason for it to infer meaning from the absence of a

situs requirement. As two decisions of this Court

confirm, a situs requirement already appears in

§ 1333(a), which limits OCSLA’s coverage “to the

subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and

to all artificial islands, and all installations and other

devices permanently or temporarily attached to the

seabed....”; it was unnecessary for Congress to

repeat that requirement in 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b).

In one of those decisions, Offshore Logistics, Inc.

v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986), two offshore drill-

ing platform workers were killed when the helicopter

carrying them from the platform to the shore crashed

30 miles off the Louisiana coast. Their widows

brought actions against the owner and operator of the

helicopter. They claimed they were not limited to

awards of pecuniary damages provided by the Death

on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30308, but

were also entitled to nonpecuniary damages under

the Louisiana wrongful death statute, which applied

either of its own force, or as surrogate federal law

under OCSLA. See 43 U.S.C. § 1333(aX(2A) (2006).

This Court held that because the helicopter crash did

not occur in the area covered by OCSLA, but rather

on the high seas, the maritime remedy for wrongful

death under the Death on the High Seas Act con-

trolled:

We do not interpret § 4 of OCSLA, 43 U-S.C.,

§ 1333 to require or permit us to extend the

15

coverage of the statute to the platform

workers in this case who were killed miles

away from the platform and on the high seas

simply because they were platform worker#

Congress determined that the general scope

of OCSLA’s coverage, like the operation of

DOHSA’s remedies, would be determined

principally by locale, not by the status of the

individual injured or killed. Because the

fatalities underlying this suit did not arise

from an accident in the area covered by

OCSLA but rather occurred on the high seas,

DOHSA plainly was intended to control.

477 U.S. at 219-20.

In a footnote, this Court in Offshore Logistics

added:

Only one provision of OCSLA superimposes a

status requirement on the otherwise deter-

minative OCSLA situs requirement; § 1333(b)

makes compensation for the death or injury

of an “employee” resulting from certain oper-

ations on the Outer Continental Shelf paya-

ble under the Longshoreman’s and Harbor

Workers’ Compensation Act. We note that be-

cause this case does not involve a suit by an

injured employee against his employer pur-

suant to § 1333(b), this provision has no

bearing on this case.

477 U.S. at 220 n.2.

In Offshore Logistics, this Court referred to its

discussion in Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S.

16

414 (1985), regarding the “status and situs require-

ments of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’

Compensation Act as applied to platform workers

making claims against their employers... .” Offshore

Logistics, 477 U.S. at 220. In Herb’s Welding, a welder

who spent roughly three-fourths of his working time

on oil drilling platforms in state waters and the rest

on platforms on the outer continental shelf claimed a

direct right to LHWCA benefits after he was injured

on a platform in state waters. This Court held that he

did not have a direct right to LHWCA benefits be-

cause he was not engaged in maritime employment.

It declined to decide whether the welder was entitled

to benefits under OCSLA because the issue had not

been fully briefed in or discussed by the Court of

Appeals. Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. at 426 n.12, & 427.

Nonetheless, the Court made clear that entitlement

to benefits under that Act depended on situs as well

as status. Noting “the explicit geographical limitation

to the Lands Act’s incorporation of the LHWCA,” it

commented that “Gray would indeed have been

covered for a significant portion of his work-time, but

because of the Lands Act, not because he fell within

the terms of the LHWCA. ... [T]Jhat statute draws a

clear geographical boundary that will predictably

result in workers moving in and out of coverage.” Id.

at 427.

The Ninth Circuit here dismissed this Court’s

statements in Offshore Logistics and Herb’s Welding

as dicta. Valladolid, 604 F.3d at 1131-32 & n.2,

App. 9a-lla & n.2. But as the Fifth Circuit in Mills

17

correctly found, those statements firmly acknowledge

“the geographic boundaries to OCSLA’s coverage. .. .”

Mills, 877 F.2d at 361. They make clear that when a

worker seeks benefits under OCSLA, § 1333(b) does

not replace the Act’s situs requirement with a status

requirement. Rather, it “superimposes,” i.e., adds, a

status requirement to “the otherwise determinative

OCSLA situs requirement” found in § 1333(a). Off-

shore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 220 n.2. Consequently, a

worker will “mov{e] in and out of coverage,” Herb’s

Welding, 470 U.S. at 427, depending on where he is

working. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Mills, “[wle

cannot accept the Director’s explanation that the

Court meant to ‘replace’ situs with status when it

used ‘superimposes.’ The Court could not have made

it clearer that a worker must demonstrate status and

situs to recover LHWCA benefits under § 1333(b).”

Mills, 877 F.2d at 361.

In sum, the Ninth Circuit’s justifications for its

decision can be reconciled with neither Congressional

intent nor this Court’s statements in prior cases

involving the OCSLA. And as we have explained, the

Ninth Circuit’s decision deepens an existing circuit

split on a threshold issue of benefits eligibility and

formulates a test that provides no meaningful guid-

ance to administrative law judges and the Benefits

Review Board. The current three-way split among the

circuits regarding the interpretation of 43 U.S.C.

§ 1333(b) and the import of this Court’s statements in

Offshore Logistics and Herb’s Welding means that a

worker’s entitlement to OCSLA benefits for an injury

18

on land depends on the circuit in which the claim

arises, an intolerable situation. Only a decision by

this Court can bring clarity and consistency to this

area of the law.

+

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ

of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Horvitz & LEVY LLP

PEDER K. BATALDEN

*PETER ABRAHAMS

THOMAS, QUINN & KRIEGER, LLP

MICHAEL W. THOMAS

Counsel for Petitioners

Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP

and Insurance Company of

the State of Pennsylvania

*Counsel of Record

App. 1

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH Circuit

LUISA VALLADOLID,

Petitioner,

Vv.

. ~ a No. 08-73862

ACIFIC OPERATIONS OFFSHORE,

LLP; INSURANCE COMPANY OF BRB No. 07-965

THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; OPINION

and DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORK-

ERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,

Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order

of the Benefits Review Board

Argued and Submitted

March 9, 2010 — San Francisco, California

Filed May 13, 2010

Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Jay S. Bybee, Cir-

cuit Judges, and James V. Selna,* District Judge.

* The Honorable James V. Selna, United States District

Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designa-

tion.

App. 2

COUNSEL

Timothy K. Sprinkles, Law Office of Charles D.

Naylor, San Pedro, California, and Joshua T. Gillelan

II, Longshore Claimants’ National Law Center, Wash-

ington, DC, for the petitioner.

Michael W. Thomas, Laughlin, Falbo, Levy & Moresi

LLP, San Francisco, California, for the respondents.

OPINION

SELNA, District Judge:

In this case, we consider whether an employee

must be injured on the outer continental shelf to be

eligible for workers’ compensation benefits under the

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (““OCSLA”), 43

U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. The two other circuits that have

considered this question have reached conflicting

conclusions.

*

Decedent Juan Valladolid worked for Pacific

Operations Offshore as a roustabout, stationed pri-

marily on one of Pacific Operations’s two offshore

drilling platforms. He was killed, however, on the

grounds of Pacific Operations’s onshore oil-processing

facility when he was crushed by a forklift. His widow

seeks workers’ compensation benefits under OCSLA

and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensa-

tion Act (“LHWCA”), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.

App. 3

Pacific Operations runs two offshore oil drilling

platforms, the Hogan and the Houchin, both located

more than three miles off the coast of California.

Valladolid spent roughly 98% of his working time

aboard the Hogan. As a roustabout, his work primari-

ly consisted of cleaning and maintenance duties:

picking up litter, emptying trash cans, washing decks,

painting, fixing equipment, and helping load and

unload the platform crane.

Valladolid also spent time working at Pacific

Operations’s onshore oil flocculation facility, located

on the California coast just 250-300 feet from the

shore.’ This facility, referred to as La Conchita,

received crude oil slurry from the Hogan and the

Houchin via pipeline. The slurry would then be

processed, separating its oil, gas, water, and solid

constituents, with the oil and gas routed off site

through pipelines to third parties. Valladolid per-

formed maintenance duties at La Conchita, including

painting, sandblasting, weed-pulling, cleaning drain-

culverts, and operating a forklift.

Crew members traveled to and from the offshore

platforms on a crew boat departing from the Casitas

Pass Pier, located about three miles from La

Conchita. The crew boat was also used to ferry

’ Pacific contends that the facility is actually 250-300 yards

from the ocean. Because our decision does not turn on the

difference between 250-300 feet and 250-300 yards, we assume

for the purposes of this appeal that Petitioner’s measure is

correct.

App. 4

equipment and supplies and to remove scrap metal —

pieces of old pipe, storage tanks, catwalks, chain, and

cables — from the platforms. The scrap metal was

ferried to the Casitas Pass Pier, where it was loaded

into trucks and driven to La Conchita. There it was

dumped at various spots on the property. Neither the

loading crew at the pier nor the truck drivers were

employed by Pacific Operations.

One of Valladolid’s duties at La Conchita was to

“centralize” the scrap metal from the various loca-

tions so that third-party scrap metal vendors could

pick the metal up and haul it away. Valladolid would

use a forklift to retrieve the scattered metal and

transport it to a central location. The consolidation

process was performed roughly once every two years.

Valladolid was killed during this process when he was

crushed by a forklift.

Petitioner, Valladolid’s widow, received death

benefits under California’s workers’ compensation

scheme. She also filed a claim for benefits under

the LHWCA, both directly under the LHWCA and via

the OCSLA extension to outer continental shelf

workers. After informal proceedings before the local

district director of the Department of Labor’s Office of

Workers’ Compensation Programs, the matter was

referred to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).

The AL.J denied Petitioner’s OCSLA claim on the

grounds that Valladolid’s injury had occurred outside

the geographic situs of the outer continental shelf.

The ALJ denied the LHWCA claim on two grounds:

App. 5

(1) Valladolid was not engaged in maritime employ-

ment, and (2) he was not injured on a maritime situs.

The Benefits Review Board (“BRB”) upheld the AL.J’s

denial of the OCSLA benefits under the “situs-of-

injury” test, and affirmed the denial of LHWCA

benefits on the maritime situs ground. The BRB did

not reach the maritime employment issue.

I.

We have jurisdiction to review the final orders of

the BRB under 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). We review the

BRB’s decisions for errors of law and adherence to the

substantial evidence standard. Pedroza v. BRB, 583

F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2009). The BRB’s decisions

on questions of law are reviewed de novo. M. Cutter

Co. v. Carroll, 458 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 2006).

Because the BRB is not a policymaking body, its

constructions of the LHWCA are not entitled to

special deference. Dyer v. Cenex Harvest States Coop.,

563 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). However, the

Court must “respect the [BRB’s] interpretation of the

statute where such interpretation is reasonable and

reflects the policy underlying the statute.” Christen-

sen v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., 557 F.3d 1049, 1052

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting McDonald v. Dir., Office of

Workers’ Comp. Programs, 897 F.2d 1510, 1512 (9th

Cir. 1990)).

App. 6

iil.

The LHWCA provides compensation for the

disability or death of a maritime employee “if the

disability or death results from an injury occurring

upon the navigable waters of the United States.” 33

U.S.C. § 903(a). Under the OCSLA workers’ compen-

sation provision, LHWCA benefits are extended to:

[the] disability or death of an employee re-

sulting from any injury occurring as the re-

sult of operations conducted on the outer

Continental Shelf for the purpose of explor-

ing for, developing, removing, or transporting

by pipeline the natural resources, or involv-

ing rights to the natural resources, of the

subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental

Shelf.

43 U.S.C. § 1333(b). The outer continental shelf

is comprised of “all submerged lands lying seaward

and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable

waters” — that is, submerged lands lying outside the

territorial jurisdiction of the states. Jd. § 1331(a); see

id. § 1301(a)(2). State jurisdiction over offshore lands

generally extends three miles from the coast line,

though in certain cases not relevant here, it may

extend further. See id. § 1301(a)\2).

Petitioner contends that the BRB impermissibly

applied a “situs-of-injury” requirement for OCSLA

workers’ compensation, denying her claim because

her husband was killed on shore and not on the outer

continental shelf. This is an issue of first impression

in the Ninth Circuit. Two other circuits presented

App. 7

with this exact issue have reached conflicting conclu-

sions.

In Curtis v. Schlumberger Offshore Servicee Inc.,

849 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1988), the Third Circuit rejected

the situs-of-injury test and held that a claimant need

only satisfy a “but for” test in establishing that the

injury occurred “as the result of” operations on the

outer continental shelf. Jd. at 809-11. Accordingly, an

employee injured in a car accident on his way to meet

a helicopter that would take him to an offshore plat-

form was eligible for OCSLA disability benefits. Jd. at

806, 811.

However, in Mills v. Lirector, Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs, 877 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1989)

(en banc), the Fifth Circuit adopted a situs-of-injury

requirement for OCSLA claims. Under Mills, an

OCSLA claimant must show that the injury occurred

on an outer continental shelf platform or on the

waters above the outer continental shelf, in addition

to satisfying the “but for” test. Jd. at 362; see also

Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 586 F.3d 358, 366-67 (5th

Cir. 2009); Pickett v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 266

F.3d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 2001); Sisson v. Davis & Sons,

Inc., 131 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1998). Thus, a welder

injured during the onshore construction of a platform

destined for the outer continental shelf was not

eligible for OCSLA disability benefits. Mills, 877 F.2d

at 357, 362.

App. 8

A.

Aside from the two conflicting Court of Appeals

decisions, there is little precedent on the question

before us. The Supreme Court touched on the ques-

tion in passing in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire,

477 U.S. 207 (1986). The relevant issue there was

whether a _ choice-of-law provision in OCSLA, 43

U.S.C. § 1333(aX2XMA), applied so as to allow the

widows of employees killed in a helicopter crash to

pursue a wrongful death action under state law. Jd. at

209. Section 1333(aX2MA) applies the law of the

nearest state as surrogate federal law for “the subsoil

and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artifi-

cial islands and fixed structures erected thereon.” 43

U.S.C. § 1333(aX2MA). The Court declined to extend

this provision to an accident occurring on the waters

above the outer continental shelf, finding that “Con-

gress determined that the general scope of OCSLA’s

coverage ... would be determined principally by

locale, not by the status of the individual injured or

killed.” Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 219. In an accompany-

ing footnote, the Court added:

Only one provision of OCSLA superimposes a

status requirement on the otherwise deter-

minative OCSLA situs requirement; § 1333(b)

makes compensation for the death or injury

of an “employee” resulting from certain oper-

ations on the Outer Continental Shelf paya-

ble under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor

Workers’ Compensation Act. We note that

because this case does not involve a suit by

an injured employee against his employer

App. 9

pursuant to § 1333(b), this provision has no

bearing on this case.

