Record and brief — Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid
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} SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 10-507
Title Pacific Operators Offshore LLP et al., Petitioners
Vv
Luisa L. Valladolid, et a!
Docketed October 15, 2010
Lower Ct United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Case Nos (08-73862)
Decision Date May 13, 2010
Rehearing Denied July 19, 2010
Questions
Presented
~~~Date~~~ ~~~~-~~~Proceedings and Orders —~
Oct 13 2010 Petition for a writ of certioran filed. (Response due November 15. 2010)
Nov 92010 Order extending time to file response to petition to and including December 15, 2010, for
all respondents
Dec 62010 Order further extending time to file response to petition to and including January 14
2011, for all respondents
Jan 14 2011 Bnef of Federal Respondent in opposition filed
Jan 14 2011 Bnef of respondent Luisa L_ Valladolid in opposition filed
Jan 21 2011 Reply of petitioners Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP. et al filed
Jan 26 2011 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of February 18, 2011
Feb 22 2011 Petition GRANTED
Mar 17 2011 The time to file the joint appendix and petitioners’ brief on the merits is extended to and
including May 23, 2011
Mar 17 2011 The time to file respondent's brief on the merits is extended to and including August 8
2011
May 23 2011 Joint appendix filed (Statement of costs filed)
May 23 2011 Bref of petitioners Pacific Operators Offshore LLP et al filed
Jul 152011 CIRCULATED
Jul 192011 SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Tuesday October 11, 2011
Jul 27 2011 The time to file respondents’ briefs on the merits is further extended to and including
August 31, 2011
Aug 11 2011 Record received from U S.C.A for Sth Circuit. (1 envelope)
Aug 30 2011 Record received from U S. Departrment of Labor Benefits Review Board
Aug 31 2011 Bnef of respondent Luisa L_ Valladolid filed (Distributed)
Aug 31 2011 Bnef of respondent Director Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs filed
(Distributed)
Sep 7 2011 Motion for divided argument filed by the Solicitor General
Sep 27 2011 Motion for divided argument filed by the Solicitor General GRANTED
Sep 30 2011 Reply of petitioners Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP, et al filed (Distnbuted)
Oct 11 2011 Argued For petitioners: Paul D. Clement, Washington. D.C. For federal respondent
Joseph R_ Palmore. Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
Washington. D. C. For private respondent David C Frederick, Washington, D C
PETITION
FOR
WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
rsccwe
20029 10-907 CCT 13 anip
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
°
PACIFIC OPERATORS OFFSHORE, LLP.
and INSURANCE COMPANY OF
THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Petitioners,
v.
LUISA L. VALLADOLID,
Respondent.
¢
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
e
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
¢
HORVITZ & LEVY LLP THOMAS, QUINN &
PEDER K. BATALDEN KRIEGER, LLP
*PETER ABRAHAMS MICHAEL W. THOMAS
15760 Ventura Boulevard, 199 Fremont Street,
18th Floor 20th Floor
Encino, California 91436 San Francisco, California
(818) 995-0800 « 94105
Fax: (818) 995-3157 (415) 546-6100 «
pbatalden@horvitzlevy.com Fax: (415) 358-5868
pabrahams@horvitzlevy.com mthomas@tqklaw.com
*Counsel of Record
Counsel for Petitioners
Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP and
Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania
os
oe
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
QUESTION PRESENTED
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43
U.S.C., §§ 1331-1356 (OCSLA), governs those who
work on oil drilling platforms and other fixed struc-
tures beyond state maritime boundaries. Workers are
eligible for compensation for “any injury occurring as
the result of operations conducted on the outer Conti-
nental Shelf.” 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (2006). When an
outer continental shelf worker is injured on land, is
he (or his heir):
(1) always eligible for compensation, because
his employer’s operations on the shelf are the but for
cause of his injury (as the Third Circuit holds); or
(2) never eligible for compensation, because the
Act applies only to injuries occurring on the shelf (as
the Fifth Circuit holds);
(3) sometimes eligible for compensation, because
eligibility for benefits depends on the nature and
extent of the factual relationship between the injury
and the operations on the shelf (as the Ninth Circuit
holds)?
a3
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
All parties are listed in the caption.
Petitioner Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP, is a
limited liability corporation wholly-owned by
AnAmerica Corporation, a successor to AnAmerica &
Drilling Company. Petitioner the Insurance Company
of the State of Pennsylvania (ICSOP) is a direct,
wholly-owned subsidiary of Chartis U.S., Inc. Chartis
U.S., Inc., is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Chartis,
Inc. Chartis, Inc., is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
American International Group, Inc., which is a publi-
cally held corporation. With the exception of the AIG
Credit Facility Trust (a trust established for the sole
benefit of the United States Treasury), no parent
corporation or publicly held corporation owns 10
percent or more of the stock of American Internation-
al Group, Inc.
ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED................. aa aeaeanees _
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS AND RULE
eo ccc ce cdacocetuspressessceessees Te
pr OP Le Bee yy 4. y\. ee . ill
eG gy tg | + ee ek,
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORART ....... l
sc usaakenndevsnweccecceccrecees ]
a nnceiedrluthecéueccessccacses: l
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED............ 2
RE 2
Ree EET E GPP BEE CADE..........000.cccccccscccccves. 4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........... 8
I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
CREATES A THREE-WAY CIRCUIT
SPLIT ON THE IMPORTANT QUES-
TION OF OIL PLATFORM WORKERS’
ELIGIBILITY FOR OCSLA BENEFITS ..... 8
Il. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETA-
TION OF OCSLA IS INCONSISTENT
WITH CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE AND
THIS COURT'S STATEMENTS ................. il
rial iceidsenes Kdasbbeccesccccaseseceeses 18
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS ~— Continued
Page
APPENDIX
Be wrnticindennsetclicebcatndadddiabsiliiiat aa teX gs ite hee App. 1
Res Se GR oe os App. 35
Order Denying the Claimant’s Motion to With-
draw or Amend Admissions, Denying the
Respondents’ Motion to Strike, and Granting
RUIN CPI os scencncedecsdscvciatissccivcceneaponens App. 53
Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En
SN sccciisnuicadadiasasacesoomevmdiceckaenibenb certs oes App. 94
33 U.S.C. section 903(a) ..........0..0.20ccecceceeececeeeeee App. 96
43 U.S.C. section 1301(aX(b) & (c) -.......0.2- 00.0... App. 97
CP as SE Beret ei App. 99
SO AAs. CR BROOD ocssssidscesiessccicoiscovscnane App. 100
GP AEA MEE Beek dnc ee App. 101
OB UA. BURRIS Bia iitiisiiiinniimiines App. 102
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Curtis v. Schlumberger Offshore Serv., Inc., 849
eee GE CE RE DD ci ctiidevsdeccccccesccensosisekacotes 2,8,9
Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414
RRR raat elle Rit en eee eerea em ELS. 15, 16, 17
Mills v. Dir, Office of Workers’ Comp. Pro-
grams, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 877 F.2d 356 (5th
Be CE dnavecipcinnnedactiasseciedanedsvacthoessetestanerkiesees passim
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S.
SET I avai sinpcnaicataceemscamianinanuinatedcuasan 14, 15, 16, 17
Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 US.
ERIE SONATA in de> SUSI s AD Ok eS 11
Valladolid v. Pac. Operations Offshore, LLP,
604 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2010)...............00000000... passim
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Se se ED I ii neckenccncciesccaveccccsanicdessconsssnins 1
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2006) .......................cceeeees passim
RR TB ER UT ee RN nee Sm eee 2
Se as Oe I i iiciccakintcciiaisasthcakandsenaesabosedals 4
See ces Oe Me SII a inicnidccancaccincsicanercecscdcoanensis 1
Se ee ae ND I ai dik sic ina cnandepnanisuisauiicsbevinéiiouins 1
43 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1312, 1331, 1332, and 1333
RRL SPE ERS SS Pease Rn Ree EAST ya RS LOTS MASE 2
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2006) .................c0eeene passim
Cf BERETS Se eR I Ee 14, 17
OO ARA, © BI oink encnscceeiscsdececcoccs 11
43 U.S.C. § 1333(a2)(A) (2006) «2... eee. 12, 14
SB DA. BB Ci tesicicccccccesccensccessscesceses passim
46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30308 (2006) ....................2.....2-0-- 14
1
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Pacific Operators and ICSOP petition for a writ
of certiorari to review the judgment of the Ugited
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The unpublished decision of the Administrative
Law Judge in the Department of Labor’s Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs is printed in the
appendix (App.) at 53a. The unpublished decision of
the Benefits Review Board is reprinted in the appen-
dix at App. 35a. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is
reported at 604 F.3d 1126 and is reprinted in the
appendix at App. la. The unpublished order of the
Court of Appeals denying rehearing en banc is re-
printed in the appendix at App. 94a.
¢
JURISDICTION
The Benefits Review Board had jurisdiction
under 33 U.S.C. § 921(bX3). The Ninth Circuit had
jurisdiction to review the decision of the Benefits
Review Board under 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). The Ninth
Circuit entered judgment on May 13, 2010, App. la,
and denied petitioners’ timely petition for rehearing
en banc on July 19, 2010. App. 94a. The jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
>
2
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The relevant portions of 33 U.S.C. § 903 and 43
U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1312, 1331, 1332, and 1333 are re-
produced at App. 96a-106a.
+
INTRODUCTION
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA),
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356, extends the jurisdiction of
the United States to the seabed, subsoil, and fixed
structures of the outer continental shelf, an area that
lies more than three miles offshore and beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the States. The Act governs
the rights and obligations of those who own, operate,
and work on offshore oil drilling platforms. The Act
creates (and Department of Labor regulations imple-
ment) an administrative scheme for compensating
injured workers that resembles the workers’ compen-
sation schemes developed in most States. Under the
Act, a worker is eligible for compensation for “any
injury occurring as the result of operations conducted
on the outer Continental Shelf.” 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b).
Three circuit courts have considered whether a
worker injured on land is eligible for compensation
under the Act. Each circuit has adopted a different
test for resolving that question. The Third Circuit has
adopted a “status” test: a worker is eligible for bene-
fits no matter where he is injured, so long as he is
involved in operations conducted on the outer conti-
nental shelf. See Curtis v. Schlumberger Offshore
3
Serv., Inc., 849 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying the
Act to a rig worker killed in a car accident on a
New Jersey freeway while traveling to a helicopter
that would have taken him to a rig on the shelf). The
Fifth Circuit requires a worker to meet both a “sta-
tus” test and a “situs” test: a worker is eligible for
benefits only if his work is related to development on
the outer continental shelf and the injury occurs
while working on the shelf. Thus, injuries on land
are not compensable. See Mills v. Director, Office of
Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 877
F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1989) (refusing to apply the Act to
a welder injured on land while constructing an off-
shore oil platform). And the Ninth Circuit (in the case
below) has adopted a separate and fact-specific test: a
worker injured on land is eligible for benefits if there
is “a substantial nexus between the injury and ex-
tractive operations on the shelf,” meaning that “the
work performed directly furthers outer continental
shelf operations and is in the regular course of such
operations.” Valladolid v. Pac. Operations Offshore,
LLP, 604 F.3d 1126, 1139 (9th Cir. 2010), App. 28a.
This disputed legal issue — the proper test of
eligibility for OCSLA benefits — is one of nationwide
importance because the three circuit courts that have
divided on this question cover a majority of the Na-
tion’s coastline and offshore drilling operations. There
is no reason to believe that this circuit split will
resolve itself. The Third and Fifth Circuits have both
followed their standards for more than two decades.
Because each of the three circuits has adopted a
4
fundamentally different test, the split will not be
resolved even if one of the circuits were to alter
its standard through the en banc process. In sum, a
writ of certiorari should be granted here because a
worker’s eligibility for OCSLA benefits should not
depend on the circuit in which his injury occurs.
+
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compen-
sation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, provides
benefits to employees engaged in maritime employ-
ment who are injured upon navigable waters, includ-
ing adjoining piers, wharfs, and other structures
customarily used in loading, unloading, repairing or
building vessels. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (2006). Section 4
of OCSLA extends LHWCA benefits to cover the
disability or death of non-maritime employees “result-
ing from any injury occurring as the result of opera-
tions conducted on the outer Continental Shelf for the
purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, or
transporting by pipeline the natural resources, or
involving rights to the natural resources, of the
subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf.” 43
U.S.C. § 1333(b). The outer continental shelf is com-
prised of “all submerged lands lying seaward and
outside of the area of lands beneath navigable wa-
ters,” that is, submerged lands lying outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the states, which generally
extends three miles from the coast line. 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1301(a\(2), 1312, 1331(a) (2006).
5
Respondent Luisa Valladolid, the widow of dece-
dent Juan Valladolid, brought this proceeding against
Pacific Operators and ICSOP for workers’ compensa-
tion benefits under the LHWCA and the OCSLA.
Pacific’s primary business involves oil exploration
and extraction. The decedent worked for Pacific as a
roustabout, stationed primarily on one of Pacific’s two
drilling platforms located on the outer continental
shelf off the coast of California. He spent approxi-
mately 98 percent of his working time on one of the
drilling platforms, primarily performing maintenance
and repair duties. He also spent time working at
Pacific’s onshore oil flocculation facility. The facility
is separated from the Pacific Ocean by railroad
tracks, a highway, and a beach. The facility received
crude oil slurry from the offshore platforms via pipe-
line. Pacific processed the slurry, separating its oil,
gas, water, and solid constituents, then routed the oil
and gas through pipelines to third parties. The dece-
dent performed maintenance duties at the facility,
including painting, sandblasting, weed-pulling, clean-
ing drain-culverts, and operating a forklift.
Pacific's employees traveled to and from the
offshore platforms on a crew boat departing from a
pier located approximately three miles from the oil
flocculation facility. The boat was also used to ferry
equipment and supplies, and to remove scrap metal
from the platforms. The scrap metal was ferried to
the pier, where it was loaded into trucks and driven
to the facility. There it was dumped at various spots
on the property. One of the decedent’s duties at the
6
onshore facility was to use a forklift to retrieve the
scattered scrap metal and transport it to a central
location so that third-party scrap metal vendors could
pick the metal up and haul it away. He performed
this process roughly once every two years.
Between May 5, 2004 and June 5, 2004, Pacific
assigned decedent to work at the onshore facility
assisting in an ongoing project painting a water tank.
He performed that work most of the day on June 2,
2004. At 4:00 p.m. that day, the decedent’s supervisor
directed him to take a forklift to the rear yard of the
facility and move some scrap metal. One hour and 15
minutes later, the supervisor found the decedent next
to a tree roughly 10 feet from a service road in the
facility, with the forklift resting on his abdomen and
chest. He was pronounced dead at the scene. The
decedent had not moved any of the scrap metal he
had been directed to move.
The accident report stated that the decedent
apparently had stood on the top of one of the raised
tines of the forklift to cut fruit hanging from a tree
that was out of reach of a person on the ground. The
forklift apparently moved forward while the decedent
was attempting to harvest the fruit, which caused
him to lose his balance, fall in front of the forklift,
and sustain fatal injuries when it rolled over him.
Respondent received death benefits under Cali-
fornia’s workers’ compensation scheme. She also filed
a claim for benefits under the LHWCA and under
OCSLA’s extension to outer continental shelf workers.
7
An administrative law judge in the Department of
Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs
denied respondent’s OCSLA claim on the ground the
death had not occurred on the outer continental shelf,
and denied the LHWCA claim on the grounds the
decedent was not engaged in maritime employment
and was not injured on a maritime situs. App. 81a,
93a. The Benefits Review Board upheld the adminis-
trative law judge’s decision. App. 42a-43a, 51a-52a.
On respondent’s petition for review, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld
the Board’s finding that the facility was not a mari-
time situs, meaning she had no direct right to
LHWCA benefits. Valladolid v. Pac. Operations
Offshore LLP, 604 F.3d 1126, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010),
App. 32a. However, the court rejected the Board’s
situs-of-injury test for determining the applicability
of OCSLA’s extension of the LHWCA. Id. at 1137-38,
App. 23a-24a. The Ninth Circuit formulated a new
and different test: “An injury is ‘the result of’ outer
continental shelf operations if there is a substantial
nexus between the injury and the operations.” 7d. at
1142, App. 34a. “To meet the standard, the claimant
must show that the work performed directly furthers
outer continental shelf operations and is in the regu-
lar course of such operations.” Jd. at 1139, App. 28a.
The Ninth Circuit remanded for further agency
proceedings involving the new test. Jd. at 1142, App.
34a.
8
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION CRE-
ATES A THREE-WAY CIRCUIT SPLIT ON
THE IMPORTANT QUESTION OF OIL
PLATFORM WORKERS’ ELIGIBILITY FOR
OCSLA BENEFITS.
Three Courts of Appeals have considered whether
a worker injured on land is eligible for LHWCA
benefits, as extended by section 4 of OCSLA, 43
U.S.C. § 1333(b). One court adopted a status test —
the employee’s work must further mineral extraction
from the outer continental shelf. Another court re-
quired an employee to satisfy both a status and a
situs test — the employee’s work must be related to
development on the outer continental shelf and he
must have suffered injury or death from an occur-
rence on the shelf. And a third court rejected both the
status and situs tests in favor of a fact-intensive
inquiry into the nature and extent of the employee’s
work.