Id. at 219 n.2.

Pacific Operations contends that this footnote is

dispositive of this case. We, on the other hand, agree

with the Third Circuit that Tallentire is simply not on

point. See Curtis, 849 F.2d at 810. Tullentire dealt

with the applicability of the § 1333(aX2)(A) choice-of-

law provision, not the § 1333(b) benefits provision, as

explicitly noted by the Court. 477 U.S. at 219 n.2

(“Section 1333(b)] has no bearing on this case”). The

Court’s footnote about § 1333(b) is textbook dictum.

Of course, we treat the considered dicta of the

Supreme Court with greater weight and deference “as

prophecy of what that Court might hold.” United

States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.17

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Zal v. Steppe, 968

F.2d 924, 935 (9th Cir. 1992) (Noonan, J., concurring

and dissenting)). They are not to be “blandly

shrugiged] ... off because they were not a holding.”

Zal, 968 F.2d at 935 (Noonan, J., concurring and

dissenting). We do not blindly, however, follow an

unconsidered statement simply because it was ut-

tered by the Supreme Court. See Montero-Camargo,

208 F.3d at 1132 n.17. As the Court itself has noted,

“general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken

in connection with the case in which those expres-

sions are used.... [TJheir possible bearing on all

other cases is seldom completely investigated.”

Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,

App. 10

627 (1935) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6

Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821)).

For the following reasons, we are convinced that

the footnote in Tutllentire is of the unconsidered

variety not entitled to special deference. The

§ 1333(b) benefits issue was not before the Court, was

not briefed by the parties, and had no relevance to

the case before it. See Tullentire, 477 U.S. at 219 &

n.2. There is no analysis or reasoning behind the

Court’s statement that a situs requirement applies to

§ 1333(b). See id. These circumstances strip the

dictum of any predictive or persuasive value. See

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816

n.25 (2008).

Moreover, the import of the Court’s statement to

the case at hand is debatable. The Court spoke gen-

erally of an OCSLA “situs” requirement, but it is not

clear that the Court’s statement requires a “situs-of-

injury,” as opposed to a “situs-of-operations,” test.

Section 1333(b) applies only to injuries occurring “as

the result of operations conducted on the outer Conti-

nental Shelf.” 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b). Clearly, the opera-

tions must be on the outer continental shelf. See

Herb’s Welding v. Gray (Herb’s Welding IT), 766 F.2d

898, 900 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that an injury occur-

ring on an oil platform in state waters is not eligible

for OCSLA benefits). It is less clear — and the

Tallentire footnote does not illuminate the issue —

App. 11

that.the injury must also be on the outer continental

shelf.’

The Ninth Circuit cases cited by the parties are

similarly unhelpful. In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Director,

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 812 F.2d

518 (9th Cir. 1986), a pipefitter/welder was injured

while working on an outer continental shelf platform

and sought benefits under OCSLA. Id. at 520. The

issue was whether he was an eligible “employee” even

though his work was “primarily land based.” Jd. at

521-22. This Court, finding him eligible for § 1333(b)

benefits, stated that:

[iIn the absence of any other limitation on

the face of the statute or in the legislative

history of [OCSLA], section 1333(b) should

* The Mills court also found support for its situs-of-injury

test in Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray (Herb’s Welding I), 470

U.S. 414 (1985). Mills, 877 F.2d at 361. The issue in Herb’s

Welding I was whether a worker on a platform in state waters

was engaged in “maritime employment” so as to entitle him to

benefits under the LHWCA. 470 U.S. at 415-16. The Fifth

Circuit found significance in the Court’s passing comment that

explicit geographic limitation to [OCSLA’s] incorporation of the

LHWCA. ... [TJhat statute draws a clear geographic boundary

that will predictably result in workers moving in and out of

coverage.” Id. at 427. As with Tullentire, however, the scope of

§ 1333(b) was never considered, rendering this passage unhelp-

ful on the issue before us. In fact, the Court explicitly declined to

consider whether the worker was entitled to OCSLA benefits

even though he had argued the issue throughout the proceed-

ings. Id. at 426 n.12.

App. 12

be construed as extending [LHWCA] cover-

age to all victims of disabling or fatal injuries

sustained while working to develop the min-

eral wealth of the OCS [outer continental

shelf].

Id. at 522. This passage does not directly apply to the

situs issue, as it came within the context of whether

the claimant met the § 1333(b) “employee” require-

ment. Id. at 522-23.

In A-Z International v. Phillips, 179 F.3d 1187

(9th Cir. 1999), this Court reviewed a BRB decision

vacating an AL.J’s order recommending sanctions for

a fraudulent OCSLA claim. Id. at 1189. In the under-

lying case, the ALJ had found the claimant ineligible

for OCSLA benefits because, contrary to his allega-

tion, his injury did not occur on an offshore platform

and he therefore failed to satisfy the situs-of-injury

test. Id. That decision was never appealed. Jd. How-

ever, on review of the subsequent sanctions order, this

Court stated in a footnote accompanying the recita-

tion of the facts:

The situs requirement is a predicate for cov-

erage under OCSLA. See 43 U.S.C. § 1333

(1994); see also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v.

Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 219 (1986) (noting

that “Congress determined that the general

scope of OCSLA’s coverage ... would be de-

termined principally by locale”).

Id. at 1189 n.1. We do not find this statement binding

or especially persuasive, given that the situs issue

was neither argued by the parties nor considered by

App. 13

the Court because the claimant never appealed the

decision on the situs question. Jd. at 1189. The issue

in A-Z International was a procedural question gbout

an AL.J’s contempt power. Jd. The comment on the

situs issue was gratuitous language appended to the

statement of facts and not a considered statement of

the law.

B.

Absent clear precedent to guide us on the situs-

of-injury issue, we are presented with a straightfor-

ward question of statutory construction. “The purpose

of statutory construction is to discern the intent of

Congress in enacting a particular statute.” Robinson

v. United States, 586 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quoting United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1174

(9th Cir. 1999)). We first look to the plain language of

the statute, which controls “unless its application

leads to unreasonable or impracticable results.” Jd. at

687 (quoting Daas, 198 F.3d at 1174). The plain

meaning is determined with an eye towards the

context of the language and design of the statute as a

whole. Jd. “It is a cardinal canon of statutory con-

struction that statutes should be interpreted harmo-

niously with their dominant legislative purpose.”

United States v. Gallenardo, 579 F.3d 1076, 1085 (9th

Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d

713, 720 (9th Cir. 2008)).

There are two distinct arguments that OCSLA’s

language supports a situs-of-injury requirement. The

App. 14

first argument — the route taken by the Fifth Circuit

in Mills — is that § 1333(b) itself contains the situs-of-

injury requirement. See 877 F.2d at 358-59. The

second argument — advanced by Pacific Operations —

is that the situs requirement of § 1333(a) applies to

OCSLA as a whole. For the reasons discussed below,

we find neither argument persuasive and find the

statute unambiguous in not requiring a situs-of-

injury test.

OCSLA was enacted in 1953 to establish federal

jurisdiction over the submerged lands beyond the

jurisdiction of the states in order to promote the

orderly exploitation of minerals lying below the

seabed. See Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395

U.S. 352 355-56 (1969); Outer Continental Shelf

Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462, 462

(1953); S. Rep. No. 83-411, at 2 (1953). As part of this

endeavor, Congress needed to establish a body of

substantive law to cover the outer continental shelf.

See Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355-56; S. Rep. No. 83-411,

at 2. Section 4 of OCSLA, codified at 43 U.S.C.

§ 1333, set forth the laws to be applied. § 4, 67 Stat.

at 462-63. For example, subsection (a) establishes the

substantive civil and criminal law applying to the

outer continental shelf, artificial islands, and plat-

forms fixed to the seabed. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a). Sub-

section (c) applies the National Labor Relations Act

(“NLRA”) to “any unfair labor practice ... occurring

upon any artificial island, installation, or other device

referred to in subsection (a).” Jd. § 1333(c). Subsection

(d) provides the Coast Guard with the authority to

App. 15

promulgate regulations governing the safety equip-

ment, warning devices, and other safety matters on

artificial islands and fixed platforms. Jd. § 1333(d).

Subsection (e) extends the Army’s authority to pre-

vent obstruction of the navigable waters to fixed

platforms on the outer continental shelf. Id. § 1333(e).

Section 1333(b) provides workers’ compensation

benefits for “any injury occurring as the result of

operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf.”

Id. §1333(b) (emphasis added). The situs-of-

operations requirement is clear; the operations must

be conducted on the outer continental shelf. However,

the only limitation on the injury is that it be “the

result of” operations on the outer continental shelf.

As many courts have recognized, the phrase “as the

result of” simply denotes causation. See, e.g., Brown

v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 119 (1994) (“as a result of”

in veterans’ benefits statute indicates causation with

no fault requirement); Murakami v. United States,

398 F.3d 1342, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“as a result

of” in federal claims statute indicates causation with

no temporal limitation); Black Hills Aviation, Inc. v.

United States, 34 F.3d 968, 975 (10th Cir. 1994) (“as a

result of” in Department of Defense regulation

means “caused by” rather than “connected with”).

Thus, the most natural reading of § 1333(b) provides

coverage for any injury caused by outer continental

shelf operations regardless of where the injury oc-

curred.

The Mills court found ambiguity in § 1333(b) by

focusing on the word “operations.” According to Millis,

App. 16

because the operations must occur on the outer conti-

nental shelf, the injury must also occur on the outer

continental shelf: “activity conducted off the OCS,

even though related to OCS mineral extraction, does

not satisfy § 1333(b).” 877 F.2d at 359. However, this

interpretation fails to acknowledge the connecting

phrase “as the result of.” The results of an operation

may regularly extend beyond its immediate physical

location. When a pitcher hits a batter with a pitch,

the batter’s injury is the result of “operations” on the

mound. The Fifth Circuit’s attempt to unearth ambi-

guity in § 1333(b) by ignoring a key phrase does not

persuade us.”

Neither are we persuaded that the situs limita-

tions in the other provisions of § 1333 indicate a

* Our position finds support in Murakami, a Federal Circuit

decision interpreting similar language in a reparations statute.

Murakami involved a claim under the Civil Liberties Act of

1988, which provided a redress payment for individuals who

were “deprived of liberty or property as a result of” the intern-

ment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. 398 F.3d at

1344 (emphasis added); 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-7(2). The claim-

ant challenged a regulation categorically denying payments to

individuals born after the restraints on travel were lifted.

Murakami, 398 F.3d at 1347-48. The Federal Circuit rejected

this categorical exclusion, noting that the result of the travel

restrictions could, in certain cases, extend beyond the date of

their repeal. Jd. at 1352-53. Murakami teaches that “as a result

of” contains no temporal limitation; likewise, in this case, we

see no reason to import a spatial one. If travel restrictions can

cause an injury after their repeal, similar logic supports the

view that operations on the outer continental shelf can cause

injury outside the outer continental shelf.

App. 17

situs-of-injury requirement for subsection (b). The

Mills majority felt that these limitations reflected a

Congressional intent to limit the reach of the statute

to occurrences on the outer continental shelf as part

of a “gap-filling” purpose. 877 F.2d at 359-60. We,

however, find the Mills dissent to be more persuasive:

the absence of a situs-of-injury requirement in sub-

section (b), in light of the explicit limitations in the

other subsections, reflects an intent not to limit that

subsection in the same manner. /d. at 362 (Duhe, J.,

dissenting). The different treatment of subsection (b)

is quite clear, given that it is the only subsection not

to incorporate the situs definition of subsection (a).

See 43 U.S.C. § 1333. This distinction ought to be

given effect.

Moreover, a comparison of the language of the

different provisions strongly implies that subsection

(b)’s coverage extends beyond the outer continental!

shelf. Subsection (c) applies the NLRA to unfair labor

practices “occurring upon any artificial island, instal-

lation, or other [fixed platform],” id. § 1333(c), while

subsection (b) provides coverage for injuries “occur-

ring as the result of operations conducted on the outer

Continental Shelf,” id. § 1333(b) (emphasis added).

Congress had the ability to craft a situs-of-injury

requirement — and did so within the very same sec-

tion of the statute — yet left it out of subsection (b).

See also Longshore & Harbor Workers’ Compensation

Act, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (limiting coverage to injuries

“occurring upon the navigable waters of the United

States” (emphasis added)). We should not read one in.

App. 18

Accordingly, we find that the language of

§ 1333(b) is unambiguous in not including a situs-of-

injury requirement. Indeed, our interpretation of

§ 1333(b) is confirmed by a Fifth Circuit decision,

Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., 280 F.3d 492, 500

(5th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds, Grand

Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d

778 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc), subsequent to Millis.

Demette held that “section 1333(b) contains only a

status requirement.” Jd. at 500 n.29. According to

Demette, the situs-of-injury requirement derives from

§ 1333(a)(1), which “creates a ‘situs’ requirement for

the application of other sections of the OCSLA, in-

cluding sections 1333(aX2) and 1333(b).” Id. at 496.

As Demette explains, “[iJn order for the LHWCA to

apply by virtue of section 1333(b), ... the injured

worker must satisfy the ‘status’ requirement of sec-

tion 1333(b) as well as the situs requirement of

section 1333(a\1).” Id. at 498. This is, however, a

misstatement of Mills’s holding, which clearly finds a

situs-of-injury requirement in the language of

§ 1333(b).‘ Mills, 877 F.2d at 362. This disagreement

* In fact, Demette ‘s interpretation of Mills would put that

decision in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision in

Tallentire. In an effort to avoid overruling its own precedent

applying OCSLA to helicopter crashes on the waters above the

outer continental shelf, Mills defined § 1333(b) as applying to

“injury or death on an OCS platform or the waters above the

OCS.” 877 F.2d at 362. Tullentire, however, expressly held that

§ 1333(a) does not apply to the waters above the outer continen-

tal shelf. 477 U.S. at 219. Had Mills pulled its situs-of-injury

(Continued on following page)

App. 19

among Fifth Circuit panels underscores the extent to

which Mills departed from the plain language of

§ 1333(b) and confirms what we find fairly obvious —

a situs-of-injury test is unambiguously absent from

§ 1333(b). |

The legislative history does not indicate other-

wise. The Mills court interpreted § 1333 as a “gap-

filler,” solely intended to fill a void in substantive law

due to the fact that the outer continental shelf lies

beyond state jurisdiction. See Mills, 877 F.2d at 358.

Therefore, Mills reasoned, no provision of OCSLA was

intended to apply outside that situs. The opinion cited

a statement during debate on the floor of the Senate

that “[OCSLA)] is legislatively joined with the Sub-

merged Lands Act.... [T]he Submerged Lands Act

deals with lands within State boundaries, while this

bill [OCSLA] concerns itself with the areas seaward

of such boundaries.” Jd. at 359 n.6 (quoting 99 Cong.

Rec. 6962 (daily ed. June 22, 1953) (statement of Sen.

Cordon)). The House Conference Report also notes

that under OCSLA “certain Federal laws are made

applicable to the [outer continental shelf] area such as

the [LHWCA].” H.R. Rep. No. 83-1031, at 12 (1953)

(Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added). |

However, certain legislative history cuts against

the gap-filing interpretation of § 1333(b). In particu-

lar, a provision allowing benefits only “if recovery for

test from § 1333(a), its holding would be inconsistent with

Tallentire.

App. 20

such disability or death through workmen’s compen-

sation proceedings is not provided by State law,” was

deleted from the original version of Section 4(c),

which became § 1333(b). S. Rep. No. 83-411, at 16

(1953). The Senate committee explained that “[i]t was

deemed inadvisable to have the [LHWCA)] apply only

if there is no applicable State law. By this amend-

ment, all workers on the outer shelf not already

protected under laws respecting seamen are protected

by the [LHWCA|].” Jd. at 23. The deletion of this anti-

overlap provision gives a clear indication that Con-

gress intended to provide LHWCA coverage regard-

less of the applicability of state law, seriously

undercutting the conception of § 1333(b) as a gap-

filler.*

This makes sense, given that at the time of

OCSLA’s enactment the workers’ compensation laws

of most relevant states provided coverage for injuries

occurring outside state jurisdiction if the employment

contract was made within the state. See, e.g.,

* Mills attempts to explain away the deletion, arguing that

it “indicates that, at most, Congress was prepared to tolerate

overlapping federal and state workers’ compensation coverage

on the OCS itself. But the proviso’s deletion does not justify

overlapping coverage for employees whose feet are planted

firmly on state soil.” Mills, 877 F.2d at 360. The Fifth Circuit

essentially concedes that § 1333(b) was not intended to be a gap-

filler. Its summary assertion that Congress was only willing to

“tolerate” overlapping coverage on the outer continental shelf

and nowhere else is supported by no more than general state-

ments by individual legislators that OCSLA “concerns itself”

with the outer continental shelf.

App. 21

Ohlhausen v. Sternberg Dredging Co., 218 La. 677,

680-81 (1951) (applying Louisiana workers’ compen-

sation statute to injury occurring in Arkansas);

Maryland Cas. Co. v. Brown, 131 Tex. 404, 406, 408

(1938) (holding that “an injury ‘outside the state’ [of

Texas] is compensable, regardless of where it may

occur” and noting that “practically every state in the

Union has made provision for extension of the bene-

fits of compensation laws to employees injured ‘out-

side the state’”); Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Indus.

Accident Comm’n of Cal., 1 Cal.2d 250, 257-58 (1934)

(holding that California workers’ compensation law

may apply to injury sustained in Alaska). Because

most state workers’ compensation laws applied extra-

territorially at the time, there was generally no gap

to fill.

Finally, Mills points to an exchange among

senators during the committee hearings where the

senators concluded that a worker on a platform above

state waters would be covered by state workers’

compensation laws even if the drilling slanted into

the outer continental shelf. Outer Continental Shelf:

Hearings on S. 1901 Before the Comm. on Interior

and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong. 15-16 (1953) (“OCS

Comm. Hearings”). The Mills majority relied on this

exchange as evidence of intent that the site of the

injury would control coverage. 877 F.2d at 359. The

reliance is unwarranted for two reasons. First, the

senators were debating the early version of the bill

that contained the anti-overlap provision that was

later deleted. See OCS Comm. Hearings, supra, at

App. 22

29-30. At that time, the issue of whether state law

applied was quite significant as it would preclude

OCSLA coverage. But the exchange loses its signifi-

cance in light of the subsequent deletion of the anti-

overlap provision.”

Second, the exchange came during the discussion

of Section 4(a) of the bill, the federal jurisdiction and

choice-of-law provision later codified at § 1333(a). Jd.

at 8-16. The committee was not yet considering the

text of Section 4(c), the workers’ compensation provi-

sion. See id. at 29. The slant-drilling hypothetical was

part of a discussion about the applicability of sub-

stantive law in general. See id. at 13-17. Workers’

compensation was simply an example used, along

with marriage and domestic laws, to illustrate the

bounds of the choice-of-law provision. See id. The

usefulness of this exchange in relation to the actual

text of Section 4(c) is minimal.

Considered as a whole, the legislative history is

inconclusive on the situs issue, other than establish-

ing that § 1333(b) was not intended to simply fill a

gap in workers’ compensation law. There is certainly

nothing clear enough to persuade us that our reading

of the statute is incorrect.

* In any case, the senators only concluded that state law

applied on state soil and never considered whether LHWCA

benefits might also apply. See id. at 15-16; Mills, 877 F.2d at 363

(Duhe, J., dissenting).

App. 23

Nor are we persuaded that policy considerations

compel the addition of a situs-of-injury requirement.

Pacific Operations points out the supposed absurdity

of workers receiving extra coverage on shore because

they “fortuitously” work to further outer continental

shelf operations. Pacific Operations also complains

about the burden on employers having to purchase

coverage under both state and federal schemes.

First, Congress clearly contemplated overlapping

coverage with the deletion of the anti-overlap provi-

sion in § 1333(b) and has enacted overlapping cover-

age in other related contexts. See 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)

(applying LHWCA coverage to shoreside activities);

Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 719-20

(1980). Second, the supposed absurdity in coverage is

a natural consequence of line-drawing, which is

Congress’s decision, not ours. Coverage is just as

absurd under the line drawn by Mills: an employee is

covered for a helicopter crash 3.1 miles from shore,

but not 2.9 miles, even though the activity and risk is

identical. Finally, Congress may have had good

reason to apply uniform coverage across the full

range of activities of an outer continental shelf work-

er — including work on a platform, in transit to and

from a platform, on pipelines between platforms and

shore, or at onshore facilities crucial to the mineral

extraction process — so that a worker does not step in

and out of coverage.

In any case, it is not necessary to speculate about

policy, as the language of § 1333(b) is clear in not con-

taining a situs-of-injury requirement. “[I]f Congress’

App. 24

coverage decisions are mistaken as a matter of policy,

it is for Congress to change them. We should not

legislate for them.” Herb’s Welding I, 470 U.S. at 427.

Because the language is unambiguous and the legis-

lative history and policy considerations do not compel

a contrary result, we find that § 1333(b) does not

contain a situs-of-injury requirement.

C.

Pacific Operations presents a different argument,

contending that § 1333(a) sets forth a situs require-

ment that is intended to apply to all of § 1333, includ-

ing subsection (b). This is a novel argument; it has no

support in either Mills, the Fifth Circuit decision, or

Curtis, the Third Circuit decision. The only case

supporting the proposition is Demette, the Fifth

Circuit decision that misstates Mills’ holding.

Section 1333(a)(1) provides that:

The Constitution and laws and civil and po-

litical jurisdiction of the United States are

extended to the subsoil and seabed of the

outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial

islands, and all installations and other de-

vices permanently or temporarily attached to

the seabed, ... to the same extent as if the

outer Continental Shelf were an area of ex-

clusive Federal jurisdiction located within a

State.

43 U.S.C. § 1333(aX1). This subsection simply pro-

vides for federal law and jurisdiction over the situs.

App. 25

Nothing in the language purports to limit the ap-

plicability of the Constitution, federal laws, or juris-

diction to the outer continental shelf, nor is there

anything applying the subsection (a)(1) situs to any

other parts of § 1333.

Section 1333(a)(2) does not provide a basis for an

overarching situs requirement either. It states that:

the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent

State ... are declared to be the law of the

United States for that portion of the subsoil

and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf,

and artificial islands and fixed structures

erected thereon, which would be within the

area of the State if its boundaries were ex-

tended seaward to the outer margin of the

outer Continental Shelf.

Id. § 1333(aX2)A). Again, nothing purports to limit

state law to the subsection (a) situs, nor to apply that

situs to the other § 1333 subsections. ,

This is consistent with the structure of § 1333.

Each subsection has its own situs definition, some

broader and some narrower than subsection (a)’s. For

example, the subsection (c) situs is narrower, apply-

ing the NLRA to unfair labor practices “occurring

upon any artificial island, installation, or other device

referred to in subsection (a),” but not to occurrences

on the subsoil or seabed. Jd. § 1333(c). The subsection

(d) situs is broader, allowing Coast Guard safety

regulations for “the artificial islands, installations,

and other devices referred to in subsection (a) of

App. 26

this section or on the waters adjacent thereto.” Id.

§ 1333(d) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court

held in Tullentire, § 1333({a) does not apply to the

waters above the outer continental shelf. 477 U.S. at

219. If subsection (a) was intended to be a strict situs

requirement for the entire statute, there would be no

need for individualized situs tests for each subsection,

much less ones that are inconsistent with subsection

(a).

Moreover, each subsection expressly incorporates

a portion of the subsection (a) situs in their own situs

definitions — with the significant exception of subsec-

tion (b), the workers’ compensation provision. If

subsection (a) applied to all other provisions by its

own terms, there would be no need for those provi-

sions to independently incorporate parts of it. And

because subsection (a) is referenced in each subsec-

tion except subsection (b), the obvious conclusion is

that subsection (b) was not intended to be limited by

subsection (a).

The legislative history of § 1333 also conclusively

demonstrates that subsection (a) was not intended to

limit the other provisions. Subsection (b) was origi-

nally a jurisdictional provision, providing federal

courts with “original jurisdiction of cases and contro-

versies arising out of or in connection with any opera-

tions conducted on the outer Continental Shelf.” Pub.

L. No. 83-212, § 4(b), 67 Stat. 462, 463 (1953) (em-

phasis added). This was clearly meant to encompass

App. 27

more than just occurrences on the subsection (a)

situs.’

The theory that subsection (a) provides #@ situs

requirement applicable to all of § 1333 is simply

inconsistent with its plain language, statutory struc- -

ture, and legislative history. Subsection (a) merely

extends federal jurisdiction and federal and state law

to the outer continental shelf. It has no applicability

beyond that purpose, other than to provide a situs

definition that several other provisions expressly

incorporate. Because subsection (b) does not incorpo-

rate (a), that provision has no bearing on our analy-

sis.

We hold that § 1333(b) may apply to injuries

occurring outside the situs of the outer continental

shelf, so long as they occur “as the result of opera-

tions conducted on the outer continental shelf.”

D.

We do not, however, find that Congress intended

to enact a simple “but for” test in covering injuries

that occur “as the result of” outer continental shelf

" When the statute was amended in 1978 to merge subsec-

tion (b) with the workers’ compensation provision in subsection

(c), the House Conference Report stated that “this amendment

involves no change in existing law. It was not the intent ... to

alter in any way the existing coverage of the [LHWCA].” H.R.

Rep. 95-1474, at 81 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1978

U.S.C.C.A.N. 1674, 1680.

App. 28

operations. Injuries with a tenuous connection to the

outer continental shelf are not covered. Cf. Black

Hills Aviation, 34 F.3d at 975 (“as a result of” re-

quires more than just a “connection with”). Thus, we

do not agree with, and decline to adopt, the Third

Circuit’s decision in Curtis to the extent that it re-

quires only a “but for” test of causation. See 849 F.2d

at 811.

Instead, we adopt the following test: the claimant

must establish a substantial nexus between the

injury and extractive operations on the shelf. To meet

the standard, the claimant must show that the work

performed directly furthers outer continental shelf

operations and is in the regular course of such opera-

tions. An injury sustained during employment on the

outer continental shelf itself would, by definition,

meet this standard. However, an accountant’s work-

place injury would not be covered even if related to

outer continental shelf operations, while a rousta-

bout’s injury in a helicopter en route to the outer

continental shelf likely would be. We leave more

precise line-drawing to the specific factual circum-

stances of later cases.

This is consistent with the pre-Mills Fifth Circuit

interpretation of § 1333(b), which we endorse. Prior to

Mills, the Fifth Circuit had long held that § 1333(b)

applied to injuries occurring outside the outer conti-

nental shelf. See Nations v. Morris, 483 F.2d 577

(5th Cir. 1973) (“OCSLA, in its incorporation of [the

LHWCA|], did not speak in terms of injuries occurring

on such platforms so as to distinguish them from

App. 29

those off the platforms ... Obviously Congress pur-

posefully established a system that would apply

without regard to physical location.”). However, it

required a more direct connection than simple “but

for” causation. In Herb’s Welding II, the Fifth Circuit

denied OCSLA benefits to a welder working on a

platform in state waters, even though it was connect-

ed by pipeline to platforms on the outer continental

shelf, upon which the welder spent approximately

25% of his time. 766 F.2d at 899-900. The court

reasoned that the accident would have occurred

regardless of whether the employer had the outer

continental shelf rigs. Jd. at 900. It contrasted heli-

copter crash cases where the employee’s “work had

furthered the operations of a fixed rig on the shelf

and was in the regular course of extractive operations

on the shelf.” Jd.

In Mills v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensa-

tion Programs, 846 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1988), rev’d en

banc, 877 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1989), the three-judge

panel decision later reversed by the Mills en banc

panel, the court clarified the scope of the then-

prevailing “but for” test in the Fifth Circuit:

Our decision does not extend LHWCA cover-

age to those whose connection with opera-

tions on the Shelf is tenuous. Workers like

[the welder in Herb’s Welding IT] whose work

is only indirectly connected with the Shelf

will still not be covered. The “but for” test

this Circuit has adopted is not the simple

“causa sine qua non” test of tort law, but

App. 30

includes the requirement that the claimant

show a nexus between the work being done

and operations on the shelf similar to the

proximate cause test in tort law; it requires

that the work “further[s] the operation of a

fixed rig on the shelf and [is] in the regular

course of extractive operations on the shelf.”