_ In Curtis v. Schlumberger Offshore Ser., Inc., 849
F.2d 805, 809 (3d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted), the
Third Circuit adopted the status test. It held that an
oil rig worker injured in a car accident on a New
Jersey freeway while traveling to a helicopter that
would have taken him to an offshore rig was entitled
to LHWCA benefits. As interpreted by the Third
Circuit, “[t]he only criterion [under OCSLA] ... for
securing LHWCA benefits is for injured employees to
be involved in ‘any operations conducted on the outer
Continental Shelf for the purpose of exploring for,
9
[and] developing ... the natural resources ... of the
outer Continental Shelf.’ There [is] ... no limitation
... to ‘artificial islands and fixed structures’... .”: Jd.
at 810 n.9 (“[sJitus does not control the application of
the LHWCA”). Thus, the Third Circuit has adopted a
“but for” test: the employee’s injury on the freeway
occurred as a result of operations on the outer conti-
nental shelf because “‘{bJut for’ his traveling to the
[offshore rig] for the purpose of conducting ‘opera-
tions’ within § 1333(b), [he] would not have sustained
injuries in the automobile accident.” Jd. at 811.
The Fifth Circuit took a different approach in
Mills v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S.
Dep’t of Labor, 877 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1989), holding
that an employee must satisfy both a status and a
situs test to be eligible for benefits under the LHWCA
as extended by OCSLA: “We interpret § 1333(b) to
require that covered operations be (1) related to OCS
development; and (2) conducted on the OCS. Given
the second requirement, activity conducted off the
OCS, even though related to OCS mineral extraction,
does not satisfy § 1333(b).” Id. at 359. Accordingly, the
Fifth Circuit in Mills held that a welder injured
during the onshore construction of a platform de-
signed for the outer continental shelf was not eligible
for LHWCA benefits.
In this case, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with
both the Third and Fifth Circuits. Rejecting the Fifth
Circuit’s holding in Mills, it held that “a situs-of-
injury test is unambiguously absent from § 1333(b).”
Valladolid, 604 F.3d at 1135, App. 19a. However,
10
refusing to follow the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit
did not “find that Congress intended to enact a simple
‘but for’ test in covering injuries that occur ‘as the
result of’ outer continental shelf operations. Injuries
with a tenuous connection to the outer continental
shelf are not covered.” Jd. at 1139, App. 27a.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit adopted the following
test:
[T]he claimant must establish a substantial
nexus between the injury and extractive op-
erations on the shelf. To meet the standard,
the claimant must show that the work per-
formed directly furthers outer continental
shelf operations and is in the regular course
of such operations. An injury sustained dur-
ing employment on the outer continental
shelf itself would, by definition, meet the
standard. However, an accountant’s work-
place injury would not be covered even if re-
lated to outer continental shelf operations,
while a roustabout’s injury in a helicopter en
route to the outer continental shelf likely
would be. We leave more precise line-
drawing to the specific factual circumstances
of later cases.
Id., App. 28a.
Although the facts in this case are undisputed
(the decedent suffered fatal injuries while attempting
to harvest fruit at Pacific’s onshore facility), the
Ninth Circuit declined to decide whether they satis-
fied its “substantial nexus” test. Instead, it remanded
1]
the case for further consideration by the agency. /d. at
1142, App. 34a.
These three circuit courts are hopelessly divtded,
and their territories include a majority of the Nation’s
coastline, giving rise to the vast majority of OCSLA
claims. The purely legal question of whether outer
continental shelf workers injured on land are eligible
for OCSLA benefits therefore deserves this Court’s
review.
i. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETA-
TION OF OCSLA IS INCONSISTENT WITH
CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE AND THIS
COURT’S STATEMENTS.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case disre-
garded Congress’ purpose in enacting OCSLA. Before
the enactment of OCSLA in 1953, the outer conti-
nental shelf was “an area of intense activity that
lacked an established legal system because it lies
beyond state boundaries.” Mills, 877 F.2d at 358.
Consequently, “to define a body of law applicable to
the seabed, the subsoil, and the fixed structures ...
on the outer Continental Shelf,” Rodrigue v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969), Congress
extended “[t]he Constitution and laws and civil and
political jurisdiction of the United States” to those
locales “to the same extent as if the outer Continental
Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction
located within a state....” 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1)
(2006). In the event no federal law existed on a
12
particular issue, Congress borrowed the adjacent
state’s law as surrogate federal law. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1333(a)(2\A) (2006).
“One obvious void in the law governing the OCS
was the lack of a workers’ compensation scheme for
thousands of workers employed in the dangerous
oilfield extraction industry. Congress filled that void
in § 1333(b) when it adopted the LHWCA’s benefits
provision to cover non-seamen employed in the oil
patch on the OCS.” Mills, 877 F.2d at 358.
No such void existed when outer continental
shelf workers were injured on land. Like the decedent
in this case, those workers were covered by the appli-
cable state workers’ compensation scheme. As the
Fifth Circuit in Mills correctly observed, “Congress
intended to regulate the OCS, not those areas that
already were governed by state law.” Jd. at 359. There
was no “legislative history suggesting that Congress
intended to single out OCSLA’s workers’ compensa-
tion scheme for different treatment.” Jd. The Ninth
Circuit’s decision anticipates that some outer conti-
nental shelf workers injured on land will be eligible
for OCSLA benefits (and even some workers who
never set foot on the outer continental shelf, so long
as their work “directly furthers outer continental
shelf development”), and to that extent the decision
runs afoul of Congress’ intentions.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision also has important
insurance consequences that are inconsistent with
Congress’ intentions. If, as the Ninth Circuit held
13
here, workers injured on land are entitled to both
state workers’ compensation benefits and OCSLA
benefits so long as their work “directly furthers outer
continental shelf operations,” Valladolid, 604 F.3d at
1139, App. 28a, then employers must purchase insur-
ance covering their liability to land based workers
(like the welder in Mills) under both the state and
federal compensation acts. As the Fifth Circuit ex-
plained, however, there is “no evidence indicating
that Congress intended to create such a cumbersome
and uncertain compensation scheme or that it in-
tended to intrude in a significant way on established
state workers’ compensation programs.” Mills, 877
F.2d at 362.
The Ninth Circuit believed its decision was
compelled by what it characterized as OCSLA’s plain
language, asserting that “a situs-of-injury test is
unambiguously absent from § 1333(b).” Valladolid,
604 F.3d at 1135, App. 19a. The language of § 1333(b)
is anything but plain, however. Interpreting the same
language, the Fifth Circuit showed that eligibility for
benefits rests on an injury occurring on the shelf:
although the phrase “‘[injured) as the result of opera-
tions conducted on the outer Continental Shelf for the
purpose of ... developing ... the natural resources
. of the [OCS])’ [in §1333(b)] is open to interpreta-
tion,” given the congressional purpose underlying
OCSLA, “under [a] . . . plausible reading of 43 U.S.C.
§ 1333(b), coverage requires that the relevant ‘opera-
tions’ out of which the injury arises occur on the
OCS.” Mills, 877 F.2d at 359.
14
Moreover, even if the Ninth Circuit’s interpreta-
tion of 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) were correct, there was no
reason for it to infer meaning from the absence of a
situs requirement. As two decisions of this Court
confirm, a situs requirement already appears in
§ 1333(a), which limits OCSLA’s coverage “to the
subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and
to all artificial islands, and all installations and other
devices permanently or temporarily attached to the
seabed....”; it was unnecessary for Congress to
repeat that requirement in 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b).
In one of those decisions, Offshore Logistics, Inc.
v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986), two offshore drill-
ing platform workers were killed when the helicopter
carrying them from the platform to the shore crashed
30 miles off the Louisiana coast. Their widows
brought actions against the owner and operator of the
helicopter. They claimed they were not limited to
awards of pecuniary damages provided by the Death
on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30308, but
were also entitled to nonpecuniary damages under
the Louisiana wrongful death statute, which applied
either of its own force, or as surrogate federal law
under OCSLA. See 43 U.S.C. § 1333(aX(2A) (2006).
This Court held that because the helicopter crash did
not occur in the area covered by OCSLA, but rather
on the high seas, the maritime remedy for wrongful
death under the Death on the High Seas Act con-
trolled:
We do not interpret § 4 of OCSLA, 43 U-S.C.,
§ 1333 to require or permit us to extend the
15
coverage of the statute to the platform
workers in this case who were killed miles
away from the platform and on the high seas
simply because they were platform worker#
Congress determined that the general scope
of OCSLA’s coverage, like the operation of
DOHSA’s remedies, would be determined
principally by locale, not by the status of the
individual injured or killed. Because the
fatalities underlying this suit did not arise
from an accident in the area covered by
OCSLA but rather occurred on the high seas,
DOHSA plainly was intended to control.
477 U.S. at 219-20.
In a footnote, this Court in Offshore Logistics
added:
Only one provision of OCSLA superimposes a
status requirement on the otherwise deter-
minative OCSLA situs requirement; § 1333(b)
makes compensation for the death or injury
of an “employee” resulting from certain oper-
ations on the Outer Continental Shelf paya-
ble under the Longshoreman’s and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act. We note that be-
cause this case does not involve a suit by an
injured employee against his employer pur-
suant to § 1333(b), this provision has no
bearing on this case.
477 U.S. at 220 n.2.
In Offshore Logistics, this Court referred to its
discussion in Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S.
16
414 (1985), regarding the “status and situs require-
ments of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act as applied to platform workers
making claims against their employers... .” Offshore
Logistics, 477 U.S. at 220. In Herb’s Welding, a welder
who spent roughly three-fourths of his working time
on oil drilling platforms in state waters and the rest
on platforms on the outer continental shelf claimed a
direct right to LHWCA benefits after he was injured
on a platform in state waters. This Court held that he
did not have a direct right to LHWCA benefits be-
cause he was not engaged in maritime employment.
It declined to decide whether the welder was entitled
to benefits under OCSLA because the issue had not
been fully briefed in or discussed by the Court of
Appeals. Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. at 426 n.12, & 427.
Nonetheless, the Court made clear that entitlement
to benefits under that Act depended on situs as well
as status. Noting “the explicit geographical limitation
to the Lands Act’s incorporation of the LHWCA,” it
commented that “Gray would indeed have been
covered for a significant portion of his work-time, but
because of the Lands Act, not because he fell within
the terms of the LHWCA. ... [T]Jhat statute draws a
clear geographical boundary that will predictably
result in workers moving in and out of coverage.” Id.
at 427.
The Ninth Circuit here dismissed this Court’s
statements in Offshore Logistics and Herb’s Welding
as dicta. Valladolid, 604 F.3d at 1131-32 & n.2,
App. 9a-lla & n.2. But as the Fifth Circuit in Mills
17
correctly found, those statements firmly acknowledge
“the geographic boundaries to OCSLA’s coverage. .. .”
Mills, 877 F.2d at 361. They make clear that when a
worker seeks benefits under OCSLA, § 1333(b) does
not replace the Act’s situs requirement with a status
requirement. Rather, it “superimposes,” i.e., adds, a
status requirement to “the otherwise determinative
OCSLA situs requirement” found in § 1333(a). Off-
shore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 220 n.2. Consequently, a
worker will “mov{e] in and out of coverage,” Herb’s
Welding, 470 U.S. at 427, depending on where he is
working. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Mills, “[wle
cannot accept the Director’s explanation that the
Court meant to ‘replace’ situs with status when it
used ‘superimposes.’ The Court could not have made
it clearer that a worker must demonstrate status and
situs to recover LHWCA benefits under § 1333(b).”
Mills, 877 F.2d at 361.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit’s justifications for its
decision can be reconciled with neither Congressional
intent nor this Court’s statements in prior cases
involving the OCSLA. And as we have explained, the
Ninth Circuit’s decision deepens an existing circuit
split on a threshold issue of benefits eligibility and
formulates a test that provides no meaningful guid-
ance to administrative law judges and the Benefits
Review Board. The current three-way split among the
circuits regarding the interpretation of 43 U.S.C.
§ 1333(b) and the import of this Court’s statements in
Offshore Logistics and Herb’s Welding means that a
worker’s entitlement to OCSLA benefits for an injury
18
on land depends on the circuit in which the claim
arises, an intolerable situation. Only a decision by
this Court can bring clarity and consistency to this
area of the law.
+
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ
of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Horvitz & LEVY LLP
PEDER K. BATALDEN
*PETER ABRAHAMS
THOMAS, QUINN & KRIEGER, LLP
MICHAEL W. THOMAS
Counsel for Petitioners
Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP
and Insurance Company of
the State of Pennsylvania
*Counsel of Record
App. 1
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH Circuit
LUISA VALLADOLID,
Petitioner,
Vv.
. ~ a No. 08-73862
ACIFIC OPERATIONS OFFSHORE,
LLP; INSURANCE COMPANY OF BRB No. 07-965
THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; OPINION
and DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORK-
ERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,
Respondents.
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Benefits Review Board
Argued and Submitted
March 9, 2010 — San Francisco, California
Filed May 13, 2010
Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Jay S. Bybee, Cir-
cuit Judges, and James V. Selna,* District Judge.
* The Honorable James V. Selna, United States District
Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designa-
tion.
App. 2
COUNSEL
Timothy K. Sprinkles, Law Office of Charles D.
Naylor, San Pedro, California, and Joshua T. Gillelan
II, Longshore Claimants’ National Law Center, Wash-
ington, DC, for the petitioner.
Michael W. Thomas, Laughlin, Falbo, Levy & Moresi
LLP, San Francisco, California, for the respondents.
OPINION
SELNA, District Judge:
In this case, we consider whether an employee
must be injured on the outer continental shelf to be
eligible for workers’ compensation benefits under the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (““OCSLA”), 43
U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. The two other circuits that have
considered this question have reached conflicting
conclusions.
*
Decedent Juan Valladolid worked for Pacific
Operations Offshore as a roustabout, stationed pri-
marily on one of Pacific Operations’s two offshore
drilling platforms. He was killed, however, on the
grounds of Pacific Operations’s onshore oil-processing
facility when he was crushed by a forklift. His widow
seeks workers’ compensation benefits under OCSLA
and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act (“LHWCA”), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.
App. 3
Pacific Operations runs two offshore oil drilling
platforms, the Hogan and the Houchin, both located
more than three miles off the coast of California.
Valladolid spent roughly 98% of his working time
aboard the Hogan. As a roustabout, his work primari-
ly consisted of cleaning and maintenance duties:
picking up litter, emptying trash cans, washing decks,
painting, fixing equipment, and helping load and
unload the platform crane.
Valladolid also spent time working at Pacific
Operations’s onshore oil flocculation facility, located
on the California coast just 250-300 feet from the
shore.’ This facility, referred to as La Conchita,
received crude oil slurry from the Hogan and the
Houchin via pipeline. The slurry would then be
processed, separating its oil, gas, water, and solid
constituents, with the oil and gas routed off site
through pipelines to third parties. Valladolid per-
formed maintenance duties at La Conchita, including
painting, sandblasting, weed-pulling, cleaning drain-
culverts, and operating a forklift.
Crew members traveled to and from the offshore
platforms on a crew boat departing from the Casitas
Pass Pier, located about three miles from La
Conchita. The crew boat was also used to ferry
’ Pacific contends that the facility is actually 250-300 yards
from the ocean. Because our decision does not turn on the
difference between 250-300 feet and 250-300 yards, we assume
for the purposes of this appeal that Petitioner’s measure is
correct.
App. 4
equipment and supplies and to remove scrap metal —
pieces of old pipe, storage tanks, catwalks, chain, and
cables — from the platforms. The scrap metal was
ferried to the Casitas Pass Pier, where it was loaded
into trucks and driven to La Conchita. There it was
dumped at various spots on the property. Neither the
loading crew at the pier nor the truck drivers were
employed by Pacific Operations.
One of Valladolid’s duties at La Conchita was to
“centralize” the scrap metal from the various loca-
tions so that third-party scrap metal vendors could
pick the metal up and haul it away. Valladolid would
use a forklift to retrieve the scattered metal and
transport it to a central location. The consolidation
process was performed roughly once every two years.
Valladolid was killed during this process when he was
crushed by a forklift.
Petitioner, Valladolid’s widow, received death
benefits under California’s workers’ compensation
scheme. She also filed a claim for benefits under
the LHWCA, both directly under the LHWCA and via
the OCSLA extension to outer continental shelf
workers. After informal proceedings before the local
district director of the Department of Labor’s Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs, the matter was
referred to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
The AL.J denied Petitioner’s OCSLA claim on the
grounds that Valladolid’s injury had occurred outside
the geographic situs of the outer continental shelf.
The ALJ denied the LHWCA claim on two grounds:
App. 5
(1) Valladolid was not engaged in maritime employ-
ment, and (2) he was not injured on a maritime situs.
The Benefits Review Board (“BRB”) upheld the AL.J’s
denial of the OCSLA benefits under the “situs-of-
injury” test, and affirmed the denial of LHWCA
benefits on the maritime situs ground. The BRB did
not reach the maritime employment issue.
I.
We have jurisdiction to review the final orders of
the BRB under 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). We review the
BRB’s decisions for errors of law and adherence to the
substantial evidence standard. Pedroza v. BRB, 583
F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2009). The BRB’s decisions
on questions of law are reviewed de novo. M. Cutter
Co. v. Carroll, 458 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 2006).
Because the BRB is not a policymaking body, its
constructions of the LHWCA are not entitled to
special deference. Dyer v. Cenex Harvest States Coop.,
563 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). However, the
Court must “respect the [BRB’s] interpretation of the
statute where such interpretation is reasonable and
reflects the policy underlying the statute.” Christen-
sen v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., 557 F.3d 1049, 1052
(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting McDonald v. Dir., Office of
Workers’ Comp. Programs, 897 F.2d 1510, 1512 (9th
Cir. 1990)).
App. 6
iil.
The LHWCA provides compensation for the
disability or death of a maritime employee “if the
disability or death results from an injury occurring
upon the navigable waters of the United States.” 33
U.S.C. § 903(a). Under the OCSLA workers’ compen-
sation provision, LHWCA benefits are extended to:
[the] disability or death of an employee re-
sulting from any injury occurring as the re-
sult of operations conducted on the outer
Continental Shelf for the purpose of explor-
ing for, developing, removing, or transporting
by pipeline the natural resources, or involv-
ing rights to the natural resources, of the
subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental
Shelf.
43 U.S.C. § 1333(b). The outer continental shelf
is comprised of “all submerged lands lying seaward
and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable
waters” — that is, submerged lands lying outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the states. Jd. § 1331(a); see
id. § 1301(a)(2). State jurisdiction over offshore lands
generally extends three miles from the coast line,
though in certain cases not relevant here, it may
extend further. See id. § 1301(a)\2).
Petitioner contends that the BRB impermissibly
applied a “situs-of-injury” requirement for OCSLA
workers’ compensation, denying her claim because
her husband was killed on shore and not on the outer
continental shelf. This is an issue of first impression
in the Ninth Circuit. Two other circuits presented
App. 7
with this exact issue have reached conflicting conclu-
sions.
In Curtis v. Schlumberger Offshore Servicee Inc.,
849 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1988), the Third Circuit rejected
the situs-of-injury test and held that a claimant need
only satisfy a “but for” test in establishing that the
injury occurred “as the result of” operations on the
outer continental shelf. Jd. at 809-11. Accordingly, an
employee injured in a car accident on his way to meet
a helicopter that would take him to an offshore plat-
form was eligible for OCSLA disability benefits. Jd. at
806, 811.
However, in Mills v. Lirector, Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs, 877 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1989)
(en banc), the Fifth Circuit adopted a situs-of-injury
requirement for OCSLA claims. Under Mills, an
OCSLA claimant must show that the injury occurred
on an outer continental shelf platform or on the
waters above the outer continental shelf, in addition
to satisfying the “but for” test. Jd. at 362; see also
Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 586 F.3d 358, 366-67 (5th
Cir. 2009); Pickett v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 266
F.3d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 2001); Sisson v. Davis & Sons,
Inc., 131 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1998). Thus, a welder
injured during the onshore construction of a platform
destined for the outer continental shelf was not
eligible for OCSLA disability benefits. Mills, 877 F.2d
at 357, 362.
App. 8
A.
Aside from the two conflicting Court of Appeals
decisions, there is little precedent on the question
before us. The Supreme Court touched on the ques-
tion in passing in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire,
477 U.S. 207 (1986). The relevant issue there was
whether a _ choice-of-law provision in OCSLA, 43
U.S.C. § 1333(aX2XMA), applied so as to allow the
widows of employees killed in a helicopter crash to
pursue a wrongful death action under state law. Jd. at
209. Section 1333(aX2MA) applies the law of the
nearest state as surrogate federal law for “the subsoil
and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artifi-
cial islands and fixed structures erected thereon.” 43
U.S.C. § 1333(aX2MA). The Court declined to extend
this provision to an accident occurring on the waters
above the outer continental shelf, finding that “Con-
gress determined that the general scope of OCSLA’s
coverage ... would be determined principally by
locale, not by the status of the individual injured or
killed.” Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 219. In an accompany-
ing footnote, the Court added:
Only one provision of OCSLA superimposes a
status requirement on the otherwise deter-
minative OCSLA situs requirement; § 1333(b)
makes compensation for the death or injury
of an “employee” resulting from certain oper-
ations on the Outer Continental Shelf paya-
ble under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act. We note that
because this case does not involve a suit by
an injured employee against his employer
App. 9
pursuant to § 1333(b), this provision has no
bearing on this case.
Id. at 219 n.2.
Pacific Operations contends that this footnote is
dispositive of this case. We, on the other hand, agree
with the Third Circuit that Tallentire is simply not on
point. See Curtis, 849 F.2d at 810. Tullentire dealt
with the applicability of the § 1333(aX2)(A) choice-of-
law provision, not the § 1333(b) benefits provision, as
explicitly noted by the Court. 477 U.S. at 219 n.2
(“Section 1333(b)] has no bearing on this case”). The
Court’s footnote about § 1333(b) is textbook dictum.
Of course, we treat the considered dicta of the
Supreme Court with greater weight and deference “as
prophecy of what that Court might hold.” United
States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.17
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Zal v. Steppe, 968
F.2d 924, 935 (9th Cir. 1992) (Noonan, J., concurring
and dissenting)). They are not to be “blandly
shrugiged] ... off because they were not a holding.”
Zal, 968 F.2d at 935 (Noonan, J., concurring and
dissenting). We do not blindly, however, follow an
unconsidered statement simply because it was ut-
tered by the Supreme Court. See Montero-Camargo,
208 F.3d at 1132 n.17. As the Court itself has noted,
“general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken
in connection with the case in which those expres-
sions are used.... [TJheir possible bearing on all
other cases is seldom completely investigated.”
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
App. 10
627 (1935) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821)).
For the following reasons, we are convinced that
the footnote in Tutllentire is of the unconsidered
variety not entitled to special deference. The
§ 1333(b) benefits issue was not before the Court, was
not briefed by the parties, and had no relevance to
the case before it. See Tullentire, 477 U.S. at 219 &
n.2. There is no analysis or reasoning behind the
Court’s statement that a situs requirement applies to
§ 1333(b). See id. These circumstances strip the
dictum of any predictive or persuasive value. See
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816
n.25 (2008).
Moreover, the import of the Court’s statement to
the case at hand is debatable. The Court spoke gen-
erally of an OCSLA “situs” requirement, but it is not
clear that the Court’s statement requires a “situs-of-
injury,” as opposed to a “situs-of-operations,” test.
Section 1333(b) applies only to injuries occurring “as
the result of operations conducted on the outer Conti-
nental Shelf.” 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b). Clearly, the opera-
tions must be on the outer continental shelf. See
Herb’s Welding v. Gray (Herb’s Welding IT), 766 F.2d
898, 900 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that an injury occur-
ring on an oil platform in state waters is not eligible
for OCSLA benefits). It is less clear — and the
Tallentire footnote does not illuminate the issue —
App. 11
that.the injury must also be on the outer continental
shelf.’
The Ninth Circuit cases cited by the parties are
similarly unhelpful. In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Director,
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 812 F.2d
518 (9th Cir. 1986), a pipefitter/welder was injured
while working on an outer continental shelf platform
and sought benefits under OCSLA. Id. at 520. The
issue was whether he was an eligible “employee” even
though his work was “primarily land based.” Jd. at
521-22. This Court, finding him eligible for § 1333(b)
benefits, stated that:
[iIn the absence of any other limitation on
the face of the statute or in the legislative
history of [OCSLA], section 1333(b) should
* The Mills court also found support for its situs-of-injury
test in Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray (Herb’s Welding I), 470
U.S. 414 (1985). Mills, 877 F.2d at 361. The issue in Herb’s
Welding I was whether a worker on a platform in state waters
was engaged in “maritime employment” so as to entitle him to
benefits under the LHWCA. 470 U.S. at 415-16. The Fifth
Circuit found significance in the Court’s passing comment that
explicit geographic limitation to [OCSLA’s] incorporation of the
LHWCA. ... [TJhat statute draws a clear geographic boundary
that will predictably result in workers moving in and out of
coverage.” Id. at 427. As with Tullentire, however, the scope of
§ 1333(b) was never considered, rendering this passage unhelp-
ful on the issue before us. In fact, the Court explicitly declined to
consider whether the worker was entitled to OCSLA benefits
even though he had argued the issue throughout the proceed-
ings. Id. at 426 n.12.
App. 12
be construed as extending [LHWCA] cover-
age to all victims of disabling or fatal injuries
sustained while working to develop the min-
eral wealth of the OCS [outer continental
shelf].
Id. at 522. This passage does not directly apply to the
situs issue, as it came within the context of whether
the claimant met the § 1333(b) “employee” require-
ment. Id. at 522-23.
In A-Z International v. Phillips, 179 F.3d 1187
(9th Cir. 1999), this Court reviewed a BRB decision
vacating an AL.J’s order recommending sanctions for
a fraudulent OCSLA claim. Id. at 1189. In the under-
lying case, the ALJ had found the claimant ineligible
for OCSLA benefits because, contrary to his allega-
tion, his injury did not occur on an offshore platform
and he therefore failed to satisfy the situs-of-injury
test. Id. That decision was never appealed. Jd. How-
ever, on review of the subsequent sanctions order, this
Court stated in a footnote accompanying the recita-
tion of the facts:
The situs requirement is a predicate for cov-
erage under OCSLA. See 43 U.S.C. § 1333
(1994); see also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v.
Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 219 (1986) (noting
that “Congress determined that the general
scope of OCSLA’s coverage ... would be de-
termined principally by locale”).
Id. at 1189 n.1. We do not find this statement binding
or especially persuasive, given that the situs issue
was neither argued by the parties nor considered by
App. 13
the Court because the claimant never appealed the
decision on the situs question. Jd. at 1189. The issue
in A-Z International was a procedural question gbout
an AL.J’s contempt power. Jd. The comment on the
situs issue was gratuitous language appended to the
statement of facts and not a considered statement of
the law.
B.
Absent clear precedent to guide us on the situs-
of-injury issue, we are presented with a straightfor-
ward question of statutory construction. “The purpose
of statutory construction is to discern the intent of
Congress in enacting a particular statute.” Robinson
v. United States, 586 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2009)
(quoting United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1174
(9th Cir. 1999)). We first look to the plain language of
the statute, which controls “unless its application
leads to unreasonable or impracticable results.” Jd. at
687 (quoting Daas, 198 F.3d at 1174). The plain
meaning is determined with an eye towards the
context of the language and design of the statute as a
whole. Jd. “It is a cardinal canon of statutory con-
struction that statutes should be interpreted harmo-
niously with their dominant legislative purpose.”
United States v. Gallenardo, 579 F.3d 1076, 1085 (9th
Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d
713, 720 (9th Cir. 2008)).
There are two distinct arguments that OCSLA’s
language supports a situs-of-injury requirement. The
App. 14
first argument — the route taken by the Fifth Circuit
in Mills — is that § 1333(b) itself contains the situs-of-
injury requirement. See 877 F.2d at 358-59. The
second argument — advanced by Pacific Operations —
is that the situs requirement of § 1333(a) applies to
OCSLA as a whole. For the reasons discussed below,
we find neither argument persuasive and find the
statute unambiguous in not requiring a situs-of-
injury test.
OCSLA was enacted in 1953 to establish federal
jurisdiction over the submerged lands beyond the
jurisdiction of the states in order to promote the
orderly exploitation of minerals lying below the
seabed. See Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395
U.S. 352 355-56 (1969); Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462, 462
(1953); S. Rep. No. 83-411, at 2 (1953). As part of this
endeavor, Congress needed to establish a body of
substantive law to cover the outer continental shelf.
See Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355-56; S. Rep. No. 83-411,
at 2. Section 4 of OCSLA, codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 1333, set forth the laws to be applied. § 4, 67 Stat.
at 462-63. For example, subsection (a) establishes the
substantive civil and criminal law applying to the
outer continental shelf, artificial islands, and plat-
forms fixed to the seabed. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a). Sub-
section (c) applies the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”) to “any unfair labor practice ... occurring
upon any artificial island, installation, or other device
referred to in subsection (a).” Jd. § 1333(c). Subsection
(d) provides the Coast Guard with the authority to
App. 15
promulgate regulations governing the safety equip-
ment, warning devices, and other safety matters on
artificial islands and fixed platforms. Jd. § 1333(d).
Subsection (e) extends the Army’s authority to pre-
vent obstruction of the navigable waters to fixed
platforms on the outer continental shelf. Id. § 1333(e).
Section 1333(b) provides workers’ compensation
benefits for “any injury occurring as the result of
operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf.”
Id. §1333(b) (emphasis added). The situs-of-
operations requirement is clear; the operations must
be conducted on the outer continental shelf. However,
the only limitation on the injury is that it be “the
result of” operations on the outer continental shelf.
As many courts have recognized, the phrase “as the
result of” simply denotes causation. See, e.g., Brown
v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 119 (1994) (“as a result of”
in veterans’ benefits statute indicates causation with
no fault requirement); Murakami v. United States,
398 F.3d 1342, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“as a result
of” in federal claims statute indicates causation with
no temporal limitation); Black Hills Aviation, Inc. v.
United States, 34 F.3d 968, 975 (10th Cir. 1994) (“as a
result of” in Department of Defense regulation
means “caused by” rather than “connected with”).
Thus, the most natural reading of § 1333(b) provides
coverage for any injury caused by outer continental
shelf operations regardless of where the injury oc-
curred.
The Mills court found ambiguity in § 1333(b) by
focusing on the word “operations.” According to Millis,
App. 16
because the operations must occur on the outer conti-
nental shelf, the injury must also occur on the outer
continental shelf: “activity conducted off the OCS,
even though related to OCS mineral extraction, does
not satisfy § 1333(b).” 877 F.2d at 359. However, this
interpretation fails to acknowledge the connecting
phrase “as the result of.” The results of an operation
may regularly extend beyond its immediate physical
location. When a pitcher hits a batter with a pitch,
the batter’s injury is the result of “operations” on the
mound. The Fifth Circuit’s attempt to unearth ambi-
guity in § 1333(b) by ignoring a key phrase does not
persuade us.”
Neither are we persuaded that the situs limita-
tions in the other provisions of § 1333 indicate a
* Our position finds support in Murakami, a Federal Circuit
decision interpreting similar language in a reparations statute.
Murakami involved a claim under the Civil Liberties Act of
1988, which provided a redress payment for individuals who
were “deprived of liberty or property as a result of” the intern-
ment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. 398 F.3d at
1344 (emphasis added); 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-7(2). The claim-
ant challenged a regulation categorically denying payments to
individuals born after the restraints on travel were lifted.
Murakami, 398 F.3d at 1347-48. The Federal Circuit rejected
this categorical exclusion, noting that the result of the travel
restrictions could, in certain cases, extend beyond the date of
their repeal. Jd. at 1352-53. Murakami teaches that “as a result
of” contains no temporal limitation; likewise, in this case, we
see no reason to import a spatial one. If travel restrictions can
cause an injury after their repeal, similar logic supports the
view that operations on the outer continental shelf can cause
injury outside the outer continental shelf.
App. 17
situs-of-injury requirement for subsection (b). The
Mills majority felt that these limitations reflected a
Congressional intent to limit the reach of the statute
to occurrences on the outer continental shelf as part
of a “gap-filling” purpose. 877 F.2d at 359-60. We,
however, find the Mills dissent to be more persuasive:
the absence of a situs-of-injury requirement in sub-
section (b), in light of the explicit limitations in the
other subsections, reflects an intent not to limit that
subsection in the same manner. /d. at 362 (Duhe, J.,
dissenting). The different treatment of subsection (b)
is quite clear, given that it is the only subsection not
to incorporate the situs definition of subsection (a).
See 43 U.S.C. § 1333. This distinction ought to be
given effect.
Moreover, a comparison of the language of the
different provisions strongly implies that subsection
(b)’s coverage extends beyond the outer continental!
shelf. Subsection (c) applies the NLRA to unfair labor
practices “occurring upon any artificial island, instal-
lation, or other [fixed platform],” id. § 1333(c), while
subsection (b) provides coverage for injuries “occur-
ring as the result of operations conducted on the outer
Continental Shelf,” id. § 1333(b) (emphasis added).
Congress had the ability to craft a situs-of-injury
requirement — and did so within the very same sec-
tion of the statute — yet left it out of subsection (b).
See also Longshore & Harbor Workers’ Compensation
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (limiting coverage to injuries
“occurring upon the navigable waters of the United
States” (emphasis added)). We should not read one in.
App. 18
Accordingly, we find that the language of
§ 1333(b) is unambiguous in not including a situs-of-
injury requirement. Indeed, our interpretation of
§ 1333(b) is confirmed by a Fifth Circuit decision,
Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., 280 F.3d 492, 500
(5th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds, Grand
Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d
778 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc), subsequent to Millis.
Demette held that “section 1333(b) contains only a
status requirement.” Jd. at 500 n.29. According to
Demette, the situs-of-injury requirement derives from
§ 1333(a)(1), which “creates a ‘situs’ requirement for
the application of other sections of the OCSLA, in-
cluding sections 1333(aX2) and 1333(b).” Id. at 496.