Id. at 1015 (quoting Herb’s Welding II, 766 F.2d at

900) (footnote omitted). Applying this test, the court

held that a welder injured during the onshore con-

struction of a platform destined for the outer conti-

nental shelf was covered by OCSLA. Id. This holding

was, of course, reversed by the Fifth Circuit en banc

panel in a 9-5 vote. Mills, 877 F.2d at 357.

In this case, the BRB affirmed the dismissal of

Petitioner’s OCSLA claim because Valladolid’s injury

did not satisfy the Mills situs-of-injury test. Because

we decline to adopt that test, we remand the OCSLA

question to the BRB for further consideration con-

sistent with this opinion.

IV.

We next consider whether the BRB erred in

denying benefits under the LHWCA. Under 33 U.S.C.

§ 903(a):

compensation shall be payable under this

chapter in respect of disability or death of an

employee, but only if the disability or death

results from an injury occurring upon the

navigable waters of the United States (in-

cluding any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock,

App. 31

terminal, building way, marine railway, or

other adjoining area customarily used by an

employer in loading, unloading, repairing,

dismantling, or building a vessel).

A LHWCA “employee” is “any person engaged in

maritime employment.” Jd. § 902(3). Thus, a claimant

seeking workers’ compensation under the LHWCA

must establish both a maritime situs and a maritime

status. Herb’s Welding I, 470 U.S. at 415-16; Peru v.

Sharpshooter Spectrum Venture LLC, 493 F.3d 1058,

1061 (9th Cir. 2007).

Petitioner contends that the BRB erred in affirm-

ing the ALJ’s determination that the onshore La

Conchita facility, where Valladolid was killed, was not

a maritime situs. Petitioner does not contest the

ALJs factual findings regarding the facility, but

argues that the BRB should have reversed the ALJ on

the legal question of whether La Conchita qualifies as

an “adjoining area customarily used by an employer

in loading [or] unloading ... a vessel.” Id. § 903(a).

We reject Petitioner’s position and affirm the BRB.

We use a “functional relationship” test in deter-

mining whether a particular facility is a § 903(a)

“adjoining area.” Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v.

Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 141 (9th Cir. 1978). We consid-

er, among other factors:

the particular suitability of the site for the

maritime uses referred to in the statute;

whether adjoining properties are devoted

primarily to uses in maritime commerce; the

App. 32

proximity of the site to the waterway; and

whether the site is as close to the waterway

as is feasible given all of the circumstances

in the case.

Id. Aithough physical congruity with navigable water

is not required, the facility must be “used as an

integral part of longshoring operations.” Jd.

Applying the Herron factors, we agree with the

BRB that La Conchita is not a maritime situs. Al-

though the facility is only 250-300 feet from the

ocean, it is separated from the water by a highway

and railroad tracks and has no direct access to any

pier, dock, or other loading facility. See Motoviloff v.

Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 692 F.2d 87,

89 (9th Cir. 1982). The closest pier used by Pacific

Operations is the Casitas Pass Pier, roughly three

miles away. There are no adjoining properties en-

gaged in maritime commerce.

Petitioner argues that La Conchita should be

considered a “transshipment” facility because scrap

metal from the offshore platforms was dumped there

before being sold to third parties. Petitioner analogiz-

es to PC. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69 (1979),

where the Supreme Court held that two warehouse-

men, who handled cargo within a port but were not

permitted to move cargo directly from or onto a

vessel, were LHWCA “employees.” Jd. at 71, 83. The

Court held that the warehousemen “were engaged in

maritime employment because they were engaged in

App. 33

intermediate steps of moving cargo between ship and

land transportation.” Jd. at 82-83.

We find the analogy unpersuasive. Firs of all,

Pfeiffer never addressed the situs requirement be-

cause the injuries occurred on a dock and a pier,

which are indisputably maritime situs. Second, the

handling of scrap metal at La Conchita did not in-

volve “moving cargo directly from ship to land trans-

portation.” Id. The scrap metal was unloaded at the

pier by third-party longshoremen, loaded into trucks

driven by third-party drivers, and driven three miles

to La Conchita, where it was dumped and would wait

for up to two years before being hauled away by

third-party dealers. The maritime activities — the

movement of cargo “directly from ship to land trans-

portation” — began and ended at the Casitas Pass

Pier. Finally, La Conchita is simply not an “adjoining

area” within the meaning of § 903(a). It is three miles

from the pier and not adjacent to any maritime

facilities.

The record demonstrates that the primary pur-

pose of the facility — and the only reason for its prox-

imity to the coastline — is to receive and process crude

oil slurry extracted by the offshore platforms, a non-

maritime activity. Herb’s Welding I, 470 U.S. at 422-

24. Its use as a convenient dumping ground for scrap

metal from the platforms does not convert it into a

maritime situs.

Accordingly, we affirm the BRB’s denial of bene-

fits under the LHWCA. Because Valladolid’s injury

App. 34

does not satisfy the situs requirement, and because

the BRB did not reach the status issue, we do not

address whether Valladolid was a maritime employee.

Williams v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs,

825 F.2d 246, 247 (9th Cir. 1987); Hurston v. Dir.,

Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 989 F.2d 1547,

1548 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1993).

V.

We hold that the OCSLA workers’ compensation

provision, 43 U.S.C. $ 1333(b), applies to any injury

resulting from operations on the outer continental

shelf, regardless of the location of the injury. An

injury is “the result of” outer continental shelf opera-

tions if there is a substantial nexus between the

injury and the operations. We therefore reject the

situs-of-injury test adopted by the BRB, and remand

for further considerations consistent with this opin-

ion.

We also hold that the BRB did not err in finding

that La Conchita was not a maritime situs. Accord-

ingly, we affirm the denial of workers’ compensation

benefits under the LHWCA.

Each side shall bear its owns costs.

GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, and RE-

MANDED.

App. 35

U.S. Department of Labor [SEAL]

Benefits Review Board

P.O. Box 37601

Washington DC 20013-7601

BRB No. 07-0965

L.V. )

(Widow of J.V.) ) PUBLISHED

Claimant-Petitioner ;

We )

PACIFIC OPERATIONS ) DATE ISSUED:

OFFSHORE, LLP ) AUG 12 2008

and

INSURANCE COMPANY )

OF THE STATE OF )

PENNSYLVANIA )

Employer/Carrier- )

Respondents ) DECISION

) and ORDER

Appeal of the Order Denying the Claimant's

Motion to Withdraw or Amend Admissions,

Denying the Respondents’ Motion to Strike,

and Granting Summary Decision of William

Dorsey, Administrative Law Judge, United

States Department of Labor.

Joshua T. Gillelan II (Longshore Claimants’

National Law Center), Washington, D.C., and

Timothy K. Sprinkles (Law Offices of Charles

D. Naylor), San Pedro, California, for claim-

ant.

App. 36

Michael W. Thomas and Shana L. Prechtl

(Laughlin, Falbo, Levy & Moresi), San Fran-

cisco, California, for employer/carrier.

Before: DOLDER, Chief Administrative

Appeals Judge, McGRANERY and HALL,

Administrative Appeals Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Claimant’ appeals the Order Denying the Claim-

ant’s Motion to Withdraw or Amend Admissions,

Denying the Respondents’ Motion to Strike, and

Granting Summary Decision (2005-LHC-0343) of Ad-

ministrative Law Judge William Dorsey rendered on

a claim filed pursuant to the provisions of the Long-

shore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, as

amended, 33 U.S.C. §901 et seq. (the Act), as extended

by. the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.

§1301 et seg. (OCSLA). We must affirm the adminis-

trative law judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of

law if they are supported by substantial evidence, are

rational, and are in accordance with law. 33 U.S.C.

§921(b)\3); O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls

Associates, Inc., 380 U.S. 359 (1965).

Decedent worked for employer as a roustabout

primarily at its offshore oil platforms, designated as

Hogan and Houchin, which are located more than

three miles off the coast of California, on the Outer

Continental Shelf. Decedent also occasionally worked

' Claimant is decedent’s surviving spouse.

App. 37

at employer’s crude oil flocculation facility, designated

La Conchita, in Ventura, California. On June 2, 2004,

decedent was directed by his immediate supervisor,

Gordon Boswell, to take a forklift to the rear yard of

the La Conchita plant and clean up some scrap metal

debris. Mr. Boswell stated that approximately an

hour and fifteen minutes later he found decedent

‘ying on his back next to a plantain tree roughly ten

feet off of one of the service roads within the plant

facility, with the forklift resting on his abdomen and

chest.

Decedent was pronounced dead at 5:27 p.m. as a

result of asphyxia by abdominal and chest compres-

sion. An accident report stated that it appeared that

decedent stood on top of the raised tines of the forklift

to harvest fruit hanging from the plantain tree be-

yond the reach of a person on the ground. Presum-

ably, the forklift was stopped while he did this, but for

some unknown reason, the forklift moved forward,

which caused decedent to lose his balance, fall in

front of the forklift, and sustain fatal injuries when it

rolled on top of him.

Claimant filed the instant claim, alleging that

decedent’s death was covered under either the Act or

its OCSLA extension, since decedent was engaged in

both maritime and oil production employment at

covered locations.. Employer controverted the claim

* Employer paid benefits pursuant to the California Work-

ers’ Compensation Act for 52 weeks following decedent’s death

(Continued on following page)

App. 38

on coverage grounds and subsequently moved for

summary decision with the administrative law judge,

citing a lack of coverage under both the Act and the

OCSLA.

Addressing employer’s motion for summary deci-

sion, the administrative law judge found that claim-

ant failed to submit any evidence raising an issue of

fact that her claim falls within the coverage of either

the Act or the OCSLA.* The administrative law judge

also found that employer is entitled to summary

decision as a matter of law because, applying the

undisputed facts to the applicable law, he found that

decedent was not a maritime worker on a maritime

situs, and/or was not killed in a location that satisfies

the OCSLA’s situs requirement. Accordingly, the ad-

ministrative law judge found that claimant is not en-

titled to benefits under either the Act or the OCSLA.

He thus granted employer’s motion for summary

decision.

at a rate of $807.69 per week. The parties agreed that decedent's

average weekly wage at the time of his death was $928.22.

* In his decision, the administrative law judge also found

that claimant is deemed to have admitted all of the requests for

admissions put forth by employer on February 25, 2005, by oper-

ation of 29 C.F.R. §18.20, since claimant failed to serve her

responses to employer's requests within thirty days of service.

The administrative law judge then considered but rejected

claimant’s motion to withdraw or amend the deemed admissions

based on his finding that claimant’s “confusing, evasive, and late

answers” have prejudiced employer's ability to defend the claim.

App. 39

On appeal, claimant challenges the administra-

tive law judge’s grant of employer’s motion for sum-

mary decision and consequent denial of benefits

under the Act and/or OCSLA. Employer responds,

urging affirmance.

For a claim to be covered by the Act, a claimant

must establish that the injury occurred upon the

navigable waters of the United States, including any

dry dock, or that it occurred on a landward area cov-

ered by Section 3(a), and that the employee’s work is

maritime in nature and is not specifically excluded by

the Act. 33 U.S.C. §§902(3), 903(a); Director, OWCP v.

Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 15 BRBS

62(CRT) (1983); PC. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69,

11 BRBS 320 (1979); Northeast Marine Terminal Co.

v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 6 BRBS 150 (1977). Thus, in

order to demonstrate that coverage under the Act

exists, a claimant must satisfy the “situs” and the

“status” requirements of the Act. Id.; see also Crapan-

zano v. Rice Mohawk, U.S. Constr. Co., Ltd., 30 BRBS

81 (1996).

Claimant argues that the administrative law

judge erred in finding that employer’s La Conchita

facility does not meet the situs requirement of the

Act. Section 3(a) of the Act provides, in pertinent

part, that:

compensation shall be payable under this

chapter ... only if the disability or death

results from an injury occurring upon the

navigable waters of the United States (in-

cluding any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock,

App. 40

terminal, building way, marine railway, or

other adjoining area customarily used by an

employer in loading, unloading, repairing,

dismantling, or building a vessel).

33 U.S.C. §903(a). The United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Ninth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this

case arises, has held that the phrase “adjoining area”

should be read to describe a site which has a func-

tional relationship with maritime commerce and a

geographical nexus with navigable waters.‘ Brady-

Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137,

7 BRBS 409 (9th Cir. 1978).

The administrative law judge found that claim-

ant did not establish the situs requirement, as there

is no evidence establishing that employer’s La

Conchita facility has a functional relationship with

any maritime commerce. The record establishes that

the La Conchita facility, which is located approxi-

mately 250 to 300 feet from the Pacific Ocean, is a

receiving station for the petroleum and oil that is

pumped from the two offshore platforms. Employer’s

Exhibit (EX) 2, Dep. at 15. Specifically, a mixture of

elements called “slurry” is pumped through pipelines

from the platforms to the plant, where it is processed

into oil, water, gas and solids. EX 2, Dep. at 34; EX

14, Dep. at 13. The processed oil and gas are then

shipped away from La Conchita by pipeline to third

* The record contains no evidence, nor does claimant raise

any contention, that decedent’s death occurred at one of the sites

specifically enumerated in Section 3(a), 33 U.S.C. §903(a).

App. 41

parties. EX 2, Dep. at 34; EX 14, Dep. at 16. The

facility has numerous storage tanks which tempo-

rarily hold the slurry, as well as the processed oil and

gas, and its byproducts. EX 2, Dep. at 33-34. How-

ever, there is no evidence that the La Conchita

facility is customarily used by employer in loading,

unloading, repairing, dismantling or building a

vessel. As such, it has no functional relationship with

navigable water, i.e., the Pacific Ocean.

Additionally, the La Conchita facility served as a

storage area for scrap metal which came from the

platforms and from around the plant. EX 2, Dep. at

40; EX 14, Dep. at 33. Specifically, the scrap metal

consisted of old pipe, old pieces of storage tanks, old

catwalk, old chain, and/or old cable. EX 2, Dep. at 42.