As Demette explains, “[iJn order for the LHWCA to
apply by virtue of section 1333(b), ... the injured
worker must satisfy the ‘status’ requirement of sec-
tion 1333(b) as well as the situs requirement of
section 1333(a\1).” Id. at 498. This is, however, a
misstatement of Mills’s holding, which clearly finds a
situs-of-injury requirement in the language of
§ 1333(b).‘ Mills, 877 F.2d at 362. This disagreement
* In fact, Demette ‘s interpretation of Mills would put that
decision in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Tallentire. In an effort to avoid overruling its own precedent
applying OCSLA to helicopter crashes on the waters above the
outer continental shelf, Mills defined § 1333(b) as applying to
“injury or death on an OCS platform or the waters above the
OCS.” 877 F.2d at 362. Tullentire, however, expressly held that
§ 1333(a) does not apply to the waters above the outer continen-
tal shelf. 477 U.S. at 219. Had Mills pulled its situs-of-injury
(Continued on following page)
App. 19
among Fifth Circuit panels underscores the extent to
which Mills departed from the plain language of
§ 1333(b) and confirms what we find fairly obvious —
a situs-of-injury test is unambiguously absent from
§ 1333(b). |
The legislative history does not indicate other-
wise. The Mills court interpreted § 1333 as a “gap-
filler,” solely intended to fill a void in substantive law
due to the fact that the outer continental shelf lies
beyond state jurisdiction. See Mills, 877 F.2d at 358.
Therefore, Mills reasoned, no provision of OCSLA was
intended to apply outside that situs. The opinion cited
a statement during debate on the floor of the Senate
that “[OCSLA)] is legislatively joined with the Sub-
merged Lands Act.... [T]he Submerged Lands Act
deals with lands within State boundaries, while this
bill [OCSLA] concerns itself with the areas seaward
of such boundaries.” Jd. at 359 n.6 (quoting 99 Cong.
Rec. 6962 (daily ed. June 22, 1953) (statement of Sen.
Cordon)). The House Conference Report also notes
that under OCSLA “certain Federal laws are made
applicable to the [outer continental shelf] area such as
the [LHWCA].” H.R. Rep. No. 83-1031, at 12 (1953)
(Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added). |
However, certain legislative history cuts against
the gap-filing interpretation of § 1333(b). In particu-
lar, a provision allowing benefits only “if recovery for
test from § 1333(a), its holding would be inconsistent with
Tallentire.
App. 20
such disability or death through workmen’s compen-
sation proceedings is not provided by State law,” was
deleted from the original version of Section 4(c),
which became § 1333(b). S. Rep. No. 83-411, at 16
(1953). The Senate committee explained that “[i]t was
deemed inadvisable to have the [LHWCA)] apply only
if there is no applicable State law. By this amend-
ment, all workers on the outer shelf not already
protected under laws respecting seamen are protected
by the [LHWCA|].” Jd. at 23. The deletion of this anti-
overlap provision gives a clear indication that Con-
gress intended to provide LHWCA coverage regard-
less of the applicability of state law, seriously
undercutting the conception of § 1333(b) as a gap-
filler.*
This makes sense, given that at the time of
OCSLA’s enactment the workers’ compensation laws
of most relevant states provided coverage for injuries
occurring outside state jurisdiction if the employment
contract was made within the state. See, e.g.,
* Mills attempts to explain away the deletion, arguing that
it “indicates that, at most, Congress was prepared to tolerate
overlapping federal and state workers’ compensation coverage
on the OCS itself. But the proviso’s deletion does not justify
overlapping coverage for employees whose feet are planted
firmly on state soil.” Mills, 877 F.2d at 360. The Fifth Circuit
essentially concedes that § 1333(b) was not intended to be a gap-
filler. Its summary assertion that Congress was only willing to
“tolerate” overlapping coverage on the outer continental shelf
and nowhere else is supported by no more than general state-
ments by individual legislators that OCSLA “concerns itself”
with the outer continental shelf.
App. 21
Ohlhausen v. Sternberg Dredging Co., 218 La. 677,
680-81 (1951) (applying Louisiana workers’ compen-
sation statute to injury occurring in Arkansas);
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Brown, 131 Tex. 404, 406, 408
(1938) (holding that “an injury ‘outside the state’ [of
Texas] is compensable, regardless of where it may
occur” and noting that “practically every state in the
Union has made provision for extension of the bene-
fits of compensation laws to employees injured ‘out-
side the state’”); Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Indus.
Accident Comm’n of Cal., 1 Cal.2d 250, 257-58 (1934)
(holding that California workers’ compensation law
may apply to injury sustained in Alaska). Because
most state workers’ compensation laws applied extra-
territorially at the time, there was generally no gap
to fill.
Finally, Mills points to an exchange among
senators during the committee hearings where the
senators concluded that a worker on a platform above
state waters would be covered by state workers’
compensation laws even if the drilling slanted into
the outer continental shelf. Outer Continental Shelf:
Hearings on S. 1901 Before the Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong. 15-16 (1953) (“OCS
Comm. Hearings”). The Mills majority relied on this
exchange as evidence of intent that the site of the
injury would control coverage. 877 F.2d at 359. The
reliance is unwarranted for two reasons. First, the
senators were debating the early version of the bill
that contained the anti-overlap provision that was
later deleted. See OCS Comm. Hearings, supra, at
App. 22
29-30. At that time, the issue of whether state law
applied was quite significant as it would preclude
OCSLA coverage. But the exchange loses its signifi-
cance in light of the subsequent deletion of the anti-
overlap provision.”
Second, the exchange came during the discussion
of Section 4(a) of the bill, the federal jurisdiction and
choice-of-law provision later codified at § 1333(a). Jd.
at 8-16. The committee was not yet considering the
text of Section 4(c), the workers’ compensation provi-
sion. See id. at 29. The slant-drilling hypothetical was
part of a discussion about the applicability of sub-
stantive law in general. See id. at 13-17. Workers’
compensation was simply an example used, along
with marriage and domestic laws, to illustrate the
bounds of the choice-of-law provision. See id. The
usefulness of this exchange in relation to the actual
text of Section 4(c) is minimal.
Considered as a whole, the legislative history is
inconclusive on the situs issue, other than establish-
ing that § 1333(b) was not intended to simply fill a
gap in workers’ compensation law. There is certainly
nothing clear enough to persuade us that our reading
of the statute is incorrect.
* In any case, the senators only concluded that state law
applied on state soil and never considered whether LHWCA
benefits might also apply. See id. at 15-16; Mills, 877 F.2d at 363
(Duhe, J., dissenting).
App. 23
Nor are we persuaded that policy considerations
compel the addition of a situs-of-injury requirement.
Pacific Operations points out the supposed absurdity
of workers receiving extra coverage on shore because
they “fortuitously” work to further outer continental
shelf operations. Pacific Operations also complains
about the burden on employers having to purchase
coverage under both state and federal schemes.
First, Congress clearly contemplated overlapping
coverage with the deletion of the anti-overlap provi-
sion in § 1333(b) and has enacted overlapping cover-
age in other related contexts. See 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)
(applying LHWCA coverage to shoreside activities);
Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 719-20
(1980). Second, the supposed absurdity in coverage is
a natural consequence of line-drawing, which is
Congress’s decision, not ours. Coverage is just as
absurd under the line drawn by Mills: an employee is
covered for a helicopter crash 3.1 miles from shore,
but not 2.9 miles, even though the activity and risk is
identical. Finally, Congress may have had good
reason to apply uniform coverage across the full
range of activities of an outer continental shelf work-
er — including work on a platform, in transit to and
from a platform, on pipelines between platforms and
shore, or at onshore facilities crucial to the mineral
extraction process — so that a worker does not step in
and out of coverage.
In any case, it is not necessary to speculate about
policy, as the language of § 1333(b) is clear in not con-
taining a situs-of-injury requirement. “[I]f Congress’
App. 24
coverage decisions are mistaken as a matter of policy,
it is for Congress to change them. We should not
legislate for them.” Herb’s Welding I, 470 U.S. at 427.
Because the language is unambiguous and the legis-
lative history and policy considerations do not compel
a contrary result, we find that § 1333(b) does not
contain a situs-of-injury requirement.
C.
Pacific Operations presents a different argument,
contending that § 1333(a) sets forth a situs require-
ment that is intended to apply to all of § 1333, includ-
ing subsection (b). This is a novel argument; it has no
support in either Mills, the Fifth Circuit decision, or
Curtis, the Third Circuit decision. The only case
supporting the proposition is Demette, the Fifth
Circuit decision that misstates Mills’ holding.
Section 1333(a)(1) provides that:
The Constitution and laws and civil and po-
litical jurisdiction of the United States are
extended to the subsoil and seabed of the
outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial
islands, and all installations and other de-
vices permanently or temporarily attached to
the seabed, ... to the same extent as if the
outer Continental Shelf were an area of ex-
clusive Federal jurisdiction located within a
State.
43 U.S.C. § 1333(aX1). This subsection simply pro-
vides for federal law and jurisdiction over the situs.
App. 25
Nothing in the language purports to limit the ap-
plicability of the Constitution, federal laws, or juris-
diction to the outer continental shelf, nor is there
anything applying the subsection (a)(1) situs to any
other parts of § 1333.
Section 1333(a)(2) does not provide a basis for an
overarching situs requirement either. It states that:
the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent
State ... are declared to be the law of the
United States for that portion of the subsoil
and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf,
and artificial islands and fixed structures
erected thereon, which would be within the
area of the State if its boundaries were ex-
tended seaward to the outer margin of the
outer Continental Shelf.
Id. § 1333(aX2)A). Again, nothing purports to limit
state law to the subsection (a) situs, nor to apply that
situs to the other § 1333 subsections. ,
This is consistent with the structure of § 1333.
Each subsection has its own situs definition, some
broader and some narrower than subsection (a)’s. For
example, the subsection (c) situs is narrower, apply-
ing the NLRA to unfair labor practices “occurring
upon any artificial island, installation, or other device
referred to in subsection (a),” but not to occurrences
on the subsoil or seabed. Jd. § 1333(c). The subsection
(d) situs is broader, allowing Coast Guard safety
regulations for “the artificial islands, installations,
and other devices referred to in subsection (a) of
App. 26
this section or on the waters adjacent thereto.” Id.
§ 1333(d) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court
held in Tullentire, § 1333({a) does not apply to the
waters above the outer continental shelf. 477 U.S. at
219. If subsection (a) was intended to be a strict situs
requirement for the entire statute, there would be no
need for individualized situs tests for each subsection,
much less ones that are inconsistent with subsection
(a).
Moreover, each subsection expressly incorporates
a portion of the subsection (a) situs in their own situs
definitions — with the significant exception of subsec-
tion (b), the workers’ compensation provision. If
subsection (a) applied to all other provisions by its
own terms, there would be no need for those provi-
sions to independently incorporate parts of it. And
because subsection (a) is referenced in each subsec-
tion except subsection (b), the obvious conclusion is
that subsection (b) was not intended to be limited by
subsection (a).
The legislative history of § 1333 also conclusively
demonstrates that subsection (a) was not intended to
limit the other provisions. Subsection (b) was origi-
nally a jurisdictional provision, providing federal
courts with “original jurisdiction of cases and contro-
versies arising out of or in connection with any opera-
tions conducted on the outer Continental Shelf.” Pub.
L. No. 83-212, § 4(b), 67 Stat. 462, 463 (1953) (em-
phasis added). This was clearly meant to encompass
App. 27
more than just occurrences on the subsection (a)
situs.’
The theory that subsection (a) provides #@ situs
requirement applicable to all of § 1333 is simply
inconsistent with its plain language, statutory struc- -
ture, and legislative history. Subsection (a) merely
extends federal jurisdiction and federal and state law
to the outer continental shelf. It has no applicability
beyond that purpose, other than to provide a situs
definition that several other provisions expressly
incorporate. Because subsection (b) does not incorpo-
rate (a), that provision has no bearing on our analy-
sis.
We hold that § 1333(b) may apply to injuries
occurring outside the situs of the outer continental
shelf, so long as they occur “as the result of opera-
tions conducted on the outer continental shelf.”
D.
We do not, however, find that Congress intended
to enact a simple “but for” test in covering injuries
that occur “as the result of” outer continental shelf
" When the statute was amended in 1978 to merge subsec-
tion (b) with the workers’ compensation provision in subsection
(c), the House Conference Report stated that “this amendment
involves no change in existing law. It was not the intent ... to
alter in any way the existing coverage of the [LHWCA].” H.R.
Rep. 95-1474, at 81 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1674, 1680.
App. 28
operations. Injuries with a tenuous connection to the
outer continental shelf are not covered. Cf. Black
Hills Aviation, 34 F.3d at 975 (“as a result of” re-
quires more than just a “connection with”). Thus, we
do not agree with, and decline to adopt, the Third
Circuit’s decision in Curtis to the extent that it re-
quires only a “but for” test of causation. See 849 F.2d
at 811.
Instead, we adopt the following test: the claimant
must establish a substantial nexus between the
injury and extractive operations on the shelf. To meet
the standard, the claimant must show that the work
performed directly furthers outer continental shelf
operations and is in the regular course of such opera-
tions. An injury sustained during employment on the
outer continental shelf itself would, by definition,
meet this standard. However, an accountant’s work-
place injury would not be covered even if related to
outer continental shelf operations, while a rousta-
bout’s injury in a helicopter en route to the outer
continental shelf likely would be. We leave more
precise line-drawing to the specific factual circum-
stances of later cases.
This is consistent with the pre-Mills Fifth Circuit
interpretation of § 1333(b), which we endorse. Prior to
Mills, the Fifth Circuit had long held that § 1333(b)
applied to injuries occurring outside the outer conti-
nental shelf. See Nations v. Morris, 483 F.2d 577
(5th Cir. 1973) (“OCSLA, in its incorporation of [the
LHWCA|], did not speak in terms of injuries occurring
on such platforms so as to distinguish them from
App. 29
those off the platforms ... Obviously Congress pur-
posefully established a system that would apply
without regard to physical location.”). However, it
required a more direct connection than simple “but
for” causation. In Herb’s Welding II, the Fifth Circuit
denied OCSLA benefits to a welder working on a
platform in state waters, even though it was connect-
ed by pipeline to platforms on the outer continental
shelf, upon which the welder spent approximately
25% of his time. 766 F.2d at 899-900. The court
reasoned that the accident would have occurred
regardless of whether the employer had the outer
continental shelf rigs. Jd. at 900. It contrasted heli-
copter crash cases where the employee’s “work had
furthered the operations of a fixed rig on the shelf
and was in the regular course of extractive operations
on the shelf.” Jd.
In Mills v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensa-
tion Programs, 846 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1988), rev’d en
banc, 877 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1989), the three-judge
panel decision later reversed by the Mills en banc
panel, the court clarified the scope of the then-
prevailing “but for” test in the Fifth Circuit:
Our decision does not extend LHWCA cover-
age to those whose connection with opera-
tions on the Shelf is tenuous. Workers like
[the welder in Herb’s Welding IT] whose work
is only indirectly connected with the Shelf
will still not be covered. The “but for” test
this Circuit has adopted is not the simple
“causa sine qua non” test of tort law, but
App. 30
includes the requirement that the claimant
show a nexus between the work being done
and operations on the shelf similar to the
proximate cause test in tort law; it requires
that the work “further[s] the operation of a
fixed rig on the shelf and [is] in the regular
course of extractive operations on the shelf.”
Id. at 1015 (quoting Herb’s Welding II, 766 F.2d at
900) (footnote omitted). Applying this test, the court
held that a welder injured during the onshore con-
struction of a platform destined for the outer conti-
nental shelf was covered by OCSLA. Id. This holding
was, of course, reversed by the Fifth Circuit en banc
panel in a 9-5 vote. Mills, 877 F.2d at 357.
In this case, the BRB affirmed the dismissal of
Petitioner’s OCSLA claim because Valladolid’s injury
did not satisfy the Mills situs-of-injury test. Because
we decline to adopt that test, we remand the OCSLA
question to the BRB for further consideration con-
sistent with this opinion.
IV.
We next consider whether the BRB erred in
denying benefits under the LHWCA. Under 33 U.S.C.
§ 903(a):
compensation shall be payable under this
chapter in respect of disability or death of an
employee, but only if the disability or death
results from an injury occurring upon the
navigable waters of the United States (in-
cluding any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock,
App. 31
terminal, building way, marine railway, or
other adjoining area customarily used by an
employer in loading, unloading, repairing,
dismantling, or building a vessel).
A LHWCA “employee” is “any person engaged in
maritime employment.” Jd. § 902(3). Thus, a claimant
seeking workers’ compensation under the LHWCA
must establish both a maritime situs and a maritime
status. Herb’s Welding I, 470 U.S. at 415-16; Peru v.
Sharpshooter Spectrum Venture LLC, 493 F.3d 1058,
1061 (9th Cir. 2007).
Petitioner contends that the BRB erred in affirm-
ing the ALJ’s determination that the onshore La
Conchita facility, where Valladolid was killed, was not
a maritime situs. Petitioner does not contest the
ALJs factual findings regarding the facility, but
argues that the BRB should have reversed the ALJ on
the legal question of whether La Conchita qualifies as
an “adjoining area customarily used by an employer
in loading [or] unloading ... a vessel.” Id. § 903(a).
We reject Petitioner’s position and affirm the BRB.