Scrap metal from the offshore platforms would be

initially collected in bins, which once full, would be

loaded on the crew boat. The scrap metal was then

unloaded from the crew boat at the Casitas Pass Pier

and loaded onto a truck and delivered to the La

Conchita facility, which is approximately three miles

away. EX 2, Dep. at 42. The truck, operated by a

third-party contractor, would dump the scrap metal

out of the bins at various locations around the La

Conchita facility. Id.; EX 14, Dep. at 32. The scrap

metal would, perhaps once every two years, be “cen-

tralized” by workers at the La Conchita plant, in-

cluding decedent, who was performing this work at

the time of his death, and thereafter sold by the ton

to contractors. EX 2, Dep. at 43; EX 14, Dep. at 33-34.

The contractors would come in and cut the scrap

App. 42

metal into manageable pieces, put it into bins, and

then haul it away to a metal scrap yard. Jd. As for

other necessities related to employer’s oil operations,

“tools and parts and equipment [necessary for the

platforms] all come from different vendors all over

Southern California and the United States,” EX 14,

Dep. at 17, and they are “shipped by the vendors”

directly to the staging area at the pier. EX 14, Dep. at

21. Thus, there is no evidence that the La Conchita

facility served as a staging area for employer’s use of

the Casitas Pass Pier for either its employees or

equipment.

The undisputed facts support the administrative

law judge’s finding that employer’s La Conchita

facility is not a covered situs pursuant to Section 3(a)

of the Act. Specifically, there is no evidence that the

La Conchita facility is an “adjoining area customarily

used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing,

dismantling, or building a vessel.” 33 U.S.C. §903(a).

Rather, the proximity of employer’s La Conchita

facility to navigable waters is not dictated by mari-

time concerns. Bennett v. Matson Terminals, Inc.,

14 BRBS 526 (1981), aff’d sub nom. Motoviloff v.

Director, OWCP, 692 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1982). It there-

fore has no functional nexus with any maritime

activities. Sisson v. Davis & Sons, Inc., 131 F.3d 555,

31 BRBS 199 CRT) (5th Cir. 1998); Charles v. Uni-

versal Ogden Services, 37 BRBS 37 (2003) (Board

affirmed administrative law judge’s finding that

claimant’s injury did not occur on an “adjoining area”

where the proximity of employer’s facility to the

App. 43

Mississippi River was not dictated by maritime

concerns and there was no functional relationship

between employer’s warehouse and the Mississippi

River in that the area is not used for loading, unload-

ing, building or repairing vessels); cf. Waugh v. Matt’s

Enterprises, Inc., 33 BRBS 9 (1999) (field where scrap

metal is hauled from barges is covered situs). Conse-

quently, as the undisputed facts establish that em-

ployer’s La Conchita facility, where the employee's

death occurred, was not used for loading, unloading,

repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel, we affirm

the administrative law judge’s finding that decedent’s

injury did not occur on a situs covered under the Act.

See generally Arjona v. Interport Maintenance Co.,

Inc., 34 BRBS 15 (2000); Bennett, 14 BRBS 526. We,

therefore, affirm the administrative law judge’s find-

ing that claimant has not established coverage under

the Act and his grant of summary judgment for

employer on this issue.”

Alternatively, claimant contends that the admin-

istrative law judge erred in denying benefits under

the OCSLA. Claimant argues that the administrative

law judge committed legal error by stating that the

* Thus, we need not address claimant’s assertions regarding

the administrative law judge’s finding that claimant did not

establish the status element under the Act, as our affirmance of

the administrative law judge’s situs finding renders the status

issue moot in this case. Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S.

297, 15 BRBS 62(CRT); Williams v. Director, OWCP, 825 F.2d

246, 20 BRBS 25(CRT) (9th Cir. 1987), aff’g Williams v. Pan

Marine Construction, 18 BRBS 98 (1986).

App. 44

decision of the United States Supreme Court in

Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986),

as well as decisions rendered by the United States

Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits,

require a situs-of-injury test, as opposed to only a

situs-of-mineral extraction operations test, in order to

establish coverage under the OCSLA. In particular,

claimant argues that the Fifth Circuit stated, in

Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 500

n. 29, 35 BRBS 136 n. 29(CRT) (5th Cir. 2002), that

the OCSLA contains “only a status requirement,” and

moreover, that the Ninth Circuit, in whose juris-

diction the instant case arises, similarly held that

Section 1333(b) imposed only a “but for” test related

to covered offshore operations and contained no situs-

of-injury requirement. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Director,

OWCP, 812 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1987), aff’g Robarge v.

Kaiser Steel Corp., 17 BRBS 213 (1985).

Compensation is available under the Longshore

Act for injuries to non-seaman [sic] occurring as a

result of operations on the OCS for the purpose of

“exploring for, developing, or producing resources” on

the OCS. 43 U.S.C. §1333(a\X1), (b); Tallentire, 477

U.S. 207; Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,

395 U.S. 352 (1969); Kaiser Steel Corp, 812 F.2d at

520. The issue in this case concerns whether the

OCSLA applies only if the employee’s injury or death

occurs on the OCS.*

* Broadly speaking, the OCS requires that the employee be

engaged in work in furtherance of the exploration, development,

(Continued on following page)

App. 45

In Curtis v. Schlumberger Offshore Service, Inc.,

849 F.2d 805, 21 BRBS 61(CRT) (3d Cir. 1988), the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

held that a claimant, injured on a highway in New

Jersey on his way to a heliport to be transported to

the OCS, was covered under the OCSLA. The court

rejected a situs requirement for OCSLA coverage, and

imposed only a “but for” test, t.e., would the claimant

have sustained injuries “but for” the operations on

the shelf. The court noted that there was no limi-

tation in Section 1333(b) to “artificial islands and

fixed structures” as there is in Section 1333(a)1).’

removal, or transportation of natural resources (the “but for” or

status test) from the subsoil and seabed of the OCS or any arti-

ficial stand or installation attached to or erected on the seabed

of the OCS (the situs test). The Board’s decision in Robarge, 17

BRBS 213, did not address the situs-of-injury issue, as it noted

that the only issue requiring resolution involved status under

the OCSLA. Specifically, the Board recognized that, as employer

conceded that claimant’s injury occurred during construction of

a fixed platform located on the outer continental shelf, i.c.,

employer conceded situs under the OCSLA, the only question

was whether claimant's activities in platform construction

constituted “development” for purposes of 43 U.S.C. §1331(a\(1).

" The Third Circuit noted that Section 1333(a) of the pre-

1978 version of the Lands Act makes no references to injuries

and is a provision intended for the separate purpose of asserting

federal jurisdiction over the seabed underlying the outer con-

tinental shelf. Curtis, 849 F.2d at 809, 21 BRBS at 68 (CRT).

It further stated that the only criteria Section 1333(b) imposes

for securing Longshore benefits is for injured employees to be

involved in “any operations conducted on the outer continental

shelf for the purpose of exploring for, [and] developing the

natural resources of the outer continental shelf.” Jd.; 43 U.S.C.

§1333(b).

App. 46

Id. It therefore construed Section 1333(b) as extend-

ing Longshore Act coverage to all employees who

sustain injuries while working to develop the mineral

wealth of the OCS. Curtis, 849 F.2d at 810, 21 BRBS

at 70 (CRT).

Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit held, in Mills v.

Director, OWCP, 877 F.2d 356, 22 BRBS 97(CRT) (5th

Cir. 1989) (en banc), that the claimant, who was a

land-based worker injured during construction on

state land of an oil production platform destined for

the OCS, did not qualify for benefits under the

OCSLA because he did not satisfy the situs-of-injury

requirement.* In reaching its conclusion, the Fifth

Circuit stated that, in furtherance of Congressional

intent “to establish a bright-line geographic boundary

for Section 1333(b) coverage,” the OCSLA applies to

those who “suffer injury or death on an OCS platform

or the waters above the OCS” and who “satisfy the

‘but for’ status test” described in Herb’s Welding, Inc.

v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 17 BRBS 78(CRT) (1985), z.e.,

the injury or death on the OCS would not have oc-

curred “but for” the extractive operations on the shelf.

Mills, 877 F.2d at 362, 22 BRBS at 102(CRT). Thus,

the Fifth Circuit concluded that Section 1331(a\(1)

creates a situs-of-injury requirement for the applica-

tion of other sections of the OCSLA, including Sec-

tions 1333(aX2) and 1333(b). See also Strong v. B.P.

* The Mills court noted the contrary Curtis decision. Mills,

877 F.2d at 363, 22 BRBS at 102(CRT).

App. 47

Exploration & Production, Inc., 440 F.2d 665, 40

BRBS 1(CRT) (5th Cir. 2006); Demette, 280 F.3d 492,

35 BRBS 136(CRT). The Board, in cases arising in

the Fifth Circuit, has explicitly acknowledged the

existence of a situs-of-injury test under the OCSLA,

which necessarily requires that the injury occur while

the employee was on the OCS.’ Kirkpatrick v. B.B.1.,

Inc., 38 BRBS 27, 28 (2004); Martin v. Pride Offshore,

Inc., 34 BRBS 192 (2001); see also Sisson v. Davis &

Sons, Inc., 131 F.3d 555, 31 BRBS 199(CRT) (5th Cir.

1998).

The Ninth Circuit has not explicitly addressed

the situs requirement, but it has stated, albeit in

dicta, that “the situs requirement is a predicate for

coverage under OCSLA.”” A-Z Int'l v. Phillips, 179

* In contrast to claimant’s assertion, the Fifth Circuit did

not hold that the OCSLA contains only a status requirement.

Rather, the court articulated that Section 1333(b) of the OCSLA,

43 U.S.C. §1333(b), “contains only a status requirement.” De-

mette, 280 F.3d at 500 n. 29, 35 BRBS 136(CRT) n. 29. The Fifth

Circuit explicitly held that “in order for the LHWCA to apply by

virtue of Section 1333(b), notwithstanding any application of the

LHWCA of its own force, the injured worker must satisfy the

‘status’ requirement of Section 1333(b) as well as the situs

requirement of Section 1333(a)(1).” Demette, 280 F.3d at 498, 35

BRBS at 134(CRT) (emphasis added).

In Phillips, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the

administrative law judge denied the claimant’s claim because he

was not injured, as he had alleged, on the offshore oil platform

Hermosa. Situs, however, was moot, as the issue considered by

the Ninth Circuit on appeal pertained to whether the Board had

jurisdiction to review the administrative law judge’s certification

(Continued on following page)

App. 48

F.3d 1187, 1189 n. 1, 33 BRBS 59(CRT), 61 n. 1 (CRT)

(9th Cir. 1999), citing 43 U.S.C. §1333 (1994); see also

Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 219. In support of this state-

ment, the Ninth Circuit cited the language of the

Supreme Court in Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 219, also

referenced by the Fifth Circuit in Mills, 877 F.2d at

361, 22 BRBS at 101(CRT), that “Congress deter-

mined that the general scope of OCSLA’s coverage . ..

would be determined principally by locale.”

In his decision, the administrative law judge

initially found that decedent established “status”

under the OCSLA because there is no dispute that his

duties for employer, while he worked on platform

Hogan, were in furtherance of its exploration and

development of oil from the outer continental shelf.

See Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 692 F.2d

337 (5th Cir. 1983). After reviewing the conflicting

positions on situs put forth by the Third and Fifth

Circuits, the administrative law judge addressed the

question of decedent’s coverage under the OCSLA in

terms of whether he sustained “an injury on the

subsoil and seabed of the outer continental shelf, or

the artificial islands and structures erected thereon

the waters above it.” Order at 18. The administrative

law judge concluded that as decedent was killed while

harvesting plantains at an onshore facility that served

offshore oil platforms, the situs element for coverage

to the district court of his finding that claimant filed a fraudu-

lent claim. Phillips, 179 F.3d 1187, 33 BRBS 59(CRT).

App. 49

under the OCSLA could not be satisfied. Accordingly,

the administrative law judge denied claimant’s claim

for benefits under this statute.

In resolving the situs issue, the administrative

law judge applied the Fifth Circuit’s test as it “adopts

the narrow Supreme Court interpretation of situs” in

Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 218. We reject claimant’s

contention that the administrative law judge erred in

this regard. The language of OCSLA and its legis-

lative history indicate that Congress intended, in

writing the OCSLA, to regulate only the OCS. Con-

gress enacted the OCSLA “to define a body of law

applicable to the seabed, the subsoil, and the fixed

structures ... on the OCS.” Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at

355. This is evidenced by the specific language of

Section 1333(a)(1) which defines, and by its very

nature limits, the coverage of the OCSLA to “the

subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and

to all artificial islands, and all installations and other

devices permanently or temporarily attached to the

seabed, which may be erected thereon for the purpose

of exploring for, developing, or producing resources

therefrom, or any such installation or other device

(other than a ship or vesse}) for the purpose of trans-

porting such resources, to the same extent as if

the outer Continental Shelf were an area of ex-

clusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State.”

43 U.S.C. §1331(aX1); see also generally Millis, 877

F.2d at 360-361, 22 BRBS at 99-100(CRT). Absent

from this provision, is any Congressional intent to

App. 50

extend coverage to individuals injured outside the

geographical locale comprising the OCS.

As discussed by the Fifth Circuit in Mills, 877

F.2d at 360-361, 22 BRBS at 99-100(CRT), the legisla-

tive history of the OCSLA supports this position.

In discussing S-1901, the bill that became OCSLA,

the Senate committee discussed a scenario where a

worker in state waters is injured while drilling a

slant hole into the OCS and concluded that in such an

instance the employee would be covered by state

workers’ compensation. See Mills, 877 F.2d at 361, 22

BRBS at 100(CRT), citing Outer Continental Shelf:

Hearings on S-1901 before Senate Comm. on Interior

and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., Ist Sess., 12-16 (1953).

Thus, Congress intended to make the place of injury a

controlling factor in the application of benefits. Jd.

Additionally, the Supreme Court recognized a

geographic boundary to OCSLA coverage in Tallen-

tire, 477 U.S. 207. In Tallentire, offshore drilling

platform workers were killed when the helicopter in

which they were riding crashed in the high seas some

35 miles off the Louisiana coast while transporting

them from the offshore drilling platform where they

worked to their home base in Louisiana. The Su-

preme Court determiined that because the helicopter

crash and ensuing death of the platform workers

occurred “miles away from the platform and on the

high seas,” it would not be proper to extend OCSLA to

the casualties in that case. Tallentire, 477 U.S. at

219. The Supreme Court thus discussed OCSLA situs

in terms of injuries which occur within “the narrowly

App. 51

circumscribed area defined by the statute.” In partic-

ular, the Court stated, as also noted by the Fifth and

Ninth Circuits, that “Congress determined that the

general scope of OCSLA’s coverage ... would be

determined principally by locale.” Id.