We use a “functional relationship” test in deter-
mining whether a particular facility is a § 903(a)
“adjoining area.” Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v.
Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 141 (9th Cir. 1978). We consid-
er, among other factors:
the particular suitability of the site for the
maritime uses referred to in the statute;
whether adjoining properties are devoted
primarily to uses in maritime commerce; the
App. 32
proximity of the site to the waterway; and
whether the site is as close to the waterway
as is feasible given all of the circumstances
in the case.
Id. Aithough physical congruity with navigable water
is not required, the facility must be “used as an
integral part of longshoring operations.” Jd.
Applying the Herron factors, we agree with the
BRB that La Conchita is not a maritime situs. Al-
though the facility is only 250-300 feet from the
ocean, it is separated from the water by a highway
and railroad tracks and has no direct access to any
pier, dock, or other loading facility. See Motoviloff v.
Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 692 F.2d 87,
89 (9th Cir. 1982). The closest pier used by Pacific
Operations is the Casitas Pass Pier, roughly three
miles away. There are no adjoining properties en-
gaged in maritime commerce.
Petitioner argues that La Conchita should be
considered a “transshipment” facility because scrap
metal from the offshore platforms was dumped there
before being sold to third parties. Petitioner analogiz-
es to PC. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69 (1979),
where the Supreme Court held that two warehouse-
men, who handled cargo within a port but were not
permitted to move cargo directly from or onto a
vessel, were LHWCA “employees.” Jd. at 71, 83. The
Court held that the warehousemen “were engaged in
maritime employment because they were engaged in
App. 33
intermediate steps of moving cargo between ship and
land transportation.” Jd. at 82-83.
We find the analogy unpersuasive. Firs of all,
Pfeiffer never addressed the situs requirement be-
cause the injuries occurred on a dock and a pier,
which are indisputably maritime situs. Second, the
handling of scrap metal at La Conchita did not in-
volve “moving cargo directly from ship to land trans-
portation.” Id. The scrap metal was unloaded at the
pier by third-party longshoremen, loaded into trucks
driven by third-party drivers, and driven three miles
to La Conchita, where it was dumped and would wait
for up to two years before being hauled away by
third-party dealers. The maritime activities — the
movement of cargo “directly from ship to land trans-
portation” — began and ended at the Casitas Pass
Pier. Finally, La Conchita is simply not an “adjoining
area” within the meaning of § 903(a). It is three miles
from the pier and not adjacent to any maritime
facilities.
The record demonstrates that the primary pur-
pose of the facility — and the only reason for its prox-
imity to the coastline — is to receive and process crude
oil slurry extracted by the offshore platforms, a non-
maritime activity. Herb’s Welding I, 470 U.S. at 422-
24. Its use as a convenient dumping ground for scrap
metal from the platforms does not convert it into a
maritime situs.
Accordingly, we affirm the BRB’s denial of bene-
fits under the LHWCA. Because Valladolid’s injury
App. 34
does not satisfy the situs requirement, and because
the BRB did not reach the status issue, we do not
address whether Valladolid was a maritime employee.
Williams v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs,
825 F.2d 246, 247 (9th Cir. 1987); Hurston v. Dir.,
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 989 F.2d 1547,
1548 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1993).
V.
We hold that the OCSLA workers’ compensation
provision, 43 U.S.C. $ 1333(b), applies to any injury
resulting from operations on the outer continental
shelf, regardless of the location of the injury. An
injury is “the result of” outer continental shelf opera-
tions if there is a substantial nexus between the
injury and the operations. We therefore reject the
situs-of-injury test adopted by the BRB, and remand
for further considerations consistent with this opin-
ion.
We also hold that the BRB did not err in finding
that La Conchita was not a maritime situs. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the denial of workers’ compensation
benefits under the LHWCA.
Each side shall bear its owns costs.
GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, and RE-
MANDED.
App. 35
U.S. Department of Labor [SEAL]
Benefits Review Board
P.O. Box 37601
Washington DC 20013-7601
BRB No. 07-0965
L.V. )
(Widow of J.V.) ) PUBLISHED
Claimant-Petitioner ;
We )
PACIFIC OPERATIONS ) DATE ISSUED:
OFFSHORE, LLP ) AUG 12 2008
and
INSURANCE COMPANY )
OF THE STATE OF )
PENNSYLVANIA )
Employer/Carrier- )
Respondents ) DECISION
) and ORDER
Appeal of the Order Denying the Claimant's
Motion to Withdraw or Amend Admissions,
Denying the Respondents’ Motion to Strike,
and Granting Summary Decision of William
Dorsey, Administrative Law Judge, United
States Department of Labor.
Joshua T. Gillelan II (Longshore Claimants’
National Law Center), Washington, D.C., and
Timothy K. Sprinkles (Law Offices of Charles
D. Naylor), San Pedro, California, for claim-
ant.
App. 36
Michael W. Thomas and Shana L. Prechtl
(Laughlin, Falbo, Levy & Moresi), San Fran-
cisco, California, for employer/carrier.
Before: DOLDER, Chief Administrative
Appeals Judge, McGRANERY and HALL,
Administrative Appeals Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Claimant’ appeals the Order Denying the Claim-
ant’s Motion to Withdraw or Amend Admissions,
Denying the Respondents’ Motion to Strike, and
Granting Summary Decision (2005-LHC-0343) of Ad-
ministrative Law Judge William Dorsey rendered on
a claim filed pursuant to the provisions of the Long-
shore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, as
amended, 33 U.S.C. §901 et seq. (the Act), as extended
by. the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
§1301 et seg. (OCSLA). We must affirm the adminis-
trative law judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of
law if they are supported by substantial evidence, are
rational, and are in accordance with law. 33 U.S.C.
§921(b)\3); O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls
Associates, Inc., 380 U.S. 359 (1965).
Decedent worked for employer as a roustabout
primarily at its offshore oil platforms, designated as
Hogan and Houchin, which are located more than
three miles off the coast of California, on the Outer
Continental Shelf. Decedent also occasionally worked
' Claimant is decedent’s surviving spouse.
App. 37
at employer’s crude oil flocculation facility, designated
La Conchita, in Ventura, California. On June 2, 2004,
decedent was directed by his immediate supervisor,
Gordon Boswell, to take a forklift to the rear yard of
the La Conchita plant and clean up some scrap metal
debris. Mr. Boswell stated that approximately an
hour and fifteen minutes later he found decedent
‘ying on his back next to a plantain tree roughly ten
feet off of one of the service roads within the plant
facility, with the forklift resting on his abdomen and
chest.
Decedent was pronounced dead at 5:27 p.m. as a
result of asphyxia by abdominal and chest compres-
sion. An accident report stated that it appeared that
decedent stood on top of the raised tines of the forklift
to harvest fruit hanging from the plantain tree be-
yond the reach of a person on the ground. Presum-
ably, the forklift was stopped while he did this, but for
some unknown reason, the forklift moved forward,
which caused decedent to lose his balance, fall in
front of the forklift, and sustain fatal injuries when it
rolled on top of him.
Claimant filed the instant claim, alleging that
decedent’s death was covered under either the Act or
its OCSLA extension, since decedent was engaged in
both maritime and oil production employment at
covered locations.. Employer controverted the claim
* Employer paid benefits pursuant to the California Work-
ers’ Compensation Act for 52 weeks following decedent’s death
(Continued on following page)
App. 38
on coverage grounds and subsequently moved for
summary decision with the administrative law judge,
citing a lack of coverage under both the Act and the
OCSLA.
Addressing employer’s motion for summary deci-
sion, the administrative law judge found that claim-
ant failed to submit any evidence raising an issue of
fact that her claim falls within the coverage of either
the Act or the OCSLA.* The administrative law judge
also found that employer is entitled to summary
decision as a matter of law because, applying the
undisputed facts to the applicable law, he found that
decedent was not a maritime worker on a maritime
situs, and/or was not killed in a location that satisfies
the OCSLA’s situs requirement. Accordingly, the ad-
ministrative law judge found that claimant is not en-
titled to benefits under either the Act or the OCSLA.
He thus granted employer’s motion for summary
decision.
at a rate of $807.69 per week. The parties agreed that decedent's
average weekly wage at the time of his death was $928.22.
* In his decision, the administrative law judge also found
that claimant is deemed to have admitted all of the requests for
admissions put forth by employer on February 25, 2005, by oper-
ation of 29 C.F.R. §18.20, since claimant failed to serve her
responses to employer's requests within thirty days of service.
The administrative law judge then considered but rejected
claimant’s motion to withdraw or amend the deemed admissions
based on his finding that claimant’s “confusing, evasive, and late
answers” have prejudiced employer's ability to defend the claim.
App. 39
On appeal, claimant challenges the administra-
tive law judge’s grant of employer’s motion for sum-
mary decision and consequent denial of benefits
under the Act and/or OCSLA. Employer responds,
urging affirmance.
For a claim to be covered by the Act, a claimant
must establish that the injury occurred upon the
navigable waters of the United States, including any
dry dock, or that it occurred on a landward area cov-
ered by Section 3(a), and that the employee’s work is
maritime in nature and is not specifically excluded by
the Act. 33 U.S.C. §§902(3), 903(a); Director, OWCP v.
Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 15 BRBS
62(CRT) (1983); PC. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69,
11 BRBS 320 (1979); Northeast Marine Terminal Co.
v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 6 BRBS 150 (1977). Thus, in
order to demonstrate that coverage under the Act
exists, a claimant must satisfy the “situs” and the
“status” requirements of the Act. Id.; see also Crapan-
zano v. Rice Mohawk, U.S. Constr. Co., Ltd., 30 BRBS
81 (1996).
Claimant argues that the administrative law
judge erred in finding that employer’s La Conchita
facility does not meet the situs requirement of the
Act. Section 3(a) of the Act provides, in pertinent
part, that:
compensation shall be payable under this
chapter ... only if the disability or death
results from an injury occurring upon the
navigable waters of the United States (in-
cluding any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock,
App. 40
terminal, building way, marine railway, or
other adjoining area customarily used by an
employer in loading, unloading, repairing,
dismantling, or building a vessel).
33 U.S.C. §903(a). The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this
case arises, has held that the phrase “adjoining area”
should be read to describe a site which has a func-
tional relationship with maritime commerce and a
geographical nexus with navigable waters.‘ Brady-
Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137,
7 BRBS 409 (9th Cir. 1978).
The administrative law judge found that claim-
ant did not establish the situs requirement, as there
is no evidence establishing that employer’s La
Conchita facility has a functional relationship with
any maritime commerce. The record establishes that
the La Conchita facility, which is located approxi-
mately 250 to 300 feet from the Pacific Ocean, is a
receiving station for the petroleum and oil that is
pumped from the two offshore platforms. Employer’s
Exhibit (EX) 2, Dep. at 15. Specifically, a mixture of
elements called “slurry” is pumped through pipelines
from the platforms to the plant, where it is processed
into oil, water, gas and solids. EX 2, Dep. at 34; EX
14, Dep. at 13. The processed oil and gas are then
shipped away from La Conchita by pipeline to third
* The record contains no evidence, nor does claimant raise
any contention, that decedent’s death occurred at one of the sites
specifically enumerated in Section 3(a), 33 U.S.C. §903(a).
App. 41
parties. EX 2, Dep. at 34; EX 14, Dep. at 16. The
facility has numerous storage tanks which tempo-
rarily hold the slurry, as well as the processed oil and
gas, and its byproducts. EX 2, Dep. at 33-34. How-
ever, there is no evidence that the La Conchita
facility is customarily used by employer in loading,
unloading, repairing, dismantling or building a
vessel. As such, it has no functional relationship with
navigable water, i.e., the Pacific Ocean.
Additionally, the La Conchita facility served as a
storage area for scrap metal which came from the
platforms and from around the plant. EX 2, Dep. at
40; EX 14, Dep. at 33. Specifically, the scrap metal
consisted of old pipe, old pieces of storage tanks, old
catwalk, old chain, and/or old cable. EX 2, Dep. at 42.
Scrap metal from the offshore platforms would be
initially collected in bins, which once full, would be
loaded on the crew boat. The scrap metal was then
unloaded from the crew boat at the Casitas Pass Pier
and loaded onto a truck and delivered to the La
Conchita facility, which is approximately three miles
away. EX 2, Dep. at 42. The truck, operated by a
third-party contractor, would dump the scrap metal
out of the bins at various locations around the La
Conchita facility. Id.; EX 14, Dep. at 32. The scrap
metal would, perhaps once every two years, be “cen-
tralized” by workers at the La Conchita plant, in-
cluding decedent, who was performing this work at
the time of his death, and thereafter sold by the ton
to contractors. EX 2, Dep. at 43; EX 14, Dep. at 33-34.
The contractors would come in and cut the scrap
App. 42
metal into manageable pieces, put it into bins, and
then haul it away to a metal scrap yard. Jd. As for
other necessities related to employer’s oil operations,
“tools and parts and equipment [necessary for the
platforms] all come from different vendors all over
Southern California and the United States,” EX 14,
Dep. at 17, and they are “shipped by the vendors”
directly to the staging area at the pier. EX 14, Dep. at
21. Thus, there is no evidence that the La Conchita
facility served as a staging area for employer’s use of
the Casitas Pass Pier for either its employees or
equipment.
The undisputed facts support the administrative
law judge’s finding that employer’s La Conchita
facility is not a covered situs pursuant to Section 3(a)
of the Act. Specifically, there is no evidence that the
La Conchita facility is an “adjoining area customarily
used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing,
dismantling, or building a vessel.” 33 U.S.C. §903(a).
Rather, the proximity of employer’s La Conchita
facility to navigable waters is not dictated by mari-
time concerns. Bennett v. Matson Terminals, Inc.,
14 BRBS 526 (1981), aff’d sub nom. Motoviloff v.
Director, OWCP, 692 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1982). It there-
fore has no functional nexus with any maritime
activities. Sisson v. Davis & Sons, Inc., 131 F.3d 555,
31 BRBS 199 CRT) (5th Cir. 1998); Charles v. Uni-
versal Ogden Services, 37 BRBS 37 (2003) (Board
affirmed administrative law judge’s finding that
claimant’s injury did not occur on an “adjoining area”
where the proximity of employer’s facility to the
App. 43
Mississippi River was not dictated by maritime
concerns and there was no functional relationship
between employer’s warehouse and the Mississippi
River in that the area is not used for loading, unload-
ing, building or repairing vessels); cf. Waugh v. Matt’s
Enterprises, Inc., 33 BRBS 9 (1999) (field where scrap
metal is hauled from barges is covered situs). Conse-
quently, as the undisputed facts establish that em-
ployer’s La Conchita facility, where the employee's
death occurred, was not used for loading, unloading,
repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel, we affirm
the administrative law judge’s finding that decedent’s
injury did not occur on a situs covered under the Act.
See generally Arjona v. Interport Maintenance Co.,
Inc., 34 BRBS 15 (2000); Bennett, 14 BRBS 526. We,
therefore, affirm the administrative law judge’s find-
ing that claimant has not established coverage under
the Act and his grant of summary judgment for
employer on this issue.”
Alternatively, claimant contends that the admin-
istrative law judge erred in denying benefits under
the OCSLA. Claimant argues that the administrative
law judge committed legal error by stating that the
* Thus, we need not address claimant’s assertions regarding
the administrative law judge’s finding that claimant did not
establish the status element under the Act, as our affirmance of
the administrative law judge’s situs finding renders the status
issue moot in this case. Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S.
297, 15 BRBS 62(CRT); Williams v. Director, OWCP, 825 F.2d
246, 20 BRBS 25(CRT) (9th Cir. 1987), aff’g Williams v. Pan
Marine Construction, 18 BRBS 98 (1986).
App. 44
decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986),
as well as decisions rendered by the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits,
require a situs-of-injury test, as opposed to only a
situs-of-mineral extraction operations test, in order to
establish coverage under the OCSLA. In particular,
claimant argues that the Fifth Circuit stated, in
Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 500
n. 29, 35 BRBS 136 n. 29(CRT) (5th Cir. 2002), that
the OCSLA contains “only a status requirement,” and
moreover, that the Ninth Circuit, in whose juris-
diction the instant case arises, similarly held that
Section 1333(b) imposed only a “but for” test related
to covered offshore operations and contained no situs-
of-injury requirement. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Director,
OWCP, 812 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1987), aff’g Robarge v.
Kaiser Steel Corp., 17 BRBS 213 (1985).