Thus, the language and legislative history of the

OCSLA, in conjunction with the Supreme Court’s

interpretation thereof, supports the decision of the

Fifth Circuit in Mills, 877 F.2d at 361, 22 BRBS at

100(CRT), that coverage under the OCSLA involves

meeting both a situs-of-injury and status test. More-

over, as the administrative law judge found, the dicta

in Phillips provides a strong indication that the

Ninth Circuit is more closely aligned with the Fifth

Circuit than the Third Circuit on the issue of whether

the OCSLA contains a situs-of-injury test. We thus

reject claimant’s position that a_situs-of-mineral

extraction operations test rather than a situs-of-

injury test is more appropriate to determine coverage

under the OCSLA. As it is undisputed that decedent’s

injury did not occur while he was working on the

OCS, the administrative law judge’s finding that

claimant did not establish situs under the OCSLA,

and thus, cannot obtain coverage under that statute,

is affirmed.

Accordingly, the administrative law judge’s find-

ings that claimant has not established situs under the

Act or the OCSLA, and resulting grant of employer’s

App. 52

motion for summary decision, and consequent denial

of benefits, are affirmed.”

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Nancy S. Dolder

NANCY S. DOLDER, Chief

Administrative Appeals Judge

/s/ Regina C. McGranery

REGINA C. McGRANERY

Administrative Appeals Judge

/s/ Betty Jean Hall

BETTY JEAN HALL

Administrative Appeals Judge

“ As the administrative law judge’s findings that claimant

did not establish that decedent's injury occurred on a covered

situs under either the Act or the OCSLA are based on the un-

contested facts in this case, we need not address claimant’s con-

tentions regarding the administrative law judge’s denial of her

motion to withdraw or amend the deemed admissions under 29

C.F.R. §18.20.

App. 53

U.S. Department of Labor [SEAL]

Office of Administrative Law Judges

50 Fremont Street — Suite 2100

San Francisco, CA 94105

(415) 744-6577

(415) 744-6569 (FAX)

Issue Date: 15 August 2007

CASE NO. 2005-LHC-00343

OWCP No.: 18-83701

In the Matter of:

L.V. AS WIDOW OF J.V. (deceased),

Claimant,

vs.

PACIFIC OPERATIONS OFFSHORE, LLP.

Employer

and

INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Carrier.

Order Denying the Claimant’s Motion to

Withdraw or Amend Admissions, Denying

the Respondents’ Motion to Strike, and

Granting Summary Decision

l. Introduction

The Claimant’s husband (the Decedent) died

when a forklift he operated at his employer’s crude oil

App. 54

flocculation plant rolled over him and crushed him.

For some reason he had used it in a way unrelated to

his job — to harvest fruit. On June 3, 2004, the Dece-.

dent’s employer,’ Pacific Operations Offshore, LLP,

submitted a claim on the Claimant’s behalf and began

paying death benefits pursuant to the California

Workers’ Compensation Act.* On July 22, 2004, the

Claimant filed for compensation under the Longshore

and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or

Longshore Act), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901, et seq. (West

2007). On February 7, 2006, the Claimant also filed

for compensation under the Outer Continental Shelf

Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (West 2007),

an extension to the LHWCA. She claims entitlement

to benefits under either statute on grounds that the

Decedent engaged in both maritime and oil produc-

tion employment at covered locations.* The Employer,

together with its carrier, the Insurance Company of

‘ The parties agree that there was an employer-employee

relationship, and that the claim was timely noticed.

* Employer provided $807.69 per week for 52 weeks after

the decedent’s death. The parties agree that his average weekly

wage when injured was $928.22.

* The Defendants assert that the Claimant is not claiming

injury under the LHWCA except as it may have occurred under

the OCSLA. However, the Claimant’s former counsel believed

that jurisdiction is proper under the LHWCA and her current

counsel has not stated otherwise. See, the Declaration of Diane

Middleton in support of the Claimant’s Motion to Withdraw or

Amend. The parties argued the merits jurisdiction under both

statutes, so I accept that the Claimant seeks benefits under

either statute.

App. 55

the State of Pennsylvania, adjusted by AIG Claim

Services, Inc. (collectively referred to as the Defen-

dants) controvert these claims for federal benefits on

jurisdictional grounds.

Three motions are before me, two discovery dis-

putes and one dispositive motion for summary deci-

sion. I deny the Claimant’s motion to withdraw or

amend and the Defendants’ motion to strike, but

grant summary decision not only as a result of the

Claimant’s admissions, but also because the Decedent

was not a maritime worker and was not killed in a

location that satisfies the OCSLA’s situs requirement.

Il. Procedural Background

On February 25, 2005, the Defendants served

their requests for admissions on the Claimant, which

were due by April 1, 2005. Declaration of Michael

Thomas in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to

Claimant’s Motion to Withdraw or Amend Deemed

Admissions (Dec. Thomas). The Claimant’s attorney

obtained extensions to respond, first until April 8,

then until May 7, 2005. Jd. The hearing on this case,

initially scheduled to proceed on May 16, 2005, was

continued to October 17, 2005. Approximately one

month before the hearing, the Claimant substituted

counsel, whose request for an additional continuance

to prepare adequately was granted, and the trial

date rescheduled to April 24, 2006. Change in the

Claimant’s counsel gave rise to two additional contin-

uances, to August 28, and December 11, 2006.

App. 56

On September 27, 2006, the Defendants moved

for summary decision, arguing that the Claimant’s

failure to respond to their requests for admissions

had admitted the matters, thereby disproving cover-

age under both the LHWCA and the OSCLA. In the

alternative, the Defendants insist that there is no

dispute of material fact regarding the non-maritime

nature of the Decedent’s job duties, which disqualifies

the Claimant from receiving benefits under the

LHWCA, and that the Claimant cannot meet the

situs requirements under either statute.

On October 9, 2006, the Claimant moved to with-

draw or amend the deemed admissions, on grounds

that all of the continuances muddled the deadline for

replying, and that it would be manifestly unjust to

accept the admissions in light of the Defendants’

motion for summary decision. The Defendants op-

posed the motion to withdraw or amend and later

moved to strike the Claimant’s reply to their oppo-

sition because she had not requested leave to submit

a reply brief, that brief was untimely, and it raised

new legal arguments and evidence. I requested fur-

ther argument on the summary decision motion and

consequently removed the case from the December

11, 2006 calendar.‘

* By Order dated October 24, 2006, I directed the Claimant

to submit further argument on the Defendants’ motion for sum-

mary decision. On November 21, 2006, I granted the Defendants

leave to reply to the Claimant’s argument in opposition to sum-

mary decision and continued the trial] once again.

App. 57

It. Factual Background

The employer is a company whose primary busi-

ness includes oil exploration and extraction. Declara-

tion of Clement M. Alberts in Support of Motion for

Summary Decision (Dec. Alberts). It operates a crude

oil flocculation facility, La Conchita, in Ventura,

California. Id. Crude oil is pumped into the plant via

pipeline from two offshore platforms designated

Hogan and Houchin, which is processed and stored in

tanks temporarily before being transported away

from the plant by pipeline. Jd. The Decedent worked

as a roustabout both at La Conchita and on offshore

platform Hogan, which is located more than three

miles off the coast of California on the outer conti-

nental shelf. Jd. He accessed this platform via crew

boat from the Casitas Pass Pier, which stands about

three miles from La Conchita. Id.

At La Conchita, the Decedent performed main-

tenance and cleaning duties that included painting,

sandblasting, weed-pulling, cleaning drain culverts,

and operating a forklift. Declaration of Gordon

“Scoop” Boswell in Support of Motion for Summary

Decision (Dec. Boswell). His regular job duties on

platform Hogan involved picking up trash and empty-

ing wastebaskets, washing the decks and well bay,

assisting in repairing wellhead safety equipment,

piping projects, painting, and assisting on the pipe

deck with crane loads going on or off the platform. /d.

On rare occasions (no more than 2% of his work time)

he used a forklift at La Conchita to move scrap metal,

which had been transported by boat from the offshore

App. 58

platforms to a pier, and then by truck from the pier to

the onshore plant. Deposition of Chris Magill (Depo.

Magill)* at 31-33.

At approximately 4:00 PM on June 2, 2004, the

Decedent’s supervisor, Gordon “Scoop” Boswell, directed

him to take a forklift to the rear yard of the La

Conchita plant and clean up some debris.* Dec. Bos-

well. About an hour and fifteen minutes later, Mr.

Boswell found the Decedent next to a plantain tree

roughly ten feet off of one of the service roads within

the plant facility. Dec. Alberts. He was lying on his

back with a forklift resting on his abdomen and

chest. Jd. He was pronounced dead at 5:27 P.M. Dec.

Alberts, Exh 2.

The accident report said it appeared that the

Decedent stood on top of the raised tines of the fork-

lift to harvest a hand of fruit hanging from a plantain

tree out of reach of a person on the ground. Dec.

Alberts, Exh 2. Presumably the forklift was stopped

as he did this, but it apparently moved forward for

unknown reasons, which caused him to lose his

balance, fall in front of the forklift, and sustain fatal

injuries when it rolled over him. /d.

* This deposition is exhibit 14 in support of the Declaration

of Timothy K_ Sprinkles in Opposition to Motion for Summary

Decision.

* Although the Claimant disputes where the Decedent

worked on June 1 and 2, 2004, she takes no issue with where

and how he died.

App. 59

IV. Analysis

A. The Claimant’s Motion to Withdraw or

Amend

A party must respond in writing to a request for

admissions within thirty days after service of the

request, or each matter is deemed admitted. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 36(a); 29 C.F.R. § 18.20 (2006). On February

25, 2005, the Respondents served their requests for

admissions on the Claimant’s prior attorney, Diane

Middleton, which were due by April 1, 2005. She

requested an extension until April 8, and then again

until May 7, 2005, to which the Respondents agreed.

Dec. Thomas. On or about September 14, 2005, the

Claimant substituted Charles Naylor as counsel, who

explained in a letter to Judge Mapes that he needed

to conduct “significant research” and “appropriate

investigations” in order to properly recpend to the

discovery requests, which he acknowledged were past

due. Exh. 10 to Dec. Thomas. The Claimant also

insists that Mr. Naylor met with Defendants’ counsel,

Mr. Thomas, to tell him that he needed more time to

respond to the discovery requests, but there is no evi-

dence that Mr. Thomas agreed to extend the deadline

for the requests for admissions, only that he agreed to

a continuance. Regardless of the change in counsel

and multiple continuances, the Claimant failed to

serve her responses to the Defendants’ requests for

admissions within thirty days after service. The

Claimant is deemed to have admitted all of the

requests by operation of 29 C.F.R. § 18.20 (2006).

App. 60

After the Defendants filed their motion for sum-

mary judgment, based in part on the Claimant’s lapse

in responding to the requests for admissions, the

Claimant moved to withdraw or amend her deemed

admissions, arguing that a late response should be

permitted because the Defendants knew she needed

more time and discovery was still open. The Claimant

particularly emphasizes that she scheduled deposi-

tions for September 15, and 19, 2006; she questions

the Defendants’ intention in moving for summary

decision so quickly on the heels of these depositions

because, she contends, the Defendants should have

known that she would need those depositions [sic]

transcripts in order to make meaningful opposition to

any dispositive motion. The Claimant represents that

she still did not have the transcripts from these

depositions by October 10, 2006.

Facts admitted when a party fails to respond to a

request for admissions may serve as the basis for a

dispositive motion. Asea, Inc. v. Southern Pacific

Transportation Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1248 (9th Cir.

1981); Moosman v. Joseph P. Blitz, Inc., 358 F.2d 686

(2nd Cir. 1966). In appropriate circumstances, un-

timely replies may be permitted where the merits of

the action would otherwise be subserved, and the

party who obtained the admission cannot establish

that withdrawing or amending them will prejudice its

defense on the merits. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(b); Sonada v.

Cabrera, 255 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (allowing

withdrawal for lack of prejudice); see also, In re:

Heritage Bond Litig., 220 F_R.D. 624, 626 (C.D. Cal.

App. 61

2004) (deeming matters admitted where responses

were filed 12 days late, but explaining that a late

response should be permitted only when necessary to.

relieve a party from default by the use of the admis-

sions to obtain a summary or default judgment).

1. Merits of the Claimant’s case subserved

The merits are subserved when deemed admis-

sions “practically eliminate[s) any presentation of the

merits of the case.” Hadley v. U.S., 45 F.3d 1345, 1348

(9th Cir. 1995). The Claimant insists that it would be

manifestly unjust to allow the admissions to stand

because they establish that the Decedent’s death is

not covered by the LHWCA or OSCLA. Most of the

admissions are dispositive (all but numbers 1 and 6),

but holding the Claimant to them is not necessarily

unjust, when she had the opportunity to withdraw or

amend those admiasions for over a year. At the latest,

responses to the Defendants’ requests for admissions

were due on May 7, 2005. Without the opportunity to

withdraw or amend, however, the admissions elimi-

nate the need for presentation of the merits because

they preclude coverage under either statute. Conse-

quently, I find that the merits would be subserved if

the Claimant is relieved from the admissions. That

does not end the inquiry, however.

2. Prejudice to the Defendants

The party that obtained the admission has the

opportunity to prove how it would be prejudiced

App. 62

if withdrawal of the admissions were permitted.

Sonada, 255 F.3d at 1039. Prejudice relates to the

difficulty a party may face in proving its case. Id.; see

also Hadley, 45 F.3d at 1349 (finding no prejudice

where the moving party would have been able to en-

gage in more extensive trial preparation had the

admission been timely). The Defendants assert that

the Claimant has failed to respond not only to ad-

missions requests, but also to interrogatories and

requests for production of documents. They also argue

that some of the Claimant’s late answers to the re-

quests for admissions are unreasonable. For example,

the Defendants’ request number 5 asks the Claimant

to admit that the Decedent was not en route to a

barge, floating platform, floating island, ship, or other

vessel located on the outer continental shelf when he

was killed. This is neither vague nor ambiguous,

despite the Claimant’s objection to the contrary. The

parties’ lists of undisputed facts both explain that the

Decedent was killed by a forklift while attempting

to harvest plantains while working on shore. Defen-

dants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (DF) 29; Claim-

ant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (CF) 34. They

also agree that workers accessed the offshore plat-

forms from a pier three miles distant from the La

Conchita plant. DF 27; CF 20. It makes no sense that

the Decedent would have driven the forklift three

miles en route to this pier. Therefore, I agree that the

Claimant had enough information to admit or deny

App. 63

this request.’ This evasive response is prejudicial to

the Defendants because it is more difficult to defend

against claims when the Claimant keeps the factual

basis for them to herself. It also runs counter to the

purpose of admissions, which is to narrow the issues

for trial. See Asea, 669 F.2d at 1248.