Compensation is available under the Longshore
Act for injuries to non-seaman [sic] occurring as a
result of operations on the OCS for the purpose of
“exploring for, developing, or producing resources” on
the OCS. 43 U.S.C. §1333(a\X1), (b); Tallentire, 477
U.S. 207; Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
395 U.S. 352 (1969); Kaiser Steel Corp, 812 F.2d at
520. The issue in this case concerns whether the
OCSLA applies only if the employee’s injury or death
occurs on the OCS.*
* Broadly speaking, the OCS requires that the employee be
engaged in work in furtherance of the exploration, development,
(Continued on following page)
App. 45
In Curtis v. Schlumberger Offshore Service, Inc.,
849 F.2d 805, 21 BRBS 61(CRT) (3d Cir. 1988), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that a claimant, injured on a highway in New
Jersey on his way to a heliport to be transported to
the OCS, was covered under the OCSLA. The court
rejected a situs requirement for OCSLA coverage, and
imposed only a “but for” test, t.e., would the claimant
have sustained injuries “but for” the operations on
the shelf. The court noted that there was no limi-
tation in Section 1333(b) to “artificial islands and
fixed structures” as there is in Section 1333(a)1).’
removal, or transportation of natural resources (the “but for” or
status test) from the subsoil and seabed of the OCS or any arti-
ficial stand or installation attached to or erected on the seabed
of the OCS (the situs test). The Board’s decision in Robarge, 17
BRBS 213, did not address the situs-of-injury issue, as it noted
that the only issue requiring resolution involved status under
the OCSLA. Specifically, the Board recognized that, as employer
conceded that claimant’s injury occurred during construction of
a fixed platform located on the outer continental shelf, i.c.,
employer conceded situs under the OCSLA, the only question
was whether claimant's activities in platform construction
constituted “development” for purposes of 43 U.S.C. §1331(a\(1).
" The Third Circuit noted that Section 1333(a) of the pre-
1978 version of the Lands Act makes no references to injuries
and is a provision intended for the separate purpose of asserting
federal jurisdiction over the seabed underlying the outer con-
tinental shelf. Curtis, 849 F.2d at 809, 21 BRBS at 68 (CRT).
It further stated that the only criteria Section 1333(b) imposes
for securing Longshore benefits is for injured employees to be
involved in “any operations conducted on the outer continental
shelf for the purpose of exploring for, [and] developing the
natural resources of the outer continental shelf.” Jd.; 43 U.S.C.
§1333(b).
App. 46
Id. It therefore construed Section 1333(b) as extend-
ing Longshore Act coverage to all employees who
sustain injuries while working to develop the mineral
wealth of the OCS. Curtis, 849 F.2d at 810, 21 BRBS
at 70 (CRT).
Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit held, in Mills v.
Director, OWCP, 877 F.2d 356, 22 BRBS 97(CRT) (5th
Cir. 1989) (en banc), that the claimant, who was a
land-based worker injured during construction on
state land of an oil production platform destined for
the OCS, did not qualify for benefits under the
OCSLA because he did not satisfy the situs-of-injury
requirement.* In reaching its conclusion, the Fifth
Circuit stated that, in furtherance of Congressional
intent “to establish a bright-line geographic boundary
for Section 1333(b) coverage,” the OCSLA applies to
those who “suffer injury or death on an OCS platform
or the waters above the OCS” and who “satisfy the
‘but for’ status test” described in Herb’s Welding, Inc.
v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 17 BRBS 78(CRT) (1985), z.e.,
the injury or death on the OCS would not have oc-
curred “but for” the extractive operations on the shelf.
Mills, 877 F.2d at 362, 22 BRBS at 102(CRT). Thus,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that Section 1331(a\(1)
creates a situs-of-injury requirement for the applica-
tion of other sections of the OCSLA, including Sec-
tions 1333(aX2) and 1333(b). See also Strong v. B.P.
* The Mills court noted the contrary Curtis decision. Mills,
877 F.2d at 363, 22 BRBS at 102(CRT).
App. 47
Exploration & Production, Inc., 440 F.2d 665, 40
BRBS 1(CRT) (5th Cir. 2006); Demette, 280 F.3d 492,
35 BRBS 136(CRT). The Board, in cases arising in
the Fifth Circuit, has explicitly acknowledged the
existence of a situs-of-injury test under the OCSLA,
which necessarily requires that the injury occur while
the employee was on the OCS.’ Kirkpatrick v. B.B.1.,
Inc., 38 BRBS 27, 28 (2004); Martin v. Pride Offshore,
Inc., 34 BRBS 192 (2001); see also Sisson v. Davis &
Sons, Inc., 131 F.3d 555, 31 BRBS 199(CRT) (5th Cir.
1998).
The Ninth Circuit has not explicitly addressed
the situs requirement, but it has stated, albeit in
dicta, that “the situs requirement is a predicate for
coverage under OCSLA.”” A-Z Int'l v. Phillips, 179
* In contrast to claimant’s assertion, the Fifth Circuit did
not hold that the OCSLA contains only a status requirement.
Rather, the court articulated that Section 1333(b) of the OCSLA,
43 U.S.C. §1333(b), “contains only a status requirement.” De-
mette, 280 F.3d at 500 n. 29, 35 BRBS 136(CRT) n. 29. The Fifth
Circuit explicitly held that “in order for the LHWCA to apply by
virtue of Section 1333(b), notwithstanding any application of the
LHWCA of its own force, the injured worker must satisfy the
‘status’ requirement of Section 1333(b) as well as the situs
requirement of Section 1333(a)(1).” Demette, 280 F.3d at 498, 35
BRBS at 134(CRT) (emphasis added).
In Phillips, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the
administrative law judge denied the claimant’s claim because he
was not injured, as he had alleged, on the offshore oil platform
Hermosa. Situs, however, was moot, as the issue considered by
the Ninth Circuit on appeal pertained to whether the Board had
jurisdiction to review the administrative law judge’s certification
(Continued on following page)
App. 48
F.3d 1187, 1189 n. 1, 33 BRBS 59(CRT), 61 n. 1 (CRT)
(9th Cir. 1999), citing 43 U.S.C. §1333 (1994); see also
Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 219. In support of this state-
ment, the Ninth Circuit cited the language of the
Supreme Court in Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 219, also
referenced by the Fifth Circuit in Mills, 877 F.2d at
361, 22 BRBS at 101(CRT), that “Congress deter-
mined that the general scope of OCSLA’s coverage . ..
would be determined principally by locale.”
In his decision, the administrative law judge
initially found that decedent established “status”
under the OCSLA because there is no dispute that his
duties for employer, while he worked on platform
Hogan, were in furtherance of its exploration and
development of oil from the outer continental shelf.
See Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 692 F.2d
337 (5th Cir. 1983). After reviewing the conflicting
positions on situs put forth by the Third and Fifth
Circuits, the administrative law judge addressed the
question of decedent’s coverage under the OCSLA in
terms of whether he sustained “an injury on the
subsoil and seabed of the outer continental shelf, or
the artificial islands and structures erected thereon
the waters above it.” Order at 18. The administrative
law judge concluded that as decedent was killed while
harvesting plantains at an onshore facility that served
offshore oil platforms, the situs element for coverage
to the district court of his finding that claimant filed a fraudu-
lent claim. Phillips, 179 F.3d 1187, 33 BRBS 59(CRT).
App. 49
under the OCSLA could not be satisfied. Accordingly,
the administrative law judge denied claimant’s claim
for benefits under this statute.
In resolving the situs issue, the administrative
law judge applied the Fifth Circuit’s test as it “adopts
the narrow Supreme Court interpretation of situs” in
Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 218. We reject claimant’s
contention that the administrative law judge erred in
this regard. The language of OCSLA and its legis-
lative history indicate that Congress intended, in
writing the OCSLA, to regulate only the OCS. Con-
gress enacted the OCSLA “to define a body of law
applicable to the seabed, the subsoil, and the fixed
structures ... on the OCS.” Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at
355. This is evidenced by the specific language of
Section 1333(a)(1) which defines, and by its very
nature limits, the coverage of the OCSLA to “the
subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and
to all artificial islands, and all installations and other
devices permanently or temporarily attached to the
seabed, which may be erected thereon for the purpose
of exploring for, developing, or producing resources
therefrom, or any such installation or other device
(other than a ship or vesse}) for the purpose of trans-
porting such resources, to the same extent as if
the outer Continental Shelf were an area of ex-
clusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State.”
43 U.S.C. §1331(aX1); see also generally Millis, 877
F.2d at 360-361, 22 BRBS at 99-100(CRT). Absent
from this provision, is any Congressional intent to
App. 50
extend coverage to individuals injured outside the
geographical locale comprising the OCS.
As discussed by the Fifth Circuit in Mills, 877
F.2d at 360-361, 22 BRBS at 99-100(CRT), the legisla-
tive history of the OCSLA supports this position.
In discussing S-1901, the bill that became OCSLA,
the Senate committee discussed a scenario where a
worker in state waters is injured while drilling a
slant hole into the OCS and concluded that in such an
instance the employee would be covered by state
workers’ compensation. See Mills, 877 F.2d at 361, 22
BRBS at 100(CRT), citing Outer Continental Shelf:
Hearings on S-1901 before Senate Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., Ist Sess., 12-16 (1953).
Thus, Congress intended to make the place of injury a
controlling factor in the application of benefits. Jd.
Additionally, the Supreme Court recognized a
geographic boundary to OCSLA coverage in Tallen-
tire, 477 U.S. 207. In Tallentire, offshore drilling
platform workers were killed when the helicopter in
which they were riding crashed in the high seas some
35 miles off the Louisiana coast while transporting
them from the offshore drilling platform where they
worked to their home base in Louisiana. The Su-
preme Court determiined that because the helicopter
crash and ensuing death of the platform workers
occurred “miles away from the platform and on the
high seas,” it would not be proper to extend OCSLA to
the casualties in that case. Tallentire, 477 U.S. at
219. The Supreme Court thus discussed OCSLA situs
in terms of injuries which occur within “the narrowly
App. 51
circumscribed area defined by the statute.” In partic-
ular, the Court stated, as also noted by the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, that “Congress determined that the
general scope of OCSLA’s coverage ... would be
determined principally by locale.” Id.
Thus, the language and legislative history of the
OCSLA, in conjunction with the Supreme Court’s
interpretation thereof, supports the decision of the
Fifth Circuit in Mills, 877 F.2d at 361, 22 BRBS at
100(CRT), that coverage under the OCSLA involves
meeting both a situs-of-injury and status test. More-
over, as the administrative law judge found, the dicta
in Phillips provides a strong indication that the
Ninth Circuit is more closely aligned with the Fifth
Circuit than the Third Circuit on the issue of whether
the OCSLA contains a situs-of-injury test. We thus
reject claimant’s position that a_situs-of-mineral
extraction operations test rather than a situs-of-
injury test is more appropriate to determine coverage
under the OCSLA. As it is undisputed that decedent’s
injury did not occur while he was working on the
OCS, the administrative law judge’s finding that
claimant did not establish situs under the OCSLA,
and thus, cannot obtain coverage under that statute,
is affirmed.
Accordingly, the administrative law judge’s find-
ings that claimant has not established situs under the
Act or the OCSLA, and resulting grant of employer’s
App. 52
motion for summary decision, and consequent denial
of benefits, are affirmed.”
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nancy S. Dolder
NANCY S. DOLDER, Chief
Administrative Appeals Judge
/s/ Regina C. McGranery
REGINA C. McGRANERY
Administrative Appeals Judge
/s/ Betty Jean Hall
BETTY JEAN HALL
Administrative Appeals Judge
“ As the administrative law judge’s findings that claimant
did not establish that decedent's injury occurred on a covered
situs under either the Act or the OCSLA are based on the un-
contested facts in this case, we need not address claimant’s con-
tentions regarding the administrative law judge’s denial of her
motion to withdraw or amend the deemed admissions under 29
C.F.R. §18.20.
App. 53
U.S. Department of Labor [SEAL]
Office of Administrative Law Judges
50 Fremont Street — Suite 2100
San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 744-6577
(415) 744-6569 (FAX)
Issue Date: 15 August 2007
CASE NO. 2005-LHC-00343
OWCP No.: 18-83701
In the Matter of:
L.V. AS WIDOW OF J.V. (deceased),
Claimant,
vs.
PACIFIC OPERATIONS OFFSHORE, LLP.
Employer
and
INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Carrier.
Order Denying the Claimant’s Motion to
Withdraw or Amend Admissions, Denying
the Respondents’ Motion to Strike, and
Granting Summary Decision
l. Introduction
The Claimant’s husband (the Decedent) died
when a forklift he operated at his employer’s crude oil
App. 54
flocculation plant rolled over him and crushed him.
For some reason he had used it in a way unrelated to
his job — to harvest fruit. On June 3, 2004, the Dece-.
dent’s employer,’ Pacific Operations Offshore, LLP,
submitted a claim on the Claimant’s behalf and began
paying death benefits pursuant to the California
Workers’ Compensation Act.* On July 22, 2004, the
Claimant filed for compensation under the Longshore
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or
Longshore Act), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901, et seq. (West
2007). On February 7, 2006, the Claimant also filed
for compensation under the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (West 2007),
an extension to the LHWCA. She claims entitlement
to benefits under either statute on grounds that the
Decedent engaged in both maritime and oil produc-
tion employment at covered locations.* The Employer,
together with its carrier, the Insurance Company of
‘ The parties agree that there was an employer-employee
relationship, and that the claim was timely noticed.
* Employer provided $807.69 per week for 52 weeks after
the decedent’s death. The parties agree that his average weekly
wage when injured was $928.22.
* The Defendants assert that the Claimant is not claiming
injury under the LHWCA except as it may have occurred under
the OCSLA. However, the Claimant’s former counsel believed
that jurisdiction is proper under the LHWCA and her current
counsel has not stated otherwise. See, the Declaration of Diane
Middleton in support of the Claimant’s Motion to Withdraw or
Amend. The parties argued the merits jurisdiction under both
statutes, so I accept that the Claimant seeks benefits under
either statute.
App. 55
the State of Pennsylvania, adjusted by AIG Claim
Services, Inc. (collectively referred to as the Defen-
dants) controvert these claims for federal benefits on
jurisdictional grounds.
Three motions are before me, two discovery dis-
putes and one dispositive motion for summary deci-
sion. I deny the Claimant’s motion to withdraw or
amend and the Defendants’ motion to strike, but
grant summary decision not only as a result of the
Claimant’s admissions, but also because the Decedent
was not a maritime worker and was not killed in a
location that satisfies the OCSLA’s situs requirement.
Il. Procedural Background
On February 25, 2005, the Defendants served
their requests for admissions on the Claimant, which
were due by April 1, 2005. Declaration of Michael
Thomas in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to
Claimant’s Motion to Withdraw or Amend Deemed
Admissions (Dec. Thomas). The Claimant’s attorney
obtained extensions to respond, first until April 8,
then until May 7, 2005. Jd. The hearing on this case,
initially scheduled to proceed on May 16, 2005, was
continued to October 17, 2005. Approximately one
month before the hearing, the Claimant substituted
counsel, whose request for an additional continuance
to prepare adequately was granted, and the trial
date rescheduled to April 24, 2006. Change in the
Claimant’s counsel gave rise to two additional contin-
uances, to August 28, and December 11, 2006.
App. 56
On September 27, 2006, the Defendants moved
for summary decision, arguing that the Claimant’s
failure to respond to their requests for admissions
had admitted the matters, thereby disproving cover-
age under both the LHWCA and the OSCLA. In the
alternative, the Defendants insist that there is no
dispute of material fact regarding the non-maritime
nature of the Decedent’s job duties, which disqualifies
the Claimant from receiving benefits under the
LHWCA, and that the Claimant cannot meet the
situs requirements under either statute.
On October 9, 2006, the Claimant moved to with-
draw or amend the deemed admissions, on grounds
that all of the continuances muddled the deadline for
replying, and that it would be manifestly unjust to
accept the admissions in light of the Defendants’
motion for summary decision. The Defendants op-
posed the motion to withdraw or amend and later
moved to strike the Claimant’s reply to their oppo-
sition because she had not requested leave to submit
a reply brief, that brief was untimely, and it raised
new legal arguments and evidence. I requested fur-
ther argument on the summary decision motion and
consequently removed the case from the December
11, 2006 calendar.‘
* By Order dated October 24, 2006, I directed the Claimant
to submit further argument on the Defendants’ motion for sum-
mary decision. On November 21, 2006, I granted the Defendants
leave to reply to the Claimant’s argument in opposition to sum-
mary decision and continued the trial] once again.
App. 57
It. Factual Background
The employer is a company whose primary busi-
ness includes oil exploration and extraction. Declara-
tion of Clement M. Alberts in Support of Motion for
Summary Decision (Dec. Alberts). It operates a crude
oil flocculation facility, La Conchita, in Ventura,
California. Id. Crude oil is pumped into the plant via
pipeline from two offshore platforms designated
Hogan and Houchin, which is processed and stored in
tanks temporarily before being transported away
from the plant by pipeline. Jd. The Decedent worked
as a roustabout both at La Conchita and on offshore
platform Hogan, which is located more than three
miles off the coast of California on the outer conti-
nental shelf. Jd. He accessed this platform via crew
boat from the Casitas Pass Pier, which stands about
three miles from La Conchita. Id.
At La Conchita, the Decedent performed main-
tenance and cleaning duties that included painting,
sandblasting, weed-pulling, cleaning drain culverts,
and operating a forklift. Declaration of Gordon
“Scoop” Boswell in Support of Motion for Summary
Decision (Dec. Boswell). His regular job duties on
platform Hogan involved picking up trash and empty-
ing wastebaskets, washing the decks and well bay,
assisting in repairing wellhead safety equipment,
piping projects, painting, and assisting on the pipe
deck with crane loads going on or off the platform. /d.
On rare occasions (no more than 2% of his work time)
he used a forklift at La Conchita to move scrap metal,
which had been transported by boat from the offshore
App. 58
platforms to a pier, and then by truck from the pier to
the onshore plant. Deposition of Chris Magill (Depo.
Magill)* at 31-33.
At approximately 4:00 PM on June 2, 2004, the
Decedent’s supervisor, Gordon “Scoop” Boswell, directed
him to take a forklift to the rear yard of the La
Conchita plant and clean up some debris.* Dec. Bos-
well. About an hour and fifteen minutes later, Mr.
Boswell found the Decedent next to a plantain tree
roughly ten feet off of one of the service roads within
the plant facility. Dec. Alberts. He was lying on his
back with a forklift resting on his abdomen and
chest. Jd. He was pronounced dead at 5:27 P.M. Dec.
Alberts, Exh 2.
The accident report said it appeared that the
Decedent stood on top of the raised tines of the fork-
lift to harvest a hand of fruit hanging from a plantain
tree out of reach of a person on the ground. Dec.
Alberts, Exh 2. Presumably the forklift was stopped
as he did this, but it apparently moved forward for
unknown reasons, which caused him to lose his
balance, fall in front of the forklift, and sustain fatal
injuries when it rolled over him. /d.
* This deposition is exhibit 14 in support of the Declaration
of Timothy K_ Sprinkles in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Decision.
* Although the Claimant disputes where the Decedent
worked on June 1 and 2, 2004, she takes no issue with where
and how he died.
App. 59
IV. Analysis
A. The Claimant’s Motion to Withdraw or
Amend
A party must respond in writing to a request for
admissions within thirty days after service of the
request, or each matter is deemed admitted. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 36(a); 29 C.F.R. § 18.20 (2006). On February
25, 2005, the Respondents served their requests for
admissions on the Claimant’s prior attorney, Diane
Middleton, which were due by April 1, 2005. She
requested an extension until April 8, and then again
until May 7, 2005, to which the Respondents agreed.
Dec. Thomas. On or about September 14, 2005, the
Claimant substituted Charles Naylor as counsel, who
explained in a letter to Judge Mapes that he needed
to conduct “significant research” and “appropriate
investigations” in order to properly recpend to the
discovery requests, which he acknowledged were past
due. Exh. 10 to Dec. Thomas. The Claimant also
insists that Mr. Naylor met with Defendants’ counsel,
Mr. Thomas, to tell him that he needed more time to
respond to the discovery requests, but there is no evi-
dence that Mr. Thomas agreed to extend the deadline
for the requests for admissions, only that he agreed to
a continuance. Regardless of the change in counsel
and multiple continuances, the Claimant failed to
serve her responses to the Defendants’ requests for
admissions within thirty days after service. The
Claimant is deemed to have admitted all of the
requests by operation of 29 C.F.R. § 18.20 (2006).
App. 60
After the Defendants filed their motion for sum-
mary judgment, based in part on the Claimant’s lapse
in responding to the requests for admissions, the
Claimant moved to withdraw or amend her deemed
admissions, arguing that a late response should be
permitted because the Defendants knew she needed
more time and discovery was still open. The Claimant
particularly emphasizes that she scheduled deposi-
tions for September 15, and 19, 2006; she questions
the Defendants’ intention in moving for summary
decision so quickly on the heels of these depositions
because, she contends, the Defendants should have
known that she would need those depositions [sic]
transcripts in order to make meaningful opposition to
any dispositive motion. The Claimant represents that
she still did not have the transcripts from these
depositions by October 10, 2006.
Facts admitted when a party fails to respond to a
request for admissions may serve as the basis for a
dispositive motion. Asea, Inc. v. Southern Pacific
Transportation Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1248 (9th Cir.
1981); Moosman v. Joseph P. Blitz, Inc., 358 F.2d 686
(2nd Cir. 1966). In appropriate circumstances, un-
timely replies may be permitted where the merits of
the action would otherwise be subserved, and the
party who obtained the admission cannot establish
that withdrawing or amending them will prejudice its
defense on the merits. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(b); Sonada v.
Cabrera, 255 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (allowing
withdrawal for lack of prejudice); see also, In re:
Heritage Bond Litig., 220 F_R.D. 624, 626 (C.D. Cal.
App. 61
2004) (deeming matters admitted where responses
were filed 12 days late, but explaining that a late
response should be permitted only when necessary to.
relieve a party from default by the use of the admis-
sions to obtain a summary or default judgment).
1. Merits of the Claimant’s case subserved
The merits are subserved when deemed admis-
sions “practically eliminate[s) any presentation of the
merits of the case.” Hadley v. U.S., 45 F.3d 1345, 1348
(9th Cir. 1995). The Claimant insists that it would be
manifestly unjust to allow the admissions to stand
because they establish that the Decedent’s death is
not covered by the LHWCA or OSCLA. Most of the
admissions are dispositive (all but numbers 1 and 6),
but holding the Claimant to them is not necessarily
unjust, when she had the opportunity to withdraw or
amend those admiasions for over a year. At the latest,
responses to the Defendants’ requests for admissions
were due on May 7, 2005. Without the opportunity to
withdraw or amend, however, the admissions elimi-
nate the need for presentation of the merits because
they preclude coverage under either statute. Conse-
quently, I find that the merits would be subserved if
the Claimant is relieved from the admissions. That
does not end the inquiry, however.
2. Prejudice to the Defendants
The party that obtained the admission has the
opportunity to prove how it would be prejudiced
App. 62
if withdrawal of the admissions were permitted.
Sonada, 255 F.3d at 1039. Prejudice relates to the
difficulty a party may face in proving its case. Id.; see
also Hadley, 45 F.3d at 1349 (finding no prejudice
where the moving party would have been able to en-
gage in more extensive trial preparation had the
admission been timely). The Defendants assert that
the Claimant has failed to respond not only to ad-
missions requests, but also to interrogatories and
requests for production of documents. They also argue
that some of the Claimant’s late answers to the re-
quests for admissions are unreasonable. For example,
the Defendants’ request number 5 asks the Claimant
to admit that the Decedent was not en route to a
barge, floating platform, floating island, ship, or other
vessel located on the outer continental shelf when he
was killed. This is neither vague nor ambiguous,
despite the Claimant’s objection to the contrary. The
parties’ lists of undisputed facts both explain that the
Decedent was killed by a forklift while attempting
to harvest plantains while working on shore. Defen-
dants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (DF) 29; Claim-
ant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (CF) 34. They
also agree that workers accessed the offshore plat-
forms from a pier three miles distant from the La
Conchita plant. DF 27; CF 20. It makes no sense that
the Decedent would have driven the forklift three
miles en route to this pier. Therefore, I agree that the
Claimant had enough information to admit or deny
App. 63
this request.’ This evasive response is prejudicial to
the Defendants because it is more difficult to defend
against claims when the Claimant keeps the factual
basis for them to herself. It also runs counter to the
purpose of admissions, which is to narrow the issues
for trial. See Asea, 669 F.2d at 1248.
The Defendants believe they would prevail on
summary judgment even without the deemed admis-
sions. This implies that they will suffer little preju-
dice if the Claimant were allowed to withdraw and
amend her responses. Yet the Defendants’ belief in
their success does not discount a prejudicial impact
on their ability to defend against this claim. When
the Defendants filed their motion for summary deci-
sion, the Claimant had not responded to any of their
discovery requests. She had over a year to answer the
requests for admissions, but aside from her response
to the Defendants’ request number. 6, I still cannot
tell what her answers are. The Claimant submitted
her objections and answers to the Defendants’ re-
quests for admissions as an exhibit to her motion
to withdraw or amend, but those answers themselves
do not match those listed in the text of the motion."
” The Claimant eventually admitted this request, but she
did so in an amended response filed after the Defendant submit-
ted its opposition to her motion to amend or withdraw.
* To request for admissions number 1: “The Decedent has
no other dependent under the Act than the Claimant,” the
Claimant answered, “admit,” and “admit in part, deny in part.
Number 2: “The Decedent was never present on Platform Hogan
on the date of death,” she answered “unable to admit or deny,”
(Continued on following page)
App. 64
She submitted a third, amended set of responses as
part of her reply to the Defendants’ opposition to
her motion to amend or withdraw.’ I decline to accept
this final set as the Claimant’s intended responses
because no leave had been granted to withdraw or
amend the first (and second) set of responses. The De-
fendants certainly face increased difficulty in pre-
paring their defense when the Claimant has offered
and “deny.” Number. 3: “The Decedent did not do any work on
any barges, floating platforms, floating islands, ships, or other
type of vessel located on the outer continental shelf on the date
of death,” she answered, “unable to admit or deny,” and “deny.”
Number. 4: “The Decedent was never present on any barges,
floating platforms, floating islands, ships, or other type of vessel
located on the outer continental shelf on the date of death,” she
answered, “unable to admit or deny,” and “deny.” Number. 5:
“The Decedent was not en route to a barge, floating platform,
floating island, ship, or other vessel located on the outer conti-
nental shelf when he was killed,” she answered: “unable to
admit or deny,” and “deny.” Number. 6: “The Decedent was not
scheduled to be on Platform Hogan or any other Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lands Act covered site on the date of death,” she
answered, “deny,” and “deny.” Number. 7: “The Decedent was
not scheduled to be on Platform Hogan or any other Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act covered site on the date of death,”
she answered, “deny,” and “admit in party, deny in part” Num-
ber. 8: “The Decedent is not claiming injury under §901 et seq. of
the Act except as it may have occurred under 43. U.S.C.
§ 1333%(b) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,” she an-
swered, “unable to admit or deny,” and “deny.”
* Although the federal rules require that a party supple
ment its discovery responses as different information becomes
available, the Claimant’s responses contained in her reply brief
seek to replace, rather than supplement the deemed admissions.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e). Therefore, they are not accepted as
supplemental! answers.
App. 65
three different answers to one round of requests for
admissions, without answering the rest of the De-
fendants’ discovery requests.
The Claimant asserts that the Defendants are
not prejudiced by the late responses because they
were aware of the factual issues and had complete
access to all discoverable evidence. She claims they
knew the Decedent worked 98% of his time on the
platforms, that his duties included unloading and
loading supplies and things off and onto the crew boat
he and others used to access Platform Hogan, and
that there was no record of his precise duties or
locations on the day he died. Therefore, they would
have known that the Claimant would deny at least
some of the requests for admissions. Regardless of
what the Defendants knew of the Decedent’s daily
activities, litigation remains an adversary system.
It is inappropriate to expect the Defendants to con-
cede a denial to any of their own requests for admis-
sions by anticipating the Claimant’s response. Were
that so, admission requests would lose much of their
value. It is the Claimant’s duty to answer the
requests, not the Defendants’ responsibility to anti-
cipate (or guess about) the answers.
Although it would be unreasonable to hold the
Claimant’s new counsel] to answer for all of the De-
fendants’ discovery requests shortly after accepting
the case, that was not required of him. The Claimant
waited to seek relief from the deemed admis-
sions until after the Defendants had submitted their
summary judgment motion. It does not matter that
App. 66
discovery was still ongoing or that there had been
multiple continuances.
Allowing the deemed admissions to stand is
somewhat harsh, but in this case it is appropriate in
light of the Claimant’s failure to withdraw them as
soon as she discovered that they were late. See U_S. v.
Kasuboski, 834 F.2d 1345, 1350 (7th Cir. 1987) (ex-
plaining that the harshness of maintaining deemed
admissions is tempered by the availability of the
motion to withdraw, a procedure that the admitting
party had failed to employ). Moreover, this result does
not disturb the Claimant’s entitlement to a remedy
under state law; the Defendants paid workers’ com-
pensation benefits at $807.69 per week for 52 weeks
after the Decedent’s death. Declaration of Michael
Thomas in Support of Summary Decision (Dec.
Thomas 2) Exh. 11. Therefore, I find that the Claim-
ant’s confusing, evasive, and late answers have
prejudiced the Defendants’ ability to defend against
this claim, and deny the Claimant’s motion to with-
draw and amend.
B. Defendants’ Motion toe Strike the
Claimant’s Reply Brief.
No reply to an answer, response to a reply, or ary
further responsive document, shall be filed unless the
presiding judge permits it. 29 C.F_R. § 18.6(b) (2006).
The Claimant did not request leave to file a reply. The
Defendants argue that this procedural misstep means
I should not consider the reply brief. They also argue
App. 67
that it should not be considered because the Claimant
filed it 41 days after they served their opposition”
and because it introduces new factual and legal
issues, which cannot be done in a reply. See Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 894-95
(1990) (explaining that it is improper to introduce
new facts or different legal arguments in a reply
brief).
A court must give the opposing party the oppor-
tunity to respond to a reply brief if it relies upon new
material in the brief. Beaird v. Seagate Tech. Inc., 145
F.3d 1159, 1164-65 (10th Cir. 1998). The Claimant
made the following four new arguments in her reply
that do not appear in her initial request to withdraw
or amend: 1) the responses are timely; 2) she never
refused to respond; 3) she was granted an extension
to respond to the requests for admissions by virtue of
her multiple requests to continue the trial; and 4) she
was compelled to prematurely respond to the requests
for admissions because she had not received some of
the Decedent’s timesheets or transcripts from deposi-
tions that were taken in September of 2006. The
Claimant raised these arguments because the De-
fendants asserted in opposition that her answers
were untimely and failed to explain why she had not
responded earlier.
Generally, responses to motions and replies are due with-
in ten days after the initial motion or opposition was served.
29 C_F.R. § 18.6(b) (2006).
App. 68
Denying the Claimant the opportunity to counter
the Defendants’ opposition brief, especially in light of
the pending summary decision motion, would inter-
fere with the Claimant’s right to address important
defense arguments. See El Pollo Loco, Inc. v. Hashim,
316 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it
entertained an argument raised for the first time in
the reply brief). Therefore, the Claimant’s peccadillo
of failing to request leave before submitting a reply is
excused.
The Defendants addressed the Claimant’s fourth
argument in their motion to strike, explaining that
591 days had passed between the service of the
requests for admissions and the Claimant’s motion to
withdraw or amend. Even with two extensions to
respond granted to the Claimant’s prior attorney,
these admissions were late as of May 8, 2005. A party
rarely has access to all discovery before it answers
requests for admissions. That is precisely why the
federal rules provide an option to respond “unable to
admit or deny,” while they also impose a duty to
supplement discovery responses. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
2&e), 36(a\4). The Claimant attempted to answer the
requests for admissions much too late. Therefore,
I agree with the Defendants that the Claimant was
not compelled to respond prematurely.
None of the Claimant’s other arguments alter the
fact that her responses to the requests for admissions
were well over a year late. Neither the change in
counsel nor the requests for continuance has any
App. 69
affect on the timeliness of the responses. None of the
exhibits attached to the Claimant’s reply brief show
that the parties agreed to restart the clock on the
requests for admissions. They show only that the
Claimant’s new counsel was aware that he would
need more time to complete discovery and prepare for
the hearing. There was no motion to withdraw until
October 9, 2006, nearly one month after the Claim-
ant’s new counsel acknowledged that responses to
discovery were late. The Claimant has not argued
that she qualifies for equitable tolling. That she never
“refused” to respond does not count as a timely re-
sponse, and there is no evidence that an extension to
respond to the requests for admissions, except for the
first two extending the deadline to May 7, 2005, was
requested. Indeed, it would have done no good to
request one after this deadline had passed, when the
remedy for late responses is to request to withdraw or
amend the admissions made by operation of law.
Therefore, I deny the Defendants’ motion to strike,
but allow the deemed admissions to stand because
the arguments in the Claimant’s reply brief do not
persuade me to alter that result.
C. Legal Standard for Granting Sum-
mary Judgment
A summary decision may be entered if the plead-
ings, affidavits, and other evidence show that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to prevail as a watter of law. 29
C.F.R. § 18.40(d); Friday v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
App. 70
2005 WL 1827745 *2, ARB no. 03-132, ALJ No. 2003
AIR 19 (July 29, 2005) (citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)). The rule on
summary decisions mirrors Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Mehen v. Delta Air Lines,
Case No. 03-070 (ARB Feb. 24, 2005).
The proof must be grounded in affidavits, decla-
rations, and answers to discovery from the complain-
ant and (or) other witnesses. 29 C.F.R. § 18.40(d)
(2006). Affidavits must be made on personal know!-
edge, setting forth facts that would be admissible in
evidence and show affirmatively that the witness is
competent to testify to the matters stated. 29 C.F.R.
§ 18.40(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The judge weighs
none of this evidence, and indulges reasonable infer-
ences in the claimant’s favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986).
The burden first is on the moving party to ex-
plain why there is no genuine issue of material fact
for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (finding
no genuine issue for trial when the record as a whole
could not lead a trier of fact to find for the non-
moving party). Once this burden has been met, the
“adverse party must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 250. The non-moving party cannot rest upon
“mere allegations, speculation, or denials of the
moving party’s pleadings, but must set forth specific
facts on each issue upon which he would bear the
App. 71
ultimate burden of proof.” Jd. at 256. If the non-
moving party fails to establish an element essential
to his case, there can be “no genuine issue as to any
material fact since a complete failure of proof con-
cerning an essential element of the non-moving
party's case necessarily renders all other facts im-
material.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
The Defendants argue that the Claimant’s ad-
missions establish that the Decedent is not covered
by either the LHWCA or the OCSLA because he was
not a maritime employee and was not working on an
outer continental shelf when he died. Moreover, they
insist that even if the Claimant had denied the re-
quests for admissions, she cannot show by sufficient
evidence that the Decedent’s death is covered by
either statute. The Claimant counters that the Dece-
dent loaded and unloaded su;,lies onto a crew boat,
which should qualify as maritime work. She contends
that he spent a majority of his time on platform
Hogan, and therefore his death on an onshore loca-
tion that served the offshore oil drilling business
should be covered under the OCSLA. She also attacks
the Defendants’ motion as procedurally defective, but
I find this last argument unpersuasive.