The Defendants believe they would prevail on

summary judgment even without the deemed admis-

sions. This implies that they will suffer little preju-

dice if the Claimant were allowed to withdraw and

amend her responses. Yet the Defendants’ belief in

their success does not discount a prejudicial impact

on their ability to defend against this claim. When

the Defendants filed their motion for summary deci-

sion, the Claimant had not responded to any of their

discovery requests. She had over a year to answer the

requests for admissions, but aside from her response

to the Defendants’ request number. 6, I still cannot

tell what her answers are. The Claimant submitted

her objections and answers to the Defendants’ re-

quests for admissions as an exhibit to her motion

to withdraw or amend, but those answers themselves

do not match those listed in the text of the motion."

” The Claimant eventually admitted this request, but she

did so in an amended response filed after the Defendant submit-

ted its opposition to her motion to amend or withdraw.

* To request for admissions number 1: “The Decedent has

no other dependent under the Act than the Claimant,” the

Claimant answered, “admit,” and “admit in part, deny in part.

Number 2: “The Decedent was never present on Platform Hogan

on the date of death,” she answered “unable to admit or deny,”

(Continued on following page)

App. 64

She submitted a third, amended set of responses as

part of her reply to the Defendants’ opposition to

her motion to amend or withdraw.’ I decline to accept

this final set as the Claimant’s intended responses

because no leave had been granted to withdraw or

amend the first (and second) set of responses. The De-

fendants certainly face increased difficulty in pre-

paring their defense when the Claimant has offered

and “deny.” Number. 3: “The Decedent did not do any work on

any barges, floating platforms, floating islands, ships, or other

type of vessel located on the outer continental shelf on the date

of death,” she answered, “unable to admit or deny,” and “deny.”

Number. 4: “The Decedent was never present on any barges,

floating platforms, floating islands, ships, or other type of vessel

located on the outer continental shelf on the date of death,” she

answered, “unable to admit or deny,” and “deny.” Number. 5:

“The Decedent was not en route to a barge, floating platform,

floating island, ship, or other vessel located on the outer conti-

nental shelf when he was killed,” she answered: “unable to

admit or deny,” and “deny.” Number. 6: “The Decedent was not

scheduled to be on Platform Hogan or any other Outer Conti-

nental Shelf Lands Act covered site on the date of death,” she

answered, “deny,” and “deny.” Number. 7: “The Decedent was

not scheduled to be on Platform Hogan or any other Outer

Continental Shelf Lands Act covered site on the date of death,”

she answered, “deny,” and “admit in party, deny in part” Num-

ber. 8: “The Decedent is not claiming injury under §901 et seq. of

the Act except as it may have occurred under 43. U.S.C.

§ 1333%(b) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,” she an-

swered, “unable to admit or deny,” and “deny.”

* Although the federal rules require that a party supple

ment its discovery responses as different information becomes

available, the Claimant’s responses contained in her reply brief

seek to replace, rather than supplement the deemed admissions.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e). Therefore, they are not accepted as

supplemental! answers.

App. 65

three different answers to one round of requests for

admissions, without answering the rest of the De-

fendants’ discovery requests.

The Claimant asserts that the Defendants are

not prejudiced by the late responses because they

were aware of the factual issues and had complete

access to all discoverable evidence. She claims they

knew the Decedent worked 98% of his time on the

platforms, that his duties included unloading and

loading supplies and things off and onto the crew boat

he and others used to access Platform Hogan, and

that there was no record of his precise duties or

locations on the day he died. Therefore, they would

have known that the Claimant would deny at least

some of the requests for admissions. Regardless of

what the Defendants knew of the Decedent’s daily

activities, litigation remains an adversary system.

It is inappropriate to expect the Defendants to con-

cede a denial to any of their own requests for admis-

sions by anticipating the Claimant’s response. Were

that so, admission requests would lose much of their

value. It is the Claimant’s duty to answer the

requests, not the Defendants’ responsibility to anti-

cipate (or guess about) the answers.

Although it would be unreasonable to hold the

Claimant’s new counsel] to answer for all of the De-

fendants’ discovery requests shortly after accepting

the case, that was not required of him. The Claimant

waited to seek relief from the deemed admis-

sions until after the Defendants had submitted their

summary judgment motion. It does not matter that

App. 66

discovery was still ongoing or that there had been

multiple continuances.

Allowing the deemed admissions to stand is

somewhat harsh, but in this case it is appropriate in

light of the Claimant’s failure to withdraw them as

soon as she discovered that they were late. See U_S. v.

Kasuboski, 834 F.2d 1345, 1350 (7th Cir. 1987) (ex-

plaining that the harshness of maintaining deemed

admissions is tempered by the availability of the

motion to withdraw, a procedure that the admitting

party had failed to employ). Moreover, this result does

not disturb the Claimant’s entitlement to a remedy

under state law; the Defendants paid workers’ com-

pensation benefits at $807.69 per week for 52 weeks

after the Decedent’s death. Declaration of Michael

Thomas in Support of Summary Decision (Dec.

Thomas 2) Exh. 11. Therefore, I find that the Claim-

ant’s confusing, evasive, and late answers have

prejudiced the Defendants’ ability to defend against

this claim, and deny the Claimant’s motion to with-

draw and amend.

B. Defendants’ Motion toe Strike the

Claimant’s Reply Brief.

No reply to an answer, response to a reply, or ary

further responsive document, shall be filed unless the

presiding judge permits it. 29 C.F_R. § 18.6(b) (2006).

The Claimant did not request leave to file a reply. The

Defendants argue that this procedural misstep means

I should not consider the reply brief. They also argue

App. 67

that it should not be considered because the Claimant

filed it 41 days after they served their opposition”

and because it introduces new factual and legal

issues, which cannot be done in a reply. See Lujan v.

National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 894-95

(1990) (explaining that it is improper to introduce

new facts or different legal arguments in a reply

brief).

A court must give the opposing party the oppor-

tunity to respond to a reply brief if it relies upon new

material in the brief. Beaird v. Seagate Tech. Inc., 145

F.3d 1159, 1164-65 (10th Cir. 1998). The Claimant

made the following four new arguments in her reply

that do not appear in her initial request to withdraw

or amend: 1) the responses are timely; 2) she never

refused to respond; 3) she was granted an extension

to respond to the requests for admissions by virtue of

her multiple requests to continue the trial; and 4) she

was compelled to prematurely respond to the requests

for admissions because she had not received some of

the Decedent’s timesheets or transcripts from deposi-

tions that were taken in September of 2006. The

Claimant raised these arguments because the De-

fendants asserted in opposition that her answers

were untimely and failed to explain why she had not

responded earlier.

Generally, responses to motions and replies are due with-

in ten days after the initial motion or opposition was served.

29 C_F.R. § 18.6(b) (2006).

App. 68

Denying the Claimant the opportunity to counter

the Defendants’ opposition brief, especially in light of

the pending summary decision motion, would inter-

fere with the Claimant’s right to address important

defense arguments. See El Pollo Loco, Inc. v. Hashim,

316 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the

district court did not abuse its discretion when it

entertained an argument raised for the first time in

the reply brief). Therefore, the Claimant’s peccadillo

of failing to request leave before submitting a reply is

excused.

The Defendants addressed the Claimant’s fourth

argument in their motion to strike, explaining that

591 days had passed between the service of the

requests for admissions and the Claimant’s motion to

withdraw or amend. Even with two extensions to

respond granted to the Claimant’s prior attorney,

these admissions were late as of May 8, 2005. A party

rarely has access to all discovery before it answers

requests for admissions. That is precisely why the

federal rules provide an option to respond “unable to

admit or deny,” while they also impose a duty to

supplement discovery responses. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

2&e), 36(a\4). The Claimant attempted to answer the

requests for admissions much too late. Therefore,

I agree with the Defendants that the Claimant was

not compelled to respond prematurely.

None of the Claimant’s other arguments alter the

fact that her responses to the requests for admissions

were well over a year late. Neither the change in

counsel nor the requests for continuance has any

App. 69

affect on the timeliness of the responses. None of the

exhibits attached to the Claimant’s reply brief show

that the parties agreed to restart the clock on the

requests for admissions. They show only that the

Claimant’s new counsel was aware that he would

need more time to complete discovery and prepare for

the hearing. There was no motion to withdraw until

October 9, 2006, nearly one month after the Claim-

ant’s new counsel acknowledged that responses to

discovery were late. The Claimant has not argued

that she qualifies for equitable tolling. That she never

“refused” to respond does not count as a timely re-

sponse, and there is no evidence that an extension to

respond to the requests for admissions, except for the

first two extending the deadline to May 7, 2005, was

requested. Indeed, it would have done no good to

request one after this deadline had passed, when the

remedy for late responses is to request to withdraw or

amend the admissions made by operation of law.

Therefore, I deny the Defendants’ motion to strike,

but allow the deemed admissions to stand because

the arguments in the Claimant’s reply brief do not

persuade me to alter that result.

C. Legal Standard for Granting Sum-

mary Judgment

A summary decision may be entered if the plead-

ings, affidavits, and other evidence show that there is

no genuine issue of material fact and the moving

party is entitled to prevail as a watter of law. 29

C.F.R. § 18.40(d); Friday v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,

App. 70

2005 WL 1827745 *2, ARB no. 03-132, ALJ No. 2003

AIR 19 (July 29, 2005) (citing Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)). The rule on

summary decisions mirrors Rule 56 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Mehen v. Delta Air Lines,

Case No. 03-070 (ARB Feb. 24, 2005).

The proof must be grounded in affidavits, decla-

rations, and answers to discovery from the complain-

ant and (or) other witnesses. 29 C.F.R. § 18.40(d)

(2006). Affidavits must be made on personal know!-

edge, setting forth facts that would be admissible in

evidence and show affirmatively that the witness is

competent to testify to the matters stated. 29 C.F.R.

§ 18.40(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The judge weighs

none of this evidence, and indulges reasonable infer-

ences in the claimant’s favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986).

The burden first is on the moving party to ex-

plain why there is no genuine issue of material fact

for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (finding

no genuine issue for trial when the record as a whole

could not lead a trier of fact to find for the non-

moving party). Once this burden has been met, the

“adverse party must set forth specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477

U.S. at 250. The non-moving party cannot rest upon

“mere allegations, speculation, or denials of the

moving party’s pleadings, but must set forth specific

facts on each issue upon which he would bear the

App. 71

ultimate burden of proof.” Jd. at 256. If the non-

moving party fails to establish an element essential

to his case, there can be “no genuine issue as to any

material fact since a complete failure of proof con-

cerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts im-

material.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

The Defendants argue that the Claimant’s ad-

missions establish that the Decedent is not covered

by either the LHWCA or the OCSLA because he was

not a maritime employee and was not working on an

outer continental shelf when he died. Moreover, they

insist that even if the Claimant had denied the re-

quests for admissions, she cannot show by sufficient

evidence that the Decedent’s death is covered by

either statute. The Claimant counters that the Dece-

dent loaded and unloaded su;,lies onto a crew boat,

which should qualify as maritime work. She contends

that he spent a majority of his time on platform

Hogan, and therefore his death on an onshore loca-

tion that served the offshore oil drilling business

should be covered under the OCSLA. She also attacks

the Defendants’ motion as procedurally defective, but

I find this last argument unpersuasive.

Although the deemed admissions are enough to

find in the Defendants’ favor, in the alternative it is

undisputed that the Defendants conducted an off-

shore drilling business. Offshore drilling and any task

essential to it is not maritime employment for pur-

poses of the LHWCA. Herb’s Welding, Inc., v. Gray,

470 U.S. 414, 422 (1985). Therefore, unloading and

App. 72

loading a supply boat intended to support the offshore

drilling business does not qualify as maritime em-

ployment. Likewise, the undisputed location of the

Decedent’s death does not satisfy the narrow situs

requirement of the OCSLA. Consequently, the Claim-

ant cannot establish coverage, an essential element to

her case. There is no genuine issue of material fact

that could overcome the Defendants’ motion for sum-

mary decision.

1. Technical Defects of Motion

The Claimant argues that the summary decision

motion fails to comply with 29 C.F_.R. § 18.6(a) and

(b), which require that applications for an order must

be made by motion and all parties must have a

reasonable opportunity to state an objection, and that

an answer in opposition to a motion is due within 10

days after the motion is served. The Claimant’s coun-

sel argues that he could not prepare a meaningful

answer to the Defendants’ summary decision motion

before deposition transcripts became available.

Whether the Claimant had all of the evidence sought

in her possession has nothing to do with these re-

quirements. Moreover, these depositions were con-

ducted by the Claimant’s counsel. If he had wanted

expedited transcripts then he could have asked for

them, and if he needed an extension to respond to

this motion for summary decision then he could have

made this request before the answer was due. The

Defendants filed a motion for summary decision, to

App. 73

which the Claimant had a reasonable opportunity to

answer. Therefore, the Defendants satisfied the regu-

lations.

The Claimant also alleges that the motion is

deficient under 29 C.F.R. §18.7(a), (bX2), and (b)\7).

Section 7(a) and b(2) state that an administrative law

judge may order a party to file a pre-hearing state-

ment, which includes stipulated facts and a state-

ment that the parties have conferred in attempt to

reach stipulation. This places no restrictions on when

a motion for summary decision may be filed, so the

Defendants’ motion is not deficient on that basis.

Section 7(b\7) requires that the parties give suggest-

ed hearing times and locations for the presentation of

their cases. Again, this is inapplicable to a motion for

summary decision, for which no hearing is required.

See 29 C.F.R. § 18.6(c) (No oral argument will be

heard on motions unless the administrative law judge

otherwise directs.) Therefore, I find that the motion

for summary decision is proper.

2. Deemed Admissions form a proper basis

for summ ision

Any matter admitted is conclusively established

unless the court permits withdrawal or amendment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b); 29 C.F_R. § 18.20(e). Admissions

made under Rule 36, even default admissions, can

serve as the factual predicate for summary judgment.

Kasuboski, 834 F.2d at 1350; see also In re Carney,

258 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that

App. 74

failure to timely respond to requests for admission

can prevent a party from contesting the merits of the

case); Kathryn Cook v. Allstate Ins. Co., 337

F. Supp.2d 1206 (C.D. CA 2004). Here, the Defend-

ants moved for summary judgment prior to the

Claimant’s motion to withdraw or amend the deemed

admissions. Where there has been no previous motion

to withdraw or amend deemed admissions, a party

may not oppose summary judgment by revisiting

issues determined by the deemed admissions. Tilila-

mook Country Smoker, Inc. v. Tillamook County

Creamery Association, 333 F. Supp.2d 975, 984 (D. Or.

2004). The deemed admissions will stand because to

allow the Claimant to withdraw or amend them

would prejudice the Defendants. The Claimant may

not claim coverage under the LHWCA or the OSCLA

because the admissions establish that the Decedent

was not a maritime worker and his death did not

occur on an outer continental shelf. Therefore, it is

proper to grant summary decision based on the

Claimant’s admissions.

3. Coverage under the LHWCA

The Longshore Act provides compensation to

certain employees engaged in maritime employment

for occupational diseases or unintentional work-

related injuries, irrespective of fault, occurring on the

navigable waterways of the United States or certain

adjoining areas, resulting in disability. See 33

U.S.C.A. §§ 901, et seq. To be eligible for compensa-

tion, a person must be an employee (status) as

App. 75

defined by § 902(3) who sustains injury in a place

(situs) defined by § 903(a). PC. Pfieffer Co., Inc., v.

Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 74 (1979). For a claim to succeed

both the situs and status requirements must be

satisfied. Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. at 415-16; Brady-

Hamilton Stevedore Co., v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 140

(9th Cir. 1978).

a. Status

To qualify for benefits under the LHWCA a

worker must engage in maritime employment. 33

U.S.C.A. § 903 (West 2007). Maritime employment

requires that workers spend “at least some of their

time in indisputably longshoring operations.” North-

east Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249

(1977). Any worker who moves cargo between ship

and land transportation qualifies as a maritime

employee. P.-C. Pfeiffer, 444 U.S. at 82-84 (covering

workers who did tasks “traditionally” performed by

longshoremen); Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. v. Schwalb,

493 U.S. 40, 45 (1989) (explaining it is “clearly decid-

ed that, aside from the specified occupations, land-

based activity occurring within the § 903 situs will be

deemed maritime only if it is an integral or essential

part of loading or unloading a vessel”). Rather than

focus on the particular task at the time of injury, a

worker’s status turns on the nature of work that he or

she may be assigned to do. PC. Pfeiffer, 444 U.S. at

81-82; see also Schwabenland v. Sanger Boats, 683

F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that inspection,

testing of new models, and occasional maintenance of

App. 76

recreational small boats is sufficiently related to the

construction of the vessels to constitute maritime

employment, even though these duties were not a

substantial portion of the employee’s overall working

time).

The Claimant insists that the Decedent was a

maritime employee because “a few times” he assisted

the platform crane operators by putting supplies into

baskets to be loaded onto the crew boat."’ Deposition

of Jose Rosales (Depo. Rosales) at 20-21. This crew

boat is used to take personnel to and from platforms

to the shore, and also for delivering supplies, pipe, or

equipment to and from the platforms. Deposition of

Gordon “Scoop” Boswell” (Depo. Boswell) at 27. Mr.

Boswell did not know whether the Decedent ever put

supplies on the crew boat, but he admitted that it was

possible. Jd. at 29.

At La Conchita, he operated a forklift, loaded and

unloaded trucks, moved, staged and marshaled worn

out equipment, valves, and other scrap metal. Depo.

Magill at 30-31. The Claimant argues that the Dece-

dent was performing maritime duties at the time of

" Jose Rosales, a coworker, testified that the Decedent

brought materials to the pier once a week, but he did not put

them on the crew boat. Depo. Rosales at 17-18. Mr. Rosales’s

deposition appears as Exh 15 in support of the Declaration of

Timothy K. Sprinkles (Dec. Sprinkles) in Opposition to Motion

for Summary Decision.

" This deposition appears as Exh. 2 in support of Dec.

Sprinkles.

App. 77

his death because he was operating a forklift while

engaged in the “intermediate steps” of moving scrap

metal between the Defendants’ ship and scrap metal

dealers. See id. at 33. At the time he died, however, he

was harvesting plantains, not moving scrap metal.

The Defendants assert that whatever material

the Decedent might have moved onto or off of a crew

boat was incidental to the offshore drilling business,

rather than linked to longshore work. His primary

duties on the platforms, they say, involved mainte-

nance, painting, cleaning oil spills, fixing leaks and

repairing valves. Although they agree that the Dece-

dent spent approximately 5% of his time loading and

unloading supplies onto and off of the crew boat, they

emphasize that the Casitas Pass Pier is owned by a

different company, Venoco Oil Company. Depo. Magill

at 13. The Venoco pier operators would crane-lift

scrap and equipment from the crew boat, onto a

truck.” Jd. at 32.

Chris Magill, one of the Decedent’s former super-

visors, testified that the crew boat made two trips

daily to the platforms, carrying cargo, equipment,

tools, and parts, and that Venoco has two crew mem-

bers that do all the loading and off-loading of equip-

ment. Depo. Magill at 14, 44. He said that when pipe

and equipment came from other vendors, the “guys

that operate the pier” would do all the unloading,

“ This deposition appears as Exh 14 in support of Dec

Sprinkles.

App. 78

staging, and loading onto the boat. /d. at 21. “A few

times” the Decedent might have assisted in chocking

a load of pipe which was to be loaded onto the crew

boat at the pier by the Venoco crew. /d. at 20. It was

not the Decedent’s normal job to assist in rigging pipe

out on the platforms; he did it only once a month. Id.

at 20-21. There was a rigging crew assisted by the

Venoco boat crew that handled most the cargo. Id. at

44.

Where loading and unloading of equipment is

incidental to an employee’s primary role in support of

oil and gas production, he does not qualify for cover-

age under the LHWCA. See Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S.

at 423 (explaining that the Claimant’s primary weld-

ing work was far removed from traditional LHWCA

activities, notwithstanding the fact that he unloaded

his own gear upon arriving at the platform by boat);

Munguia v. Director O.W.C.P., 999 F.2d 808, 812-13

(5th Cir. 1993) (holding that a roustabout/relief

pumper-gauger lacked maritime status under the

LHWCA, because he loaded and unloaded twols and

supplies for the non-maritime purpose of servicing

fixed platforms); Alexander v. Hudson Engineering

Co, 18 BRBS 78 (1986) (finding no longshore status

where onshore loading duties were incidental to the

claimant’s primary role as an electrician in the fabri-

cation and outfitting of fixed offshore oil production

facilities). But cf., Maher v. Director, O.W.C.P,, 330

F.3d 162, 167 (3rd Cir. 2003) (establishing status

under the LHWCA where the employee worked 50%

App. 79

of his time as a checker directly involved in loading

and unloading functions).

It is immaterial whether the Decedent or

Venoco’s crew members loaded or unloaded scrap

metal on and off of the crew boat. Even assuming that

the Decedent occasionally performed this task does

not amount to substantial evidence that he worked in

maritime employment because the Defendants con-

duct an oil exploration and extraction business. There

is no evidence his duties were for any purpose other

than to support this non-maritime operation. What-

ever loading and unloading the Decedent did was

incidental to his primary role as a roustabout on the

offshore platforms and the La Conchita site. See

McGray v. Director, O.W.C.P, 181 F.3d 1008, 1015

(9th Cir. 1999) (“So in the statutory context, the

phrase ‘engaged in maritime employment’ means that

an employer hired the individual to perform maritime

work in this particular contract of employment.”).

Likewise, there is no evidence that the scrap metal

that the Decedent marshaled around La Conchita

was for the purpose of maritime commerce of any

kind, especially because of the nature of the Defend-

ants’ oil operation. See Cappelluti v. Sea-Land Ser-

vice, Inc., 10 BRBS 1024 (BRB) (1979) (concluding

that the claimant did not engage in maritime em-

ployment where he cut up damaged containers that

were set aside for salvage and no longer involved in

maritime commerce); Scala v. Island City Iron and

Supply, Inc.,.9 BRBS 6000 (BRB) (1979) (finding no

maritime employment where employee cut up rusty

App. 80

iron from the dry dock for his employer in the scrap

metal business). The Claimant provides no proof to

support that the Decedent used a forklift to move

scrap metal off of the supply boat; instead, the evi-

dence shows that he used it to move scrap that had

already been transported from the pier to the plant.

This is not enough to connect him to maritime em-

ployment. Therefore, the Claimant cannot satisfy the

status requirement based on the Decedent’s primary

duties, which supported an oil and gas exploration

business.

The Claimant nonetheless insists that the Dece-

dent should be covered by the LHWCA because the

Defendants qualify as a maritime employer. A mari-

time employer is one whose employees conduct mari-

time employment. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(4) (West 2007).

The work must be done “upon the navigable waters of

the United States, including any adjoining pier,

wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine

railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by

an employer in loading, unloading, repairing or

building a vessel.” Jd. The Claimant argues that the

Employer is a maritime employer within the meaning

of the LHWCA because it has an onshore facility and

storage yard located 250-300 feet from the Pacific

Ocean, and because workers took a boat twice daily

from the Casitas Pass Pier to the offshore platforms.

CF 19-21.

Viewing the evidence in light most favorable to

the Claimant, it does not suggest that the Decedent

worked for a maritime employer. An employer’s

App. 81

operations on offshore drilling platforms do not call

for loading, unloading, repairing or building a vessel;

rather, a pipeline serves as the relevant conduit

between the platform and the shore. The operations

at La Conchita did not involve loading or unloading

onto or off of a marine vessel, ship repair or breaking.

Dec. Alberts.

Moreover, the Claimant argues, “[b]Jut for the

Defendant’s OCS oil and gas exploration, develop-

ment, extraction, and transmission business, Defend-

ant would not have owned and operated the La

Conchita facility and storage yard.” Claimant’s Oppo-

sition at p. 37. If La Conchita existed because of oil

and gas business, then the Supreme Court instructs

that it is not maritime. See Herb’s Welding, 470 U/S.

at 422. In Herb’s Welding, the Court explained that

drilling platforms were “not even suggestive of tradi-

tional maritime affairs” and that “[t]he history of the

Lands Act at the very least forecloses the ... holding

that offshore drilling is a maritime activity and that

any task essential thereto is maritime employment

for LHWCA purposes.” Jd. By linking La Conchita

inextricably to oil and gas exploration, development,

extraction, and transmission, the Claimant defeats

her own argument that the Decedent performed

maritime work for a maritime employer.

Consequently, I find that the Claimant failed to

establish that either the Decedent was a maritime

employee, or the Defendants maritime employers.

Therefore, there is no genuine issue as to any materi-

al fact concerning status under the LHWCA.

App. 82

b. Situs

In order to satisfy the situs test, the Decedent's

death must have occurred upon the navigable waters

of the United States, which is defined under the

LHWCA te include any “adjoining area customarily

used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing,

or building a vessel” 33 US.CA §903(a). See

McGray, 181 F.3d at 1010 (expanding situs to include

a pier that was not used to dock ships). Employees

who are on the situs but not engaged in the overall

process of loading or unJoading vessels are not cov-

ered. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 267. Here, the Claimant did

not establish that the Decedent engaged in maritime

employment. Consequently, the site of his injury has

no bearing on the question of coverage.

Even if he were a maritime worker, the Claimant

would have to show by substantial evidence that La

Conchita qualifies as an adjoining area customarily

used to load and unload a vessel. Caputo, 432 U.S.

263-64. Coverage under Section 3(a) is determined by

the nature of the place of work at the moment of

injury. Griffin v. McLean Contracting Co., 30 BRBS

221 (ALJ) (1996). To determine whether a site is an

“adjoining area,” the Ninth Circuit“ considers the

following factors: 1) the particular suitability of the

“ The Claimant argues that the circuit courts are split on

how to define an adjoining area under the LHWCA. While the

Third and Fifth Circuits analyze this issue slightly differently

than the Ninth Circuit, their decisions have no bearing on this

case, for binding Ninth Circuit precedent exists.

App. 83

site for maritime use; 2) whether adjoining properties

are devoted primarily to maritime commerce; 3) the

proximity of the site to the waterway; and 4) whether

the site is as close to the waterway as is feasible

given all the circumstances in the case. Brady-

Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 141

(9th Cir. 1978).

Here, La Conchita is not particularly suited for

maritime use because it is not over or contiguous with

any body of water and does not possess any area to

unload materials from a dock, barge, floating plat-

form or island, ship or other type of vessel. Dec.

Alberts. It does not possess any adjoining pier, or any

other area used for loading, unloading, repairing,

dismantling, or building of any vessel. Jd. Therefore,

the first factor weighs against finding that La

Conchita qualifies as a proper situs under the

LHWCA

There are no businesses engaged in shipping

operations or other maritime activities within at least

a one-mile radius of the La Conchita plant. Dec.

Alberts. The Casitas Pass Pier is three miles away,

but the Claimant provides no evidence that boats

other than the crew boat used to ferry back and forth

to the platforms use it. Consequently, this second

factor also weighs against the Claimant.

The Claimant argues that the proximity of the

plant to the ocean — 250-300 feet — lends itself to

maritime employment. Nonetheless, it is undisputed

that La Conchita is separated from the Pacific Ocean

App. 84

by railroad tracks, a highway and a beach. DF 32.

The plant processes oil delivered from the ground

under the platforms via pipeline, not boat. Therefore,

the proximity to the ocean is conducive to oil explora-

tion and extraction, but not loading or unloading

vessels, ship building or breaking because there is no

way to cross from the plant to the ocean without

dodging trains and highway traffic. Therefore, factors

three and four tip in favor of the Defendants and I

find that the Claimant cannot show by substantial

evidence that La Conchita is an adjoining area under

the LHWCA.

c. Missing Time Sheets

Although neither party disputes the location of

the Decedent’s death, the Claimant protests that it is

uncertain whether the Decedent was scheduled to

work at

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.