Although the deemed admissions are enough to
find in the Defendants’ favor, in the alternative it is
undisputed that the Defendants conducted an off-
shore drilling business. Offshore drilling and any task
essential to it is not maritime employment for pur-
poses of the LHWCA. Herb’s Welding, Inc., v. Gray,
470 U.S. 414, 422 (1985). Therefore, unloading and
App. 72
loading a supply boat intended to support the offshore
drilling business does not qualify as maritime em-
ployment. Likewise, the undisputed location of the
Decedent’s death does not satisfy the narrow situs
requirement of the OCSLA. Consequently, the Claim-
ant cannot establish coverage, an essential element to
her case. There is no genuine issue of material fact
that could overcome the Defendants’ motion for sum-
mary decision.
1. Technical Defects of Motion
The Claimant argues that the summary decision
motion fails to comply with 29 C.F_.R. § 18.6(a) and
(b), which require that applications for an order must
be made by motion and all parties must have a
reasonable opportunity to state an objection, and that
an answer in opposition to a motion is due within 10
days after the motion is served. The Claimant’s coun-
sel argues that he could not prepare a meaningful
answer to the Defendants’ summary decision motion
before deposition transcripts became available.
Whether the Claimant had all of the evidence sought
in her possession has nothing to do with these re-
quirements. Moreover, these depositions were con-
ducted by the Claimant’s counsel. If he had wanted
expedited transcripts then he could have asked for
them, and if he needed an extension to respond to
this motion for summary decision then he could have
made this request before the answer was due. The
Defendants filed a motion for summary decision, to
App. 73
which the Claimant had a reasonable opportunity to
answer. Therefore, the Defendants satisfied the regu-
lations.
The Claimant also alleges that the motion is
deficient under 29 C.F.R. §18.7(a), (bX2), and (b)\7).
Section 7(a) and b(2) state that an administrative law
judge may order a party to file a pre-hearing state-
ment, which includes stipulated facts and a state-
ment that the parties have conferred in attempt to
reach stipulation. This places no restrictions on when
a motion for summary decision may be filed, so the
Defendants’ motion is not deficient on that basis.
Section 7(b\7) requires that the parties give suggest-
ed hearing times and locations for the presentation of
their cases. Again, this is inapplicable to a motion for
summary decision, for which no hearing is required.
See 29 C.F.R. § 18.6(c) (No oral argument will be
heard on motions unless the administrative law judge
otherwise directs.) Therefore, I find that the motion
for summary decision is proper.
2. Deemed Admissions form a proper basis
for summ ision
Any matter admitted is conclusively established
unless the court permits withdrawal or amendment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b); 29 C.F_R. § 18.20(e). Admissions
made under Rule 36, even default admissions, can
serve as the factual predicate for summary judgment.
Kasuboski, 834 F.2d at 1350; see also In re Carney,
258 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that
App. 74
failure to timely respond to requests for admission
can prevent a party from contesting the merits of the
case); Kathryn Cook v. Allstate Ins. Co., 337
F. Supp.2d 1206 (C.D. CA 2004). Here, the Defend-
ants moved for summary judgment prior to the
Claimant’s motion to withdraw or amend the deemed
admissions. Where there has been no previous motion
to withdraw or amend deemed admissions, a party
may not oppose summary judgment by revisiting
issues determined by the deemed admissions. Tilila-
mook Country Smoker, Inc. v. Tillamook County
Creamery Association, 333 F. Supp.2d 975, 984 (D. Or.
2004). The deemed admissions will stand because to
allow the Claimant to withdraw or amend them
would prejudice the Defendants. The Claimant may
not claim coverage under the LHWCA or the OSCLA
because the admissions establish that the Decedent
was not a maritime worker and his death did not
occur on an outer continental shelf. Therefore, it is
proper to grant summary decision based on the
Claimant’s admissions.
3. Coverage under the LHWCA
The Longshore Act provides compensation to
certain employees engaged in maritime employment
for occupational diseases or unintentional work-
related injuries, irrespective of fault, occurring on the
navigable waterways of the United States or certain
adjoining areas, resulting in disability. See 33
U.S.C.A. §§ 901, et seq. To be eligible for compensa-
tion, a person must be an employee (status) as
App. 75
defined by § 902(3) who sustains injury in a place
(situs) defined by § 903(a). PC. Pfieffer Co., Inc., v.
Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 74 (1979). For a claim to succeed
both the situs and status requirements must be
satisfied. Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. at 415-16; Brady-
Hamilton Stevedore Co., v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 140
(9th Cir. 1978).
a. Status
To qualify for benefits under the LHWCA a
worker must engage in maritime employment. 33
U.S.C.A. § 903 (West 2007). Maritime employment
requires that workers spend “at least some of their
time in indisputably longshoring operations.” North-
east Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249
(1977). Any worker who moves cargo between ship
and land transportation qualifies as a maritime
employee. P.-C. Pfeiffer, 444 U.S. at 82-84 (covering
workers who did tasks “traditionally” performed by
longshoremen); Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. v. Schwalb,
493 U.S. 40, 45 (1989) (explaining it is “clearly decid-
ed that, aside from the specified occupations, land-
based activity occurring within the § 903 situs will be
deemed maritime only if it is an integral or essential
part of loading or unloading a vessel”). Rather than
focus on the particular task at the time of injury, a
worker’s status turns on the nature of work that he or
she may be assigned to do. PC. Pfeiffer, 444 U.S. at
81-82; see also Schwabenland v. Sanger Boats, 683
F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that inspection,
testing of new models, and occasional maintenance of
App. 76
recreational small boats is sufficiently related to the
construction of the vessels to constitute maritime
employment, even though these duties were not a
substantial portion of the employee’s overall working
time).
The Claimant insists that the Decedent was a
maritime employee because “a few times” he assisted
the platform crane operators by putting supplies into
baskets to be loaded onto the crew boat."’ Deposition
of Jose Rosales (Depo. Rosales) at 20-21. This crew
boat is used to take personnel to and from platforms
to the shore, and also for delivering supplies, pipe, or
equipment to and from the platforms. Deposition of
Gordon “Scoop” Boswell” (Depo. Boswell) at 27. Mr.
Boswell did not know whether the Decedent ever put
supplies on the crew boat, but he admitted that it was
possible. Jd. at 29.
At La Conchita, he operated a forklift, loaded and
unloaded trucks, moved, staged and marshaled worn
out equipment, valves, and other scrap metal. Depo.
Magill at 30-31. The Claimant argues that the Dece-
dent was performing maritime duties at the time of
" Jose Rosales, a coworker, testified that the Decedent
brought materials to the pier once a week, but he did not put
them on the crew boat. Depo. Rosales at 17-18. Mr. Rosales’s
deposition appears as Exh 15 in support of the Declaration of
Timothy K. Sprinkles (Dec. Sprinkles) in Opposition to Motion
for Summary Decision.
" This deposition appears as Exh. 2 in support of Dec.
Sprinkles.
App. 77
his death because he was operating a forklift while
engaged in the “intermediate steps” of moving scrap
metal between the Defendants’ ship and scrap metal
dealers. See id. at 33. At the time he died, however, he
was harvesting plantains, not moving scrap metal.
The Defendants assert that whatever material
the Decedent might have moved onto or off of a crew
boat was incidental to the offshore drilling business,
rather than linked to longshore work. His primary
duties on the platforms, they say, involved mainte-
nance, painting, cleaning oil spills, fixing leaks and
repairing valves. Although they agree that the Dece-
dent spent approximately 5% of his time loading and
unloading supplies onto and off of the crew boat, they
emphasize that the Casitas Pass Pier is owned by a
different company, Venoco Oil Company. Depo. Magill
at 13. The Venoco pier operators would crane-lift
scrap and equipment from the crew boat, onto a
truck.” Jd. at 32.
Chris Magill, one of the Decedent’s former super-
visors, testified that the crew boat made two trips
daily to the platforms, carrying cargo, equipment,
tools, and parts, and that Venoco has two crew mem-
bers that do all the loading and off-loading of equip-
ment. Depo. Magill at 14, 44. He said that when pipe
and equipment came from other vendors, the “guys
that operate the pier” would do all the unloading,
“ This deposition appears as Exh 14 in support of Dec
Sprinkles.
App. 78
staging, and loading onto the boat. /d. at 21. “A few
times” the Decedent might have assisted in chocking
a load of pipe which was to be loaded onto the crew
boat at the pier by the Venoco crew. /d. at 20. It was
not the Decedent’s normal job to assist in rigging pipe
out on the platforms; he did it only once a month. Id.
at 20-21. There was a rigging crew assisted by the
Venoco boat crew that handled most the cargo. Id. at
44.
Where loading and unloading of equipment is
incidental to an employee’s primary role in support of
oil and gas production, he does not qualify for cover-
age under the LHWCA. See Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S.
at 423 (explaining that the Claimant’s primary weld-
ing work was far removed from traditional LHWCA
activities, notwithstanding the fact that he unloaded
his own gear upon arriving at the platform by boat);
Munguia v. Director O.W.C.P., 999 F.2d 808, 812-13
(5th Cir. 1993) (holding that a roustabout/relief
pumper-gauger lacked maritime status under the
LHWCA, because he loaded and unloaded twols and
supplies for the non-maritime purpose of servicing
fixed platforms); Alexander v. Hudson Engineering
Co, 18 BRBS 78 (1986) (finding no longshore status
where onshore loading duties were incidental to the
claimant’s primary role as an electrician in the fabri-
cation and outfitting of fixed offshore oil production
facilities). But cf., Maher v. Director, O.W.C.P,, 330
F.3d 162, 167 (3rd Cir. 2003) (establishing status
under the LHWCA where the employee worked 50%
App. 79
of his time as a checker directly involved in loading
and unloading functions).
It is immaterial whether the Decedent or
Venoco’s crew members loaded or unloaded scrap
metal on and off of the crew boat. Even assuming that
the Decedent occasionally performed this task does
not amount to substantial evidence that he worked in
maritime employment because the Defendants con-
duct an oil exploration and extraction business. There
is no evidence his duties were for any purpose other
than to support this non-maritime operation. What-
ever loading and unloading the Decedent did was
incidental to his primary role as a roustabout on the
offshore platforms and the La Conchita site. See
McGray v. Director, O.W.C.P, 181 F.3d 1008, 1015
(9th Cir. 1999) (“So in the statutory context, the
phrase ‘engaged in maritime employment’ means that
an employer hired the individual to perform maritime
work in this particular contract of employment.”).
Likewise, there is no evidence that the scrap metal
that the Decedent marshaled around La Conchita
was for the purpose of maritime commerce of any
kind, especially because of the nature of the Defend-
ants’ oil operation. See Cappelluti v. Sea-Land Ser-
vice, Inc., 10 BRBS 1024 (BRB) (1979) (concluding
that the claimant did not engage in maritime em-
ployment where he cut up damaged containers that
were set aside for salvage and no longer involved in
maritime commerce); Scala v. Island City Iron and
Supply, Inc.,.9 BRBS 6000 (BRB) (1979) (finding no
maritime employment where employee cut up rusty
App. 80
iron from the dry dock for his employer in the scrap
metal business). The Claimant provides no proof to
support that the Decedent used a forklift to move
scrap metal off of the supply boat; instead, the evi-
dence shows that he used it to move scrap that had
already been transported from the pier to the plant.
This is not enough to connect him to maritime em-
ployment. Therefore, the Claimant cannot satisfy the
status requirement based on the Decedent’s primary
duties, which supported an oil and gas exploration
business.
The Claimant nonetheless insists that the Dece-
dent should be covered by the LHWCA because the
Defendants qualify as a maritime employer. A mari-
time employer is one whose employees conduct mari-
time employment. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(4) (West 2007).
The work must be done “upon the navigable waters of
the United States, including any adjoining pier,
wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine
railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by
an employer in loading, unloading, repairing or
building a vessel.” Jd. The Claimant argues that the
Employer is a maritime employer within the meaning
of the LHWCA because it has an onshore facility and
storage yard located 250-300 feet from the Pacific
Ocean, and because workers took a boat twice daily
from the Casitas Pass Pier to the offshore platforms.
CF 19-21.
Viewing the evidence in light most favorable to
the Claimant, it does not suggest that the Decedent
worked for a maritime employer. An employer’s
App. 81
operations on offshore drilling platforms do not call
for loading, unloading, repairing or building a vessel;
rather, a pipeline serves as the relevant conduit
between the platform and the shore. The operations
at La Conchita did not involve loading or unloading
onto or off of a marine vessel, ship repair or breaking.
Dec. Alberts.
Moreover, the Claimant argues, “[b]Jut for the
Defendant’s OCS oil and gas exploration, develop-
ment, extraction, and transmission business, Defend-
ant would not have owned and operated the La
Conchita facility and storage yard.” Claimant’s Oppo-
sition at p. 37. If La Conchita existed because of oil
and gas business, then the Supreme Court instructs
that it is not maritime. See Herb’s Welding, 470 U/S.
at 422. In Herb’s Welding, the Court explained that
drilling platforms were “not even suggestive of tradi-
tional maritime affairs” and that “[t]he history of the
Lands Act at the very least forecloses the ... holding
that offshore drilling is a maritime activity and that
any task essential thereto is maritime employment
for LHWCA purposes.” Jd. By linking La Conchita
inextricably to oil and gas exploration, development,
extraction, and transmission, the Claimant defeats
her own argument that the Decedent performed
maritime work for a maritime employer.
Consequently, I find that the Claimant failed to
establish that either the Decedent was a maritime
employee, or the Defendants maritime employers.
Therefore, there is no genuine issue as to any materi-
al fact concerning status under the LHWCA.
App. 82
b. Situs
In order to satisfy the situs test, the Decedent's
death must have occurred upon the navigable waters
of the United States, which is defined under the
LHWCA te include any “adjoining area customarily
used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing,
or building a vessel” 33 US.CA §903(a). See
McGray, 181 F.3d at 1010 (expanding situs to include
a pier that was not used to dock ships). Employees
who are on the situs but not engaged in the overall
process of loading or unJoading vessels are not cov-
ered. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 267. Here, the Claimant did
not establish that the Decedent engaged in maritime
employment. Consequently, the site of his injury has
no bearing on the question of coverage.
Even if he were a maritime worker, the Claimant
would have to show by substantial evidence that La
Conchita qualifies as an adjoining area customarily
used to load and unload a vessel. Caputo, 432 U.S.
263-64. Coverage under Section 3(a) is determined by
the nature of the place of work at the moment of
injury. Griffin v. McLean Contracting Co., 30 BRBS
221 (ALJ) (1996). To determine whether a site is an
“adjoining area,” the Ninth Circuit“ considers the
following factors: 1) the particular suitability of the
“ The Claimant argues that the circuit courts are split on
how to define an adjoining area under the LHWCA. While the
Third and Fifth Circuits analyze this issue slightly differently
than the Ninth Circuit, their decisions have no bearing on this
case, for binding Ninth Circuit precedent exists.
App. 83
site for maritime use; 2) whether adjoining properties
are devoted primarily to maritime commerce; 3) the
proximity of the site to the waterway; and 4) whether
the site is as close to the waterway as is feasible
given all the circumstances in the case. Brady-
Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 141
(9th Cir. 1978).
Here, La Conchita is not particularly suited for
maritime use because it is not over or contiguous with
any body of water and does not possess any area to
unload materials from a dock, barge, floating plat-
form or island, ship or other type of vessel. Dec.
Alberts. It does not possess any adjoining pier, or any
other area used for loading, unloading, repairing,
dismantling, or building of any vessel. Jd. Therefore,
the first factor weighs against finding that La
Conchita qualifies as a proper situs under the
LHWCA
There are no businesses engaged in shipping
operations or other maritime activities within at least
a one-mile radius of the La Conchita plant. Dec.
Alberts. The Casitas Pass Pier is three miles away,
but the Claimant provides no evidence that boats
other than the crew boat used to ferry back and forth
to the platforms use it. Consequently, this second
factor also weighs against the Claimant.
The Claimant argues that the proximity of the
plant to the ocean — 250-300 feet — lends itself to
maritime employment. Nonetheless, it is undisputed
that La Conchita is separated from the Pacific Ocean
App. 84
by railroad tracks, a highway and a beach. DF 32.
The plant processes oil delivered from the ground
under the platforms via pipeline, not boat. Therefore,
the proximity to the ocean is conducive to oil explora-
tion and extraction, but not loading or unloading
vessels, ship building or breaking because there is no
way to cross from the plant to the ocean without
dodging trains and highway traffic. Therefore, factors
three and four tip in favor of the Defendants and I
find that the Claimant cannot show by substantial
evidence that La Conchita is an adjoining area under
the LHWCA.
c. Missing Time Sheets
Although neither party disputes the location of
the Decedent’s death, the Claimant protests that it is
uncertain whether the Decedent was scheduled to
work at
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